The SPD’s party conference took place in Berlin where the delegates confirmed the new leadership of Saskia Esken and Norbert Walter-Borjans, and five new vice chairpersons among other executive figures. The SPD also approved a draft of social reforms which may be used to negotiate with the CDU/CSU coalition partners in the upcoming weeks.

Among the new vice chairpersons was 30-year-old Kevin Kühnert, the leader of the Young Socialists (Jusos), the SPD’s youth organization. Some voices have argued that no other youth politician has been as powerful as Kühnert.

During the party conference, some significant decisions were also made. Namely, the SPD eventually, and surprisingly for some hasty commentators, decided to continue to support Merkel’s current grand coalition government with the majority of the SPD delegates voting against a motion to quit the party. Saskia Esken stressed that she was and still is “sceptical about the future of this grand coalition. But with this resolution, we give the coalition a realistic chance of continuing – no more, no less.”

However, it is likely that the new leaders will be inclined to renegotiate the terms under which they will continue to lend their support to Merkel’s government. The SPD’s new co-leaders are in favour of tougher climate protection measures, much more investment in Germany’s infrastructure and a rise in the so-called minimum wage. But these issues will not be raised as an ultimatum, since the party seeks to remain in the coalition.

Following the party conference, however, some polls stated that the votes of the SPD are still decreasing, while others stressed a limited increase. For instance, according to the Emnid surveys, the SPD increased 1 point and achieved 16 percent while the Greens, stood at 20 percent (CDU: 28, AfD: 13, FDP: 9, Left Party: 8). According to another polling institution (Forsa), the SPD decreased its votes to 11 percent subsequent to the election of the new co-leaders, and therefore further deteriorated its popularity among already averse voters.

In addition to the obvious lack of a hopeful mood among German voters regarding the new SPD leadership, it is likely that the party will try to insist on a more left-leaning tax and fiscal approach in the coalition government. Though, it is striking that leading CDU and CSU figures have also started to urge the Social Democrats not to blackmail the coalition partner, as the CDU’s chairperson and defence minister, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer recently stated. According to Kramp-Karrenbauer, it is not acceptable to make preconditions such as “if these requirements are not met, then we go.”

Moreover, a leading CDU politician, Armin Laschet, criticized the SPD decisions to invest an additional 450 billion Euros in the upcoming years, stating that it had nothing to do with Germany’s current problems. Laschet also explained that there was already a huge budget, but the problems in Germany were not due to a lacking budget but obstacles in the fields of planning and approval procedures. According to Laschet, what was needed was the acceleration of these processes in order to develop required infrastructure.

Given the current conditions, it seems that in the upcoming weeks, particularly after the Christmas break, a tense talk on the continuation of the coalition might be very likely, despite current pro-coalition positions by the SPD leadership. The main problem though is the centre-left’s general lack of future perspectives. Even though the party was recently able to cement its ambitions to return to actual social-democratic policies it is unlikely that these policies can be implemented by the new co-leaders, who do not cause any kind of euphoria among the masses.

The rising popularity of the far-right in general, and, more importantly from the SPD’s perspective, the increasing support of the ecological Greens Party among centre-left circles, is increasingly threatening the 150 years old SPD. Thus, their goal of extending the party’s current votes  up to 30 percent of the electorate during the next federal elections is unconvincing given the new party program. Whether the new party program will be the only component to remerge as a successful centrist party, or whether other important factors need to be considered will be the most pressing task facing the SPD, the answers to which the SPD would need to soon find and immediately implement.

The NATO Summit in London has ended, but its outcomes are still a main topic of discussion for member countries. Since the main issue of concern was the future function of NATO, to save it from being “brain-dead”, as President Macron put it, the outcomes of the Summit have attracted the attention of the public as well as decision-makers. However, the final declaration of the Summit was far away from resolving all ambiguities related to the organization.

Although the declaration did not meet expectations, it was valuable to see the possible direction of NATO in the near future. The declaration underlined the importance of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which emphasizes that an attack against one ally shall be considered an attack against all members. The declaration also emphasized the importance of joint action against common threats such as terrorism and “security for all”.

Nevertheless, the Summit did not answer the question of how NATO would provide security for all members while its members had conflict of interests among each other. When the ongoing conflicts between Turkey and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean issue was put to the NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg, he stated that NATO was not part of the process to resolve issues between two countries. Indeed, this position clearly contradicts the final declaration of the Summit, and does not clarify the role of the organization when disputes arise between the member states.

Furthermore, the Summit could not draw a road map for renewing the function of NATO in the changing global order. The final declaration shows that unity against Russia’s “aggressive policy” is still at the top of the agenda for the organization. Moreover, the Summit paid attention to another rising challenger from the Far East, China, for the first time in its history. Although China’s increasing role in the defense industry and investments in 5G technology had been perceived as a challenge against NATO’s influence, NATO officially acknowledged this issue for the first time. “We recognize that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance”, stated the final declaration. Thus, NATO seems to be paying more attention to China’s increasing role in the global order.

As well as these structural problems, the NATO Summit also could not meet expectations in resolving ongoing problems on the ground. The issue of foreign Daesh fighters was one of the topics leaders discussed during the summit. But, the sarcastic dialogue between Trump and Macron showed that European countries are maintaining their position of refusing to accept the return of foreign fighters. “Would you like some nice ISIS fighters? I could give them to you. You could take everyone you want,” asked Trump to Macron, but could not get a positive response.

The Summit also revealed that member states have differing interests in regional and international politics which also varies their security concerns. For instance, Turkey’s security concerns about YPG terrorism in Northern Syria is still not acknowledged by member states. Despite this, President Erdoğan’s emphasis that Turkey is determined to provide security in the region was a clear message to the member states criticizing Turkey’s military operation in the Northern Syria.

Overall, the London summit showed that NATO needs a more strategic approach to set long-term goals in a changing world order. It still suffers from trying to emphasize a common understanding of security for all member states without establishing a unified understanding of what that common threat might be. Whether China will fill this gap or not will be understood in the following years.

This past Saturday, the junior partner of the coalition government, the Social Democrats (SPD) announced the party’s election of its new co-leaders Norbert Walter-Borjans and Saskia Esken. It was a surprise that these two won, as the current Vice Chancellor and Finance Minister Olaf Scholz and his partner, Klara Geywitz, were expected to be elected by the party’s members. Nevertheless, the SPD base decided that Walter-Borjans and Esken will lead the party. The pair previously pushed for renegotiation of the coalition between the SPD and Chancellor Merkel’s CDU. It must kept in mind that over the past 10 years, there has been a CDU/CSU-SPD coalition government, which according to some circles is harming the country’s traditional political balance.

The results have been evaluated partly as a shock for the Berlin political establishment and elites while some media outlets used a more negative tone. Media representatives commented on the results with headlines like: “the SPD is abolishing itself”, “adieu, social democrats”, “the end of the grand coalition” and other similar negative statements and predictions. This is actually based on the fact that the new leaders previously stated that they will insist on renegotiating the current coalition agreement at the SPD party convention this upcoming Friday. Delegates will have to decide on the future of the remaining two years of the coalition.

How can the current conditions and the general perspective within the framework of German politics be assessed and evaluated?

First of all, the results should be taken cautiously into consideration without positive or negative exaggerations. Even though some supportive voices of the grand coalition describe the SPD’s vote as a negative outcome, it is no doubt a fact that this represents the SPD’s legitimate will – and is not limited to the votes of certain delegates. Some criticize the fact that a small number of SPD members, who took part in the elections (217,000), will determine the future of the country’s federal government. However, this kind of comparison is not fair or even acceptable because every party has its own legitimate means to determine who will lead and make decisions.

As a comparison, it shouldn’t be forgotten that in the past year, the Liberals (FDP), which on several occasions acted as the junior partner of the CDU-led coalition government, were the key actors in deciding the country’s future government for four years – despite having a low number of votes in comparison to other rival parties. Thus, in such situations, which are actually influenced by the country’s parliamentary tradition, the question arises, who decides where the line of legitimacy is to be drawn, and which point of view is the most legitimate one?

The second point regarding the new SPD duo and the future of the coalition government has to be addressed from the point of view of the party’s legitimate self-evaluation. It is no secret that the SPD’s popularity among voters has decreased more and more while it has participated in grand coalition governments. The building of coalition governments has not contributed to the SPD’s popularity but has had the opposite effect. Therefore, some voices in the party have called for a return to fundamental social-democrat positions and to reject positions that continuously resemble those of the CDU/CSU. Whether it is true that the SPD is increasingly resembling the CDU or vice versa is another interesting issue, which, however, goes beyond the limits of this piece. Nevertheless, the image of two main German centrist parties permanently echoing the same policy lines has disturbed both voters on the centre-left and centre-right.

If delegates ultimately come to a decision that ends the grand coalition government at Friday’s SPD convention, then Merkel will search for a new but unlikely coalition (with the Greens or/and FDP), or she will make efforts to govern the country under a minority government – an unprecedented situation in post-1945 Germany, and a situation which Chancellor Merkel does not favour and has ruled out several times. If both potential options also fail, new elections will be held subsequent to a pseudo-confidence vote which will intentionally trigger an early election. However, it is a risky move due to the obvious threat by the far-right AfD which may have the potential to increase even more of its votes and thus unfortunately become the country’s second largest party.

For this reason, the Social Democrats have to think carefully about where they currently stand and what kind of effect their upcoming decisions may have on the entire country’s future. In contrast to the other duo (Scholz and Geywitz), the new co-leaders Walter-Borjans and Esken seem very unpredictable, which, most likely will change once they are confronted with the reality federal politics. As one has witnessed recently, both politicians are currently in favour of not immediately ending the coalition at the party convention, despite heavy pressure from left-wing members of the party to conduct an election on the future of the coalition.

Over the past years the reputation and popularity of the SPD has gradually decreased, but whether this will fundamentally change by switching to the opposition is ultimately a risky gamble. As one of the previous SPD chairpersons and one of Germany’s most famous politicians, Franz Müntefering, recently stated, at the end of the day the voters will show whether they accept the decision to switch to the opposition, a decision Müntefering believes the people will not welcome.

As a final word, it is a very situation case that a high-profile political figure such as Olaf Scholz, who was once the Vice Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, was not able to be elected as a co-leader by his own party. This is an issue or problem that parliamentary systems appear to be occasionally facing. The same uncertainty also applies to prime ministers/chancellors and various types of coalition combinations which may occur subsequent to elections if the people’s will is not represented in the subsequently established coalitions.

As the NATO summit celebrates the organization’s 70^th anniversary this week in London, this summit will not only discuss ongoing security issues, but unlike previous meetings will also include a more in-depth discussion on the future of NATO itself. Since French President Emmanuel Macron recently stated that NATO was  “brain dead” in his criticisms of Turkey’s actions in Syria, and far from meeting the security needs of member states, there have been increasing discussions on what should be the focus of NATO into the future.

Indeed, Macron’s statement is crucial to understand NATO’s position in the world. Since it was established during the Cold War era in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union, its function since the end of this era has always been controversial. Although member states have had changing security concerns in the post-Cold War era, NATO has generally functioned well to overcome these security threats. However, disputes among the member states on the future role and function of NATO has been increasing in recent years.

One of the main reasons for this dispute is the rising tensions between the US and European countries over NATO’s short and long-term strategy. The US has criticized the contribution of European member states to NATO and has argued that the US does not get value in return. For instance, one of the prominent issues of disagreement is the disproportionate defense expenditure of NATO members. President Trump in particular has been highly vocal in his criticisms of European countries who did not meet their pledge to increase expenditure on defense spending to 2% of GDP. However, in a gesture of reconciliation before the summit, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced widespread defense spending increases across NATO, also highlighting that nine allies will meet the 2% target this year, an increase from three allies a few years ago.

Alongside this issue of expenditure, NATO indeed has more serious problems which may shape the future of the organization. These include relations of NATO members with Russia, terrorism threats, the intractable Syrian conflict, and the refugee crisis. Resolution of these issues will not be straight forward as many members hold differing positions on these issues. A situation which may continue to be a source of tension between member states into the future.

The latest example of this conflict was seen in the case of the defense plan for the Baltics. Turkey refused to sign the plan. This dispute is also related to the ongoing disagreements between the member states. During Turkey’s military operation in Northern Syria, Turkey could not get the support of NATO member states as it wanted. Because of this reason, Turkey blocked the recent plan to protest the double standards by NATO allies who clearly support the security of the Baltic countries and Poland but not Turkey.

As is seen in the case of this recent dispute, NATO member states do not have a common security strategy especially in the long term. This Summit will provide a platform for member states to discuss the current problems and create a common security strategy. However, it is obvious that since most of these problems are intractable and long-lasting, it will not be possible to solve them in the short run. Without solving the current problems and satisfying the security needs of member states, it is not possible to have a consensus on a common security strategy. Despite this, the Summit may be useful to discuss how NATO can change to meet the needs of a new global order.

In recent weeks some controversial issues arose among two powerful European partners, France and Germany. The first disagreement became public when France’s president spoke of the “brain death” of NATO and also indirectly questioned the military alliance’s commitment to collective defense.

Furthermore, while Germany and other EU countries, supported the start of lengthy membership talks for North Macedonia to join the EU, France was the sole EU member to veto the launch of talks. This happened despite North Macedonia’s fulfillment of all the prerequisites, even solving the country’s name problem with a successful referendum.

Following these discordant stances and statements from the French head of state, Germany’s Chancellor Merkel has openly condemned Macron, particularly his statements on NATO, stressing that his view does not correspond to hers. Merkel also stated that she does not agree with Macron’s “drastic words” and reconfirmed Germany’s commitment to its role within the NATO.

German media and general public paid rapt attention to the disagreements between both country’s leaders – and this is still continuing. Over the past week, for instance, most commentators have described the current Franco-German relations as being at their lowest point since a very long time. It is important to mention that both countries’ disagreements cannot be reduced to the current stances regarding the NATO – and in particular the alliance’s stance against Turkey, its military operation in Northern Syria, and the U.S. in the past few months.

France and Germany are also at odds over other issues. For instance, Germany, some other EU countries, as well as leading figures of EU bodies, criticized Macron’s positions against an EU-US trade agreement and his so-called one-sided ambitions concerning relations with Russia. While France opposes Germany’s Nord-Stream 2 project with Russia, on the other hand, France has interestingly launched its own initiative right before the G7 summit in August this year to come closer with Russia and President Putin. Moreover, the approach towards Russia was initiated without a consultation or even information exchange with other leading EU countries or the EU at all, which also worried many Europeans.

In addition, German political circles along with the federal government itself also emphasized the fundamental importance of NATO for Europe’s security, while Germany’s foreign minister Maas’ proposal for NATO reform received support from the NATO secretary-general Soltenberg. At the NATO foreign ministers meeting, Maas also warned, in a similar tone to Chancellor Merkel of “divisive tendencies” that could jeopardize NATO’s role, which he described as a “life insurance for Europe”. Tuesday, Maas continued his pro-NATO statements by once again indirectly criticizing President Macron’s controversial words.

Given the current discussions, misunderstandings, but definitely bitterness among the two leading EU and NATO allies, the upcoming NATO Leaders Meeting in London on 3-4 December 2019, will receive much more global attention. As President Macron continues to be criticized within European and U.S. circles, which do not accept the French president’s remarks on NATO, describing his words as wrong, there are some analysts who imply that Macron is making use of his relatively too strong political position compared to his German counterpart. It is most likely that President Macron is becoming increasingly impatient and more active in a political landscape in which, Germany is led by a fragile coalition government and Chancellor Merkel is not the head of the senior coalition party, the CDU, and she will quit politics eventually in 2021. In addition to this, German defense minister and current CDU chairperson Kramp-Karrenbauer’s political future is not clear, making the situation even more difficult vis-à-vis President Macron “with nearly royal power”.

Thus, the NATO Leaders meeting next week has the potential to heavily influence the future course of Franco-German relations, which previously enjoyed a very positive period at the beginning of this year and which culminated with the so-called Aachen treaty>; aiming to strengthen both countries’ strong partnership – in particular against the Trump administration. Nevertheless, the current deterioration in Franco-German relations might contribute to a simultaneous enhancement of the rather ambivalent and tense German-U.S. relations, which at least have clear mutual position regarding the importance and effectiveness of the NATO. It should be clear eventually that Germany, other leading EU/NATO countries, and the U.S. will not take President Macron’s ambitions and harsh criticism against the NATO ally Turkey very seriously. The additional fact that Turkey is too important for NATO, outweighs the French president’s France-centred ambitions, as well as his non-realistic remarks.

Turkey’s main opposition party the CHP is experiencing another intra-party conflict. Although the CHP has faced many internal conflicts during the past decade, the latest conflict differs from previous ones and clearly reveals the existence of splinter groups within the party. The press conference of the CHP’s 2018 presidential candidate, Muharrem Ince, revealed that the party is facing a crisis in uniting the splinter groups within the party, and the most recent incident may cause a serious intraparty opposition movement in the upcoming days.

So what happened? Rahmi Turan, a journalist writing for Sözcü newspaper, wrote in his column that one of the candidates planning to run for the CHP’s chairmanship had a meeting with President Erdoğan. According to Turan’s claims, the President promised to help this candidate win the chairmanship of the CHP in the upcoming party congress.  

Although the public did not pay much attention to Turan’s claims in the beginning, the CHP Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu went on to state that Turan’s claims were indeed true. After Kılıçdaroğlu’s statements, there were some speculation that it may have been referring to Muharrem İnce or Metin Feyzioğlu, the Head of the Union of Turkish Bar Associations. At this point, Turan made another statement claiming that it was Muharrem İnce who met with President Erdoğan.

It did not take much time to discover that there was in fact no meeting held between President Erdoğan and Muharrem Ince, and that they were groundless claims. Thus, the question arises: what were the reasons for making these unfounded allegations? And why didn’t Kılıçdaroğlu reject the claims in the first instance?

It is certain that this latest incident is related to the ongoing conflict between two splinter groups within the party. The Kemalists/nationalists and the leftists. The party has been experiencing a struggle between both groups over the last decade. While Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the Chairman, and his team active in the party administration are drawn from the leftist circle within the party, Muharrem Ince and his followers represent the Kemalist/nationalist bloc. Both groups are struggling over the party’s administration.

The struggle between the two groups is clearly seen during the party’s congresses. There have been four extraordinary and three ordinary congresses in the last decade under the chairmanship of Kılıçdaroğlu. In each congress, the Kemalist/nationalist circle within the party have tried to win the party administration. Ince himself ran against Kılıçdaroğlu two times, in 2014 and 2018, and lost both elections.

Nevertheless, the June 24 presidential elections empowered the position of Muharrem Ince within the party. Since Ince received  31% of the votes as a presidential candidate of the CHP against Erdoğan, while the CHP only recieved 22 % of the votes in the parliamentary elections. Ince later started another intraparty opposition movement after the elections. However, he suspended his initiative because of the local elections.

It is obvious that Muharrem Ince is the only threat against Kılıçdaroğlu’s chairmanship and the leftist circle’s hegemony within the CHP. Ince clearly underlined this conflict between the two groups during his press conference. Because of this,, this latest incident was an effort to discredit Ince’s position before the upcoming congress, and to prevent the rise of an intraparty opposition movement against Kılıçdaroğlu. Nevertheless, it seems that the initiative of the leftist bloc has already failed and the conflict between the two groups will continue until the congress.

Three months ago when the Assad regime surrounded the Turkish observation post in Idlib’s Morek, I argued that Turkey needed a new approach to Idlib in order to prevent a bigger disaster. Since then, the situation in Idlib has relatively calmed down and the joint Syrian-Turkish military operation against the YPG has redirected the focus of the world to northeast Syria. The dynamic situation in this region, including the development of bilateral agreements between Turkey and Russia and between Turkey and the US in addition to the repositioning of the US to the oilfields of Syria has resulted in a general ignorance of the current situation in Idlib. Every side is using its energy to gain a bigger piece of the cake in northeast Syria, except for Iran. The latest attack on the IDP camp in Qah, in its inhuman brutality has no military purpose but was intended to shift the focus from northeast Syria to Idlib.

The dynamics between Russia and Turkey in Idlib and northeast Syria are opposite but similar to each other. The Russians demand the withdrawal of radical elements from the agreed demilitarized zone; the Turks demand the withdrawal of the Marxist YPG from the agreed safe-zone. Both sides criticize the other for not implementing the agreement and threatening the other with a military operation. However, there are also significant differences. The situation in northeast Syria is a direct threat to Turkey’s national security, but the situation in Idlib is not for Russia.

Another Turkish-backed operation against the YPG would not have costs for Russia except for the loss of additional gains and leverage. A Russian-backed operation on Idlib would be catastrophic for Turkey as Turkey can’t bear the burden of a further two million more refugees. On military terms, Russia has air superiority in Idlib, but Turkey has air superiority in northeast Syria. In all of this, the US has given massive de-facto support to Russia’s position against Turkey but does give diplomatic and rhetorical support for Turkey in Idlib.

A Russian-backed operation on Idlib would be catastrophic for Turkey as Turkey can’t bear the burden of a further two million more refugees.

