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ndia’s student protest movement has gained momentum online after demonstrations against examination paper leaks triggered a wave of social media posts criticizing Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government.

The protests, led by students demanding the resignation of Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan, intensified after a march toward Parliament on July 20 brought central New Delhi to a standstill.

According to protesters, more than 100 students were injured during a police crackdown. Police denied allegations of excessive force, but videos recorded by demonstrators circulated widely across social media platforms.

The footage showed scenes from the protests, including clashes between police and demonstrators, tear gas, baton charges, and students fleeing the area. The videos quickly spread on Instagram and other platforms, generating memes, commentary, and calls for further demonstrations.

“If nothing, we are televising our revolution,” protester Avanshika Singh told Al Jazeera during the demonstrations.

Cockroach Janta Party leads campaign

Young protesters said social media had become a central tool for documenting events and mobilizing support.

Posts criticizing the government and demanding accountability over repeated examination paper leaks have spread widely, while official posts by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party have reportedly been flooded with comments calling for the education minister’s resignation.

The protests have also inspired demonstrations in other Indian cities, including Mumbai, Bengaluru, Patna, Lucknow, and Aizawl.

The demonstrations are being organized by the Cockroach Janta Party, a political pressure group formed after remarks by India’s chief justice comparing young people to “cockroaches” and “parasites” sparked backlash online.

The group has said protests will continue peacefully until three demands are met: the resignation of Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan, assurances that criminal cases will not be pursued against protesters, and compensation for families of students who died by suicide following exam paper leaks and cancellations.

A reversal of social media dominance

Political analysts say the movement represents a significant shift in India’s online political landscape.

Modi and the BJP were among the earliest political forces in India to effectively use social media to build support. However, analysts say Generation Z protesters are now using the same platforms to challenge the government’s narrative.

Cultural critic Anurag Minus Verma described the protests as an example of online irony and meme culture being transformed into a political organizing tool.

“The criticism and hate directed at Modi in the capital is not only acceptable now, but even cool,” Verma told Al Jazeera.

Prime Minister Modi addressed the issue on social media, saying that “nothing is more important than the welfare and future of our youth” and noting that the government had established fast-track courts to punish those responsible for examination paper leaks.

The response was quickly challenged online by leaders of the Cockroach Janta Party, who continued to criticize the government’s handling of the crisis.

As protests continue in New Delhi, organizers say social media remains central to their strategy, allowing students to document events in real time and build support beyond the streets of the capital.

(Source: Aljazeeera English)

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ndia’s 2026 state elections did not produce a simple story of victory and defeat. They revealed a country moving in two directions at once. From above, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) looks stronger, more confident and more geographically expanded. From below, Indian politics looks restless, younger and increasingly impatient with old forms of authority. The same political season that gave the BJP a historic breakthrough in West Bengal also gave India the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), a satirical youth movement that has turned insult, unemployment and examination scandals into a new language of protest.

This contradiction is the real meaning of the elections. India is not only becoming more BJP-dominated. It is also becoming more politically uneven. The ruling party is expanding into regions once considered resistant to its ideological project, while regional parties, opposition alliances and younger voters search for new vehicles of expression. The result is an India that looks more consolidated on the electoral map, but less settled in society.

BJP expansion from above

The most symbolic result came from West Bengal. According to the Election Commission of India, the BJP won 207 seats in the 294-member assembly, while the All India Trinamool Congress, widely known as Trinamool Congress (TMC), fell to 80. The result ended Mamata Banerjee’s long dominance and broke one of the last major regional exceptions to BJP power. For decades, Bengal’s politics drew strength from leftist memory, regional pride, linguistic culture and a self-image of secular resistance. That image was always more complicated than its defenders admitted.

West Bengal was central to the opposition’s imagination because it showed that a regional leader could resist the BJP and speak against New Delhi from a position of strength. That model now looks broken. The BJP’s victory gives the party a psychological advantage ahead of the 2029 general election. It also weakens the opposition’s claim that regional strongholds can contain the BJP’s national expansion.

Yet the election was not a simple BJP wave. Tamil Nadu told a different story. The Election Commission’s results showed actor-politician Vijay’s Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) as the single largest party with 108 seats in the 234-member assembly, ahead of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK). Tamil Nadu shows that voter fatigue can disrupt established regional parties without automatically benefiting the BJP. Vijay’s rise suggests that younger voters may move beyond older Dravidian formations without accepting the BJP as the only alternative.

Assam, Kerala and Puducherry added further nuance. Assam confirmed the BJP’s strength in the northeast, with the party winning 82 seats in a 126-member assembly. Kerala produced a Congress-led result rather than a BJP breakthrough, while Puducherry showed that alliance management still matters in smaller political spaces. Taken together, these results put pressure on the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA), the opposition bloc formed to challenge the BJP nationally. Its problem is not only ideological, it is organizational and psychological.

The BJP, by contrast, has regained momentum after the limits exposed in the 2024 general election, when it remained the largest party but lost its single-party majority in the Lok Sabha. West Bengal gives it a new eastern frontier. Assam confirms its northeastern hold. Even where it did not dominate, as in Tamil Nadu, the weakening of older opposition parties may serve its long-term interests.

Cockroach anger from below

The rise of the Cockroach Janta Party is the clearest sign. The movement began after Chief Justice of India Surya Kant reportedly compared some unemployed youth and fake-degree holders to “cockroaches” and “parasites.” He later said sections of the media had misquoted his oral observations. But the phrase had already escaped the courtroom. Abhijeet Dipke, a U.S.-educated Indian activist, turned the insult into satire. The cockroach became a symbol of humiliation, survival and stubborn resistance.

The movement is funny, but it is not trivial. Its slogans are playful, but its anger is real. Young Indians are protesting because education has become uncertain, examinations have become scandal-prone, jobs are scarce and official responses often sound dismissive. Reuters reported that the CJP’s first street protest in New Delhi on June 6, 2026, focused on youth unemployment and examination-related grievances, including demands for Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan’s resignation over repeated paper leaks and grading errors.

This matters because exams are not a small question in India. For millions of families, they are the promised bridge between poverty and dignity. When that bridge begins to look broken, satire becomes serious. The CJP says what many young Indians feel but cannot easily organize around: they are over-tested, under-employed, mocked by power and expected to remain grateful.

The CJP may not become a conventional political party. It may fade, split or be absorbed by larger forces. But even if the organization disappears, the mood behind it will remain. India has a young population with rising aspirations and shrinking patience. That generation is asking whether nationalism, development slogans and electoral victories can answer the practical anxieties of jobs, exams and dignity.

Why this matters beyond India

This is where the 2026 elections and the Cockroach movement meet. The elections show the strength of political power. The movement shows the weakness of social consent. A party can win states and still face a generation that feels unheard. A government can expand geographically and still struggle to answer the desperation of students, job seekers and young graduates.

The consequences will not remain only domestic. In West Bengal, the BJP’s rise may harden politics around migration, citizenship, border security and Bangladesh. For Dhaka, Kathmandu, Colombo and other regional capitals, India’s internal political shifts matter because New Delhi’s domestic debates often shape regional behavior. If identity politics becomes stronger in Bengal, border communities and minorities may feel the pressure before foreign ministries do.

India after the 2026 state elections is therefore neither fully triumphant nor fully unstable. It is powerful, but tense. The BJP has expanded its map, but the opposition is not the only source of challenge. The challenge is also social, generational and emotional. It comes from young people who may not yet have a full program, but who have found a symbol in the cockroach: despised, difficult to eliminate and strangely capable of surviving.

For the BJP, the lesson is clear. Electoral expansion can create authority, but it cannot replace accountability. For the opposition, the lesson is equally sharp. Anti-BJP politics cannot rely only on old regional faces and emergency alliances. It must speak to the anxieties of the young, the unemployed, the exam-weary and the socially humiliated.

The 2026 elections changed India’s political map. The Cockroach Janta Party revealed something deeper: maps do not show pressure building under the surface. India today is governed from above with confidence, but questioned from below with increasing impatience. That tension may shape the road to 2029 more than any single state result.

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ndian Prime Minister Modi had told Russian President Putin in the context of Ukraine, “This is not a time of war.” India had not condemned Russia either, but it must have realised it could not say the same to Trump. Many countries, likely including India, had assumed that the conflict between Iran, Israel and the US would come to a swift end. New Delhi was probably among those who thought this way and had hoped to weather the storm through silence. It now seems this approach has not been very effective.

As the Iran War escalates, we are witnessing how decision-makers in the US and Israel have miscalculated Iran’s resilience and resolve. At the same time, they have underestimated Tehran’s leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. As the world is shaken by the consequences of the Iran War, India is striving to maintain its neutrality whilst managing the risks and interests in the Middle East and beyond amidst the expanding conflict. India has a large diaspora in Arab states, as well as significant trade and investment ties.

Delhi, which keeps communication channels open with all parties, believes it is managing the situation well. Is that really the case? Iran’s refusal to compromise and its resolve in the face of constant missile attacks by the US and Israel offer lessons for the world, but they also hold a mirror up to India. Modi never shies away from saying that the world is watching India. It certainly is watching, but how?

India has also been severely affected by rising fuel prices, pressure on the rupee and strained diplomatic relations. According to Goldman Sachs, whilst approximately 14 per cent of its exports to Gulf countries pass through the Strait of Hormuz, remittances sent home by the roughly 10 million Indian workers employed in the Middle East account for 40 per cent of the annual total. For India, the Strait of Hormuz is a vital energy source through which approximately 90 per cent of its LPG imports and around 50 per cent of its crude oil imports pass.

On the one hand, Indians are forming long queues outside LPG distribution centres with empty LPG cylinders, while on the other hand, four of India’s Union states are preparing for elections in April (the repatriation of many Indians will significantly impact these and other Indian elections over the next 12 months), and meanwhile, New Delhi—balancing public silence with diplomatic flexibility—is conducting intensive consultations with all stakeholders.

Delhi’s stance

India’s top priority is to maintain access to all actors. The Iran War may have granted India a 30-day exemption advantage for Russian oil (though this is characterised by some Indian commentators as humiliation, and they are not entirely without a point – consider that your trade policy is shaped, or could be shaped, by another power in this situation, subject to US approval), but a far greater blow is being felt in its strategic relations across Asia, including the Gulf.

The Iran War began on 28 February, yet Modi was in Israel on 25–26 February. During his visit, which elevated bilateral relations to the level of a special strategic partnership, Modi—greeted as a brother by Netanyahu—stated in the Israeli parliament, the Knesset: “India stands firmly by Israel’s side, both now and in the future.” It remained a matter of speculation whether Modi was aware of the attack launched 1.5 days later. However, this visit and his subsequent prolonged silence on critical issues amounted to a loss of prestige for India and a strategic detriment to its long-term interests. Delhi did not condemn the US and Israeli attacks on Iran, but supported a draft resolution at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) condemning Iran’s attacks on various Gulf states.

In the Iran crisis, it appears that India’s efforts to remain in the background have pushed it into the sidelines. It is positioning itself through quiet rhetoric rather than action. It is expressing its concerns to Gulf leaders regarding Iranian attacks in the context of the safety of Indian workers, but at the same time, it seems to be opting to turn a blind eye to US and Israeli attacks.

New Delhi is driven by a desire to become a major power. It argues that it is entitled to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. It is on its way to becoming the world’s fourth-largest economy. At every opportunity, India states that recognizing its global role would also mean giving a voice to the Global South and the developing world, which are currently unrepresented on the UN Security Council. However, this is now highly open to question. A perception has emerged that India is not a neutral player in the conflict, but rather is aligning itself with the US-Israel camp, even if it does not explicitly state so.

The torpedo attack by an American submarine on the Iranian naval vessel IRIS Dena, which had been invited to participate in the MILAN exercise held in Visakhapatnam by New Delhi on 4 March, has made matters even more difficult for the Indian government. Not a single word was spoken to the US. The Indian Navy’s statement made no mention of the attack that sank the vessel or of any regret over the sailors’ deaths. Of course, the ship was outside Indian waters and India bore no legal or political responsibility. However, Delhi had previously gone to great lengths to prove and establish its role as the ‘clear security provider’ in the Indian Ocean region. Yet in this incident, the same Delhi went to great lengths to clarify that the Indian Ocean was not India’s ocean. This formalistic perspective on such a serious incident was, in a sense, an attempt to justify the American action and Delhi’s lack of responsibility.

Silence and choices

India, which has expended immense effort to establish itself as the “voice of the Global South”, now faces not only the challenge of safeguarding the image of Global South leadership it has sought to build, but also the handicap of protecting the strategic autonomy it has jeopardized in pursuit of a special relationship with the US and Israel. India’s stance appears to amount to nothing more than hoping the problems will resolve themselves. Just as Venezuelan President Maduro did during his ousting by the Americans in January 2026.

Some circles in India view Delhi’s silent response to the war as a cool-headed calculation aimed at safeguarding the interests of a rising power across multiple fronts. In their view, silence is a legitimate strategic tool when there is no bargaining power. This is theoretically defensible, but there is a difference between an ambiguous silence and principled restraint. Not only did it refrain from condemning the death of Iran’s religious leader, but it even avoided sending an official message of condolence.

The Ministry of External Affairs explicitly instructed all Indian ambassadors in world capitals not to sign any book of condolence opened by their Iranian counterparts without prior authorization from New Delhi. Ultimately, in the face of mounting domestic criticism, the Indian Foreign Minister visited the Iranian embassy to convey his condolences. However, the initial stance went beyond mere silence. This gives the impression that silence was used not as a strategic tool, but rather as a reflexive means to please the US and Israel.

Given its immense interests in the Gulf, Delhi’s choice to remain silent and defend this stance strategically may, in one sense, be a justified position. Yet, in another sense, it is incomplete. For India, Iran is not merely a trading partner. Nor is the issue solely about its energy imports via the Strait of Hormuz. For India, Iran represents a way to bypass the China-Pakistan axis. It is about bypassing Pakistani control in land access to Central Asia.

It is the cornerstone of the International North-South Transport Corridor and the gateway to the Chabahar port. India has invested at least 120 million dollars, diplomatic capital, infrastructure resources and long-term strategic planning into this framework over a period of more than twenty years. And for India, Iran represents a bond extending to cultural ties, as Foreign Minister Jaishankar has noted (for instance, even whilst the British were attempting to conquer the subcontinent, Persian remained at the heart of Indian court life).

The BRICS factor

Meanwhile, India currently holds the presidency of BRICS. BRICS is a multilateral coalition established with the aim of challenging American financial hegemony. Iran is a BRICS member and enjoys the support of China, Russia and South Africa. Consequently, Delhi finds itself at odds with other BRICS member states, particularly during the year it holds the group’s presidency. It is ironic to lead a multipolar coalition whilst sending mixed signals as if orbiting a unipolar power.

It is true that foreign policy requires caution. However, India has failed to apply this in this crisis. Taken as a whole, although it might be termed ‘strategic silence’, India’s omissions—which show a marked bias towards Israel and the US—are creating the perception that Delhi is on the side of the aggressors in this war. Those with a realistic perspective know that in international politics, words are worthless and actions are more effective than words.

However, one must not overlook the fact that, ultimately, the pressure of US sanctions has strained India’s relations with Iran. It has significantly reduced its oil imports and has almost entirely divested its stake in the Chabahar port. It may have concluded that it must position itself alongside the US, Israel and the Gulf states to maintain its dominance in this war. If so, it must have reached this conclusion at the cost of damaging its future credibility.

Using international diplomacy as a ploy to buy time and lull the Iranians into a false sense of security, the targeted assassination of a president who was not in hiding, false claims regarding the right to pre-emptive strikes, the torpedoing of a ship returning from a fleet inspection, Israel’s occupation of Lebanese and Syrian territory. Delhi has remained silent on all of these. Modi addressed the Knesset, received his medal, and departed with a series of defense-technology agreements. Just 36 hours after returning from Israel, Israeli-US missiles began bombing Iran.

Even without prior knowledge, speculation about a possible US-Israeli attack had been rife for weeks, and the timing inevitably drew attention. Could it be that India had agreed to align its foreign and security policies with American interests? The US Deputy Secretary of State said at the 2026 Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi: “India must understand that we will not make the same mistake with India that we made with China 20 years ago.” In other words, he is saying we will not allow India’s economic development to reach the point where it becomes a commercial rival. Were those who believed Delhi could become a major power by clinging to the coattails of a superpower mistaken?

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ndian Prime Minister Narendra Modi received a standing ovation at Israel’s parliament on Wednesday, marking the start of a two-day visit aimed at deepening security, economic and technological cooperation between the two countries.

Modi addressed lawmakers at the Knesset, pledging “friendship, respect and partnership” at a time when Israel faces mounting international criticism over the genocide in Gaza. “Let us ensure that the friendship between India and Israel remains a source of strength in an uncertain world,” he said during a 30-minute speech that was warmly received by members of the governing coalition.

Modi was greeted at Ben Gurion Airport with a personal embrace from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who later introduced him to parliament as “Narendra, my dear friend.” The Knesset building in Jerusalem was illuminated in the colors of India’s flag on the eve of his arrival.

Following his address, Knesset Speaker Amir Ohana awarded Modi a medal in recognition of his role in strengthening bilateral relations.

The visit underscores how much ties have grown under Modi, who in 2017 became the first Indian prime minister to visit Israel. Netanyahu reciprocated with a trip to India in 2018, cementing a partnership that has expanded significantly in recent years.

Expanding strategic cooperation between India and Israel

India and Israel established full diplomatic relations in 1992. Since then, defense and technology cooperation have become central pillars of the relationship. India is now Israel’s second-largest trading partner in Asia, with bilateral trade valued at $3.6 billion in the 2025 fiscal year, according to India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

During his speech, Modi emphasized collaboration in security, artificial intelligence, quantum technology and infrastructure development.

“We’re committed to expanding trade, strengthening investment flows and promoting joint infrastructure development,” he said.

Netanyahu praised Modi’s early and unequivocal support for Israel “You didn’t flinch. You didn’t waver. You stood by Israel,” Netanyahu said.

Modi reaffirmed India’s support for a U.S.-backed ceasefire framework for Gaza endorsed by the U.N. Security Council, describing it as a pathway to “a just and durable peace for all the people of the region, including the Palestine issue.”

However, he did not directly address Israel’s newly approved measures to deepen control over parts of the occupied West Bank — steps that India had joined more than 100 countries in condemning earlier this month.

India historically supported the Palestinian cause, but under Modi’s leadership, New Delhi has recalibrated its Middle East policy, strengthening ties with Israel while maintaining diplomatic engagement with Palestinian authorities.

A boost for Israel’s international standing

The visit also unfolded against the backdrop of domestic political tensions in Israel. Opposition lawmakers briefly walked out of the chamber during speeches by Netanyahu and Speaker Ohana, protesting the exclusion of Supreme Court Chief Justice Yitzhak Amit from the event. They returned for Modi’s address, with opposition leader Yair Lapid assuring the Indian leader that the protest was unrelated to his visit.

Netanyahu, currently on trial for corruption charges, has faced ongoing disputes over judicial reforms that have deeply divided Israeli society.

The high-profile visit is widely seen as a diplomatic boost for Israel as it navigates strained relations with some traditional allies over the Gaza genocide. Modi is scheduled to meet President Isaac Herzog and visit the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial before concluding his trip.

As Israel seeks to broaden its global partnerships, the public display of solidarity from India — one of the world’s largest economies and most populous nations — signals a deepening strategic alignment between the two governments.

(Source: The Associated Press)

T

he United States has agreed to cut tariffs on Indian goods to 18% from as high as 50% in exchange for India halting purchases of Russian oil and lowering trade barriers, US President Donald Trump announced on Monday.

Trump said the agreement followed a call with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and would see India replace Russian oil with purchases from the United States and potentially Venezuela.

A White House official told Reuters the US would remove a punitive 25% duty imposed over India’s Russian oil imports, which had been added to a separate 25% “reciprocal” tariff.

Markets rally

US-listed shares of major Indian firms rose sharply after the announcement. Infosys gained 4.3%, Wipro rose 6.8%, HDFC Bank climbed 4.4%, and the iShares MSCI India ETF jumped 3%.

The deal also boosted broader US market sentiment, particularly among technology and semiconductor stocks.

Trump said India would “BUY AMERICAN at a much higher level,” including more than $500 billion in US energy purchases, as well as technology, agricultural, and other products. He added that India would move to reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers on US goods to zero.

However, few details were provided on implementation timelines, enforcement mechanisms, or the scope of India’s commitments. As of Monday afternoon, no presidential proclamation or Federal Register notice had been issued to formalize the changes.

India’s commerce and foreign ministries did not immediately comment, and Russia’s embassy in Washington also declined to respond.

Mixed reaction in the U..S

Economists said the deal brings India closer to tariff levels faced by other major Asian exporters.

“This puts India broadly in line with its Asian peers on tariff rates,” said Madhavi Arora of Emkay Global, adding that it would ease pressure on Indian exports and the rupee after months of investor outflows triggered by higher U.S. tariffs.

US business groups reacted cautiously. The US Chamber of Commerce called the announcement a positive step toward a broader trade agreement.

But a coalition of more than 800 small businesses, operating under the name “We Pay the Tariffs,” warned the deal still represents a sharp increase in costs for US importers, noting tariffs on Indian goods were around 2% to 3% in 2024.

Modi welcomed the announcement, thanking Trump for lowering tariffs on Indian products.

“Delighted that Made in India products will now have a reduced tariff of 18%,” Modi wrote on X, calling the move beneficial for India’s 1.4 billion people.

