On November 13, 2019, upon the invitation of U.S. President Donald Trump, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid a working visit to the United States. Watching from the sidelines, Russia observed the visit attentively and waited for the outcomes.

The Russian State News Agency, TASS, reported on the visit with the following title: “With or Without the West? Erdogan Makes a Choice in Washington.” The primary question that TASS focused on in regards to the meeting between the two leaders, was whether Turkey’s position in the NATO alliance would change.

In fact, it is necessary to separate Russian coverage of the meeting made by Russian mainstream media, such as television channels and newspapers, on the one hand, with high circulation and broader impact, and think tanks on the other, such as the Russian Council and the Institute of the Middle East, whose publications address a smaller audience who are professionally interested in specific countries. There was a noticeable difference in how both groups covered President Erdogan’s visit to Washington.

Publications from Russian mainstream media targeted at a wider audience, which include the aforementioned TASS Agency, focused on the problematic relations between the West and Turkey, especially in the framework of the NATO Alliance. This is despite the fact that some politicians in Russia consider President Trump to be a leader who is trying to be a businessman in politics, is always ready for dialogue and compromise, and that is just enveloped in a “bad environment,” which refers almost entirely to outside the perimeter of the White House, including Congress, the Pentagon, and the Department of State. Just remember how the State Duma applauded the election of Donald Trump, hoping that he will change the course of relations between the U.S. and Russia. Today the widely accepted opinion of President Trump in Russia is that “he is a good guy, but without power and in a bad environment”.

On the eve of President Erdogan’s visit to Washington, this “bad environment” presented itself in two unpleasant surprises for U.S.-Turkish relations. This came in the form of two bills. One seeking the adoption of sanctions against Turkey due to its operations in Syria, the other which aimed to recognize the events of 1915 as a “genocide of the Armenian people”. The meeting between the two presidents was closely observed by Russia to see, first, how the meeting would enable both parties to resolve old issues, and, how they would be able to deal with new challenges.

The other problems in the relations between U.S and Turkey includes Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring in Syria, American support for the YPG in Syria, Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile defense systems, the U.S.’s proposal to supply the Patriots to Turkey, extradition of Fetullah Gulen (FETO criminal cult leader) to Turkey, the “Halkbank” case and so on.

The final press conference between Presidents Erdogan and Trump did not provide much news to the Russian media. They noticed Trump’s favorable tone and compliments to the Turkish president, as well as Erdogan’s return of the famous unpleasant letter to Trump.

The Turkish and U.S presidents again spoke about their goal to increase the trade turnover between two countries by five times, from the average value of USD 20 billion up to 100 billion. Interestingly, Trump’s wording about this target was misunderstood by the Russian media, even the central TV-channels. The Russian media incorrectly understood that Trump proposed a “trade deal” to Erdogan worth up to $100 billion if Turkey refused to use the Russian S-400 air defense systems. As a result, when Erdogan, once again, announced that the Russian-Turkish deal was in motion, it was interpreted in Russia as a rejection of $100 billion ‘in cash’.

During this same time, there were many observers in Russia who were surprised by the fact that Turkey is still trying its best to normalize bilateral relations, with the U.S in despite the problematic relations. What is equally as surprising to them is what Turkey is doing with the NATO Alliance. According to them NATO has lost its sense and meaning after the end of the Cold War, and is facing an identity crisis.

Russian Turkologists and think-tankers on Turkey

Russian think tanks, like the Russian Council and the Institute of Middle East, both located in Moscow, draw a picture that differs significantly from the one that is being shown to everyday Russians through the mass media.

Firstly, Russian analysts are completely devoid of any illusions regarding the possibility of Turkey leaving the NATO alliance whether it be short, medium or long term. Secondly, the fact that Turkey acts more independently in the present day and is building its own security architecture using the S-400, or the fact that it is more profitable for Turkey to leave NATO, does not necessarily entail that this is what Turkey wants. This is an axiom.

In addition to this, the existence of the very serious problems in Turkish-American relations is not a reason for the Turkish leadership to break its ties with the United States, as this would allow distortions towards alternative world centers of power, including Russia. The skill of maintaining a permanent balance in the international arena while simultaneously maintaining its position as an important country for many foreign players is a key advantage for Turkey. Of course,  it will not give this up.

As for the opinion of Russian think tanks, which is also supported by the author of this article, at this stage, there are currently a number of unresolvable problems when it comes to the bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States. These problems include the U.S. support to the YPG, the extradition of Fetullah Gulen to Turkey, and the purchase of S-400 systems in Turkey, which, in one way or another, has negatively affected Turkey’s ability to remain in the F-35 fighter jet program.

Briefly, what could be solved by the Washington visit of President Erdogan was solved. The resolution on the events of 1915 was blocked. However, the problems that cannot be solved today are being confined by Turkey. In other words, Turkish diplomacy seeks a way to separate zones of cooperation from problem areas.

Having carried out Operation Peace Spring in Syria and creating a security corridor along the Turkish-Syrian border, the Turkish leadership has finally set in motion the removal of YPG militants and is proceeding with arrangements to send Syrian refugees living in Turkey to these territories. Obviously, Turkey does not want to be the sole sponsor of this process and will seek financial support from the West. The search for this financial assistance will take place in the European Union as well as in the United States.

A further point, which I suppose may exist between Turkey and Russia is connected to the extradition foreign Daesh fighters. It is clear that Turkey, as the Turkish leadership often says, does not want to become a “hotel for terrorists”. But in order to deport criminals who are in Turkey, the Turkish leadership needs to mold a political response with a proper understanding of the situation both in the West and in the U.S. Turkey must try to avoid any matters or steps that may be interpreted abroad as “blackmailing”. Especially with this sensitive issue, when this is a classic cliché regarding President Erdogan that appears again and again in the West.

Given the fact that the Turkish economy needs a constant influx of foreign investment, it is no coincidence that before the negotiations with Trump, Erdogan met with major American business people. The goal of attracting a large capital into Turkey is not of any less importance for the Turkish leadership than the current situation in Syria. In parallel, the country’s credit and investment ratings should be sorted, which, to a large extent, relies heavily on the United States. If Erdogan’s trip to the U.S. were to be looked at from this perspective, it would be seen as follows:

1. Erdogan’s visit to the United States and meeting with Trump balanced the intensity of the dialogue between him and Vladimir Putin.
2. Although Trump spoke at the final press conference in general terms, his statements about Turkish-American relations and his relations with Erdogan were extremely positive. Thus, he sent a signal of “stability” to the stock exchange and to investors.
3. The most odious anti-Turkish initiatives in the United States were removed from the agenda.

By obtaining the U.S’s approval for Operation Peace Spring and negotiating in Washington, Erdogan clarified Turkish-American dialogue and sent a message to his partners in the Astana Process (both Russia and Iran) that Turkey was not building exclusive relations with them, and was not going to break away from the West. According to the Russian point of view, Turkey today concludes its most important agreements with Russia and will continue to do so in the near and continuing future. Since these breakthroughs have been achieved between Turkey and Russia, Turkey will continue to try to balance the ongoing dialogue in the West, even if it does not bring significant results for Turkey today.

Naturally, the situation may somehow change after the presidential elections in the U.S in year 2020, if a new administration comes into power in the White House. But there is hardly a voice among Russian analysts who expect rapid changes in the current triangle between Russia, Turkey and the U.S. For Turkey, Russia will be a country to develop the projects and dialogue, which it may not do with the West. While in the U.S., Turkey’s hard battle to address its concerns, and the existence of anti-Turkish voices will continue without any breakthroughs.

During Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring in the north of Syria, US President Donald Trump sent an unpleasant letter to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan that was later returned to him during Erdoğan’s visit to the White House. But besides Trump’s undiplomatic language, he also made an offer to facilitate negotiations between Turkey and a so-called “General” on the Northern Syrian issue. However, there was a problem. The person Trump referred to as a “General”, was actually a wanted terrorist by Turkey on Interpol’s red notice list and the US relationship with Kobani has become a sore point Turkish-US relation

After Kobani’s name was mentioned alongside the other European politicians, Turkish President Erdoğan strongly took issue to the fact that Mazloum Kobani is terrorist wanted by Turkey. “Now we are at a point that some European countries such as France and Germany are negotiating with leaders of this terrorist organization. Again, some American authorities discuss with them. And in the face of these developments, we ask them ‘What is this situation?’ On the one hand, we talk about counter-terrorism, on the other, unfortunately, you open your doors to them and sit around the table with them. You even sent their letter as an addition to your letter” he told in a press interview.

Turkish President Erdoğan also said that Washington has to hand over Kobani to Turkey according to international law. “We have an extradition agreement. The USA has to give this man to us. Because this is the requirement of ‘wanted by the red notice’ he said.

Who is Mazloum Kobani?

Ferhat Abdi Şahin, who is better known by the adopted name of Mazloum Kobani and also as Mazloum Abdi, or by the nom de guerre Şahin Cilo, was born in Afrin, Syria in 1967. Despite a lack of information about his early life, sources say that he met with the so-called leader of the PKK Abdullah Ocalan when he was a child. It was during Ocalan’s years in Syria that the bond between them was said to have grown. Because of his close relationship with Ocalan, Kobani is considered to be Ocalan’s spiritual son.

According to sources, in 1990, when Kobani was 23 years old, he joined the PKK. From 1991-1996, he worked as a so-called Cilo Region Manager in Turkey’s Hakkari province. Kobani was responsible for the 22 August 1996 rocket attack that killed five people and wounded 11 others in Hakkari’s Şemdinli province. He was also responsible for the 8 November 1996 rocket attack that killed 17 people and wounded eight other at Hakkari’s Çukurca Province.

From 1997 to 2003, he was assigned as the PKK’s Europe Manager. In these years, he established the PKK’s Europe organizational scheme. He described this period as ‘political works’ during some interviews. Sources say that during this period he made a lot of connections with governmental institutions in the name of the PKK.

Besides his ‘political works’ in Europe, he also organized some activities such as festivals and camps mainly in the Netherlands to promote the PKK.

When Ocalan was captured at Kenya in 1999, Kobani was living in Europe. After 2003, he returned to Syria and according to Euronews he was imprisoned by the Syrian Government on five occasions and until 2009 he spent most of his time in prison.

In 2013, during the early years of the Syrian civil war, he began to work for the YPG as a so-called special forces manager and individual responsible for intelligence. It was during these years that Daesh began to strengthen in Syria and despite Turkey’s objections, the US decided to collaborate with the YPG with the purpose of defeating the Daesh.

In 2018, after Daesh was defeated, the US administration began to refer to Mazloum Kobani as ‘General Mazloum’. Particularly after the US Defense Ministry Spokesman Col. Robert Manning first referred to him as ‘General’ and argued that the US would continue to help the YPG as long as they fight against Daesh. The usage of the term ‘General’ was condemned by Turkey. After Manning’s statement, Turkish Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hami Soylu gave a press brief about the situation saying “the Pentagon Spokesman spoke nonsense on Afrin matter”.

When Turkish President Erdoğan met with US President Trump in the White House this November, a month after Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring, the Turkish delegation showed a short documentary about Kobani to US officials. In the documentary Kobani was shown to have “cost of the life of 313 Turkish security forces, honourable men and women whose sole duty and purpose was to protect and serve their people. He also killed five civilians during attacks on 29 police stations between 1991 and 1995. His preferred modus operandi, a method all too familiar to our fellow audience: Suicide.”

Following this crucial meeting that some Republican Senators also attended, some specialists commented about Kobani’s possible Washington trip. Luke Coffey, a foreign policy expert at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative policy think tank, was one of them. “Ferhat Abdi Şahin (aka Mazloum Kobanê) should NEVER be allowed to step foot on American soil” he said on his verified twitter account. He also made a special statement on Turkey’s state television TRT at beginning of Operation Peace Spring. “To defeat a terrorist organization by collaborating with another terrorist organization is a great insincerity. Entirely meaningless… If the citizens of the USA knew that the taxes that they paid to the government transferred to the YPG, which is an arm of the Neo Marxist PKK in Syria, they would not like this” he said.

After these developments Turkey’s Communications Director İbrahim Kalın wrote an article about the attitude of American politicians towards Kobani’s possible Washington visit. “Why would U.S. lawmakers roll out the red carpet for the top commander of a terrorist group, who is the subject of an Interpol Red Notice? The senators are extending an invitation to Şahin due to his role as the head of the YPG, which the U.S. has chosen to support as part of its counterterrorism strategy in Syria. This decision is riddled with too many contradictions to list. This invitation not only damages Turkish-American relations, but also constitutes a potential crime under U.S. law, given the YPG’s ties with the PKK.” he stressed.

“The Turkish public will not forget or forgive those who invited Şahin to the U.S. in order to legitimize him. Our NATO ally’s efforts to glorify a terror organization’s leader will be etched in our memory for many years. Şahin’s invitation to the U.S. will create a lasting wound in the hearts and minds of thousands of innocent Turkish families that have lost their loved ones” Kalın also emphasized.

Ahmet Hakan, a Turkish Journalist from Hurriyet Daily commented on the Kobani’s situation after the Trump- Erdoğan meeting. In his opinion the Kobani video that was shown to the US officials ended Kobani’s positive reputation. He also noted that Turkish journalists President Erdoğan watched the Kobani video together with President Erdoğan after the significant meeting. He noted that “having watched the video, we turned our sight to President Erdoğan, who told us: ‘I got Trump and the senators to watch this. I saw that Trump was influenced by the video’”.

After this diplomatic movement, there is still no clear consensus between Ankara and Washington on the issue of Mazloum Kobani. Following the meeting in the White House, international media has stressed that Erdoğan strengthened his hand against Trump. In particular, CNN International’s White House correspondent Kevin Liptak wrote an Opinion piece about the meeting entitled “Trump declares himself a ‘big fan’ of Turkey’s strongman leader Erdoğan,” and writing that “Erdoğan isn’t the only global strongman to have caught Trump’s attention. But no leader has appeared to get what he wants from Trump quite like Erdoğan.”

Written by Yeter Ada Şeko – ISTANBUL

President Erdoğan met President Trump in the White House last Thursday. The content of the meeting largely met with expectations, and some of the key issues discussed included the issue of the YPG, the S-400-F-35 dilemma, the future of Syrian refugees, the FETO problem, the Halkbank case, and the Armenian bill. While a number of key issues remained unresolved, the meeting indicated a mutual commitment towards improving bilateral relations into the future. Although two issues at the top of the agenda, the YPG issue and the S-400-F-35 dilemma, were not resolved, President Erdoğan and President Trump underlined that Turkey and the US will continue to work on the resolution of key issues in the following days.

During the meetings with the President Trump and the members of the Senate, President Erdoğan stressed that the YPG could not be accepted as a legitimate organization representing the Kurds in the Northern Syria. President Erdoğan also shared evidence of the involvement of the YPG in terrorist attacks with the US officials. Moreover, a comprehensive report covering Turkey’s arguments prepared by Turkey’s Directorate of Communications was presented to the US side. Nevertheless, the US side seems eager to continue their relations with the YPG since the U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper recently stated that the “good relations” between the USA and the YPG would continue.

When it comes to the second most critical issue, the S-400-F-35 dilemma, both countries had a clear conflict of interest. The US stated that Turkey could be accepted into the F-35 program so long as it does not activate the Russian S-400 missile air defense systems. However, President Erdoğan stated that this option was not compatible with Turkey’s interests. Thus, both countries will need to continue to negotiate on this issue to find a common solution.

The future of Syrian refugees, the FETO problem, the Halkbank case, and the Armenian bill were other critical issues discussed during the meeting. President Erdoğan underlined that Turkey had already sent the necessary documents to the US to resolve the FETO problem, which includes the extradition of the FETO leader and shutting down FETO-affiliated schools and institutions, an issue which remains of utmost interest to Turkey. However, the US side did not provide an official response to Turkey’s requests, and it seems that the FETO problem, the Halkbank issue as well as the creation of the safe zone in Northern Syria are all issues still waiting on the negotiation table.

However, the first concrete outcome of the meeting was the blocking of “the Armenian genocide” bill in the Senate. Prior to the meeting, President Erdoğan had already expressed Turkey’s concerns regarding the bill with President Trump. After the meeting, Senator Lindsey Graham emphasized that lawmakers should not “sugarcoat history or try to rewrite it” and moved to block its passage in the Senate.

Overall, it is obvious that the meeting did not solve all the intractable problems between both countries. However, it was an important step for both countries to create a conciliatory environment in order to start further negotiations to solve more deep-rooted issues. Since both countries have used face-to-face negotiations to solve the ongoing problems between the countries, it seems this will occur into the future especially in relation to the Syrian issue which is likely to occur in upcoming days. 

President Erdoğan will be paying a visit to President Trump in the U.S on November 13. After rising diplomatic tensions between two countries during Operation Peace Spring, this visit will be important in determining the future of Turkish-American relations. This face-to-face meeting will be a chance to solve problems that emerged between the two countries in recent years.

President Erdogan has stated that the top item on the agenda with President Trump will be the fight against the FETO terror group. The extradition of Fetullah Gulen, the FETO leader, to Turkey has been a long standing source of tension between Turkey and the US, and prioritizing this issue indicates a clear intention to make progress towards developing a more collaborative relationship to address security threats.

The Syrian crisis and Operation Peace Spring will also be at the top of the agenda. During Turkey’s military operation in Syria, Turkish-US relations deteriorated due to a conflict of interests and misunderstandings between the two countries on the Syrian issue. Obviously, the biggest issue of conflict is the YPG’s presence in Northern Syria. While Turkey sees it as a threat to its national security, the US sees them as useful to prevent the rise of Daesh in the region. Tensions between the two nations escalated and de-escalated several times during the operation and as a result, this visit will be important to repair relations between Turkey and the US.

President Erdoğan almost certainly be bringing the Turkish-American agreement on the safe zone to the table. President Erdoğan recently said “We know that there are still terrorists in the planned safe zone. These areas have not been cleared of terrorists yet”. Since the agreement requires the withdrawal of YPG members 30 kilometers away from Turkey’s border, President Erdoğan will most likely discuss why the agreement has not been fulfilled yet.