In recent times, Idlib has witnessed several important developments. The 4th Division of the Syrian Arab Army of Maher al-Assad known for its ties to Iran has repeatedly failed to advance against the Syrian opposition forces and HTS or HTS-aligned groups in the Kurdish mountains of Latakia. While the resistance of the armed opposition and HTS-aligned groups in Latakia’s Kabbanah is being portrayed as a heroic one, in the end when the regime side is persistent enough and gets sufficient Russian air support, the defense line will collapse sooner or later. Such a gain would have significant effects on the military balance of power in Idlib. If the regime succeeds in gaining the upper hand in this area, it can fight downhill towards the operationally significant town of Jisr al Sughour.

In the meantime, a popular uprising against HTS in the city of Kafr Takhharim is an important proof of the social movement in Idlib which rejects the regime as well as radical groups. This will be an important asset for any policy and strategy for Idlib.

Therefore, I argue that the focus on northeast Syria should continue as much as possible and attempts by the regime, Iran, or Russia to change the focus to Idlib should be prevented by increasing the escalation in northeast Syria to force the regime to allocate reinforcements to this region and to call out the manpower limits of the regime which may prevent the regime from starting another major military campaign. In the meantime, Turkey needs to change the balance of power in Idlib in its favor in order to have a stronger position in the tit-for-tat dynamic that Russia may try to create. In this manner, it is important to note that opposition groups have sent no reinforcements from Idlib to northeast Syria, but the Assad regime had to send its Russian-trained and Russian-equipped 5th Corps due to lack of manpower.

The 32^nd federal party convention of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) will be held in East Germany’s city of Leipzig this upcoming Friday and Saturday (22-23 November). During this convention, a new leader will not be elected but the future projections of the party will be addressed and determined. Given the fact that the Social Democrats (SPD), the junior partner of the current grand coalition government since March 2018, are also heading into the final phase of their leadership search at the end of this month, the CDU’s party convention might be of general relevance and importance too.

In order to clarify the party’s future plans and goals during the convention, CDU party chairperson and the federal minister of defence Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer called on her opponents to openly state their criticisms thus paving the way for possible controversial debates during the convention. It is a move that Kramp-Karrenbauer most likely hopes will present her as a strong leader who is able to cope with harsh criticism from her party’s ranks.

Kramp-Karrenbauer’s more recent decisions have been the subject of criticism by other party members, such as her surprising call for an internationally controlled safe zone in Northern Syria. Party members have also called for a new negotiation of the current coalition with the Social Democrats. However, in a recently published interview, Kramp-Karrenbauer once again stated that there were no concerns about the existing coalition agreement with the CSU and SPD and thus rejected new negotiations on it.

Furthermore, the youth organization of the party called for a new process to determine the party’s future chancellor candidate which would involve the participation of all CDU members. This recommendation was interpreted as a challenge against AKK personally. But the youth organization is not the only group seeking a new process, five other CDU associations on the state and local levels are also in agreement. However, it is expected that these recommendations will be rejected at the convention, despite the youth organization’s suggestions being taken into serious consideration by the party members.

Kramp-Karrenbauer on the other hand, has constantly tried to portray a rather strong and self-confident image of herself while calling her party’s members to criticize and even discredit the CDU’s policies, and she does this by pointing to the positive achievements of the CDU’s coalition since 2005. However, more recently Kramp-Karrenbauer has become self-critical of her one year performance as chairperson and the party’s decreasing vote shares according to polls.

In addition to several criticisms against Kramp-Karrenbauer, it seems that she still trying to hold a stable position which her intra-party opponents –at least at the moment– do not dare to challenge openly. However, recent polls indicate that for CDU members Kramp-Karrenbauer is not the most popular figure as the next chancellor candidate, but Friedrich Merz. For the moment, however, Merz is not openly challenging Kramp-Karrenbauer, who he lost the leadership race to last December. During that leadership contest, Kramp-Karrenbauer received 517 of the 999 all valid votes while Merz only received 482 votes. Whether a rather different result might occur today is an interesting question which has not been not openly addressed. This is actually related to Merz’ most likely secure strategy.

Merz currently denies any kind of “showdown” at the convention against the CDU chairperson and also strengthened his official stance supporting her. However, even though Merz rejects any kind of a debate on a new chairperson of the CDU, he has said that he will continue his critical statements concerning specific issues.

The CDU currently elects the chancellor candidate within narrow party committees where Merz would have less chances to persuade the party’s delegates. But if all CDU members would be able to determine the next chancellor candidate then Merz would have more chances compared with Kramp-Karrenbauer. Although Merz officially does not favour such an option, at least for the moment, his supporters have tried to push for this method. Therefore, it seems that Merz will eventually welcome some new processes for the election of the party’s future chancellor candidate.

On this upcoming Friday and Saturday, the CDU is unlikely to challenge its current chairperson. The party’s leading figures will most likely address other topics, among them Turkey’s EU process, which will be also problematized once again, and most likely in a rather unfortunate way due to Turkey’s recent legitimate operation in Northern Syria. But the leadership question of the CDU will most likely continue to be on the party’s table at least until the next parliamentary elections in 2021. Until then, it seems a very clever move by Merz not to risk any chances to challenge the current chairperson Kramp-Karrenbauer who he would most likely lose against, a loss that might result in the end of his political career. Due to this, Merz prefers to officially support Kramp-Karrenbauer while simultaneously continuing to appear as an alternative in any future leadership crisis, something which might occur in the next months.

While Merz is most likely aiming to solidify his own position as a long-lasting alternative, Kramp-Karrenbauer must currently persuade her party members of her future performance. In addition, the SPD’s ongoing leadership search and their final decision in December whether to continue the coalition with the CDU is also an important topic that concerns the entire coalition.

President Erdoğan met President Trump in the White House last Thursday. The content of the meeting largely met with expectations, and some of the key issues discussed included the issue of the YPG, the S-400-F-35 dilemma, the future of Syrian refugees, the FETO problem, the Halkbank case, and the Armenian bill. While a number of key issues remained unresolved, the meeting indicated a mutual commitment towards improving bilateral relations into the future. Although two issues at the top of the agenda, the YPG issue and the S-400-F-35 dilemma, were not resolved, President Erdoğan and President Trump underlined that Turkey and the US will continue to work on the resolution of key issues in the following days.

During the meetings with the President Trump and the members of the Senate, President Erdoğan stressed that the YPG could not be accepted as a legitimate organization representing the Kurds in the Northern Syria. President Erdoğan also shared evidence of the involvement of the YPG in terrorist attacks with the US officials. Moreover, a comprehensive report covering Turkey’s arguments prepared by Turkey’s Directorate of Communications was presented to the US side. Nevertheless, the US side seems eager to continue their relations with the YPG since the U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper recently stated that the “good relations” between the USA and the YPG would continue.

When it comes to the second most critical issue, the S-400-F-35 dilemma, both countries had a clear conflict of interest. The US stated that Turkey could be accepted into the F-35 program so long as it does not activate the Russian S-400 missile air defense systems. However, President Erdoğan stated that this option was not compatible with Turkey’s interests. Thus, both countries will need to continue to negotiate on this issue to find a common solution.

The future of Syrian refugees, the FETO problem, the Halkbank case, and the Armenian bill were other critical issues discussed during the meeting. President Erdoğan underlined that Turkey had already sent the necessary documents to the US to resolve the FETO problem, which includes the extradition of the FETO leader and shutting down FETO-affiliated schools and institutions, an issue which remains of utmost interest to Turkey. However, the US side did not provide an official response to Turkey’s requests, and it seems that the FETO problem, the Halkbank issue as well as the creation of the safe zone in Northern Syria are all issues still waiting on the negotiation table.

However, the first concrete outcome of the meeting was the blocking of “the Armenian genocide” bill in the Senate. Prior to the meeting, President Erdoğan had already expressed Turkey’s concerns regarding the bill with President Trump. After the meeting, Senator Lindsey Graham emphasized that lawmakers should not “sugarcoat history or try to rewrite it” and moved to block its passage in the Senate.

Overall, it is obvious that the meeting did not solve all the intractable problems between both countries. However, it was an important step for both countries to create a conciliatory environment in order to start further negotiations to solve more deep-rooted issues. Since both countries have used face-to-face negotiations to solve the ongoing problems between the countries, it seems this will occur into the future especially in relation to the Syrian issue which is likely to occur in upcoming days. 

There have been rumors regarding a possible easing of tensions between Qatar and its troubled GCC partners Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. After a decision by the Saudi, Emirati and Bahraini officials to send their teams to Qatar for the 24th Arabian Gulf Cup of 2019, certain positive interpretations followed in the international media. Along with this decision, high-level policymakers’ statements both in Saudi Arabia and Qatar have demonstrated their partial willingness for constructive dialogue to be established between the two parties. Many argued that this “football diplomacy” would help ease the tension between these three countries and Qatar. As the political and economic blockade imposed by Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Manama has been waning gradually, there was some hope that Gulf countries would recover the relationship. However, this is not as simple as many would like to think.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s lack of success on a number of regional issues, particularly the Qatar blockade, have led these countries to reconsider their foreign policies. The Saudi-Emirati axis was not able to force Qatar to bow down and meet with the initial demands. While Qatar, remaining defiant, has not made any change to its foreign policy, particularly with regards to 13 demands announced by the blockading countries. The Riyadh and Abu Dhabi administrations have come to the realization that the blockade of Qatar, which has been one of their main foreign policy miscalculations, can no longer continue. Despite realizing this there is still no genuine change to the hostile nature of these two countries’ attitude towards the Doha administration. While a majority of the issues that created division between Qatar and the Saudi-Emirati axis still exist, many initiatives of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are not and will not be supported by the Doha administration.

Therefore, it can be misleading to expect that the Qatari administration will take a positive attitude towards the rapprochement of these two countries. As a matter of fact, with the blockade in 2017, Qatar has reshaped its foreign policy and acted with the reflex of a country surrounded by hostile neighbors. As part of this strategy Qatar has developed strong alliances with regional and international actors, such as Turkey, Iran and the United States and diversified its political, diplomatic and economic alliances. 

Rather than being obliged to establish a means of dialogue with the Saudi-UAE axis, Qatar has done more to build consolidated international partnerships particularly with Turkey, the US and Iran. Bilateral relations, trade volume, military cooperation and socio-cultural harmony have seen a boost between Turkey and Qatar, with partners intending to reach record levels of bilateral trade and military cooperation particularly. With the US, Qatar has enjoyed the privilege of hosting the largest US airbase in the Middle East, and the US has also the made promises of enlarging it at despite Qatar’s regional entanglements. Qatar has also built a stronger relationship with Iran, one that was already in place even before the blockade was initiated.

Another reason as to why a genuine rapprochement between Qatar and its hostile neighbors will not occur is the way Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain treated the Doha administration. The attitude of Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Manama during the early stages of the blockade had a strongly negative effect on the both Qatari political and social actors. As the Qataris were being humiliated by its neighbors, their trust toward them was significantly damaged. Although there have been some constructive attempts by these countries to redress this more recently, the damage remains and is almost impossible to be recovered.

Finally, in the latest developments to ease tensions between the Saudi-UAE axis and Qatar, it doesn’t seem reasonable for Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed to change course. Having spent a tremendous amount of effort, money and manpower to be the regional-agenda-setters, Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed firstly intended to isolate Qatar to punish its allegedly disobedient foreign policy behavior. Being stalemated against Iran, being stuck in Yemen and having assumed an unassertive role in the global oil market, the Saudi-UAE axis aims to ease the existing tensions with Qatar, only to demonstrate their vulnerability and give countless regional concessions.

Despite suggestions that the recent football diplomacy may be a way out to the already deepened crisis in the Gulf region, it is hard to believe that there can be an easy solution to the existing problems between the parties. The idea of a rapprochement is wishful thinking at the simplest level of analysis, as the effects of the blockade continues and mistrust between the parties persists. The humiliation and insults toward Doha by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates is something fresh and unforgettable for both the political leadership and popular masses in Qatar. The Doha leadership was able to remain strong and solid during the hardest period of the crisis and it will simply not forget the mistreatment it was subjected by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.  

For a long time, Germany’s political system has been regarded as stable without any need for change. However, recently some voices have begun calls for reform. Among them is Germany’s Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy, Peter Altmaier, a close ally of Chancellor Angela Merkel. He recently called for a fundamental reform of Germany’s political procedures, which should be launched even this year. In a German newspaper, Altmaier wrote that “it seems as if the traditional political system of our country has been in a kind of permanent crisis” pointing to the recent state elections in Thuringia, where the Left Party and the far-right AfD received more than 50 percent of the votes.

Altmaier argued, that “it’s no longer about any new chairman, chancellor candidate or minister, it’s not about coalition compromises, it’s about fundamental issues of trust and acceptance”. According to Altmaier, “politics would be responsible, when the proportion of voters who no longer voted for a party represented in the German government had doubled”. Altmaier thus states that all parties – particularly the big parties – should be ready for fundamental political changes that will involve citizens into the decision-making process.

However, his concrete proposals are currently limited to reducing the number of members of the German parliament (Bundestag). Although the German constitution requires a minimum number of 598 MPs, there are currently 709 MPs in the Bundestag. The disparity in the number of seats can be explained by Germany’s electoral system which awards seats on the basis of votes received for individual constituencies and a party list. Procedures that aim to balance the outcomes between these two categories create so called overhang seats (Überhangmandate) in which further seats are added to party’s total allocation. More recently, this system has been accused of unfairly favoring the CDU.

According to Altmaier, however, the number should gradually be reduced to an “appropriate number” and the number of cabinet ministers should also be limited to fifteen. In addition, the high number of secretaries of state (currently 35), and government employees should also be reduced by one third in the next government’s tenure. Finally, Altmaier also suggests that the tenure in the federal legislature should be increased from four to five years, and that federal and state elections should coincide; that is to say, Altmaier does not agree that there should be a permanent mood of election campaigning in the country due to state and federal elections taking place during different times, and which also has an impact on the federal government’s agenda.

Until now, Altmaier’s calls have not led to any actual serious debate though some opposition politicians from the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and Greens have criticized Altmaier and his CDU for being responsible for the current conditions. They blame Altmaier and his government for increasing the number of secretaries of state. On the other hand, the FDP blasted Altmaier for not talking with his own party about the matter and instead talking to the media.

A further criticism came from the AfD, who argued that the fact that secretaries of state as members of the executive are also simultaneously MPs of the legislative body undermines the separation of powers. However, it is not clear what kind of a solution Germany’s parliamentary system should bring regarding the AfD’s criticism. Furthermore, besides prime ministers or chancellors, nearly all cabinet members are also members of the parliament, and although this may not be the best way of separating powers, it is actually quite typical across parliaments.

Furthermore, a few days later and independently from Altmaier’s remarks, the leader of the FDP, currently in the federal opposition, also called also for a substantial change to current regulations. Christian Lindner proposed a two-term limit on the tenure of the German Chancellor to 5+5 years. Some senior voices opposed this idea stressing that German citizens decide every four years who can be the Chancellor, and, that Germany is not a presidential democracy where term limits are meaningful. However, others supported Lindner’s –call.

The question of who should decide what arises. In Germany, the Chancellor is elected by the Bundestag, not by the citizens. In a presidential democracy, the citizens directly elect the president. Thus, it is also asked why term limitations should be wrong in Germany while being right in a presidential democracy?

Well, as one notices, there are currently some occasions for debating Germany’s political system which has become even more interesting due to the decreasing importance of centrist parties over the last couple of years. In such conditions, a country with a robust political system or system of government generally will proves itself against several challenges. Given Altmaier’s and Lindner’s proposals, it seems that the long-lasting tenure of Chancellor Angela Merkel has highlighted some difficulties regarding Germany’s post-1945 parliamentary democracy, even though there are not that many voices both in political and media circles that have raised these issues.

Besides Altmaier’s somewhat superficial proposals, it’s with no doubt a meaningful idea to consolidate federal and (16) state elections, which currently causes a de facto permanent election environment. This most likely constrains already fragile coalition governments at the federal level, particularly recently. A fresh debate concerning new opportunities or even proposals about the political system would not be that bad for Germany. However, it should be kept in mind that making some fundamental changes to the system will not eliminate problems caused by the rise of the extreme right and left. For this, other a changes in political content as well as structural adjustments are needed.

President Erdoğan will be paying a visit to President Trump in the U.S on November 13. After rising diplomatic tensions between two countries during Operation Peace Spring, this visit will be important in determining the future of Turkish-American relations. This face-to-face meeting will be a chance to solve problems that emerged between the two countries in recent years.

President Erdogan has stated that the top item on the agenda with President Trump will be the fight against the FETO terror group. The extradition of Fetullah Gulen, the FETO leader, to Turkey has been a long standing source of tension between Turkey and the US, and prioritizing this issue indicates a clear intention to make progress towards developing a more collaborative relationship to address security threats.

The Syrian crisis and Operation Peace Spring will also be at the top of the agenda. During Turkey’s military operation in Syria, Turkish-US relations deteriorated due to a conflict of interests and misunderstandings between the two countries on the Syrian issue. Obviously, the biggest issue of conflict is the YPG’s presence in Northern Syria. While Turkey sees it as a threat to its national security, the US sees them as useful to prevent the rise of Daesh in the region. Tensions between the two nations escalated and de-escalated several times during the operation and as a result, this visit will be important to repair relations between Turkey and the US.

President Erdoğan almost certainly be bringing the Turkish-American agreement on the safe zone to the table. President Erdoğan recently said “We know that there are still terrorists in the planned safe zone. These areas have not been cleared of terrorists yet”. Since the agreement requires the withdrawal of YPG members 30 kilometers away from Turkey’s border, President Erdoğan will most likely discuss why the agreement has not been fulfilled yet.

When it comes to the American side, it appears that while President Trump sees the visit as a chance to discuss the Syrian border, terrorism and the YPG,  the American side is much more pessimistic about the visit, and it is likely that US officials will continue to take a firm stand on the YPG’s presence outside of the safe zone. It has also been said that while the two leaders may solve the existing problems, they also have to convince the Washington bureaucracy which is still angry about the agreement and Trump’s decision to withdraw from Syria.

The future of 3.6 million refugees living in Turkey. As was previously stated by Turkey, one of the main aims of the establishment of a safe zone is the resettlement of approximately 1.5-2 million Syrian refugees within the safe zone. In his UN speech, President Erdoğan underlined that Turkey could not maintain hosting 3.6 million refugees and it was urgent to establish the safe zone and resettle refugees in that area.

Another prominent issue for the Erdoğan-Trump meeting will be the sanctions against Turkey and the resolution passed by the House of Representatives to commemorate “the Armenian Genocide”. It is a well-known fact that both decisions were taken by the US to force Turkey to halt Operation Peace Spring. President Erdoğan stated that he discussed the decision of the House of Representatives with President Trump on the phone and that Trump decided to examine this issue.

Other issues such as the Halkbank case, the future of the YPG in Syria will all be handled during the visit. Some of these issues have been in negotiation with the US for a long time and the outcome of this visit on these issues will be of interest.

It seems that even if the two leaders are eager to solve the existing problems between two countries, there is the obstacle of a resistant Washington bureaucracy. The ongoing impeachment investigation against Trump and the media’s aggressive stance against Turkey has forced him to take a confrontational stance against Turkey. Nevertheless, good relations between the two leaders helped in finding solutions for deep-rooted problems in the past, and ongoing intractable issues may be solved at the table once again.

The Social Democrats of Germany are still searching for dual-leadership from which they hope to escape from the party’s current lack of perspective and prospects. Given the results of the Thuringia state elections, the once strong centrist party of Germany is increasingly heading towards becoming a marginal one, which will most likely have serious difficulties in achieving the five percent voter threshold at the state level, and perhaps also at the federal level. As I previously addressed, Germany’s Social Democrat Party (SPD) has had a fundamental problem of maintaining its chairpersons. The party witnessed several chairpersons who were not able to receive the necessary support both from the party’s base and leading figures in the party’s senior circles. Even despite this, since 2013 the SPD has interestingly insisted on continuing to be the junior partner of Chancellor Merkel’s grand coalition governments.

In the last 24 months, the party had an overrated chairperson, Martin Schulz, who became SPD chairperson with 100 percent of the party’s votes, but resigned subsequent to the party’s federal election losses in September 2017. Then, Schulz’ successor Andrea Nahles, became the first female chairperson of the party in its more than 150 year history. However, due to several failures and miscalculations regarding the state elections, during which the SPD faced and still faces a decreasing and catastrophic voting trend, Nahles also resigned as chairperson.

The party then decided to elect its chairperson through a vote of all of its 420 thousand members. Currently, the party is being led by an interim leadership-trio. For the first time, several co-candidates declared their candidacy. Approximately 53.3 percent of the SPD members voted in the election, in which twelve co-candidates ran. However, no candidate was able to achieve an absolute majority in the first round. Consequently, a second round of voting will be scheduled between 19 and 29 November. Following this date, the results of the winning duo will be declared at the SPD party convention in early December. The interesting point is that on this convention day the SPD will also decide their future as part of the grand coalition as well.

