U

.S. envoy Jared Kushner said Monday that the United States would not support rebuilding Gaza until Hamas gives up its weapons, as Israel continues carrying out attacks across the devastated Palestinian territory.

Kushner made the remarks after meeting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in an effort to advance a U.S.-backed roadmap for ending the genocide. The meeting did not produce a breakthrough, with major disagreements remaining over Hamas’ disarmament and an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza.

“We have a plan to rebuild Gaza, but we will not allow Gaza to be rebuilt until the demilitarization occurs,” Kushner told Fox News.

He said Washington did not want reconstruction funds to be invested in Gaza if the territory could again become a battlefield.

Disarmament remains key dispute

Hamas had agreed to disarm as part of the U.S.-backed proposal, which would also involve an Israeli withdrawal and an end to attacks on Gaza. Israel, however, rejected the proposal earlier this month, saying it would not make concessions until Gaza was fully demilitarized.

Kushner appeared to align closely with Israel’s position, emphasizing that Hamas would need to surrender its weapons before major reconstruction and Israeli withdrawal could proceed.

“We’re also not going to restrict Israel’s right to defend itself if there are any imminent threats,” Kushner said, adding that Washington had sought to clarify what that provision would mean.

His comments came despite President Donald Trump earlier Monday calling for an end to Israeli attacks on Gaza.

“Israelis should not be striking in Gaza. Hamas agreed to lay down their weapons,” Trump said.

Israel has continued launching near-daily attacks on the territory. According to the figures cited by Al Jazeera, at least 1,265 Palestinians have been killed in Gaza since a ceasefire came into effect last year. The broader Israeli war on Gaza has killed more than 73,000 Palestinians since October 2023, according to the same source.

U.S. pushes Gaza roadmap

Kushner also met Hamas officials on Sunday in a rare direct encounter as Washington seeks to move its Gaza plan forward. He described the discussions as “very cordial” but said the United States would judge Hamas by its actions rather than its promises.

“They said all the right things,” Kushner said, while expressing skepticism about the group’s willingness to fulfill its commitments.

He said Hamas could potentially surrender its weapons and tunnels within 60 to 90 days, describing such an outcome as a major security gain for Israel.

Kushner warned that if Hamas failed to follow through, the group would lose international support and Israel would have greater backing from Washington and other countries to continue military action.

The U.S. envoy also argued that the proposed agreement would benefit Israel by removing what he described as a major security threat.

The dispute over reconstruction highlights one of the central obstacles to the U.S.-backed plan. Gaza has suffered enormous destruction during the Israeli genocide, creating an urgent need for housing, infrastructure, health care and other basic services.

Washington has remained a major supporter of Israel throughout the genocide. According to Al Jazeera, the United States has provided Israel with about $25 billion in military aid over the past three years and has defended the Israeli government at international forums.

The latest diplomatic efforts come as Washington attempts to reconcile its calls for an end to the fighting with Israel’s demand for Hamas’ complete disarmament before any broader political settlement.

For Palestinians in Gaza, however, the continuation of Israeli strikes and the conditions attached to reconstruction leave the territory’s future uncertain, even as international efforts seek to establish a lasting ceasefire and begin rebuilding.

)Source: Aljazeera English)

W

hilst the Middle East region has undergone significant change and transformation as a result of the attacks launched by Israel from 7 October 2023 onwards, the US-Israel–Iran war that began on 28 February 2026 has further fuelled this change, pushing it to a point of no return. For had these events not occurred, the ‘Mecca Joint Defence Agreement’, signed on 7 August 2026 between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, might not have been possible.

Developments necessitating “regional ownership”

Türkiye’s long-standing stance that the region’s problems should be resolved by the countries of the region themselves – a concept defined by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan as “regional ownership” – had not received sufficient support from the countries of the region. Whilst the reasons behind this may vary from country to country, ultimately external interventions aimed at resolving the region’s problems have failed to heal the wounds; on the contrary, they have either caused existing wounds to bleed anew or allowed them to simply harden into calluses without being resolved. Consequently, it has become apparent that interventions in the region—particularly from the West and, of course, the US—have failed to produce results and have not brought peace and stability to the region.

However, following the events that began on 7 October 2023, Israel’s adoption of a revisionist policy towards the region—believing that the conditions were favourable—and its subsequent attacks targeting not only Gaza and the West Bank but also Lebanon, Syria and Iran, have led to a shift in the preconceptions held by countries in the region towards Türkiye.

For whilst it is evident that almost all of the Western countries expected to resolve the region’s problems have taken sides in the war between Russia and Ukraine, providing Ukraine with billions of dollars in aid as well as both political and military support; whilst Israel’s razing of Gaza, massacred over 73,000 people and committed a massive genocide; deepened its annexation of the West Bank; gradually sought to alter the status of the Al-Aqsa Mosque; occupied southern Lebanon and attempted to provoke a civil war there; and, as if its decades-long occupation of the Golan Heights—which is Syrian territory —as if that were not enough—it unilaterally suspended the 1974 agreement following the revolution on 8 December 2024, occupied further Syrian territory, and sought to prevent Syria from achieving stability by manipulating the Druze and the SDG/PKK terrorist organisations.

The extent to which external actors remain indifferent to crises or conflicts in our region has once again been exposed in the war against Iran. For just as it is unjust and wrong for an actor such as the US to fall into Israel’s trap and attack Iran, it is equally wrong for other Western countries not to have taken the initiative to dissuade the US from this war, as was the case with Ukraine. Although these countries—the majority of which are also NATO members—were called upon by the US to deploy troops to open the blockaded Strait of Hormuz – although this was not in accordance with NATO regulations – they did not heed this call and, whilst not becoming directly involved in the war, they made their stance clear by expanding sanctions against Iran rather than exerting pressure on Israel to bring the war to an end.

During this war, Iran’s decision to attack Gulf states and other countries hosting US bases on their territory – rather than Israel and the US, which were directly attacking it – both because they were relatively easier targets and with the intention of indirectly exerting pressure on the US, has once again demonstrated the importance of regional ownership.

Israel’s revisionist policies and the perception of threats by regional countries

All these developments have made a mechanism such as the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement imperative, with the aim of thwarting the plans of a country like Israel—which, despite its small size, seeks to destabilize the region and derive benefit from the situation by leveraging its lobbying power in the US and Europe and relying on their support—and to establish a new status quo. Furthermore, whilst Israel recently proposed an alignment strategy—such as the “hexagon bloc”—which has yet to materialize on the ground, the formation of a counter-front by countries outside this bloc that perceive the current developments as a threat to their national interests must be regarded as inevitable.

Despite the security guarantees the US has provided to the Gulf states to date, the fact that these states have been exposed to Iranian attacks during the war against Iran has not only called into question the reliability of US guarantees in the Gulf, but has also inevitably led to a search for alternatives regarding the future of the region’s security architecture. It is therefore highly likely that the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement will address this necessity; in particular, should the US withdraw from the region following the war with Iran, it is conceivable that it might be open to entrusting the region’s security to three key and powerful allies: Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the fact that the US has not made any negative statements regarding the Mecca Agreement to date is interpreted in this light and reinforces the view that there is coordination between the signatory countries and the US.

Why is the agreement so important?

Among the key factors that make the agreement significant are the characteristics and capabilities of the signatory countries. Türkiye, for instance, is not only a NATO member but also a candidate country for the EU and has made significant strides in the defense industry in recent years. It is therefore an indispensable actor for both the Middle East and the European security architecture. Pakistan, meanwhile, is the only Muslim country to possess nuclear weapons and also has a substantial population. As for Saudi Arabia, it stands out as a key player not only due to its abundant energy resources but also because of its strategic location at the crossroads of global trade routes. Furthermore, as a leading figure in both the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League, and as the custodian of Islam’s holy sites, it is an actor held in high regard and whose word carries weight among both Arab and Muslim states.

The coming together of these three major powers to form a defense alliance would create a synergy whose effects are likely to extend beyond the region. Furthermore, should this agreement be successfully implemented, it would inevitably create a domino effect, making it likely that other countries in the region would join the agreement. Considering similar initiatives that have been attempted at various times but could never be brought to a conclusion due to both regional and circumstantial conditions, the most significant impact of this agreement, as of today, is that it stands as the sole development capable of curbing Israel’s aggressive, occupying and expansionist regional vision. Not only will the Abraham Accords no longer hold any appeal for countries in the region, but it is also understood that, should the US withdraw from the region following a war against Iran, the new security architecture of the region will be centered on the new pact established by this agreement.

What will the agreement provide for the signatory countries?

This agreement is of a defensive nature, aimed at protecting the signatories from attacks by other countries; in this way, it offers the signatory countries a security guarantee similar to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Türkiye’s current capabilities, Pakistan’s nuclear power and Saudi Arabia’s financial support not only demonstrate the agreement’s capacity and potential but also serve as a powerful deterrent to any actors seeking to attack one of the signatory states.

Consequently, in addition to Türkiye’s NATO membership, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement has now emerged as the sole agreement in the region offering an additional defense guarantee to regional countries, and it has been announced that the agreement remains open to new participants. Although it has been stated in the announcements that no specific country is being targeted, it is clear that a strong deterrent has been created for those with designs on the region – particularly Israel – or those claiming to shape its future.

Whilst there are no doubts regarding the agreement’s deterrent effect, as we do not yet possess detailed information on the nature of the agreement, it is not fully known how a response would be mounted in the event of an attack on any of the signatory states. Furthermore, given the geographical locations of the signatory states—particularly Pakistan’s relatively remote position—it is difficult to predict how such a response would be carried out. However, despite all these uncertainties, the implementation of such an arrangement in our region is of great importance.

T

urkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Wednesday that Türkiye  would continue to strongly defend the Palestinian cause, as he met Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in Ankara for talks on Gaza, the West Bank and efforts to establish an independent Palestinian state.

Speaking at a joint news conference after the meeting, Erdoğan said Türkiye  was working with the Palestinians to advance the Palestinian cause on the basis of a two-state solution. He accused the Israeli government of continuing what he described as unlawful actions in the West Bank and Jerusalem, including settlement expansion, demolitions and forced displacement.

According to United Nations figures cited by Erdoğan, about 3,800 Palestinians had been displaced in 2026 as a result of settler violence, demolitions and evictions, while nearly 100 Palestinians had been killed.

“Palestinian statehood is being undermined,” Erdoğan said, adding that the international community could not ignore what was happening. He said Palestinian support was a shared responsibility, particularly for the Muslim world.

Erdoğan calls for Palestinian state

Erdoğan said he and Abbas discussed developments in the occupied Palestinian territories as well as bilateral relations. He also welcomed the decision to hold Palestinian legislative and presidential elections, saying they could contribute to reconciliation and strengthen Palestinian unity.

The Turkish president said Ankara opposed attempts to alter the status quo at Muslim and Christian holy sites, particularly the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem and the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron.

He accused the Israeli government of seeking to benefit from instability and new conflicts while pushing the Palestinian issue out of international attention.

“Whatever they do, they will not succeed,” Erdoğan said, adding that Türkiye  would continue supporting the Palestinian cause “on every platform.”

He reiterated Türkiye ‘s support for the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital and with territorial continuity.

On Gaza, Erdoğan said Israel’s government continued to take what he described as an uncompromising and aggressive approach despite international efforts and Palestinian calls for peace.

He called for conditions to be established quickly for reconstruction in Gaza and for ensuring security for its population.

Abbas thanks Türkiye for support

Abbas thanked Erdoğan and Türkiye  for their support for Palestinian rights and for providing humanitarian assistance to Gaza, hosting Palestinian students and treating patients and wounded people.

He said the two leaders had held productive discussions on regional developments and bilateral relations and agreed to strengthen dialogue between Türkiye  and Palestine.

Abbas also welcomed the recent joint defense agreement between Türkiye , Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, describing it as potentially important for regional stability and security and for protecting the interests of Muslim countries.

He said a just peace could only be achieved by ending the occupation and establishing an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, in accordance with international law and the Arab Peace Initiative.

Abbas said a ceasefire agreement in Gaza had been reached through efforts by Türkiye , Egypt, Qatar and the United States, but warned that humanitarian aid had yet to enter Gaza at the level needed. He also called for reconstruction and the return of legitimate Palestinian authority to Gaza.

“Gaza is an integral part of the State of Palestine,” Abbas said, emphasizing that there could be no Palestinian state without Gaza.

He also said the Palestinian Authority faced serious financial difficulties, claiming Israel was withholding about $6.5 billion in Palestinian funds, affecting the government’s ability to pay salaries and cover expenses in Gaza.

Settler violence in the West Bank and Jerusalem

Abbas said he and Erdoğan also discussed escalating tensions and settler violence in the West Bank and Jerusalem. He accused Israeli settlers of acting under the protection of Israeli forces and said attacks had targeted Muslim and Christian holy sites alike.

“We are standing firm on our land and are opposed to displacement,” Abbas said.

He stressed the importance of Palestinian unity and said the Palestine Liberation Organization remained committed to a unified political program and national institutions.

Abbas also said Palestinians were preparing for legislative and presidential elections scheduled for November 28, describing them as an important step toward strengthening the Palestinian political system.

The Palestinian president ended by thanking Erdoğan for Türkiye ‘s support and expressing hope that Palestinians would achieve independence and freedom while peace and stability returned to the region.

Both leaders also expressed condolences following the crash of a Turkish F-16 fighter jet during a training flight in Yalova.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

T

he 36th NATO Summit, held in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026, saw US President Trump state that he had attended the summit solely out of respect for President Erdoğan; the ‘NATO 3.0’ agenda was realized; and, contrary to some experts’ expectations, there was no rift within the alliance. Türkiye’s excellent hosting, which continues to make the country the talk of the town, the efforts by the Israeli delegation throughout the summit to shift the agenda and overshadow the summit were equally striking.

The main factor driving Israel to make such desperate moves was Trump’s pre-summit remarks, in which he suggested that Türkiye might be supplied with F-110 jet engines and the fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets—which had been withheld since 2019—and that the CAATSA sanctions, in place since 2020, might be lifted. On the other hand, Türkiye’s hosting of the summit during such a critical period, President Erdoğan’s meetings on the sidelines of the summit with over 40 heads of state and government on the sidelines of the summit, and, of course, the organization of a defense industry exhibition showcasing Türkiye’s national and domestically produced defence industry products – a first in NATO history – have driven Israel to distraction.

The most significant reason driving Israel to such a state of exasperation and pushing it to make irrational moves is the sense of insecurity that has arisen both within Israel and in the American public sphere due to the stalemate in the war against Iran and the fact that, contrary to promises, an absolute victory has not yet been achieved. Conversely, the fact that Türkiye is viewed as one of the factors hindering Israel’s success due to its role in the war against Iran, coupled with the fact that relations between Türkiye and the US have come to take precedence over those between Israel and the US, is seen as a cause setting off alarm bells and leading Israel to pull out all the stops simultaneously.

It would therefore be useful to highlight the ‘Israel factor’ in Turkish-American relations by examining the rivalry between Türkiye and Israel, mediated through the US and Trump, and the methods Israel employed to persuade the Trump administration to withdraw its support for Türkiye.

Israel’s divergent stance as Turkish-US relations improve

Despite the improvement in Turkish-US relations during Trump’s first term—following the strained relations of Obama’s second term, which is regarded as a crisis period—full normalization could not be achieved due to the dominance of the Zionist lobby over Trump. Indeed, despite all claims of an improvement in bilateral relations, the Pastor Brunson crisis, the Halkbank crisis, threats of economic attacks and the imposition of CAATSA sanctions on Türkiye following its exclusion from the F-35 program all took place during the Trump era. Following the Biden era, which was marked by very frosty Turkish-American relations, Trump’s second presidential term was of paramount importance for both Türkiye and Israel, and both countries had high expectations of Trump from their respective perspectives.

However, Trump had not forgotten what he had gone through after losing the 2020 election; whilst he projected a warm image to the public, it was said that behind the scenes he had distanced himself from Netanyahu, viewing the latter’s relationship with Biden as a betrayal. At the same time, he did not hesitate to publicly express his affection and respect for President Erdoğan, thereby drawing a clear distinction between Erdoğan and Netanyahu. We saw the repercussions of this distinction clearly when, due to developments in Syria, Netanyahu complained to Trump at the White House about Türkiye and President Erdoğan. Indeed, Trump’s response to Netanyahu – “you must be reasonable too” – caused great disappointment on the Israeli side, whilst in Türkiye it was interpreted as Trump taking Türkiye’s side.

Similarly, whilst Trump supported Israel’s attacks on Gaza on the one hand, he did not remain indifferent to the prospect of reaching a ceasefire in Gaza through Türkiyey’s mediation on the other. Similarly, regarding developments in Syria, he has aligned himself closely with Türkiye’s position; despite all of Israel’s objections, he recognised Ahmed Shara as a legitimate interlocutor and provided the necessary support to ensure Syria’s territorial integrity.

The speeches and pledges made by Trump during his Middle East tour in May and at the meeting he held in New York in September with the heads of state and government of Muslim countries, on the occasion of the opening of the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly, are also significant in that they demonstrate that the US occupies a different position from Israel regarding the region’s future. This is because the ceasefire process in Gaza began after this date.

The Iran card

Realizing it could not influence Trump through Gaza and Syria, Israel attempted to win him over by playing the Iran card; however, it was once again disappointed when, in June 2025, despite Trump ordering strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities during the 12-Day War, he refrained from intervening in the conflict. However, by any means necessary, Israel managed to drag the US into war with Iran on 28 February, hoping that this would enable it to achieve the regime change in Iran it had long dreamt of and thereby reorganise the region as it saw fit. Yet Israel’s plans failed, and the Iranian people reacted strongly against the assassination of their religious leader, standing firmly behind their government.

The deadlock in the war with Iran has, on the one hand, led the US to reassess its approach to the region, whilst on the other, it has prompted a re-evaluation of its alliance with Israel. It was during this period that Türkiye stepped in once again; together with Qatar and Pakistan, it opened the door to negotiations, making it possible to secure a ceasefire between the US and Iran. Israel, however, found itself isolated as the sole country wishing for the war to continue; whilst continuing its attacks on the Lebanese front, it began doing everything in its power to undermine the ceasefire between the US and Iran.

Israel’s stance has been criticised on numerous occasions by both Trump and Vice-President JD Vance. The events unfolding in the region are particularly telling in demonstrating just how hollow Israel’s long-standing rhetoric about ‘actors posing a threat to it in the region’ really is. For far from certain actors in the region posing a threat to Israel, it has become undeniable that Israel itself constitutes a threat to the entire region and is the sole actor destabilising the region.

This situation has also put a strain on the so-called unshakeable alliance between Israel and the US. For Israel, particularly due to the aggressive and intransigent policies it has pursued under Netanyahu’s leadership, has become an unbearable burden for the US. Given this, it has become inevitable for the Trump administration to opt to work alongside a strong, conciliatory actor such as Türkiye, which prioritises regional stability. However, this situation has thoroughly infuriated Israel. Believing itself to be—and to remain—the US’s sole ally in the region, Israel has jeopardised both its own future and the region’s stability by resorting to endless intrigues aimed at discrediting, and even weakening, the US’s other regional ally, Türkiye.

Israel’s attempts to overshadow the NATO Summit

Türkiye is the country that has shown the strongest reaction to Israel’s attacks on Gaza and the crimes of genocide it has committed there. Whilst, on the one hand, it has given concrete expression to its response by imposing certain sanctions on Israel in accordance with its own domestic law, on the other hand, it is monitoring proceedings before both the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice, and is fighting to ensure that Israel is brought to justice and receives the necessary punishment for the genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity it has committed. In addition to this, Türkiye’s position regarding developments in Syria and its role in the Iran War have led Israel to target Türkiye, giving rise to the narrative that ‘after Iran, the new target is Türkiye’.

At a time when Israel was attempting to position Türkiye as the ‘new Iran’, and just before the critical NATO summit, Trump’s announcement to Türkiye that F-110 jet engines and F-35 fighter jets would be supplied, and that CAATSA sanctions would be lifted, naturally caused the Israeli administration to panic. As a result, Netanyahu—who had been unable to reach Trump in the run-up to the summit—appeared on US media outlets during the summit, stating: “Türkiye is not a good ally; Israel is the US’s true ally, the sale of F-35s to Türkiye would jeopardize Israel’s security and that of other US allies in the region (by which he meant Greece and the Greek Cypriots), and the CAATSA sanctions imposed on Türkiye must never be lifted”, in an attempt to influence American public opinion and, thereby, exert pressure on Trump to back down.

Whilst the whole world was discussing just how wonderfully Türkiye had hosted the summit, noting that, thanks to President Erdoğan, differences of opinion within NATO had not spilled over into the summit, and that, ultimately, a consensus had emerged in the final communiqué regarding the strengthening of NATO—and whilst praise for Türkiye was at its peak— it has been observed that certain journalists—who are clearly funded by Israel and Jewish capital—have been questioning Türkiye’s role within NATO, criticizing the security measures taken for the summit, and, worse still, raising issues that have absolutely no connection to the summit and relate entirely to processes governed by Türkiye’s domestic law, thereby asking questions and writing articles aimed at creating the perception that there is no democracy or fair trial in Türkiye.

At the conclusion of the summit, the fact that Israel was found to be behind the so-called intelligence suggesting a possible attack on the new Air Force One aircraft—a gift from Qatar which Trump used on his visit to Ankara—was viewed as an attempt by Israel to cast a shadow over the summit. Furthermore, by doing so, they sought to spread the perception that Türkiye is unsafe, whilst also sabotaging the process by presenting a pretext to derail the negotiations between the US and Iran. It must not be forgotten that, in the world, the sole country capable of carrying out such attacks is Israel rather than Iran, and history is replete with examples of this.

T

housands of Palestinians gathered in Gaza City on Tuesday for one of the largest mass funerals since the start of the genocide, mourning 112 members of the Abu Shreia and al-Hassaina families whose remains were recovered from beneath the rubble nearly three years after an Israeli airstrike destroyed their homes.

The funeral, held in the Sabra neighborhood, marked the first time many relatives had been able to bury their loved ones since the attack in November 2023, when entire extended families were killed and buried under collapsed buildings.

Rows of white body bags containing the recovered remains were carried through the streets as mourners wept, prayed and scattered flowers from balconies overlooking the funeral procession. The ceremony brought together thousands of relatives, neighbors and residents, many of whom said the burial reopened wounds that had never healed.

For 39-year-old Lara Abu Shreia, the funeral was the painful conclusion of nearly three years of waiting.

“Today felt like the first day I lost them,” she said. “It was a renewed grief, saying goodbye to them this way.”

The November 22, 2023 strike destroyed her family’s residential compound in Sabra while she, her husband and their five children had already been displaced to southern Gaza following Israeli evacuation orders issued at the start of the genocide.

Fourteen of her closest relatives were killed, including her mother, Nawal, eight siblings and several nieces and nephews.

“My family disappeared almost in one moment,” she said.

Everyone was trapped under the rubble

While displaced in southern Gaza, Lara remained in regular contact with one of her sisters whenever communications allowed. On the night the attack occurred, she learned that airstrikes had hit Sabra but initially hoped the silence from her family was due to communication outages that frequently affected Gaza during the genocide.

Instead, her husband received the devastating news that the family compound had been destroyed and everyone inside was trapped beneath the rubble.

For months, Lara struggled to accept the loss.

When she returned to northern Gaza after the fighting eased, she visited the destroyed home, hoping against all odds that someone had survived.

“I kept telling myself maybe they were playing a trick on me. Maybe someone was hiding,” she recalled. “Maybe I will find someone we didn’t know about.”

Instead, she found only ruins.

In recent weeks, Palestinian Civil Defense teams began extensive recovery operations at the site, eventually retrieving 112 sets of remains from buildings where officials believe 153 people had been buried.

The operation was among the largest recovery missions conducted since the war began.

Mahmoud Basal, spokesperson for Gaza’s Civil Defense, described the funeral as unprecedented.

“Today, 112 martyrs are being buried in one funeral for the first time in the history of the Palestinian cause,” he said.

8,000 bodies remain under the rubble in Gaza

According to Civil Defense estimates, more than 8,000 bodies remain trapped beneath collapsed buildings across Gaza.

Recovery efforts have been hampered by extensive destruction, damaged infrastructure and a shortage of heavy equipment needed to clear debris safely.

“We need the capabilities and equipment to enter Gaza so Civil Defense teams can carry out this humanitarian mission,” Basal said.

He added that in many cases identifying victims has become increasingly difficult after years beneath the rubble.

“Some bodies have disappeared. Some have evaporated. Some have been scattered into very small pieces, making identification extremely difficult,” he said.

For Lara, witnessing the recovery process became a personal necessity despite relatives urging her to stay away.

