Finance Archives - Politics Today https://politicstoday.org/category/finance/ Mon, 10 Nov 2025 07:38:03 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.4.8 Is the Dollar’s Throne Shaky? https://politicstoday.org/is-the-dollars-throne-shaky/ Mon, 10 Nov 2025 07:17:14 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/?p=29663

Although the dollar still reigns supreme today, the leading actors in the global system are aware that its dominance is waning.

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or nearly 150 years, the symbols on the U.S. dollar have been one of the most heated topics of debate. Since 1776, some have attributed mythological, philosophical, and secret society dimensions to these symbols. Others have argued from a historical perspective that the Founding Fathers designed the currency to convey important messages about establishing a state.

We will not venture into conspiracy theory narratives. It is important to note that the symbols on the U.S. dollar in circulation at that time recalled the founding vision of the United States: a “unfinished” yet forward-looking project. Considering that the founders and citizens of the United States were religious, they also wished to emphasize that God was with them in this process.

Read: Bitcoin: The New Global Reserve Currency?

The U.S.’s ‘high ideals’ narrative has lost its credibility

However, the rhetoric of the “high ideal” behind these symbols has lost credibility due to the U.S.’s increasingly aggressive, arrogant, and empathetic behavior over the past 15 years. This behavior has caused a sense of injustice and inequality in the global economic and political systems, as well as political and economic crises. While the symbols on the U.S. dollar claim “perfection,” today’s practical reality seriously questions this standard. This situation has triggered a process in which the U.S. dollar’s reputation is being called into question.

Even though the Republican Party holds a majority in Congress, the failure of some Republican members of the House of Representatives to be convinced by President Trump’s budget approach has blocked the approval process for the additional spending budget required by the federal government. Meanwhile, the Democrats are seizing this opportunity to pressure President Trump in exchange for steps they want to see taken in the areas of social security and healthcare. A shutdown of the U.S. federal government would be seen as a development that goes beyond internal political deadlock in Washington, affecting the global economy.

Because this shutdown is also a kind of admission that the record-high federal public debt, exceeding 38 trillion dollars, has now reached an unmanageable threshold. However, the real issue did not begin with today’s crisis; it stretches back to the signs of the dissolution of a nearly century-old ‘dollar empire’. It is also noteworthy that President Trump has experienced the longest shutdown among presidents since 1980, both during his first term and now. This whole picture has also undermined global confidence in U.S. federal bonds, causing the total reserves held in U.S. dollars and U.S. federal bonds by the world’s leading central banks to fall below gold reserves for the first time since 1996.

Washington is struggling to resolve the federal budget deficit issue. This situation raises the prospect of taking radical measures to reduce the budget and trade deficits or issuing federal bonds at higher, more attractive interest rates to make U.S. federal bonds appealing again in the coming period. The latter would further increase the burden of interest payments, which have already surpassed the total defense spending of $980 billion at $1.1 trillion. Therefore, the reputation of the U.S. dollar, confidence in the dollar, and the appeal of U.S. bonds are facing a severe test in the near future.

Read: Russia and China Settle 99% of Trade in National Currencies

The Dollar struggles to maintain its status as a reserve currency

However, the rhetoric of the “high ideal” behind these symbols has lost credibility due to the U.S.’s increasingly aggressive, arrogant, and empathetic behavior over the past 15 years. This behavior has caused a sense of injustice and inequality in the global economic and political systems, as well as political and economic crises. While the symbols on the U.S. dollar claim “perfection,” today’s practical reality seriously questions this standard. This situation has triggered a process in which the U.S. dollar’s reputation is being called into question.

Immediately after World War II, the United States represented approximately half of the global economy. European cities were in ruins, Japan had been devastated by atomic bombs, and much of the world’s production capacity had relocated to North America. Washington made this economic supremacy permanent by designing a new international economic and monetary order and by implementing reconstruction plans. Established in 1944, the Bretton Woods System was a system in which the U.S. dollar was pegged to gold and all other currencies were pegged to the dollar. Thus, the dollar became the financial architect of the postwar reconstruction of the world, as well as its hegemonic symbol.

For the next 80 years, the world economy largely revolved around the dollar. Europe’s recovery, Japan’s economic boom, the acceleration of globalization, the pricing of energy trade in dollars, and the policy frameworks of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were all pillars of this “dollar-centric world order.” The dollar was not just a currency but also a symbol of the ideological, financial, and strategic processes Washington defined as the “American Century.”

Today, 80 years later, we are witnessing these pillars crumble. The U.S. debt spiral, interest burden, and expansionary monetary policy are seriously eroding the dollar’s status as a “safe haven.” Furthermore, the rise of Global South countries and new cooperation platforms, such as BRICS, focusing on developing non-dollar international payment systems reinforce the idea that the dollar’s imperial days are behind it.

Washington has taken discussions about the dollar’s dominance being threatened and the BRICS countries’ attempts to establish a new international payment system outside the dollar so seriously that it perceives them as not only an economic challenge, but also a “casus belli,” or cause for war. This is because any erosion of the dollar’s global dominance would signify the dissolution not only of America’s financial power, but also of its geopolitical influence. Consequently, every tremor in the dollar’s dominance today signals a new era in which the 1945 global order is being reexamined.

Read: Central Banks Rush to Gold Reserves and the De-dollarization Nexus

Interest rate spiral: Debt, budget and FED tension

The U.S.’s $38 trillion debt is more than just a figure; it is a rising alarm signal at the heart of the global economy. For the past few years, both the IMF and the World Bank have warned that the significantly increasing debt burden in both developed and developing economies poses a major risk to the world economy and the global financial system. By 2025, interest payments on the debt will surpass $1 trillion for the first time in history, exceeding the country’s $980 billion defense budget. In other words, the U.S. now spends more on interest on its debt than on its own military. This situation threatens the U.S.’s fiscal sovereignty and growth potential.

Debt ceiling debates have become an almost annual political tragedy. Disputes between political parties in Congress shake not only the federal budget, but also the global credibility of the dollar. Markets now respond to every shutdown announcement by adding a risk premium. Each time the U.S. Treasury approaches its borrowing limit, the global foundations of the dollar are shaken as well.

In its latest report, the IMF stated that the U.S.’s growing debt could pose a “systemic risk” to global financial stability. IMF experts say that the “high debt–slow growth combination” creates fragility within the U.S. and in dollar-based financial chains. The Peterson Foundation for Global Policy (PGPF) emphasizes that, if this trend continues, investment, employment, and wage growth in the U.S. economy will be severely constrained.

Donald Trump’s reaction is growing alongside this challenging financial situation. He targets Fed Chairman Jerome Powell as “the face of the interest rate lobby in Washington,” arguing that the high-interest-rate policy is “a mistake designed to destroy the U.S. economy.” Trump’s rhetoric is certainly not limited to economic policy. He also frames the debt crisis as a matter of national sovereignty. This transforms the U.S.’s fiscal discipline problem into a direct political identity crisis.

Read: Sri Lanka to Allow Indian Rupee in Local Transactions

The Dollar’s global prestige eroding

From the end of World War II to the end of the Cold War, the dollar was the backbone of the global economic system for 50 years, from 1945 to 1995. Eighty percent of world trade and 70 percent of foreign exchange reserves were denominated in dollars. The period between 1995 and 2005 was a transitional period. During this time, U.S. federal bonds denominated in dollars surpassed gold for the first time in the reserves of world central banks. In 1999, the euro was introduced as the common currency of the European Union. In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization. During this time, the weight of the euro and other leading currencies in central bank reserves gradually increased.

After 2005, and especially following the 2008 global financial crisis, the U.S. dollar’s weight in the international system dramatically declined. The only reason the U.S. dollar maintained any weight in the global system was because the European Union mishandled the 2008 crisis, missing the opportunity for the euro to become a new “international reserve currency.” Over the last 10 years, in particular, the dollar’s share of global foreign exchange transactions has fallen from 60 percent to 40 percent. Meanwhile, the dollar’s share of central bank reserves has fallen to 58 percent, while gold’s share has surpassed that of the dollar for the first time since 1996.

In its July 2025 report, the U.S. Federal Reserve (FED) acknowledged that, despite the dollar remaining the largest reserve currency, a “wear and tear trend” had become apparent. Meanwhile, the IMF noted that increased geopolitical risks and sanctions had “undermined the dollar’s neutral reserve function.” Since the Obama presidency, Washington’s use of the U.S. dollar and the dollar-denominated international payment system as threats and sanctions has severely damaged the dollar’s neutrality. This has also revived the self-preservation instincts of Global South countries, effectively dismantling the “Washington Consensus.”

With the emergence of new blockchain-based payment systems being tested, the era in which the U.S. was alone in its ability to influence world trade has ended. “Multiple payment systems” have become the new norm. The most obvious reason for the dollar’s loss of international prestige is the U.S.’s transformation of its currency into a foreign policy weapon. This approach gained momentum in Washington after 2012 and has accelerated the perception of the dollar as an “unreliable” payment instrument, particularly in Russia, China, Iran, and, more recently, some Southeast Asian countries. This perception is due to dollar-based economic and trade sanctions, restrictions on SWIFT access, and practices that limit the targeted use of dollar-based financial chains.

Let us not forget that international investment funds are closely monitoring this economic and political rupture. According to JP Morgan’s 2025 Global Foreign Exchange Markets Report, the proportion of dollar assets in developing countries’ portfolios has fallen by 15 percent over the past five years. During that same period, the value of the Chinese yuan, the Indian rupee, and the local currency bonds of the Gulf countries have risen rapidly. These changes suggest that the dollar’s long-term reserve status is no longer guaranteed.

Therefore, Washington’s strongest argument for protecting the dollar’s nearly 80-year reign, the “no alternative card,” has weakened for the first time. The dollar certainly remains strong due to its liquidity in global markets, deep market, and institutional credibility. However, that old spell is fading. Washington has overlooked the fact that we are in a period where the dollar is experiencing an economic and moral loss of value.

Read: Can BRICS Challenge the Global Political System?

Debt burden also pulls down the Dollar

The U.S. debt crisis has become a structural problem that undermines the dollar’s value. The global reputation of the dollar relies on U.S. bonds being considered a “risk-free asset.” However, with a debt exceeding $38 trillion, confidence in U.S. bonds has become questionable. The world’s leading central banks have accelerated the diversification of their reserve portfolios. Many central banks, including those in China, Russia, Türkiye, India, Kazakhstan, Poland, and Thailand, are reducing their holdings of U.S. bonds while increasing their holdings of gold, energy assets, and local currency bonds. In the wake of two black swans—the global virus pandemic and the effects of the Russia-Ukraine War—this process has essentially brought the concept of financial geopolitics to the fore.

The IMF emphasizes that high debt and permanent interest rates could create a “debt spiral–dollar shock” cycle. Rising debt increases interest rates, and rising interest rates increase borrowing costs. This situation limits the U.S.’s growth capacity by curtailing public investment. The American economy is stifling its own growth with its interest burden. This scenario has also called into question the dollar’s status as a “safe haven.” Moody’s and Fitch have downgraded the U.S. credit outlook to “negative”; Standard & Poor’s has issued another warning following its 2011 rating downgrade. Market experts emphasize that if foreign investors demand fewer U.S. bonds, the global demand curve for the dollar could shift downward. This would represent a historic turning point for the U.S.

The federal public debt burden has broken a new historical record by exceeding $38 trillion for the U.S. It is no longer just a budgetary concern, but also a source of geopolitical fragility. As confidence in the dollar erodes, so too does the U.S.’s financial supremacy. President Trump recognizes this risk and is working quickly to address it.

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The search for alternatives: BRICS and the multipolar financial era

Countries in the Global South are determined to produce an alternative to the dollar’s hegemony. The BRICS platform is rapidly advancing the idea of a “common reserve currency.” Under the leadership of Russia and China, the BRICS Pay system is developing a non-dollar digital payment infrastructure.

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt’s alignment with the BRICS structure could challenge the dollar’s monopoly on energy pricing. Trading oil in a currency other than the U.S. dollar, such as the yuan, would mean the breakdown of the “petrodollar system” and the displacement of the cornerstone of the established order since Bretton Woods.

IMF experts note that diversifying reserves beyond the dollar into other major currencies could enhance long-term financial stability, though no single currency has yet emerged to replace the dollar. The European Central Bank (ECB) predicts that the euro and digital currency projects will become more prevalent in international transactions in the coming years. However, for the euro to rival the dollar, the EU will need to make a much greater effort. During the 2008 global financial crisis, the EU squandered a golden opportunity.

This transformation is revolutionary, affecting not only currencies, but also the global financial architecture. Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), multilateral clearing lines, and regional payment systems are becoming widespread at a rapid pace. The world economy is rapidly moving towards an era in which it will be managed by a network rather than a central authority. The U.S. is closely monitoring this trend. However, Washington’s main concern is that this transformation will diminish the dollar’s role as the “global stabilizer.” Consequently, U.S. financial policies now extend beyond the economic sphere to include defense strategy.

The fundamental truth is that the global economic system is evolving from a single-currency-centered order to a multipolar financial structure. The U.S. debt spiral, government shutdown, interest burden, and political instability could be catalysts for this transformation. Although the dollar still reigns supreme today, the leading actors in the global system are aware that its dominance is waning. This tremor is not solely caused by the size of the U.S. public debt, but also by the erosion of the system’s moral and institutional credibility. The dollar’s transformation from an economic value to a threat and a tool of coercion and sanctions wielded by Washington is the main reason for its fragility. Each debt crisis, government shutdown, and instance of Washington printing money without backing further erodes the dollar’s global reputation.

Research organizations in the field of international economics have reached a clear joint conclusion: although the dollar’s dominance will continue, it will no longer be the only dominant currency. Reports from the IMF, BIS, and the World Economic Forum predict a multipolar financial order by 2030. This shift does not signal the beginning of a new currency war, but rather, the search for a new currency balance.

For Türkiye, this situation requires careful steps as well as strategic opportunities. In the new global context that we call Türkiye’s “Closed Bazaar Metaphor,” leading the way in trade with local currencies, digital payment systems, and regional financial cooperation projects is the strongest expression of economic independence. New maps are no longer drawn with imperialist ambitions, but with hope, justice, and solidarity. The dollar’s throne is shaking, and a new chapter in global economic history is opening.

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]]> UN Report: Modest Growth Recovery Anticipated for Europe, but Challenges Persist https://politicstoday.org/un-report-modest-growth-recovery-anticipated-for-europe-but-challenges-persist/ Fri, 05 Jan 2024 13:23:00 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/?p=28913

The European Union (EU) is expected to experience an average growth of 1.2% in 2024, a modest improvement from 0.5% in 2023 but well below the pre-pandemic pace of about 2%.

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Birleşmiş Milletler Dünya Ekonomik Durumu ve Beklentileri (WESP) 2024 raporu, Avrupa’nın önümüzdeki yıl ılımlı bir ekonomik toparlanmaya hazır olduğunu gösteriyor. Ancak bölge, yüksek faiz oranları, sıkı maliye politikaları ve jeopolitik çatışmalar nedeniyle olumsuzluklarla karşı karşıya. Rapor, temkinli bir küresel ekonomik görünüm sunuyor ve küresel ekonomik büyümenin 2023’teki %2,7’den 2024’te pandemi öncesi %3,0 büyüme oranının altında %2,4’e yavaşlamasını öngörüyor.

Avrupa’nın ekonomik gidişatı parasal sıkılaştırmadan, geçmişteki faiz artışlarından ve reel ekonomiyi etkileyen azalan likiditeden etkilenmeye devam ediyor. Avrupa Birliği’nin (AB) 2024’te ortalama %1,2’lik bir büyüme yaşaması bekleniyor; bu, 2023’teki %0,5’ten mütevazı bir iyileşme ancak pandemi öncesi yaklaşık %2’lik büyüme hızının çok altında.

İyileşmenin tüketici harcamalarındaki artış, yavaşlayan enflasyon, artan reel ücretler ve güçlü işgücü piyasaları ile desteklenmesi bekleniyor. Ancak tüketici ve iş dünyası güveni düşük olmaya devam ediyor ve mali politikaların daha kısıtlayıcı hale gelmesi bekleniyor.

Okuyun: AB, Küresel Çevreyi Korumak İçin Atık İhracatını Kısıtlıyor

Tüketici harcamalarında değişiklik

Rapor, tüketici harcamalarında hizmetlere doğru bir kaymanın altını çizerek, Yunanistan, Portekiz ve İspanya gibi hizmet odaklı ekonomilerin büyüme beklentilerini Avusturya, Finlandiya ve Almanya gibi daha büyük bir üretim tabanına sahip ekonomilere tercih ediyor. Avrupa’nın büyük ekonomileri arasında yer alan Almanya, işgücü sıkıntısı, enerji yoğun endüstrilere bağımlılık ve dijital altyapıya yatırım eksikliği gibi önemli zorluklarla karşı karşıya.

Birleşik Krallık’ın, yüksek faiz oranları ve mali sıkılaştırma nedeniyle 2023’teki yüzde 0,5’ten 2024’te yüzde 0,4’e ılımlı bir büyüme yaşaması bekleniyor. Avrupa’daki işgücü piyasalarının soğurken, hem yüksek vasıflı hem de düşük vasıflı mesleklerde süregelen işgücü kıtlığı nedeniyle tarihi standartlara göre sıkı kalması bekleniyor.

Enerji şokunun dolaylı etkilerinin azalması, gıda fiyatlarındaki baskıların hafiflemesi ve sıkı para politikalarının talebi azaltması nedeniyle enflasyonun gerilemesi bekleniyor. Avrupa Birliği’nde ortalama enflasyonun 2023’teki %5,9’dan 2024’te %3,1’e düşeceği tahmin ediliyor.

Oku: Suudi Arabistan, Hindistan’ı Avrupa’ya Bağlayacak Ekonomik Koridora Yeşil Işık Yaktı

Para politikalarının kısıtlayıcı kalması bekleniyor

Avrupa’nın önde gelen merkez bankaları politika faiz oranlarının zirveye yakın olduğunun sinyalini verdi ancak enflasyonun hedefe döndüğüne dair net bir gösterge oluşana kadar para politikalarının kısıtlayıcı kalması bekleniyor.

Bu zorluklara rağmen rapor, sürdürülebilir kalkınma ve iklim eylemine yönelik önemli yatırımların önünün açılmasının küresel ekonominin büyüme yolunu güçlendirebileceğini öne sürüyor.

Birleşmiş Milletler Genel Sekreteri António Guterres, sürdürülebilir kalkınmayı ve iklim eylemini teşvik etmek için cesur yatırımlara duyulan ihtiyacı vurguladı ve yıllık minimum 500 milyar dolarlık Sürdürülebilir Kalkınma Hedefleri Teşviki çağrısında bulundu. Rapor, bu hedeflere ulaşmak için geçen yıl kaydedilen ilerlemenin daha da geliştirilmesini teşvik ediyor.

Kaynak : BM Sosyal ve Ekonomik İşler Bakanlığı

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]]> Could Blockchain Be a Real Game Changer? https://politicstoday.org/could-blockchain-be-a-real-game-changer/ Thu, 26 Jan 2023 07:57:13 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/could-blockchain-be-a-real-game-changer/

New-generation digital identities are about to replace conventional government-issued legal identity documents.

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he four most important general-purpose technologies (GPTs) that have, so far, drastically changed humanity have been steam engines, electricity, information technology (IT), and artificial intelligence (AI). And contrary to what Mr. Gates argues, blockchain has just been added to that list.

Blockchain is a globally distributed public ledger technology. It enables a secure way of recording information as well as being a secure peer-to-peer method of verifying information, movement of assets, documents, and, in particular, real-time money transfer across the world economies. And it does so with significantly small costs due. It also provides transparency, decentralization, and increases efficiency and decreases transaction costs thanks to no intermediaries.

Although there were a number of similar technologies as late as the 1970s, the blockchain technology itself was first publicly introduced by the famous Nakamoto (2008) paper of Bitcoin, following the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. And today, almost all cryptocurrencies have their own blockchains as in the bitcoin or Ethereum blockchains.

Decentralization or the decentralized nature of the blockchains basically means that the validation process is not through a central authority, but rather via a consensus algorithm in a distributed network. It decentralizes digital records of products or information and is user verified. It also provides anonymity, without revealing the true identity of a user.

Read: Bitcoin: The New Global Reserve Currency?

Trust, security, and privacy

Fundamentally, blockchain helps deal with the trust issue. That’s why The Economist once called it the “trust machine.” This new mechanism of proving trustworthiness is particularly important for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), startups, or individuals that don’t usually have a built-up reputation yet. One should not forget that the conventional financial system is also primarily built upon “trust.” And this is, in the meantime, a fundamental weakness (for conventional finance) considering the frequent financial distress periods.

Blockchain could be used in smart contracts in the shipping industry, in digitalizing the supply chains, payments, and in financing trade. Blockchain’s use in supply chain management, in business strategies, and in dealing with trust-related challenges as well as in security, privacy, payment, and settlement systems should be well-noted. It could help balance between cooperation and competition, and deal with modern issues of opportunism and adverse selection.