When it comes to the American side, it appears that while President Trump sees the visit as a chance to discuss the Syrian border, terrorism and the YPG,  the American side is much more pessimistic about the visit, and it is likely that US officials will continue to take a firm stand on the YPG’s presence outside of the safe zone. It has also been said that while the two leaders may solve the existing problems, they also have to convince the Washington bureaucracy which is still angry about the agreement and Trump’s decision to withdraw from Syria.

The future of 3.6 million refugees living in Turkey. As was previously stated by Turkey, one of the main aims of the establishment of a safe zone is the resettlement of approximately 1.5-2 million Syrian refugees within the safe zone. In his UN speech, President Erdoğan underlined that Turkey could not maintain hosting 3.6 million refugees and it was urgent to establish the safe zone and resettle refugees in that area.

Another prominent issue for the Erdoğan-Trump meeting will be the sanctions against Turkey and the resolution passed by the House of Representatives to commemorate “the Armenian Genocide”. It is a well-known fact that both decisions were taken by the US to force Turkey to halt Operation Peace Spring. President Erdoğan stated that he discussed the decision of the House of Representatives with President Trump on the phone and that Trump decided to examine this issue.

Other issues such as the Halkbank case, the future of the YPG in Syria will all be handled during the visit. Some of these issues have been in negotiation with the US for a long time and the outcome of this visit on these issues will be of interest.

It seems that even if the two leaders are eager to solve the existing problems between two countries, there is the obstacle of a resistant Washington bureaucracy. The ongoing impeachment investigation against Trump and the media’s aggressive stance against Turkey has forced him to take a confrontational stance against Turkey. Nevertheless, good relations between the two leaders helped in finding solutions for deep-rooted problems in the past, and ongoing intractable issues may be solved at the table once again.

In an earlier column, I wrote that the YPG will continue to harm Turkey-US relations, stating that the formation of allegedly new local military councils by the YPG might sabotage US-Turkey negotiations over the safe zone in northern Syria. Currently, despite the visible differences between Turkey and the US over its labeling and approach, the safe zone deal seems to be progressing, as both sides conducted their first joint patrol east of the Arab-populated Tal Abyad city. However, remarks by Turkish President Erdogan, and the visible differences between the United States European Command (EUCOM) and the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) are strong indicators that the entire enterprise might fail. In this manner, the latest action by CENTCOM of conducting joint patrols with a YPG front group immediately after the joint Turkish-American patrol at the border region, indicates that CENTCOM knows how to sabotage the deal, and is willing to do so to reassert its position as the main policy-maker in Syria, preferring the interests of its local partner over the US, and to undermine the extensive role of EUCOM.

Regardless of how one may assess the deal over the safe zone between Ankara and Washington, the deal stands. But with the deal’s implementation, differences between Ankara and Washington and between CENTCOM and EUCOM have become more visible. While the Turkish Defense Ministry and the published deal between Ankara and Washington speak of a safe zone to be evolved into a peace-corridor, US officials constantly refer to it as a security mechanism instead. This framing by the US is a sign of the attempts to control the discourse around the US-Turkey safe zone deal in Syria, and to avoid making legally binding statements, but it also represents the different approach of both sides. Turkish President Erdogan made the differences clear as he said: “While Turkey is determined to remove the [PKK/YPG] terrorist group [from northern Syria], the US wants to straddle both us and them. It seems that the US is willing to establish a safe zone for the terrorist group”.

The entire safe zone deal becomes even more complicated due to the differences between EUCOM and CENTCOM. CENTCOM has long been the US’s only policy-making and implementing body in Syria and formed a close bond to the YPG terror group. The reluctance of the Obama administration to take strategic responsibility in Syria, and the ignorance of the Trump administration towards the details on the ground enabled CENTCOM to become the sole US actor in Syria. CENTCOM officials, the foremost being Brett McGurk, see the partnership with the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as a milestone in the US approach to the Middle East. In the eyes of CENTCOM officials, the engagement with the YPG proved effective with low costs and no combat fatalities for the US. Over time, CENTCOM officials not only adopted the ideas and arguments of the YPG, but also made their alignment open to the public, even following YPG-affiliated official and non-official figures and sharing their tweets.

On the other side, EUCOM was more critical of the approach by CENTCOM and underlined the importance of Turkey to the NATO alliance. EUCOM officials have seen CENTCOM activities as steps weakening the NATO front and ignoring the threat perception of a critical NATO ally. The debacle in progress by CENTCOM had to be cleaned up by EUCOM. Therefore, it is no wonder that EUCOM played a critical role in the safe zone negotiations and enabled the deal despite CENTCOM’s resistance. US diplomats with knowledge of the safe zone deal state that CENTCOM was told that they do not have a say on this matter and must accept the deal. Actually, one of the main problems with the deal is the EUCOM-CENTCOM balance of power. Turkey falls within the scope of EUCOM’s concerns, but Syria is within the operational area of CENTCOM. The safe zone deal was brokered by EUCOM, but CENTCOM’s forces have to implement it on the ground. The difference became public when CENTCOM’s twitter account embedded a tweet by EUCOM only to say: “A combined-joint operation between EUCOM, CENTCOM, and Turkey for the security of northeast Syria” warning that the safe zone deal is not a tango between EUCOM and Turkey.

While the safe zone deal with Turkey was formed to address Turkey’s security concerns, the deal might end up provoking rivalry over power between EUCOM and CENTCOM, in which the US State Department and the US Special Envoy James Jeffrey might finally get control over Syrian affairs. The inter-military dispute over the balance between a key NATO ally and a local partner divides EUCOM and CENTCOM. EUCOM’s perspective may be more viable for international relations in a global sense and in the spirit of the NATO alliance, but it’s CENTCOM who is in charge in Syria. CENTCOM’s approach is limited, and prefers to engage with a non-state armed actor. As CENTCOM’s area of responsibility doesn’t cover any NATO state, it doesn’t value the NATO alliance as much as EUCOM. In this manner, the divergences between EUCOM and CENTCOM over how to respond to Turkey’s legitimate security concerns will continue, but CENTCOM has the capability and seemingly the will to sabotage the safe zone deal with Turkey. If CENTCOM wins this round of internal rivalry with EUCOM, the NATO alliance not only might face a huge setback as EUCOM weakens against CENTCOM, but CENTCOM may also grow into a hierarchy problem. People with knowledge about the entire safe zone discussion pointed out that the appointment of James Jeffrey after Brett McGurk’s resignation has been viewed with dissatisfaction by CENTCOM officials, and that Jeffrey and the US State Department have a tough time to enforcing their will on CENTCOM in Syria.

Therefore, the success of the safe zone deal is in the interests of the US State Department and James Jeffrey, and they must reassert control over CENTCOM and re-establish an order of command to ensure that CENTCOM is not a policy-making actor but a policy-implementing figure in Syria. James Jeffrey and the US State Department have long argued that it is wrong to ignore Turkey’s interests and doing so may ultimately end in a bigger escalation. It is only with the push from EUCOM, the threats by Turkey to launch a unilateral military operation and Trump’s unforeseen decision to withdraw from Syria that have enabled the safe zone deal with Turkey. Since the start of the counter-Daesh campaign, CENTCOM has been in charge but despite Daesh’s territorial defeat, CENTCOM isn’t willing to handover the power it shouldn’t have obtained in the first place. Now, Turkey is helping the US to re-establish order in its own house with its threats of unilateral action and with the safe zone deal, but CENTCOM knows how to sabotage agreements. CENTCOM succeeded in doing so during the Manbij roadmap, and this time tries to do so again by portraying the military councils formed by the YPG as local forces. This is despite knowing that such a move can trigger Turkey to end the safe zone deal or stall its implementation process. Such a move may end in a failure for EUCOM, blocking the US State Department and James Jeffrey from gaining control, and allowing CENTCOM to go on as the policy-making actor in Syria.

The U.S. Senate confirmed Trump’s nominee for U.S. ambassador to Turkey, David Satterfield. An esteemed career foreign service officer, Satterfield’s time with the foreign service goes back to the early 80s where he served in Jeddah, Tunis, Beirut, and Damascus. He then moved on to become the Director of the Executive Secretariat staff from 1990 to 1993 when he served on the National Security Council Staff as Director for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until 1996. After, he was appointed Director of the Department of State’s Office of Israel and Arab-Israeli affairs until 1998 when he was confirmed by the Senate as Ambassador to Lebanon.

Satterfield played a crucial role in the Middle East after the September 11 attacks and invasion of Iraq, acting as Deputy Assistant Secretary until 2004 and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs until May 2005. He subsequently took on the role of Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq in August of 2006 and then Director General of the Multinational Force and Observers. Since 2014, he has served as Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for Libya and in 2017, he was appointed as Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.

Satterfield’s relationship with Ankara will extend beyond Turkey’s borders as he must consider the scope of the turmoil in the region.

Satterfield enters the arena as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey at a time when the bilateral relationship is not exactly at an all-time high. The U.S. is essentially harboring a Turkish fugitive, Fetullah Gulen, and working with the YPG who Turkey considers a terrorist threat while Turks have purchased an S400 missile system from Russia. Satterfield has his work cut out for him, but his resume proves that he might be the best shot at reconciling these deeply rooted tensions.

With Turkey as a rising regional power and a NATO ally, it is in the U.S. strategic interest to use diplomacy as a conduit for a better relationship. Satterfield made it clear in an April 15 telephone briefing. Maintaining security, fostering transparency and liberal values, and upholding rules-based institutions should be at the top of his agenda, and using his experience as a diplomat from the First and Second Gulf Wars has the potential to point relations in the right direction.

Satterfield is a seasoned veteran when it comes to foreign service. So, will he offer Turkey carrots or come down hard with sticks?

His relationship with Ankara will extend beyond Turkey’s borders as he must consider the scope of the turmoil in the region. Iran is planning to increase its uranium enrichment beyond the limits of the JCPOA, and the crisis in Syria continues unabated. The U.S. cannot afford more failed diplomatic efforts with its allies, especially in a region as fragile as the Middle East, but Satterfield’s experience serving the Clinton and W. Bush administrations shows a promising trajectory of U.S.-Turkey relations. He now has the ability to work alongside James Jeffrey, the Secretary’s Special Representative for Syria Engagement and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, who has expressed open mindedness and optimism vis-a-vis Turkey. The State Department duo is poised to actively engage with the Turks to find common ground and reconstruct the alliance. The U.S. needs level-headed, capable diplomats to conduct foreign affairs and foster good relationships, and Satterfield is as qualified as they come.

The only smudge on his record isn’t even a smudge at all. In 2005, two members of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) were indicted in U.S. courts for disclosing classified information to Israeli officials. Satterfield was mentioned as a “government official” in the indictment and served as a witness for the defense. The complicated case involving U.S. national security was eventually dropped by the Justice Department and Satterfield was dismissed unscathed. Even after this, he still preserved a good reputation on both sides of the aisle.

Satterfield is a seasoned veteran when it comes to foreign service. So, will he offer Turkey carrots or come down hard with sticks? The U.S. cannot expect to leverage its power everywhere. Turkey needs reassurance and the Americans need an olive branch. A better relationship will only come when they recognize the value of soft power and come to a consensus like allies should.

Since 2010, Turkey’s deteriorating relations with the United States have peaked with three problematic areas. The first is the U.S. siding with the PKK affiliated PYD and its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG) throughout the Syrian crisis. Secondly, the U.S. refusal to extradite Fetullah Gulen, the so-called Muslim cleric who is behind the July 15, 2016, failed coup attempt in Turkey. Third is related to U.S. skepticism about Turkey’s loyalty to the West when Ankara decided to purchase S400s from Russia, allied with Iran and Qatar during the Qatar crisis and called the U.S. a “partner in bloodshed” over President Donald Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. In addition, Turkey’s efforts to unveil the Khashoggi murder in Istanbul damaged the Trump administration’s prestige and legitimacy when Trump openly refused to impose sanctions on those responsible for the murder of the Saudi journalist, viewing weapon sales as an important source of U.S. jobs and standing by the Saudi Crown Prince, Muhammed bin Salman (MbS).

U.S. and YPG Relations

If there is one single issue that has bedeviled Turkey-U.S. relations, it is the PKK issue. The strong belief  in Turkey that Washington covertly supported the PKK especially after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, peaked with the Trump administration’s supply of weapons to the YPG and consideration of the YPG as a legitimate and efficient fighter against the DAESH. Following Turkey’s Olive Branch operation (January 2018), the two sides agreed on a plan on the withdrawal of the YPG from Manbij in March 2018. However, the Trump administration became reluctant to cooperate with Turkey in the east of the Euphrates and the northern Syrian city of Manbij. Washington also had assured Ankara that there would be a definite withdrawal of YPG forces from the area after its capture from DAESH. These promises however, were not kept in a timely fashion and Turkey’s suggestion for the establishment of a safe zone in Syria to curb the refugee flow to Turkey fell on deaf ears.

If there is one single issue that has bedeviled relations between Turkey and the U.S., it is the PKK issue.

Interestingly, although Trump agreed on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria in January 2019 as DAESH was already defeated, only a few weeks later Trump threatened to “devastate” the Turkish economy if Ankara attacked Kurdish forces in Syria after U.S. forces left. This openly showed that the “strategic partnership” during Clinton’s period and “model partnership” during Obama’s period between Turkey and the United States took an entirely different shape. The current relationship between the two countries can be defined best as a “volatile partnership” as U.S. policies towards Turkey are quite unpredictable. Put it differently, the relationship that was structured in the Cold War at a time when Turkey had no choice but to claim its place in the West, now changed.

Today, Turkey sees itself as emerging from the shadow of the U.S. as an independent geopolitical actor that owes fealty to no one. President Erdogan views Turkey’s traditional ties with the West, including NATO, as unequal and at times unfavorable to Turkey’s interests. Therefore, Turkey under Erdogan, from the U.S. perspective, has been out of orbit. In this context, the July 15 coup attempt was perceived by a large percentage of Turks as an American attempt to topple President Erdogan.

FETO

Relations between Ankara and Washington have aggravated since the coup attempt, as the leader of FETO, Fetullah Gulen, has been a long term resident of Pennsylvania. Gulen has resided in the U.S. since 1999 and his fingerprints are explicit on all over the failed coup attempt. While the Turkish government’s passing of a state of emergency to conduct a purge in all government offices and business sector is still in progress, Turkey’s demand to extradite the mastermind of the failed coup remains unfulfilled.

As U.S. policies towards Turkey are quite unpredictable, the current engagement between the two can be defined at best as a volatile relationship.

The July 15, 2016, coup attempt led to Turkey’s upgrading relations with Russia and Iran as Turkey was estranged from its Gulf allies, and the United States who remained silent in the face of the coup whereas the Iranian and Russian leaderships publicly condemned the coup attempt within hours and supported Erdogan unreservedly.

In a nutshell, the two policies of Washington; the denial of repeated requests made by Ankara for the extradition of Gulen and the dispatch of trucks of arms to YPG three days after President Donald Trump promised that the United States would not supply any more weapons to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) pushed Turkey straight into Russia’s and Iran’s arms. Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia peaked with Turkey’s decision to buy S400s.  

Turkey’s S400 deal

Ankara’s intention to purchase an advanced air defense system, the S400, from Russia highlights diverging interests and perspectives between the two sides. According to Washington, Russian S400s are incompatible with NATO hardware equipment and deployment of such equipment risks the leaking of sensitive NATO military data to Russia as Turkey, at the same time, operates the F-35, the newest high-tech jet in the American military.

Although American officials including Scaparrotti (Commander of European Command) and Vice President Pence warned Ankara of “grave consequences” which could result in U.S. sanctions, Ankara openly declared that Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missile defense systems is a “done deal” and cannot be canceled. 

Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar underlined that Turkey fulfilled its financial commitments regarding the F-35 program and said that Turkey’s exclusion from the F-35 project would be “illegal and immoral.” In addition, according to Turkish officials, removing Turkey from the F-35 project would generate significant problems in the production of the jet fighter if the Turkish supply chain was disrupted. Here the issue is that the deal with Russia involves joint production and technology transfer to Turkey, whereas Washington has been reluctant to provide this.

Washington urges Turkey to purchase Patriots instead of the S400s, but Ankara has said that it would only be possible if the right terms were agreed upon.

Most importantly, the United States has rejected to sell Patriot systems and air defense systems to Turkey for different reasons since 1990s and wanted to prevent Turkey from purchasing these systems from China and Russia. While rejecting Turkey’s request of technology transfer or the ability to buy these technologies at a reasonable price due to being a NATO ally, NATO has transferred high military technology to non-NATO countries such as New Zealand and Sweden.

In 2011, Turkey asked for patriot systems against missiles thrown from Syria. The U.S. rejected. In a way Turkey was left defenseless by its allies against the Syrian army supported by Russia. Today, Washington urges Turkey to purchase Raytheon Co Patriot defense systems instead of the S400s, but Ankara has said that, even though it would like to make such a deal, it would only be possible if the right terms were agreed upon. Although the purchase of S400s does not lead to a firm strategic partnership between Turkey and Russia, it has caused damage to the reliability of the partnership between Turkey and the U.S.

The Qatar crisis and beyond

The Qatar crisis is noteworthy as it clarified that Turkey and the U.S. are on opposing camps in the Gulf and Middle East. With the Qatar crisis, which came soon after Trump’s visit to Riyadh, the 13-point ultimatum were given by Saudi Arabia to Qatar as the price for lifting the trade and diplomatic embargo of the country. One of the ultimatums urged Qatar to terminate the Turkish military presence in Qatar and end any joint military cooperation with Turkey inside Qatar. The most important of all, the blockade of Qatar led to an immense solidarity between the trio; Turkey, Qatar and Iran.