“I told them, ‘I want to see. Even if it is just a bone, I want to see something from them,'” she said.

Another relative, 50-year-old Ali Abu Shreia, also lost two brothers and their entire families in the attack.

He said the strikes unfolded rapidly as relatives moved between houses in search of safety before gathering in the home of Mufeed al-Hassaina, a former Palestinian minister of public works and housing.

“They thought they would be safe, but the war machine did not distinguish between civilians, homes or families,” he said.

Ali described the victims as ordinary civilians with no military role.

“They were business owners, traders, people active in their community,” he said. “Seven families were completely erased from the civil registry.”

The funeral highlighted the enduring humanitarian consequences of the war, which has left thousands of people officially listed as missing because their remains have never been recovered.

More families on the waiting list

Families across Gaza continue to wait for excavation teams to reach destroyed neighborhoods where relatives are believed to remain buried.

Civil Defense officials say the search continues across multiple locations, although limited equipment means many recovery operations progress slowly.

Tuesday’s ceremony brought together grieving families who had lived for years without graves to visit or funerals to attend.

As the procession wound through Sabra, elderly relatives, parents and children walked behind the rows of white body bags, many overcome with emotion after years of uncertainty.

Women standing on balconies overlooking the funeral scattered flower petals onto the procession below while prayers echoed through the neighborhood.

For Lara, however, the burial offered little sense of closure.

Instead, it marked the beginning of another chapter of grief.

“I wanted to hug the bag,” she said quietly. “I wanted to hug whatever remained of them.”

(Source: Aljazeera English)

T

he Democratic primary for Michigan’s open U.S. Senate seat has become one of the most expensive and closely watched congressional races in recent history, with pro-Israel lobbying group AIPAC and affiliated political action committees pouring more than $60 million into efforts to support U.S. Representative Haley Stevens and defeat progressive challenger Abdul El-Sayed. 

The race, which will determine the Democratic nominee to replace retiring Senator Gary Peters, has evolved into a national referendum on campaign finance, U.S. policy toward Israel and the growing influence of pro-Palestinian voices within the Democratic Party.

El-Sayed, a physician, epidemiologist and former public health official, has made opposition to outside political spending a central theme of his campaign, arguing that wealthy special interests are attempting to shape the outcome of the election. Stevens, a four-term congresswoman, has defended her record while distancing herself from the independent expenditures made on her behalf. 

According to Federal Election Commission records cited by Al Jazeera, AIPAC’s political arm, the United Democracy Project (UDP), has spent more than $30.6 million on the Michigan race, the largest expenditure by the organization in a single contest. Combined with spending by other political action committees and an estimated $6.5 million from a nonprofit advocacy group, outside support for Stevens has exceeded $60 million. 

The role of nonprofit organizations in U.S. elections

The spending has eclipsed previous records for Senate primaries and has intensified scrutiny of the role of super PACs and nonprofit organizations in U.S. elections.

AIPAC directs the United Democracy Project and is also its largest donor, contributing roughly $30 million of the PAC’s $100 million fundraising total this election cycle. The remaining funding comes largely from wealthy pro-Israel donors, including hedge fund manager Paul Singer, businessman Robert Kraft, investor Marc Rowan and entertainment executive Haim Saban, according to campaign finance disclosures. 

Additional support for Stevens has come through a network of newly established political committees and nonprofit organizations.

One of the largest, A Stronger Michigan, has spent more than $17 million and is backed primarily by the nonprofit Center Forward. Other committees, including Michigan Forward 2026, Center Forward Committee and Unite to Win, have also invested heavily in television advertising and voter outreach. Some of these groups receive funding from corporations, trade associations and nonprofits whose donors are not fully disclosed under U.S. campaign finance laws. 

Although the campaigns themselves cannot legally coordinate with independent expenditure groups, the unprecedented level of outside spending has dominated the political debate ahead of Tuesday’s primary.

Large Arab presence

At a campaign rally in Dearborn, a city with one of the country’s largest Arab American communities, supporters repeatedly criticized AIPAC rather than Stevens herself.

Michigan state legislator Alabas Farhat told supporters they would make the organization “burn” millions of dollars by electing El-Sayed, while several speakers, including Representatives Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar, criticized U.S. support for Israel’s military campaign in Gaza. 

El-Sayed has argued that Stevens’ campaign has become dependent on outside financial support tied to pro-Israel interests.

Speaking at a recent rally, he said America’s political system allows “billionaires and corporations and special interests like AIPAC to buy and sell politicians.” During a televised debate, he linked Stevens’ congressional votes supporting aid to Israel with the organization’s financial backing of her campaign. 

Stevens has rejected suggestions that the outside spending defines her candidacy.

During a recent debate, she argued that campaign finance reform remains a broader national issue affecting candidates across the political spectrum, saying there was little difference between super PACs supporting either campaign. Critics, however, point to the disparity in spending, noting that groups backing El-Sayed have spent only about $3.5 million. 

Strong grassroots fundraising

While outside groups have dominated television advertising, El-Sayed has outraised Stevens in direct campaign contributions from individual donors. Campaign finance records show El-Sayed has raised approximately $14.5 million compared with Stevens’ $11.9 million, reflecting strong grassroots fundraising despite the flood of independent expenditures supporting his opponent.

AIPAC has defended its involvement, saying it represents Americans who believe a strong U.S.-Israel relationship serves both countries’ interests.

The organization has rejected claims that it acts on behalf of a foreign government, describing itself as a coalition of pro-Israel Americans participating in the democratic process. In a recent message to supporters, AIPAC described the Michigan Senate contest as “critical.”

Political analysts say the outcome of the race could have implications far beyond Michigan.

A victory for El-Sayed would represent one of the highest-profile electoral successes for a progressive candidate critical of unconditional U.S. support for Israel and could signal changing attitudes among Democratic voters, particularly after months of debate over the wars in Gaza and the Middle East. Supporters argue such a result would weaken AIPAC’s influence within the Democratic Party, while opponents view the race as an important test of mainstream Democratic support for the U.S.-Israel alliance.

The contest also carries national political significance because the Michigan Senate seat is expected to be highly competitive in November. The Democratic nominee will likely face former Congressman Mike Rogers, and the outcome could help determine which party controls the U.S. Senate after the general election.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

I

ran transported Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders, military advisers, and missile- and drone-related equipment to Yemen earlier this month, according to four sources familiar with the matter, in a move that could strengthen the military capabilities of the Iran-aligned Houthi movement and increase threats to shipping in the Red Sea.

The sources, including two Iranian officials, Yemen’s information minister, and a regional security analyst, told Reuters that the personnel and equipment arrived aboard a Mahan Air flight that departed Tehran on July 13. The aircraft was reportedly bound for the Houthi-controlled capital, Sanaa, but diverted to the Red Sea port of Hodeidah after Sanaa International Airport came under attack by forces aligned with Yemen’s Saudi-backed government.

According to the two Iranian sources, between 10 and 21 IRGC personnel, including senior commanders, were aboard the flight. One source said the officers were deployed to support Houthi military operations and provide training on new missile systems. The source also alleged that Iran shipped gold on the aircraft to help finance Houthi activities.

Reuters could not independently verify the claims.

Iran denies allegations

Iran’s Foreign Ministry did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Tehran has consistently denied supplying the Houthis with missile capabilities or directing the group’s military operations.

Abdel Rahman al-Ahnomi, a Houthi media official who said he was on the flight, rejected the allegations, describing them as “lies and fabrications.” He said all passengers were civilians. The Houthis have repeatedly maintained that they develop their own weapons and are not acting as an Iranian proxy.

The reported deployment comes amid escalating regional tensions following renewed fighting involving Iran and the United States.

Three days after the reported flight, Reuters reported that Tehran had instructed the Houthis to prepare to close the Bab al-Mandab Strait if U.S. attacks targeted Iranian power infrastructure, raising concerns over global energy supplies and maritime security.

On Monday, the Houthis announced a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia, describing it as retaliation for the July 13 bombing of Sanaa airport, which they blamed on Saudi Arabia. The announcement effectively ended a four-year truce between Riyadh and the Houthis and heightened concerns over the security of one of the world’s busiest shipping routes.

The group later claimed responsibility for attacks on two Saudi oil tankers, further escalating tensions in the Red Sea.

Multiple confirmations

Yemen’s Information Minister Moammar al-Iryani confirmed to Reuters that IRGC personnel and military equipment had been transferred to Yemen, citing intelligence reports. He said their mission was to strengthen Houthi military capabilities and enable the group to threaten international maritime traffic through the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

Regional security analyst Mzahem Alsaloum also confirmed the arrival of the Iranian advisers, saying the cargo included components for short- and medium-range missiles and drones similar to systems previously used in attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Alsaloum further alleged that Iran had deployed military advisers to Yemen during last year’s conflict with Israel by routing them through Somalia, a claim Tehran has denied.

The reported transfer followed the resumption of direct flights between Tehran and Sanaa, which the Houthis say are intended to ease what they describe as a Saudi-imposed blockade on Yemen.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei said the July 13 flight was primarily intended to return a Houthi delegation that had traveled to Tehran to attend the funeral of Iran’s late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, along with Yemeni citizens who had received medical treatment in Iran.

According to the sources, the return flight also carried IRGC commanders and military advisers. Before landing in Sanaa, however, the aircraft diverted to Hodeidah after strikes targeted the airport.

The developments underscore growing concerns among regional governments and maritime security analysts that Yemen’s conflict could become increasingly intertwined with the broader confrontation between Iran and the United States, raising the risk of further disruption to international shipping through the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait.

(Source: Reuters)

A

n internal Israeli government document obtained by Al Jazeera has revealed that Israeli authorities collected information on more than 150 international humanitarian organizations in 2013, identifying several prominent charities as supporters or critics of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement against Israel.

The spreadsheet, accessed through an Israeli government ministry website, listed basic information on international charities, including directors’ names, contact details and areas of operation. A separate comments section, however, contained assessments of some organizations’ positions on Israel and the Palestinian issue.

Among the organizations singled out were Oxfam, which the document described as “active in global BDS efforts,” as well as France-based Première Urgence International, labelled a “critic of Israel,” Geneva-based Defense for Children International, described as “involved in anti-Israel campaigning,” and Spain’s Mundubat, characterized as “highly involved in BDS.”

Responding to the findings, Oxfam said the comments reflected allegations rather than objective assessments of its work.

The organization said it does not support or promote the BDS movement and operates under humanitarian principles and international legal standards. It reiterated its position that Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank violate international humanitarian law.

Experts say file shows early monitoring strategy

Analysts interviewed by Al Jazeera said the document offers insight into Israel’s approach to monitoring international civil society organizations during a period when the BDS movement was gaining international momentum.

The document dates from October 2013, a year marked by several high-profile boycott initiatives, including physicist Stephen Hawking’s withdrawal from a conference in Israel, academic boycott campaigns, and efforts by religious organizations to oppose products originating from Israeli settlements.

Mayssoun Sukarieh, a senior lecturer at King’s College London, said Israel was beginning to feel the impact of the growing BDS campaign and may have been gathering information that later informed legislation targeting boycott supporters.

In 2017, Israel enacted a law barring entry to foreign nationals who publicly support the BDS movement.

Tania Hary, executive director of the Israeli human rights organization Gisha, said the document demonstrated government monitoring of humanitarian organizations rather than addressing legitimate security concerns.

She argued the file reflected long-standing scrutiny of organizations providing assistance to Palestinians living under Israeli occupation.

Giovanni Fassina of the European Legal Support Center said the document illustrated what he described as an early phase of Israel’s broader efforts to track organizations supporting Palestinian rights.

NGOs respond

Several organizations named in the document disputed the characterizations.

Germany’s Medico International said it had never endorsed the BDS movement, although it supports the right of individuals and groups to advocate for boycotts as a form of political expression.

By contrast, the Palestine Solidarity Association of Sweden acknowledged its support for the BDS campaign, describing it as a nonviolent strategy aimed at promoting Palestinian rights and encouraging Israel to comply with international law.

The report comes amid continued debate over the relationship between Israel and international humanitarian organizations operating in the occupied Palestinian territories.

Aid groups have repeatedly raised concerns over restrictions on humanitarian access to Gaza, administrative requirements imposed on international organizations, and increased scrutiny of aid operations during the conflict that began in October 2023.

The Israeli Ministry of Welfare and Social Affairs, through whose website the document was reportedly accessed, did not respond to Al Jazeera’s request for comment.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

U

.S. Vice President JD Vance has accused members of the Israeli government of attempting to influence American public opinion against U.S. diplomatic efforts to end the war with Iran, describing the campaign as an effort to prolong the conflict.

In an interview with podcaster Joe Rogan released on Wednesday, Vance defended last month’s U.S.-Iran interim peace agreement and alleged that Israeli officials sought to derail negotiations through a coordinated influence campaign.

“I know beyond a shadow of a doubt that there have been people within the Israeli government who are trying to shift us away from that policy because they want to continue the military campaign,” Vance said.

The vice president cited a recent Time magazine report alleging that a former Trump campaign manager had been hired on behalf of Israel to oversee a digital campaign aimed at shaping American public opinion regarding Israel and the Iran conflict.

“There’s a literal foreign influence campaign being funded to tank the very deal that I was pursuing,” Vance said, adding that a “well-funded” effort had sought to undermine negotiations.

He also claimed that he had personally faced intense criticism because of his diplomatic outreach.

“People are attacking me viciously for quite literally trying to accomplish the negotiation objective that the president set for the country,” Vance said.

The issue becomes problematic

While acknowledging that allies and adversaries routinely attempt to influence U.S. policy, Vance said the issue becomes problematic when such campaigns shape American political decision-making.

“It doesn’t bother me that Israel tries to do this,” he said. “What does bother me is when those operations, those influence campaigns, actually affect American political judgement.”

Asked whether the United States would have entered the latest conflict with Iran without Israeli influence, Vance replied: “Yes, yes I do.”

He nevertheless reiterated President Donald Trump’s long-standing position that Iran should not acquire nuclear weapons.

“I think the president, separate from any influence from Israel, believes very strongly—and I agree with this—that Iran should not have a nuclear weapon,” Vance said.

The remarks highlight growing public differences between Washington and Israel over U.S. policy toward Iran, particularly following the collapse of last month’s interim peace agreement amid renewed military exchanges.

Former Israeli diplomat Alon Pinkas described Vance’s comments as unprecedented, saying no sitting U.S. vice president had previously accused Israel of actively working to undermine American foreign policy through an influence campaign.

Separately, Vance also addressed the controversy surrounding the late convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein, alleging that Epstein had unspecified high-level connections to both U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

T

he death of longtime Republican Senator Lindsey Graham has renewed debate over his enduring influence on U.S. foreign policy, with supporters praising his commitment to American leadership abroad and critics pointing to his advocacy for military intervention and unwavering support for Israel.

Graham, who died on Saturday at the age of 71 following what his office described as a brief and sudden illness, was one of the most recognizable Republican voices on national security issues for more than two decades. Throughout his career, he consistently championed military action, backed strong U.S. alliances with Israel, and maintained a hardline stance toward Iran, Russia and China.

His passing prompted tributes from U.S. President Donald Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and several Republican lawmakers, while also drawing criticism from anti-war advocates and Palestinian rights groups, who argued that Graham’s legacy was defined by support for prolonged military conflicts.

Political analysts say two themes are likely to dominate assessments of Graham’s career: his advocacy for interventionist foreign policy and his transformation into one of Trump’s closest allies.

Michael Hanna, U.S. Program Director at the International Crisis Group, said Graham had cultivated a long-standing reputation for promoting military solutions to international crises.

“He was a major supporter of the Iraq War and remained a strong advocate for the use of military force throughout his career,” Hanna said, adding that Graham played an influential role in encouraging the Trump administration’s hardline approach toward Iran.

Strong backing for Israel

Support for Israel remained central to Graham’s foreign policy positions. He repeatedly called for expanded U.S. military assistance to Israel and defended its military operations following the October 7, 2023 attacks and the subsequent war in Gaza.

In 2021, Graham successfully pushed for an additional $1 billion in U.S. military assistance after visiting Israel, where he posed alongside Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu holding a sign reading “More for Israel.”

Netanyahu paid tribute to Graham following his death, describing him as one of Israel’s strongest supporters in Washington and recalling that the senator often advocated for greater U.S. assistance than Israel itself requested.

Graham’s rhetoric on the Gaza war frequently drew international criticism. He defended Israel’s military campaign in Gaza in uncompromising terms and made several controversial remarks about the conflict that human rights advocates condemned as inflammatory.

Palestinian advocacy groups said Graham consistently supported policies that contributed to escalating violence in the region, while critics described him as one of the most outspoken proponents of military solutions in U.S. foreign policy.

Graham was also among the leading congressional advocates for confronting Iran militarily. Earlier this year, he publicly supported U.S. military action against Tehran and maintained close contact with President Trump as tensions between Washington and Iran escalated.

Analysts say Graham’s influence was one of several factors shaping the administration’s approach, although decisions ultimately rested with the president.

Alliance with Trump

Although Graham was an outspoken critic of Trump during the 2016 Republican presidential campaign—calling him “unfit for office” and “a kook”—the senator later became one of the president’s closest political allies.

The two frequently met at the White House and appeared together at public events, with Graham emerging as a trusted adviser on national security and foreign affairs.

Following Graham’s death, Trump called on South Carolina Governor Henry McMaster to appoint Graham’s sister, Darline Graham Nordone, to temporarily fill the Senate seat, describing the move as a fitting tribute to the late senator.

Observers say Graham’s death comes at a time when the Republican Party is increasingly divided over foreign policy, particularly regarding military intervention abroad.

Recent polling indicates younger Republican voters are less supportive of overseas military operations and more skeptical of interventionist policies than previous generations.

Hanna said Graham represented a generation of Republican leaders whose worldview was shaped by post-Cold War American global leadership and extensive military engagement overseas.

While his Senate seat is expected to remain in Republican hands, analysts suggest his absence could further accelerate debates within the party over the future direction of U.S. foreign policy, military intervention and Washington’s role in global conflicts.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

T

urkish tennis player Zeynep Sönmez has attracted international attention both for her historic performances at Wimbledon and for a symbolic display of solidarity with Palestinians after tournament officials barred her from wearing a pro-Palestinian badge.

The 24-year-old became one of the tournament’s most talked-about players after using a watermelon-shaped vibration dampener on her racket — a symbol widely associated with Palestinian identity and solidarity because it shares the colors of the Palestinian flag.

Sönmez said Wimbledon officials prohibited her from wearing a pro-Palestinian brooch during the tournament, prompting her to adopt the watermelon symbol instead.

“I used to wear a brooch, but tournaments no longer allow me to wear it,” Sönmez told Türkiye’s Anadolu Agency.

She questioned what she described as inconsistent standards governing political expression in tennis, noting that players have been permitted to display Ukrainian symbols while similar expressions of solidarity with Palestinians were not allowed.

“I argued that the Ukrainian flag is allowed, but the Palestinian one is not,” she said. “They told me they would not permit it.”

Unable to wear the badge on her clothing, Sönmez attached the watermelon-shaped dampener to her racket, explaining that tournament officials could not object to her choice of equipment.

Her gesture received widespread praise in Türkiye.

Turkish Youth and Sports Minister Osman Aşkın Bak commended Sönmez’s stance, describing it as an example of sport promoting universal human values. Ömer Çelik, spokesperson for Türkiye’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), also praised her expression of solidarity with Palestinians.

Sönmez thanked supporters, saying the encouragement she received from Türkiye made her feel she was “never alone” on court.

From ball girl to national trailblazer

Born in Istanbul on April 30, 2002, with family roots in the Black Sea town of Arhavi, Sönmez began dreaming of a professional tennis career while working as a ball girl at a Women’s Tennis Association tournament in Istanbul.

Watching fellow Turkish player Çağla Büyükakçay win a WTA title inspired her ambition to reach the sport’s highest level.

Coached by Issam Jellali and Mehmet Bayraktar, Sönmez transformed her game following a difficult Wimbledon qualifying defeat several years ago, adopting a more aggressive playing style while building on her speed and athleticism.

She has also earned recognition for her sportsmanship, including a widely praised fair-play moment during a tournament in Monastir, where she and opponent Eva Lys corrected line calls in each other’s favor.

Sönmez has enjoyed the strongest period of her career over the past two seasons.

She captured her first WTA 250 singles title in Mérida, Mexico, in 2024 before continuing her rise through the rankings.

Her performances elevated her to a career-high world ranking of No. 51, making her the highest-ranked Turkish woman in WTA history, surpassing Çağla Büyükakçay’s previous national record.

Sönmez also became the first Turkish player—male or female—in the Open Era to reach the third round at Wimbledon in 2025.

She matched that achievement at the 2026 Australian Open, defeating Anna Bondár and upsetting 11th seed Ekaterina Alexandrova before exiting in the third round.

Earlier this season, she earned the first top-10 victory of her career by defeating Italy’s Jasmine Paolini at the Porsche Tennis Grand Prix in Stuttgart.

Wimbledon campaign ends

Sönmez’s 2026 Wimbledon singles run concluded in the second round with a 7-5, 6-3 loss to American Claire Liu.

Despite the defeat, her performances on court and her symbolic show of support for Palestinians made her one of the tournament’s most prominent figures, drawing international attention both for her sporting achievements and her advocacy.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

T

he United States and Iran exchanged another round of military strikes on Thursday, sharply escalating tensions in the Gulf and raising fresh concerns over the stability of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global energy corridor.

The latest escalation came after U.S. forces launched a second wave of attacks against Iranian military infrastructure overnight, with Washington saying the operation was intended to safeguard freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz following Iranian attacks on commercial shipping.

Iran responded hours later by launching missile and drone strikes against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, marking another direct exchange between the two countries despite previous diplomatic efforts to halt the conflict.

The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said its latest operation struck approximately 90 military targets across Iran, including air defense systems, coastal surveillance installations, missile and drone storage sites, naval assets and military logistics infrastructure along Iran’s southern coastline.

The strikes followed an earlier round of attacks this week in which U.S. forces targeted more than 80 Iranian military sites.

Speaking to reporters while returning from the NATO summit in Türkiye, U.S. President Donald Trump defended the operation, describing it as retaliation for Iran’s attacks on commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

“We just hit them very hard,” Trump said. “Every time they hit us, we’re going to hit them 20.”

Earlier, Trump declared that the interim agreement intended to halt fighting between Washington and Tehran was effectively “over.”

Iran retaliates against US bases

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced that it had carried out strikes against U.S. military positions in Bahrain and Kuwait in response to the American attacks.

The Guards warned that further retaliation would follow if the United States launched additional strikes against Iranian territory.

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf said the Strait of Hormuz would operate only under what he described as “Iranian arrangements,” adding that U.S. “bullying and breaking its commitments no longer come without a cost.”

Iranian state media reported that three people were killed and several others injured in U.S. strikes near Ahvaz in southwestern Iran.

Multiple locations along Iran’s southern coast were reportedly hit, including Bandar Abbas, home to Iran’s largest commercial port and major naval facilities belonging to both the Iranian Navy and the Revolutionary Guards.

Additional strikes were reported in Konarak, Chabahar and Iranshahr, where a firefighter was killed during an attack on the city’s airport. Iranian media also reported damage to a railway bridge near Aqqala in northern Iran.

Oil prices climb

Global oil prices rose as markets reacted to renewed fighting and concerns that continued hostilities could threaten shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies normally pass.

Brent crude futures rose more than 1% to nearly $79 per barrel, while U.S. West Texas Intermediate crude also gained more than 1%.

The latest exchange follows a familiar pattern seen during previous rounds of fighting, with Iranian attacks on commercial shipping followed by U.S. military retaliation and subsequent Iranian strikes on American military facilities in the Gulf.

Despite the escalating military exchanges, analysts say both sides may still be seeking to strengthen their negotiating positions while avoiding a broader regional war, although the collapse of the interim agreement has significantly reduced prospects for an immediate diplomatic breakthrough.

(Source: Reuters)

F

ollowing approximately 100 days of tension, Iran and the US announced on Sunday 14 June that they had reached an agreement on a memorandum of understanding. On 17 June, the text of the 14-point memorandum of understanding was signed by US President Donald Trump and Iranian President Mesud Pezeşkiyan. Thus, an agreement has been reached that will launch a 60-day negotiation process between the two countries. The final outcome will be determined by the agreement reached at the conclusion of these 60 days of negotiations. From this perspective, it is fair to say that the current memorandum of understanding serves as a sort of ‘goodwill document’ to initiate the negotiation process between the two countries. This document also serves as a guide regarding the issues to be addressed during the negotiation process. In this context, it is worth examining in detail the matters covered by the Memorandum of Understanding.