Its extensive use in finance is already popular. However, companies such as Maersk and Walmart have also been effectively using this new technology to decrease costs, increase quality, and facilitate their business processes. Smart contracts supported by blockchain technologies can increase efficiency by fastening digitalization and decreasing operational workload in conventional business models. They can provide transparency, speed, and security to all parties.

Read: De-Dollarizing Trade: How the Global Trade Finance Gets More Nationalized

Third-party trust issues (related to intermediaries such as banks) are already addressed by the blockchain technology. However, how about first-party and second-party trust issues? Indeed, as rightly pointed out by Kshetri (2022), the combination of blockchain with the other technologies such as AI could help overcome the other dimensions of trust-related challenges as well.

The Fourth Industrial Revolution or Industry 4.0 (digital revolution) is of critical importance at this point as it can be used to increase the productivity and efficiency of the blockchain technology. The Industry 4.0 (digital revolution or IoTs) could be used to deal with the other dimensions of trust, and increase the productivity and efficiency of the blockchain technology.

Transforming industries

Blockchain-based identities to replace missing legal identity documents are a key first step in the introduction of the blockchain technologies in many industries. An efficient and reliable property, house, or land registry system could be a huge plus particularly in underdeveloped economies. Developing sustainable supply chains is another critical contribution. For example, PWC estimates effective use of blockchain in SCM (supply chain management) could increase global GDP by almost $1.8 trillion by 2030.

Blockchain technology market size. Photo provided by the author.

Read: The Transformation of Money and Blockchain Technology

Blockchain technology attracts even more investment and venture capital as its use in finance, banking, cybersecurity, payments, and smart contracts increases. The global blockchain technology market was a little over $2 billion in 2018 and $5-6 billion in 2021, according to Polaris Market Research, PWC, and a few others. It is expected to exceed the $10 billion threshold in 2022. Between 2022 and 2030, on the other hand, it is expected to grow by 80-90 percent per annum, and eventually reach somewhere between $1.2 and $2 trillion. The Asia Pacific, including China and India, in particular, is expected to raise its share the most.

Blockchain helps create new networks, organizations, and models; functions as an intermediary instrument or authority of verification; and replaces the conventional trust instrument in any formal business relationship or business contract. Meanwhile, just as in the decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) example, blockchains are likely to lead to new business models and new-generation organizational setups.

Blockchain-backed decentralized and automated validation mechanisms can create new business models and new setups where you could even earn a passive income in an automatic investment scheme. A self-driving car, automated financial transactions such as paying bills or money transfers, loan applications, and access to low-cost capital could be also be enabled.

Real estate assets, which are heterogenous and immobile, are another example. The market is illiquid, localized, and highly segmented. High information asymmetries and room for private bargaining make it difficult for authorities to follow up on the transactions. High transaction costs due to the large number of trusted intermediaries and confirmation authorities is another issue here. This is, indeed, where blockchain steps in. And, these blockchain-based land records are particularly beneficial for developing economies.

Read: Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence at a Crossroads

Blockchain is mostly associated with finance and cryptocurrencies, as its first application was in the introduction and transfer of bitcoins. The fast and efficient transactions made possible by financial technology (FinTech) along with its ordering, payment, and settlement aspects increase its efficiency and attractiveness. Blockchain could even be effectively used in international money transfers and liquidity flows or remittance transfers, just as in the RippleNet (XRP) or Stellar Lumens (XLM) networks.

Decentralized finance (DeFi) is another good example of blockchain projects that aim to remove human involvement from financial services in order to make them cheaper, faster, and more inclusive. DeFi protocols are predominantly run on an Ethereum network. A key weakness of modern DeFi protocols, on the other hand, is that they miss an oracle, which is an independent, trusted third party.

Meanwhile, blockchain can also be used to improve security and privacy in finance, IoT devices, and even in healthcare. It will work much better than the conventional password-based security systems. In the health sector, at a minimum, people won’t have to send or record their personal data at some central repository; data won’t be sent over to anyone or anywhere, and just an access permission will be given whenever needed.

Blockchain will definitely help in gaining privacy in healthcare data, but not for those who are in need, such as the elderly and people with disabilities. However, it is still not clear whether blockchain would also replace credit scores, as a new mechanism of proving trustworthiness, by increasing transparency and mitigating the lending risk.

Read: Digital Power Politics: The US Digital Doctrine Is Evolving

Security of IoT devices, cybercriminal activities, and data breaches could be avoided with the higher level of security of the blockchain technology. Blockchain technology is also used in many other industries including its application in insurance, government and public records; crowdfunding and venture capital; cybersecurity, agriculture, transportation, logistics, education, and even in politics and gaming.

Financial inclusion will also certainly be improved in countries where a large population does not have a bank account or access to financial services. For example, according to the World Bank Identification for Development (ID4D) global dataset, one billion people still do not have any form of identification. In China, only 20 percent of the population have a credit score. In Sierra Leone, only 2,000 people (out of 7 million) have a credit score. Up until 2011, just 35 percent of the population in India had a bank account.

That said, rather than the modern-day tulip bubble cryptocurrencies, blockchain-based central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and digital tokens representing some tangible or intangible assets are the future of digital technologies in finance. A few of the benefits of these digital currencies and blockchain technology would be:

  • Direct peer-to-peer lending and borrowing will be possible, by eliminating intermediaries
  • They will likely increase and facilitate international fund transfers (remittances)
  • They will also likely increase transparency, formality, and traceability, and hence decrease informal transactions and lead to higher tax collections
  • Social transfers and welfare transfers will also be facilitated
  • Economic activity will be recorded and formalized (in other words, calculated much better)
  • Transaction costs and risks will be decreased and hence huge business efficiency gains will be enabled
  • A blockchain base would also make transactions much safer and more secure
  • Blockchain-based supply chains increase transparency and make it impossible to have unfair, unequal income distribution over the supply chains, and hence increase sustainability

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Potential Risks

One should also beware of potential risks, challenges, and security pitfalls of blockchain in the public sector and services. It should, for instance, not provide an escape from the regulations and laws of the states. Blockchain could even be an alternative tool or means of governance and legal identity, and potentially replace public verification mechanisms. This, however, should not undermine the rule of law.

Meanwhile, the lack of technical specialists with blockchain expertise is another critical challenge. There are already too many software developers, but too few of them are actually aware of the blockchain codes. Demand for software engineers and blockchain developers is rising by a few hundred percentage points per annum. The majority of blockchains, up to 60-70 percent, are also still running on relatively costly and slow Ethereum platforms, and major improvements are still required.

Blockchain-based financial technologies such as CBDCs also have their own disadvantages and weaknesses. For example, too many fund transfers towards digital wallets could weaken traditional banks and financial systems. Tougher identity verification mechanisms are required to prevent money laundering, and other illegal or illicit activities. Limit controls on the highest amount users can hold could be a solution, at this point.

The sources and reliability of the data are also crucial. As the number of users increase, blockchain systems may also get inefficient and more complex. Meanwhile, new-generation digital identities are about to replace conventional government-issued legal identity documents. For instance, the European self-sovereign identity framework (ESSIF), as part of the self-sovereign identity (SSI) idea, is another strategic implication of the blockchain revolution in the middle-to-long run. This should, again, not undermine existing regulations and the rule of law.

Despite all these weaknesses, though, the blockchain technology is still a real game changer.

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]]> The End of US Dollar? More Countries Use National Currencies in Trade https://politicstoday.org/the-end-of-us-dollar-more-countries-use-national-currencies-in-trade/ Tue, 26 Apr 2022 09:28:51 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/the-end-of-us-dollar-more-countries-use-national-currencies-in-trade/

One can’t afford to ignore the IMF findings on the decline of the U.S. dollar as few countries can already be seen looking for alternatives to trade.

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On March 24, 2022, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) released a working paper entitled “The Stealth Erosion of Dollar Dominance: Active Diversifiers and the Rise of Non-traditional Reserve Currencies.”

In its findings, notable attention was given to the fact that the dollar’s share of global reserve currencies has been in a steady decline over the last 20 years as the role of non-traditional currencies such as the yuan is rising. Other than China’s national currency, currencies that are gaining ground include the Singaporean dollar, the Korean won, the Australian dollar, and the Canadian dollar.

With the advent of the Russia-Ukraine war, the U.S.-led western allies have imposed sweeping economic sanctions on Moscow and knocked it off the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) system. Gita Gopinath, the IMF’s first deputy managing director, stated that “the financial sanctions imposed on Russia threaten to gradually dilute the dominance of the U.S. dollar and could result in a more fragmented international monetary system.”

Hence, “the war would also spur the adoption of digital finance, from cryptocurrencies to stable coins and central bank digital currencies,” she added.

Read: De-Dollarizing Trade: How the Global Trade Finance Gets More Nationalized

One can’t afford to ignore the IMF findings on the decline of the U.S. dollar as few countries can already be seen looking for alternatives of the currency lingua franca—the U.S. dollar— to trade with other countries.

Looking for “dollar” alternatives, countries picking up the gauntlet!

China is purchasing Russian oil and coal using its local currency, the yuan. Since the advent of the Russia-Ukraine war, many countries cut off their Russian imports to put pressure on Russia’s economy. On the contrary, Chinese firms decided to use the yuan to buy Russian coal, which will be arriving this month at independent Chinese refiners. As Bloomberg reported, this Chinese move will mark the first commodity shipment paid in Chinese currency since the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

In a similar vein, Saudi Arabia is in talks with China regarding using the yuan instead of the greenback to price some of its oil sales. The trend between Beijing and Riyadh over the usage of yuan to buy and sell oil has been fluctuating for the last six years. But experts predict that this year may witness serious steps to use national currencies in trade between Saudi Arabia and China.

Moving towards South Asia, reports speak of initial consultations between New Delhi and Moscow to reinstate a rupee-ruble trade mechanism. India’s commerce minister Piyush Goyal added that the rupee-ruble trade mechanism is just being discussed and that no decision has been made yet.

Read: The Rise of Bitcoin and its Ambiguous Future

In addition, Iran put emphasis on the usage of rupee-rial trade for the export of gas and oil. According to the Iranian Ambassador to New Delhi Ali Chegeni, “If both countries launch a rupee-rial trade mechanism, the bilateral trade could grow to $30 billion.”

He further stated that “a rupee-rial trade mechanism can help companies from both countries deal with each other directly and avoid third-party intermediation costs.” However, there was no response from the Indian counterpart on this statement.

Dollar in the digital currency race

As nations are looking for an alternative to the U.S. dollar to buy oil and other commodities, the concept of central bank digital currency (CBDC) is gaining traction. A CBDC is the digital form of a country’s fiat currency by the central bank. Instead of printing money, the central bank issues electronic coins backed by the full faith and credit of the government.

At present, nine countries in the Eastern Caribbean, the Bahamas, and Nigeria have launched their sovereign digital currency. Fourteen countries are in the pilot stage and are preparing for a possible full launch. Some of them are major economies that are a part of the G20 such as China, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and South Africa. Other major countries include Canada, India, Brazil, Turkey, Japan, and the European continent.

As countries worldwide are adopting the concept of CBDC, the United States started considering the potential of digital currency. On March 9, the Biden administration released an executive order in which Biden has instructed the federal government to work on CBDC, a digital dollar. Following that, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen highlighted the federal digital currency of the U.S. in a speech.

Read: Cryptocurrencies in the Middle East: Investment Surrounded by Risk

However, dissenters are emerging in the U.S. over the possible benefits of digital currency. Recently, Christopher Waller, a member of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, said he is not convinced of the need for CBDC.

As the U.S. is still working on the idea of sovereign digital currency, China has already introduced the digital yuan to its 15th city. In 2021, transactions of more than $8 billion were made using the digital yuan. Hence, the pressure is rising on the U.S. to take quick action regarding the creation of a sovereign digital currency of its own.

Considering the pattern among nations to look for alternative currency for trade, one could expect a significant reorganization of existing global payment networks. However, the reorganization seems to be bolstered by a sharp escalation in the use of digital sovereign currency.

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Academia and the currency war debate

Will the dominance of the U.S. dollar erode as more countries look to trade in alternative currencies? Could the adoption of CBDC among nations have any significant impact on the dominance of the U.S. dollar? Will the U.S. dollar give way to a multipolar system of currencies? These are the question that are widely being debated among academics.

According to Gal Luft, the co-director of the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, the U.S. stinging economic measures may lead central banks to diversify their portfolios of foreign reserves instead of relying heavily on the dollar. He stated that central banks are starting to question whether reliance on the U.S. dollar is a good idea.

In regard to digital currency, Michael Sung and Christopher A. Thomas argue in their latest article that “the primacy of the U.S. dollar grants the U.S. government and economy special privileges… as the adoption of crypto and CBDC increases, the benefits afforded to the U.S. by the dollar’s dominance will gradually decrease.”

However, experts like Professor Paul Krugman  clearly denied that U.S. dollar’s world dominance is at risk. According to Krugman, the U.S. dollar dominance still looks pretty secure because its major competitor, China, is an “autocracy with a propensity for erratic policies” and therefore people will not prefer yuan assets.

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]]> Cryptocurrencies in the Middle East: Investment Surrounded by Risk https://politicstoday.org/cryptocurrencies-in-the-middle-east-investment-surrounded-by-risk/ Mon, 31 May 2021 09:28:52 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/cryptocurrencies-in-the-middle-east-investment-surrounded-by-risk/

For people in the Middle East, buying cryptocurrency is not only an opportunity to invest but it is used as a shield of their savings against the devaluation of local currencies and financial crises.

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Cryptocurrencies are going mainstream. Since the creation of Bitcoin in 2008, the market capitalization of cryptocurrencies (cryptos) has reached $2 trillion. Bitcoin and other cryptos are also growing presence in the Middle East.

Cryptos are not just an alternative investment, but they may be used to relieve economic and financial turmoils.

The Middle East is not new to the use of decentralized payment systems. For years, people used the Hawala (Trust) system as an informal value transfer system to bypass traditional banks. But with cryptocurrencies, the trust based on the Hawala system has been replaced with algorithms, which are the fundamentals of the decentralized nature of the cryptocurrencies based on blockchain technology.

Cryptocurrencies have gained attention from users in the Middle East over the past few years. A growing presence of cryptocurrency-related service providers, exchanges, and trading platforms popped up rapidly in the region.

VIDEO: Turkey to Implement New Cryptocurrency Regulations

Although crypto is a highly volatile investment, the growth of Bitcoin (from $1 in 2011 to almost $43,000 in 2021) has shown the world its promising profits.

For people, buying cryptocurrency is not only an opportunity to invest but it is used as a shield of their savings against the devaluation of local currencies and financial crises.

For people, buying cryptocurrency is not only an opportunity to invest but it is used as a shield of their savings against the devaluation of local currencies and financial crises.

Scams and frauds are ordinary in the crypto world. The relative complexity and the lack of knowledge on cryptos may expose investments and savings to big risks.

However, such risks haven’t stopped Lebanese from investing in cryptos amid an unprecedented economic and financial crisis that hit Lebanon in late 2019. Lebanese Lira fell to 80% against the dollar. Banks severely limited access to accounts to millions of people, thus, many started to invest in cryptos to relieve from the devaluation of the local currency and secure their assets away from the Lebanese banks.

Read: Bitcoin: The New Global Reserve Currency?

Crypto users in the Middle East conduct trades in many ways, depending on the regulations of their countries of residence. Many use several mobile apps. Some investors that have foreign bank accounts use well-established exchange platforms, including Coinbase. But some crypto exchanges don’t serve users in every Middle East country. So, buyers rely on local exchange platforms, such as OTC remittance outlets or private professionals that manage several portfolios by trading on WhatsApp, Telegram, Facebook, and Twitter.

Aside from Coinbase, Binance, and other popular platforms, users in the Middle East also use local exchange platforms.

Although new cryptos are getting popular, the most crypto traded in the Middle East is Bitcoin. As a second choice, buyers invest in Ether, the cryptocurrency based on the open-source blockchain developed by Vitalik Buterin in 2015. Recently, Dogecoin, a crypto formed as a joke, gained popularity due to the endorsement of Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla and other companies.

Due to the restrictions, lack of a regulatory framework, or unclarity over trading cryptos, not all countries in the Middle East may use the most popular exchange platforms. Aside from Coinbase, Binance, and other popular platforms, users in the Middle East also use local exchange platforms. For instance, BtcTurk is the biggest cryptocurrency exchange in Turkey, with around 3 million users, according to Bloomberg.

Read: The Rise of Bitcoin and its Ambiguous Future

Rain, a cryptocurrency trading platform licensed by the Central Bank of Bahrain, serves crypto products and services in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Oman. Among other exchange platforms, BitOasis, Local bitcoins and Paxful are widely used in the Middle East. However, many people join Western platforms by using Virtual Private Network (VPN) tools. Charges and the security infrastructure are the key elements that lead to preferring an exchange platform rather than another one.

Trading aside, mining is an essential operation to buy and sell cryptos. Mining is the process by which new cryptos enter into the market circulation. Furthermore, mining is the process of verifying bitcoin transactions and recording them in the public blockchain ledger.

Miners use very sophisticated computers that solve complex calculations. Miners were paid 6.25 bitcoin for every block mined, but the reward was reduced by 50% in May 2020. One of the most expensive costs to mine cryptos is power energy. Elon Musk has recently highlighted the issue related to crypto mining related to the environment. Electricity cost is an essential factor for starting a mining activity.

Most mining farms work in China, where electricity price is widely cheaper than in Europe and the U.S. In the middle East, Iran is a very important player in the mining market. Its electricity price ($0.005 KWh in a household) makes Iran a suitable country for mining, along with China and Venezuela. There are some Chinese mining farms in Iran, according to several reports. Kuwait may be an interesting county for mining, but the lack of infrastructure prevents mining operations on a large scale.

Blockchain technology is not only limited to cryptocurrency. Like the rest of the world, Middle Eastern countries are developing Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs). These are new financial instruments based on the blockchain that would allow central banks to issue digital currency. CBDCs are an effort to contain and fight back Bitcoin and other cryptos. CBDCs are the digital representation of countries’ fiat currencies (government-issued currency). They are important because they can be programmed and can reduce processing times and costs.

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In the Middle East, the central banks from Saudi Arabia and UAE are working together on a blockchain technology project called Project Aber. The dual-issued CBDC would be viable for cross-border payments, as it would be an improvement over their current centralized payment systems. Israel, Lebanon, and Turkey have claimed to plan to launch their CBDCs too. However, these pilot projects are still embryonic as they need to develop adequate infrastructures to make them work. Although some experts say that CBDC will destroy the cryptocurrency market, others see this new financial instrument only as an alternative to use cash.

The race to cryptocurrencies and the new financial instruments are part of the development of the fintech industry in the Middle East. The region has strong potential, although it is one of the most underbanked regions in the world. Furthermore, cryptocurrencies have strict relations with energy resources, thus, not all Middle East countries will be able to develop financial instruments based on blockchain.

At the political level, Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies may represent an obstacle to monitor the cash flow for some countries. For others, cryptocurrencies might help avoid international sanctions, although restrictive measures have been put in place in recent years.

Regarding CBDCs, it is too early to discuss whether they can help local or cross-border payment systems. So far, no central bank has issued a retail CBDC, and the current pilot projects are still at an early stage to get feedback about its adoption.

The post Cryptocurrencies in the Middle East: Investment Surrounded by Risk appeared first on Politics Today.

]]> The Great Reconfiguration of Global Supply Chains https://politicstoday.org/the-great-reconfiguration-of-global-supply-chains/ Mon, 24 May 2021 12:53:03 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/the-great-reconfiguration-of-global-supply-chains/

As the blurriness of geopolitical, economic, and security alliances fades, countries are likely to find themselves dependent on the supply chains of either the U.S. or China.

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In the most recent session of the Boao Forum for Asia in April 2021, Chinese President Xi Jinping gave a speech in which he warned against U.S. plans of decoupling the two superpowers’ economies. Repetitively, he has voiced his concerns about the U.S. plans to undermine China’s standing in the international order. He also called for a new international order that is built by everyone and reflecting the changes in the reality of the global balance of power and economic role.

While Xi is trying to build bridges with the U.S. and the world, U.S. President Joe Biden looks keen on being more adversarial. In a recent speech at the White House, Biden touted confrontation and competition with China. He promised a $2.5 trillion infrastructure plan with the clear aim of competing with China and restoring American competitiveness as the leading global economy.

At this stage, global economic recovery post-COVID-19 will be contoured around the global reconfiguring of economic relations on a scale never seen since WWII. This will be particularly significant in the reorganization of the global supply chains which came under scrutiny since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis as countries struggle to secure essential raw materials, vaccines, protective gears, and other commodities due to governmental policies, consequential supply shortages, and the choking of the global shipping routes and ports due to COVID-19 closures.