India’s Trade Minister Piyush Goyal said the deal would deepen economic ties and help India access US technology.

Oil geopolitics

India, the world’s third-largest oil importer, relies on imports for about 90% of its needs. Cheaper Russian crude has been central to its energy strategy since the war in Ukraine, though purchases have begun to decline in recent months.

Analysts said U.S. and Venezuelan oil could partly replace Russian supplies, reshaping energy flows as Washington pushes trade partners to distance themselves from Moscow.

The agreement comes amid a broader push by the Trump administration to finalize trade frameworks with key partners ahead of a US Supreme Court ruling on the legality of Trump’s “reciprocal” tariffs.

(Source: Reuters)

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ndia and the European Union have reached a landmark free trade agreement that will create one of the world’s largest economic zones, covering nearly two billion people and accounting for about a quarter of global GDP.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the deal on Tuesday during von der Leyen’s visit to New Delhi, describing it as a historic breakthrough after nearly two decades of intermittent negotiations.

“We have concluded the mother of all deals,” von der Leyen said in a post on X. “We have created a free trade zone of two billion people, with both sides set to benefit.”

Modi hailed the agreement as a milestone for India and the EU, calling it a source of “many opportunities” for India’s 1.4 billion people and millions across Europe.

Trade liberalization and economic impact

According to Indian officials, the agreement will cover roughly 25 percent of global economic output and is expected to significantly boost Indian exports in sectors such as textiles, gems and jewelry, and leather goods.

EU officials described the pact as the most ambitious trade deal India has ever concluded. Under the agreement, tariffs on 96.6 percent of EU goods exports to India will be eliminated or reduced, saving European companies up to €4 billion ($4.74bn) annually in duties.

Key European exports benefiting from tariff reductions include machinery, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, aircraft and spacecraft. Tariffs on cars will be gradually reduced to 10 percent under an annual quota of 250,000 vehicles.

Tariffs on wine, spirits and beer will also be lowered, while duties on fruit juices and processed foods will be eliminated.

Services, investment and strategic goals

The deal grants EU service providers enhanced access to India’s market in areas such as financial and maritime services, while India sees Europe as a crucial source of investment and advanced technology.

Brussels expects EU exports to India to double by 2032. Bilateral trade in goods already reached €120 billion ($139bn) in 2024, with services trade accounting for an additional €60 billion ($69bn).

“The EU stands to gain the highest level of access ever granted to a trade partner in India’s traditionally protected market,” von der Leyen said.

The agreement comes amid rising global trade tensions, including US tariffs and Chinese export controls, prompting both India and the EU to diversify economic partnerships.

Formal signing of the deal is expected after legal vetting, a process likely to take five to six months, with implementation anticipated within a year, according to Indian government officials.

Alongside the trade pact, India and the EU also announced the launch of a security and defence partnership, underscoring what both sides described as a growing strategic relationship.

Trade talks between India and the EU were first launched in 2007 but gained renewed momentum in 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and shifting global trade dynamics.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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ussian President Vladimir Putin visited India for the 23rd annual Russia-India summit on December 4-5, after a four-year absence. His visit signaled that the two countries’ fundamental national interests remain aligned as the global order shifts. India relies on Russia for defense equipment and affordable energy, while Russia needs a reliable economic and strategic partner outside the West. The most important takeaway from the visit was that the relationship between the two countries is strategic, not merely transactional, despite global turbulence.

Putin’s visit coincided with a challenging period for both countries. For Delhi, 2025 was the most challenging year in terms of foreign policy. The four-day conflict between India and Pakistan in May marked the worst period of hostility between the two countries in a long time. During Donald Trump’s second term as US president, he accused India of purchasing Russian crude oil, causing a sudden and sharp decline in India-US relations. Trump’s summit with Putin in Alaska signaled a strategic realignment of US policy aimed at repairing Washington’s frayed ties with Moscow. However, Trump’s overall stance is inconsistent. Moscow is dissatisfied with Washington due to its inconsistent support for Ukraine.

Due to their current problems with the US since Trump’s second term, both countries are turning to each other. India-Russia relations are strengthened by reliable arms supply and energy access, which serve as a buffer against isolation and Chinese dominance. However, expecting Russia to help India resolve its border disputes with China would be too much to ask of Russia. However, India’s ties with Russia are forcing the US to offer better terms, and Russia’s interaction with the US is forcing it to keep India as a partner.

Putin’s visit confirmed that maintaining Delhi’s strategic autonomy requires keeping all channels open. It also sent a clear signal that India and Russia are strong allies. Turbulence in India-U.S. relations, caused by Trump’s pressure tactics, led Delhi to realize that it was not indispensable. Ultimately, Prime Minister Narendra Modi misread India’s influence on the global stage, a fact that both Trump and Chinese President Xi made clear.

The roots of the relationship

Let’s start by listening to what Modi said when he first came to power, despite often being criticized in India as pro-US:

“If you ask any of the more than one billion people living in India who our country’s greatest friend is, everyone knows it’s Russia. India’s ties with Russia are incomparable. Since 1947, India-Russia relations have been the only constant in a rapidly changing world. They have stood the test of time and grown stronger. The resilience of our relationship is based on the principles of equality, trust, and mutual benefit.”

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, geopolitical pressure from the United States, China, and Pakistan kept India away from the West, led by the United States, and steered it toward closer relations with the Soviet Union. The Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation Treaty, signed in 1971, established a foundation of trust between the two countries. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, close trade partnerships and strategic ties were further strengthened.

The India-Soviet Union rapprochement, whose foundations were firmly laid during that period, continues to manifest itself in India-Russia relations today. Although Delhi displays a closer stance toward the US today, its deep-rooted ties with Moscow remain important as a “balancing alternative.” China’s assertiveness and Washington’s unpredictability make Moscow an important factor in India’s calculations.

During the Cold War, India emerged as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement. At the same time, however, India sought to develop a “special relationship” with the Soviet Union. Incidentally, the nonalignment policy itself was problematic because members of the Non-Aligned Movement were tied to the superpower blocs to some extent. As bilateral relations developed, the Soviets became an “irreplaceable counterbalancing force” in addressing India’s regional and international concerns.

The Soviets remained India’s largest trading partner until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their material and technical support formed the basis of many local industries in India. They provided India with all military production lines, from aircraft to tanks, and played a significant role in developing the Indian Navy. Mindful of the balance between the U.S. and China, the Soviet Union focused on strengthening India’s military capabilities (and Russia still does today).

Although intense interactions in bilateral relations were disrupted during the first decade after the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, the foundation of trust and friendship established during that time continued. Relations with the Russian Federation after the Cold War were restructured. Moscow’s primary motivation was and remains the pursuit of multipolarity. Moscow proposes creating a “strategic triangle” among India, Russia, and China to stabilize international security and effectively counterbalance the unipolarity led by the U.S. after the Cold War. However, the lack of trust between Delhi and Beijing hinders this goal. Nevertheless, the quest for multipolarity spearheaded by Moscow remains common ground among the three countries.

India-Russia relations grew closer when Vladimir Putin became president in 2000, and the two countries upgraded their relationship from a strategic partnership to a special and privileged strategic partnership in 2010. The most important pillar of bilateral relations is defense cooperation, and Russia is a “proven and tested” partner in this regard. Moscow provides Delhi with advanced defense equipment and sensitive military technologies. Russia is also the only country with which India has an institutionalized mechanism for high-tech transfer and joint production. Civil nuclear cooperation is particularly important; Russia is currently the only country building nuclear power plants in India.

However, India is concerned about Russia’s strategic coordination with China and its growing closeness to Pakistan. Moscow’s stance toward Beijing and Islamabad could lead to a new test of trust in its relations with Delhi. In the past, the Soviet Union was India’s primary supplier of arms, economic partner, and political supporter. Article 9 of the 1971 agreement provided India with a security umbrella against the U.S., China, and Pakistan.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Article 9 was abolished, and India-Russia relations became more normal and less guaranteed. Putin rebuilt the “special strategic partnership” label and has maintained strong defense ties for 25 years. The Indian armed forces remain heavily reliant on inexpensive, reliable, and powerful Russian weapons. However, the war in Ukraine has weakened Russia, brought it closer to China, and complicated India’s relations with the West. Delhi is now caught between needing Russian weapons and oil and needing Western support against Beijing. In a sense, Putin’s December visit was aimed at striking this balance and avoiding being crushed by sanctions or Russia’s war.

Today and tomorrow

Delhi’s enduring relationship with Russia is based on three critical pillars. First, defense has always formed the bedrock of the bilateral relationship. Despite Delhi’s recent efforts toward diversification and indigenous production, Moscow remains India’s primary military hardware supplier. Approximately 60-70 percent of India’s current military inventory is Russian or Soviet-made, ranging from fighter jets to submarines and tanks. High-level political engagement is required to ensure the continuous supply of spare parts, modernization, and maintenance support, all of which are vital for operational readiness.

Consequently, Russia still accounts for approximately 45% of India’s defense exports. Putin’s visit in December was significant in that there was a shift in defense policy from “just buy” to “produce together in India,” though Russia will retain veto power over many exports and core technologies. Putin’s visit further solidified Russia’s role as India’s long-term supplier of oil, fertilizers, critical minerals, nuclear reactors, and access to the Arctic. Despite Trump’s objections, Russia has guaranteed India an “uninterrupted” supply of oil and fuel. Fertilizers and energy are the most pressing issues; without them, Indian farmers and industries would suffer. Therefore, Delhi will not abandon Moscow.

Before 1991, India operated a socialist-style planned economy. Russia (the Soviet Union) was a natural partner because it had the same model and was India’s largest trading partner. When India transitioned to a market economy in 1991, Russia collapsed and experienced economic decline, resulting in the severing of economic ties, though defense ties remained strong. After 1991, Delhi’s real economic partners became Western countries. Moscow itself wanted the West, not India. The post-Ukraine war increase in trade was not real. However, Putin’s December visit reshaped the trade dynamics between the two countries, making the economy a central focus.

The India-Russia Economic Cooperation Program aims to reach an annual trade value of $100 billion by 2030. The two countries are also making progress on a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union. They are also establishing alternative currency channels using the rupee and the ruble to facilitate trade outside of Western control. Using national currencies for payments will facilitate greater exports from India to Russia. There is a substantial trade imbalance between the two countries. India needs to increase its exports to Russia; otherwise, the rupee pile will become problematic.

I

n conflict zones, some of the most enduring damage is unseen.

Although Kashmir is widely discussed in terms of territorial contestation in conventional political analysis, there is surprisingly little focus on how sustained exposure to conflict, violence, and systemic uncertainty influences everyday experiences, social behavior, and expression. Even after the headlines fade, these effects continue to shape how people live, think, and relate to their surroundings.

Restricted access to data and the risks associated with open communication in a tightly controlled environment severely limit research. The conditions necessary for systematic study are difficult to secure; therefore, empirical research on vital issues in Kashmir remains scarce.

However, it is critical to understand Kashmiris as subjects with agency whose responses reflect adaptive and strategic navigation within a highly constrained and closely monitored environment.

In regions marked by sustained instability, the essential foundations of childhood development are destabilized. Children are deprived of emotional security, access to stable social networks, physical protection, and a sustained sense of safety. Political instability frequently results in prolonged school closures, sometimes lasting entire semesters. Consequently, students have sometimes been promoted en masse despite prolonged interruptions to classroom instruction. During these periods, online education has not consistently served as a viable alternative, largely due to recurring internet shutdowns.

Setbacks and long-term effects

Children who are socialized in contexts of chronic insecurity and surveillance experience learning setbacks and are at risk of enduring behavioral, emotional regulatory, social trust, and political consciousness effects as adults. Hypervigilance and hypersensitivity often develop from an early age. In such conditions, children may remain in a persistent state of alertness or “fight mode,” where anger, irritability, and aggression mask underlying feelings of sadness and social isolation.

For many, silence is internalized early on, leading to self-censorship. Children observe and learn which questions lead to tension, which topics are avoided in gatherings, and which words are never spoken aloud.

This internalization of restraint develops into a broader psychological condition resembling learned helplessness with features of duality. Repeated exposure to uncontrollable loss, surveillance, or instability teaches individuals that their actions rarely alter outcomes. Taking action becomes risky, even futile. In such contexts, avoiding harm, adapting, not drawing attention, and survival become ways of life.

A scarcity mindset

Over the course of many decades of uncertainty and disruption, many Kashmiri households developed what psychologists describe as a scarcity mindset: A survival-oriented approach to resources shaped by prolonged instability. This mindset often manifests in everyday practices, such as stocking essential items for extended periods. In many Kashmiri households, for example, staple foods like rice are purchased in large quantities and stored for years as a rational adaptation to chronic uncertainty.

This mindset also extends into other areas of personal and social life. For example, communal solidarity in Kashmir is most visibly activated during moments of loss. Entire neighborhoods come together in times of grief. However, the same intensity of togetherness is largely absent during moments of joy or personal success. Successes tend to be shared quietly and are often prefaced with accounts of hardship, health concerns, or struggles that bear little direct relation to the joy being expressed.

Overt expression of joy seems discordant in contexts where loss is common. Thus, restraint and self-regulation become adaptive mechanisms of collective survival. This is one of the many unspoken social understandings: Visibility is risky.

Constant negotiation has produced a form of social “conflict correctness,” in which maintaining harmony and avoiding discomfort take precedence over direct expression.

The paradox of hospitality and hunger

Duality is deeply ingrained in Kashmiri social life. People often communicate guardedly, carefully calibrating what they say, to whom, and in what setting. Consequently, it can be challenging to discern sincerity from strategic restraint. However, it is important to understand that this is not due to an absence of honesty; caution is ingrained in Kashmiri society as a survival mechanism. This pattern can be seen extending into intimate spaces, such as the dinner table, if studied.

Kashmiri culture places immense value on hospitality. Yet, accepting food, expressing hunger, or stating personal preferences is often deferred or declined unless repeatedly insisted upon and often accompanied by emotional appeals or promises. If not confronted or engaged, this adaptive caution runs the risk of becoming a permanent psychological trait over the years.

Parents who are raising children while experiencing chronic stress often do so from a place of unresolved fear and grief. In households where loss or disappearance has altered family structures, caregiving roles are often reorganized. Widows and half-widows, in particular, take on a disproportionate amount of emotional and social responsibilities. This places them at the center of the intergenerational transmission of fear, resilience, and restraint.

For young people already living in a state of learned helplessness, the growing infiltration of drugs into Kashmiri society now fills the void left by the absence of meaningful work. Substance use often functions as a form of escapism. Interestingly, this coincides with agendas of weakening collective resistance and social cohesion.

E

ach region has its own particularities. South Asia, for instance, is largely dominated by India. Any planning that ignores Delhi’s supremacy would be unrealistic. In a military context, the defence ecosystems of the countries in the region are fragile and remain in India’s shadow, with Pakistan being a partial exception. However, there is also significant dependency on Russia, China and the West.

Nevertheless, the search for multipolarity in world politics, brought about by upheavals in the international system, has also prompted countries to protect themselves from risk. Middle powers are now resisting having their destinies determined for them, instead seeking to determine them themselves. This creates opportunities for new partners who can respond to this quest. This is precisely the new reality of the quest for a multipolar world.

Although China remains Bangladesh’s primary military supporter, Dhaka is also seeking to increase Turkey’s involvement in South Asian geopolitics. This would enable Turkey to access the Bangladeshi defence market and gradually undermine China’s near-monopoly on Dhaka’s military supply.

Therefore, this pursuit has the potential to reshape regional dynamics. Discussions regarding the potential sale of Turkey’s HİSAR O+ and SİPER medium- and long-range surface-to-air missile systems to Bangladesh have raised concerns in India. India currently exercises strategic control over the Bay of Bengal and its eastern border, and is concerned that its air superiority on the eastern front may be diminished. While Dhaka’s acquisition of Turkish air defence technology does not match the reach of India’s Russian S-400 systems, it will provide Dhaka with a credible deterrent and complicate regional air planning near sensitive border areas. This could potentially reshape the balance of air defence capabilities in South Asia, where Russian systems currently dominate.

While India may not believe that the qualitative and quantitative superiority of its armed forces in the region can be questioned, it is aware that its strategic comfort could be disrupted. While Delhi is accustomed to managing Chinese influence in the region, the defence industry export initiatives of Turkey — a strong NATO member with an independent stance that aims to expand its influence in the Indo-Pacific with its ‘Asia Anew’ policy — represent a new situation for India. Turkey offers NATO-standard technology and takes a warm approach to issues such as technology sharing and joint production, imposing fewer conditions than its alternatives.

Turkish defense influence in South Asia

While it is natural for Delhi not to consider its supremacy to be in question, the limits of its influence have been firmly questioned by even its closest neighbours for some time now. Last year, relations between India and Bangladesh became strained following the fall of the Indian-backed government amid protests in Bangladesh, and after Delhi hosted ousted Prime Minister Hasina, who had sought refuge in India and was recently sentenced to death in absentia.

Turkey–India relations have generally progressed cautiously due to the misconception of viewing them through a Pakistani lens. However, they have improved in recent years, particularly since Ankara’s diplomatic support for Islamabad during Operation Sindoor and Delhi’s subsequent show of solidarity with actors with whom Ankara has had friction in the region, such as the Greek Cypriot Administration, Greece, and Armenia. This is based on the unfounded claim that Ankara disapproves of these actors, with an eye for retaliation or tit-for-tat.

In this context, India accuses Bangladesh’s Yunus-led caretaker government of facilitating the resurgence of Islamist political forces and strengthening ties with Turkey. From this perspective, Bangladesh’s potential as Turkey’s next key partner in South Asia, similar to Pakistan, is unsettling for India.

Historically, Turkey’s foreign policy orientation has been Western-centric, limiting its outreach to more distant regions further east, such as South Asia. However, this situation has changed in recent years, particularly since the launch of the Asia Anew policy in 2019.

2025 can specifically be described as the year in which Ankara’s strategic consistency in its Asia Anew initiative converged with Bangladesh’s clear policy approach of seeking to expand its partnerships beyond traditional actors. Consequently, by 2025, Turkey–Bangladesh relations had reached a new peak, particularly evident in defence and security cooperation. While the defence rapprochement between Ankara and Dhaka is not a new development, being based on decades of institutional cooperation, it is important to note that this cooperation has manifested as a transition from an operational arms trade relationship to a comprehensive, strategically important partnership.

By incorporating at least 15 categories of Turkish military equipment, ranging from advanced rocket launchers and howitzers to Bayraktar unmanned aerial vehicles and potentially Tulpar light tanks, Bangladesh has become the fourth-largest importer of Turkish defense products since 2021, recalibrating its security policy. Bangladesh’s 2030 subsequent goal of reducing its dependence on traditional suppliers and developing domestic defense-industrial capabilities by modernizing and technologically advancing military assets aligns with Turkey’s Asia Anew initiative.

Turkey’s role in Bangladesh’s defense transformation

Turkey’s involvement in Bangladesh’s defense transformation began in the late 1970s and 1980s with the provision of military training to the Bangladesh Navy and Army. This role expanded significantly in the 2010s. This expansion is evident in the scale of supplies, repairs and logistical support, as well as joint production and industrial cooperation.

Important examples of the supply scale include Otokar Cobra light armored vehicles, guided missile frigates and the TRG-300 Kaplan medium-range missile system. Turkish personnel have also been training Bangladeshi military personnel on the system within the country. Turkish assistance has also extended to repairing Bangladeshi navy ships damaged in the Beirut port explosion in 2020. This has been followed by further steps, including establishing a production line for artillery shells at Bangladeshi ammunition factories, efforts to establish defense industry zones in Chittagong and Narayanganj, and forming a bilateral Defense Industry Working Group. Last year also saw the Turkish naval corvette TCG Kınalıada (F-514) make a goodwill visit to Chattogram Port to celebrate 50 years of diplomatic relations and signal greater maritime engagement.

Turkey is also institutionalizing cooperation in counter-terrorism, cybercrime, counter-narcotics operations and intelligence sharing. It is supporting the development of the capacities of the Bangladesh police, border guards, coast guard and paramilitary forces. It is also providing humanitarian and technical support for the repatriation of Rohingya refugees, including the reopening of the field hospital in Bhasan Char.

India’s concerns

In 2025, high-level discussions were held regarding the supply of Turkish-made combat UAVs and opportunities for joint UAV production, as well as the supply of Turkish-made HİSAR O+ medium-range and SİPER long-range air defense systems to Bangladesh. Some commentators in the region suggested that these discussions indicated a shift in strategic balances in South Asia that would cause India strategic headaches.

For Delhi, this may not be a routine arms deal. It could signal that Dhaka is diversifying its defense partners and breaking the old regional monopoly. This time, however, the supplier is Turkey, a powerful NATO country that is expanding its strategic presence right next to India’s troubled eastern flank, rather than China, with which Delhi has experience. This makes Delhi feel that its neighborhood diplomacy is facing a new, high-tech challenge.

For Bangladesh, the instability of its neighbor Myanmar is a serious problem and the frequent violation of its airspace and borders naturally compels Dhaka to demonstrate a strong defense capability. However, balancing the strategic asymmetry with India is also an important consideration for Dhaka.

