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hilst the Middle East region has undergone significant change and transformation as a result of the attacks launched by Israel from 7 October 2023 onwards, the US-Israel–Iran war that began on 28 February 2026 has further fuelled this change, pushing it to a point of no return. For had these events not occurred, the ‘Mecca Joint Defence Agreement’, signed on 7 August 2026 between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, might not have been possible.

Developments necessitating “regional ownership”

Türkiye’s long-standing stance that the region’s problems should be resolved by the countries of the region themselves – a concept defined by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan as “regional ownership” – had not received sufficient support from the countries of the region. Whilst the reasons behind this may vary from country to country, ultimately external interventions aimed at resolving the region’s problems have failed to heal the wounds; on the contrary, they have either caused existing wounds to bleed anew or allowed them to simply harden into calluses without being resolved. Consequently, it has become apparent that interventions in the region—particularly from the West and, of course, the US—have failed to produce results and have not brought peace and stability to the region.

However, following the events that began on 7 October 2023, Israel’s adoption of a revisionist policy towards the region—believing that the conditions were favourable—and its subsequent attacks targeting not only Gaza and the West Bank but also Lebanon, Syria and Iran, have led to a shift in the preconceptions held by countries in the region towards Türkiye.

For whilst it is evident that almost all of the Western countries expected to resolve the region’s problems have taken sides in the war between Russia and Ukraine, providing Ukraine with billions of dollars in aid as well as both political and military support; whilst Israel’s razing of Gaza, massacred over 73,000 people and committed a massive genocide; deepened its annexation of the West Bank; gradually sought to alter the status of the Al-Aqsa Mosque; occupied southern Lebanon and attempted to provoke a civil war there; and, as if its decades-long occupation of the Golan Heights—which is Syrian territory —as if that were not enough—it unilaterally suspended the 1974 agreement following the revolution on 8 December 2024, occupied further Syrian territory, and sought to prevent Syria from achieving stability by manipulating the Druze and the SDG/PKK terrorist organisations.

The extent to which external actors remain indifferent to crises or conflicts in our region has once again been exposed in the war against Iran. For just as it is unjust and wrong for an actor such as the US to fall into Israel’s trap and attack Iran, it is equally wrong for other Western countries not to have taken the initiative to dissuade the US from this war, as was the case with Ukraine. Although these countries—the majority of which are also NATO members—were called upon by the US to deploy troops to open the blockaded Strait of Hormuz – although this was not in accordance with NATO regulations – they did not heed this call and, whilst not becoming directly involved in the war, they made their stance clear by expanding sanctions against Iran rather than exerting pressure on Israel to bring the war to an end.

During this war, Iran’s decision to attack Gulf states and other countries hosting US bases on their territory – rather than Israel and the US, which were directly attacking it – both because they were relatively easier targets and with the intention of indirectly exerting pressure on the US, has once again demonstrated the importance of regional ownership.

Israel’s revisionist policies and the perception of threats by regional countries

All these developments have made a mechanism such as the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement imperative, with the aim of thwarting the plans of a country like Israel—which, despite its small size, seeks to destabilize the region and derive benefit from the situation by leveraging its lobbying power in the US and Europe and relying on their support—and to establish a new status quo. Furthermore, whilst Israel recently proposed an alignment strategy—such as the “hexagon bloc”—which has yet to materialize on the ground, the formation of a counter-front by countries outside this bloc that perceive the current developments as a threat to their national interests must be regarded as inevitable.

Despite the security guarantees the US has provided to the Gulf states to date, the fact that these states have been exposed to Iranian attacks during the war against Iran has not only called into question the reliability of US guarantees in the Gulf, but has also inevitably led to a search for alternatives regarding the future of the region’s security architecture. It is therefore highly likely that the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement will address this necessity; in particular, should the US withdraw from the region following the war with Iran, it is conceivable that it might be open to entrusting the region’s security to three key and powerful allies: Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the fact that the US has not made any negative statements regarding the Mecca Agreement to date is interpreted in this light and reinforces the view that there is coordination between the signatory countries and the US.

Why is the agreement so important?

Among the key factors that make the agreement significant are the characteristics and capabilities of the signatory countries. Türkiye, for instance, is not only a NATO member but also a candidate country for the EU and has made significant strides in the defense industry in recent years. It is therefore an indispensable actor for both the Middle East and the European security architecture. Pakistan, meanwhile, is the only Muslim country to possess nuclear weapons and also has a substantial population. As for Saudi Arabia, it stands out as a key player not only due to its abundant energy resources but also because of its strategic location at the crossroads of global trade routes. Furthermore, as a leading figure in both the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League, and as the custodian of Islam’s holy sites, it is an actor held in high regard and whose word carries weight among both Arab and Muslim states.

The coming together of these three major powers to form a defense alliance would create a synergy whose effects are likely to extend beyond the region. Furthermore, should this agreement be successfully implemented, it would inevitably create a domino effect, making it likely that other countries in the region would join the agreement. Considering similar initiatives that have been attempted at various times but could never be brought to a conclusion due to both regional and circumstantial conditions, the most significant impact of this agreement, as of today, is that it stands as the sole development capable of curbing Israel’s aggressive, occupying and expansionist regional vision. Not only will the Abraham Accords no longer hold any appeal for countries in the region, but it is also understood that, should the US withdraw from the region following a war against Iran, the new security architecture of the region will be centered on the new pact established by this agreement.

What will the agreement provide for the signatory countries?

This agreement is of a defensive nature, aimed at protecting the signatories from attacks by other countries; in this way, it offers the signatory countries a security guarantee similar to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Türkiye’s current capabilities, Pakistan’s nuclear power and Saudi Arabia’s financial support not only demonstrate the agreement’s capacity and potential but also serve as a powerful deterrent to any actors seeking to attack one of the signatory states.

Consequently, in addition to Türkiye’s NATO membership, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement has now emerged as the sole agreement in the region offering an additional defense guarantee to regional countries, and it has been announced that the agreement remains open to new participants. Although it has been stated in the announcements that no specific country is being targeted, it is clear that a strong deterrent has been created for those with designs on the region – particularly Israel – or those claiming to shape its future.

Whilst there are no doubts regarding the agreement’s deterrent effect, as we do not yet possess detailed information on the nature of the agreement, it is not fully known how a response would be mounted in the event of an attack on any of the signatory states. Furthermore, given the geographical locations of the signatory states—particularly Pakistan’s relatively remote position—it is difficult to predict how such a response would be carried out. However, despite all these uncertainties, the implementation of such an arrangement in our region is of great importance.

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merican President Donald Trump has welcomed a new defense agreement between Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, describing the trilateral pact as an important step toward greater security cooperation in the Middle East.

“Very happy to see that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan have recently, and finally, signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement,” Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform.

He said the agreement showed that countries in the Middle East were “coming together” and would be better positioned to defend themselves. Trump described the pact as a “BIG, BOLD, IMPORTANT FIRST STEP.”

The agreement was signed in Mecca on August 7 amid escalating regional tensions and the ongoing U.S.-Iran war, which has expanded beyond the two countries and affected several states across the Middle East.

Three countries expand military cooperation

Under the agreement, Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia will establish strategic political and military mechanisms involving their defense and foreign ministers, as well as chiefs of staff or commanders of their armed forces.

Military cooperation is expected to develop gradually, beginning with command-post and field exercises. The three countries could later conduct joint exercises involving ground, naval and air forces, air defense systems and unmanned platforms.

The agreement also includes a commitment by the three countries to participate in efforts aimed at resolving the conflict between Iran and the United States.

The pact builds on an earlier Saudi-Pakistani mutual defense agreement signed in September, which stated that an attack against either country would be considered an attack against both.

Saudi Arabia has increasingly sought to diversify its defense partnerships as its critical infrastructure and energy facilities have come under attack amid the regional conflict.

Pact comes amid regional tensions

The agreement also reflects the broader security concerns facing the three countries. Saudi Arabia has been directly affected by attacks linked to the wider U.S.-Iran war, while Iran-backed Houthi forces have targeted regional shipping and other interests.

Türkiye, meanwhile, has faced growing tensions with Israel over the war in Gaza which resulted in broader regional conflicts, including fighting involving Iran and Lebanon.

Pakistan has increasingly positioned itself as a potential mediator in regional disputes while strengthening its security relationship with Saudi Arabia and expanding defense cooperation with Türkiye.

The three-way pact brings together three major Muslim-majority countries with significant military capabilities and strategic influence. Türkiye is a NATO member, Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, and Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s largest oil producers and a key U.S. partner in the Gulf.

Trump’s endorsement marks a notable reaction from Washington to the emerging security arrangement. His comments suggest that the United States views greater defense cooperation among regional powers as potentially complementary to broader efforts to strengthen security in the Middle East.

The agreement could also reshape regional security cooperation as countries seek greater capacity to protect their territory and infrastructure amid continuing instability and the widening consequences of the U.S.-Iran war.

(Source: Daily Sabah)

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he diplomatic initiatives that have been ongoing for some time between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have now materialized into a concrete security architecture with the Joint Defense Agreement signed today in Mecca. Although the agreement in question may appear to be a manifestation of the historical and religious ties between the three countries in foreign policy, it can in fact be regarded as part of a much broader regional transformation. This agreement, signed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif at the Safa Palace in Mecca, the holy city of the Muslim world, constitutes a full-fledged ‘collective defense’ pact, as it stipulates that an armed attack against any one of the three states shall be deemed an attack against all of them.

Furthermore, the fact that the agreement is based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which governs the right to self-defense, can be seen as a reflection of the initiative led by the three countries’ quest for legitimacy within the framework of international law. Consequently, the resulting joint defense mechanism aims to serve as a deterrent not only at the regional level but also in the eyes of global actors.

Outcome of regional developments

It is evident that the agreement goes beyond a merely symbolic initiative. In this regard, the normalization process between Turkey and Saudi Arabia since 2022 and the subsequent acceleration of strategic cooperation, followed by Saudi Arabia’s move to expedite its rapprochement with Pakistan in the security context, culminating in the signing of the Joint Strategic Defense Agreement in 2025, have been the key driving forces behind this process. President Erdoğan’s emphasis on defense industry cooperation during his visit to Saudi Arabia at the start of the year, along with signals of joint investment in the KAAN National Fighter Aircraft, also demonstrate that the signing in Mecca was the result of a process that had been under way for some time.

Beyond its strategic and symbolic significance, the Mecca Agreement is of critical importance given the context in which it emerged. The growing regional instability following the war launched by the US and Israel against Iran on 28 February has led all countries to seek alternatives. When compounded by Israel’s continued pursuit of aggressive and expansionist policies and Washington’s silence in the face of these developments, the confidence of many regional actors, particularly the Gulf states, in the traditional security architecture has been permanently shaken. Furthermore, the US’s failure to provide the expected security umbrella to the Gulf states, whose vulnerabilities were laid bare by Iran’s attacks, has eroded these actors’ trust in traditional security guarantors. Consequently, Washington’s inconsistency in providing protection to its allies during times of crisis has driven regional capitals to diversify their own security arrangements.

Signed against this backdrop, the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement can be seen as a concrete outcome of the quest to reduce dependence on external security guarantees and to build an intra-regional deterrence mechanism amongst regional actors. From Türkiye’s perspective, this step constitutes a key pillar of its long-stated vision for a regional security architecture. In line with the initiatives it has taken in recent years, Ankara has played a critical role in intensifying cooperation amongst regional actors. During this process, Türkiye has strengthened its cooperation with countries including the Gulf states, as well as Egypt and Pakistan, and has sought to implement partnerships across various sectors.

During this process, one of the areas on which Türkiye has placed particular emphasis has been partnerships in the defense industry. Viewed in this context, it should also be noted that, beyond its security dimension, the Mecca Agreement provides a framework for deepening cooperation in the defense industry. Saudi Arabia’s preference and policies in recent years to transition from the role of a customer to that of a co-producer in the procurement of defense industry products have led to concrete steps being taken in this context between Ankara and Riyadh. In this regard, Türkiye has demonstrated its commitment by signing agreements with Saudi Arabia on the joint production of unmanned aerial vehicles, radar technologies, anti-tank guided missiles and other defense industry products.

Defense projects between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia

Indeed, Türkiye has successfully concluded its negotiations with Saudi Arabia regarding the co-production of the Gökbey national helicopter project, and an agreement was signed in February 2026 between TUSAŞ and the Saudi Arabian Defense Industries Organization. It is expected that the Mecca Agreement will not only strengthen the joint security mechanism but also increase such collaborations in the defense industry sector. It can be argued that, in the coming period, this initiative will not only go beyond security cooperation but also pave the way for deepening economic ties between the three countries.

Although the Mecca Agreement was signed between the three countries, President Erdoğan stated in his announcement that this security initiative is open to the participation of all countries. At this stage, it can be said that countries such as Qatar and Egypt are likely to be among those adopting a positive stance towards this security architecture in the initial phase. Given that it adopts an inclusive approach rather than an exclusionary one, unlike certain alliances that have emerged in the region in the past, it can also be noted that this alliance is set to play a strategic role in the future of the regional security architecture.

On the other hand, it remains unclear what impact the differences in foreign policy priorities and the relative divergence in threat perceptions between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will have within the context of the agreement. Indeed, the fact that Turkey’s security priorities, centered on Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean, do not align with Saudi Arabia’s threat perception, which is largely centred on Iran, or with Pakistan’s security reflexes, which are focused on India, may be seen as a constraint. However, it can be argued that the impact of this divergence on the practical feasibility of the agreement will also be limited. Indeed, the fundamental dynamic behind the tripartite alliance is not so much divergent perceptions as shared, concrete threats. This situation forms the basis for the consolidation of power and a shared security vision along the Ankara-Riyadh-Islamabad axis.

The Joint Defense Agreement signed in Mecca stands out as an initiative that clearly sets out the signatory countries’ perspectives. This agreement, which can be seen as the tangible outcome of regional actors’ quest to build their own security amongst themselves, a quest directly influenced by the hardships caused by the interventions of external actors, serves as the nucleus of a far more comprehensive regional security architecture. At this juncture, it seems inevitable that Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which have so far acted within the framework of a shared vision, will move towards a much stronger alliance should they align their foreign policy orientations, harmonize their strategic objectives and integrate their security capabilities.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed on August 7, 2026, in Mecca between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, marks a significant transformation in the security equation between the Middle East and South Asia. At the heart of the agreement lies the principle that an armed attack directed against one of the parties shall be deemed to have been directed against all three states. This provision goes beyond traditional defense  cooperation to establish a new security mechanism based on the principle of collective deterrence.

The agreement’s primary significance in terms of international relations stems from the convergence of the signatory states’ diverse power elements within a single security framework. Turkey possesses NATO’s second-largest military force, advanced operational capabilities and a defence industry that has grown significantly in recent years. Pakistan is the only Muslim state to possess nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, stands out for its energy resources, financial capacity and influence in Gulf geopolitics. For this reason, the Mecca Agreement constitutes a strategic configuration of complementary capabilities formed by complementary strategic capabilities, rather than a traditional military alliance between three similar states.

The international context in which the agreement emerged is also significant. Rising military tensions in the Middle East, the security of energy transport routes, Iran-centred conflict dynamics and the tendency of regional states to diversify their security guarantees are reinforcing the search for a new regional security order. Within this framework, the Mecca Agreement can be interpreted as a demonstration of the will of regional states to support their security needs increasingly through mechanisms established amongst themselves, rather than through guarantees provided from outside.

The concept of strategic autonomy is particularly significant here. Since the end of the Cold War, one of the fundamental pillars of the Middle Eastern security system has been the US military presence and bilateral security relations. The Mecca Agreement does not directly abolish this system. It is also explicitly stated that the parties’ existing bilateral or multilateral obligations remain in force. However, the agreement demonstrates the will of regional actors to establish their own deterrence mechanisms alongside the Washington- centred security architecture. This situation can be interpreted as a transition from a dependence on a single security centre to a multi-layered security architecture.

The significance of the agreement for the participants

From Turkey’s perspective, the agreement also has a unique dimension. Turkey is a member of NATO. The Mecca Agreement, whilst enabling Ankara to maintain its NATO membership, also allows it to expand its institutionalised defense relations with regional powers outside NATO. Turkey is thus positioning itself strategically from which it can forge links between the Euro-Atlantic security system and the Middle East–South Asia security spheres. However, the relationship between the collective defense obligation under the Mecca Agreement and Article 5 of the NATO Treaty will require detailed legal and strategic scrutiny in the coming period, particularly in the event of simultaneous crises.

Pakistan’s participation in the agreement, meanwhile, shifts the deterrence debate to a different level. Pakistan’s nuclear capability enhances the agreement’s psychological and strategic weight. However, it cannot be concluded from current statements that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence has been extended to Turkey or Saudi Arabia. Saudi officials have also stated that the agreement is not linked to nuclear purposes or an arms race. Consequently, based on the current data, it does not appear appropriate to characterise the Mecca Agreement as a nuclear umbrella agreement.

From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the agreement represents a continuation of its policy of diversifying security partnerships. By linking its economic capacity with Turkey’s defense industry and Pakistan’s military capabilities, Riyadh may secure a greater degree of strategic manoeuvre. To the extent that this framework extends to areas such as defense industry investments, joint production, technology transfer, training, intelligence sharing and maritime security, it will acquire a lasting institutional character.

The principle of collective defense

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Agreement is the principle of ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’. This provision is reminiscent of NATO’s logic of collective defense. However, there is currently a significant institutional difference between the two organizations NATO is an institutional alliance with over seventy years’ history, underpinned by a military command structure, joint defense planning, force structure, standards and permanent political bodies. The implementation mechanisms of the Mecca Agreement, however, are not yet as transparent, based on the information made public.

For this reason, the true strength of the agreement will be measured not so much by its signing as by the extent to which it becomes institutionalized. Should a joint military committee be established, joint operational plans drawn up, regular exercises conducted, an intelligence-sharing mechanism put in place and defense industry projects undertaken jointly, the Mecca Agreement could evolve into a genuine collective defense system.

From Iran’s perspective, interpreting the agreement as a direct counter-alliance requires caution. The parties have specifically emphasized that the agreement does not target any particular state. Given Turkey’s shared border with Iran, its economic ties and regional diplomatic channels, the agreement’s potential to take on a sectarian dimension could entail significant strategic costs for Ankara. Consequently, the sustainability of the agreement will depend on maintaining a balance between the principle of collective defense and the policy of avoiding regional polarization.

Towards a new regional security architecture

From Israel’s perspective, the new framework presents a distinct area for strategic calculation. The convergence of Turkey’s NATO capabilities, Pakistan’s military strength and Saudi Arabia’s regional influence within a common security mechanism holds the potential to influence the balance of power in the Middle East. However, it is not possible to draw a definitive conclusion from current statements suggesting that the agreement constitutes an alliance formed against Israel.

A broader implication of the Mecca Agreement is the possibility of institutionalizing security cooperation within the Islamic world. Whilst the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is a broad political organization with 57 members, it lacks an effective collective defense mechanism. The tripartite structure emerging in Mecca could, if successful, form the core of a narrower yet highly operational security platform that could expand with the participation of other states.

At this point, the fact that the agreement is named ‘Mecca’ also carries symbolic significance. The signing of the agreement at the most important holy centre of the Islamic world lends it political and historical visibility beyond that of a purely military text. However, the agreement’s future legitimacy will be shaped not so much by its symbolic value as by its contribution to regional peace, its compliance with international law, and its capacity to prevent crises.

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ugust 7, 2026, marks a historic turning point at which the cards of Afro-Eurasian geopolitics and the global security architecture were reshuffled. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s working visit to Saudi Arabia brought together Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, who had arrived in Saudi Arabia the day before the visit, and General Asim Munir at the same table. The defense-focused trilateral ‘Mecca Agreement’, were signed following months of diplomatic maneuvering, and were announced at a time of rising military tensions in the region and US-Iran conflict threatening Gulf security.

Analyzing this critical development from the perspective of Islamabad is of vital importance for understanding Pakistan’s defense network, which stretches from Africa to the Gulf; its chronic and hybrid challenges in internal security; and its foundational role at the crossroads of Afro-Eurasia.

From nuclear power to regional security architecture: Pakistan’s role

As the only nuclear-armed state in the Muslim world, Pakistan constitutes the most deterrent and high-calibre military human capital component of this alliance. The bilateral defense pact signed with Saudi Arabia in 2025 was a consequence of Riyadh’s quest for military assurances, including nuclear deterrence, against potential security threats. However, Turkey’s inclusion in this equation as an official and institutional partner elevates Pakistan’s role as a bilateral ‘security provider’ to a much broader and more balanced framework.