VIDEO: Why Are Modern Supply Chains So Needlessly Complex?

In the forefront of U.S.-China supply chains competition is the competition over advanced technology supply chains. As the global economy turns more digital, 5G communication networks are becoming critical to the transformation to the digital age. Historically, the U.S. built its economic supremacy on the premise of leading cutting-edge technologies and exporting them to the world.

As China grows more independent in advanced technology research and manufacturing, it is seeking to be on par with the U.S. and threatening its historical supremacy. Identifying a strategic threat, the U.S. targets China’s technology supply chains in order to undermine Chinese capabilities and to slow down its progress. To do so, the U.S. is hampering China’s 5G network and technology building efforts. It has imposed sanctions on Huawei, the Chinese tech giant, and banned its equipment use in its networks.

The U.S. gave an ultimatum to allies and pushed them to ban Chinese companies from investing in their local 5G infrastructure.

Not only that, but the U.S. gave an ultimatum to allies and pushed them to ban Chinese companies from investing in their local 5G infrastructure. India, the U.K., Italy, France, Romania, and Sweden, to mention a few, have advanced legislations banning China’s technology investments and the use of its equipment in their upcoming 5G networks.

The U.S. has also imposed sanctions on several Chinese advanced technology companies such as artificial intelligence and satellite communication companies for alleged involvement in human rights violations and industrial espionage. However, and despite the U.S. efforts, many countries remain welcoming of Chinese 5G equipment. Germany, Pakistan, the UAE, Qatar, Hungary, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt keep their doors open to working with Huawei and ZTE to build their future communication infrastructure.

Read: With US Investors Fleeing Latin America, China Steps In

Competition over semiconductor and chips industry

At the heart of the technology competition is the semiconductor and chip industry. Up until the beginning of the pandemic, semiconductor and chip supply chains were global and heavily concentrated in Asia, which accounted for roughly two-thirds of the global output. However, the U.S. use of sanctions against Chinese companies caused a panic among the semiconductor and chip suppliers and consumers. For example, the U.S. sought to curtail China’s ability to purchase chips by pressuring sellers such as the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company through direct and indirect sanctions. In response, Huawei, a leading recipient of the U.S. technology sanctions, went on a shopping spree scraping all it can from available chips in the market in order to stockpile critical components to its technology products.

Furthermore, the resulting global shortages of chip supplies are leading many prominent manufacturers of cars and technological products to shut down some of their factories as they struggle to secure necessary supplies. China did not stop at stockpiling chips, but sought to gain an edge in the chip making industry, and in 2020, it became the world’s biggest buyer of chip making tools with a total spending of $19 billion.

Fighting back against the U.S. stranglehold, China did not shy away from using its own strong position in global supply chains of rare earth metals.

Feeling the urgency to secure U.S.-based chip supply chains, to cement the U.S. position in the global supply chain of chips, and to increase the pressure on China, earlier in March, Biden called for $50 billion spending to boost the U.S. chip industry. U.S. companies were also worried and sought to find alternatives to Asian supplies. For example, Intel announced that it is set to invest $20 billion in building a plant for chip manufacturing on U.S. soil.

Supply chains of rare earth metals

Fighting back against the U.S. stranglehold, China did not shy away from using its own strong position in global supply chains of rare earth metals. As of 2019, China controlled 90% of the global production of rare earth metals used in manufacturing advanced technological products. China has mulled sanctions on U.S. weapons manufacturers in a clear expression of willingness to weaponize the supply of rare earth metals to undermine the U.S. military.

Aware of the seriousness of any potential shortages, the U.S. is actively pursuing and funding the building of local processing plants to help deal with any potential curbs of exports by China. It has also invested with allies like Australia to help de-Chinese the Western supply chains of rare earth metals. Clearly, supply chain mistrust is spreading, and interdependence is seen as a vulnerability by the two superpowers.

Read: China’s Economic Interests in the GCC: Economic Gains over Politics

India attempted to take advantage of the situation and tried to steer Western supply chains away from China by offering incentives for Western businesses to move shop from China to India. These incentives included, among others, cheaper rents, land allocations, and tax deductions. The U.S. also formed the Quad group consisting of the United States, Australia, Japan, and India to steer them away from falling heavily under Chinese influence. For example, the U.S. has signed agreements with these countries to supply them with U.S. COVID-19 vaccines known as the Quad Vaccine Partnership.

On the Chinese side, the Belt and Road Initiative continues to advance, while strategic agreements are being signed with Russia, Pakistan, and Iran with the aim of positioning China at the heart of global supply chains for raw materials and shipping routes. Despite the hurdles of the pandemic, China signed a new strategic investment treaty with the European Union with the aim of improving mutual investment standards to solidify fair competition and rule of law between the two.

China also flexed its regional economic muscle during the pandemic and managed to advance the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is a regional free trade agreement that involves 15 Asian nations constituting a third of the global GDP in an attempt to create a regional economic bloc like the U.S. federal system.

China is also building a new global financial infrastructure. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank continues to grow its mandate to fund development projects across the world with China playing the key role as a funder. To counter Chinese financial engineering, the U.S. established the American Development Bank to fund private ventures and public-private partnerships in developing countries in order to regain influence from seemingly increased Chinese investment in Africa and Latin America.

Finally, the global supply chain of finance is shifting from the U.S. towards China and other powers as evident by China’s renminbi (yuan) internationalization and its drive for the de-dollarization of global trade.

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China-U.S. interdependence is being halted and is retracting. Supply chains are no longer global and economic nationalism is driving the world to divisions that are unlikely to stop anytime soon. Countries other than the U.S. and China are trying to play both sides to maximize their national objectives.

However, as the blurriness of geopolitical, economic, and security alliances fades, countries are likely to find themselves dependent on the supply chains of either the U.S. or China. Global supply chains will stop being reliable sources for goods as shortages, sanctions, politics, and security competition redraw the globe into two blocks with less and less interaction.

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]]> What Is China’s Endgame in Northern Iraq? https://politicstoday.org/china-northern-iraq-krg-economic-investments/ Tue, 16 Mar 2021 04:53:07 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/china-northern-iraq-krg-economic-investments/

Chinese investments in Northern Iraq raise some questions. Is the devil is in the details?

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The beginning of the relations between China and the KRG, the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, dates back to the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Despite this relatively short history, Beijing has significantly strengthened its economic and diplomatic presence in the region. Only in the past six months, Beijing has signed a number of multibillion-dollar agreements with authorities in Erbil.

Among them are the $210 million contract for the construction of a cement plant based in Erbil, a $5 billion project for a giant housing development and an urban tourist attraction in the city (both announced in October 2020), and a $5 billion agreement for the construction of a massive Chinese commercial center (signed in January 2021). All this, without mentioning the enormous help China provided to Erbil during the COVID-19 pandemic by supplying hospitals and the public with masks, sanitizers, and necessary equipment.

Furthermore, China is increasing its diplomatic presence in northern Iraq. Earlier, in 2014, by opening its consulate general, Beijing showed clear support to the KRG and established a solid diplomatic presence in the region. During the opening ceremony, China’s Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming said, “The opening of our consulate general in Erbil expresses our strong support for the political process in Iraq. It is a sign of our strong desire to further deepen and strengthen our bilateral ties with Iraq and the Kurdistan Region in various fields.” This move turned a new page in developing diplomatic relations between Beijing and Erbil.

Considering it was the time when Daesh (ISIS) was at the peak of its strength in Iraq, Beijing’s move meant China had a number of strategically important plans in Iraqi Kurdistan. Despite the aggressive and devastating interventions by Daesh in Iraqi lands, the KRG was able in a surprisingly short period of time to protect and free its territories, such as Mosul and Kirkuk, from terrorists – to a great extent as a result of having its own military forces. For many, northern Iraq was a safe area that could be defended using its own forces, independently from Iraq’s central administration.

VIDEO: Chinese-built power plant meets 20% of Iraq’s electricity needs

At the same time, the KRG took control of the oil-rich province of Kirkuk and connected its oil reserves to the pipeline linking the region to Turkey. This opened a lucrative opportunity for the Kurdish government to raise its oil production to up to 450,000 barrels a day and created the ground for new Chinese investment projects in the region.

China’s non-ordinary approach to enhancing economic and diplomatic ties with the KRG during politically unstable times in war-torn Iraq is explained by Beijing’s ambitions to secure and expand its Belt and Road Initiative far beyond Iraq and the KRG. Following its non-interference policy and soft military presence in the Middle East, China is becoming an influential player in the region. Through its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO), China uses soft power to intervene in the international affairs of other countries, and especially Arab and African countries.

Read: China’s Economic Interests in the GCC: Economic Gains over Politics

For instance, in 2015, China sent over 1,000 troops to South Sudan and Darfur as part of UNPKO. The decision was mainly driven by Beijing’s interests to expand trade and commerce and to gain access to the region’s oil and mineral resources. Following its broad economic foreign policy, Beijing pressured the authorities in Khartoum to join the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations as part of the African Union by proposing investments in the region’s prospective sectors such as the oil industry and agriculture.

China has also been a frequent facilitator in negotiations between the Taliban and Afghan authorities. China pursues a mediation role in the Syria conflict too and aims to become a key investor in Syrian infrastructure, energy, and other industries as part of international efforts to rebuild the country.

Today, China’s strategy in Iraqi Kurdistan follows an ambitious geopolitical goal: to scale up Big Asia’s vector.

Today, China’s strategy in Iraqi Kurdistan follows an ambitious geopolitical goal: to scale up Big Asia’s vector. This refers not only to a geographical frame but also to the emergence of a new counterbalancing power against the West, Russia, and Turkey that will be led by China and Iran.

Having pursued a pro-Western policy for decades, the government of Iraqi Kurdistan is turning its geopolitical and economic compass to the East. It’s enough to recall the speech of Chancellor Masoud Barzani in 2018 to verify this claim. During the meeting with the Chinese ambassador to Iraq, Chen Weiqing, Barzani expressed his hopes that China would play “a greater role” in bringing stability to the Middle East – a role that China appears to have realized.

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China, a poor country only a few decades ago, has now become a superpower with a new approach. China’s influence in the Middle East, and particularly in Iraq and the KRG, goes far beyond the economic and geopolitical dominance. Within a couple of years, China has introduced its culture and language to the region. Books about China and its leaders are being translated into the Kurdish language, while tourist spots, hotels, and even some schools in Erbil have started to provide information to visitors in Chinese, apart from English and Arabic. The famous Salahaddin University-Erbil has opened a center for the Chinese language.

However, there are several risks of letting Beijing dominate northern Iraq. One is that economic relations between the KRG and China are still one-sided. In order to avoid the trade deficit and the potential inflation crisis, the KRG has to balance the imports and exports between the region and Beijing – preferably by finding other sources of exports apart from oil.

The second risk is the internal tensions between the KRG and Iraq. Should the Chinese political approach and ideology prevail in the region, it will seize the freedoms enjoyed in Erbil with its semi-autonomous status from Baghdad, as China has always supported a centralized governance model.

Read: How Does China View the Muslim World?

Finally, the Chinese Model could impact the KRG’s economic and diplomatic ties with the U.S., Russia, and Turkey, all of whom are still very important geopolitical partners in the region. This may lead to the isolation of the KRG and Baghdad from the global economy, and to becoming cut off militarily and in terms of goods supplies.

It may also exclude KRG from international diplomatic initiatives such as the U.S.-funded media outlets aimed to promote the Kurdish language, culture, and policies (e.g. Radio Nawa) and lead to the political enhancing of ties with Russia as seen by the visit of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) delegation to Moscow to enhance Russian-Kurdish cooperation in Syria.

Yet, this scenario is – at least – for the moment unlikely as the KRG has the ability to use its soft power and to establish diplomatic ties with nations which oppose each other in the international arena.

The post What Is China’s Endgame in Northern Iraq? appeared first on Politics Today.

]]> Bitcoin: The New Global Reserve Currency? https://politicstoday.org/bitcoin-the-new-global-reserve-currency/ Wed, 10 Feb 2021 04:00:25 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/bitcoin-the-new-global-reserve-currency/

World governments are likely to experience that their financial powers continue to be challenged by bitcoin-like cryptocurrencies.

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When bitcoin first emerged in 2009 in the aftermath of the greatest financial crisis in human history in 2008, its utility was questioned and scrutinised. Today, the price of bitcoin stands at $47,000 after it rallied from $5,000 when coronavirus lockdown hit the global economy back in March 2020. This is 10x value unfold in less than a year. The spectacular rise in value boggled the minds of many including investors, regulators, and bankers.

So why bitcoin is rising? Since the financial crash of 2008, questions were raised about the future of the US dollar as the global reserve currency. The quantitative easing policy adopted by the Federal Reserve Bank was described by many economists and financiers as the recipe to the destruction of the US dollar exorbitant privilege and its status as the global reserve currency.

Simply put, no one wants to save and invest their wealth in a currency that constantly loses its value to inflation. Loss of wealth that happened to many countries and investors that save in dollars is significant. The dollar had an average inflation rate of 1.64% per year between 2007 and today, producing a cumulative price increase of 25.63%.

Investors who have to deliver profits to their clients needed to hedge against dollar inflation. Thus, an influx of institutional investors lined up to buy bitcoin as they saw it become the gold standard for the digital era. The limited supply of bitcoin at 21 million coins means it is inflation-proof.

Scarcity of bitcoin operates as the catalyst for the increased demand on bitcoin and thus its price increases against the dollar. Therefore, institutional investors such as MicroStrategy and Guggenheim Partners fund managers increased their portfolio holdings of bitcoin and offered related financial services to their clients.

Read: The Rise of Bitcoin and its Ambiguous Future

A picture shows cryptocurrency, Bitcoin. Photo by Anadolu Images

Not only institutions are lining up to buy bitcoin, but also retail investors have increasingly shown greater interest in the coin and used it to hedge against losses to their savings in dollars due to inflation and to trade it. Companies such as PayPal, Square, and Visa have allowed or about to allow their customers to deal in bitcoin and used that to boost their payment solution for their customers which increased the number of retail investors who got into bitcoin.

The ongoing changes in the global economy are also part of the reasons for bitcoin rise. The Bretton Woods system of a gold-pegged dollar made the US (which owned 80% of world’s gold reserve at the time) the world leading economy. Eventually, to maintain the financial privilege, the US economy deindustrialised and became a service and finance-based economy.

With China’s rise, and due to security concerns around the safety of its supply chains, the US is interested in getting industry back onshore. Devaluing the dollar helps achieve such strategic objective as the US seeks to reclaim its domestic manufacturing capabilities.

The economic dynamic of bitcoin is simple. As USD value decreases, conversely, the price of bitcoin increases.

Overall, the economic dynamic of bitcoin is simple. As USD value decreases, conversely, the price of bitcoin increases. The increased demand helps institutional investors save their treasury, increase their profits, and adapt to technological changes in digital payment systems using blockchain-enabled technologies such as bitcoin.

Economy is not the only reason for bitcoin price rise. The global power struggle between China and the US is at play as well. At first, the Chinese government hailed bitcoin and its underlying technology, blockchain, and deemed it a way to undermine the dollar hegemony. However, political concerns around the potential use of bitcoin for capital flight and to change the power dynamic between wealthy Chinese and the state undercut such view. Additionally, China saw bitcoin rise as an opportunity to achieve its strategic objective of becoming a greater power broker in global economy.

The founder of SpaceX and Tesla Motors, Elon Musk, while delivering a speech at the Satellite 2020 Fair in Turkey. Photo by Yasin Öztürk. Anadolu Agency.

Thus, China tried to exercise regulatory control over Chinese holding bitcoin by banning cryptocurrencies. However, the Chinese crackdown on bitcoin led to more Chinese investments in the coin as it proved the need for non-government-controlled assets.

Today, China is a dominant actor in bitcoin mining. This is due to the cheap cost of electricity, mining equipment, and land. Furthermore, the strong capital controls exercised by China lured many Chinese who cannot move money abroad to bitcoin. Since China could not beat bitcoin, it decided to play its own blockchain game.

Globally, by deploying the digital yuan, China aims to offer foreign governments an opportunity to save and invest in a currency other than the dollar.

Hence, in April 2020, China announced its commitment to launching the digital yuan which would use blockchain technology. The aim of such move was to maintain the power of the Chinese state over the wealth of the nation, to reap the benefits of the new technology to reduce transactions cost and time, and to preserve the domestic power of the Chinese Communist Party.

Globally, by deploying the digital yuan, China aims to offer foreign governments an opportunity to save and invest in a currency other than the dollar. This shall help, according to the government view, boost the status of the yuan as a global reserve currency. Over the past few years, the yuan value has been appreciating, and China continues to implement policies that encourage its internationalisation.

Bottom line, China is happy the USD is losing its status as the global reserve currency which was used by the US to exercise power globally over the past seven decades. Furthermore, China’s mind is open to technological changes and is trying to harness the blockchain technology to boost the global financial status of the yuan, which is expected to help China materialize its goal of becoming the world’s top economy by 2050 and contribute to the success of its Belt and Road Initiative.

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From the US point of view, the Federal Reserve Bank continues to signal a quantitative easy policy via trillions of dollars of stimulation packages. In 2020 alone, $10 trillion were injected in the US economy to offset COVID19 depression.

The Biden administration promised more stimulus packages and an increase in the minimum wage to $15, which is expected to inflate prices. Therefore, American and international investors and retailers alike have a low level of confidence in the Fed’s willingness to protect the value of the dollar.

Is all bitcoin story gloomy? Of course not. Despite the rosy picture bitcoin enthusiasts show, mass adoption of the coin lags due to several concerns about the high volatility of bitcoin prices and the impact of bitcoin mining on the environment. However, on the long run, as more institutional and retail investors adopt bitcoin, the price will stabilise. Furthermore, mining bitcoin using green energy will become viable.

Taxing bitcoin holding is another issue due to the anonymity enjoyed by the holders. However, many governments have figured out ways to tax bitcoin holders and mechanisms continue to be developed to achieve such objective.

Read: The Transformation of Money and Blockchain Technology

Lastly, a potential ban on bitcoin by governments worries potential investors and retailers. However, the decentralised nature of bitcoin means it is proved against potential government bans. Furthermore, the geographical neutrality of bitcoin means that it will always be moveable and thus valuable.

In conclusion, governments need to reclaim investors and people trust to push them to continue to use national currencies and abandon bitcoin. Incentives such as price stability remain to be unlikely in the medium term as governments run the money-printing machine to stimulate their COVID19-depressed economies.

As monopolistic powers that operate in increasingly decentralised economic structures, world governments are likely to see their financial power continue to be challenged by bitcoin-like cryptocurrencies.

VIDEO: What’s Happening With Bitcoin?

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]]> China-US Competition in the Asia-Pacific Will Grow Stronger With the RCEP https://politicstoday.org/china-us-competition-in-the-asia-pacific-will-grow-stronger-with-the-rcep/ Tue, 15 Dec 2020 11:05:42 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/china-us-competition-in-the-asia-pacific-will-grow-stronger-with-the-rcep/

The RCEP is ostensibly a mechanism to oversee the trade activities of the major countries in the region. The hypothesis that China will draw the other countries into its orbit has yet to be proven.

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The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is the fruit of competitive international trade affairs in the Asia-Pacific that has been dominating world trade and investment environments in the past few decades. The treaty authorizes the member countries’ rational choice to stand between protectionism and free trade.

A treaty pact was signed on November 15, 2020 with virtual participation of the leaders of 15 member countries who represent almost 2.2 billion people and 30% of the world’s GDP. The anticipated greater plan and its practical gain will pump $200 billion into the global economy.

With the RCEP representing a bit less than one-third of the global economic output, this agreement is expected to have a great impact on the global economy. As observed in the last four years, more than half of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China have constantly shown annual growth of more than 6-7%.

In recent years, the ASEAN countries have not only displayed a galvanizing productivity in logistics supplies and international trade, but have also gradually improved and showed an engagement with the dominant capitalist economic principals in the form of freer commercial activities.

This development, triggered by determinant geo-political narratives in the Asia-Pacific region, effectuates creation of certain trust among members of nations and the global investors.

The spirit of the ASEAN

The terms of the agreement provide a functional vehicle to eliminate the internal differences of member countries so as to reinvigorate production and trade affairs, while obtaining gains from this regional development.

There are three major aspects which can be considered as crucial developments. The first is the ASEAN-centered expansion of trade and investment activities.

The second is related to the East Asian nations, such as China, Japan, and South Korea, that have agreed, for the first time, to comply with mutual trade rules. Without a doubt, this will have a greater influence on the region’s peace and stability. In particular, the East and South China Seas will reclaim the status of mutual waterways for all the nations adjacent to them.

Read: 70 Years: China’s Celebrations Will Impress, But Challenges Remain of Global Concern

The third aspect is that this trade pact might become a model for other emerging powers and global players to adapt free trade agreements in a post-COVID-19 world.

The ASEAN and the member countries of the RCEP are optimistic and expect to lead opportunities in the coming years by driving the region’s youth dynamic interests.

