T

he struggle for influence between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis in Yemen, which was once marked by intense fighting but had continued at a lower intensity particularly over the past four years, resurfaced following developments in September.

The wave of attacks launched by the Houthis against targets in Saudi Arabia on September 8 caused extensive damage to oil facilities and left dozens of people injured. These attacks demonstrated that the Yemen conflict, which Riyadh believed it had contained through the 2022 ceasefire, had once again intensified, bringing the fighting back onto Saudi territory.

Viewed within the broader regional and global geopolitical context, these developments can be regarded not only as a new phase of Yemen’s civil war but also as a new front in the war being waged by the United States and Israel against Iran.

The primary reason behind the Houthis’ adoption of a new strategy in Yemen and their increasingly confrontational stance towards Saudi Arabia can be identified as the collapse of the ceasefire between the United States and Iran. Indeed, following the breakdown of the ceasefire in July, the Houthis began intensifying their attacks against Yemen’s Saudi-backed central government, seeking, in a sense, to punish Riyadh, which they accused of acting in coordination with Washington.

Security vulnerabilities

In line with this strategy, the Houthis also sought to establish control over Yemen’s coastal regions. Bringing maritime traffic in the Red Sea under Houthi control was intended to exert pressure not only on Saudi Arabia but also on global actors.

Houthi forces rapidly captured stretches of the Red Sea coastline, including the port of Mocha and the strategically located island of Perim at the entrance to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. They subsequently began targeting cities under central government control further inland, including Taiz and Marib.

The principal factor behind the Houthis’ remarkably rapid advance was the withdrawal of Saudi-backed forces from their positions within a very short period, in some cases without putting up any resistance. Alongside the Houthis’ military superiority, poor coordination among opposing forces also played an important role.

Beyond the realities on the battlefield, this development can be regarded as a major loss of prestige for Saudi Arabia, while also exposing significant strategic vulnerabilities.

An even more critical dimension of these developments emerged in the subsequent phase. Emboldened by the psychological advantage gained through their advances in Yemen, the Houthis began directly targeting Saudi territory.

These attacks frequently followed strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, which the Houthis claimed had been carried out with Saudi Arabia’s involvement.

Furthermore, the Houthis regard Riyadh as the principal backer of Yemen’s central government and, for this reason, consider Saudi Arabia a legitimate target. Consequently, Houthi forces have been conducting attacks designed to inflict maximum damage on both Saudi Arabia’s military and economic capabilities.

The targeting of oil facilities in the Saudi city of Yanbu was a particularly significant development in this regard.

By seeking to undermine the oil-export capacity of Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter, the Houthis aimed to exert pressure on Riyadh, setting the stage for a further escalation of tensions.

Indeed, in the period that followed, Saudi Arabia intensified its attacks against Houthi targets, both directly and through Yemen’s central government.

Through these attacks, the Houthis also sought to obstruct the Red Sea route that Saudi Arabia had activated as an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz.

This strategy aligns with Iran’s post-war policies and is being pursued with the objectives of threatening Riyadh’s stability while ensuring that Iran’s influence over the Strait of Hormuz becomes permanent.

Indeed, weakening the Red Sea corridor that Riyadh has sought to establish as a backup route also demonstrates the Houthis’ efforts to maximise both their deterrence capabilities and their bargaining power at the negotiating table.

The support that failed to materialize from the United States

Another noteworthy aspect of the intensifying conflict is Saudi Arabia’s difficulty in responding effectively to Houthi attacks.

One of the principal reasons for this can be attributed not so much to a shortage of resources but rather to the inability to use existing resources properly and efficiently.

Indeed, the failure of Saudi Arabia, which has made the largest investments in armaments in the Middle East for years, and its local allies in Yemen to mount an effective defense against the Houthis has raised questions about Riyadh’s military capabilities.

Media reports even suggested that, during the period of intensified Houthi attacks, the Saudi crown prince called US President Donald Trump to request assistance, but Trump remained reluctant to intervene.

Trump’s proposal to offer diplomatic support and accelerate the sale of F-35 fighter jets, rather than conduct airstrikes in support of Riyadh, reportedly provoked a strong reaction from the Saudi leadership.

This process can therefore be seen as a renewed confirmation of the considerable risks Saudi Arabia faces as a result of relying on the United States as its sole security umbrella.

These developments have also paved the way for Saudi Arabia to turn towards alternative security mechanisms that it has been developing for some time.

One of the strategies prioritized by the Saudi leadership is to accelerate the implementation of the Mecca Agreement, signed jointly with Türkiye and Pakistan, and transform it into a protective security framework for Riyadh against potentially greater threats.

Although this alliance is not yet operational, it is expected to become one of the three countries’ most important security instruments in the near future.

Looking ahead, three scenarios stand out regarding Saudi Arabia-Houthi tensions, which have been among the major justifications for the US-Israeli war against Iran.

The first scenario involves the parties refraining from further escalation and instead pursuing negotiations. This could lead to a cessation of hostilities and the launch of a diplomatic process in which actors such as Oman, Pakistan or Qatar could play a role.

The second, and more dangerous, scenario would involve Saudi-backed forces launching a counteroffensive in an attempt to secure a decisive victory over the Houthis.

Such a development could prolong the conflict, pave the way for further humanitarian crises in Yemen, a country that has suffered from instability for years, and worsen the situation considerably.

The most pessimistic scenario would involve the crisis expanding into a regional confrontation, creating an environment in which a greater number of countries become directly involved in the fighting.

In fact, such an outcome could produce a geopolitical rupture far greater than that caused by the war against Iran and further entrench regional instability.

It could also make polarization among regional actors more pronounced and lead to the emergence of more clearly defined alliances.

Ultimately, Saudi Arabia’s reassessment of its security strategy concerning Yemen, along with a reconsideration of its relationship with the United States in this context, can be regarded as a necessity.

As one of the Gulf region’s most powerful countries, Saudi Arabia must first strengthen its national defense capabilities and, at the same time, invest in security frameworks developed with regional actors with whom it can establish relationships based on clear mutual trust. Such measures are essential if Riyadh is to preserve domestic stability, counter external threats and sustain its economic achievements.

Riyadh’s success in this process will have implications not only for Yemen but also for the wider geographical area stretching from the Red Sea to the Strait of Hormuz.

(Orignally published in Turkish by Kriter)

O

man has proposed a preferential bilateral trade and investment agreement with China as the two countries seek to deepen economic ties and expand cooperation across strategic industries.

Sultan Haitham bin Tariq al-Said made the proposal during a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Monday, describing the agreement as a way to create new opportunities for trade and investment.

“We are confident that such an agreement would open new avenues for trade and investment, facilitate and enhance commercial and investment exchanges between our two nations,” Haitham told Xi, according to remarks reported by Oman’s state-run news agency.

The proposal comes as Oman seeks to increase trade with its largest commercial partner and attract investment into sectors that form part of its efforts to diversify its economy beyond oil exports.

Haitham said Muscat was interested in establishing joint investment funds covering renewable energy, artificial intelligence, digital technologies, space and defense.

The discussions also emphasized closer cooperation between financial and investment institutions, suggesting that the proposed partnership could extend beyond conventional trade in goods and energy.

Xi described closer relations with Oman as a “shared strategic choice” for both countries, saying he was ready to work with Haitham to elevate their strategic partnership and contribute to regional stability and prosperity.

Energy and technology at the center of economic cooperation

China is Oman’s largest trading partner, with bilateral economic relations supported by Omani exports of crude oil and other energy products to the Chinese market.

The two countries have also been developing commercial and tourism links. Direct flights between Beijing and Muscat began in November 2025, providing additional connectivity for business and travel.

Oman is seeking to expand its renewable energy supply chains and digital commerce as it pursues broader economic diversification. Cooperation with China could provide access to investment, technology and industrial expertise in areas including clean energy and advanced digital infrastructure.

The proposed joint investment funds would offer a framework for financing projects in several emerging sectors. However, the announcement did not specify the size of the funds, their investment timelines or the projects that would receive priority.

Haitham also highlighted the importance of cooperation between financial institutions, indicating that strengthening investment channels would be an important part of the proposed economic relationship.

The talks reflect China’s continuing efforts to strengthen its economic and diplomatic partnerships across the Middle East, where energy trade, infrastructure investment and technology cooperation have become increasingly important areas of engagement.

Historic visit underscores growing strategic ties

Haitham arrived in Beijing on Sunday for a two-day state visit, the first by an Omani head of state since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1978.

His arrival was followed by an official welcoming ceremony on Monday, where he and Xi reviewed an honor guard at the Great Hall of the People.

Although the regional conflict was not directly addressed in Haitham’s opening remarks, the Omani leader praised China’s efforts to promote international security, stability and cooperation.

“We further express our deep appreciation for China’s positions on key issues concerning our region,” he said.

The visit comes as Beijing seeks to maintain diplomatic engagement across the Middle East amid continuing regional tensions. China’s Foreign Ministry said last week that Beijing would soon send special envoys to countries in the region to encourage dialogue and de-escalation.

Oman’s proposal therefore carries both economic and diplomatic significance, although the discussions announced on Monday focused primarily on bilateral trade, investment and strategic cooperation.

The two governments have described the visit as an opportunity to establish a new phase in their relationship. Whether that ambition produces a formal preferential trade agreement and concrete investment commitments will depend on subsequent negotiations.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he year 2026 became one of the major turning points in Iran’s history. The war, which intensified with joint US-Israeli airstrikes on Tehran on the morning of February 28, profoundly affected the political future of the Middle East and the balance of power in the region. Yet the Iranian people bore the war’s most severe social consequences. They experienced the conflict amid exhaustion and frustration caused by years of political developments, street protests that resulted in loss of life, economic crises and deepening polarization. To assess the impact of the war on Iranian society, it is first necessary to examine the social environment created by these developments in Iran.

Developments from 2009 to the Rouhani era

Although opposition movements had existed in Iran since the 1978 revolution, the 2009 presidential election and the protests that followed marked a major turning point in the public’s attitude toward politics and authority. At the time, a large majority of the population still believed that change and reform were possible. Allegations of electoral fraud, however, triggered months of protests, and for the first time the Islamic regime,including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei,was directly targeted by slogans. It should nevertheless be noted that the slogans of that period were much less intense than those heard today, and most did not challenge the foundations of the regime.

In the following years, despite mounting sanctions, a deteriorating economy and increasing pressure on opponents, a significant segment of society was not entirely opposed to the foundations of the regime. Against this backdrop, Hassan Rouhani, the reformists’ candidate, was elected president on expectations of change in the economy, mandatory hijab regulations and foreign relations. For many opponents, however, the Rouhani era also became a period in which hopes for reform were exhausted. A broad segment of society came to believe that a president like Rouhani was not necessarily lacking the will to pursue reform, but that Iran’s political structure prevented him from implementing it.

The core base of regime supporters, meanwhile, remained loyal to the government and the revolutionary leadership despite all the difficulties. Although a significant portion of this group shifted toward the opposition over the years, bloody protests and declining mutual tolerance deepened the divide between the two camps. Opponents accused regime supporters of backwardness and radical religiosity, while regime supporters accused opponents of treason and of serving as agents of foreign powers.

The death of Mahsa Amini in 2022 led to changes that had developed gradually in Iran and ultimately amounted to a quiet revolution in social life. The hijab requirement, which had been mandatory for decades and remained a constant issue on the national agenda, was largely abandoned by opposition-minded segments of society following the incident, although not officially. In cities such as Tehran, Isfahan, Rasht and Tabriz, women began demonstrating the courage to go outside without wearing the hijab. The process, during which hundreds of people lost their lives, became one of the largest expressions of accumulated social anger against practices such as mandatory hijab rules and the morality police.

From the 2025 protests to the 2026 war

By 2025, Iran had been severely weakened by high inflation, a rising exchange rate, reports of corruption and increasing political pressure. Demonstrations that began in Tehran at the end of December to protest worsening economic conditions quickly spread across the country. The protests, however, were met with one of the harshest crackdowns in Iran’s recent history. Iranian opposition sources and some foreign media outlets reported that more than 30,000 people had been killed, although official Iranian sources gave considerably lower figures. For many opponents, these events became an irreversible turning point.

The US-Israeli attacks that began a month after these bloody events made the divisions within society even more visible. In the course of our reporting, many Iranian opponents with whom we spoke said that years of accumulated anger toward the government,particularly the harsh crackdown on the latest protests,had convinced them that supporting the attacks was the only way to fight the regime. Regime supporters, meanwhile, maintained their backing for the new leadership despite the profound shock caused by the death of the revolutionary leader on the first day of the war, while expressing intense anger toward opponents who supported the US attacks.

The impact of the war on Iranian society

The Iranian people entered the February 2026 war carrying heavy problems and deep social wounds that had accumulated over many years. While the regime and its supporters were troubled by Iran’s loss of influence in the Middle East, opponents did not believe that there was any way out of the crises facing the country.

One of the possibilities that most frightened the public during the war was the damage or destruction of infrastructure and vital oil and energy facilities. A complete internet blackout lasting more than two months, daily increases in the prices of basic necessities, uncertainty about the country’s future, and waking up to the sound of bombardments severely affected the mental health of a society that had already accumulated years of trauma.

Since the beginning of the war, one of the greatest concerns expressed by many Iranians with whom we spoke both in Türkiye and Iran has been the uncertainty surrounding the country’s future. Sudden fluctuations in the exchange rate and the closure of trade routes have disrupted the operations of many businesses while making it increasingly difficult for people to make a living. From food and housing rents to automobile prices, it has become difficult even to speak of a price remaining stable for a full week. Opposition groups have reacted angrily to the continued allocation of national resources to military activities such as the missile program and to regional proxy forces such as Hezbollah while the population is struggling under these conditions. Indeed, during negotiations with the United States in April, demands that Israel withdraw from the territories it had occupied in Lebanon and end its attacks on Hezbollah were criticized by opponents as an indication that Iran’s fate was being tied to that of other countries and groups.

Against this backdrop, the internet shutdowns deserve particular attention. As mentioned above, Iran had already experienced nationwide internet restrictions during previous protests. But beginning in February, for the first time, communication with the outside world was completely cut off for more than two months. Internet access was unavailable except through Starlink and paid VPN/proxy services. Some Iranians identified as Starlink users were also subjected to demands for execution or severe punishment on espionage charges. For many Iranians who already felt isolated from the world, losing all communication with the outside world during the difficult days of the war made the situation even harder.

The scale of the social and economic difficulties becomes clearer when tens of thousands of online businesses whose activities were brought to a standstill by the internet shutdown are considered alongside other businesses forced to suspend operations because of the war, resulting in further unemployment.

Deepening social polarization under the shadow of war

One of the common factors bringing together different segments of Iranian society is a sense of patriotism and nationalism. Regardless of their ethnic origins or political views, the importance they attach to their Iranian identity and the territorial integrity of the country is clearly visible in their words and actions. Throughout the war, however, this sentiment has also led regime supporters and opponents to accuse one another of treason, particularly on social media.

For regime supporters, defending or supporting attacks by the enemy,the United States and Israel,is an unforgivable act of treason regardless of the justification. For opponents, however, the existing political order must be dismantled in order to protect their country’s future, and the only way to achieve this is to support attacks targeting the regime. Statements of support from US and Israeli officials toward the Iranian people, as well as assurances that civilians would not be targeted, were welcomed and defended by opposition groups. This helped foster a belief and hope among some opponents that the war would end with the regime’s downfall without causing harm to civilians or infrastructure.

Some Iranian officials, meanwhile, had hoped that an external attack would unite society, as happened during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. Yet in the more than four decades since then, Iran’s social dynamics, as well as public expectations and demands, have changed considerably. Moreover, the fractures that have emerged between different segments of society have become too deep to be repaired quickly or easily.

Regime supporters have, of course, also been affected by the negative consequences of the war described above and continue to suffer from them. Yet for this segment of society, preserving the government’s existence outweighs the hardships being experienced. Many say they are prepared, if necessary, to fight and make sacrifices with all their strength, both inside and outside the country.

Particularly during the first days of the war, this group gathered every night in the main squares of almost all cities, staging a continuous display of strength for months. This was a powerful message both to opponents supporting US and Israeli attacks and to enemy forces. Opposition groups, however, argued that these gatherings and demonstrations did nothing to improve the country’s or the war’s deteriorating situation, while instead disrupting daily life and wasting national resources. Opposition Persian-language channels broadcasting from Europe and the United States also reported allegations that citizens participating in the demonstrations were being provided with financial incentives. Ultimately, although the regime’s efforts strengthened the ranks of its supporters, they failed to create reconciliation between the different segments of society.

I

sraelis began voting Tuesday in a closely contested national election that could determine Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political future, three years after the October 7 attacks and amid growing public divisions over his leadership, successive wars and Israel’s increasing international isolation.

Polling stations opened at 7 a.m. local time and will close at 10 p.m., with approximately 7.3 million Israelis eligible to cast ballots, including 330,000 first-time voters.

The election is widely viewed as a referendum on Netanyahu, Israel’s longest-serving prime minister, who has spent 19 years in office and faces one of the most consequential political challenges of his career.

Opinion polls indicate a tight contest between Netanyahu’s Likud party and its right-wing allies and an opposition alliance led by Gadi Eisenkot, a former military chief who has positioned himself as an alternative to the incumbent’s leadership.

Neither bloc currently appears assured of securing the 61 seats required to form a majority in Israel’s 120-member parliament, raising the possibility of prolonged coalition negotiations or another election next year.

Netanyahu campaigns on wartime leadership as opposition demands accountability

Netanyahu has centered his campaign on his wartime record and close relationship with US President Donald Trump, who has publicly endorsed his reelection bid.

The prime minister has portrayed his leadership as essential to confronting Iran, suggesting Sunday that Trump would be prepared to take further military action against Tehran if Netanyahu remained in power.

Eisenkot rejected that argument, accusing Netanyahu of relying on fear and political threats to retain office.

The former military chief said he was confident Washington would cooperate with any Israeli leader chosen through democratic elections.

For many opposition supporters, the vote represents an opportunity to demand accountability for the security failures surrounding the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attacks, which killed approximately 1,200 people and resulted in 251 hostages being taken, according to Israeli figures.

Israel’s subsequent military offensive devastated much of Gaza and killed approximately 74,000 Palestinians, according to Gaza health authorities.

Eisenkot, who joined Netanyahu’s wartime cabinet following the attacks, resigned eight months later after criticizing the prime minister’s leadership.

Opposition groups have pledged to establish a national inquiry into the failures surrounding October 7.

Nilli Mor, a volunteer campaigning for the Democrats party led by former general Yair Golan, said she hoped the election would bring a new beginning for Israel.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu’s political future could once again depend on far-right coalition partners Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich.

Ben-Gvir, whose Jewish Power party has gained support in recent polls, expressed confidence Tuesday that Netanyahu would return to office.

Undecided voters and coalition arithmetic could determine outcome

With neither major bloc holding a decisive advantage, voter turnout and last-minute decisions could prove critical.

Approximately 13% of Israeli voters remained undecided, according to research by the Israel Democracy Institute.

Participation among Israel’s Arab minority could also influence the election’s outcome, potentially improving Eisenkot’s chances of forming an alternative government.

Although Eisenkot has ruled out formally joining forces with Arab parties, analysts suggest they could support a minority government to prevent Netanyahu from returning to power.

The election also comes amid growing dissatisfaction among some traditional Likud supporters, including voters concerned about Netanyahu’s ongoing corruption trial, in which he denies wrongdoing.

Political analyst Amotz Asa-El of the Shalom Hartman Institute predicted a narrow result rather than a decisive victory for either side.

Beyond domestic politics, the election carries significant implications for Israel’s regional strategy following military confrontations with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran.

Eisenkot has pledged to prevent Iran from acquiring military nuclear capabilities, either through force or a diplomatic arrangement backed by Washington.

While he opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state, he has criticized rising settler violence against Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and rejected Netanyahu’s far-right coalition partners.

If neither Netanyahu nor Eisenkot succeeds in assembling a governing majority, Netanyahu could remain caretaker prime minister until another election is held.

For Israeli voters, Tuesday’s ballot represents a choice not only between competing political leaders but also over the country’s direction after three years of devastating conflict, deepening polarization and mounting diplomatic challenges.

(Source: Reuters)

I

sraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared that overthrowing Iran’s government remains Israel’s primary objective, raising the prospect of another military confrontation with Tehran despite growing doubts over whether Israel possesses the capabilities or international backing needed to achieve regime change.

Netanyahu’s remarks come ahead of Israel’s national elections next week, as his government faces declining public support and mounting questions about its regional security strategy.

The Israeli leader reiterated his position following discussions with US President Donald Trump on Sunday and a visit to Israel by US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.

However, there has been no indication that Washington has agreed to participate in another offensive against Iran, particularly one explicitly intended to remove its political leadership.

Military analysts say Israel retains considerable offensive capabilities and could inflict substantial damage on Iranian military infrastructure. But they question whether air strikes, covert operations and cyberattacks could translate into the collapse of Tehran’s government.

Military superiority does not guarantee regime change

Israel has demonstrated its ability to strike targets deep inside Iranian territory, supported by advanced weapons systems, intelligence capabilities and aerial refueling assets.

Urban Coningham, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), said Israel could potentially reestablish air superiority and launch another campaign against Iranian targets.

Nevertheless, analysts distinguish between weakening a country’s military capabilities and removing its political leadership.

Netanyahu has portrayed Iran as a major security threat since his first term as prime minister in 1996, repeatedly advocating international action against Tehran.

The United States eventually joined Israeli military operations against Iran in June 2025 and participated again in the campaign launched on February 28, 2026.

Despite those interventions, Iran’s government remained in power.

Netanyahu himself acknowledged the limitations of aerial bombardment in March, suggesting that overthrowing the Iranian leadership would require a ground component.

Caglar Kurc, an assistant professor at Abdullah Gul University in Türkiye, said air strikes could weaken Iran’s military infrastructure without completely eliminating its capacity to retaliate.

He argued that achieving regime change would require deploying troops and maintaining a military presence inside Iran for years, a commitment Israel would struggle to sustain.

Experts also questioned whether intelligence operations or support for armed opposition groups could provide a viable alternative.

Although Israel retains intelligence networks inside Iran, deploying covert assets risks exposing them to Iranian counterintelligence operations.

Similarly, Kurdish and Baloch armed groups are not considered capable of independently defeating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Iran retains retaliatory capabilities as US support remains uncertain

A renewed Israeli offensive would also carry substantial military and economic risks.

Sidharth Kaushal, a senior RUSI research fellow, said Iran likely retains significant missile stockpiles despite damage sustained during previous confrontations.

Its antiship missile capabilities remain particularly important, supported by domestic production and mountainous terrain that provides natural protection against aerial attacks.

Iran could also exploit the financial imbalance between inexpensive offensive drones and the considerably more expensive interceptor systems used by Israel.

Previous exchanges have already depleted portions of Israel’s interceptor inventories, potentially complicating its ability to sustain defensive operations during another prolonged confrontation.

Washington’s willingness to participate represents another major uncertainty.

According to a Financial Times report this week, an Israeli proposal for renewed strikes failed to secure Trump’s approval, although the disagreement did not necessarily rule out future American involvement.

With US midterm elections approaching, Trump faces domestic political pressure to avoid another escalation.

Without American participation, Israel would also lack access to certain specialized military capabilities, including the massive GBU-57 bunker-busting bombs deployed by US B-2 bombers against Iran’s Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities in June 2025.

Analysts suggest Tehran could respond to an independent Israeli offensive by concentrating retaliatory strikes on Israel while avoiding American military installations and disruption to the Strait of Hormuz.

Such an approach could allow Iran to impose significant costs on Israel while reducing the likelihood of direct US intervention.

Ultimately, experts argue that Netanyahu faces a fundamental strategic obstacle: Israel may possess the military power to severely damage Iran, but destroying infrastructure and military installations does not necessarily create the conditions required to overthrow an established government.

Without a credible ground strategy, sustained international backing and a viable political alternative inside Iran, Netanyahu’s declared objective of regime change remains far more difficult to achieve than another round of devastating military strikes.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

T

he war that erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on April 15, 2023, has evolved, after more than three years of fighting, into a conflict that can no longer be explained simply as a power struggle between two military organisations.

As of September 2026, the situation in Sudan points to a prolonged war of attrition in which military operations of varying intensity across different parts of the country, deepening economic fragmentation, a worsening humanitarian crisis and cross-border support networks involving external actors are increasingly reinforcing one another.

During the early stages of the war, the Khartoum and Darfur fronts formed the centre of the fighting. Today, however, the military centre of gravity has shifted significantly towards Kordofan, Darfur and the Blue Nile region.

The advances made by the SAF in and around Khartoum during 2025 enabled the Sudanese government to consolidate its control over the northern and eastern parts of the country. Although efforts to restore a degree of normality in the capital have begun, this does not mean that the war is approaching its end.

On the contrary, the RSF’s continued dominance in Darfur and the expansion of fighting into Kordofan and the Blue Nile region demonstrate that the geographical character of the conflict is changing.

North Kordofan, in particular, has become one of the war’s most critical strategic junctions since the summer of 2026. The SAF’s gains along routes around Bara in July and September are important for access to logistical corridors connecting El-Obeid with Darfur.

In response, the RSF has carried out drone attacks against SAF-controlled centres, particularly El-Obeid, attempting to offset pressure on the ground through long-range strikes.

Mutual attacks and new population movements continued in North Kordofan during the final week of September.

One of the most striking transformations in the conflict has been the way unmanned aerial vehicles have altered the war’s strategic character.

According to the United Nations Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for the Sudan, more than 1,000 people were killed in drone attacks during the first five months of 2026.

Both sides have acquired the capability to strike targets far behind the front lines. Electricity infrastructure, fuel facilities, hospitals, markets and areas sheltering displaced civilians have all been affected by attacks.

Sudan’s war has thus evolved into a conflict in which conventional ground warfare is intertwined with cross-border technology and weapons supply networks, turning the country into a de facto testing ground for weapons manufacturers.

A New axis of conflict stretching from Darfur to Kordofan

Darfur continues to provide the RSF with military and economic depth in the war. The group’s capture of El Fasher in October 2025 consolidated its dominance across western Sudan.

As a result, an increasingly pronounced east-west division has emerged on Sudan’s de facto map of territorial control. The SAF largely controls the north, east and areas around Khartoum, while the RSF’s sphere of influence is concentrated in Darfur and parts of Kordofan connected to the region.

This does not, however, mean that a stable boundary has emerged between the two sides. On the contrary, Kordofan is becoming a transitional zone between their respective areas of control.

Control of El-Obeid is strategically important not only from a military perspective but also because of its position along the overland route linking Khartoum with Darfur.

Consequently, the possibility that the future of Sudan’s war will be determined less by Khartoum than by the Kordofan corridors, where control has repeatedly shifted between the parties in recent months, is becoming increasingly likely.

Meanwhile, renewed escalation in the Blue Nile region has added another dimension to the conflict.

The activities of the RSF and elements of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N) have transformed areas close to the Ethiopian and South Sudanese borders into a new security flashpoint.

Clashes around Geissan and Kurmuk in recent weeks, along with allegations concerning cross-border logistical routes, indicate that Sudan’s war is beginning to intersect more directly with instability in the Horn of Africa.

From military fragmentation to economic fragmentation

Perhaps one of the most significant dimensions of Sudan’s de facto fragmentation is emerging in the economic sphere.