Ankara’s immediate response to the blockade on Qatar was to stand by Doha. Turkey sent military forces to Qatar to deter any invasion as a symbolic gesture, given the unlikelihood of an overt attack, but one which crystallized the sharp division between the two camps. On the one side were Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies (the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain) who are against Doha, and on the other side were Turkey, Iran and, to a lesser extent, Russia, which support Doha. Interestingly, while Trump voiced his support for Riyadh’s maneuver and implicitly accused Qatar of being a sponsor of terrorism, former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson called on the Saudi-led coalition to ease its blockade of Qatar, saying the cutoff was hindering the fight against DAESH and provoking food shortages. Washington’s confused policy toward the crisis soon ended with the signature of a $12 billion deal to sell Qatar dozens of F-15 jets as Qatar hosts the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East.

The Qatar crisis and the following tectonic changes in Saudi Arabia under MbS’s de facto administration is noteworthy with respect to understanding the newly emerging distribution of power in the region. This has been an ongoing process since the fall of Morsi and the empowerment of Sisi in Egypt as a proxy of Israel and the United States. In this framework, it can be said that Turkey under President Erdogan has been in the opposing camp despite its institutional links with the West such as NATO membership, EU membership candidacy, its efforts to support NATO in Afghanistan and so on.

Unfortunately, the strategic U.S.-Turkey partnership is a thing of the past.

When looked at closely, Erdogan’s attitude towards Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the recognition of the Golan Heights as Israeli territory, the Turkish President has been extremely critical more than that of any other Arab country leader. Turkey’s unveiling of the Khashoggi murder is a response to the allegations that Turkey is sponsoring radical Islamist ideology. Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s accusation of Turkey supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and former chief strategist Steve Bannon’s statement in an interview with the Saudi-owned Asharq Al-Awsat that Turkey is “more dangerous than Iran” pushed Turkey to unveil the Khashoggi murder. Thus, Ankara demonstrated to the world how the U.S. under Trump turned a blind eye to a brutal murder as it did not suit their economic and strategic interests to act otherwise. This, at the same time, was a diplomatic success for Turkey as the murder proved the current Saudi administration under the control of MbS as much more threatening and illegitimate than the Muslim Brotherhood, which only demands reform from the long lasting monarchs in the region.

In a nutshell, almost thirty years after the Cold War, the United States and Turkey often find themselves on different sides of a variety of important issues. Many of the problems in U.S.-Turkey relations are structural. Had Erdogan never come to power, there would still be a strain between the two countries due to the transformations in global politics. At a time when the U.S. sees the limited and transactional relationship with Turkey as serving U.S. interests, Turkey is trying to prevent bilateral relations from reaching a new low. The issue is to what extent Ankara and Washington will be able to formulate a new approach to the current problematic relations. Unfortunately, the strategic U.S.-Turkey partnership is a thing of the past.

Turkey has focused on the local election results for more than three weeks. The outcome of the Istanbul elections is still under dispute between the AK Party and CHP, yet Ankara’s foreign policy agenda is much more complicated than the election results. President Erdogan has to deal with two significant difficulties simultaneously. While he is revising his political strategy to re-energize the AK Party and his constituency to maintain his strength, he is also trying to find the best approach to overcome the upcoming foreign policy crisis stemming mainly from Turkey’s decision to purchase S-400s.

In the latest bilateral meeting between Erdogan and Putin held in Moscow within the framework of High-Level Strategic Cooperation, both presidents underlined that S-400 surface to air defense missile system would be delivered to Turkey at the end of July this year. President Erdogan also stressed that Turkey is interested in different sub-complementary lower missile systems to deepen its defense and military relations with Russia.  

President Erdogan has to deal with two significant difficulties: revise his political strategy to re-energize the AK Party and overcome the upcoming foreign policy crisis stemming mainly from Turkey’s decision to purchase S-400s.

While Turkey and Russia enjoy defense cooperation, the U.S. is trying to enforce Turkey to cancel its defense deal with Moscow. According to the U.S., S-400s are incompatible with NATO’s defense network and would pose a threat to the American F-35 stealth fighter jet project when Turkey operationalizes its F-35s. Yet, Turkey has been delivered four F-35s to train Turkish pilots in the U.S.

More importantly, in case U.S. pressure does not succeed to change Ankara’s S-400 decision, Washington is set to implement a short-term road map to punish Turkey. However, the divergence between different institutions in the U.S. is still visible concerning foreign and security issues. Turkey is no exception. While Trump himself is clear about Turkey’s role in the region although he acts in a very pragmatic way on foreign policy issues, his close circle tends to act by other institution’s possible positions towards Turkey. Ultimately, the president has little leeway to counter Turkey’s many critics in Washington. The State Department is concerned by the deepening political rupture between Turkey and the U.S., yet it is prepared, in case the administration decides to place a sanction against Ankara.

In addition to the State Department’s position, prominent U.S. senators have also warned Turkey that the S-400 purchase will be too costly for Turkey. Pentagon, on the other hand, has a clear view of Turkey’s strategic role within NATO but many are suspicious about its engagement with Russia from a very strategic perspective. Last but not least, the role of the Senate is more crucial, particularly over the issue of canceling F-35 delivery to Turkey and in excluding Turkey from the project.

The recent move of prominent U.S. senators about the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act (EMSEPA) 2019 was a counter-strategic move taken for the administration to contain Turkey’s S-400 engagement with Moscow – since the purchase could trigger the imposition of a mandatory sanction under CAASTA. While the EMSEPA proposes that the U.S. should work with Greece, Cyprus, and Israel to protect U.S. national interests in the region and promote a strategic dialogue with these countries, Turkey is mentioned in the act concerning its defense and political engagement with Russia and framed as a threat. More importantly, the bill is proposing to lift the U.S. arm-sales embargo on Cyprus.

The question of how Turkey and the U.S. will overcome the possible deepening political disagreement over S-400s remains unclear.

The strategic meaning of the bill is simple and clear. If Ankara maintains its decisiveness to buy the Russian defense system, according to the EMSEPA’s strategic calculation, Turkey would be militarily balanced by the U.S. by increasing the military capacity of Greece and Cyprus. The act is also symbolic in terms of underlining that Turkey and the U.S. interests in the Mediterranean Sea are not common.  

Against this background, the question of how Turkey and the U.S. will overcome the possible deepening political disagreement over S-400s remains unclear while the two countries have already delved into strategic divergence over the issue of U.S. engagement with the YPG in Syria. Therefore, the upcoming mismanagement over the S-400 defense system may significantly affect U.S.-Turkey relations. But the risk is not limited to the deterioration of bilateral relations. The geopolitical risk of the S-400 dilemma is not one-dimensional either or dangerous only for one side. Both countries will eventually be influenced by the mismanagement of the process.  

Arming Cyprus via U.S. military supplies will deepen the insecurity in the region and eventually reiterate the lack of trust between Ankara and Washington.

Excluding Turkey from the Eastern Mediterranean geopolitical architecture is not possible since Turkey is an integral part of it. Turkey’s strategic culture has been shaped and reshaped by the geopolitical vision of Ankara towards its surrounding seas over the years, particularly in the Mediterranean and Aegean seas. More importantly, arming Cyprus via U.S. military supplies will deepen the insecurity in the region and eventually reiterate the lack of trust between Ankara and Washington. It forces Turkey to recalculate its national strategy not only towards the Cyprus issue but also towards Greece. The possible exclusion of Turkey from the F-35 program is another geopolitical risk for the future strategic calculations of NATO. Taking into consideration the upcoming geopolitical challenges, Turkey is one of the most critical countries. From the Balkans to the Caucasus and from Ukraine to the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey is an active partner of NATO and also has its particular national interests over the regions where it is located.

Geopolitics 101 says that Turkey and the U.S. have to agree, one way or another, over the issue of S-400s. It seems likely that Turkey will receive the S-400s as promised, yet the issue will be solved with the U.S.        

Once again, Turkey-U.S. relations are signaling of going through another turmoil. This time it is about Turkey’s purchase of S-400 air defense systems from Russia. Charlie Summers, head of the American forces in Europe and NATO’s top military officer stated, “If Turkey takes the S-400, there would be grave consequences in terms of our military relationship, and the Patriots and the F-35s.” It is yet to be known how binding or how backed this statement is given the complexities and ambiguities in the American state apparatus in recent years. Nevertheless, it is serious in its tone. The statement is not the first of its kind but is unprecedentedly tough. The statement also brings in some retaliatory measures, such as pulling out of the Patriot missiles purchase and denying the transfer of F-35 fighter jets to Turkey.

Despite this pressure from the U.S. side, Turkey seems solid in its deal over purchasing S-400s. During a TV interview last week, President Erdogan said that it was a “done deal,” “as we conclude the S-400 issue, signed a deal with the Russians, and will start co-production.” He even stated that after this deal is finalized, Turkey and Russia may work on a possible S-500 deal. Erdogan is well-known for his firm stance against pressure, whether coming from domestic or international parties. This is more than a simple choice though. This is a strategic choice that might re-shape Turkey’s overall position in international politics. Turkey is known as a loyal ally to the U.S. since the Cold War, but it seems like some factors have pushed Turkey to question this role.

Turkey’s purchase of S-400s from Russia is more than a simple choice. It’s a strategic choice that might re-shape Turkey’s overall position in international politics. 

In fact, it is quite a simple equation. Turkey has very concrete and longstanding worries with regard to its national security. Two of them are paramount. Two organizations, the PKK and FETO, have caused many casualties for the country. Yet both organizations have found safe havens under U.S. support. The U.S. hosts FETO leader Fetullah Gulen, a Turkish citizen, and has not complied with Turkey’s extradition request. Many other FETO members and FETO institutions still remain active in the U.S. Last week, First Lady Melanie Trump even visited one of the organization’s schools in Oklahoma.

The U.S. support for the PKK is even more threatening. This is because they are operating right across Turkey’s Syrian border. The U.S. is providing weapons, training, and active surveillance for the PKK’s Syrian branch, the PYD. This is the organization that sends suicide bombers into Turkey from Syria. Amongst the 11 such attacks documented prior to Turkey’s operation against the PYD in Syria, one was quite significant. In December 2016, the PYD conducted a terrorist attack in Besiktas, Istanbul, and caused 46 deaths, including 39 police officers and 7 civilians. The attack occurred right after a football game and the suicide bomber blew herself when she was noticed by the policeman surveilling for the game. The militant who carried out the suicide bomb received training and instructions in the PYD-ruled Kobani (Ayn-al Arab) and crossed the Turkish border illegally.

As the U.S. keeps pushing Turkey away, Turkey will now have to seek for alternative partnerships and alliances.

This is one of many examples where the PYD directly targeted Turkey, which later caused the Turkish government to conduct an operation against the PYD in Afrin. The only power that keeps this organization alive today in Syria is the U.S. It would be ridiculous to expect a blind loyalty from Turkey while the U.S. backs this group, which poses a serious threat to its national security. Naturally, Turkey is seeking security partnerships with other regional and global actors – the ones that do not support terrorist organizations that target Turkey.

This is the recent story of Turkey’s shift away from the U.S. As the U.S. keeps pushing Turkey away, Turkey will now have to seek for alternative partnerships and alliances. The bad news for relations between Turkey and the U.S. is that Turkey has never felt more threatened from any other power than it feels today about the U.S. support for terrorist organizations attacking Turkey. The S-400 deal might create grave consequences, but Turkey seems to be okay with this as it feels that it has no other choice. If the U.S. genuinely wants to re-build relations with Turkey, it is as simple as stopping the support provided for the PKK and FETO.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H-9qws51mlY 

The advance of the U.S. supported YPG-led SDF forces seems to have slowed down although President Trump had announced that it was a matter of a week before the last patch of territory in Daesh hands could be retrieved. It is no secret that SDF is against the U.S. departure from the region and it has slowed down operations in the past, such as during the Raqqa operation. In their calculation, the longer the operations against Daesh take, the more likely that the U.S. would prolong its presence on the ground. In the meantime, the administration has been persuaded to leave a residual U.S. force (400 soldiers), which would certainly make SDF happier than a sudden and full U.S. withdrawal. This is where the Turkish public opinion will be uneasy once again about the U.S. strategy. Leaving a residual force can easily look like the U.S. is more preoccupied with protecting the SDF forces rather than with precluding the return of Daesh.

Leaving a residual force of 400 soldiers can easily look like the U.S. is more preoccupied with protecting the SDF forces rather than with precluding the return of Daesh. This is where the Turkish public opinion will be uneasy once again about the U.S. strategy.

The partial reversal of the withdrawal decision by leaving roughly 400 U.S. soldiers in Syria will not surprise Turkey. There has been much debate on the advisability of a complete withdrawal and the argument that the U.S. would be “abandoning Kurds” to their fate seems to have been effective. Turkey has strongly opposed the idea that it was waiting for the U.S. to attack and “slaughter” Kurds as was argued in the Western media. It has been strongly lobbying the U.S. for a policy that would satisfy Turkish national security concerns in the form of creating a safe zone in northern Syria. Turkey also argued that the Manbij agreement could be a model to work with the U.S. but limited, if at all, progress has been achieved there. In the current situation, a U.S. residual force in the region may not necessarily be a problem if it is done in coordination with Turkey. In other words, for the sake of a healthy Turkish-American relationship going forward, the U.S. presence in the region can no longer appear as providing American protection for the YPG.

President Trump’s willingness to take Turkish concerns seriously is a plus but devil is in the details.

President Trump’s willingness to take Turkish concerns seriously is a plus but devil is in the details especially in the Syrian scene. It has been a major disadvantage for the U.S.-Turkey relations to have the divergence on Syria strategy dominate the conversation for several years now. There are signs of a broader conversation developing including bilateral as well as the regional issues. However, the U.S. support for the YPG will continue to be a factor consuming every other potential positive development. In the Turkish public opinion, the U.S. pullout decision was closely associated with the end of such support. It was clear the military leaders saw the decision as a hasty one and the public relations campaign to “protect the Kurds” was closely associated with that view. Now that the administration has agreed to leave a residual force to relieve the political pressure from Congress, the mission will have to be defined clearly and carefully. “Peacekeeping” will likely be an unconvincing one, especially if a clear strategy to work with Turkey on the ground is not crafted.

The importance of the U.S. working with Turkey on Syria should not be underestimated. It would be a clear commitment to Turkish security and reduce bilateral tensions, in the meantime, strengthening the NATO alliance. Perhaps even more importantly, it would serve as an anchor in preventing further instability in Syria, enabling the eventual political resolution of the civil war. This kind of coordination and cooperation between the two allies would not be solely in the interest of Turkish national security but for the sake of regional stability. This may sound like wishful thinking in an environment where virtually every actor seems to work at cross purposes. Nevertheless, it is arguably the only way for true stability and peace.

Turkey has long called for the establishment of some sort of a safe zone in Syria over the course of the conflict. Such calls were primarily aimed at preventing regime violence against civilians and the opposition. Turkish calls on the international community to act on the principle of responsibility to protect were ignored and Russia’s direct military intervention ended any prospect of such a scenario. As the conflict evolved, the U.S.-led coalition narrowly defined its mission in terms of counterterrorism against Daesh only. Furthermore, the U.S. investment in the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK, precluded any cooperation between the U.S. and Turkey, which could have worked to establish such a zone. Today, as the U.S. withdraws, Turkey sees a safe zone as the only option to protect its national security along the Syrian border.

The course of the conflict, in other words, has shifted from a rebellion by the opposition against the Assad regime to a de facto failed state in which international powers conducted operations against terror organizations. At the same time, Syria became a battleground for regional powers with their various proxies on the ground. In an environment where there have been very little and piecemeal instances of international cooperation, a lasting solution remained elusive at best. The U.S. decision to work “by, with, and through” the YPG has simply complicated this picture by creating a major crisis between two NATO allies. Furthermore, the U.S. has refused to provide leadership to resolve the conflict through years of indecision. President Trump’s decision to withdraw, even if many argue about its manner and timing, ironically provides a clear direction of the U.S. policy in Syria. The U.S. is leaving the country, that much we know.

As the U.S. withdraws, Turkey sees a safe zone as the only option to protect its national security along the Syrian border.

As the U.S. military is gearing to depart Syria within a matter of months, the central question for the U.S. planners seems to be how to ensure that the YPG is not attacked by Turkey. Turkish policymakers are quite puzzled by this priority as the real question should be about how to ensure the national security of a NATO ally is protected. Turkey is determined to prevent the YPG from achieving an autonomous zone for its operations. A sure way for Turkey to accomplish this goal is to create a safe zone under Turkish military’s control supported by opposition forces. Turkey hopes to repatriate significant numbers of refugees to settle in this new zone. Such a zone would not only satisfy Turkey’s national security concerns but also create conditions for the repatriation of refugees. The establishment of a safe zone under Turkish control would contribute to stabilization efforts that have long relied on sub-state actors such as the YPG. True stabilization can only happen through the commitment of serious state actors like Turkey.

Creating a safe zone would not only satisfy Turkey’s national security concerns but also create conditions for the repatriation of refugees. 

If a safe zone under Turkey’s control materializes with the support and coordination of the U.S., Turkey-U.S. relations can benefit from a serious confidence building measure after years of mistrust. It would alleviate the Turkish concerns about a continued commitment to the protection of and support for the YPG even after the U.S. withdrawal. For the U.S military, protecting their “local allies” in the fight against Daesh seems to be a priority but the administration needs to recognize that such a policy has a destabilizing effect on the dynamics on the ground, not to mention asking a NATO ally to look the other way when its national security is threatened. The U.S. withdrawal without leaving a power vacuum and a renewed instability on the ground can only happen with Turkey. If the U.S. and Turkey can work together on establishing a safe zone in northern Syria with the goal of achieving stability and security, it would go a long way in repairing years of mutual distrust.  

The debate on the U.S. withdrawal from Syria suffers from a couple of frequently repeated arguments that do not reflect the realities of the conflict, especially in northern Syria. Some argue that the U.S. should not abandon their allies on the ground and leave them to their fate, which would amount to a “betrayal of the Kurds.” This line of thinking makes a couple of flawed assumptions starting with equating the PKK’s Syrian affiliate the YPG with Syrian Kurds in general. The reality is that the YPG does not represent even the majority of the Kurds in Syria, nor are they reliable partners as they have been promoted. Since the beginning of the conflict, they refused to fight the Assad regime, maintained connections with Russia, and prolonged the anti-Daesh fight as much as possible to ensure the U.S. remained in Syria as their protectors.