The repositioning of China in global trade affairs

China is established as the RCEP’s panjandrum. But the nature of the treaty is based on a multilateralism in which China will not act as a single superpower and which eliminates the possibility that China will rule out the important of the other partner countries.

On the one side, we have the ASEAN, as a regional bloc, and on the other, we have Japan and Australia as stronger partners. This symmetry/balance, in turn, guarantees a resilience to the possibly of a thuggish China imposing its rules on the pact. Instead, this agreement means that trade activities will prioritize newly structured rules and regulations.

The ASEAN and the member countries of the RCEP are optimistic and expect to lead opportunities in the coming years by driving the region’s youth dynamic interests.

The RCEP is ostensibly a mechanism to oversee the trade activities of the major countries in the region. The hypothesis that China will draw the other countries into its orbit has yet to be proven.

Member countries such as Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Australia collaborate well, and adopt well-structured and rational institutional approaches in bilateral and regional trade activities that are determined by rule-based establishments. The Chinese administration seems unlikely to be misguided by its economic power and run against such a strong block for short-term gains.

ASEAN leaders (L to R) Prime Minister of New Zealand Jacinda Ardern, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China Li Keqiang and Thailand Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-Cha pose for a photo during the 3rd RCEP Summit at IMPACT Muang Thong Thani in Nonthaburi, Thailand on November 4, 2019. Photo by Anton Raharjo, Anadolu Images

The US: Inside or outside the game?

The RCEP resonates with signs of effort toward the gradual reconstruction of economic growth in the Asia-Pacific. It poses novel problems for the new U.S. administration that add to the distress of a presumed isolation. Thus, U.S. President-elect Biden may desperately search for alternatives for repositioning his country on the global stage, and, in particular, in the Asia-Pacific.

However, the grave challenge the Biden administration will face is how to convince the U.S. Senate to rebound the country’s leadership in the Asia-Pacific region. Rather, the U.S. may opt to revive the relationship with regional powers and the ASEAN.

Biden will have no other choice but to reinitiate the active presence of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific since the U.S. is already in a declining standing on the eco-political scene.

Since the United States lost an opportunity by rejecting the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) four years ago, the new administration will potentially be excluded from the RCEP, and President-elect Biden will experience a great dilemma.

When one closely revisits the first term of the Obama administration, it becomes apparent that the Eastern and Southeastern Asian countries, which serve as major drivers of global growth, intended to restructure regional trade affairs.

Liberalization is currently being experienced by the emerging regional powers. A larger regional trade agreement such as the TPPA or, as clearly proven today, the RCEP was expected since the beginning of this century, because of the changing nature of global business and trade.

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When soft enforcement was used by certain regional powers such as Japan and Singapore to convince the Obama administration to sign the TPPA, it took half a decade to reach a consensus, which finally arrived in 2015. Therefore, it is not astonishing that an almost similar process began in 2012 for the regional countries in the Asia-Pacific to reach a similar pact.

Biden will have no other choice but to reinitiate the active presence of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific since the U.S. is already in a declining standing on the eco-political scene.

Thus, the new U.S. administration is likely to take a step to create a peaceful environment on the global stage in order to gain the support of its allies, some of whom feel abandoned and others politically distanced. A better-case scenario would see the U.S. invest creatively in soft power rather than refocus on the competition with China as it has done in the previous years.

India’s Lack of Self-Reliance

India preferred not to sign the RCEP in order to protect its domestic market from the “invasion” of Chinese goods.

Although growth figures show that the country has progressed in the last half decade, the Narendra Modi government preferred to lean on restricted trade borders. But the major argument is that India is yet to conceive its regional power role.

Since U.S. President-elect Joe Biden and the Indian government dubbed the RCEP a new emerging power, there is an alternative for a new geopolitical structure in the Indo-Pacific.

Biden and Vice-President-elect Kamala Harris have professed a desire to engage with India. There are strong signs that Harris has been perceived positively by Indians. Harris’s ancestral link may be instrumentalized for the U.S. in the use of soft power towards India in order to help the country regain its lost presence in the Asia Pacific region.

The RCEP is the end product of the long negotiation processes among the member countries that have dominated global trade and economic activities in recent decades. If this treaty is successfully applied, there is little doubt that it will mold trade affairs on a global scale.

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]]> The NSU Trial in Germany: Has Justice Really Served after 18 Years? https://politicstoday.org/the-nsu-trial-in-germany-has-justice-really-served-after-18-years/ Sun, 22 Jul 2018 03:03:44 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/the-nsu-trial-in-germany-has-justice-really-served-after-18-years/

German official authorities throughout the trial did not adopt a constructive stance that would help uncover aspects of the trial that went insufficiently investigated. Thus, the process that started in Germany with the NSU trial is unlikely to be truly finished until institutional racism in the country is faced and addressed accordingly.

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The National Socialist Underground (NSU) trial is a trial encompassing eleven murders, bomb attacks and robberies perpetrated between the years of 2000 and 2007 by the extreme-right terrorist organization NSU. The NSU members Beate Zschäpe, Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Böhnhardt killed eight Turkish-Germans, one Greek and one German police officer between 2000 and 2007. The members also organized three bomb attacks over the course of this period. Within the case, Beate Zschäpe, the only living member of the NSU, was tried as the principal defendant on the charges of killing ten people, being a member of a terrorist organization and plotting bomb attacks. Although the motivations underlying the murders are not clear, it is thought that the terrorist organization aimed to intimidate immigrant shopkeepers and spread fear among foreigners as most of the victims were small business owners of Turkish descent. The trial has stirred public reaction since the judge has not issued any penal or legal action regarding the 24 witnesses who drew attention with their racist remarks and who were found to have some ties with the NSU, and tried only five people as part of such this large-scale organized crime case. Aside from Beate Zschäpe, four others were also tried on the charges of supporting and providing weapons to the organization.

What is the NSU?

It is predicted that Beate Zschäpe, Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Böhnhardt, who were born in Jena, Germany, met during the mid-1990s and established the NSU. Drawing attention with the racist and neo-Nazi events they organized, NSU members faced police surveillance after a short while. On January, 1998, police units were notified about the group’s preparation for an attack. Upon this notice, the police carried out a search in the garage of the group militants’ house, after which the group thought that they were deciphered and started to go underground.

During this period, the organization committed 15 bank robberies to finance themselves. Although it was announced that Uwe Benhardt and Uwe Mundlos committed suicide in a caravan when they understood that they were about to be caught following their bank robbery in 2011, there are many speculations regarding their death. Meanwhile, Beate Zschäpe, the only female member of the organization, set fire to the house where she lived with the other members and tried to destroy the video footage belonging to the NSU, which included the confessions of the murders. As Zschäpe turned herself in four days after the deaths of the other NSU members, the connection between the murders and the organization started to be unveiled. Although it is alleged that the NSU consists of only three members, there is a common belief in public that this number is actually much higher.

The NSU trial process

The NSU trial, which caused a burdensome cost to the German state, was finalized after five years of proceedings. It is suggested that the trial continued for such a long time since it encompassed a great deal of serious offenses including ten murders, 15 robberies and three bomb attacks, whereas the available data and documents pertinent to the incidents were insufficient. It took four years to collect evidence and complete the files. Another reason for the extension of the trial might be the frequent change in the judges and attorneys assigned to the case upon the requests of defendants.

The principal defendant – Beate Zschäpe – did not answer any of the questions directed to her until 2015, which also obstructed the trial. Zschäpe changed her defense strategy with her lawyers in 2015 and claimed that she has no relation with the murders and learnt about the incidents after they took place. She only took responsibility for setting fire to the house where she lived with the other two militants. Due to Zschäpe’s strategy of remaining silent, many aspects of the murders could not be illuminated and the court had to resort to a large number of witnesses and experts in order to collect evidence and documents. To that end, more than 600 people spoke as witnesses or experts. A total of 14 defense attorneys, more than 90 co-plaintiffs and 60 lawyers defending them got involved in the trial, which is among the main reasons for its extension.

The shady deaths of the eyewitnesses testifying as part of the trial is among the main aspects of the issue that is left in the dark. Throughout the five-year-long trial process, seven witnesses passed away. While some of them died from natural causes or diseases, the deaths of others raised doubts in public. To illustrate, the death of Melissa M. is among the shady ones. She died in a motorcycle accident only a month after testifying in court as part of the trial. Another witness for the NSU trial and an ex-member of German intelligence Thomas Richter was also found dead in his home during the course of the trial. But the most suspicious death during the trial was the death of Corinna B., a close friend of the main suspect Beate Zschape. Shortly before testifying to the research committee for the trial, Corinna was announced dead due to unknown causes. It does not seem likely that the deaths of witnesses during this trial were a mere coincidence.

The NSU trial is known in Germany as the trial of the century due to being the longest and most complex trial of the post-war era.

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German intelligence agencies and the NSU

One of the biggest questions left unanswered by the NSU trial is the relationship between the organization and German intelligence agencies. It is not yet clear how the NSU managed to avoid police until its detection in 2011 despite committing crimes that would otherwise attract high scrutiny. It is also known that German intelligence constantly monitors far-right extremist organizations and has undercover members in such organizations.

It was revealed that hours after members of the organization were captured and committed suicide and NSU’s sole living member Beate Zschape surrendered to the police, a German intelligence agency member had destroyed files on undercover agents. Cologne Prosecutor’s office had launched an investigation regarding this person in 2014 but the trial was closed after a 3.000-euro payment. It was also revealed that in 2012 the German Military Intelligence Agency MAD contacted NSU member Uwe Mundlos and suggested cooperation, but the latter declined this offer. The public response was significant after it became public knowledge that MAD had a file on Mundlos but chose to destroy it rather than present it to the investigation committee for the trial.

Secondly, during the last murder committed by the NSU, the murder of Halit Yozgat in a cafe, German intelligence agency member A. Temme was present in the location but claimed that he did not notice the murder because he was busy chatting on his computer. In addition, after the existence of a report on the NSU in Hessen state intelligence agency was revealed in 2017, the report was on court order restricted from public view for 120 years, which also raised suspicions.

Due to the fact that many intelligence files likely to be linked to the NSU were either destroyed or restricted to access, the link between German intelligence agencies and the NSU remains unclear.

The NSU trial and the public reaction

While the trial ended on Wednesday with Beate Zschape being sentenced to life in prison as expected, the ten-year sentence given to Wohlleben for supplying the organization with Ceska brand guns was met with confusion among the public since the prosecutor had asked for a fourteen-year sentence. Another decision of the court that caused disappointment among the plaintiffs and the public were the short sentences given to the defendants who were convicted of supporting the organization, the longest being 3 years. The neo-Nazis who followed the trial in the court room even clapped as the sentence of one such supporter, Andre Eminger, was being announced. Alexander Hoffman, one of the lawyers representing the plaintiffs, emphasized the shortness of this sentence by saying, “What this sentence means to supporters of terrorist groups is that they can go and commit whatever act they want and the consequence will only be two and a half years in prison.”

The NSU trial, since its beginning, has been followed very closely by Germans against racism, civil initiatives and journalists. In this regard, protests titled “Not Yet Over” (Kein Schlussstrich) were organized throughout Germany, demanding the NSU case to not be closed after the end of the trial. The families of the victims and the German public are also in agreement that certain aspects of the trial were left insufficiently investigated; aspects such as how and why the victims were chosen, how the organization acquired the guns it used and the relationship between German intelligence and the NSU.

German official authorities throughout the trial did not adopt a constructive stance that would help uncover aspects of the trial that went insufficiently investigated. Thus, the process that started in Germany with the NSU trial is unlikely to be truly finished until institutional racism in the country is faced and addressed accordingly.

The post The NSU Trial in Germany: Has Justice Really Served after 18 Years? appeared first on Politics Today.

]]> How Broken Deals in South Syria May Affect Northern Syria https://politicstoday.org/how-broken-deals-in-south-syria-may-affect-northern-syria/ Thu, 19 Jul 2018 10:53:46 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/how-broken-deals-in-south-syria-may-affect-northern-syria/

The YPG-dominated SDF may become frightened of how reliable their patron really is. It can be stated that the fear of the U.S. abandoning the YPG-dominated SDF is growing within the ranks of the partners of the U.S. In addition to the developments in southwest Syria, the Manbij roadmap between Turkey and the U.S. led to frustration within the SDF. Especially as the war against Daesh is coming to a near end, the YPG’s trust in the U.S. administration is declining.

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Mid-June this year the Assad regime began an extensive operation in southwest Syria aiming to get control of the last rebel stronghold region. The assault led to the displacement of 320,000 civilians and the regime made considerable territorial progress. However, the current situation in Syria’s southwest also questions the reliability of Russia and the U.S. as both states were guarantors for the de-escalation zone in Deraa.

Following large scale attacks from regime-allied militias and the Russian air force, Syrian rebels first lost ground at the Lajat valley. With time, and with the mediation of Russia, some rebel leaders negotiated a reconciliation agreement with the Assad regime. Even though Russia was (and still is) an active part of the ongoing military assault, it succeeded to position itself as a mediator between the rebels and the regime. To the cost of the Assad regime gaining control over the strategic Nassib border crossing to Jordan, thousands of displaced Syrians began heading home after the rebels and the regime reached a deal in southwest Syria.

While over the years the U.S. convinced Syrian rebels in Deraa to stop their military activities against the Assad regime in exchange for guarantees, the Russians promised to hold back the regime from attacking Deraa. Nevertheless, before the imminent start of the operation in southwest Syria, the U.S. informed the military opposition that they should not expect U.S.-support and political protection against the regime assault. On the other hand, Russia declared the end of the de-escalation zone in southwest Syria.

With the start of the assault in southwest Syria, Russia and the Assad regime gave the Syrian opposition two options: Reconcile with the regime or resist at the cost of a humanitarian crisis through heavy aerial bombardment. Rebels who were in a patron-client relation with the U.S. found themselves abandoned in front of a military superior Russian fire power.

Russia and the U.S. broke their deals with Israel and Jordan

Russia and the U.S. not only abandoned the armed Syrian opposition. Both states had initially made important promises to Jordan and Israel, which they failed to keep. While Jordan feared a new refugee wave, the Israeli government rejected the possibility of Iran-backed militias at the northern edge of the Golan Highs, which is occupied by Israel. Against all agreements between Jordan, the U.S. and Russia on one side, and Israel, the U.S. and Russia on the other, 60 thousands refugees are at the Jordan border and Iran-backed militias are part of the ongoing campaign in Deraa approaching the Israeli border, day-by-day.

For Israel the Russian intervention in Syria came at the cost of a growing Iran-backed militia and Hezbollah presence in Syria with better equipment and supplies. Therefore, the Israeli administration tried to find a solution with Russia and requested U.S. help against any Iranian aggression. Israel did not only limit itself to this, but also took action by itself by bombarding strategic Iranian positions with Syria. Geographically, Syrian rebels in southwest Syria were also a de-facto buffer between Israel and Hezbollah and other Iran-backed militias. With the current developments, Israel faces a bigger threat from Iran and its proxies to its northern border.

Possible impacts of the broken deals in southwest Syria for northern Syria

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In southwest Syria it was the U.S. who abandoned Syrian rebels and opened the way for a Russia-backed regime assault. One may argue that the U.S. lacked any military presence in Deraa in order to stop the Russian assault. However, seven years of war in Syria has showed that the cost of such an assault could become exorbitant if the U.S. decided to supply Syrian rebels with weapons and ammunition. Rising costs of a military operation is a strong argument for Russians to keep their promises. Thus, if the U.S. administration wanted to protect Syrian rebels, it would have done so.

The situation in southwest Syria also draws to the question as to whether the U.S. will abandon its partner forces in northeast Syria – the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) – in the face of a possible Russian assault. It’s known that the Assad regime want to re-gain the control of all of Syria. Until today, the U.S. has protected their partner force from various regime operations in Tabqah and DeirEzzor by using air force, but this may change in the future despite the Pentagon’s plans to expand their investment into their partner forces.

The YPG-dominated SDF may become frightened of how reliable their patron really is. It can be stated that the fear of the U.S. abandoning the YPG-dominated SDF is growing within the ranks of the partners of the U.S. In addition to the developments in southwest Syria, the Manbij roadmap between Turkey and the U.S. led to frustration within the SDF. Especially as the war against Daesh is coming to a near end, the YPG’s trust in the U.S. administration is declining.

One may argue that the nature of cooperation between the U.S. and SDF is quite different from the nature of the U.S. backing the southern front. While the rebels in southwest Syria were part of a “Train & Equip” program of the MOC operation room connected to the CIA, the “Train & Equip” program for the SDF is approved by the U.S. Congress as part of Pentagon’s efforts to eliminate Daesh.

In addition to these developments, the U.S. is only watching while Iran and Iran-backed militias are heading towards Israel despite Israel’s security concerns. If the U.S. isn’t willing or is not able to ease Israel’s security concerns by taking action due to Russian superiority in Syria, what guarantees that the U.S. will secure its partner forces from a decisive Russian position? On the other side, one can also argue that the patron-client relation between the U.S. and SDF is different to that with Syrian rebels in the southeast, as the U.S. installed several military bases in northeast Syria and invested a lot in its client.

However, with the above argument in mind, U.S.-backed forces have already began negotiating the handover of Raqqa to the Assad regime, and reports suggest that a delegation of the regime visited the city, which was captured from Daesh after 1784 airstrikes of the international coalition. According to reports, the negotiations included the arrest of members of an Arab brigade within the SDF – the Raqqa Revolutionaries Brigade. The YPG-dominated SDF and the Assad regime have reportedly agreed for the SDF to hand over the control of the Tishreen and Tabqa dams on the Euphrates River in northern Syria to the regime. Part of the negotiations between the SDF and the regime was also a full handover of Manbij, but both sides couldn’t agree on the role of the U.S. in this case.

Prior to the Trump-Putin summit in Helsinki on July 16, reports emerged suggested a possible deal between the two sides in regards to Syria, which includes Russian and the Assad regime’s expansion of outreach to northeast Syria. According to the Washing Post, this was proposed by McGurk. However, during the press conference given by the two leaders, Syria was only mentioned regarding Israel’s security concerns and the future re-constriction efforts in Syria.

The U.S. decision to abandon rebels in southern Syria facing Russian pressure also meant abandoning Israel and Jordan in many ways. This development may also affect the U.S. position in northern Syria. U.S. partner forces and the SDF have a different patron-client relationship with the U.S. in comparison to southern rebels. The U.S. invested a lot, proved to be ready to protect its client against the regime and officially plans to further invest in its client. Nevertheless, the U.S. retraction in southwest Syria led the SDF to question how reliable the U.S. administration would be in front of real Russia pressure. In this regard, the SDF had negotiations on its own with the regime and agreed to hand over two strategic dams to Assad, trying to ease its dependence from its patron and trying to prevent the regime from risking a confrontation by opening the way for negotiations and deals.

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]]> The Role of Turkey’s Diyanet During the July 15 Coup Attempt https://politicstoday.org/the-role-of-turkeys-diyanet-during-the-july-15-coup-attempt/ Sun, 15 Jul 2018 14:01:05 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/the-role-of-turkeys-diyanet-during-the-july-15-coup-attempt/

People were invited to take the streets not only for the love of God or country, but also for the love of democracy, while it was highlighted that the national will, elected government, president or the Parliament could be altered with arms and coups.

The post The Role of Turkey’s Diyanet During the July 15 Coup Attempt appeared first on Politics Today.

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One of the most important actors on the night of July 15, 2016, was the personnel of the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Calling mosque staff in all cities to duty, the directorate consolidated the people’s resistance against the coup taking place in Istanbul and Ankara. In this respect, in an unprecedented way, mosques broadcasted messages calling people to go out on the streets and thwart the coup attempt. This process, during which the Directorate of Religious Affairs personnel faced dangers such as going through a conflict zone or being attacked by some Turkish citizens verbally and physically, was initiated with former President of Religious Affairs Mehmet Gormez’s verbal instruction on Ulke TV when he reached the TV channel through phone around 11:40 PM:

“I ask all of my devoted brothers out there, please each and every one of you run to the minarets. First recite salawats to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), then invite all people of Turkey to protect their rights and will.”

In addition to this verbal instruction on TV, the directorate personnel received a text written by Mehmet Gormez around 01:00 AM:

“My fellow devoted brother, doing whatever we can to protect the rights of our people is our duty. We can never allow this country and its people to be divided, deprived of peace and prosperity along with the will of people being infringed through coercion and violence. As the spiritual guides of our nation, we will stand with the people against all illegal initiatives. I call all of you to resist this heinous treachery [the coup attempt] in a nonviolent way by going up the minarets, the symbol of our freedom. Tonight, lights of minaret should remain on and the people of Turkey should be invited to protect their rights via reciting salawats.