Dhaka’s efforts to diversify its defense partnerships — with the aim of reducing excessive dependence on Chinese and Russian systems, and ensuring interoperability with Western hardware — position Turkey as not only a supplier, but also a long-term partner in Bangladesh’s evolving security environment. This is a direct response to Ankara’s goal of expanding its defence exports beyond traditional markets in the Middle East and North Africa, and of strengthening its role as a rising global defence exporter that can compete with Russian and Western counterparts without political constraints by offering affordable, ITAR-exempt systems. Bangladesh’s Ambassador to Turkey, Amanul Haq, emphasized in his statement to the Bangladeshi media that the developing cooperation with Ankara on defense is providing Dhaka’s armed forces with NATO-standard interoperability.

T

he Pakistan Navy expects its first Chinese-designed submarine to enter active service in 2026, the country’s top naval commander has said, marking a major step in a $5 billion arms deal that underscores Beijing’s growing military partnership with Islamabad and its ambitions to project power into the Indian Ocean.

Admiral Naveed Ashraf told China’s state-run Global Times that the delivery of eight Hangor-class submarines, agreed under a landmark contract with Beijing, was “progressing smoothly.” The first of the diesel-electric attack vessels is scheduled to join Pakistan’s fleet next year, while the remainder are due to be operational by 2028.

Ashraf said the new submarines would significantly enhance Pakistan’s capacity to patrol the North Arabian Sea and safeguard sea lanes stretching toward the Middle East, a region of strategic importance for both countries. “Chinese-origin platforms and equipment have been reliable, technologically advanced, and well-suited to Pakistan Navy’s operational requirements,” he said.

The admiral added that as modern warfare evolves, Pakistan was increasingly focused on “emerging technologies such as unmanned systems, artificial intelligence and advanced electronic warfare,” and would seek closer collaboration with China in these fields.

Deepening defense partnership

Under the agreement, the first four submarines are being constructed in China, while the remaining four will be built in Pakistan, a move aimed at transferring technical know-how and expanding local shipbuilding capability. Three of the vessels have already been launched into China’s Yangtze River from a shipyard in Hubei province, Chinese media reported.

The Hangor-class submarines, based on China’s Type-039A Yuan-class design, are diesel-electric powered and capable of carrying a variety of torpedoes and anti-ship missiles. They will form the backbone of Pakistan’s naval modernization drive as it seeks to counter India’s expanding maritime power.

Islamabad’s submarine program is part of a wider $5 billion arms procurement and defense cooperation package with Beijing. Over the past decade, China has become Pakistan’s dominant military supplier, accounting for more than 60% of its weapons imports between 2020 and 2024, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

“This cooperation goes beyond hardware; it reflects a shared strategic outlook, mutual trust, and a long-standing partnership,” Ashraf said, emphasizing that the Pakistan-China defense relationship was entering a new phase of “industrial collaboration, training, and research.”

Strategic implications for the region

Analysts say the deal is likely to tilt the naval balance of power in the Indian Ocean, where India, Pakistan’s nuclear-armed rival, has steadily upgraded its fleet with Russian, French and indigenous submarines. India currently operates three nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and multiple classes of conventional submarines.

“Beijing’s delivery of advanced submarines to Pakistan gives China another foothold in the Indian Ocean, where it already has a base in Djibouti and growing access to ports along key maritime routes,” said Collin Koh, a naval expert at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. “For Islamabad, the partnership offers a crucial technological edge at a time of intensifying rivalry with India.”

The timing of the submarine rollout also aligns with Beijing’s broader ambitions to extend its reach westward through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) — a $60 billion infrastructure network that connects China’s western Xinjiang province to Pakistan’s deep-water port at Gwadar.

Economic corridor and power projection

Stretching roughly 3,000 kilometers (1,860 miles), the CPEC is a centerpiece of President Xi Jinping’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative. It provides China with a direct trade route to the Arabian Sea, allowing its energy imports from the Middle East to bypass the narrow Straits of Malacca — a maritime chokepoint between Malaysia and Indonesia that Beijing fears could be blockaded in a conflict.

Military analysts say Pakistan’s new submarine fleet will complement this corridor by giving both countries greater control over maritime approaches to Gwadar and the Arabian Sea, while expanding China’s capacity to project influence toward the Gulf region, East Africa and beyond.

“Pakistan’s submarines effectively extend China’s defensive perimeter,” said retired Pakistani naval officer Syed Hassan Rizvi. “They enhance deterrence, ensure energy route protection, and deepen the two countries’ strategic interdependence.”

I

n the global context, in recent years, almost all attention has been focused on the relations between the United States (referred to as America in the text), China, Russia and India, and what these countries are doing in international relations. In the global system, China’s rise, Russia’s visible resurgence under Vladimir Putin, and Moscow and Beijing’s pursuit of closer relations triggered America’s relative decline, prompting Washington to update its allies and its regional and global policies.

This is where India comes into play. India has emerged as the only democratic power in Asia capable of counterbalancing China’s potential hegemony. Based on this reality, the relationship Washington envisions, which superficially involves New Delhi joining the ranks of American allies, is not working out so well between the two, as India, which hands out blue beads to just about everyone, is here and there. This article provides a broad overview and summary assessment of the past, present and future of these relations.

From where to where?

Of course, this is not based on scientific evidence, but I would like to begin the article with the following words: Great friendships begin with hatred. There was once an India that had the misfortune of experiencing British colonialism, and this experience dictated that it should stay away from imperialist powers and, consequently, from the West, primarily the United States. From its independence until the 1990s, it displayed an extremely protectionist and monopolistic attitude in both its economic policy and its regional approach, pursuing a ‘monopolistic isolation’ in its neighborhood and backyard of South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.

Meanwhile, Delhi, which had a problematic and risky, volatile relationship with its long border neighbor Beijing, maintained ties with Moscow, whose domestic and foreign policy perspectives or socialist prisms appeared to be compatible with its own at the time. These ties were built on a foundation of friendship and developed upon this basis.

The changes in the global economy and world politics in the 1990s pushed India towards economic liberalization. At the same time, China’s emergence as a potential regional hegemon and its entry into the Indian Ocean region, to which India is extremely sensitive, prompted Delhi to revise its regional and global approach. The need to shed emotionalism, or more bluntly, timidity and relative strategic or monopolistic isolation, led Delhi to seek a more interconnected worldview. This orientation is most evident in its attitude towards America and the West.

ٍStrategic autonomy

However, the principle of ‘strategic autonomy’—which implies ‘not being an ally’ and ‘not being fully aligned’ in its foreign policy, alongside the time-tested friendship with Russia—appears as two important caveats in this orientation, reflecting an understanding of not completely severing ties with its essence. The third important caveat is that, although it is now referred to as a liberal economy, economic protectionism continues to a large extent.

The fundamental factor bringing India and America together was simple: the China factor. However, the main catalyst for the change in Delhi’s negative perception of America was Washington’s ‘favor’ of a civil nuclear agreement with India in the early 2000s. Since then, relations between the two countries have deepened significantly. It was as if Delhi had shed all its past perceptions. Obama declared that US-India relations would be the most special relationship of the 21st century. This rhetoric from the former American president took on a clearer form during Trump’s first term.

However, however much Delhi appears to have shed its past perceptions, I must state very clearly that distrust towards Washington has always existed and always will. Meanwhile, this distrust in the relationship also exists in America. In other words, both sides harbor a ‘strategic fear of abandonment’ towards each other in their bilateral relations. However, for Delhi, there is an additional nuance to this distrust: finding itself completely dragged along in Washington’s wake. Nevertheless, due to the impact of Trump’s first term and the general course of relations between the two countries, there was considerable sentimentality in New Delhi towards Trump’s second term. It was believed that Trump’s wrath would never be directed at them.

Turbulent times

Trump began his second term on a harsher note. The issue of reciprocal tariffs, which he first announced in April and then withdrew for a while, appeared to be a ray of hope for Delhi, which was already looking forward to Trump’s second term with emotional enthusiasm. This could divert trade away from China, which could be a ‘once-in-a-lifetime opportunity’ for Delhi, according to Indian Trade Minister Piyush Goyal. Beyond that, according to the administration in Delhi, tariffs could be a catalyst for the economic reforms India needed. After all, external shocks had triggered the country’s first wave of reforms.

August began with an external shock for Delhi, but this is not that kind of thing. Relations between the two countries, once characterized by Modi (during the Biden era) as ‘from the depths of the ocean to the heights of the sky,’ now appear to have entered a period of disruptive turbulence, and this is being done by Trump, who publicly displays a very close friendship. We now know how Trump reflects his displeasure or frustration when things don’t go his way; it’s extremely arbitrary, reckless, and even crude.

However, Delhi did not expect the same rhetoric to be directed at India, which came as a shock. He called the Indian economy a ‘dead economy’; moreover, Delhi had been busy boasting about its ‘vibrant and bright’ economy in recent years. That wasn’t enough; he described it as a country with ‘the heaviest and ugliest non-monetary trade barriers among all countries.’ That wasn’t all; it threatened further sanctions if India continued to purchase oil from Russia.

India’s shock

Delhi may be shocked by all this, but it has reacted with extreme caution and is clearly trying to maintain its cautious optimism. Optimism is always present in India-US relations. This is based on a high level of bipartisan consensus in Washington on deepening relations between the two countries. And despite everything, Delhi, which is neither America’s ally nor its enemy, maintains this unique position and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. In other words, the current period of turbulence will not change the overall course of relations. Bilateral relations are based on strategic and geopolitical foundations. So, what happened to make Trump’s anger spill over to Delhi?

The reason cited for Trump, who acted as a mediator in the Russia-Ukraine War but was unable to bring Moscow to heel, may be that India is buying Russian oil; however, let me tell you the real reason clearly: in the midst of trade negotiations between the two countries, this is a tactic by Trump or Washington to put pressure on Delhi. Washington wants protectionist India to open up more to America so that it can navigate the Indian market more easily in terms of trade and business.

In other words, Russian oil is, in a sense, an excuse or the icing on the cake. Aware of this, the Delhi government (despite facing considerable criticism from the opposition) has responded with extreme calm and caution; however, I do not expect Delhi, which is already in the process of trade negotiations with the American delegation, to show much strategic vulnerability at the end of the day, and it is highly unlikely that it will halt Russian oil purchases. If Trump continues to wield such a heavy stick or persists in playing hardball, then India will be forced to show some vulnerability, but it will still not give the U.S. everything it wants.

In fact, what Trump or America wants from India is to bring it into line, that is, to develop a kind of band wagoning relationship in the long term. However, under current conditions, this is presented not solely as a classic military alliance, but also as a package with an ‘operational’ nature aimed at protecting Washington’s interests in areas other than security, such as trade. Although the RIC forum, representing the Russia-India-China trio, or BRICS, which also includes Brazil and South Africa, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are discussed here as hedging alternatives, there is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding these issues.

C

hinese President Xi Jinping is set to host more than 20 world leaders at a high-profile regional security forum in Tianjin from August 31 to September 1, aiming to project unity among Global South nations and strengthen ties with sanctions-hit Russia amid mounting tensions with the United States.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit will mark the largest gathering since the bloc’s founding in 2001. Leaders from Central Asia, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia have been invited, with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi among the most prominent attendees.

The event comes at a time of deep geopolitical flux and shifting alliances, as countries seek to navigate between U.S.-led pressure and Beijing’s expanding influence.

Modi’s first visit to China in 7 years

One of the key moments of the summit will be Modi’s first visit to China in more than seven years. The Indian leader is expected to meet Xi on the sidelines to advance a fragile détente following deadly border clashes between the two countries in 2020.

Modi last appeared on the same stage as Xi and Putin during the 2024 BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. Since then, India has faced renewed tariff pressure from the U.S. administration of Donald Trump, while seeking to stabilize ties with Beijing in the face of broader regional competition.

“It’s likely that New Delhi will swallow their pride and put this year’s SCO problems behind them in a bid to maintain momentum in the détente with China, which is a key Modi priority right now,” said Eric Olander, editor-in-chief of The China-Global South Project.

Optics over outcomes

While the summit is being framed as a major step toward building a “new type of international relations,” analysts caution that the SCO has historically struggled to translate its convening power into concrete policy action.

“What is the precise vision that the SCO represents and its practical implementation are rather fuzzy. It is a platform that has increasing convening power, which helps in narrative projection,” said Manoj Kewalramani, chairperson of the Indo-Pacific Research Programme at the Takshashila Institution in Bangalore.

The bloc, which started as a security-focused group of six Eurasian nations, has expanded to 10 permanent members and 16 dialogue and observer countries. Its agenda now includes economic and military cooperation, though its impact on substantive security challenges remains limited.

Frictions within the organization persist, particularly between India and Pakistan. A June SCO defense ministers’ meeting failed to adopt a joint statement after India objected to omissions regarding an April 22 attack on Hindu tourists in Indian Kashmir, which sparked the worst cross-border fighting in decades.

New Delhi also refused to join an earlier SCO condemnation of Israeli attacks on Iran, another member state, reflecting the bloc’s internal divisions.

Russia’s diplomatic coup

For Russia, the summit offers another chance to break its diplomatic isolation following the war in Ukraine. Putin, shunned by many Western leaders, will share the stage with Xi and Modi in a highly symbolic demonstration of his remaining partnerships.

“Xi will want to use the summit as an opportunity to showcase what a post-American-led international order begins to look like and that all White House efforts since January to counter China, Iran, Russia, and now India have not had the intended effect,” said Olander.

Putin will remain in China after the summit to attend a World War Two military parade in Beijing, marking an unusually extended stay outside of Russia.

India’s priorities at the SCO include trade, connectivity, respect for sovereignty, and territorial integrity, according to Indian foreign ministry official Tanmaya Lal. Analysts expect incremental announcements on troop withdrawals from disputed border regions, easing of trade and visa restrictions, and new cooperation initiatives in areas such as climate policy.

“Despite the lack of substantive policy announcements expected at the summit, experts warn that the bloc’s appeal to Global South countries should not be underestimated,” said Kewalramani.

C

hina’s top diplomat Wang Yi will arrive in Pakistan on Wednesday, August 20, 2025 for a three-day visit to hold high-level talks with Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, as the two long-time allies seek to strengthen political, economic, and security cooperation amid shifting regional dynamics.

The visit, announced Tuesday by Beijing and Islamabad, will mark the sixth round of the China-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, a platform both countries have used to align their foreign policy priorities and advance joint projects.

“China and Pakistan are iron-clad and all-weather friends,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning told reporters in Beijing, emphasizing that the talks would focus on expanding “practical cooperation” in areas ranging from infrastructure to defense.

Beijing’s balancing act

Wang’s trip to Islamabad comes immediately after his two-day visit to India, where relations remain tense over a disputed Himalayan border and New Delhi’s growing strategic alignment with the United States. Analysts say the back-to-back visits underscore Beijing’s balancing act in South Asia, where it seeks to manage rivalry with India while bolstering its “all-weather partnership” with Pakistan.

During his stay, Wang is also expected to meet with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and President Asif Ali Zardari. Discussions are likely to include progress on the $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project under Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative that connects China’s Xinjiang province to the Arabian Sea via Gwadar port in Balochistan.

CPEC has been hailed by both sides as a “game changer” for Pakistan’s economy, but it has also faced delays, security challenges, and growing scrutiny from international lenders. Islamabad is eager to secure further Chinese investment as it struggles with a fragile recovery from last year’s balance-of-payments crisis.

$23 billion in trade

In 2024, bilateral trade between China and Pakistan surpassed $23 billion, making Beijing Islamabad’s largest trading partner. China is also Pakistan’s leading supplier of arms, including fighter jets, drones, and naval equipment, reinforcing deep defense ties that have spanned decades.

Security is expected to feature prominently in the dialogue. Pakistan continues to face militant attacks targeting Chinese nationals and CPEC infrastructure, prompting Beijing to demand stronger guarantees for the safety of its citizens working in the country. For Islamabad, continued Chinese backing is crucial, especially as relations with Washington remain cautious and aid flows have declined.

Regional geopolitics add further weight to Wang’s visit. With the U.S. recalibrating its role in South Asia and India moving closer to Western partners through initiatives like the Quad, Beijing and Islamabad appear determined to present a united front. “This dialogue will signal that the China-Pakistan partnership remains resilient and central to Beijing’s South Asia strategy,” said Islamabad-based analyst Ayesha Siddiqa.

The last round of the China-Pakistan strategic dialogue was held in Beijing in 2021. Since then, Pakistan has seen political upheaval, economic turbulence, and security challenges, making the upcoming talks an important test of how both countries will adapt their long-standing partnership to new realities.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

Relations between India and Pakistan—long shaped by historical rivalries and persistent conflict—are now teetering on the brink of a fresh crisis. On April 22, 2025, a deadly terrorist attack in the Baisaran Valley near Pahalgam, in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, claimed the lives of 26 civilians. The attack, the deadliest since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, has reignited debate across India over long-standing issues such as the Kashmir conflict, cross-border terrorism, and nuclear brinkmanship.

Claimed by the Resistance Front (TRF), a group that emerged in 2019 in response to India’s Kashmir policies, the attack has once again placed Pakistan-India relations at the center of global scrutiny. India swiftly blamed Pakistan, accusing it of supporting cross-border terrorism. Pakistan, in turn, denied involvement and called for an international, independent investigation.

India’s reaction was multifaceted—diplomatic, economic, and strategic. Most notably, it announced the suspension of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, signed under World Bank auspices, and revoked visas issued to Pakistani nationals. Furthermore, India imposed a complete ban on imports from Pakistan, effectively freezing what little bilateral trade remained.

Pakistan, while rejecting the terrorism allegations, emphasized the need for a transparent, international investigation and urged global institutions to intervene. In response to India’s sanctions, Islamabad implemented symbolic countermeasures and declared its intention to suspend all bilateral agreements with India, including the 1971 Simla Agreement, which has long shaped India-Pakistan diplomacy.

Historical Echoes in a Modern Crisis

This latest round of hostilities bears the unmistakable imprint of history. The Kashmir dispute remains the epicenter of tensions, echoing the unresolved legacies of partition. Pakistan continues to advocate for Kashmir’s right to self-determination and insists the conflict is international in nature. India, however, treats Kashmir as a purely internal issue and frames all discourse about it as a matter of national security.

India’s strategy of blaming Pakistan for every major incident in Kashmir reinforces its longstanding narrative: Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism. This pattern—repeating in 2001, 2008, 2019, and now 2025—illustrates the historical continuity of arguments used by both sides. However, what sets this crisis apart is the mutual suspension of two foundational agreements: the Indus Waters Treaty and the Simla Agreement.

These developments raise the specter of renewed disputes over vital issues such as water resource sharing, the status of the Line of Control (LoC), and the internationalization of the Kashmir issue—topics that had, until now, been largely settled or frozen.

The Root Cause: Kashmir

The ideological and structural tensions between India and Pakistan have persisted since the 1947 Partition. Central to this divide are identity-based narratives and the Kashmir question. Pakistan’s founding ideology—the Two-Nation Theory—underpins its position. In the wake of the April 2025 attack, Pakistan’s National Security Committee cited the incident as further validation of the Two-Nation Theory’s relevance.

For both nations, Kashmir represents more than just territory—it is an existential concern. This has led to multiple wars (1947, 1965, 1971, 1999) and numerous skirmishes. Since the 2000s, the discourse has evolved to focus on terrorism and counterterrorism, with India accusing Pakistan of supporting armed insurgents in Kashmir.

Key turning points like the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the 2019 Pulwama bombing have hardened India’s stance. Pakistan, meanwhile, maintains it merely supports Kashmiris’ right to self-determination.

India’s 2019 decision to revoke Article 370 of its Constitution—which had granted special autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir—further inflamed tensions. This move not only altered the region’s demographic dynamics but also underlined India’s insistence that the issue lies solely within its sovereign purview. However, this unilateral action has fueled demands for legal reforms and reignited grievances among the region’s Muslim-majority population.

Diplomatic Bridges in Limbo: Indus Waters and Simla Agreements

The fact that two nuclear powers are once again clashing over Kashmir raises urgent questions about regional stability. This time, the stakes are higher. India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, originally signed in 1960, could have far-reaching consequences.

The treaty allocated usage rights of eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India and western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan. As over 80% of Pakistan’s water supply relies on these western rivers, the treaty has been a lifeline for its agricultural economy and energy needs. As the upper riparian, India had been constrained from using water as a strategic weapon—until now.

Pakistan has warned that India’s withdrawal could be considered an act of war, underlining the treaty’s significance for its national security and food sovereignty.

In response, Pakistan has announced it will suspend the Simla Agreement 1971, which committed both countries to resolve all disputes bilaterally and peacefully. The Simla Agreement effectively prevented third-party intervention in Kashmir, favoring direct dialogue. India has historically used it to avoid internationalizing the Kashmir issue, while Pakistan has seen it as a path to maintain diplomatic engagement and avoid military escalation.

Another vital clause in the Simla Agreement defines the Line of Control (LoC), the de facto border in Kashmir. Though repeatedly violated, the LoC remains a critical buffer. Suspending the agreement may open new disputes about the legitimacy and control of this volatile frontier.

A Crisis Beyond Borders

The India-Pakistan conflict continues to be shaped by long-standing identity-based divisions and unresolved historical grievances. The April 2025 terrorist attack has not only reignited old hostilities but introduced new risks by dismantling key diplomatic safeguards.

With the Indus Waters Treaty and Simla Agreement effectively suspended, the crisis risks spilling into broader domains: water security, cross-border diplomacy, and international law. The specter of weaponized water and the disappearance of a legal framework governing the LoC make this moment particularly dangerous.

India’s emphasis on internal security and Pakistan’s push for internationalization reflect deeply rooted policy approaches. This confrontation, therefore, can be read as an updated version of a recurring pattern—but with higher stakes.