From the perspective of the Islamabad administration, this agreement is not merely a single Gulf commitment, but the culmination of a multi-layered strategy stretching from the Horn of Africa to the Persian Gulf. Indeed, the Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation signed last week between Pakistan and Somalia, a year after it was approved by the Somali Cabinet, demonstrated Islamabad’s determination to play an active role in ensuring the security of navigation in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Furthermore, the Kuwaiti Parliament’s approval in late July of the long-awaited defense cooperation agreement with Pakistan, alongside the pursuit by actors such as Bahrain and Jordan of reciprocal defense agreements modelled on the Saudi model, has cemented Islamabad’s position as the region’s ‘security architect’. Consequently, the Turkey–Saudi Arabia–Pakistan triad forms the backbone not only of these three countries but also of a broader Afro-Eurasian security network.

Synergy of capital, technology and military manpower

Viewed from the perspective of Islamabad, the tripartite alliance is more than just a military pact; it is an industrial lever that brings together finance and high technology. For many years, Pakistan’s military diplomacy has provided Saudi Arabia with training, military personnel and security support, whilst in return it has relied on Gulf funding. However, when the high technology, unmanned systems and operational capabilities of the Turkish defense industry are added to this equation, Pakistan finds an opportunity to move beyond being a passive exporter of security and position itself at the center of a tripartite industrial synergy.

When Saudi Arabia’s financial strength, Turkey’s advanced defense technology and Pakistan’s regional military expertise and growing production infrastructure are combined, a domestic and independent defense bloc and an integrated ecosystem emerge at the very intersection of Afro-Eurasia. At a time when Pakistan is grappling with financial difficulties, this agreement enables it to secure direct Saudi investment whilst also modernizing its domestic defense industry through joint defense projects with Turkey, thereby opening up new market opportunities for both Turkish and Pakistani defense companies.

Internal security challenges and allegations of sabotage

Pakistan’s ambitious foreign policy on the global stage is being tested by chronic internal security challenges and regional hybrid threats. The Islamabad administration has long been grappling with violence perpetrated by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, whilst in the south-west it has been combating separatist actions by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) targeting economic infrastructure and Chinese projects.

However, the recent escalation of social tensions and protests in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (Azad Kashmir) has added a new dimension to the security equation. Strategic circles in Islamabad argue that the unrest erupting in Kashmir is not merely the result of local administrative or economic grievances; rather, they contend that it has been exacerbated by the instigations of external actors who are displeased with Pakistan’s key role in its independent balancing diplomacy with Iran and within the now-concrete Turkey-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Tripartite Alliance, which is now taking concrete form. This situation illustrates that, whilst Islamabad is fighting the actions of the TTP and the BLA on the one hand, it is also forced to contend with the hybrid front opened up via Kashmir by forces seeking to undermine the regional influence of the Tripartite Alliance.

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audi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan are set to sign a trilateral defense agreement on Friday, marking a significant expansion of security cooperation among three of the Muslim world’s most influential military powers as conflict with Iran reshapes the strategic landscape of the Middle East.

The agreement will be signed in the Saudi Red Sea city of Jeddah during a summit attended by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, is also expected to participate in the high-level meeting, underscoring the military significance of the pact.

Regional officials familiar with the negotiations said the agreement follows nearly a year of discussions aimed at strengthening defense coordination among the three countries amid mounting security challenges across the Gulf and surrounding waterways.

Although officials have confirmed that an agreement will be signed, none of the governments has publicly disclosed the precise scope of the pact or the commitments each country will undertake.

The trilateral accord comes at a time of heightened instability following the U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran earlier this year and Tehran’s subsequent retaliation against military installations, energy infrastructure and strategic targets across the Gulf. The conflict has exposed vulnerabilities in regional security arrangements while threatening one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies normally pass, has experienced repeated disruptions since hostilities escalated. Commercial shipping has slowed considerably as insurers raised premiums and shipping companies rerouted vessels due to fears of further attacks.

Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan have increasingly sought closer strategic coordination, reflecting concerns that existing regional security mechanisms may not adequately address evolving threats.

A Turkish official confirmed that the defense agreement would be signed but declined to provide further details.

Expanding strategic partnership

The agreement would bring together three countries with considerable military and geopolitical influence.

Türkiye possesses NATO’s second-largest military and has significantly expanded its domestic defense industry over the past decade, becoming a leading exporter of drones, armored vehicles and missile systems.

Saudi Arabia remains one of the world’s largest defense spenders and has accelerated efforts to modernize its armed forces while investing heavily in domestic military manufacturing as part of its Vision 2030 economic transformation program.

Pakistan, meanwhile, is the only Muslim-majority nation possessing nuclear weapons and maintains one of Asia’s largest standing armies. Islamabad has long maintained close defense ties with Riyadh, including military training, intelligence cooperation and joint exercises.

Security analysts say combining the capabilities of the three countries could create one of the region’s most significant military partnerships, although its effectiveness will ultimately depend on the operational mechanisms established under the agreement.

Building on existing cooperation

The new arrangement appears to build upon the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement signed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in September 2025.

According to Saudi officials who previously described the agreement, the bilateral pact treats an attack against either country as an attack against both and provides for cooperation using “all military means.”

Whether Türkiye will assume identical obligations under the expanded framework remains unclear.

Reuters reported earlier this year that negotiations were underway to broaden Saudi-Pakistani security cooperation to include Türkiye, reflecting Ankara’s growing role in regional diplomacy and defense affairs.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said in January that Ankara supported establishing broader regional security platforms capable of promoting stability through multilateral cooperation rather than relying exclusively on outside powers.

Friday’s signing appears to represent the first major institutional step toward realizing that vision.

Maritime security takes center stage

Regional media reports suggest maritime security will feature prominently in discussions during the Jeddah summit.

The three countries have already backed Saudi Arabia’s recently announced multinational maritime initiative aimed at protecting commercial shipping through the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

The initiative gained urgency after repeated attacks on commercial vessels and energy infrastructure during recent regional conflicts disrupted global trade routes.

The Houthis in Yemen have also intensified attacks against Saudi-linked shipping in the Red Sea, further complicating regional security calculations.

Meanwhile, tensions in the Strait of Hormuz have highlighted the vulnerability of energy exports from Gulf producers, particularly Saudi Arabia, whose economy remains heavily dependent on oil exports.

Analysts say closer military coordination could improve intelligence sharing, naval patrols and joint responses to emerging threats affecting maritime commerce.

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he late Nelson Mandela said, “work to support courage where there is fear, foster agreement where there is conflict, and inspire hope where there is despair”. This may well apply to Pakistan’s position during a critical period of the escalating conflict between the United States and Iran. Many parties were unable to, or perhaps remained either reluctant or hesitant to get involved amidst waves of retaliatory strikes, a political and media discourse that had reached a new peak since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and a division in stances regarding the ongoing conflict.

However, one thing there was absolute agreement on the necessity of reaching a détente that would lead to the opening of the Strait of Hormuz to international navigation, thus restoring global economic activity, and ensuring the continued export of energy supply to consumers, including Pakistan, which considers the stability of the Strait and the region crucial to its economy and maritime security. The Pakistani initiative came at a pivotal moment, acting as a decisive factor in achieving a ceasefire, in an attempt to reach a consensus between both parties to end the conflict and quash its repercussions.

The initiative raised numerous questions about Islamabad’s role, which some might interpret as exploiting a political vacuum that other parties were unable to fill, adding to Pakistan’s regional influence, especially in view of the escalating tensions. There are also ongoing concerns about the continuation of the crisis, and its repercussions at the regional and international levels, as well as its economic and security implications for Pakistan itself. There is a conviction that an early effort at mediation allows more room for negotiation, and that the longer the initiative is delayed, the less willing the conflicting parties will be to accept a compromise. Therefore, Pakistan’s involvement at this juncture is commendable, even if it is limited, as it occurred during a period of transition, not after the situation had already stabilized.

Pakistan’s initiative to find a solution to the crisis between the United States and Iran may be viewed through the lens of political, economic, and geographical factors. The country has good relations with both sides, and is utilizing other channels of communication, such as with Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye, to advance its mediation efforts. It is worth noting that regional stability, and internal stability in Iran itself is important to Pakistan, which shares a long border of 900 km with its western neighbor. Islamabad fears the spillover of any political turmoil in Iran that may have sectarian and security repercussions for Pakistan, not to mention other repercussions on the energy markets, and on regional and global trade. Thus, Islamabad saw an opportunity to draw attention to itself as an important regional player and a diplomatic power capable of playing a prominent role during crises, which enhances its political standing and its international relations. Despite all this, the Pakistani initiative has raised many questions and perhaps drawn skepticism about Pakistan’s intentions and its role at this particular time.

Pakistan and the parties to the conflict

The relationship between Pakistan and the Western powers, particularly the United States, has always been complex and volatile. It can be described as a pragmatic partnership rather than an alliance based on mutual trust. This relationship has witnessed periods of intense rapprochement but also periods of sharp tension, depending on the changing circumstances and strategic interests of each party. During the Cold War, the relationship was very close, allowing Pakistan to join US-backed alliances such as the Baghdad Pact and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), in exchange for military and financial aid. This cooperation reached its peak during the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when Pakistan played a prominent role in supporting the ‘Mujahideen’, while receiving direct assistance from the United States. However, this harmony did not last long.

After the end of the Cold War in 1991, the relationship cooled off, especially with the emergence of Pakistan’s nuclear program, which led the United States to impose sanctions. The attacks of September 11, however, revived Pakistan’s ties with the United States, through the logistical and intelligence support provided by Islamabad to Washington, despite lingering suspicions about Pakistan’s duplicity in its dealings with the West. Its unstable surroundings worried western analysts, and in recent years the United States’ suspicions of Pakistan’s intentions have increased, especially following Islamabad’s growing rapprochement with Beijing through a series of economic projects and defense partnerships, particularly in military manufacturing and technology transfer. Consequently, the relationship between the two sides is determined by regional and international power balances, without any guarantee of a lasting political and strategic convergence.

Conversely, since its separation from India in 1947, Islamabad has maintained a relatively good relationship with Tehran, recognizing its direct proximity to its western neighbor, and understanding that any regional conflict in which Iran is directly involved will immediately affect Pakistan. This would have several repercussions, including disruptions to the transport of natural resources such as oil and gas, the potential for refugee flows, and the possibility of an escalation in sectarian tensions within Pakistan, given that approximately 20% of the population is Shia, who could potentially ignite an internal crisis. Therefore, in any escalation between Iran and the United States, such as the one that occurred following the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force in 2020, Islamabad has been quick to intervene diplomatically, emphasizing the need to respect the sovereignty of states and renounce the use of force.

Pakistan has also stressed that it will not allow its territory to be used in any conflict against any neighboring country, especially since Islamabad intends to maintain good relations with Tehran, Washington, Riyadh, and other regional actors. Meanwhile, tensions occasionally surface between Iran and its Gulf neighbors, albeit with some noticeable variations. Consequently, Islamabad knows it will have to maintain the delicate balance that grants it a regional role, and presents itself to the world as an influential state capable of resolving conflicts, thus giving it greater diplomatic weight.

Current regional events have cast a shadow over the political and economic landscape, given the difficulty of reaching a formula for consensus between the United States and Iran. This has prompted Islamabad to intervene and adopt a mediation initiative, hosting direct negotiations at the highest level. This step has been described by many as the result of precise political and security calculations that take into consideration the repercussions of escalation in the region and its impact on Iran’s neighbors, and on the region as a whole.

The Pakistani initiative did not come about as a reaction at a particularly sensitive moment, but rather as a direct protection of its internal security and its economy, which cannot withstand the devastating effects of being drawn into regional conflicts, which in itself seems a justifiable reason for such action. However, the timing of Islamabad’s entry as a mediator has raised many questions, at a time when countries such as Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Egypt were themselves seeking to bridge the divide and reduce tension. Therefore, what was it that prompted Islamabad this time to adopt the mediation role that Oman has played between the United States and Iran for many decades?

A regional role or an opportunistic approach?

There may be several interpretations of Pakistan’s decision to take a mediation role at this critical juncture, involving two parties whose relationship has been marked by open hostility since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Some believe that Islamabad’s move stems from a desire to ensure regional stability, which is essential for the smooth flow of maritime traffic, the uninterrupted flow of energy resources to consumers, and the avoidance of internal tensions in Iran. This is to say nothing of the potential influx of refugees and border tensions, as well as the economic shocks associated with disruption to energy prices, trade, shipping, and insurance. Therefore, according to this argument, Islamabad has adopted a mediating stance to prevent escalation and seek diplomatic solutions to the crisis, given that a protracted conflict threatens both regional and internal Pakistani security. Thus, the mediation role reflects a desire to prevent the expansion of the regional war, an attempt to de-escalate tensions between competing powers, and a commitment to maintaining a strategic balance between all parties to the conflict, without siding with any of them. The initiative embodies Pakistani political traditions of keeping channels of communication open with all competing powers.

On the contrary, some believe Pakistan’s move is driven by opportunistic motives. Perhaps, Islamabad saw an opportunity to regain its diminishing standing and bolster its international presence, at a time when it is grappling with economic difficulties and political instability. Others view this as less credible, arguing that it is seeking to improve its image abroad, particularly in the United States, and strengthen its ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Such a move would grant it diplomatic prestige and the ability to present itself as an indispensable regional power.

This comes within the framework of repositioning itself after years of relative isolation and attempting to balance its relationships with regional actors like Iran and Saudi Arabia, especially given the Joint Defense Agreement (JDA) with Riyadh, which places Islamabad in a precarious position, particularly in the event of a potential clash between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, it seeks to maintain balanced relations with other regional and international players such as Türkiye and the United States, a position which could lead to economic gain, broader security cooperation, defense-industry partnerships, and debt relief. With the disruption to energy supplies, Islamabad has been forced to implement austerity measures, shortening school days and working hours to conserve energy.

Ensuring a de-escalation of the regional situation would in fact bring significant benefits to Pakistan. These include guaranteeing access to Iranian oil at affordable prices once sanctions are lifted, and the completion of the long-awaited Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. By avoiding further escalation, Islamabad would also secure a safe trade corridor to Central Asia via Iran, as evidenced by the shipment of the first batch of Pakistani frozen meat to Uzbekistan in April 2026. This is particularly important given that trade routes through Torkham and Chaman, key strategic border crossings and vital trade arteries from Afghanistan to Central Asia, remain closed due to ongoing strained relations between Islamabad and Kabul. Furthermore, internal stability in Iran would prevent Indian attempts to infiltrate Pakistan’s Baluchistan via the Chabahar project, thus thwarting any encirclement efforts by New Delhi. These benefits would also prevent India from attempting to extend its influence through Iran into Pakistani Baluchistan.

According to an extreme view, still others believe that Islamabad may be complicit in a conspiracy against Tehran, given the actions of the United States, Pakistan’s historical ally, and Iran, its ideological antithesis and the primary rival of Saudi Arabia, a key Pakistani ally in the region. Maintaining complete neutrality in these circumstances would therefore be extremely difficult. This view is supported by the mobilization of forces and the stringent sentiment that the United States continued to express while negotiations were underway.

US and Pakistani forces in Saudi Arabia

This included the entry of two American destroyers into Saudi waters in the Arabian Gulf and the arrival of Pakistani forces at King Abdulaziz Air Base in the Eastern Province, accompanied by fighter jets and various weapons. Some interpreted this as an activation of the JDA between the two countries, an agreement considered a strategic buffer for Saudi Arabia and an additional layer of deterrence. It is worth noting that there were also reports that Pakistan simultaneously hosted some Iranian aircraft at Nur Khan Air Base, to protect them from any American military strikes. These included RC-130 intelligence and reconnaissance aircraft and C-130 transport aircraft. Conflicting views call for a deep reassessment of Pakistan’s actual role in the negotiations, which means that Islamabad’s initiative appeared to be not so much altruistic as a geostrategic maneuver to achieve substantial gains under the guise of ensuring the region’s security.

There remains the factor of China, which strongly supports the negotiating track adopted by Pakistan, preferring a diplomatic solution to escalation. China supports Iran, not only because the latter is a key partner in trade and energy, but also because it is a reliable strategic ally in any future confrontation with the United States. Beijing does not want any disruption to shipping lanes, and at the same time seeks a balanced relationship with Washington, as was evident during US President Donald Trump’s visit to China on May 13, 2026. Therefore, it prefers to play a supporting role in negotiations rather than leading them. Reports indicate that Beijing pressured Tehran to accept de-escalation and enter negotiations, exploiting Iran’s need to export its oil to the Chinese market.

In short, Islamabad’s hosting of negotiations between two parties that are extremely important to its national security involves several possible motives, including that this is at the request of the United States, which is trying to end the crisis with the least number of losses and concurrently to save face. It may also be driven by other parties such as Saudi Arabia, which is keen on the security of the region at a time when it is accelerating towards achieving its economic ambitions that require a degree of regional stability.

Despite the regional competition with Iran, Riyadh sees the stability and prosperity of its northern neighbor as a greater opportunity for rapprochement, at a time when its relationship with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is shrouded in much ambiguity. Thus, the outcomes of Pakistan’s role and what the conflict will lead to is likely to indicate much of what the region will face, which also means that the true implications behind the role that Pakistan is playing may become clear later, for Pakistan itself, for the two parties to the conflict, and for the entire region.

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akistan’s desire to mediate stems from a need for peace and a perception of a vital threat. The war in Iran could lead to a direct security crisis for Pakistan. While the Iranian Ministry of Defense’s latest statement suggests that the U.S. is seeking to “save face,” Pakistan has feared from the beginning that the conflict would spread.

Defense Minister Hoca Muhammad Asif’s warning encapsulates Pakistan’s strategic concerns: This war could result in an Israel-aligned “encirclement” encompassing Afghanistan, Iran, and India. In such a scenario, Pakistan would be caught between a threat triangle comprising India to the east, Iran to the west, and Afghanistan/Taliban-aligned forces to the northwest. Although Islamabad dismisses the risk of a direct attack, citing the country’s integration into the international system and its robust defense capabilities, the instability that a proxy war would generate would be unacceptable for Pakistan.

In addition to external security concerns, Pakistan’s status as home to the world’s second-largest Shia population after Iran increases Islamabad’s internal security risks in the event of a potential escalation. In the early days of the war, for example, dissatisfied Shias in Karachi stormed the US Consulate. Meanwhile, the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz for eight weeks constitutes a direct threat to the Pakistani economy. Pakistan is experiencing direct inflationary impacts caused by rising oil prices and global supply chain disruptions. Consequently, Munir’s mediation is viewed as a vital national security and economic imperative, not merely a foreign policy move.

The Rise of the Marshal as a diplomatic actor

As Islamabad-led diplomacy seeks to end the conflict, one name stands out in this critical role: Marshal Asim Munir. Munir’s exceptional performance can be attributed to his unique profile and the extraordinary consolidation of power that has taken place over the past year.

Munir is a new-generation military leader who embodies Pakistan’s institutional memory and pragmatism. Munir is one of the few figures to have previously led both Military Intelligence and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). This experience makes him privy to all of the regime’s secrets. However, what sets him apart from his predecessors is his ability to maneuver on the international stage. While US President Donald Trump called him “my favorite marshal,” Iranian officials have also repeatedly expressed their trust in him. This mutual trust has placed Münir in a unique position.

Last year’s brief war with India marked a turning point in his rise. His measured response during that period earned him respect in Washington and enabled him to establish a direct line of communication with the Trump administration. Moreover, his position in Pakistan, where the military has the final say in domestic and foreign policy, has been further consolidated through constitutional amendments. Promoted to Marshal and granted lifelong judicial immunity, he is now the Chief of Defense Forces (CDF). This title encompasses air, naval, and strategic nuclear command, making him the country’s absolute authority. While Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif is on diplomatic tours, Munir is seen as the true decision-maker and the “strongman.”

The benefits Pakistan hopes to gain from mediation

Pakistan’s mediation initiative is primarily aimed at securing vital economic gains. Sanctions against Iran due to the war and risks in the Strait of Hormuz have sent Pakistan’s energy prices soaring and plunged the country into a serious economic crisis. Pakistan has been forced to implement austerity measures, such as a four-day workweek for public sector employees and school closures. Through this mediation, Pakistan aims to revive the long-delayed Iran-Pakistan natural gas pipeline project. A successful agreement would provide Pakistan with a steady supply of low-cost natural gas, reducing industrial production costs and establishing long-term energy security.

