In 2018, the British public was shocked to learn that its cherished aid agency Oxfam was mired by a sex scandal which involved its own workers in Haiti, which were essentially using their power to rape women, or at the very best forcefully exchanging sex with food and medicine. 

But should we really have been so shocked?

Indeed, in the world of international aid it is commonly known that western aid workers often carry out such practices. But how do they escape prosecution or any accountability?

Given that the UN conducted a report of its own staff in January of this year and concluded that a third of all those interviewed reported some form of sexual harassment with ten percent reporting actually being touched inappropriately, is it not unreasonable to assume that it is the UN itself which is setting the ‘example’ to aid workers in the field?

Guterres himself was quoted by the London Guardian in January wanting to make a stand. “As an organization founded on equality, dignity and human rights, we must lead by example and set the standard,” he said. But under his administration, the UN might foster a reputation of being the champion of both sexual harassment in the office but also a compliant offender in covering it up.

According to the Guardian, “The UN has tried to increase transparency and strengthen how it deals with such accusations over the past few years after a string of sexual exploitation and abuse accusations against UN peacekeepers in Africa”.

But is that really true?

The head of the UN agency for HIV and Aids Michel Sidibe stepped down in June, six months before his term ends, after an independent panel said that his “defective leadership” tolerated “a culture of harassment, including sexual harassment, bullying, and abuse of power.” His deputy, along with the Geneva-based agency’s head of the Nigeria mission also followed suite.

What these three individuals all have in common is not only were they incriminated in “a culture of harassment, including sexual harassment, bullying, and abuse of power”, but they are all likely of African origin.

Why is that relevant? Simply, because what we are witnessing now in the UN headquarters in New York doesn’t correspond with the clean up of UNAIDS and its scandal, which was called a “boys own” club. By contrast, the UN under Guterres seems to be blocking an investigations against white officials.

Western Sahara peace deal

Given that Sidibe, who became Mali’s health minister, wasn’t actually accused of any sexual misconduct himself, rather than covering up for a colleague, it is extraordinary now that Guterres won’t throw his weight behind an equally zealous campaign to investigate allegations against Canadian Colin Stewart, who is believed just about to have his contract as MINURSO boss extended in Western Sahara.

Unlike Sidibe, Stewart has very real allegations for his conduct in his previous post in Adis Ababa from both colleagues in New York and in the Ethiopian capital, according to an anti corruption website in New York, whose founder has just been banned from the UN headquarters for exposing the rank hypocrisy of Guterres.

Stewart is expected to continue in his role of MINURSO which is in Western Sahara, a disputed region bordering Morocco which took it over, when Spain abandoned it in 1975. Currently in the UN, a proposal for Western Sahara to gain partial independence from Rabat is being mulled by the security council and so it beggars belief that during such a delicate and tumultuous period, with so much riding on the peace deal, that Guterres would risk such a move, to support a friend and colleague.

Corruption seems to be a real problem in the UN. Cover ups seem to be more and more being reported at all levels from an institution which seems hell bent on not making itself accountable. Patrick Henningsen, editor of 21st Century Wire, who has seen the UN’s operations around the world with his own eyes, says it’s a cultural problem.

“It’s not surprising to see the UN would drag their heels an issue like sexual misconduct with their sordid record of covering-up sexual abuse and human trafficking in places like Bosnia, Haiti, Sudan and the Congo, and who knows where else” he says. “Clearly, there is a culture of corruption running through the wider institution.”

But with sexual harassment and the opportunities for cover ups that it creates, it’s hard to imagine how, in this day and age of social media and on line campaigns like “Me too” that such a calamity could remain. Putting aside how Stewart’s appointment as a UN chief where he could be compromised by blackmail for any sexual impropriety in his capacity as MUNURSO boss, let alone how a scandal could effect his ability to run the Western Sahara mission, there are other more important factors which we should consider.

Who really, genuinely cares about sexual harassment?

There are those who go as far to say that peace in a given country can be threatened by how you treat the women there. Lina Abirafeh, a women’s rights campaigner working with the Lebanese American University in Beirut claims she has also been the victim of sexual harassment and understands how in Haiti (with the Oxfam scandal) and in African with UNAIDS revelations that it remains perennial.

“There’s a humanitarian “culture” rampant with toxic masculinity. Boys will be boys and “locker room talk” attitudes are pervasive. Such attitudes easily lead to a sense of entitlement – and an abuse of power” she says.

“Funding to prevent sexual exploitation always fell short. And cases were often not addressed – unless there was reputational risk to the organization. Convoluted “internal processes” did not result in concrete action. Whistleblowers continue to be silenced, threatened, fired. If people aren’t speaking up, it is because we did not provide them with the means to do so” she adds.

Speaking specifically about the UN problem, Abirafeh spells out how a problem like the UNAIDS sex scandal came about and took so long to be tackled and gives a clue as to what’s slowing down the same process in New York and why, perhaps, the MUNIRSO boss is avoiding a full investigation.

“There’s a disturbing trend here: More and more senior officials of NGOs and UN agencies are implicated. But… they’re being put on fully-paid suspension, thanked for their years of service, and given a dignified exit.

“And the UN’s response to these increasing cases of sexual harassment? Our usual recipe is a study and a task force!”

And yet, in Stewart’s case, he is neither facing a dignified exit nor suspension, which raises the question whether there is a racist element in the somnolent, but visible crackdown on those involved with sex scandals. Are only African officials being targeted?

Racism is a factor and even an element of corruption in itself. Who gets chosen to be protected against investigation for sexual harassment over those who do, is a real factor which not only makes the UN chief even more powerful, but encourages corruption and sexual impropriety? If Stewart gets a get-out-of-jail card and is not investigated for the allegations which stand against him, then what message does that send to other British, Canadian, American and any European official who can’t control his hands in the office?

Common currency: sex and blackmail

What is clear is that big members like the U.S., Britain and France don’t really care about corruption within the UN and certainly not sexual harassment, regardless of the implications in poorer countries in the world. The author contacted three British Lib Dem MEPs in the European parliament but none of them – not even the one who recently became chair of a human rights committee – could be even bothered to respond to any questions. It’s as though even those who do not practice it or support it, know that it’s the essential currency of big international organizations, along with blackmail, and so prefer to keep quiet as at some point, will be effected by it. It’s not the sexual harassment itself. It’s the blackmail or preferential treatment to waiver prosecution which comes with it. 

In reality very few people actually care about sexual harassment at the UN or anywhere, which is one of the reasons it is rampant in the UN, whose members refuse point blank to hold it to account. Even Transparency International’s media operation couldn’t find one official in its vast international network to even make a comment about it. 

And so, consequently, although Guterres has a massive corruption problem in the UN with sexual harassment at the core of it. And even his own account comes into question for any journalist who wishes to probe deeper. A Lisbon based organization which paid him in 2016 – but which the editor of Inner City Press claims he didn’t declare as earnings – is being linked to Patrick Ho, the Hong Kong businessman politico who is in jail now for bribing UN officials. Questions over a proposed deal by the Lisbon organization’s sale of an energy utility to a Chinese firm in 2018 are a dark cloud hanging over the UN chief who, appears at least, to have broken the mould on corruption, compared to Ki Moon and Anan before him. Let’s make no mistake. “Me Too” might have arrived at the UNs headquarters but like the journalist who has been banned from reporting on graft there, has been left standing in the rain. It may be knocking, but no one is answering. This is Guterres’s legacy in the making only two and half years into his term. It’s sexual harassment. At the UN. Who cares?

Within a few decades, the political stability in Turkey ensured economic modernization in a sustainable manner. There is no doubt that this is a widely accepted truth and a reason behind Turkey becoming a member of the G-20. Turkey wants to play big and become a global political player in the coming decades. Pertaining to this strong political will, the country now thinks about how to expand its economic activities by upgrading its currently established conventional trade and investment environments.

Successful developmental models in the Asia-Pacific

Though the current global economic stagnation has caused some significant obstacles for sustainable development in recent times, it is undeniable that the East and Southeast Asia are still considered as engines for global production and consumption processes.

In fact, these regions are also part of a larger geographical setting, namely, the Asia-Pacific region, which has significant future prospects. Some circles even express a greater vision of the connectivity of the region by including India as well.

Such aspirations were observed in the latest ASEAN summit in Bangkok in June this year. Though there is a political aspiration inherent in this view, nobody can deny India’s status as an emerging economic power house, which will be giving a new shape to current relationships.

An analytical approach to the developments in the last half century would indicate that the positioning of Asia-Pacific as a regional establishment in terms of economic modernization is not a new phenomenon. The Asia-Pacific region has been increasingly playing a crucial role for the progress of the global economy. And beyond this, the region has been quite successfully reconstructed considering 21st century globalization.

The early signs of this development were seen in the role of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the initiation of the reconstruction of the U.S. in the early 1970s. Today, all major and minor actors in the global setting undeniably agree that the power house called China is determinant in not only regional, but also global economic progress.

Lost opportunities and new occasions

In retrospective analysis, Turkey is seen to have been busy and stuck in domestic issues pertaining to political rivalry among ideologically divided parties. As a result, we should honestly say that it has been missing the opportunity to focus accordingly on the Asian developmental perspective for a while.

While this latter issue is still relevant in the context of the rapid progress of the Asia-Pacific, Turkey should have a bold vision to expand and improve its economic capacity through various fronts. But as a first condition, it is a must to overcome the issue of geographical distance, which is a repeated argument by concerned parties that see it as an obstacle. Ending this distance, which constitutes a psychological barrier as well as a source of contention in front of business initiations, should definitely be a priority.

To expand into the Asia-Pacific economically, Turkey must first overcome the issues of geographical distance and psychological barriers.

The strong regional improvement of the Asia-Pacific has been observed in the last half century. Major analysts in the West have been arguing why Western business circles should strongly reposition themselves towards this region in various fields pertaining to economic development, international finance and investment environment, reaching towards and dominating the newly emerging markets in the Asia-Pacific.

With regard to this grand picture of global tendencies, one can assert that Turkey should not be left behind and should focus on becoming a partner and play-maker with significant long-term planning. For that purpose, policy makers, business associations, and to some extent some socio-cultural organizations in Turkey must have innovative and concerted efforts towards such policies.

Pertaining to this vision, there are some important conditions that should be taken into consideration in order to improve bilateral relationships with the member countries of regional associations, no matter how small or big they are. It would be quite a reasonable action, since the prospects of the region are still relevant for long term development.

Need for modelling on strong partnership

As the issues matter for Turkey’s national development, collaboration with some states such as the ASEAN states which can be said to have similarities in some perspectives and have already proved economic activities in the region is very crucial.

In this angle, the Federation of Malaysia, among the member countries of the ASEAN is a strong candidate for a beneficial partnership in various fields for both public and private sectors.

Without being trapped in some misunderstood historical issues or manipulations, as done by certain groups in recent decades, the Turkish government should consider restructuring its relations with Malaysia. Close partnership among the business interests from both countries will ensure stability and encourage in expanding to economically less developed countries through both investment and export activities.

And this process must be, as required, based on the basis of high-level coordinated efforts with the participation of relevant parties from public and private sectors, without alienating the professional contributions of the higher education institutions. The latter seems to have already initiated some valuable insights on the regional countries and societies, though there are still many more areas to be covered accordingly.

Turkish business circles must have an aggressive approach to comprehend why the Asia-Pacific region has been constantly progressing and why they themselves must have multi-level partnerships with regional actors.

Turkish authorities should have a new geo-political narrative considering high-level calculation mindful of prospective geographical settings.

In this context, relevant business circles which are capable in business areas such as textile and apparel business, fishery, food processing, animal farming, maritime, mining, oil and gas industry, which are considered as labor-intensive, can find quite fruitful opportunities to expand and sustain their business agenda for mid and long-term prospects.

I remember that almost a decade ago, an international consortium was going to be established in order to have a search and drilling process in north-west of Indonesia. Though there was an attempt to get an initiation for this quite fruitful investment, the representatives of the Turkish government in the region did not support it in any way, rather arguing that Turkish companies had no experience in this particular business.

What was quite interesting was that one of the member countries which ultimately took part in this consortium was Malaysia. No one can negate the professionality and experience of the Malaysian petroleum companies and sub-sectors which support the whole process of production till the marketing stage. Someone can attest similar lost opportunities in the recent past in various fields of investment in the sub-regions of the Asia-Pacific area owing to the misunderstanding of the situations in the region.

What makes Malaysia an important country is that it is the biggest trade partner of China in the ASEAN, and this relationship has not been hampered due to ideological differences.

It is obvious that the Malaysian state-based companies and private sector in distinct fields have aggressively attempted to increase the amount of bilateral commercial interaction with China. In addition, both countries look for expanding their investment opportunities. The recent dispute pertaining to a huge investment of China in the Eastern coastal area of the Malay Peninsula should not cause any misunderstanding about the direction of bilateral relations. 

According to the above-mentioned ideas, Turkish authorities should have a new geo-political narrative considering high-level calculation mindful of prospective geographical settings.

It would be helpful for the relevant agencies in the case that investment departments of the relevant corporations have an open policy towards Southeast Asia in order to attain a strong profitable position in the coming future.

The Sudanese massacre of the general command that took place on June 3 was followed by a massive series of global condemnations against the Sudanese Transitional Military Council (TMC) that promised to relinquish power to civilians within two years – a proposal that was rejected by protestors. The sit-in break up came after months of mass demonstrations and protests called for the departure of the TMC as well as the formation of a civil government.

The TMC, which was running the country at the time, was responsible for the worst bout of violence since Al-Bashir was ousted as president in April. The massacre resulted in the death of over 100 people, and hundreds of people were wounded. Bodies of the protestors were said to be disposed in the Nile near the site of the protest sit-in.

After severe pressure from the international community against TMC and the continuing protests, the talks between civilians and the junta resulted in the formation of a joint provisional government including both civilians and military soldiers. However, on May 3, the seven-member-TMC headed by General Abdel Fattah Burhan rejected a civilian majority in the council. This led to the failure of the talks.

On May 7, both the United Nations and the African Union declared their backup for a civilian-led transitional government in Sudan. They also described the rule of the TMC as unacceptable, but added that the military could be part of the civilian government. The African Union initially gave the TMC a 15-day period to leave power. This was later extended to 60 days.

On May 14, the TMC had agreed with the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) declaration that the transition period for Sudan will last for 3 years. This decision came after a long time within which the TMC insisted for determining a maximum of a two-year transition period. The opposition alliance wanted a four-year period. However, on May 15, instead of achieving an agreement over the formation of a new body to cover the country within the transitional period, the TMC suspended talks with the opposition alliance for 72 hours.

On May 16, the British ambassador, Irfan Siddiq asked the junta to resume talks with the Sudanese protest leaders.

On May 19, the talks resumed but due to the failure of both sides to reach a deal, the talks stalled and the protest umbrella group called for a protest calling for a civilian majority council to govern the country. The reason why these clashes occurred is because both sides wanted to have a majority of the council to rule the country throughout the transitional period.

Between 24 and 26 of May, leaders of Sudan’s Military council visited the 3 meddler countries in Sudanese affairs – Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The visit was met by mass protests in Sudan, which were dispersed by Sudan’s Rabid Forces.

On May 28, the opposition had called for a two-day protest to put pressure on the TMC to hand over power to a civilian government. The strike came after claims made by the military council, which accused protest leaders of not wanting to share power.

On May 31, the TMC threatened to take action against the protest camp, which it sees as a threat to Sudan’s national security.

The UK ambassador to Sudan condemned the violence and called for the resumption of transition talks among the two parties toward a civilian government in the sake of reaching stability in the country.

On June 3, the visit took place almost a week before more violence occurred against peaceful protestors. The massacre was met by severe condemnations and convictions from so many countries around the world. The incident also led to the suspension of talks by the military.

On June 4, right after the massacre, the military council cancelled all reached agreements with civilians and called for holding elections within 9 months – a proposal that was refused by the Sudanese opposition coalition leaders. Sudan’s Transitional Military Council said on the same day that it cancelled all previous agreements with the main opposition coalition and called for snap elections following deadly violence in the capital Khartoum after security forces moved to disperse the main protest camp outside the defense ministry.

The Declaration for Change and Freedom is considered as the umbrella body for Sudanese protests and has announced that no talks will take place without the presence of a third party, as they declared that they lost confidence in the Council on June 15. They also announced that they had informed the Ethiopian prime minister their unwillingness to resume any talks with the junta in the absence of a third party. They expressed their refusal to the one-sided investigation upon the break-up of the Khartoum sit-in, calling for an international investigation to be opened before the return to talks with TMC.

With the mediation of the Ethiopian prime minister together with the African Union, the suspension of talks among the two parties reached to an end.

On 18 June, for the first time since the dispersal of the protest that took place outside the defense ministry, the military council announced its willingness to resume the transition talks with Freedom and Change forces, while expressing their readiness to start the democratic transition process in the country. The council leader also stated that the opposition alliance should engage in the talks without any preconditions.

On 24 June, the spokesman of the Sudanese military junta announced that they received two different proposals from the African Union and Ethiopia, which were to be put under study by the Council – although they agreed with them to send a joint proposal instead of two separate ones. This called them to come up with a brand new joint proposal in order to facilitate the matter. The military declared its denial for the Ethiopian proposal, as they claim that it was from only one stakeholder. The Ethiopian proposal includes a civilian majority transitional government as well as the formation of a legislative body, which was to include 300 lawmakers from which 67 percent were to be from FFC declaration while the rest were to be chosen from different groups (apart from Al-Bashir’s party).

By sending its envoy to Sudan on 20 May, Eritrea became the second country to send its delegation to Sudan after Ethiopia.

On 24 June, their delegation had a meeting with the TMC, which was warmly welcomed by the junta council. They also expressed their support to the military as well as the Sudanese protestors.

On 27 June, the opposition alliance declared that they received a new transition proposal from the AU and Ethiopia, which was a joint one this time. The proposal called for the formation of a 15-member civilian majority ruling council that was supposed to rule the country for a three-year period. However, the proposal did not mention the formation of a new parliament to operate during the transition process. The proposal found support from the UK as their envoy to Sudan called for the two parties to accept the joint proposal presented by the AU as well as Ethiopia.

On 4 July, the Freedom and Change forces made a decision to engage in direct negotiations with the Military Council after accepting the official invitation that came with the AU-Ethiopian mediation. However, the opposition alliance in Sudan said that the Transitional Military Council “excluded” political parties by negotiating with the forces of the Declaration of Freedom and Change only, and not with other opposition groups.

On July 11, Sudan had witnessed a coup attempt that was said to be taken place by a group of retired officers. It was foiled successfully. The council declared after the failed coup attempt that it was a trial to undermine the so-called “power-sharing” deal reached between them and the opposition alliance.

On July 17, the Military Council and the opposition met in Khartoum  in order to sign the power-sharing deal that was reached among them, after a 3-day postponement, which put an end to the months of transition talks between the military junta and the FFC declaration. Afterwards, the two parties spent the day over discussing some details related to the signed agreement, such as the formation of a new transitional civilian administration as well as the constitutional declaration that is to define the duties and responsibilities of the sovereign council, which will lead the country for 3 years according to the signed agreement.

The constitutional declaration was said to be made on July 19.

The deal stipulated that the new transitional council will be formed of 11 people – 5 soldiers from the current Transitional Military Council and 5 civilians from Freedom and Change Forces, and 1 person will be chosen among the two parties. There will also be a general who will be the head of the council for 21 months, and who will later be replaced by a civilian for 18 months. After this, an election will be held.

The two sides agreed on the formation of an independent technocratic government and on the launch of an independent, transparent investigation into the violence that broke out against protestors. They also agreed to postpone the establishment of a legislative council until the sovereign council and the civil government are established. The new prime minister will also be chosen by the FFC declaration, according to the criteria that will be defined in the constitutional declaration. A cabinet of twenty ministries will be named by the prime minister. The defense and interior ministries will be placed by the military council.

On July 18, the Armed Movement declared their reservations about the agreement signed between the TMC and FCF, declaring that the deal does not meet the aspirations of achieving comprehensive peace in the country. Malek Akar, leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, had announced his appreciation to the signatories but stated that the agreement ignores important issues that were discussed in Addis Ababa. “We are for the Forces of Freedom and Change, and this agreement will lead to different positions,” Akar said.

On July 19, the Freedom and Change Forces announced that the text for peace in Sudan will be included in the constitutional declaration, which is to be declared in the upcoming days.

On July 24, the Transitional Military Council announced that it arrested at least 16 superannuated and active military officers upon the foiled coup attempt that took place on 11 July. The failed coup attempt was said to be made by the army chief alongside with the armed forces, the national intelligence and security service, as well as some leaders of the Islamic Movement and the National Congress Party.

It is said that General Hashim Abdel Muttalib Ahmed, head of the joint chief staff, was among those arrested by the TMC over the coup attempt.

*Written by Rahma Elfeky

Last week, Germany’s main conservative party, the Christian Democrats (CDU), surprisingly achieved some important success in certain areas of political significance. On the one hand, former defense minister and a close ally of Angela Merkel, Ursula von der Leyen (CDU), was elected as the new European Commission President. On the other hand, the CDU’s chairperson and another close ally of Merkel, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (AKK), was appointed as the new defense minister in Merkel’s current coalition government, succeeding von der Leyen.

Merkel has made some tactical moves. Although these moves were not aggressive in nature, they do eventually promise success. Merkel is ambitiously preparing the CDU for the post-2021 era, when she will ultimately quit active politics, as she had already declared at the beginning of this year. Besides her moves of domestic political significance, Merkel also supported a very well-known name on the EU platform- that is to say, von der Leyen- in order to become the European Commission President for the next five years. A real success.

Of course, there has been heavy criticism with regard to both Ursula von der Leyen- even from the coalition partner, the Social Democrats- and also regarding AKK as the country’s new defense minister. The liberal FDP criticized AKK on the basis that she had recently declared she will not join Merkel’s cabinet and only focus on her task as party chairperson. However, according to FDP’s defense expert, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, AKK undermined her credibility by doing the exact opposite. Some voices also casted doubt on AKK’s expertise and experience as a minister of defense and in the specific field in general, while some academics and military officers addressed the issue with a rather critical perspective.

These critical voices may be taken into consideration while Germany’s military is also being criticized domestically and abroad for its lack of capacity, which became public during the last years under Ursula von der Leyen.

The main controversial statement however came from the far-right and populist AfD. The AfD’s parliamentary group leader in the German state of Rhineland-Palatinate (Rheinland-Pfalz), Uwe Junge, who was a former officer in the German military until he quit his job in 2016 for a career in politics stated, “If this (AKK) is the best personality of our old parties with regard to one of the most important offices of our #nation, this says a lot about the state of our country! When will it come finally to the uprising of the #generals?” (“Wenn das die beste Personalie der alten Parteien für eines der wichtigsten Ämter unserer #Nation ist, sagt das viel über den Zustand unseres Landes aus! Wann kommt endlich der Aufstand der #Generale?”)

As expected, Junge’s statements received harsh criticism from some circles that perceived it as a call for a military coup. According to Junge, though, the German word “Aufstand” cannot be counted as a call for a coup against the defense minister. Nevertheless, one has to clarify some basic points before elaborating such difficult statements, which is not something that occurs often in German politics – at least since 1945.

Interestingly, last week, I addressed in this column whether another military coup could occur in Turkey while analyzing the recently July 15, 2016, coup attempt. However, it seems that a potential putschist mentality or mentalities that ignore the democratic civilian control of the military may occur anywhere in the world, no matter what degree of democratization the country has achieved.

Regarding Junge’s statement one should also mention that he was a military officer (lieutenant colonel) of the so called PsyOps (psychological operations/Zentrum Operative Kommunikation der Bundeswehr).

How can one elaborate on these –not entirely representative of the AfD- but very controversial statements with regard to civil-military relations, which are believed to be on a very democratic standard in Germany? It would be, no doubt, a mistake to take a single statement of an AfD member and accuse it of being representative of the whole party, even if the party is located on the far-right. However, the continuation of the party’s (in general) controversial, racist and deliberately manipulative statements with double-meanings contributes to the image of how a potential AfD government in the future could look like. This and several other controversial statements and even scandals illustrate what kind of democracy understanding is currently present among AfD members and what it might evolve into in the future.

It is not legitimate to call any members of the military for an uprising or rebellion against the country’s legitimately appointed defense minister. If this basic point is not accepted by any politician, then something is definitely wrong. By this, I do not mean any concrete factual statements, legal recommendations or reports by army members about certain fields that concentrate on their expertise and where of course a minister’s expertise may lack. The call for an uprising (Aufstand) is, however, an expression with an absolutely extreme controversial content. Whether the Chancellor’s decision is wrong or right, this does not give current or former military personnel the right to react in this way against the democratically elected and legitimate Chancellor’s mandate.

Nevertheless, the statements made by alleged “moderate” AfD members could be taken as a notice as to how a potential future government constellation with the AfD will end.

The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) introduced geographical depth and diversification to its military operations against terror by initiating Operation Claw against elements of the PKK in the Hakurk area in northern Iraq on May 27, 2019. This operation carries critical importance in the creation of a wide and integrated zone for fighting the PKK in Iraqi territory through proceeding in the direction of Mount Qandil, which is the headquarters of the PKK, and expanding towards the Iran border with the regions of Avashin-Basyan and Zap. As such, Operation Claw is the continuation of the cross border operation that started in northern Iraq on March 11, 2018, and is a precursor for subsequent ones.

Operation Claw serves as a bridge in Turkey’s fight against terror in two ways: Firstly, it combines the structural, methodological and technological changes in the fight against terrorism. And secondly, it unifies the cross border operation started by Turkey in 2018 with operations to be conducted in the future. To understand the effects of Operation Claw, its scope must be analyzed. Thus, it is beneficial to briefly review the region, and the goals and concept of the operation along with the capacity of the threat. Following the review, the procedure of the operation, which is the main topic of discussion, and its place in Turkey’s fight against terrorism can be examined.

Operation Claw’s scope

The operation is being conducted in a mountainous region roughly 30 kilometers deep from the Turkish border and 25 kilometers wide parallel to the Turkish border, starting from the south of Derecik district of Hakkari province, including Iraq’s Kani Rash region and reaching to the rural surrounding area of Chubkan village of Soran district. The distance between the southernmost front of the operation and the PKK’s headquarters Mount Qandil is roughly 55 kilometers, and the distance to Asos Mountain, which is also used by the terror organization and lies further south, is 150 kilometers.

The operation geography makes it possible for elements of the terrorist organization to hide in the terrain, and constitutes a natural obstacle for the troops conducting the operation. Unlike Syrian territory, the region of Hakurk, with its many mountains, hills and deep valleys stretching from east to west, peaks ranging from 1.700 to 3.200 meters and low population density makes it hard and sometimes impossible to conduct armored and mechanized operations. Thus, the horizontal advance made by commando units in the mountainous region needs to be constantly supported by vertical engagement from the air. The low number of settlements in the region significantly reduces the likelihood of civilian casualties during the conduct of the operation.

The tactical aims of the operation are the destruction of the caves and shelters used by the terrorist organization in the Hakurk region along with the neutralization of the terrorists in the region, and the strategical aim is extending and deepening the region for fighting the PKK in Iraqi territory. These actions are motivated to eliminate the PKK’s military capabilities and reduce the terrorist organization’s area of operations. The operation also prevents the PKK’s tactical elements from infiltrating into Turkey over the Hakurk region and makes the detection and engagement of terrorist elements easier by limiting them to a smaller region. The region of the operation is in a position that can be expanded towards the Iran border to the east and Avashin-Basyan and Zap regions to the west, which makes tactical and operative engagement of the PKK targets outside of the Hakurk region easier.

Operation Claw serves as a bridge in Turkey’s fight against terrorism through combining methodological and technological changes in the fight against terror and through unifying with Turkey’s former cross border operations.

In order to carry out the fight against the PKK deep in the territory of a foreign country and over a large front, the TSK has determined a proper operation concept and chose the elements of the operation accordingly. The field conditions, tactical capabilities of the terrorists and the lessons learned from the operation that started in 2018 can be said to be the main factors in choosing the operation concept. The geographical conditions of the Hakurk region, along with the terrorists moving in small groups of four to five people, make the detection of terrorist elements harder. Due to this, the use of electronic intelligence devices for instantaneous target detection and the use of technical means for instantaneous engagement both increases success and reduces the casualty risk of maneuvering elements.

The operation is being conducted according to a concept that relies on the combined use of maneuvering elements composed of units from the Special Forces Command and commando units alongside tactical elements from the air force with UCAVs and UAVs from the land forces, combat helicopters of the army aviation units and land combat support vehicles providing constant combat support via high firepower and precise engagement. The maneuvering elements that have the capability to capture critical field locations via surprise attack landings are entirely composed of professional soldiers.

The air force elements that directly provide support for the operation can strike PKK targets outside of the operation region as well as meeting the instantaneous firepower needs of the maneuvering units, preventing terrorist elements from making consolidated defenses. Within this context, the importance of precision guiding kits that are developed by national resources, used by the air force and integrated with general-purpose munition must be emphasized. Mini smart munition used by unmanned aerial vehicles have also contributed greatly to the success and tempo of the operation both due to their capabilities allowing them to be used against precise targets and the close air support they provide for maneuvering units. It has also been observed that multiple-launch rocket systems used in the operation to prevent the terrorist organization from moving in large groups have been effectively integrated with the firepower support elements of the operation.

The geographical extent of the operation is not restricted and has the potential to expand in response to new conditions that may arise in the future. Within this context, the main factor that affects the success of the operation is the flexibility of its mission. The underlying reason for this is the compact and mobile capabilities of the units conducting the operation. Alongside the control of the operation area, in the regions outside, the TSK’s mobile air and land platforms can continuously maintain their effect on the PKK, blocking the terrorist organization’s action capabilities on a tactical and operative level.

Against this, the terrorist organization attempts to conduct low risk activities, meaning activities such as long-range mortar attacks and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). And these activities fail to have a large effect due to not being supported by other action tactics. Moreover, the mortar detection radars used by the TSK make it possible to respond to the PKK’s long range attacks even in cases where the attackers are not visible to the eye, and this capability of the terrorist organization is instantaneously defused. Another action practice of the terrorist organization is the deployment of anti-air weapons and land to air portable missile systems against aircrafts. While the PKK attempts to use DSHK series anti-air weapons and SA series portable missile systems against the TSK’s engagement from the air, thanks to the continuous electronic surveillance capabilities of the TSK and the human-sourced information provided by the intelligence agency, the locations of these weapons can be easily determined, targeted and neutralized.