The current Finance Minister and Vice Chancellor Olaf Scholz and his running mate, Klara Geywitz, received most of the votes (22.68%) in the first round, followed by Norbert Walter-Borjans and Saskia Esken (21.04%). Resulting in both of these duos achieving the right to run for the party’s new co-leadership in the second round.

Polls indicate that 37 percent of members want to see Walter-Borjans and Saskia Esken as the party’s new co-leaders, while only 25 percent support Scholz and Geywitz. However, 38 percent of those polled do not support any of the co-candidates. On the other hand, leading political figures such as the SPD’s current foreign minister Heiko Maas, or the former chairperson Martin Schulz, have recently declared their support for the Scholz-Geywitz duo. Similarly, media outlets also suggest that Germany’s current Finance Minister Scholz is the favorite to lead the SPD together with Geywitz.

In the next weeks, SPD members will ultimately have a new chairperson on whom party members will set their hopes. However, in reality choosing new leadership will not guarantee that the existing obstacles within the party, and dismal predictions at the ballot will find any resolutions. But the fact that Maas and Schulz, prominent figures of the SPD, have shown support for Scholz and Geywitz, indicates the possibility of a continuation of a political line which may not be not so attractive from the point of view of voters seeking more promising change.

It is also very debatable whether the current method of electing a new chairperson of the SPD is the best one. It does not seem very convincing that a new top-leader and a potential candidate for chancellor will emerge with this kind of extended and unexciting election process.

Finally, it is a fact that the German Finance Minister Olaf Scholz only narrowly received most of the votes during the first round, which then triggered the second round. This indicates that all of the SPD’s candidates have a similar support rate, and further suggests the lack of a new and exciting mood within the party. In reality, any potential successful chairperson of a major centrist party will have to deliver much more than what Social Democrat circles are currently offering. It is clear that the current mood and choice of candidates signal that there will not be any extraordinary changes for the SPD in general, which hardly seems an appropriate development to stem the tide of voter dissatisfaction and a growing right-wing populist trend.

On November 3, 2002, Turkey’s parliamentary elections resulted in a great surprise. The AK Party, which was established almost a year and a half earlier, came to power by receiving 34 per cent of the total votes and winning 363 out of 550 MP’s in the parliament. This was despite being underestimated by both media and other political parties during the election process. There was a common perception in the media that it was not possible for the AK Party to get majority of the votes in the elections since it was newly established and did not have enough power to influence voters. Nevertheless, the AK Party’s victory started an unprecedented era of Turkish political history that still continues.

Indeed, it was not easy for the AK Party to rule the country in the beginning. All actors in the system such as the army, the judiciary, political parties, and, last but not least, media were clearly against the AK Party rule. According to these actors, the AK Party was a threat to Turkey’s modernity and secular values. Moreover, the party’s chairman, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was initially banned from running as a candidate in the elections due to a conviction for reciting an “Islamic” poem at a political rally, an act which the Constitutional Court considered to be against laicism in Turkey. It was a therefore a tough beginning to AK Party rule.

Despite this, the AK Party government achieved a difficult goal and the party has been in power for the past 17 years. Under the AK Party’s rule, Turkey made considerable achievements economically and sociologically, and many steps to democratize the country were taken. For instance, the state launched the first Kurdish language TV and radio channels and provided more rights to minorities. Furthermore, the Turkish economy reached the highest growth rate by 2010 as a result of economic reforms. Considering this legacy of the AK Party, what are the possible challenges and opportunities for AK Party rule in the upcoming period?

The first critical issue for the party is renewing itself to become more compatible with the dynamics of new political system.  Turkey switched to a presidential system after the June 2018 general elections, and all political parties are still experiencing some difficulties in understanding the new political dynamics under the presidential system. Since the presidential system requires 50 per cent +1 votes, cooperation between parties will become crucial for success in elections. However, parties still do not seem to understand the new rules of the game. For instance, political party members cannot differentiate between coalitions, requiring unanimity of all participating parties on all issues, and pre-electoral alliances, depending more on restricted cooperation between political parties. As a result, even a small disagreement between political parties are perceived to signal the end of alliances. The AK Party and the MHP experienced this situation in November 2018, and the CHP and the Iyi Party have been experiencing this more recently. Even the CHP and Iyi Party have been experiencing some disagreements, this disagreement may not turn into a break of their alliance as it was claimed. Thus, all parties, including the AK Party, needs to understand these dynamics.

The second eye-catching issue for the AK Party is understanding the sociological transformation of Turkish society over the last 17 years. This transformation has also affected voting behavior and has changed expectations for political parties. Almost all surveys show that the main determinant of voting behavior is no longer the ideology of political party as it was before. Instead, voters are paying more attention to secondary issues such as environmental and youth policies. This new voter profile also focuses on individual gains such as economic benefits. Because of this, the AK Party like all other parties will likely adjust their policy agenda to meet the changing expectations of voters.

The third important issue for the party is rejuvenating its members in preparation for the future. Indeed, the political participation of young people significantly increased during the AK Party rule. The AK Party government also decreased the age of candidacy in parliament from 25 to 18 and has the highest percentage of MP’s between the age of 18-29 in parliament. However, the party needs more youth participation especially in decision-making processes to attract the attention of young people.

Another issue for the party is the emergence of new splinter parties established by previous AK Party politicians. There is an ongoing discussion in the media that these parties may challenge the AK Party and split their votes, which may weaken the party’s position in the political arena. Even if it is too early to measure the impact of these parties on the AK Party government, the ongoing discussions in the media seem to suggest that these parties do not have the potential to break the AK Party’s power in politics. To be sure, if the AK Party pays attention to all these issues, these challenges may become opportunities for the party to maintain its rule in the following years.

When the war in Syria attracted radicals from across the globe, almost all of them were not hindered from leaving their countries despite being listed as potential suspects. The governments and their intelligence agencies, especially European states, wanted their problems to be exported to Syria. The laws in these countries are not equipped to properly address the criminal issues arising from their activities abroad, and leaving them to die in Syria appeared to be an easy choice. However, things turned out differently. The suspected terrorists went to Syria, facilitated the buildup of an alleged caliphate, murdered thousands of people, created a mess in the Middle East, conducted terror attacks in European capitals and survived.

After the territorial defeat of Daesh, the home countries are now confronted with new challenges. In contrast to their expectation, the suspected terrorists did not die but had children and survived. Many of them are now imprisoned in Syria, Iraq and Turkey. Taking those foreign terrorist fighters back is the legal obligation of their home countries, but most know that their laws are incapable of declaring a proper sentence against them. If their terror export returns, they will import battle-hardened militants who may be released from prison in a short period of time. All of this happens while the European Union denies Turkish citizens visa free entry to the EU due to the ‘harsh’ terror laws in Turkey.

European states are for the first time really facing the dilemma of terrorists and the problems of dealing with them within existing legal frameworks. If the laws of the EU are not adjusted, returning fighters might exploit it and become a new security threat. There is also an increase of Islamophobia that could in turn radicalize a number of Muslims living in Europe. If this is combined with former Daesh members released due to insufficient laws, it would potentially be a national security threat for the EU states in the near future. On the other hand, if the EU does adjust its laws, it won’t fit into the legal standards the EU demands from the candidates wanting to join the Union.

The Turkish government’s declaration that Turkey won’t be a hotel for terror exported by foreign states, did not come out of nowhere. It fits into a broader process. Turkey has signed a refugee deal with the EU to hinder the flow of refugees into Europe but complains that the other side does not act in line with the agreed terms. As Turkey is carrying the burden of 3.6 million refugees alone, and sees nothing but obstacles from the EU to accelerate the return of refugees back to the safe-zone planned by Turkey, the Turkish government’s patience is low. Ankara is not willing to take on the burden of foreign terrorist fighters as well. In addition to the European terrorists, the Turkish government also has indirect control over foreign terrorists from the Operation Euphrates Shield areas and the Operation Peace Spring areas. In total, the number of Daesh prisoners is almost 1,500 with a significant number of foreigners.

At the current moment, European states are shirking their duties to handle their self-created terror problem. The EU’s attempt to export its terror threat has seemingly backfired in a more dangerous way. Either the European governments take responsibility by accepting their citizens back, or the EU will be dependent on Turkey, Iraq and non-state actors in Syria, all of whom will use the inmates as a legitimate tool of pressure with little interest in taking care of them. If a terrorist is being released by the YPG for example, the EU will have limited means to prevent that person from smuggling into the EU and conducting a terror attack.

One of the main outcomes of the Sochi Summit between Turkey and Russia was the joint patrols along the Syrian-Turkish border with a depth of 10km. Since then, northeast Syria has witnessed many important developments, and joint patrols between Russia and Turkey commenced at the moment of writing. The future of Turkish-Russian joint patrols faces an important challenge due to the gap between the agreed mechanism and the capacities of Russia in Syria. Even if the Russians increase their military presence, they might still be incapable of maintaining joint patrols with the Turkish Armed Forces. The only possibility of such patrols for Russia would be to accept Turkish superiority in the region and to use Turkish strength against the YPG.

Going with the premise that Russia and Turkey are fully interested in conducting the ongoing joint patrols and fulfilling the deal, the main reason why joint patrols in northeastern Syria is a difficult task is quite similar to the reason why both nations could not conduct joint patrols in Idlib. Armed groups on both sides are of essential threat to one another. If the Russians enter Idlib, Turkey would have a hard time ensuring their safety and vice-versa. If Moscow wants to conduct joint patrols with Turkey and ensure the safety of such patrols, Russian forces accompanied by the Assad regime would need to convince the YPG terror group first. However, the latter is not so interested in this, especially after the Turkish-Syrian joint military operation against them. Even the Americans who were trusted by much of the YPG had a very hard time convincing the YPG for the temporary entry of the Turkish army in a much smaller area in depth and length. It is impossible that the YPG will accept Turkish patrols willingly along the entire Turkish-Syrian border strip.

The only option for Russia to facilitate the joint patrols would be to implement the Sochi agreement fully. Only if Moscow enforces the withdrawal of the YPG to 30km south of the Turkish border will joint patrols with Turkey be safe and durable. Some patrols might happen without the full withdrawal, but the risks are too high and it won’t be sustainable, especially when both sides enter non-rural areas. Therefore, the Turkish demand of joint patrols which was agreed upon in Sochi can be seen as a guarantor mechanism for the real withdrawal of the YPG from the safe-zone. There seems to be no way of having joint patrols with Turkey and providing camouflage for the YPG to remain in the zone simultaneously.

And it is exactly at this point that Russia may reach its limits in Syria. As the situation in Idlib is still fragile, the Assad regime is incapable of sending its battle hardened forces to northeast Syria. The Russian military assets are located at the west side of Syria. To build up a strong military presence in northeast Syria would be a huge task for the Assad regime and Russia’s logistics. For instance, the S-400’s air protection system does not cover the Russian forces in east Syria and the financial resources of the regime are limited.

Even if the regime and Russia could manage to build up a strong presence in northeast Syria, it seems that the enforcement of the YPG’s withdrawal from the safe-zone would almost be mission impossible for Russia. Vladimir Putin may have made promises he is incapable of keeping. The only way out for Russia would seem to be letting Turkey weaken the YPG to an extent which is manageable for the Russian military presence in Syria, or to clearly threaten the YPG with the strength of the Turkish Armed Forces.

Last Monday, Germany’s Defense Minister and Chairperson of the Christian Democrats (CDU), Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (AKK), surprisingly raised a proposal for an internationally controlled safe zone in northern Syria. AKK who is currently Chancellor Merkel’s preferred successor, stated that Germany “cannot just stand by and watch and not do anything” about Syria, while outlining her safe zone suggestion, one that which would be internationally controlled and involve Turkey and Russia.

Following her statements, the question arose as to whether she had shared this idea with her coalition partners, and above all, with the actual office responsible for foreign issues, namely, Germany’s Federal Foreign Office and its Social Democrat (SPD) foreign minister, Heiko Maas.

However, it became clear that neither the SPD nor the junior coalition partner, the Christian Social Union (CSU) and its leader Markus Söder, were informed about AKK’s ambitious proposal. Consequently, a dispute occurred behind closed doors between the coalition partners, and the proposal as well as the possible deployment of German troops to northern Syria was severely contested.

The foreign minister’s initial comments also revealed the uncomfortable mood among the coalition members. Maas stated publicly that there were some unanswered questions and that Germany had received skepticism from its EU allies. He added that there was no current discussion among partners to create such an international safe zone, and criticized the time and style in which the proposal was made.

Despite similar irritation and silent criticism by other SPD members, it seems that CDU officials instead supported the defense minister in a quasi-obligatory way, while opposition parties criticized AKK’s proposal. For instance, the Left Party called the proposal “ridiculous”, while the Greens stated that the proposal raised more questions than answers. Interestingly, the former SPD chairman and foreign minister, Sigmar Gabriel, welcomed AKK’s proposal on its content.

Neither the SPD nor the junior coalition partner, the Christian Social Union (CSU) were informed about AKK’s ambitious proposal.

In the following days, though, AKK accused Turkey of annexing parts of northern Syria which consequently caused a backlash even from the German public. Thus, some opposition members harshly criticized the defense minister for spreading “false information” while others described her as “incompetent on such issues”. AKK’s usage of the term “annexation” showed her lack of knowledge regarding military issues. It is generally accepted that there is no intention of a permanent integration of northern Syria into Turkey, which makes AKK’s assertion even more unacceptable.

One day following her public proposal, AKK did not receive the hoped for support from other NATO defense ministers. Furthermore, this recent weekend, Foreign Minister Maas made a surprise visit to Ankara, where he indirectly criticized his colleague’s safe zone proposal. When he was asked about the unclear plan, Maas answered “we were told it was not realistic. Therefore, we prioritized issues that are more important for us at the moment.”

Given the current circumstances; how should we comment on these recent events? It is quite interesting to observe that AKK is preferring to use language which stresses that the situation in Syria is massively compromising the security interests of Germany and Europe. She also criticized both actors for acting too much like “onlookers” and argued that only “a political initiative from Germany for a European advance through NATO makes sense.” But what may be AKK’s main purpose and interest in proposing such an unrealistic step, one which even the German Foreign Minister had to dismiss during his recent visit in Ankara?

Actually, it is no doubt a risky step that aimed to increase her political importance and public popularity, which has been gradually decreasing over the past couple of months. In addition, the recent blow in the Thuringia state elections has also been related to AKK’s performance as the CDU chairperson.

Therefore, as the potential future German chancellor, AKK most likely made a move to achieve a success story on an international platform. This, however, did not receive that much support and even deteriorated the intra-coalition relations, as Maas had stressed during his short-planned visit to Ankara, in which Maas made it clear that Germany’s foreign policy was not determined by the CDU leader and defense minister, but by his ministry. However, other CDU politicians and even opposition figures preferred to criticize Maas’ undiplomatic words that targeted (and even offended) their cabinet colleague.

At the end of the day, the move by the CDU leader will most likely not contribute positively towards her ambitions of becoming Germany’s next chancellor in 2021. Although her previous rival for chancellor, Friedrich Merz is not currently attacking her personally, he has focused attention instead on Chancellor Merkel as the main person responsible of the electoral defeat in Thuringia and other failings of the party. Importantly, Merz recently stressed that the current grand coalition could not continue until 2021.

While these were not direct criticisms of AKK, it can be surmised that such statements will ultimately affect the position of AKK herself, and the future of the coalition partnership as a whole. One which has suffered heavily due to the recent unplanned safe zone move by AKK and the undiplomatic reactions by the foreign minister abroad.

As Turkey launched its Operation Peace Spring, an unfortunate phenomenon has been observed once again among European and German circles. Namely the continuation of a myth about the YPG. This begins with their practice of legitimizing the YPG as the representative of all Kurds – no matter whether they are living in Turkey, Syria or in Germany, and despite the strong evidence to the contrary.

Without taking into consideration the diversity within the Kurdish community, a false narrative is established in which YPG members, sympathizers and even its leading figures are only discussed within a positive and uncritical narrative. This disguises the true face of the PKK and its offshoot, the YPG in Northern Syria. A mistake rooted in both a lack of knowledge and an intention to shape public opinion, observable among politicians, artistic circles, media representatives, journalists and even think-tankers.

Most of the media outlets disregard or do not explicitly mention the fact that the PKK/YPG is officially listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, EU, and the US. The term used to describe the terrorist organization in the media is the “prohibited Kurdistan Workers’ Party” which implies two incorrect meanings: First, Turkey’s supposed undemocratic political landscape where minority groups are not allowed political representation, and second the alleged legality of the PKK and its supposed leftist credentials. There are thousands of articles which either hide the PKK’s ethno-nationalist, separatist and armed character or mention that it is prohibited in the US, EU and Turkey without ever explaining why. It is by using this kind of language that a positive perception of the terrorist group is generally achieved.

If one focuses on the stances of German politicians and compares their approaches towards Daesh and to the YPG, particularly with the rise of Daesh (ISIS) in Iraq and Syria, it is noticeable that unfortunately one –secular– terror group was preferred in order to fight another terror group Daesh. This is despite the Western world’s powerful militarily superiority. The question is, if both are deemed to be abhorrent terrorist groups why was one of them acceptable, even to become an ally to the US and EU?

It appears the ethnic-separatist, neo-Marxist and totalitarian PKK/YPG is somehow deemed to be a lesser threat to Europeans and the West, who instead classify so called religiously inspired terrorism at the top of their hierarchy of evil.

In addition to the ideologically motivated stance of journalists and politicians with regard to the YPG, the most striking issue is the ambivalent behavior of academics’ and think-tankers’. Not for the first time, experts on the PKK/YPG were seen to disregard their own research on the YPG on television and radio. But why choose to disregard what you know? It would seem the societal, media and political pressure which underpins the YPG myth have led these academics to disregard their research, opinions and analyses regarding this terrorist group.

Academics spoke about the YPG as if it had no relation with the PKK while their own publications openly stress a PKK-YPG relationship. Unfortunately, popularity, professional “reputation”, financial dependence, and current political developments seem to trump academic integrity. Similarly, think-tankers, who are likely responsible to their sponsors have disregarded their own publications and have even made calls to support a terrorist organization.

Nevertheless, at the end of the day, more realist approaches appear to be winning favor. In this context, Germany’s defense minister and leader of the Christian Democrats recently proposed the establishment of an internationally controlled security zone in Syria in cooperation with Turkey and Russia. It is too early to tell whether these delayed proposals will have any effect on the current discourse and myths surrounding the PKK/YPG terrorist organization in Germany, the same applies to whether such moves will be taken seriously at all both domestically and internationally.

Countries such as Russia and Turkey will most likely reject such delayed calls after their history of disregarding previous efforts, particularly of Turkey. It should be remembered that during those times Western states took no responsibility but tried to put themselves in the foreground. Due to this, it seems rather unlikely that Turkey will accept certain states interrupting an ongoing process, particularly since the recent memorandum of understanding was signed between Turkey and Russia on north-eastern Syria. The picture will become clearer in the coming days and weeks.

After Turkey began its military operations in Northern Syria on October 9, public debate focused on how the military operation would affect Turkey’s relations with Western countries, especially the US, and whether the operation would change the power balance in Syria. Turkey and the US then came to an agreement to suspend the operation for five days while the US oversaw the withdrawal of the YPG from the region. After the de-escalation of the conflict in Northern Syria, Turkey’s main opposition party, the CHP, changed its position towards the operation, again. As I wrote earlier, from its inception, Operation Peace Spring received the support of all of Turkey’s political parties, except the HDP. Even the resolution of the Turkish Assembly renewing authorization for the Turkish Armed Forces to launch a military operation in Northern Syria received the support of the AK Party, CHP, MHP, and Iyi Party. It was the first time since the July 15, 2016 coup attempt that all political parties were unanimous on an issue.

However, this did not last long. Turkey’s opposition parties adopted their critical positions again. Especially the CHP, which turned back to its harsh position towards the government’s Syria policy. Indeed, even if the CHP had supported the military operation from the beginning, there was a lot of criticism from the party’s pro-HDP circles towards the operation.

For instance, Canan Kaftancıoğlu, head of the Istanbul branch of the CHP, criticized Turkey’s military operation in a written statement and underlined that the operation should not be conducted. Moreover, Sezgin Tanrıkulu, the CHP’s Istanbul MP, blamed Turkey for “invading” Syrian territories and killing civilians living in that area.

The CHP’s flip-flopping position on the Syria issue shows a clash of opinions between two different blocs within the party. While Kemalist and nationalist circles support the operation without any hesitation since they see the operation as Turkey’s right to secure its borders, pro-HDP circles within the CHP are clearly against the operation, and do not acknowledge that the CHP has supported to the operation from the start. The prominent names of this pro-HDP circles, Canan Kaftancığlu, Sezgin Tanrıkulu and Aytuğ Atıcı have been explicitly criticizing the operation and calling it an “invasion”. When it comes to Kemalist and nationalist circles, the leading figures of this group including Muharrem İnce, Umut Oran, and Tanju Özcan supported the military operation. Thus, it is obvious that the recent shift in the CHP’s position after Turkey’s agreement with the US over Syria is also related to the dominance of the pro-HDP group in the party politics. Since the members of this group were clearly against the operation from the beginning, and did not favor the official stance of the party that supported the operation, their hegemony in the party caused the shift in the CHP’s position.