Matters covered by the memorandum of understanding

The provisions set out in the 14-article Memorandum of Understanding are broadly divided into two categories. Some of these are provisions that come into force upon the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, whilst others are provisions expected to come into force subject to the outcome of the 60-day negotiations.

Accordingly, Articles 1, 4, 5, 10 and 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding cover the matters that come into force upon its signing. Article 1 stipulates that the US, Iran and their allies must immediately and permanently cease hostilities on all fronts where tensions persist, particularly in Lebanon. This article also emphasises that the parties shall henceforth refrain from initiating war or military operations against one another, shall not issue threats, and that Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity shall be guaranteed. Consequently, the implementation of this article extends not only to the US and Iran but also to Israel and Hezbollah. Indeed, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi stated in a statement that one party to the agreement consists of the US and Israel, whilst the other comprises Iran and Hezbollah. From this perspective, any potential conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is of critical importance. Given Israel’s statements that it will not withdraw from the territories it occupies in Lebanon, it is clear that this provision is also one of the factors rendering the agreement fragile.

Another important issue—the keeping of the Strait of Hormuz open and the regulation of transit—is addressed in Articles 4 and 5 of the Memorandum of Understanding. Accordingly, the US will lift its naval blockade against Iran within 30 days, commencing immediately after the signing of the agreement. In return, Iran will ensure that traffic through the Strait of Hormuz returns to pre-war levels within 30 days. It has been stated that Iran will not charge fees to ships transiting through the Strait of Hormuz for a period of 60 days. Once the 60-day period has ended, it is envisaged that Iran will reach an agreement with Gulf states, primarily Oman, regarding transit arrangements. It has also been stated that the US will withdraw its troops from the vicinity of Iran. According to statements by US officials, this does not imply that the US will withdraw from its bases in the region; rather, it refers to the restoration of the US military presence to its pre-war status.

Iran’s frozen assets

Another issue expected to be implemented following the signing of the memorandum of understanding concerns Iran’s frozen assets and restrictions on its oil sales. Under Articles 10 and 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding, the US Department of the Treasury will issue the necessary authorizations regarding Iran’s oil sales and related insurance, transport and banking transactions, which will remain in force until sanctions are lifted. In addition, Iran’s frozen assets will be released. The details regarding the implementation of these articles will be determined during the negotiation process.

In addition to the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding that come into force upon signature, there are also provisions that will come into force with the final agreement, which is expected to be signed following 60 days of negotiations. These provisions cover more fundamental issues than those that come into force upon the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding and require detailed technical information.

The sanctions imposed on Iran in connection with its nuclear program also constitute one of the provisions contained in the Memorandum of Understanding. The sanctions are addressed in Articles 6 and 7 of the Memorandum of Understanding. Accordingly, all sanctions imposed on Iran – primarily those enacted through United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and those unilaterally imposed by the US – will be lifted. In addition, the US will plan an investment program worth at least 300 billion dollars, with the assistance of its regional allies, to support Iran’s economic development. The program will operate entirely under US supervision. It is stated that this program has been established by the US as an alternative to Iran’s claim for war reparations. [OO1] The implementation of the program is contingent upon a final agreement following the negotiations. The issue of sanctions, meanwhile, constitutes one of the first matters to be addressed upon the commencement of negotiations.

An examination of the articles of the Memorandum of Understanding reveals that, alongside operational provisions, there are also articles containing general provisions. For example, Article 2 of the Memorandum emphasizes that Iran and the US shall respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and shall not interfere in each other’s internal affairs.

Finally, Articles 12, 13 and 14 regulate the operation of the Memorandum of Understanding. According to these articles, a mechanism will be established to monitor the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding. Once the provisions set out in Articles 1, 4, 5, 10 and 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding have entered into force, the two parties will commence 60 days of negotiations. The final agreement reached following the 60-day negotiations will also be confirmed by a UN Security Council resolution.

Risks and opportunities

One of the most significant aspects envisaged by the Memorandum of Understanding concerns Lebanon. Accordingly, it provides for an immediate cessation of hostilities in Lebanon and guarantees of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, Israel has stated that it will not withdraw from the territories it occupies in Lebanon; not content with this, it has also launched attacks on Lebanese territory following the announcement that an agreement had been reached between Iran and the US. Similarly, the memorandum of understanding signed between Iran and the US has drawn predominantly negative reactions from within Israeli domestic politics.

Channel 14, based in Israel and a staunch supporter of Netanyahu, has levelled harsh criticism at Trump over the signed memorandum of understanding. This situation has prompted a reaction from US Vice-President JD Vance. Consequently, it is evident that the memorandum of understanding is highly fragile, given that Israel – one of its indirect parties – has adopted such an adversarial stance. However, as can be inferred from the reactions of Trump and his deputy Vance, the US administration appears determined to secure a final agreement. Yet, only time will tell whether this US determination will be sufficient to rein in Israel.

Another risk factor is the potential for new regulations governing transit through the Strait of Hormuz. According to the provision in the memorandum of understanding, Iran will temporarily allow transit through the Strait of Hormuz without charging any fees. However, once the 60-day period has expired, a new arrangement will be put in place in consultation with other Gulf states, primarily Oman. Indeed, Iran has previously held discussions with Oman on this matter. Iran maintains that transit through the Strait of Hormuz should be under the control of both Oman and Iran. In this regard, it proposes that a specific fee be charged in return for the service provided. Furthermore, Iran has raised the issue of distinguishing between military and civilian transit. Iran’s refusal to back down from these demands, coupled with the other side’s refusal to accept them, poses a risk to the negotiation process.

Although the signed memorandum of understanding contains elements of risk, it represents the highest-level interaction between the two countries since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. For the first time since then, the presidents of the two countries have signed a document aimed at securing peace. This not only signals the beginning of a new era but also demonstrates that 47 years of hostility have borne no fruit. The most concrete example of this is the tensions and conflicts that have arisen between the two sides over the past year. For this reason, the memorandum of understanding signed is more likely to evolve into a lasting agreement than previous ones.

Unlike other negotiations, the current talks are taking place against a backdrop where other options – primarily war – have already been tried alongside diplomacy. Given that war, as the most radical option, has proved fruitless, it is clear that the two sides have no alternative to diplomacy. Consequently, it is highly likely that the new process that has been initiated will result in peace. However, given that the negotiations leading to the KOEP lasted 18 months, it is clear that a 60-day period is not sufficient for a comprehensive agreement. It is therefore reasonable to assume that this period will be extended and that a longer-term process is on the cards.

(Originally published in Turkish by SETA Foundation)

G

ulf Arab states are reassessing their long-standing security relationship with the United States following Washington’s emerging agreement with Iran, amid concerns that the proposed deal could reshape the regional balance of power and leave key security issues unresolved.

The framework agreement between the United States and Iran, announced after months of conflict and negotiations, has been welcomed across the Gulf as a step away from a wider regional war. However, analysts and diplomats say many governments in the region remain deeply uneasy about its long-term implications, particularly regarding Iran’s military capabilities and growing regional influence.

The agreement seeks to end hostilities between Washington and Tehran, reopen the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping and establish a process for broader negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions relief and economic reconstruction. While Gulf capitals support efforts to prevent another devastating conflict, many officials are questioning whether the arrangement adequately addresses their security concerns.

Trust in US erodes

For decades, Gulf monarchies have relied heavily on the United States as their principal security guarantor. American military bases, naval deployments and defence partnerships have formed the backbone of regional deterrence against external threats, particularly from Iran.

Yet confidence in those guarantees has gradually weakened over the past several years.

Regional observers point to a series of developments that have fuelled doubts, including the limited U.S. response to attacks on Saudi oil facilities in 2019 and Washington’s broader shift toward reducing its military footprint in the Middle East.

Those concerns have resurfaced following the latest U.S.-Iran agreement, which many Gulf officials view as another indication that Washington is increasingly prioritising diplomacy and strategic disengagement over long-term military commitments in the region.

The agreement also introduces new arrangements affecting navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors. Under the framework, Iran is expected to play a role in future discussions on managing commercial shipping alongside Oman and other regional stakeholders.

Possible Iranian influence on maritime security

For Gulf countries whose economies depend heavily on energy exports passing through the waterway, the prospect of expanded Iranian influence over maritime security has generated considerable debate.

Analysts argue that while reopening shipping lanes would benefit global energy markets, Gulf governments remain cautious about any arrangement that could strengthen Tehran’s leverage over regional trade.

The deal also leaves several contentious issues unresolved.

Although negotiations on Iran’s nuclear activities are expected to continue during a 60-day transition period, the current framework does not directly address Tehran’s ballistic missile programme or its relationships with armed groups across the Middle East.

Many Gulf governments have long regarded those issues as posing a more immediate security challenge than Iran’s nuclear ambitions alone.

During a regional tour following the announcement of the agreement, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio sought to reassure Gulf allies that Washington would continue consulting closely with them throughout negotiations and would not pursue policies that undermine their security.

Rubio emphasised that future discussions concerning Iran’s missile program would be coordinated with regional partners and reaffirmed America’s commitment to longstanding alliances in the Gulf.

Despite those assurances, regional analysts say trust has been weakened by years of uncertainty surrounding U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Diversifying military partnerships

Several experts argue that Gulf states increasingly believe they must prepare for a future in which they shoulder greater responsibility for their own defense.

As a result, some governments have accelerated efforts to diversify their military partnerships and defence procurement beyond traditional suppliers.

Turkey has emerged as one potential alternative source of military equipment and defense cooperation, reflecting a broader strategy of reducing dependence on any single security partner.

At the same time, Gulf countries continue to strengthen economic ties with the United States. Major investment commitments announced in recent years demonstrate that while questions persist over security arrangements, economic cooperation remains a central pillar of bilateral relations.

The proposed agreement with Iran also includes plans for a multibillion-dollar reconstruction and investment fund intended to support Iran’s economic recovery after the conflict.

Although Washington has indicated that Gulf participation would be important, several regional governments have said they have not yet committed funding and are awaiting further details before making any decisions.

For many Gulf leaders, preventing another regional war remains the immediate priority.

The recent conflict exposed the vulnerability of Gulf states to missile and drone attacks and highlighted the economic consequences of disruptions to energy exports and international shipping.

T

he U.S. Senate has voted to direct President Donald Trump to halt military action against Iran, marking the first time since the passage of the 1973 War Powers Act that both chambers of Congress have approved a resolution seeking to end a president’s involvement in an ongoing conflict.

The Senate approved the measure on Tuesday by a vote of 50-48, following its earlier passage in the House of Representatives. The resolution reflects growing unease in Congress over the war that began on February 28, when U.S. and Israeli forces launched attacks on Iran, and signals a widening split between Trump and some members of his own Republican Party.

Although the practical effect of the resolution remains uncertain, the vote represents one of the most significant congressional challenges to Trump’s foreign policy since he returned to office.

Historic congressional action

The measure was passed under the framework of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, legislation enacted after the Vietnam War to limit presidential authority to conduct military operations without congressional approval.

No previous war powers resolution had successfully passed both the House and Senate.

Under the legislation, Congress directed the president to remove U.S. armed forces from hostilities involving Iran. However, the White House maintains that the resolution has no legal force because it is not submitted to the president for signature or veto.

The administration also argues that active hostilities effectively ended following a ceasefire reached on April 7.

A White House official dismissed the vote as largely symbolic, saying it had “no significance” and noting that the resolution passed only because two Republican senators were absent.

Trump responded sharply to the vote, calling it “poorly timed and meaningless” in a social media post. He accused lawmakers who supported the measure of making negotiations with Tehran more difficult and providing “comfort” to Iran.

Republican support signals growing unease

The Senate vote largely followed party lines, but four Republicans broke ranks to support the resolution.

The Republican senators voting in favor were Susan Collins, Rand Paul, Bill Cassidy, and Lisa Murkowski.

Meanwhile, Democratic Senator John Fetterman voted against the measure, becoming the only Democrat to oppose it.

Two Republican senators, Mitch McConnell and David McCormick, did not participate in the vote.

The House had approved the same measure earlier this month by a margin of 215-208, with four Republicans joining Democrats in support.

The vote highlights growing frustration among lawmakers over a conflict that has become increasingly unpopular with the American public.

Public opinion turning against the war

According to a Reuters/Ipsos poll released Tuesday, only one-quarter of Americans believe the war against Iran has been worth its costs. A majority of respondents also expressed concern that any ceasefire or peace agreement could collapse.

The conflict has generated political challenges for the Trump administration as it seeks congressional approval for tens of billions of dollars in additional funding linked to military operations.

At the same time, several Republican lawmakers have recently shown greater willingness to oppose the president on key issues, including immigration spending and a proposed fund intended to compensate political allies whom Trump says were unfairly targeted by federal authorities.

A

n independent United Nations commission has accused Israeli authorities and security forces of deliberately targeting Palestinian children during the war in Gaza, actions it said amount to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The findings, released Tuesday, drew an immediate and forceful rejection from Israel, which described the report as a “libelous sham” that ignored the conduct of Hamas.

The report was issued by the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory and examines alleged violations committed against Palestinian children in Gaza, the occupied West Bank, and East Jerusalem since the outbreak of war on October 7, 2023.

According to the commission, children accounted for approximately 30 percent of all fatalities during the Gaza conflict, a proportion significantly higher than in previous rounds of fighting. Investigators concluded that Israeli military operations caused an unprecedented level of harm to children and that evidence pointed to deliberate targeting in some cases.

“The evidence shows that Palestinian children have been deliberately targeted and killed by the Israeli security forces,” commission chair Srinivasan Muralidhar said in a statement accompanying the report.

Genocidal intent

The commission argued that the killing of children was a central factor in establishing a genocidal intent against Palestinians in Gaza. According to the report, Israeli military operations continued to result in child casualties even after a ceasefire took effect in October 2025.

Investigators said Israeli forces repeatedly employed high-payload munitions and weapons with wide-area effects in densely populated residential neighborhoods despite mounting evidence of civilian and child casualties.

The report stated that such attacks, which caused exceptionally high numbers of child deaths, indicated intentional conduct. It further argued that Palestinian children were targeted collectively because Israeli security forces viewed the broader civilian population as being associated with Hamas and other armed groups operating in Gaza.

The commission concluded that these actions contributed to efforts aimed at destroying the Palestinian population in Gaza, in whole or in part.

Thousands of children killed

According to figures cited in the report, at least 20,179 Palestinian children were killed between October 7, 2023, and October 7, 2025.

The commission noted that children represented roughly 30 percent of all fatalities during that period. By comparison, children accounted for about 24 percent of conflict-related deaths during previous Gaza conflicts in 2008–2009 and 2014.

Investigators said the scale of child deaths, combined with patterns of military operations, distinguished the current conflict from earlier wars.

The report also highlighted the broader humanitarian consequences of the conflict on Gaza’s youngest residents. It said repeated displacement, destruction of homes, shortages of food and medicine, and restrictions on humanitarian assistance severely damaged children’s health, development, and psychological well-being.

Impact on health and future generations

Beyond direct casualties, the commission found that attacks on healthcare facilities and reproductive services had long-term effects on children and families.

The report documented rising miscarriages, deteriorating conditions for newborns, and severe strain on Gaza’s medical infrastructure. Investigators warned that the destruction of healthcare services had undermined the survival prospects of infants and young children.

The commission further reported that nearly all children in Gaza now require psychological support due to trauma caused by the conflict, displacement, loss of family members, and prolonged exposure to violence.

Muralidhar said the targeting of children threatened not only individual lives but also the future existence of the Palestinian people.

“By targeting children, Israel is undermining the capacity of the Palestinian people to exist and determine their future,” he said.

I

n recent years, the Eastern Mediterranean has become one of the most sensitive arenas of regional competition shaped around energy resources. The main reason for this sensitivity is that regional resources are viewed not merely as economic assets, but also as strategic instruments in terms of sovereignty, security, and power politics. Indeed, the intensifying competition in the Eastern Mediterranean has further deepened the existing political and military tensions in the region. One of the most striking examples of this tension today is Israel’s attempt to render ineffective the maritime border understanding reached between Lebanon and Israel in October 2022 under US mediation through unilateral and coercive moves.

The process leading to the agreement was the outcome of a long-standing maritime jurisdiction dispute. The area between Lebanon’s Line 29 claim and the border approach imposed by Israel in its own favour had gone far beyond a technical issue of maritime delimitation because of its high hydrocarbon potential. Under the understanding reached, the maritime boundary was drawn on the basis of Line 23. Thus, while Israel secured its sovereign rights over the Karish field, which was ready for natural gas production, Lebanon was given the opportunity to continue exploration activities in Block 9, which includes the Qana field. However, the Beirut administration, under a severe economic crisis, not only had to step back from its Line 29 claim, but was also forced to accept the concession of granting Tel Aviv a share of the possible revenues from the part of the Qana field extending into the Israeli side.

Nevertheless, Lebanon has not yet been able to obtain the short-term economic gains it expected from this understanding. The identification of commercially viable reserves in the Qana field and the transition to actual production are, by their nature, processes that will take time. Moreover, political instability, institutional weaknesses, and uncertainty in the investment environment make Beirut’s energy planning even more fragile. The current conjuncture, in turn, feeds Israel’s effort to transform Lebanon’s political and economic vulnerabilities into an asymmetric advantage in its own favor. Tel Aviv’s approach should therefore be read as part of a broader strategy aimed at eroding Lebanon’s rights over the Qana field and establishing a new hegemonic sphere in favour of Israel within the Eastern Mediterranean energy equation.

The historical continuity of geopolitical conflict

Essentially, although the tension surrounding Lebanese gas in the Eastern Mediterranean may at first appear to be a current maritime jurisdiction dispute between two states, it is part of a broader struggle for power shaped by the control of energy resources.  Throughout the twentieth century, oil in the Middle East, and following the dissolution of the Soviet Union,, energy resources in the Caspian Basin, were among the main factors fuelling sovereignty disputes, external interventions, and struggles for regional influence. From this perspective, the dispute over Lebanese gas can also be read as the contemporary reflection in the Eastern Mediterranean of the historical role of energy resources in generating geopolitical rivalry and power competition.

However, it is not sufficient to explain Israel’s position only through the general conflictual logic of energy geopolitics. The main point that deserves attention here is that Tel Aviv has brought an agreement signed through international mediation back into question in such a short period of time and has sought to create the ground for its unilateral termination. The regional conflicts that have intensified since October 2023, the silence of Western states in the face of Israel’s genocidpole in Gaza, and Tel Aviv’s strategy of leaving Beirut helpless on the ground through military pressure directly extended into the Lebanese arena have turned Israel into a maximalist and revisionist actor that recklessly violates the limits of the international legal order.

Indeed, Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen’s statement in March 2026 describing the 2022 Maritime Border Agreement as a “document of surrender” for Israel and bringing the option of cancellation onto the agenda shows that Tel Aviv is trying to exploit the regional chaos it has deepened in order to reopen Lebanon’s maritime jurisdiction areas to discussion. In other words, Israel’s move targeting Lebanon’s maritime jurisdiction areas and natural gas fields points directly to a development that can be described as an “energy grab”.

The west’s double standards and Europe’s energy supply security

The United States, which was the main architect and mediator of the maritime border understanding in 2022, has not shown any significant reaction to the Israeli Energy Minister’s statements aimed at cancelling the agreement. On the one hand, the Washington administration explains Tel Aviv’s military operations in the region through the discourse of “self-defense”; on the other hand, it does not raise a strong objection to the de facto reopening of maritime borders to discussion or to Israel’s moves that put pressure on Lebanon’s sovereign rights.

Europe’s stance is not very different from that of the United States. Brussels’ position is shaped not by the protection of international law, sovereign rights, or Lebanon’s legitimate claims, but rather by the potential value of Eastern Mediterranean gas for European energy supply security. For the European Union, which significantly reduced its dependence on Russian gas after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022, Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon reserves have become one of the important alternatives due to their geographical proximity and potential for supply diversification.

In this new geopolitical environment, the Tel Aviv administration seeks to realize its objective of becoming the dominant actor in the control of energy resources and transport routes in the Eastern Mediterranean by pursuing a more aggressive strategy. Despite this, the silence of Western actors in the face of Israel’s moves to narrow Lebanon’s maritime jurisdiction areas and establish de facto superiority over energy resources reveals the existence of a clear double standard. While the Western world strongly emphasizes territorial integrity and international law when Ukraine is at stake, its reluctance to defend the same principles against Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean reveals a clear double standard.

Lebanon’s economic future and investment risk

For Lebanon, which is grappling with political instability, economic challenges and infrastructure collapse, the potential revenues from the Qana field are viewed not merely as an economic gain, but as a significant opportunity for the state’s recovery and the strengthening of its institutional capacity. However, for a country such as Lebanon, marked by limited economic resources, a fragmented political system and vulnerability to external interference, any uncertainty surrounding energy projects carries serious consequences. In this regard, Israel’s attempt to revive the maritime border dispute has the potential to undermine not only the future of a specific gas field, but also the broader investment climate in Lebanon’s energy sector.

This is because offshore natural gas projects are high-cost, long-term investments that are highly sensitive to political stability. An increase in legal and political uncertainty in such projects may heighten investors’ risk perception, thereby further weakening Lebanon’s position in the regional energy equation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the statements about unilateral cancellation and the threatening rhetoric issued by Tel Aviv clearly show that the issue in the Eastern Mediterranean is not merely a technical border dispute. The picture before us is Israel’s attempt, relying on its military superiority and the silence of Western actors, to erode Lebanon’s right to exercise control over its legitimate energy resources and to establish de facto superiority on the ground. In other words, this process should be read not as a diplomatic disagreement, but as a systematic state-led “energy grab.”

Tel Aviv’s approach once again reveals that Israel is far from being a predictable actor committed to its obligations under international law. International law, diplomatic agreements and border arrangements can easily be eroded in the face of Israel’s Zionist expansionist reflexes. For this reason, Israel’s stance once again confirms the existence of a deep and structural trust problem regarding the sustainability of long-term agreements with Tel Aviv.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

T

he United States and Iran have released the text of a 14-point memorandum of understanding that lays the foundation for ending months of conflict, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, easing economic restrictions on Tehran, and launching negotiations toward a comprehensive peace agreement.

The document, formally titled the “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran,” was read to reporters by a senior U.S. official on Wednesday and is expected to serve as the basis for intensive negotiations over the next 60 days.

While the memorandum establishes an immediate ceasefire and outlines broad commitments by both sides, many of the most difficult issues—including Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions relief, and regional security arrangements—remain subject to future negotiations.

Immediate end to war

The first provision commits both countries and their allies to the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon. Both sides pledged not to initiate future military action against one another and agreed to respect Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Under the second point, Washington and Tehran agreed to respect each other’s sovereignty and refrain from interference in internal affairs.

The third provision establishes a negotiation period of up to 60 days, which may be extended by mutual agreement, to finalize a broader peace settlement.

The fourth and fifth points focus on restoring maritime commerce through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy shipping routes.

The United States agreed to begin lifting its naval blockade immediately and to remove all restrictions within 30 days. Washington also committed to withdrawing military forces from Iran’s vicinity within 30 days after a final agreement is reached.

Iran, for its part, pledged to facilitate safe passage for commercial vessels through the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Tehran also agreed to remove mines and military obstacles and restore normal shipping operations over the next month.

The agreement further calls for consultations between Iran, Oman, and other Gulf states regarding future administration and maritime services in the strategic waterway.

Massive reconstruction package

One of the most significant elements of the agreement is contained in point six.

The United States committed to working with regional partners to develop a reconstruction and economic development package worth at least $300 billion for Iran.

The mechanism for implementing the fund will be finalized during negotiations, while Washington pledged to provide the necessary licenses, waivers, and permissions required for financial transactions.

Point seven outlines a U.S. commitment to terminate all sanctions imposed on Iran, including United Nations-related restrictions, nuclear-related measures, and both primary and secondary U.S. sanctions.

The timing and sequencing of sanctions removal remain subject to negotiation during the upcoming talks.

Both sides described sanctions relief as one of the most important issues to be addressed during the next phase of diplomacy.

Nuclear program left for future talks

The eighth provision addresses Iran’s nuclear activities but postpones major decisions until a final agreement.

Iran reaffirmed that it would not seek or develop nuclear weapons.

The two countries agreed that the future of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium would be determined through a mutually agreed mechanism. At a minimum, any solution would involve down-blending enriched material under supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Future discussions will also address uranium enrichment levels and Iran’s civilian nuclear requirements.

Under point nine, both countries agreed to maintain the status quo while negotiations continue.

Iran will not expand its current nuclear activities, while the United States pledged not to impose additional sanctions or deploy new military forces to the region.

Point ten requires the U.S. Treasury Department to issue waivers immediately permitting Iranian oil exports, petroleum product sales, banking transactions, shipping, insurance, and related services.