The importance of Operation Claw

The operations Turkey conducts against the PKK within its borders and the intelligence and military operations conducted against terror elements in northern Iraq and northern Syria continue simultaneously. The continuity and integrity of these operations have led the terrorist organization to lose power and become unable to conduct certain organized attacks within Turkey, while causing the erosion of its military capabilities and the loss of the areas under its control abroad. Operation Claw is also a result of Turkey’s integrated approach in the fight against terror, technological transformations in the military and structural reforms. The operation must be evaluated separately from previous cross border anti-PKK operations that had limited extent, and must be seen as part of Turkey’s political and military strategy in its fight against terror. The operation is being conducted in a manner in accordance with Turkey’s strategy of reducing the areas controlled by terrorist elements and addressing the problem at its source in its fight against PKK and with a tempo that lays the groundwork for subsequent operations.

With Operation Claw, Turkey both defends Iraq’s territorial integrity and strives to increase Iraq’s capabilities of fighting terrorism.

In 2017 and before, PKK had, by diversifying its action capabilities and expanding its fields of operation, forced Turkey to constantly develop strategies focusing on its internal security, and the terrorist organization maintained its presence across the border via this manner. The PKK diversified the locations of its activities within a region in Turkey bound by Tokat-Giresun-Gümüşhane to the north, Kars-Ağrı-Van-Hakkari to the east, Hakkari-Şırnak-Mardin-Şanlıurfa-Hatay to the south and Osmaniye-Adıyaman-Elazığ-Tunceli to the west, and kept the TSK and law enforcement forces occupied in different sectors within the country. But the concept of fighting terrorism that developed and started showing its effects after 2017 drastically changed the situation for the PKK.

The TSK has turned the PKK into an easier target by restricting their operations to a variety of sectors in small spaces in Syria and Iraq, and has ensured that the fight against the terrorist organization within Turkey changed from simply being limited to active PKK members to including all social circles of the organization such as its underground members, passive supporters and political extensions. While the fight against the PKK within Turkey has evolved towards fighting the ideology of the organization, the fight across the border is aiming to eliminate the last armed active members and the leaders of the organization.

As part of Operation Claw, 61 terrorists have been neutralized as of July 14, 2019, and a great deal of equipment, munition and materials belonging to the PKK, including advanced weapons such as the SA-14 portable anti-air missile system, have been captured. Alongside this, PKK’s action capabilities have heavily been suppressed and the region of Hakurk, 500 square kilometers in size and previously used for the purposes of logistics, training, smuggling and indoctrination by the terrorist organization, has been cleared of terrorist elements. Moreover, the operation is being conducted with national resources with a focus on intelligence and operation aspects. Neither is intelligence being received from allies nor are local forces supporting the operation.

Operation Claw entered a new phase on July 12, 2019, by expanding its territorial scope into the east towards the Iranian border. This phase is called Operation Claw 2.

The diplomatic relations between Turkey and the federal government of Iraq as well as the Kurdistan Region of Iraq have raised Turkey’s leverage in terms of intelligence and operations, increasing the country’s level of impact in the region. The diplomatic efforts of Turkey in its fight against the PKK in Iraqi territory both search for common ground in the fight against the terrorist organization and aim to prevent Iraqi territory from being occupied by another terrorist organization again. Thus, the country both defends the territorial integrity of Iraq and fights in the field to increase Iraq’s capabilities of fighting terrorism.

Operation Claw’s main goal

Operation Claw has the quality of being an operation that makes use of the success of Operation Determination, which started in 2018, and due to its goal of removing terrorist elements from a large region of Iraqi territory, it is a first in Turkey’s anti-PKK fight. The operation may lead to many potential outcomes that can contribute to ensuring Turkey’s internal and national security. It can be argued that the existing tempo and success of the operation will contribute to the stability of Turkey and the region within the framework of the following assessments:

• The operation that began in 2018 is stabilizing the safe area created along Şemdinli and Derecik and serves as a preventive measure for the PKK’s terror attacks. Alongside this, the offensive threat of the organization is being kept at a distance of 30 kilometers from the border.
• The operation has laid the groundwork for subsequent operations and has a unifying role in other operation areas in northern Iraq.
• It has reduced the chances of PKK’s staying intact by directly threatening the organization’s living spaces.
• It has caused the PKK’s loss of territorial control in Hakurk, which breaks the terrorist organization’s “media defense field” perception.
• It prevents a potential power vacuum that may arise in northern Iraq following a possible US-Iran conflict and averts the PKK’s possibility of taking advantage of the instability created by such a situation.
• It creates an opportunity to develop a common approach against the PKK with the federal government of Iraq as well as the Kurdistan Region of Iraq by ensuring Iraq’s territorial integrity

Operation Claw entered a new phase on July 12, 2019, by expanding its territorial scope into the east towards the Iranian border that leads the operation’s right flank more active. The second phase of the operation is called Operation Claw 2 and it confirms the bridging role of Operation Claw for future operations. Though no conceptual or force combination change is reported, the number of soldiers in the operation increased in order to secure a larger area in the Khakurk region. Each and every phase of the operation is expected to target a new operational area in the form of a chain sequence until a vast safe area is established. An operation against the Qandil Mountain may be seen after a total establishment of a safe zone in northern Iraq.  

Following its launching ceremony in the Dilovası district of Kocaeli province on June 20, Turkey’s second drilling ship Yavuz set off to the Eastern Mediterranean, near the other Turkish-flagged drilling ship Fatih. In doing so, Ankara declared to its friends and rivals once again that it will defend the rights of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in the Mediterranean in accordance with international law.

With its two drilling ships along with its seismic exploration ships, Ankara made it clear that it will fight for its maritime zones and has the required skills for the fight that is ongoing as an energy struggle in neighboring waters. This has seemingly disturbed the officials of Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration, who have been issuing statements that disregard the rights of Turkey and the TRNC in the Eastern Mediterranean.

As known, the Greek Cypriot administration is striving to hinder the drilling activities of Turkey in Turkey’s own continental shelf and in areas where Turkish Cypriot authorities have licensed the country to work in the Mediterranean by using the advantage of being an EU member. By acting as if they represent the entire island, the Greek Cypriot administration renders the energy resources of Cyprus a component of the political stance that disregards the TRNC’s and the Turkish Cypriots’ right to have an economic presence.

This policy of the Greek Cypriot administration is not new. Greek Cyprus unilaterally declared a so-called exclusive economic zone (EEZ) by signing EEZ delineation agreements with Egypt in 2003 and with Israel in 2009. Subsequently, it made other agreements with foreign energy companies that allowed them to conduct drilling activities around the island without asking for the permission or approval of the TRNC, which made the agreements unlawful.

With such actions, the Greek Cypriot administration does not only ignore the presence of the TRNC and Turkish people on the island, but also paves the way for new formations that exclude Turkey, which has the longest Mediterranean coastline. Turkey is trying to be isolated as an actor in the discovery, drilling and sharing processes of energy resources whereas the TRNC, another important actor, is being completely ignored. Remembering the latest examples on the manipulation of these economic parameters for political purposes would be enough to understand the severity of the issue.

Ankara is exercising its jus natural in accordance with the outward bound limits of its continental shelf in the Mediterranean, which is recognized by the UN since 2004.

The Greek Cypriot administration co-founded the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum with Egypt, Israel, Greece, Italy, Jordan and Palestine and encouraged European leaders to issue statements stressing that the EU will stand against Turkey on the issue in the framework of the Union policies by acting with France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Greece during the MED7 Summit. The state or government heads of 28 EU countries, who gathered in Brussels on June 21, expressed that they condemn Turkey’s gas and oil exploration activities in the Eastern Mediterranean as a result of the propaganda run by the Greek Cypriot administration and Greece. Also, in a written statement issued by the European Council, Turkey’s activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean were declared unlawful with reference to prior decisions.

So, the EU and the energy alliance supported by Greek Cyprus and the U.S. have predicated their political purposes in the Mediterranean on the isolation of Turkey and the disregard of the TRNC. But it must be questioned whether they have achieved to do so in line with their expectations. Looking at Turkey’s capabilities in the region with the power stemming from the TRNC and international law, the answer is definitely “no.” Despite all their “serious” statements, the new energy alliance backed by the EU and the U.S. has failed in its policy of laying claims to the hydrocarbon reserves in the Mediterranean. The activities of Fatih and Yavuz drilling ships present the leading evidence to the failure of the anti-Turkey energy alliance.

Yavuz and Fatih drilling ships

The Greek Cypriot administration signed EEC agreements with Egypt in 2003 and with Lebanon and Israel subsequently on behalf of the entire island despite not having such a right. Although Turkey announced that it does not recognize these agreements, Greek Cyprus continued signing new energy and safety agreements with the riparian countries and conducting drilling activities in the Mediterranean despite all the objections of Turkey and the TRNC. Upon this, Ankara realized that the issue of appropriating and sharing the energy resources in the region was not built as an economic move but rather motivated to exclude the TRNC and Turkey, and took a series of measures against the moves.

So, Ankara is exercising its jus natural in accordance with the outward bound limits of its continental shelf in the Mediterranean, which is recognized by the UN since 2004, and acting in line with the offshore license guarantee granted by the TRNC to the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) in 2009 and 2012. Ankara was also authorized to conduct hydrocarbon exploration activities within its maritime zones offshore Cyprus by making a license agreement with the TRNC in 2011 against the unilateral EEC declarations of the Greek Cypriot administration. The Mediterranean journey of Fatih drilling ship is ongoing within this legal framework and in the scope of the license granted to Turkey by the TRNC. Similarly, the drilling activities of Yavuz will start within this framework in early July.

Thanks to Yavuz, Ankara has attained the ability to engage in drilling activities down to 12.200 meters offshore Cyprus.

On the other hand, Turkey displayed a great determination and made a considerable progress in developing its A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) capabilities in the military field for the protection of its maritime zones in the Mediterranean that became an issue of dispute. In the current situation, Turkey’s step to purchase S-400 air defense systems is significant for Ankara’s area denial capabilities. When Ankara obtains and deploys these systems, it will have the opportunity to close an important area on Cyprus to its rivals and enemies. As Turkey’s area denial capabilities in the Mediterranean improve, it will be possible for the country to maintain its seismic exploration and drilling activities in energy field more freely. In a nutshell, as Ankara’s area denial facilities develop in line with the naval doctrine, the projects that exclude Turkey and the TRNC will be condemned to fail no matter who supports them. The Nabucco dream had lasted quite a while. And it is not hard to project that the East-Med dream will not last that long considering the measures taken and capabilities developed by Turkey.

Thanks to Yavuz, Ankara has attained the ability to engage in drilling activities down to 12.200 meters offshore Cyprus. Yavuz is expected to reach a depth of 3.300 meters at the Karpaz-1 spot in offshore Famagusta-Kahramanmaraş, which is the first location the drilling ship has been assigned to. Similarly, Fatih is maintaining its activities in 80 kilometers west of Paphos within the so-called EEC declared by the Greek Cypriot administration. By having two (Yavuz and Fatih) of the 16 deep-sea drilling ships in the world and demonstrating its naval capabilities to ensure the security of these ships with the operations it conducts in neighboring waters, Turkey does not only show that it is present in the Mediterranean energy equation but also makes it open that it will not allow this economic game in the Mediterranean to turn into an international political plot that disregards the rights of Turkey and the TRNC.

Turkey’s drilling ships operate on legal grounds

It is known that Ankara opposes the one-sided appropriation of natural resources around the island before the resolution of the Cyprus issue, and always stresses that the Turkish Cypriots have a share in these resources. Of course, the breach of international law and lack of common sense are not only seen in the cases related to the TRNC. Via the so-called “Seville Map,” Ankara is trying to be restricted to a very limited area in the Mediterranean by means of the disputed maritime zones.

Turkey’s Energy and Natural Resources Minister stated that the operations of Fatih and Yavuz drilling ships will be in accordance with international rules and regulations.

The Greek Cypriot administration continues insisting on the Seville Map that proposes to implement the median line method in sharing maritime zones. However, experts of international law such as Dr. Emete Gözügüzelli argue that an equitable sharing principle must be adopted in the Mediterranean instead of equal sharing among all the coastal states since it is a semi-closed sea. According to Gözügüzelli, Articles 74(1) and 83(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea obliges the median line principle and stipulates that area restriction must be on an equitable basis. 

The gas excavation activities unlawfully conducted by Greek Cyprus offshore Cyprus and the attempts to disregard the rights of the TRNC increased tensions in the Mediterranean region. On top of this, the Greek administration issued a warrant for the arrest of Fatih drilling ship’s crew just before Turkey launched Yavuz drilling ship, which became the final straw. Turkey harshly responded to this step and openly expressed that it would resort to all legal measures if necessary. Amid the debates on the issue, the Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister Fatih Dönmez stated in a speech he gave during the launching ceremony of Yavuz that the operations of Fatih and Yavuz will be in accordance with international rules and regulations. He also clearly remarked that Turkey would never back down from supporting the rights and interests of the TRNC in the Mediterranean, adding that it is an ineffective strategy to hide behind legal excuses to stop Ankara.

In brief, Turkey sent Yavuz to the Mediterranean after emphasizing its determination and righteousness once again. Yavuz was accompanied by the Turkish Navy frigate TCG Fatih in its journey to the Mediterranean, which shows that Ankara is poised to battle against any possible threat. So, Turkey is ready for the fight in the Mediterranean and asserts its presence in the region with its capabilities and legal arguments. The sirens of Fatih and Yavuz are now ringing like alarm bells to awake those dreaming about ignoring Ankara and Nicosia in the Mediterranean, while the region is on the brink of a global-scale geopolitical fight.

Since the start of the war in Syria, many debates erupted around the future of Bashar al-Assad and that he will not play any role in the future of Syria. However, the Syrian opposition demands the change of the regime, not just an individual. Until today, the Iranians and Russians succeeded in securing Assad his position, long enough that the U.S. does not speak about regime-change anymore. Saudi Arabia is trying to push the Syrian opposition to accept a political transition process with Assad. But Assad remains as a symbolic obstacle for peace in Syria. Thus, the question is: If Russia decides to oust Assad from power to accelerate the political process in Syria and tries to impose a trustful and reliable ally in the country, will it succeed?

To date, two different names come up in this regard: Ali Mamlouk, the former head of the National Security Bureau, and the Syrian Commander Gen. Suhail al-Hassan, nicknamed the “Tiger,” who leads the Russian-backed famous Tiger Forces. Suhail al-Hassan as a predecessor to Assad came into discussion when he was rewarded by Russian generals at the Humeimin base and his congratulations letter to the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. Ali Mamlouk on the other hand, remains as one of the only people who allegedly is in contact with other states such as the U.S., Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and others, solely due to this position as being the head of intelligence.

The recent re-shuffle in the Syrian regime has seemingly strengthened the Russian position and Russia-allied figures have been appointed to critical positions.

Going on with the case of Suhail al-Hassan, in his report, Can Kasapoglu argues: “[…] evidence suggest that Syria could witness a serious intra-regime power struggle between General Suheil al-Hassan, the commander of the battle-hardened Tiger Forces (Qawat al Nimr), and the incumbent Baathist military elite” and that “to materialize its political goals in Syria, Russia should rein in profiteer paramilitary formations, restrict Iran-orchestrated Shiite militancy’s presence in the Syrian security sector, and ensure a unified chain of command to lay the foundations of the post-civil war doctrinal order of battle of the Syrian Arab Armed Forces.”

Ali Mamlouk on the other hand might help Russia have a less problematic ousting of Assad as his stance within the Baathist military and political elite is strong. In this regard, during the beginning of July 2019, Russia placed Ali Mamlouk as the deputy of Bashar al-Assad and appointed Mohamed Deeb Zeitoun as the head of the National Security Bureau. Zeitoun is also a close ally of Russia.  

The general re-shuffle in the regime apparatus has seemingly strengthened the Russian position and Russia-allied figures have been appointed to critical positions. However, a main obstacle remains in front of Russia – its ally, Iran.

If Russia ousts Assad, then it would risk confrontation with Iran in Syria as the regime apparatus is divided between Iranian and Russian allies.

Currently, the alliance between both parties is being symbolized by Assad himself. If Russia ousts Assad, then it would risk confrontation with Iran in Syria as the regime apparatus is divided between Iranian and Russian allies, who are in competition over power. While the Russian side has more political power, the Iranian side is overwhelmingly stronger in terms of allied militias. In short, if Russia ousts Assad, Syria might enter a new dynamic in which the current regime axis would split and fight within themselves. Also, the current escalation in Idlib has proven the Russian limits without the active support of Iran. As long as the war continues or even further escalates, Russia is dependent on Iranian support.

All in all, Russia can find its Syrian Kadyrov. However, in contrast to Chechnya, Russia needs to balance and share power with another actor or risk an entire new conflict dynamic to evolve in Syria. Therefore, as long as Bashar al-Assad succeeds in managing the balance between Iran and Russia, he may remain as the formal head of Syria. However, if the political transition process finally occurs, even this balancing act may not help him stay in his position for which Assad burned Syria down and handed over his Powers to his protectors in Tehran and Moscow.

Almost as a historical coincidence, on the third anniversary of the 2016 failed coup attempt, the European Union has placed serious sanctions on Turkey. To some extent, the decision is coherent with the European stance towards Turkey as it underlines the double standard approach. Certainly, it is not a mystery that the relations had become very tense after 15 July, 2016, generating a profound and mutual frustration. However, the casus belli legitimizing the adoption of measures against Turkey refers to the thorny Cyprus issue and to the exploration activities started around the island. Indeed, the EU foreign ministers decided to punish Ankara over its alleged “illegal drilling activities within the territorial waters of member state Cyprus.” The outgoing President of the Council of Ministers – Donald Tusk- clearly stated “Despite our best intentions to keep good neighborly relations with Turkey, its continued escalation and challenge to the sovereignty of our Member State Cyprus will inevitably lead the EU to respond in full solidarity.” 

Essentially, the sanctions endorse that “in light of Turkey’s continued and new illegal drilling activities, the EU decides to suspend negotiations on the Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement and agrees not to hold further meetings of the high-level dialogues for the time being.” Furthermore, “the Council endorses the European Commission’s proposal to reduce the pre-accession assistance to Turkey for next year and it invites the European Investment Bank to review its lending activities in Turkey, notably with regard to sovereign-backed lending” by warning that the EU is ready to take action against individuals and companies involved in Turkey’s drilling activities on the areas, which are perceived as interference in Cyprus’s Exclusive Economic zone.

What we are witnessing today between the European Union and Turkey is the product of a long-standing deadlock.

Actually, due to the already existing tension with Brussels, Turkey had recently experienced a significant decrease on EU financial support. Indeed, for the 2014-2020 period, Ankara was supposed to receive around 4.45 billion euros for implementing political reforms and other projects aiming to facilitate Turkey-EU accession, which was downgraded of 175 million euros. As matter of fact, the sanctions aim to penalize Turkey, but they look like a cosmetic move. Indeed, what we are witnessing today it is the product of a long-standing deadlock. For example, the EU-Turkey talks on civil aviation got stuck just after the first round of negotiations started in 2016 as part of 2015 Aviation Strategy for Europe, due to the animosity of the Greek Cypriot administration. Even though Turkey is a very important global hub and valuable aviation partner for Europe, as long as there is not a reciprocal recognition and flight connections this file will be frozen.

Moreover, it is not the first time that the pre-accession assistance got reduced. In other words, anything happening on the Eastern Mediterranean does not surprise much as it is just the unfair price Turkey has been paying for the historical mistake made by Europe itself back to 2004. That year has to be recognized as a real turning point and the mother of each problems affecting Turkey-EU relations. After the Annan Plan and the related referendum on the future of Cyprus, although the Turkish Cypriots had voted for the reunification of the island and the Greek Cypriots supported the division, Brussels rewarded them by granting the status of full EU member. As it is sadly already known, internationally the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is not recognized as a sovereign state, but as invaded territory. Hence, Turkey plays a crucial role in protecting the Turkish community while it suffers the price of a distorted negotiation process as Cyprus vetoed most EU accession chapters and many EU leaders sympathized with the Greek side. This is an anathema for Turkey and its interests as EU candidate state as well as Turkish Cypriots guarantor. In other words, there is not much Ankara can do without being slammed or sanctioned. That was the case in 2004 and along the first stages of the negotiation process. Nowadays, again the story repeats itself. The EU has shown just a one-way approach by supporting unconditionally anything the Greek Cyprus claims- like the self-proclaimed economic exclusive area.

Anything happening on the Eastern Mediterranean does not surprise much as it is just the unfair price Turkey has been paying for the historical mistake made by Europe itself back to 2004.

The European management seems to not think twice in extending its jurisdiction on controversial areas and overall in targeting Turkey in a sort of provocative and nonobjective style. Overall, the EU believes that anything Turkey is doing on the Cyprus offshore is a violation of international law while on the other hand Ankara claims its own legitimacy in defending the Turkish Cypriots, who have equal rights to the natural resources of the islands. To tell the truth, the Turkish Cypriots have recently proposed a joint committee for the hydrocarbon activities off the island, which was simply ignored by the EU institutions. Actually, the upstream problem lays on the definition of legitimacy that once again goes back to the old question of the island division that Europe not only failed to solve, but has even contributed to further complicate.

Despite its international recognition and EU full membership, Turkish Cypriots consider the Republic of Cyprus illegitimate as the Greek Cypriots consider the Turkish–Cypriots self-governance illegitimate. However, the European Court of Human Rights recognizes TRNC “subservient administration” to the Government of Turkey, based on the principle that no population can remain in a governance vacuum. Thus, once again the situation is tangling up with increasing tones that are unlikely to produce further consequences.

Being understood that Turkey’s journey towards the EU got frozen due to some domestic stalemates and double standard approaches, the only card on the table recently has been the economic one. As matter of fact, Europe is one of the main trade partners of Turkey, even though some issues persist on the review of the current customs union. Likely, the measures adopted by EU institutions will not have a dramatic impact on the Turkish market, which has already proved some sustainability and resilience after the severe crisis of the last year with U.S. Moreover, for Europe Turkey is a valuable partner on the containment of immigration flows. Indeed, in a time when the far-right extremist groups in Europe are arising as protest to the current management of some critical issues such as security and migrants, Brussels cannot afford to lose Ankara’s support and collaboration hence there is room to think that any further sanctions would have limited impact.

Overall, between Turkey and Europe remains a communication gap and a mutual frustration merely undermining any dialogue for a constructive approach towards those pending issues. Thus, the impasse seems destined to continue and to become a real paradox.

A year has passed since Turkey switched from a parliamentary system to a presidential form of governance. Turkey’s new presidential system had been a hot topic of discussion for politicians, especially last year. Pro and anti-presidential system camps discussed the issue within certain parameters in accordance with their political calculations and ideology. Nevertheless, the lack of knowledge in the discussions shows that there is still a further need of understanding the main characteristics of the Turkish version of the presidential system.

Previous discussions reflected that political parties had been debating the from an ideological point of view. As a result, there were two main compositions as pro and anti-presidential system camps, which prevented an in-depth evaluation of the proposed new system. While anti-presidential system camps conducted an aggressive stigmatizing campaign against the system, pro-presidential system groups failed in discussing the issue out of ongoing political paradigms.

Does the system provide division of power in practice? How does Turkish bureaucracy accord to the new presidential system? There is a need of thinking outside of the box to find clear answers.

Due to this, there is still a failure in understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the system. Does the system provide division of power in practice? Is there an efficient check and balances system in the new structure? How does Turkish bureaucracy accord to the new presidential system? There is a need of thinking outside of the box in order to find clear answers to these questions.

President Erdogan recently stated that if there is a lack in the new government system, it will be corrected in time. Nonetheless, since most political parties approach this issue from a rigid angle, there is no chance to create a joint platform in order to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the system from a more broad perspective.

Moreover, recent political incidents created new ruptures in the ideological stance and discourse of political parties against the new system. For instance, after the March 31 local elections, the CHP’s perception towards the system significantly changed, as it enabled the party to form pre-electoral alliances with other political parties. As a result of this opportunity, the CHP maximized its gains in the election. This was a click moment for the CHP to utilize 50 percent +1 vote prerequisite in Turkey’s presidential system. With this, the CHP managed to form an alliance with the Iyi Party and HDP in Istanbul, Ankara, and Antalya.

Recent political developments in Turkey created an environment, in which political parties now revise their approaches to the presidential system.

Since the CHP realized the advantages that the new system brings for the main opposition party, its direction of criticism towards the system shifted. Kemal Kilicdaroglu- CHP Chairman- recently declared that they were also aware of the shortcomings of Turkey’s old parliamentary system and that they never supported it. Kilicdaroglu also claimed that they were supporting a well-established presidential system, like the one in the U.S.

However, the CHP’s arguments against the presidential system were quite different during the 2017 referendum and its aftermath. For instance, while the CHP had been against switching to a presidential system during the referendum due to finding the system “authoritarian, less democratic, and less representative,” it always underlined that everything was fine with Turkey’s parliamentary democracy, which goes back to 1876. During the June 24 parliamentary and presidential elections, one of CHP’s promises was to switch back to the parliamentary system.

Overall, it should always be kept in mind that most political parties in Turkey may reserve their positions under the new circumstances –even if they have a sharp ideological stance. The latest discussions on Turkey’s presidential system has shown this fact once again. Nonetheless, it is still not easy to guess the future positions of political parties in the upcoming years.

The U.S. House of Representatives voted on Tuesday to condemn President Trump’s racist tweets against 4 Democratic congresswomen.

Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ilhan Omar, Ayanna Pressley and Rashida Tlaib have been critical of Trump’s harsh immigration policies. Trump tweeted on Sunday that the four congresswomen should “go back” to where they came from.

Before the vote, Representative John Lewis, a democrat and civil rights leader, who marched with Martin Luther King Jr in the 60s, called on members of Congress to do “the right thing” and condemn the president’s words.

“The world is watching. They are shocked and dismayed because it seems we have lost our way as a proud and dignified people,” 79-year-old Lewis said.

“I know racism when I see it. I know racism when I feel it. And it has no place in the highest levels of our government,” Lewis added.

The measure, the first House rebuke of a president in more than 100 years, passed by 240 to 187, after one of the most polarizing disputes the floor has witnessed in recent times.

Raucous crowds chanted “Send her back!” as Trump held his first campaign rally since announcing his 2020 re-election bid.

“I am where I belong, at the people’s house and you’re just gonna have to deal!” Ilhan Omar tweeted, alongside a photo of her presiding over the House chamber.

The US representative was welcomed by a crowd of people at the airport with cheers and support as she returns to Minnesota on Thursday.

“We’ve heard it before throughout our history, but it has no place in America in 2019,” former Vice-President Joe Biden tweeted. “It’s clear that Donald Trump is trying to divide us by race and gender. It’s immortal.”

He praised immigrants as an example of “what makes America great,” while adding: “Donald Trump thinks our nation’s great diversity makes us weak – because he has no idea what makes us great.”

In response to the increasing criticism, Trump tweeted, “Those tweets were NOT racist. I don’t have a racist bone in my body! The so-called vote to be taken is a Democrat con game. Republicans should not show ‘weakness’ and fall into their trap.”

In response to this tweet, Ocasio-Cortez tweeted: “You’re right, Mr. President – you don’t have a racist bone in your body. You have a racist mind in your head and a racist heart in your chest.”

“Sadly, this is not first nor will it be the last time we hear disgusting, bigoted language from the president,” Tlaib said on Monday.

Both Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar – who are both Muslims – have received death threats since they have been elected as congresswomen.

Increase of hate crime since Trump’s election

Hate crime in the U.S. has been on the rise since Donald Trump was elected president in 2016.

The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), a prominent U.S. civil rights group said it has identified 900 incidents of harassment following Trump’s election to the presidency. SPLC outlines that Trump’s rhetoric and actions have affected U.S. society.

The number recorded hate crime incidents was around 6,200 in 2016 – a 5% jump from 2015. According to an FBI report on the issue, this figure increased by 17% in 2017.

According to the report, 59.6% of incidents were motivated by bias against race, ethnicity, or ancestry. Crimes motivated by a victim’s religion constituted 20.6% of attacks, and crimes against a person’s sexual orientation made up 15.8%

*Written by Fadıl Hancı

The United Arab Emirates has recently announced its renewed policy towards the conflict in Yemen. The Abu Dhabi administration suggested that the country is planning to decrease its military presence in Yemen, where a bloody civil war has been continuing since 2015. The announcement brought questions about Abu Dhabi’s real motivations as the country has been the staunchest supporter of the Saudi-led military operation in Yemen. Although international observers interpret the UAE’s statement as a withdrawal, it can be argued that this move is rather a “strategic redeployment.” Therefore, the UAE’s decision is not a complete withdrawal, but rather an attempt to update its strategy toward the conflict in Yemen.

There are three reasons behind this “strategic redeployment” move. These are the UAE’s unwillingness to continue carrying the military and financial costs of the war, Abu Dhabi’s desire to improve its increasingly worsening image in the West- particularly concerning human rights issues- and the goal of continuing the war through proxies instead of direct intervention.

The UAE has been one of the most important partners for Saudi Arabia in Yemen in the fight against Iranian-supported Houthis.

The UAE has been one of the most important partners for Saudi Arabia in the fight against Iranian-supported Houthis in Yemen. Since 2015, it is estimated that the UAE has lost at least 100 Emirati military personnel in the operations in Yemen. The war also costs billions of U.S. dollars to the Emirati budget. With a new strategic redeployment, the UAE aims to minimize such military and financial costs related to the war in Yemen. Instead of being directly involved in the war, the UAE plans to increase its presence through proxies that have been heavily invested in since the beginning of the war.

The UAE has transferred huge stocks of weapons and high-tech equipment to its proxies fighting in different locations in Yemen. The militia forces supported by the UAE are now considered to be able to fight Iran-backed Houthis in terms of both military capacity and technical competence. With this new strategy, the UAE leadership will try to have the same influence in the conflict, but with a less direct involvement of the Emirati forces. This will not only reduce human losses but also reduce the financial costs the war has had for the Emirates.

The UAE also aims to repair its damaged image among the Western public. It’s image was initially damaged due to issues related to human rights violations in the war in Yemen. The UAE has been widely criticized in the international media for its role in the death of thousands of children and women, systematic attacks on civilian targets as well as destroying historical cities of Yemen. The UAE has also been accused of preventing humanitarian aid to reach those who have been affected by the ongoing conflict. In order to help change this negative image, the UAE is attempting to present its new strategy of redeployment as “withdrawal,” with hopes that international pressure may be minimized.