In areas controlled by the SAF, the Sudanese pound’s black-market exchange rate against the US dollar has fallen by almost half since the summer of 2026. By contrast, the currency has followed a relatively more stable trajectory in some RSF-controlled areas.

According to figures for September 2026, the dollar was trading at approximately 7,500 Sudanese pounds on the black market in SAF-controlled areas, compared with around 4,200 pounds in RSF-controlled territories.

A significant share of Sudan’s gold, livestock, oilseed and gum arabic production is located in areas controlled by the RSF or in contested territories, further deepening the country’s economic fragmentation.

Consequently, control over the resources and trade routes that finance the war economy has become as decisive as territorial control itself.

Gold-producing areas, overland routes extending into Libya and Chad, Red Sea ports and oil infrastructure are now as important to the sustainability of the war as military bases.

G

ulf security has reached a historic turning point in recent years amid shifting global power balances and deepening regional crises. Qatari Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani’s call to bring the Gulf states and Iran together within a shared regional security framework stands out as one of the most tangible diplomatic manifestations of this search.

Al Thani’s description of the region’s recent conflicts as a “wake-up call” for all actors exposes the fundamental shortcomings of the existing security equation. Qatar’s proposal should therefore be understood not merely as an isolated diplomatic initiative by Doha, but as an expression of regional actors’ desire to assume greater responsibility and initiative over their own security.

Qatar’s proposed model

Underlying this ambition are the limitations of security policies pursued for decades. For a long time, Gulf states built their security strategies largely around military alliances and defence agreements with actors outside the region, particularly the United States.

However, recent conflicts have clearly demonstrated that external security guarantees alone are insufficient to establish regional stability. The direct targeting of energy facilities, critical infrastructure and maritime navigation routes has shown that security cannot be ensured solely through conventional military capabilities or alliance commitments.

Qatar’s vision does not seek to dismantle existing external alliances or military cooperation with the United States. On the contrary, it aims to add a homegrown, regional layer of security to the existing architecture.

Doha’s model envisages preserving the deterrent power of external security partnerships while establishing direct communication channels and confidence-building mechanisms between the Gulf states and Iran to prevent crises from escalating.

The greatest challenge facing this vision, however, lies in the structural difficulties of integrating Iran into such an architecture.

The crisis between the Gulf states and Tehran is not simply a temporary disagreement. Rather, it represents a deeply entrenched structure of mistrust shaped by ideological divisions, competition for regional influence, missile programmes, maritime security risks and the activities of non-state armed actors.

From Iran’s perspective, meanwhile, the US military presence in the region and new security partnerships with Israel are regarded as threats in their own right.

Given this profound asymmetry, the establishment of a NATO-style Gulf-Iran security alliance based on collective defence is unrealistic in the short or medium term.

The success of Qatar’s proposal should not, in any case, be measured against such maximalist expectations. A more feasible alternative would be a gradual approach to establishing regional security mechanisms.

In the initial phase, it would be possible to open military communication channels, establish common navigation rules to ensure maritime safety, limit attacks on energy infrastructure and activate direct diplomatic channels during crises.

Such concrete, small-scale measures could, over time, provide the foundation for a more institutionalised framework for regional dialogue.

Establishing the security equation

Another critical factor that will determine the extent to which Qatar’s call gains traction is the absence of a uniform perception of the Iranian threat among members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

While Qatar and Oman have traditionally pursued policies that keep channels of dialogue with Tehran open, the security calculations of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain have been shaped by a more uncompromising approach.

Nevertheless, the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in recent years through Chinese mediation has demonstrated that greater space has emerged for diplomacy across the Gulf.

Although this development has not ended the rivalry, it has revealed a willingness to make tensions more manageable.

Qatar’s proposal seeks to transform this current environment of dialogue into a permanent and institutionalised structure.

However, Doha cannot pursue this initiative alone. A more realistic path would involve GCC members first reaching a minimum level of consensus among themselves on security matters, before moving towards an expanded framework that includes Iran.

On the other hand, the inclusive structure proposed by Qatar does not contradict deterrence-oriented military cooperation initiatives such as the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement being developed between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan.

At first glance, robust defence alliances and dialogue-oriented security initiatives may appear contradictory. In reality, however, they represent two complementary dimensions of the same security equation.

While defence agreements and joint military structures strengthen deterrence capabilities, the regional dialogue mechanisms proposed by Qatar seek to reduce the risk of military confrontation arising from miscalculations.

The future of Gulf security will therefore rest not on a single alliance model, but on a multilayered architecture in which deterrence and diplomacy are pursued simultaneously.

This multilayered structure also offers strategic opportunities for Türkiye.

Ankara’s growing defence industry and security cooperation with Gulf countries strengthens regional deterrence, while the diplomatic channels it maintains with Tehran position Türkiye as a facilitating and balancing actor during periods of crisis.

Beyond all these regional and global dynamics, Qatar’s insistence on this proposal is directly rooted in its own economic and national security interests.

With its enormous LNG exports, major investments around the world and ambitious economic transformation objectives, Doha can sustain its position only within a stable and predictable regional environment.

Moreover, the extensive economic transformation visions being pursued by neighbouring countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE also require an uninterrupted environment of regional peace.

A large-scale war breaking out in the Gulf has the potential to directly paralyse the economic infrastructure and trade routes of the entire region, including Qatar.

Regional stability is therefore not an abstract aspiration for Qatar, but a prerequisite for its national development.

Doha’s mediation diplomacy on the global stage is also an extension of this logic. Its ability to communicate simultaneously with different, and even adversarial, actors gives Qatar a critical role as a “safety valve” during regional crises.

Mistrust between the parties

Ultimately, Prime Minister Al Thani’s call for a new security architecture encompassing the Gulf states and Iran is not a straightforward project that can be implemented in all its dimensions in the short term.

Deep-rooted mistrust between the parties, asymmetric threat perceptions, the prominent role occupied by external actors within the existing framework, and Iran’s reluctance to make concrete security commitments constitute the most significant obstacles to the process.

Nevertheless, it would also be a mistake to dismiss the proposal as a utopian diplomatic aspiration.

Recent crises have demonstrated the fragility of the existing externally dependent security structure. This reality is compelling regional actors to establish gradual and flexible dialogue mechanisms.

Qatar’s initiative clearly demonstrates that Gulf security can no longer be maintained solely under a security umbrella provided by external powers. Instead, the region needs a homegrown and inclusive approach in which regional countries assume direct responsibility.

Although time will tell to what extent this initiative can be institutionalised, the reality that a Gulf security architecture excluding Iran is unsustainable is becoming increasingly apparent.

The new security concept proposed by Qatar offers an indispensable vision for the Gulf’s future stability.

Although deep-rooted mistrust and asymmetric threat perceptions among the parties may slow the process, the limitations of the traditional externally dependent architecture are pushing regional actors towards flexible and gradual dialogue mechanisms.

The diplomatic initiative launched by Doha not only seeks to safeguard economic interests but also paves the way for regional countries to have a greater say in determining their own future.

In the long term, this multilayered structure, combining deterrence with diplomacy, represents the most rational roadmap for building lasting peace and collective security in the Gulf.

(Orignally published in Turkish by Kriter)

I

srael’s expanding military-controlled zones in Gaza and southern Lebanon are reshaping both territories despite US-brokered ceasefire agreements, as shifting boundaries, widespread demolitions and restrictions on civilian movement leave hundreds of thousands of displaced families uncertain about whether they will ever return home.

The so-called “Yellow Line”, used by Israel to demarcate areas under its military control, has emerged as a defining feature of the post-ceasefire landscape in both territories, according to separate Al Jazeera reports published on October 12 and 14.

In Gaza, Israeli control and access restrictions now cover approximately 65 percent of the territory, confining 2.1 million Palestinians to the remaining 35 percent. In southern Lebanon, Israeli troops continue to occupy a zone extending up to 10 kilometers into Lebanese territory, where entire villages have been demolished and residents remain unable to return.

Although the circumstances and agreements governing the two territories differ, analysts cited by Al Jazeera say the expanding military boundaries reflect a similar pattern of territorial control, population displacement and destruction of civilian infrastructure.

Gaza’s shrinking territory

A year after the US-brokered Gaza ceasefire, Israel has expanded its military-controlled territory beyond the original Yellow Line established under US President Donald Trump’s 20-point plan to end the war.

The agreement initially required Israeli forces to withdraw to the demarcation within 24 hours, with further withdrawals expected in subsequent phases.

Instead, Israeli troops have repeatedly moved the yellow concrete blocks marking the boundary farther west, bringing additional Palestinian neighbourhoods and agricultural areas under military control.

On Sunday, Israeli forces reportedly relocated the blocks dozens of metres west in Shujayea, southeastern Gaza City, forcing more Palestinian families to flee.

“It’s not simply about where the ‘Yellow Line’ is today but where it can move next,” Al Jazeera correspondent Ibrahim al-Khalili reported from Gaza City.

The original ceasefire arrangement left Israel controlling approximately 53 percent of Gaza, restricting Palestinians to 172 square kilometres of the 365-square-kilometre territory.

Research organisation Forensic Architecture estimated that Israeli control had expanded to 58 percent by December. In March, the Israeli military introduced an additional restricted area, described as the “orange line”, requiring humanitarian organisations to coordinate movements with the army.

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), military control and access restrictions now cover 65 percent of Gaza.

The remaining population is concentrated within approximately 128 square kilometres, increasing population density to nearly 16,000 people per square kilometre, almost three times its prewar level.

Each resident has an average of just 61 square metres of land, compared with approximately 160 square metres before the war.

The humanitarian consequences are compounded by extensive destruction. The UN Satellite Centre estimates that 82 percent of Gaza’s structures have been damaged or destroyed, while the Food and Agriculture Organization says only 3 percent of its cropland remains both undamaged and accessible.

More than 950,000 Palestinians are living in displacement sites vulnerable to flooding, predominantly in tents and makeshift shelters.

Approaching the Yellow Line also poses significant dangers. Nearly 1,500 Palestinians have been killed across Gaza since the ceasefire was announced, according to figures cited by Al Jazeera.

Southern Lebanon faces a similar pattern

A comparable military demarcation has emerged in southern Lebanon, where Israeli forces continue occupying substantial territory despite a framework agreement signed with Lebanon in June.

The agreement, reached through US-brokered negotiations, was intended to facilitate a phased Israeli withdrawal and establish pilot zones where Lebanese Armed Forces personnel would replace Israeli troops and disarm Hezbollah forces.

However, Israel continues to occupy territory extending up to 10 kilometres north of the border, while demolitions of homes and infrastructure have continued behind the Yellow Line.

Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz has previously indicated that Israeli forces would not withdraw from Lebanon, raising concerns about an extended occupation.

The latest Israeli military campaign followed Hezbollah rocket fire on March 2, which the group described as retaliation for repeated Israeli violations of the November 2024 ceasefire and the assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Israel subsequently intensified its military operations and reinvaded southern Lebanon, displacing more than 1.2 million people.

According to Al Jazeera, approximately 50 frontline villages, including Khiam and Bint Jbeil, have suffered extensive destruction.

Mohamad Bazzi, a New York-based political analyst originally from southern Lebanon, said the destruction reflected an effort to make entire communities uninhabitable.

“Israel’s primary goals were to empty, depopulate, and make those dozens of frontline villages and towns uninhabitable,” he told Al Jazeera, describing the approach as an application of the Gaza model to Lebanon.

Ahmad Baydoun, a Lebanese architect and open-source researcher based in the Netherlands, said the Yellow Line had effectively become a fixed military boundary despite the ceasefire.

He argued that continued demolitions suggested the ceasefire was being applied differently to Israeli-occupied territory than to the rest of Lebanon.

Displacement risks becoming permanent

Beyond the Yellow Line, discussions in Israel about establishing an additional “Grey Line” have intensified concerns about the future of southern Lebanon.

According to reports cited by Al Jazeera, the proposed boundary could extend approximately four kilometres into Lebanese territory, creating an uninhabited buffer zone where civilians would be prohibited from rebuilding their homes.

Restrictions also affect residents who remain in villages under Israeli control.

Baydoun said access to agricultural land increasingly depends on checkpoints and military coordination, describing the emerging system as the “West Bankification of those who remained”.

The consequences extend beyond immediate military operations.

Even if Israeli forces eventually withdraw, widespread destruction of housing, roads, agricultural land and essential infrastructure could prevent displaced communities from returning for years.

Ali, a displaced resident of Khiam currently renting accommodation in Hasbaiyya, said his hometown had become uninhabitable.

“Khiam is destroyed, there’s nothing, it’s uninhabitable for the next 10, 15, 20 years,” he told Al Jazeera.

Across Gaza and southern Lebanon, the expanding Yellow Lines have therefore become more than military demarcations. They increasingly determine where civilians can live, whether they can access their land and how much territory remains available for reconstruction.

With withdrawals stalled and destruction continuing, both territories face growing uncertainty over whether temporary ceasefire arrangements are evolving into prolonged systems of territorial control and displacement.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

I

srael will hold one of its most significant elections in recent years on October 27, 2026. What makes this election different from previous ones, and potentially historic, is that it will take place amid a war environment that emerged following the October 7, 2023, Al-Aqsa Flood attack and Israel’s subsequent military campaign in Gaza, launched with the stated aim of eliminating Hamas. The conflict subsequently spread to other countries in the region and at times involved five or six fronts simultaneously. This has been compounded by the war against Iran that began on February 28.

Although Israel has held elections in wartime before, it has never fought on so many fronts at once, maintained a state of war for such a long period, and perhaps has never been so severely strained militarily, economically, and politically. Add to all this the fact that Israel faces trials in international courts for the crimes of genocide it has committed in Gaza, has lost the support of Western public opinion—particularly in the U.S.—and that Western countries are, one by one, recognizing Palestine while adopting resolutions to impose sanctions on Israel, it would not be wrong to say that the elections Israel is holding under these conditions will amount to a referendum rather than merely an election.

For this reason, as we head into such a crucial election, one that may lead to a change in Israel’s current policies or the continuation of its policies of genocide and occupation, it would be helpful to address questions regarding the general mood of public opinion, developments within the ruling and opposition parties, the promises made by the parties and their leaders, and the predictions regarding the election outcome.

The general atmosphere ahead of the election

Netanyahu’s current government, formed at the end of 2022 with the support of far-right parties, has become increasingly weakened after four years in office. Its difficulties stem not only from foreign-policy failures, including international isolation, boycotts and sanctions over its policies in Gaza, but also from domestic problems such as protests over the so-called judicial reform, Netanyahu’s corruption trials, military-service exemptions for Haredi Jews, restrictions targeting civil society and the media, and economic and social problems caused by the wars.

The fact that residents have still not been able to return to areas evacuated after October 7 for security reasons, including communities around Gaza and along the Lebanese border, has further compounded these problems. Despite Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and Syria following the Gaza war and its subsequent war with Iran, moves that critics have linked to Netanyahu’s desire to remain in power by keeping the country in a permanent state of conflict, the failure to eliminate Hamas as claimed and achieve a decisive victory in Gaza, the resurgence of Hezbollah despite claims that it had been neutralized, Israel’s failure in Syria, and the inability to bring about regime change in Iran despite U.S. involvement in the war have all been interpreted by Netanyahu’s opponents as failures of his government. They have also undermined the notion of Israel as a secure country.

These security developments have naturally eroded Israelis’ confidence in their government and military and prompted some members of the largely immigrant population to return to their countries of origin.

Israeli voters are therefore heading to the polls under the shadow of security, economic and social problems in a way they have never experienced before. They will be deciding not merely which party or prime minister should govern the country, but what direction Israel itself should take.

Developments in the government and opposition camps

The parties forming the governing coalition centered on Netanyahu’s Likud appear likely to enter the election with largely the same personnel and political messaging. Following Likud’s internal primaries, the candidate list shaped by Netanyahu was submitted to the election authorities. The coalition’s ultra-Orthodox parties, Shas and United Torah Judaism (UTJ), are also expected to contest the election with their existing leadership and parliamentary teams. The only significant change within the coalition is that Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) and the Religious Zionist Party, which ran together on a single list in the previous election, will contest this election separately.

Despite Netanyahu’s insistence that the two parties should once again form an alliance in order to prevent the right-wing vote from being divided, Jewish Power leader Itamar Ben-Gvir rejected the request and announced that his party would run independently. Having lost hope of reaching an agreement with Ben-Gvir, Religious Zionist Party leader Bezalel Smotrich decided to form an alliance with Zehut, the party founded by former Likud lawmaker Moshe Feiglin, after polls indicated that the Religious Zionist Party would fail to cross the electoral threshold if it ran alone.

The main movement ahead of the election, however, has taken place within the opposition camp.

The first major development was the announcement by former minister and prime minister Naftali Bennett that he would return to active politics after previously declaring that he had ended his political career. Bennett first established the Bennett 2026 party and then announced that he would enter the election in alliance with Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid party under the name Beyahad (Together).

The experience Bennett and Lapid gained from their previous coalition government appears to have given them a significant level of public support, and they quickly reached Netanyahu’s level in opinion polls.

The Bennett momentum, however, began to fade when former military chief of staff and Blue and White lawmaker Gadi Eisenkot resigned from his party and established the Yashar (Straight/Justice) Party. Eisenkot’s background as a former military officer, the absence of corruption allegations against him, and his more centrist political positioning compared with Bennett helped him gain public support, and he soon moved ahead of Netanyahu in opinion polls.

Another important opposition figure is Yisrael Beiteinu, led by Avigdor Lieberman and traditionally supported largely by Jews who immigrated from Russia. Lieberman previously formed alliances with Netanyahu but positioned his party against him from 2018 onward. In the most recent elections, Yisrael Beiteinu joined the anti-Netanyahu bloc and supported the change government. The party, which will also contest this election independently, has announced that it will support Eisenkot for prime minister.

On the left side of the opposition is the Democrats Party led by Yair Golan, formed through the merger of the Labor Party and Meretz. Seeking to prevent further erosion of Israel’s left-wing vote, Golan has positioned his party against Netanyahu and announced that it would support a potential Eisenkot government.

The most controversial group within the opposition camp has been the Arab parties. The Ra’am, Hadash, Ta’al and Balad parties previously ran together under the Joint List and won 13 seats. It had been estimated that if they united again in this election, they could win at least 15 seats. In this context, Hadash and Ta’al reached an agreement and sought to persuade Ra’am to join their alliance.

Meanwhile, Ra’am, led by Mansour Abbas, recruited Yoaz Segalovitz, a lawmaker from Yesh Atid, signaling that it intended to appeal not only to Arab voters but also to Jewish voters.

However, the Central Elections Committee’s announcement on September 24 that the Joint List and Ra’am, as well as Balad leader Sami Abu Shehadeh and Hadash lawmaker Ofer Cassif, had been barred from participating in the election changed the entire electoral dynamic.

At a time when neither the Netanyahu bloc nor the Eisenkot-led opposition bloc was expected to reach the 61 seats required to form a government in the 120-seat Knesset, Arab parties were widely expected to determine the outcome. The Central Elections Committee’s decision therefore required the various calculations surrounding government formation to be reconsidered from scratch.

Nevertheless, Arab parties are expected to appeal the committee’s disqualification decisions to the Supreme Court, while the court is also expected to overturn some of the bans, with possible exceptions involving certain individuals.

Even so, it is argued that such restrictive decisions targeting Arab parties could benefit Netanyahu. If Arab voters stay away from the polls in protest, Netanyahu could gain an advantage. In previous elections, there have also been instances in which measures were allegedly taken to discourage Arab voters from participating or prevent them from freely exercising their right to vote, with Netanyahu benefiting from the resulting circumstances.

Who is promising what?

Security issues have traditionally dominated Israeli elections. Parties and political leaders generally explain how they intend to make the country safer. In this election, however, neither the governing coalition nor the opposition appears to have much left to promise on security. The country has been living under wartime conditions for three years, and it remains unclear how much longer this situation will continue.

The governing camp argues that it will finish what it started and eliminate Hamas and empty Gaza of its population, but it has not presented a concrete plan explaining how this would be achieved. Netanyahu argues that not only attacks on Gaza but also military operations targeting the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria and Iran are necessary for national security, and he seeks to promote the promise of achieving success on all fronts.

With the exception of the Arab parties, the opposition has also failed to articulate a clear position on either the war in Gaza or the continuing conflict with Iran. Its main argument has been that, had it been in power, it would have resolved these problems by now.

The issue of Iran, in particular, has long been regarded in Israel as a national-security concern, meaning that the war against Iran is not subject to the same level of criticism. Instead, opposition figures emphasize that the objective of regime change in Iran is unrealistic.

Some opposition parties support a two-state solution, but under current circumstances none appears willing to state this position openly, preferring to leave such declarations until after the election.

Consequently, it appears unlikely that voters will hear a fundamentally different position on Gaza from either the government or the opposition. In other words, it cannot be assumed that if Netanyahu loses and Eisenkot becomes prime minister, the genocide in Gaza would necessarily end, the annexation of the West Bank would be halted, actions aimed at changing the status quo at the Al-Aqsa Mosque would cease, the occupations in Lebanon and Syria would end, or the war with Iran would be brought to a close.

The principal differences between the government and opposition concern Netanyahu’s corruption trials, military-service exemptions for Haredi Jews, and the judicial reform.

The governing camp regards the corruption cases against Netanyahu as a conspiracy, while the opposition calls for the trials to proceed as quickly as possible and for Netanyahu to receive what it considers an appropriate sentence and be barred from political activity.

The government and opposition are also diametrically opposed over military-service exemptions for Haredi Jews and judicial reform. The government seeks to institutionalize exemptions for the Haredi community and regards judicial reform as necessary to reduce what it describes as judicial overreach. The opposition, by contrast, considers Haredi military exemptions contrary to the law and the principle of equality and rejects them.

The opposition also views the judicial reform as part of what it describes as Netanyahu’s plan to take control of the state and is asking voters to support it in order to prevent this.

However, neither side appears to be discussing how to repair the economy, address the economic damage caused by the wars, or overcome Israel’s international isolation and sanctions. Nor are there significant campaign promises on these issues.

A

merican President Donald Trump announced an immediate energy ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine on Sunday, catching Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy by surprise as Kyiv awaited details of the proposed agreement and reported continued Russian attacks on its energy infrastructure.

Trump declared on his Truth Social platform that both countries had agreed to halt attacks on energy facilities, following days of mounting pressure on Ukraine to stop targeting Russian oil refineries.

“Effective immediately, there is an ENERGY CEASEFIRE in the War between Russia and Ukraine. Both parties have agreed. Do not break it!” Trump wrote.

Neither Moscow nor Kyiv immediately confirmed that a formal agreement had been reached.

Zelenskiy subsequently said Ukraine supported an energy ceasefire but needed clarification from Washington, emphasizing that Russia must also comply with any arrangement.

“Ukraine supports the ceasefire, and it is important that Russia support it as well. We are awaiting details from the American side,” he said on Telegram.

The Ukrainian leader said he had discussed the announcement with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and Finnish President Alexander Stubb.

However, Zelenskiy reported that Russian forces continued striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure, including a combined heating and power plant in Kharkiv. A Ukrainian official confirmed that the attack occurred after Trump’s announcement.

Washington pressures Kyiv over Russian oil strikes

Trump’s announcement followed a sharp deterioration in relations between Washington and Kyiv over Ukraine’s attacks on Russian oil refineries, which the US president has blamed for contributing to rising global diesel prices.

On Saturday, Trump publicly warned Zelenskiy to stop targeting Russian refineries and suggested that Ukrainians should elect a new leader willing to reach an agreement with Moscow.

According to a person familiar with the situation, Washington also threatened to suspend intelligence sharing with Ukraine and block weapons procurement through the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) mechanism unless Kyiv halted its attacks on Russian energy facilities.

The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the reported threats.

Zelenskiy maintained that Ukraine would suspend strikes against Russian refineries only if Moscow reciprocated by ending attacks on Ukrainian electricity and energy infrastructure.

The dispute comes amid rising global fuel prices following the outbreak of the Iran war in February. Higher diesel costs have become a political concern for Trump’s Republican Party ahead of November’s US midterm elections.

Zelenskiy rejected suggestions that Ukrainian strikes were primarily responsible for the increase, arguing that the conflict in the Middle East was a more significant factor.

Tensions were further heightened by Trump’s announcement on Friday of a diesel supply arrangement with Russia. Under the deal described by the US president, Moscow would immediately supply more than 300,000 metric tons of diesel to American and international markets, equivalent to approximately 2.25 million barrels.

Zelenskiy criticized the arrangement, warning that renewed economic cooperation with Moscow could embolden Russia and lead to further Ukrainian casualties.

The deal also drew criticism from US lawmakers, including Republican Senator Thom Tillis, who questioned its legality and warned that it could endanger American lives.

Zelenskiy offers elections in exchange for 60-day truce

The diplomatic confrontation also extended to Ukraine’s political leadership after Trump called for new presidential elections, which have been suspended since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Zelenskiy responded that Ukrainians alone should determine their country’s leadership and offered to organize elections if Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to a comprehensive 60-day ceasefire.

“Please tell Putin, give us two months, 60 days of total ceasefire, 60 days, and we will organise elections,” Zelenskiy said.

Ukrainian legislation prohibits elections during martial law because of security concerns.

Trump’s remarks drew criticism from residents in Kyiv, where some viewed his intervention in Ukraine’s electoral affairs as inappropriate while the country remained at war.

Meanwhile, Russian attacks continued on Sunday. Ukrainian authorities reported that three people were killed outside a grocery store in Kharkiv, while another three died in strikes on the western city of Ivano-Frankivsk.

Neighbouring Moldova also reported an incursion involving suspected Russian drones, which landed approximately 35 kilometres from its capital, Chisinau.

The continuing violence highlighted the uncertainty surrounding Trump’s ceasefire declaration, with neither a confirmed agreement nor evidence of an immediate halt to attacks on Ukrainian energy facilities.

For Kyiv, the central question remains whether Washington’s proposed arrangement will impose reciprocal obligations on Moscow or primarily restrict Ukraine’s ability to target Russian energy infrastructure.

(Source: Reuters)

Alongside strengthening diplomatic relations with Latin American countries, the Israeli government is seeking to expand cooperation in the fields of the economy, technology, security and innovation. However, Israel’s outreach to Latin America also faces certain limitations. While the foreign-policy priorities of governments in the region can change, the Israel-Palestine issue remains an important factor in relations with Latin American countries. Israel’s actions in Gaza have provoked the strongest reaction among Latin American populations in recent history. Israel is aware of this and is therefore pursuing new policies in the region.

The decision by Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to declare 2026 the “year of focusing on Latin America” from the ministry’s perspective is being presented as part of Tel Aviv’s strategy to break its isolation in the region. Alongside strengthening diplomatic relations with Latin American countries, the Israeli government is seeking to expand cooperation in the fields of the economy, technology, security and innovation.

One of the important steps in this policy was the Isaac Accords launched between Israel and Argentina in April 2026. The agreement aims to promote security, counterterrorism, trade, technology and economic cooperation between the two countries and other Western Hemisphere countries that share similar policies.

Bolivia restored diplomatic relations with Israel in December 2025, with the two countries agreeing to reappoint ambassadors and increase bilateral contacts. Relations with Colombia were also restored in August 2026. Under the new President Abelardo de la Espriella, steps were taken to reestablish diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv, appoint ambassadors and strengthen economic relations.