Given both nations’ nuclear capabilities, the ramifications of continued escalation are not just regional, but potentially global. As we advance, international actors and diplomatic channels must intervene and de-escalate tensions. Otherwise, the collapse of foundational agreements could open the door to unpredictable and potentially catastrophic outcomes—not just for India and Pakistan, but for all of South Asia.

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ndia has recently put into effect a citizenship law that has drawn widespread criticism for its exclusion of Muslims, marking a significant development under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Hindu nationalist government. The law, announced on Monday, establishes a religious criterion for migrants from major South Asian faiths, effectively excluding Islam. Here’s a breakdown of what this means and why it’s stirring controversy.

The Citizenship Amendment Act provides an expedited path to citizenship for migrants belonging to Hindu, Parsi, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, and Christian communities who fled Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan before December 31, 2014. Notably, it excludes Muslims, who form a majority in these nations. This law, which is the first of its kind in India, sets a religious standard for citizenship in a country known for its religious diversity.

The implementation of this law has been met with widespread backlash and protests, particularly from India’s Muslim community and its supporters. The legislation was passed by Parliament in 2019 but was delayed following deadly protests. Critics argue that the law undermines India’s secular foundation and could be used in conjunction with proposed citizenship registries to marginalize Muslims.

International concern and domestic response

The United States has expressed concern over the law’s implementation and emphasized the importance of religious freedom and equal treatment under the law for all communities. Meanwhile, within India, opposition parties, rights groups, and minority communities have vehemently opposed the law, labeling it exclusionary and unconstitutional.

India’s Muslims, who constitute a significant minority within the country, have voiced concerns over the law’s discriminatory nature and its potential to further marginalize their community. Critics accuse Prime Minister Modi of advancing a Hindu nationalist agenda that threatens India’s secular fabric and fosters intolerance towards religious minorities. Modi’s government has faced criticism for its handling of anti-Muslim violence and its perceived alignment with Hindu nationalist sentiments.

Exclusion of Muslims

The Citizenship Amendment Act offers an expedited pathway to citizenship for Hindus, Parsis, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and Christians who sought refuge in India, primarily from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, up to December 31, 2014. Notably, this legislation excludes Muslims, who constitute the majority population in all three countries.

Furthermore, the act revises the previous law that prohibited illegal migrants from attaining Indian citizenship. This marks a significant departure for India, which is officially a secular state with a population characterized by religious diversity, as it introduces religious qualifications for citizenship for the first time.

As India grapples with the implications of this controversial citizenship law, tensions between religious communities and political factions are expected to persist. The law’s implementation reflects broader debates over secularism, nationalism, and religious identity in one of the world’s most populous democracies.

The impact of India’s citizenship law will continue to shape discussions on human rights, religious freedom, and the future of democracy in the region.

Source: The Associated Press

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n response to escalating tensions with the Maldives, India has announced plans for a new naval base named INS Jatayu, to be located on Minicoy, the southernmost island in the Lakshadweep archipelago. The move comes as relations between New Delhi and the Maldives have strained, with geopolitical considerations and recent diplomatic incidents contributing to the frictions.

The Indian Navy disclosed its intention to construct the naval base on Saturday, situated approximately 130 kilometers (80 miles) north of the Maldives. The Lakshadweep islands have assumed strategic significance for India, and the new base aims to enhance operational reach, focusing on anti-piracy and anti-narcotics operations in the Western Arabian Sea.

“The base will also augment Indian Navy’s capability as the first responder in the region and augment connectivity with the mainland,” stated the Indian Navy in its official statement. The move aligns with India’s policy to incrementally bolster security infrastructure in strategically vital locations.

Response to tensions

Tensions between India and the Maldives have intensified since President Mohamed Muizzu assumed power last year. His visit to China before India and statements emphasizing Maldives’ sovereignty drew attention, leading to increased scrutiny of the bilateral relationship.

In response to derogatory posts about Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi made by three Maldives deputy ministers, there were calls for a tourist boycott of the Maldives on Indian social media. The ministers were subsequently suspended.

The latest move follows Muizzu’s request to replace Indian military personnel in the Maldives with civilian technical staff. Approximately 75 Indian military personnel are stationed in the Maldives, operating humanitarian service planes that conduct medical evacuations and provide assistance to remote islands.

Incremental security measures

The announcement of INS Jatayu underscores India’s commitment to enhancing its military presence in the Indian Ocean region. The Lakshadweep islands have strategic importance due to their proximity to crucial sea routes, making them pivotal in the country’s maritime security strategy.

As India pursues the establishment of the new naval base, the geopolitical dynamics in the Indian Ocean region are likely to draw continued attention. The move reflects a proactive approach by India to safeguard its interests and respond to evolving regional challenges.

Source: The Associated Press

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ndia’s ambitious plans to position itself as a major smartphone export hub are under threat, with Deputy IT Minister Rajeev Chandrasekhar sounding the alarm on the urgency to lower tariffs. Government documents reveal growing fears that India may lose ground to competitors such as China and Vietnam in the fiercely contested smartphone export race.

India’s smartphone manufacturing, a key element of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s economic agenda, has seen impressive growth, attracting global giants like Apple, Foxconn, and Samsung. However, concerns are now being raised about the impact of high tariffs, which some argue act as a deterrent for companies seeking to diversify their supply chains beyond China.

Deputy IT Minister Chandrasekhar, in documents addressed to Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, expressed deep concerns about India’s competitiveness due to uncompetitive tariffs. He stressed the need for immediate action to prevent a potential shift of supply chains to countries like Vietnam, Mexico, and Thailand.

Geopolitical realignment and urgency:

Highlighting the ongoing geopolitical realignment and the resultant relocation of supply chains from China, Chandrasekhar emphasized the need for swift action. He warned that delays in addressing tariff concerns could lead to India losing out to more competitive destinations.

While financial incentives have fueled the growth of smartphone production in India, the Deputy IT Minister acknowledged that high tariffs pose a challenge. The country’s success, he noted, is due in large part to these incentives, but he urged a shift in tariff policies to align with the nation’s export ambitions.

India’s export rates for smartphones stood at 25% in 2023, a fraction of China’s 63% and Vietnam’s staggering 95%. The Deputy IT Minister’s documents underscored the need for India to match China and surpass Vietnam in terms of competitive tariffs to secure global supply chains.

Budgetary implications

Chandrasekhar’s documents were submitted as part of a lobbying effort for lower tariffs in the annual budget. While some component taxes saw reductions, other requested tariff cuts were not implemented. The minister called for a shift in tariff policy to accommodate India’s evolving export ambitions.

With India’s domestic smartphone market nearing saturation, the focus is shifting towards exports. The government aims to account for 25% of global electronics manufacturing by 2029, but the official documents revealed that India’s current stake is just 4%. The urgency to revise tariff policies is seen as critical to attracting foreign investments and ensuring competitiveness in the global smartphone manufacturing landscape.

As India stands at a crossroads in its pursuit of becoming a smartphone export powerhouse, the government faces the challenge of balancing financial incentives with competitive tariffs to secure its position on the global stage. The decisions made in the upcoming budget could shape India’s role in the highly competitive smartphone manufacturing sector.

Source: Reuters

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or decades, India has strategically concentrated its defense efforts on land borders, particularly with neighboring rivals Pakistan and China. However, a shift in India’s global ambitions is now evident as the country begins to assert its naval power in international waters. This newfound focus includes active participation in anti-piracy patrols and a well-publicized naval deployment close to the Red Sea, aimed at safeguarding ships during Israel’s conflict with Hamas.

In a significant move, India dispatched three guided-missile destroyers and reconnaissance aircraft in November in response to Yemen-based Houthi rebels targeting ships in solidarity with Hamas. This disruption impacted a crucial trading route responsible for handling approximately 12% of global trade. The deployment showcased India as a “proactive contributor” to international maritime stability, according to Vice Adm. Anil Kumar Chawla, the former head of India’s southern naval command.

Chawla emphasized the strategic importance of maritime power, stating, “Unless you are a maritime power, you can never aspire to be a global power.” India, already a regional powerhouse, is now positioning itself as a “global player” with expanding maritime ambitions, seeking to project influence and stability on the international stage.

A clear message to regional rival China

India’s naval engagements have not gone unnoticed, as the country actively publicizes its deployments, signaling a desire to assume a more significant role in maritime security. This also serves as a clear message to regional rival China, showcasing India’s capability to deploy a formidable naval force in its vicinity.

The Indian Navy’s involvement has extended beyond mere displays of strength, actively assisting ships under threat. It aided at least four ships attacked by Houthi rebels and responded to a drone attack on a U.S.-owned merchant vessel. This underscores India’s commitment to maintaining maritime security, a shift that Darshana M. Baruah, a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, acknowledges is a new dimension in India’s foreign policy engagements.

The growing competition with China plays a pivotal role in India’s maritime endeavors. China has steadily increased its presence in the Indian Ocean, a critical route for its energy supplies, boasting the world’s largest navy. Beijing’s deepening engagement in the Indian Ocean through infrastructure deals with India’s neighbors has prompted India to bolster its naval capabilities.

The need to counterbalance China

Lt. Gen. D. S. Hooda, a former Indian military officer and strategic expert, notes that India doesn’t have an option but to build up its naval capabilities in response to China’s expanding presence. India’s maritime initiatives are energized by the need to counterbalance China, leading to investments in advanced ships, submarines, aircraft, and technology infrastructure. The navy’s share of India’s defense budget has increased to 19%, reflecting a strategic shift.

The Indian Navy has also forged strategic partnerships through joint exercises with nations in the region and beyond. As part of the Quad alliance, comprising India, the U.S., Australia, and Japan, India actively participates in drills to counter China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific. The South China Sea remains a top concern for Indian naval planners, with about 60% of India’s cargo passing through shipping lanes in the region dominated by Beijing.

Over the years, China has significantly expanded its presence in the Indian Ocean, a crucial route for its energy supply chain. Boasting the world’s largest navy, with a fleet size exceeding three times that of the Indian navy, China has also developed a formidable fleet of large coast guard ships. Additionally, it operates a maritime militia, consisting of fishing vessels, which collaborates with the coast guard to assert territorial claims in the contested South China Sea.

China’s deepening involvement in the Indian Ocean is primarily facilitated through infrastructure deals with India’s neighboring countries, including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and most recently, the Maldives. Lt. Gen. D. S. Hooda, a former Indian military officer turned strategic expert, notes the Chinese pursuit of more naval bases in the extended Indian Ocean, prompting India to intensify its own naval capabilities.

India in the Maldives

Recent developments have raised concerns in India, notably the Maldives government granting clearance for a Chinese research ship to dock in its port. Similar Chinese vessels made port calls in Sri Lanka in 2022 and 2023, fueling Indian apprehensions about potential surveillance activities in the region. Responding to India’s concerns, Sri Lanka declared a one-year moratorium on foreign research ships entering its waters earlier this year.

The escalating competition with China serves as a catalyst for India to enhance its naval capabilities. This drive has led to increased investments in advanced ships, submarines, and aircraft, coupled with substantial allocations for technology and infrastructure development. In the burgeoning defense budget, which reached $72.6 billion last year, the navy’s share has risen to 19%, marking a notable increase from the traditional emphasis on the Indian army.

To bolster its maritime influence, the Indian navy has fostered strategic partnerships by actively participating in joint exercises with nations in the region and beyond. This collaborative approach underscores India’s commitment to navigating the evolving geopolitical landscape, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. As China expands its maritime reach, India’s strategic response involves not only strengthening its naval capabilities but also fostering alliances to maintain stability and assert its influence in the broader maritime domain.

While India’s current focus is on regional maritime stability, experts recognize the need for a maritime-oriented strategic thinking in Delhi to advance India’s geopolitical and strategic priorities globally. The evolving scenario underscores India’s aspirations to be a major player in shaping the future of international maritime security.

Source: The Associated Press

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he diplomatic landscape in the Indian Ocean region witnessed a significant development as China and the Maldives solidified their relationship through a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership. President Mohamed Muizzu’s state visit to Beijing marked a turning point in the geopolitical dynamics of the region, with the two nations signaling a commitment to enhanced collaboration across various sectors. This report delves into the implications, motivations, and potential consequences of this evolving partnership.

President Muizzu’s election in November brought forth a unique campaign narrative, distinctly characterized by the slogan “India Out.” The President, in his electoral bid, portrayed India as a threat to the Maldives’ sovereignty, challenging the influence exerted by New Delhi. Since assuming office, Muizzu’s administration has taken bold steps, including the expulsion of Indian military personnel and the pursuit of Chinese investments despite the Maldives’ considerable debt to Beijing.

Chinese President Xi Jinping, during the talks at the Great Hall of the People, referred to President Muizzu as an “old friend,” emphasizing the historic opportunity for both nations to build on their past and forge ahead into the future. The elevation of bilateral ties to a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership” sets the stage for deeper collaboration, encompassing economic, political, and infrastructure domains.

Strategic implications

The upgrading of relations between China and the Maldives holds broader strategic implications for the Indian Ocean region. The move aligns with China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative, strengthening its influence in strategically vital maritime territories. As the Maldives pivots towards China, the regional balance of power undergoes a subtle shift, echoing similar dynamics observed in neighboring countries.

The Maldives, grappling with significant public debt, finds China as its most substantial bilateral creditor. The debt, amounting to $1.37 billion, represents around 20% of the Maldives’ total public debt. Despite concerns raised by international financial institutions, the Maldives has welcomed further Chinese investments, with Chinese firms injecting an additional $1.37 billion since the Maldives joined the Belt and Road Initiative in 2014.

The strategic partnership between China and the Maldives sends ripples across the geopolitical landscape, particularly impacting regional players. India, the Maldives’ historical ally, now faces a shifting dynamic in its immediate maritime neighborhood. The Maldives’ tilt towards China mirrors trends observed in Sri Lanka, indicating China’s expanding influence in the Indian Ocean.

World bank caution and domestic challenges

While Chinese investments contribute significantly to the Maldives’ economic success, concerns have been raised by the World Bank. A development report from October warned of a potential build-up of sovereign exposure during the pandemic, coupled with a lack of domestic investment opportunities. The Maldives, according to the report, should carefully navigate its economic policies to avoid over-reliance on external partners.

President Xi expressed support for increasing direct flights between China and the Maldives, a move that could significantly benefit the Maldives’ tourism sector. With tourism contributing 79% to economic growth in 2022, the country seeks to leverage Chinese connectivity to boost its travel industry. Additionally, China’s commitment to infrastructure development aligns with the Maldives’ aspirations for economic diversification.

The strategic partnership between China and the Maldives represents a geopolitical shift with far-reaching consequences. As the Maldives reorients its diplomatic and economic ties, the regional balance of power undergoes subtle transformations. The Maldives-China axis adds complexity to an already intricate geopolitical puzzle in the Indian Ocean, demanding close attention from international observers. The future trajectory of this partnership will likely shape the geopolitical dynamics of the region in the years to come.

Source: CNBC News and Reuters

Australian journalist Antony Loewenstein’s groundbreaking book, The Palestine Laboratory: How Israel Exports the Technology of Occupation Around the World, offers a chilling exposé of Israel’s military-industrial complex and its sinister role in perfecting and exporting oppressive technologies developed through the prolonged occupation of Palestinian territories. For over half a century, the West Bank and Gaza have served as a testing ground for weaponry, surveillance tools, and control mechanisms, solidifying Israel’s position as a global leader in the military-techno complex.

Loewenstein takes readers on a riveting journey through a clandestine world, backed by secret documents, revealing interviews, and on-the-ground reporting. The book unveils, for the first time, the meticulous architecture of control that Israel has honed through surveillance, home demolitions, and brutality, evolving from the occupation of Palestinian lands. 

From the notorious Pegasus software implicated in high-profile hacks to the weapons supplied to oppressive regimes like Myanmar, Israel’s technological prowess is exposed as a driving force behind some of the world’s most brutal conflicts. A striking example is the use of Israeli drones by the EU and Frontex, battle-tested in Palestine, for surveillance and border control, particularly in response to the refugee crisis after 2015. 

The author skillfully connects the dots, illustrating how Israel’s ethno-nationalistic approach has become a global model, influencing governments such as Modi’s in India where admiration for Israel’s actions in the West Bank influences their approach in regions like Kashmir. Loewenstein highlights the alarming rise of Israel as a major player in spying technology and defense hardware, revealing the dark underbelly of its contributions to the violation of human rights on a global scale.

The book further unmasks the ruthlessness with which Israel leverages the experiences gained from an illegal occupation. It argues that Israel has successfully exported its tested technologies and methods to over 130 countries worldwide. This includes the sale of spyware, smart walls, facial recognition tools, and other tools of occupation and repression. The book serves as a stark reminder of how Israel’s oppression of Palestinians has become the cornerstone of its military and security industries.

Moreover, The Palestine Laboratory sheds light on Israel’s questionable alliances, exposing its support for despots worldwide. Over the past 50 years, the U.S. and Israel have formed close partnerships, with Israel serving as an invaluable partner in arming and training nations that the U.S. officially couldn’t support due to various restraints.

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ussia and India have achieved significant progress in discussions on jointly producing military equipment, according to statements from Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. The announcement came after talks with Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar in Moscow.

Lavrov highlighted the strategic nature of this collaboration, emphasizing its alignment with the interests of both nations and its role in ensuring security on the Eurasian continent. He acknowledged India’s desire to diversify its military hardware suppliers and expressed Moscow’s readiness to support India’s domestic manufacturing needs.

The move comes as India has become one of Russia’s core economic partners, particularly following sweeping sanctions imposed on Moscow by the West in 2022 over the conflict in Ukraine. Russia has redirected a significant portion of its oil exports to India and intensified diplomatic efforts within the BRICS group, of which both countries are founding members.

Conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza

In addition to discussing military cooperation, Lavrov and Jaishankar delved into global issues, including conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. The talks also covered bilateral trade and investment. Jaishankar expressed optimism about a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi expected to take place next year.

Indian-Russian trade is anticipated to surpass $50 billion this year, underscoring the growing economic ties between the two nations. Jaishankar emphasized India’s interest in signing a bilateral investment treaty with Russia and pursuing a free trade agreement with the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union.

The collaboration between Russia and India in military equipment production adds a new dimension to their strategic partnership. Both nations recognize the mutual benefits of such cooperation, and the development is poised to further strengthen the ties between Moscow and New Delhi​.

Putin meets with Jaishankar

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin would meet with Jaishankar later on Wednesday. Jaishankar expressed anticipation for a meeting between Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the coming year.

Jaishankar expressed India’s interest in signing a bilateral investment treaty with Russia and pursuing a free trade agreement with the Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union. The move towards joint military equipment production adds a new dimension to the strategic partnership between Russia and India, enhancing cooperation in defense and strengthening diplomatic ties.

Sources: Reuters and the Deccan Herald.

Narendra Modi is roaring to the world that India is a worthy contender on the global scene. India has come to the fore with its massive economy, recent successes at the space front, potential megaproject linking India, the Middle East and Europe via rail and sea, and playing the role of a distanced ally towards to the competing world powers: the U.S. and China.

All eyes were on the G20 summit taking place in New Delhi this year, and Modi surely wanted to make a good impression. Schools and offices were shut, roads were blocked, and street vendors were removed. Even whole slums near the venue were covered in tarpaulin! Ironically, Modi’s speeches repeatedly described India as the world’s largest democracy and the ‘voice of the Global South’.

However, behind this sterilized facade lies discrimination, oppression, and erasure— on brand with the Hindu nationalism fueled by Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Numerous attacks on minority communities sweep through the country, including demolitions of Muslim houses, mosque and church attacks, grave desecrations and violent killings. Meanwhile, the government takes every step to define India as a Hindu nation.

In this month’s book bundle, we examine how Modi’s India both oppresses and suppresses its minority citizens. Through books that explain the political dynamics in India, the impact of state-sanctioned violence, and the silencing of critical voices, we observe how the world’s largest democracy goes wrong.

In the book Modi’s India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy, Christophe Jaffrelot delves into the intricate dynamics of Indian politics over the last two decades, with a particular focus on the rise of Hindu nationalism coupled with national-populism, largely attributed to Narendra Modi’s leadership. This confluence of factors has not only secured Modi’s electoral success, starting in Gujarat and extending to the entire country but has also transformed the very nature of democracy in India.

Jaffrelot’s work spotlights Modi’s ability to captivate a significant portion of the Indian populace by offering promises of development while simultaneously exploiting ethno-religious fault lines within the electorate. This national-populism is marked by Modi’s personalized political style, characterized by direct communication with voters through various channels, effectively saturating the public discourse.

To shed light on the consequences of this political shift, Jaffrelot conducts original interviews across India, revealing a troubling evolution toward what he terms an “ethnic democracy.” In this model, the majority community is equated with the nation, while religious minorities, specifically Muslims and Christians, find themselves relegated to the status of second-class citizens, vulnerable to harassment by ‘vigilante’ groups.

Furthermore, Jaffrelot elucidates how the political landscape in India has developed authoritarian tendencies for various reasons. In its quest for power not only at the national level but also in the states, the government has centralized authority at the expense of federalism, eroding the very institutions that once served as checks and balances, including India’s Supreme Court.

In sum, Modi’s India showcases a government, supported by popular mandate, stifles dissent and grows increasingly intolerant of ethnic and religious minorities. The book provides essential insights into politics, nationalism, and populism in contemporary India.