Why did the CHP support the operation although pro-HDP circles are dominant in the party? When the operation started on October 9, the mobilization of nationalist sentiments in the country forced the CHP to support the operation. Although the pro-HDP circles of the CHP were clearly against to the operation, it was not an option for the CHP to oppose to the operation while all of the Turkish public was united in favor of the operation. In other words, the CHP had to perform a pragmatic action to prevent a negative reaction from the public, especially its voters, a certain amount of whom are nationalist voters. Nevertheless, rising tensions in US-Turkey relations, the escalation of a diplomatic crisis with the US, as well as the ambiguity of Russia-Turkey relations during the operation forced the CHP to change its discourse. At this point, the pro-HDP group’s position towards the Syria issue became dominant in the party’s official stance.

The recent statements of the CHP’s Chairman, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, reflects the recent shift in the discourse of the party and the dominance of pro-HDP groups. Even if Kılıçdaroğlu is closer to the pro-HDP groups rather than Kemalist and nationalist circles as the chairman of the party, he had to support the operation because of the increasing nationalist sentiments in Turkey. Nevertheless, Kılıçdaroğlu criticized the government after the agreement and said that Turkey should not be involved in the Syrian issue anymore and should stay away from “the quagmire of Middle East”. Moreover, to strengthen his position in the political atmosphere where nationalist sentiments are still on the rise, Kılıçdaroğlu focused on Trump’s letter to Erdoğan and problematize it as a matter of honor for Turkey.

Indeed, incidents in the last two weeks show that the CHP’s position towards the Syrian issue is more compatible with Western perspectives, as the party does not see the establishment of a Kurdish state in Northern Syria as a threat to Turkey. This party position is shaped by the former bureaucrats of the Foreign Ministry who are influential within the party and in pro-HDP circles. This group includes prominent names within the party such as Ünal Çeviköz and Faruk Loğoğlu, and since the beginning of the Syrian crisis this group defended the idea that the Turkish government should have negotiated with the Assad regime. According to their approach, Turkey’s quest to build a safe-zone on the border is nothing but a “demographic engineering project”, as was stated in the final report of the CHP’s Syria Conference. Since these groups were critical of the operation from the beginning, their discourse became the main determinants of the CHP’s position in time.

Because of this, Turkey’s operation to Northern Syria showed again that pro-HDP groups within the CHP are more powerful than its Kemalist and nationalist circles. It also proves that the pro-HDP group dominates the party’s discourse on critical issues. Even if the increasing nationalist sentiment during the operation forced the party to support the operation in the beginning, it did not take so long for the CHP to adopt its traditional approach to the Syria issue which is highly dominated by the pro-HDP group.

After Turkey and the Syrian opposition started a joint military operation against the YPG terror group in northeastern Syria, many new developments are beginning to reshape the situation in the region and the future of Syria. One of the most important will be the summit to be held today between the Turkish and Russian presidents in Sochi. While many are awaiting the outcome of the summit, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov’s recent remarks about the possibility of amending the Adana agreement raises the question if this might be one of the outcomes today’s meeting. Sergei Lavrov stated: “This is the existing international legal framework that has been recently confirmed by both parties, including in the context of current events. If the parties, in the course of contacts, consider it necessary and mutually accept to clarify or amend this agreement in any way, this will be their decision, we will certainly accept and support it,”

In his following remarks, according to Sputnik News Agency, Lavrov underlined that “all Kurdish structures on Syrian territory should be solidly covered by the Syrian legislation, the Syrian constitution, so that there are no illegal armed groups on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, and so that there is no threat to security of the Republic of Turkey”

The Adana protocol signed by Turkey and Syria in 1998 outlines that the Syrian government will recognize the PKK as a terror group and will ensure the total destruction of PKK networks and operations in Syria, it also allows Turkey to cross five kms into Syria if necessary.

Russia has long argued for the reactivation of the Adana protocol to facilitate direct contacts between Damascus and Ankara, knowing that direct contact will change the diplomatic and political environment dramatically in favor of Russia and the Assad regime it backs. However, the Turkish government argued that direct contact with Damascus is only possible after a genuine political transition process and the election of a new government in free and fair elections.

Currently, the new dynamics in Syria have forced Turkey and Russia to find a new pathway forward. With the US withdrawal and the joint Syrian-Turkish military operation, the dynamics in Syria have changed dramatically. The Assad regime signed a deal with the YPG to control the front lines and borders with Turkey and the Syrian opposition, and to prevent their further incursion. After the entry of the regime into Manbij and Ayn al Arab, the operations in those areas were halted. During his announcement of the Turkish-American agreement for the safe-zone in northeast Syria. The Turkish Foreign Minister also said that Turkey will discuss the removal of the YPG from these areas with Assad backed by Moscow.

However, Ankara is frustrated that the Assad regime has not cracked down on the YPG in the areas it entered after a deal with the US. Most notably, the region of Tal Rifaat is of great importance as a present example. Not only did the residents who fled the region after its capture by the YPG not return, but the YPG has continuously attacked Turkish soldiers and the Syrian National Army from Tal Rifaat.

Turkey knows that the regime is unlikely to crackdown on the YPG and will likely use it as a tool against Turkey, and that Syrian refugees won’t return to regime-held areas. This would mean that the Turkish safe-zone project might fail to achieve its objectives. The recent deal with the American side allowed Ankara to gain important leverage ahead of the summit in Sochi, but no one can foresee what the two presidents will agree on in today’s summit. At the end of the day, the outcome of the summit will be determined by the personal relationship between Erdogan and Putin as well as their negotiation skills.

Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring was launched with the purpose of establishing a safe zone to remove the YPG terror group from southern borders of Turkey. Now, Turkey’s military operation has been paused for 120 hours as a result of the deal reached with the US yesterday evening. Observers noted during the course of the operation so far that the images of Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK’s imprisoned leader, left hanging over walls in the border towns of Tal Abyad and Rasulayn. This is a clear indication of the YPG’s tie to the PKK, its sympathy with Ocalan, and its shared aspiration to establish an ideologically Marxist and ethno-nationalist statelet in the region.

Since the operation was launched, Western media and politicians along with PKK sympathizers and nationalist Kurdish social media users, have harshly criticized Turkey. They presented Turkey as an invading or occupying force with no intention to leave Syria in the long run. They have further portrayed Turkey’s fight against the YPG as being against international law, although, in fact, the operation was supported by local Arab Muslims and regional Christian groups.

A deeper analysis of such criticisms by Western journalists and politicians reveal the fact that these are deeply biased responses devoid of any engagement with facts. Some have accused Turkey of targeting civilians while others have described Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring as part of an oft-repeated plot to establish a Neo-Ottoman Empire.

It is so strange that Turkey’s security concerns emanating from the PKK terror threat over four consecutive decades are not properly addressed, and that neither NATO allies nor Western journalists or think-tankers paid due attention to the subject except a few thoughtful exceptions (I>; II).

Analysts have embellished and insisted on the narrative that Turkey’s military operations will result in strengthening Daesh (ISIS) and the Assad regime ignoring that this would only happen against Turkey’s interests in the region.

The narrative about Daesh prisoners, for example, ignores the fact that the Turkish Armed Forces have fought against this terror threat more than any other country in the world through military and security operations inside and outside the country. While instead, Western governments have chosen not to support a NATO ally in the fight against Daesh, but preferred to back a terror group, as President Trump indirectly admitted in a recent statement.

Despite Turkey’s ambitions to establish the security conditions required so that more than one million Syrians may be resettled in the north of Syria, some Western critics have argued that Turkey’s recent operations might cause the number of Syrian refugees heading to Europe to increase. Most of the critics do not address and disregard the fact that the YPG itself has succeeded in changing Northern Syria’s demographics causing many to flee to across the border.

Most observers of Turkey find that unlike their own opinions, the majority of Turks support the operations against the YPG, including politicians from the main opposition party the CHP. Others have also stated that the operation has strengthened President Erdogan’s domestic position without analyzing the reasons. Analysts have tried to dismiss support for President Erdogan by explaining it away as a simple “rally round the flag”, however without looking at the Turkish context in particular, these theoretical approaches fail to explain the reality on the ground. Instead a greater focus by western analysts appears to be on how the operation will supposedly make Turkey much more isolated in the global context.

It is interesting to note the disappointment expressed by foreign observers highly critical of Erdogan that the new mayor of Istanbul (CHP), who they have often lauded as a “hope” for Turkey, is also supportive of “Erdogan’s operation”. Demonstrating once again their failure to understand Turkey’s complex social dynamics and also exposing the way in which highly rigid, ideological narratives dominate their readings of Turkish politics. Some deliberately do not want to understand that most Turks fundamentally reject any kind of cooperation with the PKK’s offshoots.

On the other hand, discussions in Europe and in Germany have also focused on the fact that there are no European instruments that can be used to effectively oppose Turkey’s actions in the Syrian context, except for the somewhat symbolic steps made by some European authorities to halt arms exports to Turkey. Ultimately in the words of the Foreign minister of Luxembourg’s recent tweet, “We as Europeans are not able to stop that. This has to be told honestly to the people”.

Turkey’s security concerns are for the most part disregarded while those of a terrorist organizations are tolerated and even supported. Leading Western countries, think-tanks, and media representatives who aware of the dangers of PKK affiliated organizations, do not hesitate to challenge Turkey in favor of the YPG. This however appears to be rooted in a reading of Turkish politics and foreign affairs that disregards facts and opinions inside Turkey, and the conditions on the ground in Northern Syria. Such a situation cannot continue forever, and as Turkey is an important NATO player in the region, it will only be a matter of time until the importance of Turkey as an ally will be once again rediscovered.

Turkey’s cross-border military operation, Operation Peace Spring, was launched on October 9, 2019. The Turkish Armed Forces secured some critical targets including Rasulayn and Tal-Abyad. After the operation started, numerous fake news stories and manipulative content were published targeting Operation Peace Spring and the endeavor was turned into a propaganda war. With the YPG forces about to quickly lose their power and domination in Northern Syria militarily, they have turned to the long-standing support of Western nations as a way out. And for this, they are relying on their well-oiled propaganda machine.

Which tools are being used by the YPG in the propaganda war? First of all, the YPG’s main goal is getting the support of Western countries and encouraging them to use their foreign policy tools. And indeed, they appear to be successful in gaining the public support of most Western countries. These countries now threaten Turkey with embargoes and military measures to end the military operation. Finland, Norway, Netherlands, Germany, and France have already suspended arm sales to Turkey. European countries are trying to force Turkey to terminate its operation in the region.

But why are European countries acting so harshly towards the operation? One of the answers lies in the imagined idea of Rojava. For a long time, Rojava, the YPG-led autonomous region of Northern Syria, has been imagined in Western media as a democratic and pluralistic society flourishing in the heart of a troubled Middle East. However, the reality on the ground was quite different, with the YPG carrying out a campaign of violence, intimidation and displacement in order to secure territorial gains. 

After the capture of Northeast Syria by the YPG forces in 2012, the PKK’s long-lasting democratic autonomy project was implemented in Rojava. At this point, it is crucial to understand what the PKK’s democratic autonomy project is. Since 2007, both the PKK and ethno-nationalist separatist Kurdish political parties have underlined that the solution to the problems facing Kurds requires the creation of an autonomous region enabling Kurds to govern themselves, without the intervention of any other actor. This project began to be implemented with the establishment of Rojava with this region becoming a laboratory for this project. But the terrible abuses carried out in the name of establishing Rojava speaks for itself. 

Instead, most Western media channels depicted life in Rojava as a place where women and other vulnerable groups directly participated in political processes, and where decisions are taken by consensus. Indeed, most of this coverage paid specific attention to the secular policies of Rojava and compared it to the practices of the Daesh.  For instance, the New York Times Magazine defined Rojava as a “Dream of Secular Utopia in ISIS’ Backyard” and underlined how secular education policies were being implemented in the region.

Because of this reason, Western media channels have also represented the YPG as freedom fighters who ended the brutality of Daesh in the region. The operation by Turkey was therefore perceived as the fall of the Rojava dream. This was reflected in the remarkable headlines and stories by some Western newspapers and journals such as “Rojava Betrayed. An End to our Dream of Revolution?” and “Turkish Attack on Syria Endangers a Remarkable Democratic Experiment by the Kurds”. Therefore, the long-lasting glorification of Rojava in the Western media strengthened the hand of the YPG in the propaganda war.

Secondly, the cooperation between the United States and the YPG was instrumentalized to urge the Trump administration not to withdraw its support to the YPG. Since the Obama administration, the US had been aiding arms to the YPG forces, this aid became formalized during the Trump administration in order to speed up military operations in Raqqa and ensure victory over Daesh. Thus, the US media are now accusing the Trump administration of betraying “the Kurds”, who are considered to be “the US allies who ended the Daesh dominance in Northern Syria”. Since the Trump administration is under pressure, President Trump has been trying to satisfy public opinion and decrease the domestic fall out by threatening Turkey with new sanctions. Nevertheless, almost all leading Western newspapers and journals are not convinced about the rationale behind Turkey’s operation in the region and this has empowered the hand of the YPG in its propaganda.

The first days of the operation and the success of the Turkish Armed Forces on the ground show that success in a propaganda war has not changed the real situation for the YPG. Because of this, the YPG has been trying to find a new ally to push back against the Turkish army. In order to seek a way out the YPG appears to have shaken hands with the Assad regime and Russia. When for so long the Assad regime has been blacklisted for its brutal role in the Syrian civil war, including the use chemical weapons on civilians, how such an alliance will impact the YPG’s image into the future remains to be seen.

On October 9, Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring for which it had been preparing for months. Understanding that diplomatic efforts with regional and international actors could not prevent the establishment of a planned corridor by the YPG terror group in northern Syria, Ankara decided to take a unilateral step towards eliminating the threats against its territorial integrity and national interests. Acting within the framework of international rights and obligations and with the legitimacy of international law, Turkey emphasizes that the primary objective of Operation Peace Spring is to prevent a terrorist controlled corridor along its southern border.

In fact, within the scope of this, Turkey’s multi-staged plan began to be  implemented three years ago, on August 24, 2016, through Operation Euphrates Shield. Organized with the wide participation of the Turkish Armed Forces’ air and ground troops, Operation Euphrates Shield played a critical role in minimizing some of the negative consequences of the Syrian Civil War. The Operation made significant progress in blocking the PYD, the Syrian branch of the PKK, and the YPG, the military wing of PYD, from establishing a “terror corridor” in the region. The push back against this organization that is supported by the United States, Turkey’s now unreliable ally, through all kinds of weapons and ammunition, was crucial for Ankara. Turkey believed that YPG constituted a permanent threat along its southern borders. Therefore, eliminating the terror group was of vital significance not only for the national security of Turkey, but also for the long-term interests of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean. Operation Euphrates Shield may be seen as a  milestone in the history of modern Turkey.

The second operation was carried out between  January and March 2018 under the name Operation Olive Branch that was the next step in the process. Through this operation, an important area in the West of the Euphrates, including the city of Afrin, came under the Turkish control and the groups supported by Ankara. The city of Afrin was a strategic location for the YPG and regarded as one of its strongholds in the region. With these two operations, Turkey proved its determination to eliminate all kinds of threats directed to its national security.

In the last stage of this initiative, Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring. It was announced that the Turkish Armed Forces have initially aimed to control the area between the towns of Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn. In the later stages, the operation aims to create a safe zone, which will be 480 km long and 30 km deep on the other side of Turkey’s border with Syria. With Operation Peace Spring, Ankara aims to free a total of 13,500 square kilometers from terrorist elements and to achieve four goals to ensure its national security.

The first and primary objective of Operation Peace Spring is to prevent the establishment of a terror corridor in Northern Syria. Turkey aims to not only make terrorist elements leave the area but to also create a peaceful safe zone along its southern border where the Arab, Turkmen and Kurdish civilian population of the region can live in peace. For this, the liberation of the cities under the YPG control was vital.

Turkey’s second goal is to send a message to the international community and regional actors that Ankara is determined to use hard power when needed. Through Operation Peace Spring, Turkey once again shows its determination in the face of any anti-Turkey policies by global and regional actors, and that it will not hesitate to resort to military options if its national interests are threatened. While Turkey considered both diplomatic and military options in finding solutions to regional problems, it also demonstrated itself to be a decisive power in responding to initiatives which may attempt to undermine Turkey’s rights in other conflict zones such as the Eastern Mediterranean.

Another important objective of Operation Peace Spring is to create a safe zone for the return of the Syrians. As President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated, Syrian refugees who want to return to their country will be able to return to the cities that will be liberated and built after Operation Peace Spring. This step will be in line with the demands of various social groups inside Turkey that have criticized the government for its handling of Syrian refugees. It is understandable that Ankara aims to prevent further polarization over Syrian refugees.

Finally, Turkey plans to safeguard the territorial integrity of Syria, which it has been defending from the beginning of the civil war. Through Operation Peace Spring, Ankara reemphasized its commitment to ensuring the territorial integrity of Syria, which is ignored by external players involved in the conflict. From the very beginning of the war, Turkey has  tried to cooperate with other actors to protect Syria’s territorial integrity and to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Turkey has taken initiatives to settle the issue with Russia and Iran. It should be noted that former US President Barack Obama supported the terrorist organization the YPG instead of cooperating with Turkey, and thus, the formation of a terrorist state in the region became a serious possibility. This development clearly threatens the territorial integrity of Syria. In order to prevent the partition of Syria, Turkey decided to take a unilateral step and launched Operation Peace Spring.

Turkey has recognized that there may be a greater threat to its own interests in the future if such an ethno-nationalist Kurdish state is established, and has taken a decisive stance to eliminate this terror corridor despite international pressure. Due to this determination, Turkey could turn a deaf ear to regional and global actors. In spite of the serious reactions and threats by the US administration, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan stressed that Operation Peace Spring will continue until it reaches its goals.

Several international organizations such as the European Union and the Arab League raised concerns about the operation but Turkey’s response to these statements were harsh. In one of his speeches, President Erdogan gave a strong response to the condemning messages by countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Reminding listeners that Saudi Arabia was responsible for thousands of civilian deaths in Yemen, he stressed that Riyadh had no right to criticize Turkey’s operation against terrorist organizations. He also mentioned that Sisi, who came to power with a military coup in Egypt, was a “democracy killer” and that Cairo would not be successful in its smear campaign against Turkey.

It should be reiterated that most of the governments in the Arab world are regimes that do not derive their legitimacy from the people, and do not reflect the views and will of their public. The foreign policies of these regimes do not go beyond the desires of their Western allies. These regimes are taking a position against Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring as they think Turkey’s actions could threaten their own interests or their Western allies. Therefore, it would be misleading to think that the statements made by these countries have also been endorsed by the Arab masses. In contrast, the Arab people support the leadership of Turkey led by President Erdogan in the Middle East as public opinion polls show that he is the most respected and trusted leader in the region.

With Operation Peace Spring, Turkey has taken a vital step towards ensuring peace and stability in the region. Despite facing all kinds of threats and pressure, Ankara has shown the international community that it will never allow a terrorist organization on its borders. With its military capacity, technical equipment and operational capability developed in recent years, the Turkish Armed Forces are one of the most important actors that have contributed to launching Operation Peace Spring. The operation is also endorsed and supported by almost all political parties represented in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. Only the HDP, which has close links to the PKK/YPG terror group, did not support the operation. No doubt, Operation Peace Spring will take its place in the history books as a military operation through which Turkey’s future was saved by today’s leadership.

After Turkey and the Syrian opposition launched Operation Peace Spring against the PKK/YPG terror group to preserve Syria’s territorial integrity and address Turkey’s national security concerns, many states have taken steps against Turkey. The main tool used was sanctions against the Turkish government. At the time of writing, Czechia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway have imposed arms embargoes on Turkey. Additionally, the Trump administration announced a set of sanctions against Turkey including new tariffs and the targeting of Turkish officials, with possible sanctions from the US Congress as well. The absurdity of all of these sanctions is that Turkey is ready to accept any kind of sanction as the cost of inaction would be of much higher. The sanctions only weaken NATO and pushes Turkey away from the western alliance.

Turkey did not start this operation hoping that the Trump administration would greenlight it. This operation was inevitable. Northeast Syria was heading towards becoming a PKK statelet and a long-term threat to Turkey’s national security and territorial integrity. Diplomatic attempts by Ankara to find a joint solution with Washington failed as the American side have not acknowledged the most important concerns of Turkey and CENTCOM torpedoed any agreements from happening.

For Turkey, the YPG presence in northeast Syria poses a threat to Turkey through their possible cross-border attacks. In this manner, the security mechanism as the US side called it could address these concerns but actually this was the less important concern of Turkey. The oft repeated sentence that the US side “understands Turkey’s legitimate security concerns” was just not true. The US has not understood its longtime ally at all. Turkey wants to prevent the establishment of a PKK communist state along its southern borders at all costs. Turkey looks to the situation in Syria from a geopolitical standpoint of view and knows that the situation in Syria would harm Syria’s territorial integrity and pose a serious threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity in the long run, opening the gates for endless wars and chaos in the already chaotic Middle East.