These developments indicate that Israel is seeking to reverse the diplomatic ruptures experienced in Latin America in the previous period and rebuild its diplomatic network across the region.

Argentine leader Milei’s “extraordinary” affinity for Israel

Relations between Israel and Argentina have become closer politically and diplomatically than ever before following Javier Milei’s election as president in 2023. The Milei administration has described Israel as one of Argentina’s principal strategic partners, designated Hamas as a terrorist organization and continued to express strong support for Israel on international platforms.

Milei’s visit to Israel in 2024 and his visit to the Western Wall were among the symbolic steps reflecting the political rapprochement between the two countries. One of the key elements of this rapprochement was Argentina’s decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem. Milei announced the decision in 2024 and stated that the embassy would be moved to Jerusalem in 2026.

While the ideological and strategic alliance established by the Milei administration with Israel in foreign policy has reached a peak, Argentina is experiencing a deep socioeconomic crisis at home. The “shock therapy” economic policies implemented by Milei after taking office—including cuts in public spending, the removal of subsidies and the devaluation of the peso—were intended to bring inflation under control but severely affected the population’s purchasing power.

As a result of these measures, the country’s official poverty rate surpassed 50 percent, reaching its highest levels in two decades. Pensioners, public-sector workers and low-income groups in particular were pushed into a severe cost-of-living crisis as food, transportation and energy costs increased.

Colombia’s new leader is a strong supporter of Israel

Relations between Colombia and Israel began to take a new shape following the diplomatic rupture that occurred under former President Gustavo Petro over Israel’s actions in Gaza. The new period began with Abelardo de la Espriella, who took office on August 7 and had refused to recognize the victory of the left-wing administration, describing it as fraudulent.

The Petro administration had severed diplomatic relations with Israel in May 2024 over Israel’s actions in Gaza. Following de la Espriella’s assumption of office, a rapid normalization process began between the two countries.

One of the most notable steps in the new administration’s shift in Israel policy was Colombia’s recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. In a statement issued on August 10, 2026, Colombia announced that it recognized Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights and considered Israeli control of the area important for Israel’s security.

The decision was one of the clearest indications that Bogotá had departed significantly from the previous administration’s policy toward Israel.

Another important component of the change in relations is the relocation of the Colombian Embassy to Jerusalem. The de la Espriella administration had already included the relocation of the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem among its campaign promises.

While the two sides have discussed strengthening security and economic ties alongside diplomatic relations, the possibility of Colombia resuming coal exports to Israel and changing its position in certain international legal proceedings against Israel has also emerged.

Most recently, Colombia withdrew its request to intervene in the genocide case filed against Israel at the International Court of Justice.

Critical elections in Brazil enter Israel’s radar

Brazil’s general elections, scheduled for October 4, 2026, represent an important turning point for the future of relations between Israel and Latin America’s largest country.

During the Lula administration, relations between the two countries experienced serious diplomatic tensions over the Gaza war. Brazil’s position on the Palestinian issue became a particularly clear source of divergence.

In February 2024, Israel declared Lula “persona non grata,” while Brazil recalled its ambassador from Tel Aviv. Diplomatic tensions between the two countries continued into 2025.

Against this backdrop, Flavio Bolsonaro, the presidential candidate of Brazil’s right-wing opposition, has been sending clear messages about strengthening relations with Israel. In a statement in June, Bolsonaro said that if elected, Brazil would once again move closer to Israel, relocate its embassy in Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and join the Isaac Accords.

Bolsonaro’s Israel policy has not been limited to foreign policy during the election campaign. Bolsonaro also presented to the public at an election event a video message sent to his campaign by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

This development indicates that political contacts between Brazil’s right-wing camp and the Israeli government have become increasingly visible during the electoral process.

Depending on the election result, two different approaches are expected to emerge regarding Brazil’s Israel policy: the continuation of the Lula administration’s existing position on the Palestinian issue or a Bolsonaro administration seeking to restore and strengthen diplomatic and strategic relations with Israel.

Flavio Bolsonaro’s statements on Jerusalem, Israel and the Isaac Accords have already outlined the main areas in which foreign policy could change in the event of a change of government.

Y

emen’s Saudi-backed, internationally recognized government has announced a major military offensive aimed at recapturing territory controlled by the Iran-backed Houthi movement, escalating a conflict with growing implications for regional security and international shipping.

Yemeni President Rashad al-Alimi said on Sunday that government forces would continue their campaign until the country was liberated from what he described as the grip of the “terrorist militia.” A military spokesman subsequently called on the Houthis to surrender their weapons.

The announcement by the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), which governs from the southern city of Aden, followed weeks of Houthi advances that have weakened government forces and brought the strategically important Bab el-Mandeb Strait under the group’s control.

The strait, at the southern entrance to the Red Sea, is a crucial passage for international shipping between the Mediterranean and Asia. Its capture has given the Houthis additional leverage over global maritime trade and opened a new front in the wider war involving the United States, Israel and Iran.

The latest escalation comes as regional tensions remain high following the US-Israeli war against Iran, which began in February. Iran’s responses have included disrupting oil shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, on the opposite side of the Arabian Peninsula.

Houthis claim attacks on Saudi oil facilities

As the Yemeni government announced its counteroffensive, the Houthis said they had launched ballistic missiles and drones against Saudi Aramco sites in Riyadh and the Khurais area of Saudi Arabia.

The group claimed the attacks caused major fires and were retaliation for approximately 50 Saudi-led air and missile strikes in Yemen during the preceding 12 hours. Saudi Arabia had not immediately confirmed the reported attacks or the extent of any damage.

Al-Alimi said the government had decided to launch the offensive after exhausting opportunities to de-escalate the conflict. He thanked Saudi Arabia for its support and urged Yemen’s regional allies and international partners to assist the PLC’s forces and institutions.

Regional and Western officials had previously told Reuters that Saudi Arabia and its Yemeni allies were preparing an assault against the Houthis. Under the reported plans, Saudi forces would lead aerial operations while Yemeni government troops conducted fighting on the ground.

The United States is already providing intelligence support for Saudi operations in Yemen, according to people familiar with the preparations. Several regional and European countries are also providing mainly defensive military assistance to the kingdom.

Washington’s involvement comes as the US war against Iran has weakened parts of Iran’s military and political leadership while drawing the United States into another major regional engagement and depleting important military equipment.

The Houthis, formally known as Ansar Allah, have controlled Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, and large areas of the northwest since 2014. The region contains most of the country’s population. Despite years of military operations by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and their Western allies, the movement has retained control of extensive territory and strengthened its weapons capabilities with Iranian assistance.

Saudi Arabia intervened in Yemen’s civil war in 2015 at the head of an Arab coalition supporting the internationally recognized government, but the campaign failed to defeat the Houthis. A truce agreed in 2022 largely held until this year, when the conflict intensified amid the wider confrontation involving Iran.

Houthi advances threaten Taiz and Red Sea shipping

The government’s announcement follows a rapid Houthi offensive last month that captured the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and approximately 150 kilometers of Red Sea coastline within weeks. The advance caused government forces to retreat and shifted the balance of power on the ground.

Military sources said the Houthis had also gained control of strategic hilltops near Taiz over the previous 48 hours, advancing towards the last road connecting the city with Aden on Yemen’s southern coast.

Control of that route could effectively place Taiz under siege. Yemen’s third-largest city is home to hundreds of thousands of civilians and hosts thousands of government troops. Its strategic importance is compounded by its political significance: Al-Alimi comes from the region.

A siege would further worsen an already severe humanitarian crisis. The World Food Program said last week that three in four families in parts of Yemen were going hungry as fighting intensified, displacing tens of thousands of people and disrupting supplies to millions.

The struggle for Bab el-Mandeb has also raised concerns beyond Yemen. The waterway is a vital route for commercial shipping, and its importance has increased as disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has made alternative routes more strategically significant.

The Houthis’ recent territorial gains therefore pose challenges for Yemen’s government, Saudi Arabia and international efforts to protect maritime trade. Their ability to threaten shipping and Saudi oil infrastructure gives the group influence extending well beyond the territory it controls.

Yemen has been fragmented by years of conflict involving local armed groups and regional powers. The latest government offensive could reshape the military balance, but the Houthis’ recent advances, their control of strategic territory and the continuing humanitarian emergency suggest that any campaign to retake the country will face substantial challenges.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he Trump administration has urged France and Germany to release emergency diesel reserves to help ease soaring global fuel prices, warning that Washington could impose a ban on US diesel exports if European countries fail to act, according to three people familiar with the discussions.

The pressure marks an escalation in Washington’s efforts to bring down record US diesel prices as President Donald Trump considers measures to increase domestic fuel supplies ahead of November’s midterm elections.

For European governments, however, releasing additional emergency stocks presents a difficult choice. The European Union must weigh the immediate need to reduce fuel prices against the possibility of a worsening supply crisis if the conflict involving Iran continues and global energy markets remain disrupted.

The European Commission’s energy taskforce, which includes the Commission and representatives of all 27 EU member states, is due to discuss the situation on Friday morning, a Commission spokesperson said.

EU officials said the Commission, Germany, France, Italy, Britain and Ireland had already held discussions on Thursday about the possible release of diesel reserves.

The International Energy Agency has not yet asked Germany to release its emergency stocks, Germany’s economy ministry said. It was not immediately clear when the IEA would next consider the issue.

The US administration has expressed particular frustration with France and Germany, which Washington believes have not fully implemented earlier commitments to release emergency oil and petroleum-product reserves.

“It is in Europe’s best interest to work with the United States as we pursue multiple pathways to boost the supply of refined products and lower costs for consumers,” a US official told Reuters.

Washington seeks more fuel as global supply tightens

One source familiar with the discussions said the United States had asked the European Union to release 120 million barrels of diesel over the next six months.

Europe has become increasingly dependent on US fuel supplies after banning Russian imports following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. The disruption caused by the US-Israeli war against Iran has further complicated supplies from the Middle East, increasing pressure on global refined-product markets.

US Energy Secretary Chris Wright said he was “highly confident” that Europe could help reduce fuel prices by drawing down its emergency diesel inventories.

“This is a time for a coordinated release of diesel stores as we go into harvest season and we go into winter heating oil season,” Wright told Fox News. He said additional diesel was available and suggested that coordinated action could produce positive results for consumers.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also called on US allies to fulfill commitments made under an agreement among International Energy Agency members in March. He said the United States had already released 172 million barrels of oil under the agreement.

“America is doing its part,” Bessent said on X, adding that Washington expected its allies to match their commitments with action.

The pressure on European reserves comes as several major fuel suppliers have taken measures that are tightening international markets.

Russia has extended its ban on diesel exports until the end of October, according to Reuters. The measure comes after Ukrainian attacks damaged several Russian refineries.

Chinese refiners have also suspended October fuel exports to strengthen domestic supplies, while PetroChina has cancelled cargoes, according to sources cited by Reuters.

The disruptions have added to concerns about the availability of diesel at a time when demand is expected to rise during the agricultural harvest and winter heating season.

Europe faces a difficult reserve decision

The European Union must balance the immediate economic pressure from high fuel prices against the strategic value of maintaining emergency stocks.

Releasing large volumes could increase supplies and potentially reduce prices, but governments may be reluctant to deplete reserves while uncertainty remains over the conflict involving Iran and the possibility of further disruptions to international energy markets.

Relations between Washington and European capitals have already been strained by disagreements over tariffs and defense spending, adding another layer of complexity to the discussions over fuel reserves.

France’s energy ministry declined to comment on the US request. An official at the Élysée Palace said Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron did not discuss the issue when they met on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York the previous week.

The official said Macron would convene a video conference of G7 leaders to discuss rising fuel prices and the global availability of refined petroleum products. The meeting would also consider coordination on releasing strategic reserves in cooperation with the International Energy Agency.

The proposed G7 discussions reflect the broader international effort to manage a tightening fuel market as governments confront disruptions from several major producers.

For Washington, securing additional supplies could help ease pressure on US consumers before the November elections. For Europe, however, releasing substantial diesel reserves could reduce prices in the short term while leaving countries with smaller buffers against a further deterioration in global energy supplies.

The debate therefore places the United States and its European allies under pressure to coordinate their response to an increasingly strained global fuel market, even as they face different domestic priorities and concerns about future supply disruptions.

(Source: Reuters)

A

passenger aircraft traveling from Dubai to Tel Aviv transmitted an emergency signal and was reportedly diverted toward Saudi Arabia, according to Israeli media reports.

Ynet reported that the aircraft, carrying more than 150 passengers, issued an emergency alert during the flight. Initial reports described the incident as a possible hijacking, although the circumstances surrounding the alert and the aircraft’s subsequent change of course have not been independently established.

According to the reports, the aircraft changed direction and headed toward Saudi Arabia after the emergency signal was transmitted. The reason for the diversion remained unclear, and there was no immediate official confirmation explaining what had occurred aboard the plane.

The reported incident prompted an emergency response at the highest levels of the Israeli government. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz were reported to have convened an emergency meeting following the alert.

However, authorities had not immediately confirmed whether the aircraft had actually been subjected to an attempted hijacking or whether the emergency signal was linked to another technical, security or operational issue.

Preliminary information

There was also no immediate official information regarding the condition of the passengers and crew, the aircraft’s exact location, or whether it had landed or was continuing toward Saudi Arabia.

The reports come amid heightened sensitivity surrounding aviation routes and security in the region. Any confirmed security incident involving a passenger aircraft traveling between the Gulf and Israel could have wider implications for regional aviation.

At this stage, however, the available information remains preliminary. The initial reference to a possible hijacking has not been independently verified, and the reasons for the reported diversion remain unknown.

Authorities are expected to provide further information as they investigate the emergency signal and establish what prompted the aircraft to alter its flight path.

(Source: Ynews)

F

or many years, Lebanon did not occupy a central position in Türkiye’s regional policy. The fragility of the country’s political, social, and economic structure, its relative weakness compared to other actors in the Middle East, and its subjection to the influence of various powers were the primary obstacles preventing Ankara from developing a comprehensive strategy for Lebanon.

It would not have been a meaningful or reasonable choice for Türkiye to become involved before conditions conducive to the intense competition among various actors on Lebanese soil had emerged. Consequently, a situation prevailed in which a more basic-level approach, such as stable diplomatic relations between Ankara and Beirut, along with humanitarian aid, cultural events, and limited economic ties, was accepted as a given by both sides. However, the new status quo that emerged in the Middle East following Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, which began on October 7, 2023, paved the way for reshaping established relationship patterns and adopting a new understanding among regional countries.

The genocide in Gaza, the attacks carried out by the occupying state in line with its aggressive expansionist strategy, the state-building process led by Ahmed al-Sharaa that began with the end of the Bashar al-Assad era in Syria, the triggering of regional fault lines, and the emergence of a new reality due to the U.S./Israel-Iran War, all of these have paved the way for the restructuring of bilateral relations between Türkiye and Lebanon in a new tone. Before October 7, spheres of influence in Lebanon were largely defined.

The Assad regime’s influence, which, though weakened after 2006, persisted, and Iran’s decisive role in the country’s politics through Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia’s balancing role on the ground through Sunni political and economic elites, France’s efforts to preserve its traditional presence under the pretext of being the protector of the Maronite population, and the Zionist administration’s ambition, particularly to seize southern Lebanon, prevented the formulation of long-term strategies for the country. In Lebanon, a country with extreme fragility and an equally weak capacity to generate solutions, it was not easy for a new actor to enter the scene as a game-changer. The fundamental shift in the regional political equation and the transformation of the security landscape resulting from the events mentioned above presented an opportunity for a new beginning in Turkish-Lebanese relations.

The new reality in Lebanon after October 7

The shifting geopolitical environment around Lebanon after Al-Aqsa Flood not only disrupted the country’s traditional balances but also heightened society’s need for a new, trustworthy actor. In addition to the traumas of the 1975–90 civil war, the spillover of the Iran-Israel conflict into Lebanese territory had pushed societal fatigue to its peak. One main reason was weak state authority in Lebanon and Hezbollah’s transformation into a key determining actor because of the power it wielded. Furthermore, the profound disruption of Lebanon’s economic and social fabric following the civil war in Syria, along with the fact that pro-Assad and anti-Assad groups were waging a struggle through Lebanese territory, were among the factors preventing the Lebanese government from functioning effectively. However, the escalation of clashes between Hezbollah and the Zionist regime, followed by the occupying army’s series of operations that killed the majority of Hezbollah’s leading figures, signaled the emergence of a new reality on the ground.

The fact that the occupying army, which had withdrawn from Lebanese territory in 2000, began to regain control of certain areas within the country and asserted sovereignty over the region extending as far as the Litani River meant that Beirut would face numerous challenges in the new era. Perhaps the most significant development offering hope for Lebanese politics and the people during this period was the change taking place in Damascus. While the end of the Assad regime and Shara’s assumption of control with a new vision posed new security risks for Tel Aviv, for Beirut it highlighted the potential for a new strategic alliance to emerge in the region.

The spread of the aggressive strategy, carried out by the Zionist regime for political motives, into Syrian territory, and the occupying army’s intensification of its attacks and invasive actions aimed at disrupting Damascus’s stability, undermining its self-confidence, and increasing its vulnerability, were developments that also posed a threat to Türkiye’s national security. It was unthinkable for Ankara, which had paid a heavy price throughout the Syrian civil war, to accept that the Syrian people would be thrown into turmoil by the actions of the occupying state just as they were about to catch their breath. The strategic alliance between Türkiye and Syria also gave the Lebanese people hope.

Walid Canbolat’s visit to Türkiye in December 2024, as a prominent political figure and leader of the Druze community, was a significant indicator of Lebanese expectations. This visit, which took place immediately following the revolution in Syria, was nothing less than a message to Ankara to develop a new strategy regarding Lebanon. In a context where Hezbollah had lost a significant portion of its leadership, the Gulf states and the Western world were unable to assert themselves against Zionist aggression. Tel Aviv’s claim to sovereignty over Lebanon was expanding day by day; mentioning Türkiye in the context of its historical legacy aligned with the prevailing mood in the country. Following October 7, the overwhelming majority of every group in the country had come to expect Ankara to take a more visible role in Lebanon.

A Strategic relationship as a necessity

The profound changes in Syria and Türkiye’s ever-increasing influence in the Middle East are forcing the occupying state to intensify its pressure on Lebanon and to make the government dependent on it by compelling it to enter into various agreements. Caught between Hezbollah and Israel, Lebanese leaders are seeking a way out while simultaneously pursuing a balanced policy toward Tel Aviv in line with U.S. recommendations. Because the country’s political system has created deep ideological divisions among the ruling elites, conflicting political statements and strategies are a constant feature of Lebanese politics. In such an environment, the Zionist administration seeks to consolidate its influence in the region by developing a new relationship with Beirut through the Eastern Mediterranean, while also trying to minimize the likelihood of Beirut joining the Ankara-Damascus alliance in the new post-revolutionary situation in Syria. For this reason, Türkiye’s policy toward Lebanon must be conducted under the new conditions, with a strategic vision far more distinct and profound than in the past.

The separate visits to Türkiye in July by Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and President Joseph Aoun not only have the potential to open a new chapter in bilateral relations but also reveal the unique balances of Lebanese politics. During Salam’s meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, statements regarding Türkiye’s role in developing Lebanon’s infrastructure and the need to strengthen strategic relations in light of the new regional situation were particularly prominent. President Aoun, for his part, emphasized during his visit that the cooperation and coordination to be established with Türkiye constitute a strategic necessity rather than a temporary preference. In particular, conveying Ankara’s clear stance in the face of Israel’s dangerous initiatives in the Eastern Mediterranean and its efforts to involve Lebanon in this process via Southern Cyprus was highly significant for the course of the process.

Both visits and the topics discussed are highly significant in that they demonstrate the need to develop relations between the two sides after many years. Given the current fragilities, Türkiye is the only actor with which Lebanon can establish a strategic partnership in the region, and whose role Lebanese society can clearly accept. From Ankara’s perspective, shifting balances in the Palestinian arena, the transformation in Damascus, and the need to curb Tel Aviv’s aggression and expansionism require moving relations with Lebanon into a new phase. Although Ankara adopted a more limited policy toward Beirut to avoid becoming entangled in Lebanon’s power struggle in the past, the dynamics following October 7 have made it imperative to shift this approach and significantly strengthen ties with Lebanon within a strategic framework. In particular, sustaining the momentum gained after the revolution in Syria on December 8, 2024, and building relationships at various levels on the ground are crucial to a more stable region.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

C

hinese President Xi Jinping visited Egypt on September 1, marking the first such visit in a decade. Taking place on the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1956, Xi’s visit carried symbolic significance and served as a key indicator of the growing momentum in relations between Beijing and Cairo in recent years. The statements made by the leaders of both countries regarding the visit, in which they emphasized the importance they attach to bilateral relations, further underscore this trend.

Another notable aspect was that both leaders highlighted the broader regional implications of these bilateral ties. In this context, Chinese President Xi, highlighting Egypt’s dual Arab and African identity, emphasized the need to strengthen cooperation by noting that Cairo plays “an important role in promoting the collective cooperation between China and Arab states as well as between China and African countries.” Meanwhile, Egyptian President Abdulfettah el-Sisi similarly highlighted that his country was the first Arab and African state to recognize China, emphasizing that Cairo is a key actor in Beijing’s efforts to develop relations with both Arab and African states.

It can be said that China-Egypt relations, which had limited opportunities for development in the 20th century, began to develop rapidly from the beginning of the 21st century, as Beijing’s relations with Africa gained momentum. The elevation of the relationship to the level of a comprehensive strategic partnership during President Sisi’s official visit to China in 2014 marked a significant step.

Economy is the key word

As is the case with China’s relations with many other countries, economic ties constitute the most concrete and significant aspect of the relations that have developed during this period. China’s annual trade volume with Egypt, which stood at approximately $0.9 billion in 2000, reached approximately $20.8 billion by 2025. Another key indicator of these economic ties is China’s investments in Egypt. Beijing’s investments in Egypt have exceeded $10 billion, with investments in the industrial sector being particularly noteworthy.

The Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone project, launched in 2008 to encourage China’s industrial investments in Egypt, is one of the most significant steps taken in this direction. As of 2025, with over $3.8 billion in investments made in the zone, nearly 200 companies are operating there, providing employment for approximately 10,000 people. China has also provided $7.7 billion in loans to Egypt between 2000 and 2024.

In contrast to economic relations, the security dimension of relations between the two countries has been an area with limited scope for development until recently. However, it is possible to say that significant activity has taken place in this area, particularly in 2025. In this context, claims that emerged during the year, that Egypt procured the HQ-9B air defense system from China and signed a deal worth approximately $400 million for the procurement of 10 WJ-700 UAVs, represent significant developments in arms trade between the two countries. The signing of a memorandum of understanding between Egypt and China’s North Industries Corporation for joint UAV production during this period was a step demonstrating the two countries’ intention to develop defense industry cooperation.

Eagles of Civilization exercises

One of the most important steps taken to strengthen military relations between Beijing and Cairo was the “Eagles of Civilization 2025” exercise. Held in Egypt, this large-scale exercise, the first joint air exercise between the two countries, also holds symbolic significance as it represents one of China’s most important military activities on the African continent. The second iteration of the exercise, “Eagles of Civilization 2026,” was conducted immediately prior to Xi’s visit.

China-Egypt cooperation, which is generally built on a foundation of strong economic ties, is evolving into a strategic partnership that increasingly encompasses the security dimension, as intended by both sides. However, it is fair to say that sustaining the momentum achieved in these relations will become increasingly difficult. The primary reason for this is the concerns that the deepening of Beijing-Cairo relations, particularly in the security sphere, will raise on the U.S. side. A key reason for Washington’s concerns is that, as part of its global competition with China, Beijing’s development of security ties with Egypt could allow it to gain military influence in a strategically important region.

Another major source of concern for the U.S. relates to Israeli interests. Egypt’s efforts to reduce its dependence on the U.S. in this area by developing military ties with China, and to enhance its military capabilities independently of the U.S., will be viewed as a threat by Israel. Driven by similar concerns, Washington intervened in the military relations Egypt developed with Russia in the second half of the 2010s, as well as in significant arms procurements, by applying pressure through the threat of sanctions against Cairo. The trajectory of China-Egypt security relations also holds the potential to trigger similar interventions.

(Originally published in Turkish by the Middle East Africa website)

I

sraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed a largely empty United Nations General Assembly on Thursday after dozens of national delegations walked out of the chamber as he took the podium, protesting Israel’s genocide in Gaza and its policies in the occupied West Bank and the wider region.

Netanyahu entered the chamber to deliver his address to the 81st session of the UN General Assembly in New York. As he approached the podium, representatives from numerous countries stood and left the hall, while chants and protests could be heard inside the chamber. The number of countries that left in protest is estimated at 77.

The delegations were protesting Israel’s genocide in Gaza, its continued attacks despite calls for a ceasefire, settlement and land seizure activities in the occupied West Bank, and Israeli strikes against Syria and Lebanon, according to the report.

Delegations from countries including Türkiye, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Senegal, Pakistan, Sudan, Iran and Indonesia were among those that walked out as Netanyahu began speaking. Other countries, including Spain, South Africa, Kuwait, Morocco, Nigeria and Brazil, did not attend the session, according to the report.

As the delegations departed, Netanyahu continued his speech before a chamber that was almost completely empty. The visitors’ gallery, however, saw supporters of Israel, who applauded and cheered during parts of his address.

The walkout marked the third time Netanyahu has faced such a protest at the UN General Assembly since the Oct. 7, 2023.

Netanyahu defends Israel’s genocide

Despite the mass walkout, Netanyahu delivered an extended address in which he defended Israel’s genocide in Gaza and criticized opponents of his government.

Speaking about Israel’s military action against Iran, Netanyahu said the decision to attack Iranian nuclear facilities had been among the easiest decisions he had made as prime minister, despite acknowledging that carrying out the attacks had been difficult.

He also addressed the Golan Heights, rejecting assertions that the territory is Syrian land. Netanyahu argued that the area, which Israel has occupied since 1967, has historical ties to the Jewish people.

Netanyahu also defended Israeli settlers in the occupied West Bank while addressing violence against Palestinians. He characterized attacks on Palestinian homes and property as the work of a small number of individuals and argued that Israeli settlers involved in such incidents were otherwise law-abiding citizens.

He further rejected criticism of Israel’s genocide in Gaza, saying the Israeli army protects civilians and describing it as “the most moral army in the world.”

Netanyahu also targeted New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani, who has described Netanyahu as responsible for the destruction in Gaza. Referring to attempts to prevent him from addressing the UN, Netanyahu said he had been challenged and sought to be silenced.

During the speech, Netanyahu also made claims concerning Türkiye and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

He brought a Starlink device to the UN and said he would leave it for Iranian officials to use, while arguing that Iran’s government would eventually be overthrown.

During his remarks on Iran, a photograph of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a 2020 US drone strike in Baghdad, was visible in the Iranian delegation’s seating area.

Protests continue outside UN headquarters

The demonstrations against Netanyahu were not limited to the General Assembly chamber.

Large groups of pro-Palestinian protesters gathered in Manhattan as Netanyahu spoke, calling for an end to Israel’s military operations in Gaza and criticizing US support for Israel.