The UAE has recently changed its strategy and transferred huge stocks of weapons and high-tech equipment to its proxies fighting in different locations in Yemen.

Therefore, it should be noted that the steps taken for the future of the military presence of the UAE in Yemen are strategic and tactical. Aiming to use local collaborators as proxies, the Abu Dhabi administration wants to cover up its failed military policy in Yemen with the illusion of withdrawal. The UAE leadership also tried to frame its new strategy as part of the United Nations brokered transitional process in order to acquire legitimacy to its future presence in the conflict.

Emirati officials have been trying to eliminate the arguments that the UAE has been destabilizing the region by stating that the withdrawal has been discussed for more than a year and that the UAE wants to facilitate the implementation of the Stockholm agreement signed on December 13, 2018. In addition, Abu Dhabi has increasingly made visible the humanitarian aid it delivered to Yemen through media channels in order to present itself as a humanitarian actor as well. With these moves, the UAE is trying to erase its role in the humanitarian crisis in war-torn Yemen.

The UAE will not end its military presence in Yemen as the conflict is now considered as one of the most important fronts in the fight against Iran.

Finally, the UAE’s new strategy for Yemen should not be considered independent of Abu Dhabi’s foreign policy activism in the Middle East. The UAE has been increasingly involved in conflicts in the region, including Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Palestine, Syria, and Yemen. Such activism has become a burden and brings serious weakness for Emirati foreign policy, as the UAE leadership faces difficulties in managing its activities simultaneously. This confirms the fact that if a country with a limited capacity engages in a number of conflicts, it can face uncontrollable outcomes that can damage the overall policy, as is seen in the foreign policy activism of the UAE. This repositioning move in Yemen can also be used as a way out in terms of addressing other urgent foreign policy issues and escaping at least one of the UAE’s intense foreign policy engagements.

However, as detailed above, the Yemeni conflict will continue to place an important role for the Emirati foreign policy – even if it brings serious problems. Therefore, it may be misleading to imagine the UAE could end its military presence in Yemen, as the conflict is now considered as one of the most important fronts in the fight against Iran.

The U.S. Senate confirmed Trump’s nominee for U.S. ambassador to Turkey, David Satterfield. An esteemed career foreign service officer, Satterfield’s time with the foreign service goes back to the early 80s where he served in Jeddah, Tunis, Beirut, and Damascus. He then moved on to become the Director of the Executive Secretariat staff from 1990 to 1993 when he served on the National Security Council Staff as Director for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until 1996. After, he was appointed Director of the Department of State’s Office of Israel and Arab-Israeli affairs until 1998 when he was confirmed by the Senate as Ambassador to Lebanon.

Satterfield played a crucial role in the Middle East after the September 11 attacks and invasion of Iraq, acting as Deputy Assistant Secretary until 2004 and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs until May 2005. He subsequently took on the role of Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq in August of 2006 and then Director General of the Multinational Force and Observers. Since 2014, he has served as Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for Libya and in 2017, he was appointed as Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.

Satterfield’s relationship with Ankara will extend beyond Turkey’s borders as he must consider the scope of the turmoil in the region.

Satterfield enters the arena as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey at a time when the bilateral relationship is not exactly at an all-time high. The U.S. is essentially harboring a Turkish fugitive, Fetullah Gulen, and working with the YPG who Turkey considers a terrorist threat while Turks have purchased an S400 missile system from Russia. Satterfield has his work cut out for him, but his resume proves that he might be the best shot at reconciling these deeply rooted tensions.

With Turkey as a rising regional power and a NATO ally, it is in the U.S. strategic interest to use diplomacy as a conduit for a better relationship. Satterfield made it clear in an April 15 telephone briefing. Maintaining security, fostering transparency and liberal values, and upholding rules-based institutions should be at the top of his agenda, and using his experience as a diplomat from the First and Second Gulf Wars has the potential to point relations in the right direction.

Satterfield is a seasoned veteran when it comes to foreign service. So, will he offer Turkey carrots or come down hard with sticks?

His relationship with Ankara will extend beyond Turkey’s borders as he must consider the scope of the turmoil in the region. Iran is planning to increase its uranium enrichment beyond the limits of the JCPOA, and the crisis in Syria continues unabated. The U.S. cannot afford more failed diplomatic efforts with its allies, especially in a region as fragile as the Middle East, but Satterfield’s experience serving the Clinton and W. Bush administrations shows a promising trajectory of U.S.-Turkey relations. He now has the ability to work alongside James Jeffrey, the Secretary’s Special Representative for Syria Engagement and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, who has expressed open mindedness and optimism vis-a-vis Turkey. The State Department duo is poised to actively engage with the Turks to find common ground and reconstruct the alliance. The U.S. needs level-headed, capable diplomats to conduct foreign affairs and foster good relationships, and Satterfield is as qualified as they come.

The only smudge on his record isn’t even a smudge at all. In 2005, two members of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) were indicted in U.S. courts for disclosing classified information to Israeli officials. Satterfield was mentioned as a “government official” in the indictment and served as a witness for the defense. The complicated case involving U.S. national security was eventually dropped by the Justice Department and Satterfield was dismissed unscathed. Even after this, he still preserved a good reputation on both sides of the aisle.

Satterfield is a seasoned veteran when it comes to foreign service. So, will he offer Turkey carrots or come down hard with sticks? The U.S. cannot expect to leverage its power everywhere. Turkey needs reassurance and the Americans need an olive branch. A better relationship will only come when they recognize the value of soft power and come to a consensus like allies should.

During the Cold War period and the decade following its ending, Turkey experienced a phase in which its defense policies were integrated to the policies developed by NATO, while terrorism was fought in line with the military’s foresight inside the country.

Regarding decision-making mechanisms and politics, dominated by the military and the bureaucratic elite at the time, solely as structures to obtain funds remained under the veil of the sacredness attributed to the subjects related to defense.

In the present situation, it has become a requisite for the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), which has successfully remained as a ruling power by overcoming all kinds of tutelage mechanisms since the early 2000s, to confront this problem. Particularly in the aftermath of the July 15 coup attempt, the politically and institutionally autonomous spaces developed within the security mechanisms of the country by the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ) and the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) as from the 1960 coup attempt became visible and showed the necessity of holding the TSK under a democratic monitoring.  

The need for air defense systems

Although countries’ needs for air defense systems have been evident since the Germans used the V2 missiles that could hit targets within 250 kilometers of distance during World War II, an air defense system that offers solutions with an integrative perspective has never been established in Turkey, where NATO’s defense policies were complied with until the 1990s. Even though low altitude air defense systems and radar systems were set up in order to protect some critical facilities and cities during the Cold War period, it is obvious that these systems are unable to avert threats today. This becomes even sharper as the air defense systems owned by Turkey and the threats surrounding the country are contrasted.

Turkey has many different air radar site commands and radar systems deployed in critical zones for the monitor and control of its air space. Within these systems, four E737 airborne early warning and control aircrafts comprise a significant monitoring and warning mechanism as they can control more than 3 thousand targets within the range of 350 kilometers and the altitude of 12.200 meters. However, these radar systems do not have the ability to trace enemy air components from beyond 600 kilometers unlike S-400 radars. Also, a defense system that is integrated to these radar systems and that can eliminate enemy air components (aircraft and missile systems) in medium or high altitude is unfortunately not present in the TAF inventory.

The air defense systems registered in the TAF inventory, which are considerably less advanced and more effective against low altitude components rather than ballistic missile threats, are listed below:

• Bofors L60 and L70 anti-aircraft gun system (manufactured in 1934 and currently used in order to protect the base areas in certain sizes within 4-kilometer effective range)
• Oerlikon anti-aircraft gun systems (manufactured and registered in the TSK inventory in 1956, and used against low altitude components with its 4-kilometer effective range)
• Rapier missile systems (included in the TSK inventory in 1983 and still used by the TSK in low altitude air defense with its 8-kilometer effective range)
• Stinger shoulder-fired air defense system and pedestal mounted systems (first manufactured in 1978 and effective in low altitude, these systems are used by the TSK both for the purpose of shoulder launch and as a pedestal mounted model)
• Korkut air defense system (used as low altitude air defense system in 4-kilometer effective range)
• Hawk air defense system (first manufactured in 1960, this system entered the TSK inventory in 2001. It is actively used with its 18-kilometer effective range)
• Nike Hercules air defense system (entered in the TSK inventory in 1964, this system is no longer used and about to be removed from the inventory)

The threats and S-400 systems

As can be seen, the air defense systems owned by Turkey are designed for low altitude and remain much less developed considering the current ones. Turkey confronts a major threat stemming from both its neighbors and allies. Although Turkey initially tried to close this gap with the air defense batteries it requested from NATO, the experiences revealed that this method is not always effective.

During the 1991 Gulf War, it turned out that Turkey did not have the means to protect itself from Iraq’s Scud missile systems, which had limited media coverage at the time.

During the 1991 Gulf War, it turned out that Turkey did not have the means to protect itself from Iraq’s Scud missile systems, which had media coverage at the time, albeit to a limited extent. However, the issue was forgotten until the Second Gulf War due to Ankara’s focus on the fight against terrorism.  

During the Second Gulf War, the issue was remembered again due to the possible missile attacks on Turkish territory that could stem from the possibility that Turkey might lend its bases to the U.S. When the necessity to urgently meet this deficit was brought to NATO’s agenda, Germany, France and Belgium strictly opposed this support, which inevitably added a political character in the debates on Turkey’s air defense system. It can be remembered that then U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, issued an array of statements to NATO and European capitals and endeavored to convince these countries.

Between the Second Gulf War (2003) and the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, the Turkish government ran a busy schedule to meet the deficit in the national air defense system. When the purchase of Patriot missile systems from the U.S. was hindered by the U.S. Congress, Turkey announced in 2008 that it would go out to tender to close the gap in its air defense system and made a call to the companies that could possibly join the tender by releasing a request for proposals in 2010. Although Chinese, Russian, American, French and Italian firms placed bids, Turkey announced to public that the best offer was made by the Chinese firm as a result of the tally conducted on the basis of certain criteria such as technology transfer, costs, delivery time etc. Following this announcement, Turkey confronted serious pressure about purchasing an air defense system from China, and the tender, whose winner was not officially announced, was postponed with a political decision due to all the pressure.

Following the atrocious coup attempt Turkey went through on July 15, 2016, the West displayed a hypocritical approach and covertly sided with the coup organizers, which showed the Turkish government the diversity of the military threat sources it confronts. Turkey, which sought to urgently close the gap in its air defense system after that, made an agreement with Russia for the procurement and financing of the S-400 air defense system since Russia made the optimum commitment on the subject whereas NATO allies, particularly the U.S., refused to agree with Turkey on many aspects such as the delivery date, technology transfer and overall cost.

Russia made the optimum commitment on the air defense system issue whereas NATO allies, particularly the U.S., refused to agree with Turkey on many aspects such as the delivery date, technology transfer and cost.

Turkey’s air defense area

Currently, Turkey is confronted by several fait accompli policies since the country’s influence area is tried to be limited to İskenderun and Antalya Gulfs and it is attempted to revoke the rights of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and Turkish Cypriots. Besides, both the EU and U.S. Congress are openly threatening the country on this matter.

Meanwhile, despite being Turkey’s ally, the U.S. continues to provide all kinds of weaponry and equipment to the terror groups in our region and openly supports the terror corridor that will besiege Turkey. In addition to all these threats, the threat of medium- and long-range missiles based in Iran, Israel, Armenia and Syria is growing each day. Considering the possibility that the West might also intervene in a conflict that might emerge due to the Eastern Mediterranean issue, it becomes more obvious that Turkey needs to make up the deficiencies in its national air defense as soon as possible.

The most urgent and essential strategic step in Turkey’s defense policy is to establish an effective high altitude air defense system in the Anatolia region.

Undoubtedly, the procurement of S-400 air defense systems is not sufficient for an air defense mechanism that requires a multi-layered system, which is surely within the knowledge of the political will that develops defense policies. Those who argue that purchasing S-400s are unnecessary for Turkey and that the country should not turn to groups other than NATO use the fact that the S-400 is not sufficient for air defense on its own as an excuse. They seemingly wish to see the continuity of the volatilities in Turkey’s defense system.

Leaving the country’s air defense to the mercy of NATO is another matter of debate that requires a thorough analysis. But in light of the developments, the most urgent and essential strategic step in Turkey’s defense policy is to establish an effective high altitude air defense system in the Anatolia region. After this step, Turkey will undoubtedly establish a multi-layered defense mechanism that will be able to rule out missiles and other air threats with medium and low altitude air defense systems in short and medium terms.

Since it is the government’s responsibility to defend the country against all kinds of attacks according to the Constitution, the political powers should lend an ear to the voice of those who can fight for their country and should pay attention to their constitutional responsibilities instead of listening to those serving the West.  

Hindu nationalism has been on a rapid rise since 2014, reaching its recent peak in the last 2019 general elections. The nationalist BJP won two elections in 2014 and 2019 respectively, which raised concerns among minorities about the increasing racism coinciding with the rise of Hindu nationalism.

Back in the 1950s, Hindu nationalism was a marginal ideology. When the predecessor of the BJP, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, contested its first election as a Hindu nationalist party, it only obtained 3 percent of the vote and 3 seats in parliament.

Hindu nationalism has never been stronger than it is now. The ruling BJP managed to obtain 282 out of 543 seats in parliament in the 2014 general election. This number increased to 303 seats in 2019, ensuring a majority for two periods respectively.

Narendra Modi is accused by many people for seeking votes by raising and stroking fear among the Hindu majority of the potential dangers posed by the presence of a large Muslim minority in India.

The saffron-clad Yogi Adityanath chief minister of one of the biggest Indian states Uttar Pradesh had spoken about a “green virus” in referring to Muslim voters who he said were being wooed by opposition parties.

Since India’s independence, Indian Muslims have largely backed secular formations like the Congress, SP, BSP, Trinamool and RJD. But while these parties have spoken about protecting Muslim interests, they have been less forthcoming in giving them proportional representation.

The loss of faith in Congress and the subsequent failure of regional secular parties have resulted in the growth of several Muslim-centric parties such as the AIMIM, the Indian Union Muslim League and the All-India United Democratic Front. However, these parties have remained region-specific and have obtained only 4 seats in the 2019 Lok Sabha elections.

Although Muslims comprise 14 percent of India’s population, the representation of Muslims has been gradually declining, as the BJP gained a majority in the last two elections.

In 2014, BJP became the first party to win a simple majority and to not have any elected Muslim MP. Later, Narendra Modi introduced one Muslim MP in 2019.

As Hindu nationalism is powerful than it has ever been before, it is raising concerns about the increasing hate crimes against Muslims and other minorities in the country.

In the past 5 years under Modi’s rule, 44 people have been lynched- most of them Muslims- according to a report by Human Rights Watch.

In its annual report, United Nations Human Rights chief Michelle Bachelet raised concerns over “increasing harassment and targeting of minorities – in particular, Muslims and people from historically disadvantaged and marginalized groups, such as Dalits (formerly known as untouchables).”

Amnesty international has called Indian authorities to ensure that there is no impunity for those responsible for public lynching and other hate crimes against Muslims in several states.

However, it seems these calls have not been taken seriously by the government. Just a day after a 79-year-old activist was lynched, the BJP’s state urban development minister CP Singh said, “I think he sponsored an attack on himself. He is a huge hypocrite. He talks against Hindus, makes anti-national comments, supports Kashmiri separatists and Naxals.”

According to observers, the Hindu nationalist rhetoric and the electoral marginalization of Muslims are two of the reasons why India has been falling behind on human rights and representation in democratic institutions.

*Written by Fadıl Hancı 

Ursula von der Leyen served as the German Defense Minister from 2013-2019, before she resigned to take the EU’s top job. Der Leyen was the first female defense minister in Germany and will also be the first woman to hold the position of European Commission President.

Von der Leyen will replace Jean Claude Junker as the new Commission President.

Being positioned in Germany’s center-right political spectrum, Von der Leyen is well known for her objections against Trump’s politics. The argument made by the Trump Administration that NATO allies- especially Germany – should “pay more” for their security protection was not welcomed by Der Leyen. In her response to the U.S. President, she stated, “Burden sharing is a matter of funding, of money, but sharing the burden is also much more than what can be expressed in euros and in dollars. To share a burden is to first of all share the principle to stand up for one another. Without exception.”

Another issue that Von der Leyen objected Trump on during her tenure as defense minister was his policy towards Muslims. Hitting back on Trump’s attitude on torture, Von der Leyen stated, “We must beware of turning this fight into one against Islam and Muslims per se. Otherwise we run the risk of deepening the trenches from which terrorism grows.”

Von der Leyen was the first woman to be nominated for the EU’s top job. Proposed by French President Emmanuel Macron, she also received crucial backing from the Visegrad 4 bloc.

It is important to note that Von der Leyen’s father also works for the European Commission.

One of her top priorities as Commission President will be to oversee the implementation of Brexit.

She was endorsed by the European Parliament on 17 July, 2019. During her endorsement speech, Von der Leyen announced her six priorities within her mandate: A European Green Deal, an economy that works for people, a Europe fit for the digital age, protection of the “European way of life,” a stronger Europe and a push for European democracy.

During her endorsement, most controversial remarks were made from MEP Nigel Farage, who is also the leader of the UK’s Brexit Party.

Farage accused Von der Leyen of wanting to control “every single aspect of our lives,” and that she wants to build an “undemocratic, outdated form of communism that will render nation state parliaments, where the state controls everything, where nation state parliaments will seize to have any relevance at all.”

Farage also mentioned how he believes the endorsement and election of Von der Leyen will increase the popularity of Brexit in the United Kingdom, as he has slammed the Commission President for being a “European army fanatic,” and wanting to build a European army, which will destroy the relevance of NATO in Europe.

*Written by Rahma Elfeky

In the early mornings of Monday, July 15, Italian elite police raided and searched several properties across northern Italy. The targets were houses believed to be resided by neo-Nazi groups and their members. In the northern city of Turin, a region economically well-off compared to the austerity ridden south, the global media was treated with staggering and unnerving images of missiles and Nazi memorabilia. When the raids were concluded, the police gave precise numbers of the arsenals of weapons recovered: a Mantra air-to-air missile; 26 automatic guns; 20 bayonets; 306 gun parts; and 800 bullets of different calibres – all from manufacturers and sellers in France, Austria, Germany and the U.S.

Three individuals were arrested. Moreover, the police stated that the investigation is not yet conclusive or over – more raids and arrests could be carried out across Italy and possibly in other European countries too. Fabio Del Bergiolo, an Italian politician who ran for the senate on the far-right Forza Nuova Party ticket, and two Swiss citizens Alessandro Monti and Fabio Bernardi were arrested. The Italian police stumbled on these extremist groups while investigating citizens who travelled to Ukraine and fought alongside the Russian-backed separatists in the Donbass region – There is a ‘‘strange’’ love relation between far-rights and Vladmir Putin’s Russia. However, these investigations and discoveries of arsenals of ammunitions in the hands of Nazi sympathisers and far-rights extremists showcase a Europe descending into rancid ethno-nationalism and outright fascism. More importantly, across the globe, and particularly in the west, a new political undercurrent is emerging: a politics spearheaded by ‘‘strongmen’’ embodying white-supremacy and contempt and hatred for Muslims, Jews, Women and African immigrants. 

The rise of the politics of hate

Michael Perlman’s movie The Politics of Hate (2017), delves into and investigates the rise and thriving of far-right parties in Europe and America. Although these extremist parties gained political relevance recently, after the 2015 so-called migrant crisis, they have always been part and parcel of Europe’s political landscape. Attacks on Asian, African and Turkish immigrants have been recurrent in places like the UK, Netherlands and Germany throughout the 80s and 90s. The 1993 arson in Solingen, Germany, where women and young girls were killed by far-right extremists is a case-in-point. Violence, hate crimes and racism aren’t a new appalling phenomenon in Europe – and cross the world. Nevertheless, in the last decade, far-right parties and their political mantras have become mainstream and established in Europe and America. Today, some of them have missiles (and God knows what else). And that is scary.

Steve Bannon toured Europe to spread his gospel of white supremacy and far-right politics. The essence and tone of his speeches are reminiscent of those delivered from the pulpits of the genocidal führer. 

The number of far-right attacks in Europe have increased drastically over the years. According to the Global Terrorism Index, 47 attacks have occurred in Europe in 2018 carried out by “lone actors with far-right, white nationalists or anti-Muslim beliefs.”. Briton Darren Osborne drove a van into Muslim worshipers; attacks on Synagogues and Kosher restaurants have increased in France; Brenton Tarrant massacred Muslim worshipers in New Zealand; and above all, Italy’s notorious deputy premier and minister of interior, Matteo Salvini, faces charges of abducting African immigrants. The rise of far-right politics and populism in Europe could have its roots in the full-of-blemish democratic institutions in Europe and America, and the economic down-turn since 2008, but the hatred and violence unleashed against Muslims, Jews and African immigrants reflects a dangerous past in Europe that is reminiscent of the 1930s – of racism, xenophobia and scapegoating psychology.

Steve Bannon, Donald J. Trump’s white house chief strategist, toured Europe to spread his gospel of white supremacy and far-right politics. “The Movement,” Steve Bannon’s Brussels based “political vehicle” is dispersing and sprinkling hatred and violence across continental Europe– and far beyond; including in far places like India and Myanmar. Alison Klayman’s documentary The Brink (2019) follows Steve Bannon for 13 months across Europe as he gave talks to European far-right groups and populist Euro-sceptics. The essence and tone of his speeches are reminiscent of those delivered from the pulpits of the genocidal führer. His impact on the rise of these extremist groups and there subsequent violence against minorities is beyond doubt. In doing so, Europe’s far-rights and neo-Nazis are drinking from the fountains of the virtuosos and wizards of racism, hate and violence: Bannon et al.

Football hooliganism, video gaming and neo-Nazism

Football fans and their extreme variants – Ultra-fans and Hooligans – are usually susceptible to violence and hate speeches during and after games. In Europe, a continent where the sport is prominent and a multi-billion industry, football stadiums have become breeding grounds of racism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, and sexism. Recently, far-right groups and neo-Nazis are increasingly recruiting their members from football fans and hooligans. Moreover, these trends – of radicalising young white males into extremist ideologies – are also documented in violent video games circles and “dark” chat rooms and troll networks. All over Europe and America, Steve Bannon claimed, is full of many white young males immersed in virtual realities of video games and violent hooliganism, that are susceptible to join or sympathizes with his political projects. He boasts of utilizing the “monster power”: the underground worlds of video gaming and violent hooliganism.

Football stadiums have become breeding grounds of racism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, and sexism. Recently, far-right groups and neo-Nazis are increasingly recruiting their members from football fans and hooligans.

Neo-Nazism is thriving in the virtual world of video gaming. Steve Bannon himself gave an opening speech in the International Conference on Advances in Computer Entertainment Technology, an annual academic symposium on the subject – and it attracted its own share of controversy and criticism. Bannon and his counterparts in Europe are aware of the utility of the video gaming world and football hooliganism: that they are social networks with their own sub-cultures. More importantly, its members are mainly young, antisocial, disillusioned, socially disenfranchised and suicidal white males – and they are angry and aggrieved. So, the spread of racism, hatred and violent sentiments in these virtual echo chambers is easy and equally guaranteed. Nazi paraphernalia and racist trope are common among football hooligans, video games and in “dark” web chats.

We live in a post-normal time posits Ziauddin Sardar, the post-normal conditions intellectual and writer: in a world where ideas – some violent – move with speed and simultaneity. Neo-Nazis and far-right extremist groups are capitalizing on the networked, interconnectedness and chaotic nature of technology and video gaming to legitimate and spread their ideologies – so far they are successful. The discovery of missiles and a large stock of weapons in the hands of neo-Nazis have to ring warning bells all over Europe. A genocidal and monstrous ideology is making a come-back in Europe and America – thanks to far-right populism – and its consequences would be far-reaching and calamitous. The police raids in Turin unearthed a dangerous plot. These weapons could have been used in attacking a mosque, a synagogue, a refugee centre or even an abortion care clinic. Innocent lives would have been ended and families devastated. Neo-Nazi terrorism is an existential crisis to all; it is eroding European core values and moral stands. There threats are real. European governments must take effective steps and actions against neo-Nazi and far-right hate, violence and terrorism.

Intelligence is a field that is really problematic with its own confidentiality to be investigated, understood and made sense of. Academic studies in the field are mostly the product of former intelligence sector employees or those individuals who have the “curiosity.” In addition, those who write dissertations in the field of intelligence tend to do more literature search than investigation.

Intelligence studies conducted on specific countries are unfortunately insufficient for reasons such as difficulty in accessing intelligence activities, which are confidential, law enforcement and drowning in the line between conducting an academic study and creating conspiracy theories. However, it is necessary to conduct relevant studies and make intelligence a field in academia in order to understand the scope and method of the area.

The scope of intelligence

Identification is the most difficult part of intelligence. When considering its general practice, it is the curing of information gaps for national security by making sense of intelligence data, providing early warnings and presenting the “picture” that is conceived through foresight to decision makers and institutions. So, there is no discrimination such as peace-crisis-war in the production of intelligence. In a systematic way, the following tasks are expected from intelligence employees:

• To present prioritized intelligence to decision-makers
• To make intelligence planning
• To profess information activities
• To analyze and synthesize the obtained data
• To increase action by drawing to a conclusion

If we were to classify intelligence, which is generally the organ of security operations, it can be arranged as the following: state intelligence, police force intelligence, military intelligence, functional intelligence on the level of ministries and institutions, and “private” intelligence, which consists of the business world and individuals trying to perform in a semi-professional manner. Different classifications can be made for the preferred methods in the production of intelligence, different disciplines, or the times that intelligence is used. Without disregarding this classification, the following should be considered:

A classification considering the institutions mediated to produce intelligence can make research easy. In the evaluations made on the basis of the institution, the academic opinion that intelligence is an art because it requires science and foresight is based on tangible findings such as a “multi-disciplinary” field.

Turkey’s intelligence institutions

The president of the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) is responsible for intelligence activities in Turkey and is responsible for the coordination of all intelligence activities among different institutions. In this framework, according to No. 2937 of the State Intelligence Services and National Intelligence Organization law, MIT is liable and authorized to enforce the activities of all intelligence for Turkey’s internal or external security, intelligence gathering management, execution of analysis and synthesis process, conducting early warning processes for the development of necessary measures, and conducting intelligence activities on an operational level when necessary. In other words, the “National Intelligence Agency is the first actor responsible for both the success and failure of the national security of Turkey.”

The activities of law enforcement intelligence include to prevent crime, the pursuance of duties and to commerce the legal procedure by the General Directorate of Security, the Gendarmerie General Command and the Coast Guard Command. This branch of intelligence is essentially under the responsibility of the Interior Ministry. This branch of intelligence is necessary to produce the intelligence required for the duties stated in the laws and regulations that regulate the activities of relevant institutions.

Military intelligence accounts to the production of military information needed for conditions of war and crisis and for military tasks specified under the law. It is professed under the responsibility of the Ministry of National Defense in order to fill the “information gap related to threats from air and land,” which is a cliché in military literature. Military intelligence activities that begin during times of war and crisis should also be enforced during periods of peace due to the possibility of being late in terms of timing. Thus, military intelligence is expected to examine the capacity of a nation’s military capacities or the military capacities of actors that may be threatened during times of crisis.

The private intelligence activities of individuals and the business world are limited due to legal regulations in Turkey. However, the business world can examine data that belongs to other companies they compete with within the framework of their own agenda and by using legal means available to the public during this period. On the other hand, it does not seem possible for individuals to conduct intelligence activities for the privacy of personal data and the protection of private life.

Intelligence and July 15

The issue of how effective Turkish intelligence is currently and how effective it was before the July 15 coup attempt is still a question that is being discussed. Effectiveness in this regard can be measured in two ways:

• The measurement of intelligence services in different duty areas
• Examining the success or failure of the results achieved from tasks performed

The first can be done separately by the evaluation and assessment bodies within intelligence organizations. Parameters such as personal management, organizational rhythm and activity, operational capacity and capability, access and use of intelligence technologies, reporting and feedback system can be taken into consideration when measuring the task effectiveness of intelligence organizations. It is not possible to make any judgement at the moment due to the fact that all this data belongs to the internal functioning and supervision of the relevant organizations and are not shared with the public.

A second method of measuring success or failure is evaluating the results desired on the national agenda or observing the management of events in the direction of national interests. In the evaluation of MIT, which is the dominant coordinator of intelligence and the sole responsible organization in ensuring the security of Turkey, taking preventative measures against the re-occurrence of an event such as July 15 can be considered as a success criteria in the struggle with such a terrorist organization. It is now well accepted that MIT was too late in preventing the July 15 coup attempt. However, following the coup, efforts to clear FETO staff in government institutions and taking proactive intelligence measures in the developments on the southern border are positive signs.

The intelligence structure of the police and gendarmerie was abused by FETO prior to the July 15 coup attempt. This illustrates a failure in the fulfillment of evaluating the effectiveness of intelligence efforts of law enforcement officers. In the aftermath however, with the fight against FETO, efforts in the field of crime and counter-terrorism, in parallel with the success achieved in domestic counter-terrorism are clear. In the context of military intelligence, the weakness of exposing FETO members before July 15 is a weak point. Again however, in the aftermath of the coup attempt, while carrying out successful land and air operations, counter-terrorism measures taken by the Special Forces promise hope for the activity of military intelligence in Turkey.

Intelligence is a function that states perform in both full productivity and privacy. When the general norms for intelligence and its organization in practice – starting from the definition and scope of intelligence – are analyzed, it can be stated that Turkey took measures in the aftermath of the July 15 coup attempt, and is continuing to take measures for a concrete intelligence structure that will bring positive change. In this context, lessons ought to be taken from failures, and intelligence needs to be developed with a proper management policy that includes science and arts, with reference to duties stated in the law. Turkey has the relevant manpower, organizational capacity, tools and technology, and political will in order to realize the relevant transformation.

On Monday, Turkey commemorated the third anniversary of the July 15 coup attempt. As a nation that has faced several military coups and coup attempts in the Republican Era, July 15, 2016, symbolizes a significant milestone regarding civil-military relations and the civilian control of the military on an institutional platform.