The U.S. military has openly promoted the “accomplishments” of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a rebranding of the YPG, despite the fact that U.S. intelligence community as well as high-level officials have repeatedly admitted on the record that the YPG is the “Syrian militia” of the PKK. The U.S. military officials, especially those at CENTCOM, have expressed displeasure about Turkey as they have perceived Turkish efforts in northern Syria as hindering their anti-Daesh mission despite the fact that Turkey has been part of the anti-Daesh coalition from the beginning. Turkey’s reservations and repeated warnings against allying with the YPG seem to have been received by the U.S. military more as an annoyance than legitimate national security concerns of a NATO ally.

Some argue that the U.S. should not abandon their allies on the ground and leave them to their fate, which would amount to a “betrayal of the Kurds.” This line of thinking makes a couple of flawed assumptions starting with equating the PKK’s Syrian affiliate the YPG with Syrian Kurds in general.

The disconnect between the U.S. and Turkey on the YPG issue has widened and deepened in recent years. As both the Obama and Trump administrations adopted a policy of “by, with, and through” local partners to fight Daesh, Turkish concerns have been ignored until very recently. President Trump’s withdrawal decision created an opening for repairing the long-simmering tensions between the two countries contingent on a rethinking of the U.S. partnership with the YPG. In the early days of the decision, I commented that the withdrawal might not translate to an immediate halt to the U.S. support for the YPG. Today, all indications are that the U.S. policy planners are trying to convince Turkey to forego any potential military operations against the YPG once the U.S. leaves. However, Turkey’s refusal to commit to not fighting the Syrian branch of the PKK should surprise no one. While the “betrayal of the Kurds” argument might have some currency among at least some policymakers, reassuring a NATO ally should take priority.

Turkey has not only supported the U.S. withdrawal decision but also offered ways to make it an orderly and successful process by leaving no room for a political vacuum. Turkey’s insistence on establishing a safe zone along the border with Syria in the north aims to achieve two main goals, which would ensure its national security and allow for stability in the region. First, the YPG would no longer control the border, which would reassure Turkish security concerns about arms transfers into Turkey and the PKK control in the region. Second, significant numbers of refugees would be settled in northern Syria to relieve Turkey of some of the political burden of hosting more than 3.6 million refugees. From the American perspective, however, the safe zone appears to be a demarcation zone where Turkey and the YPG would be separated from each other so that the U.S. forces would not leave the YPG at the “mercy” of Turkey. Just as the two NATO allies’ approaches to the YPG has diverged, their conceptions of the function of the potential safe zone are not aligned. Once again, their basic disagreement about the YPG spells potential for disaster in bilateral relations.

By establishing a safe zone along the border with Syria in the north, Turkey aims to achieve two main goals: First, the YPG would no longer control the border, which would reassure Turkish security concerns about arms transfers into Turkey and the PKK control in the region. Second, significant numbers of refugees would be settled in northern Syria to relieve Turkey of some of the political burden of hosting more than 3.6 million refugees. 

It is time for a truly honest and in-depth strategic conversation between the two allies about the U.S. relationship with the YPG. Characterizing it as a tactical and temporary alliance will not suffice as the withdrawal discussions show that the U.S. feels it owes the YPG as if it is actually a strategic partner for the long haul. Turkey needs reassurance that this is not the case and the reassurance cannot be in words only. The U.S. policy planners need to make it clear to Turkey that they are not looking for ways to protect the YPG as part of their withdrawal plan.

2018 has been a year of some historic developments in the Middle East, which has been witnessing an era of instability and uncertainty since the start of the Arab Spring 8 years ago. The political events of 2018 may show their effects in 2019 as the region approaches a much more complicated political atmosphere. The most important of these events is undoubtedly the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate General in Istanbul. The incident that took place on October 2 not only had a global impact but also had an impact on the Saudi political leadership as well. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, who was being groomed to the top position of the Kingdom, had to reconsider his options. MbS was subjected to an international campaign as he was accused of having links to the murder of Khashoggi. Despite the dramatic turn of events, the Crown Prince has so far managed to keep his position and continues to oversee the country’s reform process.

Another important aspect of criticism toward Mohammad bin Salman is the on-going civil war in Yemen and the role of Saudi Arabia in this war. Tens of thousands of civilians lost their lives in Yemen because of the Decisive Storm Operation that was launched in 2015 when Mohammed bin Salman was the Minister of Defence. This operation has created further damage in Yemen as air bombardments targeted civilian areas indiscriminately. A humanitarian crisis has been experienced recently in the country due to the blockade of the coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Due to the blockade in some regions, hundreds of thousands of Yemeni civilians have been facing hunger and disease. The international community increased its criticism of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi – the two countries that are accused of being responsible in the deteriorating situation in Yemen.

The Jamal Khashoggi murder, civil war in Yemen, U.S. withdrawal from Syria, and Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel are among the events that will have their effects on the Middle East in 2019. 

The year 2018 has also seen significant developments in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The most important of these is the decision of the U.S. President Trump to move the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. On 14 May the opening ceremony was held with the attendance of Trump’s daughter Ivanka and his son-in-law Jared Kushner, as well as his advisor Steven Mnuchin. This has been considered as a historical development for Israel. Tel-Aviv has achieved a new phase in its occupation policies and reached an important goal of eliminating the Palestinian state’s presence in Jerusalem. The move attracted little reaction from the Muslim world, except with harsh criticism from Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The increasing U.S. support for Israel and Tel-Aviv’s aggressive policies in Palestine caused a violent reaction within the Palestinians with a new wave of protests that continued throughout 2018. Tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip organized a Great March of Return, which began in Gaza on March 30, 2018, in order to express their desire to return to their lands that were taken away by Israel in 1948. The March  has turned out to be one of the biggest mass protests movements against Israel since the second Intifada. The Palestinians called Israel to end its occupation and let them return to their lands and homes that were forcibly taken from them 70 years ago. The protesters also called the 11-yearlong blockade on Gaza by Israel to be removed. At least 200 Palestinians were killed and more than 25 thousand civilians were injured during the protests by Israeli forces. Despite international calls, the Israeli army continues to use live ammunition against civilians and targets Palestinians who participate in protests indiscriminately.

Two other important events of 2018 are related with the U.S. policies towards the Middle East. The first is Donald Trump’s decision to implement new sanctions against Iran. The first phase of the sanctions was put into effect in August, while the second and more comprehensive part, which was planned to last for 180 days, was initiated in November. Despite the international outcry and criticism, the Trump administration continued with its plans and argued that the sanctions are needed to deter Iran from nuclear activities and prevent its expansionist policies in the Middle East. Trump argued that Iran’s policies are a threat to the U.S. and its allies in the region. It is however uncertain how sanctions will affect Iran as previous experiences in this regard did not prevent Tehran from achieving its policy goals both in nuclear and expansionist activities.

The increasing U.S. support for Israel and Tel-Aviv’s aggressive policies in Palestine led to the Great March of Return, which expressed the Palestinian desire to return to their lands that were taken away by Israel in 1948.

Turkey-U.S. relations have been in a state of crisis since the July 15 coup attempt, which many in Turkey believed that the U.S. was somehow involved. The arrest of Pastor Brunson by Turkish authorities just added more fuel to the fire and the bilateral relations were further damaged. However, the release of Pastor in October changed the course of events. As a first step, the Trump administration reconsidered his country’s ill-mannered support for the terrorist organization PYD in Northern Syria. In mid-December Trump announced that U.S. soldiers will withdraw from Syria. Trump’s  announcement of pulling U.S. troops from Syria has been a landmark for not only the country’s Syria policy but also for U.S.-Turkey relations. Trump’s decision came after his long phone calls with Turkish President Erdogan. When announcing his decision Trump underlined that Erdogan convinced him that Turkey would continue to fight against Daesh. Despite the fact that the U.S. President did not emphasize that his country will no longer support the PYD, his decision was welcomed in Turkish political circles and seen as a positive step towards Turkey. However, the U.S. withdrawal from Syria should send waves of caution for countries like Turkey as a number of other actors will intend to fill in the power vacuum in the war-torn country in the post-U.S. period.

The U.S. withdrawal from Syria should send waves of caution for countries like Turkey as a number of other actors will intend to fill in the power vacuum in the war-torn country in the post-U.S. period.

The legacy of 2018 will be clearly visible during the following year. There would be serious consequences as a result of the political developments of 2018, such as the murder of Khashoggi, the Yemen war, Israel-Palestine conflict, sanctions on Iran, the U.S. withdrawal from Syria, and the changes in the U.S.-Turkey relations. Other developments such as Turkey’s increasing involvement in Syria, tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the Gulf crisis would also dominate the agenda of the 2019.

President Erdogan recently announced that Turkey’s next military operation against the YPG/PKK in northeastern Syria might be launched “within a few days,” which became the top high-level statement made in Ankara most recently. The details such as time, particular target place and duration of the military operation are not precise yet, but Turkey’s strategic objective is clear: to de-territorialize the YPG/PYD alongside its Syrian border, fix relations with the U.S. in Syria and recalibrate its military presence.

More importantly, since Turkey previously conducted military operations in Syria, policymakers realized that without any military action Turkey could not reach any of its strategic objectives in Syria. Therefore, eliminating the PKK presence alongside Turkey’s Syrian border and maintaining an army presence there might provide Ankara with an additional political maneuver to consolidate its political stance within the Syrian crisis. This, especially, will be the case when the international actors begin to shape the future of Syria.

Turkey’s strategic objective is clear: to de-territorialize the YPG/PYD alongside its Syrian border, fix relations with the U.S. in Syria and recalibrate its military presence.

Although Turkey has an obvious agenda and strategic objective in the Syrian crisis and towards the PKK/YPG presence in Syria; others, especially the U.S., hold different strategic calculations and concerns regarding Turkey’s next military move in northeastern Syria especially a comprehensive military operation against the U.S.-backed YPG group. The U.S. attempt to establish observation points in the eastern part of Euphrates was clearly a strong signal to discourage Turkey to launch a military operation against the YPG’s strongholds such as Ayn El-Arab, Tal Abyad, and Rasulayn.

Following President Erdogan’ precise statement about Turkey’s next military operation, the Pentagon said that the military operation against the “SDG is not acceptable.” However, news coming from the ground shows that the U.S. began to withdraw its military forces from Tal Abyad. This development strongly demonstrates that Turkey’s military operation is underway.  Then two questions concerning Turkey’s upcoming military operation need to be answered. While the first one is the question of how Turkey is planning the military move on an operational level, the second one is the question of how Turkey’s next military action against the YPG will potentially reshape relations between Ankara and Washington.

News coming from the ground shows that the U.S. began to withdraw its military forces from Tal Abyad. This development strongly demonstrates that Turkey’s military operation is underway.

Regarding the operational dimension of military intervention, it seems that Turkey’s military operation at this stage will not be comprehensive compared to the previous cross-border operations such as OES and OOB. Even though there are different operational scenarios in the hands of the Turkish Armed Forces, such as conducting a comprehensive and full-scale direct intervention including the infiltration of ground troops into northeastern Syria, Ankara’s first aim is to discourage the U.S. from continuing its observation points alongside Turkey’s Syrian border to protect the YPG. Ankara believes that it would be too late if the U.S. continues to establish observation points.

Ankara’s primary objective is to create a militarily protected safe zone which will be liberated from the terrorist entities and then open up a territorial zone not only to protect Turkey’s border against the terrorist infiltration but also to prevent the YPG’s territorial continuity in the eastern part of the Euphrates River. This will undoubtedly be a game changer for Turkey on the ground. The new operation, therefore, would focus on forming a region liberated from the YPG along the Syrian border and controlling critical points. The first signal coming from the ground is that Tal Abyad might be the initial target of Turkey.

Turkey will certainly use its legitimate right of self-defense or intervention. For Turkey, the YPG issue is not negotiable.

Regarding relations between Turkey and the U.S., there are many strategic domains that both sides have to rethink through. If there is an agreement over Turkey’s military operation, then one side should certainly step back. President Erdogan said that the U.S. forces would not be the target of Turkey by underlying the potential cooperation between Ankara and Washington in the fight against the remaining element of Daesh. Erdogan strongly underlined that Turkey could take full-responsibility to fight against Daesh. More importantly, Turkey will certainly use its legitimate right of self-defense or intervention, as President Erdogan stated two days ago in Ankara. For Turkey, the YPG issue is not negotiable. Under this circumstance, Turkey, one way or another, will want to keep its eyes over the YPG and northeastern Syria until a political solution is reached across Syria.

Therefore, the most likely scenario for Turkey’s upcoming military operation is a limited intervention to clean the YPG presence by holding a small piece of territory to prevent the terrorist organization from consolidating its territorial and political order. If Turkey and the U.S. can find common ground to mitigate Turkey’s security concerns over the YPG, then the two countries might be able to establish a new modality to work in cooperation for Syria.

The U.S. wants to cooperate with Turkey on all issues related to the Syrian conflict and sees it as critical to end the civil war. The U.S. Syria envoy James Jeffrey points to the Manbij agreement as a good model for broader cooperation. He is reassuring Turkey that the PYD and YPG members are leaving Manbij and that they will not participate in local councils and the police force, as Turkish policymakers have demanded. Progress, however, in Manbij has been slow and Turkey has yet to declare that the YPG members have left to go east of the Euphrates. It is also not clear in what areas specifically this model can be replicated. Some progress is obviously better than none and the U.S.’ willingness to work with Turkey is an encouraging sign, both for stability of northern Syria and also for the end of the broader conflict. Nevertheless, we need to keep in mind that Turkey continues to be concerned about and feel threatened by YPG control and presence east of the Euphrates as well.

The envoy’s remarks about “pulling the plug” on the Astana process was met with criticism both by Turkey and Russia, who believe they have been making progress contrary to outside views about the lack of tangible results. The failure to create a constitutional committee to draft a new constitution has suffered from the dynamics of the conflict at play since the beginning. The opposition remains fragmented and Assad’s supporters, Russia and Iran, remain invested in the continuation of the regime. Determining the composition of the committee has been extremely difficult not only because the guarantor states cannot agree on who will be participating in the constitution writing process but also because of the fundamental dynamics of the conflict.

The only other alternative is for the U.S. to fundamentally shake up the dynamics on the ground and create a different game where other actors may be lured to a framework that excludes Iran.

In other words, if the balance of power is not significantly changed between numerous sides on the ground, there will be no party that is able to impose its will. By refusing to empower the Arab opposition in concert with Turkey, the U.S. has contributed to this fragmentation. It is not a matter simply of diplomatic negotiations over picking the constitution writers but it is also about creating a committee that reflects the power dynamics on the ground for drafting a constitution acceptable to all sides. In this process, the U.S. should actually support Turkey’s efforts and empower the opposition representatives at the negotiation table instead of calling for the replacement of the Astana process with that of the UN process. The Astana process has been effective in creating de-confliction zones and a forum for those with military presence on the ground to have sustained dialogue. It has not produced a political solution so far but it can contribute to it by engaging one of the most crucial actors on the ground, i.e. Iran.

The U.S. has already declared pushing Iran out of Syria as a major policy goal in Syria and Jeffery’s comments about the end of the Astana process appear to reflect that objective in mind. The Trump administration has been talking about confronting and rolling back Iran’s influence in the region, however it does not currently have a clear plan to achieve that. The only other alternative is for the U.S. to fundamentally shake up the dynamics on the ground and create a different game where other actors may be lured to a framework that excludes Iran. This, however, will be extremely difficult given Iran’s investments in Syria and willingness to commit its military and human resources on the ground. Absent a serious American investment to isolate Iran in Syria, Iran will continue to be part of the discussion as it can act as a spoiler militarily, politically, and diplomatically.

The good news is that the U.S. recognizes the crucial role of Turkey in all these goals, however the bad news is all these goals are unlikely to be achieved simultaneously. 

The U.S. balancing act between supporting the PYD and providing reassurances to Turkey to be able to cooperate on the resolution of the Syrian conflict is not an easy one. Moreover, the U.S. hopes to push Iran out of the equation in Syria while achieving a political solution to the civil war, as well as, an “enduring” defeat of Daesh. Granted that the complexity of the terrain has a lot to do with this complicated picture, but the lack of clarity and the mismatch of the U.S. goals with its investments on the ground is the enduring story from the Obama to the Trump administration. The good news is that the U.S. recognizes the crucial role of Turkey in all these goals, however the bad news is all these goals are unlikely to be achieved simultaneously. 

The U.S.-Turkey relationship is going through interesting times, as both allies are willing to work through their differences despite serious disagreements over a host of issues. Turkey has been pressing the U.S. as well as the international community to take a firmer stand against those responsible for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

When asked about the extradition of Gulen to Turkey, Trump denied getting involved in the legal process but stated that the U.S. is looking for “whatever we can do for Turkey.”

The Turkish position puts President Trump in an awkward position, as he appears inclined to accept that the Crown Prince Mohammad bin Selman was not responsible. Trump also pledged that the relationship with Saudi Arabia would not be affected by the Khashoggi affair. Despite this disagreement, President Trump made some positive statements about President Erdogan and Turkey, citing the release of Pastor Andrew Brunson last month. Most recently, when asked about the extradition of Gulen to Turkey, Trump denied getting involved in the legal process but stated that the U.S. is looking for “whatever we can do for Turkey.”

There is also the U.S. support for the YPG that continues to be a sticking point. However, both the American and Turkish leaderships express willingness to work through these differences largely because the two NATO allies have a lot more to gain by working together than at cross purposes. 

For some analysts, the Khashoggi case has been a useful tool for Turkey to play politics in a geostrategic power struggle.