Christophe Jaffrelot, Modi’s India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2021) ISBN: 9780691206806, 656 pages

In Composing Violence: The Limits of Exposure and the Making of Minorities, Moyukh Chatterjee examines the haunting memory of the 2002 anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat, India, where armed Hindu mobs unleashed brutal attacks on Muslims in broad daylight, resulting in a staggering death toll that shocked the nation. Chatterjee’s investigation goes beyond the horrific events themselves, aiming to dissect how such highly visible political violence against minority communities serves as a catalyst for profound transformations in the domains of law, public culture, and power dynamics.

Contrary to the expectation that exposing state-sanctioned anti-Muslim violence would lead to its suppression, Chatterjee argues that these incidents actually set the stage for a fundamental shift in India, pushing it toward a Hindu supremacist state. He contends that examining the responses of both the state and civil society to this violence offers crucial insights into the inherent features of modern democracy, where riots and pogroms become tools for molding a society defined by a vulnerable minority and a dominant majority.

Chatterjee’s exploration focuses on multiple facets, including courtroom procedures, police archives, legal activism, and mainstream media coverage. Through this multifaceted approach, he constructs a theory of violence as a form of governance, effectively engineering minority populations.

Composing Violence invites readers to grapple with the profound and unsettling implications of anti-Muslim violence in India. Chatterjee’s meticulous analysis paints a picture of how violence can shape the course of democracy, raising profound questions about the fragility of minority rights and the complex interplay between power and prejudice in contemporary societies.

Moyukh Chatterjee, Composing Violence: The Limits of Exposure and the Making of Minorities (Duke University Press, 2023) ISBN: 978-1-4780-1966-4, 184 pages

What happens to those who dare question the injustices of the Modi regime? The book How Long Can the Moon Be Caged? provides a piercing examination of the authoritarian regime under Narendra Modi in India, where the suppression of critical voices and the silencing of dissent have become central objectives for the ruling BJP party. Their ethno-nationalist aspiration of establishing an exclusively ‘Hindu’ India, involves targeting anyone who dares to voice questions or opposition.

Authors Suchitra Vijayan and Francesca Recchia present a unique perspective highlight the experiences of political prisoners. Their approach combines astute political and legal analysis with firsthand accounts, offering readers an in-depth exploration of the subtle acts of resistance that occur both within and beyond prison walls, involving not only the prisoners themselves but also their families. The narrative unravels a tale of institutional decay and the erosion of fundamental rights.

The book spotlights the stories of those who have been falsely accused of inciting the Bhima Koregaon violence, student leaders who have protested against the discriminatory citizenship law of 2020, and activists associated with the Pinjra Tod movement. By weaving together these voices, How Long Can the Moon Be Caged? celebrates the remarkable bravery, unwavering humanity, and moral integrity of individuals who have been incarcerated for their unwavering solidarity with marginalized and oppressed communities.

In a world where the struggle for dissent and the preservation of civil liberties are ever more vital, this book serves as a powerful testament to the resilience of those who refuse to be silenced, while painting a vivid picture of the ongoing battle for justice and equality in India.

Suchitra Vijayan and Francesca Recchia, How Long Can the Moon Be Caged?: Voices of Indian Political Prisoners (Pluto books, 2023) ISBN 9780745347981, 216 pages

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n 2023, Father’s Day fell on Sunday, June 18, when the world annually celebrates and honors fatherhood and its influence on society. For Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a father of two sons, like any other father in the world, this day should have been filled with joy and celebration. What should have been a great day, however, abruptly turned into a day of horror.

The phone at Nijjar’s home rang on Sunday, and a family friend informed them that Nijjar had been shot outside the Guru Nanak Sikh Gurdwara Temple. Ten minutes earlier, Nijjar was speaking on the phone with his son, Balraj, who told him that the family was going to have pizza and seviyan, vermicelli pudding, Nijjar’s favorite dessert.

His family and friends in the Sikh community were immediately almost certain who was behind the attack: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. But why would the prime minister be suspected of having anything to do with the attack?

Who was Hardeep Singh Nijjar?

Hardeep Singh Nijjar was a Canadian citizen who was born in India and ran a plumbing business in Surrey, British Columbia. He was also the head of the Guru Nanak Sikh Gurdwara Temple in Surrey, and an outspoken leader of the Khalistan movement, a separatist movement that seeks to establish an independent Sikh homeland in the Punjab region of India. Due to its separatist nature, the movement is banned in India.

Nijjar’s support and leadership in the movement brought him to the attention of the Indian security services. In July 2022, they labeled him as a “fugitive terrorist” for his alleged murder of a Hindu priest in the Punjab region. The tension between Nijjar and the Indian government has led to speculation that the government may be responsible for Nijjar’s assassination.

Canadian security agencies were aware of the peril surrounding Nijjar, as revealed by Balpreet Singh Boparai, the legal representative of the World Sikh Organization of Canada. Several weeks before Nijjar’s assassination, Boparai took the initiative to contact the Canadian law enforcement to warn them about the potential threats to Nijjar’s safety. Boparai claimed that the Canadian authorities did not take sufficient steps to safeguard Nijjar.

Canada holds India responsible for the assassination

On Monday, September 18, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced in Parliament that Canadian security agencies are investigating “credible allegations” that potentially link the Indian government to Nijjar’s assassination. Trudeau also mentioned that he conveyed his “deep concerns” to Modi at the G-20 summit in New Delhi earlier in the month, seeking cooperation in the investigation.

“Any involvement of a foreign government in the killing of a Canadian citizen on Canadian soil is an unacceptable violation of our sovereignty,” said Trudeau.

India’s Foreign Ministry dismissed the allegations, calling it “absurd” and an attempt to divert attention from the real issue: Canada’s protection of Indian individuals who are on New Delhi’s list of terrorists. Since then, relations between the two countries have taken a turn for the worse.

Deterioration of Canada and India’s relations

Even before this confrontation, the two countries’ diplomatic relations were becoming strained. Ten days before Nijjar’s assassination, during a press conference, India expressed its concerns about Canada’s sheltering of Sikh separatists, and claimed that it was not good for the relationship between the two countries.

Furthermore, a week ahead of Trudeau’s accusation, Canada cancelled a trade trip to India that was scheduled for early October. “Trade appears to have become a casualty of deepening tensions,” said Michael Kugelman, director of the South Asia Institute at the Wilson Center, a Washington D.C.-based think tank. Kugelman added that the tension was rising simultaneously with the growth of Sikh activism in Canada, the UK, the U.S., and Australia.

After Trudeau’s accusation, Canada and India have both expelled senior diplomats. Moreover, India has temporarily suspended visa applications for Canadian citizens until further notice, with immediate effect as of September 21, 2023. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs explained that they stopped giving visas because of “security risks” that the Indian High Commission and consulates in Canada are currently facing.

“The issue is of incitement of violence, the inaction by the Canadian authorities, [and] the creation of an environment that disrupts the functioning of our high commission and consulates,” said Arindam Bagchi, the ministry’s spokesperson. “That’s what’s making us stop temporarily the issuance of visas or providing visa services,” he added. India has also warned travelers to Canada about growing “anti-India activities.”

In response, Trudeau tried to deescalate the situation and has called on India to cooperate with his government and allow justice to take its course. He explained that Canada is not trying to cause problems and is simply following the rule of law to achieve justice.

It’s uncertain whether the bilateral relations between Canada and India will improve, as India accuses Canada of harboring Indian dissidents, while Sikh demonstrators in Canada are calling for the expulsion of the Indian ambassador.

India told Canada to reduce the number of its diplomats in India, and it seems that the next few days will reveal the extent of diplomatic rift the two countries will have in the future.

O

n September 10, 2023, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) announced the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with India to establish a new economic corridor linking India, the Middle East, and Europe.

The Saudi crown prince announced the project on X, formerly Twitter, a day after it was announced by Saudi Arabia and the United States.

Bin Salman announced that, “As a culmination of what has been worked on during the last period, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United States of America, the Republic of India, the United Arab Emirates, and the Republic of France, The Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy and the European Union signed a memorandum of understanding regarding the project to establish a new economic corridor linking India, the Middle East and Europe.”

He added that the memorandum “crystallizes the foundations upon which it was built to achieve the Kingdom’s common interests, enhance economic interdependence with its partners from other countries, and reflect positively on the global economy in general.”

On September 9, the Saudi crown prince said, “The economic corridor will contribute to developing and rehabilitating the infrastructure that includes railways and ports and will help increase the exchange of goods and services.”

He continued, “The project will enhance economic integration and contribute to providing new and quality job opportunities in order to achieve long-term gains along the new cross-border corridors.”

The statement concluded that the MoU “requires continuing the pace of efforts that have been made, and immediately starting to develop the necessary mechanisms for their implementation, according to the time frame that was agreed upon based on what was stated in the memorandum.”

Economic cooperation: Beyond India and Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia and India signed more than 50 agreements during the G20 Summit, in the fields of information technology, communications, entrepreneurship, chemicals, energy, and advanced industries, according to the Saudi Ministry of Investment.

In his speech during the Saudi-India Investment Forum held in New Delhi, Saudi Investment Minister Khalid Al-Falih revealed that the Saudi Public Investment Fund, which manages assets exceeding $750 billion, is considering opening a branch in New Delhi. This indicates the sovereign fund’s interest in investing in Indian companies that have recently seen expansion and development.

The U.S. involvement in inking the agreement that will eventually link India to Europe through the Middle East suggests that Washington aims to mitigate the growing influence of China through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

In addition to India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, Cyprus, Greece, and the rest of the European Union, the economic corridor will include shipping and rail routes.

Besides speeding up trade between India and the EU by 40%, the project aims to normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. When launched, the project is likely to impact the Suez Canal negatively; approximately 12% of global trade and 30% of global container traffic currently pass through the Suez Canal.

Turkey, Egypt, and the India-Europe economic corridor

The economic corridor connecting India with Europe will also negatively impact another trade corridor that was supposed to be established between Iraq and Turkey, connecting the Gulf with Europe through Ankara, known as the Development Road Project. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan commented on establishing the economic corridor between India and Europe by saying, “We say that there is no corridor without Turkey.”

Speaking to journalists accompanying him to the G20 summit in India, Erdoğan added, “Turkey is an important production and trade base. The most convenient line for traffic from East to West must pass through Turkey.”

Erdoğan noted that many countries in the region, such as Qatar and the UAE, are in favor of Turkey’s proposed project, expressing hope that the Development Road Project will proceed as planned.

Some 2.7 million Indian workers work in Saudi Arabia and send billions of dollars in hard currency back home annually. The Saudi involvement in the economic corridor project reflects the growing economic ties bet3ween India and the Kingdom, which recently has been engaging in diversifying its economic resources to move away from oil dependency.

*Written by the staff of Politics Today

M

any of us still remember the images of empty store shelves that surfed the internet during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The images struck fear into the hearts of the public, which was worried about the onset of a food crisis. Sadly, similar images may resurface as news of India’s ban on non-basmati rice exports broke on July 20.

This is not the first time that India has imposed restrictions on its rice exports. In 2022, the Indian government imposed a 20% export duty on non-basmati white rice to ensure its domestic availability. This decision came at a time when the world was struggling with the economic impacts from Russia’s war in Ukraine while also recovering from the effects of the pandemic.

India is not the only country to impose export restrictions on certain food products. Other countries have taken similar measures over the past three years to protect their economic needs amid a growing global food crisis.

Food restrictions since COVID-19

When COVID-19 erupted in 2020, it caused chaos. People were in a state of panic as they rushed to stores to grab whatever they could get their hands on before the lockdown. This led to the disappearance of many food items such as rice, canned goods, meat, etc.

The food shortage alarmed governments worldwide, prompting intervention and restrictive measures to protect domestic markets from a potential food crisis. Restrictive measurements included price controls, export taxes, bans, and quantitative export restrictions.

According to a World Bank research paper, the aim of restricting food exports is to protect domestic markets from the developments occurring in the global markets. By reducing or banning exports, governments ensure that their domestic needs will be protected from global food crises.

To keep track of food export restrictions, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) has created a Food and Fertilizer Export Restrictions Tracker. Since 2020, wheat, rice, and sunflower seeds/oil appear to be the most banned items in terms of export restrictions. Countries that have banned these products include Romania, Russia, India, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Cambodia.

IFPRI has compiled a full list of countries that restricted exports of certain food products since COVID-19 and has kept track of their developments.

The Black Sea Grain Initiative

On July 22, 2022, Russia and Ukraine, along with Turkey and the UN, signed the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The agreement allowed for the safe transportation of grain and foodstuffs from Ukrainian ports. According to the European Council, the initiative managed to safely export about 33 million tons of grain and foodstuff to 45 countries, making a significant contribution to the fight against the global food crisis.

On July 17, Russia withdrew from the initiative when its request for increased food shipments was not met. This sparked a wave of global condemnation since Russia is unilaterally blocking Ukraine’s main export route. According to the European Council, the Russian invasion is further exacerbating the global food crisis.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken accused Russia of “weaponizing food.” Last year, Yale historian Timothy Snyder claimed that Russia’s move to starve the world is “a new level of colonialism.”

The prices of key commodities such as wheat and corn have skyrocketed, raising global concerns around hunger. Coupled with India’s ban on non-basmati rice exports, global warming, and rising inflation rates worldwide, a humanitarian food crisis is looming.

The impact of export restrictions on global food security 

As most governments impose restrictions on food exports to protect their domestic interests, the entire world suffers the consequences. According to a World Bank’s recent report, the global food crisis has worsened as food trade restrictions have increased.

Since June 5, 2023, 20 countries have implemented 27 food export bans and ten countries have implemented 14 export-restricting measures. The effects of these restrictions are driving up food costs and creating instability in the market. In addition, Aljazeera has reported that the local food prices in many developing countries continue to rise due to the devaluation of their local currencies.

The chief economist at the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization Maximo Torero has warned about rising food prices which he believes will lead to a potential global food crisis if the trend is not reversed immediately.

A potential food crisis?

Following India’s steps, the United Arab Emirates and Russia have declared bans on their rice exports. On July 28, 2023, the UAE announced that it will temporarily suspend rice exports for four months. The next day, Russia also declared a ban on rice exports until December 31, 2023, to protect its domestic market.

Over three billion people worldwide rely on rice for their livelihood and its demand continues to grow. Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, an economist at the International Monetary Fund, told Reuters that India’s ban could exacerbate food price inflation.

The World Food Programme (WFP) recently reported that more than 345 million people are struggling with food insecurity in 2023. In just two years, the number has jumped from 135 million to 345 million. Unfortunately, this number will continue to grow as countries continue to restrict food exports amid conflict and climate shocks.

The WFP warns that we are facing a global food crisis of “unprecedented proportions.” Unless governments cooperate to meet people’s immediate food needs, the world is destined for a global hunger catastrophe.

C

an you imagine a sovereign country using a currency other than its own for local transactions? This has been the case in Sri Lanka since 20 July 2023.

Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Ali Sabry and President Ranil Wickremesinghe made their first visit to India since Ranil assumed office last year. Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi held talks with Wickremesinghe. After the meeting, Sabry highlighted that allowing the use of India’s currency would simplify transactions for Indian tourists and residents in Sri Lanka, eliminating the need for multiple currency conversions.

Indian tourists in Sri Lanka can use Indian rupee for local expenses

During a meeting organized by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka Nandalal Weerasinghe announced that Indian tourists visiting Sri Lanka can now transact in Indian rupees (INR) as the Central Bank has officially designated it as a currency for trade settlement between the two nations.

This new designation allows Sri Lankan citizens to hold INR equivalent to $10,000 in physical form, and both Sri Lankans and Indians can now use Indian rupees instead of U.S. dollars for international transactions with each other. With this development, Sri Lanka becomes the third country after Nepal and Bhutan where INR can be freely used.

Economy experts believe that during times of economic instability, adopting a stable currency like the Indian rupee can provide a sense of financial security and reduce the risk of currency fluctuations. Sabry stated, “We have considered the possibility of using Indian rupees like we accept the dollar, euro, and yen.”

It is believed that allowing direct use of the rupee would prevent the need for multiple currency conversions for Indian tourists and businesspeople. One of the main problem tourists face during their vacation is exchange rates—using Indian rupees will eliminate such confusion.

According to a report in the Economic Times, Sri Lanka’s Central Bank clarified that the Indian rupee cannot be utilized for local transactions within the country. The official statement emphasizes that all transactions between residents in Sri Lanka must be conducted in LKR (Lankan rupee), which is the country’s legal currency.

Background of Sri Lanka’s economic crisis

On July 22, thousands of protestors attacked the home and office of Sri Lanka’s former president, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, forcing him to resign due to public outrage over the nation’s economic predicament. On July 9, 2022, Rajapaksa fled to the Maldives, then traveled to Singapore before spending a few weeks in Thailand on a diplomatic visa. During this time, the current president, Ranil, served as the prime minister. The protestors burned down the presidential residence; it was later confirmed that no one was inside the building.

The Sri Lankan government faced harsh criticism for mismanaging the country’s economy, which led to a devastating economic crisis, causing high inflation, frequent blackouts, and shortages of gasoline, medicine, and other essential supplies.

The fuel shortage resulted in the closure of many schools on multiple occasions, and personal vehicles were not permitted to be used, with priority given to buses and emergency services. Additionally, the Public Administration Ministry requested public employees skip work on Fridays due to the ongoing fuel shortage and transportation issues across the nation.

During the economic crisis, India sent its neighbor vital financial and humanitarian aid totaling nearly $4 billion in 2022, including supplies of food, medicine, and fuel. In addition, India was the first creditor to offer a letter of support for Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring efforts, which sparked IMF assistance. The entire debt owed by Sri Lanka exceeds $83 billion of which $41.5 billion is owed abroad and $42.1 billion is owed domestically. Sri Lanka started the process of restructuring its debt.

Trading in local currency is a new trend

In an effort to lessen their reliance on the U.S. dollar and strengthen regional trade, Bangladesh and India began trading in local currency on July 21, 2023. Officials in both countries assert that the use of takas (Bangladesh currency) and rupees, in addition to the dollar, raises expectations of easing pressure on dollar reserves and cutting trade costs. The two nations can directly exchange import and export prices using the taka and rupee.

The United Arab Emirates is India’s second-largest export market and its third-largest trading partner for the years 2022–2023. Since the invasion of Ukraine and the sanctions that followed, many nations have realized they need to expand their selection of invoicing and settlement processes, making it a wise move to explore alternatives with the UAE, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. The UAE is also one of the economies with the fastest growth rates.

Sri Lanka strengthens ties with India

Sri Lanka’s minister Sabry emphasized that accepting the Indian rupee would serve as an advantage for Sri Lanka, particularly due to the trade imbalance in favor of India. He highlighted that Sri Lanka needs more Indian currency and the increased influx of Indian tourists spending in Indian rupees would benefit their economy. As other nations also adopt the rupee in their international trade, India stands to potentially reduce its trade deficit and strengthen its market position.

During the visit, India and Sri Lanka further solidified their economic ties by signing a series of energy, development, and trade agreements. Notably, the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) and Lanka Pay signed a network-to-network agreement to approve the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) application in Sri Lanka. Additionally, the two countries signed an MoU to develop Trincomalee as a regional center for business, energy, and bilateral cooperation. Minister Sabry highlighted that Sri Lanka’s non-aligned state engaged in open and honest negotiations, resulting in these agreements without opposition from other nations. He emphasized that their approach of exploring feasible projects through joint committees fosters cooperation and mutual understanding, aligning with their non-aligned status.

For Sri Lanka, the pressure is still on as the country continues to suffer from a huge crisis. However, Sri Lanka’s economy is expected to grow from the end of this year and to exit bankruptcy by 2026. With the help of its neighboring countries and agreements with India, Sri Lankans hope the country will return to its good old days as soon as possible.

R

eports about the death of the state amongst international relations scholars seem premature just yet. In this century, the world will conduct an extraordinary experiment in government. By 2050, forty percent of the planet’s population will live in just four places: India, China, the European Union, and the United States. These are superstates: polities that are distinguished from normal countries by expansiveness, population, diversity, and complexity.

Modern statecraft has attempted to adapt to the challenges of globalization, interdependency, and population increase, bringing piling responsibilities to the states. How can superstates manage the burden of their growing scale? Can such states be effectively governed at all? Looking at other model modern states offers only an incomplete picture; however, while there is not much experience to be drawn from today, empires may offer a guide.

Alasdair Roberts, professor of public policy at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, likens these superstates to the empires of the past. After all, it was the age of empires that gave way to the age of states, and later the hybrid polity superstates. In the coming decades, the least populous superstate, the U.S., will contain as many people as the vast British Empire did at its peak in 1914.

Roberts first attempts to decipher the nature of this ongoing experimentin light of new dilemmas of governance. He argues that, for the most part, superstates wrestle with the same problems of leadership, control, and creed that plagued empires for centuries. Yet, there are no simple solutions.

Could superstates be more durable? What are the pros and cons of a superstate in comparison to an empire? A postulate of empires is the assumption of their eventual death. Size and complexity led to fragility, and imperial rulers improvised constantly to put off the day of reckoning—leaders of superstates are doing the same today.

However, superstates now differ from traditional empires in the responsibilities that they bear, and most importantly in the obligation to improve life for ordinary citizens. They pursue radically different strategies for governing at scale that have profound implications for democracy and human rights. While technology provides more ease to superstates for surveillance and many other tasks, their populations are more restless and demanding, they need to govern more intensively and provide more services.

Roberts takes the reader through each superstate one by one to understand their unique challenges and complementing strategies, and reveals common themes amongst these giants in the process. He, then, takes the COVID-19 pandemic as a case study to analyze how these superstates reacted to a common problem in a different way and how they bared during a shock at the global level.