Mehmet Gormez”

After this instruction of Mehmet Gormez, sounds of salawats, call to prayers, prayers and announcements rose from the minarets. Gormez had given the general framework to muezzins and let them do whatever they can within this framework. This situation revealed a rich potential of materials; while some muezzins recited salawats unceasingly, others were inviting people to resistance after salawats, praying in Turkish/Arabic, reciting “salat-ı ümmiye,” Turkey’s national anthem and poems.

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Shaped through improvisation in terms of content, this rich material gave insight to the relations between the July 15-religion in particular and religion-state/politics/democracy/military in general along with how these relations were perceived by Turkish society. In addition, it also revealed how the directorate personnel viewed this sinister event and how they conveyed their views to the public along with uncovering how one of the most effective motivators functioned. In this respect, this material is crucial and for this reason it would be beneficial to look at what happened on the night of July 15 from this perspective through the common points that could be found among limited sources:

Looking at the mood of these calls and prayers, it is clear that there is an apparent and dominant “war of independence” or invasion psychology. This wasn’t a coup aiming to overthrow the government, but the state, call to prayer, the flag and independence – all of which are seen as synonymous. “Europe,” “the U.S.” “Zionists,” “Christians,” “heretics,” “hypocrites” and co-conspiring traitors are behind this coup attempt. This psychology had an impact on the frequent recitation of the Turkish national anthem written along with Arif Nihat Asya’s poem “Biz Kısık Sesleriz” [“We are the husky voices”]. Meanwhile, referred historical figures also reflect this psychology: Ulubatli Hasan, Mehmed the Conquerer, Abdulhamid II, Sütçü İmam…

National unity and solidarity are among the most underscored arguments during the calls made from minarets. Undoubtedly, this was the case because it wasn’t a solely military coup; it was perpetrated by a religious order which had a social correspondence. In this respect, with the addition of indiscriminate usage of heavy weaponry against the people, the coup was seen more of a threat than just a struggle for power between two parties or an attempt to shift power. This perception was due to the damage caused by violent political and social conflicts in Syria and Egypt in the near past being still fresh in the memory of people.

Protecting democracy and the national will were two points that were frequently expressed by religious officials when calling people to resist. People were invited to take the streets not only for the love of God or country, but also for the love of democracy, while it was highlighted that the national will, elected government, president or the Parliament could be altered with arms and coups, that was a clear threat.

The post The Role of Turkey’s Diyanet During the July 15 Coup Attempt appeared first on Politics Today.

]]> FETO: Portrait of a Terrorist Organization https://politicstoday.org/feto-portrait-of-a-terrorist-organization/ Sun, 15 Jul 2018 09:26:50 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/feto-portrait-of-a-terrorist-organization/

We must not forget that FETO is the product of an 'intelligence thinking' and the group's structure and activities were shaped by the same line of thinking. As such, the organization poses a security threat not just to Turkey but also other countries where it remains operational.

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Exactly two years has passed since the July 15, 2016, coup attempt in Turkey, but the fight against the terrorist organization led by the U.S.-based former imam Fetullah Gulen, officially known as FETO, remains at the top of the country’s agenda. The sustained importance of this issue stems from the discovery of new evidence about the organization as well as the opposition’s approach to Turkey’s crackdown on the FETO network.

In the wake of the July 15 coup attempt, Turkey launched a proactive campaign against FETO terrorism. It is necessary to note, however, that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s commitment to this struggle predated the failed coup. As a matter of fact, he described the group as a ‘parallel state’ in the immediate aftermath of the judicial coup attempt on December 17-25, 2013. A designated terrorist organization that the National Security Council (MGK) officially identified as a threat against Turkey’s national security, FETO suffered major setbacks since the July 15 coup attempt, as its operational capabilities within the country were completely eliminated – at least for the time being. The declaration of a state of emergency, coupled with a number of decreed issues within that legal framework, facilitated the dismissal of FETO members, affiliates and contacts from the public service. Others, who actively participated in the organization’s illegal activities, were brought to justice. Over the following months, Turkish courts handed down various sentences to defendants over their links to FETO and their complicity in the July 15 coup attempt.

The question today is whether Turkey’s struggle against this 50-year-old organization, which is half as old as the Republic itself, has reached its conclusion. In order to answer this question, we must provide the following analysis and support the claims mentioned in it.

First of all, FETO has never been a religious organization. Since its formation, the group operated as a terrorist organization. Provided that it successfully disguised itself as a faith community, however, resulted in an overall failure to understand the movement’s true nature until the July 15 coup attempt.

Fundamental qualities of the organization

In order to fully appreciate the challenges that Turkish authorities face in their fight against FETO, it is necessary to understand what kind of organization it really is. At the same time, it is crucial to raise awareness about the threat posed by FETO members, whom certain foreign governments continue to harbor, to host FETO members around the world.

According to many counterterrorism experts who describe FETO as a terrorist organization, the group does not share the organization structure and operational processes with others. Developing a deeper understanding of the organization, whose members are radicalized by Fetullah Gulen’s cult of personality, is also key to the success of ongoing efforts to defeat it. To be clear, it is not possible to argue that FETO is known or has been explained sufficiently.

The first defining feature of cult movements is that their authoritarian leaders are considered sacred by their followers. Since the organization’s establishment, Gulen’s most significant accomplishment was to identify himself as a holy person. As a self-proclaimed chosen person, Gulen repeatedly compared himself to the Prophet Muhammad over the years. At other times, he presented himself as the executioner of His wishes. In doing so, Gulen took necessary precautions to ensure his total control over the organization. As a paranoid individual, he single-handedly decided which of his followers would marry and how they would name their children. Gülen also monitored the communications of his closest associates in an effort to concentrate all powers in his own hands.

FETO is also quite capable of indoctrination, which is the second most important quality of cult movements. As a matter of fact, the entire organization is a reflection of Gülen himself. A closer look at the group would reveal that it shares the personality traits of its leader. As such, the organization shares Gülen’s sinister nature, desire for becoming a legend, fear of death, tendency to alienate others, eagerness to hide his true motives and lack of confidence. Gulen was able to accomplish this goal with the help of a powerful network of indoctrination. Over the years, recordings, preparation schools and educational institutions have been the most significant carriers of Gulen’s messages. It was thereby that the organization’s leader came to control the minds of recruits from their childhood onwards. Those individuals, whose minds came to be controlled, became main players within the ‘parallel state’ in later years. With a sense of absolute devotion, they swallowed all discourse and actions of Gulen and his organization without reservation. Despite the overwhelming evidence against Gulen, for example, many members of the organization continue to turn a blind eye to the criminal nature of its activities out of absolute devotion and the hope of a better future.

To be clear, the nature of FETO was unmistakably shaped by the objectives of its sponsors. For example, many people view the organization’s current state as a deviation from religious principles over time. Quite the contrary, FETO has never been a religious movement. Instead, it has always been a terrorist organization. Instead of undermining state authority through armed struggle like traditional terrorist organizations, it aimed to infiltrate various public institutions to create a ‘parallel state’ which would take over the country’s government when the time came. Almost all sources on FETO, however, lack a coherent analysis of its emergence – – even though Gulen has always been open about his ultimate goal. A careful analysis would reveal that only a handful studies delve into the organization’s relationship with the Peace Volunteers Movement, a product of Washington’s anti-communist campaign that started its activities in Turkey in the early 1960s (just as Gulen was starting out), or how much time Gulen used to spend at the American locale in Edirne and his links to intelligence officers during his military service.

At all stages of its evolution, FETO remained capable of easily adapting to changing political circumstances in Turkey and around the world.  In other words, it assumed the shape of its container. It used religion to conceal its true identity and seized the opportunities it entailed.

At which level is Turkey in its fight against FETO?

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The first step taken in order to fight with FETO was to initiate investigations against kumpas davaları (trials that FETO promoted with manipulations and fake evidences) which were used by FETO for the purpose of providing a “legal” dimension to its illegal activities. By these illegal activities, FETO aimed to speed up its organizational structuration in public institutions such as the Turkish Armed Forces.

OHAL (state of emergency) was put into action following the July 15 failed coup attempt. Then, with the help of decree laws issued in this state of emergency, the elimination of FETO members in public officials and breaking their power in various fields mainly including the spheres of education, media and economy, were at the top of the agenda. Dismissal of persons, who take orders from their “brothers” and “sisters” in the organization instead of their chiefs in the public offices, can be understood in this context. In this way, public personnel who have connections with FETO were dismissed and legal proceedings against them were initiated for the reason of abusing the possibilities offered by the state.

In order to block activities of FETO in the field of education, nearly 2.000 schools, student dormitories and various courses in connection with the organization have been closed by the Ministry of National Education.

Also, precautions were taken against the economic power of FETO by dealing with companies such as Bank Asya and Group of Koza Ipek, who act as intermediaries for money laundering. Trustees were appointed to these companies and suspicious past activities of them were examined by ministries, institutions and organizations.

The process of removing the effects of FETO from the state, as the most important part of the fight against FETO, is not an individual-centered approach but rather it aims to remove groups whose activities were infected with terrorism/crime. Up to now, 287 lawsuits were filed against the coup attempt and 171 cases reached at decisions. In these cases, 2.140 people were sentenced.

Turkey continues to struggle with FETO even in the international arena. Various information and documents have been forwarded to interlocuters in order to struggle with the manipulations initiated by the terrorist organization. In this context, authority in FETO schools in many places, especially in the Balkans and African countries, were delivered to the Republic of Turkey.

FETO isn’t just a threat against Turkey

Starting with the judiciary and law enforcement, the officials conducting Turkey’s fight against FETO, along with the political leadership behind the agenda, cracked down on the organization’s network at unprecedented levels. Keeping in mind Gulen’s character traits, it is important to highlight that the organization cannot be completely incapacitated in a short period of time. After all, FETO isn’t limited to its public profile. Since April 2017, the Turkish National Police has identified the organization’s undercover cells within the state apparatus and security operations concentrated on those specific targets. In light of newly available evidence, the Turkish authorities concluded that FETO was an extremely potent covert organization. It is possible to argue that each visible component of the organization has a ‘parallel’ or hidden counterpart. For example, it became clear that all FETO members within the Turkish Armed Forces reported to other, ghost-like members (known as hidden imams within the group). Regardless of their ranks, those operatives received orders and instructions from individuals other than their superiors within the military hierarchy. This specific arrangement meant that FETO became a ‘parallel state’ par excellence and was indeed a terrorist organization seeking to seize control of the state apparatus.

In addition to generating revenue for the group, FETO schools across the world served as a source of new recruits who would be trained to become part of the ‘parallel state.’ For the sake of presenting itself as a peaceful movement, FETO used its educational institutions as a front. Although Turkey ended the group’s activities in the area of education, it is important to note that Gulen’s school network became the organization’s backbone in recent years. Gulen-affiliated schools in the United States, Europe, Central Asia and Africa carry on supporting the survival of the organization. According to information obtained from individuals, who were captured in Ukrain, Sudan, Kosovo, Azerbaijan and Gabon in recent months by the Turkish intelligence servcices, they served as principals or teachers at FETO schools.

FETO schools outside Turkey must be considered serious national security threats in host countries. After all, those institutions formed the backbone of the group’s presence in other countries. First and foremost, countries harboring identified FETO members are now the new centers of the organization. These countries violate international law and diplomatic norms by supporting a terrorist organization, which attempted to overthrow Turkey’s democratically elected government in 2016, to seem unreliable. At the same time, they render themselves defenseless against potential attacks by FETO members. It is no secret that the children of local elites in many countries, where the group operates, are enrolled in schools affiliated with Gulen. As a matter of fact, it is possible to argue that political elites in countries, where FETO launched educational institutions relatively early, are graduates of those schools. In this regard, the group forms ‘parallel states’ in those countries as well.

On July 15, 2016, Turkey encountered the single greatest act of rebellion in the history of the Republic – which it overcame thanks to the sacrifice of the ordinary people. In the wake of the coup attempt, the country launched an all-out offensive against FETO. Although significant progress has been made within the country, members of the organization, who fled Turkey ahead of the failed coup, continue a smear campaign against the country. In this regard, many countries, including Turkey’s self-proclaimed allies in the West, do not pay the due attention to the steps taken by Turks in the international arena. Although there is irrefutable evidence linking Gulen to the coup attempt in Turkey, those countries are unwilling to extradite senior leaders of the organization to Turkey. We must not forget that FETO is the product of an ‘intelligence thinking’ and the group’s structure and activities were shaped by the same line of thinking. As such, the organization poses a security threat not just to Turkey but also other countries where it remains operational. Let us hope that those who ignore the FETO threat today can see the group for what it really is before it is too late.

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]]> How FETO Became Fanatic and Dogmatic https://politicstoday.org/how-feto-became-fanatic-and-dogmatic/ Sun, 15 Jul 2018 03:04:05 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/how-feto-became-fanatic-and-dogmatic/

There was never innocence within FETO and the members of the criminal cult only paid respect to their leader - Fetullah Gulen - who they believed to be the "messiah."

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“Once innocence is lost, it’s not possible to find it again,” says Bauman. When people start to taint their God-given nature with or without intent, being aware of it or not, nothing will be like it used to before. In this respect, infer the following inspired by the verses “Are those who know equal to those who do not know?” (Az-Zumar 9) and “The darkness and the light are not equal” (Fatir 20): Are those who protect their candor, innocence and humanity equal to those who do not? Holy texts are full of examples who betray themselves, their society, nature and ultimately God himself by failing to protect their innocence. I believe it’s enough to remind Lucifer’s disobedience and Cain’s murder of his brother Able.

To comprehend the loss of innocence is the issue. Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) defines feeling guilty as “remorse” (Ibn Majah, Zuhd, 30). To feel remorse, one should be aware of its crime; moreover, one should reprimand himself/herself. We see that Prophet Jonah submits to the God Almighty by saying “Indeed, I have been of the wrongdoers” (Al-Anbya 87) despite being a prophet himself, while Lucifer constantly avoids facing his crime and loss of innocence through arrogance (Al-Baqarah 34) and trying to justify itself (Al-A’raf 12). This is where the soul and mind become devilish.

FETO’s dogmatism

2 years has passed since the heinous July 15 coup attempt perpetrated by FETO. Turkey was in intensive care for a year, trying to come back to life. Our state, its government (Justice and Development Party, or AK Party for short) and those who backed them both (Nationalist Movement Party, or MHP for short) have implemented meticulous policies throughout this process. We have experienced the individual and societal trauma caused by the attempted attack on the state organization and democratic system. It’s without doubt that some were victimized by false accusations and denouncements motivated by the purple brain or personal ambitions. We see that these wrongs are being corrected incrementally.

The discrepancy between FETO’s apparent facet and hidden agenda, thus it’s extreme form of dissimulation (taqiyya), have inflicted wounds to the minds of all Muslims, especially Islamists, the pious and nationalist-conservatives. Firstly, the treatment of this wound isn’t as easy as it seems. An indomitable will by a resolute political administration is required.

Let’s go back to where it all started. FETO, which was deemed innocent by the public prior to 2012, lost its innocence through the December 17-25 events and the July 15 coup attempt. We are facing a structure characterized by Hoffer’s “true believers” and Rokeach’s “closed [dogmatic] mind.” A mental and emotional rigidity with the potential of fanaticism… Caused by unshakeable belief and utmost devotion, this condition was defined as “being a hashhashin,” referring to Hasan as-Sabbah’s original assassins.

Why? Because with the mind-numbing opium, people transform into mindless drones. It’s possible to talk about Marx’s remark that “religion is the opium of the people.” In FETO’s hand, religion turns into an opiate. For this reason, its members don’t feel remorse about attempting to suspend democracy and infringe the constitution along with killing hundreds of people. According to their belief, remorse is only possible if they disobey FETO leader Gulen, their acclaimed “messiah.”

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Considering Fromm described such structures as “authoritarian,” it’s easy to understand how the leaders of fascist organizations are idolized. In this respect, loyalty and trust is only reserved for the leader in FETO. The belief that only the leader represents the truth has invaded every cell of their being. They evaluate every knowledge and information only according to their narrow ideology and purpose. If the provided knowledge and information is compatible with the organization’s teachings, it is accepted easily; otherwise, they will deny. “They have hearts with which they do not understand, they have eyes with which they do not see, and they have ears with which they do not hear” (Al-A’raf 179) describes the type of dogmatic and fanatical people in such authoritarian organizations perfectly.

Fanaticism takes only one step from dogmatism. Fanatics possess all the traits of dogmatic thought process and personality. However, they’re more prone to employing violence. Regardless of religious exploitation, rigid authoritarian structures all possess psychosocial issues like seeing the world in black and white, failing to see the grey zones, monopolizing the truth, perceiving the future with a pessimistic outlook, feeling insecure and accepting only other members as their brothers and sisters. All of these could be observed in FETO; yet, there is more: fanaticism. Individual or organizational, fanaticism is characterized by violence and aggression caused by contracting consciousness. In this regard, FETO isn’t only a dogmatic organization, but also a fanatical one.

The December 17-25 events and the heinous July 15 coup attempt has shown that Gulenism believes the ends justify the means and that it is a terrorist organization using violence unfetteredly. Similar to FETO, the PKK with its Marxist and leftist discourse is also a dogmatic and fanatical organization. So, it’s not hard to understand how these two terrorist organizations have found common ground in inflicting harm to the Turkish people and the state. We see that once innocence is lost everything is permitted.

In psychology, such personalities are deemed as morbose and it’s contagious. Brainwashing, inculcation and persuasion  strategies uniform the members, rendering them into one dimensional personalities. Members of FETO and similar organizations always have strong reaction mechanisms; what I mean by this mechanism is that there is a discrepancy between how they appear and what they actually are. Then, lets ask the question again: did the FETO leader and his followers lose their innocence after December 17-25 and July 15? It’s apparent that this organization that employs and encourages dissimulation has used a different language while they speak with pious people, Kemalists, and with a fellow member. This means innocence never existed.

The July 15 resistance is a milestone

There is another question to ask: why does Turkey suffer a coup or a coup attempt, which is backed by external powers, every 10-15 years? The answer should be sought in terms such as trauma, instability and discontinuity. The 1960 military coup traumatized our grandfathers, 1980 coup traumatized our fathers, February 28, 1997, coup traumatized ourselves and the July 15 coup attempt traumatized our children. Could these traumatized generations attempt to develop the country, build a civilization or challenge imperialism and capitalism? They can hardly do it anymore. Due to political instability, development is interrupted. In turn, his interruption creates transitional periods, wasting generations in a decade or so. What needs to be done is clear; we need to be politically stable and achieve continuity in development.

In his book “The Foundations of Civilization,” Will Durant insistently underscores the importance of a resolute state structure, political stability and economic order. Durant also expresses that religion and morality along with advanced scientific researches, literature and arts are indispensable elements of a civilization. It’s high time that we leave our traumas behind, achieve development and stability, and rebuild our civilization. The heinous July 15 coup attempt taught us that coups are history in this country. Nevertheless, the state should be equally distanced from either secular or religious organizations and should try to pull them towards legitimate grounds. Why? “Too much trust is too much indeed,” says Shakespeare.

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]]> Will the EU Keep the JCPOA Alive? https://politicstoday.org/will-the-eu-keep-the-jcpoa-alive/ Tue, 10 Jul 2018 03:01:23 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/will-the-eu-keep-the-jcpoa-alive/

While the EU’s grand effort to keep the JCPOA alive seems to fail in the future, unlike the U.S., the participant countries have shown that they still maintain the channel of communication with the government of Iran.

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Upon the request from Iran, on July 6, 2018, the remaining parties of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) gathered to discuss the future of the agreement at the Joint Commission. The officials and leaders of Iran, China, Russia, the U.K., France, Germany, and European Union leaders had initiated bilateral talks in order to underline their commitments to the agreement. However, the remaining countries of the agreement have held this multilateral meeting for the first time since President Trump announced to withdraw from the Iran Nuclear deal. Chaired by the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini, foreign ministers from the countries that remained in the JCPOA attended the meeting to discuss the ability to export gas and oil from Iran.

The diplomatic language in the statement released after the meeting appears to be promising for the future of the agreement.  As stated in the bilateral meetings, attendants of this meeting were not reluctant to mention that they “reconfirmed their commitment to the full and effective implementation” of the agreement. The remaining JCPOA countries intend to keep themselves motivated when considering the list of objectives attached in the statement. According to the list, parties aim to, among others, increase the economic and sectorial cooperation. Most importantly, they added the objective of protecting “companies from the exterritorial effects of U.S. sanctions,” which has been the most severe legal impediment to implement the JCPOA effectively. In other words, the extraterritoriality of the upcoming sanctions imposed by the U.S. authorities will hamper the ability of the remaining parties to comply with the obligations arising from the nuclear deal.

In regards to the withdrawal of the U.S., the remaining parties began to formulate several means to tackle with the U.S. sanctions against Iran. As included in the statement, one of these means includes the adoption of the “Blocking Statute” which aims to protect European companies operating in Iran against the U.S. sanctions by preventing a judgment of a court located outside the EU to be enforced.