For some analysts, the Khashoggi case has been a useful tool for Turkey to play politics in a geostrategic power struggle. It is important to note that the Saudi failure to provide an explanation for what happened to Khashoggi lasted weeks. Every explanation the Saudis provided was quickly falsified by facts and Turkey insisted on accountability as well as national sovereignty. For all intents and purposes, the Saudi behavior forced Turkey to leak facts and made it all too easy to pursue a “drip drip strategy,” if there was ever such a conscious strategy in the first place.

The U.S. media’s pressure on the Trump administration to take a clear stance was indirectly owed to Turkey’s unwillingness to let this murder be covered up. Turkey made a careful distinction between King Salman and the rest of the Saudi leadership, creating at least some wiggle room without abandoning full accountability for Khashoggi’s murder. President Trump may have preferred that the issue goes away somehow but his administration continued to engage Turkey on the matter. This dynamic of persistent engagement despite deep differences is interesting and might provide a blueprint at least for the next two years.

Both on the issue of Gulen’s extradition and the U.S. support for the YPG, there seems to be a similar dynamic at play. Turkey has requested Gulen’s extradition and pushed hard for it politically but understands the political constraints on the Trump administration. This does not mean Turkey will contend itself with the status quo and give up on the extradition request. Turkey will continue to bring up the issue and pressure the U.S. side to act against the Gulen network all the while engaging instead of confronting the administration. With regard to the YPG issue, Turkey again insists that the U.S. should stop supporting the organization because of its links to the PKK. Yet, it continues to engage the new U.S. team on the Syria policy without accepting any kind of normalization of the YPG.

Time will tell if this is all we can hope for but continuous engagement through crises may be the solution for the time being.

All the minefields in the U.S.-Turkey relationship need careful analysis and comprehensive policy coordination and there is a long way to go before that happens. Nevertheless, it is important to underline that the two sides are both willing to listen to each other’s positions and engage in a meaningful way. It is not clear if this dynamic will be sustainable in the medium and long terms but it should be considered a start in any case.

Time will tell if this is all we can hope for but continuous engagement through crises may be the solution for the time being. However, we should not lose sight that a comprehensive strategic dialogue would produce more concrete and sustainable results in the long run.   

According to a recent NBC News report, the White House is looking for ways to extradite Fetullah Gulen, the leader of FETO, which plotted the failed coup attempt on 15 July 2016 in Turkey, which left 250 victims dead and more than 2,000 injured. According to the report, the “Trump administration officials asked federal law enforcement agencies to examine legal ways of removing” Gulen. The Justice Department, FBI, Homeland Security Department and naturally the White House, are all reported to be involved in the process. Now you might be thinking that this was denied by the U.S. administration, as on Friday, the Justice Dept denied any potential extradition. This in itself was unusual, as it’s not typical for the Justice Department to comment on matters pertaining to potential cases of extradition. However, the fact that something like this has been on the agenda this week was quite serious.

The initial report by NBC News suggests that the extradition of Gulen could take place in order to ease Turkey’s pressure on Saudi Arabia in regards to the Jamal Khashoggi murder, which brought Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman to the forefront as a brutal murderer. As expressed in the report, this is an option, but could also be false. Hence, the focus here isn’t on the language of the report, which describes Gulen as an “Erdogan foe,” and an “exiled cleric,” nor is it the link with the Khashoggi case. Rather, Gulen’s extradition is far more important than any of these. With various sources claiming different stories, if the Trump administration has actually considered the extradition of Fetullah Gulen, this would be a game changing move.

With various sources claiming different stories, if the Trump administration has actually considered the extradition of Fetullah Gulen, this would be a game changing move.

For over two years, the U.S. has underestimated the significance of Gulen for Turkey. It’s as if the U.S. administration doesn’t care about hosting the individual responsible for Turkey’s bloodiest coup ever. What annoyed the Turkish public and the politicians as well is the perception that the U.S. was behind the coup attempt. There seemed to be no other explanation for why a capable state like the U.S. would host such a most-wanted terrorist despite its ally’s persistent requests. If the extradition process was to take place, the Turkish perception of the U.S. would take a new turn.

As for my own part, with all these different stories in the media, I’m still having trouble in understanding why the U.S. would want to extradite Gulen after all the damage done to its relations with Turkey. Once he returns to Turkey, Gulen will eventually inform the Turkish authorities on his foreign connections. After all, the reasons for the inquiries over him before the coup attempt were more about the spying activities of his organization in Turkey. It is impossible for an organization like FETO to maintain its network in such an effective manner without support from outside. If the U.S. were really to extradite him, this would show that the administration is not afraid of what Gulen would spill during his questioning by Turkish authorities. This will give back the U.S. the credibility it lost within the Turkish public opinion and decision makers.

The U.S. administration has underestimated the significance of Gulen for Turkey. It’s as if the administration doesn’t care about hosting the individual responsible for Turkey’s bloodiest coup ever.

Nevertheless, there must be a reason why the potential extradition of Gulen was high on the agenda this week – 2 years after the failed coup attempt. It’s hard to figure out why the U.S. has insisted to protect Gulen for so long, and then suddenly various rumors emerge about the administration wanting to extradite him. When taking this development into consideration with the recent bounties on the PKK’s top three leaders, one does ask whether the U.S. is reformulating its policy with Turkey.

While the debate on Gulen’s extradition and the U.S. listing three PKK terrorists on the Rewards for Justice Program will remain live, we’ll have to wait and see if any concrete results come out of these steps.

As the U.S. pushed Turkey away with the hope that coercion will make Turkey realign its foreign policies in harmony with U.S. interests, Turkey has searched and found new channels of cooperation in the international arena. Such cooperation channels with the European countries, Russia, Iran, and Qatar showed that the coercion is not pulling Turkey to the U.S. orbit but pushing it further away. Hence, if the U.S. does take any positive move in helping Turkey fight FETO, this could be interpreted as a way of compensating the damage caused to bilateral relations between Ankara and Washington.

While the debate on Gulen’s extradition and the U.S. listing three PKK terrorists on the Rewards for Justice Program will remain live, we’ll have to wait and see if any concrete results come out of these steps. If they do produce sincere results, this will reflect itself as an unrepresented boost in relations between Turkey and the U.S.

Since the beginning of this month, the U.S. has taken many positive steps toward Turkey. The first was the joint patrols with Turkey in Manbij. The U.S. also declared that Turkey would be exempt from the sanctions on Iran. The U.S., on the very same day, also lifted the sanctions against Justice Minister Abdulhamit Gul and Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu with regard to the ban on their entry to the U.S. and their possible financial affairs in the U.S. Turkey quickly responded in the same way by removing its own sanctions against the counterparts in the U.S.

A new one was added to these steps last Tuesday. On November 6, the State Department listed the PKK’s three top executives in its ‘reward for justice ’program. ‘Reward for Justice’ is a reward program developed by the U.S. Department of State for counter-terrorism. The program lists the names and information of the most wanted terrorists and promises a reward if information provided is useful for the capture of these persons. The list includes 11 categories covering rewards ranging from 250 thousand dollars up to 25 million dollars. The names of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and Daesh leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi are on the top of the list. The PKK leaders included in the list are Murat Karayilan ($5 million), Cemil Bayik ($4 million) and Duran Kalkan ($3 million). Three other familiar names are also in the list but none of them are new in the list. Musa Asoglu, Seher Demir Sen, Zerrin Sari, all from the revolutionary socialist DHKP-C organization, had already been in the category of 3 million dollars before last Tuesday.

Along with Murat Karayilan, Cemil Bayik, and Duran Kalkan, there are three other familiar names in the list of ‘Reward for Justice’ who are Musa Asoglu, Seher Demir Sen and Zerrin Sari, all from the revolutionary socialist DHKP-C organization.

One major aspect of this matter is about the significance of these positive steps, if they really are. Frankly speaking, there is not much going on here no matter how many steps the U.S. took toward Turkey. To start with, Turkey’s exemption from the Iran sanctions is not only for Turkey but also for seven other Asian countries, and is only temporary. And the main motive in this exemption is not about giving Turkey a relief but about controlling global oil prices. The removal of sanctions against two Turkish ministers is also no big deal. There was no real harm anyway, it was a sanction only on paper. The joint patrols in Manbij is good news but it came too late, much later than expected. Further, Turkey is still expecting the promises to be kept in its entirety, such as the removal of the PYD units from the city of Manbij.

The US bounty on the PKK’s top leadership is one thing. But Turkey-U.S. relations have much deeper issues to resolve ranging from the Halkbank Case to the ongoing American hospitality to coup plotter Fetullah Gulen and to the American support for the PYD.

If we go back to the bounty issue for the PKK’s top leadership, that’s another good sign, but just a sign, nothing more. It’s not as if the U.S. captured these three people and handed them to Turkey. It is still a mystery to many in Turkey whether the U.S. will use the expected information in favor of Turkey or not. Relations between Turkey and the U.S. have much deeper issues to resolve ranging from the famous Halkbank Case to the ongoing American hospitality to coup plotter Fetullah Gulen.

And perhaps at the deepest level, there lies the American support and shield for the PYD. Unless the U.S. shows a sign, a genuine sign, that it understands and respects Turkey’s concerns on these matters, other steps taken will be nothing more than noise. This should not be understood in the way that all these steps mean nothing for Turkey. They mean a lot if this is the first stage of a new path. But it does not really mean much, if at all, if this is the entire package.

Turkey and the U.S. started joint patrols in the northern Syrian city of Manbij on Thursday, November 1 based on a long waited deal between the two countries. Since the days of Turkey’s Euphrates Shield Operation (Aug 24, 2016 – Mar 29, 2017) in the Jarabslus-Al Bab-Mare triangle, Turkey had been waiting for a role in the future of Manbij. Turkey cleaned this area from Daesh forces with the operation but did not enter Manbij. This decision was taken as a response to the guarantees Turkey received from the U.S. regarding the future of the city, which included that the PYD would not rule the city, and further, withdraw its forces out of the city. The deal was brokered between Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on June 4 but was delayed by the U.S. side until this moment. Despite this delay, the two countries finally came to the next stage of carrying out joint patrols on top of two other significant developments in bilateral relations.

First, based on Pompeo’s remarks, Turkey will be granted a waiver from the U.S. oil sanctions against Iran, which is essential as Iran is a major energy source for Turkey. The news came out on Friday, just three days before the second phase of sanctions were set to go into effect on November 5. The second big news also came out on the very same day as the U.S Treasury Department stated that the blacklisting of two Turkish ministers, Abdulhamit Gul and Suleyman Soylu, had been lifted. Turkey corresponded in the same way by lifting its own bans towards the American counterparts. The bans were placed initially by the U.S. to put pressure on Turkey over the Brunson affair. The softening also followed the release of Andrew Brunson.

All the three developments (joint patrols in Manbij, waiver from the Iran sanctions, and mutual removal of bans over ministers) are good news for the future of the troubled relations between the two countries. Nevertheless, there are still plenty of reasons to worry about the future of relations between Turkey and the U.S. First, Turkey still perceives a great deal of threat originating from U.S. actions. Two such perceptions have quite solid bases as the U.S. still hosts Fetullah Gulen, the criminal cult leader of FETO, which carried out a failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016, in which the organization sent a squad to assassinate President Erdogan, bombed the Turkish parliament, and murdered 250 Turkish citizens. Further, the U.S. still supports the PKK’s Syrian offshoot, the PYD, in Northern Syria. Until these two matters are resolved, relations cannot go back to normal. Given that Turkey is also pressuring the PYD in the east of Euphrates nowadays, Turkey-U.S. relations are still fragile and have not passed the test of time in Syria. These are all the crisis points between the two used-to-be allies.

These crises cost Turkey a lot, not only in terms of the economy as the Turkish Lira lost quite a deal of its value vis-a-vis the USD as the tension rose in the late summer. Turkey’s even bigger cost was its sense of security as the U.S. is still the primary reason why Turkey cannot eliminate FETO and the PYD completely. Despite these, Turkey had one major gain from these crises. Ankara has learnt how to survive, not only without American support, but also despite the American efforts to hurt the country politically and economically. Turkey has learnt how to carry out cross-border military operations in a country where U.S. forces are settled in favor of Turkey’s adversaries.

Turkey has also learnt how to negotiate for its interests rather than prioritizing the possible American reactions. Turkey has learnt how to coordinate its actions with other global powers such as Russia based on mutual respect and understanding. Further, Turkey has learnt how to set a negotiation table where the future of Syria is discussed without the U.S. Perhaps the right way to interpret the recent warming in the bilateral relations is about the American recognition of Turkey as a rational and effective international actor whether the U.S. supports or tries to undermine this effective role. This recognition, if supported with a genuine respect toward Turkey’s security needs, can save the exhausted bilateral relation.

We have been living in a unipolar world since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. has been the sole major power. However, the structure of the international system has been evolving away from unipolarity due to the disproportional growth rates among states. Accordingly, there are states that speedily head to gain the status of major power. China in particular has increased its military and economic capacity in a short span of time, which is expected to reach the level of development that facilitates it to challenge the primacy of the U.S. So, a bipolar world is rising.

Besides, recently, new regional powers have emerged. Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey, are among those powers. The rise of regional powers, though it does not complicate things much at the global level, puts pressure on the U.S., which, as the only major power, engages in the politics of regions such as the Middle East as an off-shore balancer. Losing the control of a region may undoubtedly have political repercussions on the international level. That may give way to penetration of another extra-regional power or worse lead to the emergence of a regional hegemon, which may happen to rise as a global power in the long run.

Russia’s enhancement of its influence and Turkey’s tendency to act autonomously in the Middle East can be cited in this context. The relative decline of U.S. power in the Middle East has prompted Russia to fill the power vacuum and has urged Turkey to start the process of uplifting its status from a balancer to a hegemon in the region.

Current U.S. foreign policy faces the problem of accommodating China and regional powers like Turkey. So far under the Trump presidency, the U.S. has countered this problem by developing a unilateralist and isolationist foreign policy. This foreign policy basically seeks to contain and overturn the power shift that is now taking place. The Trump administration has taken policies that range from trade war to military tour de force for that purpose. This has been accompanied by the securitization of China and regional power like Turkey in the media.

Nevertheless, especially owing to the domestic political necessities like the upcoming elections for the Senate, the Trump administration has started to take contrary decisions towards these countries. The release of Pastor Andrew Brunson last week, who had been in prison for about two years in Turkey on accusations of aiding the PKK, was reciprocated by signaling to lift some of the economic sanctions that had been imposed on Turkey earlier this year.

Here we should note that Trump seems to plan to use the release of Brunson in his election campaign in order to mobilize the Evangelical and conservative voters to go to the polls and vote for the Republicans for the Senate. Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, has recently expressed that some sanctions could be lifted. This marks that the period of tension, which was grown by mutual retaliatory political moves, seems to enter into a period of relative normalcy.

However, this should not increase the hopes for bilateral relations. As noted above, relations between Turkey and the U.S. will not be normalized unless the U.S. agrees to accommodate Turkey by admitting its new international status, which is an autonomous regional power. Indeed, in the past, relations between the two countries have witnessed several low points, including the Cyprus crisis in the 1970s. Yet, the reason behind these kinds of tensions was not structural. Turkey was merely expecting for its sovereign rights to be expected. It did not seek to change its status and position in international politics.

Today, Turkey seeks to adjust the international order according to recent changes in its domestic politics and the distribution of power in the region. Turkey does not want to keep playing its traditional role of the “outsider” balancer in its vicinity by following the U.S. leadership and national interests. Instead, it desires to establish itself as an autonomous powerhouse in the region. The U.S. has so far responded to Turkey’s new foreign policy attitude by supporting the terrorist organizations such as the PKK and FETO (led by U.S.-based criminal cult leader Fetullah Gulen), which strives to curb the country’s potentials and capabilities.

In response to this attitude, Turkey has continuously given the message that it will not take a step back. For instance, last week President Erdogan signaled a new wave of military operations in the south of the country and stated that Turkey was adamant to cleanse the east of the Euphrates River from all terrorist (PKK) elements. This, no doubt, will be a new test on how “healthy” the relations between Turkey and the U.S. are.

Recent sources that have been secretly released to the press confirm the fact that the Saudi journalist was killed in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul – in the room of the General Consul.

According to reports that have been leaked to the press, Khashoggi was wearing an Apple Watch on his visit and this recorded the events that occurred. A recording that was then automatically uploaded on his iCloud revealed that the journalist was killed – in fact, chopped into pieces while still alive in a seven-minute execution session.

A group of men had flown into Turkey a day before Khashoggi’s entrance, and left Istanbul on the day of the event (after Khashoggi’s disappearance). According to a source that spoke to the Middle East Eye, “There was no attempt to interrogate him. They had come to kill him.”

His murderers are reported to have listened to music on their headphones while dismembering his body.

The Saudi General Consul in Istanbul fled the country yesterday (16 October) after the UN Human Rights chief called for his immunity to be stripped in order to be able to question him within the current investigation being carried on.

Upon the disappearance of Khashoggi and increasing international pressure, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Saudi Arabia and then Turkey. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, head of the National Intelligence Service Hakan Fidan, Presidential Spokesman Ibrahim Kalin and the U.S. Special Representative for Syria James Jeffrey attended the meeting between Pompeo and President Erdogan.

While Pompeo confirmed that the U.S. will support Turkey in its investigation, other items such as the Syrian Civil War, the PKK/YPG and the Manbij deal were also on the agenda.

Turkey will enter Saudi Consul’s residence

Within the scope of the investigation in regards to Jamal Khashoggi’s disappearance, the Turkish authorities will enter the Saudi Consul’s residence in Istanbul.

While the authorities intended to enter the residence yesterday, M. Cavusoglu told reporters tht they couldn’t as “the Saudis claimed that his [consul’s] family were inside.”

The question as to where the remains of Jamal Khashoggi are still remains unanswered. The Saudi regime have insisted that they do not know the answer to this. However, the international community are pretty much aware that the Saudi diplomats in Istanbul would have not been able to pursue such an act without the knowledge of Riyadh.