Furthermore, this process has opened the door for Pakistan to form partnerships with the U.S. in cutting-edge strategic sectors, such as rare earth elements and cryptocurrency. The critical mining agreements signed under Marshal Munir’s personal supervision and the agreements reached with a cryptocurrency company linked to the Trump family demonstrate that the war-induced chaos has transformed into an economic opportunity for Pakistan.

In terms of foreign policy, Pakistan aims to achieve a “revision of its reputation” and strategic autonomy on a global scale through this initiative. Often labeled a “destabilizing force” due to its history in Afghanistan and disputes with neighbors, Pakistan seeks to elevate itself to the role of peacemaker. This process is believed to demonstrate Pakistan’s unique ability to conduct simultaneous diplomacy with Washington, Ankara, Tehran, Riyadh, and Beijing.

With the support of a broad international coalition ranging from the UN Secretary-General to China and Turkey to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan aims to position itself not just as a regional crisis manager but as an “indispensable interlocutor” in the eyes of global powers. This situation provides Pakistan

Backed by a broad international coalition ranging from the UN Secretary-General to China and Turkey to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan is positioning itself not just as a regional crisis manager, but as an “indispensable interlocutor” in the eyes of global powers. This provides Pakistan with the maneuvering space to advance the CPEC project with China and establish a strategic partnership with the U.S., alleviating the traditional pressure on the country to “pick sides” in the U.S.-China rivalry to some extent.

In domestic politics, the greatest gain relates to consolidating the army’s institutional legitimacy and political dominance under Marshal Asim Munir’s leadership. Mounting criticism of internal security, fueled by the economic crisis, protests by Imran Khan’s supporters, and the actions of terrorist organizations such as the Pakistani Taliban and the Baluchistan Liberation Army, had fueled debates about the erosion of trust in the army under Munir’s leadership. Despite these criticisms, the 2025 constitutional amendment elevated Munir to become the head of the army and the country’s most powerful leader since Pervez Musharraf. Consequently, this mediation process served as a demonstration of how Munir could project the profile of a “crisis manager” on the international stage using his new powers and secured his legitimacy.

Can Pakistan end the war?

So far, Pakistan has undertaken a functional mission, acting as a party capable of overcoming communication issues and conveying critical information that could end the war. However, as Pakistan lacks the capacity of a third-party Great Power to force concessions or exert pressure on the parties, which would be necessary to end the war completely, its options are limited.

Prior to the second round of talks, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi met with Marshal Munir and Prime Minister Sharif in Islamabad. He praised Pakistan’s efforts, particularly Marshal Munir’s, toward a ceasefire and the end of the war and conveyed Iran’s demands to Pakistani officials. Just as everything was ready for the American delegation to arrive in Islamabad and begin the second round of talks, Trump announced that he had canceled his team’s trip to Pakistan.

This sudden cancellation cast uncertainty over the future of the negotiations but did not bring the mediation process to a complete end. In a telephone conversation with the Iranian president, Prime Minister Sharif reiterated that Pakistan would continue to play the role of an “honest and sincere facilitator.” Trump’s refusal to negotiate appears to be a bargaining tactic that draws attention to the “chaos and internal conflicts” under Iranian leadership. Meanwhile, the U.S. has stated that it obtained this information from Pakistani officials.

Consequently, with the Strait of Hormuz still closed and the parties observing a ceasefire, it cannot be said that Pakistan’s mediation efforts have come to an end. In this context, the world will continue to watch and see if Islamabad can turn this chaos into a diplomatic victory.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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fragile diplomatic breakthrough halted the escalating war involving Iran after Pakistan launched an intense, last-minute mediation effort that brought United States and Tehran to the brink of direct negotiations, according to multiple sources familiar with the talks.

The ceasefire agreement came after what officials described as “intense, breathless” overnight negotiations that were close to collapse just hours earlier. The situation deteriorated sharply following an Iranian strike on a Saudi petrochemical facility, which angered Saudi Arabia and threatened to derail weeks of behind-the-scenes diplomacy.

With a deadline set by U.S. President Donald Trump fast approaching, Pakistani officials scrambled to maintain communication between Washington and Tehran. Trump had warned that continued fighting could have catastrophic consequences, raising the urgency of reaching an agreement.

Pakistan’s intervention involved direct outreach to key figures, including U.S. Vice President JD Vance, special envoy Steve Witkoff, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, and senior Iranian military officials.

After hours of high-stakes diplomacy, Iran agreed to a temporary ceasefire without preconditions and signaled willingness to enter formal negotiations.

Pakistan’s dual pressure

Islamabad played a delicate balancing role. On one hand, it conveyed its “strongest ever anger” to Tehran over the strike on Saudi Arabia, a country with which Pakistan maintains close defense ties. On the other, it pressed Washington to restrain Israel from further military action.

According to sources, Iran insisted it could not engage in talks while Israeli strikes continued. Pakistan warned U.S. officials that ongoing Israeli operations risked collapsing the entire diplomatic process.

Only after receiving assurances that Israel would scale back its attacks was Pakistan able to secure Iran’s agreement to the ceasefire.

Israeli officials reportedly opposed a truce, believing continued military pressure could further weaken Iran’s leadership. However, they ultimately deferred to Washington’s decision.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signaled that Israel had not yet achieved all its objectives and warned that military operations could resume if necessary.

An Israeli official emphasized that the ceasefire does not represent a permanent end to the war and does not include commitments such as lifting sanctions or compensating Iran.

Final push before dawn

As negotiations stretched into the night, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif personally urged all sides to honor a ceasefire, a move coordinated after preliminary agreement had already been reached.

Behind the scenes, discussions focused on a U.S. proposal outlining the structure of the ceasefire and the framework for future talks. Key sticking points included Iran’s demands regarding sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, its nuclear program, and regional defense arrangements.

A major breakthrough came when Iran agreed to postpone its demands and enter talks without preconditions — a concession described by sources as the most difficult part of the negotiations.

Formal negotiations are expected to begin soon, with the U.S. delegation led by JD Vance and Iranian representatives headed by Abbas Araqchi.

The talks are expected to address critical issues including Iran’s nuclear activities, missile program, and regional security concerns.

Despite the breakthrough, the ceasefire remains fragile. Officials on all sides have indicated that failure in upcoming negotiations could quickly lead to renewed hostilities.

As Sharif noted after the agreement, the overnight effort demonstrated how persistence in diplomacy can prevent even the most dire outcomes.

(Source: Reuters)

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hen Pakistan’s defense minister went on television at the end of February and spoke of an “open war” with the Taliban government in Kabul, he was not simply using a dramatic phrase for a familiar border clash. He was signaling that the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre – long managed through deniable strikes, proxy groups and quiet understandings – had entered a new and more dangerous phase.

His announcement came as Pakistani warplanes hit Taliban-controlled areas near the capital and along the eastern frontier, targeting what Islamabad describes as TTP safe havens that fuel attacks inside Pakistan. For people on both sides of the border, this looked less like the start of a brand-new conflict and more like a sharp escalation in a security problem that never really went away.

Islamabad said the strikes targeted militants of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) responsible for repeated attacks across the border and inside Pakistan. Taliban authorities in Kabul countered that civilians, including women and children, were among the dead, and that Afghan sovereignty had been violated yet again by a neighbor that long used their soil as a strategic area. Both sides accused each other of sheltering militants and of turning a porous line on the map into a revolving door for armed groups.

The first theatre of the “war on terror” is now moving toward an undeclared confrontation between two governments that once cooperated closely. As this front heats up, the question becomes more concrete: in a crowded and contested international agenda, who has both the interest and the capacity to help limit the damage? Middle powers such as Türkiye are increasingly part of the answer, but their real room for maneuver is still being tested.

From counterterrorism to open war

For years, Afghanistan-Pakistan borders sat in a grey zone. Pakistani jets and artillery occasionally hit suspected militant camps across the border. Taliban leaders quietly tolerated some of these strikes, publicly condemned others and tried to manage a relationship built on decades of covert cooperation, refugee flows and shared enemies. The line between a counterterrorism operation and a cross-border skirmish was kept deliberately vague.

Late February 2026 changed the atmosphere. Pakistani warplanes bombed Taliban-held areas near Kabul and in eastern provinces, while officials spoke openly about dismantling what they describe as TTP safe havens inside Afghanistan. Taliban spokesmen responded with their own casualty figures, allegations of civilian deaths and an ultimatum: respect Afghan territory or face consequences. When both sides use language such as “open war,” the space for quiet de-escalation narrows quickly.

This is not only a matter of public rhetoric. When armed groups move across borders, governments still have a certain flexibility in how they respond and how they explain their actions. Once capitals and regular forces are engaged in a declared confrontation, domestic audiences, rival factions and external partners all push for more rigid positions. Political costs rise for any actor who wants to step back.

A nuclear shadow over a crowded map

The Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier links two nuclear-armed states and sits close to a third, India, which has its own history of war with Pakistan. It also lies on top of the supply routes, smuggling lines and ideological networks that have sustained jihadist movements since the 1980s. In a relatively small space, tribal structures, armed groups and long-standing border disputes overlap and feed into each other.

In such an environment, escalation can move faster than intentions. A few days of airstrikes and retaliatory raids might remain limited; several weeks of miscalculation could start to affect stability in Central Asia, the Gulf and even China’s Xinjiang region. Pakistani security planners are clearly aware of these linkages. Taliban commanders understand as well that allowing TTP fighters extensive freedom of action from Afghan territory increases the chance of additional punitive strikes.

The timing of this crisis matters. It comes as the U.N. Security Council is already dealing with a crowded agenda dominated by the fourth year of the Ukraine war and the unresolved consequences of the Gaza genocide. Diplomatic bandwidth in many capitals is limited. Intelligence services and foreign ministries are managing several urgent files at once. Adding Afghanistan-Pakistan to this list makes coordination harder at the very moment when it is most needed.

Where middle powers step in

At this point, middle powers come into focus. States with regional reach, flexible diplomacy and no colonial baggage in Afghanistan-Pakistan have a specific advantage. Various reports and commentaries already point to regional mediators such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, as well as Türkiye and possibly the UAE. All of them have channels to Islamabad, some degree of contact with the Taliban and a clear interest in avoiding a prolonged war on the edge of the Muslim world.

Türkiye enters this picture with a record that combines alliance ties and autonomous initiatives. As a NATO member that maintained dialogue with Moscow during the Ukraine war, Ankara helped build the Black Sea grain corridor when many saw little space for compromise. On Gaza, Turkish officials engaged in back-channel contacts involving Israel, Egypt, Qatar and the United States while keeping a critical public line. In Afghanistan, Türkiye sought a role at Kabul airport after the U.S. withdrawal, signaling that it did not intend to disappear from the file when Western militaries left.

This pattern has strengthened Ankara’s claim to a certain mediation capacity. Middle powers accumulate influence not only through defense sales or summit diplomacy, but also by repeatedly entering crisis management roles when larger powers are divided or simply tired. The Afghanistan-Pakistan confrontation is another test case. For Pakistan’s leaders, a Muslim-majority partner with established defense links and personal relationships is a good option. For Taliban figures who do not want to depend on a single patron, an interlocutor that talks about security, trade and political process at the same time has clear value.

This does not mean a middle power can impose a settlement between Pakistan’s security establishment and the Taliban leadership. It does mean expectations are shifting about which actors are asked to “do something” when escalation threatens to spin out of control.

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n recent years, Turkey’s foreign policy has fundamentally focused on establishing a belt of stability and development stretching from Asia to Africa. In this context, Ankara has played a constructive role in regional crisis areas with the aim of achieving lasting stability. Thanks to Turkey’s positive approach, crises have been prevented from deepening in many areas, including Libya, Somalia, Syria and Sudan.

Ankara has not hesitated to cooperate with like-minded actors, bringing together all parties that can contribute positively to the processes and striving to implement solution-oriented, multilateral approaches. Rather than deepening divisions, Turkey’s position has been to bring regional actors together around common interests, resolving the problems encountered through the region’s own dynamics. In this context, Turkey has recently joined forces with countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan, adopting joint positions on regional policies and acting in a coordinated manner to resolve issues.

Alliance motivations of regional powers

The primary motivation behind Turkey’s proposed alliance structure, which would integrate the region’s leading countries, is to address mounting security concerns and ensure lasting stability. This would allow the Middle East and the Islamic world to tackle the issues they have faced increasingly in recent years, and could pave the way for a climate of peace. In recent years, the divergent agendas and policy preferences of the relevant parties have produced destructive rather than constructive results, leading to instability becoming the norm in crisis-stricken countries and across the region as a whole. This is evident in crisis regions such as Syria, Libya, Sudan and Yemen, where resolving crises has proven much more difficult during periods of discord and lack of cooperation among regional actors.

Another motivation behind this process of rapprochement among regional powers is anxiety caused by shifts in global power balances and the resulting uncertainty. The new approach to US policy in the Middle East, coupled with increasing signs of Washington’s diminishing presence in the region, has caused regional actors to adopt a more cautious approach to traditional security mechanisms. Consequently, countries in the region have increased their efforts to establish new security and cooperation mechanisms. While Turkey and Saudi Arabia’s recent initiatives towards this goal have resulted in concrete agreements being signed, the prospect of alliance structures emerging, comprising actors with shared priorities who intend to join, has strengthened.

Another factor encouraging the formation of regional alliances is the economic cooperation potential that has been stifled by an unstable political environment. Competitive foreign policies, regional leadership ambitions and mutual distrust among the region’s leading figures have hindered rapprochement and occasionally pushed these countries towards hostile policies. This situation creates a geo-economic context that conflicts with the goals of regional actors seeking to strengthen their economies or establish stronger, more resilient economic models through diversification. Cooperation initiatives between countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have the potential to foster closer interaction, both in terms of security and economically.

A political ecosystem established with the encouragement and leadership of regional powers would encourage the participation of other actors and pave the way for all parties to embrace the broader goal of achieving economic stability and development, particularly in the Middle East and the Islamic world. If embraced by the region’s leading actors, such an initiative will yield lasting benefits in terms of its potential outcomes and will help establish long-term stability. This is particularly true for the founding and participating countries of this alliance.

Turkey’s leadership in regional cooperation

Turkey currently supports such an initiative and, in this context, is intensifying its coordination with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in particular. Turkey has been active in many crisis areas in the region in recent years and has made intensive efforts to resolve crises and achieve lasting stability. However, Ankara prioritises cooperation with all relevant actors to achieve lasting solutions in regional crisis areas, and in this context it also needs allies. Acting together with the region’s leading powers will strengthen Turkey’s capacity to resolve crises. Increased cooperation with Egypt in Libya and Somalia, Saudi Arabia in Sudan and Qatar in Syria, for example, would strengthen coordination between these actors and enable them to play a more active role in post-stabilisation reconstruction processes in the relevant countries.

Another example of this can be seen in Gaza. Since 7 October 2023, Turkey has taken the strongest stance against the massacres carried out by Israel in Gaza and conducted intensive diplomacy with regional and global actors to stop Tel-Aviv. In particular, Turkey acted in concert with Egypt and Qatar to pressure the United States into forcing the Israeli government to agree to a ceasefire. On 9 October 2025, the Gaza Peace Plan — prepared under US leadership and agreed by Israel and Hamas — came into force, having been signed by Egypt, Turkey and Qatar. Intensive coordination between Ankara and Cairo during this process pressured both the US and Israel into accepting the ceasefire. In this respect, Ankara and Cairo’s joint action on Gaza can be seen as one of the most effective steps towards finding a solution.

Another concrete outcome of Turkey’s potential alliance with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and other leading regional countries could be the implementation of a joint defence system. Pakistan’s nuclear capacity, Saudi Arabia’s financial power and Turkey’s advanced defense technologies, if combined, could create a power centre that would redefine regional geopolitics. Supporting and expanding such a structure in future with the involvement of like-minded countries could provide the ‘ability to act together’ that has been lacking in the Islamic world for many years. This would be of critical importance in enabling faster and more effective steps to be taken in resolving crises, fighting external threats, coordinating foreign policies and acting jointly in development processes.

In a geopolitical landscape where global risks are increasing and regional unity is becoming more important, an alliance led by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey would, in principle, be open to actors adopting constructive regional policies and not susceptible to external destructive agendas. This bloc will adopt the fundamental approach of being an ‘inclusive cooperation platform to protect common interests’ rather than a rigid bloc.

In addition, this alliance will adopt a multinational and participatory philosophy, particularly when it comes to resolving crises centred on the Middle East, ending conflicts, and building a collective future. This approach aims to prioritise the welfare and security of the peoples of the region. The existence of such an alliance would play a pivotal role in re-establishing the Islamic world’s presence in global diplomacy, enabling countries that have struggled to form meaningful alliances for many years to become significant players in international politics.

T

he Pakistan Navy expects its first Chinese-designed submarine to enter active service in 2026, the country’s top naval commander has said, marking a major step in a $5 billion arms deal that underscores Beijing’s growing military partnership with Islamabad and its ambitions to project power into the Indian Ocean.

Admiral Naveed Ashraf told China’s state-run Global Times that the delivery of eight Hangor-class submarines, agreed under a landmark contract with Beijing, was “progressing smoothly.” The first of the diesel-electric attack vessels is scheduled to join Pakistan’s fleet next year, while the remainder are due to be operational by 2028.

Ashraf said the new submarines would significantly enhance Pakistan’s capacity to patrol the North Arabian Sea and safeguard sea lanes stretching toward the Middle East, a region of strategic importance for both countries. “Chinese-origin platforms and equipment have been reliable, technologically advanced, and well-suited to Pakistan Navy’s operational requirements,” he said.

The admiral added that as modern warfare evolves, Pakistan was increasingly focused on “emerging technologies such as unmanned systems, artificial intelligence and advanced electronic warfare,” and would seek closer collaboration with China in these fields.

Deepening defense partnership

Under the agreement, the first four submarines are being constructed in China, while the remaining four will be built in Pakistan, a move aimed at transferring technical know-how and expanding local shipbuilding capability. Three of the vessels have already been launched into China’s Yangtze River from a shipyard in Hubei province, Chinese media reported.

The Hangor-class submarines, based on China’s Type-039A Yuan-class design, are diesel-electric powered and capable of carrying a variety of torpedoes and anti-ship missiles. They will form the backbone of Pakistan’s naval modernization drive as it seeks to counter India’s expanding maritime power.

Islamabad’s submarine program is part of a wider $5 billion arms procurement and defense cooperation package with Beijing. Over the past decade, China has become Pakistan’s dominant military supplier, accounting for more than 60% of its weapons imports between 2020 and 2024, according to data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

“This cooperation goes beyond hardware; it reflects a shared strategic outlook, mutual trust, and a long-standing partnership,” Ashraf said, emphasizing that the Pakistan-China defense relationship was entering a new phase of “industrial collaboration, training, and research.”

Strategic implications for the region

Analysts say the deal is likely to tilt the naval balance of power in the Indian Ocean, where India, Pakistan’s nuclear-armed rival, has steadily upgraded its fleet with Russian, French and indigenous submarines. India currently operates three nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and multiple classes of conventional submarines.

“Beijing’s delivery of advanced submarines to Pakistan gives China another foothold in the Indian Ocean, where it already has a base in Djibouti and growing access to ports along key maritime routes,” said Collin Koh, a naval expert at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. “For Islamabad, the partnership offers a crucial technological edge at a time of intensifying rivalry with India.”

The timing of the submarine rollout also aligns with Beijing’s broader ambitions to extend its reach westward through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) — a $60 billion infrastructure network that connects China’s western Xinjiang province to Pakistan’s deep-water port at Gwadar.

Economic corridor and power projection

Stretching roughly 3,000 kilometers (1,860 miles), the CPEC is a centerpiece of President Xi Jinping’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative. It provides China with a direct trade route to the Arabian Sea, allowing its energy imports from the Middle East to bypass the narrow Straits of Malacca — a maritime chokepoint between Malaysia and Indonesia that Beijing fears could be blockaded in a conflict.

Military analysts say Pakistan’s new submarine fleet will complement this corridor by giving both countries greater control over maritime approaches to Gwadar and the Arabian Sea, while expanding China’s capacity to project influence toward the Gulf region, East Africa and beyond.

“Pakistan’s submarines effectively extend China’s defensive perimeter,” said retired Pakistani naval officer Syed Hassan Rizvi. “They enhance deterrence, ensure energy route protection, and deepen the two countries’ strategic interdependence.”

H

eavy fighting erupted along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border over the weekend, leaving dozens dead on both sides and prompting the closure of all major crossings, officials said on Sunday, in the most serious confrontation between the neighbors since the Taliban returned to power in Kabul four years ago.

Pakistan’s military said that 23 of its soldiers were killed and several others wounded in overnight clashes after Afghan forces attacked border posts. The Taliban government confirmed that nine of its fighters had died but claimed to have inflicted heavy casualties on Pakistani forces.