Security restrictions prevented protesters from approaching the UN headquarters. Hundreds gathered near First Avenue and 39th Street, where they chanted slogans including “No to war, no to weapons, freedom for Palestine” and “Netanyahu, you can’t hide, we will prosecute you for genocide.”

Jay Saper of the Jewish Voice for Peace organization told Anadolu that more than 400 people were participating in a demonstration accompanying a convoy moving toward the UN.

Saper said the protesters were there to oppose Netanyahu’s actions in Gaza, including attacks on homes and hospitals. He also criticized the US government for continuing to provide weapons to Israel, arguing that Washington should end what he described as its involvement in the conflict.

New York City Council member Diana Moreno, who supported the demonstration, also criticized Netanyahu and said protesters were sending a clear message about his conduct.

Moreno said US taxpayers should not be financing what she described as an ethnic-cleansing project or attacks on Iran and Lebanon. She also emphasized the equal value of children’s lives regardless of where they are born.

Several protesters were detained after blocking a road four or five blocks from the UN headquarters. Police deployed in large numbers to the area, and detained demonstrators were seen being placed on two police buses while continuing to chant slogans in support of Gaza.

According to US media reports cited by Anadolu, those detained included Hollywood actress Susan Sarandon, New York City Council member Chi Osse, New York congressional candidate Darializa Avila Chevalier, comedian Caleb Hearon, actresses Hannah Einbinder and Cynthia Nixon, and former US Army intelligence analyst Chelsea Manning.

A separate demonstration was held outside the Israeli Consulate near Second Avenue and 42nd Street in Manhattan. Activists from the group Standing Together carried signs criticizing Netanyahu and calling for humanitarian aid to be allowed into Gaza.

The protests inside and outside the UN highlighted the deep divisions surrounding Israel’s military campaign and Netanyahu’s international standing as he addressed the world body. While many delegations left the chamber in protest, Netanyahu continued speaking to the remaining audience and defended Israel’s policies before supporters in the visitors’ gallery.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

F

ifteen years after Libyans rose against personalized rule, the country risks replacing one family-centred dictatorship not with democracy, but with competing dynasties, armed patronage networks and a political class that has discovered that “transition” can last forever.

Libyans have not necessarily abandoned their aspiration for democracy. Something more insidious is happening: They are being taught that democracy does not matter.

Fifteen years after the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi, Libya remains trapped in what is still politely called a “transition.” Governments described as temporary become permanent, elections are promised and postponed, and institutions whose democratic mandates have long expired continue to exercise power. Armed groups become state actors, family members become commanders and power brokers, and public money sustains a system whose principal achievement is its own survival.

The absurdity is illustrated by the Government of National Unity headed by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. Created as an interim authority to take Libya to presidential and parliamentary elections in December 2021, it remains in power in Tripoli in 2026 although those elections never happened. In the east, meanwhile, another political-security establishment has consolidated itself around Khalifa Haftar, his family and the forces under their control. Governments change names, roadmaps are rewritten, and election dates recede into the future, but those exercising power remain. Libya has turned the provisional government into a permanent political system: everybody is temporary, but nobody leaves.

Perhaps that is no accident. Genuine elections contain something profoundly threatening to Libya’s political class: the possibility of losing. Elections mean that those controlling ministries, budgets, armed formations, contracts and patronage networks today might wake up tomorrow without them. Why should beneficiaries of the existing order enthusiastically construct the mechanism capable of removing them?

A convergence of interests

Dbeibah and Haftar are not allies, and eastern and western power centres continue to compete. Yet beneath their rivalry lies a convergence of interests. The western establishment needs money, armed protection and control of Tripoli; the eastern establishment needs access to national revenues and international legitimacy. Militias need salaries and influence, business networks need contracts, politicians need offices, and families surrounding powerful men need access to wealth. Foreign governments want oil, migration control, counterterrorism cooperation and sufficient stability to protect their interests. No formal coalition is necessary. Everyone merely has to conclude that continuation of the existing system is preferable to allowing Libyan voters to overturn it.

The bitterest irony concerns nepotism. Libyans rose in 2011 against a political order in which the state had become inseparable from Qaddafi, his sons and the networks surrounding them. Yet power in eastern Libya has become increasingly concentrated not merely around Khalifa Haftar but around the Haftar family. His son Saddam Haftar has risen to become deputy commander of the eastern forces and increasingly represents that establishment internationally. Instead of building institutions capable of surviving Khalifa Haftar, eastern Libya risks building a succession mechanism capable of perpetuating his family. Western Libya has developed a different but similarly troubling phenomenon through the growing political and commercial influence of networks associated with the Dbeibah family.

Libya thus risks completing a grotesque historical circle. It overthrew one family-centred authoritarian state only to produce multiple family-centred political, commercial and military fiefdoms. This is not a restoration of Qaddafi’s Jamahiriya. In one respect it could prove worse: Qaddafi presided over one personalised state; Libya now risks acquiring several personalized centres of power competing over the resources of the same country.

None of this can be understood without oil. Libya possesses immense petroleum wealth shared among a population of only several million people. That should provide the foundations for one of Africa’s most prosperous states. Instead, it helps finance political dysfunction. A government dependent upon taxation must, however imperfectly, worry about the citizens from whom it collects revenue. Libya receives enormous income from selling hydrocarbons abroad. Control the institutions through which that money flows and you gain influence over budgets, salaries, subsidies, contracts, appointments and patronage.

How do we build a prosperous Libyan state?

The central political question therefore risks ceasing to be “How do we build a prosperous Libyan state?” and becoming “Who gets access to the money generated by the Libyan state?” Oil makes capturing the government extraordinarily profitable. When political survival can be financed through distributing oil rents, accountability to citizens becomes less urgent. Libya’s greatest economic blessing becomes its political curse.

The international community also deserves uncomfortable scrutiny. Western governments proclaim their commitment to elections, while the United Nations continues producing roadmaps towards elected and unified institutions. The language remains impeccable. But governments reveal their priorities through behaviour rather than communiqués.

Europe wants Libya to restrain migration across the Mediterranean. Washington wants counterterrorism cooperation, regional stability and limits on Russian influence. Italy wants energy and migration cooperation. Turkey, Egypt, France, Russia and the Gulf states pursue their own strategic and commercial interests. Oil must continue flowing, migration must be contained, jihadists controlled, and geopolitical competitors kept in check.

And if the men capable of delivering these things happen to be authoritarian, dynastic or embedded in systems of patronage? Increasingly, the practical answer appears to be: We can work with them.

Haftar has understood this particularly well. The more he presents himself not merely as a Libyan military strongman but as a regional security broker—cooperating against terrorism, becoming useful in the Sahel, controlling territory and offering stability—the more the question in foreign capitals changes. Instead of asking, “By what democratic authority does this man exercise power?”, policymakers begin asking, “Can this man deliver what we need?”

Democracy in question

That is often how democratic principles die in international diplomacy: not through one dramatic betrayal, but through a thousand pragmatic accommodations. Democracy moves quietly from objective, to aspiration, to talking point.

Yet it would be wrong to conclude that Libyans themselves have rejected democracy. When municipal elections have been permitted, Libyans have demonstrated a willingness to participate, while consultations have repeatedly produced demands for elections, unified institutions and accountable government. The tragedy may therefore not be that Libyans no longer want democracy, but that they increasingly believe nobody will allow democracy to change anything.

That is more dangerous, because frustration eventually becomes exhaustion. After enough failed roadmaps, postponed elections, rival governments, parliaments, militias, foreign interventions and political conferences, ordinary citizens stop asking constitutional questions. They ask whether the electricity will stay on, whether salaries will be paid, whether their children can find work and whether they can return home safely at night. When politics reaches that point, authoritarianism no longer requires enthusiasm. It requires fatigue.

Then comes one of the oldest bargains in politics: give us obedience and we will give you stability. After fifteen years of turmoil, such a proposition inevitably becomes more attractive. Some Libyans remember a country that, whatever the brutality and absurdities of Qaddafi’s rule, possessed a single government, a recognizable state and a degree of everyday predictability. That does not mean they want Qaddafi back. It means that when democracy becomes associated with disorder, corruption and political impotence, authoritarianism can acquire the appearance of competence simply by comparison.

That may ultimately prove the greatest failure of post-2011 Libya: not merely that democracy failed to arrive, but that those who captured the transition could succeed in discrediting democracy without ever seriously trying it.

Libyans demanded dignity, accountability, political participation and an end to arbitrary, personalized government in 2011. What risks emerging instead is a system of family networks, armed patronage, oil rents, corruption, foreign sponsorship, unelected institutions and indefinitely postponed elections.

C

hinese President Xi Jinping arrived in the United States for talks with President Donald Trump on Wednesday, as the war involving Iran has reshaped global energy markets and strengthened Beijing’s position as an increasingly influential player in the international energy system.

Trump is expected to press Xi over China’s energy relationship with Iran during the meeting in Washington. However, analysts and energy executives cited in the report see limited incentives for Beijing to change course, arguing that the conflict has in several ways strengthened China’s economic and strategic leverage.

The war has pushed global energy and commodity prices higher, with oil trading at around $100 a barrel on Tuesday. At the same time, China has expanded exports of clean-energy technologies to countries facing energy insecurity and has relied on its substantial crude oil reserves to cushion the effects of market disruptions.

Erica Downs, a former CIA energy analyst and current senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, described China as a major beneficiary of the crisis. She said Beijing had managed the disruption relatively well and was unlikely to feel significant pressure to respond to US requests.

The developments come as Trump’s administration seeks to persuade China to reduce its energy ties with Iran and Russia while increasing purchases of American oil and natural gas.

Trump seeks to pressure Beijing over Iran and energy

A senior White House official said the administration would tell Xi that continuing to do business with Iran was unacceptable and that there would be consequences.

The issue is particularly significant because China has been a major buyer of Iranian and Venezuelan crude. Trump has taken measures that have made it more difficult and expensive for Beijing to obtain oil from those sources, while also suggesting that the United States could take control of Venezuelan oil.

Trump told world leaders at the United Nations on Tuesday that the United States now had a primary claim to Venezuela’s oil, adding: “To the victor belong the spoils.”

At the same time, Washington hopes to encourage Beijing to rely less heavily on Russia for oil and gas and return to the US energy market.

China has sharply reduced direct purchases of US natural gas since Trump imposed tariffs on Chinese imports last year. It also stopped buying US crude oil, although Chinese purchases of fuel from US refiners have increased in recent months.

The Trump administration had previously argued that tariffs on Chinese goods could encourage Beijing to loosen its control over critical minerals and persuade Chinese companies to purchase more American energy.

So far, however, those efforts have produced limited results. An LNG industry executive cited in the report said there was little expectation that the Xi-Trump talks would generate a major breakthrough.

The meeting is also taking place against the backdrop of a war that has absorbed much of the White House’s attention. Philip Luck, an international business analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former State Department official, said the administration appeared to have had limited time to prepare for the summit because of the ongoing crisis.

Despite the geopolitical importance of the meeting, energy executives and analysts interviewed for the report did not expect major substantive developments.

China expands its role as an energy superpower

The conflict has nevertheless highlighted the scale of China’s influence over global energy markets.

China is the world’s largest oil importer and has used its purchasing power to build substantial crude reserves. It has also become a major regional supplier of petroleum products, meaning changes in Chinese exports or domestic demand can influence energy markets well beyond its borders.

The war has also accelerated China’s role in clean-energy markets. Chinese companies are exporting solar panels and electric vehicles to countries seeking alternatives to vulnerable supplies of Middle Eastern oil and gas.

Experts cited in the report said this combination of conventional energy reserves, petroleum exports and clean-energy manufacturing is giving Beijing new forms of leverage in the global energy economy.

Downs said the perception in China is that energy security is increasingly shifting away from control over physical resources such as oil and coal toward control over energy technologies. China’s dominant position in the manufacturing of many clean-energy products puts it in a strong position to meet its own needs while supplying other countries.

Ethan Zindler, head of country and policy research at BloombergNEF and a former US Treasury Department official, said the war was boosting Chinese clean-energy exports into developing markets.

In regions such as sub-Saharan Africa, where many countries are still working to expand electricity access, Chinese solar technology can provide an immediate alternative to dependence on imported fossil fuels.

The developments could therefore have consequences extending well beyond the immediate US-China dispute. As countries seek greater energy security following disruptions in global oil and gas supplies, China is increasingly positioned to provide both energy products and the technologies needed for electrification.

For Washington, that presents a difficult backdrop to the Xi-Trump meeting. The United States is seeking to use trade and energy policy to influence Beijing’s relationship with Iran, Russia and global commodity markets. Yet the Iran war has simultaneously strengthened China’s position in areas ranging from oil reserves and petroleum products to solar panels and electric vehicles.

The result is a US-China meeting taking place at a moment when the global energy landscape is changing rapidly, with China gaining influence through both traditional energy markets and the expanding clean-energy economy.

(Source: Politico)

I

srael’s practices of forced displacement and even extermination in Gaza have created a rift in the architecture of security and memory that post-World War II Europe constructed. This rupture clearly signifies a crisis. Rather than framing this crisis as a mere foreign policy divergence, it is important to characterize it as the collapse of the moral exceptionalism generated through the absolutization of the suffering of the Holocaust. The diplomatic protest process currently led by Spain and Ireland takes the form of a rebellion by the periphery and postcolonial memory against the hegemony of memory represented by the center—Germany and the United Kingdom. Consequently, with this protest, the capital of victimhood has been exhausted, and the colonial codes within Western rationality have begun to be deciphered.

The most significant case illustrating this is the images of destruction emerging from Gaza. These images not only triggered a diplomatic fault line in Western capitals but also led to the fracturing of the most fundamental pillar of memory upon which modern European identity was built. The scene unfolding is less about ceasefire negotiations or humanitarian crisis management and more about the collapse of the perception of “moral exceptionalism”—the transformation of the trauma of the Holocaust into a political shield. This collapse lays bare just how fragile and internally fragmented Western rationality—which was assumed to be a homogeneous whole—truly is.

Moral exceptionalism and the capital of victimhood

With the end of World War II, the Israeli state apparatus converted its unique “capital of victimhood” into a pragmatic geopolitical strategy within the international community. At the root of this capital of victimhood lies the Holocaust perpetrated by Nazi Germany. Undoubtedly, the Holocaust was an organized and bureaucratic machine of extermination in human history. However, rather than interpreting this historical tragedy as a universal warning against fascism, Israel’s official political discourse has transformed it into a functional diplomatic shield that legitimizes every military move by the state and disregards international law.

The danger articulated by sociologist Michael Rothberg lies precisely here. As he puts it, when memory is constructed as a zero-sum game, the recognition of one suffering necessitates the invisibilization of all other sufferings. This zero-sum regime of memory, which Israel has imposed not only on the West but on nearly the entire world, has placed the Jewish Holocaust in an absolute and incomparable position. In this process, the dispossession of Palestinians and the violence they have endured have been reduced to an ontologically secondary and insignificant detail. Another manifestation of the effort to render this genocide absolute and incomparable was Europe’s granting of the privilege to Israel to operate beyond the bounds of the law in order to suppress its own sense of guilt. The entire spectrum of practices currently taking place in Gaza—based on dispossession, violence, displacement, and annihilation—is being carried out in connection with this privilege.

The illusion of Western state rationality: Germany and the United Kingdom

The case of Germany serves as the most jarring laboratory for this privilege-based normative blindness. Without distinguishing Israel’s security from its own state rationality, Germany is attempting to atone for its past experience of the Holocaust through its silence today. To such an extent that German bureaucratic rationality, in an effort to free itself from the burden of its negative historical legacy, has become incapable of naming the violence Israel is perpetrating in Gaza. Its reflexive criminalization of pro-Palestinian protests in the streets as anti-Semitism should not be interpreted as an authoritarian securitization practice. This situation amounts to the center’s preservation of its own hegemony of memory. For Germany, criticizing Israel would mean the collapse of its moral foundation. Thus, preserving the uniqueness of the Holocaust paradoxically necessitates turning a blind eye to the crimes being committed today.

Germany serves as the normative shield of the regime of moral exceptionalism. Britain, on the other hand, is the imperial architect of this regime. The British state mind approaches the issue not so much through the lens of Holocaust guilt but rather through a colonial continuity inherited from the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the Mandate for Palestine. The British government’s current stance—suspending the rule of law in the face of the destruction in Gaza—is a reflex to protect the center’s own imperial legacy. For this reason, the United Kingdom occupies the center of moral exceptionalism in terms of imperial architecture.

Spain and Ireland: The postcolonial uprising of the periphery

Germany’s normative position and Britain’s imperial architectural position are what tie the issue together precisely at this point. The rift taking shape in Europe regarding this issue originates not from the center but from the historical and geographical “periphery.” The fact that Spain, Ireland, Norway, and Slovenia have recognized the State of Palestine and adopted the harshest diplomatic language in modern European history against Israel does not signify a sudden awakening of human rights consciousness.

Ireland, in particular, carries within its national memory the trauma of British colonialism and forced displacement from its lands. The fundamental factor that makes Ireland’s rebellion within Europe so jarring is directly linked to Britain’s imperial background. Indeed, when the Dublin government looks at Gaza, it sees the colonial geopolitical order that its former master, Britain, established in the Middle East and continues to support to this day. Consequently, an Irish diplomat’s assessment of Gaza is built not on the victims of World War II, but on the recognition of a 21st-century prototype of 19th-century colonial logic—a displaced people and an occupying power.

Although in a different way than Ireland, Spain has a political fabric shaped by confronting the aftershocks of the Franco dictatorship, the civil war, and ultimately its own imperial past, bearing the traces of the leftist political tradition and the post-ETA disarmament processes. With such a political fabric, Spain resonates on the international stage as the most significant voice from the periphery. Consequently, from the perspective of the Madrid administration, events at the Al-Aqsa Mosque or in Gaza enable it to take a leading role in taking significant steps to expose the hypocrisy of the exceptional protection Europe grants to Israel.

These countries, in Rothberg’s words, are operating the mechanism of “Multidirectional Memory.” These countries do not deny the Holocaust, but they openly rebel against its use as a cloak to cover up today’s colonial violence, the apartheid regime, demographic engineering, and the massacre in Gaza.

A

n observation that the world is undergoing a profound transformation across the political, economic, technological, and security spectrum has become a cliché. Yet the scale and nature of the transformation underway today extend well beyond a conventional geopolitical realignment where merely existing power balances are redistributed. What is changing simultaneously is far more fundamental: the rules governing the international system, the centers of gravity, the meaning of security, patterns of economic interdependence, and even the nature of war and conflict itself.

States continue to compete through conventional military capabilities. However, technology, energy, trade, finance, intelligence, information, and strategic communication have increasingly become integral instruments of national power. At the same time, the contours of the emerging order will not be determined by great powers alone. Regional actors will also play a determinant role to shape this order through their political will, economic capacity, asymmetric capabilities, military strength, diplomatic networks, and ability to build partnerships.

For countries with a potential to be a regional power, therefore, the fundamental question is no longer simply how to withstand the consequences of global transformation. It is how to acquire sufficient capacity and strategic agency to influence its direction and help shape its outcomes. This is not merely a matter of strategic preference. It is an imperative.

Creating strategic space

Türkiye’s strategic orientation in recent years should be understood precisely against this backdrop. Rather than positioning itself as a state that merely adapts to changes determined elsewhere, Türkiye has increasingly sought to develop the capacity to influence the environment in which those changes unfold.

This orientation is visible across a broad spectrum of national policy—from foreign and security policy to defense-industrial development, energy security, diplomatic activism, and domestic political stability. Two developments are particularly illustrative of this strategic direction: the National Solidarity and Social Integration process pursued under the objective of a “Terror Free Türkiye,” and the Türkiye-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Joint Defense Agreement, referred to as the Mecca Agreement.

At home, Türkiye is seeking to eliminate the structural security challenges that have constrained its political, economic, and social potential. Abroad, it is simultaneously developing bilateral and multilateral partnerships designed to strengthen its position in a rapidly changing regional environment and to contribute to the formation of a more capable and resilient regional security architecture.

Developments across Türkiye’s immediate neighborhood have demonstrated that terrorism, irregular migration, energy security, border security, economic stability, and regional order can no longer be treated as separate policy issues. They constitute an interconnected security environment. Türkiye has therefore sought to create greater strategic space by employing the full spectrum of its national capabilities—from diplomacy and intelligence to military power and defense-industrial capacity. Its regional approach has gradually evolved from a conception of security centered primarily on protecting its borders toward one focused increasingly on shaping the security environment beyond them.

The critical point here is that strategic power is not driven from military capability alone. What matters is the ability to translate capabilities into political outcomes through the combination of power, political will, and diplomatic capacity. In Türkiye’s recent strategic approach, the interaction among these three elements has become increasingly visible.

A Türkiye free of terrorism

The objective of a “Terror Free Türkiye” can be understood as a natural extension of this broader strategic approach. The National Solidarity and Social Integration process should therefore not be viewed solely as a security policy designed to dismantle the PKK terrorist organization or eliminate an armed threat. Its strategic ambition is considerably broader. It seeks to strengthen social cohesion, reinforce the bonds of citizenship, and unleash Türkiye’s political, economic, and social potential from the long-term constraints imposed by terrorism and security-related instability.

The significance of the “Terror Free Türkiye” vision lies precisely in its ability to bring security and social integration within a single strategic framework. The Law on National Solidarity and the Strengthening of Social Cohesion, adopted by the General Assembly of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, should likewise be understood within this broader political and strategic context. It is not simply a legal instrument; it forms part of a wider effort to strengthen the foundations of national resilience.

In the contemporary understanding of national security, state power can no longer be measured solely by weapons systems, economic output, military personnel, or territorial capacity. Social resilience, political stability, institutional strength, and the existence of a shared sense of national purpose are equally important components of national power.

This is particularly significant in an era characterized by hybrid threats, disinformation, social polarization, proxy conflicts, and attempts to exploit societal divisions. Under such conditions, social cohesion is not merely a domestic policy objective. It is itself a component of national security. This creates a direct strategic link between domestic security and foreign policy.

The traditional distinction between internal and external security is increasingly blurred. Domestic stability and foreign policy are no longer separate spheres governed by entirely different dynamics. They form an interconnected strategic matrix in which developments in one domain directly affect the capacity available in the other.

For Türkiye, eliminating the terrorist threat and strengthening social cohesion at home, while simultaneously contributing to the shaping of regional security architectures abroad, are therefore interconnected components of a single strategic vision.

The resources, political attention, and strategic energy consumed by terrorism can instead be redirected toward economic development, technological advancement, social resilience, and foreign policy. In this sense, a “Türkiye Free of Terrorism” is not simply a domestic security objective; it is a foundation for greater strategic autonomy.

A state can exercise greater maneuverability in foreign policy only when it possesses a sustainable foundation of security, stability, and social cohesion at home.

From security consumer to security producer

This brings us to the second dimension of Türkiye’s emerging strategic posture: the transition from unilaterally producing security to building shared security capabilities.

The defense and security cooperation Türkiye has developed with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, alongside the domestic National Solidarity and Social Integration process, should be viewed within this broader framework. The three countries possess capabilities that are, in many respects, complementary. Türkiye contributes a sophisticated defense industry, extensive military experience, operational capabilities, technological know-how, and decades of NATO experience. Pakistan brings significant military capabilities, strategic geographic positioning, and established expertise in defense production and security affairs. Saudi Arabia contributes substantial economic and financial capacity, energy resources, and considerable strategic influence in the Gulf and wider Arab world. Taken together, these capabilities can form the foundations of a broader and more resilient regional security ecosystem.

The emerging model also has the potential to transcend the traditional concept of an alliance. The security challenges of the twenty-first century are increasingly multidimensional and interconnected. Terrorism, proxy warfare, missile and UAV threats, maritime security, energy security, cyberattacks, the protection of critical infrastructure, economic vulnerabilities, and emerging technological threats cannot be effectively addressed through military capabilities alone—or by any single state acting in isolation.

The regional security architecture of the future will therefore depend increasingly on multi-layered and complementary partnerships encompassing defense, intelligence, technology, energy, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, and economic resilience. Türkiye’s strategic opportunity in this environment is to position itself not merely as a country that consumes security, but as a country capable of producing and exporting security capabilities.

Türkiye’s growing defense-industrial capacity is central to this transformation. The defense industry is no longer simply a sector designed to meet the military requirements of the state. It has become an increasingly important instrument of foreign policy, technological development, diplomatic influence, economic power, and strategic autonomy.

A country’s ability to meet a substantial proportion of its defense requirements domestically reduces its vulnerability to external constraints during periods of crisis. At the same time, defense-industrial capacity changes the nature of its relationships with other countries. A state that can provide advanced defense technologies, establish joint production arrangements, transfer know-how, and develop long-term industrial partnerships possesses instruments of influence that extend well beyond conventional diplomacy.

Türkiye’s defense-industrial rise should therefore not be interpreted merely as a technological or economic achievement. From the perspective of regional security, it represents a strategic lever through which Türkiye can share capabilities with partners, develop joint production ecosystems, deepen institutional ties, and transform short-term security cooperation into durable strategic partnerships. This perspective also highlights the broader geopolitical significance of the Türkiye-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan axis.

Türkiye occupies a pivotal position connecting Europe, the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Pakistan is strategically positioned at the intersection of South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Saudi Arabia lies at the center of the Gulf and occupies a pivotal position within the Arab world.

The convergence of these three countries in the security domain therefore has implications extending well beyond their bilateral or trilateral relations. It has the potential to establish strategic connectivity between different geographic theaters.

The fact that the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement is open to the participation of other regional countries further strengthens this potential. Such an approach can enhance collective resilience while creating a framework through which regional actors themselves assume greater responsibility for their security environment. For this reason, the emerging cooperation should not be interpreted simply as a conventional defense arrangement among three states.

Viewed from a broader strategic perspective, it can potentially contribute to the emergence of a new belt of security and strategic cooperation linking Eurasia and the Middle East, as well as South Asia and the Gulf. When this external dimension is considered together with the objective of a “Terror Free Türkiye,” a striking strategic symmetry emerges between Türkiye’s domestic and foreign policy.

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elations between the United Kingdom (UK) and Israel have undergone a notable change over the past two years. Following the war that began in Gaza on October 7, 2023, and turned into a genocide, the British government’s criticism of Israel has grown increasingly forceful. Initially evident mainly in its rhetoric, this shift gradually translated into concrete policy measures.

The UK’s formal recognition of the State of Palestine alongside several other countries in September 2025 marked an important turning point in this regard. The change became more visible in 2026. On June 9, the UK joined Australia, Canada, France, New Zealand, and Norway in imposing sanctions on individuals and entities that financed or facilitated violence against Palestinians in the West Bank. On August 19, it objected to the tender process for the E1 settlement project, which would undermine the West Bank’s geographic contiguity and weaken its connection to East Jerusalem. Finally, on September 8, it joined France and Canada and 11 other countries in banning trade in goods produced in illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

London’s language has also hardened markedly. For example, in a speech to the House of Commons on September 8, 2026, Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband said that “settler terrorists” were carrying out ethnic cleansing against Palestinians in parts of the West Bank. Miliband accused the Israeli government of turning a blind eye to the situation and announced that the UK would henceforth regard Israel’s entire occupation of the West Bank as unlawful. Prime Minister Andy Burnham, writing in The Guardian the same day, emphasized that the measures targeted Israel’s unacceptable policies.