In contrast to previous attempts, the 15 July coup attempt was perpetrated by FETO members who infiltrated the Turkish Armed Forces in the last 40 years. Why did they mobilize a coup attempt against Turkey’s democratically elected government? More, how has the subsequent struggle period been conducted, and why did they fail?

Firstly, the main reason as to why the July 15 coup attempt failed is based on the fact that FETO- which symbolizes a certain radical mentality- has no collective support among different social groups in Turkey. This is a fundamental point that might be disregarded by biased experts who still cannot imagine how intense the anger against the group is all over Turkey. In other words, it is very obvious that there is no social base in Turkey having any sympathy for Gulenists anymore.

There is no social base in Turkey, from ideological right to left, having any sympathy for Gulenists anymore.

Besides its own marginal, radical, blinded, and even terrorism-tolerating base, this societal rejection is a fundamental fact across Turkey’s nationalist, secular, conservative, Kemalist and ethnically motivated groups. Consequently, this fact has to be counted as one of the main points that facilitated the collective resistance against the coup attempt during the night of July 15, 2016. By this, it should be reminded that it is not a secret that specific social groups in Turkey had previously supported military coups in the country. In cases of “certain conditions,” when the Turkish military’s specific cadres persuaded some civilian groups, the majority of the country’s media and leading figures of the judiciary, these conditions enabled a military coup. The military men had a higher possibility to execute this illegal activity (a military coup) within a “successful” framework, compared to the failed attempt in 2016.

Building on these facts and the main denial against the FETO criminal cult in general, it has to be stressed that Turkey has had a quite successful development trajectory, particularly during the last 15-20 years. During this period, the belief of the younger generations with regard to civil democracy and the increase of a rather diversified media – in contrast to previous eras where the media obeyed the military-dominated elite – made it possible for tutelage representatives to be elaborated critically.

Another critical point that made it impossible for the putschists to overthrow the civilian government on July 15 was the fact that Turkey’s president called for all citizens to go on the streets and resist against the military coup. Unfortunately, this civilian resistance, which left 250 dead and over 2,000 injured, is not taken into account seriously by particular prejudiced circles mostly represented in the Western world.

The unprecedented civilian resistance against the coup that left 251 dead and over 2,000 injured, is not taken into account by the West.

With regard to the future of civil-military relations in Turkey, while the mindset is changing, this gradual behavioral change ought to be strengthened. The democratic trend of dominating the military by legal civilian representatives has achieved broad acceptance among Turkey’s population. Furthermore, Turkey’s new system of government, which enables and fosters former high-ranked military commanders to enter active politics in a democratic way, will contribute to the civilian control of the military. An example of this is former Chief of General Staff, Hulusi Akar. After quitting his military career in 2018, he was appointed as Turkey’s defense minister in the first presidential cabinet under the new system. In one of his speeches, he underlined that he took the ministerial role in order to contribute to Turkey’s democratization process.

The Turkish Republic has faced serious difficulties in its 96 years, of which has no doubt seen military coups and coup attempts that have left disastrous results. Trials against the July 15 coup plotters are still taking place, and will likely continue for some time. Despite the civilian government’s determined will and several structural measures that have taken place and the change of mindset in Turkey, a potential junta within the Turkish Armed Forces must still be taken seriously. With this, simultaneously, the democratic government and military must continue to be revisited in accordance with Turkey’s constitution and all its related laws.

If we are to see the ‘special relationship’ between the U.S. and the UK at face value – very much a myth at the best of times wheeled out and dusted down and used on rare occasions by both sides like an old piece of machinery which still has its uses – then, the debacle which we have witnessed with the British ambassador can and should be seen in a similar light.

When the leaked cables of Sir Kim Darroch became public leaked to a British tabloid, many pundits drew breath and saw the pernicious comments about Trump as potentially very damaging, given the timing of a new Tory leader entering office and Brexit being such a herculean topic which the new PM needs to tackle.

The common belief is that Trump’s relationship with a new PM, likely to be Boris who is his preferred candidate, will be paramount to helping Britain ride the storm of a hard Brexit. If only the premise of that assumption – the UK and the U.S. could pull off a new trade deal quickly – were even remotely true, then perhaps there could be some gravitus in this notion. 

But we’re talking about Trump here managing to get through a month, let alone a couple of years, with Boris Johnson without a clash and falling out and for both sides to have common ground on what that trade deal could look like. It’s not just that Boris is so weak (as he proved when he failed to throw his weight behind the U.S. ambassador’s resignation), but more that he will have to pull off two minor miracles to secure such a deal with the Trump administration; one, he will have to play an absurdly submissive role to Trump personally; and two, he will have to face Trump head on, on two nuggets of the deal which Trump has already signaled he is eyeing.

The thing about Trump is that he’s a lousy negotiator and only wants talks to start with America being dominant, dictating terms and then allowing the other side to decide how they are going to get out of the mess they’re in. Trump is also not interested in the nuts and bolts of a trade deal with the UK but the sweeteners which come, when the screws are turned. In Britain, this would mean allowing U.S. companies to clean up with a part privatization of the health service and to fill British supermarkets with U.S. foods pumped with hormones. I have long argued since Trump’s first visit to the UK, that he wants a hard Brexit – but not because he believes, like his biggest British sycophant Nigel Farage that a no-deal Brexit will put the UK in a stronger position to negotiate a better trade deal with the EU, but rather because he and his cronies want to clean up by buying up firms for a song in a post Brexit Britain.

The common belief is that Trump’s relationship with a new British PM, likely to be Boris who is his preferred candidate, will be paramount to helping Britain ride the storm of a hard Brexit.

We need to wise up about Trump. And this is really the question now with Boris after Sir Kim’s resignation. What will Boris learn from the triumph of insecurity which Trump’s tweets revealed? We would hope that he will learn that Trump’s idea of a special relationship is one where Boris lies on his back and Trump violates him. And we should also dismiss this idea of honor amongst thieves and that Boris and Trump are both cut from the same cloth, so will probably get along and this can only be in the UK’s interests, with regards to a quick trade deal and using Washington to soften up Brussels. If Boris has learnt nothing from being Foreign Secretary and observing Trump, he should have noted how Trump doesn’t respond even in the slightest to sycophancy.

Theresa May is still licking her wounds after he pushed the knife into her when she supported Sir Kim. But May bent over backwards and did everything to help Trump, moving heaven and earth to get him to come to the UK on two occasions – the second one with his entire family which will no doubt help his re-election. She spoke up for him at every possible opportunity. No matter. Trump only takes and gives nothing back and is sure to betray even his supporters at some point – which is part of the identity of a failed businessman who has lost most of his family fortune and has to have a book published which promotes a fantasy that he is a great negotiator and a formidable businessman. To break the blade in Theresa May’s back, probably his greatest friend in Europe and one who was most able to promote him there, was pure Trump. Rank stupidity only matched by gross treachery on a whole new level.

What we are likely to see with Trump and Boris is a lot of tantrums and misunderstandings. And for this reason alone, he may well take the wise decision to give Nigel Farage the job of U.S. ambassador in Washington, for no other reason than Farage is going to be the one who becomes the mediator in these clashes anyway, so why not send him to Washington where can serve Trump well, after the U.S. president made Farage so wealthy by arranging his Fox contract there. 

If Boris has learnt nothing from being Foreign Secretary and observing Trump, he should have noted how Trump doesn’t respond even in the slightest to sycophancy.

The problem for Boris is that the very thing he needs – power and leverage – to work with Trump, is lacking, unless he turns to yet another myth about the special relationship, which is that UK, at one point in history, did America’s diplomacy around the world and cleared the path for the Washington machine to engage with countries that normally were off limits. Trump only respects those who have power over him, like Kim, Xi and Putin. He’s an absolutely hopeless negotiator and understands nothing about international politics or trade, which is partly why he is about to start a new ‘war’ with Turkey over the S-400 deal with Moscow.

For this reason, Johnson’s choice of foreign minister – and we could argue also its ambassador to replace Sir Kim – are both critical. The leverage that UK could offer is to take a bigger role in resolving Iran (which Trump badly needs to do), a more dynamic role in the Middle East (which the UK could easily do as it knows the ground) and even helping with the peace process with the Taliban in Afghanistan.

But it might be too late. What we know now is that Trump withdrew from the Iran deal simply for personal, petulant reasons as he wanted to spoil Obama’s one main foreign policy decision. This is the real take-way from the Sir Kim cables. His earlier comments about Trump’s administration being “inept” seems opaque and insignificant almost like an American tourist complaining about British weather, compared to Boris’s previous insults about Trump, when he was foreign minister.

The real question for the ‘special relationship’ now and how the Boris-Donald relationship going to pan out will be more based on Trump’s craven style of exploitation in everything he does. It may well be that post October 31, when Boris is negotiating with the EU for a better Brexit deal and the pressure reaches fever pitch, he may well find Trump pretending to offer help to him. But at a very high price.

The resignation of Sir Kim is irrelevant as Trump is a big fan of the new world order of diplomacy being dead and diplomats having almost no real role in negotiating anything or resolving disputes. The fiasco also shows how journalism is also almost dead as not so long ago newspaper editors stood by their own signatures on the UK’s ‘official secrets act’ and would not publish the leaked cables anyway. If the British public has the right to read them, then surely is also has the right to know who leaked them in these polarised political times.

What Trump has done by the Sir Kim move is show quite clearly what it expects from the UK and what he is prepared to do to get Boris to play the role of servile ally. The chances of a UK-U.S. trade deal coming even in Trump’s second term are even more unlikely than Boris pulling off a hard Brexit as Britain struggles to define itself in the world and Trump continues to blunder and stumble on the foreign policy circuit. Trump may well like Boris as he sees his pathological lying and lack of political dynamism as qualities he warms to, but in reality we should not expect anything other than drama, misunderstandings and more childish outbursts.

Late last month, the U.S. Senate voted to lift a 32-year arms embargo against the Greek Cypriot administration after months of campaigning spearheaded by Senators Marco Rubio, a Republican, and Bob Menendez, a Democrat. The bill, dubbed the “Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act,” aims to deepen U.S. security ties with the internationally-recognized “Republic of Cyprus,” and, in the words of Sen. Menendez, “usher a new era for an eastern Mediterranean architecture rooted in shared security and prosperity.”

Calls to lift the embargo were first brought up in December 2018 in a letter sent to the State Department penned by Republican Congressman and co-chair of the Congressional Caucus on Hellenic Issues, Gus Bilirakis. He was supported by fellow members of congress, including Democratic representatives Ted Deutch, who serves as the co-chair of the Congressional Hellenic-Israel Alliance and chairman of the U.S. House Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee. In addition to the lifting of the Cyprus arms embargo, the bill also envisions greater energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean with Greece, Israel and the Greek Cypriot administration through the establishment of a United States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center, and the authorization of millions of dollars of financial and logistical assistance to the Greek and Greek Cypriot militaries. Most significantly, however, the bill further aims to halt the delivery of American F-35 fighter jets to Turkey in a bid to dissuade Ankara from going ahead with the purchase of the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system.

Turkey struck the deal with Russia to purchase the S-400s in July 2017 after Washington refused to share technology from its Patriot system with Ankara.

Turkey struck the deal with Russia to purchase the S-400s in July 2017 after Washington refused to share technology from its Patriot system with Ankara. Some critics in the U.S., such as Representative Eliot Engel, have argued the Russian system is not compatible with NATO systems. But the dispute between Turkey and the U.S. over the Russian missiles is just one of a number of ongoing issues that continue to plague relations between Ankara and Washington. The two NATO allies have had a number of differences in recent years, particularly over the U.S.-led alliance’s arming of PKK-linked militants in Syria, as well as Washington’s failure to extradite Fetullah Gulen, a Pennsylvania-based criminal cult leader accused of orchestrating a coup attempt in Turkey in 2016.

Last year, U.S. President Donald Trump declared sanctions against two ministers in the Turkish cabinet over the jailing of an American pastor in Turkey who expressed support for the PKK. The sanctions caused the U.S. dollar to spike to record highs against the Turkish lira. Even though Turkey later released the pastor, Trump’s words opened the door wide for further anti-Turkish sentiment in the U.S., with some critics even calling for Turkey to be expelled from NATO. At the same time, amid talk of distancing Turkey from the military bloc, conversations about opening the doors of NATO membership to the “Republic of Cyprus” were sparked.

The lifting of the arms embargo could be seen as the start of a process designed to gradually integrate the Greek Cypriots into a greater alliance with the West. It is therefore no surprise that the bill passed by the U.S. Senate also comes with some anti-Russian strings attached. Two last-minute amendments to the bill requires the U.S. administration to submit reports to Congress at least once a year to certify that the Greek Cypriot administration “has made and is continuing to take the steps necessary to deny Russian military vessels access to ports for refuelling and servicing” and is “continuing to cooperate with the United States government in efforts to implement reforms on anti-money laundering regulations and financial regulatory oversight.”

The Russian foreign ministry warned the U.S. against “anti-Russian plans” in Cyprus.

Back in December, the Russian foreign ministry warned the U.S. against “anti-Russian plans” in Cyprus. Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Nikos Christodoulides reassured the Russians that closer Greek Cypriot-American ties were not “prejudicial” to Nicosia’s other diplomatic relations with Moscow and that its foreign policy doesn’t engage in a “zero-sum game.” In early June, before the bill was passed, Stefanos Stefanou, spokesman of the Greek Cypriot opposition left-wing party AKEL, argued the lifting of the arms embargo served as “part of the promotion of US foreign policy in the region … to prevail in a competition with other countries like Russia, China and Iran in the wider region”. Stefanou said this strategy would prove dangerous to Cyprus and put at risk Nicosia’s diplomatic relations with other countries “which Cyprus needs at least as much as the US”. Even Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades described the amendments as “unfortunate” and an attempt to interfere with his country’s sovereignty. Indeed, Greek Cypriot compliance with the amendments would undermine a 2015 agreement between Anastasiades and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin to allow Russian military ships access to the island’s ports. Nonetheless, Greek Cypriot Defense Minister Savvas Angelides brushed off the amendments after the bill passed, telling state radio: “No country can impose on Cyprus an obligation to stop providing facilities to Russian or other ships”.

It could be argued that Greek Cypriot closeness to Russia during the Cold War was the reason why the U.S. arms embargo was implemented in the first place, although in more diplomatic terms it was just seen as a measure to prevent an escalation of tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Only four years prior to the ban, Turkish Cypriots in the north of the island had declared the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognized only by Turkey. That was following nine years of failed peace negotiations between the island’s two largest communities after a Turkish military intervention in response to a Greek-inspired coup in 1974 saw Cyprus split in two.

Although the “Republic of Cyprus” has long been an ally of the West, going on to gain EU membership in 2004, as a non-NATO state it has also been seen as susceptible to falling into Russia’s sphere of influence. Turkey, on the other hand, boasts of having the second largest army in NATO and is a committed Western ally with a proven track-record of loyalty. That being said, the international community considers Turkey’s continued presence in northern Cyprus to be an “occupation,” rejecting Turkey’s legal argument for the intervention.

And while Turkey was also on the receiving end of a U.S. arms embargo following its 1974 intervention, the arms trade between Washington and Ankara returned to normal just four years later when the embargo was lifted. Today, despite their differences, Turkey and the U.S. continue to cooperate in the field of security. Even President Trump at the G20 summit in Japan in late June showed understanding towards Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, saying that Turkey was treated unfairly by the previous Obama administration when Ankara sought to acquire the American-made Patriots.

When it comes to the “Republic of Cyprus,” however, Washington still approaches the Greek Cypriot administration with a degree of mistrust due to Nicosia’s ongoing warm ties with Moscow. Despite a gradual decline since 2012, Russian investments still account for a huge proportion of economic activity in Cyprus. Furthermore, the EU has expressed concern over the Greek Cypriot administration abusing its EU membership by allowing Russian oligarchs with strong ties to the Kremlin a backdoor entrance to the bloc and its market through passport sales, as well as the corruption and money laundering.

The Greek Cypriot administration has also notoriously defied EU sanctions by allowing Russian ships destined for Syria to dock at its harbors, and has additionally granted Russian navy vessels in the region access to the port in Limassol. It is precisely this behavior that the US seeks to curb with the amendments of the aforementioned bill. Yet despite receiving no firm guarantees from the Greek Cypriot administration that it will fulfil its part of the deal to lift the arms embargo, the U.S. continues to support the Greek Cypriots in its moves against Turkish and Turkish Cypriot interests in the region.

Despite receiving no firm guarantees from the Greek Cypriot administration, the U.S. continues to support the Greek Cypriots in its moves against Turkish and Turkish Cypriot interests.

Notably, the international community continues to ignore the repeated cries of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots over unilateral Greek Cypriot efforts to exploit hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey and the TRNC have both insisted that attempts to exploit the reserves before a peace deal between Turkish and Greek Cypriots is agreed is a violation of Turkish Cypriot rights to those reserves. To add, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots have also warned that Greek Cypriot unilateralism on this issue threatens peace and stability in Cyprus. Nonetheless, the Greek Cypriot administration has started offering licenses to investors, including firms from the U.S., France and Italy. This has already led to a few incidents involving Turkish vessels that have been deployed block developments surrounding the hydrocarbons off the Cypriot coast.

Turkey has also recently started taking unilateral steps of its own to search for hydrocarbons around Cyprus in response, irking condemnations from the West. And instead of working to de-escalate tensions, bills like the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Partnership Act have been seen as an endorsement of Greek Cypriot provocations. Kudret Ozersay, the foreign minister of the TRNC, argued the bill would prove to be counter-productive to U.S. interests, saying: “A peaceful and prosperous Cyprus, with both sides working together in good faith to resolve their problems, would be a good model in a region where peace is hard to preserve. Promoting dialogue is in the interest of the United States. The Eastern Mediterranean Security and Partnership Act is not.”

But in early July, Rep. Bilirakis, who initiated the process of lifting the embargo, in an article he wrote with the President of the American Hellenic Institute, Nick Larigakis, insists that the 1987 embargo on Cyprus “appears to have been imposed in the erroneous belief that it would somehow encourage Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to resolve the nearly 45-year division of the territory,” and is “as anachronistic as Turkey’s perspective on the Cyprus issue,” while claiming Turkey’s “occupation” of the island’s north was the main obstacle to peace. “It is in the best interests of the United States for Cyprus to look to the United States, and not any other nation, to procure its defense articles,” the article said.

The main objective behind the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act is to sideline Turkey in the region and to oust all rivals to US foreign policy from Cyprus.

In May, Bilirakis also said the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act will enable the U.S. to support the trilateral relationship between Greece, Cyprus and Israel, which he hailed as a “new example of cooperation in an increasingly turbulent Eastern Mediterranean region.” Based on the congressman’s words, it is clear that the main objective behind the bill is to sideline Turkey in the region and to oust all rivals to US foreign policy from Cyprus. The bill is designed to assert U.S. control over the developing partnership between Athens, Nicosia and Tel Aviv to stop the emerging alliance falling prey to Russian agendas. However, Russia, which in recent years has been expanding its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean through its bases in Syria, is not taking such plans lightly. A statement released by the Russian foreign ministry said the bill “contains the provisions which are directly aimed at undermining Russian-Cypriot cooperation” and, in the event of the bill being adopted, would “seriously take into account its consequences” on Moscow’s foreign policy. “We consider any attempts to set an independent and sovereign country before an artificial choice with whom to cooperate, with Russia or Washington, as the most blatant violation of any possible rules and norms,” the statement added.

The probability is, however, that Russia would not have to take any real action to secure its interests in Cyprus, as the Greek Cypriot administration is not likely to shut the door on Moscow any time soon, especially as Nicosia is still heavily reliant on Russian money. Russian sympathies also run deep within Greek Cypriot society, with allied proxies ever-ready to stand their ground against further Western integration. Even the incentive of an end to the U.S. arms embargo is unlikely to persuade the Greek Cypriots to disown Russia, as Nicosia has never had a problem securing arms from other countries in the past, including an order of Russian-made S-300 missiles in 1997. And while the head of the governing Greek Cypriot center-right party DISY, Averof Neophytou, exclaimed “we will go tomorrow (to Washington) to order weapons” in a retort against AKEL’s scepticism toward the U.S. bill, the actual demand in Cyprus for U.S.-produced weapons is negligible.

Sanctions would only push Turkey further into Russia’s arms. Until then, Turkey is likely to stockpile American-made weapons to avoid the problems it faced during the last embargo in 1974.

As a small island-state surrounded by powerful nations, the “Republic of Cyprus” cannot rely on fire-power alone to ward off military threats. Frankly put, the Greek Cypriot army does not have the capacity to take on the responsibility that comes with owning a large amount of heavy weapons. Even with such weapons, the Greek Cypriots would still stand little to no chance against countries that have more enlisted soldiers than the entire population of Cyprus. Of course, the U.S. would be foolish to sell heavy weapons to an ally that may not be able to prevent them falling into the hands of elements hostile to U.S. interests. Therefore, the Greek Cypriot administration is unlikely to swerve from its current strategy of lobbying to politically isolate its enemies by forming alliances with neighboring countries – namely Egypt, Israel and Greece – who if need be would do the fighting for them.

If anything, the lifting of the arms embargo is no more than a symbolic gesture of solidarity to the Greek Cypriots, as well as a test of their loyalty to U.S. foreign policy. More importantly, however, the bill serves as a message to Turkey, which faces being expelled from participation in the F-35 program by July 31, as well as other sanctions due to the S-400s deal. A separate resolution submitted to the House of Representatives on June 10 proposed sanctions that could hamper Turkish bids to acquire CH-47F Chinook heavy lift helicopters, UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters, F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft, and funnily enough, the Patriot missile defense system. Naturally, such sanctions would only push Turkey further into Russia’s arms. Until then, Turkey is likely to stockpile American-made weapons to avoid the problems it faced during the last embargo in 1974. In the meantime, the U.S. needs to consider whether the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Partnership Act will actually work for its interests in the region, or strengthen its rivals even more.

In response to Turkey’s assembling of troops along the Syria-Tukey border to areas held by the YPG terror group, the U.S. warned Turkey against launching any cross-border military operation in Syria. As I wrote, U.S. sanctions over the purchase of the Russian S-400 systems by Turkey might trigger a Turkish military operation in northeast Syria, but it will remain the duty of the U.S. to resolve the situation and avoid a confrontation with Turkey in Syria.

As negotiations over the safe-zone have stalled and a Turkish military operation seems imminent, the U.S. has to accept Turkey establishing a safe-zone by military means and has to withdraw south from the area and left the YPG face the same fate they did in Afrin. The defeat of the YPG by Turkey would allow the U.S. to form a new Syrian Democratic Forces with only non-YPG elements and join forces with Turkey.

As negotiations over the safe-zone have stalled and a Turkish military operation seems imminent, the U.S. has to accept Turkey establishing a safe-zone by military means.

Firstly, the U.S. expressed its concerns that U.S. troops deployed in Syria might be caught up in a potential cross-border Turkish military operation. In reality, Turkey does not need to care about U.S. concerns, as the U.S. has repeatedly ignored Turkey’s national security concerns by supplying the Syrian branch of the PKK. When the U.S., as a NATO partner, ignored an essential threat to the territorial integrity of Turkey and supplied terrorists, then why should Turkey stop itself from pursuing its national interest due to U.S. concerns over the situation of around 2,600 U.S. troops in Syria?

Secondly, the U.S. suggested that dialogue is the only way to secure the Turkey-Syria border in a sustainable manner. If so, why hasn’t the Manbij roadmap been implemented? Or, why have negotiations over a potential safe-zone stalled? While Turkey maintains dialogue, the U.S. and YPG are creating facts on the ground, such as the formation of 15 different military councils.

If the U.S. would have applied the withdrawal decision by Trump instead of annulling it, Turkey and the U.S. would have built a strong partnership in Syria. However, in case of a Turkish unilateral military operation, both sides can avoid confrontation. Turkey and the U.S. can agree to form the safe-zone by military means. Judging on the events of the past, neither the American administration nor its special envoy James Jeffrey are capable of enforcing its vision on CENTCOM officials operating in Syria, nor is the YPG willing to withdraw and allow a safe-zone torpedoing the long-term vision of the PKK.

If the U.S. would have applied the withdrawal decision by Trump instead of annulling it, Turkey and the U.S. would have built a strong partnership in Syria.

A common understanding between Turkey and the U.S. is the establishment of a safe-zone in northeast Syria. However, both sides cannot agree on the depth and the forces controlling the region. Turkey wants full depth and full control, the U.S. wants limited depth and no Turkish control. Even if both sides would have agreed on anything, the question of how the U.S. would enforce the agreement terms on the YPG still remains unanswered.

If the U.S. is as much concerned as they claim about the situation of U.S. troops in Syria, then the U.S. should make sure that its soldiers will withdraw south before the start of a potential Turkish military operation in Syria. The U.S. should let Turkey, the Syrian opposition and the YPG fight it out, and concentrate on the non-YPG elements of the SDF, focusing on reconstruction and governance. When the fighting in the north is over, the U.S. can engage with the new realities on the ground and work with Turkey.

When discussing the media’s strong links to democracy in the literature of democracy, it is problematic that large media organizations that have a global network make a choice between two images that represent similar concepts. Although their time, space, causes and social dynamics are different, the July 15 coup attempt in Turkey and the incidents in China’s Tiananmen Square, which occurred in 1989, have a common point. On both occasions, civilians united to resist tanks. The image of a civilian standing before the tanks at Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989 is used as one of the symbols of the pro-democracy stance in Western media, as the image is definitely a strong symbol for that.

On the other hand, many similar images were captured on the night of the July 15 coup attempt in 2016. Many photos and other kinds of images that showed great instances of heroism were released to the public. However, over the course of the three years since the coup attempt, the global media has not approached these images with similar enthusiasm. I will elaborate on this factor in terms of media-democracy relations, but firstly, I would like to briefly mention the coup attempt in Turkey.

While global media outlets served justice to the civilian who stood against tanks in China’s Tiananmen Square in 1989, it refused to pay attention to the acts of heroism displayed by the Turkish people on the night of the July 15 coup attempt. 

MSNBC did not apologize for its fake news

Three years has passed since the military coup attempt orchestrated by the Fetullah Terror Organization (FETO). The Turkish nation has the justified proud of repelling this attempt under the leadership of President Erdogan. The night of July 15 witnessed an epic, in which civilians resisted heavy weapons with their bare hands – a phenomenon that is not very common in the history of modern nation states. Organized by FETO militants infiltrated in the Turkish military, the coup attempt aimed to overthrow Turkey’s democratically elected president and the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, which had won the general election by receiving 49 percent of the vote share only 7 months before the coup attempt.

On the night of July 15, the political will, patriotic military officers, police officers and media, acted together in order to repel the coup. They all became heroes of the night. Democracy won that night, whereas the pro-coup mindset suffered a huge blow. The other two defeated groups of that night include the global political actors who kept their silence and hesitated to support democracy against the coup attempt for a long time, and media organs with global networks who did not take a stance against the coup attempt. The Turkish media united and stood up against the atrocity and played a key role in the fight for democracy.

A number of global media outlets, which are supposed to display a similar approach against the coup attempt according to media theory, reported fake news through the U.S.-based MSNBC. While reporting the news, the correspondent said that Erdogan’s plan that was supposed to land in Istanbul was banned and that he was trying to seek refuge in Germany.

Since it is obvious that such a thing never occurred, we would like to remind MSNBC that the Turkish public is still expecting an apology from them. According to professional principles of journalism, they are required to apologize and issue a correction notice by acknowledging that the news was false. From the U.S. to the UK, Germany and France, the Western media tried to legitimize the coup attempt with news reports asserting that the coup was organized against an “authoritarian, dictator, anti-democrat and fundamentalist Erdogan.” They also seemed regretful while discussing how the coup attempt was defeated. FETO leader Fetullah Gulen’s first statement on July 15 was published by the Wall Street Journal on July 17. In the answers he gave to the questions relayed to him via email, Gulen acted as if he was the victim, and released the expression, “this is a plot,” into circulation.

We would like to remind MSNBC that the Turkish public is still expecting an apology for the fake news during the July 15 coup attempt.

Remembering how the Western media approached the coup attempt is important in terms of making sense of today. Although Turkey has so far concrete evidence proving that FETO members organized the coup attempt, Western politicians and media outlets still display the same cynical approach. The exclusivist and obsessive language used in news reports and opinion articles throughout the coup attempt process still frames the current approach to the incident.

Had they approached the event through a lens of universal achievements of democracy, they would have made news about people who stopped tanks with their bare hands, who stood up against bullets, and who suffered severe injuries due to the bombs dropped by fighter jets. Such news stories would set an example to the peoples of the world and make a great contribution to the collective memory of humanity. However, these media outlets chose to ignore these stories.

The power of bare hands against tanks

As stressed above, a comparison based on a single photograph will help us remember the double standards applied by media organizations. There is a striking resemblance between the image from Tiananmen Square, which is imprinted on the memories and images reflected from the July 15 resistance in terms of manifesting the civilian will against tyranny.

Western media outlets still serve the image of the Chinese civilian who stood up against tanks during the Tiananmen incidents in 1989 as an example of resistance. This is exactly how it should be. Those who resisted must be given credit for their heroism.

On the other hand, Western journalists do not seem to remember or simply ignore the heroic resistance of the Turkish people on the night of July 15, 2016, although that night witnessed many similar moments of heroism. This is undoubtedly ignored on purpose. Even though some of the images that portray the resistance in the best way are owned by Reuters, AP and AFP, the general trend of ignorance still continues. This shows the absence of an unbiased attitude that is needed in democracy-media relations.

There is a striking resemblance between the image from Tiananmen Square, which is imprinted on the memories and images reflected from the July 15 resistance in terms of manifesting the civilian will against tyranny.

For instance, the striking photo of Metin Dogan, a citizen who laid in front of a tank to stop it at Ataturk Airport on the night of July 15, did not circulate among the global media as a symbol of civilian resistance defending democracy against coup plotters.

Similarly, the courage displayed by a citizen named Sabri Unal, who tried to stop the tanks in Uskudar, was astounding. Unal stood up against a tank and laid in front of it when it did not stop. When the tank ran him over, Unal miraculously survived and leaped back to his feet again. Then he moved on to stop the second tank advancing him. He lay down once again but the second tank left him injured. The footage showing such stories of heroism were recorded by security cameras that night and are available on the internet. These instances of defending democracy against coups and civilian politics against authoritarianism can barely be found in history.