A second concern of Turkey is related to the situation of the Syrian refugees, which is heavily underestimated by the west. The rise in hate speech, social tensions, economic costs and the political environment in Turkey has meant that Turkey can no longer carry this burden anymore, but Turkey has found itself in a deadlock. Syrian refugees will not return to areas held by the regime or the YPG, the EU will not allow refugees to cross into Europe, and the international community is not providing enough support to Turkey for hosting such a large refugee population. Lastly, the situation in Idlib could generate a further two million more refugees. A new inflow of refugees into Turkey would destabilize one of the last islands of stability in the Middle East. Turkey had no other choice but to establish a safe-zone in Syria.

Many other costs could have emerged if Turkey would not have intervened. In order not to surpass the limits of this article, I will finish with a last danger. The PKK/YPG is  indoctrinating a new generation in northeast Syria with hatred against Turkey, and like Daesh (ISIS) indoctrination in the region, would create a long term security threat for Turkey as well. Seeing the costs that Turkey could face by not intervening in Syria, attempts by other states to impose sanctions against Turkey are useless and won’t change Turkish opinion at all. These same governments who have not imposed any sanctions against Saudi Arabia over Yemen are only satisfying themselves by doing so.

Iraq has been witnessing popular protests that have taken the lives of more than 100 civilians. Political instability, economic hardships and increasingly difficult living conditions have caused the masses, especially young people, to protests against the government. A rapid escalation of violence during the protests caused death of at least 100 protesters in a few days. The course of events was very similar to last year’s wave of protests in the southern city of Basra, where scores of civilian protesters were also killed.

In both cases, unknown assailants were accused of attacking protesters with live weapons. Various social media accounts and eyewitnesses reported that a number of unknown assailants were seen as they shot protesters. It was speculated that some groups close to Iran could have been behind the attacks on the protesters as the demonstrators were strongly against Iranian influence on Iraq. While anti-Iran slogans are common, protesters carried banners criticizing Iranian influence in the country. Despite the claims, the role of any Iran-related groups in the spiral of violence is not clear.

However, Iran was associated with another key development that triggered the protests. The dismissal of Abdulwahab Al-Saadi from his position as the deputy head of the Counter-Terrorism Unit, came as a surprise for many, particularly for his followers. Al-Saadi was a key figure in Iraq’s fight against ISIS over the past years. Al-Saadi was seen as pro-American due to his record of working with US military as part of training for the Counter-Terrorism Unit, which was created by US forces. He was therefore considered as an obstacle for Iran-backed groups to have influence on the Counter-Terrorism Unit. Al-Saadi’s increasing charisma would have been also considered as a threat by circles that are close to Iran. So, it is widely believed by Al-Saadi supporters that he was removed from his position because he didn’t seem loyal enough to Iran as Tehran wished him to be. Therefore, Al-Saadi’s supporters, who thought he was dismissed because of his position toward Iran, voiced their discomfort with Tehran’s increasing influence over Iraq. While protesters shouted slogans like “Iran out” and “Free Iraq”, they also burned the Iranian flag. 

There is no doubt that Iran’s influence on Iraq has increased in recent years. This can be seen in political and social life. Pro-Iranian figures are granted high-ranking positions, and many Iraqis avoid making critical comments against Iran publicly. Iranian influence is also seen on Iraq’s security establishment. For instance, the Hashdi Shabi, which is composed of Shiite militias and backed by Iran, has become one of the most vital institutions in today’s Iraqi security sector. It is stated that Hashdi Shabii is the most organized military organization in contemporary Iraq. 

Apart from the Iranian aspect, another major cause of the wave of protests is the poor political and economic conditions in Iraq. Despite being one of the richest countries in world in terms of oil reserves, Iraqis have to confront with instability, poverty, unemployment, high inflation, power shortages and inadequate public services. Fed up with economic and political uncertainties, Iraqi youth no longer hesitate to raise their voices against the government.

Corruption is also seen as one of the main causes of the current problems in Iraq. According to international observers and local sources, at least $80 billion is said to disappear due to corruption annually. Experts state that a significant portion of this money may be going to Iran, which suffers economic problems due to international sanctions. If true, this flow of cash from Iraq could be helping the Iranian economy enormously.

Finally, the protesters also targeted Adel Abdul-Mahdi, who became the prime minister a year ago. Abdul- Mahdi is seen as incapable of leading the country, which has been witnessing a deteriorating political and economic environment and he was criticized for being too slow in making any progress to address the country’s urgent problems. Despite the criticism, Abdul-Mahdi made a public speech on TV and suggested that he would take steps to solve the problems that protesters raised. He also announced that he would implement some reforms in the coming period. These statements, however, were not enough to ease the anger of the demonstrators. The government declared a curfew in many cities, including the capital Baghdad, to prevent people gathering outside. The government also shut down internet access in order to prevent protesters from organizing through social media.

Even though the demonstrations in Iraq have slowed down after the intervention of the security forces and the government’s reform announcements, it should be underlined that the demands of the Iraqi youth remain and the reaction against the increasing influence of Iran in the country continues. Iraqi politics, which is already fragile, may be subject to greater complications if protests continue One of the most serious concerns discussed about the future of Iraq is the breakdown of the state and a possible division of the country. This has the potential to have lasting and serious consequences for both Iraq and the countries in the region. The concerns of the youth in Iraq should be taken into consideration and a lasting solution should be offered in order to protect the territorial integrity of the country.

Turkey will no longer tolerate the presence of a terrorist group on its southern borders as the country’s leading figures recently announced their determination to start a military operation as soon as possible. As has been globally observed in recent days, the U.S.-backing of the YPG/PYD has decreased at the U.S. presidential level despite the heavy criticism and pressure from both the Republicans and Democrats. The following days will most likely involve a greater clarification of positions towards Turkey’s planned military operations.

Besides the operation’s potential scope and its military purpose which will be discussed in detail, it is interesting to observe that most of the U.S. and Western voices in general take a position that blindly supports the YPG, which is the Syrian branch of the PKK terrorist organization.

Turkey’s alliance with the U.S. and NATO has 67 years of history. The country has positioned itself long ago in the Western alliance, viewing it as a strategic partnership in the fight against regional and global terrorism. Given this, it is not understandable why most Western politicians, media representatives and social media users directly or indirectly prefer the YPG despite Turkey’s serious security concerns.

Turkey’s struggle against the PKK terrorism is disregarded. Instead, the U.S. and other Western democracies describe “Kurds” as friends or allies. Referring to “Kurds” instead of the more accurate YPG/PKK, reinforces a false narrative because not every Kurdish person is a YPG/PKK member or supporter, and further implies that opposition to the YPG and PKK is in reality opposition to the Kurdish people themselves. The more accurate question is whether the West has ever truly been friends of the Kurdish people when they have themselves been facing PKK terrorism for more than 35 years. But this reality is ignored when PKK propaganda in the form of political liaisons with PYD/YPG is widespread.

Unfortunately, this attitude is of fundamental concern and should not be ignored while Turkey conducts military strikes in the upcoming days. There should be research to discover the roots of Western and even some domestic support for the PKK. This issue is perhaps not well addressed today, but for future readers and researchers, it is important to understand the current positions of Western democracies, their media and even their civil representatives in favour of the PKK/PYD.

How it is possible that democracies and their media hide, disregard, downplay the activities of a neo-Marxist and ethnic-separatist terrorist organization? How can a terrorist organization such as the PKK, which is regarded as a prohibited terrorist organization both in Europe and the U.S. enjoy comfortable support by Western powers? This happens despite several reports, opinion pieces, studies, and interviews with experts from the Western world that prove the obvious connection between the PKK and PYD/YPG.

I doubt that a realism-based approach is able to explain such irrational positions. Furthermore, the preferred arguments that “defeating Daesh terrorism has to be the priority” does not answer why a terrorist organization such as the YPG is actively preferred by Western policymakers and even supported by civilians in order to fight another terror organization such as Daesh. Actually, this narrative has been reiterated for more than six to seven years and therefore more people in the West are inclined to play down the PKK’s actual role as a terrorist organization while disregarding the fundamental concerns of an ally.

The direct or indirect support of the PKK through its offshoot in Syria has perhaps functioned until now but it is clear that this blind stance will not guarantee a long-term approach. It is not acceptable that an ethnic-separatist and neo-Marxist terrorist organization is normalized.

In Turkey, there is one political party, the HDP, and only a few supporters from among radical Marxist groups that declared their support for the YPG. Turkey’s main opposition party, the CHP’s current stance is not to support a Turkish military strike openly against the YPG in Northern Syria. But this should not confuse observers. Although there are sympathizers of Kurdish separatism among the ranks of the CHP administration, the party rejects the existence of the YPG/PKK and supports the fight against it. This also counts for all other terrorist groups no matter what their political agendas are. A high majority of Turkish citizens oppose the PKK/PYD, Daesh, FETO and all other terrorist groups, and this is a stance which should be reflected in the allies of Turkey, which at the moment appears to only be Spain.

As a result of Turkey’s decisiveness, the White House announced that the U.S. forces in Syria will withdraw in expectation of a Turkish military operation into the region, opening the way for Turkey and the Syrian opposition to go after the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK terrorist organization. Since then, many experts have been discussing the potential scope and implications of the operation, but it is most likely that the operational plan of the joint Syrian-Turkish military operation will occur in Arab areas between Tal Abyad and Rasulayn and in the region of Manbij west of the Euphrates.

Immediately before and since the announcement by the White House, many developments have occurred on the ground in Syria and Turkey. Most notably, the U.S. soldiers evacuated their bases along the Turkish-Syrian border and left the area. With this move, the U.S opened the way for a joint Syrian-Turkish military operation between Tal Abyad and Rasulayn. A second development is ongoing on the Turkish side of the border where Turkish Armed Forces are amassing troops and equipment between Akcakale and Ceylanpinar, which are on the other side of the border from Tal Abyad and Rasulayn. This Turkish preparation also includes the buildup of howitzer and artillery positions suitably located to shell the strip between Tal Abyad to Rasulayn. The armed Syrian opposition, the Syrian National Army, has sent reinforcements to Jarablus to cross into Turkey and take position along the Syrian-Turkish border strip between Tal Abyad and Rasulayn.

On the other side, the region of Manbij is seeing an intensive arrival of reinforcements by the Syrian National Army and the Turkish Armed Forces. The Syrian opposition has sent massive reinforcements to the frontlines of Manbij chanting that they will liberate Manbij from the terrorists occupying the area. Additionally, the Turkish Armed Forces have been sending heavy armory and Special Forces through Jarablus towards the region of Manbij.

The region of Manbij is crucial as the Assad regime in the south and the Syrian opposition in the north are of equal distance to Manbij city, and both sides have ambitions to control this strategic area. This includes the Tishreen dam, which is located at the Euphrates in Manbij and is the second most important dam in Syria after the Tabqah dam. In case of a military operation, both sides may race for control over this area, and the YPG is likely to hand the region to the Assad regime which will improve its speed of advance. In this regard, the Syrian opposition may try to cut the advance route of the regime as they are stationed west of Manbij and received training on air-landing with Turkish helicopters. By cutting the route of the regime to Manbij, the Syrian National army can guarantee its control over the region. However, if they cannot act fast enough, the region will fall to the regime, opening its way towards the east of the Euphrates. From the Turkish perspective, Manbij is also of upmost importance as its liberation will enable the return of the Sulayman Shah tomb to its original place by the Euphrates River.

The joint Syrian-Turkish operation will firstly aim to liberate Arab areas from the YPG. By doing so, the operation will in its initial phase contradict critics who state that the main goal of the operation is demographic engineering. Additionally, by liberating Arab areas first, the number of recruits in the Syrian National Army may increase massively as the local Arab population and tribes are strong supporters of the Syrian opposition. The scope and possibility of a second stage towards Arab areas in the south or towards mainly Kurdish populated areas in Ayn al Arab and Qamishli may most likely be decided after the Trump-Erdogan summit on November 13.

After long-lasting negotiations between Turkey and the United States, a cross-border military operation in Syria has been decided. Although President Erdoğan emphasized many times that Turkey would conduct a military operation in Northern Syria for the creation a safe zone, the conditions of the operation and the US’s role were ambiguous. That ambiguity ended on Sunday night when the White House Office of the Press Secretary announced that “Turkey is preparing to launch a military operation in Northern Syria, and the United States will withdraw its troops in the area ahead of the long-planned attack”. Thus, the US will not join the military operation and will not intervene, contrary to pro-YPG claims.

Since the operation was announced, there has been a lot of debate about how it will impact regional dynamics and Turkey’s foreign policy in general. How will ongoing alliances among political parties be affected by the operation? Will the operation deepen the current conflicts between the CHP and Iyi Party? What will be the early responses of political parties to the operation?

It seems that there are two different approaches to the upcoming military operation among political parties in Turkey. The AK Party, the MHP, and the Iyi Party support the military operation in Northern Syria but the CHP and the HDP are clearly against it. Three parties supporting the military operation see it as an obligation to provide regional security and protect Turkey’s interests in the region. As the members of People’s Alliance, the AK Party and the MHP already had a consensus on this issue for a long time. However, the Iyi Party, contrary to its partners in the Nation Alliance, also supports the operation. Meral Akşener, leader of the Iyi Party, has often underlined that Turkish military should take the necessary steps in Syria and Iraq to overcome threats against Turkey’s security.

When it comes to the CHP and HDP, both parties are against the military operation in Northern Syria. Indeed, the CHP’s approach towards the operation can be seen from the outcomes of their recently-conducted conference on Syria. As I stated in my latest column, the CHP regards Turkey’s efforts to create a safe zone on the border as a “demographic engineering” project and underestimates the threat of the YPG against Turkey. For the CHP, Turkey should negotiate with the Assad regime rather than conducting an operation. Despite this, the CHP does not offer any roadmap to overcome the existing threat or how the involvement of the Assad regime in the negotiation process will help to overcome these threats. The CHP’s early response to the operation also demonstrated this. CHP Group Deputy Chairman Engin Özkoç stated that Turkey should get out of the “Middle East quagmire” rather than conduct a military operation for political interests of the government.

The HDP is also clearly against the operation. According to the official statement of the party, this operation will not bring stability and peace to the region. Since the party perceived the previous military operations as “ethnic cleansing” against the Kurds in the region, it is obvious that they will have the same reaction to the recent operation, too.

How will the operation affect the alliances between the parties in Turkey? As Burhanettin Duran stated in his latest column, the variation of approaches towards the military operation of Turkey in Syria will escalate ongoing conflicts among political parties in Turkey. Thus, if the CHP choose to show the same reaction as the HDP against the military operation, it will deepen the current conflicts in the Nation Alliance since the Iyi Party has underlined that cooperation with the HDP is the Iyi Party’s redline. And the party will not stand for the rapprochement between the CHP and HDP anymore. Because of this reason, the military operation will potentially be a significant determinant for the future of political alliances in Turkey.

Former French president Jacques Chirac passed away last week at the age of 86. As a well-known personality with a political career spanning more than 40 years in France, Europe and internationally, several articles on his life have been published in the past days. Most of those briefly summarized his life, focusing on the most interesting incidents of his career both domestically and internationally. I do not aim to repeat these details, though some significant points should be addressed.

As a representative of the so-called Neo-Gaullist stance, Chirac started his political career by entering the French Assemblée Nationale. In the following years, he was promoted by former Presidents Pompidou and Giscard d’Estaing. However, disagreements with d’Estaing became more and more obvious. Consequently, Chirac quit his job as a high ranked member of his cabinet.

Chirac led his RPR party (Rassemblement pour la République / Rally for the Republic) between 1976 and 1994, which he had established after he quit his membership at Giscard’s UDR in 1976, both officially and later during his presidency in a de facto way.

In 1977, Chirac was elected as the first elected mayor of Paris, which contributed to his increasing popularity. When the Socialists under President François Mitterrand achieved power at the presidential level, by lost the majority at the legislative level, Chirac was appointed as prime minister by Mitterrand.

Under this so-called “cohabitation” period, and after serving two times as prime minister, Chirac finally won the French presidency in 1995. Following this first tenure which lasted seven years, he once again became President in 2002, receving 82 percent of the votes in the second round against far-right Jean-Marie Le Pen.

By this, Chirac became France’s second longest serving post-1945 president after his predecessor, socialist President Mitterrand. Although Chirac was given a suspended jail sentence in 2011, for corruption during his period as mayor of Paris (1977-1995), today, he is still considered the most popular French president (33 percent), according to polls, even more popular than François Mitterrand (21 percent) and Charles de Gaulle (17 percent).

Despite his position in the international context, in my opinion, Chirac has had a fundamental impact on the trajectory of the French system of government and its consolidation over the years. He played important roles in his stance against the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, his positions regarding Turkey in the EU context, and his very controversial decision of ordering tests of French nuclear weapons in the South Pacific subsequent to being elected as President in 1995.

Despite these issues, Chirac has been a main figure who shaped and consolidated the country’s “presidentialized” framework and, particularly, its current president-party relationship. President Chirac, who had one of the longest continuous political careers in France and Europe, is seen as a successor of previous leaders such as Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou. Described mostly as a so-called “Neo-Gaullist”, referring to the “founding figure” and first president of the Fifth Republic since 1958, Chirac is also considered a nationalist in the specific French context and among French republicans.

Like all French presidents, who became influential political figures in the country since the adoption of the 1958 Constitution, Chirac, too, dominated the political scene, particularly in his first tenure from 1995 to 2002. He supported constitutional reforms which reduced the tenure of the president from seven to five years, while changing the election periods. This meant that since 2002, parliamentary (legislative) and presidential (executive) elections are held quasi-simultaneously, that is to say, legislative elections are held only some weeks after the presidential elections. Consequently, due to the so-called “coattail effects” which are also seen in the U.S. presidential context, no “cohabitation” cases occurred again. And due to this, the president is able to work in harmony with a parliamentary majority.

In order to understand the specific path of France and the trajectory of its system of government, it is useful to explore Chirac’s political path, the manoeuvres of his political party and its relations between the executive and the legislative arms of government. Chirac’s successor President Sarkozy also continued with similar president-party relations by broadening the informal relations to a more formal one.

Today, the French semi-presidential system is based on a leader focused presidency that mostly operates through the president’s party or supporting parties. Most likely, the same counts for President Emmanuel Macron, who is the informal but actual leader of his so-called En Marche! party.

During the past weeks, Egypt has witnessed unexpected anti-government protests. The demonstrations were triggered by the social media posts of businessman Mohammad Ali, who did construction projects for the Egyptian military, but did not receive payments for some time. Mohammad Ali heavily criticized the Sisi regime and the Egyptian army by revealing their serious malpractices. As his videos became popular, the interest among the youth to organize protests against the regime increased. On September 20 and 21, thousands of Egyptians took to streets to protest the regime despite the fear of arrest by the security forces. While protests didn’t last long, it was surprising for many that some people would actually go to streets and protest. The regime’s responses were harsh. Hundreds of protesters were arrested in the following days. However, the demonstrations failed to produce tangible results.

The lack of international support for the protesters and the continued backing of Sisi by global actors are the main factors behind this. Egyptians know that the increasing regime pressure on civilians will not be condemned, and human rights abuses will continue to occur. Therefore, even though Egyptians wish for the regime to topple, activists were cautious to go to the streets to protest. This applies to Muslim Brotherhood members as well. As the group experienced the harshest pressure in its history under the Sisi regime, they rightly abstained from participating in protests in order to prevent further oppression.

However, the Muslim Brotherhood’s peaceful struggle for democracy has been the main motivation for a handful of protesters who could stand up against the regime. As the movement lost the opportunity for civil opposition inside the country, it had to carry its struggle outside. The movement was keen on staying peaceful and sought every means to establish a democratic system in Egypt. 

One of the most important factors behind the protests in Egypt is the continuation of the democratic struggle of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, especially through the use of traditional and social media. One of the most important tools in this sense is the regime-critical television channels. Istanbul-based Mkemmelin and Sharq are two major TV channels that the Egyptian opposition use to broadcast critical coverage of the Sisi regime. These channels have millions of viewers in Egypt where state media allows no critical coverage. While the discussion programs broadcast on these channels reach millions of Egyptians via satellite, they are an alternative source of news for media organizations, which are one of the propaganda tools of the oppressive regime in the country. These programs, which have widespread popularity among young people, reveal the true face of the regime in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood is also supported by other political and intellectual figures in its struggle for a democratic Egypt. These efforts represent a hope for the domestic masses in Egypt and encourage them to continue their struggle for democracy.

Another dynamic that triggered the protests was the use of social media. In an environment where oppositional discourses cannot be expressed in the public sphere, young people often use social media tools for political activism. While Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, which were used extensively in the early periods of the Arab revolutions, remained popular, it has been observed that regime critical posts and publications have increased significantly.