As expected, these British measures drew a sharp response in Israel. Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar described the UK’s latest decisions as interference in Israel’s sovereignty and electoral process. He also announced on September 8 that it had given the UK 30 days to close its consulate in East Jerusalem. In addition, it decided to end British participation in the Gaza coordination mechanism and halt the training that the UK provides to Palestinian forces. It also barred 11 British members of Parliament, including former Labor Party leader Jeremy Corbyn, and one British citizen from entering Israel.

Taken together, these rapid developments inevitably raise a question: Is the UK truly distancing itself from Israel?

Pragmatic distancing rather than a rupture

The latest developments make it easy to answer this question with a simple “yes.” Such an assessment, however, would make it difficult to distinguish what has changed in British policy toward Israel from what has remained the same. On the one hand, London has recognized Palestine, adopted economic measures against illegal settlements, and sharpened its criticism of Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. On the other hand, it is trying to preserve its traditional position on Israel’s security.

Indeed, when announcing the September 8 measures, the UK did not “neglect” to refer to Israel’s legitimate security interests and condemn Hamas’s October 7 attacks. Under these circumstances, it makes more sense to view the current situation as pragmatic distancing rather than a strategic rupture. The UK is avoiding a complete break with Israel while placing greater distance between the two countries as the political cost of supporting the Netanyahu government rises.

The role of Labor governments in this process should not be overlooked. The shift in British policy toward Israel did not occur overnight, but it became increasingly apparent after the Labor Party came to power in July 2024. This new direction, made tangible by the UK’s recognition of the State of Palestine in 2025, advanced further with the measures taken in 2026. Miliband’s use of the term ethnic cleansing in relation to the West Bank and the British government’s decision to regard the entire Israeli occupation as unlawful indicate that the shift will continue in both rhetoric and action. In short, compared with the Conservatives’ more cautious approach, the Labor government is taking a harder line against the Netanyahu government without severing relations with Israel.

It is worth recalling that in 1997, Robin Cook, foreign secretary in Tony Blair’s Labor government, argued that British foreign policy should have an “ethical dimension.” This approach, which sought to connect human rights and democratic values with national interests, was frequently debated in later years because of contradictions in British foreign policy practice. Gaza has revived the same debate under different circumstances. The UK has made international law, human rights, and the two-state solution part of its foreign policy discourse. Against a war at the center of allegations of genocide in Gaza, continuing to give Israel unconditional support became increasingly difficult to reconcile with the UK’s own political position. From this perspective, the Labor government’s harder stance toward Israel recalls the debate over the ethical dimension that Cook introduced years ago.

The rising legitimacy cost of supporting Israel

More than 73,000 Palestinians have been killed in the war that began after October 7, while illegal settlements in the West Bank have expanded and illegal settlers have committed violence against civilians. Together, these developments have increased the political cost to the UK of supporting Israel. After the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Netanyahu in November 2024 and the Republic of South Africa brought a genocide case against Israel before the International Court of Justice, revising British policy became a necessity rather than a choice. In response to these proceedings, the UK stated that the process prescribed by British law would be followed if Netanyahu entered the country. On the question of genocide, it maintained that the competent court must make the determination while affirming its support for the Court’s independence and the ongoing judicial process.

Moreover, reactions against Israel are no longer confined to particular countries; they have spread around the world. From Türkiye and South Africa to Spain and Canada, political pressure against Israel’s policies in Gaza is growing. What makes this trend especially important for the UK is that Israel’s traditional Western partners are also adopting increasingly critical positions. It is therefore notable that London has not taken its recent measures against Israel alone. By acting together with other countries on sanctions and trade restrictions, the UK exerts pressure on Israel while sharing the political responsibility and potential costs of those decisions. In other words, multilateral action gives London greater room for political maneuver in its dealings with Israel.

Public opinion and economic room for maneuver

Growing opposition across the country to the Israeli government’s policies is also strengthening the domestic political basis for the UK to pursue a more assertive policy toward Israel. Demonstrations against Israel and in support of Palestine across the country, debates in Parliament, and increasingly visible public discontent are putting greater pressure on the government. According to a YouGov survey conducted in September 2026, 52% of Britons supported a ban on imports from illegal Israeli settlements, while only 17% opposed it. Another YouGov survey published in July 2026 showed the extent of the change in public opinion even more clearly. According to that survey, 50% of Britons believed that Israel was committing genocide in Gaza, while 17% disagreed. In short, the domestic political cost of maintaining unconditional support for Israel is steadily rising for the British government.

Economic relations with Israel do not present a serious obstacle to this new political direction. According to data from the UK’s Office for National Statistics, total trade between the two countries amounted to approximately £6 billion in 2025. British exports to Israel accounted for £3.5 billion, while imports from Israel totaled £2.5 billion. The UK therefore runs a trade surplus with Israel. At the same time, Israel’s limited share of the UK’s total foreign trade makes the economic cost of distancing manageable.

T

he six-month-old U.S. war against Iran has cost Washington about $38 billion so far, with the figure expected to increase by roughly $3 billion each month, according to an assessment by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), adding to pressure on the Trump administration as it searches for a way to end the conflict and reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

The nonpartisan congressional budget office said its accounting covered costs through August 1 and estimated that the war could increase U.S. inflation by 0.5% during the first three months of 2027. The growing financial burden comes alongside mounting pressure on American military stockpiles and higher energy prices linked to the conflict.

The CBO’s assessment highlights the broader consequences of the war for U.S. military readiness and the federal budget. It said the majority of the costs resulted from the rapid drawdown of U.S. munitions, warning that replenishing depleted stockpiles could take as long as five years.

The report comes as Washington continues military operations against Iran while attempting to address disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global energy route. The waterway previously carried roughly 20% of the world’s oil, and attacks and disruptions in the region have contributed to sharp increases in energy prices.

The latest CBO estimate is close to the $37.5 billion cost Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth reported during a Senate hearing on July 21. Hegseth has also called for nearly $90 billion in emergency funding to replenish U.S. weapons supplies.

Munitions shortages raise concerns over U.S. readiness

The CBO said shortages of critical munitions, including missile interceptors, could limit the Pentagon’s ability to respond if the United States becomes involved in another major conflict.

Among the scenarios cited was a potential future confrontation involving China and Taiwan. The assessment indicates that the continued use of U.S. weapons in the Iran conflict could have consequences extending beyond the Middle East by reducing supplies available for other military contingencies.

Reuters reported in August that the United States had used virtually all of its long-range precision missiles during the war. The CBO estimated that rebuilding those stockpiles could take several years.

The Department of Defense did not cooperate with congressional financial auditors, according to the CBO. Pentagon officials, however, rejected the assessment that the military was facing inadequate supplies.

White House spokeswoman Anna Kelly described President Donald Trump’s attacks on Iran as “decisive action” aimed at preventing Tehran from threatening U.S. personnel or interests. She said the military had more than enough munitions, ammunition and stockpiles to meet the president’s strategic objectives.

Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell also disputed the findings on shortages, saying the department had everything necessary to conduct strikes when and where the president ordered them.

The CBO accounting also excludes some expenses that could push the eventual cost substantially higher. It did not include the costs of recent attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz or strikes on U.S. military installations in the region. Nor did it account for borrowing costs associated with financing the war, which could add tens of billions of dollars to the total.

The financial estimate comes amid a significant human toll. Eighteen U.S. service members have been killed in the conflict, according to the report.

Energy shock adds pressure to U.S. economy

Beyond military spending, the war has created economic consequences through disruptions to energy supplies and higher prices.

Attacks affecting the Strait of Hormuz and energy facilities in neighboring Gulf countries have sharply increased energy costs for consumers and producers. The resulting inflationary pressure is expected to continue affecting the U.S. economy, with the CBO projecting a 0.5% increase in inflation during the first three months of 2027.

The higher costs come at a time when the United States is already facing growing fiscal pressures. The country’s total public debt surpassed $40 trillion in August, adding another concern as Washington continues to finance the war and other government commitments.

The Pentagon’s inspector general separately reported that Iranian attacks had damaged or destroyed hundreds of buildings at U.S. military bases in the Middle East, along with fighter aircraft, refueling planes and drones. Its assessment put the cost of the war through June 19 at $33.4 billion, including about $184 million in damage to U.S. diplomatic facilities.

The scale of the current spending is also being viewed against previous U.S. wars. Trump has frequently compared the Iran conflict with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The eight-year Iraq war cost about $2 trillion, while the two-decade conflict in Afghanistan cost an estimated $2.3 trillion, according to figures cited by Reuters.

For the Trump administration, the latest CBO assessment underscores the financial and military costs accumulating as the conflict continues. With expenses projected to rise by billions of dollars each month and weapons stockpiles requiring years to replenish, the war is creating pressures that extend beyond the immediate battlefield and into U.S. economic and defense planning.

(Source: Reuters)

I

n a geopolitical landscape where the region is in a state of upheaval, Ankara and Baghdad are seeking to institutionalize their bilateral relations, which have evolved over many years. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi, following his first foreign visit to the U.S. on July 14, visited Iran on July 23 and Türkiye on July 28. Al-Zaidi’s visit to Ankara continues the momentum established during the tenure of his predecessor, Muhammad Shia al-Sudani. Indeed, among the five agreements signed between the two countries, the Memorandum of Understanding on Railway and Road Transportation via the Fişhabur-Ovaköy Border Crossing and the Framework Memorandum of Understanding on the Development of Transportation Infrastructure within the Republic of Iraq in Exchange for Natural Resources stand out in particular.

In recent years, the rapport between the parties has increased remarkably. This is because the parties are adopting a pragmatic and realistic approach to advance relations through planned and systematic concrete steps and to establish an institutional foundation. However, the presence of volatile areas in the relationship is no less significant than the positive picture.

Relations are grounded in state-to-state ties

At a time when U.S. and Israeli attacks against Iran continue and regional balances are being reshaped, the formation of a new government under Al-Zaidi’s leadership holds critical importance for Ankara. Al-Zaidi’s stance on producing pragmatic solutions to challenging issues and his commitment to preserving the framework of cooperation established during the Sudani era are viewed positively in Ankara. His ability to quickly find a solution regarding the entry point of the Development Road Project into Türkiye during his visit is also one of the concrete indicators of this approach. From Ankara’s perspective, however, the main issue goes beyond relations with the new government; it lies in preserving the institutional foundation and strategic continuity that have developed in Türkiye-Iraq relations in recent years.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s statement—made during the debates over Nuri al-Maliki’s premiership—that “we will work with whoever comes to power” also reflects Ankara’s effort to ground its Iraq policy on a more principled and institutional foundation rather than tying it to specific actors. Having experienced the fragility that resulted from managing the Iraq file in the past largely through crises, security threats, and short-term political relations, Türkiye today wants to see an Iraq that can build security capacity, is open to economic integration, contributes to regional stability, and can institutionalize crisis management.

Economy: The most institutionalized issue

Ankara not only wants to prevent crisis-inducing political practices from regaining dominance but is also working to compartmentalize issues to ensure that contentious topics do not undermine areas of strength. The issue that stands out in this new approach is the economy.

Bilateral trade continues to hover around the $20 billion mark. Indeed, economic issues were the main focus during Al-Zaidi’s visit. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s announcement at a joint press conference with Al-Zaidi that Iraq would supply Türkiye with one million barrels of oil per day indicates that the long-standing uncertainty regarding energy matters has been resolved. In addition, the acquisition by the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) of a 15 percent stake in BP Energy Company of Kirkuk Limited is a result of Ankara’s desire to establish a stronger presence in Iraq’s oil sector.

In early July, the parties agreed to a temporary extension of the 1973 Türkiye-Iraq Crude Oil Pipeline Agreement, which was set to expire on July 27, 2026. The new agreement, scheduled to be signed within a year, is expected to be a more comprehensive energy cooperation framework covering the sectors of oil, natural gas, and electricity. Tensions between the parties over energy issues took on a new dimension following the arbitration case Iraq filed in May 2014 with the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The case was based on the allegation that Ankara had violated the 1973 agreement by allowing the export of KRG oil via the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline without Baghdad’s approval during the 2014–2018 period. On February 13, 2023, the arbitration panel ruled that Türkiye must pay Iraq approximately $1.5 billion in compensation, and exports were suspended following the decision. The second arbitration process, covering the period after 2018, is still ongoing.

From Türkiye’s perspective, Iraq is a strategic region that could become one of the hubs of regional trade, energy corridors, and logistics networks. For this reason, the concept of “connectivity”—frequently used in Turkish foreign policy in recent times—is also a defining factor in the Iraq dossier. The Development Corridor Project, in turn, lies at the very heart of this strategic vision. Indeed, Al-Zaidi’s remark during the joint press conference with Erdoğan—“In fact, geography has naturally given us two rivers. We want a third river as well. Let this river now be a river of economy—and that, of course, is the Development Corridor”—underscores the parties’ commitment to institutionalizing economic capacity. Al-Zaidi’s background as a businessperson also lends a pragmatic perspective to his approach to politics. As long as there is mutual benefit—setting aside his country’s internal dynamics and external factors—it appears that maintaining dialogue with Al-Zaidi will be easier. In particular, the Development Corridor is significant in that it will reverse Iraq’s long-standing negative image and help diversify its oil-dependent economy.

The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz following the U.S.-Iran War has elevated the project to an even more critical level. Nearly 80 percent of Iraq’s oil is transported via the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Hormuz is the only exit point. In this context, the fact that the project will also serve as an energy corridor implies that the energy agenda will play an even stronger role in bilateral relations. Of course, the KRG’s objections to the project have not yet been resolved. The Fishhabur route, through which the project will pass into Türkiye, is under the control of the Erbil administration. Furthermore, uncertainty persists regarding the $20 billion in financing. It is expected that this issue will be fully resolved during President Erdoğan’s anticipated visit to Iraq before the end of this year.

Security eases political tensions

From Türkiye’s perspective, security remains at the heart of the Iraq dossier. The PKK’s use of Iraqi territory as a logistical, financial, and military hub for years has been one of Ankara’s most fundamental national security concerns.

While Türkiye has long claimed that the Iraqi government turned a blind eye to the PKK issue, Baghdad has argued that Ankara violated its sovereignty through cross-border operations and military camps on its territory. Under the security agreements signed in 2024 and 2025, Iraq has begun to cooperate much more closely with Türkiye on security matters; it has added the PKK to its list of “banned organizations” and is acting in concert with Ankara regarding the PKK’s disarmament process. In particular, the approval of the framework law by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) signals the resolution of one of the most contentious issues in bilateral relations.

Ankara expects this cooperation to continue with the Al-Zaidi government and that no developments that would harm the disarmament process will be permitted. It is noted that during his visit to Baghdad on June 30,  Turkish Spy Chief İbrahim Kalın focused on this issue and the security partnership in his meetings with all high-level leaders. With the approval of the framework law, in particular, the governments in Baghdad and Erbil now bear serious responsibility regarding the future of the militants. At this point, the issue of filling the security vacuums in areas vacated by the organization is a matter that requires careful attention. Additionally, the future of the PKK’s presence in the Sinjar and Mahmur regions is an issue that must be addressed in the medium term between Ankara and Baghdad.

The sharing of the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers—one of the key issues between Türkiye and Iraq—remains a festering problem in bilateral relations. Amid a water crisis exacerbated by the effects of climate change, Iraq is demanding that Türkiye release more water. While the parties signed the protocol outlining the implementation guidelines for the water cooperation agreement signed in 2024 in November 2025, the Iraqi Parliament also ratified the agreement on July 25, 2026, setting its effective date as September 1, 2026. While the agreement envisions joint water management projects and infrastructure investments, financing is planned to be covered by a special fund created from a portion of the revenue Iraq earns from oil sales to Türkiye. Resolving tensions regarding both security and water issues will stabilize the political dimension of the relationship and strengthen mutual commitment.

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ran-aligned Houthi forces seized control of Yemen’s Red Sea port city of Mocha on Thursday and advanced toward strategic islands near the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, escalating a conflict that threatens one of the world’s most important maritime routes and Saudi Arabia’s ability to export oil.

Yemeni government military sources said the Houthis had moved toward the Hanish Islands after taking Mocha, giving the group greater leverage over the southern entrance to the Red Sea. The developments came as fighting between the Houthis and Saudi-backed Yemeni government forces intensified along the coast.

The advance has raised concerns about the security of shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb, a narrow passage connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. Control of the waterway could provide Iran, which supports the Houthis, with an important strategic advantage amid its wider confrontation with the United States.

The Houthis’ humanitarian operations coordination centre said Red Sea navigation remained safe for shipping companies except for Saudi vessels, effectively highlighting the growing threat to Saudi maritime interests.

Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter, has increasingly relied on the Red Sea route after the war in the region effectively disrupted traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Before the conflict, Hormuz carried roughly a fifth of global oil supplies.

Yemeni government forces and their allies were relocating south along the Red Sea coast toward Dhubab, near the Bab el-Mandeb and opposite Perim Island. Military sources said control of Dhubab and Perim would be strategically important for controlling access to the strait.

UN warns of a more dangerous phase

The latest Houthi gains prompted warnings from the United Nations about the wider consequences of the escalation.

UN Special Envoy for Yemen Hans Grundberg told the UN Security Council that the international community must respond to what he described as a “new and more dangerous phase” in Yemen’s conflict. He said the Houthi capture of Mocha had given the group a direct presence near one of the world’s most vital maritime passages and raised serious concerns about freedom of navigation.

The United States accused the Houthis of acting as agents of Iran. Jenifer Neidhart de Ortiz, the US representative at the Security Council meeting, described the escalation as unacceptable and said those supporting the group would bear responsibility for its consequences.

Iran, meanwhile, called for dialogue and said the Yemen conflict could not be resolved through military action or a blockade. Tehran did not address allegations that it had helped direct the latest Houthi offensive.

Yemeni, Iranian and regional sources told Reuters that members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps had provided direct guidance to the Houthis during their advance along the coast.

Houthi spokesperson Mohammed Abdulsalam said the group’s operations were defensive and would end if attacks on Yemen stopped. The Houthis entered the wider regional conflict in March with an attack on Israel and declared a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia in July, followed by an escalation in attacks this month.

The fighting has also intensified in other parts of Yemen as Saudi-backed forces attempt to halt the Houthi advance. Saudi civil defence authorities issued emergency alerts in the southwestern city of Khamis Mushait for the fourth time within 24 hours as Houthi attacks continued.

Pakistan has also attempted to prevent the conflict from spreading further. Islamabad delivered a warning to Iran urging Tehran to rein in the Houthis and prevent Riyadh from launching a broader response. According to Saudi, Pakistani and Iranian sources, a senior Iranian official responded that Iran did not control the Houthis.

The escalation is occurring alongside the largest declared wave of US-Iranian attacks on Gulf shipping since the war began in late February.

Oil prices rise as shipping risks grow

Financial markets reacted quickly to the latest developments. Brent crude prices rose as much as 4% on Thursday, climbing above $105 a barrel as investors became increasingly concerned about disruptions to oil supply routes.

In the United States, the average diesel price surpassed $6 a gallon for the first time, according to GasBuddy. Rising fuel costs are adding to economic pressure at a time when the administration of President Donald Trump is facing growing political concerns over the impact of the war.

Trump said Thursday that he continued to expect the Iran war to end immediately after the November midterm elections. He rejected suggestions that he regretted the conflict despite its economic and political consequences, saying he would make the same decisions again.

The war has contributed to a sharp increase in fuel prices and weakened Trump’s political standing, according to polls. Republicans face the prospect of voters judging the administration over the cost of living and energy prices as they seek to retain control of Congress.

The conflict has also complicated efforts to restore traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Washington had recently pointed to increasing success in guiding tankers through the waterway, but renewed fighting has undermined that progress.

Only seven vessels passed through Hormuz on Wednesday, according to preliminary ship-tracking data, roughly half the 10-day average.

Iranian state media reported that the Revolutionary Guards Navy had struck a US unmanned vessel at the entrance to the strait on Thursday, adding to concerns over the safety of commercial shipping.

The simultaneous pressure around Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb has created a potentially significant threat to global energy markets. Further Houthi gains along Yemen’s Red Sea coast could increase risks for Saudi oil exports while restricting another major route for international trade.

With the Yemen conflict becoming increasingly connected to the wider US-Iran confrontation, the latest developments have raised fears that disruption in the region could persist even as Washington seeks a path toward ending the broader war.

(Source: Reuters)

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S President Donald Trump has said the war with Iran will end “immediately after” November’s midterm elections, offering a new timeline for ending a conflict that has continued for months and contributed to a sharp rise in energy prices across the United States.

Trump made the remarks on Wednesday while speaking to reporters on the tarmac as he travelled to Texas for the Republican midterm convention. He also accused Iran’s leadership of deliberately escalating the conflict in an attempt to influence the US elections and damage Republican candidates.

“I think the war is going to end immediately after the election,” Trump said, arguing that Iranian leaders were increasingly desperate and seeking to affect the political outcome in November.

The president’s latest prediction represents another shift in his timeline for the conflict. The war has lasted significantly longer than Trump initially suggested, while Republican lawmakers and candidates have increasingly faced questions about the economic consequences of the fighting.

Trump claimed that Iran was attempting to influence American voters by prolonging the conflict and said Tehran wanted to see Republicans weakened after the election.

“They’re desperate to try and affect the election,” Trump said, arguing that Iran wanted Americans to elect what he described as a weaker group of lawmakers that would allow Tehran to continue pursuing its nuclear ambitions.

The comments come as the war has become an increasingly important political and economic issue in the United States. Rising fuel prices have added pressure on American households and intensified concerns among Republicans that the conflict could damage the party’s prospects in the midterms.

Rising energy prices put pressure on Republicans

The economic consequences of the war have become particularly visible through higher energy costs. Diesel fuel has risen to almost $6 per gallon on average, reaching a record high the previous week, while regular gasoline is averaging about $4.22 per gallon, up from $4.01 a month earlier.

Higher fuel prices have also affected the cost of everyday goods, including groceries, adding to broader inflation concerns and increasing frustration among voters.

Republicans have been concerned that the economic impact of the conflict could threaten their majorities in Congress. The party is seeking to maintain control of the House of Representatives and potentially the Senate in the November elections, making the trajectory of energy prices a significant political issue.

Trump sought to reassure voters by predicting that gasoline prices would fall sharply after the elections. He claimed that prices could drop below $2 per gallon once the midterms were over.

However, the continuing conflict has created uncertainty over how quickly energy markets could stabilize. The United States and Iran have intensified attacks in recent days, with the two sides trading strikes involving naval vessels and oil tankers.

The escalation has increased pressure on global energy markets and contributed to concerns about the wider economic consequences of continued hostilities.

Trump’s comments came against this backdrop, linking the conclusion of the war directly to the political calendar. His prediction that the conflict will end immediately after the midterms could place additional pressure on his administration and Republican candidates if fighting continues into or beyond November.

Trump rules out immediate negotiations with Iran

Alongside his prediction that the war would end after the elections, Trump said he was no longer actively seeking negotiations with Iran’s leadership.

The president said he had initially wanted to reach an agreement to end the fighting, but argued that the situation had changed significantly.

“Originally, I wanted to make a deal,” Trump said. He added that there was now very little of Iran left, in his assessment, and that his administration was therefore not actively pursuing negotiations.

Trump nevertheless acknowledged that negotiations could still take place under certain circumstances, saying that a diplomatic agreement remained possible even though it was not currently an objective of the administration.

The shift in Trump’s position comes as military confrontations between Washington and Tehran continue to intensify. The recent exchanges involving naval ships and oil tankers have raised the stakes of the conflict and increased concerns over further disruption to energy supplies.

Trump’s comments also reflect the increasingly political dimension of the war inside the United States. With the midterm elections approaching, both the conflict itself and its economic effects are likely to remain major issues for voters.

Republican candidates face the challenge of defending the administration’s handling of the war while responding to the impact of higher fuel and food prices. Democrats, meanwhile, could use the economic pressures associated with the conflict to argue that the administration’s policies are hurting American households.

Trump has framed the conflict as a struggle against Iran’s nuclear ambitions and accused Tehran of attempting to interfere in US politics. But his latest promise that the war will end immediately after the midterms leaves the timing of any potential ceasefire or settlement uncertain.

For now, the United States and Iran remain engaged in an escalating confrontation, while energy prices continue to weigh on American consumers. Trump’s latest deadline therefore places the November election at the center of both the political debate and his administration’s stated expectations for the war’s conclusion.

(Source: Politico)

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audi Arabia says attacks by Yemen’s Houthi rebels have struck civilian and economic targets in the kingdom, leaving at least 73 civilians wounded, including women and children, as fighting intensifies across Yemen between the Iran-backed group and the Saudi-supported internationally recognized government.

Major-General Turki al-Maliki, spokesman for the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen, said on Tuesday that Houthi attacks had targeted civilian and economic sites in the southern Saudi provinces of Abha, Khamis Mushait, Jizan and Najran.

Al-Maliki did not specify when the attacks took place, but described them as a “dangerous escalation” and a “blatant violation” of Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty. He said the attacks represented a direct threat to Saudi citizens and residents and pledged that the coalition would take “all necessary operational measures” to confront the attacks and target the sources of the threat.

The Saudi Ministry of Energy separately said several energy-sector facilities and installations in southern parts of the country were hit early on Tuesday. The ministry said the attacks wounded a number of citizens and residents and caused fires at several locations.

Some operations were temporarily halted as a result of the damage, although the ministry did not provide further details about the facilities affected or the scale of the disruption.

The attacks mark a sharp escalation in hostilities between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, who have been engaged in a conflict with Yemen’s government and its regional supporters for more than a decade.

Houthis cite Saudi strikes as retaliation

The Houthis later claimed responsibility for the attacks, saying they were carried out in response to more than 120 Saudi strikes against Yemen over the previous three days.

Houthi military spokesman Yahya Saree said Yemeni armed forces had conducted a large-scale, long-range operation involving dozens of ballistic missiles and drones. The group has increasingly targeted Saudi territory as fighting on the ground intensifies inside Yemen.

The Houthis had also accused Saudi Arabia of carrying out an air strike on a prison in Yemen’s northern al-Jawf governorate. The group said at least seven people were killed in the attack on a prison in al-Hazm and warned that what it called continued Saudi “aggression” would not go unanswered.

Saudi authorities have not commented on that allegation.

The latest exchange of attacks comes as Saudi-backed government forces mount a counteroffensive aimed at retaking territory from the Houthis and ultimately advancing towards the capital, Sanaa.

Yemen has been trapped in a prolonged conflict since the Houthis seized Sanaa in 2014, prompting Saudi Arabia and its allies to intervene militarily the following year in support of the internationally recognized government.

Although fighting largely subsided following a United Nations-brokered truce in 2022, the relative calm has since broken down. The latest escalation follows the war launched by the United States and Israel against Iran in February, according to the source report.

The Houthis resumed attacks towards Saudi Arabia in July, launching missiles and drones at Abha international airport after an attack on Sanaa airport. Later that month, the group announced a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia and began targeting Saudi-linked shipping in the Red Sea.

The renewed fighting has expanded the conflict beyond isolated exchanges of fire, raising concerns about wider regional instability and threats to vital transport and energy infrastructure.