The two images I mentioned above are only two instances of the resistance that we witnessed on the night of July 15. Every moment of the civilian resistance against F-16 jets, tanks, and other armed vehicles is a testament to the heroism and courage displayed that night. They constitute the most striking examples of fighting for freedom, democracy, and popular will.

Undoubtedly, the global media does not only refuse to see the facts on the subject, but also creates a perspective that rebuts the reality and meaning of that night.

FETO is a genuine threat

Had the Western media outlets approached the subject in the framework of democratic standards instead of accusing Turkey within the three years since the coup attempt, they would have realized the serious threat posed by FETO in their own countries. Surely, it is not too late to realize this. They still have a chance and can present the democracy heroes they have so far ignored to the global public. On the night of July 15, civilians and journalists in Turkey demonstrated the strong ties between media and democracy. The country showed the world that military junta attempts do not have a chance as long as these two structures support each other without hesitation. The solidarity we sought was practiced that night for the first time in Turkey. Acting against the democracy-media theory in such a positive context also indicates that Western media outlets yield to biases and black propaganda.

Three years ago, the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) initiated a coup attempt in Turkey to overthrow the government and seize power. People poured to the streets to defend Turkish democracy against the coup plotters. 251 people were killed and over 2,000 were injured.

After the failed coup attempt, Turkey faced some serious problems. The first was the issue of cleansing state institutions in the fight against FETO. In accordance with this aim, comprehensive investigations were conducted in every state institution in order to identify people affiliated with FETO. Until today, approximately 120,000 people have been dismissed from state institutions. Nonetheless, after in-depth investigations, some of them managed to return to their jobs. This problem became one of the most difficult and complicated issues in the aftermath of the coup attempt.

Until today, approximately 120,000 people have been dismissed from their positions in state institutions due to their affiliation with FETO, which orchestrated the July 15 failed coup. 

The second critical problem was related to the legal procedure in the post-coup period. Since many high-rank officials in the military were directly involved in the coup attempt, there was a need of holding fair trials in order to punish the coup plotters. 263 out of 289 trials have now been completed. Nevertheless, the whole judicial process will be completed after the applications of higher courts – the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Due to this reason, it is possible for the whole judicial process to last almost 10 years.

The third problem was related to the fight against FETO in the international arena. While the national struggle against FETO requires mostly short-term strategies, there is a need of long-term strategies on an international level. While FETO had been infiltrating state institutions since the 1970s, it had also been organizing abroad. FETO had approximately 800 schools and over 1,000 foundations in 160 countries. After the coup attempt, Turkey made official applications to end FETO activities in these countries. In total, 22 countries, including Russia, Jordan, and Serbia, closed FETO-affiliated schools and NGOs after responding positively to Turkey’s official application. However, FETO maintains its activities in numerous countries. Thus, Turkey needs a better long-term strategy and back-channel diplomacy to deal with this issue.

In total, 22 countries, including Russia, Jordan, and Serbia, have closed FETO-affiliated schools and NGOs after responding positively to Turkey’s official application.

All these problems illustrate that Turkey has shown success in dealing with FETO after the July 15 coup attempt. Compared to other countries after such experiences, Turkish democracy still functions, and judicial independence has not been deteriorated. Nonetheless, it is also obvious that there is still a lot of work to be done in the fight against FETO. Turkey especially needs a renewed perspective in the fight on an international level. At this stage, it is crucial to find a sophisticated way of explaining how FETO is not only a serious problem for Turkey but is also of critical danger for other countries. Since the international audience is not aware of the FETO issue, it is a necessity to find a new discourse in order to establish this awareness. This responsibility falls on the government, universities, and NGOs.

Late historian Eric Hobsbawm called the 20th century “the age of extremes.” Undoubtedly, this description is closely related to the genocides, two world wars, the social movements and the extreme manifestation and sharp rise of racism throughout the 20th century. With reference to Hobsbawm’s arguments, it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that similar tendencies and extremist views persist in world politics in different forms in today’s age.

Due to the mobilization that emerged with globalization and the replacement of conventional wars by more sophisticated ones, global population movements reached unprecedented levels. The extent of this mobilization can be better visualized when it is considered that around 13 million people fled the Syrian Civil War only during the period of the Arab revolts.

The issue of immigration, which was tabled as an agenda topic in the latest G-20 Summit held in Osaka, Japan, stands out as the most critical and urgent problem of today’s world. Becoming a tool for domestic policies in many countries, this issue manifests itself in different forms and mostly in racist discourses.

The evolution of racism

In the aftermath of World War II, studies on racism gradually abandoned scientific racism and focused on cultural racism. As Etienne Balibar contends in his article penned in the early 1990s, “Is There a ‘Neo-Racism’?” “New racism” is a form of culturalism that can be defined as a “racism without race,” in which the arguments of race biology are hardly found.

Neo-racism, which is a phenomenon highly influential in Europe, mounts its arguments on cultural differences. As Balibar states, Muslims are today marginalized not because of their belonging to a different race, but because of their cultural difference and alleged inability to adapt to European democracy and liberal culture.

The contention suggesting that there are insurmountable cultural differences between “we” and “they” constitutes the leading argument employed in the legitimization of neo-racism. The accuracy of Balibar’s analysis becomes obvious when it is considered that the culturalist tone is predominant in the discriminatory and exclusionist policies against immigrants and foreigners particularly in Europe.

The raison d’étre of the far-right: Anti-immigration sentiments

Balibar stresses that the word “race” is replaced by “immigrant” in the context of neo-racism. Immigrants are targeted because of their culture rather than their race and manipulated as a tool for the discourse used by far-right parties in modern Western states to appeal to large masses.

The process of Brexit in 2016 that caused a significant friction in the politics of the West and the French general election in 2017 witnessed serious manipulations made with anti-immigration sentiments. During the Brexit process, the pro-leave groups who produced content by focusing on the issues of economy and immigration took advantage of the rising populism and anti-immigration sentiments across the world.

Acting with the strategy of agenda setting, these groups manipulated the public with unfounded news about Turkey and the Turkish people. A noteworthy example is the claim suggesting that 12 million Turkish people will move to England and change the culture and demographics of the country unless Britain leaves the EU.

Similarly, European Parliament member Bernard Monot lied that the French state gave cash cards to refugees, which allow them to make withdrawals of 40 euros a day, and remarked that Marine Le Pen and the National Front prioritize the French people. These examples demonstrate the influence of the “we” and “they” dichotomy produced by the neo-racist discourse.

Reverberations of anti-Turkish and anti-immigration sentiments

Although neo-racism, which is based on a discourse of cultural difference instead of biological superiority, has not been institutionalized in Turkey, neo-racist tendencies are still apparent in the policies of Turkey’s opposition parties. During the campaign periods of the 24 June, 2018, general election, 31 March local election and its re-run on 23 June in Turkey, opposition parties ran campaigns intending to undermine Syrian immigrants, which surely affected the public opinion.

On social media platforms, many politicians and popular public figures shared anti-immigration messages and baseless news on the subject, which sharpened the negative sentiments towards Syrians. For instance, before the Istanbul mayoral election, the Iyi Party candidate and prominent names in the party promised to send Syrian immigrants back to their country.

A recent study conducted by Kadir Has University shows that most of the people who are disturbed by the presence of Syrian refugees and immigrants support the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) and the Iyi Party, which is definitely not a coincidence.

In view of this, it is obvious that political actors have a role in the spread of the hashtag “Syrians, get out!” on social media during the election process. Although the anti-immigration sentiments that are mostly observed in approaches to Syrians have recently been tried to be justified with economic reasons, the negative image of Arabs that is deeply-rooted in Turkish society also has a role in the negative feelings and biases against Syrian immigrants.

The baseless claims against Syrians uttered by some politicians or shared on social networks shape the negative sentiments against Syrians. Misinformation or fake news about Syrians are circulated online and reproduced for political motivations, such as rumors stating that Syrian immigrants have been enfranchised, they are admitted to universities without taking any exam, the state puts Syrians on a salary and pays their costs and bills, the state-run housing agency TOKİ has granted them houses for free, etc. Such misinforming contents spur anti-immigration sentiments in masses to a great extent.

Recently, in Istanbul’s Küçükçekmece district, a Syrian group were subject to violence on the pretext that a Syrian young man verbally harassed a child. But it turned out to be a complete misunderstanding and was revealed that the man did not actually harass the child and the child’s family did not file any complaint. Nevertheless, in this age of informatics where perceptions precede truths, rising racist tendencies triggered by social media platforms are quite influential.

Although neo-racism, which is based on a discourse of cultural difference, has not been institutionalized in Turkey, neo-racist tendencies are apparent.

Although racism is not institutionalized in Turkey, it is still a fact that anti-immigration discourse is common in the country and is used as a tool in the political arena in order to manipulate the masses. In some municipalities governed by the opposition parties, several racist practices against Syrians have been institutionalized, and such practices encourage assaults and discriminatory acts against immigrants. The anti-immigration sentiments that grow with the support of some parliament members and other public figures are circulated on social media.

Although it is true that the Syrian immigrant population in Turkey has considerably affected Turkey’s demographic structure, fake news about immigrants should not be condoned. Otherwise, the presence of the actors in the opposition parties who look up to Le Pen and Geert Wilders might be institutionalized in the following period, as a result of which Turkey will yield to rising populism across the globe. In this context, it is important to ask this question: If a war breaks out in Europe and there is a serious immigrant inflow to Turkey from countries like Switzerland, France, Germany and Britain, what will be the approach of the politicians who use anti-immigration sentiments as a political tool along with the leftist and social democrat names in Turkey?

The state and non-governmental organizations should speak up on this subject in every platform available to the public. Today, Turkey hosts the largest number of Syrian immigrants in the world and this situation surely brings major sociological consequences. Bureaucracy and civil society should cooperate in developing strategies that will solve the immigration issue in the medium and long terms by taking the sensitivities of Turkish society into account.

Saudi Arabia has become a frequently mentioned actor in the international media. The King, “the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques,” and his troublesome son Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) are accused of being involved in many international criminal activities, including the civil war in Yemen and the Khashoggi murder. In 2015, just after becoming defense minister, MbS led many transformational endeavours, both in foreign and domestic policies. Since the infamous Ritz-Carlton hotel imprisonment of many royals, MbS is now trying to pave his way to the throne and is ready for executing a number of Sahwa leaders in the upcoming days.

Historical episode

A decades long history reveals that there is no room for political Islam or any form of it in Saudi Arabia. Further, Riyadh does not want to see any Islamist leader in power across the region. This is because it directly poses an existential threat to the al-Saud family – the ruling elite. Therefore, it is the al-Saud’s strategy to eliminate significant Islamist opposition. The preachers of Sahwa are among those Islamists. They strongly opposed the government during the 1990s, saying that the settling of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia is against Islam. They took their position and began an awareness campaign in society, revolving around the idea that the al-Saud regime has lost its credibility and that they have become servants of Western powers, especially of the U.S.

Since the infamous Ritz-Carlton hotel imprisonment of many royals, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is now ready for executing a number of Sahwa leaders in the upcoming days.

During these years, the threat coming from Saddam to the Gulf monarchs was at its peak. To balance this threat, the Saudis invited the U.S. army to deter Saddam. The sheiks of Sahwa, especially al-Hawali and al-Awdah criticized the regime during their preaching. In May 1991, 52 scholars signed a declaratory Letter of Recommendation that was presented to King Fahd, urging him to revise his policies. However, the al-Saud family perceived this as a threat from the Sahwa movement. As the name implies, Sahwa means the “awakening” of society. Therefore, Al-Awdah was sentenced to imprisonment in 1994. After receiving the attention of the opposition, he was released in 1999 on the basis that he remained “moderate.”

Two days before his brutal murder, Jamal Khashoggi warned that al-Awdah will be executed for being moderated. According to UN experts, al-Awdah is considered to be a reformist, and that MbS also sees him as a threat. Therefore, 37 separate accusations were filled against Al-Awdah. Among these accusations include leading a terrorist organization, opposing the blockade against Qatar, cooperating with the Muslim Brotherhood, rivaling the success of the government, being in contact with the royal family in Qatar, threatening national security, and provoking violence.

Sahwa: Synthesis of Ikhwan and Salafism

Sahwa is a mergence of Ikhwan, i.e. the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism. The preachers, scholars and members of this movement are Salafi, but they are not from the traditional current that obeys the Saudi establishment. They differ from the traditional Salafist concept of Islam, which obeys the status quo government –whoever that may be. Therefore, Sahwa is an alternative that goes against the classic Wahhabi ulamas in Saudi Arabia, as they are considered to be Salafists but with Muslim Brotherhood ideas. The connection between the Sahwa and the Ikhwan can be traced back to the 1970s, when members of the Ikhwan, who were under pressure in Egypt and Syria, densely migrated to Saudi Arabia, bringing their ideas to the Kingdom.

Members of the Ikhwan settled in Saudi Arabia and managed to establish a university in which al-Awda and al-Havali were active members. During the reign of King Faisal, they had a chance to meet with several prominent educational institutions. Al-Hawali met with Mohammed Qutb, brother of a prominent Egyptian MB Sayyid Qutb and al-Awdah was educated by Mohammed Surur, who was a significant figure of Ikhwan in Syria. Al-Havali and al-Awdah were impressed by the Sahwa’s ideology.

The preachers, scholars and members of Sahwa movement are Salafi, but they are not from the traditional current that obeys the Saudi establishment.

The Sahva movement was significantly influenced by the Ikhwan political thinkers such as Muhammad Ahmad Al-Rashid, Muhammad Qutb, and Muhammad Surur. Standing against imperialism and having a plan to implement Sharia in the state system, Hassan al-Banna was an ideal for Sahwa’s proponents. In comparison with Ikhwan, Sahwa has no hierarchical organization with a certain structure, and is rather a loose system.

Another distinctive feature of Sahwa is that it has a different ideology from the modernist and liberal Islamists. They differ from liberal Islamist thinkers who are influenced by Western liberal philosophies and who believe that religion and politics must be separated from each other. According to them, the Islamic faith is applicable in all walks of individual and public life, including statecraft and public policy. The political factor is seen as an essential element of Sunni Islam from their point of view. Modernity and secularism are seen as two ideologies that contradict the Sunni Islamic understanding.

While Saudis generally perceive Islamists as a threat in general, the Sahwa scholars are considered as an existential threat.

Another factor that differentiates the Sahwa from other Islamic movements is that it does not urge for violence and revolution as a means to achieve its goal. Therefore, they also differ from jihadist groups that see violence as a legitimate tool in order to achieve religious goals. They believe that political reforms should not be implemented in Saudi Arabia through a revolution. Instead, the Sahwa urge for building a consensus among society for embracing reconciliation between scholars and the ruling elite, which will eventually bring political reform. Therefore, the sheiks of Sahwa are considered as prominent figures for all the Muslim world.

While Saudis generally perceive Islamists as a threat in general, the Sahwa scholars are considered as an existential threat. Therefore, the regime wants to deter society and intends to do this by executing them in order to install an empire of horror, imitating the Egyptian style of treating Islamists. In his quest for the throne, MbS needs to buy legitimacy from outside the kingdom. The traditional role of such leaders is to act as the “warrior against terrorism” and jump on the western ship. However, even if he succeeds in installing the empire of horror, or paving his way to the throne with the blood of Sahwa leaders, he still has to overcome a great obstacle within the royal family. Preventing a coalition between the regime and Islamists can effectively hinder his ascendance to the throne.

It has been exactly one year since Turkey officially switched to its current presidential system. This is a system that is on the one hand, oriented by global principles and on the other, by Turkey’s own dynamics based on previous and certain political experiences.

Given the current conditions, Turkey’s president is also a member of a political party (currently Erdogan is a member of the AK Party). This was prohibited between 1961-2017. Thus, with the new system, a new kind of politics occurred. In addition, there are current circumstances where the parliamentary majority consists of the AK Party-MHP alliance, and where some metropolitans are led by CHP mayors. This has led to arguments casting doubt on the performance of the new presidential system.

In the last 40 years, many efforts were made in order to reform Turkey’s system of government, which finally became reality in 2017-2018.

Firstly, one has to stress that the Turkish presidential system and the general historical search to solve Turkey’s chronic problem with its political system cannot be limited to the AK Party era or in particular to President Erdogan himself. Certain politicians in the past have gradually tried to circumvent significant problems of Turkey’s previous and lacking parliamentary system by making the offer to switch to either a semi-presidential system or to a system like the one in the U.S. In this sense, in the last 40 years, many efforts were made in order to reform Turkey’s system of government, which finally became reality in 2017-2018.

As I generally addressed in this column, I tend to not believe that Turkey’s opposition circles are really aiming to shift back to a parliamentary system. By this, I don’t mean the political elite, in particular around the CHP, but the secular-oriented Kemalist Turkish voters. During the presidential election in 2018 for instance, the CHP’s candidate, Muharrem Ince, interestingly stated that he does not aim to immediately switch back to the parliamentary system as soon as he is elected. According to Ince’s words, he wanted to work for approximately 2 years under the presidential system and then consider a shift back to the parliamentary system.

Interestingly, even the CHP chair Kemal Kilicdaroglu said that they had never requested to shift back to the old parliamentary system.

But to be honest, with regard to Turkey’s very dynamic political agenda, two years is not an actual persuasive time projection. These words had been interpreted by some voices that even the CHP was considering to accept the presidential system in the long-run. Maybe not in the exact words of Ince, but during his visit to Istanbul’s new mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, CHP chair Kemal Kilicdaroglu said that they [the CHP] had never requested to shift back to the old parliamentary system. This reveals –or most likely will clearly show in the near future- that Turkey’s current presidential system will be established in the future.

Maybe it does not seem that clear at the moment, but the opposition’s categorical rejection of the presidential system –as has been the case in previous years- most likely shifted to a rather cautious tone. This becomes obvious in the criticism by the CHP’s chairperson regarding the previous parliamentary system. By this, one should also take into account a fundamental development. Namely, the AK Party recently lost mayoral elections in Turkey’s main cities, Ankara and Istanbul. This has been interpreted as a result of the “blocs-oriented politics,” which is a result of Turkey’s new presidential system.  

To re-emphasize; the main idea of the new system of government is based on transparent policy-making, which additionally requires pre-electoral alliances in order to achieve the needed majority of 50 percent +1 vote prerequisite. Thus, the need to establish alliances also make it possible for the opposition to gather an alliance against the ruling government.

The debate over Turkey’s system of government have come to an end with the presidential system. But minor changes are possible.

As a consequence, in my opinion, discussions about Turkey’s system of government have come to an end despite several wishful thinking ambitions. I guess that in the long-run some minor changes may be made to reduce new regulations or shortcomings in the implementation of Turkey’s presidential system. However, a potential call or goal to re-shift to a pure parliamentary system does not seem very convincing. As I have already pointed out, the ability of opposition parties to form an alliance and to gather together is related to the fact that the new presidential system is well established, even though this fact is yet to be noticed.

In this context, it might be useful to look at the historical implementation and societal acceptance process of France’s new system of government after 1958/62 by center-right parties. Until that time, French leftists initially opposed the new semi-presidential system. However, in the following years it became clear that even French socialists, who of course differentiate themselves from Turkish leftists or particularly CHP members, got used to the new system and decreased their categorical rejection to the new system.

On July 14, 2015, Iran agreed a long-term deal on its nuclear program with a group of world powers known as the P5+1 – the U.S., UK, France, China, Russia and Germany. The agreement was signed after a long period of negotiations and tensions over Iran’s alleged efforts to develop nuclear bombs and missiles. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran agreed to limit its nuclear activities and allow IAEA to achieve international inspections in return for the suspension of deactivated economic sanctions.

Under the JCPOA, Iran’s 20,000 centrifuges were limited to installing no more than 5,060 of the oldest and least efficient centrifuges at Natanz until 2026. Iran’s uranium stockpile was also reduced by 98% to 300kg – a figure that must not be surpassed until 2031. Iran was also ordered to keep the stockpile’s level of enrichment at 3.67%. More, Iran will not be permitted to build additional heavy-water reactors or accumulate any excess heavy water until 2031.

Sanctions imposed on Iran before the deal by the UN, U.S. and EU, in an attempt to force Iran to halt uranium enrichment crippled the country’s economy, costing the country more than $160 billion in oil revenue from 2012 to 2016. However, under the deal, Iran gained access to more than $100bn in assets frozen overseas and was able to resume selling oil in the international market by using the global financial system for trade.

After two years of stable relations among the parties, relations went sour between the U.S. and Iran as a result of the U.S. withdrawing from the so-called “Iran Deal.” The withdrawal came under the Trump Administration after President Trump announced that the nuclear deal is “defective at its core.”

The first round of renewed U.S. sanctions imposed on Iran as part of Washington’s strategy to apply “maximum pressure” on Tehran over its alleged malign activity came into force on 7 August, 2018. These sanctions prohibited Iran’s purchase of U.S. dollars and precious metals as an attempt to cut the country off from the international financial system. Broad sanctions on Iran’s industry, ranging from carpets to health care and to the automotive and aviation sectors were also re-imposed.

A second chain of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s oil and gas sector was imposed on 5 November. More than 700 Iranian individuals, entities, vessels and aircraft was put on the sanctions list, including major banks, oil exporters and shipping companies. More than 100 big international companies had withdrawn from Iran due to the sanctions, which further escalated tensions between the two countries.

On 8 May, 2019 – the anniversary of the U.S. withdrawal – Iran gave a 60-day deadline to the remaining parties of the deal – China, France, Germany, Russia and the UK – to protect it from U.S. sanctions. Especially Tehran urgently demanded the E3 -France, Germany and the UK- to fully activate the INSTEX, which was founded after the U.S. withdrawal and the re-activation of the sanctions to continue trade with Iran, and to maintain their Iranian crude imports without constraint.

However, the point here is that although E3 announced that the INSTEX is now operational from July 1, 2019, Tehran is still not content with it since the scope of the mechanism is limited to humanitarian goods like food and medicine, does not have any effect on Tehran’s oil trade, which is the most revenue generator sector of its GDP.

Iran had suspended commitments it made under the terms of the 2015 nuclear deal, and Rouhani declared that Tehran would hang on to its stocks of excess enriched uranium and heavy water instead of exporting them. He also threatened to resume enriching uranium in 60 days, above its limit in case the remaining signatories do not make promises to shield the oil and baking sector from further sanctions.

At the end of the 60 days Iran set as a period for the remaining parties of the nuclear deal to make progress on the relief of sanctions, Iran declared it resumed enriching uranium above a concentration of 3.67% and threatened to keep reducing its commitments every 60 days until other parties to the deal could protect Tehran from the sanctions.

After Iran announced that it will break a limit set on uranium enrichment, in breach of the limit set on the 2015 nuclear deal, already existing tensions between Iran and the U.S. escalated to a new high.

On 8 July 2019, Tehran threatened major powers that they will not be able to negotiate a better deal than the landmark 2015 nuclear deal. Iran also threatened to restart deactivated centrifuges and ramp up its enrichment of uranium to 20 percent purity, which will constitute its following potential big moves away from the deal that Washington abandoned last year.On July 8, President Trump warned Iran that it “better be careful,” responding to Iran’s announcement that Tehran has breached the uranium enrichment limit set in the international nuclear accord.

Mike Pompeo also reacted on Twitter: “Iran’s latest expansion of its nuclear program will lead to further isolation and sanctions. Nations should restore the longstanding standard of no enrichment for Iran’s nuclear program. Iran’s regime, armed with nuclear weapons, would pose an even greater danger to the world.”

Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, asserted that the steps were “reversible” if European states carried their commitments. Zarif also stated that expecting Iran to reduce its uranium enrichment level to “zero” is a “delusion.”

More, White House National Security Adviser John Bolton said on Monday that the U.S. will keep increasing pressure on Iran until it abandons its pursuit of nuclear weapons and ceases its “violent activities in the Middle East.”

New sanctions were about to be imposed on Iranian bureaucrats, especially foreign minister Zarif, after the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned the Iranian Supreme Leader Rouhani’s office in June. İt was said that any further sanction against Iran might put an end to the diplomatic doors between the two countries. However, The United States made a decision, on 11th of July, to hold off the sanctions imposed on the Iranian Foreign Minister Mr. Zarif, which constitutes a positive step towards opening the diplomatic door again amongst the 2 countries.

*Written by Rahma Elfeky

After days of negotiations, an agreement was finally reached on the appointment of the top management within the major European institutions. The main positions to be renewed are five: the President of the Commission, the President of the European Council, the High Representative of Foreign Affairs, the Presidency of the Parliament and the Central Bank. Actually, the European Council plays an important role in certain appointment procedures for high-profile positions at EU level. Specifically, it is competent to elect the president of the European Council; to propose the president of the European Commission; to appoint the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of EU; to officially appoint the entire college of commissioners; to appoint the executive committee of the European Central Bank (ECB), including its President. Upon a majority vote elections, the new appointments will have the responsibility to carry the next five years legislature. The main groups running are Popular, Socialist, Liberal and Green groups. Indeed, the main issue was not just to put all four different political family together, but also the respect of geographical criteria – aiming to not upset any of the most important countries and the block of countries that move in a coordinated manner – and the criteria of gender.

The United States has long been using sanctions to change the behavior of target countries. It has been imposing several sanctions against different countries such as Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela. It can be observed that during the Trump period, the U.S. relinquished these decisions through its own national laws, which passed through the U.S. Congress and have not been supported by other countries. The reasoning the U.S. gave for early sanctions were violations of international norms and rules. Other countries were not on the same page with the U.S. and they opposed these decisions. Thus, the U.S. tries to internationalize its domestic laws through sanctions policies.

After the Russian annexation of Crimea, a number of politicians and generals became the targets of sanctions. These names consisted of those who were directly involved with the annexation. CAATSA, (Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act), has taken both the scale and impact of sanctions one step further. In addition, the DASKAA (American Security against Kremlin Aggression Act), bill has illustrated that the U.S. intends to further increase sanctions on Russia. CAATSA and DASKAA subsequently show that the U.S. front is spending overtime on sanctions and that future sanctions will be more comprehensive and effective.

Given the fact that 28 member states have different economic interests and historical ties with Russia, taking and implementing a joint decision on sectorial sanctions against Russia seems quite difficult for the EU. For instance, the EU cannot inflict sanctions on Gazprom or other Russian companies in the natural gas sector. On the other hand, it can impose lending and investment restrictions in the oil sector. In addition, the EU supports to a certain extent sanctions on petroleum-only projects for the sale of hydrocarbon exploration equipment, technology, and services.

The U.S. has been trying to internationalize its domestic laws through sanctions policies. 

The CAATSA sanctions singled out Russian activities undermining cyber-security, transactions with Russian defense and intelligence sectors, the development of Russian energy export pipelines and investment in Russian privatizations. This sanction covers the sale of critical oil extraction equipment to Russia, such as drilling rigs, horizontal drilling and well completion equipment. Moreover, restrictions have been imposed on equipment to be used in the deep sea, Arctic sea or rock and oil projects. Seismic data acquisition equipment, remote controlled vehicles and high-pressure pumps are also subject to sanctions under the CAATSA law. All these tools and equipment have been imprinted in order to reduce and weaken Russian production in the energy sector.

While the project has progressed by more than 50 per cent, the U.S. wants to increase pressure on Russia through the adoption of DASKAA for North Stream 2. However, this is not an exclusive target sought by the U.S. They are also trying to prevent Russia’s LNG projects in Europe and effect the liquefied gas terminal that Russia’s Novatek Company plans to build in Rostock. More, the U.S. is attempting to influence Rosneft, which has a share in three of the 12 German refineries. Likewise, German and Austrian governments have been concerned about the possibility of sanctions regarding investment firms since German, Austrian and other European energy companies, which finance the North Stream 2 pipeline, have the potential to face new sanctions owing to expanding Russia’s natural gas export ability.

The effects on Turkey

According to data gathered in 2017, Russia holds 106 billion barrels of oil reserves and owns 35 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves. Being one of the largest suppliers of EU countries and Turkey, Russia produces 635 billion cubic meters annually and about 210 billion cubic meters of natural gas is mostly exported to Germany and Turkey. Russia provides for almost half of the demand from these countries.

TurkStream and Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant are significant projects between Russia and Turkey in the energy area. The sanctions imposed by the U.S. have a major effect on the partnership Turkey has handled with Russia in this field. More, these sanctions, especially those concerning the energy sector, could become a controversial obstacle in any future cooperation between the two countries.

According to a distinctive provision of CAATSA, any kind of investment higher than 5 million dollars on the Russian energy export pipeline will face the issued sanctions. Furthermore, any investment that contributes directly and significantly to the Russian Federation’s capacity to build energy export pipelines will be considered within this scope. These sanctions are included in goods, services, technology, information and areas that support the construction, modernization, maintenance, and expansion of energy export pipelines. Thus, these sanctions have the potential to restrict the future activities of Turkish firms in the Russian energy infrastructure and construction sector.

The U.S. sanctions on Russia may badly affect the energy partnerships between Turkey and Russia, such as TurkStream and Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant projects.

If the DASKAA bill is enforced, sanctions will be imposed on companies that have cooperation in energy projects outside of Russia worth more than 250 million dollars. This bill, which is believed to have a negative impact on the development of relations between Turkey and Russia, will be a serious obstacle to the construction of new energy projects with Russia.

An intergovernmental agreement between Russia and Turkey was signed on October 10, 2016, in Istanbul. The agreement was adopted by the Turkish Assembly on December 2, 2016, and entered into force after it was published in the Official Newspaper on 6 December. On the other side, on January 22, 2017, the Duma –the lower wing of the Russian parliament- ratified the agreement. Later, during a session held by the Russian Council on February 1, 2017, the agreement on the TurkStream project was accepted. Thus, it is understood that the TurkStream project is not covered by the sanctions specified in CAATSA since it was applied on 2 August, 2017, before the CATSAA law was initiated. Likewise, the Akkuyu project is also not included in this range as it was initiated before the CATSAA law.

Energy security is a sensitive matter for Turkey due to the country’s dependency on external resources. This is why Turkey needs new projects and cooperation with energy exporters. The U.S. sanctions on Russia restrict Ankara’s cooperation with Moscow on the energy issue and will have a negative impact on the emergence of new projects. It is necessary to act within international platforms with other affected countries and react within the framework of international law for the abolition of the sanctions imposed.

In the last couple of weeks, Turkey has been witnessing an increase of hate speech against Syrian refugees. While the first traces had appeared on social media channels, refugees became exposed to physical and psychological attacks in daily life. Even though this issue is still being ignored among the public, it is crucial to discuss the reasons behind this phenomenon and possible ways to fight against it.