In the first year of President Trump’s tenure, Turkish-American relations went through what we can call a period of “sizing up,” as hopes for a new beginning were somewhat moderated by strategic challenges. The Trump administration had inherited the Obama policy of supporting “local forces” (read YPG) against Daesh with no U.S. boots on the ground save for the “military advisors.” Turkey was patient in Trump’s first year to allow the administration some time to re-evaluate the mission and start working with Turkey instead of the PKK’s Syrian branch. When it became clear that the Trump administration would settle on the same policy, Turkey launched a military operation in Afrin to ensure the YPG forces would not go west of the Euphrates river.

The serious divergence on the ground in northern Syria has continued, but efforts to put the U.S.-Turkey relationship back on track also continued, as outstanding legal cases (Brunson and Zarrab cases) were compartmentalized away from broader policy questions. However, the pressure from the Evangelical base of the Trump administration led to an ill-timed ultimatum by President Trump and Vice President Pence, resulting in yet another bilateral crisis.

As a result of the pressure, the U.S. imposed sanctions against Turkish ministers and additional steel and aluminum tariffs, a first against a NATO ally. These measures appeared to be largely symbolic, but they had a serious impact on the Turkish Lira’s devaluation against the U.S. dollar. As Turkey refused to bow down to such economic pressures, the relationship came to the brink of total breakdown. Clearly, the Brunson case was a major catalyzer in this process, but the underlying strategic disagreements and the already existing mutual distrust has created a fertile ground for a major crisis.

With the Turkish courts deciding to release Pastor Brunson last week, however, an important new phase might just be starting in the bilateral relationship. Brunson’s return to the U.S. and President Trump’s hosting of the pastor in the oval office with high level administration officials sends a strong message to the Evangelical base ahead of the midterm elections in November.

Not that Trump risked losing the support of the Evangelicals, but Brunson’s return gives his standing with Evangelical supporters a big boost. Turkish leadership has maintained the legal process played itself out and both sides insisted there was no specific deal. We should note that there does not need to be a deal for this development to have a positive impact on the U.S.-Turkey relationship.

The fact that a legal case derailed the relationship between two NATO allies should give everyone a pause. It underscores the complexity of the strategic environment in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood and heightened security concerns Turkey feels as a result of U.S. policies in the region. President Trump’s positive remarks about Turkey reflect his concern over his standing with the Evangelical voters, but this will not be enough for a broader strategic conversation between the U.S. and Turkey.

The recent changes in the U.S. Syria policy have given at least a limited amount of reassurances to Turkey that its interests would be taken into consideration more carefully. The U.S. rhetorical support for Turkey against an imminent military operation against Idlib was a welcome development in this sense. Yet, without a more comprehensive policy coordination between two sides, the mutual skepticism will continue, especially as the U.S. continues to support the YPG.

The upside for the relationship is that the “sizing up” period may be over and both sides are much clearer about their positions. The ambiguities regarding northern Syria as well as the uncertain fate of the Brunson case are no longer excuses for the lack of an honest dialogue. The regional crises will almost certainly create new challenges and the U.S.-Turkey ties will be tried. The lesson from the Brunson case is that Turkey will not bow to threats and pressures, and that the U.S. will need to pursue diplomatic options instead. Going forward, a talk-first-shoot-later approach will have to win for a healthier U.S.-Turkey relationship.

The past week in Turkey’s foreign affairs agenda was quite busy. The disappearance of Washington Post opinion columnist Jamal Khashoggi topped this. After entering the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, the Saudi journalist mysteriously disappeared. The Turkish authorities showed the footage of his entrance to the consulate but he simply did not come out, at least, in the way he was expected to. The Saudi side claims that Khashoggi left the consular building but they cannot provide evidence because their cameras were not recording that day according to their statement.

The Turkish side on the other hand shows the footage of Khashoggi’s entry as well as a well documented story of a 15-man team of Saudi officers (including special forces and intelligence officers) who flew in Istanbul with two private jets and left hours after, allegedly, after “handling” the Khashoggi case. As the Saudi squad left the consular building, Khashoggi’s fiancée was still waiting for him outside the consulate.

The second matter with respect to Turkey’s foreign affairs agenda came a week after Khashoggi’s disappearance. Andrew Brunson, an American pastor living in Turkey and on trial for alleged espionage with links to the Gulenist terror network, was released by the Turkish court on Friday, 12 October. His arrest for almost 2 years and following house arrest for the following 2 months was a major issue deepening the crisis between Turkey and the U.S. (Here is an earlier assessment of the matter).

The third major event with regard to Turkey’s foreign affairs agenda came out from President Erdogan’s statements regarding a possible incursion into the Northern Syrian city of Manbij. During his speech in Isparta on Friday, 12 October, Erdogan touched upon the recent news on the trenches being dug by the PYD/SDF in Manbij against a possible Turkish offensive. Erdogan gave a clear message in his speech and said that “we will enter there too.”

While an offensive does not seem imminent, it is well-known that Erdogan is pretty straightforward when it comes to Turkish military incursions. We saw similar remarks by Erdogan before Turkey’s offensives in Jarablus and Afrin and also before Turkey’s establishment of observatory posts in Idlib, all in Syria. Turkey’s ground incursion into the PKK-controlled territories in Iraq also came after similar remarks by Erdogan. In all these cases, the President gave the orders after making his warnings in public. Hence, it is natural to question whether we will see new developments in Manbij.

Looking at the three events of the past week, one can see the parameters are about to change in the Saudi Arabia-Syria-U.S. triangle of Turkish foreign politics. The Saudi case is likely to make the already tense relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia even tenser. Turkey has leaked strong evidence against the Saudis on Khashoggi’s disappearance but for now is keeping itself back from a more aggressive strategy against the Saudis. Perhaps the country wants to keep escalation under control and avoids escalating the tension to a no-turn level given that the economic relations with the Saudis still matter.

Or, Turkey may be willing to play the Khashoggi case against the Saudis to the fullest degree but does not rush for it to make the full impact at the right moment. Further, Turkey’s evidences have already hurt the Saudis in a number of ways. A number of U.S. senators have already discussed invoking the Global Magnitsky Act on Saudi Arabia. Further, a long list of global media sponsors have already dropped out of the Saudi conference, The Future Investment Initiative (popularly marketed as Davos in desert). While these are the first tangible effects of the Khashoggi case, the biggest strike was about the well-funded and well-crafted “reformist leader Muhammad Bin Salman” propaganda.

In the eyes of many in the Middle East, Europe, or North America, Saudi Arabia is now nothing more than a brutal tribe-state. It is too hard for Muhammad Bin Salman to fix this damage to his PR campaign. That being said, a real blow can only become possible if Trump turns his back to Bin Salman, which is not likely at the moment.

While Turkey seems to be committed to pressure Saudi Arabia on the unfortunate disappearance and probable murder of Khashoggi, it also has other plans in its Middle East strategy. It seems like Turkey will keep Saudi off the loop in its affairs with the U.S. with regard to Syria. Given the Saudi vulnerability vis-à-vis Turkey (after all, they are accused of murdering a journalist in Turkey in the most brutal, and silly way), Saudis may also not risk a further escalation with Turkey on the question of Syria.

As Turkey released Brunson and hopes a significant improvement in its relations with the U.S. (despite all the other problems between the two), it can also be more demanding with respect to the future of Manbij. While the power game in Syria continues in its fullest sensitivity, the fates of individuals from the tragedy of Khashoggi to the release of Brunson will have reflections in Turkey’s complex and interdependent foreign affairs calculations.

The most striking feature of the Brunson case is that the U.S. has resisted to understand Turkey’s new foreign policy, and this led to a crisis between the two countries. Just to remind the reader, American Pastor Andrew C. Brunson has been kept under arrest for almost two years with the accusation of aiding terrorist groups such as the PKK. He was put on trial, found guilty and was condemned to a three year plus imprisonment by the Turkish courts.

U.S. President Donald Trump and Vice President Mike Pence claimed earlier that he had been innocent and expressed that he had to be released immediately. The language adopted in those statements bore a degree of threat and was disrespectful to the Turkish judicial system. That’s why Turkish officials have criticized President Trump and Vice President Pence for not showing patience and being disrespectful to the judicial process after the release of the pastor. They underlined that Turkey is a country where the rule of law is shown due respect. In fact, the issue was more than being about the rule of law, it is more of respecting Turkey’s sovereignty and recognizing its new international status.

The Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi’s probable murder in the Saudi Arabia Consulate in Istanbul also points to the same problem. It is clear that the Saudi crown prince Mohammad Bin Salman ordered the killing of Mr. Khashoggi on account of his critical stance towards the Saudi regime. Regarding the very close and special relations between Prince Salman and President Trump’s son-in-law and senior envoy to the Middle East Jared Kushner, it is not hard to guess that the U.S. was closely following the issue and was informed that Mr. Khashoggi was ordered to be killed. Choosing Istanbul as the location for this outrageous act, which directly defies the norms of international politics, does not seem to be random. It has been rightly put forward by some analysts that the purpose of this unfortunate act of killing was not just to get rid of an opponent of the Saudi regime but to get Turkey involved into this unfortunate incident and to violate its sovereignty.

Combining these two recent incidents with the Trump administration’s supply of heavy weapons and diplomatic protection to the Syrian branch of PKK (YPG) and its unabashed and militant foreign policy towards Palestine and Jerusalem, one can conclude that the U.S. shows no respect to Turkey’s security concerns and sovereign rights. More to the point, the Trump administration fails to understand Turkey’s new foreign policy doctrine. Turkey has been following a revisionist foreign policy for a couple of years. It has been seeking adjustments in the existing distribution of power in its region and in the international system in general.

Turkey’s current Syrian policy and its call for reforming international institutions such as the UN Security Council on the basis of new international realities can be given as examples to this revisionist turn in Turkish foreign policy. Despite that these are defensive policies, since they were put into action after Turkey came under attack by terrorist groups and its long-term allies, they manifest the desire for change in international politics.

The U.S.’s uncompromising posture pushes Turkey towards more activism in its foreign policy. President Erdogan has just vowed to eliminate all the YPG militants in Manbij and cleanse off the region from the terrorist elements located in the east of the Euphrates river. This would be a punch in the face to the YPG (and also to the U.S.) who has already suffered a terrible loss in the Operation Oil Branch in Afrin. After that done Turkey would secure the control of all its southern border with Syria and become a more powerful actor in Syrian politics and in the region in general.

As long as the U.S. clings to its current policy of disrespecting Turkey’s sovereignty and supporting its enemies, this will get Turkey to feel more insecure and as a result it will accelerate its policy of defensive expansion in its vicinity. The Trump administration has to find a better policy to be able to contain Turkey. Supporting the YPG, giving unconditional support to Israel, disrespecting Turkey’s sovereignty and opening an economic war have so far backfired. Turkey has grown more powerful.

According to news reported from Anadolu Agency on Wednesday 10 October , U.S. forces in Syria’s Manbij have provided the PKK/YPG terror group with new construction equipment, allowing for terrorists to continue digging up trenches in the city center.

The U.S. support to the PKK/YPG in Syria has been a major point of difference between the policies of Washington and Ankara in Syria. While the U.S. believes that they can wipe out a terrorist organization by supporting another, Ankara has insisted that the U.S. regime ought to rule out support for any terrorist organization – regardless of their so-called ideological affiliation.

U.S. troops have continued to provide military and logistic transportation from northern Iraq to northwestern Syria, despite a deal between Ankara and Washington on the withdrawal of the terrorist organization from the city.

The Manbij deal that was reached in June this year was a reassurance to Ankara that the terrorist organization will withdraw from the city in order to stabilize the region.

According to the news produced by AA, local sources also told journalists that the U.S. also sends aid to the PKK/YPG in the region.

In the recent logistic support, trucks carrying four construction vehicles were transported to Manbij. U.S. soldiers escorted the transfer of these vehicles, which included 3 bulldozers and one excavator.

The PKK/YPG use this equipment in order to continue digging trenches and tunnels.

The disagreement over the control and status of the Syrian town of Manbij has been a symbol of the strategic differences between the U.S. and Turkey’s Syria policies for a while now. Turkey’s successful military operation in Afrin led to the announcement of a roadmap over Manbij, which relatively calmed down U.S.-Turkey tensions. However, the U.S. continued to support the PKK-affiliated YPG forces in a stated mission to deny a return to Daesh in northern Syria.

With Daesh no longer holding territory, this mission did not appear to provide convincing rationale for a prolonged American presence on the ground. More recently, the U.S. ended its ambiguity by announcing an open-ended presence in Syria declaring a mission to limit Iranian influence in Syria as part of a broader strategy to confront Iran in the region.

With this critical shift in strategy, the U.S. commitment to northern Syria seems to be set in motion for the long term. One of the first concrete outcomes of this change appears to be the administration’s stern warnings against a regime operation against Idlib, which would have caused yet another humanitarian catastrophe.

Turkey sent reinforcements to its observation posts in and around Idlib to prevent the regime from an easy takeover while lobbying Russia to prevent such an operation. The U.S. rhetoric against the looming operation may have helped Turkey’s case, convincing Russia to hold off at least for a period of time in return for the Turkish promise to push terror groups out of Idlib.

Another consequence of the U.S. policy change seems to be the announcement that the PYD would no longer negotiate with the Assad regime. This step seems to be aimed at softening the Turkish argument that the U.S. should not trust the PYD, which would work with the Assad regime, Iran or Russia depending on its needs. This argument still holds true despite the PYD’s obvious tactic to appease its American supporters, who are clearly concerned about the degree to which the regime is supported by Iranians.

The PYD has played a critical role in the PKK’s regional ambitions by opening the door for legitimacy in the international arena despite Turkey’s warnings. Turkey has been able to limit the PYD’s forays into the western side of the Euphrates but the area it continues to control remains a major concern for Turkey.

The U.S. policymakers in charge of the Syria policy would like to see Turkey enlisted on their side in their push back against Iran in the region and they must see an interest in alleviating at least some of the Turkish concerns. This kind of willingness to work with Turkey and the most recent announcement of joint Turkish-American patrols around Manbij can help rebuild confidence between the two NATO allies.

Nevertheless, we should be clear-eyed about the reality on the ground of the U.S. support for the PYD, which is considered by Turkey as a direct security threat. This will continue to be the Achilles’ heel in the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relationship. The PKK understands this and will seek to exploit it for its interests.

Turkey feels more confident after its Afrin operation, the Manbij agreement with the U.S., and the successful diplomatic effort to prevent the Assad regime from launching a major military assault against Idlib, supported at least rhetorically by Washington. These are strong signs for a renewed dynamic that takes into consideration Turkey’s interests and concerns. But once again, American support for the YPG continues to be the underlying fundamental strategic divergence between the two allies, with significant potential to undermine any positive momentum.

On Thursday, President Erdogan spoke at the TRT World Forum, which is currently taking place in Istanbul. The Forum, which began on Wednesday, brought many speakers from all across the world, with the theme “Envisioning Peace and Security in a Fragmented World.”

During his speech, President Erdogan repeated his call for serious reforms within the United Nations Security Council – an issue that he also emphasized during his speech at the United Nations General Assembly that took place in September in New York.

Speaking at the closing session of the Forum, Erdogan said, “We need to achieve a United Nations Security Council with participation from seven continents.”

Turkey’s criticism against the United Nations and the UNSC in particular has heightened due to the organization’s failure to successfully deal with the Syrian crisis, which has led to a mass refugee problem across the world.

Erdogan repeated his “The world is bigger than five” motto, and argued that reforms need to be initiated in accordance with this acceptance.

Reminding the audience of the historical context of the UN, and that it was constructed in this manner due to the circumstances of the Second World War, the Turkish President stated, “The era of the five permanent members of the UNSC is over, we are not living under the same circumstances.”

Apart from Syria, Erdogan underlined the issue of Palestine. Arguing that the Palestine issue is one that can be solved, the President argued that the main reason why this issue has been prolonged is because the UN fails to ensure that Israel puts to practice the decisions that have been made against it.

“There are many decisions that have been taken against Israel at the UN, but none of them is implementable.”

Turkey-EU relations

During his speech, President Erdogan also touched upon Turkey’s bid to the European Union. Talking about this historical process, the President also mentioned that there could be a potential referendum in Turkey regarding this issue.

“There are many things that we can contribute to the European Union. They may have things to contribute to us but what should be done is, I suppose, to consult with 81 million people [in Turkey] and see what they will decide.”

Syrian Civil War

Turkey has been an active and key player in trying to end the Syrian Civil War. While party to the Astana process, in which Iran and Russia are also guarantor states, recently Ankara and Moscow reached an agreement on the Idlib issue.

Idlib is the only stronghold for Syrian rebels, and throughout the last month the political agenda was full with news that the Assad regime in Syria were to attack the city with Russian air support.

In regards to the issues in Syria, President Erdogan emphasized that Turkish troops are currently in Syria because the Syrian people want them to be there.

“The people of Syria invited us there. ‘Come here to save us’ they said.”

Touching upon the fragile Turkey-U.S. relations, President Erdogan also accused the U.S. of sending 19,000 truckloads of weapons and ammunition to terrorist groups in Syria.

The PKK/PYD issue and the continuous support that the U.S. has provided for the group continues to be a main obstacle in healing relations between the two countries.

In cooperation with the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, SETA Istanbul held a panel today discussing the changing dynamics in Turkey’s foreign policy. Under the title “Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the New Period: Opportunities and Challenges,” the speakers were Kemal Inat, Talha Kose, Samir Salha, and Said Elhaj.

Kemal Inat began by stating that Turkey is currently trying to follow an “independent foreign policy,” meaning that Ankara is prioritizing its own interests due to the clash it has found itself in with its Western partners.

Increasingly, Turkey’s Western allies have been falling distant to the threats that Turkey has encountered in terms of fighting against terrorism and the Syrian Civil War that has caused mass migration into the country.

In terms of the current problems that Turkey is facing, Inat stated that the problems that Turkey has witnessed “are greatly related to Ankara’s foreign policy position.”