How should superstates be governed? What must their leaders do to hold these immense polities together? How can these superstates withstand the extraordinary strains and shocks of the contemporary world? If they survive, will they thrive? Superstates: Empires of the Twenty-First Century attempts to answer these and other questions by looking into history for ways to govern these sprawling and diverse polities.

With a groundbreaking twist in thinking about the art and methods of statecraft, Roberts considers the decisions leaders must make to devise and redevise strategies for governance at such a grand scale. Pragmatism, a little bit of reservation, and sometimes unorthodox policies may be necessary.

Alasdair Roberts, Superstates: Empires of the Twenty-First Century (Polity Press, 2022) ISBN: 978-1-509-54449-3, 224 pages

F

or many Indian Muslims, the Gujarat riots are among some of their darkest memories. However, this year, millions of Indian history textbooks will erase the plight endured by Muslims at the hands of Hindu nationalists in 2002.

India’s state-run National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) has prescribed new changes to history textbooks, removing chapters that write about the Gujarat riots.

The removed sections also include the assassination of Mohandas K. Gandhi by Nathuram Godse of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), an Indian right-wing, Hindu nationalist volunteer paramilitary organization. Paragraphs on the ban on the RSS after the assassination of Gandhi have also been removed from textbooks.

The RSS shares ideological links with the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

The changes will apply to thousands of Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) schools following the NCERT syllabus.

With tens of millions of students, more than 24,000 schools are affiliated with India’s CBSE and use NCERT textbooks. In addition, around 240 CBSE-affiliated schools operate in 26 countries across the world.

Erasing “Muslim history”

Among the deleted sections is an entire chapter on Mughal rulers, whom Hindu nationalists have often addressed as Muslim oppressors.

Mughals and other Muslim dynasties ruled many parts of India for hundreds of years and have made significant contributions to the country’s rich culture.

BJP leader Kapil Mishra applauded the changes calling it “a great decision to remove the false history of Mughals.” He added, “Thieves, pickpockets and two-penny road raiders were called the Mughal Sultanate and the emperor of India. Akbar, Babar, Shahjahan, Aurangzeb are not in the history books, they are in the dustbin.”

In addition, all references to the Gujarat riots that rocked Modi’s state of Gujarat in 2002, leaving 1,000 people dead, mostly Muslims, were omitted from textbooks.

India is home to more than 200 million Muslims, the second-largest religion in the country. In fact, India is the country with the third-largest Muslim population in the world. The Indian government has always been at the center of criticism for pursuing a Hindu nationalist agenda and oppressing the Muslim population.

Since the BJP came to power in 2014, the Indian government has attempted to revise textbooks three times with the previous textbook revisions taking place in 2017 and 2019. Interestingly, in the past, India’s BJP government has also changed Muslim-sounding names of places and cities.

In fact, the BJP has previously expressed its desire to rewrite the country’s history. “It is our responsibility to write our history,” said Indian home affairs minister Amit Shah in a 2019 speech.

Rationalization exercises?

As the chapter deletions got widely criticized, NCERT justified the re-edited books as a “rationalization” project aiming to reduce the curriculum load on students.

“There has been a lot of learning loss due to the COVID pandemic and the students underwent a lot of traumas. To help stressed students, and as a responsibility to society and the nation, it was felt that the content load in textbooks should be reduced,” Dinesh Prasad Saklani, director of the NCERT, told NDTV.

However, many historians and opposition leaders have criticized the NCERT’s deletions and called them an attempt to rewrite history.

A joint statement by more than 250 historians in India read, “The decision of the NCERT is guided by divisive motives. It is a decision which goes against the constitutional ethos and composite culture of the Indian subcontinent. As such, it must be rescinded at the earliest.”

It remains to be seen how omitting key moments in Indian history will distort the understanding of history for younger generations in India and across the world. What is certain, however, is that the weaponization of the past and attempts to change history to build a society that is ideologically compliant with BJP nationalism has become the new reality of Modi’s India.

D

uring the past decade, international audiences have come to associate the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led Indian Government with a muscular form on Hindu nationalism that has made the country a metaphorical living hell for religious minorities. Many experts claim Muslims and Christians have been pushed to the brink of genocide by a regime and ideology – Hindutva – that makes no secret of its intent to transform India into a Hindu-only nation.

International headlines convey this reality: “In India, calls for Muslim genocide, grow louder,” observes the Washington Post. “India’s Muslims fear for their future under Narendra Modi,” says BBC. “India’s Christians attacked under anti-conversion laws” remarks the New York Times. “Dreams of a Hindu nation leave minorities worried,” declares the Japan Times.

But when it comes to the Indian Government’s relationship with non-Hindu religions, these headlines tell only a small part of a very large story, because as anyone with an intimate knowledge of India knows – this is a country of profound paradoxes and contradictions. India is what former UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill would describe as a “riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma,” a statement he used to define the Soviet Union.

Buddhism as a foreign policy tool

Because at the same time, India is persecuting religious minorities at home, it’s using Buddhism advance its foreign policy objectives abroad, particularly in Asia, despite Buddhists accounting for less than one percent of India’s total population. India has adopted the religion as a soft power tool to enhance bilateral relations in the region.

Indian headlines convey this reality: “PM Modi projects Buddhism as unique part of India’s foreign policy,” says ANI News. “Indian PM Narendra Modi promotes Buddhism worldwide,” observes Associates Times. “Modi has been working to turn India’s Buddhist heritage into strategic asset,” remarks The Week.

Buddhists may represent a tiny percentage of India’s population, but the Indian Government can plausibly sell “India’s Buddhist heritage” to a global audience, given the country is not only the birthplace of the religious faith, but also home to numerous sacred sites, including Bodh Gaya, Nalanda, and Sarnath. Some analysts contend Buddhism has been India’s most successful export, having opened the South Asian country to the world in the 6^th century, when the religion was introduced to Japan.

Modi’s ‘Act East’ and Buddhism

Moreover, Buddhism diplomacy has become an organizing principle of Modi’s ‘Act East’ policy, which aims to counter China’s growing influence in the region by cultivating bilateral economic and strategic relations with Indo Pacific nations, which is why Modi has made Buddhism a prominent feature of his international visits.

International headlines again convey this reality: “In a bid to woo Thailand, PM Narendra Modi invokes Lord Buddha,” observes the Economic Times. “PM Narendra Modi’s visit to Nepal’s Lumbini Showcases Indian Buddhist diplomacy,” writes Outlook. “PM Modi visits Buddhist temple in Japan,” remarked The Hindu. “India to spend $15 million to boost Buddhist ties in the region,” reported Associated Press.

Last year on the holiday to commemorate Buddha’s birthday – Vesak Day – Modi said, “Lord Buddha has become even more relevant…Countries are joining hands with each other and becoming each other’s strength, taking the values of Buddha.”

In his rhetoric and policies, Modi has made clear he views Buddhism to be the perfect instrument to build and enhance bilateral relations in the region because of the religion’s pan-Asian presence and reputation for promoting equality and encouraging peaceful coexistence.

Buddhist ties with Sri Lanka and Japan

By touting India’s Buddhist heritage, Modi has bolstered his government’s economic, cultural, and academic initiatives. Last year, the Indian Government announced a $15 million grant for the promotion of Buddhist ties with its neighbor Sri Lanka, where the religion is practiced by more than 70 percent of the population.

This money will be spent on the construction and renovation of Buddhist monasteries, cultural exchanges, archaeological cooperation, and reciprocal exposition of Buddha’s relics, according to India’s External Affairs Ministry.

But it’s the India-Japan relationship that best illustrates how Buddhism has operated as a binding agent between New Delhi and a fellow regional economic power, with Buddhists accounting for nearly 70 percent of the total Japanese population, a reality Modi turned into opportunity during his first visit to the North Asian country in 2014, when he chose Kyoto, instead of Tokyo, as his first destination.

He chose Kyoto because it’s home to To-ji Temple, a 9^th century Buddhist complex. There he met with then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. When India’s Minister for External Affairs tweeted a photo of the two leaders walking together through the temple grounds, he included the words, “Moving in unison. PM Modi and PM Abe at To-ji temple, symbolic of India-Japan civilizational commonalities.”

The Japanese leader echoed this sentiment, telling local reporters at the time how Buddhism spread from India to Japan, creating what he called a “sutra” [thread] between the two countries.

V

ivo Mobile, a Chinese technology company, is accused by India’s Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) of evading $280 million in taxes. This has led to a dispute between two of Asia’s biggest economic markets.

Notwithstanding the COVID19 outbreak, China-India trade increased to $67.1 billion in the first half of 2022, putting it on track to surpass $100 billion for the second year in a row. However, in spite of the potential and wide-ranging prospects of economic and trade collaboration between the two countries, diplomatic disputes and trade rivalry continue.

The Chinese mobile phone industry and technology companies are in the spotlight in India, and relations between the Indian government and Chinese tech giants Xiaomi, Huawei, Vivo, and Oppo are strained. While Chinese smartphone producers control 60–70% of the Indian smartphone market, Chinese companies conducting business in India still face challenges.

Chinese smartphones are widely used in India especially due to their low price and high quality, despite political conflicts.

Vivo Mobile

Chinese smartphone manufacturers have recently come under scrutiny from India’s Enforcement Directorate (ED), the Indian financial investigating authorities, and courts. In an attempt to boost its lackluster domestic industry, India aims to prevent Chinese smartphone manufacturers from selling products for less than 12,000 rupees ($150), which will hurt companies like Xiaomi, Bloomberg reports.

The DRI accuses Vivo Mobile of evading taxes totaling 22.1 billion rupees ($280 million). In the statement, the DRI said that there was “incriminating evidence indicating willful misdeclaration in the description of certain imported items.” In addition, earlier in July, India’s Enforcement Directorate declared that it had searched 48 Vivo locations across India, seizing $60 million from the company’s bank accounts.

On July 13, Oppo, another Chinese smartphone producer which sells the favored Realme model and OnePlus brand, was accused by the DRI of evading customs duties totaling 43.9 billion rupees ($551 million).

The DRI claims Oppo misdeclared imported goods and failed to factor in royalties and license fees when calculating their value to avoid paying higher customs duties. The revenue agency is demanding that Oppo repay the entire amount.

According to Oppo’s spokesperson response, “We are going to reply to the notice, presenting our side, and will be working further with the related government departments.”

The 2020 border dispute

Since the June 2020 border dispute, bilateral relations between India and China have not improved much despite frequent meetings. The year 2020 was a watershed moment as 20 Indian soldiers and five Chinese soldiers died in violent clashes, according to their respective governments. Since then, India has imposed sanctions on numerous Chinese companies.

After political tensions increased, several Chinese businesses faced difficulties conducting business in India. Since then, India has banned more than 200 Chinese apps like ByteDance’s TikTok and Tencent Holdings Ltd.’s WeChat. Moreover, India tightened regulations on Chinese investment, citing security concerns.

Turbulent bilateral relations

The sanctions and investigations by the Indian government on Chinese technology companies are criticized by China. Hu Weijia, a reporter for China’s state-run English-language daily Global Times, published an article under the title “Crackdown on Chinese Firms Undercuts India’s Attractiveness.”

The article argues that India has been trying to increase domestic production in order to make itself a global production center, but for some reasons, it has not been able to do so.

The trade war between China and the United States intensified during the period of former U.S. President Donald Trump, who blamed China for spreading the COVID19 virus. The decision of American companies to withdraw from China after the escalating tension prompted India to attract the U.S. investments in a race to become a possible world production center.

The article states that India has a “protectionist policy” and “approval system” that prevents it from being a global production center.

It is stated that if smartphone production in India becomes increasingly difficult, withdrawing from India is also an option.

Middle powers are states that rank neither as great powers nor as small actors in international relations. There is no single definition or straightforward approach to conceptualize their role other than the commonly held view that such countries are key players in the geopolitics of their regions. The variety of roles and aims assumed by middle powers also vary according to their regional context. Some middle powers such as Turkey are traditionally seen as key military allies by the West, while others such as Canada and Japan are considered major trade partners.

However, despite such fundamental differences in their strength or standing, countries like Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, India, South Korea, South Africa, and Turkey are increasingly involved in international crises and developments. Below, I shall outline both challenges and opportunities provided by the current global context for middle powers. I ultimately argue that middle powers can implement collective strategies on the basis of their common interests and gain more say in global affairs.

Middle Powers’ Organizational Capacity

The foremost challenge facing middle powers is organizational. There are many international organizations populated by middle powers, but almost none of them are exclusively middle-power oriented. Middle powers are often members of the global institutions dominated by great powers, like G20 and BRICS, whose agendas mainly benefit the great powers involved. An exclusively middle power organization is yet to be formed, the closest organization of such a nature being MIKTA. MITKA is an exclusive club of a number of middle powers with quite limited membership, namely Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea, and Australia.

In the absence of an organization representing their interests vocally, middle powers cannot assume a bigger role in international politics. The security architecture of the UN privileges the five permanent members of the UN Security Council; NATO, the world’s most significant military alliance, is under American leadership; and the EU, the largest trading bloc, is led by a Franco-German alliance. Middle powers such as Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, and India are all key players in their region but none seems capable of exerting global influence. An alliance or an organization exclusive to middle powers can change the overall dynamic.

Middle powers such as Brazil, Turkey, and India can agree among themselves on pushing for a reform of the UN.

One of the first goals of any middle power club should be a reform of the UN system. Middle powers individually, or collectively, should have more say in the UN’s decision-making on international security crises. Such reform may stipulate more quotas for each region and some rotational representation for middle powers, and particularly African, Latin American, and Middle Eastern middle power states should be afforded more representation at the UN’s Security Council. However, the reform proposal first requires a consensus among middle powers and that may prove hard to achieve.

Middle powers such as Brazil, Turkey, and India are all part of the liberal international system. As democratic countries with huge potential for economic growth and no significant military or strategic conflict with the West, they can agree among themselves on pushing for a reform of the UN. More established and traditional middle powers like Australia, Canada, Japan, and Sweden may also join the reform call, as this may benefit them as well. The less democratic, or authoritarian ones, such as Egypt, Iran, or Saudi Arabia, however, may have more radical demands concerning the UN reform and might not join a collective reform movement.

As mentioned above, the most straightforward path forward could be a reform of the UN’s security architecture allowing more say to middle power states, maybe through a recognition of their status which may provide them some form of collective representation. In order to make that happen, middle powers need to agree on their common interests and goals.

Middle powers are mostly liberal democratic states, so they should highlight the fact that they are in favor of the liberal order, e.g., the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the UN system. Mediation and peacekeeping should remain their most preferred means of international crisis diplomacy, though they must publicize their efforts and seek more recognition for their contributions.

An effective alliance or organization of middle power diplomacy should be formed and take sides in global crises since leaving such crises to be mainly decided by great power politics will only downgrade the middle power cause.

In short, middle powers need more concerted actions and efforts in highlighting their undeniable role in world affairs. The world is no longer divided into two or three competing strategic blocs. Global affairs are much more complex and require collective action of actors with different levels of international standing. Middle powers are no longer bound to side with one or the other alliance; these days, more than ever before, they collectively command a much more serious economic and military might.

Organizational problems can be tackled and collective interests can be furthered particularly if the leading middle powers such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, India, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey can agree on a collective initiative. The list of countries mentioned is just indicative – more states can be welcomed into this group, and even small nations can join their forces with middle powers as they see that international peace and stability can be furthered through a collective movement.

As Russian President Vladimir Putin has launched a “special military operation” against Ukraine, many countries and regional organizations reacted with condemnation, criticism, and sanctions while some others declared their support for Russia. For many countries in Asia and Africa, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a tightrope walk. Taking a neutral stance is regarded as an expression of support for Russia, and many leaders are concerned about the long-term consequences of publicly criticizing the Russians.

India and the Invasion of Ukraine

India maintains close ties with Russia and the United States. New Delhi has traditionally refrained from criticizing Russian aggression, including the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Despite being a key player in the U.S.-led Quad in Asia, India has maintained a unique and privileged strategic relationship with Russia. In recent years, India has diversified its defense procurement, and much of the recently procured high-end defense equipment in the Indian inventory is of Western origin, particularly American and French; however, Russia still remains India’s largest arms supplier and a critical strategic ally.

Between 2016 and 2020, Russia supplied more than half of India’s arms imports. Close relationships with Moscow not only provided top-of-the-line military equipment, but also the much-desired strategic autonomy to India.

At a time when New Delhi has invested a lot of political capital in strengthening its ties with Washington, it is not easy for India to strike a delicate balance between its relationships with the United States, Europe, and Russia.

Between 2016 and 2020, Russia supplied more than half of India’s arms imports.

India’s archrival, Pakistan, which has had strained relations with Russia in the past, is now trying to improve its bilateral relations. Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan met with President Putin in Moscow as the Russian military forces were invading Ukraine. Khan’s visit to Moscow happened at the cost of Pakistan’s straining relations with the United States.

The timing of Khan’s visit may give the impression that Pakistan indirectly supported Putin’s decree on breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine, as well as the invasion, which began just hours after Khan arrived in Moscow. Pakistani officials have insisted that Khan’s visit to Moscow had nothing to do with the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The visit was planned much earlier, and Khan and Putin stated that they discussed bilateral and South Asian issues during their meeting on Thursday.

The challenge for Pakistan will be to strengthen ties with Russia without alienating Western trade partners.

At a time when the world has become increasingly divided between the Western and China-Russia camps, it has become ever more difficult for India and Pakistan, South Asia’s rivals, to remain neutral.

The challenge for Pakistan will be to strengthen ties with Russia without alienating Western trade partners, all while balancing a growing defense relationship with Ukraine. Islamabad’s balancing act is simpler than that of New Delhi: its relationship with the U.S. is strained, and it has long sought to use its alliance with China to collaborate more closely with Russia, particularly in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

However, given its commercial ties with Europe and desire to play a larger role on the global stage, Islamabad must be cautious not to get too close to Moscow.

Although Pakistani authorities maintain that they want good relations with both China and the United States, and it was difficult to cancel or postpone the visit at the last minute, many Pakistanis believe Imran Khan could have rescheduled his trip.

Israel showed a calculated response to the Russian aggression in Ukraine.

At a time when neutrality and silence are seen as support for Russian aggression in Ukraine, Chinese influence and fear of irritating Russians forced Pakistani officials to go ahead with Khan’s trip to Moscow.

Israel and Ukraine

Israel, which has maintained excellent relations with Russia, demonstrated a calculated response to the Russian aggression in Ukraine, prompting significant criticism in the West. Israel is attempting to strike a balanced tone, doing the bare minimum to meet the bar set by the U.S. while avoiding crossing the red line drawn by Russia.

On February 22, Israel issued an insipid announcement supporting Ukraine’s “territorial integrity” without mentioning Russia. An irritated Russian ambassador to the UN responded by stating that his country opposes Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights. This reference to Israel’s takeover of the Golan Heights from Syria 55 years ago signaled to Israeli officials that the time had come to get off the fence.

It will be difficult for astute Israelis to fool Putin. Israel expected to take an ambiguous stand, as it did following the 2014 Russian invasion of the Crimean Peninsula. Then, Israel simply abstained from the UN vote, citing a fictitious general strike in their foreign ministry as justification.

Because of its massive military presence on the Syrian side of the occupied Golan Heights border fence, Russia has become Israel’s “northern neighbor.” Russia also enjoys a huge influence on Israel’s archenemy, Iran, and Israel very well knows the repercussions of annoying Russia.

Four weeks after Amnesty International was forced to halt is operations in India in September 2020, citing the Indian government’s crackdown on civil society, the UK-based human rights organization published a report warning of a coordinated effort to target journalists and activists in India and Kashmir, specifically those critical of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

The Indian government “must immediately halt its intensifying suppression of dissent,” said Amnesty International, following a series of counter-terrorism raids on human rights groups and human rights defenders and journalists in Jammu and Kashmir.

Since then, the situation has deteriorated from bad to worse for journalists in both Kashmir and India, culminating with terrorism charges levelled against me and 101 other journalists, lawyers, academics, and human rights defenders in November of last year – for “promoting enmity between religious groups” across social media, an Orwellian way to describe reporting violent attacks committed by right-wing Hindu groups against Muslims in Tripura state in late October.

These criminal charges were filed under the country’s draconian anti-terror law – the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) – a legacy of British colonial rule, prompting a strong rebuke from Reporters Without Borders, which said our “only crimes were to cover the recent attacks against mosques in the North-eastern state of Tripura,” while the Editors Guild of India described the bogus charges as an attempt by the BJP ruled state government to “deflect attention away from its own failure to control majoritarian violence.”

International silence has created space for New Delhi to carry out “counter-terrorism raids” against journalists and editors.

But whereas human rights and civil society groups have been vocal in their condemnation of the Modi regime’s anti-democratic and unconstitutional crackdown on dissent, India’s international allies, particularly Western governments, have been conspicuously silent, showing a willingness to ignore its attacks on free speech and free press in exchange for New Delhi’s unfettered cooperation in the contestation between Washington DC and Beijing for primacy in Indo-Pacific.

This international silence has created space for New Delhi to carry out an ever-increasing number of cynically named “counter-terrorism raids” against journalists and editors, particularly those in Indian administered Kashmir. Notably these raids go unreported in the intimidated and ever-compliant mainstream media ecosystem, which has helped Modi build the most extraordinary personality cult in modern political history,” as noted by former UN under-secretary-general and Congress MP Shashi Tharoor.