Although the exact number of Syrian refugees is unknown, the estimated number of refugees in Turkey is around 3.6 million. Since the migration flow that began in 2010, Turkey has illustrated great success in building refugee camps and providing access to first aid services. Nonetheless, due to the fact that the war in Syria has not ended, it is not possible to host all refugees in these camps. As a result, refugees migrated to cities in order to start better lives.

Today, 87% of Syrian refugees in Turkey are living in cities. While Istanbul hosts the highest Syrian population with around 500 thousand people, Gaziantep, Sanliurfa, Hatay, Adana, Mersin, and Bursa follow suit. Although authorized institutions and organizations such as the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), Directorate General of Migration Management, the Ministry of National Education (MEB), and the UN work for the integration of refugees in Turkey, there is still much work to be done.

Contrary to all struggles to integrate refugees into society, some circles have shown enormous reaction to this from the very beginning. Unfortunately, some high-level politicians and prominent public figures have also shown the same reaction against all integration efforts in Turkey.

 It is not acceptable to use hate speech against vulnerable groups, such as Syrian refugees, who do not have equal chance to defend themselves in public.

It is very well known that every society reacts against social integration and cohesion efforts to some extent. Nevertheless, it is not acceptable to use hate speech against vulnerable groups that do not have an equal chance to defend themselves in public.

I personally know a refugee who suffers discrimination on a daily basis. A couple of months ago, I met a 9-year-old Syrian refugee boy who is a primary school student. He told me that most of his classmates bully him at school but that he prefers not to respond. Indeed, there are loads of other refugees that experience the same kind of treatment in society. This definitely needs greater recognition.

As stated, increasing the awareness and recognition of this issue is crucial to fight against xenophobia and hate speech, which is on the rise in Turkey. The role of public figures is especially important in order to create awareness in all circles of society.

I met a 9-year-old Syrian refugee boy who is a primary school student. He told me that most of his classmates bully him at school but that he prefers not to respond.

Since most of the acts on dehumanizing Syrian refugees take place on social media, there is a need of a well-planned strategy to fight against it. Some right-wing extremist politicians blame refugees for the ongoing economic problems in the country and the level of unemployment. Since their ideas become very influential and spread all over society, there is a need of urgent actions on this issue.

The rise of hate speech in all circles of society shows that it is necessary to teach the importance of tolerance and respect for diversity at schools. The Ministry of National Education conducts comprehensive projects to teach these values at primary school. Nevertheless, all circles of society should show an effort to increase the awareness of the danger of rising xenophobia and hate speech against Syrian refugees before it is too late.

The six years long oppressive regime of Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi did little to prevent the growing opposition in Egypt. The country has witnessed increasing opposition towards the regime that was established in the aftermath of the July 3, 2013, military coup. Domestically, various social and political groups as well as the general public have increasingly been dissatisfied with the policies of the Sisi regime. A similar observation can be made for the perception of the Sisi regime among the international community. Major research institutions and news outlets claim that under the Sisi regime, Egypt is going towards a major breakdown that could affect not only the region, but wider geographies, including Europe.

There are two major reasons for the increasing discontent towards the Sisi regime. First, Egyptians and the international community believe that the Sisi regime is moving country to a more authoritarian stance. This is in total contradiction with what the revolutionaries of 2011 had hoped for when they managed to topple the three-decade long dictator, Hosni Mubarak. In the aftermath of the revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood leadership made a number of attempts to strengthen the democratic nature of the Egyptian state. However, the July 3 coup led by Sisi ended this short experience of democracy. Since then, the Sisi regime has been distancing Egypt from democracy and this is something that the revolutionaries would continue to stand up against.

Egyptians and the international community believe that the Sisi regime is moving country to a more authoritarian stance.

The second reason for this increasing discontent is the mismanagement of the Sisi regime. This can be observed in various fields such as the economy, security, social policy, the rule of law and foreign policy. Mistakes and wrong choices made by the Sisi regime in these fields have already caused a huge burden on Egyptians and will continue to bring additional problems in the short-term. It is widely believed in Egypt that if such policies continue to be implemented by the Sisi regime, the country will suffer both domestically and externally. This has created a political environment in which although there has been heavy pressure on the opposition, it has still achieved to stay alive.

Opposition towards the Sisi regime is not only limited with the Muslim Brotherhood organization, which suffered the most brutal crackdown in the country’s modern history. Other social forces that have different ideologies to the Muslim Brotherhood have also been dissatisfied with the policies of the Sisi regime. Egyptians are seriously disturbed by the loss of the gains made during the 2011 revolution and by the fact that the regime is increasingly becoming a repressive government. For this reason, the anti-Sisi opposition, which was largely led by the Muslim Brotherhood since 2013, has now spread to a wider audience that includes various ideological groups, including liberals, secular people and socialists.

This process is actually a result of a chain of events and policy choices that took place since 2013. In the aftermath of the military coup, the Sisi regime aimed to crash all the opposition that raised voice against the military takeover. Thousands of arrests and violent dispersals of protesters were initial signs of further repression. The Rabaa Massacre, where the Egyptian security forces killed more than a thousand protesters was the most obvious sign proving that the military regime would have no mercy for protesters who oppose the coup. In order to prevent a possible uprising, the Sisi regime gradually increased its pressure on the opposition regardless of their ideologies.

To prevent a possible uprising, the Sisi regime gradually increased its pressure on the opposition regardless of their ideologies.

Even the 6 April Movement and the Revolutionary Socialists, which supported the July 3, 2013, military coup, had their share of repressive policies of the regime. While leaders and scores of members of the 6 April Movement were arrested, a member of the Revolutionary Socialists was killed by the police during demonstrations in Cairo on the anniversary of the January 25 Revolution. The 6 April Movement was also barred from establishing a political party and was taken to court for being a terrorist organization. Following the heavy pressure, both the 6 April Movement and the Revolutionary Socialists had to step back to avoid further mistreatment from the Sisi regime.

As a result of the continuation of oppressive policies at home as well as the mismanagement of the country, Sisi has never been considered a reliable statesmen – not only in the eyes of the Egyptian people, but across the Middle East. Human rights violations, unjust court proceedings, arbitrary arrests and wide-spread torture have all caused a deep hatred towards the Sisi regime by millions of Egyptians. Despite developing good relations with regional actors, opening new initiatives in Africa and receiving the support of Western powers, Sisi has become a figure whose leadership skills and motivations are questioned by the masses and whose existence is seen as a problem for the stability of the country.

Human rights violations, unjust court proceedings, arbitrary arrests and wide-spread torture have all caused a deep hatred towards the Sisi regime by millions of Egyptians.

Finally, it can be observed that Sisi has lost the confidence of the Egyptian people. The Egyptian people no longer consider the Sisi regime as a government that can make democratic reforms, advance economic conditions, reduce poverty, bring political stability and achieve social integrity. It is also believed that the continuation of human rights violations, economic hardships and political instability will force the Sisi regime to re-consider its existence.

While relying heavily on the support of global powers, particularly from the U.S. and Israel, the Sisi regime does not take into account the fact that there is a deepening anger towards the administration domestically. The continuation of this trend may cause problems for Cairo that will have serious consequences with a devastating impact. The future of the Sisi regime is dependent on whether it will begin to address these issues and how Cairo will respond to domestic problems.

The Afrin region in Syria was liberated by the Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian National Army during Operation Olive Branch. Since then, the security of the region has been a main topic. Based on a dataset of two months of YPG attacks, I wrote earlier how the YPG is trying to sabotage security and how the YPG propaganda machine defends these terrorist attacks. Bellingcat published a report about the insurgency of the YPG in Afrin. The YPG has explicitly tried to undermine efforts to increase security as a strategy, but security is also undermined by crimes of Syrian National Army fighters and as a result of mass migration towards Afrin due to the forced displacement by the Assad regime of residents living in Ghouta, Homs, Hama and Deraa. While security in Afrin is better than in Deir Ezzor, Raqqa, Idlib, or Deraa, especially after the ‘Peace Operation’ targeting criminal gangs, it is very important to improve the security of the region for the sake of the people. This column will discuss some possible ways of improving security in Afrin.

1. Cleansing of Tel Rifaat

One of the main sources of the relative insecurity in Afrin is Tel Rifaat. The YPG is using the area protected by the Russians and the Assad regime in order to infiltrate Afrin, conduct terrorist attacks and intimidate locals cooperating with the Turkish authorities. As long as Tel Rifaat remains a safe-haven for the YPG, the security in Afrin will always be threatened. Turkey needs to find a way to clean the area, but until now, the Russian and Assad regime are rejecting any attempts, while not doing anything against the YPG themselves. The source of insecurity in Afrin will likely remain over the foreseeable future. Therefore, the only way of dealing with Tel Rifaat remains in trying to prevent infiltration from Tel Rifaat to Afrin as much as possible. In this regard, the wall in construction between Afrin and Tel Rifaat might ease the threat.

As long as Tel Rifaat remains a safe-haven for the YPG, the security in Afrin will always be threatened.

2. Strong Turkish footprint model

The Turkish Armed Forces currently have a light footprint in Afrin. Turkish soldiers are mainly located inside their bases and go on patrols with massive precautions and protective measures. The Turkish role is limited to advice, training and logistic support to the Syrian National Army and the Free Syrian Police in Afrin. If this changes and Turkey implements its New Southeast Strategy in Afrin, the security of the region might improve significantly. On the other side, a strong Turkish footprint model would directly risk Turkish soldiers and result in the impression of a Turkish annexation of Afrin, which may have other diplomatic and political consequences. Turkey’s engagement in Syria is based on the aim to preserve Syria’s territorial integrity and such a move might harm Turkey’s reliability.

If Turkey implements its New Southeast Strategy in Afrin, the security of the region might improve significantly. 

3. Forming a hierarchic governance

The security apparatus in Afrin is divided into four autonomous sections: The Free Syrian Police, the Syrian National Army, the free courts and local councils. All are officially related to the Syrian interim government. This could be changed entirely towards hierarchic governance in which a government oversees the work of all three sections and has full control over them, basically to establish an alternative government to the Assad regime in the northwest of the country. This move could also be empowered by popular elections in the region. However, this move is a double edged sword. While on the one hand it may boost the role of the Syrian opposition and challenge the Assad regime in its entirety, on the other, it will re-draw the dynamics of the Syrian conflict with its risks as well as its opportunities.

Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s remark “liberalism has become obsolete” was headlined in the Financial Times issue dated 27 June, 2019.

The liberalism meant by Putin is the administrative system based on “liberal values” that are defined by the American left and called “constitutional liberal democracy” by the West.

From the perspective of these values, Putin is often accused of a series of things, such as being “authoritarian,” ruling his country with an iron fist, silencing the opposition and condoning the killing of dissident names.

Until recently, it was a common belief that a country could not have an advanced capitalist system that would render it a big player in the global arena without having a democracy based on liberal values.

However, Russia, a country rich in energy resources and not liberal by any means, has been taking on crucial roles in the world scene. In addition, China is ruled by the Communist Party and has lately granted almost lifelong leadership to its new leader Xi Jinping. Despite its gigantic police state and its order that can send millions to concentration camps at the same time and can close big regions at the scale of countries to the world, China has the most rapidly advancing capitalist economy of the past 40 years and its critical position in the world order is obvious.

Turkey and liberal politics

Is Putin right? Has liberalism really gone beyond its purpose and become obsolete? These questions are discussed everywhere in the world nowadays, including Turkey, of course. In Turkey’s case, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been accused of being “authoritarian” and suspending democracy especially as of 2013. And lately, the EU has accused Turkey of going backwards in terms of the rule of law and human rights.

 Has liberalism really gone beyond its purpose and become obsolete? These questions are discussed everywhere in the world nowadays, including Turkey, of course.

The Western media often depicts President Erdogan as “the sultan of Turkey” with a typical orientalist gaze. This is a groundless insolence, because Erdogan’s power is based on popular support. It would be an insult to the Turkish nation if we compare the democracy in Turkey with countries like Russia, Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan. Turkey has always had a very vocal opposition. Turkey’s founding leader Kemal Ataturk had a strong opposition at the time, and Erdogan has a strong opposition today. Besides, the opposition in Turkey is on the rise in the current context.

Although the People’s Alliance, composed of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), has preserved its power by enjoying more than 52 percent of the vote share in the latest local election, the opposition led by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) caught an advantage in terms of morale, since it won critical metropolitan municipalities such as Istanbul and Ankara. The repeat of the Istanbul mayoral election and the victory of the CHP’s Istanbul candidate Ekrem Imamoglu by 54 percent in the re-election amped up the morale of the opposition and caused opponents to see Imamoglu as a strong candidate to run for presidency against Erdogan in the 2023 presidential election.

On June 23, Turkey reached the end of an array of elections and referendums that began in March 2014. We have gone through two local elections, three general elections, two presidential elections and one referendum over the course of the past five years. The latest June 23 election should also be recognized as a separate election. So, the Turkish electorate went to the polls for nine times within this period. And now, the closest election is scheduled to be held on May 2023, at least on paper.

Depicting Erdogan as “the Sultan of Turkey” is typically orientalist. President Erdogan’s power is based on popular support and Turkey has always had a very vocal opposition.

Turkey has been in a great turbulence since the Gezi Park incidents in May 2013. The Gezi Park incidents, which caused a serious political and societal damage, were followed by the December 17 and 25 investigations, a purge attempt by the members of Gulenist Terror Group (FETO), the coup attempt on 15 July, 2016, orchestrated by FETO and the state of emergency declared after the coup attempt.

Throughout this period, the AK Party government turned to polls for the legitimization of the fight against FETO, asked for the people’s approval, and resorted to several extraordinary legal measures as of December 2013.

These measures that were taken as part of the anti-FETO fight form the basis of the criticisms directed to Turkey in terms of going backwards in democracy, human rights and the rule of law.  

The AK Party government and President Erdogan revoked a part of the extraordinary measures on the grounds that they are no longer needed, but Turkey could still not return to its pre-2013 “normal” state. In early 2013, Turkey was seeking to become more liberal and had started announcing judicial reform packages. After several liberating reforms made in 2013, the country entered a long period of stagnation, which is still ongoing.

The judicial reform initiative announced before the June 23 election is the most crucial indicator of the fact that the ruling power in Turkey still wishes to turn back to the pre-2013 route.

Will the liberal order, claimed to be dead by Putin, resuscitate in Turkey in the following months or years?

Will the liberal order, claimed to be dead by Putin, resuscitate in Turkey in the following months or years? Does President Erdogan and his administration wish that new liberties and reforms would determine the agenda of the country in the run up to the 2023 elections? 

Turkey’s economic challenge 

Before scrutinizing this, the economic recession Turkey has been confronting is also worth a brief mention. Turkey is currently facing the economic consequences of the political turbulence ongoing since 2013.

In fact, the economic recession began in 2013, when Turkey entered this political turbulence. The country firstly experienced a slow growth rate, which turned into recession over time. It would not be wrong to suggest that since 2013, Turkish people have been growing poorer whereas their income and wealth levels are on a gradual decline as the Turkish Lira’s value against the U.S. dollar is considered.

There is a correlation between the political turbulence experienced with this recession and the extraordinary legal measures taken.

The Turkish economy has a serious structural weakness. It always needs foreign capital for economic growth. There is no problem as long as this capital comes as direct investment, but not all of what is needed comes as direct investment. Turkey takes loans from abroad to a serious extent. This high level of financial indebtedness makes economic actors very sensitive to the changes in the value of the Turkish Lira while increasing the volatility of the currency. This is unavoidable when the earnings are Turkish Lira-denominated but the debts are in foreign currency.

Even worse, it does not seem very possible to overcome this economic weakness in the short term. Therefore, all the administrations in Turkey need the inflow of foreign sources in order to improve the welfare of the Turkish people. They naturally want to meet this need by drawing direct foreign investment capital instead of taking loans, but as I mentioned above, direct investment does not always satisfy all the needs.

The economic conditions and the no-election period that will last until May 2023 oblige the government to turn back to the pre-2013 Turkey.

The sharp devaluation in the Turkish Lira as of early 2018 alarmed the Western banks lending to Turkey. Turkey can no longer find additional loans. According to the latest figures, Turkish companies have paid debts corresponding to more than $25 billion over the past 12 months, and still cannot find new loans to take.

So, the economic conditions and the no-election period that will last until May 2023 oblige the government to turn back to the pre-2013 Turkey. Adopting policies that will prioritize economic development and promote peace and stability, the rule of law and other liberal values and practices seem unavoidable.

Furthermore, we have seen in the past 5-6 years that Turkish foreign policy directly affects the economy and the welfare of citizens. Turkey’s foreign policy steps always seek to guarantee its own national survival and the peace of its neighborhood in a tough region of the world. In the following period, the government should concentrate on the policy of having fewer foes and more friends.

I think it would be too assertive to refer to them as a “return to liberal policies,” because what Turkey seeks in the first place is “normalization.” Only after the normalization process is completed economic growth is enabled, it will be possible to speak about liberalization.

Who won and who lost the local elections in Turkey? The answer to this question depends on your perspective. For instance, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli said prior to the elections that their target was to receive 52 percent of the vote share for the People’s Alliance, and the Alliance received 51.6 percent. Also, considering that 51.41 percent of the electorate opted for “yes” in the 2017 constitutional referendum and 52.6 percent voted for Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the 2018 presidential election, it is obvious that the current ruling party in Turkey is preserving its power.

On the other hand, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) Istanbul mayoral candidate, Ekrem Imamoglu, won the recent mayoral election by receiving 54.3 percent with the support of the Iyi Party and the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). Although this vote share has only been achieved in Istanbul and represents an alliance, no other CHP candidate has so far received such a high score. This vote share has also been marked as the highest rate a mayoral candidate has so far received in the history of Istanbul municipal elections. Beside this, the CHP’s Ankara candidate Mansur Yavas won the mayoral race in Ankara by receiving 50.93 percent of the vote, which was about four points higher than the ruling Justice and Development Party’s candidate Mehmet Ozhaseki.

The CHP has achieved quite a success in Turkey’s local elections. Does it mean the end of conservative politics in Turkey?

Since the CHP candidates won in Turkey’s capital city Ankara and most populous city Istanbul, it can be said that the alliance led by the CHP has achieved quite a success. So, is it possible to claim that the fears over the CHP persisting for years in the entire political spectrum aside from the CHP base have been overcome? Or, as many claim nowadays, has the heyday of the conservative politics led by Erdogan come to an end? My answer to the second question would be: “No, it has not. Muslim conservative values have been consolidated rather than decline all across Turkey, particularly in Istanbul and Ankara.”

First of all, Yavas is a former MHP member. So, he has a nationalist-conservative political background considering the stance of the MHP, which has been juxtaposed with the Western far-right movements for years in Europe (such a juxtaposition is problematic in many respects but this is the subject of another debate). He firstly became a mayoral candidate from the MHP for the local election held on 18 April, 1999, and was elected as the mayor of Ankara’s Beypazari district with 51 percent of the vote share. He was re-elected for the district in the 2004 election, and ran for Ankara mayor’s office from the MHP in 2009, but could not win the metropolitan race. When he was not nominated by the MHP in 2013, he passed to the CHP and ran for the metropolitan mayor’s office again from the CHP in 2014, but did not win then either. And finally, in the 2019 local election, he managed to become the mayor of Ankara. However, neither in his election campaign nor in any of his statements has he remarked a word that shows his allegiance to the CHP.  He has refused to wear the CHP badge and announced that he will not wear it. Yavas celebrated his Ankara victory with his friends by shouting Allah-u Akbar, demonstrating his belonging to the Turkish nationalist tradition.

Mansur Yavas celebrated his Ankara victory with his friends by shouting Allah-u Akbar and demonstrating his belonging to the Turkish nationalist tradition.

For the first time in the history of the CHP, a candidate has ceaselessly issued statements with religious and conservative underpinnings during his campaign. On his first day in office as Istanbul mayor, Imamoglu made an unprecedented act that was not seen even in the periods of the AK Party or late Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party. He summoned a religious clerk to his office and made him recite the Quran. Also, maintaining separate time periods allocated to men and women for municipality swimming pools (one of the reasons for closing the Welfare Party in 1998 was allocating separate sections for men and women in swimming pools), and keeping the alcohol ban in the cafes and restaurants owned by the municipality were among the election promises of İmamoğlu. Although several names within pro-CHP media outlets and a few CHP politicians tepidly reacted to such promises during the first weeks of his campaign process, İmamoğlu has continued to pursue his politics with a religious and conservative emphasis for six months.

The CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu did not appear in the media and abstained from issuing any public statements throughout the election campaign due to the fear that the CHP’s shadow might jeopardize Imamoglu’s image. Pleased with the election result, Kilicdaroglu hinted after the election that the same political rhetoric would continue. Brushing all the questions such as “Is this rhetoric sustainable?” and “What will the CHP base think after a while?” aside, it must be stressed that the CHP candidate received votes from the conservative Turkish and Kurdish people thanks to this new political discourse that propagated separate sections for men and women in pools, alcohol-free restaurants and cafes, freedom for different clothing styles, and prevention of any kind of discrimination against women in hijab in public and private sectors.

Ekrem Imamoglu received votes from the conservative people thanks to his political discourse that propagated separate sections for men and women in pools, alcohol-free restaurants, etc.

In this political atmosphere and the post-truth world (a world where lies comprise the only remaining truth, to quote an academic studying intellectual history), such acrobatic maneuvers of the CHP can work and have apparently worked in the recent period. It is dubious whether a normal political praxis will replace acrobatics and turn into a political stance, or whether the lifestyle of Muslim conservatives will stop being a space of intervention for the CHP. Nevertheless, it is undoubted that the successive election victories of the AK Party led by Erdogan for the past 17 years despite all the challenges in modern Turkey obliged the CHP to lean towards (at least ostensibly) to the values it has been against for 95 years.

Established in Canada in 2006, Wattpad is an internet community for readers and writers that has more than 40 million active monthly users and is available in over 50 languages. After the U.S. and Philippines, Turkey is the third country with the highest number of Wattpad users. In Turkey, Wattpad is gradually growing in popularity with more than three million users and seven million stories published in Turkish.

Viewing the reader profile in Turkey, it is noteworthy that the average time spent on reading printed books is one minute per day, whereas this time is around 30 minutes per day for Wattpad. Reading books on electronic platforms is gaining prominence in line with the spirit of generation Z and the technological tendencies of the youth. However, observing the reading habits of the youth and analyzing the effects of platforms like Wattpad on these habits are particularly necessary in Turkey, which does not have an established reading culture and ranks 86th in the index of most reading countries.

Teenagers aged between 10 and 18 comprise the most active group in Wattpad. With this platform, teenagers can satisfy their socializing and sharing needs. Wattpad appeals to younger demographics since it is easily accessible and free of charge, provides an opportunity to publish content freely and stimulates imagination and creativity. The readers on Wattpad can like, comment on, or criticize the contents via notifications. In this sense, Wattpad’s functions of helping teenagers create their own language, compose their own audience and interact with them increase the platform’s popularity. Wattpad also presents the youth an opportunity to get away from the pressures of the external world, brings them popularity and recognition, and provides the opportunity of gathering around stories, sharing them among peer groups and forming sympathy.

The threat posed by Wattpad

Apart from all these factors that attract the youth to Wattpad, the online platform has some negative features that are not so visible, yet which threaten the audience. In the stories they write, young writers prefer portraying marginal, narcissistic, depressive, violence prone, psychologically troubled or anti-social characters in order to have more followers and address a larger audience. In doing so, they sugarcoat risky or marginal behaviors, anomalies and negative psychological states.

The youth in Wattpad generally read and write fiction in the categories of romance, young adult fiction, fantastic literature and science fiction. Plots of many such stories involve violence, sexual abuse, rape, pornography, pedophilia or social exclusion. It is striking and curious that the fictions narrating the stories of emotional bonds between characters despite all the sexual abuse are found desirable. Children’s and adolescents’ direct exposure to such contents negatively affect their personality and identity development, emotions and minds.

The stories involving explicit sexuality, eroticism, pornography and distorted relationships lead the youth to become more repressive, conservative or deviant in their relationships while increasing their violence prone behaviors, hampering the development of their sense of self and self-esteem and harming their sense of privacy. In addition, the stories that get high numbers of clicks or likes on Wattpad are published by publishing houses. These books enjoy great interest in book fairs and autograph sessions, which increases the social acceptability of Wattpad’s transition from a digital platform to the printing sector in Turkey. 

Young Wattpad writers prefer portraying marginal, narcissistic, depressive, violence prone, psychologically troubled or anti-social characters in order to have more followers.

In the current context, it can be argued that alongside social media, Wattpad and transmedia storytelling might be playing a role in the growing sexual abuse and violence cases. In 2018, the number of reported abuse cases reached its peak in Turkey. Accordingly, children have been subjected to fifty sexual assaults per day and such cases have increased four times compared to the previous year. So, it may be asserted that digital storytelling has a major role in increasing sex crimes and the gradual degeneration of society due to negative behavioral patterns imbedded in the collective subconscious.   

Moreover, the stories in the platform might lead to wrong orientations among teenagers as they might take the characters in the stories as role models. The Wattpad stories that involve aggression, sexuality, sexual abuse, emotional and physical violence cause introversion, dysfunctional relations, traumas stemming from early sexual experience, and legitimization of violence considering that adolescence is a phase in which people need to assert themselves as individuals, become independent, look for values, need to love and to be loved in return, and make future plans. When they leave the virtual world, adolescents can confront serious problems in perceiving real life and social relations. In this regard, Wattpad is detrimental to not only individuals, but also the future of society.

Wattpad and transmedia storytelling might be playing a role in the growing sexual abuse and violence cases. In 2018, the number of reported abuse cases reached its peak in Turkey.

Several factors such as the absence of an established reading culture in Turkish society, the replacement of conventional printing and publishing activities by digital platforms, new media’s spotlighting the culture of exposure, and the inability to realize Tukey’s cultural potential increase the negative effects of the platforms like Wattpad on society.

The most important factors leading the youth to follow inappropriate contents in Wattpad include the fact that they cannot reach the “fantastic” characters they read about in Wattpad in daily life, emotional and cognitive dissatisfaction from the family and the education they receive, and the absence of strong role models who will shape their world of meanings. Also, the youth sympathizing with amoral characters and taking them as role models might profoundly affect their family and social relations, education and careers. It is evident that the youth are vulnerable and highly impressionable in the face of the threats posed by this platform although they lean towards it with intellectual motives. Furthermore, some books written by several Wattpad writers have been adapted into screenplay, which manifest the rising influence of the platform.

In order to get rid of the possible threats posed by Wattpad, content checks should be made, the age limit should be heeded, or the logins of children and adolescents on such platforms should be under parent control.

Wattpad, which at first seems promising in terms of filling the gaps in children’s literature and young adult fiction in Turkey and the world, is taking generation Z by storm with the contents published on it. Considering that the rate of selectively and regularly reading books in the 7-14 age group in Turkey is 35 percent, it becomes obvious that Wattpad’s prominence will negatively affect children and adolescents as it will change the form of reading culture and intellectual motives.

In order to get rid of the possible threats posed by Wattpad, content checks should be made, the age limit should be heeded, or the logins of children and adolescents on such platforms should be under parent control. However, the current control mechanisms on technologies and communications cannot prevent access to online networks. So, cooperation within the family and educating and raising awareness on the subject appear as the best solution. Parents must be especially informed on the 18+ contents written randomly and having inappropriate features. Relevant state institutions should spearhead and disseminate digital culture channels and establish new platforms that will satisfy and appeal to generation Z.  

“In the Far East if you want to come together, we should start with a common trading currency, not to be used locally but for the purpose of settling of trade. …… the global market is tied to the US dollar, which gives room for the currency to be manipulated” (Dr. Mahathir Mohamad)

The “25th International Conference on the Future of Asia” was held in Tokyo – Japan on 30 May, 2019. The theme of the conference this time was “Seeking a New Global Order – Overcoming the Chaos.” The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad as a keynote-Speaker inaugurated the conference and without losing time criticized the risks of a U.S.-dominated unipolar world and the instability of the world’s reserve currency, the fiat U.S. dollar. He suggested Asian leaders and advisors to rethink on a single Asian currency that is linked to Gold. Dr. Mahathir advocated that the same currency can be used for international trade and investment amongst the Asian economies. And could also serve as an alternative to minimize the dependency on the U.S. Dollar. As a quick refresher, the 93 year old Dr. Mahathir was the Prime Minister of Malaysia from 1981 to 2003, and again took office in May 2018. He also served as Malaysia’s minister of finance from 1998- 1999 and between 2001 -2003.

Dr. Mahathir’s remarks are very similar to what he has advocated in the past. He has been well known for his criticisms of the International Monitory Fund (IMF) and the international currency markets. It was during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 that Dr. Mahathir singled out currency speculators and traders. He openly condemned George Soros, as being responsible for the demise of Malaysian ringgits during the Asian Financial crises, a period in which the Malaysian Ringgit lost much of its value. Hence, it is easy to apprehend when Dr. Mahathir asserted that “in the Far East, if you want to come together, we should start with a common trading currency, not to be used locally but for the purpose of settling of trade. At the moment we have to depend upon the US dollar, but the US dollar is also not stable. So the currency that we propose should be based on gold because gold is much more stable.”

Asia has a long history when it comes to dealing with floating fiat currencies or trading in gold, silver and copper coins.

The veteran statesman in the past has also proposed the Islamic countries (i.e. Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and many countries of the Middle East) to opt for “gold dinar.” The Muslim world indeed holds a very long history of gold dinar (a gold coins weighing 4.5 grams), which was used as a basic mode of exchange from the 7th century through the 13th century. Likewise, Muammar Gaddafi of Libya also presented a similar notion where he proposed a common gold-standard policy for Islamic North Africa, and Africa. And it is generally assumed by quite a few that the perceived threat of this plan, to the hegemony of the floating fiat U.S. dollar, was one of the key factors that led to the invasion of Libya by U.S.-led NATO forces in 2011, which paved Gaddafi’s downfall.  

Further, Dr. Mahathir noted that the idea of adopting another currency such as Chinese Yuan or Japanese Yen is not favored amongst the Asian countries. This is merely due to the fear of a loss of one’s sovereignty/autonomy. For that reason, the idea of introducing a Pan Asian gold currency is more viable in order to neutralize such reservations. Nevertheless, if the project becomes accepted in the near future the local currencies could also follow the same policy of linking to gold, which would eventually bring all of Asia under a common currency standard. This solution would likewise maintain the sovereignty of the domestic currency excluding the need for a centralized institution like the European Central Bank, and all the supranational superstructure that has accompanied it.