Providing a historical background on the relations between Turkey and the U.S., Inat reminded the audience that the initial beginning of a relationship between Ankara and Washington was during the Cold War era, when Turkey needed the protection of the U.S. against Soviet expansionism.

“There was no equal relationship at first. The U.S. is trying to maintain this power relationship, while Turkey wants an equal relationship.”

In regards to Turkey’s attempts to form equal relationships between its allies, Inat also added an “alternative” dimension to the discussions on Turkish foreign policy. Inat stated that it is “natural” for Turkey to seek alternative allies – including Russia – due to its deteriorating relations with its Western allies.

“Ankara wants to form relationships based on mutual interdependence. Who ever is close to this idea, then Turkey will form good relations with that country. This is the answer to who Turkey will form relations with.”

In spite of all discussions surrounding relations between Turkey and the West, Inat also reminded the audience that the European Union is still Turkey’s largest trading partner and that the two blocs are mutually dependent on each other in terms of trade.

In agreement, Talha Kose also mentioned that while there have been ups and downs in the bilateral relation between the U.S. and Turkey, there has never been such a systematic clog.

Kose stated how anti-Turkey lobbies in the U.S. gained power after the Iraq war and were finally at a peak where they had a direct affect on relations between the two countries.

Regional powers that want to maintain the current status quo in the Middle East – namely, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt – have all maintained good relations with the U.S., while mutual insecurity has haunted the Turkey-U.S. relationship.

Speaking after Talha Kose, Said Elhaj also added the FETO dimension. Elhaj stated how the U.S. support for Fetullah Gulen and FETO has been a major detriment to relations between Washington and Ankara.

Emphasizing that the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. is an important one, Elhaj added that “Turkey does not want to lose the U.S. or NATO.”

Apart from Turkey’s relations with the U.S., Elhaj also re-iterated why some countries in the Arab world support a deteriorated Turkey-U.S. relationship. The reason for this according to Elhaj is due to the fact that “Turkey is a country observed as supporting the Arab Spring.” More, Turkey was very open in its support to Qatar during the Gulf crisis – something that initially went against the interests of Saudi Arabia.

The steep devaluation of the Turkish Lira against the U.S. dollar in August 2018 has mostly been attributed not to economic, but political reasons by many around the world – although most Western media outlets have tended to argue otherwise in a rather biased way as I discussed in my last column.

It should be noted that the abuse of the global reserve currency, the U.S. dollar, as a “financial weapon” against the countries that the U.S. is not happy with in political terms will have significant adverse consequences for the U.S. itself.

In today’s world, the U.S. dollar has certainly been in a rather dominant position as the reserve currency of the world. However, the U.S. economy is not that dominant at all in the world economy. First, although the share of the U.S. in the global trade is around 16 percent (14 percent of global exports and 18 percent of global imports), half of the total global trade is conducted via the U.S. dollar. Second, oil, gold and other commodities are overwhelmingly, if not totally, denominated in the U.S. dollar in global trade. Third, the U.S. dollar reserves comprise of around two-thirds (62.48 percent) of foreign-exchange reserves in central bank coffers around the world. Fourth, more than 80 percent of global foreign currency exchanges have been carried out with the U.S. dollar in either buy-side or sell-side.

The U.S. dollar had not been that strong in the past and certainly will not be in that position forever. The U.S. dollar has reached its current dominant position with the construction of the global economic/financial system by the U.S. itself during and in the wake of World War II. In this system, which is also called Bretton Woods, the U.S. dollar had been indexed to gold and other currencies had been tied to the U.S. dollar. However, in 1971 amid growing strains on the U.S. dollar, U.S. President Nixon severed the tie between the U.S. dollar and gold. This was the beginning of the end for the Bretton Woods system, which has gradually been replaced by neoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s around the world. The U.S. dollar has managed to keep its title as the world’s reserve currency in this transition, due to the fact that the U.S. was the world’s biggest economy and hegemonic power and the U.S. dollar was firmly established in the global financial/economic order.

No one can deny that the U.S. dollar, as the world’s reserve currency, contributes greatly to the U.S. economy. On the other hand, however, other countries also benefit from a steady economic/financial system “to an extent,” in which the U.S. dollar has a central place. But, the reputation of this structure has been tarnished by the myriad financial crises occurred since the introduction of neoliberalism and, of course, the global financial crisis of 2008-09. Lastly, using the U.S. dollar as a weapon against other countries in an effort to promote the political interests of the U.S. itself has become the final blow to the U.S. dollar. The U.S. dollar was meant to be the stabilizer of the world trade and economy, not the destabilizer.

Using the U.S. dollar with political motivations against Turkey will certainly damage the Turkish economy to an extent in the short run. However, the U.S. itself, will be the biggest loser of this financial warfare in the medium/long run. Because the U.S. dollar benefits other countries by providing a stable financial environment, in which financial transactions could be conducted without serious fluctuations in value. Moreover, the U.S. dollar serves the world as the global unit of account, or the yardstick, with which all sorts of assets can be compared in value easily globally. However, make no mistake: the U.S. is by far the biggest winner of this system. Yet, it is the U.S. itself marring it.

Although the U.S. is still the hegemonic power of the world, it is an apparent fact that its power has been waning in relative terms. The share of the U.S. economy in the world was 25 percent in 1950. It is just around 17 percent now. Moreover, in terms of purchasing power parity, China has surpassed the U.S. as the world’s biggest economy in 2011. The same thing will happen in terms of market exchange rates in the medium term. This means that the power of the U.S. dollar is destined to abate significantly. And it will possibly cease to be the reserve currency of the world in the medium/long term with dire consequences for the U.S., resulting in several reserve currencies. Using the U.S. dollar as a political weapon would only precipitate this fate.

Turkey has been the most vocal critic of the seemingly impending military assault against Idlib by the Assad regime. Turkey has serious concerns about the strategic and humanitarian consequences of a potential operation. An Assad-Iran ground operation supported by Russian airpower (though limited it may be) can unleash yet another humanitarian catastrophe, producing hundreds of thousands of IDPs and refugees. A regime takeover would signal the end of the opposition as we know it. However, Turkey’s adamant stance combined with its recent military reinforcements to the 12 observation posts might bear fruit and deter the regime, at least for the time being. Given the strong rhetoric used by the U.S. against the Assad regime especially with regard to its potential chemical weapons use, Russia might not be so eager to deploy its air support to the regime any time soon.

The most recent Tehran summit that brought the main sponsors of the Astana process, Turkey, Russia and Iran, demonstrated the level of deep disagreements between these powers. While Ankara has pushed for better relations with Moscow recently, the summit showed that Turkey would stand its ground when it comes to defending its interests in Syria, including the support for the moderate opposition. Turkey has not contended itself with warnings about a possible disaster in Idlib but has taken measures to deter the Assad regime from engineering a fait accompli. Clearly, a regime assault on Idlib goes against the basic logic of the Astana process and it can seriously derail any attempt at a political solution.

The Assad regime and its supporters have shown time and again that they have little interest in a truly political process to end the conflict in Syria. The regime has been trying to “win” through a systematic effort to take over most of the country by implementing strategic ceasefires and military operations both sequentially and simultaneously depending on the region. While there has been the talk of a political process, there has been little tangible progress on that front. Turkey’s military presence on the ground and its continued support to the opposition appear to be the only true obstacles before the regime to accomplish its goals. Turkey, on the other, is trying hard to ensure that when and if the Geneva process happens, it comes to the table with a strong hand and a viable opposition to speak of.

The most recent reports indicate that there has been a quiet policy shift in U.S. policy. Having justified its military operations in the north of Syria on the Daesh threat, the U.S. political and military leaders have not been making a strong case for continued operations in Syria, albeit until recently. The recent shift seems to entail a more open-ended commitment despite President Trump’s earlier comments about leaving Syria soon. Now, the Syria policy appears to be insistent on the departure of Iranian forces from the country as well as a stronger, albeit rhetorical, posture against the Assad regime’s potential Idlib operation. It is difficult to say the U.S. and Turkey see eye-to-eye on Idlib but there are clearly strong overlaps.

A realignment could re-emerge between the U.S. and Turkey’s policies on Idlib, which could give the Assad regime and especially Russia a pause. Despite the diplomatic benefits the U.S. position may provide, Turkey has skin in the game in a way its NATO ally does not. With the recent U.S. appointment of James Jeffrey, the new representative for engagement on Syria, there are signs that Washington might listen to and understand Ankara better, especially on its Syria policy. However, there is every indication that the U.S.’s continued support for the YPG, the Syrian extension of the PKK, will continue. In fact, much of the new Syria policy might depend on this relationship. If that continues to be the case, the U.S.-Turkey agreement on Idlib may not grow into broader cooperation on Syria.

A key component of the new U.S. policy on Syria will be the focus on reducing Iranian influence in the region, hoping to enlist Turkey’s support. However, with the impending sanctions on Iranian energy sectors, it is safe to bet that the U.S. and Turkey will have serious disagreements on Iran. Turkey vehemently disagrees with Iran on Syria but it is reliant on Iran for its oil and natural gas needs. If the U.S. is interested in enlisting Turkish support against Iran’s regional influence, it will need to engage Turkey in a meaningful way beyond the somewhat limited agreement on Idlib.

On Saturday 18 August, the AK Party held its Sixth Ordinary Congress in which it created new executive boards. Since the establishment of the party, all ordinary and extraordinary congresses have been seriously important in determining the party’s politics in the following terms. These congresses have been important not only due to the creation of new executive boards but also because they underline the party’s position on ongoing critical issues. The last Congress included important messages on current issues such as the ongoing U.S.-Turkey row and the state of the Turkish economy.

It is important to evaluate the changes in the newly formed executive boards of the party before going deeper into other issues. The AK Party, as was expected, made significant changes in both the Central Executive Board (MYK) and the Central Decision Board (MKYK). Almost half of these authorization bodies were renewed. More, both in the MYK and the MKYK, women and young people were appointed to sensitive positions. For instance, the youngest member of the MKYK is a 20-year-old female. This reflects the fact that, contrary to its rivals, the AK Party takes the rejuvenation of the party’s bodies as a serious issue and puts words into practice. The party places importance on young leading cadres both within its internal bodies and among its members of parliament; the AK Party currently has one of the youngest populations in the parliament.

As was mentioned, the Sixth Ordinary Congress was striking due to the strong messages that were given by President Erdogan during a speech he made in which he emphasized Turkey’s position on current ongoing issues. This was especially necessary to the ongoing crisis with the U.S. In his speech, President Erdogan heavily criticized the Trump administration’s latest discourse on Turkey and commented on the future of Turkey-U.S. relations. The most striking comment made in this regard was: “We will not surrender to those who act like a strategic partner but make us a strategic target.” This clearly reflects the fact that Turkey will not take a step back in its approach to the latest issue. Thus, contrary to all political and economic manipulative acts, Turkey is determined to protect its rule of law and autonomy.

Another prominent issue that arose in the Congress was President Erdogan’s call for a fight against exchange rate manipulations. Underlining the latest manipulations, Erdogan echoed his call for the Turkish people to challenge these manipulations. In addition to this, he announced new economic plans in order to prevent the vulnerability of the Turkish economy. All these developments indicate that Turkey’s fight against international manipulations on its economy will gain momentum in the upcoming period.

Beyond all these factors, the Congress and the formation of new executive boards are crucial for the party’s success in the upcoming local elections that will take place in March 2019. The executive bodies were without doubt formed in accordance with the requirements of the election campaign, and therefore the AK Party’s newly formed executive bodies include politicians that have strong local representation.

For all these reasons, the latest congress was not only important because of domestic policy issues, but also because it has reflections on Turkey’s relations and position in the international arena. The messages given at the Congress strongly underlines the fact that despite all manipulative acts coming from both national and international levels, Turkey will not make any concessions to its principals.

Many dynamics of political disagreements between Turkey and the U.S. over bilateral and regional issues have reached a crossroad that might lead to long-term strategic implications for both states. The nature of conflict is extraordinarily complex and the preceding discussion represents only a surface-level picture.

The U.S. administration has imposed sanctions against Turkish ministers and Turkey, has (and continues to) arm the PYD/YPG, which is known as the Syrian offshoot of the PKK – an armed terrorist organization that has been responsible for the deaths of thousands of Turkish citizens since 1984 and which is recognized as a terrorist organization by the United States in the fight against Daesh in Syria and Iraq – and more, the U.S. is currently hosting a so-called religious cleric who was the mastermind behind the July 15 military coup attempt that was orchestrated by Gulenist putschists.

At the center of the current crisis, the U.S. is requesting for the evangelist Pastor, Andrew Brunson, to be released from house arrest in Turkey and is trying to prevent Ankara from obtaining a Russian-made air defense missile system, which is scheduled to be delivered to Turkey by the end of 2019. More importantly, the U.S.’s new strategy in the wider Middle East region towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the status of Al-Quds and the Iranian nuclear deal is not comprised of Turkey.

Against these policies, Turkey seeks to recalibrate its foreign and security policies by alternating its geopolitical portfolio not only on economic terms but also through its foreign and security policies. Recently, President Erdogan called for alternative foreign and economic policies for Turkey. In his article published by the New York Times, following the sanctions crisis, Erdogan underlined that “before it is too late, Washington must give us the misguided notion that our relationship can be asymmetrical and come to terms with the fact that Turkey has alternatives. Failure to reverse this trend of unilateralism and disrespect will require us to start looking for new friends and allies.”

Since 2002, the AK Party governments and President Erdogan have followed a multidimensional foreign and security policy by redefining Turkey’s regional and international role in order to reconstruct Turkey’s power status from a middle-range regional power to a big power, which could relatively be noted as a more assertive reformulation of Turkey’s role in the international system. Since then, Turkish foreign policy has been under fundamental transformation not only because of the changes in foreign policy mentality but also due to the regional and geopolitical turmoil emanating mainly from the Arab uprising.

In the post-Arab spring regional and geopolitical landscape, Turkey had to adjust its foreign policy strategy and reformulate its military strategy, especially in Syria and Iraq. In the early stages, the Arab spring was observed as an opportunity to recalibrate Turkey’s power in the region. However, following the diversification of the Syrian war and other regional developments, Turkey was barred from getting a new power status on the regional level.

The Middle East crisis articulated around the Arab revolutions and counter-revolutions were also perceived as an opportunity to reformulate Turkish strategy towards the Syrian crisis and security threats across the region. Throughout all the stages of the Arab uprising, the U.S. has been the main country that caused a strategic shift in Turkey’s preferences. Due to ambiguity in U.S. strategy, Turkey had to change its policy in regards to Syria, Libya, Yemen, Egypt, and Iraq.

The existing crisis between Turkey and the U.S. is a consequence of the Arab uprising and the U.S.’s strategic choices towards Syria, Iraq and other countries. However, this time Turkey perceives the bilateral crisis as a real opportunity to reformulate its geopolitical portfolio. Ankara believes that the U.S. is still a strategic partner in nature but the unpredictable nature of the new American administration and “institutional chaos” in the U.S. foreign and security decision-making processes drive Turkey to seek new alternatives. The perception here is much more important than the realities of strategic relations between Turkey and the U.S. More importantly, the Turkish government believes that if they want to reach strategic flexibility in international and regional politics, Turkey’s geopolitical portfolio should be reformulated.

The question is how Turkey will reformulate its new geopolitical game, and this can be understood by examining Turkey’s response to U.S. policies that have been encountered against the Turkish will. There are three broad dimensions for Turkish strategy. The first one is Turkey’s bilateral strategic engagements with alternative power centers. Russia is the most crucial power that Turkey can utilize in order to balance U.S. pressure in the short term. Russia is not an economic giant for Turkey, but in terms of the strategic implications over Turkey-U.S. relations, Russia might become an external balancer for Ankara against the U.S. There is already increasing rapprochement between Turkey and Russia over various issues. However, the nature of the conflict in Syria and historical geopolitical codes in Turkey-Russia relations need to be carefully taken into consideration by Ankara.

China is another alternative power for Turkey, especially when considering the need to deepen and diversify the Turkish economy. Turkey’s political and economic engagements with the rising power also constitute important alternatives for the geopolitical portfolio of Ankara in the near future. There has also been increasing foreign policy initiatives taken by Ankara to extend its diplomatic and economic relations with Latin American, African and Asian countries.

The second and probably the most important point here is Turkey-EU relations which have been under fundamental pressure for almost more than five years. Historically, Europe has always played a vital role in Ottoman diplomacy. Following the dissolution of the Empire, one way or another, European powers maintained a way to influence Turkish diplomacy and facilitated Turkey’s balance of power game against Soviet Russia. This time, Turkey can use European powers as an opportunity to readjust its geopolitical game vis-à-vis the U.S. There are two important aspects of Turkey-EU relations following the Turkey-U.S. crisis. Turkey, firstly, can use this opportunity to repair its institutional relations on the EU level. Secondly, Turkey can effectively join the European side in balancing the U.S. in the trade war and can especially contribute to European powers in reshaping NATO’s strategic mission while Trump holds a different view of NATO.

Last but not least, Turkey’s third option to alternate its geopolitical portfolio is the Middle East. The Middle East region is geopolitically important for Turkey in regards to protecting its national security, deepening its economic lifeline, and recalibrating Turkey’s international actor role by consolidating its military tools in the region. It seems that Iran is perceived as an important strategic partner by Ankara in the region but there are some limits as well potential risks for Turkey. The Gulf countries except the UAE seems a real economic life-line for Turkey. As the Qatar case shows, the more security investment in the region provides more space of maneuver for Turkey, especially on an economic level.

Within this context, therefore, it seems that the crisis in relations between Turkey and the U.S. is pushing Turkey to rethink its current foreign policy strategy and gives Ankara an opportunity to readjust its geopolitical portfolio.

Turkey-U.S. relations are at a new low and it should not come as surprise to anyone that Trumpian foreign policymaking has a lot to do with it. It was less than a month ago that President Trump snubbed most European leaders in a NATO summit in Brussels and seemed to have a warm relationship with President Erdogan, symbolized by the now famous fist bump.