Yemen fighting spreads as humanitarian crisis deepens

On Thursday, the Houthis launched a major ground offensive seeking to advance through western Taiz and southern Hodeidah towards al-Makha, also known as Mocha, a strategically important port city on the Red Sea near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

The fighting was initially concentrated west of Taiz and south of Hodeidah but has since spread to several other provinces, including al-Dhalea, Marib, al-Jawf and al-Bayda.

Government forces are seeking to stretch Houthi military resources by opening additional fronts and increasing pressure on the group. The expansion of the fighting has added to concerns over the security of areas already affected by years of war.

The humanitarian consequences have been severe. The World Health Organization said about 1,078 people had been killed or wounded since August 24, while more than 21,000 people had been displaced since Thursday.

The latest displacement comes on top of years of humanitarian hardship in Yemen, where millions of people have been affected by conflict, economic instability and limited access to essential services.

The renewed violence also threatens to undermine efforts to contain the conflict after the relative calm that followed the 2022 truce. With fighting now occurring across multiple Yemeni provinces and attacks reaching Saudi civilian and energy infrastructure, the conflict is increasingly taking on a regional dimension.

Saudi officials have vowed to respond to the Houthi attacks, while the Houthis say their operations are retaliation for Saudi military action in Yemen. The cycle of attacks raises the prospect of further escalation unless the opposing sides find a way to halt the latest round of hostilities.

For Saudi Arabia, the attacks pose both a security and economic challenge, particularly as energy facilities in the kingdom’s south have been affected. For Yemen, the renewed fighting threatens to deepen displacement and casualties in a country already devastated by years of conflict.

The latest escalation therefore represents a serious setback to hopes of a sustained reduction in violence, with civilians on both sides increasingly exposed to the consequences of the widening confrontation.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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emen’s internationally recognized government said its forces dealt significant damage to Houthi fighters during intense clashes in Taiz province over the weekend, as fighting across multiple fronts continues to escalate and raise fears of a slide back into full-scale war.

The government-aligned National Resistance Forces said Sunday that its troops engaged in fierce combat with Houthi forces in the Al-Kadhah sector of western Taiz, a front line of particular strategic value because it links the cities of Taiz and Mokha. The statement did not specify the scale or nature of the losses inflicted.

Government forces claim gains across several fronts

The clashes in Al-Kadhah followed a series of reported advances elsewhere. On Saturday, government forces said they had recaptured territory in the western provinces of Taiz and Hodeidah and taken dozens of Houthi fighters prisoner. Among the gains, the government-controlled SABA news agency reported that Yemeni forces had seized the Hais district in Hodeidah, a location of strategic importance sitting at the junction of Hodeidah, Taiz and Ibb provinces. Forces also said they had pushed back Houthi positions around the al-Barh junction in western Taiz.

The fighting has come at a steep cost. More than 60 people, including civilians, were reported killed in Taiz clashes on Saturday alone, and 26 government soldiers were killed in a single stretch of fighting the same day, underscoring how contested the battlefield remains despite the government’s claimed advances. The United Nations said roughly 1,800 families were displaced over just two days as the violence intensified in Taiz.

By early Monday, the Yemeni army said it had carried out 13 air strikes on Houthi positions, gatherings and military vehicles in central Yemen, hitting sites across several districts of Al-Bayda governorate and destroying a Houthi command post and surveillance equipment on Mount Nasa in neighboring Al-Dhale governorate. Additional strikes were reported in Marib and Al-Jawf, though none of the claims from either side could be independently verified.

A fragile truce under renewed strain

The current wave of fighting follows months of relative quiet that had largely held since a UN-brokered truce took effect in April 2022, which ended large-scale combat following the Houthis’ seizure of the capital, Sanaa, and other major cities back in 2014. Hostilities resumed in early August, when government forces launched offensives on Houthi positions along multiple fronts after regaining major southern and eastern territory in a Saudi-backed counteroffensive earlier in the year.

Despite the government’s recent gains, analysts caution the shifts do not yet represent a decisive turning point in Yemen’s long war. The Houthis still hold Sanaa and several other cities, and have mounted their own advances near Taiz, pressing toward the government-held port of al-Makha and areas near the Bab al-Mandeb strait — a vital corridor linking the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea. Presidential Leadership Council chairman Rashad al-Alimi said Yemen’s military was capable of restoring control nationwide and cautioned that Houthi missteps would lead to their downfall.

The conflict has increasingly become entangled with the broader regional confrontation tied to the US-Israel war on Iran. The Iran-aligned Houthis declared a maritime blockade against Saudi Arabia in July and have targeted Saudi vessels and territory, prompting Saudi air strikes on Houthi positions in Taiz. The Bab al-Mandeb strait has taken on added significance since Iran shut the Strait of Hormuz to commercial shipping, a move that has driven global energy prices higher and rattled the world economy. In July, Saudi Arabia announced plans to build an international coalition to protect Red Sea shipping from Houthi attacks.

(Source: Aljazeera English, Anadolu and TRT World)

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sian economies are accelerating efforts to strengthen domestic oil and gas storage after the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz exposed the region’s vulnerability to disruptions in Middle Eastern energy supplies.

The region suffered major economic consequences after the United States and Israel went to war with Iran six months ago. Shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, a crucial route for Gulf oil and gas exports, has been reduced to a trickle by Iranian attacks and a US naval blockade.

The disruption pushed Asian governments to introduce emergency fuel-saving measures as energy prices surged. Measures included price controls, alternate driving days and work-from-home requirements for some civil servants. But governments are now looking beyond short-term responses, seeking to build larger strategic reserves and reduce dependence on vulnerable supply routes.

“The crisis is producing two very different kinds of investment: infrastructure that bypasses geopolitical risk, and infrastructure that eliminates exposure to imported fuel altogether,” said Parul Bakshi, a visiting research fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.

Japan calls for energy security

Japan has emerged as one of the strongest advocates of expanding regional energy security. Although the country remains heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil and gas, it has been better positioned to withstand the crisis because of its large strategic petroleum reserves.

In April, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi announced the $10 billion POWERR Asia initiative. The programme is designed to help Southeast Asian countries secure oil and petroleum products and eventually develop larger strategic stockpiles.

The urgency is particularly evident in Southeast Asia. When the war began in late February, Vietnam had national oil reserves sufficient for only five to seven days, according to state media. Commercial inventories and other sources, however, could extend supplies for as long as another 65 days.

Thailand had about 61 days of reserves across public and private sectors in early March, compared with a legally mandated minimum of 25 days. The Philippines was estimated to have between 50 and 60 days of supplies in private commercial inventories.

Despite these levels, the three countries remained below the International Energy Agency’s 90-day benchmark for emergency oil stocks.

The crisis has revived efforts in Bangkok and Manila to establish more comprehensive government-controlled reserves. Last month, a parliamentary panel in the Philippines approved legislation proposing a government-held oil reserve equivalent to 60 days of consumption.

Plans for new infrastructure

Thailand is also moving ahead with plans for new infrastructure, including cross-peninsula crude pipelines and tank farms. Ben Kiatkwankul of Bangkok-based Maverick Consulting Group said the projects could position Thailand as a competitor to Singapore for the storage of Gulf crude.

India has similarly been reassessing its strategic reserves. The country held about 74 days’ worth of oil stocks as of May, with more than 90 percent controlled by state-owned enterprises, according to S&P Global.

In July, India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation announced plans to build a reserve of 1.75 million metric tonnes, equivalent to about 13 million barrels, in southern India. The company also plans to expand existing stockpiles by 6.5 million metric tonnes.

Meanwhile, major Asian economies are exploring closer storage arrangements with Gulf producers. Japan, South Korea and Singapore already have longstanding partnerships with Middle Eastern countries that allow energy supplies to be stored closer to Asian markets.

Clara Gillispie, a senior fellow for climate and energy at the Council on Foreign Relations, said the three countries had shown interest in expanding existing storage capacity and potentially establishing new agreements. Similar discussions have also involved India.

Storing oil away from Hormuz

The United Arab Emirates and its state-owned Abu Dhabi National Oil Company already store oil in Singapore, India, South Korea and Japan. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia also maintain stockpiles in South Korea and Japan.

ADNOC is seeking to increase its crude storage capacity in India to 30 million barrels. India is also considering storing some strategic reserves at the UAE port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz.

South Korea is considering expanding its oil reserves, which stand at about 146 million barrels. Reports suggest Seoul could add another 30 million to 40 million barrels, exceeding earlier plans for an additional 20 million barrels.

China, the world’s second-largest oil consumer after the United States, is also reassessing its energy security. The Hormuz disruption has reinforced Beijing’s focus on reducing its exposure to imported fuel and vulnerable supply routes.

China’s 2026–2030 five-year plan includes provisions for additional oil and gas pipelines and expanded liquefied natural gas storage, alongside increased deep-water drilling. State-owned pipeline operator PipeChina said in May that it was accelerating construction of nearly 40 oil and gas projects, including about 9,000 kilometres of domestic pipelines.

Energy policy expert David Fishman said the Iran conflict had strengthened the rationale for investments already included in China’s plans.

Across Asia, the crisis has therefore shifted the focus from simply securing additional supplies to ensuring that energy can reach consumers even when major shipping routes are disrupted.

Bakshi said the common objective was to reduce dependence on a “single fuel, supplier or chokepoint”.

The crisis has forced governments to ask not only where their next supply of oil will come from, but also how it will reach them, how long they can survive without it and whether they can reduce their dependence on imported fuel altogether.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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t least four people have been killed and more than 60 wounded after a US military strike hit a wedding ceremony in Kuhestak, a city in Iran’s southern Sirik County, according to Iranian authorities, local sources and reports from the area.

The overnight attacks took place in Hormozgan province, near the strategically important Strait of Hormuz, as Iran and the United States exchanged further strikes amid an escalating conflict. Iranian authorities said the attack struck a residential building where a wedding was being held, while a nearby telecommunications tower was also destroyed.

The Hormozgan governor’s office identified the four people killed as four-year-old Amir Ali Karimi, 16-year-old Mohammad Malahi, and two 43-year-old women, Kolsoum Malahi and Zarkhatoun Taheri. More than 60 people were reported wounded, with some suffering serious injuries.

The circumstances surrounding the strike remain disputed, and the operational details have not been independently established. US Central Command spokesperson Tim Hawkins said the US military was aware of reports of civilian casualties but said the reports originated from Iranian state media.

Multiple projectiles struck Kuhestak

Nevertheless, videos, photographs, witness accounts and official reports from the area indicated that multiple projectiles struck Kuhestak. Footage showed damage to buildings and the destruction of a telecommunications tower close to the city’s shoreline.

Defence experts examining fragments recovered in Kuhestak suggested that the weapon could have been a variant of the AGM-84K SLAM-ER, an air-launched, precision-guided cruise missile. The missile is manufactured by Boeing and is designed for precision attacks.

Video footage taken on Wednesday morning appeared to show at least one projectile hitting the roof of the building where the wedding was taking place. Other images showed debris and partial destruction inside the building, while electricity was reportedly cut in the surrounding area.

Women’s and children’s footwear could be seen scattered among the debris, while neighbouring residential buildings also sustained damage.

Iranian state television reported that three US missiles had been used in the attack. According to the broadcaster, one missile penetrated the roof of the building and created a hole measuring about 1.5 metres in the ground.

“Everyone inside was a civilian”

Ali Malahi, the owner of the targeted building, told Iranian state television that his daughter’s wedding was taking place there and that everyone inside was a civilian. Hospital footage broadcast by state television showed wounded children and relatives receiving medical treatment.

A young man injured in the attack said he and others were approaching the house when they heard aircraft overhead. He described the explosions as massive and said many women and children were badly wounded.

A woman who said she had been at the scene also claimed that the building was not close to a military installation and that the attack appeared to have directly targeted it.

The Iranian Red Crescent Society released images documenting the aftermath and the injured children. It also contacted the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, calling for legal action against those responsible for what it described as a serious attack.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry condemned the strikes, describing them as part of what it called a wider pattern of attacks against Iranian civilians. Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei linked the Kuhestak strike to previous attacks in Minab, Lamerd, Qeshm and other locations.

The strike has also drawn attention because it follows other deadly incidents involving civilian locations during the conflict.

Repeated attacks against civilians

In Minab, in Hormozgan province, an elementary school was largely destroyed during a strike on February 28, the first day of the war. Iranian authorities said about 156 people were killed, most of them schoolchildren, along with teachers, parents and others.

The US military has not released the findings of its investigation into the Minab incident, despite evidence that Tomahawk missiles were used. CENTCOM commander Brad Cooper said the school was situated on an active Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps cruise-missile base.

In Lamerd, in southern Fars province, a sports hall being used by a women’s volleyball team was also struck on the first day of the war. The incident killed 21 people, including four children. Although CENTCOM denied responsibility and accused Iran, investigations by The New York Times, the BBC and independent analysts concluded that a US Precision Strike Missile was responsible.

The latest attack comes after more than six months of war in Iran, during which the US and Israel have also targeted oil and gas facilities, fuel depots, industrial plants, airports, ports, bridges and other critical infrastructure.

According to Iranian authorities, more than 3,500 people have been killed since the beginning of the war, including more than 50 people during a 60-day truce before fighting resumed in July.

The deadly strike on the wedding has intensified questions about civilian protection and accountability as fighting continues around the Strait of Hormuz and elsewhere in Iran.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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ith Israeli elections roughly two months away, the country’s far-right political scene has grown crowded and increasingly combative, as a cluster of small parties compete for a shrinking pool of hardline voters by pushing their rhetoric further to the edges.

National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir has built his public profile in part on provocation, regularly sharing footage of himself mocking or confronting Palestinian prisoners, publicizing threats against a prominent detainee, and championing legislation that broadens the use of the death penalty for Palestinians convicted of terrorism-related offenses. As campaigning intensifies, his messaging has escalated further still.

A recent AI-generated video posted to his campaign account depicted numbered Palestinian prisoners in uniform being funneled along a conveyor belt into a fenced, watchtower-ringed compound, growing visibly gaunt and distressed as the sequence progressed, captioned to suggest a promise fulfilled. The clip drew more than four million views before it was taken down. Ben Gvir has also repeatedly called for prison conditions for Palestinian security detainees to be stripped down to the bare legal minimum.

As the minister overseeing both police and prisons, Ben Gvir wields real institutional power, and his rhetoric has become closely tied to how Israel is perceived internationally. He is widely seen as the most prominent figure among Israel’s far-right politicians, but he is far from alone. Under Israel’s electoral system, parties must clear a 3.25 percent threshold to win seats in parliament — any votes cast for parties that fall short are effectively discarded. That dynamic is fueling fierce competition among right-wing contenders, each trying to carve out distinct, hard-edged positions to survive the cutoff.

A field of rivals pushing further right

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has made expanding Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank a centerpiece of his platform, framing the effort as a way to foreclose any future Palestinian state. His campaign features a plan to reshape the demographic makeup of the Negev and Galilee — regions with sizable Arab populations — by importing West Bank-style settlement tactics: relocating roughly a million additional Jewish residents to the areas and building around 40 new communities along with numerous individual farms.

Retired Brigadier General Ofer Winter has entered the race with a newly formed party, drawing support from religious Zionist and right-wing circles. At his campaign launch late in August, he ruled out any future Palestinian statehood and framed emigration as the answer for Gaza. His running mate, Yoseph Haddad, an Arab Christian activist known for his outspoken pro-Israel stance, has said Arab Israelis deserve representatives loyal to their own community rather than to Palestinian population centers, and has voiced open disdain for existing Arab political leadership. Haddad has said he hopes to become the country’s next minister of public diplomacy and the first Arab member of the security cabinet.

Further along the spectrum, Avi Maoz’s Noam party has built its identity around opposition to Jerusalem’s Pride parades, secularism and feminism, though it is not projected to reach the electoral threshold on its own. Moshe Feiglin’s Identity party faces the same long odds. Feiglin, a longtime far-right activist with past ties to Netanyahu’s Likud party, has called for Gaza’s destruction and the relocation of Palestinians to other countries, previously declaring that “every child in Gaza is the enemy” while arguing for full Israeli resettlement of the territory.

Netanyahu’s dilemma as the right fractures

The proliferation of far-right parties poses a genuine threat to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition prospects, since votes split among multiple small parties could be lost entirely if any of them miss the threshold. Netanyahu has warned that such fragmentation could cost the right-wing bloc the election outright, and he has released a series of video appeals urging Ben Gvir, Smotrich and Winter to merge into a single unified list rather than run separately.

So far, none of the three have shown signs of stepping back from their individual campaigns. Instead, each continues to sharpen his own message, leaning further into hardline positions as the race for a limited bloc of far-right votes grows tighter — a trend that shows no sign of reversing before Israelis head to the polls.

(Source: CNN)

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urkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit, covering Tripoli and Benghazi between August 11 and 12, has been one of the most visible indicators of the shift in Türkiye’s Libya policy that has become apparent in recent years. Immediately prior to the visit, a 4.5-million-litre petrol tank at the Zawiya Refinery, 50 kilometres west of Tripoli, was set alight by a drone attack, prompting the National Oil Corporation to declare a state of emergency at the highest level. Foreign Minister Fidan’s reference to an approach that “makes no distinction between western, eastern and southern Libya” is the clearest expression of Ankara’s new approach, which, whilst defending Libya’s territorial integrity, does not limit its engagement on the ground to a single political and geographical center.

Exercises unite the army but not politics

One of the notable changes in the Libya dossier in 2026 was Washington’s return as a more visible actor. Indeed, the initiative led by Massad Boulos, US President Donald Trump’s adviser on Arab and African affairs, materialized in Sirte on July 14. Khalid Haftar, son of Khalifa Haftar and Chief of Staff of the Libyan National Army (LNA), and Selahaddin Nemrush, Chief of Staff of the Government of National Unity (GNU), met under the supervision of the United Nations (UN) Support Mission and issued a declaration on a ‘single national army’. They also agreed to organize joint exercises to tackle smuggling and migration along the Chad-Niger border.

Details that have emerged suggest that a power-sharing formula is being discussed, under which Abdulhamid Dbeibeh would remain as Prime Minister and a senior executive position would be opened up for the Hafter faction. Furthermore, plans to encourage the return of American energy companies to Libya and to carry out joint military activities under the leadership of AFRICOM indicate that Washington is seeking to advance the political, economic and security dimensions of its Libya policy simultaneously. The adoption in April 2026 of the first unified budget since 2013 has been one of the most tangible outcomes of this process to date.

Washington approaches Libya’s political crisis partly with a cost-benefit analysis. The Central Bank cannot finance two parallel governments indefinitely; therefore, scarcity forces the parties to unite. This is an approach that treats the economy as the driving force, whilst regarding legitimacy as a technical detail to be resolved later. The unification of military institutions under a single structure, the conduct of joint exercises and even reaching agreement on a joint budget are genuine achievements. However, none of this address the question of which political authority the armed groups will be subject to. Indeed, the outright rejection of the plan by the armed groups in Misrata, the militia clashes in Tripoli and the objections rising from the south demonstrate that the architecture on paper has yet to find its counterpart on the ground.

Ankara’s own terms

Another weakness of the Boulos initiative lies in the tension between timing and legitimacy. The 36-month transition timetable and the stated election date of February 17 position the ballot box as a promise rather than a concrete objective. The fact that the unified budget signed in April has still not been implemented shows that the agreement on paper has had only limited impact on the ground. Political steps taken without establishing an implementation mechanism do not, on their own, alter the balance of power on the ground. Furthermore, power-sharing carries the risk of fueling corruption and further reinforcing existing power networks by easing current constraints on public spending. In short, the formula of political compromise in exchange for oil revenue is sufficient to keep the two capitals at the negotiating table in the short term. However, as the size of the rent to be shared increases, so does the disruptive capacity of armed actors left out of the process. The events in Zawiya can also be interpreted within this framework.

Türkiye is positioning itself within this plan on its own terms. Ankara’s advantage lies in maintaining its strong military and political presence in western Libya whilst progressively deepening its relations with actors in the east. Foreign Minister Fidan’s meetings in Tripoli with Dibeybe, Menfi and Takala, as well as Acting Defence Minister Zubi, Interior Minister Trabelsi, Chief of the General Staff Nemrush and Head of Military Intelligence Mahmud Hamza; and in Benghazi with Marshal Hafter, Saddam Hafter and Agile Salih, demonstrates that Türkiye is analyzing the situation in Libya at the level of its security apparatus.

Moreover, some of the figures on this list, including Agile Salih, are known to be actors who maintain a distance from the American initiative. Consequently, Ankara’s network of contacts encompasses actors who approach the American initiative to varying degrees. Ankara’s military and political access emerges as a key factor in making the US plan feasible on the ground. This position allows it to continue its engagement with Ankara through American initiative, whilst enabling it to defend its own priorities more forcefully at the negotiating table.

Sons and nephews: The consolidation of loyalty and a fragile arena

The most critical dynamic observed in Libya today is the advancement of succession engineering rather than institutionalization. In the east, Saddam Hafter’s military and political clout, Khalid Hafter’s position within the General Staff, and Bilkasım Hafter’s management of the reconstruction budget through the Development and Reconstruction Fund; whilst in the west, Ibrahim Dibeybe’s central role in the dossier as the Prime Minister’s national security adviser, represent the two ends of the same spectrum. In both camps, power is consolidated through families and networks of loyalty rather than through institutions. In this context, Ankara has established relations with actors likely to influence the future of Libyan politics.

The fact that political and military balances in Libya are never static makes this approach rational from a foreign policy perspective. Washington’s return to the negotiating table is also reshaping the calculations. The key capability stemming from Ankara’s decade-long experience lies not in alliances formed with specific actors, but in the flexibility to recalibrate its position as actors change. Conversely, when Türkiye’s core interests are at stake, the same flexibility cannot apply. The inclusion of the Turkish Armed Forces’ Libya Task Force Command in Tripoli in the visit program serves as a deliberate reminder of the deterrent power underpinning diplomacy.

Vulnerability, however, is concentrated in the west. The Zawiya refinery has for years been a nexus of fuel subsidies, smuggling and rivalry between armed groups. The increasing isolation of Mohammed Bahrun—a key regional actor who once aligned closely with the Dbeibeh faction—is turning Zawiya into one of the new flashpoints of tension between the government and local armed groups. Regardless of who carried out the attack, the current situation indicates that one of the key dimensions of the struggle in western Libya centers on the distribution of rents and resources. Foreign Minister Fidan’s inclusion of Omar Mukhtar’s memorial tomb in his Benghazi itinerary can be interpreted as a symbolic message showing that Türkiye’s engagement in the east is not limited solely to existing political and military actors. Ankara is establishing a foundation in the east that is grounded not only in military and political relations but also in Libya’s historical memory.

The Cairo circle: The Mecca Pact, maritime jurisdiction zones and the equation extending to the Red Sea

The framework that gives Fidan’s visit to Libya its true significance, however, is regional. The joint defense agreement signed in Mecca on August 7 by President Erdoğan, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif established a collective security architecture that treats an attack on one party as an attack on all parties, whilst remaining open to the participation of other regional countries. This move, which brings together Türkiye’s military weight within NATO, Saudi Arabia’s financial capacity and Pakistan’s security capabilities within the same framework, has made the divisions between the various partnership networks already taking shape in the region more apparent.

The addition of India’s growing interest to the cooperation between Greece, the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus and Israel indicate the emergence of overlapping partnerships that balance Türkiye’s regional influence, rather than a single opposing bloc. The competitive arena for this axis could extend from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea and East Africa.

At this juncture, the Türkiye–Libya agreement on maritime zones, signed in 2019, is becoming one of the key elements in the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean, in addition to its legal status. The political sustainability of the agreement depends not only on the continuity of the government in Tripoli but also on Benghazi’s stance towards this text. For this reason, the relationship maintained with the Haftar family is also significant in terms of safeguarding Türkiye’s legal rights and gains regarding maritime zones in the Eastern Mediterranean. The relations Ankara has developed with Benghazi present an important opportunity for the maritime zones agreement to gain acceptance in eastern Libya as well.

Egypt might join the Mecca Agreement

Cairo was the missing link in this equation. Foreign Minister Fidan’s visit to Egypt following his trip to Libya completes this missing link. The topics to be discussed outline the strategy for the region. Alongside Gaza, Syria, Libya, Sudan and the Eastern Mediterranean, the details of this strategy include hydrocarbon and electricity grid integration, the defense industry, and the trade volume, which is targeted to increase from 8 billion dollars to 15 billion dollars. Foreign Minister Fidan’s indication that Egypt might join the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, however, elevates this visit beyond a mere technical consultation. The fact that Türkiye and Egypt are now able to speak with one voice on Libya could weaken one of the key elements of the rival patronage equation that has long fueled the east-west divide in Libya.

It is no coincidence that the Sudan dossier is also being discussed at the same table. Egypt is the key country in the corridor linking the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea and East Africa. The quest for stability in Libya and the containment of the conflict in Sudan are two ends of the same geopolitical axis. The defense framework signed in Mecca on August 7, the meetings in Tripoli and Benghazi held between August 11 and 12, the reception of Mahmoud Abbas in Ankara on August 12, and the visit to Cairo on August 13 all constitute an intense diplomatic flurry crammed into a single week. It would be an oversimplification to view this sequence of events as entirely unrelated developments.

Turkish foreign policy today views the Eastern Mediterranean, North Africa and the Red Sea basin as an increasingly interconnected security zone. Ankara’s emphasis on a ‘single Libya’ is, in fact, the diplomatic expression of its view that the Eastern Mediterranean constitutes a holistic, rather than fragmented, strategic equation. Within this equation, Libya serves as a strategic terrain where it is critical not only to secure gains but also to safeguard them over the long term.

(Originally published in Turkish by SETA Foundation)

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ensions between Iran and the United States flared again this weekend, marking the first major exchange of fire between the two countries since late July. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced it had launched a combined missile and drone operation targeting two American-linked bases in Jordan, the King Hussein base and Al Azraq base, in direct response to a US strike on Iran’s Larak Island earlier the same day.

The IRGC described the operation as a punitive strike against American aggression and claimed it had caused significant damage to repair facilities and fighter jet deployment sites at the targeted bases. Jordanian authorities confirmed their air defenses intercepted eight incoming missiles early Monday morning, and officials from both sides reported no casualties.

The situation escalated further on Monday when Iranian forces said they downed a US MQ-9 Reaper drone over the Strait of Hormuz, with the aircraft reportedly falling into the Gulf after being intercepted.

Iran’s position

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian addressed the strikes publicly for the first time as he departed for Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. He characterized Iran’s posture as defensive rather than aggressive, signaling Tehran would not initiate a wider war but would respond to attacks against it.

US Central Command rejected characterizations of Sunday’s strike as unprovoked aggression, describing its action as a limited and targeted effort meant to stop Iranian forces from planting mines in the Strait of Hormuz. American officials placed responsibility for the resulting exchange on Iran. Iranian state media, meanwhile, reported casualties among its forces from what it called the joint American-Israeli assault, though no specific numbers were disclosed.

Separately, President Donald Trump posted an AI-generated video to his Truth Social account appearing to show an attack on Kharg Island, a key Iranian oil export hub, captioned to suggest the island had been destroyed. No independent evidence supported the claim that Kharg Island had actually been struck. Trump has previously floated seizing or destroying the island since the conflict with Iran began.