Point eleven concerns Iranian assets frozen abroad.

The United States agreed to make those assets available for use and to work with Iran on procedures governing their release. Washington also committed to issuing the necessary licenses and authorizations to facilitate access to those funds.

A

proposed $300 billion private investment fund aimed at revitalizing Iran’s economy has emerged as a central component of the framework agreement reached between the United States and Iran to end months of conflict, according to a source with direct knowledge of the negotiations.

The fund, which would be known as the Reconstruction and Development Fund, is designed to encourage both sides to finalize a comprehensive peace agreement by offering a powerful economic incentive for post-war recovery and long-term investment.

According to the source, more than half of the proposed funding—over $150 billion—has already been pledged by companies and financial institutions across multiple regions, including North America, Asia, the Gulf, Africa, and South America.

The initiative remains contingent on the successful completion of a final agreement between Washington and Tehran. Negotiators are expected to spend the next 60 days working on unresolved issues, including Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions relief, and regional security arrangements.

Economic dimension of peace deal

The investment proposal represents one of the most ambitious economic initiatives linked to a Middle Eastern peace agreement in recent decades.

Unlike traditional reconstruction packages financed by governments or international organizations, the proposed fund would be entirely privately financed.

The source familiar with the negotiations said no government money, grants, or direct public financing would be involved.

Instead, private companies and financial institutions have committed investment capital intended for projects in key sectors of Iran’s economy, including energy, transportation, logistics, manufacturing, and industrial development.

The fund is separate from ongoing discussions regarding the release of Iranian assets frozen abroad and the lifting of U.S. sanctions.

Negotiators have reportedly established distinct tracks for those issues, with separate timelines and objectives.

“This is not compensation, reparations, or a government aid package,” the source said. “It is an investment vehicle intended to unlock economic opportunities once a final settlement is achieved.”

From compensation demand to investment plan

The idea reportedly emerged after Iran initially sought substantial compensation for damage caused during the conflict.

A senior Iranian source told Reuters that Tehran had requested approximately $400 billion in compensation from the United States for wartime losses.

Washington rejected that proposal, leading negotiators to explore alternative mechanisms capable of supporting economic recovery while remaining politically acceptable to all parties.

The resulting concept focuses on investment rather than compensation.

Under the proposed structure, regional countries and international investors would contribute through various mechanisms, including financing projects directly, establishing credit facilities, guaranteeing loans, and supporting reconstruction efforts at damaged industrial and infrastructure sites.

Projects under consideration reportedly include repairs and modernization of refineries, airports, transportation networks, industrial facilities, and major manufacturing centers damaged during the conflict.

Among the sites expected to benefit is the Mobarakeh Steel complex, one of Iran’s largest industrial enterprises.

Untapped economic potential

Supporters of the initiative argue that Iran presents significant long-term opportunities for investors if geopolitical risks and sanctions barriers can be reduced.

Despite decades of economic isolation, Iran remains one of the largest economies in the Middle East.

The country possesses the world’s second-largest proven natural gas reserves and the fourth-largest oil reserves, making it a major potential energy producer.

In addition, Iran has a population exceeding 92 million people, a relatively educated workforce, extensive industrial infrastructure, and significant potential in sectors ranging from petrochemicals and mining to tourism and agriculture.

However, successive rounds of international sanctions and political tensions have largely excluded Iran from global capital markets for more than four decades.

As a result, foreign direct investment has remained limited despite the country’s economic potential.

Analysts say that if sanctions are eased and political stability improves, Iran could attract substantial foreign investment in the coming years.

While the investment initiative has generated considerable attention, its implementation depends entirely on the success of broader negotiations.

The framework agreement announced earlier this week established a 60-day period during which U.S. and Iranian negotiators will seek to reach a comprehensive settlement.

One of the most difficult issues remains Iran’s nuclear program.

According to U.S. Vice President JD Vance, access to the reconstruction fund would depend on Iran meeting strict conditions, including dismantling key elements of its nuclear program, eliminating stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, and accepting extensive international inspections.

Iran has consistently maintained that its nuclear activities are intended for peaceful purposes and has rejected accusations that it seeks nuclear weapons.

The issue remains one of the most contentious points in negotiations.

B

ritain’s Court of Appeal has ruled that the government’s decision to ban the pro-Palestinian protest group Palestine Action as “a terrorist organization” was lawful, marking a major victory for the government and a significant setback for campaigners who argue the move threatens free speech and the right to protest.

In a judgment delivered on Monday, Chief Justice Dame Sue Carr rejected the group’s claim that it was primarily engaged in non-violent civil disobedience, concluding instead that its activities involved organized and deliberate acts of property destruction targeting military facilities and defense companies.

The ruling overturns a February decision by the High Court, which had found that although some of Palestine Action’s activities involved criminal conduct, the scale and nature of its actions did not justify designation under Britain’s terrorism legislation.

The government appealed that decision, and the ban remained in force while the legal challenge proceeded.

Court rejects non-violence argument

Delivering the judgment, Carr said the court found significant flaws in Palestine Action’s argument that it should be viewed as a peaceful protest movement.

“In our judgment, that premise was seriously flawed,” she said. “It was not a sustainable proposition to portray Palestine Action as a non-violent organization.”

The court concluded that the organization operated through covert networks that carried out coordinated attacks on defense contractors and military sites, causing substantial property damage and disruption.

Government lawyers argued that the group’s activities went beyond legitimate protest and amounted to actions that threatened national security and public safety.

The ruling effectively places Palestine Action in the same legal category as proscribed organizations such as Al-Qaeda and Hamas under British law.

Membership of, or support for, a proscribed organization is a criminal offense in the United Kingdom and can carry a prison sentence of up to 14 years.

Group vows further legal challenge

Following the judgment, Palestine Action co-founder Huda Ammori said the organization would continue its legal battle.

“We will fight proscription all the way,” Ammori said, pledging to challenge the ruling before the UK’s Supreme Court and, if necessary, the European Court of Human Rights.

She described the ban as “one of the most extreme attacks on free speech and the right to protest in modern British history.”

Supporters of the group argue that Palestine Action’s activities are a form of direct action aimed at disrupting companies linked to Israel’s military operations in Gaza rather than acts of terrorism.

Civil liberties organizations have also criticized the government’s approach, warning that the designation could set a precedent for treating political protest movements as terrorist organizations.

Origins of the ban

The British government moved to outlaw Palestine Action following a high-profile incident in June 2025 when activists entered a Royal Air Force base to protest Britain’s support for Israel’s genocide in Gaza.

The action followed a series of demonstrations and acts of vandalism directed at defense facilities, particularly sites connected to Israeli weapons manufacturer Elbit Systems and its British subsidiaries.

Officials have said the group’s operations have caused millions of pounds in damage and disrupted facilities considered important to national security.

Palestine Action was established in 2020 and has become known for direct-action campaigns involving occupations, blockades, and damage to property associated with defense and security industries.

Government ministers argued that the cumulative impact of those actions justified proscription under terrorism legislation.

T

he United States and Iran have reached a preliminary agreement to end months of conflict and reopen the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz, marking the most significant diplomatic breakthrough since the outbreak of war earlier this year and triggering a sharp decline in global oil prices.

The framework agreement, announced by U.S. President Donald Trump and confirmed by Iranian officials on Monday, is intended to halt military operations across multiple fronts and establish a pathway toward broader negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief.

The memorandum of understanding is scheduled to be formally signed in Switzerland on Friday following mediation efforts led by Pakistan.

“The Deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran is now complete,” Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform on Sunday evening. The announcement came shortly after Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif revealed that negotiators had reached an agreement.

If implemented, the deal would represent the most important diplomatic achievement since the conflict began in February with joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, a war that has killed thousands, destabilized the Middle East, and disrupted global energy markets.

Ceasefire across multiple fronts

According to Pakistani officials, the agreement calls for the immediate and permanent cessation of military operations throughout the region, including in Lebanon, where fighting between Israel and the Iran-backed Hezbollah movement has complicated diplomatic efforts.

Iran’s Supreme National Security Council confirmed that military operations on all fronts would cease beginning Monday night.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said the agreement would establish a 60-day ceasefire period during which negotiators would work toward a more comprehensive settlement.

The future agreement is expected to address some of the most contentious issues dividing Washington and Tehran, including economic sanctions, regional security arrangements, and Iran’s nuclear activities.

Despite the breakthrough, uncertainty remains over how the agreement will affect Israel, which has not participated in the U.S.-Iran negotiations and has repeatedly insisted on maintaining freedom of military action against perceived threats in the region.

There was no immediate official response from the Israeli government following the announcement.

Strait of Hormuz to reopen

One of the most significant elements of the agreement concerns the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway through which a substantial portion of the world’s oil and natural gas exports pass.

Since the escalation of hostilities, Iran has effectively restricted shipping through the strait, while the United States imposed countermeasures targeting Iranian ports and maritime operations.

Trump announced that the waterway would reopen on Friday and said he had ordered an end to the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports.

“Ships of the World, start your engines. Let the oil flow!” Trump wrote.

Financial markets responded immediately to the news.

Brent crude prices fell more than 4 percent in early trading as investors welcomed the prospect of restored energy supplies and reduced geopolitical risk. Stock markets across Asia also posted gains as concerns over disruptions to global trade eased.

Market analysts cautioned, however, that many details of the agreement remain unclear.

“The lack of details, especially on freedom of shipping, is a concern, but not one that should constrain markets today as the surge in risk appetite plays out,” said currency analyst Sean Callow.

Nuclear issue deferred

While the agreement addresses military hostilities and maritime security, negotiators have postponed decisions regarding Iran’s nuclear program, one of the central issues behind the conflict.

Sources familiar with the talks said nuclear negotiations will take place during the 60-day ceasefire period.

Trump has repeatedly stated that any final settlement must ensure Iran cannot develop nuclear weapons.

Iran maintains that its nuclear program is peaceful and has consistently denied seeking a nuclear arsenal.

Before the conflict, Iran had accumulated more than 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to levels approaching weapons-grade purity, according to international estimates. The future of that stockpile is expected to become one of the most difficult issues in upcoming negotiations.

Officials involved in the talks have offered differing accounts of the draft agreement.

A senior American official indicated that the eventual settlement could require the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program and the removal or destruction of highly enriched uranium stockpiles.

Iranian officials, meanwhile, suggested that Tehran would retain the ability to dilute and manage enriched uranium domestically rather than surrendering it.

I

srael and Iran exchanged direct military strikes on Monday for the first time since a ceasefire was declared in April, raising fresh concerns about a wider regional conflict and threatening diplomatic efforts led by the United States to end months of hostilities.

The renewed confrontation began after Israel launched strikes on military targets in western and central Iran, prompting Tehran to respond with missile attacks targeting Israeli military facilities. The exchanges mark the most serious escalation between the two regional rivals since the ceasefire halted direct hostilities earlier this year.

The latest violence comes despite efforts by U.S. President Donald Trump to preserve ongoing negotiations with Tehran and prevent a collapse of the fragile truce that has largely held since April.

Israeli military officials said air force jets struck military installations in Iran during overnight operations. Iranian authorities reported explosions in several cities, including Tehran, Tabriz, and Isfahan, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) accused Israel of carrying out attacks using air-launched ballistic missiles.

Hours later, the IRGC announced retaliatory strikes against Israel’s Nevatim and Tel Nof air bases. Iranian state media described the attacks as a warning and said Iran was prepared for broader military operations if Israeli attacks continued.

“The armed forces are ready for any scenario,” the IRGC said in a statement carried by Iranian media, warning that future responses could be more extensive.

Israeli authorities confirmed that missiles had been launched from Iran and said air defense systems were activated to intercept incoming threats. No immediate reports of casualties or significant damage were released.

Energy infrastructure hit

The escalation took a significant turn when Israeli strikes reportedly hit facilities within Iran’s energy sector.

Iranian officials said the Karun petrochemical plant near the southwestern city of Bandar-e-Mahshahr sustained damage during the attacks. Shortly afterward, the Israeli military confirmed that it had targeted several sites within the Mahshahr petrochemical complex.

Iranian state media reported that authorities had begun evacuating the Mahshahr Special Petrochemical Economic Zone, a major industrial hub located near the Persian Gulf.

The strikes marked the first reported attack on Iranian energy infrastructure since the ceasefire was announced in April, raising fears that the conflict could increasingly target economically strategic facilities.

Energy analysts warned that attacks on petrochemical installations could have broader implications for global energy markets if hostilities continue to expand.

Financial markets reacted quickly to the renewed fighting.

Brent crude futures rose more than $3 per barrel, climbing above $96, while U.S. crude futures also posted gains of more than 3 percent. The increases erased losses recorded late last week when hopes for diplomatic progress between Washington and Tehran had boosted investor confidence.

Oil prices have remained highly sensitive to developments in the Middle East, particularly since the wider conflict involving Iran, Israel, and Iran-backed groups intensified earlier this year.

Traders fear that any prolonged disruption to energy infrastructure or shipping routes could threaten supplies from one of the world’s most important oil-producing regions.

Trump pushes for diplomacy

The renewed violence unfolded despite reports that Trump personally urged Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to avoid further military escalation.

According to U.S. officials cited by American media, Trump told Netanyahu during a phone conversation that additional attacks could jeopardize ongoing efforts to secure a broader agreement with Iran.

“We are close to doing something good in terms of a deal,” Trump reportedly told the Israeli leader.

Speaking to the Financial Times before the latest strikes, Trump downplayed concerns that renewed military action would derail negotiations.

“It is not going to have any impact on the deal,” Trump said. “I call the shots. I call all the shots. He doesn’t call the shots.”

The comments reflected growing tensions between Washington and the Israeli government over how to manage the conflict. Reports indicate that Trump has repeatedly pressed Israel to limit military operations in Lebanon and elsewhere to create space for diplomacy.

Last week, the U.S. president publicly expressed frustration with Netanyahu’s approach to the conflict, signaling rare daylight between Washington and its closest regional ally.

The latest exchange comes after Israel launched strikes near Beirut on Sunday, targeting positions linked to Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Lebanese armed group.

Those attacks represented Israel’s first military action in the Beirut area since Washington proposed a truce plan for Lebanon last week.

Iran has repeatedly stated that any long-term peace arrangement with the United States would depend on a sustained ceasefire not only between Israel and Iran but also in Lebanon, where fighting involving Hezbollah has continued intermittently.

Before Sunday’s missile exchange, Iran had not directly attacked Israel since the ceasefire took effect in April, although Hezbollah and other groups aligned with Tehran have continued occasional attacks against Israeli targets.

The situation became even more complicated when Israel’s military reported a missile launch from Yemen toward Israeli territory. While details remained limited, the launch highlighted the involvement of multiple regional actors in the broader conflict.

What is the path forward?

Diplomatic observers warn that the latest confrontation could undermine efforts to achieve a comprehensive agreement aimed at ending months of regional warfare.

While both Israel and Iran have framed their actions as responses to previous attacks, the direct exchange of strikes suggests that the ceasefire remains fragile and vulnerable to collapse.

The targeting of military facilities, energy infrastructure, and strategic installations has increased concerns that future attacks could become more damaging and difficult to contain.

For now, both governments appear determined to demonstrate military resolve while avoiding a full-scale war. However, with missiles flying across borders, energy markets reacting sharply, and diplomatic negotiations hanging in the balance, the latest escalation has underscored how quickly tensions in the Middle East can reignite despite international efforts to secure peace.

As Washington continues to push for a negotiated settlement, the coming days may prove critical in determining whether the region returns to a path of diplomacy or slides back toward a broader conflict involving multiple fronts and regional powers.

(Source: Reuters)

A

year after its introduction in Congress, the proposed Block the Bombs Act has gained significant support among U.S. lawmakers, reflecting growing debate in Washington over military aid to Israel and the humanitarian consequences of the war in Gaza.

The legislation, introduced in June 2025 by Representative Delia Ramirez, initially attracted 21 Democratic co-sponsors. That number has now risen to 73 lawmakers, including one Republican, marking one of the most substantial congressional challenges to longstanding bipartisan support for military assistance to Israel.

Speaking at a news conference on Capitol Hill, Ramirez described the growing support as evidence that views within Congress are shifting.

“While some thought that the bill was extreme, it has, in fact, become pretty mainstream,” she said.

Despite the increase in backing, supporters acknowledge that the proposal remains far from securing a majority in the 435-member House of Representatives, where Republican leadership has not allowed the measure to come to a vote.

Bill targets specific weapons transfers

The Block the Bombs Act would prohibit the transfer of certain heavy bombs and artillery ammunition to Israel, weapons that supporters say have been used in some of the deadliest attacks during the war in Gaza.

Backers of the legislation argue that U.S. military assistance should be conditioned on compliance with international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians.

Representative Rashida Tlaib said public opinion has increasingly shifted toward questioning unconditional military support for Israel.

“Americans want us to invest here at home,” Tlaib said. “They want us not to invest in death and destruction and bombs. They want us to invest in clean water and housing and childcare and so much more.”

The legislation has attracted support from lawmakers who were not previously associated with efforts to restrict military aid to Israel. Representative Valerie Foushee, who previously received support from pro-Israel advocacy groups, endorsed the bill in 2025, arguing that weapons should not be supplied if they are not used in accordance with international law.

This week, Representative Thomas Massie became the first Republican co-sponsor of the measure.

“America is morally obligated to end support of Israel’s devastation of Gaza and its people,” Massie said in announcing his support.

Growing debate over US policy toward Israel

Advocates say the bill reflects broader changes in public opinion regarding U.S. policy toward Israel and the Palestinian territories.

Recent polls have shown declining support among Americans for providing military aid to Israel without conditions. Supporters of the legislation argue that Congress should better reflect those changing attitudes.

The bill has also received support from the Congressional Progressive Caucus. Its chair, Greg Casar, said public activism has played a major role in increasing support for the proposal.

“The idea behind the Block the Bombs Act is simple: The United States should not be supplying bombs that we know will be used to perpetuate one of the worst disasters of our lifetimes,” Casar said.

The debate comes amid broader congressional scrutiny of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Earlier this week, the House approved a resolution aimed at limiting President Donald Trump’s authority to conduct military action against Iran without congressional authorization.

In addition, 40 senators voted in April to block the transfer of military bulldozers to Israel, signaling growing willingness among some lawmakers to challenge aspects of U.S. military support.

Advocacy groups backing the legislation welcomed the increase in support but stressed that much work remains.

Jewish Voice for Peace Action Political Director Beth Miller described the growth in co-sponsors as significant but said the total remains well below a congressional majority.

Supporters of the measure argue that continued humanitarian suffering in Gaza requires a reassessment of U.S. military assistance, while opponents maintain that aid to Israel remains essential for the country’s security.

With Congress still largely supportive of Israel, the legislation faces difficult odds. Nevertheless, its growing backing highlights a notable shift in the political debate surrounding U.S. arms transfers and Washington’s role in the war.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

I

srael and Lebanon have agreed to implement a ceasefire aimed at ending months of hostilities, the Trump administration announced on Wednesday, raising hopes that a broader agreement to end the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran could be within reach.

The agreement, reached following negotiations in Washington, requires a complete cessation of hostilities by the Iran-backed Hezbollah and the withdrawal of its fighters from southern Lebanon’s Litani region, according to a joint statement issued by the United States Department of State.

The development comes despite continued violence across the region and mounting tensions involving Iran, Gulf states, and U.S. forces.

A previous ceasefire announced last month failed to halt fighting, with clashes continuing after Israel launched operations in Lebanon in March against Hezbollah, which had opened a front against Israel in support of Tehran.

The latest agreement is viewed as a key component of wider diplomatic efforts to end the regional conflict that erupted following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran earlier this year.

Gulf attacks and Strait of Hormuz tensions continue

Even as diplomatic efforts advanced, regional tensions remained high.

Kuwaiti authorities said Iranian missile and drone attacks damaged facilities at Kuwait International Airport, killing one person and injuring more than 60 others. Airport operations were temporarily suspended before flights resumed later in the day following emergency safety measures.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps denied targeting the airport directly, claiming the damage was caused by failed U.S. interceptor missiles. The U.S. military rejected that account, saying Iranian drones deliberately targeted the airport.

At the same time, the United States Central Command reported carrying out defensive strikes against missile launch sites and naval assets in southern Iran. U.S. forces also struck targets on Qeshm Island near the strategically important Strait of Hormuz after what officials described as attempted Iranian attacks.

The Strait of Hormuz, a critical route for global oil and gas shipments, remains largely closed more than three months after the conflict began. Oil prices rose nearly 2% on concerns about continuing disruptions to energy supplies.

Negotiations with Iran remain fragile

The ceasefire announcement comes amid ongoing efforts to secure a broader agreement between Washington and Tehran.

Iran has linked progress in negotiations to an end to fighting in Lebanon and is seeking access to frozen oil revenues, sanctions relief, an end to restrictions on its ports, and guarantees regarding future access to the Strait of Hormuz.

Abbas Araqchi said negotiations with the United States had not been suspended but acknowledged that no significant progress had been made in recent days.

Meanwhile, President Donald Trump expressed optimism that developments could occur soon.

“If it happens, it could happen over the weekend,” Trump told reporters at the White House, without providing further details.

Trump also indicated that negotiators were attempting to separate discussions about reopening the Strait of Hormuz from the conflict in Lebanon.

Despite the ceasefire announcement, violence continued on Wednesday. Lebanese security sources reported Israeli drone strikes that killed at least six people in southern Lebanon and targeted areas near Beirut. Israel said it had intercepted a hostile aircraft believed to have been launched by Hezbollah.

Araqchi warned that Iran would respond decisively if Israel expanded military operations against Beirut.

The conflict has killed thousands of people, primarily in Iran and Lebanon, while disrupting global trade and energy markets. Although the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire has raised hopes for a wider diplomatic breakthrough, ongoing military incidents underscore the fragility of the situation and the challenges facing negotiators seeking a broader regional settlement.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he late Nelson Mandela said, “work to support courage where there is fear, foster agreement where there is conflict, and inspire hope where there is despair”. This may well apply to Pakistan’s position during a critical period of the escalating conflict between the United States and Iran. Many parties were unable to, or perhaps remained either reluctant or hesitant to get involved amidst waves of retaliatory strikes, a political and media discourse that had reached a new peak since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and a division in stances regarding the ongoing conflict.

However, one thing there was absolute agreement on the necessity of reaching a détente that would lead to the opening of the Strait of Hormuz to international navigation, thus restoring global economic activity, and ensuring the continued export of energy supply to consumers, including Pakistan, which considers the stability of the Strait and the region crucial to its economy and maritime security. The Pakistani initiative came at a pivotal moment, acting as a decisive factor in achieving a ceasefire, in an attempt to reach a consensus between both parties to end the conflict and quash its repercussions.

The initiative raised numerous questions about Islamabad’s role, which some might interpret as exploiting a political vacuum that other parties were unable to fill, adding to Pakistan’s regional influence, especially in view of the escalating tensions. There are also ongoing concerns about the continuation of the crisis, and its repercussions at the regional and international levels, as well as its economic and security implications for Pakistan itself. There is a conviction that an early effort at mediation allows more room for negotiation, and that the longer the initiative is delayed, the less willing the conflicting parties will be to accept a compromise. Therefore, Pakistan’s involvement at this juncture is commendable, even if it is limited, as it occurred during a period of transition, not after the situation had already stabilized.

Pakistan’s initiative to find a solution to the crisis between the United States and Iran may be viewed through the lens of political, economic, and geographical factors. The country has good relations with both sides, and is utilizing other channels of communication, such as with Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye, to advance its mediation efforts. It is worth noting that regional stability, and internal stability in Iran itself is important to Pakistan, which shares a long border of 900 km with its western neighbor. Islamabad fears the spillover of any political turmoil in Iran that may have sectarian and security repercussions for Pakistan, not to mention other repercussions on the energy markets, and on regional and global trade. Thus, Islamabad saw an opportunity to draw attention to itself as an important regional player and a diplomatic power capable of playing a prominent role during crises, which enhances its political standing and its international relations. Despite all this, the Pakistani initiative has raised many questions and perhaps drawn skepticism about Pakistan’s intentions and its role at this particular time.

Pakistan and the parties to the conflict

The relationship between Pakistan and the Western powers, particularly the United States, has always been complex and volatile. It can be described as a pragmatic partnership rather than an alliance based on mutual trust. This relationship has witnessed periods of intense rapprochement but also periods of sharp tension, depending on the changing circumstances and strategic interests of each party. During the Cold War, the relationship was very close, allowing Pakistan to join US-backed alliances such as the Baghdad Pact and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), in exchange for military and financial aid. This cooperation reached its peak during the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when Pakistan played a prominent role in supporting the ‘Mujahideen’, while receiving direct assistance from the United States. However, this harmony did not last long.