Yet within a month, Trump has given Turkey an ultimatum over the Brunson case, clearly trying to satisfy his Evangelical supporters. As Erdogan refused to bow down to such pressure, Trump announced the doubling of tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum that had been imposed earlier this year. Trump was not only impatient with the legal process but also bypassed diplomatic talks between Ankara and Washington, which were designed to resolve the outstanding legal issues between the two countries. As a result, the Turkey-U.S. relationship has become the latest victim of Trumpian foreign policymaking.

This is not the first time that the President has attacked an ally with an eye to retain or increase domestic support on a given issue. Trump attacked Mexico based on his immigration agenda while imposing tariffs on Canada as a result of his economic agenda at home. He threatened to impose tariffs on European imports, which seems to be on hold for the moment after European leaders convinced Trump to work on a new trade agreement.

Trump continues to threaten allies with sanctions for doing business with Iran based on his campaign promise to rip apart the Iran deal, which he did. In all of these instances, President Trump’s domestic agenda has driven the foreign policy agenda while he makes little effort to synthesize the two. In this sense, “America First” has come to mean undermining America’s alliances if it served the administration’s domestic political agenda.

Similarly, President Trump has questioned the very institutions that the U.S. has helped build since the start of the Cold War, including NATO – undermining perhaps the most important institution for U.S. global leadership. Trump’s relentless attacks on NATO were meant to serve his nationalist domestic agenda. The reduction of the debate on NATO’s global role and mission to a budgetary matter, often expressed in terms of financial contributions of member states, was a message to the domestic audience that the U.S. would insist on everybody paying their “fair share.” This message could resonate with a constituency sensitive to government spending and skeptical of the U.S.’ global role. It also sends a message that international organizations are there to serve, first and foremost, U.S. interests rather than sustaining an international system.

Trumpian foreign policy will have long-lasting implications for the global system as well as America’s alliances with countries like Turkey. Turkey is already faced with monumental challenges emanating from the regional instability caused by civil wars in Iraq and Syria. Turkey has also been a strong advocate of international institutions like the UN and NATO assuming larger responsibilities to achieve stability in the region. The U.S., however, chose a unilateralist path under Trump, eroding the effectiveness of multilateral institutions.

Despite these realities, Turkey was working with the U.S. in order to find a resolution to outstanding legal issues between the two countries through diplomatic channels. But the Trump administration’s sanctions and tariffs on Turkey, motivated by domestic political calculations, make it impossible to repair the relationship in the short term.

Trumpian foreign policy will continue to damage U.S. credibility and standing within its allies as well as its competitors. While U.S. allies like Europe and Turkey are going to struggle to effectively address these challenges, they are unlikely to simply roll over. The clear message from the Turkish leadership in the latest currency crisis was that Turkey would not give in to unreasonable demands. Clearly, this is not a desirable state of affairs between two NATO allies, but it is the reality of a new era in which the U.S. government does not hesitate to punish its allies and undermine the very institutions it helped build over decades. Even if the Turkey-U.S. relationship is somehow put back on track, Trumpian foreign policy will continue to introduce much instability into the international system for the foreseeable future.

As the relations between Turkey and the U.S. have turned tense, the economic cost of the tension is increasing for Turkey with the USD skyrocketing vis-a-vis the Turkish Lira. The outcome is heavy for the Turkish economy but it is not what Turkey deserved when bilateral relations are examined retrospectively.

The Turkey-U.S. alliance had better days over the past seven decades. While it’s not in its best mood today, it’s not in its worst either. Turkey served as a significant pillar of the containment strategy of the USSR during the Cold War era. The logic was simple. Turkey would not be part of the Soviet sphere of influence. It would allow the American intelligence to operate freely from Turkey to monitor the Soviets. It would host NATO military bases. It would be okay for the nuclear-tipped Jupiter rockets to be deployed in its own soils to deter the Soviets. It would also be okay if the U.S. uninstalls its military equipment on a whim. It would be ready to absorb a possible offense from the Soviets so that the “West” would save some time for its defense, and so on. This way, Turkey was a key part of the Western defense strategy against the USSR. This way, the Black Sea has never been a Soviet lake, the Soviets could not rule the Eastern Mediterranean, and they could not have direct access to the Middle East. In return for this great strategic favor, Turkey would get NATO’s word for its collective defense against any possible Soviet aggression and, further, would receive economic aid and cheap credit from the West.

Nevertheless, this seemingly plausible anti-Soviet alliance was tested multiple times. The opium crisis and Turkey’s military intervention against the Greece-backed junta in Cyprus let to the most memorable crisis between the allies. While the U.S. placed an arms embargo on Turkey from 1975 to 1978, Turkey responded by closing the military bases that were hosting American troops in the country. The crisis did not last long though. As Turkey changed its opium policy in a way to satisfy the American demands, the U.S. ended the embargo and did not push Turkey too hard on the Cyprus matter. Yet, it costed Turkey to diverge from the American orientation with its shrinking economy in the late 1970s. After all, it was and is still costly to annoy a superpower. Annoying the global sheriff led the Turkish economy in the late 1970s to something very much reminiscent of today.

The U.S. will fail to leave a smooth legacy in the Middle East without the support of Turkey. Thus, there’s still time to transform relations from a lose-lose to a win-win situation.

The Turkey-U.S. alliance did not die as did the enemy, that is the Soviets, died in 1991. By the time it became clear that the old enemy was collapsing, the U.S. had already found new enemies. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1990 was about to be the first rogue state of the new world order. As a loyal American ally, Turkey provided assistance to the U.S. for its first Gulf War against Saddam. It was an easy military win but not a final victory with a persistent legacy. It was not the end but a whole new start for Turkey.

With its role in the war, Turkey seemed happy to show its utility as an ally in the post-Cold War era but what it did not know was Iraq would never be a stable neighbor again for the next 17 years until now. The power vacuum in its neighbor was filled by the PKK and Turkey has witnessed years of terror attacks originating from Iraq. For that reason, Turkish policymakers did not welcome the idea of a second Gulf War across its borders in 2003.

The Turkish parliament denied the U.S. permission to use the base in Turkey to store its military equipment before the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This was the most significant turning point and the heaviest crisis between the allies after the opium crisis of the 1970s. The alliance has become a pseudo-alliance since then. The Syrian War was and still is proof of the fact that Turkey is not being treated as a genuine ally by the U.S. Turkey’s refugee problem due to the Syrian Civil War has been disregarded by the U.S. as it rejected Turkey’s calls for joint action. Further, Turkey was left alone when it got really close to a war with Russia after it downed a Russian jet in 2015. By the time Turkey found a formula to get out of the tight corner it got stuck to in the course of the Syrian War, the U.S. had already started to cook a new alliance with Turkey’s long-time adversary, the PKK (its Syrian branch PYD to be precise).

As long as the U.S. does not change its policies regarding the PYD and FETO, Turkey will see its alliance with the U.S. as no more than a pseudo-alliance no matter how much it hurts the Turkish economy.

Further, the U.S. is also hosting the FETO (Fethullahist Terror Organization) network on American soil. FETO is the organization that carried out the coup attempt of June 15, 2016. These two issues are direct threats to Turkey’s very basic national security and far more significant than the following crises whether it be last year’s visa crisis or today’s Brunson crisis. It seems like as long as the U.S. does not change its policies regarding the PYD and FETO, Turkey will see its alliance with the U.S. as no more than a pseudo-alliance no matter how much it hurts the Turkish economy. This may not sound as a big problem for a superpower like the U.S. Nevertheless, it should also see that it can win wars in Iraq or Syria but cannot leave a smooth legacy without Turkey.

The bilateral relations can still change course from a lose-lose scenario to a win-win one. Perhaps American policymakers no longer need Turkey to contain Russian expansion for now, but it will not help the U.S. to alienate Turkey and push it to the revisionist camp of the American hegemony. I still think the U.S. is not blind to lose Turkey altogether and will flex its muscles in its dealing with Turkey. If it does not, Turkey has its own instruments. It cannot hurt the USD by threats on Twitter, but Turkey is a growing country in its capabilities, population, and significance on the world scale.

As the financial pressure increases over Turkey, it will search for an exit, which may lead to an increasing financial linkage to China, which I believe will not please American interests. As Turkey will try to overcome the current financial risks with domestic structural reforms and a quest for new international economic partners, it is still not too late to resurrect the pseudo-alliance. Some easier solutions on the Brunson or Halkbank matters based on mutual respect can spill over toward something better and bigger.

Relations between Turkey and the U.S. are underway fundamental challenges following the U.S. administration’s reaction to Pastor Andrew Brunson, who has been under house arrest since July 8. The tension reached peak due to the remarks made by Washington and Ankara regarding the freezing of two American officials’ assets – namely interior and justice ministers. However, given President Erdogan’s treatment of the issue, the continuation of diplomatic contact between the two countries at the highest level of crisis, and the preferences of President Trump, an expectation emerged that will help to overcome the Brunson crisis. It should be expected that the Brunson crisis will be overcome shortly. However, both sides have to intensify efforts in order to close down the deeply-rooted political rift in Turkey-U.S. relations.

One of the primary things that have to be accomplished shortly after the resolution of the tension is to redefine bilateral relations on a very realistic ground. For this reason, both sides need to communicate and understand the significant global, regional and domestic challenges that constrain relations. To do so, both sides should avoid conceptualizing bilateral ties within the framework of “strategic partnership,” “model partnership” and “alliance” – terms that have never entirely fulfilled the Turkish-American cooperation objectives. This, in turn, requires also the recalculation of the long-term strategic vision of Turkish foreign policy. It is important to note that Turkish-American relations are at the center of Turkish foreign policy if the existing foreign policy engagements of Turkey are taken into consideration, particularly in the Middle East region.

At this stage, both sides should analyze the real damages caused following the multidimensional conjectural crisis in Turkey-U.S. relations. Later on, it is also necessary to make a list of possible short-term problems that have been encountered in Turkey-U.S. relations and make clear what can be done and what cannot be to recover bilateral relations.

Managing the lack of trust in bilateral relations

The most important issue that both sides should bear in mind about damage assessment is the lack of trust in bilateral relations. The lack of trust between states is one of the oldest hidden rules of international relations. States usually do not trust each other. There is a simple explanation for that; a state can never be sure whether the intention of another state is good or not. It is possible to make a list of issues that fueled the lack of mutual trust between Turkey and the U.S. One of the most important reasons, and perhaps the most unlikely to be overcome soon is the role of the U.S. in the July 15 coup attempt. It is not possible to say that Turkish public opinion on this subject is very positive, given that Fetullah Gulen, the commander of the July 15 military coup, remains free in the U.S. and other members of FETO perceive the U.S. as a safe haven. The issue of lack of trust is not limited to this. With the support of the U.S., the PYD-YPG, the political and military branch of the PKK, enjoys its terrorist insurgency against Turkey. This further deepens the lack of trust between the two countries. Turkey strongly believes that providing more space to the PYD-YPG consolidates the PKK’s political and military power that ultimately undermine Turkey’s national security.

The crisis of the lack of trust in bilateral relations is not one-sided. The U.S. administration does not perceive Turkey as a “reliable ally.” From the U.S. strategic view, Turkey refuses to join the U.S. strategy towards Iran, continues to work with Russia, and undermines Trump’s Israel strategy. Therefore, the lack of trust is reciprocal.

The second issue emerges as a result of the lack of trust. Turkey has a serious difference as compared to the U.S. in addressing global issues. Turkey criticizes the U.S.-centric international order, believes that the international order should be reformed and underlines that the U.S. undermines the very nature of the international order, which is based on universal norms and institutions. Therefore, Turkey seeks to establish a more balanced international order. To do so, Turkey is working with the alternative power centers such as Russia and China to develop an alternative relationship and seeks to consolidate its relations with the rising powers to balance out the U.S.-centric international order.

Harmonization of foreign and security policies

Even if the conjectural crises experienced in bilateral relations are to be overcome shortly, the harmonization of foreign and security policies, which is the primary driving factor of the lack of trust, is crucial for the re-positioning of Turkey-U.S. relations. However, the issues that the two countries have to deal with in the near future are very complex in nature. One of the first issues that both sides should think about is Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy. Turkey does not embrace any foreign policy option that could threaten U.S national security and territorial integrity, unlike the U.S. administration. If Washington D.C. maintains its current strategy regarding PKK presence in northern Syria and does not prevent the PKK from threatening Turkey’s national security, the U.S. may face a stricter face of Turkish military activism in the region. Immediately after the Brunson crisis is overcome, both sides have to develop a more comprehensive strategy on how the Manbij model will be implemented towards the other regions in northern Syria. This strategy should not be handled separately from the general solution to the Syrian crisis.

Even if the PKK problem in Syria is overcome, it is unlikely that the two countries will share the same strategy on Israel after the Brunson crisis. A new political structure has emerged in Washington and the Middle East following the Trump administration’s Al-Quds decision. The Washington administration has an agenda that gives Israel a “blank check” on its policy towards Palestine. In the region, there is also a turning point in the policy of Arab states towards Palestine. Turkey is the only country in the region that has many objections against the policy of “abandoning Palestine.” Turkey’s Israel policy will be directly affected by its relations with the U.S.

After the Brunson crisis, the more difficult issue that the two countries are unlikely to overcome is Turkey’s desire to obtain an air defense system from Russia. Provided that the Turkish administration ultimately receives the S-400 systems at the end of 2019, the U.S. administration might impose a series of additional sanctions against Turkey. One of the first results of this purchase will be seen in Turkey-U.S. military relations. The U.S. considers removing Turkey from the F-35 program. Another short-term problem that can potentially disrupt bilateral relations is the Trump administration’s strategy towards Iran. Turkey believes that the new U.S. strategy on the Iranian nuclear program would destabilize the region and undermine Turkey’s trade relations with Iran. Turkey’s early reaction against the U.S. administration’s decision about imposing new sanctions against Tehran highlights that Turkey will not follow the U.S. strategy. Therefore, the U.S.-Iran conflict would bring more instability to the U.S.-Turkey relations.

As long as there is no structural change on the regional or global level, it is not true that Turkey-U.S. relations will collapse. In this transition period, it is necessary to contain the costs of damage for both sides. Therefore, in the post-Brunson Turkey-U.S. relations, both sides should carefully follow a damage control policy. One of the most fundamental things that the Turkish administration should be aware of is the fact that under the Trump administration no single strategic logic can run bilateral relations and other regional issues. For this reason, it would be more appropriate for Turkey to remind itself that the tensions in Turkey-U.S. relations are shaped by mutual foreign policy choices rather than a single actor-centered determination.

The U.S. withdrawal of the Iran nuclear deal and the fresh round of sanctions imposed on Monday present a test to U.S. allies including Europe and Turkey. President Trump campaigned on getting rid of the “worst deal” ever, pulled out of the agreement, imposed sanctions on Iran and promised to isolate the country despite warnings by European allies as well as Turkey. Although President Trump made a rhetorical gesture to Iran’s President Rouhani about meeting face-to-face without preconditions, the U.S. is set to ratchet up the pressure and seek to isolate Iran ahead of the November elections. If anything is clear, Europe is less than thrilled about having to cooperate with the U.S. and states like Russia, China, and India will most likely continue to do business with Iran. Under these conditions, a renewed U.S.-Iran standoff in the coming months might have serious consequences not only for the region but for U.S. allies as well.

In the absence of a leadership, Europe will likely limit itself to protecting the financial interests of European companies but will not be able to produce a comprehensive deal.

European leaders have already expressed their dismay with the Trump administration’s decision to re-impose sanctions underlining that the deal had been working. Furthermore, they are working on providing legislative cover for those businesses adversely affected by U.S. action. The U.S. leadership has been touting Iran’s growing economic problems as part of the success of their pressure campaign but the Iranian regime survived heavy international pressure before. When it finally came to the negotiating table to make the 2015 deal, there was a broad unity among the P5+1 powers and others. The Trump administration’s unilateralist approach will, in all likelihood, be even less effective in isolating Iran and more punishing against U.S. allies.

The Trump administration says it is open to making a more comprehensive deal but declines to take the lead on forging a framework and doing the diplomatic heavy lifting. In the absence of such leadership, Europe will likely limit itself to protecting the financial interests of European companies but will not be able to produce a comprehensive deal. It is doubtful if it can save the Iran deal in any meaningful way. The element of surprise is a signature feature of the Trump presidency as we have seen the President declare his willingness to work toward no trade barriers with the EU. Yet, on Iran, he will most likely pursue a hardline policy until he can declare some sort of “victory.” This dynamic in the wake of November elections makes it almost certain that we will witness increased pressure on Iran and heightened regional tensions.

The Trump administration’s unprecedented sanctions and additional penalties imposed on Turkish entities for facilitating trade with Iran would deepen the divide, potentially setting the bilateral ties on a course of complete breakdown.

If the U.S. makes good on its promise to actually start penalizing companies doing business with Iran, Europe, as well as Turkey, will find themselves in a difficult position. Turkey relies on Russia and Iran for most of its energy needs and it cannot easily give up on especially Iranian natural gas. The Obama administration provided Turkey with waivers but doing business with Iran continued to be a significant source of tension in the bilateral relationship. It is not clear whether the White House will be willing to provide exemptions to Turkey but President Erdogan already indicated Turkey’s energy needs as his first priority on this issue. The Trump administration’s unprecedented sanctions on a NATO ally have already severely strained the Turkey-U.S. relationship and additional penalties imposed on Turkish entities for facilitating trade with Iran would deepen the divide, potentially setting the bilateral ties on a course of complete breakdown. Let us hope that the most recent talks between the two sides on the Iran sanctions produce tangible results and that they are not reversed by hasty decisions.

Finding a comprehensive solution to the standoff with Iran would remove a significant source of tension from the region but it will probably not be possible in the short and medium terms, barring a major reversal by President Trump or the Iranian regime. In the meantime, both Europe and Turkey will have to figure out a way to work with a unilateralist U.S. administration in order to protect their economic interests as well as energy needs. The already troubled Turkey-U.S. ties, however, will almost certainly experience the most duress as a result.