The clash comes as the US shifts its approach from direct military strikes toward economic and financial pressure on Tehran, even as the wider US-Israel war against Iran enters its seventh month. Washington has recently asserted that it is safeguarding oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz despite Iran’s claimed blockade, though attacks on vessels in the waterway have continued to be reported on a near-daily basis. Sunday’s strikes underscore that military force remains part of the US strategy toward Iran, even as sanctions pressure over its nuclear program and control of the strait intensifies.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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resident Donald Trump has sent a proposed civil nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia to Congress while maintaining that the deal will only take effect if the kingdom normalizes relations with Israel, a U.S. administration official told Reuters on Tuesday.

The agreement, reached in July, would allow American companies to export civilian nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia. It was formally transmitted to Congress on Monday, according to the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The Saudi embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Under U.S. law, Congress has 90 session days to review the pact. Unless lawmakers object, the agreement will go into force. If Congress were to reject it, Trump could veto that decision, which would require a two-thirds majority in both chambers to override.

“The president’s position has not changed that the agreement will only move forward if Saudi Arabia joins the Abraham Accords,” the U.S. official said, referring to the U.S.-brokered normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab and Muslim-majority nations reached in 2020 and 2021.

It was not immediately clear how sending the deal to Congress now advances the president’s objectives, given the normalization condition.

Recognition of Israel as a prerequisite for implementation

Days after agreeing to the nuclear pact in July, Trump set Saudi recognition of Israel as a prerequisite for implementation. Former President Joe Biden had also sought to link a nuclear agreement to normalization. Diplomats believed Riyadh was close to recognizing Israel in 2023, but the outbreak of Israel’s war in Gaza in October of that year dramatically altered the diplomatic landscape.

Saudi Arabia has demanded an irreversible path to a Palestinian state before recognizing Israel.

The 30-year nuclear deal calls for the construction of AP1000 reactors, a project worth tens of billions of dollars that would benefit Westinghouse, jointly owned by Canada-based Cameco and Brookfield Asset Management.

Two congressional sources said the deal was sent to congressional leaders and is expected to be referred to relevant committees on Wednesday.

‘Hardly Ideal’

Some Democratic lawmakers and nonproliferation advocates have criticized the agreement for not explicitly barring Saudi Arabia from enriching uranium or reprocessing nuclear waste — two potential pathways to developing a nuclear weapon. The United Arab Emirates accepted such restrictions, known as the “gold standard,” in its 2009 civil nuclear agreement with Washington.

The Trump administration says the deal includes nonproliferation measures required by law.

Henry Sokolski, head of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, said that by initiating the congressional review process, Trump has opened the possibility that lawmakers could approve the deal without the normalization and proliferation conditions attached.

“This is hardly ideal if you’re serious about no enrichment and recognition of Israel,” Sokolski said.

(Source: Reuters)

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he Strait of Hormuz has long been the lifeline for the energy production of the GCC states, enabling these oil-rich nations to export huge quantities of oil to consumers, particularly those in East Asian countries such as China, Japan, and South Korea. This allowed the GCC states to prosper, build their economies, foster population growth, and cultivate international relations, using energy as a tool of influence. However, the geopolitical shifts in the region, represented by the war between the United States and Iran in late February 2026, and the associated regional security dilemma, led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran on March 4, 2026.

This has cast a shadow over the economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which rely heavily on energy exports, and has also affected consumer economies, the industrial production cycle, supply chains, and global trade in general. Approximately 20% of global trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz daily, including roughly 16 million barrels of crude oil, representing more than 15% of global oil demand, estimated at 104 million barrels per day, according to 2025 figures.

In addition, about 10 billion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas (LNG) passes through the Strait, mostly from Qatar, which accounts for nearly 20% of global LNG trade. Therefore, a complete halt to shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz has severely disrupted energy exports and crippled the economies of the GCC countries, recovery from which is likely to take a considerable time. The disruption of energy exports through the Strait led to a supply gap estimated at around 10 million barrels per day.

Alternative options to bypass Hormuz

Countries with alternative export routes, such as the UAE’s Habshan-Fujairah crude oil pipeline, and Saudi Arabia’s 1,200 km. pipeline from Abqaiq in the Eastern Province to Yanbu on the Red Sea, were unable to fill the gap due to the limited capacity of these alternative routes. The limitation of the alternative oil export pipeline was compounded for Saudi Arabia when the Houthis closed the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb in July 2026, effectively choking off Saudi oil exports. Saudi Arabia alone exports between six and seven million barrels of crude oil per day, and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz reduced this production to less than half.

Overall, the pumping capacity of both alternative routes — the UAE’s Habshan-Fujairah pipeline and the Saudi pipeline from the Eastern Province to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea — remained capped at only 3.5–5.5 million barrels per day. The war with Iran and its major repercussions, such as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, posed a genuine threat, primarily to the GCC with their economies that are significantly reliant on revenues from the export of hydrocarbons. The dilemma also disclosed gaps in the GCC’s security arrangements and revealed a clear absence of long-term plans, to ensure the sustainability of energy exports without total dependence on passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

Despite the multiple official statements of condemnation and calls for the indispensability of allowing free navigation through the Strait, future considerations can be viewed through two main perspectives. First, the lack of cooperation on energy export strategies. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz severely impacted some GCC members, such as Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, due to the lack of alternative shipping routes. Second, the absence of a collective approach to security, particularly maritime security, within the GCC. This was manifested in the lack of a unified stance on the conflict, and the absence of a manifest collective security framework.

Collective energy export strategy

With regard to energy export strategies and economic security, the GCC countries need a joint strategy, to ensure the continuity of oil and gas exports during times of regional crisis that cause disruption to maritime shipping, such as when transit through the Strait of Hormuz becomes impossible. First, this requires the building of trust, as transboundary pipelines will traverse the territories of neighboring countries, with coastal states serving as the final export hub. If these final export hubs are to be the Omani ports on the Arab Sea, while avoiding the use of ports on the Sea of ​​Oman due to their proximity to Iran, this will pose a challenge for countries like Kuwait, as export routes will be long, and will pass through several GCC states’ territories.

Furthermore, a single export hub implies greater vulnerability, as it will represent a center of gravity for energy resources, making it susceptible to targeting or sabotage. Second, Saudi Arabia and the UAE may consider expanding their alternative pipeline capacity to accommodate their daily oil production. However, for the UAE, the alternative export terminal at the port of Fujairah on the Sea of ​​Oman remains vulnerable, due to its proximity to Iran. Likewise, for Saudi Arabia, the alternative oil pipeline in Yanbu on the Red Sea remains dependent on the status of the other maritime corridor, the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait.

Third, it is possible to invest in LNG and storage facilities in areas that do not require passage through any of the straits. This move could be linked to increasing storage capacity to accommodate mass LNG production, which would ensure the safe flow of LNG away from conflict zones, as it passes through the straits. However, the GCC states must reach a consensus on managing unified export hubs, and again, a common export hub would remain vulnerable to attacks and sabotage. Reaching a consensus on future security arrangements and energy export strategies is crucial for the GCC states, as divergent and unilateral approaches to security and energy issues have proven strategically costly.

Collective regional security approach is a must

When viewing the issue of their inability to secure energy exports, the GCC states appear to be constrained by divergent energy transportation strategies, each of which entails numerous challenges and risks. Therefore, the GCC states may need a comprehensive review of their security cooperation, to ensure a unified stance on regional crises and support mediation efforts, so as to reach solutions satisfactory to all members and regional actors alike.

The February 2026 outbreak of war serves as a wake-up call for GCC decision-makers to enhance coordination on security issues, ensuring the continuity of energy exports and regional security. Particular attention must be paid to maritime security through a collective approach, which is currently lacking. By ensuring a unified maritime security policy, the GCC states can strengthen their naval capabilities, guarantee the interoperability of systems, improve coastal patrols, and reduce defense spending through the concept of burden-sharing.

However, collective maritime security will only bear fruit by fostering a degree of coexistence with other actors, thus bringing relative calm to the region. This would allow the GCC states to address security issues in partnership with other regional actors, such as Iran, Iraq, and potentially Yemen, without foreign interference, and through joint investments, incentives, and shared interests, to build trust and counter geopolitical volatility.

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raqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zeidi’s visits to Washington, Tehran and Ankara in quick succession are significant in terms of demonstrating the new government’s approach to foreign policy. For Iraq, Washington and Tehran are two capitals closely linked to security, capital, historical influence and developments in Iraqi domestic politics. Ankara, on the other hand, represents the most concrete, stable and reliable economic route through which the country can access global markets. For this reason, al-Zaidi’s visit to Ankara immediately following his engagements in Washington and Tehran should not be viewed as a mere neighbourly visit. This visit demonstrates that Baghdad, which has placed economic development at the centre of its government program, views Türkiye not merely as a trading partner but as a strategic gateway in Iraq’s production, transport and energy equation.

The most significant aspect of the talks in Ankara is not the number of documents signed, but rather the needs of Iraq and Türkiye that they address. Five memoranda of understanding were signed between the two countries covering educational and academic cooperation, youth and sport, industrial property, rail and road transport via the Fishhabur–Ovaköy border crossing, and the development of transport infrastructure in Iraq in exchange for natural resources. Whilst the first three agreements broaden the social and institutional foundation of the relationship, the latter two are of direct strategic importance for Iraq’s economic future. This is because these agreements strengthen the necessary links to move the Development Corridor Project – which aims to connect the Grand Faw Port in Basra to the Turkish border via Iraq and from there to Europe – into the implementation phase.

The visit also demonstrates that the strong relations established between Iraq and Türkiye in recent years are being maintained by the new Iraqi government. During President Erdoğan’s visit to Baghdad in April 2024, 27 legal texts were signed, whilst 11 documents were signed at the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council meeting held in May 2025. The fact that Zaidi has included Ankara in the itinerary of his first foreign visit since taking office suggests that Türkiye has secured a permanent place in Iraq’s development plans.

Oil production but lack of control

Iraq has been producing oil for many years but has been unable to establish sufficient control over the routes by which this oil is transported. The fact that a very large proportion of oil revenues depends on exports via the southern ports and the Strait of Hormuz means that any military tension in the Gulf directly becomes a problem for the Iraqi budget. The closure of ports and disruption to tanker traffic affects not only oil companies but the entire state apparatus, from public sector wages to social spending. Road, rail and pipeline links via Türkiye therefore represent both a means of facilitating trade and a tool for economic security from Baghdad’s perspective.

This is where the true significance of the Development Corridor comes to the fore. If successful, the project—which is planned to link the Port of Faw to Türkiye via a network of approximately 1,200 kilometres of railways and motorways—will do more than simply transport containers from Basra to Türkiye. It will also create new industrial zones, logistics centres, energy networks and urban development areas along the route. Given Iraq’s young population and high unemployment rate, this transformation could provide an alternative to the limited employment opportunities currently available in the oil sector alone.

Türkiye plays a role in this equation that no other neighbour can easily fulfil. Iran is linked to Iraq through energy, trade and political networks, whilst the Gulf states can provide capital to Iraq. However, Türkiye is the only direct neighbour capable of connecting Iraq to the European market by road and rail, and to the Mediterranean via Ceyhan. Moreover, the economic foundation between the two countries will not be built from scratch. Trade volume between Türkiye and Iraq reached approximately 17 billion dollars in 2025, and Turkish companies have undertaken over 1,000 projects in Iraq with a total value of around 40 billion dollars. The setting of a medium-term trade target of 30 billion dollars during the Ankara talks demonstrates the will to roughly double the current level of trade.

Developments in the energy sector also demonstrated that the visit was not limited solely to the transport agenda. Although no long-term, comprehensive energy agreement was signed at the ceremony in Ankara, TPAO’s acquisition of a 15 per cent stake in the company managing BP’s operations in Kirkuk is a step that could transform Türkiye from merely being a buyer and transit country for Iraqi oil into a production partner.

A few days after the visit, Türkiye and Iraq signed a provisional agreement extending the use of the existing oil pipeline for another year, with a capacity of 750,000 barrels per day. This also showed that the talks in Ankara had begun to produce concrete results. Whilst time is being gained to prepare a broader energy agreement, Baghdad has secured the use of the only operational oil export pipeline. Given that the pipeline carries approximately 170,000 barrels per day, increasing the current capacity could be a significant step in Iraq’s efforts to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz.

The secret behind the fifth agreement!

The signing ceremony in Ankara also brought to light the main obstacle facing the Iraqi government. Whilst the signing of five agreements was expected, President Erdoğan’s realization that one agreement had not been signed, followed by Zaidi’s turn to Iraq’s Minister of Transport, Veheb al-Hasani, and the subsequent inclusion of the remaining documents in the signing process, were widely discussed in the media of both countries. Hasani later explained the incident as a technical and protocol-related disagreement. A spokesperson for the Iraqi Ministry of Transport, however, stated that there had been a prior dispute on the Iraqi side—involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Oil—regarding the inclusion of the document in the visit’s program.

In contrast, some Iraqi and Turkish commentators alleged that the minister, who has a background in the Badr Organization, was attempting to slow down the Development Corridor agreement under Iranian influence. This claim could not be definitively confirmed, and the available information is insufficient to characterize the events as a definitive act of sabotage by Iran. However, the incident itself remains significant. Whether the problem stems from a lack of protocol, inter-institutional disagreement or political influence, it demonstrates that during the implementation of strategic decisions in Iraq, different ministries, parties and actors with external connections are not acting in unison. Viewed from this perspective, the success of the Zaidi government’s economic program will in fact depend not so much on how many agreements it signs abroad, but rather on the extent to which it can implement state decisions at home.

Economy in Ankara, missiles on the ground

The joint Saudi Arabian–US air strikes that took place immediately after the visit to Ankara once again demonstrated just how fragile the security environment is in which Zaidi’s development diplomacy is being conducted. US Central Command stated that the strikes targeted logistics and weapons sites belonging to groups it alleged were directed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Reports citing Iraqi and Iranian sources stated that at least 20 members of the Hashd al-Shaabi were killed. Baghdad condemned the strikes as a violation of its sovereignty, and Zaidi cancelled his visit to Riyadh, which had been scheduled for July 30. Thus, within a matter of days, Iraq – which had been discussing transport corridors and economic integration in Ankara – has once again been drawn into the military arena of US-Iranian tensions.

This development does not diminish the importance of the Ankara visit; on the contrary, it enhances it. This is because the path for Iraq to extricate itself from regional military rivalry does not lie solely in maintaining balanced relations with Washington and Tehran. Iraq must raise the cost of the conflict by developing its economic ties, thereby forcing countries to step back from clashing on its territory. It would be difficult to claim that the intensive trade, energy and transport networks to be established with Türkiye will provide Baghdad with an absolute security guarantee. However, these links will make Iraq’s stability more valuable to Türkiye, Europe, the Gulf states and international companies. Economic interdependence alone will not prevent war, but it will help Iraq move away from being perceived solely as a country defined by militias, military bases and spheres of influence.

Looking at Zaidi’s initial foreign policy moves, he is seeking investment from Washington, political balance from Tehran and economic links from Ankara. Among these three capitals, Türkiye stands out for offering the most viable route to turn Iraq’s geography into an economic advantage. Multi-billion-dollar deals in Washington could provide capital and technology. Relations with Tehran cannot be entirely disregarded in terms of internal stability. However, Iraq’s ability to generate non-oil revenue, open up to Europe, create new employment opportunities and reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz depends to a large extent on the operationalisation of the routes extending northwards.

Ultimately, the visit to Ankara has done more than simply demonstrate Iraq’s growing rapprochement with Türkiye; it has also revealed the direction of the new government’s approach to development. The real issue is not the signing of the five documents. The real issue is whether the pipeline stretching from Ovaköy to Faw, the oil flowing from Kirkuk to Ceyhan, and the $30 billion trade target will make the Iraqi state stronger and more independent. If the Zaidi government can support these projects with institutional reform, transparency and state authority, relations with Türkiye could transform Iraq’s quest for balance in foreign policy into an economic strategy. Otherwise, the documents signed in Ankara will simply be added to the long list of agreements that Baghdad has accumulated over the years but has been unable to implement. .

(Originally published in Turkish by Middle East Africa)

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he United States and Iran traded threats over a new economic confrontation on Monday, with Washington preparing what it described as an unprecedented sanctions campaign and Tehran warning it could halt all oil exports from the Persian Gulf if the pressure continues.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent was due to unveil new sanctions targeting countries and companies that continue trading with Iran, describing the campaign as “the single greatest financial offensive ever marshaled against an adversary.”

The measures come after months of war between the United States, Israel and Iran that have damaged Iran’s military and economic infrastructure while disrupting energy markets and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

“The economic D-Day” will begin with the new measures, Bessent wrote in an opinion article published in the Financial Times, warning countries that continue doing business with Iran that they could face consequences.

Iran threans to halt oil exports

Iran responded with a threat to dramatically escalate the economic confrontation.

Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said Tehran could stop all oil exports from the Persian Gulf if the U.S. economic campaign continued.

“If the economic war continues, not a single drop of oil will be exported,” Rezaei said in a social media post, adding that Iran would regard countries supporting Washington’s economic campaign as participating in an act of war.

The warning raises the possibility of a further disruption to global energy markets. The Strait of Hormuz, through which a major share of the world’s oil supplies normally passes, has already been brought close to a standstill by the conflict.

Iran retains missile and drone capabilities that it has used against U.S. allies in the Gulf and has threatened commercial shipping in the strategic waterway.

The new U.S. sanctions campaign comes as Washington and Tehran remain far from a negotiated settlement. Although direct military strikes between the two countries have stopped for several weeks, the two sides have yet to resume substantive negotiations.

The conflict began on February 28 with U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran. Months of fighting have killed thousands of people, most of them in Iran and Lebanon, and inflicted extensive damage on Iranian infrastructure.

Iran also suffered the killing of its Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during the conflict, while the United States has reported 18 military personnel killed and more than 750 wounded.

Struggling economy but still standing

Despite the economic pressure, Tehran has maintained a defiant public stance. Iranian officials, however, have acknowledged that the country’s economy was already under severe strain before the war because of years of sanctions, high inflation, currency weakness and energy shortages.

The war has added to those problems by damaging infrastructure, disrupting trade and reducing production, leaving Tehran facing major reconstruction costs.

Iranian officials have warned that further economic pressure could deepen hardship, fuel public discontent and undermine the government’s legitimacy.

Washington is also seeking support from major trading partners, particularly China, which has remained one of Iran’s most important economic partners.

Bessent has urged Beijing to cooperate with the U.S. campaign, noting that China has historically obtained a large share of its oil imports from the Gulf.

China has rejected the use of economic pressure as a solution to the conflict.

“Sanctions and pressure do not help resolve the problem,” a spokesperson for China’s embassy in Washington said, while calling for diplomacy.

Calls for diplomacy continue

With direct U.S.-Iran talks stalled, several countries have attempted to mediate between the two sides. Qatar, Pakistan and Turkey have all been involved in diplomatic efforts aimed at preventing a further escalation.

Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, was expected to visit Tehran on Monday as part of Islamabad’s efforts to promote regional peace and security. Pakistani officials said the visit would include discussions on the latest developments and Washington’s threatened sanctions.

The economic confrontation comes at a particularly sensitive moment for global energy markets. Any further disruption to Gulf oil exports could send prices sharply higher and increase pressure on countries already struggling with elevated energy costs.

For Washington, the sanctions campaign is intended to force Iran back to the negotiating table by increasing the economic cost of refusing U.S. demands.

For Tehran, the threat to halt oil exports represents an attempt to demonstrate that Iran can impose significant costs on the United States and its allies if economic pressure continues.

The confrontation therefore risks developing into a wider contest over energy, trade and financial access, even as military operations remain suspended.

With neither side showing signs of abandoning its core demands, the latest exchange of threats suggests that the six-month conflict has entered a new phase — one in which economic pressure and control of global energy supplies could prove as important as military power.

(Source: Reuters)

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urkish Presidential Communications Director Burhanettin Duran said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s threats and accusations against Türkiye and Syria reflect Israel’s growing international isolation and domestic political concerns.

Speaking to Anadolu Agency, Duran described Netanyahu’s recent remarks as an attempt to create imaginary threats and enemies and distract international attention from Israel’s policies in Gaza, Syria and Lebanon.

“Netanyahu’s threats and lies against Türkiye and Syria are a new reflection of the Israeli prime minister’s growing international isolation, political fears and delusions,” Duran said.

He argued that international criticism of Israel’s policies has increased, including among the United States, Britain and other countries. Duran said Netanyahu was using hostility toward Türkiye as a political tool amid domestic pressures and competition with more radical elements within Israel’s political system.

Türkiye says Israel is fueling regional instability

Duran accused Netanyahu’s government of pursuing an increasingly aggressive regional policy, including military operations in Gaza, Syria and Lebanon, as well as allowing attacks by Israeli settlers in the occupied West Bank.

He said Israel’s attempt to blame Türkiye following its strikes in Syria demonstrated what he described as an effort to shift responsibility for its own actions.

“The problem is not that people do not understand Israeli policies,” Duran said. “It is that more and more people understand and reject these policies.”

He said Türkiye did not pose a threat to Israel but opposed policies that undermine regional security and stability.

According to Duran, Ankara would continue supporting countries pursuing peaceful policies in the region, particularly Syria, while seeking to prevent further escalation.

He said Türkiye had sufficient experience and strength to respond to threats while maintaining a cautious and measured approach.

Duran calls for two-state solution

Duran also pointed to criticism of Netanyahu within Israel, saying opposition politicians had described his anti-Türkiye rhetoric as irresponsible and extreme and warned that it was creating concern among the Israeli public.

He argued that Israel was losing international support and said tensions with Türkiye had produced no meaningful benefit for Israel.

Duran emphasized Türkiye’s position as a NATO member with significant military and diplomatic capabilities, saying Ankara would continue to prioritize regional peace and stability.

He urged Israel to abandon what he described as destabilizing policies and instead work toward a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

“The most rational course for the Israeli government would be to work toward a two-state solution that would completely resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to stop taking further destabilizing steps in the region,” Duran said.

He also criticized Israeli policies concerning the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem and plans for new settlements in the occupied West Bank.

Duran said Türkiye would not allow Netanyahu’s policies to undermine regional peace or threaten the security of Türkiye and its allies.

“Türkiye’s prudent and peaceful foreign policy will thwart the bloody games of figures like Netanyahu who are willing to set the region on fire to secure their own political futures,” he said.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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he Israeli military has acknowledged for the first time that its forces fired on a vehicle carrying 5-year-old Palestinian girl Hind Rajab in Gaza in January 2024 and announced a criminal investigation into the incident.

The Israeli army had previously denied that its troops were involved in the killing. Months after the incident, a preliminary military investigation concluded that Israeli forces were “not present near the vehicle or within firing range.”

The new findings mark a significant reversal in the military’s account of one of the most widely publicized killings of a Palestinian child during the Gaza war.

Hind was traveling with six members of her family in a vehicle in northern Gaza when it came under Israeli fire. She survived the initial attack and remained trapped inside the car, where she made a desperate phone call to Palestinian Red Crescent paramedics asking for help.

An ambulance sent to rescue her also came under fire.

Twelve days later, rescuers found Hind’s body inside the bullet-riddled vehicle alongside the bodies of her relatives.

Military acknowledges firing on vehicle

In a statement, the Israeli military said an examination had found that Israeli troops had fired at a vehicle “that was approaching them.”

The military said the findings, combined with what it described as apparent failures in coordinating the movement of the Palestinian Red Crescent ambulance, had led to the decision to open a criminal investigation by the Military Police Criminal Investigation Division.

The investigation is part of the Israeli military’s first comprehensive review of alleged war crimes since the beginning of Israel’s war in Gaza in October 2023.

The military said its General Staff’s Fact Finding and Assessment Mechanism had examined 150 incidents and transferred them to the military’s top legal authorities to determine whether criminal investigations should be opened.

Of five decisions announced Wednesday, two resulted in criminal investigations: the killing of Hind Rajab and the March 2025 killing of 15 Palestinian paramedics and first responders.

Family calls for independent investigation

Hind’s mother, Wesam Hamada, welcomed the decision as a long-overdue development but said it did not amount to justice.

She called for an independent and transparent investigation and genuine accountability for those responsible for her daughter’s death, rather than a closed military inquiry.

Palestinian Ambassador to the United Nations Riyad Mansour also questioned whether the Israeli military could conduct a credible investigation into its own forces. He described previous Israeli investigations as neither independent nor credible and said accountability should include the arrest of those responsible.

The Hind Rajab Foundation similarly criticized Israel’s military justice system, arguing that investigations into alleged violations by Israeli forces frequently end without meaningful prosecution or punishment.

No criminal probes into aid worker killings

The Israeli army also announced that it would not open criminal investigations into three other incidents involving humanitarian workers.

They included the April 2024 Israeli strike that killed seven World Central Kitchen aid workers in Deir el-Balah, a February 2024 strike on a Doctors Without Borders shelter in Khan Younis that killed two employees, and a November 2023 attack on a Doctors Without Borders convoy that killed two others.

In the World Central Kitchen case, the Israeli military acknowledged “serious failures” that led its forces to mistakenly believe the convoy had been taken over by Hamas fighters. However, the military advocate-general concluded there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal misconduct.

World Central Kitchen condemned the decision, saying it was inconsistent with the full circumstances of the attack and failed to provide meaningful accountability.

Australia also criticized the decision because one of those killed, Australian aid worker Zomi Frankcom, was among the seven WCK employees.

Foreign Minister Penny Wong said Frankcom’s family deserved justice and that the decision fell “far short” of the accountability Australia expected. She said Australia would summon Israel’s ambassador and continue pressing Israel over the deaths.

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srael is facing growing international criticism after its warplanes struck an abandoned military airfield in northwestern Syria, with regional governments and international organizations warning that continued attacks threaten Syria’s sovereignty and regional stability.

The Israeli strikes targeted the disused Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase in Idlib province. Syrian officials said Israeli aircraft carried out eight separate strikes, damaging the runway and hitting a derelict structure inside a hangar. No casualties were immediately reported.

The Syrian Foreign Ministry condemned the operation as a violation of the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, saying Israeli attacks on Syrian territory have continued since December 8, 2024.

Damascus said it has pursued a policy of restraint in an effort to strengthen domestic stability and prevent a wider regional escalation.

Regional governments condemn Israeli strikes

Türkiye strongly condemned the Israeli operation and called for greater international pressure to end what it described as Israel’s continuing aggression against Syria.

“We call on the international community to display a more decisive stance to ensure an end to Israel’s aggression against Syria,” the Turkish Foreign Ministry said, urging accountability for actions it said disregarded international law.

Jordan described the strikes as an “unjustified hostile attack” and said they violated international law and Syrian sovereignty. Egypt similarly warned that repeated Israeli violations of Syrian territory and airspace could trigger a dangerous escalation and undermine wider regional peace efforts.

The Gulf Cooperation Council also condemned the strikes. Saudi Arabia denounced the attack in the strongest terms and rejected the targeting of the Abu al-Duhur facility, while Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait warned that continued military action against Syria threatened regional security.

GCC Secretary-General Jasem Mohamed al-Budaiwi called for stronger international action to protect Syrian territory and uphold regional stability.

U.N. and U.S. express concern

The Arab League also criticized the Israeli strikes, with Secretary-General Nabil Fahmy accusing Israel of using provocative military action to intensify regional tensions.

Pakistan expressed solidarity with Syria and described the strikes as a violation of international law that threatened regional stability. Islamabad called on the international community to ensure accountability.