Each side said it had destroyed border positions of the other, but neither provided evidence, and the figures could not be independently verified. Pakistani officials said their forces killed more than 200 Afghan Taliban and allied fighters, while Afghan officials said 58 Pakistani soldiers were dead.

Escalating tensions

Tensions between Islamabad and Kabul have soared in recent months amid Pakistani accusations that militants behind a surge in attacks in Pakistan are operating from Afghan territory. The Taliban administration has repeatedly denied the allegation, insisting it does not allow any group to threaten neighboring countries.

The weekend clashes followed a series of Pakistani airstrikes on Thursday that reportedly hit targets in Kabul and in a marketplace in eastern Afghanistan. Taliban authorities and Pakistani security sources confirmed the strikes, though Islamabad has not officially acknowledged them.

In retaliation, Afghan troops launched attacks late Saturday on Pakistani border posts, triggering hours of heavy exchange involving artillery, rockets and small arms. Fighting was reported in multiple locations along the rugged frontier, including Kurram district in Pakistan’s northwest, where intermittent gunfire continued on Sunday, according to residents.

A Taliban defense ministry statement said their forces had targeted “enemy posts that had bombarded Afghan villages,” while Pakistan’s military said it was “responding decisively to unprovoked aggression.”

Regional mediation and calls for calm

By early Sunday, major exchanges had largely ceased. The Taliban’s defense ministry said it halted attacks at midnight local time following requests for restraint from Qatar and Saudi Arabia, both of which issued statements expressing “grave concern” over the escalation.

“There is no kind of threat in any part of Afghanistan’s territory,” Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said. “The Islamic Emirate and the people of Afghanistan will defend their land and remain resolute and committed in this defense.”

Pakistani officials described the situation as “tense but under control” and said communications with Kabul had been established through diplomatic and military channels to prevent further escalation.

Border closures and humanitarian impact

Pakistan announced the closure of all crossings along the 2,600-kilometre (1,600-mile) border, a disputed frontier known as the Durand Line, drawn up by British colonial authorities in 1893.

The key trade routes at Torkham in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and Chaman in Balochistan were sealed on Sunday morning, halting cross-border movement of people and goods. At least three smaller crossings — Kharlachi, Angoor Adda and Ghulam Khan — were also shut, Pakistani local officials said.

Video footage from Chaman showed long lines of stranded trucks and people carrying belongings, as Afghan nationals living in Pakistan sought to return home. “Thousands are stuck on both sides,” said a customs official in Balochistan. “Trade and daily wage work have completely stopped.”

The border closures threaten to deepen economic hardship for Afghanistan, which depends heavily on imports through Pakistan for food, fuel and medical supplies.

T

he defense agreement recently concluded between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is more than a conventional arrangement between two allies. It is a harbinger of a shifting order, signaling how Middle Eastern power is being reconstituted in ways that diminish U.S. centrality while elevating Gulf-driven legitimacy and multipolar alignments. Crystallized against the backdrop of global turbulence, this pact reflects how security, economics, and credibility are being rethreaded into a new fabric of regional architecture.

The Pakistan–Saudi defense agreement carries deep implications. For Saudi Arabia, it adds a new layer of strategic depth. For decades, Pakistan has quietly underwritten Riyadh’s security, particularly through military training and personnel support. By formalizing this cooperation, Saudi Arabia diversifies away from exclusive reliance on Washington at a time when American commitments look increasingly uncertain. For Pakistan, the pact enhances prestige and cements its role as a core partner in shaping Islamic and regional security.

But the broader significance lies in its network effect: once Saudi Arabia anchors itself in such an arrangement, the gravitational pull will inevitably extend across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman cannot afford to remain outside an emerging defense framework that binds Pakistan and Saudi Arabia together. What begins bilaterally is likely to evolve into a GCC-wide lattice of security arrangements, forming the skeleton of a new Middle Eastern order.

Strategy of recalibration

Crucially, Saudi Arabia has positioned this defense pact at the apex of the global power center. It is not framed as a narrow bilateral contract but as part of Riyadh’s sovereign strategy of recalibration: balancing U.S. ties while embedding its security in multipolar circuits that stretch from Islamabad to Beijing and Moscow. This is both hedging and projection, securing the Kingdom against volatility while ensuring that Saudi leadership defines the grammar of regional security. Pakistan, in turn, is elevated from peripheral partner to central architect in this evolving equation.

This realignment intersects directly with the unresolved Palestinian question. For decades, Palestine was treated as a frozen conflict, endlessly deferred while U.S. power guaranteed the regional status quo. That status quo is now unraveling. Recent moves by Western capitals, including recognitions of Palestinian statehood by European governments, are not simply moral awakenings, but signs of the old structure crumbling.

Yet while Europe shows visible adjustment, Washington remains the primary bastion of Israel’s narrative power. Recognition and peace are now treated not merely as ethical gestures, but as instruments of realignment in the global balance of power. In this context, Saudi Arabia’s insistence that normalization with Israel must pass through Palestinian recognition is not mere symbolism; it is a geopolitical condition backed by sovereign wealth, strategic independence, and Chinese leverage.

Israel at a crossroads

This places Israel at a crossroads. For decades, it thrived as Washington’s forward outpost, the spearhead of U.S. regional dominance, and the beneficiary of unconditional American support. That model is now fraying. To endure in the emerging landscape, Israel must pivot from reliance on unilateral American security guarantees to anchoring itself within a regionally mediated framework of validity. It must adapt to the logic of what might be called Abraham Accords 2.0: a framework where normalization is inseparable from Palestinian recognition and GCC mediation.

This carries profound political implications inside Israel itself. The maximalist politics embodied by Benjamin Netanyahu, deeply tied to a vanishing unipolar moment, no longer fit the realities of a multipolar Middle East. The future will belong to Israeli leaders capable of embedding their state into regional designs of cooperation, rather than clinging to unilateral hegemony.

What is manifesting is not state collapse, but the rise of a new formation: autonomous regional finance, security, and trade frameworks. Here, the Gulf states are already gaining disproportionate influence, economically, diplomatically, in energy, tech, and investment. The real divide ahead is less Israel vs. Iran and more dependency vs. independence; global alignment vs. regional resilience; old patronage vs. new investment.

A new Israel?

Within this emerging regional architecture will appear a new Israel, likely post-Netanyahu, integrated into the system rather than dominating it. That transition is already unfolding, not only in the U.S. political arena but within its power structure itself, where competing narratives are contesting Israel’s future place in a Gulf-centered order. In such a system, Israel is no longer the pivot, but one actor among many in a Gulf-dominated framework. And this is precisely why Israel’s strike in Qatar was less about Hamas itself than about disrupting the very system now taking shape.

In this reconfiguration, the U.S. role is instructive not by its dominance but by its erosion. Washington remains powerful, but its monopoly on dictating the terms of Middle Eastern politics is gone. It cannot unilaterally impose solutions in Palestine, nor can it guarantee Israel’s regional acceptance. Instead, the United States is becoming one actor among many, still influential, but increasingly compelled to negotiate with the gravitational fields generated by Riyadh, Beijing, Moscow, and now Islamabad. The very fact that Western recognition of Palestine is accelerating without U.S. orchestration underscores this diffusion of power.

Here, the rise of BRICS is decisive. The alignment of Russia, China, and Iran, anchored in coordinated policy, military cooperation, and alternative financial systems, has forged a new axis of resilience. No longer isolated, Iran is now embedded in a hardened geopolitical circuit: shielded by eastern powers and engaging pragmatically with Gulf actors. What was once styled the “axis of resistance” has matured into an axis of integration. This is not the region’s disintegration, but its reassembly, and therein lies its durability.

Thus, the Pakistan–Saudi pact should not be seen in isolation. It is part of a larger tectonic movement: the erosion of U.S.-centric hegemony, the recalibration of Israel’s place within regional politics, and the repositioning of Palestine from a deferred issue to a litmus test of standing. What begins with a defense pact in Riyadh and Islamabad reverberates through Doha, Abu Dhabi, and beyond, ultimately converging on the question of Jerusalem.

The contours of the emerging landscape are clear. It is multipolar, Gulf-centered, and legitimacy-driven. It binds security to sovereignty, finance to diplomacy, and recognition to survival. In this edifice, neither the United States nor Israel can dictate terms unilaterally. Instead, the power to define regional order now flows increasingly from the Gulf and the Pakistan–Saudi Defense Agreement is one of the clearest signals yet that a new Middle East is being born.

C

hina’s top diplomat Wang Yi will arrive in Pakistan on Wednesday, August 20, 2025 for a three-day visit to hold high-level talks with Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, as the two long-time allies seek to strengthen political, economic, and security cooperation amid shifting regional dynamics.

The visit, announced Tuesday by Beijing and Islamabad, will mark the sixth round of the China-Pakistan Strategic Dialogue, a platform both countries have used to align their foreign policy priorities and advance joint projects.

“China and Pakistan are iron-clad and all-weather friends,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning told reporters in Beijing, emphasizing that the talks would focus on expanding “practical cooperation” in areas ranging from infrastructure to defense.

Beijing’s balancing act

Wang’s trip to Islamabad comes immediately after his two-day visit to India, where relations remain tense over a disputed Himalayan border and New Delhi’s growing strategic alignment with the United States. Analysts say the back-to-back visits underscore Beijing’s balancing act in South Asia, where it seeks to manage rivalry with India while bolstering its “all-weather partnership” with Pakistan.

During his stay, Wang is also expected to meet with Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and President Asif Ali Zardari. Discussions are likely to include progress on the $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a flagship project under Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative that connects China’s Xinjiang province to the Arabian Sea via Gwadar port in Balochistan.

CPEC has been hailed by both sides as a “game changer” for Pakistan’s economy, but it has also faced delays, security challenges, and growing scrutiny from international lenders. Islamabad is eager to secure further Chinese investment as it struggles with a fragile recovery from last year’s balance-of-payments crisis.

$23 billion in trade

In 2024, bilateral trade between China and Pakistan surpassed $23 billion, making Beijing Islamabad’s largest trading partner. China is also Pakistan’s leading supplier of arms, including fighter jets, drones, and naval equipment, reinforcing deep defense ties that have spanned decades.

Security is expected to feature prominently in the dialogue. Pakistan continues to face militant attacks targeting Chinese nationals and CPEC infrastructure, prompting Beijing to demand stronger guarantees for the safety of its citizens working in the country. For Islamabad, continued Chinese backing is crucial, especially as relations with Washington remain cautious and aid flows have declined.

Regional geopolitics add further weight to Wang’s visit. With the U.S. recalibrating its role in South Asia and India moving closer to Western partners through initiatives like the Quad, Beijing and Islamabad appear determined to present a united front. “This dialogue will signal that the China-Pakistan partnership remains resilient and central to Beijing’s South Asia strategy,” said Islamabad-based analyst Ayesha Siddiqa.

The last round of the China-Pakistan strategic dialogue was held in Beijing in 2021. Since then, Pakistan has seen political upheaval, economic turbulence, and security challenges, making the upcoming talks an important test of how both countries will adapt their long-standing partnership to new realities.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

Relations between India and Pakistan—long shaped by historical rivalries and persistent conflict—are now teetering on the brink of a fresh crisis. On April 22, 2025, a deadly terrorist attack in the Baisaran Valley near Pahalgam, in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, claimed the lives of 26 civilians. The attack, the deadliest since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, has reignited debate across India over long-standing issues such as the Kashmir conflict, cross-border terrorism, and nuclear brinkmanship.

Claimed by the Resistance Front (TRF), a group that emerged in 2019 in response to India’s Kashmir policies, the attack has once again placed Pakistan-India relations at the center of global scrutiny. India swiftly blamed Pakistan, accusing it of supporting cross-border terrorism. Pakistan, in turn, denied involvement and called for an international, independent investigation.

India’s reaction was multifaceted—diplomatic, economic, and strategic. Most notably, it announced the suspension of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, signed under World Bank auspices, and revoked visas issued to Pakistani nationals. Furthermore, India imposed a complete ban on imports from Pakistan, effectively freezing what little bilateral trade remained.

Pakistan, while rejecting the terrorism allegations, emphasized the need for a transparent, international investigation and urged global institutions to intervene. In response to India’s sanctions, Islamabad implemented symbolic countermeasures and declared its intention to suspend all bilateral agreements with India, including the 1971 Simla Agreement, which has long shaped India-Pakistan diplomacy.

Historical Echoes in a Modern Crisis

This latest round of hostilities bears the unmistakable imprint of history. The Kashmir dispute remains the epicenter of tensions, echoing the unresolved legacies of partition. Pakistan continues to advocate for Kashmir’s right to self-determination and insists the conflict is international in nature. India, however, treats Kashmir as a purely internal issue and frames all discourse about it as a matter of national security.

India’s strategy of blaming Pakistan for every major incident in Kashmir reinforces its longstanding narrative: Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism. This pattern—repeating in 2001, 2008, 2019, and now 2025—illustrates the historical continuity of arguments used by both sides. However, what sets this crisis apart is the mutual suspension of two foundational agreements: the Indus Waters Treaty and the Simla Agreement.

These developments raise the specter of renewed disputes over vital issues such as water resource sharing, the status of the Line of Control (LoC), and the internationalization of the Kashmir issue—topics that had, until now, been largely settled or frozen.

The Root Cause: Kashmir

The ideological and structural tensions between India and Pakistan have persisted since the 1947 Partition. Central to this divide are identity-based narratives and the Kashmir question. Pakistan’s founding ideology—the Two-Nation Theory—underpins its position. In the wake of the April 2025 attack, Pakistan’s National Security Committee cited the incident as further validation of the Two-Nation Theory’s relevance.

For both nations, Kashmir represents more than just territory—it is an existential concern. This has led to multiple wars (1947, 1965, 1971, 1999) and numerous skirmishes. Since the 2000s, the discourse has evolved to focus on terrorism and counterterrorism, with India accusing Pakistan of supporting armed insurgents in Kashmir.

Key turning points like the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the 2019 Pulwama bombing have hardened India’s stance. Pakistan, meanwhile, maintains it merely supports Kashmiris’ right to self-determination.

India’s 2019 decision to revoke Article 370 of its Constitution—which had granted special autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir—further inflamed tensions. This move not only altered the region’s demographic dynamics but also underlined India’s insistence that the issue lies solely within its sovereign purview. However, this unilateral action has fueled demands for legal reforms and reignited grievances among the region’s Muslim-majority population.

Diplomatic Bridges in Limbo: Indus Waters and Simla Agreements

The fact that two nuclear powers are once again clashing over Kashmir raises urgent questions about regional stability. This time, the stakes are higher. India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, originally signed in 1960, could have far-reaching consequences.

The treaty allocated usage rights of eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India and western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan. As over 80% of Pakistan’s water supply relies on these western rivers, the treaty has been a lifeline for its agricultural economy and energy needs. As the upper riparian, India had been constrained from using water as a strategic weapon—until now.

Pakistan has warned that India’s withdrawal could be considered an act of war, underlining the treaty’s significance for its national security and food sovereignty.

In response, Pakistan has announced it will suspend the Simla Agreement 1971, which committed both countries to resolve all disputes bilaterally and peacefully. The Simla Agreement effectively prevented third-party intervention in Kashmir, favoring direct dialogue. India has historically used it to avoid internationalizing the Kashmir issue, while Pakistan has seen it as a path to maintain diplomatic engagement and avoid military escalation.

Another vital clause in the Simla Agreement defines the Line of Control (LoC), the de facto border in Kashmir. Though repeatedly violated, the LoC remains a critical buffer. Suspending the agreement may open new disputes about the legitimacy and control of this volatile frontier.

A Crisis Beyond Borders

The India-Pakistan conflict continues to be shaped by long-standing identity-based divisions and unresolved historical grievances. The April 2025 terrorist attack has not only reignited old hostilities but introduced new risks by dismantling key diplomatic safeguards.

With the Indus Waters Treaty and Simla Agreement effectively suspended, the crisis risks spilling into broader domains: water security, cross-border diplomacy, and international law. The specter of weaponized water and the disappearance of a legal framework governing the LoC make this moment particularly dangerous.

India’s emphasis on internal security and Pakistan’s push for internationalization reflect deeply rooted policy approaches. This confrontation, therefore, can be read as an updated version of a recurring pattern—but with higher stakes.

Given both nations’ nuclear capabilities, the ramifications of continued escalation are not just regional, but potentially global. As we advance, international actors and diplomatic channels must intervene and de-escalate tensions. Otherwise, the collapse of foundational agreements could open the door to unpredictable and potentially catastrophic outcomes—not just for India and Pakistan, but for all of South Asia.

W

hether it was a unilateral action by the Iranian deep state or had the assent of the Iranian government as well, it is hard to make sense of Iranian missiles that streaked more than 50 km deep into the territory of Pakistan on January 16, 2024, and, per Pakistan, killed two children and injured three others. When already faced with sanctions and in the midst of proxy wars on multiple fronts, why would Tehran decide to irk a neighboring Islamic country with which it shares a 900 km border and which has perhaps superior military strength?

“Missiles rain down on the headquarters of Mossad”

A glance at the headline of the state-aligned paper Tehran Times on January 16, 2024, alludes to what the Iranian leadership could have been thinking. It read, “Iran Hits Back,” with the caption “Missiles rain down on the headquarters of Mossad and terrorists in Iraqi Kurdistan, Syria’s Idlib and Pakistan’s Balochistan.”

Interestingly, apart from the clubbing with Iraq and Syria in the caption, there was no mention of Pakistan in the news story itself. Manifestly, the strikes were aimed at creating the impression that Iran is a formidable regional power capable of retaliation and hitting back, among other threats, at the assets of its arch enemy Israel wherever those assets are – even if that stretched the narrative too far. Iranian sources suggested that the targeted Iran-based, anti-Iran sectarian group Jaish al-Adl had links with Israel and was planning attacks on Iran across the porous Iran-Pakistan border (which militants on either side cross frequently).

The temporary souring of relations with Pakistan was adjudged to be an acceptable collateral damage of the strikes that were meant to project Iran’s fury to the world. Tehran was ready to hit targets not just in Syria and Iraq, but even across clearly defined borders like Pakistan’s. The intended message was perhaps that if a nuclear power’s border could be violated so could others.

Pakistan’s reaction

Pakistan took strong exception to the attack, which came as a complete surprise. After all, Pakistan’s interim prime minister had met Iran’s foreign minister merely hours before the attack on the sidelines of Davos. Worse, when Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) -seen as the overreaching arm of the deep state- was striking Pakistan, unleashing kamikaze drones and missiles eastwards, the navies of the two countries were conducting joint naval drills in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf.

Despite such close contact, no official communication channel, either between governments or militaries, was used to convey Iran’s concerns and/or intentions to Pakistan. This was completely in contrast with the relationship nurtured by the two countries over decades, where despite occasional disagreements and sometimes accusations, pertaining to Baloch insurgencies on either side of the border, security cooperation and coordinated border management had grown, especially in recent years since the 2013 security agreement.

On multiple occasions, Pakistan had targeted or arrested and handed over anti-Iran insurgents to Tehran, including key figures of Jaish al-Adl and its predecessor Jundullah. For Pakistan, the projectiles came out of the blue.

A midnight statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs termed the “violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty” as “completely unacceptable” and warned of “serious consequences,” as Islamabad waited for an official apology, as suggested by diplomatic circles. When it wasn’t issued within 48 hours, Pakistan struck Pakistani separatist insurgents belonging to the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) about 90 km inside Iran, using ballistic missiles, rockets, and jets. According to Iran, the incursions killed three women, two men, and four children who were not Iranian.

Iran’s miscalculation

Iran’s miscalculation was surprising in the first place. Wind back to February 25, 2019, when Indian jets launched “surgical strikes” in Pakistan’s Azad Kashmir province. At that time, Pakistani jets had intercepted the Indian jets and struck back at targets deep in the Indian-occupied Kashmir territory within two days, after having issued the warning “get ready now for our surprise” to India in advance.

When Indian jets tried to chase Pakistani jets, at least one Indian jet was outmaneuvered and coaxed into entering Pakistani territory, after which it was immediately hit and downed. The Indian pilot Abhinandhan’s comment, “The tea is fantastic,” upon being served a cup of tea in captivity, continues to fuel memes in Pakistani social media today.

With such a precedent existing in recent history, the calculations of the Iranian leadership remain shrouded in mystery. Perhaps, Iran thought that a missile-and-drone attack by a “friendly and brotherly” nation was below the retaliation threshold. For Pakistan, however, a counterstrike was imperative, not only to demonstrate its military prowess and respond to domestic pressures, but also in order to send a message to any aggressor, especially India.