If convicted of sedition under the draconian anti-terrorism legislation, known as the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), both Shah and Gul face life imprisonment. It’s for this reason Sanjay Kapoor, head of the Editors Guild of India, accused the government of “stifling” democracy in Kashmir, and for painting journalists as the “enemy of the state.”

Meanwhile, Hindu nationalist leaders who publicly call for a genocide against Muslims and other religious minorities are ignored by security forces and the Indian government. The double standard and motive of the Modi government could not be more obvious.

It must also be noted here that this anti-democratic campaign to intimidate and silence journalists in Kashmir is taking place alongside continued government-controlled communications blackouts and curfews. The Modi government is desperate to deny the international community evidence of its human rights violations in the disputed territory, which have become measurably worse since 2019, the year India revoked Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status, as illustrated in an upward spike in extrajudicial killings.

“Indian authorities appear determined to prevent journalists from doing their jobs,” says Steven Butler, Asia programme coordinator of the U.S.-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), which partly explains why India has seen its democracy downgraded by 53^rd position on the most recent Democracy Index published by The Economist Intelligence Unit, while falling to 142^nd position out of 180 countries in the 2021 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders.

The Sweden-based V-Dem Institute went even further in its latest report on global democracy in describing India an “electoral autocracy,” and accusing the Modi government of “diminishing freedom of expression, media and civil society” to a point where it’s “as autocratic as Pakistan and worse than its neighbours Bangladesh and Nepal.”

Any number of Indian news media watchers have observed how the country’s mainstream media has essentially functioned as the public relations arm of Modi and BJP, leading many to mock influential television news channels as the “Godi Media,” a pejorative Hindi term that accuses journalists and editors of performing as lapdogs for the Hindu nationalist agenda.

“Perhaps the best example of how journalists have become accustomed to not challenging the government is the fact that Modi failed to hold a single press conference in his first term in office,” says iconic Indian editor and journalist Vir Sanghvi, who also observes how access to the Modi government has become conditional on the journalist’s ideology.

Clearly, the Indian government’s war on the free press and democracy hasn’t gone unnoticed.

The question is what will New Delhi’s democratic allies do about it?

For India’s religious minorities, 2021 has been described a “year of fear” and “annus horribilis,” after the country experienced an unprecedented level of communal violence, but what makes the previous year stand out from others during the Narendra Modi era is the way in which Christians have come under increasing pressure and attack.

While attacks against Muslims have become the norm since 2014, with Hindu nationalist leaders and hate preachers openly urging genocide, as mobs belonging to fringe Hindu organizations, such as Bajrang Dal, hunt and lynch Muslims in the streets – the country’s 25 million Christians had, until now, been spared the worse of what has become a government backed effort to transform India into a Hindu-only nation.

These radicals have deliberately engineered a “hate storm,” and it’s without coincidence that a wave of attacks were carried out against Christians days after Hindutva hate preachers at the Dharma Sansad (Hindu convention) in mid-December vowed to “kill and die” for a Hindu nation, and “be ready to kill and go to jail,” while others urged Indian security forces to mimic the Myanmar military’s crackdown against Rohingya Muslims.

The final month of 2021 saw a spike in violence against Christians and their places of worship, including attacks on churches in Karnataka, a Christian school in Madhya Pradesh, a Jesus statue in Haryana and the disruption of Christian celebrations in Assam and Uttar Pradesh, with Christmas Day witnessing more than a half-dozen hate crime incidents alone.

A total of 486 incidents of violence against Christians in India were recorded in 2021, representing a 75 percent increase on the previous year, with 104 of these attacks occurring in the final two months of the year, according to the United Christian Forum, which called 2021 the “most violent year for Christians in India since 2014.”

While Persecution Relief, a non-profit that tracks violence against Christians, has documented a steady rise in attacks against the religious minority since Modi came to power, climbing 60 percent from 2016 to 2019.

The upward spike during the past year has come largely on the back of Hindu nationalist groups falsely accusing Christians of using Christmas celebrations as a front to lure Hindus into the Christian faith, and then forcibly convert them. The regional general secretary of Hindutva outfit Bajrang Dal in Uttar Pradesh told members, “They [Christians] lure [Hindu] children by making Santa Claus distribute gifts to them and attract them towards Christianity.”

Tejasvi Surya, a BJP member of parliament and card carrying member of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), stated demands for Christians to be “brought back” into the Hindu fold, perpetuating the myth India’s religious minorities were duped or forcibly pulled away from the Hindu faith, which signals the government’s support to those who commit violence against Christians and Muslims under the pretence of forced conversions.

In fact, India’s ruling party – Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – says its working on a “strong law” to combat religious conversion in several states, including Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh, while promising prison sentences of up to 10 years for those found guilty of converting others by “force” or “fraudulent methods,” despite there been zero evidence Hindus are being lured or forced against their will into Christianity or Islam, which is why critics have described these proposed laws as the “Nazification of India’s laws.”

Christian leaders fear these bills will further embolden Hindu nationalist groups and individuals to further target the community, with Peter Machado, Archbishop of Bangalore, telling BBC Hindi, “Once the bill is passed, we will have to wait for more persecution and more difficulties.”

These proposed anti-conversion bills draw their inspiration from the passing of a so-called “anti-Love Jihad” law in BJP-ruled Uttar Pradesh last year, after an online conspiracy alleged Muslim men are tricking Hindu women into marriage with the aim of converting them to Islam. The state’s Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath threatening death to those who lure Hindu women, saying “I warn those who conceal identity and play with our sisters’ respect. If you don’t mend your ways your ‘Ram naam satya’ (a chant associated with Hindu funerals) journey will begin.”

Notably, the Modi government has not only refused to condemn calls for genocide and violent attacks against religious minorities, but also has signalled its support for anti-Christian attitudes in recently blocking Missions for Charity, a Catholic-based charity associated with human rights icon and Nobel laureate recipient Mother Teresa, from receiving international dominations in response to allegations it is forcibly converting Hindus to Catholicism, therefore cutting off a major source of funding for desperately impoverished and disabled Indians.

But nobody should be surprised by this unjustified and callous cruelty, given there’s zero daylight between Modi’s BJP and Hindu nationalist organizations, as noted by a former RSS member who said exactly that, proclaiming, “There is no difference between the BJP and RSS. BJP is the body. RSS is the soul, and the Bajrang Dal is the hands for beating.”

This escalating attacks against Christians by Hindu nationalist supporters in the streets and accompanying support by BJP in the country’s legislatures are taking place inside an ecosystem of hate and a culture of impunity. In the minds of Hindu nationalists, the logic becomes self-evident – if authorities have done nothing to halt anti-Muslim violence, then why not also target Christians?

The objective is clear, according to political scientist Zoya Hasan, who says isolating and demonizing minorities is part of the “plan” to consolidate Hindu supremacism and establish a Hindu state. “It is well thought out and purposeful,” he says.

More concerning still is the way in which the country’s institutions, particularly the police and courts, have been corrupted by Hindu nationalist sensibilities, which is why human rights groups have witnessed an institutional siding with Hindu perpetrators over non- Hindu victims of violence, leaving religious minorities nowhere to turn.

In other words, violent Hindu extremists have been given a “free run” to attack religious minorities whenever and wherever they find them, which is why experts are warning Christians and Muslims find themselves on the brink of genocide in Modi’s India.

On November 12, thousands of protesters took to the streets of the Maldivian capital Male, calling for and an end to the Indian military presence and interference in domestic affairs, while chanting, “Indian Military Out,” making it one of the largest ever political protests on the archipelagic country, and igniting similar protests elsewhere, including Fuvahmulah city, where thousands gathered on Sunday, November 14, 2021.

Despite the Maldivian government’s efforts to ignore and downplay the protester’s demands, the hashtags “IndiaOut,” “IndianMilitaryOut,” and “DefendMaldives” have since become the top trending topics on social media in the country.

While the Maldives and India have long enjoyed warm ties, with Indian nationals accounting for 90,000 of the roughly 1.5 million tourists who visit the Maldivian islands each year, there’s been a noticeable shift in attitudes among the general population in recent times, as resentment grows towards New Delhi’s ever-more aggressive policies and meddling in the country and region.

These anxieties were given a jolt in June, when a series of leaked documents, showing communication between the Maldives Foreign Ministry and the Indian High Commission, revealed the Indian government denied a request by the previous Maldivian administration, under President Abdulla Yameen, to withdraw its Indian Military helicopters from the country in the months leading up to the 2018 Presidential Election.

Mr. Yameen was ultimately defeated by his Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) rival and current President – Ibrahim Mohamed Solih – in the November 2018 polls, a victory secured among allegations New Delhi had tipped its finger on the scales by meddling in the election.

The Indian government denied a request to withdraw its Indian Military helicopters from the Maldives in the months leading up to the 2018 Presidential Election

These allegations were given undeniable credibility when former President and current Speaker of Parliament – Mohamed Nasheed – gave an interview to India Today in 2019, in which he praised Indian officials and diplomats for creating a “small window” to help MDP win the election.

Worryingly, for many Maldivians, President Solih has been acting as New Delhi’s “yes-man” since the election, prompting widespread concerns he has traded the country’s sovereignty and independence to enrich his political and personal fortunes, while also dressing up Indian military expansionism as “infrastructure projects.”

More troubling still is the way some of the agreements between the two countries have been signed in secrecy, and made available to the public only because of leaked documents obtained by The Maldives Journal earlier this year.

Worryingly, for many Maldivians, President Solih has been acting as New Delhi’s “yes-man” since the election.

At the core of the protesters grievances is revelation the current Maldivian government has signed a secretive deal with New Delhi, allowing for Indian military personnel to enjoy full diplomatic immunity and tax exemption status, thus constituting a violation of the Maldivian Constitution, which states foreign soldiers may not be stationed in the country without full approval from Parliament.

Hamdham Shakeel, co-founder and editor of the independently operated Maldives News Network, explained to Politics Today how Maldivians don’t wish to be caught in the middle of a potential future shooting war between India and China in the increasingly contested Indian Ocean, a concern he described as “one of the major driving forces behind anti-Indian military sentiments.”

“Stationing and operating military assets in the Maldives would mean that it has become a point of military operation. Maldivians would have to face collateral damages for stationing Indian military personnel and hardware in the Maldives,” therefore breaking from its long-held policy of remaining neutral in regional and great power rivalries, said Shakeel.

Of particular concern is an agreement signed between the current Maldivian government and India on 21 February to develop and maintain the country’s most strategic military naval bases – Uthuru ThilhaFalhu (UTF) – which is not only located within close proximity to the capital city, but also described as its “last line of defence.”

Details of the agreement became public only after it was leaked to local newspapers, revealing Indian military personnel will be allowed to carry arms and live ammunition and conduct their own surveillance and patrols in the country.

It’s for these reasons, the “Indian Military Out” protest movement continues to gather steam, becoming better organized, with the group “Defend Maldives,” consisting of the opposition coalition, a breakaway faction of the ruling party and many other smaller groups, lending its support and infrastructure.

Expectedly, the Maldivian government launched a counter campaign against the protest movement on 17 November, when it issued a statement condemning the protesters as only a “small group of individuals with the objective of tarnishing the country’s long-standing cordial ties with India,” while accusing them of “spreading false information.”

Conspicuously, however, the Maldivian government mischievously removed the word “military” in its statement, therefore mislabelling the protest movement as “India Out,” a naked effort to malign the “Indian Military Out” protest movement as anti-India.

Shakeel scoffed at the government’s characterization of the protesters, describing the Maldivian people as great friends of the Indian people and culture, and saying they specifically oppose India’s BJP government’s “aggressive foreign policy revolving around Indian imperialism in the Indian Ocean” and encroachment on the country’s sovereignty and independence.

Pakistan entered the ICC T-20 World Cup with a least than ideal preparation, after both the England and New Zealand cricket teams cancelled their respective tours to the country in September, citing “security concerns,” thus depriving the Green Shirts of a much-needed tune up on the eve of the white ball tournament in the United Arab Emirates.

On Sunday evening, however, Pakistan shocked the world by upstaging its perennial foe and tournament favourite – India– in a match played before a packed Dubai International Cricket Stadium and a television audience surpassing one billion people.

If cricket perfection is attainable, then Pakistan came within a whisker of it in securing an impossible to better 10-wicket victory, which was delivered on the back of Shaheen Sha Afridi’s blistering speed and mercurial guile, along with the batting precision, elegance and brutality of Babar Azam and Mohammad Rizwan.

Despite his team’s humiliating defeat, Indian captain Virat Kolhi gave a masterclass in accepting loss with graciousness and humility, heaping praise on his opponents for their professionalism and performance, saying, “They definitely outplayed us. There’s no doubt about that.”

Muslims are secretly plotting to take over the country via Love Jihad (intercommunal marriage), Land Jihad (property acquisition), Economic Jihad (starting businesses,) Corona Jihad (deliberately spreading the virus to Hindus), and now Cricket Jihad, where Indian Muslim cricketers are deliberately underperforming on the field to help Pakistan win games at the ICC T-20 World Cup, according to pro-government supporters.

Cricket Jihad” Conspiracy

While it’s tempting to dismiss the newly minted “Cricket Jihad” conspiracy as the mutterings and ramblings of a nation overflowing with bigoted, sore losers, the reality is far more sinister, with the Indian government using Pakistan’s victory on the cricket pitch to wage yet another violent and anti-democratic crackdown on Muslims in India and Kashmir.

On Wednesday, police in India’s largest state – Uttar Pradesh – charged seven Muslims, but taking four of them into custody, for allegedly “raising Pro-Pak slogans or celebrating Pakistan’s victory over India in the T20 Cricket World Cup match that took place on Oct 24,” according to a brief from Chief Minister’s Office.

The four were detained under an array of local laws and different charges, including, “Posting WhatsApp status in support of Pakistan and its cricket team,” “Uploading Pakistan’s flag as the cover image and profile image on his Facebook account and for uploading posts in support of Pakistan’s win vs India,” and “Posting support for Pakistan” in public domain.

A school teacher in Rajasthan’s Udaipur city was not only arrested for sharing a celebratory post on WhatsApp following Pakistan’s win over India, but also was charged and arrested by police, before being later released on bail.

In Indian administered Kashmir, two medical students from two separate medical colleges were also arrested after being charged under the draconian anti-terror law Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) for causing “insult to the national sentiment during the cricket match.” They now join more than 2,300 other Kashmiri Muslims who have been detained under UAPA law since the Indian government stripped the disputed territory of its semi-autonomous status on August 5, 2019.

Indian Government’s Silence

On Thursday, three Kashmir students in Agra, Uttar Pradesh were physically assaulted by a mob of Hindu nationalist thugs in the company of police as they were being brought before a court to face sedition charges in relation to celebrating Pakistan’s victory over India at T20 World Cup.

On the other side of the sub-continent, Hindu nationalists, led by militant Hindutva organizations Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), carried out their sixth consecutive day of violence against Muslims in the north-eastern state of Tripura on Tuesday, the day Pakistan defeated New Zealand in its second match of the World Cup tournament.

The Indian government has not only refused to condemn violent attacks against Muslims and the destruction of more than a dozen mosques and hundreds of homes in Tripura, but also has done nothing to halt the violence and little to arrest the perpetrators, thus signalling its tacit support for terrorism against the religious minority.

Just two years after the December 1971 war between Pakistan and India, on May 18, 1974, India detonated a nuclear device, confirming it possessed the A-bomb.

Pakistan had already lost a significant part of its land in that war. East Pakistan, which had already been undergoing a civil war, had emerged as the independent state of Bangladesh with help from India. With the war lost, and the country now divided, the timing of the Indian nuclear test could not have been worse.

Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was under intense pressure to counter what was perceived as a threat to the very sovereignty of Pakistan. Just a few years back, in 1965, in an interview, Bhutto had said that if India built a nuclear bomb, “we will eat grass, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.”

Sensing what was being cooked next door, he had already directed work on Pakistan’s nuclear program to be initiated and research had already begun in 1972. But it was progressing very slowly, and the prime minister’s restlessness was growing with each passing day. Now, India’s test had come to confirm his worst fears.

Like serendipity, a letter from a hardly known young scientist working in Amsterdam, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, arrived, in which he offered his services to provide guidance for Pakistan’s nuclear program – Mossad officials would later regret having failed to assassinate him in time.

Dr. Khan, was immediately invited for a meeting by PM Bhutto. Upon his arrival in December 1974, he was surprised to learn that Pakistan’s nuclear program had already set about. What he did not like, however, was that the scientists were relying on the plutonium route. He sharply criticized this approach and explained the viability of the uranium enrichment route to Bhutto. Upon Bhutto’s request, he spelled out the action plan for highly enriched uranium to the scientists of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC).

One year after the first meeting, when Khan came to his home country for his annual vacation, and happened to visit the site, he was dismayed with the pace of progress. The scientists already working in the PAEC were no lightweights and perhaps had little reason to be receptive towards the views of someone they saw – more or less – as a holidaymaker, coming from Amsterdam for vacation and telling them what to do. The distance bomb-learning program was not working.

But Khan’s frustration over the inefficiency of the program resulted in a reaction he did not expect: Bhutto invited Khan to leave his job, settle in Pakistan, and lead the program. Khan, who was well settled in his new home abroad, which he liked very much, and who also had a wife from the Netherlands, initially expressed hesitance.

Khan had studied metallurgy in Germany, materials engineering in the Netherlands, and obtained a doctorate from the Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium. Just after his doctorate, he had joined the company Verenigde Machinefabrieken Stork-Werkspoor (VMF) in the Netherlands, which had a big portfolio of heavy machinery, including nuclear plants-related equipment.

Khan got posted by VMF as a consultant at Urenco, a uranium enrichment company, which used to provide enriched uranium to power plants in Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and the United States. According to Khan, the company was facing problems with designing gas centrifuges, and being an expert in materials, he was one of the engineers posted to this top secret facility.

Thus, Khan brought with him his experience and expertise in designing gas centrifuge technologies for uranium enrichment, which represented perhaps the most critical part in developing weapons-grade nuclear technology. He started working at a rapid pace to build the facility, and to develop and acquire materials and technologies, as fast as possible, without being detected.

Khan was a scientist, a metallurgist, and a nuclear-program architect, but at the same time, he was at the center of a secret network, having to strike deals to procure whatever was required from wherever at minimum cost and in the shortest time. Sometimes, this might have meant defense cooperation with other countries. In any case, the work progressed swiftly, and by the 1980s, Pakistan had achieved the capability for nuclear explosion.

Interestingly, the PAEC and the KRL, both complemented each other, but in many ways emerged as competitors too. Both claimed to have reached the potential to make a bomb in the 1980s using their own routes.

When India mobilized its forces in 1987 and started some of the biggest war exercises since WWII, Pakistani General Zia-ul-Haq landed in India to “watch a test match.” At the airport, he briefly met Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and warned him with a chilling equanimity, “Mr Rajiv, you want to attack Pakistan, do it. But keep in mind that this world will forget Hulagu Khan and Genghis Khan and will remember only Zia-ul-Haq and Rajiv Gandhi, because this will not be a conventional war but a nuclear war…”

With that threat, the war was averted. And Israel’s plans to strike KRL plants with India’s help, had fallen flat too.

The nuclear tests and Khan’s legacy

It was not until 1998 that Pakistan came to the fore with the bomb. When India performed its tests on May 11 and 13, 1998, Pakistan decided to go ahead with its own merely 17 days later. Pakistan conducted its nuclear explosions in an unpopulated, granite mountain range in Balochistan Province, under the name “Chaghi-I” on May 28, 1998 and “Chaghi-II” on May 30, 1998.

Before this, some had doubted Pakistan’s nuclear capability altogether. But the speed of Pakistani reaction came as a surprise even to those who believed it was in possession of an atomic bomb. Independent sources, based on seismic activity, confirmed that Pakistan had indeed conducted nuclear tests.

Today, the country is estimated to have a stockpile of nearly 165 nuclear warheads compared to India’s 156. Moreover, the KRL, in competition with the PAEC, operates a booming missiles program, in addition to other defense equipment.

Meanwhile, Khan became the target of Western media and governments quite early. In 1983, he was sentenced in absentia for trying to steal enrichment secrets from the Netherlands. He denied the charges, citing that the information he used to build the centrifuges was available in various sources which did not need any classified access. His conviction was overturned in 1986.

In 2004, Khan was accused of smuggling nuclear secrets and operating a nuclear black market. Pakistan, which is not a signatory to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and hence not bound by its terms, assured the international community of cooperation to avoid a backlash and possible sanctions.

To the nation’s surprise, the country’s hero appeared on national television and expressed regret over his actions, extending an unconditional apology. He confessed to having supplied gas centrifuge components to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Immediately, he was put under house arrest to prevent further proliferation.

His house arrest ended in 2009, when a court found the house arrest orders to be illegal; however, his freedom to move remained severely restricted and he was kept under watch until his death on October 10, 2021, a few weeks after he had recovered from COVID19.

For much of the past seven years, the international community has stood on the sidelines as a passive onlooker as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) he leads, ratches up telegraphed efforts to eradicate and annihilate the country’s 200 million Muslims.

The United Nations, Western democracies and even the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) each turned a blind eye and deaf ear to a speech given by then BJP president and current Home Affairs Minister Amit Shah in 2019, whereby he vowed to “remove every single infiltrator from the country, except Buddhists, Hindus and Sikhs.”

When the Indian government suddenly stripped Kashmir of its semi-autonomous status by undemocratically revoking Articles 370 and 35A of the Constitution on August 5, 2019, with the unmistakable intent of changing the disputed territory’s Muslim majority demography, it barely caused a ripple outside of Pakistan.