Interestingly, Asia has a long history when it comes to dealing with floating fiat currencies or trading in gold, silver and copper coins. For instance, China throughout the 11th and 15th century used paper currency for trade and commerce. And later reverted to silver, gold and copper coins and continued to deal in the same till mid-1930s. In fact, a number of Asian countries (like; Japan, Korea and Vietnam) in the past did follow the Chinese paper currency model. So much so, that the paper currency of China’s Yuan Dynasty was also used in Indonesia and in some parts of Europe for a number of years, even before the West formally introduced fiat money. However, the past showcases that the experience of Asia with paper currency was never worthy, hence, time and again the Asians reverted back to gold, silver and copper coins.

China, Russia, Iran and Turkey are aiming to bypass the U.S. Dollar and a common currency backed by the gold standard can be a valid option for all.

One can confidently affirm that gold has fascinated man since the very beginning. And what seems more attractive is the idea presented by Dr. Mahathir of having a currency that can be backed by the gold standard. Rather than a worthless fiat currency, gold backed currency would not only be holding real value, but would also be a hard currency. Importantly, one needs to recognize that over the last few years Russia and China have been proposing a framework that would manage and accommodate transactions in gold, bypassing the U.S. dollar and U.S. hegemony. In addition, both the countries are trying to make most of their transactions in gold since the two have been amassing gold reserves at a rapid pace compared to other countries.

At the same time, China, Russia, Iran and Turkey are aiming to bypass the U.S. dollar. And with the introduction of a common currency backed by gold can be a valid option for all. It is worth mentioning that a gold standard if implemented not doubt be allowing countries to flee away from the whims of the policy makers in Washington. The price of gold unlike U.S. dollar cannot be simply manipulated by even powerful governments. A world trading in gold currency will not be easily disrupted by the trade wars among two other countries or even a group of other nations.

Nevertheless, replacing the U.S. dollar may not be so simple or straight forward as it may seem.

As gold is universally acknowledged, therefore, sanctions even from a giant economic state cannot bar friendly states from trading peacefully in currencies operating under a gold standard. Nevertheless, it is fairly evident that replacing the U.S. dollar may not be so simple or straight forward as it may seem. The process of introducing an Asian common currency will be a long-term attempt which not only requires a strong political will within the region but also a considerable amount of time and effort. Hence, the young Asian leaders need to take heed from the 93 year old Dr. Mahathir’s call and work towards making this notion a reality.

The PKK is a terrorist organization that was formed in the late 1970s and launched an armed struggle against the Turkish government in 1984, calling for an independent Kurdish state within Turkey. While Abdullah Ocalan is the leader of the terrorist organization, Kesire Yildirim, Haki Karaer, Cemil Bayik, and Kemal Pir are among the founders of the PKK. The main goal of the organization is to occupy the eastern and southeastern parts of the Anatolia Region of Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq on the lines of revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ideology and separatist ethno-nationalist principles, calling for Kurds to establish an independent state in the region.

The PKK chose to base its aim on armed struggle. It committed massacres against unarmed and innocent people in not only Turkey but across the region. Since its foundation in 1984, more than 40 thousand people lost their lives because of PKK terrorism. They’ve attacked tourists, tourist facilities and organizations. The terrorist organization has and continues to pursue sabotage-type attacks on facilities, institutions, and infrastructures in order to prevent investments and damage the economy, and to also make propaganda abroad. The PKK is also into organized crime, illegal human smuggling and drug trafficking. The organization is listed as a terrorist organization internationally by numerous countries, including the members of the European Union and other countries such as the U.S., Canada, and Australia. While the U.S. recognized the PKK as a terrorist organization in 1997, the EU designated the group as terrorist entity in 2004.  

Following the op-ed written by Cemil Bayik –one of the five founders of the PKK and the second-hand man of the organization- and published by the Washington Post on Wednesday, Turkey’s foreign ministry, top diplomats and politicians highly denounced and condemned the American newspaper for its level of hypocrisy.

Turkey’s Foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, slammed the U.S.-based Washington Post for making “terrorist propaganda” during a live interview with Turkish state channel, TRT.

A statement made by the ministry read: “A head terrorist of the PKK –listed as a terrorist organization by many countries, including the U.S., and which has brutally massacred tens of thousands of innocent people- has brazenly engaged in terrorist propaganda by using The Washington Post.”

The statement also stressed that there should be no discrimination between terrorist organizations in the fight against terror.

Further, the statement read: This publication has violated the principle of “preventing the promotion of terrorism,” which is the most important commitment of the international community in the fight against terrorism.

Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Serdar Kilic, tweeted: The Post “took the profession of journalism to new lows” by giving a platform to one of the PKK’s “bloodthirsty” leaders.

“This is an affront not only to the Turkish people but also to the memories of tens of thousands of innocent men, women and children who became victims of terror at the hands of the PKK,” he stressed.     

“It should be noted that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that providing support to even nonviolent activity of a terrorist organization violates the anti-terror laws of the U.S.,” Kılıç added.   

Spokesperson to the Turkish president, Ibrahim Kalin said: “It is not possible to explain this with freedom of press and expression. To portray one of the leaders of a terrorist organization as the representation of Kurds is, above all, an insult to the Kurds.”

Kalin added: “It’s a grave scandal that an article written by a terror organization member has been published in the Washington Post.”

In the written statement, Kalin also stated: “The Washington Post, which provided space for a terrorist that is on the list of terror organizations of the U.S. and the EU as well as awarded a prize by the U.S. administration, openly makes propaganda for terrorism and violates the U.S. laws.”

*Written by Rahma Elfeky.

“I long for freedom. I long for it.

The people are unsafe in their homes.

Young and old they all know whoever kills their own people is a traitor.

Freedom is what the people demand.

From Homs, to Daraa, to Banias.”

– Abdul Basit Saroot

These are the words of a song written and sung by Abdul Basit Saroot, who was the voice of a nation ripped apart by a crimson dictator hell bent on keeping power at any cost.

Before the war he was a young and promising goal keeper for the junior Syrian national football club.

When protesters hit the streets he decided to join them and take a stand against the violence, arrests, torture, and treachery of the regime towards civilians.

Of course, his time as a member of the junior national football club didn’t give him preferential status.

Instead it made him and his family a direct target for regime attacks. Eventually, he and four of his siblings, as well as his father were are killed in regime attacks.

During protests anti-Assad revolutionaries could pick out his voice from a crowd of tens of thousands.

With a hoarse tone and a mellow melody about it, his voice became the calling cry of Syrian revolutionaries around the world.

He spent many months besieged in Homs and reluctantly left in a deal struck between the opposition and the regime in 2014.

Activists like Abdul Basit Saroot have become icons for the Syrian opposition and are endeared by many Syrians searching for an alternative to the dictatorial rule of the Assad regime.

Following his death in a hospital in southern Turkey on June 8, his funeral procession was attended by tens of thousands of Syrians displaced by years of war.

Even though there are always deaths, natural and otherwise, the Syrian community in southern Turkey responded voraciously to the news of Abdul Basit Saroot’s death.

Activists like Abdul Basit Saroot have become icons for the Syrian opposition and are endeared by many Syrians searching for an alternative to the dictatorial rule of the Assad regime.

Thousands of displaced Syrians gathered at a mosque in Reyhanlı, Turkey and held funeral prayers for him and then delivered his body to Idlib where another procession of mourners took him to a graveyard and buried Saroot next to his brother. Syrians who couldn’t reach there held their own prayers for Saroot around the world as well.

The mobilization of all these people revived a sense of purpose to the Syrian revolution and triggered serious discussions about reviving the revolutionary spirit among Syrians.

Losing an icon like Abdul Basit Saroot is a tragedy for the family, friends, and even the revolution. However, his death brought people together and rekindled a revolutionary spirit that had faded in the hearts of many Syrians suffering from the fatigue of non-stop war and death for eight years.

Why is all of this significant?

This reality reveals a state of the Syrian conflict that is contrary to that which claims the Syrian revolution is over and Assad has won the war.

Syrians that have been displaced, more than 10 million, about half of Syria’s prewar population, are still committed to the revolutionary change that they set out for in 2011.

Saroot’s songs are famous for invoking freedom and bringing down the Assad regime. His songs also reminded people of their homes and serenaded the idea of once again returning to them – without Assad.

Upon his death those lyrics were sung in unison via social media and in demonstrations inside Syria and around the world commemorating the revolutionary spirit that Saroot stirred among the masses. Uniting a large cohort of the Syrian people who many suspected were no longer united.

Another revelation is that Syrians, especially those that have fled the war, do have an opinion. They haven’t grown callous from many years of war as some might suggest.

The reality reveals a state of the Syrian conflict that is contrary to that which claims the Syrian revolution is over and Assad has won the war.

Currently the regime, backed by Russia and Iran, and with incentivized reconstruction programs from the international community via the UN, is trying to change the focus of the conflict from violent military action to reconstruction and a political process.

Part of that effort, according to the UN resolution 2254, requires that an election would take place after an 18 month transition period.

According to the agreement even those Syrians that are displaced, living in non-regime controlled areas of Syria, as well as abroad, should be able to take part in such a vote.

As we can see from their reaction to the news of Saroot’s death, it’s clear that those Syrians are willing to let their voices be heard.

Whether Syrians will get the chance to go to the ballot box and choose who will lead them next is yet to be determined.

But what Saroot’s death tells us for sure is that there is real opposition to Assad’s rule that may disagree on many issues, but are united by a voice that called for overthrowing Assad and eventually gave his life for the cause.

As the Russian backed regime bombing campaign stacks up a higher death toll and the destruction of critical infrastructure cripples civilian life, the millions of people affected by the violence are not going to easily forget what and who caused their loss and suffering.

Signs of such sentiment can be found in other parts of Syria as well, where with Russia’s help, the regime managed to take over.

For example in Daraa, on the Syrian-Jordanian border, Syrians that entered into so-called reconciliation agreements continue to show opposition to Assad rule through demonstrations, protests, and armed resistance.

This came after regime and Iranian forces entered the area and began arresting, abducting, and abusing the locals. They were even forcefully conscripting former armed opposition fighters and forcing them to fight on the front lines in northern Hama, southern Idlib and rural Latakia.

But those fighters that actually reached the front lines were unwilling to fight, or ran away, and on the whole were ineffective in the fighting since May.

The regimes and its allies have employed these failed policies since the regime took full control of the region in southern Syria.

However unlikely it seems now, if the regime did manage to take all 4,800 square kilometers of the remaining northwestern pocket, Syrians there and in the region will surely voice their objection to living under the rule of a dictatorial regime backed by international allies who have no regard for international law and don’t represent the interests of the Syrian people.

‘‘You have to understand, no one puts their children in a boat, unless the water is safer than the land’’ – Warsan Shire, Somali poet.

Imagine you are stranded on a boat in the Mediterranean Sea. The sun is scorching your frail dehydrated body. And you are a mother – from an African country or war-ravaged Syria and Afghanistan – with small kids on a boat full to the brim with people who are destitute like you. The sea is vast. The horizons blue. The sun’s heat seems to evaporate all the hopes you have. Death only hovers over the boat.

No port on mainland Europe will accept your boat. ‘Lethal Fortress Europe’ will rather have your boat capsize and all of you perish in the vast Mediterranean sea – never to be heard of again. But if you are lucky enough, you might be rescued by Sea-Watch, a group of civilian sea rescue team, and they do this at a greater personal cost.

For Matteo Salvini, Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, saving immigrants stranded in the Mediterranean Sea is an ‘act of war’ against Italy and Europe. Salvini is a grotesque politician. His political ethos and rationale are informed by a fringe but now anti-migrant and racist views are the mainstream in far-right politics in Italy. He has turned back ships and boats carrying thousands of migrants back to the seas – breaking international, European and Italian laws.

Imagine being a refugee, where no port on mainland Europe will accept your boat. ‘Lethal Fortress Europe’ will rather have your boat capsize and all of you perish in the vast Mediterranean – never to be heard of again.

Europe has no migrant crisis

Since 2014, a particular narrative has been at the centre of global media outputs: one that emphasized that Europe has an incessant immigrant crisis. Images of Syrian immigrants – fleeing the horrors of a brutal war – walking in hordes while crossing European borders have been permanent in television screens all over the world. The dangers and precariousness of their maiden journeys were insignificant. Small Eastern European nations were quick to react. Serbia and Slovenia raised a barbed wire. Hungary and Bulgaria arrested migrants indefinitely. Emmanuel Macron and Matteo Salvini exchanged accusatory words, all while lambasting Germany’s refugee policies. And we were also told Brexit happened because of immigrant fears and anxiety – not only Syrians, but also of Polish and Romanian migrants.

Nevertheless, Europe has a minuscule immigrant number within its borders. Turkey and Jordan have the highest immigrants since the Syrian civil war erupted. Today, Turkey has 3.6 million refugees in camps and in humanitarian centres. Jordan homes close to 800,000 both Iraqi and Syrian refugees. All along we had an immigrant crisis, but not in Europe. Western media houses hyperbolized and sensationalized the issue – and this had a political consequence; right-wing parties gained relevance in European and national politics.

Resort beaches from Spain to Turkey are sporadically awash with immigrant bodies and belongings.

In countries like Poland and Hungary, anti-immigration rallies were a common feature despite having a hand-full of immigrants. Immigrants fleeing war were seen as dangerous. They were an affront to the supposedly humanistic European identity and civilization. Viktor Orban, the Prime Minister of Hungary (a nation morphing into the dystopian The Handmaid’s Tale), declared that Europe ‘‘doesn’t see these people as Muslim refugees. We see them as Muslim invaders.’’

However, it is no secret that Europe is a ‘dream’ destination for immigrants. Immigrants from Africa, who are fleeing poverty, instability and state violence prefer Europe as their final destination. Syrian refugees – in their millions – in Turkey and Jordan are content with the stability and peace they already have in these countries, but regardless, will also prefer Europe as their final destination. In their journeys to Europe, the immigrants are at the mercy of human traffickers and boats that are prone to capsizing. The Mediterranean Sea – a sea that has historically connected all Mediterranean basin civilizations and values – has become the graveyard for thousands of immigrants seeking better lives and livelihood. Resort beaches from Spain to Turkey are sporadically awash with immigrant bodies and belongings.

Drowning migrants, detaining rescuers

On June 29, Italy detained Carola Rackete, the captain of a rescue ship that was carrying 40 immigrants who were stranded in the seas near the Italian island of Lampedusa. What were her charges? Assisting and rescuing immigrants in the Mediterranean seas. Previously, her ship, the Open Arms, received a fine of 900,000 Euros (1.02m USD) from Spain for rescuing immigrants stranded off the coast of war-torn Libya. Helping, assisting and even rescuing immigrants from the pawns of death will land you in prison and fines in Europe. Immigrants are supposed to perish in the seas, not seek asylum in European countries.

Another captain of a rescue ship, Pia Klemp, faces more than 20 years jail time for rescuing 1000 African immigrants. The state of Italy brought criminal charges against her: the prosecutors argue she is collaborating and aiding human traffickers, not the immigrants – what a mockery to our intelligence! European nations are arresting rescuers and slapping fines on humanitarian groups aiding immigrants. They also support –both diplomatically and materially- Khalifa Haftar’s militia in Libya, and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) – all groups that kill, torture, maim and enslave immigrants in North Africa and sabotaging democracy in Sudan respectively. On 3 July, Haftar forces attacked in an air raid a UN refugee support centre, killing more than 50 people. Haftar’s militia and RSF are the EU’s no-more-secret proxies that guard and protect ‘fortress Europe’ from far-away lands.

Helping, assisting and even rescuing immigrants from the pawns of death will land you in prison and fines in Europe.

So far this year 356 migrants have died in the Mediterranean Sea trying to reach Europe – and these are only the official figures. On average, nearly 2000 migrants drowned in the seas on their way to Europe. This is how it happens: their boats approach Greece, Italy, France or Spain coasts, and they are turned back by the coast guards. These small boats are now stranded in the vast Mediterranean seas, and if they are not rescued by groups like the Sea-Watch or by a Samaritan captain like Carola or Pia, they wait for their deaths at the vicinity of fortress Europe. They are unwelcomed guests, or rather, Agamben’s Homo Sacres, ought to be killed by EU-funded rebels in North Africa or drown and die in the Mediterranean.

Europe has a responsibility when it comes to immigrants under international law. The attack by Khalifa Haftar, a rogue figure backed by the EU, Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Libya’s political conundrum, amounts to crimes against humanity. Europe has neglected its political and moral values vis-a-vis immigrants. Europe’s operation Triton – a brutal counter-immigration policy framework, disguised as helping immigrants – is a failure. Immigrants are drowning in the Mediterranean Sea, imprisoned in squalid conditions in Bulgaria and Greece, and now murdered en masse by Haftar’s militias. The EU is employing extreme measures and monstrous actors in dealing with immigrants. Fortress Europe has become sociopathic, as Belen Fernandez puts it succinctly.

During the past weekend, former head of Germany’s federal domestic intelligence, that is to say, the country’s previous federal “spymaster,” Hans-Georg Maaßen, gave a very controversial speech in the southern German city of Weinheim. Maaßen is the person who in the near past openly came against Germany’s Chancellor, Merkel – to the person whose authority he was actually working under. The title of his one-hour long speech was “Germany in danger – why we have to defend our security.” The event was organized by the local Christian Democrats (CDU) and the so-called “Werteunion” (union of values), which can be described as an association of conservative CDU members, who challenge Merkel’s rather liberal policies.

Maaßen has also been a member of this association since February this year. The former domestic intelligence chief was invited to hold a speech and due to his current work as an advisor/consultant and advocate/lawyer in the private sector, there was no obstacles for him to do so. When one focuses on the content of the speech, it is possible to notice that Germany has an urgent problem with far-right extremism and the main problem within this is the fact that the threat emanating from this issue is under-estimated.

Hans-Georg Maaßen gave a very controversial speech in the southern German city of Weinheim with the title of “Germany in Danger: Why we have to defend our security”

It is quite known that –particularly German nationalists- are generally cautious when explaining their actual positions. Due to this, they tend to use sentences such as “one should be allowed at least to say this or these things…” in order to legitimize their – generally – either prejudiced, racist, or far-right sentiments. Similarly, Maaßen stated, “I’m always happy when I can leave Germany,” due to the alleged fact that by temporarily leaving Germany for a trip abroad, he is then able to convey his opinion. This, according to him, is not possible in Germany.

It is interesting and of course –ultimately- legitimate that Maaßen is not a supporter of a positive migration policy in contrast to Merkel, as he stresses his stance by mentioning, “I’m not a friend of immigration policy,” which his CDU audience in the room applauded with joy.

Maaßen continued his words, which he most likely elaborated as being a mouthpiece for all “quiet but angry conservatives” with his controversial statement:

“I did not join the CDU thirty years ago to allow 1,8 million Arabs come to Germany today” (Ich bin vor dreißig Jahren nicht der CDU beigetreten, damit heute 1,8 Millionen Araber nach Deutschland kommen), while adding that –allegedly- none of these people are both able or willing to integrate.

These statements are not unacceptable because the person who made them held a very high position in office until only recently. It would be nonsense to problematize the ethnic-stigmatizing language and word preferences of a person who did not act as an official person free of biases during his reign, but quite the opposite, rather protecting and maintaining actions of obvious far-right circles. One may just remember what happened towards the end of Maaßen’s tenure in office.

Hans-Georg Maaßen said: “I did not join the CDU thirty years ago to allow 1,8 million Arabs come to Germany today.”

For instance, in September 2018, Maaßen had doubted the authenticity of a video that showed openly racist violence in the German city of Chemnitz. Furthermore, he ignored and even challenged the official view of the country’s Chancellor. In addition to his previous statements, similarly underestimating and even relativizing positions regarding far-right extremism, led the federal minister of the interior to ultimately change the head of domestic intelligence. Even though the ultra-conservative federal minister of the interior, Horst Seehofer (CSU), initially resisted to dismissing him, he appointed a new name to the office due to heavy pressure from both moderate government circles and the media.

Despite Maaßen’s recent discriminating tone with regard to “Arabs” and its generalizing incline, which is not acceptable from a global enlightened and even humanist point of view, which also contradicts the German constitution, it seems that the new head of domestic intelligence, Thomas Haldenwang, unfortunately prefers similar biases – or at least discourse until now – which recently became obvious. For instance, following the publication of the annual security report of the domestic intelligence service, the new head once again relativized the far-right threat.

Despite Maaßen’s recent discriminating tone with regard to “Arabs”, it seems that the new head of domestic intelligence, Thomas Haldenwang, unfortunately has a similar bias.

Furthermore, although there has not been an increase in Islamic extremism-related crimes compared to right-wing extremist ones, both the media, politics and intelligence officers have focused on the former rather than the later. In this context, Haldenwang said: “…we have had to see the emergence of right-wing extremism in recent years depends on many circumstances. … In my opinion this has a relation with current political developments and possibly also with the refugee and migration policies since 2015,” thus criticizing Angela Merkel without addressing the actual reasons for the increase of far-right extremism.

All these statements were made in a recent time period when a district president in Germany, Walter Lübcke, who was a member of the conservative and ruling CDU, had been assassinated in his home. Also during a time period in which almost every day a new kind of scandal breaks out, such as the current news that a German far-right group “used police data to compile a death list.”

Although there has not been an increase in Islamic extremism-related crimes compared to right-wing extremist ones, both the media, politics and intelligence officers in Germany have focused on the former rather than the later. 

Under the current conditions and developments in Germany, the former intelligence chief’s unacceptable statements have to be taken seriously into account, in particular by rational politicians from all political blocs. It is unfortunately an increasing trend that far-right discourses and even expectations are becoming more and more “normal.” This must not occur. However, voices among the democratic conservatives are decreasing and social-democratic parties are being reduced to an insignificant meaning within German politics. At the current moment, it does not look very positive for Germany’s political landscape and its equilibrium in the near future, if one also observes statements by Hans-Georg Maaßen who oddly describes his political stance as “realistic.” In addition, Maaßen’s elaboration regarding the question whether he is the “Thilo Sarrazin in the CDU,” by answering, “No, because unlike Sarrrazin, I believe that I am not alone with my opinion” unfortunately seems to be the reality.

Germany must face right-right extremism as soon as possible and start a collective struggle against the threat on political, societal, and of course bureaucratic platforms. But above all, should prepare for this threat in Germany’s security apparatus.

In a press release on June 30, the Turkish foreign ministry announced that 6 Turkish citizens were detained in Libya by Haftar’s militia, describing the hostile act as an act of banditry and piracy. The ministry warned in the statement that Haftar’s elements will become legitimate targets unless the citizens were released immediately.

On their side, Haftar’s self-style army spokesman denied their involvement in the affair. However, a day after the ultimatum, the 6 Turkish sailors were freed.

This accident came amid the escalation of tensions between Turkey and Haftar, and one day after Haftar’s self-style army – the so-called Libyan National Army (composed of local militias and gangs, Salafi Maskhali radical groups and mercenaries from African countries) – threatened to target Turkish ‘strategic targets.’ The spokesman of Haftar’s self-style army, Colonel Ahmed al-Mismari, said on June 28, ‘General Command [Haftar] has issued orders to the Air Force to target Turkish ships and boats operating inside Libyan regional waters, and issued orders to the Ground Forces to target all Turkish strategic targets such as companies, headquarters and projects belonging to the Turkish government.’ In response to this, Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar said that LNA would pay a heavy price for any attacks and underlined that Turkey will respond with the most effective and severe means.

Haftar’s hostility towards Turkey

Khalifa Haftar’s hostility towards Turkey is not a new reality. Being the sole representative of the anti-Arab Spring camp in Libya, which is backed by the UAE-KSA-Egypt axis, Haftar adopted an anti-Turkey policy since he began his coup d’état attempt.

Turkey has been siding with the popular demands for change in Arab countries and supporting the installation of a democratic regime in Libya.

Turkey has been siding with the popular demands for change in Arab countries and has been supporting the installation of a democratic regime in Libya and across the region. While doing so, Turkey has been acting within the boundaries of international law and the international consensus. Hence, Ankara has been supporting the national unity government based in Tripoli, which was established as a result of a UN-backed political process that ended by signing the Libya Political Agreement (LPA) in Skhirat, Morocco, in December 2015. However, refusing to ratify the LPA, Haftar and his backers adopted military means aiming to control Libyan territory and topple the national government in Tripoli, which is supported and seen as the representative of the Libyan people and backed by the international community, including Turkey.

Following Haftar’s control of Benghazi and the establishment of his self-style political entity, the so-called Libyan interim government in East Libya, Haftar did not hesitate to display his hostility towards Turkey despite the fact that Turkey’s special envoy to Libya, Emrullah Isler, had visited the government in East Libya and met with its Prime Minister, Abdullah al-Thani. In April, Haftar’s eastern-based interim administration’s Council of Ministers issued a new law recognizing the so-called Armenian Genocide and declared April 24 as the national day to commemorate this.

Haftar’s hostility does not only come as a result of being on opposite rival camps in Libya. It can also be seen as an adulation from Haftar to his regional backers, who are hostile against Turkey.

Haftar’s setback in Gharyan and his quest for an escalation with Turkey

Although it comes in consistency with his previous positions, Haftar’s latest escalation against Turkey aims to cover his heavy defeat in Gharyan and wishes to pull Turkey into the Libyan conflict. Thus, by this, he could justify the more intense involvement of his backers on the ground.

In April, the Haftar-led militia launched a military assault trying to capture Tripoli, the Libyan capital, which is under the control of the internationally recognized national unity government. However, despite the enormous military and political support by France, KSA, UAE, and Egypt, and regardless of the lack of reaction from the UN and the international community, Haftar’s militias could not advance towards Tripoli.

Haftar and his camp searched for a scapegoat and an external actor to cover their heavy defeat, and hence they came to blame Turkey.

On June 27, in a surprise attack, the forces allied to the Tripoli government managed to re-take control of Gharyan city, the strategic city in the south of Tripoli, which Haftar militias have used as a platform for their assault. Haftar militias were forced to withdraw from Gharyan, leaving sophisticated weaponry behind; including the U.S.-made Javelin anti-tank missiles, which cost more than $170,000 each. The missiles were apparently given to Haftar by the UAE in a violation of both the UN arms embargo and the sails agreement between the U.S. and UAE.

The major setback in Gharyan blew Haftar’s ambition to capture Tripoli and his aim to become the strong man of Libya. Therefore, Haftar and his camp searched for a scapegoat and an external actor to cover their heavy defeat, and hence they came to blame Turkey.

After this unsuccessful assault, it became clear that Haftar and his militia were unable and incapable of capturing Tripoli – though Haftar and his backers thought it would only be a matter of days or weeks at the most. In fact, in his progress on the ground, Haftar never encountered organized military forces such as the forces of the Tripoli government and the forces of Misrata city. Haftar’s militia has been progressing in open areas and against unorganized forces. This was its first test. The defeat in Gharyan made it clear that Haftar cannot deliver in the current balance of power.

Haftar wants to drag Turkey further into the Libyan conflict and pave the way for Turkey’s regional rivals to be more involved on the ground.

The fact that Haftar’s camp is pushing for escalation with Turkey reflects the state of crisis that he and his backers are going through. The defeat that Haftar’s camp faced through the inability to advance towards Tripoli and their setback in Gharyan brought down Haftar’s as well as his backers’ ambitions to capture Libya as a whole.

Faced with this setback, Haftar is trying to export his crisis through an escalation with Turkey, which he falsely blames for his defeat. He also wants to drag Turkey further into the Libyan conflict and hence pave the way for Turkey’s regional rivals and Haftar’s backers to be more involved on the ground, hoping that this would change the balance of power in his favor.

Both Turkey and China have had difficult relations with the U.S. in the past year. The U.S. decision to not increase tariffs on Chinese products has re-opened room for dialogue in bilateral relations. Likewise, topics that are of concern for relations between Turkey and the U.S., such as FETO, the fight against PKK terrorism, the purchase of S-400s, still remain unsolved.

During the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Osaka, Japan, President Trump stated, “The U.S. had a complicated situation in how to react to Turkey’s S-400 deal with Russia.” The president also blamed Barack Obama for setting conditions on the patriot missiles that were to be purchased by Turkey, claiming that his administration were to blame for the current state of relations between the two countries.

Both China and Turkey, apart from having separate problems with the United States, have been affected by the U.S. sanctions on Iran. Due to this, Turkey and China are trying to deepen their economic cooperation in order to at least compensate for what they lose when they cannot trade with Iran.

During President Erdogan’s official state visit to China on 15 June, 2019, the two presidents made it clear that they support the existence of a new world order that is more advanced, fairly constructed and willing to absorb and fully represent all states. With his interview with Chinese Xinhua News Agency, President Erdogan said that the two states were in favor of a “new international order, which will serve the interests of humanity.” He further added that due to Turkey and China having the world’s most ancient civilizations, they both have a duty to “contribute to building this new system.”

President Erdogan praised the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative by describing it as the “greatest development projects of the 21st century, encompassing over 100 nations and international organizations.”

The president stressed that Turkey was one of the first countries to back this initiative in early 2013. He also mentioned that the Turkish “Middle Corridor” Project is lying at the heart of the Chinese initiative.

During the visit, the two leaders agreed to double Turkey’s trade volume with China to 100 billion dollars. In addition, the Turkish president called for Chinese businessmen to invest more in Turkey and declared that the AK Party government have a target of welcoming 1 million Chinese tourists to Turkey per year as a step forward for serving the interests of both countries and to strengthen bilateral ties.

Underlining the role of China in international politics, President Erdogan said that for the sake of world peace, security and stability, in addition to enhancing multilateralism – the values that both countries share – it is fundamental to “achieve cooperation with our Chinese friends.”

After meeting with President Xi Jinping for over 1 hour at the Great Hall of the People, the two leaders gave the message that the two countries have great potential for enhancing cooperation.

President Xi Jinping said that the two states should work together for the sake of propping a multilateral new world system with the UN as its essence. The Chinese president also added that the new world system should be constructed based on international law.