Outcome and outlook

Thankfully, things did not escalate any further. “Following the telephone conversation between the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, it has been mutually agreed that ambassadors of both countries may return to their respective posts by 26 January 2024,” read a statement issued by Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry.

However, Iran’s choice to target a neighboring Islamic country, a nation that stands unequivocally with the Palestinians and has been actively condemning the abominable devastation being wreaked in Gaza seems perplexing. The attack appeared merely to draw away the world from the ever clearer enemy lines being drawn globally between those who favor the mass-killing of civilians and those against it. How Israel will see a heated Iran-Pakistan border is anyone’s guess – but one wonders what the Iranian leadership was thinking.

I

n a significant escalation of tensions between Pakistan and Iran, Pakistan conducted strikes inside Iranian territory on Thursday, January 28, 2024, targeting separatist Baloch militants, according to a statement from the Pakistani foreign ministry. This comes just two days after Iran claimed to have attacked bases of another group within Pakistani territory. The cross-border intrusions mark a rare and high-profile event between the two neighboring countries.

Iranian media reported that several missiles struck a village in the Sistan-Baluchestan province, which shares a border with Pakistan, resulting in the reported deaths of at least nine people. Initial reports indicated that among the casualties were three women and four children, all of whom were non-Iranians.

The strikes represent a notable development in the historically rocky ties between Pakistan and Iran, raising concerns about regional stability. Both countries have been grappling with internal security challenges, and the recent actions threaten to further destabilize the region.

Ensuring Pakistan’s own security and national interests

Pakistan’s foreign ministry issued a statement asserting that the operation was intelligence-based, involving highly coordinated and specifically targeted precision military strikes against terrorist hideouts. The statement emphasized that Pakistan fully respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran, and the sole objective of the operation was to ensure Pakistan’s own security and national interests, which it considers paramount and non-negotiable.

A senior Pakistani security official informed Reuters that the military was on “extremely” high alert, ready to respond forcefully to any “misadventure” from the Iranian side. The official warned that Pakistan would not tolerate any infringement on its sovereignty.

In response to the strikes, Iran vehemently condemned the actions, with the foreign ministry spokesperson, Nasser Kanaani, stating that Pakistan’s charge d’affaires had been summoned to provide an explanation. The situation has led to a diplomatic strain between the two nations, and Pakistan’s caretaker Prime Minister Anwaar-ul-haq Kakar is cutting short his visit to the World Economic Forum in Davos to return home.

Baloch background

The strikes by Pakistan come in the aftermath of Iran’s claim to have attacked Israel-linked militant bases inside Pakistani territory. Both targeted groups, the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) in Pakistan’s operation and Jaish al Adl (JAA) in Iran’s strike, share an ethnic Baloch background. However, it remains unclear whether these groups are cooperating in any way.

The recent events add complexity to an already delicate regional landscape. Iran has been actively asserting itself in the region, launching strikes on Syria and Iraq before the cross-border incursion into Pakistan. While Pakistan’s statements suggest an attempt to contain the situation, analysts warn that the escalating tensions could spiral out of control.

Khwaja Asif, Pakistan’s former defense minister, described the action as retaliatory and emphasized the importance of measured responses to prevent further escalation. As the situation unfolds, regional stability remains a top concern, and diplomatic efforts will be crucial to de-escalate tensions between the two neighboring countries.

The situation in the Middle East, particularly the ongoing genocide in Gaza, adds an additional layer of complexity to the evolving geopolitical landscape.

Source: Reuters

I

n a recent development, Iran targeted two bases of the Balochi militant group Jaish al Adl in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, escalating tensions between the two neighboring countries. The missile and drone attacks followed Iran’s strikes on alleged Israeli targets in Iraq and Syria, raising concerns about the widening conflict in the Middle East.

Pakistan confirmed the loss of two children and injuries to three girls in the strikes on Jaish ul-Adl bases. Reacting strongly, Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry issued a stern warning, deeming the incident “completely unacceptable” and highlighting the potential for “serious consequences.”

The ministry did not specify the location of the incident but strongly condemned the “unprovoked violation” of its airspace.

A strong protest

Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry lodged a strong protest with the Iranian Foreign Ministry and summoned the Iranian Charge d’Affaires. The responsibility for the consequences was squarely placed on Iran by Pakistan.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards claimed responsibility for the attacks, citing Jaish al Adl’s previous attacks on Iranian security forces in the border region with Pakistan.

This latest escalation adds another layer of complexity to the already intricate geopolitical landscape in the Middle East.

Attacking Mossad in Iraq

The strikes come in the wake of Iranian attacks on what they described as Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency’s “espionage headquarters” in Iraq’s Northern region and targeting the Islamic State in Syria.

The broader context of the Middle East conflict involves Iran accusing the U.S. of supporting what it labels as Israeli war crimes in Gaza, with the U.S. expressing concerns about civilian casualties in the region.

The situation remains fluid, with international observers closely monitoring developments in the region. The latest events underscore the challenges of maintaining stability in an area marked by multiple conflicts and the involvement of various regional actors.

Pakistani Foreign Ministry meeting 

On January 15, Pakistani Foreign Minister Jalil Abbas Jilani welcomed Hassan Kazmi Qomi, Iran’s Special Representative for Afghanistan Affairs. During the meeting, the Foreign Minister reiterated Pakistan’s dedication to fostering a peaceful and stable Afghanistan.

He stressed the importance of heightened coordination among regional nations to achieve stability in the area. Emphasizing the critical role of Afghanistan’s neighboring countries, the Foreign Minister highlighted their collective responsibility in realizing a vision of a tranquil and stable region.

Prior to this, Ambassador Qomi engaged in extensive discussions with his Pakistani counterpart, Ambassador Asif Durrani, delving into the current situation in Afghanistan. The talks focused on regional initiatives for peace and dialogue, reflecting the ongoing efforts to address the challenges facing Afghanistan and its neighboring nations.

Source: PTC News.

I

f you’re traveling in Pakistan, you’ll have come across long stretches of road that the locals call CPEC (pronounced see-pack, short for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor). In fact, you may hardly have to leave the CPEC during intercity travel. The average travel time between Lahore and Karachi, Pakistan’s two largest cities which are about 1,200 km apart, has dropped from 20 to about 13 hours, on what represents just one part of the 3,000-kilometer-long road.

Thanks to the CPEC-related power projects, electricity outages have been reduced significantly. Tens of thousands of Pakistanis are employed in projects related to the CPEC, itself a part of China’s grandiose Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for the seamless connection of Eurasia.

Yet, if you ask a common person how the CPEC has changed life in Pakistan, they’d probably be evasive, if not dejected. They would tell you about the crushing inflation, inflated bills, the dismal status of law and order, and there being no sign of respite, exacerbated by the confusion surrounding delayed elections. There would be no mention of the CPEC or its magic.

Yet, the CPEC and the heat of the New Great Game that Pakistan faces may be behind much of what is rattling Pakistan these days.

Backdrop: The Dragon and the seas

A decade ago, the CPEC—a combination of roads, railways, special economic zones, and power and energy projects—was anticipated by many in Pakistan as a game-changer for the heavily indebted South Asian nation, comparable with the Marshall Plan, according to some analysts.

The original promise of $46 billion over 15 years came as serendipity for Pakistan at a time when the outlook was otherwise bleak—the figure has since risen to $62 billion.

The expertise and investment from a country that had the distinction of creating thriving port cities like Shenzhen out of virtually nothing garnered much fascination in Pakistan.

In turn, the deep-sea, warm-water port of Gwadar, situated in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, near the Strait of Hormuz, offered China the closest access to sea from its landlocked easternmost province of Xinjiang. It’s now the gateway of the CPEC, the BRI’s main artery, to the oceans and a commercial hub in the making.

Gwadar offers China a much faster trade route to Europe and the Middle East, reducing travel time by 10-20 days, in addition to providing an alternative route for its energy needs. It has reduced the 12,000 km sea distance to less than 3,000 km on land. Considering that Saudi Arabia is among China’s top two oil suppliers, the importance of Gwadar to China is clear.

Politics in the line of cross fire

Much that has transpired in Pakistan in the political arena over the last year may be the burden of the CPEC that Pakistan is finding hard to sustain. Imran Khan, the former prime minister, now behind bars in relation to one of the more than 150 cases against him directly accused the U.S. of overturning his government, the veiled instructions for which allegedly were conveyed by the U.S. in a diplomatic cable after his visit to Russia.

Khan had flatly declined to provide air bases to the U.S. for striking Afghanistan a few months before this and even praised the Taliban for having broken the “shackles of slavery,” shortly after the U.S. exit from Afghanistan.

However, the possibility of revival of Pakistan-Russia relations, reinvigorated by the Russian offer to export wheat and oil to Pakistan on concessional terms when the U.S. and EU were looking to isolate Russia, was the last nail in the coffin for Khan’s government, who seemed to have visited Russia without the assent of the powerful Pakistani military establishment.

Several articles in Chinese government-aligned media published after Khan’s ouster were critical of the regime change in Pakistan. The Khan administration, though initially suspicious of the CPEC agreements signed with China under the previous government, had developed a better understanding with the Asian heavyweight over time.

Still, perhaps given the scale of the country’s investment in Pakistan and the imperative to continue working with any government, China avoided an official reaction. The Russian Foreign Ministry minced no words, however, accusing the U.S. of “shameless interference” in a plot to remove the “disobedient” Khan.

As the new government assumed power in Pakistan, relations with the U.S. improved significantly. A package worth $450 million was approved for the maintenance of Pakistan Air Force’s F16 program. The much-needed IMF Standby Arrangement was signed. And most recently, Pakistan renewed a security pact with the U.S., namely the Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), after a lapse of three years.

Reports of Pakistani munition supplies to Ukraine mediated by the U.S. have emerged as well, reflecting Pakistan’s considerable warming up to the West after Khan.

Meanwhile, the U.S. showed complete aloofness to the overthrowing of Khan and the virtual dissolution of his party domestically. The Western media coverage of Khan’s ouster mostly depicted Khan as an anti-freedom enemy of the West.

Turbulence in perspective: The Dragon-slayers

It’s not just politics that is becoming a victim of the New Great Game. Pakistan is facing a resurgence in terrorism. India has often been accused of being present in Balochistan, supporting separatist insurgencies, and in the Pakistani tribal belt in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province, where it is blamed for backing the insurgent group, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Pakistani officials have repeatedly linked India to attacks on Chinese workers employed at CPEC projects, which includes the infamous case of Indian spy Kalbushan Yadav tasked with sabotaging the CPEC.

Being a counterweight to China, India is now a close U.S. ally. This has resulted in a situation where Pakistan’s stance on Indian involvement in its territory is largely ignored by the West.

For India, the Gwadar port is a competitor to its investment in Iran’s Chabahar port, just 76 nautical miles west of Gwadar, and the recently announced grand India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). That may mean even more trouble for the CPEC and its host country.

I

t was 1997, and the first elections that Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (Movement for Justice, PTI) had contested. The party’s candidate secured about 19 votes from the polling station in an area of a small town in Punjab, Sadiqabad. That was an apt reflection of his position in national politics as well, where his PTI couldn’t secure a single seat. His detractors were proven right: the delusions of grandeur that followed the cricket World Cup of 1992, where Khan had led his team, had got the best of him. He was shrugged off as being irrelevant by Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (PMLN), the two major parties at the time.

In the 2000s, during General Musharraf’s military rule, Khan remained in opposition, albeit with only one seat that he was able to win in the 2002 elections. The PTI boycotted the following elections, held in 2008, alleging the system was rigged in favor of the corrupt.

But Khan’s party began to gather steam in the years preceding the 2013 elections and surprisingly came forth as the second-biggest party by popular vote in the 2013 elections, securing 35 seats in the lower house of parliament, the National Assembly. With just one seat in the 2002 and zero seats in the 2008 elections, this rise to 35 seats was phenomenal.

Then came the elections of 2018, in which the PTI secured 149 seats, leaving the PMLN trailing behind at 82. But the party was still short of the coveted number of 172 needed to form a government. It was left with no option but to invite smaller parties to a coalition to be led by the PTI. In any case, Imran Khan—long played down for his poor political acumen and irrelevance in national politics—had finally risen to become the prime minister of Pakistan within about two decades of entering politics.

Pakistan under Khan

Imran Khan had won elections on the promise of a “Naya Pakistan” (New Pakistan), an Islamic welfare state. He refashioned and expanded the existing Benazir Income Support Programme into the state-of-the-art Ehsaas cash transfers program for the poor, opened soup kitchens and shelters for the poor, and introduced fully state-sponsored health insurance in two provinces that were governed by the PTI, making treatment at government and many private hospitals free for over two-thirds of the population of the world’s fifth most populous country.

This was in addition to the other measures taken to give voice to the common person, such as the Citizen’s Portal, where any citizen could lodge a complaint online for any issues they faced in public services, and various other digitization initiatives for smooth provision of public services and reduction in red tape.

Even with COVID19 wreaking havoc across the world, Khan’s government performed decently in containing the pandemic and its economic fallout. Pakistan did not suffer the catastrophic mortality rates that both its neighboring countries—Iran and India—did, nor did it see a similar dip in its GDP. Moreover, the expansion of the social safety nets helped cushion the poor to muddle through the crisis.

Still, it was not all sunshine and roses. The government’s economic management left much to be desired. The IMF program kept getting interrupted—and prolonged—because of slippages in meeting targets, and policy inconsistency and uncertainty remained a problem throughout Khan’s time in office. Meanwhile in Khan’s almost four years in office, inflation was roughly double what it had been in the preceding four years.

Khan, the establishment, and a new-found camaraderie

Khan was quite popular when he assumed the premiership. However, he owed at least a share of that popularity to the tacit support of the powerful Pakistani military establishment. In fact, Khan’s rivals accused the momentous rally he held on October 30, 2011, which set up the tone for the PTI’s successful 2013 election campaign that saw its rise to second-largest party by popular vote, as having been sponsored by the military establishment.

Later, in 2018, when the PTI was short of the magic number of 172 seats to form a government, it was the establishment-leaning parties, such as the Pakistan Muslim League (PMLQ), the Balochistan Awami Party (BAP), and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement – Pakistan (MQM), which joined the PTI-led coalition, enabling Khan to become premier. But even before that, in the run-up to the 2018 elections, many candidates had warmed up to the PTI primarily because it was seen as the King’s (establishment) party.

Khan provided a fresh alternative to the establishment. He was clean, driven, and was ready to work under its auspices. General Bajwa, the military chief at the time, developed a good understanding with Khan and helped habilitate his government in both the domestic and international contexts. This helped the PTI-led coalition, as Khan’s party was mostly made of new politicians and was seen as inexperienced. In no time, Khan developed a warm relationship with the Arab Gulf states too—especially, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MBS).

Countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar had the international clout needed to bolster Pakistan’s position internationally, which helped break the ice with the U.S. Trump-led administration. At the same time, the influence of these regional heavyweights, which historically were practically lenders-of-the-last-resort to Pakistan, significantly eased things for Khan domestically as well.

The disillusionment

Yet, for someone like Khan, known for being headstrong throughout his life, working under the establishment’s influence was not an option. As the honeymoon period of his government neared its end, he started asserting his will. Khan wanted full control of his government, a relentless crackdown on corruption, and autonomy in devising foreign policy—as the PTI’s manifesto had promised.

Being the gung-ho type that he is, Khan was looking to make waves with radical changes in all spheres. General Bajwa, being relatively temperate, preferred stability and a continuation of the status quo, of which he was himself a part. For him, Khan was somewhat of a loose cannon.

Clearly, Khan was not cut out for the tightrope he was having to tread, and eventually, things fell apart.

Khan’s fall

As Khan diverged from Pakistan’s long-standing positions on various facets of foreign policy, his problems grew beyond Pakistan’s borders to ruffle feathers globally. His warming up to Turkey and Malaysia, and the idea of a new Islamic bloc besides the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) was not received well in Saudi Arabia; his flat rejection of the recognition of Israel irked the regional powers which had already yielded to its growing influence.

Khan’s tilt towards Russia and China, and the denial of air bases to the United States, which was looking to maintain a presence in the region after the withdrawal from Afghanistan, angered the Biden administration. His strong exception to the letter by European countries’ ambassadors insisting on condemning the Russian onslaught on Ukraine irritated Europe. The U.S. was not ready to hear an “Absolutely no” to a question about bases, and European countries were not ready for rhetoric of the sort “Are we your slaves?”

How far-fetched is it to believe that global powers – with purpose, capacity, and reach, embark on regime change? In fact, it is not just probable, but likely. From Mossadegh in Iran, Rousseff in Brazil, Gaddafi in Libya, or several U.S. orchestrated regime change operations in Latin America, this is nothing out of the ordinary. It is a reality hiding in plain sight, openly attributed to the concept of American exceptionalism.

Therefore, outright dismissiveness of this possibility in Pakistan – with the illegal, unconstitutional removal of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, is not just disconcerting, but contrived. Loud, boisterous proclamations condemning the accusation of regime change seem so phony – especially coming from scholars of political science.

“I’m haunted every day…by the lies I told,” writes American author John Perkins in his New York Times best-seller Confessions of an Economic Hitman. “I’m haunted by the payoffs to the leaders of poor countries, the blackmail, and the threats that if they resisted, if they refused to accept loans that would enslave their countries in debt, the CIA’s jackals would overthrow or assassinate them.”

In compelling detail, Perkins describes the ways by which U.S. hegemony privileges an elite minority in countries of the Global South to convince them to mortgage their country’s wealth and policymaking. Whether it is by highly paid professionals that encourage the target country to accept loans in order for “corporatocracy” to flourish, or by local ‘kept rajas,’ who manipulate local policymaking in service of their foreign masters.

The consequences are simple: forfeiture of sovereignty. For those who resist, a well-orchestrated plan erupts to engineer regime change – through character assassination, bribery, parliamentary manipulation or, if necessary, murder.

Today, Perkin’s powerful, ominous words are hauntingly familiar as Pakistan – a nuclear nation of 220 million people, has been thrown into political disarray. Why? A vote of no confidence, allegedly orchestrated by the U.S., has removed the fiery, incorruptible Imran Khan. All this due to alleged U.S. unhappiness with Pakistan’s independent foreign policy, refusal to condemn Russia, allow drone strikes in Afghanistan, and an ‘iron-clad’ brotherhood with China.

As is customary according to diplomatic protocol, Pakistan officially lodged a strong protest and summoned the U.S. diplomat in Islamabad to condemn the meddling. If this is not an unequivocal instance of foreign interference in Pakistan’s internal politics, then what is?

Secondly, Khan’s government persuasively argues that it’s not just the evidentiary nature of the letter, but the context from which it emerges. The opposition focus, and the Supreme Court judgement, both remarkably avoid any mention of foreign interference, horse-trading, politicians on bail for corruption – even murder. Nor do they honestly acknowledge the National Security Committee, who agreed that there was a blatant interference.

What about the clandestine Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) dissident meetings with foreign diplomats? How about the recorded conversations with former National Security Advisor Moeed Yusuf with his American counterpart and instances of the clear hostile messages made to Pakistan’s outgoing Ambassador Asad Majid? All this has a direct bearing on the validity of vote of no confidence and Supreme Court decision.

After all, Khan’s government claims it has hard evidence of the horse-trading and bribery. If true, this is further evidence of an affront to the constitution and in clear violation of the rule of law. Is it not gross negligence, perhaps even treasonous, that neither the Supreme Court nor the opposition acknowledge this?

Third, in an unprecedented outpouring of grief, anger and determination, massive protests are occurring all over Pakistan. What is so inspiring is that these huge crowds were spontaneous. Millions of people across the country, in every major city, exploded in support of Imran Khan.

The powerful voices of hundreds of thousands of people were reverberating in the air with chants of ‘God is the Greatest.’ The chant means ‘there is nothing worthy of worship other than God’ and ‘the people will not accept an imported government’ – in clear reference to the new government being thrust on the people by foreign powers. Even Khan’s twitter account broke all records with over 160,000 people tuning in at the same time. It was nothing short of a spectacle.

This eruption of overwhelming popular mobilization screams to the world ‘we are not your slaves.’ It poses a direct, immediate threat to the teetering political order. And, this anger is not just directed at the opposition, but all those who facilitated this subjugation. Imagine the absurdity of asking someone to stand idly by as laws meant to protect society are being trampled by a privileged few. How could the judiciary allow murderers, traitors and convicted criminals abuse Pakistan’s parliamentary democratic structures in this way?