At the United Nations, spokesperson Stephane Dujarric said the strikes represented another “alarming violation” of Syria’s territorial integrity and airspace.

“These airstrikes must stop, and we are opposed to them,” Dujarric told reporters.

The United States also expressed concern. Tom Barrack, the U.S. ambassador to Ankara and special envoy for Syria and Iraq, said Washington remained committed to diplomatic efforts and talks between regional parties.

Barrack said Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government had not adopted an aggressive posture toward Israel and had instead repeatedly favored de-escalation.

The latest strikes come as Syria seeks to consolidate its new political order and strengthen relations with regional and international partners. The growing criticism of Israeli military operations, meanwhile, reflects broader concerns that continued attacks could undermine efforts to stabilize Syria and prevent another escalation across the Middle East.

(Source: Daily Sabah)

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.S. envoy Jared Kushner said Monday that the United States would not support rebuilding Gaza until Hamas gives up its weapons, as Israel continues carrying out attacks across the devastated Palestinian territory.

Kushner made the remarks after meeting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in an effort to advance a U.S.-backed roadmap for ending the genocide. The meeting did not produce a breakthrough, with major disagreements remaining over Hamas’ disarmament and an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.

“We have a plan to rebuild Gaza, but we will not allow Gaza to be rebuilt until the demilitarization occurs,” Kushner told Fox News.

He said Washington did not want reconstruction funds to be invested in Gaza if the territory could again become a battlefield.

Disarmament remains key dispute

Hamas had agreed to disarm as part of the U.S.-backed proposal, which would also involve an Israeli withdrawal and an end to attacks on Gaza. Israel, however, rejected the proposal earlier this month, saying it would not make concessions until Gaza was fully demilitarized.

Kushner appeared to align closely with Israel’s position, emphasizing that Hamas would need to surrender its weapons before major reconstruction and Israeli withdrawal could proceed.

“We’re also not going to restrict Israel’s right to defend itself if there are any imminent threats,” Kushner said, adding that Washington had sought to clarify what that provision would mean.

His comments came despite President Donald Trump earlier Monday calling for an end to Israeli attacks on Gaza.

“Israelis should not be striking in Gaza. Hamas agreed to lay down their weapons,” Trump said.

Israel has continued launching near-daily attacks on the territory. According to the figures cited by Al Jazeera, at least 1,265 Palestinians have been killed in Gaza since a ceasefire came into effect last year. The broader Israeli war on Gaza has killed more than 73,000 Palestinians since October 2023, according to the same source.

U.S. pushes Gaza roadmap

Kushner also met Hamas officials on Sunday in a rare direct encounter as Washington seeks to move its Gaza plan forward. He described the discussions as “very cordial” but said the United States would judge Hamas by its actions rather than its promises.

“They said all the right things,” Kushner said, while expressing skepticism about the group’s willingness to fulfill its commitments.

He said Hamas could potentially surrender its weapons and tunnels within 60 to 90 days, describing such an outcome as a major security gain for Israel.

Kushner warned that if Hamas failed to follow through, the group would lose international support and Israel would have greater backing from Washington and other countries to continue military action.

The U.S. envoy also argued that the proposed agreement would benefit Israel by removing what he described as a major security threat.

The dispute over reconstruction highlights one of the central obstacles to the U.S.-backed plan. Gaza has suffered enormous destruction during the Israeli genocide, creating an urgent need for housing, infrastructure, health care and other basic services.

Washington has remained a major supporter of Israel throughout the genocide. According to Al Jazeera, the United States has provided Israel with about $25 billion in military aid over the past three years and has defended the Israeli government at international forums.

The latest diplomatic efforts come as Washington attempts to reconcile its calls for an end to the fighting with Israel’s demand for Hamas’ complete disarmament before any broader political settlement.

For Palestinians in Gaza, however, the continuation of Israeli strikes and the conditions attached to reconstruction leave the territory’s future uncertain, even as international efforts seek to establish a lasting ceasefire and begin rebuilding.

)Source: Aljazeera English)

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merican President Donald Trump’s approval rating has fallen to 33%, the lowest level of his current presidency, as growing concerns over the war with Iran and rising gasoline prices weigh on his standing with American voters, according to a Reuters/Ipsos poll released Monday.

The four-day survey found that 64% of Americans disapproved of Trump’s performance, compared with 33% who approved. His approval rating fell from 35% in an earlier poll this month and matched the lowest level recorded during his previous presidency, in December 2017.

Trump returned to the White House in 2025 with approval from just under half of Americans, but his standing has weakened as the conflict with Iran has continued. The war has disrupted a significant share of global oil trade and pushed gasoline prices higher, adding pressure on U.S. households.

Most Americans expect Iran war to continue

The poll showed widespread concern that U.S. involvement in the conflict will last much longer than Trump initially suggested.

About 80% of Americans said they believed U.S. involvement in Iran would continue for an extended period, including 87% of Democrats and 71% of Republicans. Only 16% expected the conflict to end within a few weeks.

Trump initially suggested that the war could be resolved within weeks, but Iran has continued resisting U.S. and Israeli military pressure. The conflict has also disrupted oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, contributing to higher energy prices.

Trump has defended the rising cost of gasoline as necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. At a rally in New York on Friday, he told supporters that paying somewhat more for gasoline was worthwhile to prevent what he described as an evil country from obtaining nuclear weapons.

However, only about one in five Americans said the war was worth the cost. Among Republicans, only about half considered the conflict worthwhile.

The economic impact of the war could become a major issue ahead of the Nov. 3 congressional elections, with Republicans seeking to defend narrow majorities in the House while Democrats increasingly see an opportunity to gain control of the Senate.

Democrats gain ground on economy

The poll also showed Democrats gaining an advantage over Republicans on economic issues. About 38% of registered voters said Democrats would handle the economy better, compared with 35% who preferred Republicans.

That represents a significant shift from previous years and comes as voters express increasing concern about the cost of living and gasoline prices.

Democrats were also viewed as better equipped to manage the cost of living, while Republicans continued to hold a narrow advantage on immigration.

About 40% of voters said Republicans had the better approach to immigration, compared with 38% who favored Democrats. The two-point Republican advantage was the smallest recorded during Trump’s current presidency. Republicans had held a 26-point advantage on immigration in January 2025.

Although Trump’s administration has overseen a sharp decline in border crossings and expanded immigration enforcement, Republicans have faced political pressure over deadly confrontations and the growing number of people held in immigration detention, including children.

The Reuters/Ipsos poll was conducted online among 1,166 U.S. adults nationwide and had a margin of error of three percentage points in either direction.

The findings point to growing political challenges for Trump as voters confront the economic consequences of the Iran conflict and prepare to vote in the November midterm elections.

(Source: Reuters)

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hilst the Middle East region has undergone significant change and transformation as a result of the attacks launched by Israel from 7 October 2023 onwards, the US-Israel–Iran war that began on 28 February 2026 has further fuelled this change, pushing it to a point of no return. For had these events not occurred, the ‘Mecca Joint Defence Agreement’, signed on 7 August 2026 between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, might not have been possible.

Developments necessitating “regional ownership”

Türkiye’s long-standing stance that the region’s problems should be resolved by the countries of the region themselves – a concept defined by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan as “regional ownership” – had not received sufficient support from the countries of the region. Whilst the reasons behind this may vary from country to country, ultimately external interventions aimed at resolving the region’s problems have failed to heal the wounds; on the contrary, they have either caused existing wounds to bleed anew or allowed them to simply harden into calluses without being resolved. Consequently, it has become apparent that interventions in the region—particularly from the West and, of course, the US—have failed to produce results and have not brought peace and stability to the region.

However, following the events that began on 7 October 2023, Israel’s adoption of a revisionist policy towards the region—believing that the conditions were favourable—and its subsequent attacks targeting not only Gaza and the West Bank but also Lebanon, Syria and Iran, have led to a shift in the preconceptions held by countries in the region towards Türkiye.

For whilst it is evident that almost all of the Western countries expected to resolve the region’s problems have taken sides in the war between Russia and Ukraine, providing Ukraine with billions of dollars in aid as well as both political and military support; whilst Israel’s razing of Gaza, massacred over 73,000 people and committed a massive genocide; deepened its annexation of the West Bank; gradually sought to alter the status of the Al-Aqsa Mosque; occupied southern Lebanon and attempted to provoke a civil war there; and, as if its decades-long occupation of the Golan Heights—which is Syrian territory —as if that were not enough—it unilaterally suspended the 1974 agreement following the revolution on 8 December 2024, occupied further Syrian territory, and sought to prevent Syria from achieving stability by manipulating the Druze and the SDG/PKK terrorist organisations.

The extent to which external actors remain indifferent to crises or conflicts in our region has once again been exposed in the war against Iran. For just as it is unjust and wrong for an actor such as the US to fall into Israel’s trap and attack Iran, it is equally wrong for other Western countries not to have taken the initiative to dissuade the US from this war, as was the case with Ukraine. Although these countries—the majority of which are also NATO members—were called upon by the US to deploy troops to open the blockaded Strait of Hormuz – although this was not in accordance with NATO regulations – they did not heed this call and, whilst not becoming directly involved in the war, they made their stance clear by expanding sanctions against Iran rather than exerting pressure on Israel to bring the war to an end.

During this war, Iran’s decision to attack Gulf states and other countries hosting US bases on their territory – rather than Israel and the US, which were directly attacking it – both because they were relatively easier targets and with the intention of indirectly exerting pressure on the US, has once again demonstrated the importance of regional ownership.

Israel’s revisionist policies and the perception of threats by regional countries

All these developments have made a mechanism such as the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement imperative, with the aim of thwarting the plans of a country like Israel—which, despite its small size, seeks to destabilize the region and derive benefit from the situation by leveraging its lobbying power in the US and Europe and relying on their support—and to establish a new status quo. Furthermore, whilst Israel recently proposed an alignment strategy—such as the “hexagon bloc”—which has yet to materialize on the ground, the formation of a counter-front by countries outside this bloc that perceive the current developments as a threat to their national interests must be regarded as inevitable.

Despite the security guarantees the US has provided to the Gulf states to date, the fact that these states have been exposed to Iranian attacks during the war against Iran has not only called into question the reliability of US guarantees in the Gulf, but has also inevitably led to a search for alternatives regarding the future of the region’s security architecture. It is therefore highly likely that the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement will address this necessity; in particular, should the US withdraw from the region following the war with Iran, it is conceivable that it might be open to entrusting the region’s security to three key and powerful allies: Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the fact that the US has not made any negative statements regarding the Mecca Agreement to date is interpreted in this light and reinforces the view that there is coordination between the signatory countries and the US.

Why is the agreement so important?

Among the key factors that make the agreement significant are the characteristics and capabilities of the signatory countries. Türkiye, for instance, is not only a NATO member but also a candidate country for the EU and has made significant strides in the defense industry in recent years. It is therefore an indispensable actor for both the Middle East and the European security architecture. Pakistan, meanwhile, is the only Muslim country to possess nuclear weapons and also has a substantial population. As for Saudi Arabia, it stands out as a key player not only due to its abundant energy resources but also because of its strategic location at the crossroads of global trade routes. Furthermore, as a leading figure in both the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League, and as the custodian of Islam’s holy sites, it is an actor held in high regard and whose word carries weight among both Arab and Muslim states.

The coming together of these three major powers to form a defense alliance would create a synergy whose effects are likely to extend beyond the region. Furthermore, should this agreement be successfully implemented, it would inevitably create a domino effect, making it likely that other countries in the region would join the agreement. Considering similar initiatives that have been attempted at various times but could never be brought to a conclusion due to both regional and circumstantial conditions, the most significant impact of this agreement, as of today, is that it stands as the sole development capable of curbing Israel’s aggressive, occupying and expansionist regional vision. Not only will the Abraham Accords no longer hold any appeal for countries in the region, but it is also understood that, should the US withdraw from the region following a war against Iran, the new security architecture of the region will be centered on the new pact established by this agreement.

What will the agreement provide for the signatory countries?

This agreement is of a defensive nature, aimed at protecting the signatories from attacks by other countries; in this way, it offers the signatory countries a security guarantee similar to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Türkiye’s current capabilities, Pakistan’s nuclear power and Saudi Arabia’s financial support not only demonstrate the agreement’s capacity and potential but also serve as a powerful deterrent to any actors seeking to attack one of the signatory states.

Consequently, in addition to Türkiye’s NATO membership, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement has now emerged as the sole agreement in the region offering an additional defense guarantee to regional countries, and it has been announced that the agreement remains open to new participants. Although it has been stated in the announcements that no specific country is being targeted, it is clear that a strong deterrent has been created for those with designs on the region – particularly Israel – or those claiming to shape its future.

Whilst there are no doubts regarding the agreement’s deterrent effect, as we do not yet possess detailed information on the nature of the agreement, it is not fully known how a response would be mounted in the event of an attack on any of the signatory states. Furthermore, given the geographical locations of the signatory states—particularly Pakistan’s relatively remote position—it is difficult to predict how such a response would be carried out. However, despite all these uncertainties, the implementation of such an arrangement in our region is of great importance.

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merican President Donald Trump has welcomed a new defense agreement between Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, describing the trilateral pact as an important step toward greater security cooperation in the Middle East.

“Very happy to see that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan have recently, and finally, signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement,” Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform.

He said the agreement showed that countries in the Middle East were “coming together” and would be better positioned to defend themselves. Trump described the pact as a “BIG, BOLD, IMPORTANT FIRST STEP.”

The agreement was signed in Mecca on August 7 amid escalating regional tensions and the ongoing U.S.-Iran war, which has expanded beyond the two countries and affected several states across the Middle East.

Three countries expand military cooperation

Under the agreement, Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia will establish strategic political and military mechanisms involving their defense and foreign ministers, as well as chiefs of staff or commanders of their armed forces.

Military cooperation is expected to develop gradually, beginning with command-post and field exercises. The three countries could later conduct joint exercises involving ground, naval and air forces, air defense systems and unmanned platforms.

The agreement also includes a commitment by the three countries to participate in efforts aimed at resolving the conflict between Iran and the United States.

The pact builds on an earlier Saudi-Pakistani mutual defense agreement signed in September, which stated that an attack against either country would be considered an attack against both.

Saudi Arabia has increasingly sought to diversify its defense partnerships as its critical infrastructure and energy facilities have come under attack amid the regional conflict.

Pact comes amid regional tensions

The agreement also reflects the broader security concerns facing the three countries. Saudi Arabia has been directly affected by attacks linked to the wider U.S.-Iran war, while Iran-backed Houthi forces have targeted regional shipping and other interests.

Türkiye, meanwhile, has faced growing tensions with Israel over the war in Gaza which resulted in broader regional conflicts, including fighting involving Iran and Lebanon.

Pakistan has increasingly positioned itself as a potential mediator in regional disputes while strengthening its security relationship with Saudi Arabia and expanding defense cooperation with Türkiye.

The three-way pact brings together three major Muslim-majority countries with significant military capabilities and strategic influence. Türkiye is a NATO member, Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, and Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s largest oil producers and a key U.S. partner in the Gulf.

Trump’s endorsement marks a notable reaction from Washington to the emerging security arrangement. His comments suggest that the United States views greater defense cooperation among regional powers as potentially complementary to broader efforts to strengthen security in the Middle East.

The agreement could also reshape regional security cooperation as countries seek greater capacity to protect their territory and infrastructure amid continuing instability and the widening consequences of the U.S.-Iran war.

(Source: Daily Sabah)

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he diplomatic initiatives that have been ongoing for some time between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have now materialized into a concrete security architecture with the Joint Defense Agreement signed today in Mecca. Although the agreement in question may appear to be a manifestation of the historical and religious ties between the three countries in foreign policy, it can in fact be regarded as part of a much broader regional transformation. This agreement, signed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif at the Safa Palace in Mecca, the holy city of the Muslim world, constitutes a full-fledged ‘collective defense’ pact, as it stipulates that an armed attack against any one of the three states shall be deemed an attack against all of them.

Furthermore, the fact that the agreement is based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which governs the right to self-defense, can be seen as a reflection of the initiative led by the three countries’ quest for legitimacy within the framework of international law. Consequently, the resulting joint defense mechanism aims to serve as a deterrent not only at the regional level but also in the eyes of global actors.

Outcome of regional developments

It is evident that the agreement goes beyond a merely symbolic initiative. In this regard, the normalization process between Turkey and Saudi Arabia since 2022 and the subsequent acceleration of strategic cooperation, followed by Saudi Arabia’s move to expedite its rapprochement with Pakistan in the security context, culminating in the signing of the Joint Strategic Defense Agreement in 2025, have been the key driving forces behind this process. President Erdoğan’s emphasis on defense industry cooperation during his visit to Saudi Arabia at the start of the year, along with signals of joint investment in the KAAN National Fighter Aircraft, also demonstrate that the signing in Mecca was the result of a process that had been under way for some time.

Beyond its strategic and symbolic significance, the Mecca Agreement is of critical importance given the context in which it emerged. The growing regional instability following the war launched by the US and Israel against Iran on 28 February has led all countries to seek alternatives. When compounded by Israel’s continued pursuit of aggressive and expansionist policies and Washington’s silence in the face of these developments, the confidence of many regional actors, particularly the Gulf states, in the traditional security architecture has been permanently shaken. Furthermore, the US’s failure to provide the expected security umbrella to the Gulf states, whose vulnerabilities were laid bare by Iran’s attacks, has eroded these actors’ trust in traditional security guarantors. Consequently, Washington’s inconsistency in providing protection to its allies during times of crisis has driven regional capitals to diversify their own security arrangements.

Signed against this backdrop, the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement can be seen as a concrete outcome of the quest to reduce dependence on external security guarantees and to build an intra-regional deterrence mechanism amongst regional actors. From Türkiye’s perspective, this step constitutes a key pillar of its long-stated vision for a regional security architecture. In line with the initiatives it has taken in recent years, Ankara has played a critical role in intensifying cooperation amongst regional actors. During this process, Türkiye has strengthened its cooperation with countries including the Gulf states, as well as Egypt and Pakistan, and has sought to implement partnerships across various sectors.

During this process, one of the areas on which Türkiye has placed particular emphasis has been partnerships in the defense industry. Viewed in this context, it should also be noted that, beyond its security dimension, the Mecca Agreement provides a framework for deepening cooperation in the defense industry. Saudi Arabia’s preference and policies in recent years to transition from the role of a customer to that of a co-producer in the procurement of defense industry products have led to concrete steps being taken in this context between Ankara and Riyadh. In this regard, Türkiye has demonstrated its commitment by signing agreements with Saudi Arabia on the joint production of unmanned aerial vehicles, radar technologies, anti-tank guided missiles and other defense industry products.

Defense projects between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia

Indeed, Türkiye has successfully concluded its negotiations with Saudi Arabia regarding the co-production of the Gökbey national helicopter project, and an agreement was signed in February 2026 between TUSAŞ and the Saudi Arabian Defense Industries Organization. It is expected that the Mecca Agreement will not only strengthen the joint security mechanism but also increase such collaborations in the defense industry sector. It can be argued that, in the coming period, this initiative will not only go beyond security cooperation but also pave the way for deepening economic ties between the three countries.

Although the Mecca Agreement was signed between the three countries, President Erdoğan stated in his announcement that this security initiative is open to the participation of all countries. At this stage, it can be said that countries such as Qatar and Egypt are likely to be among those adopting a positive stance towards this security architecture in the initial phase. Given that it adopts an inclusive approach rather than an exclusionary one, unlike certain alliances that have emerged in the region in the past, it can also be noted that this alliance is set to play a strategic role in the future of the regional security architecture.

On the other hand, it remains unclear what impact the differences in foreign policy priorities and the relative divergence in threat perceptions between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will have within the context of the agreement. Indeed, the fact that Turkey’s security priorities, centered on Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean, do not align with Saudi Arabia’s threat perception, which is largely centred on Iran, or with Pakistan’s security reflexes, which are focused on India, may be seen as a constraint. However, it can be argued that the impact of this divergence on the practical feasibility of the agreement will also be limited. Indeed, the fundamental dynamic behind the tripartite alliance is not so much divergent perceptions as shared, concrete threats. This situation forms the basis for the consolidation of power and a shared security vision along the Ankara-Riyadh-Islamabad axis.

The Joint Defense Agreement signed in Mecca stands out as an initiative that clearly sets out the signatory countries’ perspectives. This agreement, which can be seen as the tangible outcome of regional actors’ quest to build their own security amongst themselves, a quest directly influenced by the hardships caused by the interventions of external actors, serves as the nucleus of a far more comprehensive regional security architecture. At this juncture, it seems inevitable that Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which have so far acted within the framework of a shared vision, will move towards a much stronger alliance should they align their foreign policy orientations, harmonize their strategic objectives and integrate their security capabilities.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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urkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Wednesday that Türkiye  would continue to strongly defend the Palestinian cause, as he met Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in Ankara for talks on Gaza, the West Bank and efforts to establish an independent Palestinian state.

Speaking at a joint news conference after the meeting, Erdoğan said Türkiye  was working with the Palestinians to advance the Palestinian cause on the basis of a two-state solution. He accused the Israeli government of continuing what he described as unlawful actions in the West Bank and Jerusalem, including settlement expansion, demolitions and forced displacement.

According to United Nations figures cited by Erdoğan, about 3,800 Palestinians had been displaced in 2026 as a result of settler violence, demolitions and evictions, while nearly 100 Palestinians had been killed.

“Palestinian statehood is being undermined,” Erdoğan said, adding that the international community could not ignore what was happening. He said Palestinian support was a shared responsibility, particularly for the Muslim world.

Erdoğan calls for Palestinian state

Erdoğan said he and Abbas discussed developments in the occupied Palestinian territories as well as bilateral relations. He also welcomed the decision to hold Palestinian legislative and presidential elections, saying they could contribute to reconciliation and strengthen Palestinian unity.

The Turkish president said Ankara opposed attempts to alter the status quo at Muslim and Christian holy sites, particularly the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem and the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron.

He accused the Israeli government of seeking to benefit from instability and new conflicts while pushing the Palestinian issue out of international attention.

“Whatever they do, they will not succeed,” Erdoğan said, adding that Türkiye  would continue supporting the Palestinian cause “on every platform.”

He reiterated Türkiye ‘s support for the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital and with territorial continuity.

On Gaza, Erdoğan said Israel’s government continued to take what he described as an uncompromising and aggressive approach despite international efforts and Palestinian calls for peace.

He called for conditions to be established quickly for reconstruction in Gaza and for ensuring security for its population.

Abbas thanks Türkiye for support

Abbas thanked Erdoğan and Türkiye  for their support for Palestinian rights and for providing humanitarian assistance to Gaza, hosting Palestinian students and treating patients and wounded people.

He said the two leaders had held productive discussions on regional developments and bilateral relations and agreed to strengthen dialogue between Türkiye  and Palestine.

Abbas also welcomed the recent joint defense agreement between Türkiye , Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, describing it as potentially important for regional stability and security and for protecting the interests of Muslim countries.

He said a just peace could only be achieved by ending the occupation and establishing an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, in accordance with international law and the Arab Peace Initiative.

Abbas said a ceasefire agreement in Gaza had been reached through efforts by Türkiye , Egypt, Qatar and the United States, but warned that humanitarian aid had yet to enter Gaza at the level needed. He also called for reconstruction and the return of legitimate Palestinian authority to Gaza.

“Gaza is an integral part of the State of Palestine,” Abbas said, emphasizing that there could be no Palestinian state without Gaza.

He also said the Palestinian Authority faced serious financial difficulties, claiming Israel was withholding about $6.5 billion in Palestinian funds, affecting the government’s ability to pay salaries and cover expenses in Gaza.

Settler violence in the West Bank and Jerusalem

Abbas said he and Erdoğan also discussed escalating tensions and settler violence in the West Bank and Jerusalem. He accused Israeli settlers of acting under the protection of Israeli forces and said attacks had targeted Muslim and Christian holy sites alike.

“We are standing firm on our land and are opposed to displacement,” Abbas said.

He stressed the importance of Palestinian unity and said the Palestine Liberation Organization remained committed to a unified political program and national institutions.

Abbas also said Palestinians were preparing for legislative and presidential elections scheduled for November 28, describing them as an important step toward strengthening the Palestinian political system.

The Palestinian president ended by thanking Erdoğan for Türkiye ‘s support and expressing hope that Palestinians would achieve independence and freedom while peace and stability returned to the region.

Both leaders also expressed condolences following the crash of a Turkish F-16 fighter jet during a training flight in Yalova.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

S

yria and Russia have reached an agreement that will significantly reshape Moscow’s military presence along Syria’s Mediterranean coast, with Damascus set to take control of two strategically important facilities previously used as Russian military outposts.

Under the agreement announced by Syria’s Foreign Ministry, Syria will assume control of the Hmeimem air base near Latakia and the commercial berth at Tartus port as part of its civil administration. Military facilities at both locations will instead be transformed into joint training and qualification centers.

The ministry described the arrangement as a “reorganizing of the Russian presence” along Syria’s coast and said it represented the most significant development since negotiations began about a year and a half ago.

Russia’s military presence in Syria

Russia had been the most important political and military ally of former President Bashar Assad throughout Syria’s civil war. The Hmeimem air base and Tartus naval facility became central pillars of Russia’s military presence in the eastern Mediterranean, allowing Moscow to project air and naval power into the region.

The agreement comes after Assad was overthrown following a lightning insurgency. Russia did not intervene to prevent his removal but subsequently granted asylum to Assad and his family. Russian forces remaining in Syria have gradually withdrawn since the change of government.

Despite the reduction of Russia’s military role, Syria’s new leadership has sought to maintain relations with Moscow. Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa has visited Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow twice since taking power, with the future of the two Mediterranean facilities among the key issues discussed.

The latest agreement does not appear to end Russian-Syrian cooperation altogether. Instead, the conversion of the military facilities into joint training centers suggests that Damascus and Moscow intend to preserve some form of defense and institutional relationship while reducing Russia’s role as a military power stationed on Syrian territory.

Russia had not immediately issued a public comment on the agreement.

Syria’s new foreign policy

The development also reflects a broader transformation in Syria’s foreign policy following Assad’s fall. While Damascus has maintained ties with Moscow, it has simultaneously strengthened relations with Western governments and neighboring Arab states that had distanced themselves from Syria during Assad’s crackdown on opposition protests.

The United States has lifted most of its sanctions on Syria, while European countries have also begun rebuilding diplomatic relations with Damascus.

French President Emmanuel Macron visited Syria in July, during which he announced that France and Syria would appoint ambassadors for the first time in 14 years.

The shift has placed Syria at the center of a wider geopolitical realignment. For years, Russia’s military presence in Syria provided Moscow with a strategic foothold in the Mediterranean and helped sustain Assad’s government. The new arrangement indicates that this role is now being substantially reduced under Syria’s new leadership.

For Damascus, taking control of Hmeimem and the commercial facilities at Tartus represents an important assertion of sovereignty over strategic infrastructure. For Moscow, maintaining joint training facilities could preserve elements of its longstanding relationship with Syria even as its former military footprint is scaled back.

The agreement is likely to become an important marker of Syria’s transition from the Assad era, as the country seeks to balance its longstanding relationship with Russia against growing engagement with Türkiye Europe, the United States and Arab countries.

(Source: CNN)