After the end of the Cold War in 1991, the relationship cooled off, especially with the emergence of Pakistan’s nuclear program, which led the United States to impose sanctions. The attacks of September 11, however, revived Pakistan’s ties with the United States, through the logistical and intelligence support provided by Islamabad to Washington, despite lingering suspicions about Pakistan’s duplicity in its dealings with the West. Its unstable surroundings worried western analysts, and in recent years the United States’ suspicions of Pakistan’s intentions have increased, especially following Islamabad’s growing rapprochement with Beijing through a series of economic projects and defense partnerships, particularly in military manufacturing and technology transfer. Consequently, the relationship between the two sides is determined by regional and international power balances, without any guarantee of a lasting political and strategic convergence.

Conversely, since its separation from India in 1947, Islamabad has maintained a relatively good relationship with Tehran, recognizing its direct proximity to its western neighbor, and understanding that any regional conflict in which Iran is directly involved will immediately affect Pakistan. This would have several repercussions, including disruptions to the transport of natural resources such as oil and gas, the potential for refugee flows, and the possibility of an escalation in sectarian tensions within Pakistan, given that approximately 20% of the population is Shia, who could potentially ignite an internal crisis. Therefore, in any escalation between Iran and the United States, such as the one that occurred following the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force in 2020, Islamabad has been quick to intervene diplomatically, emphasizing the need to respect the sovereignty of states and renounce the use of force.

Pakistan has also stressed that it will not allow its territory to be used in any conflict against any neighboring country, especially since Islamabad intends to maintain good relations with Tehran, Washington, Riyadh, and other regional actors. Meanwhile, tensions occasionally surface between Iran and its Gulf neighbors, albeit with some noticeable variations. Consequently, Islamabad knows it will have to maintain the delicate balance that grants it a regional role, and presents itself to the world as an influential state capable of resolving conflicts, thus giving it greater diplomatic weight.

Current regional events have cast a shadow over the political and economic landscape, given the difficulty of reaching a formula for consensus between the United States and Iran. This has prompted Islamabad to intervene and adopt a mediation initiative, hosting direct negotiations at the highest level. This step has been described by many as the result of precise political and security calculations that take into consideration the repercussions of escalation in the region and its impact on Iran’s neighbors, and on the region as a whole.

The Pakistani initiative did not come about as a reaction at a particularly sensitive moment, but rather as a direct protection of its internal security and its economy, which cannot withstand the devastating effects of being drawn into regional conflicts, which in itself seems a justifiable reason for such action. However, the timing of Islamabad’s entry as a mediator has raised many questions, at a time when countries such as Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Egypt were themselves seeking to bridge the divide and reduce tension. Therefore, what was it that prompted Islamabad this time to adopt the mediation role that Oman has played between the United States and Iran for many decades?

A regional role or an opportunistic approach?

There may be several interpretations of Pakistan’s decision to take a mediation role at this critical juncture, involving two parties whose relationship has been marked by open hostility since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Some believe that Islamabad’s move stems from a desire to ensure regional stability, which is essential for the smooth flow of maritime traffic, the uninterrupted flow of energy resources to consumers, and the avoidance of internal tensions in Iran. This is to say nothing of the potential influx of refugees and border tensions, as well as the economic shocks associated with disruption to energy prices, trade, shipping, and insurance. Therefore, according to this argument, Islamabad has adopted a mediating stance to prevent escalation and seek diplomatic solutions to the crisis, given that a protracted conflict threatens both regional and internal Pakistani security. Thus, the mediation role reflects a desire to prevent the expansion of the regional war, an attempt to de-escalate tensions between competing powers, and a commitment to maintaining a strategic balance between all parties to the conflict, without siding with any of them. The initiative embodies Pakistani political traditions of keeping channels of communication open with all competing powers.

On the contrary, some believe Pakistan’s move is driven by opportunistic motives. Perhaps, Islamabad saw an opportunity to regain its diminishing standing and bolster its international presence, at a time when it is grappling with economic difficulties and political instability. Others view this as less credible, arguing that it is seeking to improve its image abroad, particularly in the United States, and strengthen its ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Such a move would grant it diplomatic prestige and the ability to present itself as an indispensable regional power.

This comes within the framework of repositioning itself after years of relative isolation and attempting to balance its relationships with regional actors like Iran and Saudi Arabia, especially given the Joint Defense Agreement (JDA) with Riyadh, which places Islamabad in a precarious position, particularly in the event of a potential clash between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, it seeks to maintain balanced relations with other regional and international players such as Türkiye and the United States, a position which could lead to economic gain, broader security cooperation, defense-industry partnerships, and debt relief. With the disruption to energy supplies, Islamabad has been forced to implement austerity measures, shortening school days and working hours to conserve energy.

Ensuring a de-escalation of the regional situation would in fact bring significant benefits to Pakistan. These include guaranteeing access to Iranian oil at affordable prices once sanctions are lifted, and the completion of the long-awaited Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. By avoiding further escalation, Islamabad would also secure a safe trade corridor to Central Asia via Iran, as evidenced by the shipment of the first batch of Pakistani frozen meat to Uzbekistan in April 2026. This is particularly important given that trade routes through Torkham and Chaman, key strategic border crossings and vital trade arteries from Afghanistan to Central Asia, remain closed due to ongoing strained relations between Islamabad and Kabul. Furthermore, internal stability in Iran would prevent Indian attempts to infiltrate Pakistan’s Baluchistan via the Chabahar project, thus thwarting any encirclement efforts by New Delhi. These benefits would also prevent India from attempting to extend its influence through Iran into Pakistani Baluchistan.

According to an extreme view, still others believe that Islamabad may be complicit in a conspiracy against Tehran, given the actions of the United States, Pakistan’s historical ally, and Iran, its ideological antithesis and the primary rival of Saudi Arabia, a key Pakistani ally in the region. Maintaining complete neutrality in these circumstances would therefore be extremely difficult. This view is supported by the mobilization of forces and the stringent sentiment that the United States continued to express while negotiations were underway.

US and Pakistani forces in Saudi Arabia

This included the entry of two American destroyers into Saudi waters in the Arabian Gulf and the arrival of Pakistani forces at King Abdulaziz Air Base in the Eastern Province, accompanied by fighter jets and various weapons. Some interpreted this as an activation of the JDA between the two countries, an agreement considered a strategic buffer for Saudi Arabia and an additional layer of deterrence. It is worth noting that there were also reports that Pakistan simultaneously hosted some Iranian aircraft at Nur Khan Air Base, to protect them from any American military strikes. These included RC-130 intelligence and reconnaissance aircraft and C-130 transport aircraft. Conflicting views call for a deep reassessment of Pakistan’s actual role in the negotiations, which means that Islamabad’s initiative appeared to be not so much altruistic as a geostrategic maneuver to achieve substantial gains under the guise of ensuring the region’s security.

There remains the factor of China, which strongly supports the negotiating track adopted by Pakistan, preferring a diplomatic solution to escalation. China supports Iran, not only because the latter is a key partner in trade and energy, but also because it is a reliable strategic ally in any future confrontation with the United States. Beijing does not want any disruption to shipping lanes, and at the same time seeks a balanced relationship with Washington, as was evident during US President Donald Trump’s visit to China on May 13, 2026. Therefore, it prefers to play a supporting role in negotiations rather than leading them. Reports indicate that Beijing pressured Tehran to accept de-escalation and enter negotiations, exploiting Iran’s need to export its oil to the Chinese market.

In short, Islamabad’s hosting of negotiations between two parties that are extremely important to its national security involves several possible motives, including that this is at the request of the United States, which is trying to end the crisis with the least number of losses and concurrently to save face. It may also be driven by other parties such as Saudi Arabia, which is keen on the security of the region at a time when it is accelerating towards achieving its economic ambitions that require a degree of regional stability.

Despite the regional competition with Iran, Riyadh sees the stability and prosperity of its northern neighbor as a greater opportunity for rapprochement, at a time when its relationship with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is shrouded in much ambiguity. Thus, the outcomes of Pakistan’s role and what the conflict will lead to is likely to indicate much of what the region will face, which also means that the true implications behind the role that Pakistan is playing may become clear later, for Pakistan itself, for the two parties to the conflict, and for the entire region.

A

fter the end of the Cold War, the United States began to dominate the world as the sole superpower. Over the past 35 years, the Americans, maintaining this singularity, have tried to punish their enemies and the countries they declared as enemies by invading them. For this purpose, they occupied Afghanistan and Iraq, the latter having no connection to the 9/11 attacks while the former’s sheltering of Bin Laden did not require invasion of the whole country. Allies also did not withhold their support from the U.S. in these occupations.

Americans, together with Israel, who consider it their duty to attack countries they have labeled as enemies and try to legitimize it with excuses such as democracy and human rights, most recently attacked Iran on February 28. More than two months have passed but the Israel‑U.S. duo, which killed all Iranian leaders on the first day with Iran’s initial naivete, still have not achieved their goals. No regime has collapsed, no country has been occupied, Iran’s nuclear program has not been destroyed, and the Iranian army has not been neutralized. Moreover, Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz has plunged the whole world into an economic crisis.

In short, Iran is a big bite for the U.S. and Israel, and they could not swallow it. Although Trump repeatedly proclaimed victories, there is no real victory. If the allies had supported America, the outcome might have been different, but the allies declared they would not do anything for the U.S. by refusing to enter a war that the U.S. itself does not even have. Moreover, the U.S. was planning to occupy Greenland, NATO territory, just a few months ago.

Super‑power status open to debate?

The United States’ failure naturally opens its super‑power status to debate. Five years ago, while writing an academic paper on whether the U.S. is still a superpower, I observed that despite being the world’s most powerful country in many areas, the U.S. does not possess the power to control the entire world. For example, 24 % of global GDP belongs to the United States. With that share, it is impossible to dominate the remaining 76 % of the world. Militarily, the U.S. is the strongest country, but even in this field the days of policing the world are far behind.

However, while writing the paper I concluded that the U.S. remains a superpower thanks to its allies. Especially because many European states, Japan, South Korea, Canada, and numerous European allies accept U.S. leadership, America’s super‑power status continued.

The tide has turned, and now the United States is led by Donald Trump, a leader whose actions are uncertain even in his own country, whose statecraft is debated, and who does not hesitate to target his own allies. In the Iran war, Trump entered the conflict without any ally’s approval, simply because Israel wanted it. Even though he eyed Greenland and threatened to withdraw from NATO, he still expected support from allies. Yet his allies, not being as reckless, did not join a war that the U.S. itself had not started, leaving the U.S. (and Israel) alone.

Israel is an ally of the US more than Europe

Today, Israel is the United States’ closest ally. You will not see Israel suffering the insults Trump directed at Europeans. Conversely, Israel’s closest ally is not the United States. In other words, Israel will not go to war for the U.S.; they see the U.S. as a country whose resources will be exploited. Unfortunately, this is the painful truth many know but dare not say about U.S.–Israel relations.

As a result, the United States is more alone than ever, which provides a good opportunity to test its power. The Iran war became an example serving exactly this purpose. It is evident that the U.S. cannot maintain hegemony alone. Perhaps it could win a one‑on‑one war against Iran or another country, but the price would be heavy. Therefore, if it does not engage in an existential war, every war it joins will take pieces from its existence and further weaken it.

It is also necessary to emphasize the clumsiness of the American army. Americans are truly ahead in internet technology, which helps keep their economy strong. However, they struggle to keep up with changes in the weapons industry. While Iran managed to push away massive aircraft carriers with a few thousand‑dollar kamikaze drones and, according to claims, shot down an F‑35 with a lower‑technology air‑defense system, battlefields are filling with smaller, more effective weapons, yet the U.S. still relies on large‑scale armaments. Consequently, some of its assets have been destroyed or forced to withdraw from the region. If this trend continues, the United States’ biggest asset will be its nuclear weapons, whose production becomes easier over time. Thus, American hegemony in weaponry is rapidly declining.

Moreover, as long as the Trump administration governs, it is unlikely that Washington will abandon its current policies for a more rational foreign policy. Since American voters elected Trump, Americans themselves need to do a reckoning for their country and elect leaders who truly believe in the “America First” motto and think more sensibly. Otherwise, even if they do not realize it, their country is sliding downhill rapidly.

If this trend continues, the American era will end much earlier. Assuming the U.S. emerged as a superpower in 1945, its hegemony would not even last a hundred years. No hegemon lends its power to another country for free, alienates its friends, conducts arbitrary invasions, or hands state power to leaders who are blackmailed, have a dark past, and are incompetent.

I

n the context of the effects of the war launched by the U.S. and Israel against Iran on February 28 on the Gulf region, the saying “Geography is destiny” is a particularly apt description. The Gulf states, which were not direct parties to the war, have been affected almost as negatively as the warring parties by this process. From the war’s very first days, the Gulf states, known as the “oasis of prosperity” in the Middle East, began to emerge as the biggest losers of this process, following Iran’s retaliations. While not all have been affected equally, the myth of the “Gulf’s inviolability” has ended, opening the door to a bleak future for the region’s monarchies.

In this context, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which could be considered the actors closest to the US politically, have borne the brunt of the blow. Their cautious statements in the early days of the war gave the impression that they were avoiding taking sides. However, the use of US military bases on their territory during the conflict was viewed by Iran as an unacceptable pretext.

They attempted to maintain security ties with Washington while keeping tensions with Tehran under control, but the rapidly rising tension and chaos soon made it impossible for these countries to avoid becoming targets. Bahrain and Kuwait, which pursue low-intensity foreign policies, were similarly affected. In both countries, critical infrastructure, including US military bases, ports, and water treatment facilities, was targeted by Iran at various times.

Position towards Iran

The differing reactions of the Gulf countries during the war resulted in varying impacts of the conflict. From this perspective, Oman and Qatar’s positions during the war set them apart from other Gulf states. Although Qatar sustained heavy damage and expelled Iranian diplomats, the Doha administration’s decision to maintain dialogue with Tehran was notable. Oman, on the other hand, stood apart from all other Gulf states. It became one of the few Gulf countries not targeted by ballistic missiles from Tehran and emerged as one of the most important mediators between Iran and the US.

Throughout this process, both countries adopted a measured approach. However, Oman engaged in intensive mediation efforts to prevent the outbreak of war in the pre-conflict period. It can be argued that the common ground underpinning these countries’ approaches lies in their distanced stance toward the U.S. and Israel, coupled with a relatively closer position regarding their relations with Iran.

A common factor among the Gulf states, which have been affected by the war to varying degrees, is growing security concerns. The deployment of air defense systems in the Gulf following drone and missile attacks on critical infrastructure, particularly energy facilities, marked a turning point in terms of defense for the Gulf states. Iran’s unexpectedly aggressive stance, coupled with the Gulf states’ realization that they were facing this aggression alone, constituted a significant turning point.

The Gulf states were disappointed by the failure of the security architecture, which had been based on the assumption that the US would protect them, to withstand this severe test. This disappointment has driven the Gulf states to develop alternative security mechanisms. Consequently, while the Gulf states realized during this war that the U.S. would not directly protect them, they also recognized the need to form alliances with other actors to ensure their security and prepare for a potential Iranian threat after the war. It has become evident that countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar are trying to strengthen security cooperation by working with important regional actors, including Türkiye, Pakistan, and Egypt.

Economic impact

The economy is another area where the concrete effects of the war have been particularly felt in the region. The Gulf region, one of the most important hubs for the global energy supply, found itself in the midst of the conflict. The initial impact was felt in the form of rising oil prices. While some shipments were diverted to alternative routes due to the war, this has increased costs and extended delivery times.

Although rising oil prices above $100 per barrel might appear favorable for the Gulf states, which are exporters, the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for hydrocarbon products reaching global markets, remained at the center of military activity. Coupled with rising insurance costs and the complete halt of transit, the Gulf states were deprived of one of their main sources of income.

In this context, Oman is the only country that stands apart from the other Gulf states. Due to its geographical location, Oman is not dependent on the Strait of Hormuz. Consequently, its oil revenues have risen in line with the increase in prices during this period. Oman continued to export oil, particularly to Asian countries, from its LNG facility in Kalhat, even during the war. Shipments also continued from Mina al Fahal, the country’s most important oil export hub. Omani crude oil traded at $120 per barrel when global oil prices were at $100. This played a critical role in the country’s economy.

Beyond hydrocarbon trade, the economic impacts of the war on Gulf countries have also been highly destructive. In the United Arab Emirates, a key tourism hub in the region, tourist activities came to a complete standstill. Hundreds of hotels in Dubai were left entirely empty within a short period, and thousands of future bookings were canceled. Following the damage to the region’s “safe haven” image, there was a capital outflow amounting to billions of dollars, particularly from Dubai, a recognized global financial center. While the Abu Dhabi and Dubai stock exchanges suffered significant losses, the property market declined by up to 30 percent.

Another sector severely affected by the war is the aviation industry. Major Gulf airports, such as those in Dubai, Doha, and Abu Dhabi, which serve as key hubs for global air transport, became completely non-operational in the early days of the war. They were subsequently forced to operate at minimum capacity. As a result, tens of thousands of foreign workers, who form the backbone of the Gulf labor market, have left the region, negatively impacting consumption and the labor market. Due to these factors, many Gulf countries, including the UAE, are expected to experience severe economic contraction by 2026.

Social impact and expectations of peace

On the other hand, the war has undoubtedly impacted societies in the Gulf. While the effects were limited to daily life and the food supply chain during the war, the erosion of the region’s sense of security has had a traumatic effect on Gulf societies accustomed to nothing but prosperity and development for decades. Consequently, some Gulf citizens have reportedly temporarily relocated with their families to safe havens such as London, Zurich, Singapore, and Istanbul. Uncertainty has also rapidly increased for the millions of foreign workers who play a key role in daily life and the labor market across the Gulf states. The fact that some of the migrant workforce, particularly in the energy and construction sectors, is considering returning to their home countries risks disrupting the already fragile labor market balance. Meanwhile, rising energy and logistics costs are reflected in daily living expenses, and price increases have been observed in food and essential consumer goods.

Although the effects of the war are gradually subsiding following a temporary ceasefire, the Gulf states are prioritizing lasting peace. The Gulf states’ key priorities in the post-war period include the cessation of cross-border threats, particularly from Iran; the guarantee of regime security; and the permanent removal of barriers to energy exports. The Gulf states also expect Iran to struggle for regional influence through proxy forces and to limit Tehran’s nuclear capabilities. Finally, establishing a new security architecture and implementing defense mechanisms to ensure regional security are of critical importance to the Gulf states.

Conversely, one could argue that the collapse of the Iranian regime or the country’s descent into deep instability in the post-war era would also pose a risk to the Gulf states. A resulting power vacuum could lead to uncontrollable consequences that go beyond the current threats. The emergence of a more radical Iranian regime would also pose risks to the Gulf states. A Tehran administration capable of holding the Gulf regimes accountable for events during the war could threaten the Gulf states for decades to come. From this perspective, the Gulf states would prefer Iran to remain an actor whose capacity to generate security concerns is limited and with whom limited dialogue can be maintained rather than being perceived as a threat. Consequently, the Gulf states greatly value entering the post-war period in an environment free of threats from Iran.

The war initiated on February 28 by the U.S. and Israel targeting Iran has had its most intense regional impact on the Gulf states at this stage. The Persian Gulf’s role as the logistical hub and economic heart of the war is the primary reason for this. Consequently, although a temporary ceasefire has been established, the Gulf states now face a vortex of uncertainty within their own borders, as this war has transformed from a crisis unfolding elsewhere. This serves as a reminder that crises seemingly far removed from the Gulf states are much closer than they appear. As the most vulnerable actors in the climate of uncertainty created by the war, the Gulf states are calling for an immediate end to the conflict while attempting to prepare for the new political, military, and economic order set to emerge.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

T

he United States has removed Francesca Albanese from its sanctions list, reversing a controversial decision imposed during the Trump administration over her criticism of Israel’s war in Gaza and her calls for international legal action against Israeli and American officials.

The move came one week after a federal judge temporarily blocked the sanctions, ruling that the measures likely violated Albanese’s free-speech protections under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

Albanese, an Italian lawyer serving as the United Nations special rapporteur on human rights in the occupied Palestinian territories, had become a prominent critic of Israeli military operations in Gaza. In her role, she called on the International Criminal Court to investigate alleged war crimes involving Israeli and U.S. nationals.

She also authored a report accusing several major American corporations of complicity in what she described as Israel’s “ongoing genocidal campaign in Gaza,” drawing strong criticism from Washington and pro-Israel groups.

The sanctions, imposed in July 2025, barred Albanese from entering the United States and cut off her access to the American banking system. U.S. officials at the time said the measures were intended to counter efforts to pressure the ICC into pursuing investigations against U.S. and Israeli officials, executives, and companies.

Judge says sanctions likely violated free speech

The legal challenge against the sanctions was filed in February by Albanese’s husband and daughter, who is a U.S. citizen. Their lawsuit argued that the penalties were politically motivated and unlawfully targeted Albanese for expressing her views on Gaza and international law.

On May 13, U.S. District Judge Richard Leon ruled in favor of temporarily blocking the sanctions. Leon stated that Albanese’s residence outside the United States did not strip her of constitutional protections in this case and suggested the administration had sought to punish her because of the “idea or message expressed” in her public statements.

Following the ruling, the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control announced it would suspend enforcement of the sanctions while the court order remained in effect. The Treasury Department’s latest update now confirms Albanese has been fully removed from the sanctions list.

Neither the United States Department of State nor the White House immediately commented on the reversal.

Debate Over Gaza genocide and international accountability

The case has drawn international attention amid growing global divisions over Israel’s genocide in Gaza and efforts to pursue accountability through international courts.

Supporters of Albanese argued that the sanctions represented an unprecedented attempt by the United States to silence a U.N. official for expressing criticism of a close U.S. ally. Human rights organizations and legal experts warned that the measures risked undermining the independence of U.N. investigators and international institutions.

Critics of Albanese, however, accused her of bias against Israel and defended the Trump administration’s decision to sanction her. U.S. officials previously argued that her actions unfairly targeted Israeli and American individuals while politicizing the work of the United Nations.

The removal of the sanctions may now ease tensions between Washington and some international human rights bodies, though broader disagreements over the Gaza conflict and the role of the ICC are likely to continue.

Albanese has not yet publicly commented on the Treasury Department’s decision.

(Source: Reuters)

S

ince almost the very beginning of the attacks carried out by the US and Israel against Iran, the Strait of Hormuz has been one of the most significant factors influencing the course of the war. The Strait of Hormuz also fundamentally affects whether the current peace talks stall or progress. The most significant reason for this is that economic and commercial considerations have come to the fore amongst the global repercussions of armed conflicts today.

Since passage through international straits, particularly the Strait of Hormuz, is critical, the regime governing passage has become a significant concern. In this context, questions have arisen about whether any state has the right to close an international strait and whether restricting, closing, or imposing a blockade on international straits during wartime is legally permissible.

Given the illegality of many actions in the US/Israel-Iran conflict, it would be beneficial to clarify the legal principles governing transit through the Strait of Hormuz, a vital international maritime transport route, during wartime.

The importance of international straits and channels

Apart from the Strait of Hormuz, there are other straits and channels around the world that are of central importance to international maritime transport. The Strait of Gibraltar, the Turkish Straits, and the Straits of Singapore and Malacca are among the most important of these. The Strait of Gibraltar is the only maritime passageway connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the open ocean. The Straits of Singapore and Malacca are maritime passages between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea in Southeast Asia. Stretching between Singapore and the Riau Islands of Indonesia, these straits are among the busiest waterways in global maritime trade. Approximately 40 percent of the world’s merchant vessels pass through them. They form the route for most oil and raw material shipments destined for Asia’s industrial giants, such as China, Japan, and South Korea.

The Turkish Straits system, comprising the Straits of Istanbul and Çanakkale and the Sea of Marmara, is the only waterway connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. The Turkish Straits are of vital importance to the economies and military security of countries bordering the Black Sea. Currently, over 50,000 ships, including more than 10,000 tankers, pass through the Turkish Straits each year, making them crucial for the transit of food, oil, natural gas, and commercial goods.

Meanwhile, the Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important oil transit points. This strait is the sole route connecting Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain to the rest of the world, and it is also the only functional maritime transport route for oil exports from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In 2024 and 2025, more than a quarter of total global seaborne oil trade and approximately one-fifth of global oil and petroleum product consumption passed through the Strait of Hormuz. Furthermore, approximately one-fifth of the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade passed through the strait in 2024, primarily from Qatar. Consequently, even temporarily halting the passage of oil or LNG tankers through the strait is likely to increase global energy prices, shipping costs, and lead to significant supply delays.