The Supreme Court’s bias is rightly being called out and their protestations seem so hollow and hypocritical. After all, the former head of Pakistan’s opposition, and newly minted Prime Minister, is himself on bail for corruption cases. It’s a strange, dystopic reality that has emerged.

Today, the overwhelming majority of Pakistan inwardly feel shame due the bizarre developments over the past few days. It’s not just that Imran Khan was removed from political office, but those who replaced him are the unethical, corrupt elite who do not represent the people. The new government is dominated by all those on corruption charges. In fact, 24 out of the 34 newly selected/imported cabinet are out on bail for various criminal offenses.

This is a horrible joke on the dignity of a nation. What makes this worse is that this imported government contains people who have previously viciously attacked state institutions, including the prestige of the army. As a result, demoralization, resentment, and anger is commonplace, which is feeding revolutionary fervor. This is a dangerous time for the people of Pakistan, and the powers that be must recognize this situation for what it is, and demand elections.

As Russian President Vladimir Putin has launched a “special military operation” against Ukraine, many countries and regional organizations reacted with condemnation, criticism, and sanctions while some others declared their support for Russia. For many countries in Asia and Africa, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a tightrope walk. Taking a neutral stance is regarded as an expression of support for Russia, and many leaders are concerned about the long-term consequences of publicly criticizing the Russians.

India and the Invasion of Ukraine

India maintains close ties with Russia and the United States. New Delhi has traditionally refrained from criticizing Russian aggression, including the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Despite being a key player in the U.S.-led Quad in Asia, India has maintained a unique and privileged strategic relationship with Russia. In recent years, India has diversified its defense procurement, and much of the recently procured high-end defense equipment in the Indian inventory is of Western origin, particularly American and French; however, Russia still remains India’s largest arms supplier and a critical strategic ally.

Between 2016 and 2020, Russia supplied more than half of India’s arms imports. Close relationships with Moscow not only provided top-of-the-line military equipment, but also the much-desired strategic autonomy to India.

At a time when New Delhi has invested a lot of political capital in strengthening its ties with Washington, it is not easy for India to strike a delicate balance between its relationships with the United States, Europe, and Russia.

Between 2016 and 2020, Russia supplied more than half of India’s arms imports.

India’s archrival, Pakistan, which has had strained relations with Russia in the past, is now trying to improve its bilateral relations. Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan met with President Putin in Moscow as the Russian military forces were invading Ukraine. Khan’s visit to Moscow happened at the cost of Pakistan’s straining relations with the United States.

The timing of Khan’s visit may give the impression that Pakistan indirectly supported Putin’s decree on breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine, as well as the invasion, which began just hours after Khan arrived in Moscow. Pakistani officials have insisted that Khan’s visit to Moscow had nothing to do with the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The visit was planned much earlier, and Khan and Putin stated that they discussed bilateral and South Asian issues during their meeting on Thursday.

The challenge for Pakistan will be to strengthen ties with Russia without alienating Western trade partners.

At a time when the world has become increasingly divided between the Western and China-Russia camps, it has become ever more difficult for India and Pakistan, South Asia’s rivals, to remain neutral.

The challenge for Pakistan will be to strengthen ties with Russia without alienating Western trade partners, all while balancing a growing defense relationship with Ukraine. Islamabad’s balancing act is simpler than that of New Delhi: its relationship with the U.S. is strained, and it has long sought to use its alliance with China to collaborate more closely with Russia, particularly in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

However, given its commercial ties with Europe and desire to play a larger role on the global stage, Islamabad must be cautious not to get too close to Moscow.

Although Pakistani authorities maintain that they want good relations with both China and the United States, and it was difficult to cancel or postpone the visit at the last minute, many Pakistanis believe Imran Khan could have rescheduled his trip.

Israel showed a calculated response to the Russian aggression in Ukraine.

At a time when neutrality and silence are seen as support for Russian aggression in Ukraine, Chinese influence and fear of irritating Russians forced Pakistani officials to go ahead with Khan’s trip to Moscow.

Israel and Ukraine

Israel, which has maintained excellent relations with Russia, demonstrated a calculated response to the Russian aggression in Ukraine, prompting significant criticism in the West. Israel is attempting to strike a balanced tone, doing the bare minimum to meet the bar set by the U.S. while avoiding crossing the red line drawn by Russia.

On February 22, Israel issued an insipid announcement supporting Ukraine’s “territorial integrity” without mentioning Russia. An irritated Russian ambassador to the UN responded by stating that his country opposes Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights. This reference to Israel’s takeover of the Golan Heights from Syria 55 years ago signaled to Israeli officials that the time had come to get off the fence.

It will be difficult for astute Israelis to fool Putin. Israel expected to take an ambiguous stand, as it did following the 2014 Russian invasion of the Crimean Peninsula. Then, Israel simply abstained from the UN vote, citing a fictitious general strike in their foreign ministry as justification.

Because of its massive military presence on the Syrian side of the occupied Golan Heights border fence, Russia has become Israel’s “northern neighbor.” Russia also enjoys a huge influence on Israel’s archenemy, Iran, and Israel very well knows the repercussions of annoying Russia.

Pakistan entered the ICC T-20 World Cup with a least than ideal preparation, after both the England and New Zealand cricket teams cancelled their respective tours to the country in September, citing “security concerns,” thus depriving the Green Shirts of a much-needed tune up on the eve of the white ball tournament in the United Arab Emirates.

On Sunday evening, however, Pakistan shocked the world by upstaging its perennial foe and tournament favourite – India– in a match played before a packed Dubai International Cricket Stadium and a television audience surpassing one billion people.

If cricket perfection is attainable, then Pakistan came within a whisker of it in securing an impossible to better 10-wicket victory, which was delivered on the back of Shaheen Sha Afridi’s blistering speed and mercurial guile, along with the batting precision, elegance and brutality of Babar Azam and Mohammad Rizwan.

Despite his team’s humiliating defeat, Indian captain Virat Kolhi gave a masterclass in accepting loss with graciousness and humility, heaping praise on his opponents for their professionalism and performance, saying, “They definitely outplayed us. There’s no doubt about that.”

Muslims are secretly plotting to take over the country via Love Jihad (intercommunal marriage), Land Jihad (property acquisition), Economic Jihad (starting businesses,) Corona Jihad (deliberately spreading the virus to Hindus), and now Cricket Jihad, where Indian Muslim cricketers are deliberately underperforming on the field to help Pakistan win games at the ICC T-20 World Cup, according to pro-government supporters.

Cricket Jihad” Conspiracy

While it’s tempting to dismiss the newly minted “Cricket Jihad” conspiracy as the mutterings and ramblings of a nation overflowing with bigoted, sore losers, the reality is far more sinister, with the Indian government using Pakistan’s victory on the cricket pitch to wage yet another violent and anti-democratic crackdown on Muslims in India and Kashmir.

On Wednesday, police in India’s largest state – Uttar Pradesh – charged seven Muslims, but taking four of them into custody, for allegedly “raising Pro-Pak slogans or celebrating Pakistan’s victory over India in the T20 Cricket World Cup match that took place on Oct 24,” according to a brief from Chief Minister’s Office.

The four were detained under an array of local laws and different charges, including, “Posting WhatsApp status in support of Pakistan and its cricket team,” “Uploading Pakistan’s flag as the cover image and profile image on his Facebook account and for uploading posts in support of Pakistan’s win vs India,” and “Posting support for Pakistan” in public domain.

A school teacher in Rajasthan’s Udaipur city was not only arrested for sharing a celebratory post on WhatsApp following Pakistan’s win over India, but also was charged and arrested by police, before being later released on bail.

In Indian administered Kashmir, two medical students from two separate medical colleges were also arrested after being charged under the draconian anti-terror law Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) for causing “insult to the national sentiment during the cricket match.” They now join more than 2,300 other Kashmiri Muslims who have been detained under UAPA law since the Indian government stripped the disputed territory of its semi-autonomous status on August 5, 2019.

Indian Government’s Silence

On Thursday, three Kashmir students in Agra, Uttar Pradesh were physically assaulted by a mob of Hindu nationalist thugs in the company of police as they were being brought before a court to face sedition charges in relation to celebrating Pakistan’s victory over India at T20 World Cup.

On the other side of the sub-continent, Hindu nationalists, led by militant Hindutva organizations Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), carried out their sixth consecutive day of violence against Muslims in the north-eastern state of Tripura on Tuesday, the day Pakistan defeated New Zealand in its second match of the World Cup tournament.

The Indian government has not only refused to condemn violent attacks against Muslims and the destruction of more than a dozen mosques and hundreds of homes in Tripura, but also has done nothing to halt the violence and little to arrest the perpetrators, thus signalling its tacit support for terrorism against the religious minority.

Just two years after the December 1971 war between Pakistan and India, on May 18, 1974, India detonated a nuclear device, confirming it possessed the A-bomb.

Pakistan had already lost a significant part of its land in that war. East Pakistan, which had already been undergoing a civil war, had emerged as the independent state of Bangladesh with help from India. With the war lost, and the country now divided, the timing of the Indian nuclear test could not have been worse.

Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was under intense pressure to counter what was perceived as a threat to the very sovereignty of Pakistan. Just a few years back, in 1965, in an interview, Bhutto had said that if India built a nuclear bomb, “we will eat grass, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.”

Sensing what was being cooked next door, he had already directed work on Pakistan’s nuclear program to be initiated and research had already begun in 1972. But it was progressing very slowly, and the prime minister’s restlessness was growing with each passing day. Now, India’s test had come to confirm his worst fears.

Like serendipity, a letter from a hardly known young scientist working in Amsterdam, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, arrived, in which he offered his services to provide guidance for Pakistan’s nuclear program – Mossad officials would later regret having failed to assassinate him in time.

Dr. Khan, was immediately invited for a meeting by PM Bhutto. Upon his arrival in December 1974, he was surprised to learn that Pakistan’s nuclear program had already set about. What he did not like, however, was that the scientists were relying on the plutonium route. He sharply criticized this approach and explained the viability of the uranium enrichment route to Bhutto. Upon Bhutto’s request, he spelled out the action plan for highly enriched uranium to the scientists of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC).

One year after the first meeting, when Khan came to his home country for his annual vacation, and happened to visit the site, he was dismayed with the pace of progress. The scientists already working in the PAEC were no lightweights and perhaps had little reason to be receptive towards the views of someone they saw – more or less – as a holidaymaker, coming from Amsterdam for vacation and telling them what to do. The distance bomb-learning program was not working.

But Khan’s frustration over the inefficiency of the program resulted in a reaction he did not expect: Bhutto invited Khan to leave his job, settle in Pakistan, and lead the program. Khan, who was well settled in his new home abroad, which he liked very much, and who also had a wife from the Netherlands, initially expressed hesitance.

Khan had studied metallurgy in Germany, materials engineering in the Netherlands, and obtained a doctorate from the Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium. Just after his doctorate, he had joined the company Verenigde Machinefabrieken Stork-Werkspoor (VMF) in the Netherlands, which had a big portfolio of heavy machinery, including nuclear plants-related equipment.

Khan got posted by VMF as a consultant at Urenco, a uranium enrichment company, which used to provide enriched uranium to power plants in Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and the United States. According to Khan, the company was facing problems with designing gas centrifuges, and being an expert in materials, he was one of the engineers posted to this top secret facility.

Thus, Khan brought with him his experience and expertise in designing gas centrifuge technologies for uranium enrichment, which represented perhaps the most critical part in developing weapons-grade nuclear technology. He started working at a rapid pace to build the facility, and to develop and acquire materials and technologies, as fast as possible, without being detected.

Khan was a scientist, a metallurgist, and a nuclear-program architect, but at the same time, he was at the center of a secret network, having to strike deals to procure whatever was required from wherever at minimum cost and in the shortest time. Sometimes, this might have meant defense cooperation with other countries. In any case, the work progressed swiftly, and by the 1980s, Pakistan had achieved the capability for nuclear explosion.

Interestingly, the PAEC and the KRL, both complemented each other, but in many ways emerged as competitors too. Both claimed to have reached the potential to make a bomb in the 1980s using their own routes.

When India mobilized its forces in 1987 and started some of the biggest war exercises since WWII, Pakistani General Zia-ul-Haq landed in India to “watch a test match.” At the airport, he briefly met Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and warned him with a chilling equanimity, “Mr Rajiv, you want to attack Pakistan, do it. But keep in mind that this world will forget Hulagu Khan and Genghis Khan and will remember only Zia-ul-Haq and Rajiv Gandhi, because this will not be a conventional war but a nuclear war…”

With that threat, the war was averted. And Israel’s plans to strike KRL plants with India’s help, had fallen flat too.

The nuclear tests and Khan’s legacy

It was not until 1998 that Pakistan came to the fore with the bomb. When India performed its tests on May 11 and 13, 1998, Pakistan decided to go ahead with its own merely 17 days later. Pakistan conducted its nuclear explosions in an unpopulated, granite mountain range in Balochistan Province, under the name “Chaghi-I” on May 28, 1998 and “Chaghi-II” on May 30, 1998.

Before this, some had doubted Pakistan’s nuclear capability altogether. But the speed of Pakistani reaction came as a surprise even to those who believed it was in possession of an atomic bomb. Independent sources, based on seismic activity, confirmed that Pakistan had indeed conducted nuclear tests.

Today, the country is estimated to have a stockpile of nearly 165 nuclear warheads compared to India’s 156. Moreover, the KRL, in competition with the PAEC, operates a booming missiles program, in addition to other defense equipment.

Meanwhile, Khan became the target of Western media and governments quite early. In 1983, he was sentenced in absentia for trying to steal enrichment secrets from the Netherlands. He denied the charges, citing that the information he used to build the centrifuges was available in various sources which did not need any classified access. His conviction was overturned in 1986.

In 2004, Khan was accused of smuggling nuclear secrets and operating a nuclear black market. Pakistan, which is not a signatory to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and hence not bound by its terms, assured the international community of cooperation to avoid a backlash and possible sanctions.

To the nation’s surprise, the country’s hero appeared on national television and expressed regret over his actions, extending an unconditional apology. He confessed to having supplied gas centrifuge components to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Immediately, he was put under house arrest to prevent further proliferation.

His house arrest ended in 2009, when a court found the house arrest orders to be illegal; however, his freedom to move remained severely restricted and he was kept under watch until his death on October 10, 2021, a few weeks after he had recovered from COVID19.

In the midst of the sudden political changes in Afghanistan, the disastrous withdrawal of the U.S. forces, the rapid Taliban takeover, and the narrow escape of the American-installed Afghan government, Pakistan sees itself once again trying to carefully handle the mess left by the Americans on its western border. International pressure is mounting, time is short, the internal situation of Afghanistan is fragile, and Pakistan is once again at crossroads to tackle the American leftovers.

“So, we then left Pakistan. We said okay, fine, you deal with the Stingers that we left all over your country. You deal with the mines that are along the border. And, by the way, we don’t want to have anything to do with you, in fact we’re sanctioning you. So, we stopped dealing with the Pakistani military and with ISI and we now are making up for a lot of lost time.”

These were the words uttered by then U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton, in the congressional hearings of April 2009, on the Obama administration’s foreign policy. She categorically highlighted that the U.S. had a share in plaguing Pakistan. She criticized the role of the U.S. in the post-Soviet scenario for leaving Afghanistan prematurely and never looking back. Importantly, the U.S. not only left the mess in Afghanistan for Pakistan, but to add salt to injury, Pakistan was sanctioned by the United States.

Today’s Pakistan once again is being blamed by the U.S. for American failures in the region. The Pakistani military and intelligence are being targeted by the West. The U.S., as always, is trying to look for a scapegoat in Pakistan. The Biden administration is not only criticizing Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan but U.S. senators have introduced a bill seeking to probe its alleged role in the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan.

Today’s Pakistan once again is being blamed by the U.S. for American failures in the region.

One wonders if the U.S. will ever learn from its past mistakes. Will it ever put a full stop to its hegemonic stance towards the countries that do not accept its influence while designing their foreign policy?

It’s time for the U.S. to realize that scapegoating and pressurizing Pakistan will not work at all in its favor. It will neither help Pakistan nor will it bring any good to the people of Afghanistan. It is not the time for diplomatic confrontation.  Rather, it’s time for seeking long-lasting resolutions by extending a helping hand to the ultimate shareholders of Afghanistan, the Taliban. As highlighted by Pakistani Premier Imran Khan in his recent address to the United Nations General Assembly, the world must come forward to help Afghanistan before it turns into a humanitarian crisis.

If the U.S. is genuinely concerned about the well-being of the people of Afghanistan, then it must shun the idea of enjoying unipolar superpower stature in the world. The U.S. needs to turn itself into a cooperative state that believes in mutual benefits based on bilateral relations, rather than acting as an agitating and aggressive state towards other nations.

Sadly, the Americans did not pay any heed to Pakistan’s concerns and Pakistan had to fight against terrorism on its own. Pakistan paid an enormous cost in a war on terror that initially had nothing to do with Pakistan. Nearly 80,000 people lost their lives, with almost the same number losing limbs, and more than $200 billion was lost owing to the fragility of the western front.

One might question how is India to be blamed for terrorism in Pakistan for the last 18 years? Well, interestingly enough, the current national security advisor to the Indian premier, Ajit Doval, while delivering a lecture at SASTRA University in 2014, highlighted the “defensive offense” doctrine that India followed to engage with Pakistan. The doctrine revolves around Indian tactics to engage with Pakistan on two fronts. Doval boasted about how India exploited Pakistan’s fault lines to invest in proxies against Pakistan from its western front.

Pakistan continued showing its concerns related to India about issues such as India financing and facilitating terrorism in the country through supporting the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA). Pakistan captured an in-service commander of the Indian Navy, Kulbhushan Jhadev, from Balochistan. Hindu by faith, commander Jhadev held a passport with the Muslim name “Hussein Mubarak Patel” and clandestinely entered Pakistan via the Pakistani-Iranian border. The case is still sub judice in the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

India believes that Pakistan’s military has always focused on its eastern front with India. To engage Pakistan through an Afghanistan ruled by an anti-Pakistan regime was the most suitable solution for India as it would force Pakistan to split its military’s strategic focus. As a nation, Pakistan fought valiantly and tirelessly against the Indian “defensive offense.”

Currently, Pakistan’s supreme focus is on the sustainability of the Taliban setup in Kabul knowing that the Taliban, time and again, have stated that they will never allow their land to be used against any of their immediate neighbors. Pakistan not only wants sustainable peace in Afghanistan, but to ensure that Afghanistan gains momentum economically. It is an uncontested fact that Afghanistan will be self-reliant in securing itself under the rule of the Taliban, but whether they can ensure the country’s economic security is debatable.

Linking the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan and eventually to the Central Asian Republics (CARs) from Pakistan is the only viable solution to the clouds hanging over economic security in Afghanistan. Only an economically active and self-reliant Afghanistan under the Taliban can ensure regional peace.

The Indian government’s criminally negligent mishandling of the Coronavirus pandemic has made the country a dystopic COVID19 hell, as mass cremations and burials, along with scenes of COVID19 distressed patients choking to death in the streets washing over our social media timelines like a gigantic tidal wave.

Almost every layer of government has been completely overwhelmed. The health system is on the brink of collapse, but rather than tend to the crisis at hand, the Narendra Modi led regime is waging a war against its critics by ordering Twitter to silence its critics and carrying out property seizures against journalists who report the truth about the country’s rapid descent into the COVID19 abyss.

As new daily cases continue spiking upwards, surpassing 350,000 per day on Monday, the people of Indian Administered Kashmir fear for the worse, knowing they are not only subjected to the brutal rule of an Indian military occupation but also the incompetence and neglect of an Indian central government.

The Kashmiri people are especially concerned for the health and welfare of their loved ones who remain trapped in prisons and dungeons throughout the territory and India for no other crime than speaking out against Indian colonial rule and in favor of self-determination. They are Kashmir’s political prisoners.

“The Republic of India is facing a tsunami of COVID19 with tens of thousands of cases every day including thousands of deaths which has put lives of Kashmiri political prisoners at highest risk,” the Kashmiri advocacy group Legal Forum for Kashmir (LFOVK) urged in a letter to the WHO Director General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus.

LVOVK has also pleaded with International Committee Red Cross and other human rights organizations to take concrete steps to pressure India into releasing Kashmiri political prisoners from their jails, saying, “Any danger to their lives will be solely on the shoulders of Republic of India.”