The question arises as to what extent the EU will effectively address this by adopting a blocking statute, regarding the fact that several European companies have already decided to terminate their business in Iran. This was worrisome when considering the lengthy legislative process and the structural changes in the EU. It was unlikely that the immediate reaction coming from EU leaders in the political arena or at the bilateral level did facilitate the complexities in the language of the legislation drafted in 1996. Since 1996, the EU has passed tremendous changes, adopted three main treaties that have altered the primary structure of the EU. These changes include the ones in the realm of EU financial institutions, which are mainly “reliant on access to U.S. markets and the U.S. dollar.”

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In the meeting on July 6, 2018, the participants shortly noted that the blocking regulations were now in the process of updating. This procedure could be summarized as follows:  On May 16, 2018, the President of the EU Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, along with the High Representative Mogherini, presented the proposal to update the blocking statute. The proposal includes four comprehensive measures to be taken. First, the list of U.S. sanctions on Iran will be updated in order to determine the scope of secondary sanctions that could potentially be imposed against European companies. Second, the proposal will aim to eliminate the impediments for the European Investment Bank by guaranteeing financial activities in Iran. However, it was also noted that by adopting this proposal, the EIB was not intended actually to support projects in Iran. Third, the proposal will focus on sectorial cooperation with Iran, especially in the energy sector. Fourth, the EU Commission will encourage Member States of the EU to find out the options of one-off bank transfers to the Central Bank of Iran in order to transfer oil-related revenues.

Last month, on June 6, 2018, the EU Commission adopted the proposal, and it will enter into force in 2 months unless other institutions, namely the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union object to the proposal. Recently, on July 4, an attempt to object to this proposal was made by the far-right political group EFDD but it failed with only 93 votes for, 573 against and 11 abstentions. As to the Council of the EU, formed by the ministers from the Members States, can, in principle, raise their objections but they are expected to follow their leaders who agreed to stand with the proposal. It is likely that the EU will adopt the blocking statutes in order to cope with U.S. secondary sanctions, albeit the capacity to cope with the U.S. sanctions remains unclear.

In addition to the legislation procedure in the realm of the EU, the meeting held on July 6 gives several significant indications for the future of the Iran deal. Most importantly, as experts argue, the statement released after the meeting does not specify “any concrete means” to achieve the abovementioned goals. This two-page statement with ten clauses does not declare a clear roadmap for Iran and other remaining countries in the deal as expected.

While the EU’s grand effort to keep the JCPOA alive seems to fail in the future, unlike the U.S., the participant countries have shown that they still maintain the channel of communication with the government of Iran. In order to maintain peace in the region, states that remain in the agreement took a more difficult challenge than just withdrawing.

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]]> The Rise of Asia Against the Weakened Western Alliance https://politicstoday.org/the-rise-of-asia-against-the-weakened-western-alliance/ Thu, 28 Jun 2018 10:34:49 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/the-rise-of-asia-against-the-weakened-western-alliance/

Trump, in his attempt to undermine China’s hegemony in the Asia Pacific, is harming the Western alliance. Due to these reasons, policies adopted by the U.S. and China, dubbed G7 countries, and being the principal actors of the global order, may trigger many-faceted trade wars in the following period.

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Behaviors of U.S. President Donald Trump occupied the 44th G7 summit held in Canada this year, which had a distinct atmosphere compared to previous summits held every year. Trump’s uncompromising attitude and his announcement regarding U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement, which he made during the summit in Italy last year, have led some to argue that the G7 is effectively becoming a G6.

One should note that several decisions made by President Trump, such as withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Paris Climate Agreement and the nuclear agreement with Iran (JCPOA), opening NAFTA for renegotiation, putting negotiations regarding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) on hold and recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel has led to deep differences of opinion between the U.S. and other G7 countries. In addition, his recent statement regarding the fact that his policy of imposing a 25% tariff rate on imported steel and 10% tariff on imported aluminum would include the European Union, Canada and Mexico by June 1, 2018, has been met with great reaction and anxiety among the Western allies of the U.S. Following this decision, which would affect the current balance of international trade, the rest of the G7 countries tried to persuade the U.S. administration to abandon this policy in order to avoid disrupting the liberal economic order.

As a reaction to Trump’s policies, 29 ambassadors from the EU sent an open letter to the president on the first day of the summit. The letter stated that the trade and investment relationships between the U.S. and the EU have been a win-win for both parties for years; the U.S. has benefited from its trade with the EU more than anyone else. Furthermore, the letter suggested to cooperate against China. Prior to the G7 leaders’ summit, the finance ministers of the six-member countries also repeated the call to withdraw tariffs. Thus, the main subject during the G7 summit was the heavy tariffs imposed on steel and aluminum by the U.S. President.

During the summit, Canada, the biggest trade partner of the U.S., made several attempts to resolve the situation to no avail. With close inspection, one can see that Canada exports an important amount of steel and by itself provides over 50% of U.S. aluminum imports. Attempts to open negotiations made by the Canadian Prime Minister led to heated exchanges between the U.S. and Canada. After Trump’s accusation of “backstabbing,” several high-ranking U.S. bureaucrats also targeted Trudeau with heavy accusations and criticisms. Trudeau, accused of being unfair by Trump, stressed the fact that Canadian workers, just like American workers, needed to be protected, and reminded Trump that he ought to be a fair-trade partner. Following his press conference with Trump, Trudeau stated that Canada will also impose new tariffs on July 1 in retaliation to the U.S., signaling that the protectionist policies of the Trump administration will not go without response.

Western allies, who had hoped to persuade Trump during this year’s summit, failed to achieve any progress and the summit revealed the fractured state of the western bloc. The fact that the other six countries of the G7 cooperated against the U.S. and made joint announcement signifies that the trade war sparked by Trump will not be one-sided. While such a trade war in a situation where countries compete against each other will not have any winners, it has the potential to cause a global recession and to negatively impact the prosperity of the world.

When we take a look at the statistics of trade between the G7 countries, an interesting picture emerges. More than one third of the U.S. $568 billion trade deficit as of 2017 was due to its trade with G7 countries. The fact that the U.S. is running trade deficits with all G7 member countries except from the United Kingdom provides important context for the merchant attitude displayed by Trump during the summit.

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The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO): A new organization versus a divided G7

The protectionist policies adopted by Trump are hurting Asian countries as much as they are western countries. Following the election, the Trump administration focused on competition with China and forced the Western world to act in cooperation. Stating that allies who do not act in accordance of this particular vision should not count on the U.S. for further support, Trump has illustrated that the U.S. is aiming for a bilateral competition with China, and that the U.S. no longer wants to finance the liberal world. Trump’s “Russia should’ve been here” statement during the G7and his tweets following his early departure were highlights of the event. Some even claimed that Trump’s behavior is aimed at destroying the Western alliance.

The fact that on the same day of the G7 summit another summit was being held on the other side of the Atlantic by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization supports this theory. With messages promoting cooperation and unity at a time when Western allies are bickering among themselves for economic gain, the SCO – which claims to be an alternative bloc to the West – signaled to the world that a new center of power now exists. Putin’s emphasis on the rising economic power of the SCO especially drew attention. In reference to the SCO’s combined economic power – over $15 trillion – which totals to 20% of the world economy, the Russian President claimed that the SCO is stronger than the G7 in terms of purchasing power parity. One can appreciate how bright the future of the SCO compared to the G7 by noting that China and India – the two fastest growing economies in the world – will account for 40% of the global GDP growth in the next 10 years. While undoubtedly, this organization should not be expected to succeed in the immediate future, its claim of being an alternative to the Western alliance should not be underestimated. In opposition to the West, which is experiencing clashes of economic interest, the internal harmony displayed by the SCO illustrates that it is a new focus of power.

Deepening divisions among the West and the Rise of Asia

The G7 summit ended tensely after heavy criticisms directed to Canada by the U.S. President and his decision not to sign the joint statement at the end of the summit. The disagreements on trade not only failed to be resolved during the summit, but even grew tenser. President Trump and his advisors, following neo-mercantilist policies, state at every given opportunity that they will put their national interests first, disregarding international norms and thus following protectionist and one-sided approaches. Similarly, the Trump administration does not hesitate to repeatedly declare that they do not want to finance the liberal global order. Therefore, the grounds that justify the superiority of the U.S. in the current global order are now being debated more than ever. Trade wars seem inevitable in a global atmosphere such as this, where political balances are shifting profoundly. If other countries were to react in cooperation to Trump’s continued protectionist policies, this would be met with great anxiety in the global economy and the implementation of such reactionary policies may cause trade wars on a global scale.

On the other hand, the U.S., while adopting more aggressive policies after the incredible economic rise of China, is also shifting its military presence to the Asia Pacific, and is adopting protectionist policies in order to maintain its economic superiority in the global arena. Trump is acting destructively in his economic and political relations with the West. However, he is more constructive and cooperative when it comes to relationships with Asia. Within this framework, it’s important to note that Trump left the G7 summit early to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un. So, Trump, in his attempt to undermine China’s hegemony in the Asia Pacific, is harming the Western alliance. The policies that the two leading global actors such as the U.S. and China – who have become referred to as the G2 – will implement against each other, can trigger multifaceted trade wars.

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]]> Taking Stock of Turkey’s Historic Elections https://politicstoday.org/taking-stock-of-turkeys-historic-elections/ Thu, 28 Jun 2018 08:00:43 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/taking-stock-of-turkeys-historic-elections/

The June 24 elections were the first general elections that were held in the aftermath of the failed military coup attempt on July 15, 2016, and as such they represented the dawn of democratic normalization and a potential end to the state of emergency that was declared after the coup.

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After weeks of intensive campaigning and eager anticipation, Turkey successfully accomplished yet another test of democratic maturity by holding the combined general and presidential elections last Sunday. The fact that these elections constituted a milestone for the paradigmatic transition towards the presidential government system ensured that they were fiercely fought by both the government and the opposition parties with the notable addition of public relation initiatives by the presidential candidates. These were the first general elections that were held in the aftermath of the failed military coup attempt on July 15, 2016, and as such they represented the dawn of democratic normalization and a potential end to the state of emergency that was declared after the coup.

Despite all the hype and misinformation in mainstream international media accusing President Erdogan of authoritarianism and the government for suppressing the political opposition, pretty much all the stakeholders agreed that the elections were held in an open, free and fair environment. The campaign trail was peaceful and turned the whole country into a festival zone via vibrant promotion endeavors by the parties and candidates.

On election day, voter turnout was around 87 per cent which represented one of the highest participation rates in Turkey’s democratic history, comfortably surpassing most of the established democratic polities in the world. Electoral alliances ensured that the ten per cent threshold for entry to the parliament was not applied and almost 99 per cent of the votes cast for political parties were reflected as parliamentary representation.

The incumbent Justice and Development Party (AK Party), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), the Iyi Party, the Democrat Party (DP), the Felicity Party (SP) and the Great Union Party (BBP) will be represented in the forthcoming parliament. The parliament will be one of the most representative and inclusive parliaments in Turkey’s political history. So there is no discussion concerning the procedural validity or democratic legitimacy of the election results.

When it comes to gauging the winners and losers of the elections, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan emerged undoubtedly as the biggest winner with yet another crystal clear victory over his political opponents. He received over 52 per cent of the total votes and was successfully elected in the first round as the first president of Turkey under the new presidential government system. Being the dominant political actor who placed his mark on Turkey’s political, economic and social transformation over the course of the 2000s, Erdogan managed an effective campaign and confirmed once again that he retains the confidence of the Turkish electorate going forward as the most credible leader.

Erdogan has been in power as Prime Minister and President for the last sixteen years without interruption and managed to record thirteen election victories. Despite risks of democratic fatigue and popular reaction to some of the government actions by certain social groups, the personal political popularity and societal approval of Erdogan seems to withstand the toughest tests of time. While clinching his latest landslide victory in the presidential elections, he managed to receive nearly eleven million votes more than his closest rival Muharrem İnce. It is really very difficult to cite another political leader in the modern democratic world with such strong and consistent democratic credentials.

The reluctance of Western media to understand and analyze the uniqueness of the deep bond between Erdogan and the Turkish society lets them to confuse unrivaled democratic legitimacy with authoritarianism. The Turkish President displays exceptional capacity to create a popular blend of socio-economic stability, structural transformation, improved public services, increased living standards and identity politics which is translated into sustained electoral success.

But it was also interesting to note that for the first time in these elections there was a ten per cent gap between Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (52 to 42 per cent) which indicated a performance divergence. Although the People’s Alliance, comprising the AK Party (295 MPs), MHP (49 MPs) and BBP (1 MP), which was born out of the popular resistance to the July 15 coup attempt clinched a clear parliamentary majority, Erdogan in his traditional balcony speech on election night frankly expressed that he received the ‘message of the electorate’ and will oversee a thorough post-election analysis.

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So far, taking electoral demands, reactions, or signals swiftly into account through rational and well-researched analyses has been one of the greatest strengths of Erdogan. Therefore, it is pretty likely that he will gather detailed reports concerning the dynamics that affected AK Party votes in certain cities as a result of candidate selections for the parliament, performance of local administrations, or certain economic policies. Therefore, the post June 24 process will witness Erdogan’s multifaceted attempts to oversee a great transformation in the institutional structures of the Turkish state, while keeping the electoral strength of his AK Party in check going forward to the municipal elections next March.

Sunday’s elections also opened a new chapter in Turkish politics as the new electoral regulations allowed alliances between different political parties, thereby making the ten per cent national threshold obsolete. As voters made it absolutely clear that local representation is important to them, legal reforms could be made to lower the national threshold or create some form of single-member district system in the near future. Incidentally, strategic voting which implied certain shifts among allied political parties was one of the most important factors leading to surprising results in view of preceding public opinion polls. As the presidential government system becomes more institutionalized, it is highly likely that strategic voting and issue-based alliances among different political groups will become more pronounced. Therefore, leading political parties and their leaders will have to adopt their ways in line with the emerging patterns of pragmatic voting behavior.

The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) clearly gained from its alliance with the AK Party and the rising national sentiments in the wake of military operations in northern Syria, gathering critical parliamentary representation with 49 MPs. The leader of the MHP, Devlet Bahceli, was among the winners of the electoral process by managing to keep his party above the eleven per cent mark and maintaining his strategic alliance with Erdogan despite the recent internal division within his party which gave birth to the Iyi Party. In the context of the strong executive that will be formed with the presidential system, MHP has great potential of acquiring a degree of political effectiveness that goes much above its numerical presence.

Another winner who came stronger from the campaign trail and election experience was Muharrem Ince who ran as the presidential candidate of the CHP. Ince, a long-time domestic opponent of CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu, was nominated as the presidential candidate in an almost futile race against the towering figure of President Erdogan probably in an attempt to undermine his future party leadership aspirations. Yet Ince as a pragmatic figure who could address the radical secular groups that characterize the backbone of the CHP as well as relatively conservative voters in central Anatolia displayed a surprising performance and personally received eight points higher than his party.

Differing from Kilicdaroglu in his more mature reactions, Ince congratulated Erdogan’s election victory and declared that he will continue his public meetings after the elections, signalling a leadership clash within the CHP. Both CHP and Kilicdaroglu were among the main losers as the party vote stood around a disappointing twenty two percent, while their strategic moves aimed at keeping the Iyi Party and the PKK-affiliated HDP above the ten per cent threshold caused numerous criticisms from within the party organization.

Meral Aksener, the leader of the newly established Iyi Party was another loser as she received unlimited public support from international media during the campign as the chief candidate that could undermine Erdogan’s authority. But despite all the media hype, Aksener’s personal electoral support did not even reach to the ten percent mark and her fragile party might well disintegrate in the parliament. Finally, HDP was another loser as the support for its leader Selahattin Demirtas fell three points to seven per cent, while party votes reached eleven per cent with the controversial tactical support of CHP supporters which was later criticized for legitimizing a terror-affiliated group.

As soon as election results were declared President Erdogan adopted a reconciliatory tone and expressed that the institutionalization of the presidential system will proceed through an inclusive process with the contributions of different social sectors, business actors and NGOs. He is keen to embark on a democratic normalization and development endeavor through which the state of emergency will be gradually lifted, structural reforms in the economy will be swiftly implemented and new productive synergies will be created to galvanize Turkey’s position as an emerging power in the global system. If the Western world decides to support this endeavor by accepting respectable and equitable forms of interaction with Turkey rather than portraying Erdogan as an ‘old-school third world dictator’ and blackmailing him through political or financial means, a positive environment of win-win situations could emerge sooner rather than later.

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]]> The Indecisive 2018 Election Results and the Prospect of Civil War in Iraq https://politicstoday.org/the-indecisive-2018-election-results-and-the-prospect-of-civil-war-in-iraq/ Mon, 25 Jun 2018 10:35:27 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/the-indecisive-2018-election-results-and-the-prospect-of-civil-war-in-iraq/

The African proverb goes to say that when two elephants wrestle, it is only the grass on which the wrestle taking place will be harmed. Iraq looks like it has become the grass affected by the two fighting elephants: Iran and the U.S. Turkey should support Abadi or Sadr in order to form a coalition government as only a moderate Shiite group could help prevent a civil war.

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Since the announcement of the inconclusive national election results, events in Iraq have been sliding towards a civil war. In addition to this, the U.S. and Iran race for influence and hegemony in the country has speeded up the deterioration of conditions in Iraq. This piece seeks to discuss the latest developments regarding this issue in the light of the decision of the Iraqi parliament, which was issued on June 6, and which called for the sorting and manual re-count of all votes and the abolition of thousands of ballot boxes. This matter puts Iraq into a path of uncertainty during a very critical period.

The political situation has become a bottleneck that may be difficult to get out of, and it is being followed with series of destabilizing events. Unless these issues are being checked upon, Iraq will witness a civil war in a manner very similar to what is going on in Syria and Yemen. An Iraqi political analyst, writing for the daily Baghdad Post (May 23, 2018), stated that: “Iran ignites fire of “civil war” in Iraq… Iran is trying through Qassem Soleimani’s efforts, which is in Iraq now, to ruin all efforts to form a government that would not be totally loyal to her…”

Nouri al-Maliki, ex-premier and the leader of the State of Law election bloc, has joined with Hadi al-Amir’s Naser bloc in a single sectarian bloc, and has declared their hostility to the Moqatada Sadr bloc, which won the most seats in the recent election. The Sadrist project, which has been viewed by many as an Iraqi project, stands against the pro-Iranian Maliki project. The former wants to disband and demobilize the Shiite militia, known as Hashed, improve relations with Iraq’s Arab neighbors, and wants to take a neutral stand in the ongoing U.S. and Iranian rivalry in the Middle East.

Iranians have been involved in many political games such as eliciting dozens of deputies in the coalition of Naser, led by Prime Minister Haidar Abadi, in order to join pro-Iranian political blocs. According to some sources in Baghdad, the pro-Iranian circles have recently inaugurated a series of assassinations in Baghdad in order to fuel the fire of civil war. The explosion in Sadr City, which killed and wounded tens of people in Baghdad on the night of June 7, and the subsequent burning of the election ballot boxes housed in the Independent Electoral High Commission storage in Baghdad are designs of the people that want to push the Sadr group into retaliation and want to create a political rapture in Iraq. If history is any guide to us, Mr. Sadr will not be silent on all these events, even if this requires a full-fledged civil war.

It is noteworthy that al-Maliki made numerous statements in the week leading to the election in which he threatened with civil war if the election results were rigged. Many believe that this was an expression of prior knowledge on his part that he will lose the elections. Those threats “are not new to him, especially since his record is full of manipulating sectarian violence during the past years. It is not unlikely for him to re-start it again, if the course of the events were to his dislike,” wrote an expert on Iraq affairs. After the elections, al-Maliki repeated the same threat through the statement made by an MP from his bloc – Mohamed Sahiod – who told the press on May 17 that, “We demand the abolition of the election results and the extension of the work of parliament and to make the current government of Abadi a Caretaker Government due to the wide scale of fraud which took place in the electoral process.”

Iraq’s parliament passed a law on June 6 ordering a nationwide manual recount of votes in the May 12 parliamentary elections. This was a day after the prime minister had stated that there had been serious violations. This move could hinder the delicate process of forming a new government and raising the prospect of further uncertainty in Iraq. This law has also added further fuel to the fire of crisis and was received with mixed and opposing statements. It appears that Abadi’s bloc, which trailed in third place, has some information suggesting that a manual recount will increase their seats.

The pro-Iranian camp wanted the parliament to go further than by just declaring the election results null and void in order to deny Sadr any opportunity to form the government. The National Coalition of Iyad Allawi, which did not perform well either, has also supported the idea of re-holding the election. Allawi stated that, “the declared results of the elections, as it stands now and without taking into consideration numerous appeals against abuse and large-scale fraud, especially after the United Nations confirmed the existence of fraud and manipulation of votes, will lead to producing a parliament challenged by its legitimacy and an illegitimate government.