In addition to criticism on social media, Egyptians have shown their dissatisfaction towards the Sisi regime in street as well. Sisi’s regime has not been able to provide political stability, find a solution to the economic crisis, and prevent deepening social inequalities. The regime’s spending on various sectors was also source of discomfort. The most obvious example of this is the expenditures in the defense industry. In an environment where inflation is increasing and purchasing power is gradually decreasing, the Sisi regime’s purchase of billions of dollars of defense industry products has been met with public reaction. A similar situation can also be said in the context of giant projects such as the construction of the new capital and the expansion of the Suez Canal. It is widely argued that these projects did not produce intended outcomes and were waste of public resources. 

It is unclear how anti-Sisi protests will have an impact on the future of the regime. As a matter of fact, although there is dissatisfaction with Sisi within the army and political bureaucracy, there is no clear indication that regional and global actors have disregarded Sisi. On the other hand, these protests will strengthen the perception that Sisi’s image, which has been damaged in domestic public opinion, has become even more negative before these actors. Therefore, since 2013, the countries that support Sisi have been forced to consider an alternative name in case of a possible change in government.

Sisi was placed in power by regional and global actors led by the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE with the aim of ending the revolutionary process in Egypt in 2011. Sisi fulfilled his duty by preventing the revolutionary process, prioritizing Western interests, guaranteeing the security of Israel and eliminating the Muslim Brotherhood from political life. However, given both the lack of internal stability in Egypt and the growing reaction against Sisi, it is seen that although Sisi is still a functional actor, and he has completed the mission given to him in the counter-revolution process, there may be an increasing demand for a new and more charismatic actor in Egyptian politics. Therefore, the future of Sisi will depend not only on the developments within Egypt, but also on the attitude of regional and global actors that have an impact on this country.

Many Daesh members are held in makeshift camps, most notably the Al Hol camp in Syria, in which thousands of Daesh women are held together with their children. The camp is mainly divided into two sections, the first hosting foreign Daesh members, the second Syrian and Iraqi Daesh members. Not all of the inhabitants of the camps are Daesh members, especially children. However, the situation in the camp has a huge potential to create the next generation of Daesh, similar to Camp Bucca in Iraq whose inmates including Abu Bakr al Baghdadi formed Daesh out of Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

This time the camp promises a long lasting resurgence of Daesh. Despite Turkey’s warnings, the US opted to go with a YPG-led organization and now the organization is incapable of dealing with the situation. However, small but effective steps can be undertaken to minimize the threat in the short-term, sparing some time to find a lasting solution to the issue of Daesh members.

The Al Hol camp situated in the governorate of Hasakah is inhabited by more than 68,000 people of whom 55% are children under the age of 12. In recent times, female Daesh members asserted their de-facto control over the Al Hol camp implementing Daesh methods within the camp. The female members formed so-called Hisba battalions within the camp and maintained order on their own. The inhabitants organize alleged Sharia-courses and propagate the ideology of Daesh.

The YPG’s lack of control over the camp was demonstrated again recently when a Turkestani Daesh member was heavily beaten up by Russian Daesh members of the camp when she refused to attend the courses. More dramatically, the YPG security discovered the dead body of a woman who was likely killed by the Daesh Hisba group in the camp.

If Daesh captives are left to the YPG who are reportedly incapable, and the issues are not addressed correctly, the Iraqi scenario will likely repeat itself, only more dangerously and brutally than before.

Previously other women and even a little girl were said to be killed by other female Daesh members inside the camp. Other incidents include the burning of tents and the harassment of women and children who do not comply with the rules of the Daesh Hisba in the Al Hol camp. As Turkey warned several times before, the YPG/SDF is overwhelmed with the task of how to deal with Daesh members in custody. Together with Sila Naz Engin, we wrote about the dangers of having terrorists in the hand of other terrorists.

A solution for al-Hol camp

I suggest a two-step approach to the situation. The first should address the urgent situation, ease current risks and win time. The second should be more lasting.

Firstly, the international coalition needs to force the YPG to divide the camps into many smaller ones. No camp should be inhabited by more than one thousand Daesh members. These camps might be bordering each other, but there should be no opportunity to establish contact between the camps for the inhabitants.

Secondly, the international coalition should establish a training center in Turkey to train personnel to manage the affairs in such camps. The training should not be limited to security personnel but also of social employees, teachers and religious scholars. It is important to use the experience of Turkey as a Muslim country and the experience of the Syrian opposition to determine how to deal with Daesh members and people traumatized by Daesh.

The rehabilitation center in Marea or Jarablus might be a good example of a model to follow. The rehabilitation camps have plenty of success stories including children who changed their goals from becoming a suicide bomber to becoming a successful student. Currently, there is no such center in YPG-held areas. After being adequately trained, the employees of these camps should be totally independent from militias on the ground, act under the Syrian Interim Government, be provided security guarantees from the international coalition, and should take total control over the camps and prisons in the area.

However, if Daesh captives are left to the YPG who are reportedly incapable, and the issues are not addressed correctly, the Iraqi scenario will likely repeat itself, only more dangerously and brutally than before.

Turkey’s main opposition party has held a conference in Istanbul on Syria recently. While the conference was mostly conducted with the participation of academics and journalists interested in the issue, its aim was to bring together middle level officials from the Syrian government in an informal platform. However, the conference could not achieve its intended impact since it did not include broader participation and the outcome of the conference was one sided.

Before understanding the reasons behind holding the conference, it is necessary to evaluate the critical junctures of the CHP’s Syria policy. After the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011, the CHP’s approach to finding a resolution to the conflict was to support a power-sharing mechanism bringing together all parties, including the Assad regime. From the CHP’s perspective, involvement of representatives of the Assad regime was crucial to a peaceful transition. In accordance with this, the CHP made three formal visits to Assad from 2011 to 2013.

However, after the war escalated and reports by international organizations proved that the Assad regime used chemical weapons against civilians in 2013, the CHP ended meetings with the regime and adopted a relatively neutral approach compared to their previous one. Even with the rising nationalism in Turkey after 2016, the CHP kept this approach towards the Syrian conflict. For instance, the party supported cross-border military operations in Syria although it had reservations on the issue.  

Nonetheless, the party has been experiencing another shift in its Syria policy and the conference reflects this change. Since the last year, the CHP had again started to underline the importance of Assad’s involvement in the negotiation process. Because of this, the party invited representatives of the regime to the conference, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not give them permission to enter Turkey.

It is not exaggeration to say that since the CHP has strengthened its position in domestic politics, it has also started to deal with foreign policy issues more. The party’s relative success in the latest local elections accelerated the CHP’s quest for a new strategy in foreign policy. Thus, the CHP’s recent shift in its Syria policy should be evaluated within this framework.

Nevertheless, the party did not completely leave its relatively neutral approach in Syrian conflict. Since a potential cross-border military operation is on the table, the CHP did not invite any official YPG representatives to the conference. But at the same time, the party did invite some pro-YPG experts such as Professor Amy Austin Holmes to hear their perspectives.

After the conference, the invitation of Amy Austin Holmes caused a crisis for the party, and the decision to invite her was harshly criticized especially on social media. Beyond this issue, the most problematic issue of the CHP’s initiative was the final declaration of the conference.

As the report states, the party sees the safe zone as “demographic engineering” which may deteriorate the future relations between various ethnic groups in the region. According to the report, the stakeholders should count on peace building rather than further escalation of the conflict to find an effective solution. Furthermore, the party clearly stated that they want the Turkish government to work with the Syrian regime for a resolution of the conflict. Another problematic issue was the final declaration report’s lack of attention to the YPG’s threat to Turkey’s security in the region.

All of these factors show that CHP’s new approach to Syrian policy will get a negative reaction from the public including its own voters. Since the YPG threat is still alive and Turkey will prioritize its security, the CHP’s new policy may get even more negative reactions from the public.

The 74th session of the United Nations General Assembly opened on September 17, 2019 and will continue until the 30th. Following the first day of the high-level General Debate held on Tuesday, the 24th September 2019, some other high-level events have also started to take place in New York.

Without going into much detail of this years’ specific events, it is no doubt valid to elaborate upon the increasing loss of the UN’s global effectiveness and its purpose. As pointed out by some, the UN is losing its already limited global influence, in particular after the U.S. circumvented the global institution in order to conduct its war on Iraq in 2003.

Nevertheless, the gathering of the annual general assembly once again raises the long debated call for a reform of the United Nations Security Council, the UN’s most important organ.

The Security Council is charged with ensuring international peace and security, although this is hindered due to its complicated formation, the disagreements among its members, which consists of five permanent and ten non-permanent members, as well as the general lack of willingness particularly by the so-called “great powers” to fulfil their duties in a manner consistent with the demands of the General Assembly.

For approximately twenty-five years, an increasing number of countries such as Germany, Japan, South Africa, Canada, Brazil and Turkey, have insisted on a reform of the Security Council. Several movements were established for this, some called for the expansion of the permanent seats such as the G4 nations of which Germany and Japan are members. While the “Uniting for Consensus” (UfC) movement, of which countries such as Italy, Spain, Argentina and Turkey are members, oppose the call to expand the Security Council with new permanent seats, and instead suggest a principle of rotation for the Council’s membership and a rejection of the “veto” privilege of certain states.

Without a doubt, the permanent members of the UN Security Council are not willing to give up their veto rights and permanent seats.

It is important to highlight the main positions of some countries. Without a doubt, the permanent members of the Security Council, the U.S., France, Russia, China and the United Kingdom, are not willing to give up their veto rights and permanent seats in the Security Council. A privilege they were given due to their victory over the Nazi Germany and Japan in the Second World War.  

While countries such as France have been open to support the Germany’s call to expand the number of permanent seats, a position that Germany seeks for itself, it does not actually seem realistic to expect such a development. Furthermore, it is quite obvious that all of the permanent members act rather in terms of national interest instead prioritizing global security and peace.

If one looks at Germany’s position regarding Security Council reform, one notices an increasing insistence. As a country which was able to become a non-permanent Security Council member seven times—a huge success for a country considered a former “aggressor” prior to 1945— Germany is currently calling for a permanent seat, pointing to its global acceptance and successful economic performance. However, it is rather unlikely that an option for a  permanent seat will become true.

In comparison, Turkey calls for a comprehensive reform regarding the structure of the Security Council, stressing its fundamental statement that “the world is bigger than five”, as President Erdogan once again addressed during his speech at the 74th session of the UN General Assembly. As a member of the UfC movement, Turkey’s expectations of a new rotational format within the Security Council without increasing the numbers of permanent members, seems to be more realistic.

The current conditions within the UN demonstrate its gradual and unfortunate loss in its global significance, and it is seen instead as a dialog platform between world leaders. Countries seeking reform of the UN can use occasions such as the annual sessions of the UN General Assembly to make their call for a reform of the UN and specifically the Security Council. By this, closely allied countries such as Germany and Turkey should continue to stress their requests and perspectives on the UN reform, despite basic differences and expectations in how it should be done.

On 16 September, 2019 the leaders of Turkey, Russia and Iran came together in Ankara for a trilateral summit in line with the Astana process. One of the main outcomes of the summit was the announcement of the formation of a participants list for the Syrian constitutional committee.

On 23 September, United Nations chief, Antonio Guterres said an agreement was reached on the composition of the constitutional committee and that the UN considers the committee to be the next step in efforts to find a political solution to end the more than eight-year-long war in Syria. Despite this significant progress, the formation of the constitutional committee isn’t final as the procedures of the committee are yet to be decided, and it is here that the differences between the Astana states will become more critical. The decision over the procedures of the committee will set the framework for Syria’s new constitution. Therefore, before the committee commences, the outcome of these discussions will be the most significant building block towards the reconstruction of Syria.

The formation of the constitutional committee in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 2254 has been a major obstacle for over the past eight years and only the Astana format has proven itself able to achieve progress. After the guarantors of the Astana process formulated their willingness to push along this process, the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition managed to come up with a list of 50 participants from their sides. Both sides were supported by their fellow backers in their efforts to formulate their own list, which is Iran and Russia for the regime and Turkey for the opposition. However, a third list was to be prepared by the UN of 50 independent figures but this faced several obstacles. This third list of independent members is of decisive importance, as whoever can manage to influence more than half of the independent members might secure its majority within the constitutional committee.

At first, the Assad regime protested against the decision-making role of the UN arguing that the UN’s role has to be limited to monitoring rather than taking an active role. Only with the pressure from the Astana format did the regime step back and accept the UN’s role in forming the list of independent members. However, the regime again blocked the process when the UN shared its list with all sides. The Assad regime argued that some of the independent members should have been in the list of the Syrian opposition instead. After diplomatic back and forths, the number of independent people considered problematic by the regime was reduced step-by-step, first to six then three until there was finally agreement on the last person during the Ankara summit.

At the current stage, the procedures of the committee have to be decided, but now the differences will be even bigger and won’t be limited to the Syrian opposition and the regime, but will include the differences between Turkey, Iran and Russia. Among other issues, the most visible will the question of who will head the committee. While Iran and Russia argue that the regime is the legal authority of Syria in the UN and deserves to head the constitutional committee, Turkey underlines that such a move will be fruitless and cannot result in a political solution, as such, the UN has to head the committee. From the Turkish standpoint, the Assad regime can be seen as a legitimate actor only if it wins an election after a genuine political transition process, but for Iran and Russia the regime is already a legitimate actor. After years of cooperation, the Astana process now comes to a point in which they have to decide if the opposition and the regime should be equal, or if both sides should find a solution under the regime’s direction.

Recent disputes between the CHP and the Iyi Party have reached a deadlock. Last week, I mentioned that the different responses of these two parties towards recent incidents in Turkish politics may shift the composition of alliances in the long term. The recent announcement of the Iyi Party’s spokesperson shows that the Nation Alliance may be on the verge of shifting towards in another direction due to the changing environment in Turkish politics.

The Iyi Party’s Spokesperson Yavuz Agıralioglu announced that if the CHP keeps its relations with the HDP intact, the Iyi Party will no longer take part in the Nation Alliance. This statement shows that the ongoing disputes between two parties has deep-rooted causes. The Iyi Party had been complaining about the CHP’s cooperation with the HDP in the appointment of trustees in some municipalities, and the HDP’s active involvement with the Nation Alliance during the local elections. Thus, the latent crisis has come to the surface recently.

Nonetheless, it is impossible to say that the Nation Alliance will collapse due to the ongoing crisis. Understanding the rationale behind this issue requires examining the characteristics of pre-electoral alliances. In general, pre-electoral alliances are classified into two categories: active and passive alliances. In active alliances, the position of political parties in the alliance and their perception towards the issues at the agenda may change in time. When it comes to passive alliances, since political parties have a consensus on their positions rather than interests, the alliance is robust against challenging issues.

It is obvious that the Nation Alliance is indeed an active alliance compared to the People’s Alliance, which is clearly a passive one. Because of this issue, although the People’s Alliance can keep firmly grounded in the local and national values (yerlilik ve millilik) of Turkey, the change in the interests of one of the members of the Nation Alliance may create serious consequences for all members.

However, although the dispute between the CHP and the Iyi Party cannot be underestimated for the future of this alliance, it will not bring the collapse of the cooperation between the two parties. Since these parties’ interests are not adversarial yet, their cooperation to overthrow the AK Party government and President Erdoğan will seem to be maintained.

Nevertheless, it is also inescapable for these parties to keep their alliances without losing the support of their electorate. The Iyi Party may especially suffer from its cooperation with the CHP-HDP alliance if it becomes official. The Iyi Party’s nationalist supporters may withdraw their supports from the party due to the HDP’s increasing influence in the Nation Alliance block.

Moreover, since the parliamentary elections in Turkey require the building of formal alliances through declaring the reason of the alliance with a document, the Iyi Party cannot convince its electorate to have a formal alliance with the HDP. Because of this reason, as the latent figure of the opposition block, the HDP’s role is still ambiguous and stays under the surface.

Thus, it is too early to say that the Nation Alliance is collapsing due to the failure of cooperation and coordination mechanisms between the CHP and Iyi Party. Nevertheless, it seems that the Iyi Party should convince its supporters to have an alliance with the CHP which does not hide its close relations with the HDP anymore. Beyond all, as there are still four years until the elections, it is difficult for all political parties to keep their positions on currently shaky political ground.

In a recent report published by the German public broadcaster ARD’s Mainz Report program it was revealed that Germany’s main conservative party, the Christian Democrat Union (CDU), and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), had established alliances in 18 towns at the municipal level.

Although the CDU officially prohibits cooperation or establishing alliances with the AfD at both the local and federal levels, it seems that there is a significant disconnect between the federal CDU leadership and their local representatives. The CDU has reiterated its official position of not cooperating with the AfD while stressing that all CDU affiliated members who have been found to disregard this ban will suffer consequences in accordance with the party’s rules.

Besides the actual measures and consequences, and whether or not they will be applied any time, the cooperation between the CDU and AfD in the local districts of  Saxony, Thuringia and Saxony-Anhalt, underpin the already existing concerns with regard to the increasing radicalization of center-right politics, that is to say, the increasing normalization of the far-right.

The Mainz Report story also received attention due to an incident which became publicised a few days prior, in which a member of the neo-Nazi party NPD was elected to a city council in the state of Hessen though the support of the CDU and even the Social Democrats (SPD).

Following the report’s revelations, local CDU and AfD groups in the council of Eisleben ended their cooperation, which they had previously agreed to do if it became public. Interestingly, local representatives from both parties did not appear bothered by the incident and instead indirectly criticized the media’s report–which is rather concerning on the part of the CDU.

If they are serious about resisting the far-right in Germany, the CDU must sanction members who cooperated with the AfD.

But how should we understand this issue although the recent cases are, at least at the moment, restricted to the municipal levels? Are concerns that the cooperation between the CDU and AfD might expand in future to higher levels really legitimate?

Of course, the main question is why such alliances emerged in the first place, and more specifically in the towns of East Germany. One of the main factors is the AfD’s recent electoral successes in the eastern states of Saxony and Brandenburg. Even though the party did not win both elections, they were very successful in increasing their votes, greatly harming the traditional center-left and center-right parties. In addition to this, ongoing intra-party difficulties within the CDU and SPD in the past two years have irritated and alienated German voters from center parties, creating a mood in which the far-right has found room to become more normalised among both German politicians and citizens.

With this, a further important question arises, namely, what kind of impacts might be caused in the long-term by this cooperation, and can further cooperation can be prevented in the future? Unfortunately, it is generally the case that conditions at the local levels are initially “tested” by political parties before actions are transferred to the federal level. Therefore, parties who are serious about challenging the rise of the far-right must stand firm against these alliances and take action against those who break the rules, or similar behaviour may occur yet again. 

In all such cases the initial stance of the party leadership is extremely important, and all democratic political parties that openly reject the AfD’s position must recognize the importance of giving symbolic responses to reject their ideology. The current political mood and the quasi-normalization of such cooperative steps or even alliances will most likely have a direct impact on the state elections scheduled for the end of October in Thuringia – another eastern German state where far-right tendencies are growing. Political parties have to take serious action and distance themselves very clearly from the AfD. They must initiate concrete steps in a collective way against the AfD and all other far-right groups. This should be done by simultaneously taking into serious consideration the legitimate and reasonable concerns of voters that may have led them to the far-right in the first place. This will most likely be a very difficult process and will require a careful and balanced response, though no one promised politicians that a political career will be that easy.

On 7 of August, Turkey and the US declared their safe-zone deal. Since then many things have been discussed, but one of the most important topics was the declaration that the safe zone would become “a peace corridor”, and that “any additional measures” would be taken so that Syrian refugees can return home. While many were discussing the meaning of this, Turkish President Erdogan announced plans to resettle one million refugees in the safe-zone in northern Syria. Many have asked where this figure has come from, and if the return of one million refugees is realistic. In reality, the number of Syrians returning to Syria may be even higher, but only if the YPG does not prevent it.

Before determining where this number came from, it is clear that if 350,000 Syrian refugees returned back to the tiny areas of northern Aleppo and Afrin, the return of one million to the vast areas of the safe-zone along the Turkish-Syrian border isn’t unachievable. According to the UNHCR, Turkey is currently hosting 3,658,250 Syrian refugees. Over 300,000 are Syrian Kurds from east of the Euphrates, and close to 350,000 are Syrian Arabs from the eastern Euphrates governates of Hasakah, Deir al-Zor and Raqqa. In addition, the Syrian Stabilization Committee, an office of the Syrian Interim Government, reports nearly 350,000 IDPs from YPG-held areas are now living in northwestern Syria.

If the safe zone is established, these IDPs can return home. Such a movement would encourage more Syrian refugees in Turkey to return to the areas under Turkish-protection in northern Aleppo and Afrin. Furthermore, according to the UNHCR, the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq hosts over 250,000 Syrian refugees. 90,000 of them are living in camps. In total, 1,250,000 refugees might return to the safe zone, but the number of returnees might increase more if refugees who originated from elsewhere return back to the safe zone as well. Many have relatives, or would prefer acceptable living conditions somewhere in Syria to being a refugee.

In line with the suggestion of President Erdogan, if the safe zone is supported by a systematic housing project that includes other necessary services and infrastructure, the capacity of the region might increase. Such a step might bring fruitful progress for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Syria, and may accelerate the economy in other regions of the country as well, therefore, many other refugees might return to other areas of Syria.