*Written by Rahma Elfeky

Bahrain’s capital Manama hosted the “Peace to Prosperity” workshop that aimed to bring a new framework to present new financial instruments to develop Palestine and Gaza. Despite the stated aim, the workshop received wide criticism from not only Palestinians, but also other Arab countries that considered the meeting as part of a so-called “Deal of the Century.” The agreement was previously proposed by Jared Kushner, Middle East advisor to U.S. President Donald Trump and aimed to resolve the decades-long conflict between Israel and Palestine.

In the opening speech of the workshop, Kushner claimed that the so-called “Deal of the Century” is actually the opportunity of the century that can pave the way for a peaceful Middle East. He stressed that together with Arab partners, the U.S. administration is offering a 50 billion USD aid package for Palestine and its neighbouring countries, in order to help them create jobs, improve infrastructure and develop living conditions. Despite the positive discourse, Kushner’s initiatives received strong reactions. His proposal, which does not offer a state for Palestinians, has been strongly refused by the Arabs who have been living under Israeli occupation for decades. For this reason, the Manama workshop was seen as an attempt to prepare Palestinians for a secret deal that would eventually lead them to lose their centuries-long homeland.

Kushner’s “Deal of the Century” has been strongly refused by the Arabs who have been living under Israeli occupation for decades. 

Therefore, although the economic development of Palestine was presented as the main agenda of the workshop, the most important goal was to garner support from Arab leaders for Kushner’s “Middle East Peace Plan.” The participants of the meeting is a clear indicator as to how the U.S. administration is forcing Gulf monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, to support Washington’s plans towards the Israel-Palestine conflict. The Manama summit is also supposed to serve to strengthen this alliance led by the Trump Administration.

In addition to the host Bahrain, a number of other Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Jordan, Qatar, Morocco, and Egypt participated in the summit, while Iraq and Lebanon opposed the meeting. Algeria, Libya, Somalia, Oman and Kuwait did not clearly state their position on the meeting, but they were reluctant to providing public support.

The “Peace to Prosperity” Workshop led by the U.S. in Bahrain was an attempt to prepare Palestinians for a secret deal. 

It was also noticed that Palestine and Israel – countries that would be directly affected by the meeting – did not participate on an official level. While the Palestinian side declared its reaction to both the Manama meeting and the Deal of the Century, Israeli representatives did not participate as Tel-Aviv does not have diplomatic relations with Manama. However, many Israeli businessmen and journalists as well as Jewish religious figures from the U.S. and Canada attended the meeting.

Some of these rabbis organized a religious ceremony in a synagogue in Bahrain, which was also attended by Jason Greenblatt, Trump’s Special Envoy for the Middle East. The images of that ceremony were widely shared on social media, where Greenblatt and rabbis were seen singing “The People of Israel Live” covered with the symbols of the Jewish faith.

One of the highlights of the workshop is the low profile participation from Arab countries. This situation shows the concerns of these countries and the fear that they may cause domestic backlash. As a matter of fact, protests were organized in some countries including Morocco, Lebanon and Jordan, due to the policies of their governments towards the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Protesters also criticized Washington’s Middle East policies and the recent summit held in Manama, Bahrain.

There was low profile participation from many Arab states to the workshop held by Kushner in Bahrain as these states feared that their stance may cause domestic backlash. 

Public figures, opinion leaders and politicians also reacted to the Bahrain meeting. Walid Jumblatt, the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party in Lebanon, criticized the stance of the Arab countries towards the Palestine issue and considered the Bahrain summit as a step in the process of Arab countries selling Palestine to Israel and the United States.

Observers also notice the special attention of Bahraini organizers to host Israeli participants, particularly from business and media circles. Even though Bahrain and Israel does not have diplomatic relations, a number of Israeli businessmen and journalists were invited to a meeting, probably for the first time over half a century. In his first interview of its kind to an Israeli newspaper, Bahrain’s foreign minister Sheikh Khaled al-Khalifa stated that his country supports Israel’s right to defend itself from threats in the region and that there can be official relations between the two countries in the coming period.

Although the real motivation of the “Peace to Prosperity” workshop was presented to be a solution for the Palestine-Israel conflict, its main purpose was to prepare a political venue by which Israel’s occupation policies can be institutionalized. Despite the heavy pressure from the U.S. government, the participation of Arab countries at the Bahrain summit was limited due to the possible backlash Arab states could receive from their domestic polity. Another reason was the lack of official representatives from both Israel and Palestine, the two countries that would be directly affected by the meeting. On the other hand, this Bahrain meeting, rejected by leading Muslim-majority states such as Turkey and Iran, is a continuation of the U.S.’ unilateral efforts to impose its agenda for the Middle East. For this reason, both the Bahrain meeting and the deal of the century will continue to be seen as an illegitimate initiative not only for the Palestinians but for the entire Islamic world.

On 4 April, 2019, Haftar declared that he issued orders for his forces to move westward and take control of Tripoli, the capital of Libya, which is under the control of the UN-backed National Accord government. Critics of Haftar, including Turkey, accuse him of trying to seize power from the internationally recognized legitimate government by using force. However, Haftar and his supporters claim that they are trying to free Tripoli from militias, which they see as de-stabilizing the country.

Hostility between Haftar and Turkey is not new. Haftar previously held special conferences to attack the Ankara government and accused it of interfering in Libyan affairs.

Haftar said they destroyed a Turkish drone parked at Tripoli’s only working airport on Sunday and announced a ‘general mobilization’ as tensions grew between the Eastern administration and the Ankara government. This was in retaliation of Ankara’s backing the legitimate Accord government in Libya. They also wrote on Facebook that “The [Turkish] aircraft had been prepared to target our armed forces.”

It was also announced that they had arrested 2 Turkish citizens from Ajdabiya.

Earlier this week the Turkish Foreign Ministry accused Khalifa Haftar for arresting 6 Turkish citizens and warned that the Eastern forces would become a ‘legitimate target’ if the citizens were not released promptly.

During a press conference on Friday, after he lost 43 soldiers in a battle over the town of Gayran, Ahmed Al-Mesmari stated that he got orders to cut all ties with Turkey, banning all flights and ships to and from Eastern Libya. The issue escalated on Saturday, after Turkish firms, shops, and projects were declared illegal. Mesmari also added that any Turkish citizen on Libyan lands will be arrested justifying this escalation as a response to what he described as ‘Turkish aggression,’ which led to the fall of Gayran at their hands of the rival, National Accord government.

Libya’s Supreme State Council condemned the threats made by Haftar against Turkey, saying that it was an attempt by Haftar to justify his defeat in Garyan and described this as additional pretexts for the intervention of countries backing Haftar.

The interior ministry of the Al-Wefaq government denied what it described as rumors about the presence of Turkish soldiers within the territory and under its authority. It was said that these rumors came with the plan to mislead public opinion and distort the efforts of the Libyan armed forces to defend Tripoli and protect the democratic track. It also reassured foreign nationals including Turks working inside Libya that it would guarantee their safety.

In an official response to Haftar’s threats and the war waged on Saturday against Turkish assets on Libyan territories, during the G20 Leaders’ Summit held in Osaka, Japan, the Turkish President said that Turkey will take the “necessary measures” on this issue.

Following all these developments, 6 Turkish citizens were released on Monday 1 July, 2019. No further information has been provided.

*Written by Rahma Elfeky. 

When the demonstrations in Syria started, the U.S. was fast on the very forefront, declaring its support to the demands for a democratic and free Syria. However, after 8 years of war, the U.S. has sidelined itself in the dispute between the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition, abandoning the later entirely. Nevertheless, the formulated U.S. ambitions in Syria bring up the need for the U.S. to re-engage with the Syrian opposition, namely the Syrian National Army. Otherwise, the U.S. goals for Syria will remain as meaningless words, likely to be redrafted by military measures of the regime axis.

According to U.S. Special Envoy James Jeffrey, the main goals of the U.S. in Syria are to ensure the defeat of Daesh, force Iran out of Syria and change the behavior of the Assad regime. While many in Washington think that they can enforce these terms by economic means – like sanctions as a stick and funds for reconstruction as a carrot – and staying inside Syria until U.S. terms are accepted, the regime axis does not seem impressed. The current carrot and stick strategy is based upon the assumption that the regime and Russia has a huge interest in re-building the formerly opposition-held areas it destroyed itself, and the miscalculation of the regime’s behavior. If economic sanctions would be enough to enforce terms on the regime, the regime would have accepted them when it was on the verge of collapse before the Russian intervention in 2015 and in 2013, when the regime almost lost control over all of Syria.

Many in Washington think that the U.S. can enforce its terms in Syria only by economic means – like sanctions as a stick and funds for reconstruction as a carrot.

In regards to Iran, I argued last week that the U.S. has limited options in Syria and has no real effective way of dealing with Iran in Syria. The last U.S. ambition in Syria is the enduring defeat of Daesh in which the U.S. has reportedly invested about $14.3 billion until June 30, 2017, but now the organization is re-grouping underground and conducting several attacks in Syria and Iraq. Some analysts like the ISW report suggests that Daesh has the capacity to capture an urban center. Focusing on Syria; there is a huge correlation between YPG-held areas and Daesh attacks.

Source: Tomasz Rolbieck

In order to be capable of achieving any goals in Syria, the U.S. needs to re-engage with the Syrian opposition. I am not suggesting that the U.S. change its horses, but that it should come back to its first horse again. The U.S. has mainly abandoned the opposition for two reasons: First, the fight against Daesh, in which the U.S. has regarded the Syrian branch of the PKK the most effective, and second, the ties between the Syrian opposition and extremists.

Regardless of the truth in these arguments, currently none of them apply. The first fight against Daesh is now in a new era in which popular support and acceptable governance will be the main effective tools to grab the extremists from their pool of recruitment and target their survivability. In regards to Iran, the Syrian opposition is a natural enemy of Iran and empowering them will ultimately help to force Iranians out of Syria. By supporting the Syrian opposition, the U.S. will have more room to ‘change the behavior’ of the regime in line with the UN-coordinated process.

The U.S. needs to re-engage with the Syrian opposition. I am not suggesting that the U.S. change its horses, but that it should come back to its first horse again.

In this matter, the Syrian National Army (SNA) provides the U.S. with a good opportunity. Composed of Arabs, Turkmens and Kurds, the SNA is the official armed structure of the Syrian Interim Government, which was formed by the Syrian opposition. The areas held by the SNA are totally separated from any extremist faction. Of the 28 factions in the SNA, 13 were previously supported by the U.S., 11 were established after U.S. support came to an end, and 22 fought against Daesh.

The results of the Istanbul elections is still being discussed in Turkey. The clear-cut victory of Ekrem Imamoglu over Binali Yildirim has raised questions on the transformation of voting behavior. Why did a significant number of the Istanbul electorate change their voting preference in just 84 days? Is this change in voting behavior related to a long-lasting social and political transformation in Turkish society? Even though it is not an easy task answering these questions, there are some eye-catching issues that are crucial to find a satisfying answer.

The first critical point is related to the transformation of the profile of the electorate in the last decade. Contrary to a common myth implying that the number of young voters is increasing in Turkey, their number showed a decrease in the last decade. While the ratio of young people between the ages 15-29 consisted of 26.79 percent of the whole population in 2007, this ratio decreased to 24,34 percent in 2015. In parallel to this information, the ratio of young voters is also showing a slight decrease. Thus, it is obvious that the argument on rejuvenation does not explain the reason behind the change of voting behavior.

Contrary to a common myth, the number of young voters in Turkey showed a decrease in the last decade.

Nonetheless, a second more prominent point explains more about the change of voting behavior, especially in regards to the Istanbul elections. This point is the reaction that the electorate gave against the renewal of elections in Istanbul. The Turkish electorate has always been critical against the renewal of elections and the idea of snap elections. However, the ongoing dynamics in political, economic, and social affairs determine the way of reactions. For instance, in 2002, the electorate showed a noticeable reaction against existing political actors because of the ongoing economic crisis. During November 2015, the electorate favored the ruling party in the renewed elections in order to avoid uncertainty arising from political and economic instability, the future of the Kurdish question, and the war in Syria.

When it comes to the Istanbul elections, it is possible to say that the electorate was not convinced about the reason why the elections were canceled in the first place. Therefore, they reacted against the AK Party candidate, Binali Yildirim. Thus, rather than a long-lasting dissatisfaction with the government, the results of the election is substantially related to the post-March 31 period, along with pre-electoral alliances.

The electorate was not convinced of the reason why the elections were canceled, and they reacted against the AK Party.

The reaction given by the 220,000 AK Party supporters who voted for Binali Yildirim on March 31 and who did not vote for him on June 24 should therefore be evaluated within this framework. A certain number of the electorate did not accept the rationality behind the renewal of the Istanbul elections – although it was legally explained.

All political parties will most probably take all issues into consideration when discussing the change of voting behavior in Turkey. It is obvious that there is a need for further studies based on empirical data in order to understand the in-depth reasons behind this issue. It is crucial to understand whether there had been a long-lasting shift in voting behavior of whether the specific conditions of the Istanbul elections created a short-term change in the electorate. Even if the second option is more valid under these circumstances, all political parties need to take necessary measures in order to prepare for the first option.

On Saturday 22 June, fear and anxiety griped Ethiopia – a nation already on uncertain political transition. A coup bid was underway in Bahir Dar, the capital of the northern Amhara regional state. Reports emerged that General Asamnew Tsige, chief of security of the Amhara region, busted into a board meeting of the regional government with coup plotters – mostly members of Amhara region’s paramilitary officers. In the incident, Dr. Ambachew Mekonnen, the regional president of Amhara and Atto Ezez Wase, a senior political advisor were murdered on the spot. The Attorney general of the regional state who was present was also wounded.

Meanwhile in Addis Ababa, the nation’s capital, the coup plotters were present and carried a string of assassinations targeting senior military officials: General Seare Mekonnen, the chief of Ethiopia’s defence forces and Major General (Rtd) Gezai Abera were murdered in their residents – by their body guards. The two incidents in Bahir Dar and Addis Ababa were coordinated and well-planned. Despite targeted killings of its top leadership with the aim to sabotage the chain of command, the Ethiopian army reacted swiftly: the coup leader was killed in Bahir Dar and many coup plotters were arrested. The African nation had survived a cataclysmic and potentially ruinous moment.

Reforms amid violence

However, Ethiopia is not out of the bushes yet. The Prime Minister, Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali, was himself targeted last year in a bomb blast in Addis Ababa. Since Dr. Abiy Ahmed came to power Ethiopia witnessed both bright and dark gloomy days. He initiated political and social reforms that have won him praises both at home and globally. Ethiopia is on the right course. Nonetheless, the transition to democracy and liberty has unleashed out rancid ethno-nationalism and violence on a large scale – Ethiopia has the highest Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) globally, 2 Million citizens to be precise. And the recent coup d’ etat attempt has risen the political temperature of the nation.

Reforms in Ethipoia have to be ‘fast and furious’ – and so far they have been. 

So far Premier Abiy Ahmed has a good track-record. But the challenges his administration face are deep-rooted. Ethiopia has a brutal history: Centuries of imperialism; followed by the genocidal Marxist-Leninist Derg regime; and then came the equally genocidal and totalitarian Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF). Violence and brutalities have been rendered the social and political ethos of this nation that has more than 100 different ethnic groups and languages. Unfortunately, today Ethiopia is brimming with internal xenophobia, ethnic tensions and contempt, and a dangerous zero-sum political posturing among its different ethnic political classes.

The reforms initiated by Abiy Ahmed since coming to power in April 2018 have been cathartic and promising. Political prisoners and journalists languishing in prisons were all released. Reconciliatory talks were initiated with secessionist rebel groups and factions – most prominently with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Somali Ogaden National Liberation Front (OLNF). Bones were also strengthened with arch-nemesis Eritrea. Freedom of speech and publication were celebrated by the government – a new trend in Ethiopia. Conversely, amid all these neck-breaking reformations Ethiopia was descending into an internal ethnic psychosis. The Somali and Oromo regional states were the epicentres, and most recently Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz regional states.

Ethno-nationalism and the inevitability of decentralization

Centuries of a statist and centralised governance model are at the root of Ethiopia’s ethnic tensions and trepidations. Memories of state violence and brutalities coupled with perceived (and real) ethnic autocracies punctuate the tapestry that is Ethiopia’s national memory and consciousness. Interestingly, the ethnic based autonomy governance structure – that is now in place – instituted by the EPDRF since 1993 seems not to help at all. And when anti-government protests began in Oromo and Amhara regions in 2015, many regional analysts anticipated that it was a matter of time that Ethiopia takes the path of Yugoslavia and disintegrate along Ethnic lines.

Abiy Ahmed’s reign is characterised by his medemer philosophy: a loose meaning of unity, peace and coming-together in Amharic. But, so far, anything has happened but medemer. Ethnic violence has engulfed the Somali and Oromo states in 2018, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz and Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ State (SNNP) in the last three months. The Prime Minister himself was targeted. The president of the Somali State, Abdi Mohamoud Omar, a war criminal himself, was deposed by the Ethiopian Army from his post (and this was perceived as the beginning of a new ethnic hegemony by Abiy Ahmed’s Oromos). Bloody Saturday (June 22) and the subsequent coup d’ etat attempt will exacerbate the reforms initiated by Abiy Ahmed since April 2018; they are an unfortunate precedent in the new Ethiopia envisaged by medemer.

While the reforms initiated by Abiy Ahmed have been cathartic and promising, his administration faces problems deeply rooted in Ethiopia’s governance.

2020 is an election year in Ethiopia: The first general election after Premier Abiy Ahmed’s political and human rights reforms. This election will be a litmus test of the EPDRF’s – the ruling party that is chaired by the Premier – resolve and commitment to democratic transition with free and fair elections, where different parties contest on a levelled political arena. Next year will be a defining year in Ethiopia’s future. Opposition parties are coalescing around political alliances and offer an alternative vision for the nation alongside the ruling EPDRF.

Reforms have to be ‘fast and furious’ – and so far they have been. Discourse and debates on the most effective and relevant administrative model is raging throughout the nation and among the intellectual and political elites. A statist and centralist model is detrimental for Ethiopia, and it is not feasible at this juncture – when different ethnic groups have tasted autonomy from Addis Ababa. A viable Ethiopian state will only flourish in a federated and autonomous Ethiopia. Centralization of power will only increase ethnic anxiety and tension that can loosen the nation’s social fabric. Centralization, which was argued for by the coup plotters, has dark connotations: Imperialism, assimilation policies, land grab and Amhara supremacy.

Diversity as a panacea

Ethiopia is a nation of different nationalities, peoples and ethnic groups all encapsulated in what was once the Christian Ethiopian empire. Today, the nation has a massive population of 105 Million and more than 100 languages. It is diverse and beautiful. Its 40% Muslim population – a whole population that is historically marginalized and suppressed – feel invigorated under the reforms initiated by Abiy Ahmed. Reforms in this transition period have to be painstaking and conscientious. Ethnic supremacists, chauvinistic nationalism and extremists will be a challenge in the transition period – and this was all-over the coup plotters.

After  decades of violence, brutalities and totalitarian regimes Ethiopia needs reconciliation on a national scale.

After  decades of violence, brutalities and totalitarian regimes Ethiopia needs reconciliation on a national scale. Premier Abiy Ahmed Ali has the backing and the goodwill of the majority of Ethiopians, and he has to deliver amid these challenges and quandaries that the nation faces. Reforming and strengthening the existing autonomous administrative structure is indispensible – the Tigray and Somali regional state parliaments are already ruminating secession in case a centralist way is ventured by the EPDRF. Rule of law, free and fair elections, respect for human rights and dignity and the Philosophy of Medemer will only salvage Ethiopia. Challenges, uncertainties and sabotages in this transition period will be inevitable. And Abiy Ahmed has the political and strategic acumen to deliver Ethiopians into the land of Canaan – of peace, stability, democracy and prosperity.

Following the Istanbul elections on June 23, Turkey’s policymakers will now focus on politics and on particular foreign policy issues of current significance. The upcoming days will most likely show some striking developments in the field of foreign policy, as the S-400 missile case, tensions between the U.S. and Iran and the G20 Summit will be of great importance.

However, before that, a final elaboration from a systematic point of view should be made regarding the political system in general and the recent mayoral elections in particular. The Turkish public went to the ballot every year since 2014 due to both extraordinary situations, such as early elections held in 2015, the failed coup attempt in 2016, the referendum in 2017, and the snap elections in 2018. Added to this list was the re-run of the Istanbul elections on June 23. These experiences give us political scientists a lot of data to analyze Turkey’s continuous political perception of the previous parliamentary system, while the dynamic transformation is continuing into the new presidential system, which was adopted in 2017.

In the new system, the country’s executive organ is led by a single office, namely the Turkish presidency. According to the previous constitutional requirement, the Turkish prime minister had to share the country’s executive organ with the president, which in the past had caused several system-based difficulties and even crises between the two offices. One of my first observations is that despite official opposition regarding the Turkish presidential system by most opposition parties – except the MHP – it seems that opposition circles have increasingly become used to the current system, which eventually enables opposition parties to form a so-called “bloc” or “alliance” in order to win certain offices of great importance.

Of course, the recent mayoral election in Istanbul, where in a de facto manner only two candidates, namely the Nation Alliance’s and the People’s Alliance’s candidates, became actual rivals, cannot be counted as a presidential election. Ekrem Imamoglu’s success was due to the “bloc” formed between former frustrated Kemalist/secular voters and voters that changed their minds, which is an outcome of Turkey’s presidential system, which enables alliances/blocs based on political realities.

In order to become Turkey’s president, one needs either more than 50 percent of all the votes to win in the first round or the majority of votes to gain victory in the second round. This necessity led to alliances during the 2018 presidential elections, which were formed between the AK Party and the MHP and on the other hand between the CHP and its rather heterogenous allies.

To underscore what I’m trying to explain in this week’s column, one has to stress the similar perception, which had been the case in the re-run of the mayoral elections on June 23, and which had eventually been elaborated as a de facto second round for Istanbul’s mayoral office. Under these conditions, it would be perhaps an interesting outcome and even future projection or change to consider an official second-round vote system, in particular for metropoles such as Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul. By this, it might be a step to 1) boost Turkey’s presidential system through a similar voting system, and 2) increase the acceptance rate for the system itself.

Thus, Turkey’s dynamic political and its own path of democratic experience, which definitely must not be limited to exaggerated comments by foreign correspondents/journalists in Turkey and who are nowadays broadcasting in a very extreme and absurd Imamoglu-backing bias, offers a very good opportunity to examine the recent results in a more comparative and of course, system-based context.

In recent days, the world has been on the verge of a potential war between Iran and the U.S. over the shooting down of an American drone by Iranian air-defense units. The Trump administration stopped the military response and considered the planned strike inappropriate for the downing of an unmanned air vehicle. The current escalation in the Basra Bay may have seemingly calmed down, but will the downing of the U.S. drone have real-life implications for Iran in Syria. Or more, what are the U.S. abilities and weaknesses in responding within the Syrian theatre?

Over the years, the U.S. sidelined itself in Syria by abandoning the Syrian opposition and solely focusing on the fight against Daesh. The U.S. made it a pre-condition not to fight against the Assad regime in order to obtain U.S. support, supplies and training to fight against Daesh. Most Free Syrian Army factions rejected to end their fight against the regime and were not co-opted by the U.S. As a result of this policy and other factors, the U.S. partnered with the Syrian branch of the PKK and formed the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), ergo not an enemy of Iran.

The SDF is not capable and is unwilling to confront Iran.

If the U.S. wants to take bold steps to undermine Iranian presence in Syria, its partners on the ground are an alliance of forces who did not come together to fight against Iran, and lack the motivation to do so. The SDF is not capable and is unwilling to confront Iran. Therefore, the U.S. seems limited in its ambitions to cut the Tehran-Damascus land route via Albu Kamal in southeast Syria. To go offensive on the ground against Iran seems unlikely. Only an over-extended air support might overdo the unwillingness of the SDF to cut the land route. However, this may open other fronts of weaknesses for the U.S. and risk the demobilization of some SDF units, including its biggest Arab component, the Shanadid Forces.

Another possibility for the U.S. to confront Iran in Syria might be through Israel. Israeli air forces have conducted several airstrikes against Iranian targets in Syria, but the extent of the Israeli air campaign is limited by Russia’s behavior to look the other way when Israeli air forces enter Syrian air space, and by the regime’s air-defense capabilities. Nevertheless, the Israelis might function as an important asset for the U.S. to strike Iranian positions in Syria as its own air force would need to challenge the Russian air-superiority in western Syria.

The U.S. could also use sanctions as a vehicle to undermine the Iranian role in Syria by targeting the Iranian regime and businessmen, and Iranian economical transactions as well as Iranian assets to gain money from Syria via business agreements. The U.S. can make life hard for Iran, but the effect of such actions would not be decisive.

In the U.S-Iran feud, the U.S. has limited options in Syria and has no real effective way of dealing with Iran in Syria.

As an exceptional way to limit Iran, the proposal made by the United Arab Emirates can come to mind as well. The UAE re-engaged with the Assad regime, arguing to limit Iran and Turkey by offering the regime an alternative. However, this option is the product of mindless politics. The regime will not abandon Iran, which saved the regime when everyone abandoned it, and especially not when all Iranian militias are in Syria. Lastly, the U.S. could target Iran by empowering the Syrian opposition, a natural enemy of Iran in Syria, but this would mean to re-evaluate U.S. policies in Syria again.

All in all, in the U.S-Iran feud, the U.S. has limited options in Syria and has no real effective way of dealing with Iran in Syria. This is because the U.S.’ policy on Syria is constructed in a way in which the fight against Iran was not and could not be a part of it. In order to challenge Iran in Syria, the U.S. needs to re-start its Syrian policy.

The re-emergence of a series of mass demonstrations in large avenues and public squares of Hong Kong, which is recognized as being among the international financial and trade centers, in the middle of June, is not surprising.

The people of Hong Kong have been on the streets opposing a proposed law allowing the extradition of suspects for trial in mainland China.

This law arrangement offered by the Island’s Chief Executive to be discussed in parliament without consulting the public is believed to be a political decision imposed by mainland China.

What makes the series of demonstrations important is that people in Hong Kong are having growing suspicions about the fairness of rule on the island.

A thriving number of protestors, who represent the diverse ways of life in Hong Kong society, have come together in order to protest against the reshaping of the island’s political environment. This also shows that they feel themselves to be under a gradually growing threat and danger of the impositions made by Beijing.

While the Chinese government argues that the proposed law is related to security issues, people in Hong Kong consider it as a tool of impairment of the established democratic rules and regulations in the island.

In Hong Kong, there have been consecutive arrangements making the Island’s public life unbearable.

The latest law proposal is not a sole case, rather it is proof that there have been consecutive arrangements making the Island’s public life unbearable in terms of public law rights.

This is the exact reason behind the Island’s public outpour onto the streets as an expression of their view against the undemocratic processes run by the rulers who have been accused of being puppets of Beijing. Chinese rule tries to impose its own repressive laws, as observed in the form of the extradition case, bypassing the Island’s public through utilizing the institution of the Chief Executive.

In this regard, the mass demonstrations can be fairly considered as a reaction to the imposition policies of the rules and regulations by Beijing. In fact, this is not the only reason for the enduring demonstrations but rather it is considered to be another stage of curtailment of the Island’s socio-political landscape, determined by Beijing’s politics.

Starting just a few days before the second-round discussion of the law proposal in parliament, the demonstrators were able to suspend the process. In addition, although they were unable to succeed in forcing the resignation of Carrie Lam, the Chief Executive, from her post, the latter has publicly apologized to the public.

This is a mass movement by civil participants who marched in a peaceful manner through the large avenues of the Island, which also witnessed the Occupation movement in 2017 in response to mainland China rule which failed to keep its promise to initiate universal suffrage.

Some believe that mass protests in Hong Kong were just standard, but, in fact, the demonstrations are the proof for the transformation of the Island dwellers in terms of political mobilization.

Though some circles assume that this was just a standard demonstration, in fact it is a proof of the crucial transformation of the Island dwellers in terms of political mobilization.

Taking the huge participation into consideration, one can assert that the failure of China rule seems to have naturally united the people of the Island to advocate for their rights.

In the past several years, the Island’s dwellers have been gradually transforming, as observed, into a mass movement in growing numbers to save their future from the undemocratic rule of China. And this is the picture of Hong Kong in these years.

There are some important aspects to the June demonstrations. First, it shows a significant increase in the number of participants, exceeding that of the 2014 demonstrations.

It was then known as the Umbrella Movement, which took stage for almost 3 months against the undemocratic practices of the Island government and was described as historically the largest turnout with an attendance of over a million individuals.

Secondly, it signals to both the Island’s special administration, and to Beijing, that the Island’s public highly care about their future and the freedom of the next generation.

Thirdly, the Hong Kong diaspora, such as students and migrant workers, particularly in Western capitals came out in support of the movement. Despite their minor numbers, these appearances were symbolically important, with banners demanding that their democratic rights not be grabbed by mainland China. This means that the political movement in Hong Kong is expanding onto the global stage.

Fourthly, these demonstrators are capable of organizing demonstrations on their own personal initiatives and through their civil institutions which seems to be quite challenging for Beijing. There is no doubt that this reality is giving a strong message to the mainland China rule.

At this point, one should argue that there is a strong division between the Islands’ ruling elite, who represent mainland China’s political regime, and the Hong Kongers who call themselves the citizens of Hong Kong, not citizens of the People’s Republic of China.

But today what marks these June demonstrations, continuing till date, is the active participation of the huge number of people. In fact, these are the largest demonstrations seen in the Island against Chinese rule since the Island’s union with China in 1997.

The Island folks admit that they will not surrender to the rulers of the Island’s administration, who are directed by Beijing.

The Island folks admit that they will not surrender to the rulers of the Island’s administration, who are directed by Beijing. This challenge bores immediate results in that Carrie Lam, the Chief Executive, announced the suspension of the discussions pertaining to the mentioned law in parliament. In the aftermath, however, she has declined, till today, to withdraw the proposed law or resign from her post.

These series of demonstrations are clear expressions of democratic wishes of the people on the Island. Here, one can argue that these large scale social movements prove the discontent of the ordinary Island folks against the current political rule in China. And the former does not want to relinquish the political arena to the latter to play its own game freely.

Though both the rulers and ruling party of China are proud of reaching the second top level spot in economic development after the U.S. globally, this does not give any hope to the peoples living in the autonomous regions, which are under the indirect rule of Beijing such as Hong Kong.

The increase in the size of demonstrations in Hong Kong has already become an increasingly discernable phenomenon for the people to express their views, especially those who feel themselves to be under the threats and pressures of China.