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Hassan Jihad, a leader in the Coalition of Justice and Democracy in Northern Iraq (Kurdistan), led by Barham Sali, said on June 7 that the decisions of the parliament on the elections restored confidence in the elections and institutions: “The re-counting and manual counting and the application of recent measures will change the number of seats and the results of opposition parties.” He added that, “the ruling parties in the KRG should accept the fact that recounting electoral votes will change the number of seats and it should respect the domestic experience.”

The new election has suspended the work of the Independent Electoral Commission and authorized a Commission made of nine judges to carry out the re-count of votes throughout Iraq. Should this law be applied, it may lead to a series of new crises and complicate the political situation in Iraq in order to reach a state of suffocation. On June 21, the Supreme Court passed a decree, which approved the June 6 law passed by the Iraqi Parliament regarding the manual recount of votes in Iraq as constitutional. This will halt all attempts to form the government and will open hell’s door and further complicate the situation.

It appears that the “biggest beneficiaries of this process are parliamentarian Salim al-Jubouri and the government of Haider al-Abadi.” Al-Jubouri, who failed to regain his seat, believes that he has been done a great deal of injustice in this election. Hassan Turan, a Turkmen MP, was quoted stating, “The high attendance rate during the parliamentary session confirmed beyond doubt that all political blocs, including the winner, wants to distance themselves from the forgers.”

While it may seem that both Iran and the U.S. are distancing themselves from all these rapid transformations that are taking place in Iraq, behind the scenes both governments are moving all the threads of the game. It is noteworthy that both governments have welcomed the results of the election declared by electronic counting. However, it seems that the frantic frenzy behind the scene of both the U.S. and Iran is to influence the process of government formation.

It could be stated that the election results are only a symptom of a larger crisis. The 2003 Iraq invasion not only destroyed the existing state machinery but failed to replace it with a sound and effective one. As the Iraqi Vice President Ayad Allawi told The National during his visit to Dubai on April 9: “Elections will not solve the crises Iraq faces unless it maintains an inclusive political process, overcomes sectarian divisions and rids itself of foreign interference.

The African proverb goes to say that when two elephants wrestle, it is only the grass on which the wrestle taking place will be harmed. Iraq looks like it has become the grass affected by the two fighting elephants: Iran and the U.S. Turkey should support Abadi or Sadr in order to form a coalition government as only a moderate Shiite group could help prevent a civil war. As with the Syrian Civil War, a civil war in Iraq will have adverse effects on Turkey.

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]]> Restructuring Macroeconomic Governance in the Presidential System https://politicstoday.org/restructuring-macroeconomic-governance-in-the-presidential-system/ Wed, 13 Jun 2018 05:30:32 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/restructuring-macroeconomic-governance-in-the-presidential-system/

Turkey is heading for a systemic transformation towards the “Presidential Government System” under such difficult global conditions. But it is exactly these difficult conditions that make Turkey’s systemic transition more important and inevitable.

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Since the onset of the global economic crisis political, economic and technological competition among the global and emerging powers acquired increased pace and tenacity. While the U.S., Russia and China experience geo-political tensions with increasing frequency and face the possibility of direct confrontation beyond proxy-wars; liberal economics and free trade approaches rapidly lose their proponents in the world economy.

The political backing behind the liberal international trading system represented by institutions such as the World Trade Organization is fading, while neo-protectionism gains ground along with rising economic nationalism. Triggered by the Trump administration in the U.S. and the rising tide of nationalist/neo-populist parties in Europe and elsewhere, trade wars, currency wars, cyber-space wars, economic sanctions and accusations of technological theft are also increasing.

A fierce conflict for sustained global economic hegemony, or to use Organski’s words, to prevent a “power transition,” openly takes place between the U.S. and China. All these developments constitute crucial challenges for the political and economic authorities of emerging powers and developing countries. There is an ever-increasing pressure on decision-making communities in these countries to monitor global developments closely and formulate effective and timely responses.

Managing the Turkish economy under presidential system

Turkey is heading for a systemic transformation towards the “Presidential Government System” under such difficult global conditions. But it is exactly these difficult conditions that make Turkey’s systemic transition more important and inevitable. As such, the systemic reform that will take place in Turkey following the June 24 elections shall be conceptualized not only as a legal and political reform that will restructure the separation of powers among the executive, judiciary and the legislative branches of the government. On the contrary, it should be construed as a structural reform that would transform the macroeconomic governance architecture and socio-economic development strategy with comprehensive institutional changes.

While embarking on major institutional reform in macroeconomic governance, there are several common features that need to be taken into account from the successful development experiences across the globe:

  1. Strong political leadership that supports politico-economic stability and the autonomy of key institutions formulating long-term development policies with a clear division of labor.
  2. A highly qualified, professional, meritocratic, practical, fast-acting, problem-solving bureaucracy controlled by “pilot organizations” with strong channels of communication with political and economic actors.
  3. A dynamic, open-minded and innovative private sector that shares common interest with the politico-bureaucratic elite as to the long-term development goals of the country and focuses on vibrant sectorial competition strategies with a global view.
  4. A dynamic social structure that allows vertical mobilization through a high-quality education system, participatory institutions and structured collaboration among political, bureaucratic and market actors.

Therefore, Turkey’s initiative for institutional reform shall proceed in a way to enable smooth progress on all these accounts. When we look at the historical record of previous AK Party governments for institutional reform, it is clear that significant reforms were made to institutionalize a “regulatory state” in the first decade of the 2000s. Consequently, fiscal discipline was permanently established and the financial structure became resilient against severe international shocks.

Several institutional reforms in line with the “Post-Washington Consensus” style of prudent financial and macroeconomic regulation were successfully accomplished. Instrumental independence of the Central Bank to conduct monetary policy and autonomy of key regulatory agencies responsible for the supervision of regulation of finance, capital markets and other services were secured. This robust regulatory framework was extremely effective in constraining the negative repercussions of the global economic crisis on Turkey.

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But there was one major structural problem with the overall macroeconomic management approach in that it favored the inflow of international funds to sponsor the booming construction, finance and service industries; rather than industrial production and technological know-how.

Over the course of the years following the global economic crisis Turkey tried to realize a paradigmatic transition to a more production and real economy oriented growth model with no avail. In order to precipitate a transition to a more industry-technology and export oriented growth strategy various inventories and reports were prepared, sectorial goals were determined and subsidies were released. Yet the path dependency, which remained from Turkey’s stabilization program during the early 2000s with an emphasis on fiscal discipline and the service sector, could not be broken.

Social and political volatilities from the Gezi Park protests in 2013 to the failed coup on 15 July 2016 also exerted a negative impact on the projected strategic transition. As did the hesitant attitude of the AK Party leadership on taking a leading role for industrial-technological upgrading through public-private partnership schemes since these were seen contrary to the principles of economic liberalism.

When we came to 2018, the global atmosphere concerning strategic public involvement in key industries and neo-protectionism are globally accepted practices and there is a relative sea change in terms of the public-private balances in macroeconomic management. Therefore, the political leadership in Turkey has more leeway to exert strategic activism when it comes to achieving prioritized sectorial growth objectives.

Restructuring macroeconomic management

In order to follow global developments leading to the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution, Turkey needs to radically restructure both the philosophy and institutional manifestations of macroeconomic management in order to keep up with the pace of ever-fastening global competition among global and emerging powers.

Concretely speaking, the following institutional changes could be made in the existing macroeconomic governance architecture:

  1. The basic law of the Central Bank could be altered to establish a dual role for the Bank focusing on price stability (inflation control) and employment (growth) as in the case American FED and several other major central banks. This will transform the current standing of the Central Bank from a purely financial management organ to a pilot institution trying to balance price and financial stability with growth and employment objectives in the real economy.
  2. The current ministerial portfolio responsible for the management of macroeconomic areas is excessively dispersed. Several ministries could be merged and some of them could be made leaner in order to increase their efficiency.
  3. In this context, the current Economy Ministry, Science-Industry and Technology Ministry, and Development Ministry could be merged together to form an “Industry, Trade and Development Ministry.” This ministry could play the role of a coordinating ministry such as Japan’s METI holding the pulse of the real economy and productive sectors.
  4. The fiscal and financial branches of the ministerial-bureaucratic network such as the Ministry of Finance and Treasury could be brought under the roof of a “Ministry of Finance and Treasury” so that financing development and budget management could be properly coordinated.
  5. A new “Ministry for Science, Higher Education and Information” could be formed to better manage science policy in close coordination with universities and institutions responsible for high-tech infrastructure.
  6. An autonomous agency that brings together academics, experts, bureaucrats and key stakeholders from civil society could be formed to monitor the institutional reform process and conduct objective impact analysis such as India’s NITI or Malaysia’s PEMANDU.
  7. Sector-specific incentive schemes could be prepared to boost research and development for scientific agriculture, nanotechnology, biotechnology, optics, lasers, rocket science, high-tech materials such as carbon-fiber and renewable energy technologies. Autonomous sectorial monitoring commissions could be formed within the Office of the Presidency to follow up the efficiency of these schemes.
  8. Advisory positions within the Office of the Presidency could be organized into more institutionalized offices in order to allow sectorial offices for modernization of agriculture, manufacturing industry, R&D financing, entrepreneurship, export promotion and so on.
  9. These presidential offices could follow up both policy formulation and implementation processes in order to solve jurisdiction problems among different ministries and assess the efficiency of devised policies, allowing policy adaptation.

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]]> F–35 Case: Not the First Time, Won’t be the Last https://politicstoday.org/f-35-case-not-the-first-time-wont-be-the-last/ Mon, 11 Jun 2018 05:50:23 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/f-35-case-not-the-first-time-wont-be-the-last/

If the U.S. Senate approves the bill to punish Ankara, then it will punish its own defense company Lockheed Martin as well. Turkey is one of the company’s biggest customers, with 116 stealth fighters on order.

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Since the beginning of the 2000s, Turkey has been one of nine prime partner nations of the JSF and one of its biggest customers – with 116 stealth fighters on order. Besides, Turkey has been partnering with Lockheed Martin for over 25 years, primarily on the F–16 and continued this partnership by joining F–35. However, a bill introduced by senators Lankford, Tillis and Shaheen aims to prevent the transfer of F-35s to Turkey and aims to keep the country out of being a maintenance depot for stealth fighters.

The bill set the stage for reconsidering relations between Turkey and the U.S., as it seems like the two country’s are no longer strategic partners, but rather are turning into foes. As can be expected, neither will the U.S. or Turkey live happily ever after, nor will the hostile attidue of the senators continue forever. In any case, in the end, “mutual interests” will probably suppress the “clash of interests.”

U.S.-Turkey relations have soured since March 1, 2003, when the Turkish Parliament refused to pass a proposal to allow U.S. troops to operate from the Incirlik Base during the Iraq War. Since then, Turkey has repeatedly come face-to-face with the U.S. in the Middle East. So the current F-35 case is not the first and will not be the last case for Turkey having experienced undesired congressional responses whenever the country disagrees with U.S. policy due to its defense and security needs. An example of this in recent years is the big clash that arose due to the “local force” that was initially designed by the U.S. to be used against Daesh.

For Turkey, the PYD/YPG is a terrorist organization and the Syrian arm of the PKK – which the country has been fighting against for almost 40 years both within and outside its borders. The same terrorist organization – the YPG – is accepted by the U.S. as the most capable ground force (although it is initially listed by the CIA as an offshoot organization of the PKK in Syria) in fighting Daesh, and thus deserves to be fully supported with aids and arms. In addition to this, the Turkish government has been seeking the extradition of Fetullah Gulen, while American pastor Brunson is still being judged in Turkey. Tensions again rose to a higher level due to the AK Party’s severe criticism towards Israel and U.S. opportunism in Syria and Palestine, as well as Turkey’s planned purchase of S400 systems and the contract signed for domestic industrial cooperation.

Same Punishment Methodology

Ankara eventually got used to undesired responses, threatening patterns of Congress and sanctions whenever the interests of the U.S. clashed with Turkey’s. As you may also recall, the Cyprus issue (Johnson’s letter warning Turkey not to use NATO equipment), the 1974 Peace Operation (U.S. Congress to impose an embargo on arms transfers to Turkey), and the political differences between the U.S. and Turkey, especially in regards to the fight against terror, are the first examples that come to mind. Congress is once again utilizing the punishment methodology on its strategic partner and wants Turkey to be sanctioned if Ankara completes the purchase of Russia’s S-400s. However, Congress needs to remember that the U.S. was also a bidder in the T-LORAMIDS but could not fully meet Turkey’s criteria in regards to technology transfer, local contribution, delivery date and price.

Besides, Congress should also keep in mind that Greece is the only NATO member that purchased the Russian made S-300PMU-1 system in the mid-1990s (Bulgari and Slovakia are also NATO members that posses S-300s in their inventories). Moreover, at the NATO Missile Firing Installation in Crete, in December 2013, Greece carried out its first test firing of the missle as part of an operational live exercise, “White Eagle.” Here we must ask why Greece has the privilege to make use of a Russian system operative after so many years and why Israel is the only country allowed to customize U.S. F-35s.

Political reaction, not final decision

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The bill is a political reaction against the AK Party government, and is not really dealing with technological concerns. Certainly, the political reasoning behind the bill is Ankara’s close ties with Moscow. For the U.S. and NATO, F-35s symbolize the deterrent power of the West against challenger powers such as Russia and China. If Turkey purchases S400s, then Turkey will become a strategic deterrent with Russian military technology. If Russia sells this system to a NATO country, then it will also increase its own current deterrent.

From a different perspective, the main goal of acquiring high tech systems such as F-35s is to increase deterrence and military capabilities against hostile state and non-state military actors. As a matter of fact, the U.S. clearly defines the potential hostile countries as Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. Therefore, Turkey’s cooperation and trade in military technology with Russia is somewhat perceived as a successful attempt of the Putin administration to shade U.S. power. However, Turkey’s external orientation in purchasing a missile system from Russia must be analyzed through the whole process – namely how Turkey was left alone in struggling to meet its defense and security needs.

Lose-lose situation

If Senate approves the bill to punish Ankara, then it will punish its own defense company Lockheed Martin as well. Yet Turkey is one of the company’s biggest customers, with 116 stealth fighters on order. Either way, Turkey will pay a high price for a fifth-generation jet fighter purchased from either the U.S. or another country. None of the world’s largest arms exporters would want to lose a customer such as Turkey while Russian and Chinese companies are dying to sell their own combat jets. In other words, during a time where rivalry is increasing among suppliers, none of the world’s largest arm exporting countries – including the U.S. – would ever want to lose such a major client. In this respect, the Senate needs to carefully examine its gains and losses in regards to the income that will be earned by companies within the defense ecosystem as well as their power of lobbying. Losing Turkey by keeping it out of the JSF also means that the U.S. would weaken its own strategic objectives in the Middle East.

What really happens if Turkey is left out of the F-35 program?

Firstly, Turkey’s deteriorating relationship with the U.S. will worsen; the increasing tension between the two countries will bring unfavorable reflections over deals in areas such as terrorism, especially against Daesh in Syria. More, this decision might also have negative impacts on relations between Turkey and NATO. As it is known, NATO plans to set up a 30,000-strong reserve force in order to improve its combat readiness. As a NATO member sanctioned by the U.S., Turkey would most probably not want to contribute to the Atlantic Alliance and would not want to take an active place in a variety of missions.

Secondly, Turkey will bring the issue to a trial and file a claim for compensation in accordance with the original agreement. This agreement is not only about purchase through foreign procurement, but is also about co-production. For instance, Turkey’s Roketsan collaborated with Lockheed Martin for the development, production, marketing, selling and supporting of Turkey’s SOM-J air-launched cruise missile for the F-35 Lighting II combat jet. Likewise, TAI has also undertaken important responsibilities in contributing to the program. For instance, one of the most complex structural sections of the aircraft, “F-35A Center Fuselage” is produced by TAI as a second source. There are also other work-packages such as F-35 A/B/C Composite Components, F-35A’s Metallic Sub-Assemblies and Air Inlet Ducts and F-35 A/B/C Air-to-Ground Alternate Mission Equipment Pylon Manufacturing.

Thirdly, Turkey might embark on a quest to buy fifth generation fighters from other countries such as Russia’s SU-57 and China’s J-31. However, if Turkey decides to buy a fighter jet from a non-NATO country, this may lead to infrastructure and technology problems. Lastly, the Senate’s sanction method does not seem to be the best way to keep Turkey in NATO’s security architecture. While political issues are undermining relations between Turkey and the U.S., the military aspect is without a doubt the most crucial part to sustain strategic relations between the two countries.

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]]> The YPG’s Child Recruits: An Accustomed Human Rights Abuse? https://politicstoday.org/the-ypgs-child-recruits-an-accustomed-human-rights-abuse/ Wed, 06 Jun 2018 04:43:46 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/the-ypgs-child-recruits-an-accustomed-human-rights-abuse/

All the sources and data on the subject indicate that the PYD, which endeavors to idealize its armed conflict in the guise of fighting a liberation war, systematically engages in child recruitment, which is mainly due to the obstacles the organization faces in mobilizing militants while proving that the PYD’s ideology does not address the masses in the region.

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The outlawed PKK’s Syrian offshoot Democratic Union Party (PYD) has been forcibly recruiting children similar to the PKK, which has been systematically using children in armed conflicts since 1994. It is not possible to learn the exact number of children recruited by the group. However, after the death of Latife Kaya in 2016, who was notorious for recruiting girls traveling alone around the checkpoints in Qamishli region by either convincing them or forcibly bringing them to the PYD’s training camps, it was revealed that Kaya and her friends recruited more than 500 girls through this way. Meanwhile, it has been observed that the situation caused by the group’s recruitment policy particularly in the regions they capture is even graver.

The group’s recruitment of children is known from a variety of sources including the victim testimonials covered by the media, videos of the group militants uploaded on YouTube, U.S. CENTCOM’s tweets informing that the PYD and its child soldiers were ready for war, and fashion magazine Marie Claire’s article titled “These Remarkable Women Are Fighting ISIS. It’s Time You Know Who They Are.” Some of these publications represent the children fighting in the deployments of the PYD as the subjects of a liberation war when child recruitment is in fact a serious war crime that cannot be justified with any excuse.

A number of verdicts issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC), which was established with the Rome Statute, led to the conviction of the leaders of two terror organizations on the grounds of forcibly conscripting child soldiers. An arrest warrant was issued for Bosco Ntaganda while the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) leader Thomas Lubanga Dylio was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. Furthermore, the regulations ban the involvement of children in any act linked to terror organizations along with the deployment of children in armed conflicts, which entails the risk of death or injury.

The 2007 Paris Principles, which is the most comprehensive regulation on the subject, defines “a child associated with an armed force or armed group” as any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes.

In the framework of the ban, there is no difference between the voluntary and involuntary recruitment of children in an armed group. In both cases, the will of children cannot be regarded as consent in legal terms. The protection of the child requires annulling the child’s will to his/her own detriment. Also, the consent given to an unlawful activity is already invalid.

Aside from the legal aspect of the subject, assuming the voluntary participation of children into an armed group implies that they can also voluntarily depart the group, which is hardly the case for terror groups. In an interview published in the website of Kurd Watch, Nurman Ibrahim Khalifa, who was abducted and conscripted by the PYD in 2014 as he was 13 years old, stated that a great number of children kept at the Iraqi Kurdistan camps were severely punished due to their attempts to escape, adding that a woman who was recruited as a child was killed before the eyes of people and her body was thrown into a lake after she was caught in her eighth attempt to escape when she was 18.

A great number of children kept at the Iraqi Kurdistan camps were severely punished due to their attempts to escape, adding that a woman who was recruited as a child was killed before the eyes of people

In 2013, when the organization’s child recruitment stirred reaction from the international public, the PYD signed the “Deed of Commitment for the Protection of Children from the Effects of Armed Conflict” in Qandil with an NGO named Geneva Call, guaranteeing that they would not conscript child soldiers under the age of 18. However, it was unraveled that the organization still continued using children after signing this contract except from a small-scale demobilization following the signing, and broke into houses and abducted children by clashing with their families when they needed more militants. Although the organization ran propaganda to the international public that this situation was an exception, the statements of the victims, the propaganda and actions of the group, and the fact that the group has members in charge of recruiting and training children demonstrate that using children in armed conflicts is a systematic practice for the organization.

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As the recruitment cases are examined, it is seen that the organization increases its forcible recruitment activities when they have growing need for militants and goes beyond the limits of their self-proclaimed commitments during such times. For instance, the organization ruled that they would recruit people aged between 18 and 30 in Jazira, but in their practices in Manbij during 2016, a conscription was ruled for persons aged between 16 and 35. Also, in their actions in Afrin shaped through Turkey’s operation in the region, the group increased its forcible recruitment of children out of panic.