Man-made waterways that connect seas are known as sea canals. The Panama and Suez Canals are the most prominent examples. The Panama Canal was constructed under the 1903 Washington Treaty between Panama and the United States and completed in 1914. Governed by the “Treaty on Permanent Neutrality and the Operation of the Panama Canal,” signed by the United States and Panama in 1977, the Panama Canal provides a direct passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Meanwhile, the Suez Canal is an artificial waterway that is approximately 190 kilometers long and connects the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea. Transit through the canal is regulated by the Istanbul Convention, a multilateral treaty signed in 1888, which permits all ships, regardless of nationality or purpose, to pass through. The canal handles approximately 10–15 percent of global maritime trade. It serves as a critical transit point for the transport of oil, natural gas, and container freight in particular.

Transit through international straits during armed conflicts

According to international law, the right to transit through international straits during peacetime is considered a “right of innocent passage.” However, this right is not absolute, meaning the coastal state may suspend transit if it becomes harmful. This suspension does not essentially amount to a total ban on passage; rather, it is an exceptional power that the coastal state may exercise when the passage of a specific vessel or vessels becomes “detrimental” to the coastal state’s peace, security, or order. In situations where transit has become entirely harmful, exceptional circumstances may arise in which transit may be suspended entirely, provided that the suspension is not indefinite and is for reasons such as health inspections.

Unlike the right of innocent passage, the “right of transit passage” through international straits is an inalienable right recognized by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which 172 states are currently parties. According to Article 38 of the Convention, all ships and aircraft have the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded.

However, it can be said that the rules governing the right of passage through international straits change significantly during wartime. In the event of war, two situations may arise. The first situation occurs when one or more states bordering the strait is involved in the war. These straits may be characterized as “international straits involved in the war.” The second scenario is when none of the states bordering the strait are involved in the war. These straits are referred to as “neutral,” or non-belligerent, straits.

International straits involved in a war that do not consist entirely of a single state’s territorial waters, where a route passes through the high seas or exclusive economic zone, cannot be exercised by the coastal states beyond their own territorial waters.

If an international strait involved in a war consists entirely of territorial waters, then those waters also form part of the general theater of hostilities. This means that the entire strait becomes a theater of war. Subject to the relevant provisions of the laws of war, enemy ships and aircraft in these straits may be attacked, and enemy and neutral merchant ships may be stopped and seized. The coastal state has the right to deny passage to all enemy ships and aircraft.

Neutral ships

However, these straits cannot be closed to ships belonging to states that are not parties to the conflict, i.e., neutral ships. There is a prevailing view that peaceful shipping traffic should be allowed to pass through the straits with minimal disruption. While states bordering an international strait may be inclined to close it, even to peaceful shipping, if they are parties to an international armed conflict, completely closing international straits, particularly by using sea mines, would not be lawful. This was stated in the International Court of Justice’s judgment on April 9, 1949, in the Corfu Channel case. Neutral warships and merchant vessels must not be deprived of their right of passage, or their inalienable right of innocent passage, through international straits belonging to parties to an international armed conflict.

As for neutral international straits not involved in the war, transit generally takes place under peacetime conditions. According to Article 38(2) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a “right of transit passage” exists through neutral straits, which must not be impeded. Transit must be continuous and expeditious for the purpose of passing through the strait. As in peacetime, warships of belligerent states in transit must proceed without delay in accordance with designated sea lanes and traffic separation schemes. Belligerent warships and military aircraft transiting a neutral international strait may take all necessary measures to defend themselves.

In neutral international straits, the right of transit passage does not apply if the straits do not coincide entirely with the coastal state’s territorial waters. In these cases, vessels and aircraft of all nations enjoy freedom of navigation and overflight in the remaining corridor, even if an exclusive economic zone has been declared. In parts of the strait that are part of a coastal state’s territorial waters, ships and aircraft only have a suspensible right of innocent passage.

E

xchanges between US President Donald Trump and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz are becoming increasingly heated. Merz was initially one of the European leaders with whom Trump got on best. While leaders of major European nations, such as France and Spain, found themselves embroiled in disputes with Trump following his inauguration for a second term in early 2025, Merz’s first meeting with Trump at the White House in June 2025 ended without incident. Trump’s warm welcome and words of praise were also well received in the German media.

Merz’s praise for Trump, his avoidance of raising issues between the two countries, and his assertion that the US was an indispensable partner for Germany all played a key role in ensuring the meeting’s positive outcome. Furthermore, Merz brought a copy of his German grandfather’s birth certificate as a gift and did his utmost to win over the American president.

Despite Trump’s threats regarding Greenland and the economic toll of his tariffs on European industry, the positive start to the Trump-Merz relationship proved resilient for a long duration. This was because Merz was one of the European leaders who was most vocal in advocating a cautious and conciliatory approach in response to Trump’s aggressive policies. Unlike France, Spain and the UK, Germany continued to unconditionally support Israel’s actions in the Middle East during Merz’s tenure. While the aforementioned countries recognized the State of Palestine in response to Israel’s actions, Germany’s refusal to recognize Palestine also contributed to Trump’s satisfaction with Merz.

Finally, Merz’s statements supporting the war initiated by the U.S. and Israel against Iran—which was in violation of international law—had also greatly pleased Trump. The German Chancellor, who supported Israel during last year’s 12-Day War by stating, ‘This is the dirty work Israel is doing for all of us,’ entered into a heated dispute with Iranian leaders by demanding regime change prior to the Israel/U.S. offensive that began on February 28 of this year, earning the appreciation of the Trump-Netanyahu duo.

Regarding the US and Israel’s stance on attacking Iran with the aim of changing its regime, Merz argued that this was in accordance with international law. Shortly after the war began, the German chancellor visited Trump at the White House. While he expressed his support for the US and Israel, he remained silent in the face of Trump’s harsh criticism of the Spanish and British prime ministers, who had announced during the meeting that they would not allow their countries’ bases to be used for the war. Clearly, Merz’s stance also pleased the American president.

Angering Trump

It was clear that the German chancellor would anger Trump by changing his stance on Iran and making critical statements as events took a turn for the worse, given that he had pursued an Iran policy aligned with the US and Israel. The deterioration in the relationship between Trump and Merz became apparent when the US and Israel realized that effecting a regime change in Iran would be more difficult than they had anticipated. They had not even managed to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, which had been closed by Tehran. Merz’s rejection of Trump’s request for assistance against Iran in reopening the Strait of Hormuz infuriated the American president.

Merz’s rejection of this request, accompanied by the question, ‘Did they ask us when they started the war?’, led to an intense response from Trump, given that the German chancellor had previously adopted a stance in his pre-war statements along the lines of ‘Yes, the regime in Iran must change’ and ‘Go on, do our dirty work for us’. Now that the process was not going as planned and the global cost of the war was rising daily, Merz’s reluctance to offer support was causing Trump distress.

It should be noted that both parties believed they were justified in their actions. Merz feels vindicated in his stance, arguing: ‘Our support was purely rhetorical; you entered this war confidently without the need to consult us, so do not ask us to join now. We are already occupied with a war against Russia in Ukraine, and our military strength is insufficient. Trump, on the other hand, believed he was in the right, reasoning, ‘You said the regime in Iran must change. You said our attack was in accordance with international law, so why aren’t you supporting us?’

Damaging a relationship

These differences in position and perspective appear to have damaged the relationship between the two leaders, as well as US–German relations, to an extent that will be difficult to repair. The German chancellor’s remarks in a speech on 27 April further enraged Trump. In the speech, she stated that ‘the US would not be able to end the war against Iran in the short term because the Iranians are stronger than anticipated and the Americans lack a truly persuasive negotiating strategy’, and that ‘the entire American nation has been humiliated by the Iranian regime’. Trump, who has threatened to withdraw American troops from Germany, said that ‘it is hardly surprising that Germany is in such a dire state, both economically and in other respects, under the leadership of Merz, who has no idea what he is talking about’.

Unable to contain his anger, Trump took his criticism of the German chancellor a step further, accusing Merz of being ‘completely ineffective’ in the war in Ukraine thus far and stating that ‘instead of meddling in other matters, he should be trying to put his “ruined country” back in order’. Trump’s remarks that the German chancellor should devote more time to ending the war between Russia and Ukraine, followed by his instruction to the defense minister to withdraw 5,000 troops from Germany, may prevent Merz from further escalating this dispute. This is because, while US interest in and support for Ukraine has diminished significantly under Trump, an escalation of tensions between Washington and Berlin could leave Germany and other European countries in an even more difficult position with regard to Russia.

The failure of the US and Israel to achieve their objectives in the unjust war they launched against Iran, coupled with Iranian resistance, is causing a rift among even Trump’s most loyal supporters. The US could face serious problems with its allies and Israel if the Strait of Hormuz were to close for an extended period.

(This article was originally published in Turkish by the Middle East Africa website)

W

hile nuclear negotiations between the U.S. and Iran were ongoing, the U.S.-Israel-Iran War began with Israel’s attack on Iran, which received a green light from Trump. This attack occurred just as it had on June 13, 2025, and continued with U.S. participation. For the time being, the war has come to an end with the 15-day ceasefire declared on April 8. This ceasefire occurred because Iran administration survived despite the human casualties and damage to its infrastructure in the war. Iran simultaneously struck Israel with ballistic missiles, spreading the war to Gulf states and closing the Strait of Hormuz. Iran achieved a relative balance of power. One of the reasons for the ceasefire on the US side is Trump’s unwillingness to bear further costs.

Shortly after the ceasefire was declared on April 8, the U.S. and Iranian negotiation delegations met in Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital. They left Islamabad without reaching an agreement due to failing to find common ground on the conditions put forward by both sides. However, they did agree to maintain the ceasefire. However, both sides declared their resolve to return to war should no agreement be reached.

While both the US and Iran appear to agree on not prolonging the 40-day war, Israel—which initiated the war and drew the US into it—does not want to end the war or see an agreement between the US and Iran. This is because Israel has yet to achieve its objectives against Iran. Although Israel has stated that it will comply with the ceasefire, its approach to the process has unfortunately rendered the ceasefire exceedingly fragile. Israel’s stance complicates any potential agreement requiring the US to act contrary to Israel’s interests and concerns.

Just as Israel has pitted the US against Iran through its sustained campaign over the years, it does not wish for this war to end without securing maximum benefit from the situation. In other words, it wants to bring about internal turmoil or regime change that would lead to Iran’s fragmentation. To this end, Israel is attempting to poison the negotiations and render any potential agreement impossible by utilizing all its influence and power over the US administration.

Israel’s negative stance toward ceasefires is not limited to those between the U.S. and Iran. In fact, even the ceasefire with Lebanon, secured under US pressure, holds no significance for Israel. While appearing to have reached an agreement with Lebanon, Israel continues its attacks under the pretext of Hezbollah. Consequently, it is evident that Israel cannot accept ceasefires in Iran and Lebanon and is therefore trying to break them and return to war.

This study will examine Israel’s attempts to undermine ceasefires in the region separately for the Iranian and Lebanese fronts. In the conclusion, an attempt will be made to explain what Israel aims to achieve through these moves.

Israel’s approach to the ceasefire between the US and Iran

The justifications Israel cited for initiating the war against Iran are the same as those it is now citing to violate the ceasefire and, if possible, prevent an agreement from being reached. Yet, over the course of the 40-day war, it has become clear that nearly all of the claims Israel made regarding the Iranian regime were false.

Most notably, the claims that Iran was on the verge of possessing a nuclear weapon were baseless. This reinforces the argument that Israel made this claim solely to initiate the conflict. Claims that the Iranian people would not support the regime and that the regime would collapse if the religious leader were killed have also been proven false. It has also come to light that Israel deceived Trump on this matter.

However, despite all these facts, Israel continues to demonize Iran by claiming that it has the potential to acquire nuclear weapons and plans to eliminate first Israel, then the United States, and rest of West; in doing so, it seeks to prevent the establishment of mutual trust and to block any agreement with what it portrays as such an “enemy of civilization.”

Israel has done more than circulate these narratives to undermine the ceasefire. It has also pressured Trump and his administration through the Jewish lobby in the U.S. While doing so, Israel has enlisted the support of Jewish senators and members of the House of Representatives in the U.S. Congress, including senators like Lindsey Graham, who is funded by the Jewish lobby. Israel has used these tactics to persuade Trump to break the ceasefire and return to war.

Israel’s most significant assets in sabotaging negotiations with Iran have been Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, both of whom were part of the U.S. negotiating delegation. Both of these Jewish figures have close ties to the Israeli government and Netanyahu. As with the process of securing the ceasefire in Gaza, this pair relayed all discussions to Netanyahu and took no steps without his approval. Following the February 26 negotiations, Witkoff stated that “everything was on track and we could now move on to technical matters.” However, after the outbreak of war on February 28, he attempted to exonerate Israel, which initiated the war, by spreading the lie that “the Iranian delegation threatened them by claiming to possess 400 kilograms of enriched uranium and the ability to produce at least 11 nuclear bombs during the final negotiations,” thereby seeking to legitimize the war.

For this reason, the Iranian side announced that they would not accept Witkoff as head of the U.S. negotiating delegation and preferred Vice President J.D. Vance instead. Consequently, Vance chaired the negotiations in Islamabad. However, Israel did not remain idle during this process. According to media reports, Vance spoke with Netanyahu by telephone during the negotiations to convey Iran’s proposals. The negotiations stalled due to Netanyahu’s negative stance.

As can be seen, while Israel seeks to both undermine the ceasefire and prevent a potential agreement by portraying Iran as an unreliable actor, on the other hand, through its mouthpieces in the U.S. media, it has published analyses claiming that the ceasefire was a mistake, that an agreement with Iran would strengthen Iran and damage U.S. prestige, and that the best option is for the U.S. to bring Iran to heel through the use of force. Not content with this, Israel has sought to influence the U.S. public and exert pressure on the Trump administration’s decisions by mobilizing all institutions of the Jewish lobby.

The impossible ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon

Although the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, which began on November 27, 2024, is technically still in place, it is highly unlikely to be upheld due to Hezbollah’s involvement in the conflict on Iran’s behalf since March 2. Israel had also frequently violated the ceasefire, carrying out attacks—particularly in Beirut’s Dahiye district and southern regions beyond the Litani River—under the pretext of targeting Hezbollah. However, with Hezbollah’s intervention in the war, the ceasefire has officially ceased to exist.

From March 2 until the 10-day ceasefire was announced on April 17 following talks held on April 14 under U.S. facilitation and hosting, Israel used Hezbollah as usual and, following the ground operation that began on March 16, established an 8–10-kilometer buffer zone in southern Lebanon. Consequently, by the time the ceasefire took effect, Israel had occupied approximately % 6 of Lebanese territory and refused to allow the return of Lebanese civilians forcibly evacuated from the area.

One of the preconditions for the ceasefire between the US and Iran was that Israel cease its attacks on Lebanon. However, due to Israel’s continued attacks, the Lebanon issue was deemed outside the scope of the US-Iran ceasefire. Nevertheless, at Trump’s insistence, the Israeli and Lebanese ambassadors were brought together in Washington to declare a ceasefire. Trump then prohibited Israel from attacking Lebanon. Although Israel did not take this ban seriously, Iran’s demand was ultimately met.

However, since the Lebanese government and army were unable to disarm Hezbollah as assigned under the ceasefire, Israel continues its attacks on the pretext that the necessary conditions have not been met.

Despite these setbacks, on April 24, before the ceasefire period expired, the Israeli and Lebanese ambassadors met again in Washington under the leadership of U.S. Secretary of State Rubio. At a ceremony attended by Trump and Vance, they announced that the ceasefire had been extended for an additional three weeks more.

While the continuation of the ceasefire is positive, Israel’s occupation of Lebanese territory persists, and Hezbollah has stated that it will continue to fight Israel. Thus, the ceasefire appears likely to remain on paper only. Indeed, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has stated that Lebanon will not agree to a final settlement unless Israel ends its occupation of Lebanese territory. Meanwhile, it has been leaked to the media that Trump plans to sign a peace agreement in Washington within approximately a month, with Netanyahu and Lebanese President Aoun in attendance. However, as long as Israel continues to attack Lebanon and attempt to provoke a civil war by pitting Hezbollah against other ethnic and sectarian groups, this seems unlikely to materialize.

Consequently, since Israel has not yet achieved its objectives regarding Iran, it is trying to undermine the ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran to keep the war going. Although Israel appears to have agreed to a ceasefire in Lebanon on paper, it is continuing its attacks under the pretext of Hezbollah. Israel is also attempting to establish a permanent presence in the territories it has occupied. As long as Israel maintains its current policy, neither a ceasefire nor lasting peace in the region will be possible.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

B

y late April 2026, the war involving Iran, the United States and Israel has pushed Iran’s already fragile economy into a deepening crisis, leaving millions of Iranians facing unemployment, inflation and growing poverty.

Across the country, workers from nearly every sector, from heavy industry and aviation to online services and education, are losing jobs or seeing their incomes collapse as airstrikes, internet shutdowns and trade disruptions cripple economic activity.

For many Iranians, the consequences of the conflict are immediate and personal.

Asal, a freelance designer in her 30s living in Tehran, said international work opportunities disappeared after prolonged internet restrictions cut her off from clients abroad.

“Everything just stopped overnight,” she told CNN, explaining that her income no longer covers basic living expenses.

Her story reflects a broader national crisis unfolding as Iran’s economy absorbs the impact of war after years of sanctions, inflation and structural weakness.

Economy fragile before war

Even before the fighting escalated, Iran’s economy was under severe pressure. National income per person had dropped from roughly $8,000 in 2012 to about $5,000 by 2024, weakened by international sanctions, corruption and years of high inflation.

Now economists warn that conditions are deteriorating rapidly.

According to estimates from the United Nations Development Program, as many as 4.1 million additional Iranians could fall into poverty because of the conflict.

Thousands of airstrikes have damaged factories, infrastructure and industrial sites across the country. Iranian media outlet EcoIran reported that more than 23,000 factories and businesses have been affected.

Iranian Deputy Work and Social Security Minister Gholamhossein Mohammadi said the destruction has directly cost one million jobs. Additional disruptions throughout the economy may have pushed another million people out of work.

The war has severely disrupted Iran’s industrial production and trade networks.

Israeli strikes targeting major petrochemical facilities last month forced thousands of workers into unpaid leave, while damage to steel production created shortages that spread across manufacturing industries.

Trailer manufacturer Maral Sanat reportedly laid off 1,500 workers because of insufficient steel supplies. One of Iran’s largest textile producers, Borujerd, dismissed around 700 employees.

Economic analyst Hadi Kahalzadeh of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft warned that the combination of war, inflation and collapsing consumer demand is threatening much of Iran’s labor market.

He estimated that disruptions to shipping and imports could place up to half of Iranian jobs at risk while pushing even more citizens into poverty.

Meanwhile, shortages of imported materials have forced dairy plants and other manufacturers to suspend operations.

Official figures show unemployment insurance applications have surged dramatically, reaching approximately 147,000 in the past two months, nearly three times the number recorded during the same period last year.

Inflation and internet shutdowns deepen hardship

The economic pain has been intensified by soaring inflation.

Official data placed annual inflation at 72% in March, though prices for essential goods rose even faster, putting food and household necessities beyond the reach of many families.

At the same time, widespread internet shutdowns have devastated sectors dependent on digital connectivity.

Iranian media reported layoffs at the country’s largest e-commerce company, Digikala, as online businesses struggle to operate under communication restrictions.

Jafar, a data analyst whose company shut down entirely, told independent media outlet Fararu that he is now considering work in ride-hailing services simply to survive.

The internet disruptions have particularly affected women working remotely.

Somayeh, an online German teacher from Isfahan, said unreliable domestic applications and weak connectivity have made online teaching nearly impossible.

“Platforms keep crashing,” she said, explaining that students are often unable to join lessons consistently.

Women have accounted for roughly one-third of unemployment insurance claims filed since the war began.

Growing pressure on government

The rising unemployment rate is placing additional strain on Iran’s social security system as state revenues decline.

Economists and business groups are urging the government to introduce emergency support measures, including tax relief, low-interest loans and aid for small businesses, warning that unemployment could worsen without immediate intervention.

Criticism of the government’s economic management is also increasing.

Saeed Tajik criticized authorities for raising salaries for state employees while many private businesses struggle to pay workers and are forced to implement layoffs.

The Tehran Chamber of Commerce has called preserving jobs the country’s highest economic priority.

Iranian officials argue the hardship is the result of what they describe as an unjust war imposed by the United States and Israel. Authorities are reportedly considering expanding monthly food vouchers and assistance programs for low-income households.

Still, conservative Iranian newspaper Ettelaat warned this week that the country faces “a dire and complicated situation” requiring emergency wartime economic policies.

The worsening economic conditions are reviving memories of nationwide protests that erupted before the war over inflation, unemployment and declining living standards.

Although the government has maintained tight political control, uncertainty continues to spread across Iranian society as the conflict remains unresolved.

For many ordinary citizens, the greatest burden is no longer only financial loss, but the uncertainty about what comes next.

“You never know what’s going to happen next,” Somayeh said from Isfahan, describing a feeling increasingly shared across Iran as the war drags on.

(Source: CNN)

A

s tensions between United States and Iran continue to escalate, analysts warn that the confrontation is increasingly becoming a battle of economic endurance rather than a conventional military contest, with global markets and oil supplies emerging as key pressure points.

The crisis has centered on the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important waterways through which a significant share of global oil exports passes daily. Continued instability in the region has already triggered volatility in energy markets and renewed concerns over inflation and economic disruption worldwide.

Although the United States has intensified naval patrols and expanded operations targeting Iranian-linked shipping, Tehran appears focused on using asymmetric tactics to raise the cost of the conflict for Washington and its allies.

US officials say dozens of vessels associated with Iranian trade networks have been intercepted since the beginning of the maritime blockade. Yet despite heavy military pressure, Iranian forces continue to operate small fast-attack boats near the strait, targeting cargo vessels and commercial tankers in what analysts describe as a campaign designed to undermine confidence in regional shipping security.

Observers note that Iran’s strategy does not rely on achieving military superiority over the United States. Instead, Tehran appears determined to sustain enough disruption to global energy flows to increase international pressure for negotiations and concessions.

Oil prices remain highly sensitive to developments in the Gulf. Even limited attacks or threats against shipping routes and energy facilities can sharply increase transportation and insurance costs, affecting economies across Europe, Asia, and North America.

Threats to Gulf energy infrastructure raise alarm

Iranian state-linked media outlets have also escalated rhetoric in recent days by discussing possible future targets across the Gulf region. The semi-official Tasnim news agency highlighted the vulnerability of undersea communication cables concentrated in narrow sections of the Gulf seabed, suggesting that Tehran could expand its tactics beyond direct attacks on ships.

Regional energy infrastructure has also been referenced in Iranian statements and commentary. Facilities such as the Ruwais Refinery in the United Arab Emirates and the Abqaiq Oil Processing Facility in Saudi Arabia have emerged as potential flashpoints.

Security analysts say such threats are intended not only to intimidate regional rivals but also to deepen uncertainty in international financial markets. Previous attacks on Gulf oil facilities caused temporary disruptions in production and triggered sharp reactions in global energy prices.

Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump has continued to publicly project confidence, insisting that Iran is under mounting pressure and that Washington can sustain the confrontation for as long as necessary.

However, economic concerns are beginning to weigh heavily on governments and investors. Rising fuel prices threaten to intensify inflationary pressures at a time when many economies are still struggling with slowing growth and supply chain challenges.

Diplomacy stalls as both sides avoid appearing weak

Efforts to restart negotiations have so far failed to produce a breakthrough. Planned talks in Islamabad reportedly stalled after Iranian representatives failed to attend scheduled meetings, fueling concerns that both sides remain far apart on core demands.

Despite the diplomatic deadlock, analysts familiar with Iran’s negotiating history say Tehran has often relied on patience and gradual pressure during international disputes. Comparisons have been drawn to the lengthy negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, when Iranian negotiators spent years maneuvering diplomatically while resisting Western pressure.

For now, neither Washington nor Tehran appears willing to publicly compromise. Behind the scenes, however, regional mediators are believed to be maintaining quiet contacts in an effort to prevent the crisis from escalating into a wider regional conflict.

As military tensions continue and markets remain volatile, analysts say the conflict is increasingly becoming a test of political stamina and economic resilience. The coming weeks may determine whether the United States can maintain pressure without suffering significant domestic political costs, or whether Iran can continue enduring economic hardship while sustaining disruption in one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.