However, the housing project of Erdogan faces two main obstacles. The first is the reluctance of the international community. Most countries are open to the idea of building housing and infrastructure in general, but are not willing to provide the necessary funds, despite it being in everyone’s best interests. The housing project would be a win-win situation for all involved, from the refugees to the construction firms. The second main obstacle for this housing project is the YPG and its continued support by CENTCOM. As long as the area isn’t liberated from the militants, the refugees will hesitate to return, especially Syrian Kurds who are seen as traitors and collaborators by the YPG. Furthermore, in a meeting between CENTCOM officials and the SDF/YPG both sides agreed that refugees can only return when preparations are complete, that refugees have to be screened, and only those who originated from the region without any connection to terror organizations and crimes against the Syrian people would be allowed to return. Despite the irony that such a condition is being formulated by a terror-affiliated entity, this condition of origin will restrict the return of refugees.

Since when is the freedom of movement legally restricted inside Syria for Syrians? According to UNHCR, there are 6.2 million people, including 2.5 million children, displaced within Syria, the biggest internally displaced population in the World. Living in another part of Syria has already become a reality for Syrians. Also the experience in Manbij showed the difficulties of using a registration process for so many people. Many who had lived in Manbij for years and even went to school were never registered. Also many, especially Syrian Kurds, don’t have any proper documents. In this regard, no one should underestimate the willingness of the Syrian people to return to their home country once obstacles are removed. The only thing the Syrians need is a framework on the ground which enables their return and to live in peace. After that, most Syrians are more than willing to rebuild their own country.

A new era in Turkish politics began in September 2019. After a series of long-lasting and uninterrupted elections, there is now a nearly four-year election-free period ahead of Turkey. It is important to discuss the main challenges and opportunities in Turkey’s domestic politics during this term, and to analyze rumors of a potential snap election as alleged by opposition parties.

The first and the most important political issue at the top of the agenda is the consolidation of the presidential system in Turkey. Although it was approved in the April 2017 referendum, Turkey officially switched to a presidential system after the June 24 elections in 2018. The evaluation of the first year under the new system shows that there are some emerging problems, especially in its implementation. The most prominent problem being a lack of coordination between policy-makers and practitioners. Furthermore, bureaucratic problems emerged due to ambiguity in the role and function of new institutions under the system. Moreover, the failure of civil servants in adopting to the new system in some cases show the need for further consolidation of presidential system.

Because of this reason, Vice President of Turkey Fuat Oktay, conducted a series of workshops with bureaucrats, politicians, academics, and journalists to discuss the current problems. The outcome of these workshops show that the main problem is rooted in the implementation stage. As a result, some detailed reports are being prepared that aim to consolidate the presidential system and solve current problems.

The second most important emerging issue in domestic politics is uncertainty over the future of established political alliances. Political parties in Turkey have been facing important shifts in their compositions, and the next four years will also determine the future of many political parties. For example, members of the Nation’s Alliance showed different reactions towards recent incidents in Turkish politics such as appointment of trustees and the HDP’s links with the PKK. Additionally, recent changes in the leading cadre of the Iyi Party will be critical for the party’s position within the Nation’s Alliance.

When it comes to the People’s Alliance, the AK Party and the MHP maintain their cooperation without any significant problem. Nevertheless, the emergence of new parties founded by former AK Party members may create uncertainty in this two-block coalition. Since there are few details about the program and leading cadres of these new parties, it is difficult to predict what their position will be in the new political order.

Indeed, all political parties will face the challenge of both broadening the sphere of their alliances and gaining the support of the masses. Since the next parliamentary and presidential elections are planned for June 2023, parties have enough time to determine their strategies to overcome these challenges. Nevertheless, in the coming period, the AK Party and President Erdoğan will also have the responsibility of solving some deep-rooted problems facing Turkey especially in foreign policy and the economy.  Their success in resolving these problems may be effective in gaining more electoral support from the masses in future elections.

Economic concerns remain one of the top issues for the Saudi leadership. A recent replacement in the cabinet reflects the demands of addressing this problem. Following a royal decree, the Minister of Energy of Saudi Arabia and CEO of ARAMCO Khalid al-Falih has been replaced with Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, acting State Minister for Energy Affairs. Khalid al-Falih has been acting as the Minister of Energy since May 2016. The replacement decision came after the recent ministry reshuffle at the end of the August. That reshuffle was aimed at alleviating the workload on the Ministry of Energy by creating a separate ministry responsible for the affairs relating to the Industry and Mineral Resources.

Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman is the son of King Salman bin Abdulaziz and an older half-brother of the Crown Prince. This change marks the first time a royal family member has been appointed to serve as the Energy Minister. The appointment took place at a time when Saudi leadership made a renewed attempt to sell shares in Aramco. This strategy was previously made public by Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman in order to overcome financial problems facing the Kingdom. Even though the new minister is not a close figure to Muhammad bin Salman, his appointment means that the two will work together to overcome the economic problems that face the Kingdom.

It is argued that the decision to replace Khalid al-Falih is mainly about maintaining low crude prices and to address the mismanagement of the ARAMCO’s IPO (Initial Public Offering) process. In 2018-2019, Saudi leadership expected that in order for its budget to be balanced, crude oil prices would need to be around 80 USD. However, the Brent type crude has remained at the level of 60 USD. Although Khalid al-Falih was one of the architects of the global efforts to curb daily oil production in order to balance the prices, his management did not seem to be enough for Saudi leadership. Another reason leading to his replacement might be ARAMCO’s IPO process. For quite some time, the Saudi leadership has been planning an IPO of five per cent of ARAMCO’s stocks. That process seemed to stagger due to the lack of leadership on the part of Khalid al-Falih, which could also be a reason for his replacement.

What this development may represent for the Saudi leadership is that Mohammed bin Salman seems to intend to more directly lead the kingdom’s oil exports and policies to diversify economic resources in accordance with the kingdoms 2030 Vision. The promotion of a royal figure and his half-brother to the minister position will also strengthen the influence of Mohammed bin Salman in the kingdom. It has been argued in the media that Mohammed bin Salman has finally established the team that can help realize ARAMCO’s IPO goal. As soon as taking office, the new Saudi Energy Minister commented that while Aramco’s IPO will better serve for the interest of the country, there would be no radical shift in oil policy.

Despite efforts during the past three years, the Saudi economy is continuing to face challenges and uncertainties. While the Saudi stock market has fallen 14% since May 2019, declining oil prices have deepened an atmosphere of crisis in the country’s economic outlook. In order to overcome economic problems, the Saudi leadership will still have to focus on oil-related solutions in the short term as oil accounts for 40% of gross domestic product and 70% of government revenues. At the same time, it is also crucial for Riyadh to diversify economic activities as was formulated in the Vision 2030 plan.

For those who did not hear about it until now, most likely due to the fact that foreign media are not covering such news that parents, whose children were kidnapped and forcefully recruited by the PKK terrorist organization, launched a civil resistance in front of the Peoples’ Democratic Party’s (HDP’s) Diyarbakir Provincial Office.

Following in the footsteps of a mother who was the first to call on the HDP to bring back her son, other families soon joined the sit-in protest in front of the HPD office. At the beginning of this week, the number has increased to 18 families. It is no doubt a good sign that people of Kurdish origin in Diyarbakir, who are wrongly presumed to be natural supporters of the HDP, have increased their active criticism of the PKK. Of course, the Turkish security forces’ active fight against the PKK in the last couple of years in particular and the actual state authority may be also counted as a reason for the recent resistance. Many Kurdish families are now more confident to stand up against the PKK and their political affiliates to protect their children.

In such circumstances, the usual tactic of the HDP, a political party which is based on Kurdish nationalist and separatist aspirations, is to play possum. They did not address this challenge by the families, closed the doors of their Diyarbakir office, kept silent regarding the accusations made by the families, and instead only referred to their requests as a “provocation”.

It is the method of HDP members to not to address accusations when it involves harsh criticism against the PKK’s terrorism and crimes. By this, though, the HDP indirectly confesses its clear relation to the PKK and does not openly deny it. For all readers abroad and who perhaps need a refresh; the PKK is classified as a terrorist organization in the EU and the US despite the lack of will to fight against them in both.

Although it is a puzzle worth considering why foreign correspondents and the broader Western media, who usually cover incidents in Turkey in great detail deliberately disregarded the current events in Diyarbakir, the main focus of my discussion is on the puzzle of why well known Turkish personalities stood silent regarding the current incident in Diyarbakir – both on social and conventional media.

Constantly failing to criticize and oppose to the PKK’s forcible recruitment in order to achieve short-term goals will lead Turkey’s traditional secular left nowhere in the long-run.

Before addressing the potential preferences of these well-known personalities, a clear distinction between different kinds of leftists in Turkey should be made. There is a difference between left-wing oriented people who openly sympathize with Kurdish leftist-nationalists, Kurdish Marxists and open PKK supporters of Kurdish origin, on the one hand, and the traditional secular-left Kemalists, on the other. Traditionally the secular-left Kemalists have maintained a strong nationalist approach that ruled out separatist support.

However, younger Kemalist youth are not following the traditional nationalist stance of the earlier generations and are espousing a softer tone against Kurdish separatists for pragmatic purposes. Consequently, the borders between these two camps are becoming more blurred. Given this ongoing shift, Turkish artists, writers and ‘thinkers’ who have long positioned themselves as traditional secular-left-Kemalists, are now preferring to either keep silent or openly support HDP friendly discourses in general.

Of course, a comprehensive assessment and analysis of this fundamental shift goes beyond the borders of this column, though my initial guess about this socio-political development is that there appears to be a strange concern among left-wing oriented people and its younger generation of being stigmatized as an AK Party sympathizer. In particular, the leading figures of the left-wing bloc are blinded by a prejudiced mentality that it has shifted their behavior, leading them to stay silent even towards the PKK’s crimes. Consequently, it is a phenomenon which deserves further academic research. What has led certain leftists to remain silent and reject responding to a significant criminal and humanitarian problem as was highlighted in the recent Diyarbakir resistance?

Under these circumstances, particularly reasonable left-wing supporters should start questioning the current trajectory of Turkey’s traditional nationalist leftist bloc and its political stance which is heading towards self-dissolution in the long run. Romanticizing a political party by ignoring its affiliation with a terrorist organization will undermine Turkey’s main left-wing bloc and its supporters’ trustworthiness. Constantly failing to criticize and oppose to the PKK’s forcible recruitment in order to achieve short-term goals will lead Turkey’s traditional secular left nowhere in the long-run.

Last week, Hacire Akar started a sit-in protest in front of the HDP building in Diyarbakir. Akar claimed that her 22 year-old-son, Mehmet, had been kidnapped by the PKK. She continued her protest until her son was brought to her. Her determination encouraged other mothers to make their voices heard, with many mothers starting their own protests to bring back their sons and daughters kidnapped by the PKK.

Indeed, it is not the first time that mothers took part in a protest to uncover the fate of their children abducted and recruited by the PKK. There had been an earlier wave of protests in 2014 but it did not create much public awareness at that time. The current protests, on the other hand, have attracted the attention of the masses, and the child recruitment practices of the PKK, considered a war crime, has become a topical issue in Turkey. 

It is a well-known fact that one of the main targets of the PKK are underage people. Because the emotional attachment of those recruited at the early age is more powerful, they are recruited as child soldiers especially for front-line combat.

The research on OECD countries shows that the average age of recruitment in the PKK is almost 20. However, other research shows that the average age decreases to 17 when only women are taken into consideration. When it comes to education, it is seen that the education level of younger recruits is very low.

Since the peak period of recruitment of the PKK that took place from 1990 to 1994, the target group of this terrorist organization has been underage people coming from low-income families. This group was vulnerable, and it was difficult for these families to protect their children from the influence of the PKK. After their children from these families are recruited, they are brainwashed and trained in accordance with the aims of the organization.

What is the function of child recruits in the PKK? It is known that children are in the most disadvantaged positions in the PKK hierarchy. They are mostly used in the front line during military attacks and underage female recruits are especially trained for suicide bombing missions. Since the case of Zeynep Kınacı in 1996, most of the suicide missions of the PKK have been conducted by young women.

Because of these reasons, the sit-in protests of mothers in Diyarbakir is very valuable to break the long-lasting domination of the PKK over families and children. Raising awareness of the PKK’s child recruits may create positive outcomes and families may play a more crucial role in protecting their children from the PKK propaganda. If families in the region become more conscious on this threat, they make their children and other families aware of it. In the end, this awareness may cause the decline of the PKK’s power.

Thus, the mass protest by the families, whose children were abducted and recruited by the PKK, may become a game changer in the fight against terrorism. At this point, it is also necessary to pay the attention to this issue at the national level. Not only political parties, but also NGOs, academics, and all public figures should realize the potential of the sit-in protests in ending the PKK’s domination over children.

The state elections in Germany’s Saxony and Brandenburg states were held this past Sunday. As was previously expected, the far-right AfD heavily increased its votes, tripling it in Saxony and doubling it in Brandenburg.

The Christian Democrats (CDU) emerged as the final winner of the elections in Saxony with 32 percent of the votes, but suffered losses of around 7 points compared with 2014. While the AfD became the second strongest party in Saxony by receiving more than 27.5 percent of the votes. This means that the AfD made an increase of 17 points compared with 2014.

But one has to be careful when analyzing the results. A look back at the Saxony results from the September 2017 federal election will show that the AfD had also received 27 percent of the votes while the CDU had achieved only 26.9 percent at that time.

It cannot be said that the current election results are an actual success for centrist parties, especially the Social Democrats (SPD) which continued its trend of voter losses. However, the Saxon parliament results have been interpreted as a partial improvement by some optimistic voices, when compared with the September 2017 federal election results in Saxony. According to which the CDU even increased its votes from 26,9 to 32 percent.

On the other hand, when looking at the results across both states an unpleasant picture emerges. Namely, the AfD received the highest number of votes with a combined total of 892.959 votes, while the CDU came second with 892.483 votes. The SPD came third with only 498.618 votes in total. Thus, is it reasonable to talk about an actual victory of the CDU based on the facts?

The election in Brandenburg also revealed that the SPD (by achieving 26.2 percent of votes) is still a strong centrist party, at least in traditionally left-wing dominated federal states. Although the party has continued to lose votes at both the federal and state level – as was the case in Saxony where it received only 7.7 percent of the votes.

However, the gap between the SPD and the AfD in Brandenburg has narrowed. The AfD gained 23.5 percent of the votes in Brandenburg, separating the two parties by only 2.7 per cent. This becomes more significant if one notices that the conservative CDU achieved just 15.6 percent of the votes in Brandenburg – that is to say the AfD has now become second party of choice.

In a concerning outcome, one fourth of all the voters across both states voted in favor of a far-right or extremist party. This leads to the possible danger that the far-right will continue to be normalized within Germany’s political landscape. How far this trend will continue is still a main concern among Germany’s Christian democrats, as the main or closest de facto competitor of the far-rightists.

Besides the continuing risks of the far-right becoming mainstream and the increasing strength of the far-right within the political establishment, the focus now is on how the coalition governments will be shaped in the upcoming days. As one should remember, all major parties rejected a coalition with the AfD, but continuing with pre-existing coalitions in both states will not be enough to form a government. Each coalition will need to find an additional partner.

As predicted in a report published prior to the elections, it is likely that in Saxony the CDU will form a coalition together with the SPD and the Greens. In Brandenburg, a SPD-Left Party-Greens coalition might be formed as is currently case in the state of Berlin.

German media and politicians have also been focusing on the fact that surprisingly, the CDU did not lose even more votes to the AfD. The reason why this did not occur can be answered by pointing to the visible efforts of Saxony’s incumbent Minister President Michael Kretschmer (CDU). Kretschmer distanced himself from the federal CDU and also criticized CDU politicians such as Hans-Georg Maaßen, who often expressed stances similar to the AfD.

It seems most likely that some center-right voters were persuaded by Kretschmer’s dedicated personal stance. Whether an imitation of AfD rhetoric by a CDU politician would have resulted in the same outcome seems unlikely. It would likely be worse because voters are often biased towards the parties which are first to articulate a political message or movement, which in the sense of populist and far-right rhetoric is definitely epitomized by the AfD.

Regarding Brandenburg, it is argued that despite the fact that the SPD is still the strongest party, it is much more difficult to establish a stable coalition government consisting of three parties. The losses of the Left Party make it impossible to continue an SPD-Left Party coalition in Brandenburg.  This will most likely lead to a three-way coalition as it the case in Berlin. In the end, the elections are a quasi-success for the AfD in that in the long-term it destabilizes the previous political equilibrium in which centrist parties would dominate.

All in all, it is argued by Western media and politicians that a “nightmare” has not come true – for now. However, the next state elections will be held towards the end of October in Thuringia where the AfD is also strongly motivated. The bad news is when Thuringia’s election day arrives, the focus will not simply be on the CDU or SPD coming first at the ballot. This was recently the case last Sunday, and unfortunately distracted from the grim reality of both party’s losses in each state. In the short-term, the political elites from Germany’s centrist parties and those from the federal but fragile “grand coalition” government have been saved. But this must not mislead anyone.

On 2 September, 2019 the pro-Kurdish media outlet Kurdistan 24 stationed in the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) released a public statement explaining that while they have previously worked in northeastern Syria with the permission of the local YPG administration, they were recently banned from doing so. Despite an approximately one month long negotiation, Kurdistan 24 failed to convince the YPG administration to remove the ban. Kurdistan 24’s ability to report from YPG-held areas ended when Kurdistan24 TV aired a talk show in which Hülya Oran (alias Besê Hozat), a leading PKK figure and KCK (PKK’s administrative umbrella) co-chair, was allegedly insulted. This decision by the YPG not only confirms its status as the Syrian branch of the PKK, but also highlights their hypocrisy as self-proclaimed defenders of freedom and of the Kurdish cause. This step is also noteworthy since it comes after growing tensions between the KRG in Iraq and the PKK.

The decision of the YPG to ban Kurdistan 24 shows again that the YPG and the PKK terrorist organization are inseparable organizations. Reports that the YPG’s decision making bodies are dominated by PKK veterans from the Qandil Mountains appear to be corroborated. The ban of the Kurdish media outlet by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq is not surprising, as the head of the US supported Syrian Democratic Forces, Ferhat Abdi Sahin (alias Mazloum Kobane in the SDF, and Sahin Cilo in the PKK), was close friends with Hülya Oran and were active in the Qandil Mountains together. Furthermore, most of the SDF officials answered to orders from Oran in northern Iraq and Turkey, before they went to Syria to operate as partners of the US.

It is interesting that the YPG’s relative openness to media and press ended when a leading PKK figure was criticized. The media has been as an essential part the YPG’s strategy of winning hearts and minds in the west by portraying themselves as defenders of human rights, and especially women’s rights. For this reason, many foreign journalists can enter YPG-held areas and report about the situation on the ground. By doing this, the YPG won many sympathizers among the western journalists and effectively disguised its nature as a branch of the internationally recognized terror organization, namely the PKK. Remembering the critical coverage of some journalists of the YPG, one wonders if it is the case that the YPG doesn’t allow criticism of senior figures of the PKK only, or if the YPG has different standards for Kurdish and western media outlets.

Lastly, this move by the YPG can also be seen as an attempt to retaliate in the name of the PKK against the KRG in northern Iraq. Since the launch of the Operation Claw by Turkey, the PKK has lost strategic hills in the Hakurk region, and the PKK has accused the KRG of collaboration with Ankara. Attempts by the PKK to provoke the local population against the Turkish Armed Forces were undermined by Prime Minister Nacirvan Barzani who blamed the PKK for an attack on a Turkish base and demanded the PKK withdraw from northern Iraq, so that Turkey could stop its operations against them. The step to ban Kurdistan 24 overlaps with a time in which the Iraqi Kurds actively supported Ankara’s fight against the PKK, and might be a way of retaliation.

In the beginning of the 1970s, the Turkish people were living in an unstable political and economic climate which was about to trigger another military intervention. Nevertheless, ordinary people across the country were quite busy reading a novel titled “The Peace Street” (Huzur Sokağı). The novel focusing on a love story attracted the unprecedented attention of millions, and was later adapted to cinema where it became a blockbuster movie. All of this was made possible thanks to a woman, Şule Yüksel Şenler, who passed away last week.

Şule Yüksel Şenler was not only a novelist, but also was a well-known women’s rights activist in Turkey. Throughout her life, she consistently dedicated herself to improving the status of conservative/pious women in Turkish society and by the late 1960s became a role model for their involvement in the public sphere. All notable conservative/pious women, who were by any means underrepresented or not represented at all, have been influenced by Şenler’s activism, passion and struggle.

Şenler’s motivation was not only to support the active involvement of women in public life, she was also trying to be a role model for conservative/pious women in the way they dressed. In the beginning of her career, she tried to standardize how conservative/pious women should wear a headscarf and her style still attracts a lot of women today. In order words, she paved the way for conservative/pious women both inwardly and outwardly.

Beyond this, Şenler was rigorously against modernism and especially its deteriorating effect on Turkish families. She claimed that Turkish society was in the process of collapse due to the dominance of modern habits and fashions. Thus, she especially focused on saving the Turkish family from the deteriorating effects of modern life. In accordance with this aim, she had written novels narrating the stories of young women whose lives were destroyed by imitating Western values and lifestyles.