The group has identified the Kashmiri political prisoners as Muhammad Ashraf Sehrai, Shabir Ahmad Shah, Masarat Alam Bhat, Altaf Ahmad Shah, Bashir Ahmad Bhat alias Peer Saifullah, Raj Mahraj-uddin-Kalwal, Ghulam Muhammad Bhat, Ayaz Akbar, Farooq Ahmad, Shahid-ul-Islam, Syed Shakeel, Nayeem Ahmad Khan, Zahoor Ahmad Watali, Shahid ul Islam, Dr. Ashiq Hussain Faktoo, Muhammad Yasin Malik.

When I spoke with the son of Dr. Ashiq Hussain Faktoo, and daughter of Shabir Ahmad Shah this week, they described to me the grave fears and concerns they have for the fate of their respective fathers as the COVID19 virus rips through India and Kashmir at record speed.

Dr. Faktoo, along with his wife, has been held in prison by Indian authorities for nearly all of the past 27 years.

Dr. Faktoo, along with his wife, has been held in prison by Indian authorities for nearly all of the past 27 years. He’s not only one of the disputed territory’s longest jailed political prisoners but also commonly described as “the Nelson Mandela of Kashmir,” having attained his PhD and published more than 20 books in prison.

His youngest son Ahmed Bin Qasim, who is now 22 years of age and has never seen his father “under the open sky,” says his father was arrested for refusing to “join mainstream Indian politics,” and be a puppet politician, one who would endorse “the politics of what India does in Kashmir; the masquerade of democracy India puts up in Kashmir. They wanted him to be a part of that.”

Instead, Dr. Faktoo wrote books about the way in which the Indian government’s rule over Kashmir, including the judiciary and legislature, is set up to help the Indian state buy time in preventing international intervention in resolving the territorial dispute and validate the otherwise illegal detention of political prisoners and human rights violations carried out by Indian security forces.

“Both of my incarcerated parents are old and suffer from multiple chronic ailments,” says Ahmed. “Since the outbreak of COVID19 in India, we have had no communication with them. So while pandemic is difficult for everyone, but we can’t even inquire about or ascertain the well-being of our jailed family members.”

“My mother is 60 and she is jailed in Tihar Jail. Just a few days back, a massive outbreak of COVID19 was reported from the same jail. There are many Kashmiris in that crowded jail. The Indian state deems Kashmiris living outside prisons as killable and dispensable. One can only imagine their treatment of those inside prisons.”

Shahir Ahmed Shah, who was dubbed by Amnesty International as “the prisoner of conscience,” has languished in prison for more than 30 years for speaking out against Indian colonial rule in Kashmir.

When I spoke with his daughter Sehar Shah, she said she’s panic stricken by the deteriorating health of her father and the ever-worsening COVID19 pandemic.

“He has lost tremendous weight living in his 6-foot by 8-foot cell, and has visible dark circles around his eyes, and not able to stand fully because of weakness and aches in his back,” she told me. “He has been diagnosed with a severe heart ailment block in his arteries, and a few weeks ago doctors said he’s in immediate need of spine surgery and is struggling with diabetes and hypertension.”

In other words, Mr. Shah’s pre-existing conditions make him more vulnerable to a more severe infection from the virus, putting him at a high risk of death. There’s no justifiable or reasonable reason why he should have been detained as a young man 30 years ago in the first place and it’s a moral outrage that India has kept him in captivity today.

On March 23, when Pakistan annually commemorates Pakistan Resolution Day, also known as Lahore Resolution Day, Narendra Modi, the prime minister of India, sent a letter to his counterpart Imran Khan, the prime minister of Pakistan, in which he greeted Pakistani people and stated, “India, as a neighboring country, desires cordial relations with the people of Pakistan. For this, an environment of trust, devoid of terror and hostility, is imperative.” He also expressed his appreciation of Pakistanis’ efforts to tackle the COVID-19 pandemic.

Khan took the initiative to thank Modi for his wishes. He was quoted as saying, “We are convinced that durable peace and stability in South Asia is contingent upon resolving all outstanding issues between India and Pakistan, in particular, the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.” Since then, there has been much skepticism as to what this reconciliation really means. Were bilateral relations really improving or were there hidden games being played?

In addition, Pakistanis have been expressing solidarity with India since the COVID-19 outbreak began to get out of control in India. A couple of days ago, hashtags like Pakistan stands with India and India needs oxygen were trending in Pakistani social media. On April 23, Faisal Edhi, chairman of Edhi Foundation, Pakistan’s top non-profit social welfare organization, penned a letter to Modi and offered unconditional humanitarian aid to India including a fleet of 50 ambulances to tackle the devastated health sector.

Bilateral moves toward rapprochement

Apart from the letter commemorating Pakistan Resolution Day, India’s prime minister also wished Khan good health after he contracted the COVID-19 virus in March. He tweeted, “Best wishes to PM Imran Khan for a speedy recovery.” Furthermore, in February 2021, military commanders of both countries decided to respect the ceasefire agreement signed in 2003. The deal was brokered with the assistance of the UAE.

This extraordinary step can lead to a more comprehensive road map through which the two belligerents can rebuild their relations, which have been torn for decades, through diplomacy. Unfortunately, on May 3, 2021, cross-border firing occurred along the International Border (IB) in Jammu and Kashmir, and both states accused each other of violating the fresh ceasefire agreement.

Later in February, the Indian government gave permission to Khan’s airplane to use its airspace during his two-day official visit to Sri Lanka. There are also rumors pertaining to secret peace talks going on between Pakistan and India in the UAE to normalize the relations. However, while speaking to TRT’s “The Newsmakers” on April 23, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Pakistan’s foreign minister, denied the rumors by saying: “At present, there is no such secret meetings and the UAE is not involved in brokering peace talks between India and Pakistan.”

In mid-March 2021, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, Pakistan’s chief of the army staff (COAS), while addressing an audience at the Islamabad Security Dialogue forum spoke of the gradually developing India-Pakistan ties.

In mid-March 2021, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, Pakistan’s chief of the army staff (COAS), while addressing an audience at the Islamabad Security Dialogue forum spoke of the gradually developing India-Pakistan ties by saying, “Let’s bury the past and move forward. Our neighbor will have to create a conducive environment.” He added that stable bilateral relations are necessary for a long-lasting peace in South Asia. He referred to the Kashmir issue by saying, “The Kashmir issue is obviously at the heart of this. It is important to understand that without the resolution of the Kashmir dispute through peaceful means, the process of subcontinental rapprochement will always remain susceptible to derailment due to politically motivated bellicosity.”

Since 2018, after Imran Khan assumed office, a backdoor diplomacy has been established between India and Pakistan. Even Khan himself, before being sworn into office in 2018, in order to deepen bilateral relations, said, “If India takes one step, we will take two.”

On November 9, 2019, Khan took a historical step towards the normalization of relations with India by inaugurating the Kartarpur Corridor. The corridor provides a visa-free border crossing and facilitates Indian Sikh pilgrims and devotees to visit their sacred shrine Gurdwara Darbar Sahib Kartarpur in Kartarpur, Pakistan. As a result, Khan was praised both regionally and internationally as the access to the holy shrine was complicated in the past due to the deterioration of bilateral relations.

Since 2018, after Imran Khan assumed office, a backdoor diplomacy has been established between India and Pakistan.

However, India has made some bellicose attempts which, in turn, pushed Khan to adopt an aggressive position. For example, in August 2019, India unilaterally and unconstitutionally scrapped the special status of Jammu and Kashmir by rebuking Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. The Pulwama attack and the Balakot airstrike took place afterward and elevated the tensions between the two nuclear states, which eventually cut off relations.

In 2019, India announced its intention to grant visas to athletes from all countries for participation in international sports events like the Olympics including Pakistani sportspersons without prejudice. This was seen as a positive step as in February 2019, India had refused to issue visas to a three-member Pakistani team which was on its way to participate in the ISSF World Cup Rifle/Pistol/Shotgun held in New Delhi.

Is India exploiting Pakistan with rapprochement rhetoric?

Not everyone is convinced of the sincerity of the rapprochement efforts between India and Pakistan. Dr. Moeed Pirzada, a renowned journalist, geostrategic analyst, and political commentator, speaking at the Global Village Space (GVS), analyzed Khan’s positive approach towards Modi’s attempt to strengthen the bilateral relations with Pakistan. He said, “This is not a Pakistan-driven step, but a U.S.A.-India driven step. Pakistan will not benefit in the long term. The U.S. is pressuring India to approach Pakistan just for their national interests, to maintain its world supremacy and to ensure its leverage in South Asia. The U.S. is intended to contain China as its hegemony is under threat. As India is a member of the Quad (U.S., India, Japan, and Australia), the purpose of which is to contain China, India is the most effective ally of the U.S. to balance its power in the region.”

According to Pirzada, the recent move to resume trade ties between India and Pakistan is geostrategic in nature and not economic. India is trying to legitimize its decision of abrogating the special status of Jammu and Kashmir. In short, Pirzada argues that India has cleverly exploited Pakistan. Pakistan to maintain its legitimacy in the affairs of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), to remove itself from the “Grey List” of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), to reach a better settlement in Afghanistan, build good relations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and have access to trade in Central Asia.

India wants to strengthen its ties with its diaspora in the West, and particularly in the U.S., in order to rectify its image by making the world forget its unconstitutional moves like nullifying Article 370 of its constitution, the recent farmer protests, the passing of the anti-Muslim Citizen Amendment Act (CAA), etc.

The fact that Modi greeted Pakistanis on Pakistan Day, when the Lahore Resolution of Pakistan was passed back in 1940 and the first constitution of Pakistan was adopted, is strange. Modi belongs to a Hindu nationalist political party, the Indian People’s Party (BJP), which has ideological links to the right-wing nationalist party, the National Volunteer Organization (RSS).

The fundamental ideology of the latter opposes the existence of Pakistan as Pakistan came into being as an independent Muslim state. In other words, Modi’s gesture appears to be an explicitly ironic attempt as it is hard to expect positive greetings from a person who is a Hindu extremist. This unexpected approach points to some sort of conspiracy behind the rapprochement.

The leaders of Pakistan’s main opposition parties gathered and formed the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) in September 2020, accusing Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan of having a strong connection with the country’s military.

According to the opposition, democracy is under a serious threat if the current government proceeds in its cooperation with the army. Nationwide protests erupted across Pakistan with supporters of the two main opposition parties, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), protesting against the military establishment’s involvement in politics.

The two main opposition parties have claimed that the country’s army brought Imran Khan into power. On September 16, 2020, a bill was introduced by Khan’s government which punishes anyone who intentionally defames or ridicules Pakistan’s army. The main purpose of the bill is to prevent “hate speech” against the armed forces. According to the opposition, however, this shows how the military establishment in Pakistan is strengthening its grip on power.

The Pakistani opposition had formerly claimed that an excessive number of troops was deployed inside the polling stations during the general elections of 2018. They claimed this showed the army’s powerful support for Imran Khan and that, therefore, the election was rigged.

Imran Khan’s party, Pakistan Movement of Justice (PTI), denied these claims by arguing that the presence of the army was to maintain law and order, and to ensure the transparency of the elections. The military presence, they argued, was only for the peaceful transition of power as general elections in Pakistan never go smoothly, opposition parties always claim that the elections are rigged, the elections are followed by protests, etc.

Military men rising in Pakistan’s bureaucracy

The number of governmental and private institutions run by persons who have a military background has been increasing since Khan was sworn into office. For example, retired Lt. Gen. Asim Saleem Bajwa was appointed by Khan as the chairman of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) authority and Pakistan’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Bilal Akbar, is a former three-star general. However, the latter was a reciprocal step as the Saudi ambassador to Pakistan, Nawaf bin Said Al-Malki, is also a former navy officer.

According to the opposition in Pakistan, foreign actors sometimes approach the army directly whenever they are on an official visit and this gesture runs against democracy.

According to the opposition in Pakistan, foreign actors sometimes approach the army directly whenever they are on an official visit and this gesture runs against democracy. However, PTI officials reject these claims by saying that although undoubtedly Pakistan’s army is an integral part of the Pakistani government, it’s an autonomous institution. They claim that the Khan administration has the same sort of relations with the armed forces as with other state institutions.

Pakistan is surrounded by its adversaries, and in particular India, so security is an inevitable part of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Speaking to Al Jazeera, Fawad Chaudhry, Pakistan’s federal minister of science and technology, said, “As far as Pakistan’s border security and territorial integrity are concerned, army and politicians should be on a mutual platform against India’s intentions to create chaos in Pakistan by sabotaging the CPEC project as well as supporting the BLA [Balochistan Liberation Army]. Army officials are strategically experienced and and disciplined in making decisions under alarming situations – there is no harm if the government moves forward with harmony with the military.”

Only 11 years after its independence, in 1958, Pakistan saw its very first military coup.

Pakistan has a decades-long history of army interference in civilian governments. Only 11 years after its independence, in 1958, Pakistan saw its very first military coup. Following this, there were two more coups, in 1977 and 1999. On other occasions, the Pakistani military explicitly ceased the government or enforced martial law.

Although Pakistan was established as a democratic country, in the 73 years since Pakistan emerged on the world map, almost half of this time has been under the rule of military administrations. Undoubtedly, the army has played an effective role in the political history of Pakistan.

Along with the failed coup attempts, the Pakistani army dissolved assemblies and removed civilian leaders from office several times. What is more, whenever martial law was announced in Pakistan, the military always stayed in power for a long period as compared to the democratically elected governments.

Despite long years of military rule, the Pakistani public has embraced army rule more enthusiastically than civilian governments. People love the army-run governments because according to them, Pakistan has developed more under martial law. Nonetheless, army rule is not acceptable for a democratic country as it increases the possibility of a dictatorship or totalitarianism.

Pakistani citizens love the military but there seems to be a wrong correlation between loving the country’s army and supporting a military administration in a democratic country. It is true that Pakistan has experienced economic growth under military governments, and this has helped create a positive image and legitimacy in the eyes of the public. For example, economic growth has always been higher under military rule as opposed to civilian rule.

Yet, certain military reigns overwhelmingly blackened the country’s image such as the results of the military operation carried out in 2004 under General Musharaf. Thereafter Pakistan started facing terrorism threats by Taliban attacks. During that time, the West started labelling Pakistan as a safe haven for terrorism.

Relations between India and Pakistan are strained even at the best of times. But in recent years, since Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party took power, the two countries have been constantly feuding on many fronts. Modi seems intent not only in stirring tension over India occupied Kashmir- a cause célèbre of his popular far-right base largely made up of Hindutva ideologues- but also in applying pressure on his rival within multinational forums in the one area where Islamabad suffers a serious weakness: containing non-state armed actors.

Pakistan’s problem with groups designated as terrorists is no secret. Having been the base for military operations that saw the Soviet Union defeated in Afghanistan in 1989 and, over a decade later in clashes with the West, during the US invasion of the Islamic Republic, which at the time was under Taliban rule, Pakistan has found it challenging, to say the least, in dealing with non-state armed groups and tribes that moved freely through its porous border.

Predictably India has exploited what is a major weak spot for Pakistan by lobbying to place its neighbor on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist. The intergovernmental organization founded in 1989 on the initiative of the G7, plays a central role in global efforts in combatting terrorist financing. The Paris based organization has set global standards to combat terrorist financing. It also monitors a countries ability to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute the financing of terrorism.

Once subjected to the FATF’s monitoring regime, a country can expect to face a tough time clearing its name. Since 2001 FATF has maintained a “Black-list,” containing the names of countries that the intragovernmental organization considers non-cooperative in the global effort to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

While being grey-listed is not as harsh as being blacklisted, countries placed on the list may still face economic sanctions from institutions like the IMF and the World Bank and experience adverse effects on trade.

Only North Korea and Iran are in the current blacklist. It also keeps a “Grey-list.” These are countries that are at a higher risk of money laundering and terrorism financing but have formally committed to working with the FATF to develop action plans for what it calls anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT).

Both are living document, issued and updated periodically in official FATF reports. Blacklisted countries are highly likely to be subjected to economic sanctions, placed under prohibitive measures by FATF member states as well as international organizations. While being grey-listed is not as harsh as being blacklisted, countries placed on the list may still face economic sanctions from institutions like the IMF and the World Bank and experience adverse effects on trade.

Pakistan has been on the FATF grey-list since June 2018. It was put on notice to be blacklisted by October 2019 if the country failed to curb money laundering and terror financing. A 27 point action plan was also issued, demanding Islamabad to deliver successfully for it to avoid further punitive monitoring and for it to be granted unfettered access to the global financial networks.

Ever since, Prime Minister Imran Khan has been in a race against time to avoid Pakistan’s inclusion in the FATF black-list. Seeking to wriggle out of the grey list, last year the country’s federal government imposed financial sanctions on 88 banned terror groups and their leaders, including the alleged mastermind of the 2008 Mumbai attack.

Khan has expressed deep unease over the potential consequences of Pakistan’s failure to deliver on the 27 point action-plan as much as he has been worried over opposition parties politicizing the issue. “Going on the blacklist would mean sanctions, our economy crashing; we were hoping opposition would jointly pass legislation for FATF because it’s for Pakistan, not [our] personal interest” Pakistan is reported saying following a round of voting on new domestic legislation designed to address the 27 point action-plan.

India accelerated its lobbying against Pakistan during the four-day virtual meeting of the FATF two months ago.

Measures adopted by Khan’s government has eased some of the pressure. In October last year, FATF said that Pakistan had successfully complied with 21 out of 27 points of the action plan but nonetheless it decided to keep the country on its grey list until February 2021. This was a decisive moment when things were expected to come to a head. India accelerated its lobbying against Pakistan during the four-day virtual meeting of the FATF two months ago.

“It’s not that Pakistan is not trying hard to get out of the grey list, but the lobbying against the country by India is very strong,” a Pakistani representative in the FATF was reported saying to Anadolu Agency. The official also pointed to a vast network of hundreds of “fake media” outlets serving “Indian interests”. The official cited a Brussels-based watchdog, EU DisinfoLab, which uncovered a network of 265 coordinated fake local media outlets in 65 countries “serving Indian interests” and “undermining Pakistan”, as well as multiple dubious think-tanks and NGOs.

India’s lobbying campaign also joined forces with the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) in what seemed to have been an attempt to inflate the terror menace emanating from Pakistan. The group alleged that Pakistan recruited terrorists to aid Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey in last year’s conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. Pakistan has denied such claims.

Details of the alliance uncovered by Foreign Lobby exposed the way in which ANCA was seeking to get support from the 4 million-strong Indian diaspora in its new campaign calling on the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden to sanction Pakistan as a terrorist financing state.

These efforts however have not produced the desired outcome India perhaps had hoped for, partly it is said due to the fact that since Islamabad’s inclusion in the grey-list three years ago, Pakistan has been assisted by Turkey, China, and Malaysia. Though it’s not clear if the three countries helped their ally in this case, Pakistan avoided sliding into the blacklist in February. FATF determined that Islamabad should remain on its grey-list, with the country’s status set to be reviewed at an extraordinary plenary session in June 2021.

At a press conference following the four-day virtual plenary meeting, FATF President Dr Marcus Pleyer said that Pakistan had made “significant progress” even though there remained some “serious deficiencies” in mechanisms to plug terrorism financing. Pakistan had fulfilled 24 out of the 27 actions points while the 3 remaining areas, said Pleyer “need to be fully addressed.” The FATF president noted that Pakistan was working towards its commitment made at a high level to implement the illicit financing watchdog’s recommendations, saying “that is not the time to put a country on the blacklist”.

During the second half of the twentieth century, numerous transformational changes took place in the socio-economic structure of the Pashtun tribes living across the Durand Line between Afghanistan and Pakistan due to forced or labor-influenced migration, civil war, foreign invasions, and the effects of modernity.

The Pashtun tribal belt, formerly known as the “Federally Administered Tribal Areas” (FATA), is known today as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) is located in the northwest of Pakistan. It shared its borders with the province of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP). FATA comprised seven agencies (tribal districts), namely Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan, South Waziristan, Bajaur, and Orakzai. In fact, some Frontier Regions of Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, Dera Ismail Khan, and Tank were also included in FATA.

The Durand Line in KP stretches approximately for 1,360 kilometers and cuts through the lands inhabited by the tribes of the Salarzai, Mamund, Mohmand, Afridi, Shinwari, Turi, Bangash, Wazir, Mehsud, Dawar, and Aurkazai, while the Achekzai, Nurzai and Kakar also live on the Durand Line and, in fact, dwell almost equally on both sides of the border. This deplorable state of affairs does not conform with the right of peoples to choose their fate nor is it aligned with the 21^st-century politics of peace, public welfare, political and civil justice, and economic development.