(Source: CNN)

M

odern international law has aimed to re-establish the conscience of humanity through the normative framework constructed in the aftermath of the Second World War. However, this legal architecture is a fragile structure built upon historical traumas. Beneath this structure lies a deep fissure: the dark past that Western civilization has been unable to confront. Whilst the Holocaust originally functioned as an ethical wound at the heart of this past, its role has shifted over time; it has moved away from its function of remembrance to become a mechanism of repression. This form of collective repression, conceptualized by Carl Gustav Jung as the ‘shadow’ archetype, is becoming increasingly visible today as international law effectively loses its efficacy.

Jung’s theory of the collective unconscious and archetypes analyses the irrational layers of individuals and societies. Human beings are not confined to the level of rational consciousness; they exist alongside myths, symbols and repressed shadows. States act in a similar manner. The superficial language of international law is losing its determinative power; archetypal images are becoming the guiding force. In the case of Israel, the ‘victim archetype’ arising from the collective pain of the Holocaust is transforming into a ‘shadow archetype’ that demands absolute inviolability and derives legitimacy through violence. The Holocaust continues to be one of the most shattering collective traumas residing in humanity’s collective unconscious.

However, this trauma is gradually stripped of its meaning and reduced to the mechanism Jung termed “psychic compensation”. Repressed trauma returns in various forms within the unconscious. According to Jung, every repressed element inevitably emerges as the “shadow”. Israel does not merely limit itself to making the collective pain of the Holocaust a component of its founding identity; it sanctifies this identity, transforming it into a shield of inviolability. When assessed within the framework of Jung’s concept of the “persona”, Israel’s “victim” persona takes on the nature of an artificial mask; the shadow beneath it, with its perpetrator-like qualities, is becoming visible in Gaza.

The victim mask

Benjamin Netanyahu’s political persona aligns with Jung’s “arrogant shadow” archetype. This archetype arises from the fusion of repressed insecurities and the illusion of legitimacy produced by collective myths. Netanyahu does not content himself with positioning himself as an ordinary statesman; he presents himself as a figure imbued with historical and sacred significance. This narcissistic persona interacts with the collective unconscious, fostering irrational loyalty. The psychic intensity of the sacred—which Jung defined as the ‘numinous experience’—becomes evident here.

When this intensity finds no counterpart at the level of consciousness, it generates sacred wrath, fanaticism and, ultimately, anarchy. The elevation of the Holocaust to a sacred status immune to criticism generates violence through this very sanctity. The sanctity of the victim transforms into the legitimacy for creating new victims. This situation is explained within the framework of Jung’s principle of ‘enantiodromia’: every phenomenon turns into its opposite. The victim becomes the perpetrator; violence is perpetrated in the name of the sacred. This transformation transcends the boundaries of legal analysis. The driving forces do not operate on a rational plane; they possess mythological and archetypal qualities.

Today, international law is not limited to examining the actions and conduct of states; it must also take into account the collective unconscious archetypes that shape these acts. The sanctification of the Holocaust, the re-production of Israel as a perpetrator under the guise of a victim, and Benjamin Netanyahu’s personalisation of this unconscious mythology raise questions about the psycho-political foundations of international legitimacy. Jus cogens norms lose their effectiveness to the extent that they cannot cope with the repressed shadows of the collective unconscious.

In this situation, the future of law becomes vulnerable to the influence of myths. Myths do not dispense justice; they generate loyalty and anger. At this point, the law falls silent. Unconscious mythologies, enemy images and sacred missions are becoming decisive. Jung’s warning is clear: politics that surrenders to the mythological unconscious produces destructive results. This transformation is clearly observable in the case of Netanyahu. The victim identity is transforming into an inherent power within the perpetrator; jus cogens norms remain ineffective in the face of this irrational structure.

The mask of law

This unconscious process is becoming particularly visible through the actions in Gaza. These actions transcend the boundaries of conventional security policy; they manifest as ritualised violence stemming from collective trauma. Israel constructs its founding myth upon the Holocaust and transforms this myth into the absolute foundation of its political legitimacy. This foundation is becoming sacrosanct. The irrefutability of the Holocaust is transforming into a dogma that criminalizes criticism.

This dogmatic structure determines the political stances of the West. Rather than confronting historical responsibility, European states sanctify the trauma, rendering it untouchable. From a Freudian perspective, this situation is assessed as a masochistic tendency towards guilt. In the case of Germany, historical guilt is transforming into an irrational dependency that influences current political decisions. Like societies that deny Jung’s ‘shadow’, these states are forming a covert alliance with darkness.

At this point, Roger Garaudy’s analyses take on significance. In his work Israel, Myths and Terror, Garaudy examines the political instrumentalization of modern myths. The transformation of the Holocaust from a historical catastrophe into a sacred symbol is regarded as a harbinger of a new form of fascism. This new form operates through sanctified myths rather than military force. Israel stands as the principal beneficiary of this process. The fusion of sanctity with fascist nationalism silences the language of justice and subjects the law to dogma.

International law and crimes

International law does not operate independently of this structure. Clear war crimes such as the targeting of civilians in Gaza, the killing of children and the obstruction of basic humanitarian needs are disappearing into a legal silence. This silence bears the nature of a manifestation of the unconscious. Jung’s concept of the ‘collective shadow’ explains modern civilization’s inability to confront its own barbarism.

Israel is reproducing the trauma it suffered in the past from the position of the perpetrator. In this context, the rising student movements in Western universities represent a form of ethical resistance. These movements embody, in Jung’s words, the courage to confront the shadow. The mask of the myth is being torn away, and the sanctification of trauma is being challenged. This action possesses an ethical quality. Nurettin Topçu’s concept of the “Ethics of Rebellion” offers a powerful theoretical framework to explain this situation: the moral struggle of the self that sacrifices itself for the sake of truth.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

N

ew U.S. intelligence assessments indicate that recent military operations have caused only limited additional setbacks to Iran’s nuclear program, with analysts maintaining that Tehran’s estimated timeline to build a nuclear weapon remains largely unchanged, according to multiple sources familiar with the findings.

The assessments suggest that despite two months of conflict initiated by Donald Trump, Iran would still require roughly nine months to a year to produce a nuclear weapon if its leadership chose to pursue one. That estimate mirrors conclusions reached after earlier U.S. and Israeli strikes in mid-2025, which had already pushed back Tehran’s capabilities from a shorter three-to-six-month window.

According to sources, the relatively unchanged timeline reflects the strategic focus of recent U.S. operations. While Israel has conducted strikes on some nuclear-related facilities, American forces have largely targeted conventional military infrastructure, including air defenses, weapons production sites and elements of Iran’s defense-industrial base.

U.S. officials argue that degrading these systems complicates Iran’s ability to weaponize its nuclear program by weakening its broader military shield. However, experts note that the core components of Iran’s nuclear capability, particularly its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, remain largely intact and potentially accessible.

A key concern centers on roughly 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to near weapons-grade levels. The International Atomic Energy Agency has said it cannot currently verify the location of much of this material following the suspension of inspections during the war. Analysts believe a significant portion may be stored in underground facilities, making it difficult to target or monitor.

War stalemate and rising regional stakes

The findings come amid a fragile truce between Washington and Tehran agreed on April 7, which has paused large-scale hostilities but left tensions unresolved. Iran’s restrictions on maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz have disrupted global energy markets, with about 20% of the world’s oil and gas flows affected.

U.S. officials continue to emphasize that preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon remains a central objective of the conflict. Public statements from senior leaders, including Vice President JD Vance, have underscored that goal, while the Pentagon has framed ongoing military pressure as part of a broader strategy to constrain Tehran’s long-term capabilities.

Experts say the intelligence assessments highlight the limitations of airstrikes in dismantling deeply entrenched nuclear programs. Many of Iran’s most sensitive materials and technologies are believed to be housed in fortified underground complexes that are difficult to destroy using conventional munitions.

“There is broad agreement that Iran still retains its nuclear material,” said analysts familiar with the issue, noting that physical infrastructure can be damaged, but the underlying expertise and technical capacity are harder to eliminate.

Some U.S. officials have reportedly considered more aggressive options, including potential ground operations to secure or remove nuclear materials. However, such scenarios carry significant risks and have not been publicly endorsed.

Iran denies weapons ambitions

The impact of Israel’s campaign targeting Iranian nuclear scientists adds another layer of uncertainty. While such actions may disrupt technical progress, experts caution that knowledge cannot be entirely eradicated.

Still, the loss of experienced personnel could slow Iran’s ability to assemble a functioning weapon, even if sufficient material is available. Analysts say this creates a more complex picture in which timelines remain stable, but practical challenges to weaponization may have increased.

Iran has consistently denied seeking to develop nuclear weapons, maintaining that its program is intended for peaceful purposes. U.S. intelligence agencies and international observers have long assessed that Tehran halted a formal weapons program in 2003, though concerns persist about its capacity to resume such efforts if it chooses.

The latest intelligence underscores a central dilemma for policymakers: while military action has inflicted damage on Iran’s broader capabilities, it has not fundamentally altered the timeline of its nuclear potential, leaving diplomacy, deterrence, and long-term monitoring as critical elements in managing the crisis.

(Source: Reuters)

D

onald Trump has announced that the United States will begin guiding stranded vessels through the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz starting Monday, as tensions with Iran remain high despite ongoing diplomatic contacts.

In a social media post, Trump described the initiative, dubbed “Project Freedom”, as a humanitarian effort aimed at ensuring safe passage for ships trapped in restricted waters since the outbreak of war in February. He warned that any interference with the operation would be met “forcefully.”

According to United States Central Command, the mission will involve approximately 15,000 personnel, guided-missile destroyers, and over 100 aircraft. The operation comes as an estimated 20,000 sailors remain stranded in the Gulf, facing dwindling supplies and mounting physical and psychological strain.

Iranian officials, however, have pushed back against the move. Senior lawmaker Ebrahim Azizi warned that any US involvement in the waterway would constitute a violation of the current ceasefire.

Despite the tensions, Trump said discussions with Tehran were “very positive,” raising cautious hopes for a broader agreement. Iranian state media confirmed that a US response to Tehran’s latest peace proposal, reportedly delivered via Pakistan, is under review.

Strategic waterway under pressure

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most critical energy corridors, with roughly 20% of global oil and liquefied natural gas passing through it. The ongoing conflict has already driven up global energy prices and disrupted maritime traffic.

Late Sunday, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported that a tanker in the strait had been struck by an “unknown projectile,” though all crew members were reported safe.

Iran’s latest 14-point proposal reportedly calls for a full cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of US forces near its borders and an end to the naval blockade. It also seeks a comprehensive agreement within 30 days.

While Trump acknowledged receiving the proposal, he expressed skepticism about its acceptability and left open the possibility of renewed military strikes if Iran “misbehaves.”

“We’re not leaving,” Trump said, signaling continued US involvement in the region even as diplomatic efforts proceed.

Iran stresses full control of the Strait of Hormuz

Iran has maintained that it retains full control over the Strait of Hormuz, insisting that any vessel movement must be coordinated with its authorities. Officials warned that continued US naval activity and blockade measures could violate existing ceasefire understandings, signaling that Tehran may take “reciprocal measures” if it views Washington as breaching agreements. 

At the same time, Iranian messaging has combined deterrence with diplomacy. While submitting a 14-point peace proposal that includes reopening the waterway and ending hostilities, Tehran has also reinforced its military posture in the region. Reports of recent incidents, including attacks on vessels near Iranian waters, underline its willingness to enforce restrictions, even as negotiations with the United States continue in parallel.

(Source: BBC)

H

ow is the Ukraine-Russia War going? Who has suffered what losses? Which country is in the stronger position? Is Russia close to victory? Is Ukraine definitely losing? So many years have passed since the war began, and we still do not know…

There is a war between the US-Israel coalition and Iran; what is the situation for each side? How heavy are America’s losses? What is the situation in Israel? Is Iran losing? What is the capacity of the parties to continue the war? Ismail Kaani; has he betrayed Iran, been executed, fled to Israel, or is he still in his post in his country and fighting? Who attacked the girls’ school in Iran? Why are Trump and his team now denying the attack they initially admitted to? Did Iran fire missiles at neighbouring countries, or is it all a Mossad ploy to expand the front?

Once again, attempts are being made to sow seeds of discord between Turkey and Azerbaijan. There is a desire for the war to spread to encompass all countries in the region, and disinformation is being churned out ceaselessly.

It is possible to extend these events and questions to all wars and conflicts. But is it ever possible to obtain the true answers in all their stark reality?

The battle for communication during war

Our region has long been shaped by intense geopolitical tensions, wars, conflicts, proxy wars, civil wars and various forms of inter-state competition. One of the most fundamental challenges facing the public during such periods is the issue of access to reliable information. In an environment where conflicts are taking place, a significant portion of the news, images and commentary circulating are often not merely neutral accounts of events; they are also fragments of information produced, selected, framed or distorted in line with specific strategic objectives.

This situation is directly linked to the nature of modern warfare. This is because contemporary wars involve not only battles fought on physical fronts—such as space, air, land and sea—where military units confront one another, but also a comprehensive communication struggle aimed at shaping public perceptions.

In this context, the information domain has become just as significant as the military dimension of war. States, armed groups, intelligence services, international actors and, in some cases, even private communications companies seek to influence the production and circulation of information in conflict environments. The primary aim of these efforts extends far beyond merely influencing rival military forces; it targets a much broader audience.

Various objectives, such as undermining the morale of rival societies, boosting the morale of one’s own society, gaining the support of the international public, generating diplomatic legitimacy, and obscuring military failures, lie at the heart of these communication activities. Consequently, a significant portion of the information circulating during wartime functions as strategic communication tools.

Historically, it is evident that propaganda and psychological operations have been an integral part of modern states’ war strategies. Propaganda bureaus established in Europe and America during the First World War developed systematic communication techniques to mobilise public opinion. During this process, the communication tools of the era—such as newspapers, posters, cinema and radio—were utilised extensively. Subsequently, during the Second World War and the Cold War, propaganda techniques became even more institutionalised, and states’ communication strategies became an integral part of military doctrine. Today, digital communication technologies have made this process far more complex and rapid.

The impact of evolving communication

The emergence of social media platforms, in particular, has dramatically increased the speed and volume of information circulation during times of war. Whilst information reaches the public via specific editorial processes in traditional media systems, these filtering mechanisms appear to have weakened significantly in the digital environment. Social media algorithms operate not according to criteria of accuracy or reliability, but according to the logic of the ‘attention economy’. This leads to content that is emotionally striking, dramatic or provokes anger spreading much more rapidly. Consequently, the flow of information the public faces during periods of war is not only intense but also highly irregular and difficult to verify.

Another significant reason for the spread of false or distorted information in conflict environments is military secrecy and information control. A significant portion of actual data regarding military operations is naturally classified or restricted. States do not share operational details for security reasons, and the information presented to the public is often filtered to some extent. This situation creates a breeding ground for speculation to fill the gaps. At the same time, the parties to the conflict may be inclined to exaggerate their own successes, inflate their opponents’ losses, or downplay their own losses. Such rhetorical strategies have been frequently observed throughout military history and have become far more visible with the advent of modern communication technologies.

The development of digital technologies has also significantly expanded the technical scope of information manipulation. Image editing software, AI-assisted video production techniques, and visual material taken out of context have introduced new tools that make it difficult to assess the accuracy of war reporting. For example, footage from an old conflict may be presented as evidence of a new incident, or a video filmed in a different geographical location may be linked entirely to a different event. When such content spreads rapidly, particularly on social media, it can provoke strong emotional reactions among the public. However, subsequent verification efforts may reveal that the context of this content is incorrect.

Today, many people believe they are watching wars almost in real time. Footage shot on mobile phones, social media posts and live news feeds create the impression that conflicts are being followed directly and without interruption. Yet this is largely an illusion. The content the public sees is often narratives produced about the events rather than the events themselves. These narratives are presented within specific frames and lead the viewer to perceive the event from a particular perspective. Consequently, there is a significant difference between the war itself and the way it is represented in the media.

It is observed that narratives produced during periods of conflict generally take shape around specific patterns. Whilst narratives of heroism and resistance are highlighted on one side, themes of victimhood and human drama may be emphasised on the other. Furthermore, discourses portraying the opposing side as entirely irrational, barbaric or inhuman are also widely used. Such narrative patterns may be repeated in state propaganda apparatus, individual social media posts and the news language of certain media organisations. This is because people often find it easier to accept and share information that aligns with their own identities, political views, or emotional inclinations.

Information in times of war

Under all these conditions, the fundamental problem faced by ordinary citizens is an epistemological one. In other words, the issue is not merely knowing which information is true, but understanding how to access accurate information. In conflict zones, it is often impossible to arrive at absolute truths. Obtaining definitive information regarding military developments, diplomatic negotiations and the actual situation on the ground usually takes time. The true scale of many events may only become apparent months or years later. For this reason, it is important to avoid definitive judgements and to develop a certain intellectual caution when approaching information during times of war.

To make a more informed assessment of information in such an environment, certain methods can be employed. Firstly, comparing different sources is of great importance. Relying on a single media source can lead to a significant narrowing of perspective, particularly when international conflicts are involved. Comparing news reports from media organizations in different countries allows one to see how events are presented within different frameworks. Furthermore, reports from independent research institutions, academic analyses and open-source intelligence studies can also assist in making a more balanced assessment.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

I

ran has warned it will launch “long and painful strikes” against U.S. military positions if Washington resumes attacks, as tensions deepen over control of the vital Strait of Hormuz and the United States considers fresh military options.

The threat, delivered by Iranian Aerospace Force Commander Majid Mousavi, marks one of Tehran’s strongest signals yet that it is prepared to escalate militarily following weeks of confrontation with U.S. forces. Mousavi said Iran had already demonstrated its ability to strike regional bases and warned that U.S. naval assets could face a similar fate if hostilities resume.

His remarks came after statements by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) asserting the effectiveness of a naval blockade targeting Iranian oil exports. The blockade, intended to cut off Tehran’s primary source of revenue, has further intensified the standoff between the two countries.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei reinforced the message, declaring that Tehran would maintain control over the Strait of Hormuz and prevent what he described as “foreign abuses” of the waterway. In a statement carried by state media, he warned that external powers had no legitimate presence in the region.

Energy calculations

The escalating rhetoric comes two months into a U.S.-Israeli war with Iran that has disrupted global energy markets and heightened fears of a broader regional conflict. Although a ceasefire has technically been in place since April 8, it has done little to resolve the central dispute: Iran continues to block passage through the strait, while the United States maintains its maritime pressure campaign.

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil and gas supplies pass. Its closure has already sent shockwaves through international markets, with Brent crude prices briefly surging above $126 per barrel before easing to around $114.

U.S. President Donald Trump is expected to receive a classified briefing on potential military strike options, according to a U.S. official. The plans reportedly aim to compel Iran to return to negotiations and reopen the waterway. While such options have long been under consideration, their renewed urgency reflects growing frustration in Washington over the impasse.

Trump has reiterated that Iran will not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons and expressed confidence that energy prices would fall sharply if the conflict ends. However, the prospect of further military action has raised concerns among analysts about the risk of rapid escalation.

Diplomatic efforts have so far failed to produce a breakthrough. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said expectations of a quick resolution were unrealistic, regardless of mediation efforts. His comments underscore the widening gap between the two sides as the conflict enters a more entrenched phase.

Continued military activity

Meanwhile, signs of continued military activity have emerged on the ground. Iranian media reported that air defense systems in Tehran engaged drones and other unmanned aerial vehicles late Thursday, highlighting the persistent volatility despite the ceasefire.

The broader regional impact is also becoming increasingly apparent. The United Arab Emirates has banned its citizens from traveling to Iran, Iraq and Lebanon, urging those already in those countries to return home immediately. The move reflects growing fears that the conflict could spill over beyond the Gulf.

Global economic concerns are mounting as the crisis drags on. Antonio Guterres warned that prolonged disruption in the Strait of Hormuz could have severe consequences, including slower global growth, rising inflation and increased poverty.

“The longer this vital artery is choked, the harder it will be to reverse the damage,” Guterres said, emphasizing the urgency of restoring stability to the waterway.

Despite mounting economic pressure, analysts say Iran appears capable of sustaining its position in the short term. While the U.S. blockade has sharply reduced Iranian oil exports, Tehran has shown resilience in past crises and may be prepared for a prolonged standoff.

For Trump, the coming days present a critical decision point. He faces a formal deadline to either end the conflict or seek congressional approval for a 30-day extension of military operations. Observers expect he may opt for the latter, or potentially bypass the deadline altogether.

As both sides dig in, the risk of miscalculation remains high. Any renewed military confrontation could not only destabilize the Gulf region but also trigger wider economic and geopolitical consequences.

For now, the standoff continues, with global markets, regional governments and international institutions watching closely for the next move.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he United States has spent an estimated $25 billion on its war in Iran so far, according to a senior Pentagon official, marking the first official public figure for the cost of the conflict.

Jules Hurst, acting comptroller at the Pentagon, disclosed the figure during testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. He noted that the majority of the spending has gone toward munitions but did not provide a detailed breakdown or clarify whether the estimate includes long-term costs such as rebuilding damaged military infrastructure in the Middle East.

The figure drew a response from Democratic Representative Adam Smith, who said lawmakers had long been seeking clarity on the war’s financial toll. The $25 billion total is roughly equivalent to the annual budget of NASA.

War spending fuels economic and political concerns

The cost of the war is becoming a growing political issue in Washington, particularly with midterm elections approaching. Democrats are attempting to tie the conflict to rising living costs, as disruptions to global oil and gas supplies have driven up fuel prices and contributed to broader inflation.

U.S. gasoline prices have reached their highest level in nearly four years, according to industry data, adding to voter frustration over affordability.

President Donald Trump’s approval ratings have also declined amid the conflict. A recent Reuters/Ipsos poll shows only 34% of Americans support the war, a drop from 38% in March.

Pentagon defends war as ceasefire holds

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth defended the war effort, arguing that the spending is justified to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.

“What would you pay to ensure Iran does not get a nuclear bomb?” he told lawmakers, dismissing criticism from Democrats as defeatist.

The conflict began on February 28 with U.S. strikes on Iran. Although a fragile ceasefire is currently in place, the Pentagon has significantly increased its military presence in the region, including deploying three aircraft carriers.

So far, 13 U.S. troops have been killed and hundreds wounded in the fighting.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he US/Israel-Iran war has reached a scale far beyond that of a war explainable solely by the military capabilities of the parties involved. The course of the war is being shaped by the risks, disruptions and costs generated at an accelerating pace upon the circulatory arteries of the global economy. Consequently, just as much as the military situation on the ground, the question of which sea lanes, energy corridors and logistical hubs the war is putting under pressure has become a decisive factor.

The geopolitical significance of the current war must be discussed beyond the scope of traditional debates on the expansion of fronts. The real issue is that the critical chokepoints of the global system have begun to generate tension simultaneously. The growing uncertainty and risk premium in the Strait of Hormuz are creating a de facto blockage in energy flows. However, the Houthis’ more direct involvement in Yemen carries the risk of turning the Bab el-Mandeb–Red Sea corridor into a second flashpoint. This scenario signifies a threshold that extends the cost of the war beyond regional borders and deepens the fragility of the global economy.

In this context, the US/Israel-Iran War, in a sense, heralds a new geopolitical era that could be defined as the ‘Age of Chokepoints’, originating from the Strait of Hormuz. Indeed, it is no coincidence that geopolitical chokepoints such as the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Malacca, the Bering Strait and Arctic passages in the context of Greenland have come to the fore in recent years. In the current climate, the global economy has become increasingly concentrated. Furthermore, energy, trade, food and data flows now pass through a limited number of chokepoints. Any disruption at these nodes transforms military crises into economic shocks, and economic shocks into political turbulence.

Beyond the Strait of Hormuz

The debate surrounding the Strait of Hormuz is moving beyond the dichotomy of whether it is closed or open. The current situation is generating a risk premium, characterised by a significant slowdown in maritime traffic—even if partial transit continues—along with rising costs for ship insurance, freight rates and trade finance. This risk premium is causing delays and cost increases in global supply chains, going beyond the fluctuations reflected in energy prices.

In this context, the cost of the war is moving towards a scale that cannot be measured solely by the price per barrel. As the risk premium rises, panic over supply security—independent of the physical supply of oil—is spreading through the markets, undermining inflation expectations and weakening the global growth outlook. Furthermore, the persistence of the bottleneck in the Strait of Hormuz is increasing logistics costs for food and industrial inputs, creating new vulnerabilities, particularly in economies reliant on imports. Indeed, logistical issues affecting both petrochemical products and fertilizers carry the risk of directly and profoundly impacting numerous sectors.

A notable aspect of this situation is that a resolution to the Strait of Hormuz impasse will not be achieved by a political decision alone. Even if tensions ease temporarily, it will take significant time for the market to regain confidence. The fact that the insurance and freight markets will not immediately absorb the shock, that companies will not regain their appetite for risk overnight, and that supply chain delays will have cumulative effects, suggests that costs may persist even in the post-war period. Consequently, the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz stems not only from its role as a transit point but also from its function as a pivotal point capable of determining the pace of normalisation within the global system.