Throughout her life, Şenler dedicated herself to improving the status of conservative/pious women in Turkish society and became a role model for their involvement in the public sphere by the late 1960s.

Şenler used simple dichotomies of Islamic/Western, modern/traditional, and just/unjust to support her arguments. She believed that the salvation of conservative/pious Muslim women heavily depends on their relationship with Islamic and traditional values, which provide the only way of living a just life. Because of this reason, female characters in her novels understand the importance of adopting Islamic values. As they were trying to find “the true path” at the end of the day. Nevertheless, her harsh criticisms against western values received backlash from secularist female activist groups such as the Turkish Women’s Union, and she was judged in court against allegations of speaking out against Turkish laicism.

When it is taken into consideration that Şenler is the first conservative/pious Muslim female activist in Turkey involved in public discussions, it is crucial to understand her thoughts to understand the conservative/pious women’s movement in Turkey. While prominent newspapers were calling the headscarf as “the pain in Turkey’s head”, Şenler was not only criticizing the headscarf ban in the public sphere, but also was trying to create more self-confident and conscious conservative/pious women in Turkey. Even the opponents of her ideas should accept her valuable role in the struggle of conservative/pious women to become active subjects and to construct their identity against to the demands of the dominant culture.

Despite years of close economic and cultural relations, the United Arab Emirates and Iran have been in opposite camps in regional politics. The UAE has taken a negative stance towards Iran, particularly in the post-2011 period, thanks to the support of the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia. The UAE Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed’s tough policies toward Tehran even caused a rift between the leaders of Dubai and Abu Dhabi, as the former Emirate significantly felt the economic losses caused by escalating tensions with Iran.

There are, however, signs that the UAE has been changing its strategy toward Tehran. The initial signs of this possible shift were observed last May. On May 12, Emirati and international oil vessels at the Port of Fujairah were attacked by an unidentified source. While regional and global actors rushed to blame Iran for the attack, the UAE was cautious to blame any party. A few days after the attacks, Anwar Gargash, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the UAE, announced that the UAE did not want to escalate tensions with Iran. Subsequently, following an investigation into the event, the UAE announced that a “state actor might be responsible for the attack” not mentioning Iran by name.

The UAE then went on to reduce its military presence in Yemen on 8 June. Although it consulted with Saudi Arabia, the UAE’s Yemen move was an upsetting decision for Saudi Arabia, as Riyadh had a long-term strategy to confront Iranian backed Houthis in Yemen. Abu Dhabi’s decision was also a sign of diverging views between Saudi and Emirati leadership on regional politics, particularly regarding the strategies toward Iran.

In another unprecedented move, in late June, a UAE delegation arrived in Tehran to discuss issues related to maritime security in the Gulf, border problems, illegal crossings, fishermen issues, mutual visits by citizens of the two countries and other issues regarding territorial waters. By sending a delegation to Iran, the UAE showed that a new strategy was in the making toward Tehran. While this was the first delegation from Abu Dhabi to Tehran to discuss these issues since 2013, the Iranian media framed the visit as a “Mission of Peace”.

There are several main reasons behind this possible policy shift by the UAE toward Iran. First of all, the UAE leadership realized that it is not ready for a direct confrontation with Iran. Despite years long defence spending, the UAE’s military capabilities are still limited. In case of a confrontation with Iran, the UAE would face serious damage, as it would be a direct target for Iranian attacks. This was also visible in the campaign in Yemen. Iranian supported Houthis could attack targets inside Saudi Arabia. This means that if they wish, their missiles can reach UAE cities as well.

It is a question whether Iran will positively respond to UAE’s likely rapprochement following long years of hostility.

Secondly, there is a problem of trust by the UAE regarding the future of its allies, such as the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia. It is not certain that the US President Donald Trump will win the next presidential election in 2020, and there is political uncertainty in Israel, which will hold another round of elections. Saudi Arabia’s leadership has also been facing strong criticism globally, particularly after the killing of Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018 in Saudi Consulate in Istanbul. Without an environment of trust, the UAE leadership would not want to face a direct confrontation with Iran, as it would be left alone in its struggle if other allies have their own priorities.

Another reason for the UAE’s possible repositioning of itself against Iran is the fact that Tehran has proved itself as a regional power, as it has successfully held on to its campaigns on many fronts. Iranian supported Houthis have kept their position in Yemen while they prevented Saudi Arabia from taking control of major cities in the country. In addition to that, while Tehran’s influence over Iraq has grown to an unexpected level, Iran continued to keep good relations with countries like Turkey and Qatar. More recently, Iran has also shown its muscles in the Strait of Hormuz as the Revolutionary Guards seized a British vessel in retaliation for Britain’s decision to seize an Iranian vessel in the strait of Gibraltar. This was a clear sign to global actors that Iran would do whatever was necessary to continue its control over the Strait of Hormuz and would not tolerate any aggression toward itself.

 The safe passage of ships through the Strait of Hormuz is also a red line for the United Arab Emirates. The UAE’s efforts to become a strategic player in maritime trade is very much dependent on safety in the Strait of Hormuz. The UAE would not risk the success of the Port of Jebal Ali as major trade hub in the region. The Strait of Hormuz is also important for the oil exports of the UAE to global markets. Therefore, Abu Dhabi would prefer de-escalation with Iran in order to keep its maritime trade on track.

 Despite these motivations the UAE’s decision to redesign its strategy toward Iran would not be welcomed by Saudi Arabia, the US, and Israel—countries that see Tehran as the main enemy in the region. It seems that the anti-Iranian camp would hardly change its current policy toward Tehran as the US would likely toughen sanctions against the Iranian regime. Therefore, it is not clear how the UAE will manage its relations with these countries while changing its strategy toward Iran. It is also another question whether Iran will positively respond to UAE’s likely rapprochement following years of hostility.

As two German federal states Saxony and Brandenburg head to state elections on 1^st September, German political parties have increased their campaigns and statements.

With no doubt, most of the attention over the past few weeks has focused on the Saxony election campaign and the CDU’s activities both at the federal and state level, in particular the highly public inter-party conflict between senior CDU members. CDU’s federal chairperson, Annegret Kramp-Karenbauer, and CDU Minister President of Saxony, Michael Kretschmer, both had controversial disputes with the former chief of Germany’s federal domestic intelligence and fellow CDU member, Hans-Georg Maaßen. As a representative of the so-called “union of values” group, a right leaning faction within the CDU, Maaßen was supporting the CDU in their election campaign in Saxony, a state the CDU is losing ground to the right-wing AfD. He also attended some campaign events until he decided to stop supporting the CDU’s Saxony election campaign due to criticism he received from Kretschmer.

In the previous weeks, though, it was Kramp-Karrenbauer who surprisingly criticized Maaßen, even stating that: “There are high hurdles for expelling someone from the party, and for good reason. But when it comes to Mr. Maaßen’s attitude, I don’t see anything that really connects him with CDU”. This was interpreted as a call for Maaßen’s exclusion from the party. These statements provoked anger among CDU politicians, particularly in Saxony. Later on, Kramp-Karrenbauer revised her statement by saying that she did not mean a party ban for Maaßen, and that “the CDU is a party with more than 400.000 members, that makes everyone have their own opinion, that makes us interesting.”

Saxony’s incumbent Minister President Kretschmer, criticized Maaßen due to his campaign activities, leading Maaßen to declare that he will not participate in any further election activities in Saxony. He also added that he will concentrate on the CDU’s activities and election campaign in Brandenburg. This is despite the fact that Maaßen does not have any official roles nor any future goal of being elected in that state. Maaßens’s mood was remarkable as he stated that “I wanted to help my party in Saxony but if the Minister President Kretschmer does not see this as necessary, I quit and wish the CDU Saxony good luck!”

CDU cannot afford additional huge losses in Saxony and Brandenburg, which might also undermine the future position of Kramp-Karrenbauer as CDU’s federal chairperson.

Furthermore, Maaßen recently invited Kramp-Karrenbauer to meet in order to explain his positions. However, this was  indirectly rejected due to her busy election campaign agenda in Saxony.

These recent incidents can be viewed from a negative and positive point of view. On the one hand, it is quite a good sign that leading CDU figures have started to openly criticize Maaßen due to his stances that contradict the CDU’s main lines. Although there are some new perspectives within the party, following the main CDU party line is an aim by the party’s leaders. This is despite right-wing oriented groupings in the party openly comparing themselves with rightists and actually admiring AfD’s perspectives. In such circumstances, it is a difficult decision to determine at what point a center party can tolerate dissenting voices and where to draw a clear line in order to ensure the party’s unity.

Unfortunately, it also shows how populist sentiment has struck center parties, even as the CDU. Considering these issues, it needs to be reminded that there has been a huge lack of criticism of stances held by Maaßen’s or others within the party’s right wing. Consequently, keeping silent and allowing Maaßen to speak for a long time during an election campaign in Eastern Germany, can regarded as a miscalculation from leaders in the CDU.

Thus, it becomes clear that in the aftermath of the upcoming state elections on Sunday, the CDU will most likely clarify the party’s future positions by solving its intra-party conflicts. For this the party cannot afford additional huge losses in both federal states, which might also undermine the future position of Kramp-Karrenbauer as CDU’s federal chairperson.

The Turkish Ministry of Interior announced that the mayors of Diyarbakır, Van, and Mardin were discharged because of their engagement with the PKK terrorist organization. According to the Ministry’s official statement, the mayors are being charged with: re-employing former municipal employees who have been dismissed due to their liaison with the PKK terrorist organization; allowing persons to illegally work in municipalities, persons who were formerly elected as municipal councilors from the HDP but were not given the official mandate because of their affiliation with the PKK; naming streets after PKK terrorists; allowing the PKK march to be performed in official meetings of the municipalities, and changing the administrative structure of municipalities by appointing co-chairpersons that, by rule, breaches the current administrative law.

Based on these grounds, three mayors; Ahmet Turk of Mardin, Selcuk Mizrakli of Diyarbakir, and Bedia Ertan of Van, were discharged and the governors of these provinces were appointed as new mayors. Since this issue is currently at the top of the agenda for all political parties, it is crucial to evaluate how they reflected this incident and why they reacted differently.

It is possible to classify the reactions to these developments into three groups: supporters consisting of the AK Party and the MHP, opponents consisting of the CHP and the HDP, and the relatively-neutral Iyi Party. The supporters of this decision underline that it is crucial for Turkey to strengthen the fight against terrorism. In accordance with this aim, Turkey should not allow any activity supporting terrorist groups or legitimizing their existence.

Even the opponents of the trustee appointments do not deny the affiliation between the HDP municipalities and the PKK.

“We will not allow any money of Turkey’s people to go to terrorist organizations. And we will not sit back and watch those, who use the money of our people to help terrorists,” stated President Erdogan.

Indeed, even the opponents of this incident do not deny the affiliation between the HDP municipalities and the PKK, since the HDP itself does not hide this. One of the most concrete examples of this affiliation was during the official inauguration ceremonies of these municipalities. During the official ceremony in Diyarbakir, the national anthem of Turkey was not allowed to be sung, and instead the PKK’s march was performed. Furthermore, a moment of silence for dead PKK members took place. Relatives of people killed by the PKK were also fired in all of these municipalities.

On the other side, the opponents of these developments state that the trustee appointments are against the democratic rule and the will of the people. CHP officials visited the discharged mayors and showed them their support. The party underlines that these mayors should not be discharged without a judicial decision. Indeed, this process seems to have resulted in a further rapprochement between the CHP and the HDP since the reaction of both parties to this issue are the same.

Nevertheless, the CHP’s alliance partner Iyi Party stayed relatively neutral during the process. Unlike the CHP’s Chairman Kılıçdaroğlu, the Iyi Party’s leader Meral Akşener did not make any comments.. Nonetheless, the Iyi Party’s spokesperson made an official statement and underlined that although respect for the will of the people is crucial for democratic rule, affiliations with terrorist activities and organizations should not be allowed.

Iyi Party’s relatively neutral stance and the further rapprochement between the CHP and HDP on this issue might be signaling a change in the balance of power among the CHP-HDP-Iyi Party political bloc. Thus, the reflections of Turkey’s opposition parties on the appointment of trustees may point to the future directions of these parties in their domestic political agendas.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) released a new report about humanitarian developments in Idlib, stating that 576,000 people were displaced between 1 May and August 18 in 2019. The OCHA report gives a strong warning to the world and to Turkey in particular. Since Turkey stands alone in Idlib, European states have avoided taking strategic responsibility, the US has sidelined itself and Gulf States like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates view Idlib as a zero-sum game to undermine Turkey. Turkey also failed to use any of its four options to prevent its observation posts in Morek being besieged by the Assad regime. I argued that Turkey needs a new approach for Idlib, but what if the worst case scenario happens? One where a humanitarian disaster in Idlib cannot be prevented and the UN warning that 2 million refugees may flee to Turkey occurs?

According to UNHCR, the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey has reached 3,650,000 making Turkey the biggest host country for refugees in the world. However, the situation has its burdens for Turkey. Ignoring the economical, humanitarian and political costs, social tensions within Turkish society and hate speech against Syrian refugees are increasing. As a step to manager the refugee population, authorities in Istanbul announced new regulations that required unregistered Syrian refugees to return to cities in which they were registered by 20 August. However, after demands by the Syrian community, the deadline was extended for two months. While tensions against Syrian refugees are on rise in Turkey, the prospect of a further two million refugees from Idlib would be a catastrophe.

Turkey may be forced to establish transfer routes to the Greek and Bulgarian borders, opening the way for Syrian refugees to pass into Europe.

One of the main reasons behind such a worst case scenario would indeed be that Turkey stands alone in Idlib. While Turkey has taken on the burden of preventing a humanitarian disaster in Idlib alone, the country should not also carry the burden of the costs and risks of hosting two more million refugees. Turkey needs to force the world to take responsibility. Closing the borders to Syrians who face death in Idlib is not an option for Turkey, and if the worst case scenario happens, Turkey must open its borders to Syrians. However, while Turkey has no other option but to let Syrians in, it also has no other option but to let Syrians out. In order to prevent unregistered movement of refugees inside the country, Turkey may be forced to establish transfer routes to the Greek and Bulgarian borders. In such a case, the refugee deal between the EU and Turkey would end, opening the way for refugees in Turkey to pass into Europe. The countries that rejected taking responsibility for Syrian refugees and let Turkey do so on its own would then be forced to carry some of the burden. Turkey cannot take full responsibility if such a worst case scenario were to occur even if they provided with financial support to do so.

However, a second option also remains. With the support of the EU states and the US, Turkey could convince Russia to establish a security belt in Idlib. Such a move would require Turkey to take control over a certain area in Idlib following the Euphrates Shield model. Until now, Russia and the Assad regime want a military solution for Idlib, but the pressure of European States and the US, and Turkey’s decisiveness may help to facilitate a security belt free from bombs, terrorists and Assad’s forces. A security belt would also require commitments from the EU and the US. While details like depth and timeline of such a safe zone have to be decided, the new Turkish base north of Khan Sheikhoun, where the Turkish convoy remained after raids, could be a good guide for a new line. In this context, the upcoming Erdogan-Putin meeting in Russia will determine the fate of Idlib, the fate of millions of civilians and whether this worst-case scenario will happen.

Between 22 April 2018 and June 2019, one of Germany’s most central political parties, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), was led by Andrea Nahles, who was the first female leader in the party’s history. However, in June of this year, she announced her resignation as chairperson. Following this decision, the party now faces, once again, a leadership problem and an election to fill the role of chairperson will be held this October. Until that date, the party is being led by an interim leadership-trio. SPD members can declare their candidacy until September 1st. Candidates have the right to run alone or alongside a co-candidate. Without going into detail of the election process, it is worth mentioning that if the candidate(s) are not able to achieve an absolute majority in the first round, the election can go on to a second round of voting. Ultimately, the final results will be declared during the SPD party convention in early December.

It can be said that until now the SPD is going through an interesting but desperate path. Unfortunately, until last week, there have been no exciting candidates who have declared their interest in being the next chairperson. This is despite party members being able to declare their candidacy since 1 July. The only striking candidate until now has been Olaf Scholz, the incumbent federal minister of finance and vice chancellor of Germany. Scholz stated that he is willing to be a candidate due to the lack of interest by other prominent SPD figures. He previously ruled out being a candidate by pointing to his time constraints as a current federal minister. As expected, Scholz finally declared a female running mate to co-head the SPD, namely, a rather unknown SPD-politician and MP in Brandenburg’s state parliament, Klara Geywitz.

Scholz is considered to be a person who would bring more stability to Merkel’s shaky grand coalition, and is seen as a rather persuasive figure from an economic perspective. The chances of other candidates as the new chairperson are unlikely. But these speculations and discussions before and after the election of the SPD chairperson may be misleading. One of the SPD’s former leaders, Martin Schulz, received 100 percent of the votes when he was elected as the party’s new chairman in early 2017. Despite this overwhelming initial success, he ended his career as one of the most unsuccessful SPD leaders in its history.

If the SPD votes continue to decrease in Germany, the Greens may replace the SPD in the near future.

The SPD is currently a junior member of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s federal government coalition. In the last years, the SPD has suffered several disappointing election results. In upcoming elections in three federal states in the east of Germany, similar disastrous election results are expected. Under such deteriorating conditions, some SPD members have increasingly called for quitting their party membership unless the current coalition with Merkel’s conservative CDU/CSU continues. Current polls show that SPD’s votes range between 12 and 14 percent at the federal level while in some states the percentage is even less. It is argued that the desperate search for a new party leader has also decreased the number of potential votes. Besides that, since 2018, the SPD lost 37,000 members of its party members, from 463,723 to 426,352 members.

The current process in the SPD does not promise a successful post-election projection. It is not a secret that the SPD cannot properly articulate their differences from other leading parties such as the center-right CDU, and the Greens. If the SPD votes continue to decrease, the Greens may replace the SPD in the near future. Furthermore, the fact that Germany does not have a political tradition where political figures are in the foreground brings some difficulties when finding a new leader for a party. Political parties are the main focus in German politics while individual political personalities are less decisive in the overall party structure. This is in contrast to neighboring France, where a party leader is the most prominent figure in politics. In Germany, this creates conditions in which charismatic leaders do not easily emerge from the party’s own ranks. Not only for the SPD but for Germany’s conservatives who also face problems determining and electing new leaders able to trigger excitement and hope among the citizens. All in all, while the election of a new leader or co-leaders in the SPD is significant it will not solely determine the party’s future course.

It has been eighteen years since the AK Party was founded in 2001. Contrary to previous splinter party experiences in Turkey, the party was soon able to consolidate its electorate and consequently came to power in 2002. Although none of the previous political parties were able to stay in power for such a long time, the AK Party has been in power for 17 years and is guaranteed to remain in power until 2023.

Since the AK Party is the only example of dominant party in Turkish political life, it is highly crucial to understand the underlying reasons of its success story. To do so, it is necessary to examine the breaking points in the AK Party rule.

The first breaking point was its success in the fight against long-lasting military tutelage and making democratic reforms. When the AK Party came to power, the military was very active in politics and interfered with Turkey’s democracy through a chain of military coups. Thus, the first period of the AK Party rule also suffered from the military’s dominant position in the political arena.

Because of this reason, the AK Party took necessary steps to ensure the consolidation of democracy. Promotion of minority rights, adopting a more pluralistic approach in state apparatuses, and promoting human rights were the key issues in the party’s agenda. “The AK Party embraces all citizens regardless of their gender, ethnicity, beliefs, and worldview without discrimination”, as written in the party program. The party made necessary political and judicial reforms in accordance with this aim.

Between the period beginning with the Gezi Park protests in 2013 and ending in the July 15 coup attempt in 2016, the AK Party struggled to both retain its power and keep the gains of Turkish democracy.

Nevertheless, the party confronted many challenges as a result of these reforms. Especially between 2007–2009, the military, the judiciary, political parties, and NGOs tried to overthrow the AK Party government to sustain their privileged positions in the existing political order. However, the AK Party became successful in the fight against these challenges and survived. The party’s success against these challenges was the second breaking point in the AK Party rule.

After defeating these challenges, the party has faced more serious crises in national and international arena. The period beginning with the Gezi Park protests in 2013 and ending in the July 15 coup attempt in 2016 caused trouble for the party’s rule and survival of Turkish democracy. During this period, the party struggled to both retain its power and keep the gains of Turkish democracy. Although the actions of the party had faced lots of criticism in the public, the party was able to handle the third breaking point successfully.

It is obvious that there will be more breaking points for the AK Party which will determine its future position in Turkish politics. Since the world order becomes more chaotic, the AK Party may face more challenges both in the domestic and international arena. The remainder of 2019 will be especially important for Turkey’s foreign policy and security. The regional security and the uncertainty in northern Syria will be at the top of the foreign policy agenda. Despite all the possible challenges in the foreign policy for the rest of 2019, the main challenge for the AK Party will be the consolidation of the presidential system and providing stability in the Turkish economy in 2020.