Fazal Wahid, a researcher and lecture at Peshawer University indicates that the inability of the United States to apply the carrot and stick strategy effectively in Afghanistan prompted Pakistan in 2003 to move its armed forces into KP in an impetuous manner, resulting in failure and the militarization of the tribal belt. This simultaneously caused the tribes to be more proactively involved in the fight against the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and to defend themselves from the atrocities of Pakistan’s army in the region.

The Pashtun tribal belt goes back to the nineteenth century. Even then, the so-called Durand Line region between Afghanistan and Pakistan had begun to play a role in world politics.

The Pashtun tribal belt goes back to the nineteenth century. Even then, the so-called Durand Line region between Afghanistan and Pakistan had begun to play a role in world politics. Conrad Schetter, a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Development Studies (ZEF) of the University of Bonn discusses the struggle that was referred to by contemporaries as the “Great Game” and which saw Great Britain and Russia struggle for power and influence in the region between the the Amu River (known historically as the Oxus River) in the north and the Indus in the south. The fact that the Durand Line runs right through the Pashtun tribal areas indicates the significance of the line for the conception of Afghanistan as a nation state.

Schetter and other academics argue that the tribal areas on either side of the Durand Line did not possess any particular status on their own. However, neither state ever succeeded in dominating the tribes. With the exception of the urban centers such as Jalalabad, Gardez, or Khost, Afghanistan could not exercise its powers in the tribal areas.

In the current context, with cross-border terrorism a major regional feature, the region is once again of huge – even essential – importance to both Pakistan and Afghanistan. On the one hand, it is central to the territorial integrity and Muslim identity of newly independent Pakistan. On the other hand, it is necessary to the completion of Afghanistan’s nation-state theorem. In fact, what had been a colonial periphery under the Raj was actively developed and slowly integrated by Pakistani leaders.

Meanwhile for the Afghan royal family, who turned to social, economic, and political modernization in an era of free-flowing international aid and declining British influence, the land across the Durand Line presented the opportunity for expanded influence among the largely Pashtun population which shared ethnic, cultural, and religious roots with much of Afghanistan’s own people.

Despite their seemingly peripheral location in the world, the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands exercised remarkable influence on politics in South Asia and beyond. In these borderlands, ethnic, religious, and political networks interlinked, creating a site both molded by events in faraway metropoles and capable of impacting decision-making across the globe.

The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan after September 11 highlighted the Afghanistan-Pakistan boundary region in a way that had not happened since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The region was the safe haven and retreat of the Taliban and their Al Qaeda affiliates. Schetter correctly argues that this was an area where state power had far less influence and less impact than elsewhere. From 2001 onward, violence in the tribal region escalated. The border tribal region became the heart of the resistance to U.S. invasion and to the Afghan and Pakistani armies. In fact, every attempt from outside to wield influence that impacts on the local order is a source of irritation to the local tribal leaders.

Wahid argues that the tribal economy is mainly based on individual enterprises and irregular activities. On both sides of the Durand Line, the states have maintained minimal intervention in terms of creating the resources necessary for the local people to be able to generate a basic income.

This lack of a state economy and authority makes smuggling easy. Furthermore, it is common for those living in wide-open areas to be involved in the transport of goods. It should be noted that the other main economic activity here is animal husbandry. People living close to the Durand Line carry out small cross-border trade and sustain their families quite comfortably. Remittance economy is another source of income for the tribal people who work as laborers in Gulf countries.

Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have become complicated in recent years as a result of changing regional geopolitics. To manage the difficulties in relations with Saudi Arabia, in January of this year, Pakistan appointed a retired military commander as its ambassador to Riyadh. Lieutenant General Bilal Akbar replaces Ambassador Raja Ali Ejaz, a career diplomat who was appointed to Riyadh in January 2019.

The appointment of an experienced military man is a calculated move to better handle the challenges facing the bilateral ties and their likely effect on economic relations between Pakistan, on one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on the other. It is worth noting that the Saudi ambassador to Islamabad, Nawaf bin Said Al-Malki, is also a former military man who has been in his current post since September 2017.

General Manoj Mukund Naravane, the chief of the Indian army, visited the UAE and Saudi Arabia recently for the first time. The visit was seen as a clear sign of India’s growing military ties with the two Gulf states.

Though India has close economic relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as it imports a significant portion of its oil and gas needs from the region and exports some $60 billion worth of goods to the six GCC states, New Delhi is keen to advance its military interests in the Arab region.

India’s ambition is supported by the large presence of Indian expatriates in the GCC, with their numbers in the UAE and Saudi Arabia reaching six million in total. Indian interest in expanding military ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE presents a tricky situation for Pakistan, which has been a major security partner to both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi for a long time.

A number of factors are contributing to the changing security environment in the Gulf region as key countries keep a close watch on Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) and his Saudi counterpart Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) uncontrolled ambitions. Countries like Pakistan, India, Iran, and Turkey as well as France, Britain, and the U.S. realize that power equations in the Middle East are changing. Israel’s embrace by Arab princes adds a new dimension to regional politics.

Military ties between Pakistan and the GCC

Pakistan can take credit for having developed a military ecosystem in the Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as the GCC has a history of deep-rooted military ties with Pakistan. India already enjoys a vast trade and business engagement with Arab monarchies. Since 1967, Pakistan has routinely provided military and air force training to the Saudi Kingdom. The comprehensive defense pact between the two countries in 1982 institutionalized Pakistan’s role in Saudi Arabia’s security.

Islamabad has also supplied troops in times of regional conflicts, especially during the Iran-Iraq War and the 1991 Gulf War. Officially, some 1,600 Pakistani military personnel are now deployed in the Saudi Kingdom, but it is believed that a much larger number of Pakistani retired military personnel are serving in Saudi Arabia.

Similar engagements exist with the UAE. The fact that the first five chiefs of the UAE Air Force were Pakistan Air Force (PAF) officers speaks volumes about this military relationship. PAF officers continue to serve in the UAE as of today. The Pakistani army has also established an armor training school in the UAE  and has provided training to UAE commando battalions, as well as to all armed and artillery corps officers.

Pakistan’s economic dependency on the Gulf

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the two biggest sources of remittances to Pakistan’s economy. Around 2.7 million Pakistanis live in Saudi Arabia and 1.5 million live in the UAE. Pakistan received $14.2 billion in remittances during the first half of the financial year 2020-21 compared to $11.37 billion in the same period of the previous year. The GCC contributed 60.14% of the total cash inflow to Pakistan during the July-December 2020 period.

The rulers of Saudi Arabia and the UAE are experts in displaying their petulant money power towards Asian and Arab countries by using threats of not issuing work visas, trade boycotts, and withdrawing investments. Such a state of affairs requires high levels of diplomatic and political skills. Therefore, Pakistan’s new ambassador to Riyadh has a delicate task in managing relations on multiple fronts.

Saudi Arabia asked Pakistan to return the second tranche of $1 billion of a total of $3 billion that it had borrowed from Riyadh in 2018 shortly after Imran Khan became prime minister of Pakistan. The UAE only deposited $2 billion out of the $3 billion it had committed to Pakistan, halting a $1 billion tranche when Pakistan’s foreign minister refused to participate in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) foreign ministers’ meeting in the UAE after Abu Dhabi extended an invitation to India to be the guest of honor in the plenary session on March 1, 2019.

Bin Salman put pressure on Pakistan to stay away from the Kuala Lumpur Summit in December 2019 which was attended by Malaysia, Turkey, Qatar, Iran, and Indonesia.

In November of last year, the UAE temporarily suspended the issuance of new visit visas for 12 countries, including Pakistani passport holders.

Saudi fragility

The criticism of the Saudi-based OIC by Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi in August 2020 for not organizing a meeting of foreign ministers on the Kashmir issue did not go down well with Saudi Arabia. Qureshi’s statement that Pakistan would explore the possibility of convening a meeting of foreign ministers of Muslim countries outside the OIC angered the Saudis. Bin Salman put pressure on Pakistan to stay away from the Kuala Lumpur Summit in December 2019 which was attended by Malaysia, Turkey, Qatar, Iran, and Indonesia.

Western power brokers have exploited Saudi control and influence over the OIC, making the 57-member organization ineffective on major global issues. Saudi interventions on behalf of Western interests have been a source of frustration and anger among Muslims but not many countries have come forward to challenge Saudi Arabia’s fragile leadership in this matter. Though the Kuala Lumpur Summit was not directed at the Saudi leadership, the Saudi government was panic-stricken when it saw important Muslim leaders gathering for a summit without its approval.

Pakistan feels that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have betrayed Islamabad on the Kashmir issue by not being vocal enough to support its position against India. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have long supported Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir. Now, their growing ties with India have become strategically and economically important, and the Saudi and UAE leaderships have distanced themselves from Pakistan’s interests.

It is true that Pakistan has limited economic options. It is equally true, however, that Saudi Arabia is left with limited military options in the case a major crisis hits Riyadh. Many in Pakistan believe that the Saudis and Emiratis do not provide them the kind of economic support they have been providing to Egypt, especially after bankrolling the coup against the democratically elected government of Mohamed Morsi.

The friction in relations with Saudi Arabia is also because of Pakistan’s own change of foreign policy orientation. Prime Minister Imran Khan is keen on charting a more independent foreign policy after decades of reliance on the U.S. and the Gulf states. Islamabad’s reduced reliance on the U.S. is replicated in less reliance on the Saudi-UAE axis. It started in 2015 when Pakistan’s parliament unanimously refused to send troops to participate in the Saudi-UAE-led war in Yemen, shattering the Saudi impression of using Pakistan as a hired gun.

In many respects, border disputes are a feature of the modern nation state. At the end of the colonial period, the formation of international boundaries often cut across historically connected communities with shared heritage and common culture.

The division of natural terrain by cartographers, using a pencil and ruler to draw straight lines on a map for the redistribution of territories led to – at best resentment by the traditional custodians of such lands, and at worst – outright wars over the sovereignty of territories.

In some cases, borders have been created within erstwhile states – as seen with the division of Ireland, Palestine and the case study here – Jammu & Kashmir (J&K).

Furthermore, in discussing contemporary cross border tensions, Rongxing Guo reminds us that many boundaries are in fact “fuzzy”, in other words, lack coordinates or quantifiable demarcations on the ground, leaving room for claims over the rightful ownership of land – and thus conflict. Guo summarizes the main factors contributing to the escalation of border disputes between nation states as; “resource scarcity, locational feature [or characteristics], domestic politics, geopolitical competition and cultural difference”.

Using these factors as reference points, this article adds important context to the long-standing border conflicts between nuclear powers – India and China and India and Pakistan, in the disputed territory of J&K.

Until 1947 J&K was an autonomous state ruled by a monarch, who was instructed by the British to merge with either India or Pakistan. This led to military interventions by India and Pakistan, resulting in both taking control of parts of the state and three subsequent wars. In 1962, India and China also went to war over a portion of the territory.

It was due to the magnitude of the territorial dispute that Bill Clinton referred to J&K as the most dangerous place in the world. The military standoffs between India and Pakistan on one of J&K’s borders or ceasefire lines – known as the Line of Control (LoC), frequently make international headlines reporting deaths of army personnel and civilians.

Whoever controls J&K controls the source of the water so desperately required by both states for consumption, agriculture and more pressingly, the generation of electricity through hydropower projects (or dams).

India and China clashed on J&K’s eastern border, known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC) several times during 2020, with incidents in June resulting in 20 Indian deaths, and in September, firing from both sides reported.

Resources

J&K is resource rich, with minerals, precious gems, forests and, significantly, water. When the snow on its mountains melts, it flows into the rivers providing a lifeline to both neighboring India and Pakistan. Whoever controls J&K controls the source of the water so desperately required by both states for consumption, agriculture and more pressingly, the generation of electricity through hydropower projects (or dams).

Geopolitical competition

Border skirmishes between troops can distract from larger regional issues often hidden behind episodes of aggression, such as geopolitical competition and economic allying. The building of infrastructure in the form of highways and rail tracks along the LAC by India was reported to trigger concerns by China.

Yet China has been engaged in an ambitious project with India’s rival Pakistan for a number of years. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has built roads through Gilgit Baltistan, in Pakistani controlled J&K, which India lays claim to (along with the rest of the divided J&K).

CPEC allows China to access the Arabian Sea to export goods, via Pakistani administered J&K and into mainland Pakistan, where it has built a port in Gwadar. China and Pakistan’s diplomatic relations have been strengthened by the endeavor, with the former becoming an even more important ally for the latter in its own border dispute with India.

In February 2019, a suicide bomb killed 49 police officers in Palwama, Indian Controlled J&K. India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) blamed Pakistan for the attack as an act of state sponsored terrorism and declared threats of war in retaliation. Yet Pakistan fervently denied any involvement, with one media outlet claiming that the “Palwama drama” was “a conspiracy”. As bizarre as it may sound, many within India believed the attack was in fact a way for the BJP to flex its political muscle by standing up to Pakistan in order to boost electoral advantage.

Creating friction with Pakistan, in this view, was merely a political strategy. Theorist such as Ariel Zellman describe how democratic leaders can gain credibility with their electorates through “extreme policy positions” regarding international disputes. This can entail reigniting a dispute and/or emphasising threats to national security. In other words, border disputes can be useful for domestic political gain.

Cultural differences

Guo describes how cultural differences between hostile nations can exacerbate border disputes. He writes, “race, ethnicity, language and religion have divided states into separate political entities as much as physical terrain, political fiat or conquest.”

In the case of Indo-Pak relations, religion is the differentiator, given the partition of British India and creation of Pakistan was to provide a homeland for the Muslim minority. The fact that J&K is a Muslim majority state under Hindu majority control has been the core rationale for Pakistan’s claim over the territory.

In 2014, the aforementioned BJP gained power with their right wing ideology known as Hindutva, which emphasises Hindu superiority. Collective identities like national identities are bolstered against a perceived ‘other’ – in this case, the Muslim minority within the Indian boundaries, as well as the Muslim neighbor with which the country shares a border dispute.

This is of course a trend noted in other parts of the world with the rise of nationalism, which has consequences for state minorities as well as regional and even global relations.

The mere fact that Israel has somehow managed to keep the question of its recognition on the agenda is extraordinary in and of itself. There is no other country in the world that could afford the luxury of abusing any semblance of international law at leisure with calls for “recognition” of its legitimacy still in place.

Yet, since the warming up of ties with the monarchy in the UAE (and other states), the question of recognition has been gaining even more attention. What was once a sacrilege in Pakistan is becoming somewhat less questionable, at least among Pakistanis who see the West as their model. Some respected figures in the media have chosen to propagate the proposal of recognizing Israel vehemently.

But why does the question of Israel’s recognition keep popping up every few days in Pakistan? And what is the nature of pressures on the Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, including from the U.S. as he suggested in a recent interview?

Of course, Israel has a penchant for working from behind closed doors and its foreign policy seems to be woven around the “fly like a butterfly and sting like a bee” ethos.

Even though it likes to play the card of being the original victim of ethno-religious persecution, Israel takes an eerie pride in covert “operations” – checkered by assassinations around the world – clandestine lobbying through elements in foreign governments, and even the charm offensive which can range from narrative building and subtle mobilization of the comprador classes within a country to the vulgar uses of human flesh, including its own.

So, whether you are a human rights activist, a person of refined artistic disposition, or even a mercenary, the menu has everything on offer, with added blessings from the United States, and not more than an eye roll from the European Union.

Pakistan is one of the countries on the radar of Israel, looking for more clout in the world. Historically, it has lent unflinching support to the Palestinian people – including having sent its pilots during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. At one point, in the mid-80s, Israel is even reported to have planned to strike the nuclear facilities in Pakistan.

You just have to view the Palestinians as “foreign” and inherently problematic people who dispossessed the “Israelis” who “had come first” to the “Promised Land” and who are now creating problems for the “original” owners of the land. Interestingly, even though many of the Palestinian Muslims and Christians may be traced back to what’s referred to as the “Children of Israel” in the Jewish scriptures, it is still deemed virtuous to erase their most basic rights.

Once you’re able to see the unmistakable credibility and consistency of this Israeli tale of the “Promised Land” – a view rejected even by many Jews –   you will get plenty of food for thought to sedate your conscience.

Pressures Facing Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan

Pakistan is one of the countries on the radar of Israel, looking for more clout in the world. Historically, it has lent unflinching support to the Palestinian people – including having sent its pilots during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. At one point, in the mid-80s, Israel is even reported to have planned to strike the nuclear facilities in Pakistan. That kind of cold-blooded animosity has softened over time. But Israel still regards Pakistan as a significant force in the region.

Even though Pakistani PM Khan categorically denied the possibility of recognition of an Israeli state until a “just solution for Palestinians” is achieved, it is intriguing that the question was raised by journalist Kamran Khan, who is widely known for being close to Pakistan’s influential military.

Even though Pakistani PM Khan categorically denied the possibility of recognition of an Israeli state until a “just solution for Palestinians” is achieved, it is intriguing that the question was raised by journalist Kamran Khan, who is widely known for being close to Pakistan’s influential military.

Kamran Khan, who is the president of the Dunya News Group in Pakistan, is a popular TV analyst who boasts a Twitter following of four million. Every few months, he floats a series of tweets encouraging his audience to think about Israeli recognition which kicks off a debate even when there is none.

Some other pro-establishment journalists such as Moeed Peerzada, and more recently, Mubasher Lucman, also like to join the chorus using arguments revolving around realpolitik.

The Role of the Gulf

Interestingly, for at least the last two decades, the most influential cleric in politics, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, who has been reviling Imran Khan for allegedly being “a Jewish undercover agent,” was happy to sit with the leaders of the secular ANP party to lend support to the UAE’s recognition of Israel, giving the move his blessings.

This is the same cleric who for years based his election campaigns on opposition to Israel and whose chief battle cry had been the mobilization against Zionism. What happened overnight that made this dealmaker – if not an outright kingmaker – of Pakistani politics change his mind is something left to the people’s imagination.

Madrasas in Pakistan, including those associated with Fazal-ur-Rehman – of which there are thousands – have the reputation of heavily relying on charity from the Gulf states. This represents a huge segment of the population which has traditionally been fiercely anti-Israel, but whose fervor for the Palestinian cause may just be dampening.

Yet, the influence of the Middle East extends farther than madrasas and the sway they have over religious parties.

Pakistan maintains a close relationship with the Gulf countries at the state level, especially Saudi Arabia – and the UAE of course – because of its reliance on financial aid, subsidized oil, the lion’s share of remittances it gets from expats in both countries, and the significant defense cooperation that bounds the countries together.

Perhaps the most concrete manifestation of the depth of this relationship was the appointment of General Raheel Sharif, ex-chief of the Pakistan Army, as the first commander-in-chief of the Saudi-led “Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition,” which has 41 countries as members. General Sharif assumed the role in May, 2017 and still holds the position today.

No wonder, when in another interview PM Khan was asked to reveal if there were any Muslim countries pressuring him to recognize Israel, he tried to make light of it by telling the interviewer to ask that question once Pakistan had achieved economic independence.

Growing India-Israel Alliance

Another consideration in the relations with Israel is Pakistan’s archrival, India, which has become the 2^nd-largest arms importer in the world behind Saudi Arabia. In the 2014-2019 period, Israel was the 3^rd-largest arms exporter to India, providing 12% of Indian arms imports. “Defense purchases” from Israel account for over $1 billion each year (2019-2020), in addition to the significantly rising research and development collaboration.

When the Indian jets sneaked into Pakistani airspace to conduct a “surgical strike” on an alleged “terrorist camp” in the early hours of February 26, 2019, the Indian press claimed that they had used Israeli-made Rafael Spice-2000 “smart bombs.” The “strike” resulted in the downing of a few trees for which Pakistan lodged a complaint with the UN to express its outrage over hurting “voiceless” flora. The Pakistani military later clarified that no bombs were used, and that the jets had only dropped the payload to fly faster when they were scrambled after.

Nevertheless, the speculations about the use of Israeli weapons by Indian media were not out of the blue. Pakistan is wary of the aggressive collaboration between its neighbor and Israel. Some Pakistanis are of the opinion that bringing Israel around – by recognition – may tone down its cooperation with India, at the same time easing diplomatic pressures on Pakistan, even if this does not result in explicit and immediate defense deals. In addition, it may pave the way for upgrading Pakistan-U.S. defense ties.

Sceptics, however, argue that Israel has already chosen India as its ally in South Asia, and will have limited offers, if any at all, for Pakistan. The U.S.-Pakistan defense cooperation similarly has been losing weight since Pakistan has been tilting towards China for its economic and defense needs; 73 percent of Pakistan’s arms imports came from China in the period of 2015-2019.

This is especially true in the wake of the massive Chinese pledges and ongoing projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) amounting to $62 billion, a flagship project of the massive Chinese Belt and Road Initiative