Is there a risk of a second ‘gate of shock’ alongside the Houthis?

One of the key factors exacerbating the geopolitical risks of the current war is the Houthis’ more direct involvement. This situation carries the risk of turning the Bab el-Mandeb–Red Sea corridor—one of the most critical points for global maritime trade—into a natural corridor for the war’s expansion. Indeed, just as the Strait of Hormuz is the linchpin of energy flows centred on the Persian Gulf, the Bab el-Mandeb is one of the most critical chokepoints for Europe-Asia trade and access to the Suez Canal.

The increasing risk posed by the Bab el-Mandeb does not merely imply the possibility of attacks on commercial vessels. Tensions along this route carry the risk of increasing global trade costs by forcing route diversions and prolonging delivery times. Furthermore, the Red Sea basin is a region with a significant foreign military presence. Djibouti hosts military bases and forces from various countries, notably the US and China. Consequently, a more direct involvement by the Houthis carries the potential to transform the maritime security crisis into a multi-actor military standoff.

In this scenario, the critical risk is the so-called ‘double-strait crisis’. Whilst the risk premium in the Strait of Hormuz becomes entrenched, the simultaneous pressure on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait would severely constrict the global system’s circulation capacity. In such a scenario, the cost of war would by no means be confined to the Middle East; it would exacerbate inflation and energy supply concerns in Europe, food and logistics costs in Africa, and industrial and supply chain pressures in Asia. Consequently, an escalation along the Bab el-Mandeb corridor is the fastest route for the war to evolve from a regional issue into a global systemic crisis.

Turkiye and the geopolitics of chokepoints

The rise of the ‘age of chokepoints’ is also producing strategic consequences for Turkiye. Although Turkiye is not a direct party to the current war, it lies at the heart of one of the critical nodes of global circulation. The Straits of Istanbul and Dardanelles hold high strategic value not only for commercial transit along the Black Sea–Mediterranean route but also in terms of energy transport, regional security and crisis management. In an era where global competition is played out through these chokepoints, the importance of the Straits is likely to increase more than ever in the near future.

Consequently, this situation yields a two-fold outcome for Turkiye. Whilst strategic weight and diplomatic manoevring space expand on the one hand, the responsibility for risk management increases on the other. As seen in the Strait of Hormuz, in the current era, geography emerges both as an advantage and as a focal point for crisis management. For this reason, Turkiye’s priority must be to keep diplomatic channels open without allowing tensions to cross the threshold of regional escalation, and to contribute to efforts that prevent further constriction of global maritime traffic.

In this context, three policy priorities stand out. Firstly, supporting diplomatic pressure to prevent the war from spilling over to the Bab el-Mandeb–Red Sea corridor and strengthening international coordination to prevent an increase in maritime security risks. An escalation along this corridor would affect regional security and the broader economic landscape—including Turkiye’s own interests—particularly given the context of Turkiye’s investments in the Horn of Africa.

Secondly, given that the blockage in the Strait of Hormuz generates a risk premium that could persist even with partial flow, preventive policies must be implemented to limit the repercussions of fluctuations in energy and logistics markets on the Turkish economy. The pace of post-war normalization must be taken into account as much as the course of the war itself.

Thirdly, the geopolitics of global bottlenecks must be monitored more systematically at the institutional level, and Turkiye’s strategic preparedness capacity must be enhanced in the context of the Straits, ports, maritime security and critical supply lines. This situation stands out as a matter of defense and security, as well as a matter of economic, energy, logistics and crisis management capacity.

P

resident Donald Trump has rejected Iran’s latest proposal to end the two-month war, according to a U.S. official, dealing a setback to already fragile diplomatic efforts and raising concerns over prolonged disruptions to global energy markets.

The proposal, delivered by Iranian officials through regional intermediaries, reportedly seeks to postpone negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear program until after a ceasefire is achieved and maritime disputes in the Gulf are resolved. But Washington has insisted that any agreement to end the conflict must address Iran’s nuclear activities from the outset.

A U.S. official familiar with internal discussions said Trump was dissatisfied with the plan because it sidelines the nuclear issue, a long-standing point of contention between the two countries. “The president has been clear about the need to deal with nuclear concerns early in any negotiation,” the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The White House declined to comment directly on the proposal. A spokesperson said the United States “will not negotiate through the press” and reiterated that Washington’s red lines remain unchanged as it seeks to bring the conflict to an end.

Iran’s plan

The war, which began in February with U.S. and Israeli strikes targeting Iranian assets, has killed thousands and severely disrupted oil shipments through the Gulf, a critical artery for global energy supplies. The conflict has also added upward pressure on inflation worldwide, as oil prices continue to rise amid constrained flows.

Iran’s plan, according to sources familiar with the discussions, envisions a phased approach to negotiations. The first stage would involve halting hostilities and securing guarantees that the United States would not resume military action. This would be followed by talks on lifting a U.S. naval blockade and restoring normal shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important oil transit routes.

Only after these steps would negotiations turn to broader issues, including Iran’s nuclear program. Tehran has long maintained that its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes and continues to seek international recognition of its right to enrich uranium.

The U.S. position reflects deep skepticism rooted in the collapse of the Iran nuclear deal, which had imposed strict limits on Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief. Trump withdrew from the agreement during his first term, arguing it failed to address broader security concerns, a move that led to escalating tensions in subsequent years.

Diplomatic momentum slowed

Diplomatic momentum appears to have slowed in recent days. Planned talks in Islamabad were called off after the U.S. cancelled a visit by its special envoy, while Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi has continued a series of regional and international meetings aimed at rallying support.

Araqchi travelled to Moscow this week, where he met President Vladimir Putin, securing backing from a key ally. He has also held discussions in Oman and Pakistan as part of ongoing shuttle diplomacy efforts.

Meanwhile, the situation in the Gulf remains tense. Shipping traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has dropped sharply since the conflict began, with only a handful of vessels transiting the waterway in the past day, according to maritime tracking data. Several tankers carrying Iranian oil have reportedly been turned back due to the U.S. blockade, underscoring the war’s impact on global supply chains.

Iran has condemned the seizures of its oil shipments, describing them as acts of “piracy” and warning of consequences if restrictions on its exports continue.

Markets react

Energy analysts say the market is increasingly focused on physical supply disruptions rather than political rhetoric. Reduced tanker traffic and uncertainty over the security of key shipping lanes have driven oil prices higher, with traders closely watching any developments that could signal either escalation or de-escalation.

At home, Trump faces growing political pressure to bring the conflict to a close, as declining approval ratings and rising fuel costs weigh on public sentiment. Iranian officials, for their part, argue that Washington has yet to achieve its stated military objectives and should return to negotiations without preconditions.

With both sides holding firm on core demands, prospects for a near-term breakthrough appear limited. The gap between Washington’s insistence on immediate nuclear concessions and Tehran’s push for a phased process suggests that any resolution to the conflict will require significant compromises — ones that neither side currently appears ready to make.

(Source: Reuters)

O

man has been one of the most notable countries in the war waged by the US and Israel against Iran, both in terms of the stance it has adopted and the policies it has pursued. As the country in the Gulf region with the closest historical and cultural ties to Iran, Oman made intensive efforts in the pre-conflict period to prevent a potential war. In this context, the negotiations led by Oman’s foreign minister between the US and Iran were largely successful; however, Washington’s unilateral decision to go to war could not be prevented. Whilst many attribute this decision to the influence of pro-Israeli actors within US decision-making mechanisms, the Trump administration’s miscalculations in this regard were evident in its statements during the war.

Oman’s forecasts and policies

Indeed, it was Oman that attempted to dissuade the Trump administration from this decision right up to the last minute. Oman’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Badr bin Hamad al-Busaidi, in a statement to the CBS channel just a few hours before the US attacks began, said, “We are very close to peace between the US and Iran,” thereby making a final attempt to ensure that all the efforts they had undertaken as a neutral mediator in this process were not in vain. Despite this, the Trump administration decided to go to war, launching attacks against Iran and thereby initiating a process that has disrupted all political fault lines in the Middle East and the Gulf region, paving the way for a redesign of the region’s security architecture.

In an interview with the CBC, Badr bin Hamad al-Busaidi’s warning that “no option other than diplomacy will bring peace” is noteworthy; indeed, it could also be interpreted as a veiled warning against the US entering this war, the motivations for which remain unclear. Oman, as an actor representing reconciliation, diplomacy and neutrality in the region, had argued that regardless of its own reasons, a potential war would benefit no regional country, including the US.

As seen a month after the war began, Oman’s predictions have largely come to pass. The US and Israeli attacks on Iran have brought serious destruction, primarily to these three countries directly involved in the conflict, whilst regional nations have also been heavily affected by the process. The Gulf states, which failed to provide sufficient support for Oman’s pre-war mediation efforts and did not exert pressure on the US regarding the potential negative consequences of an attack on Iran, have emerged as the actors most severely affected by the process. Iran, having issued warnings on numerous previous occasions, has struck military bases in the Gulf states, the US targets closest to it, in response to the attacks.

During this process, Tehran has begun to pursue a strategy of spreading the conflict to the region by targeting certain locations in Gulf states that have close ties with the US and have been under Washington’s security protection for years. Whilst this may have been one of the unexpected developments of the process, the fact that countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which had long been the centre of peace and stability in the region, suddenly found themselves in the midst of the conflict has been a major source of concern for them. As the perception of a ‘safe haven’ built up over many years was suddenly shattered, the resulting severe crisis of confidence, coupled with a massive capital outflow, has exposed economic vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the fact that these countries’ economies, which rely heavily on food security and energy exports, have been affected by the war has highlighted that the Gulf states could face far more severe structural crises.

Historical ties between Oman and Iran

When assessed as of the first month of the war, it became apparent that Oman was the exception to this pattern. Whilst Gulf countries such as Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE, which host US bases and military units, became targets of Iran during the conflict, Oman remained largely outside this equation. The attacks carried out by Iran against Oman did not target Oman’s oil and gas companies, OQ or PDO; rather, they were directed at the Port of Duqm, where the US maintains a military presence under agreements concluded with Oman in previous years. In a statement, the Iranian Ministry of Defense announced that the attack on the port of Salalah had not been carried out by Iran and suggested that a third country might be behind it.

Oman views its status as the country least affected by the conflict in the Gulf in security terms as a result of the neutral policy it has pursued from the past to the present. Indeed, Oman, which acted as a mediator in Iran’s negotiations with the West during its most difficult periods, is not being targeted by this country with which it has historically maintained strong ties. Oman, once one of the region’s most significant empires, has relations with Iran rooted in ties dating back centuries. In the modern era, it is known that Iran provided substantial military aid to the Sultanate of Oman during the Dhofar uprising. Throughout this conflict, which lasted from 1960 to 1976, the support provided by Iran, then under the Shah’s rule, played a critical role in Oman’s suppression of the uprising and its return to stability.

The positive relations between the two countries continued even after the 1979 revolution in Iran and have persisted to the present day. Indeed, in October 2024, the Iranian and Omani Armed Forces conducted their first-ever joint military exercise in Oman’s Jebel Akhdar region. Even during years when Iran was embroiled in intense crises with the US and Israel, senior military officials from Oman and Iran have exchanged visits, whilst there remains significant political and economic interaction between Tehran and Muscat. In this context, whilst there is a significant Iranian diaspora in Oman, particularly in the capital Muscat, a new ferry route was launched in 2024 connecting Oman’s Shinas port with Iran’s Bandar Abbas port as a result of these interactions.

Iran’s perspective

From Iran’s perspective, there is no rational justification for posing any security threat to Oman. The primary reason for this is the long-standing relationship of trust between the two countries. Another factor is that Iran still views Oman as a key channel of communication, particularly in its dealings with the West. Although various actors such as Pakistan, Türkiye and Egypt have become involved in the mediation process, Oman’s potential role in this regard may once again come to the fore. Consequently, Iran’s positioning of Oman in a different stance from the Gulf states during this process could be viewed as a rational policy choice.

In conclusion, Oman’s stance in this process constitutes a continuation of its traditional policy. Through its strategy of neutrality, Oman seeks to minimize potential risks arising from regional crises, whilst simultaneously aiming to ensure that its development programs—which are progressing at a relatively slower pace compared to those of its neighbours—are not derailed. Furthermore, Oman aims to utilize its geostrategic position to mitigate the effects of a prolonged crisis in the Strait of Hormuz on the region and to ensure the continuity of global and regional trade activities.

The investments made in the port of Duqm over many years, along with the enhanced functionality of the port of Sohar, one of the Gulf region’s gateways to the Indian Ocean, will significantly strengthen Oman’s geopolitical position. As the second-most populous country in the Gulf in terms of its native population, Oman continues to act as the region’s ‘wise man’ through policies shaped by its imperial heritage.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

T

he process, which began on 28 February with US and Israeli attacks on Iran and rapidly escalated with Iran’s direct retaliations, is no longer merely a conflict between two sides but has transformed into a war dynamic that has spread across the region. From the very first days of the war, Iraq has been the sole country where the direct and indirect attacks of both the US/Israel axis and Iran have intersected; the country has effectively become the second front of this war. Furthermore, whilst Iraq has become one of the parties that is involved in the war, it also lies at the centre of a multi-layered crisis spiral where military, political and strategic dimensions feed into one another.

It would not be inaccurate to say that the impact of the US/Israel–Iran war on Iraq goes beyond a classic example of a ‘neighboring country being affected’. The emerging picture shows that Iraq has become not only country bearing the consequences of the war but also a terrain where the war is being waged directly. In this sense, it would be appropriate to analyze the dynamics unfolding in Iraq today through the lens of a three-layered reality.

Consequently, in this process, Iraq has transformed into a ‘secondary front’ militarily; strategically, Iran and the US/Israel have begun to wear each other down through its territory; and politically, the Iraqi state has once again demonstrated that it faces sovereignty issues within its own borders. Indeed, from the very first days of the war, the targeting of US bases, diplomatic missions and energy infrastructure, coupled with the rapid development of a high-intensity attack capability by Iran-backed militia networks, has transformed Iraq from a passive spectator into an active theatre of conflict.

Indeed, the decisions taken at the meeting of the Iraqi National Security Council on 24 March, following the attack on the Popular Mobilization Forces headquarters in Anbar on the night of 23 March—in which more than 15 PMF members lost their lives—are noteworthy. In a statement issued after the Iraqi National Security Council meeting, whilst it was emphasized that the state is the sole authority on decisions regarding war and peace, it was also announced that a decision had been taken to respond to attacks against Iraqi security forces—particularly the PMF—within the framework of the “right to legitimate self-defense and retaliation”.

Iraq no longer outside the conflcit

Whilst this decision does not technically constitute a declaration of open war against any state, it demonstrates that Iraq has effectively abandoned its position of remaining outside the conflict. This is because, for the first time on this scale and with this clarity, the state has defined its authority to provide a collective and institutional response to attacks against its own security apparatus. More importantly, rather than interpreting this decision merely as a defensive reflex, it can also be assessed as a step that redefines Iraq’s position within the conflict. Whilst this decision challenges the monopolisation of decisions regarding war and peace by non-state actors, it simultaneously positions the state itself as one of the parties to this conflict.

Although the decisions taken by the Iraqi National Security Council—which include the simultaneous protest against US and Iranian representatives and the expression of preparations to appeal to the United Nations—may indicate that Iraq is attempting to pursue a policy of balance, the reality on the ground is increasingly eroding this balance. In this context, the decision in question reveals that Iraq is positioned not as a ‘declared party’ to the war, but as an actor that has become involved both de facto and institutionally.

Consequently, Iraq has moved beyond being merely a geographical area where conflict is waged, becoming a country directly involved in the dynamics of this war through its own security institutions, political decision-making mechanisms and military reflexes. This marks a new threshold for Iraq; the country’s capacity for neutrality has been replaced by controlled participation and compulsory engagement.

How are the attacks in Iraq taking shape?

Today, the military manifestation of the Israel/US–Iran conflict in Iraq is, in fact, creating a hybrid arena where two distinct models of warfare intersect. The fact that the majority of attacks are carried out using drones and rockets, supplemented by a limited number of ballistic missiles and precision air strikes, indicates that the parties are pursuing a strategy focused on low-cost, sustained pressure that wears down the opposing side’s defence systems, rather than conventional frontline warfare. The war in Iraq is being waged, on the one hand, by actors possessing high-intensity conventional warfare capabilities and, on the other, through proxy networks carrying out low-cost, flexible and deniable attacks.

Within this framework, the Iranian axis seeks to establish territorial pressure through quantity—that is, via intense and dispersed attacks—whilst the US/Israeli axis strives to achieve qualitative superiority through more selective and lethal targets. The methods employed by structures affiliated with or aligned to Iran are aimed at saturating air defence systems, straining reaction times, and creating a constant state of alert to reduce the operational tempo of the opposing side. In contrast, the US-Israel axis’s approach aims to disrupt the integrity of the network by targeting command-and-control nodes, logistics centres and critical infrastructure through intelligence-based targeting.

However, this asymmetric balance creates a persistent climate of insecurity across Iraqi territory rather than producing a definitive outcome on the ground. This is because one side’s dispersed and regenerative attack capacity cannot be entirely neutralised by the other side’s high-precision but limited interventions.

At this juncture, the decisive factor is increasingly the ‘shadow militias’ and proxy structures. As these structures provide both operational flexibility and political deniability, they ensure the conflict’s continuity whilst keeping its costs under control. In this context, the military picture emerging on the Iraqi battlefield can be interpreted as a war of attrition rather than a decisive war. Rather than gaining ground, the parties are focusing on eroding the opponent’s capabilities, testing their deterrence, and exerting long-term pressure. This renders the conflict unpredictable, fragmented and chronic. Indeed, even if tensions between Israel/the US and Iran were to ease in the coming period, or even if the war were to end, it would not be wrong to expect the conflict dynamics in Iraq to persist. Furthermore, this conflict dynamic will not be confined solely to the military sphere; as seen in the country’s political system following 2003, it could drag Iraq into a multi-layered system of competition.

Iraq’s strategic depth

Indeed, on the strategic level, Iraq serves as a ‘proxy depth’ for Iran and a ‘containment corridor’ for the US and Israel. Through its militia networks in Iraq, Iran is able to exert pressure on the US without opening a direct and costly front, thereby keeping the conflict away from its own territory whilst actively utilizing its regional influence. This model provides Iran with both operational flexibility and escalation control.

This situation removes Iraq from being a buffer zone in the classical sense, transforming it into a flexible and permeable arena of conflict where both sides impose costs on one another. In other words, no actor can fully control Iraq, yet all actors utilize Iraq for their own strategic calculations. This state of ‘uncontrolled use’ enhances Iraq’s geopolitical value whilst simultaneously deepening its fragility.

The most severe consequence of this military and strategic pressure is manifesting in the political sphere. The Iraqi state is compelled to both maintain its security relationship with the US and react to the targeting of militia structures that form part of its own security architecture. This situation pushes Baghdad into a contradictory position, making it both dependent on Washington yet in tension with it. This contradiction goes beyond a diplomatic dilemma for Iraq; it directly becomes a matter of state capacity and sovereignty. This is because if Iraq remains silent regarding the targeting of The Popular Mobilization Forces elements—which it defines as part of its own security structure—it weakens its internal legitimacy; if it responds, however, it increases the risk of direct tension with the US. Consequently, Baghdad is becoming increasingly trapped in a ‘policy of forced balance’ with a narrowing scope for manoevre.

This predicament has become more apparent in recent decisions taken by the Iraqi National Security Council. More importantly, the manner in which these decisions are implemented has the potential to affect directly Iraq’s internal political balances. The question of which actors will exercise the right to self-defense, to what extent, and under what coordination, could redefine the balance of power between the central state and militia structures. If this process cannot be managed under central command, the scope of action for non-state actors may expand, and this could further deepen Iraq’s already contentious ‘multi-headed security structure’.

Conversely, should central authority bring this process under control, the position of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) within the state could become even more institutionalized. Both scenarios carry the potential to create new fault lines in Iraqi politics. For this reason, the current situation should be assessed not merely as a classic foreign policy crisis, but as a structural breaking point simultaneously transforming Iraq’s state structure, security architecture and political balances.

D

onald Trump has said the United States is likely to resume bombing Iran as a fragile ceasefire approaches its expiration, underscoring rising tensions despite ongoing diplomatic efforts.

Speaking on Tuesday, Trump indicated he did not intend to extend the 14-day truce, which is set to end on Wednesday. He framed renewed military action as part of a strategy to strengthen Washington’s position in negotiations, saying the US was prepared to act if talks failed to produce results.

“We’re ready to go. The military is raring to go,” he said, adding that he expected force would ultimately help secure a favorable agreement. However, he did not specify what such a deal would entail or how quickly it might be reached.

The remarks were accompanied by statements on Truth Social, where Trump accused Tehran of repeatedly violating the ceasefire. While such claims could serve as a basis for renewed strikes, they have not been independently verified.

Diplomatic channels remain open

At the same time, diplomatic channels remain open. A new round of talks is expected in Islamabad, where US Vice President JD Vance is set to meet Iranian parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. The discussions are seen as a last effort to extend the truce or reach a broader agreement before hostilities potentially resume.

Trump’s latest comments reflect a broader pattern of mixed messaging from the administration, alternating between warnings of escalation and suggestions that a deal may be within reach. Earlier in the week, he warned that “lots of bombs” could be used if negotiations collapsed, even as officials pointed to ongoing diplomatic engagement.

Senior figures in Washington have also adopted a hard line. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth recently said US forces were “locked and loaded,” signaling readiness to target Iran’s infrastructure, including its energy sector.

Firm Iranian opposition to coercive diplomacy

Iranian officials have responded with firm opposition to what they describe as coercive diplomacy. Ghalibaf said Tehran would not negotiate “under the shadow of threats,” while military leaders warned that any renewed US strikes would prompt an immediate and decisive response.

The standoff has already had wider implications, particularly for global energy markets. Fatih Birol, head of the International Energy Agency, warned that the crisis could have unprecedented consequences, especially when combined with ongoing disruptions linked to Russian gas supplies.

Analysts say the next phase of the conflict will likely hinge on the outcome of talks in Islamabad. A breakthrough could stabilize the situation, but failure to reach an agreement may lead to a rapid return to military confrontation.

With the ceasefire deadline fast approaching, both sides appear to be preparing for multiple scenarios—keeping diplomacy alive while signaling readiness for escalation.

(Source: The Guardian)

I

n the early hours of the morning of 28 February, the Middle East faced serious developments that would determine the region’s future following an attack by the US and Israel on the compound housing the office of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, known as ‘Beyt-i Rehberi’. It had long been suggested by Israelis that these attacks would be carried out as a final phase, particularly following the 12-day Iran-Israel war in June 2025.

Regarding how and why the situation has reached this point, it can be argued that the harsh suppression of the protests that erupted in Iran in recent months, coupled with the significant backlash and pressure from the Iranian diaspora, presented an opportunity that Israel and the US could not afford to miss. At the outset of the events, protests by opposition groups—who initially took to the streets largely in response to the country’s economic crisis but subsequently demanded regime change and targeted the government directly—escalated and spiraled out of control, prompting the government to take harsh measures and resulting in the ‘bloodiest’ crackdown in the 47-year history of the Islamic Revolution. The events resulted in the deaths of thousands of regime opponents.

Opposition groups, which had previously experienced similar protests—such as the allegations of electoral fraud in the 2009 presidential elections, the November 2019 protests, and the Mahsa Amini incident in 2022—but failed to achieve their goals, have now launched a serious campaign, both domestically and internationally, calling for military intervention by the US and Israel in the wake of the latest events. In this context, footage of protests and the security forces’ harsh crackdown, which has spread globally across online platforms, has been frequently shared. Particularly in the US, under pressure from Reza Pahlavi—the son of the former Shah of Iran—and other Iranian lobbies, the narrative that the only way to combat the Iranian regime is now through military intervention and conflict has been presented in Washington and Tel Aviv as the will of the Iranian people.

For Israel, which for many years had characterized Tehran as the “head of the snake” in its opposition to Israel, the bloody protests and calls from Iranian dissidents provided an opportunity to add a humanitarian dimension to the rhetoric of military action against Iran. Trump and Netanyahu had repeatedly assured the Iranian people that the aid and support they sought on the path to “freedom” would come. Although the negotiations between Iran and the US throughout February raised the question in the minds of the opposition – “might a new agreement be reached that would keep the regime afloat?” – and triggered a brief wave of backlash against Trump, the messages delivered in the final week before the operation and the military build-up in the region demonstrated the inevitability of the operation for both the regime and the opposition.