Equally ignored are the country’s year-on-year upward spike in anti-Muslim hate crimes, efforts to strip Muslims of their civil and democratic rights, including the Citizenship Amendment Act, National Register of Citizens, and so-called anti-Love Jihad laws, and nationwide calls for genocide among members of India’s ruling party or its closely held allies.

But when video emerged of a Hindu photographer jumping up and down triumphantly on a lifeless Muslim man, who had been shot and killed seconds earlier by a throng of police officers during an eviction drive in Assam’s Darrang district on September 25, the international community suddenly sprang to attention.

This was the moment the international community witnessed the Indian government cross the proverbial Rubicon River, a point of no turning back from what appears to be an irreversible slide towards genocide. The world now had footage to match a warning made two years ago by Dr. Gregory Stanton, founder of Genocide Watch, when he said, “Preparation for a genocide is definitely underway in India.”

Oman’s Grand Mufti Sheikh Ahmed Al Khalili, who’s widely regarded as one of the most influential clerics in the Middle East, put out a statement accusing the Indian government of “blatant aggression” against Muslims,” and called on Muslim counties to stand united against it.

Dr. Abdulaziz Othman Altwaijiri, former director of Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (IESCO), accused India’s “Hindu government” of persecuting Muslims “within the framework of a systematic policy and in light of international silence and Islamic inaction.”

There does, however, appear to be a global awakening towards the persecution of Indian Muslims, with the hashtags “India Kills Muslims,” “Indian Muslims Under Attack” and “Boycott Indian Products” trending on social media in Arab and Asian countries, alike.

Whether this evolves into something akin to the Boycott, Divestment and Sanction (BDS) movement against Israel remains to be seen, but what’s clear for now the Modi government’s actions and rhetoric, particularly as they apply to Muslims, is under a level of global scrutiny like never before.

When he became the first Indian prime minister to not be received at the porch of the White House by either the U.S. President or First Lady, which was widely interpreted a diplomatic rebuttal of his government’s human rights violations in Assam and Kashmir, a cold chill could be felt throughout the Indian parliament.

This chill made ever frostier by the recent hosting of the first ever major online conference on Hindutva in the United States, which saw faculty members and students from more than 53 universities, including Harvard and Stanford, come together with the objective of “Dismantling Global Hindutva.”

With growing international pressure and condemnation, along with a continued worsening of the economy, with unemployment and poverty levels rising to their highest levels in more than a decade, Modi needs something, anything that simultaneously throws the global community off his back and keeps Hindu voters polarized against Muslims.

This diversion came tragically, but politically opportunistically for the Modi government when members of a hitherto unknown militant group – the Resistant Front – were alleged to have assassinated two school teachers and a businessman in Indian occupied Kashmir on October 7.

A statement issued by the group said the targets were killed because they were “non-local Hindutva agents” and “government informers.” Indian security forces claim, without evidence, the militant group works under the orders of a “handler in Pakistan,” providing the pretext for a military crackdown in the disputed territory, which has already resulted in the arrests of more than 700 Kashmiri Muslims accused of being “terrorist sympathizers.”

If the sum of New Delhi’s fears is a Taliban take-over of Afghan government in Kabul, then those anxieties received a further jolt on 26 July when Pakistan reopened a major southwestern border crossing that is currently under Taliban control on the Afghan side.

Islamabad has said the border crossing will be used only for the transportation of food and other goods, the Afghan government has accused Pakistan of backing the Taliban, an accusation that invites the Indian government to imagine future teams of violent jihadists flowing across Pakistan into India and Kashmir.

New Delhi is also acutely aware that a destabilized Afghanistan, or one controlled by the Taliban is totally fine with Islamabad, particularly because friendly relations between the Indian government and Kabul is the sum of Islamabad’s fears. What Pakistan fears most is being wedged between two hostile states – India on its eastern border and an Indian friendly Kabul on its western frontier.

It’s for these reasons, Pakistan has a close or cordial relationship with the Taliban, and India with the Afghan government, thus posing a strategic problem for New Delhi as the militants make their seemingly unstoppable march towards the Afghan capital.

New Delhi is now planning for the inevitable by reaching out to the Taliban, an effort made complicated by the military support it has long provided the Afghan government in its war against the militants. India has already invested $3 billion in aid and reconstruction activities in the country, including providing Kabul with combat helicopters, artillery platforms, small arms, surveillance and targeting technologies and ammunition.

Kabul has been pleading with New Delhi for more military assistance and sent Afghan Army chief Wali Mohammad Ahmadzai to India on 27 July for a 3-day series of meetings with his Indian military counterparts, but requests for more weapons and Indian soldiers have fallen largely upon deaf ears because the Taliban appear set for total victory.

India’s former ambassador to the United Nations, Syed Akbaruddin, said in a recent interview that there’s no chance of India sending troops to Afghanistan, saying, “We have challenges on our own frontiers too. In the current situation I don’t think there is any political or public acceptance for it.”

Instead, New Delhi is “scrambling” to open diplomatic channels with the Taliban, with India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar signalling his country’s interest in engaging with the Taliban during a video conference held in September of last year.

But to date, this effort has also fallen upon deaf ears because of India’s hitherto military partnership with the Afghan government.

Suhail Shaheen, a spokesperson for the Taliban, accused India of “siding with the government installed by foreigners” during a recent interview with Foreign Policy.

“They are not with us. If they stick to their policy of supporting a government imposed on Afghans, then maybe they should be worried. That is a wrong policy which will not serve them,” he said, before adding, “We have reports from our commanders that India is providing weapons to the other side.”

“How is it possible that they want to talk to the Taliban but practically they are providing weapons, drones, everything to Kabul? This is contradictory.”

This – a starkly contrasting tone to the one struck five years ago, when a former Taliban spokesperson said the group had “no problem with Hindustan…In fact, we want to send them a message of peace and friendship.”

But now that the Taliban anticipates victory, it sees little or no advantage in forging close diplomatic ties with New Delhi, especially given neighboring Pakistan, China and Iran, along with Russia have each expressed a willingness to accept and normalize a future Taliban controlled Afghan government.

From the Taliban’s perspective, it’s fledgling relationship with China offers the most upside, given the Asian country’s status as a regional and global superpower, and its desire to include Afghanistan as part of its Belt and Road Initiative, having expressed interest to construct a motorway connecting Kabul to Peshawar, Pakistan, as reported by the Daily Beast.

That said, any future relationship China, Pakistan, Russia, and Iran strikes with the Taliban will not come without unwanted complications and blowback, a reality that gives India room to pause and breathe, particularly because each of these countries has ongoing security issues with what they deem to be Islamic extremists and separatists within their own borders.

“This explains why not only India but several Asian countries consider the return of Taliban as a security headache despite Pakistan and China reportedly looking for an advantageous role in Afghanistan, the strategic heart of Asia,” observes India Today columnist Prabhash K. Dutta.

India will take heart from the fact that the Taliban is likely to incite fear and a sense of insecurity among non-Pashtun ethnic communities along the Afghan-Pak border, which might spark conflict within Pakistan’s borders.

India will also see value in persisting with backchannel diplomacy with the Taliban, knowing the militant group will need significant outside help to reconstruct the country in a post-civil war environment. The Taliban will also see upside in establishing a security guarantee with India to allow it space to focus almost exclusively on domestic concerns.

But for now, New Delhi is adopting a multilateral approach to unfolding events in Afghanistan by calling for peaceful reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban, while at the same time urging its geopolitical allies, including the United States, to avoid presuming the insurgent group has secured victory, and to not rush into “normalizing” a Taliban takeover of the country.

India’s ruling party – the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – has not only been chipping away at the rights of religious minorities in the courts since taking power under Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014, but also in the streets, where Muslims are faced with escalating threats from roaming Hindutva radicalized gangs.

The data shows that 90 percent of religious hate crimes in the previous decade occurred after Modi was sworn into office, and that an overwhelming majority of the victims were Muslims and perpetrators Hindus.

What we are witnessing today is the mass radicalization of a Hindu majority under a regime that has made no secret of its intent and desire to transform the country’s secular democracy into a tyrannical Hindu theocracy.

At the same time the Modi Government and BJP ruled states enact laws to make Muslims second class citizens, their most vociferous supporters are lynching Muslims, Dalits and other religious minorities with a perceived sense of total impunity.

And who could blame Hindu nationalists for thinking the Indian state had given them its explicit blessing to carry out dastardly deeds.

And who could blame Hindu nationalists for thinking the Indian state had given them its explicit blessing to carry out dastardly deeds, given the way in which Delhi Police officers so enthusiastically participated in the slaughter of 52 Muslims during the 2020 Delhi Riots?

A fact-finding report into the violence cited “instances of sexual harassment of Muslim women by the cops and also instances of police engaging in direct violence and abuse” during the riots that broke out in Northeast Delhi, after a former BJP leader urged his followers to attack anti-Citizenship Amendment Act protesters.

Victims of the violence, and their lawyers, have accused authorities of pressuring them to drop their respective cases and of sabotaging the investigation by carrying out raids of law firm offices to destroy evidence against Delhi Police.

On 23 May, police raided the home of 42-year-old Mohammed Aquil Qureshi in the state of Uttar Pradesh, after Hindu locals accused him of cow slaughter. According to his surviving wife and two daughters, the police tried extorting a bribe from Qureshi, before cracking him over the head with the butt of a gun and then throwing him to his death from the home’s terrace.

On 23 May, police raided the home of 42-year-old Mohammed Aquil Qureshi in the state of Uttar Pradesh, after Hindu locals accused him of cow slaughter.

What we are witnessing here is the radicalization of the country’s police departments by Hindu nationalist forces, a reality brought clearer into view by the recent upward surge in the deaths and torture of Muslims in police custody.

On 31 May, a 21-year-old Muslim man in Haryana was tortured to death in the custody of Haryana’s cybercrime police unit. The killers not only used anti-Muslim slurs against his family members but threatened violence against them should they file a report.

“If you file a complaint, I will make your entire family like Junaid’s state”, a police officer reportedly told the victim’s brothers, according to their mother.

Sadly, he wouldn’t be only Muslim murdered in police custody that day in Haryana.

Fifty-year-old Ayub Khan was tortured to death by police officer at Panipat’s Quila police station.

On 1 June, police in Uttar Pradesh’s Amroha are reported to have tortured six Muslim men in custody the “whole night,” after locals had falsely accused them of slaughtering an ox. One of the victims said the police boasted that even if they were to murder them, they would only be “transferred” as punishment.

A recent report into custodial torture and death across the world reveals that 1,731 people died in the custody of Indian security forces and correction officers in 2019, with most of the victims hailing from minority communities, particularly Muslims and Dalits.

The authors of the report also found that a majority of the deaths were caused by torture, and that the use of torture is “rampant” in India and meant to punish them or gather information or extract confessions.

Apart from most common methods of torture, such as punching, kicking and slapping, the study found that torture methods used by the police also included administering electric shocks, hammering iron nails into the torso, beating the soles of the feet, hanging detainees upside down and then hitting in private parts, stabbings with hand held tools, pouring petrol onto private parts, branding with hot iron rods, urinating into the mouth, inserting hard blunt object into anus and kicking pregnant women.

When Israeli warplanes, artillery positions and armed drones rained missiles and bombs upon Gaza for 11 consecutive days last month, killing 253 Palestinians, 66 of whom were children, the Israeli Government received predictable support from the United States, but the words of solidarity it received from India has raised eyebrows around the world.

Whereas Congressional Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. offered boilerplate talking points in defense of Israeli military aggression against a largely defenseless civilian population, members of India’s ruling party – Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – and its allies unabashedly pontificated their solidarity with the self-proclaimed Jewish state on social media.

For more than a week, the hashtags #IndiaWithIsrael, “#ISupportIsrael, #IndiaStandsWithIsrael and #PalestineTerrorists were the top trending topics on Twitter in India, demonstrating widespread popular support for the Israel and its heavy-handed military response to Palestinian resistance.

Indian journalist Rana Ayyub reviewed tweets posted under these hashtags and found that “a common thread that runs through is a visceral hatred for Muslims and a bloodlust to see Muslims massacred and shown their place,” adding, “Most handles followed by one or more BJP minister or the PM himself.”

These tweets echoed pronouncements made by members of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Government, including Member of Parliament Tejasyi Surya, who posted on Twitter, “We are with you. Stay strong, Israel,” and a BJP spokesperson, Guarav Goel, who posted, “Dear Israelis, you are not alone, we Indians stand strongly with you.”

These expressions of solidarity with Israel by members of India’s ruling party and its supporters make it easy to forget that the Indian relationship with Israel has been anything but close or even cordial, with previous Indian administrations expressing hostility towards Israel for its persecution of the Palestinian people and occupation of the Palestinian Territories.

“Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the English or France to the French,” Mahatma Gandhi wrote in 1938. A decade later India would become one of only 13 countries to vote against the United Nations Partition Plan, which divided historic Palestine into two separate states – thus forming the foundation of the Israeli state in 1948.

India also voted for a UN resolution that condemned Zionism as “a form of racism and racial discrimination,” stating, “The racist regime in occupied Palestine and the racist regime in Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common imperialist origin, forming a whole and having the same racist structure and being organically linked in their policy aimed at repression of the dignity and integrity of the human being.”

India’s Cold War alliance with the Soviet Union also made it a natural opponent of the United States’ geopolitical orbit, while its large Muslim population helped the country maintain close ties with the Arab world, particularly the Palestinians – but when the Communist superpower collapsed in 1991, New Delhi hit the reset button on its relationship with Tel Aviv.

A natural thawing of relations between the two former British ruled colonies has blossomed into a full blown “special friendship,” with many likening the bond between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Modi as a full blown “bromance,” one that oversaw a record $1.5 billion arms deal in 2016, making Israel the second-largest weapons exporter to the Indian state. Bilateral trade between the two countries has ballooned from $200 million in the early 1990s to nearly $6 billion today.

This fledgling Modi-Netanyahu “bromance” is not only driven by trade deals, but also by shared values, as both Hindu nationalism and Zionism draw from the same spring of hate – ethno-nationalist ideologies. Whereas Hindu nationalists seek to transform India into a Hindu Rashtra (nation), one absent non-Hindu religious minorities, but particularly Muslims, Zionism aims to cleanse the Palestinian Territories of non-Jews, but particularly Muslims.

At the core of the Modi Government’s ideological DNA is the militant Hindu organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which has long admired Israel’s brutality of the Palestinian people. RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat gave voice to this sentiment when he said in 2016, “Israel was attacked by surrounding Islamic countries on five occasions, but the Israeli people repulsed their aggressions and extended their boundaries due to strong resolve to save motherland.”

Somdeep Sen, an associate professor of international development studies at Roskilde University in Denmark, accurately observes, “The electoral successes of the BJP have meant that what was once a fringe Hindu nationalist love affair with Israel has now become a matter of public policy.”

It’s no surprise then that India has modelled its settler-colonial-project in Kashmir on Israel’s settler enterprise in the Palestinian Territories by turning military outposts into settlements, and settlements into bona fide towns and even small cities. In both projects, the occupying force rules over a restive Muslim majority population, and it’s for this reason India has turned to Israel for its supply of occupation management tools and strategies.

The corona virus pandemic has affected and devastated the world. Every country in the globe has been affected by the virus which does not distinguish between developing or developed countries, rich or poor.

COVID19 has changed the lives of millions, disrupted, and even uprooted the lives of many others. There are not many people in this world who have not experienced the devastation of COVID19. Countries that fared well during the first wave have failed in their responses to their second waves such as India.

As the pandemic raged in its first wave, India’s strict lockdown policy between March 25 to May 31, 2020, proved to have worked to limit the number of cases and even bringing the average down to 20% of its peak compared to the population of India of 1.3 billion people. India was an exporter of vaccines, shipping 66 million doses since January, while its own cases rose.

However, India is devastated with its second wave of COVID19 infections leading up to 23 million infections with 250,000 dead in mid-May alone according to The New York Times, while the actual figures are much higher and go unreported.

Hospitals are overwhelmed and depleted of oxygen tanks which have become as valuable as gold as people are dying on the streets. Funerals have been held en masses where resources for the funeral pyres have also become hard to find and afford.

It is devastating for families that must cope with their loved ones going through the ravages of the pandemic while families that live in diaspora have no way of helping their loved ones back home including the frustration of cancelled and banned flights from and to India.

For Indians living in the diaspora, the anguish of helplessness for their family members grows day by day.

For Indians living in the diaspora, the anguish of helplessness for their family members grows day by day. The constant anxiety that our loved ones are at severe risk has made many scrambling to secure oxygen tanks for family members and send funds that can give them a chance at life, so they do not end up like thousands who had been rejected and turned back by multiple hospitals.

My mother for one, calls upon her family a few times a day just to see if her cousin who lives with a pre-existing condition and nieces and nephews are safe. The most tragic confrontation with COVID19 my family has faced in India is my aunt’s contracting the virus, who became a widow a few months ago with the loss of my uncle. Her situation was so dire that the doctors at the hospital had no indication that she would make it out of the hospital alive.

If it was not for a family member living in the United States, who had direct connections to the hospital’s doctors and staff, they would not have treated her with attention. We have been blessed that her condition had turned around, that was not the case for so many as her sister, who accompanied her at the hospital, had to witness numerous people leaving the hospital in body bags.

Up until recently, another personal scare was when my close friend in Delhi sent a voice note that her entire family has been affected and her father is in the hospital in serious condition. Luckily for her and her family, her father made it while many did not. There have been countless stories I hear from friends who have lost loved ones already.

One of my friends who resides in London, England, has lost three members of his family in India. One was his cousin who left behind two little girls who will never know the love of their father again.

However, politics prevail over life in this case as the failure of the second wave falls completely on the rights-wing Hindu nationalist government of Prime Minister Narinder Modi. Instead of following COVID19 guidelines of wearing masks and social distancing in public places, he held mass political rallies and allowed religious zealots to hold mass festivals that became super spreaders.

It came to the point where Narinder Modi and other political leaders tried to prevent social media sites and other media sources from showing images of the apocalyptic scenes of people dying in the streets and the cremation sites.

Previously, the state of Punjab where our family is from was not as affected until outside residents started to come into the state for medical treatments at the hospitals. This has pushed COVID19 cases in the state of Punjab further. It is more upsetting to have learned that Narinder Modi and his government has denied the state of Punjab to facilitate an oxygen corridor to procure oxygen tanks and gases from Pakistan who is a traditional ‘enemy of India’ since its inception and partition of 1947.

This is despite Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan offering to help India in providing medical aid.

The chief minister of Punjab Amrinder Singh and many other politicians have repeatedly asked Narinder Modi’s government to procure the lifesaving equipment from the city of Lahore, Pakistan which is only 31 miles from Amritsar, Punjab, instead of waiting for oxygen, health equipment and other medical aid from the state of Jharkhand, 1,088 miles away. It is tragic that the right-wing Indian government cares more about maintaining their political egos than accepting much needed help from a neighboring country that they see as their ‘enemy’ while millions of people have been affected with COVID19 and thousands are proclaimed dead each day.

It is heartbreaking and tragic to witness the thousands of lives lost each day to COVID19 from afar. The thought that maybe someone we know, or a family member can easily become one of those statistics is a constant anxiety.

The fear that the next phone call from the motherland will bring intense news of sadness makes us all feel we should have done more in the past to be with them. Only if we can take a flight back home and console them that they are not alone, we stand with them shoulder to shoulder, from afar.

The Indian government’s criminally negligent mishandling of the Coronavirus pandemic has made the country a dystopic COVID19 hell, as mass cremations and burials, along with scenes of COVID19 distressed patients choking to death in the streets washing over our social media timelines like a gigantic tidal wave.

Almost every layer of government has been completely overwhelmed. The health system is on the brink of collapse, but rather than tend to the crisis at hand, the Narendra Modi led regime is waging a war against its critics by ordering Twitter to silence its critics and carrying out property seizures against journalists who report the truth about the country’s rapid descent into the COVID19 abyss.

As new daily cases continue spiking upwards, surpassing 350,000 per day on Monday, the people of Indian Administered Kashmir fear for the worse, knowing they are not only subjected to the brutal rule of an Indian military occupation but also the incompetence and neglect of an Indian central government.

The Kashmiri people are especially concerned for the health and welfare of their loved ones who remain trapped in prisons and dungeons throughout the territory and India for no other crime than speaking out against Indian colonial rule and in favor of self-determination. They are Kashmir’s political prisoners.

“The Republic of India is facing a tsunami of COVID19 with tens of thousands of cases every day including thousands of deaths which has put lives of Kashmiri political prisoners at highest risk,” the Kashmiri advocacy group Legal Forum for Kashmir (LFOVK) urged in a letter to the WHO Director General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus.

LVOVK has also pleaded with International Committee Red Cross and other human rights organizations to take concrete steps to pressure India into releasing Kashmiri political prisoners from their jails, saying, “Any danger to their lives will be solely on the shoulders of Republic of India.”

The group has identified the Kashmiri political prisoners as Muhammad Ashraf Sehrai, Shabir Ahmad Shah, Masarat Alam Bhat, Altaf Ahmad Shah, Bashir Ahmad Bhat alias Peer Saifullah, Raj Mahraj-uddin-Kalwal, Ghulam Muhammad Bhat, Ayaz Akbar, Farooq Ahmad, Shahid-ul-Islam, Syed Shakeel, Nayeem Ahmad Khan, Zahoor Ahmad Watali, Shahid ul Islam, Dr. Ashiq Hussain Faktoo, Muhammad Yasin Malik.