A Syrian man who took refuge in Turkey said that after the capture of Raqqa by the PYD, the group forcibly recruited girls from houses with no men, demanded $20.000 from the families not allowing that, and they silently had to watch their daughter taken from them

At this point, the accounts of the children who escaped from the group and the people who left their hometowns are of utmost significance as they portray first-hand experiences and testimonials. In an interview he gave to the press, a Syrian man who took refuge in Turkey said that after the capture of Raqqa by the PYD, the group forcibly recruited girls from houses with no men, demanded $20.000 from the families not allowing that, and they silently had to watch their daughter taken from them since they were unable to pay the money demanded. The Syrian refugee also relayed that his 65-year-old uncle who tried to prevent the abduction of his two daughters was wounded by the group militants with a gun stroke. Upon this, the two families met in the midnight of the same day and took refuge in Turkey.

In another news report published on February 11, 2018, a boy aged around 12-14 stated that the PYD’s armed wing People’s Protection Units (YPG) forcibly gave military training to a group of children including him, and he fled after 12 days, adding that everyone he saw in the camp was forcibly recruited. Another boy around the same age also said that the YPG militants raided into their house to take him. His father fought the militants but could not stop them. According to the account of another boy, he was abducted and brought to a conflict zone by the group militants when he refused to join them.

Besides, the propaganda videos uploaded on the organization’s YouTube channels, such as YPG Press Office, feature a great deal of footage displaying child warriors. These videos try to create the impression that the children joined the PYD with motivations like fighting against Daesh, the liberation of the Kurdish people and freedom of women. In doing so, the organization strives to whitewash its policy based on systematic child rights abuse by making use of generally-accepted notions. The Western supporters of this policy also release material contributing to the group propaganda. In a video titled “Her War: Women vs. ISIS,” which was uploaded on RT America’s YouTube channel, a 16-year-old girl expresses that her participation in the group’s armed units is an honor to her family, adding that she does not go to school since women’s liberation is more important than going to school.

The organization also has members responsible for conscripting and training children. Beritan Sela, who is featured in the videos titled “Women Against Daesh” on the YouTube channel of BBC News, states that they are training the youth aged between 17 and 18. The videos shared on RT America’s YouTube channel also features a member of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), whose code name is Tolheldan, while engaging in the training of girls in the Sehit Berivan training camp. Some militants also endeavor to gather children by going from house to house. In another incident reported by the NSO’s website, a man named Natheer Mostafa was arrested by the YPG as he tried to protect his children from the organization. NSO also reported that a YPG member called Qaraso used to visit Mostafa’s house when Natheer Mostafa and his wife were outside and tried to convince their daughters to join the YPJ, the female equivalent of the YPG.

All the sources and data on the subject indicate that the PYD, which endeavors to idealize its armed conflict in the guise of fighting a liberation war, systematically engages in child recruitment, which is mainly due to the obstacles the organization faces in mobilizing militants while proving that the PYD’s ideology does not address the masses in the region. The organization’s discourse is purportedly based on generally-accepted values, but this does not mean that they embrace these values as they claim to do and does not render the conflicts involving children ethical. Aside from the PYD, states and media outlets giving overt or covert support to child recruitment are also responsible for the risks children will undergo in conflicts and the challenges they will encounter in their education and rehabilitation processes following the conflicts.

The post The YPG’s Child Recruits: An Accustomed Human Rights Abuse? appeared first on Politics Today.

]]> Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: The Changes and Challenges in Iraqi Politics https://politicstoday.org/iraqi-parliamentary-elections-the-changes-and-challenges-in-iraqi-politics/ Tue, 05 Jun 2018 04:50:11 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/iraqi-parliamentary-elections-the-changes-and-challenges-in-iraqi-politics/

U.S. regional allies, the Israel-Gulf bloc’s demands toward breaking Iran’s regional influence and the rigidity of U.S. President Trump’s steps to that end will determine the rigidity of Iran’s counter maneuvers. If confronted with harsh steps, Iran will attempt to use its influence on Iraq to break the pressure on itself. While the U.S. will prefer actors in Iraq that will leave Iraq out of this tension by narrowing Iran’s sphere of influence, Iran will prefer actors that will act in its favor.

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The Iraqi parliamentary elections took place on May 12, 2018 in the shadow of the concerns shaped by the profound crises the country confronted as of 2003. Leaving the sectarian discourses that determined post-2003 Iraqi politics aside, the political parties this time made an emphasis on the Iraqi nation and went to the polls with supra-sectarian lists. The Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s Victory Alliance became the first party in Mosul, Moqtada al-Sadr’s Saairun coalition received a considerable vote share across the nation, and Ayad Allawi’s Al-Wataniya coalition listed both Sunni and Shia politicians. All these developments demonstrated that various political actors endeavored to address the Iraqi nation as a whole in terms of both discourse and practice.

Another matter of debate during the election process has been a question as to whether the government would be formed with a sectarian and ethnicity-based distribution of seats or with a political majority. Various circles in Iraq stressed that the presence of all the parliamentary parties in the government and the absence of an opposition blocked the political control mechanisms in the country. It was suggested that the political majority should form the government whereas those unable to enter the government should remain as opposition. Also, due to such political barriers, the corruption allegations could not be dealt with properly. Prime Minister Abadi brought the corruption allegations to the agenda and pointed out that it is time to fight against corruption following the successful anti-Daesh fight.

Another issue that was highly discussed during the election process was the relations between politics and arms. The collapse of the security sector in the country following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the fact that U.S. troops stayed in the country for a long time as an occupying force, the appearance of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF, Al-Hashd Al-Sha’abi) during the anti-Daesh fight, and the presence of a separate security sector in North Iraq led to a complicated security system in Iraq. Those making an emphasis on civilian politics, especially Sadr, defended the reconstruction of the Iraqi security sector, the complete exclusion of armed units from the realm of politics, and drawing a sharp distinction between politics and arms. Various political groups and societal segments expressed their complaints over the PMF and the Fatah coalition, who has strong links to the former. In addition, the comments of Ayatollah Sistani on the political situation, who is the most influential Shia cleric in Iraq and the leading Ayatollah in Najaf, stirred a great deal of debates ahead of the parliamentary elections.

Serious objections were made to the election results beginning from the night of the election. The Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission announced that the votes in a total of 1024 ballot boxes were cancelled on the grounds of irregularities. Meanwhile, a number of news reports stated that several political parties are preparing to issue a parliamentary motion next week for the manual recount of votes in case the electronic tallies used in the election might be faulty. The manual recount decision will be issued if 165 parliament members vote for the motion. But such a decision is quite risky as it will unsettle the atmosphere formed by the election results. Correspondingly, the head of the Independent High Electoral Commission Riyadh al-Badran issued a statement on the subject and warned that a possible intervention in the election results might drift the country into an internal conflict.

The election results displayed that the Iraqi electorate wants reform, national unity, economic development and demilitarization while refusing to get involved in the U.S.-Iran rivalry. The one making the strongest emphasis on these aspects turned out as the frontrunner of the elections, which reflects the electorate’s will in this direction. It has been seen that Sadr hastily established contacts with the actors emphasizing the abovementioned aspects, such as Ammar al-Hakim and Abadi, and gave the signals of cooperating with Sunni political coalitions including as Al-Wataniya and Muttahidoon (the Uniters for Reform Coalition) while giving a green light to the Kurdish actors such as the New Generation, Goran and Barham Salih. Such acts of Sadr showed that he is willing to meet the demands of the electorate.

Considering Sadr’s political background and his discourse and messages before and after the elections, it is seen that he wishes to shape Iraqi politics on the basis of national consensus and a reformist perspective and render the country independent from external factors. Therefore, Sadr will probably want to cooperate with the actors close to him by eliminating political actors representing the burdens of Iraq, such as sectarianism, dependence on foreign actors and corruption as much as possible. This approach of Sadr will be quite effective in the ongoing government forming process in Iraq.

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The divergence of the Shia political groups that cooperated in the past and the dissolution of the Shiite bloc in the run up to the elections showed that the Shias developed different visions on the future of Iraq. Abadi and Nouri al-Maliki, two figures from Iraq’s Dawa Party, ran for the elections on two different lists, whereas the PMF gathered the electorate from many political groups including the bases of Abadi, Maliki and Hakim and a divergence has been observed between Hakim and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. These are some of the examples portraying the divergence of Shia groups. Also, the rivalries between Sadr and Maliki; Hadi Al-Amiri and Hakim; and Abadi and Maliki demonstrate the growing dissent. The spiritual leadership Sistani represents seeks to play a conciliatory role by avoiding to become a party to any side, but he does not refrain from taking a stance against crucial issues such as corruption. Alternative opinions regarding the relation between religion and politics that do not cohere with orthodox Shiism began to spread among the youth while the separation of religion and politics started to be articulated more frequently and vocally.

The number of minor and local groups increased after the dissolution of Sunni groups and some of them ran for the elections in the lists of Abadi and Fatah, which revealed that the Shia political actors in control of government bodies achieved to win the Sunnis over and the Sunni political elites failed to meet the demands of the Sunni electorate. Furthermore, it has been frequently expressed in field that the presence of the PMF in Sunni regions has a strong influence on the behaviors of the Sunni electorate and elite and negatively affected the political representation of the Sunni will. Another significant issue that needs to be addressed is the question as to whether the ballots reflect the will of the Sunnis subject to domestic migration to different parts of Iraq due to the Daesh threat. The reflection of the Sunni people’s will on politics and whether they would receive the share they demanded from the Baghdad administration will continue to be among the primary issues of Iraqi politics.

More, it has been observed that there is not any significant divergence in Kurdish politics. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), who are the two leading actors of Kurdish politics, maintain their influence. There has been a decrease in parliamentary seats occupied by Goran and Islamic parties. It has been revealed that new political movements, such as the coalitions founded by Shahsuvar Abdulvahit and Barham Salih, enjoyed a voter support that suffices to carry them through. Despite that, it has been another point of discussion whether the Kurdish electorate found what they expected from Kurdish politics. The developments in the upcoming days will shed light on a number of issues including how the tensions in the Arbil-Baghdad line could be restored following the illegal referendum and the profound economic crisis suffered by North Iraq and how the internal balances in North Iraq will reflect on the relations with Baghdad. The attitude of the Iraqi Kurds during the government formation process will also be a major determinant in Iraqi politics.

The new political portrait that has emerged as a result of the interaction between politicians and the electorate for the past 15 years is not the sole factor reflecting the trajectory of Iraqi politics since Iraq is the leading country affected by the U.S.-Iran tension. In the following period, the character of the tension between Iran and the U.S. will shape both actors’ Iraq policies and determine the features they are looking for in their alliances in Iraq. The rising tension between these countries will negatively influence the voter-politician interaction in Iraq and the possibility of reconciliation in Iraq will increase in the contrary case. Therefore, the future of Iraq also depends on global and regional balances alongside the country’s internal dynamics, and the new government will be formed on this basis.

U.S. regional allies, the Israel-Gulf bloc’s demands toward breaking Iran’s regional influence and the rigidity of U.S. President Trump’s steps to that end will determine the rigidity of Iran’s counter maneuvers. If confronted with harsh steps, Iran will attempt to use its influence on Iraq to break the pressure on itself. While the U.S. will prefer actors in Iraq that will leave Iraq out of this tension by narrowing Iran’s sphere of influence, Iran will prefer actors that will act in its favor. As in the past 15 years, Turkey will prefer to play a balancing role to help Iraq overcome such tensions with minimum damage. In addition to this, Turkey will take on active roles in solving the water problem in Iraq, cooperation in counter-terror fight and the reconstruction of Iraq – displaying a policy rather different from those engaging in power struggle by proxy.

In a nutshell, the atmosphere prevailing after the Iraqi parliamentary elections showed the changing nature of Iraqi politics. A considerable part of the Iraqi electorate demands the solution of the country’s chronic problems, normalization of daily life and wants domestic politics to get over sectarian and ethnicity-based polarizations whilst another part still carries the burden introduced with post-2003 Iraq. In Iraqi politics, local dynamics are not the sole determinants as the U.S.-Iran conflict also has negative effects on the country. This conflict will be visible in the government formation process of Iraq and will continue to negatively affect the future of the country. On the other hand, the balancing role played by several countries in the region such as Turkey is making positive contributions to the relief of Iraqi people.

The post Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: The Changes and Challenges in Iraqi Politics appeared first on Politics Today.

]]> What if the US and Turkey Agree on Manbij? https://politicstoday.org/what-if-the-us-and-turkey-agree-on-manbij/ Mon, 04 Jun 2018 08:38:25 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/what-if-the-us-and-turkey-agree-on-manbij/

Turkey's low-profile operation in northern Iraq against the terrorist organization, the PKK, illustrates that Ankara has patiently been weaving its terror strategy. If the U.S. and Turkey can agree of pushing the PKK out of Manbij, this will be a significant achievement for Ankara.

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Wise countries plan their mid and long-term moves after analyzing threats and benefits. These moves might seem unrelated with each other, causing their purpose to remain blurred. However, when the smoke clears after some time, all dots connect and reveals a picture.

Turkey’s long-term counter terrorism operations are just like this. This process has proven that there is a strategic mind in Ankara. Turkey has seen the schemes in the region threatening its very survival and put a comprehensive plan into action in order to thwart them.

In 2014, Ankara saw that a terror corridor was being formed in North Syria. This terror corridor was planned to span from northern parts of Iraq, going along the Turkish border, up until the Mediterranean Sea. This planned corridor was a threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. The October 6-8 incidents and the democratic autonomy attempts in 2014 were a part of this plan.

Ankara’s long-term action plan against this scheme has three stages:

In the first stage, terrorist elements within Turkey were aimed and the terrorist threat was minimized with trench operations launched on August 24, 2015.

During the second stage, the march of terror was halted with cross-border operations, preventing terrorist elements from reaching the Mediterranean Sea. Launched on August 24, 2016, Operation Euphrates Shield divided the corridor into two parts by the west, while the following Operation Olive Branch prevented terrorist elements from accessing the Mediterranean Sea. With checkpoints established in Idlib, preventative measures against terrorism were consolidated.

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In the third stage, Turkey aims to dissolve the corridor, eliminating the terrorist threat surrounding Turkey. To achieve this goal, Turkey has put a plan on the east-west axis into action. Grip on the terrorist PKK is tightening, from west to east and east to west.

I’ll convey the details of two crucial developments.

Firstly, the negotiations with the U.S. regarding the PKK’s withdrawal from Manbij are coming to an end. Diplomatic circles are expressing that the low-level meetings have resulted in an agreement and that ministers will put the finishing touches to the said agreement. Indeed, it’s possible to see the signs of this agreement in Foreign Minister Cavusoglu’s statements. Cavusoglu stated that a road map might be announced after his meeting with U.S. Secretary of State, Pompeo on June 4. According to this road map, the PKK will withdraw from Manbij, the Turkish military will oversee this withdrawal, Manbij’s security would be provided by a local police force formed by Arabs as it was the case in Afrin, and the U.S. will maintain its military presence in the region. After everything is settled in Manbij, it’s supposed that France’s military presence in the city won’t be needed. If the U.S. adheres to the agreement, Turkey will push the PKK out of Manbij and towards the East. This will be a strategic and crucial success for Turkey in counter-terrorism.

Secondly, the other stage of this grip is north of Iraq. The low profiled cross-border military operation there aims to disrupt the connection between Sinjar and Qandil, preventing the YPG from receiving logistic support. This operation has gained momentum. Qandil is being sieged rather silently. Then, Qandil will be interned and the line will be pushed towards the West.

Looking at the bigger picture, it is possible to state that Ankara has patiently weaved a plan thread-by-thread.

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]]> What are the Legal Implications of Withdrawing from the Iran Nuclear Deal? https://politicstoday.org/what-are-the-legal-implications-of-withdrawing-from-the-iran-nuclear-deal/ Thu, 24 May 2018 08:57:59 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/what-are-the-legal-implications-of-withdrawing-from-the-iran-nuclear-deal/

While the Trump administration’s decision may cause increased conflict with Europe, the disregard for the international community’s interests and laws was not a complete surprise for the international community, and neither was the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal.

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President Trump announced the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Iran Nuclear Deal. This brief will shed light on several legal implications arising from this historic decision by the Trump administration. First, while the Iran Nuclear Deal connotes an international agreement signed by six states and the Islamic Republic Iran, it does not have the same legal features as an international agreement does under international law. It is a mere political commitment, as opposed to a legally binding international agreement. Former President Barack Obama made considerable efforts to strike this deal. However, he followed the procedure to adopt the deal as an executive agreement, rather than a treaty passed by the Senate. Therefore, this facilitated his successor to withdraw from the agreement, specifically at the international level. Nevertheless, the Trump administration would not have been legally bound to continue with the deal, even if it had been adopted as a treaty.

So, how does the current legislation define the scope of the sanctions regime? Section 3 of the presidential memorandum signed on May 8 provides a to-do-list for the State Department and Treasury Department. According to this section, several executive orders will be “re-issued,” and individuals on the sanction lists will be “re-listed.” The government will re-register more persons and entities on the list of Specifically Designated Nationals (SDN), and this will require more enforcement effort. It will be more likely that a company, whether in the U.S. or overseas, appears on the radar unless they cut their commercial relations with Iran. These increased enforcement efforts can result in more cases that are brought against entities, banks, and companies.

The direct effect against Iranian nationals and entities in the U.S. is not anticipated to be much, since the withdrawal decision was not a surprise for them. They can move all of their assets from U.S. jurisdiction, limiting the territorial effect of the decision. However, the adverse effect will be dramatic for Europe, since U.S. enforcement authorities are not reluctant to exercise their jurisdiction over individuals and entities overseas. The withdrawal decision allows them no option but to cut off their commercial relations with Iran. The memorandum issued on May 8 explicitly instructed the State and Treasury Department “to [prepare the] guidance necessary to educate United States and non-United States business communities on the scope of the prohibited and sanctionable activity.” Hence, the government will make additional efforts to assist business communities around the world to adapt to the changes.

While U.S. authorities will attempt to implement a detailed plan to revive the sanctions against Iran, it is not clear how this will produce far-reaching effects on non-U.S. business. For instance, the high amount of fines will not only jeopardize business, but also create additional political conflict between European countries and the U.S. One notable example was the fine imposed against BNP Paribas in 2014. The amount of the fine did not only harm the French financial system, it caused tension between former presidents Obama and François Hollande. If the scope of the sanctions will be wide, there is much more possibility that this kind of conflict will occur again between Europe and the U.S. If individuals attempt to circumvent the sanction rules by committing other ‘crimes’ under U.S. law, such as conspiring to defraud the U.S., or bank fraud, they are likely to sit as defendants in a criminal trial.

The Iran Deal plays a particular role for Europe, and the trade between Iran and the EU considerably increased after signing the deal in 2015. The efforts made by European leaders, namely President Emmanuel Macron and Chancellor Angela Merkel, stem from interest in their commercial ties with Iran. These efforts include the meetings held in Washington D.C. to convince President Trump to save the deal. On 8 May 2018, European leaders promptly reacted to the decision made by President Trump. President Macron underlined the significant interest in preserving the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In a similar vein, German Foreign Minister pointed out the risk of jeopardizing the long-term relations between Europe and the U.S. Foreign Minister of the U.K., Boris Johnson, expressed his regrets of this decision. A week after the decision of May 8, several European politicians met the Foreign Minister of Iran in order to devise an effective plan. For instance, Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the EU, expressed their willingness to carry out determined work to keep the commitments of the deal.

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From a legal point of view, the withdrawal decision does not force any other parties to quit, but the abovementioned extraterritoriality will hamper the ability of others to comply with the deal in practice. For this reason, the European Union plans to use other means to keep the deal alive. For instance, the EU might impose the notorious “blocking regulations.” These regulations, which were adopted in 1996, are intended to protect European companies from the “extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country.” In the past, it was considered effective against the extraterritorial sanctions imposed against Cuba by the U.S.

Another option could be the change of currency. EU members could carry on their trade with Iran by using the Euro, so that U.S. authorities will be less likely to exercise their jurisdiction over these transactions. The rationale behind the extraterritorial application of the sanction regime is that U.S. authorities need to establish the link between an extraterritorial transaction and territory of the U.S., and, once a transaction is made in U.S. dollars, it is sufficient for the U.S. government to exercise its jurisdiction based on this link. The single fact that a bank processes U.S. dollar transactions means that this bank is on the radar of U.S. enforcement authorities, as observed in the case of PNB Paribas. If this bank fails to comply with the sanction regime as part of the domestic law of the U.S., authorities will impose a fine on this bank. In order to mitigate the loss and escape from U.S. jurisdiction, the change of currency offers a useful alternative for the EU, albeit the business between these countries is unlikely to take any legal or financial risk. Similarly, the EU can take the Indian investments in Iran, which are made in the currency of Indian rupee.

Moreover, as the spokesman of the French government suggested, the EU could challenge this withdrawal decision at the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Unit by arguing it would adversely affect the trade between WTO members. In this case, the EU could attempt to resolve this issue as a trade dispute. Although they could make reasonable arguments before the WTO, a ruling from a panel may not produce an effect powerful enough to force the Trump administration to reconsider the future of the Iran deal.

The U.S. decision will undoubtedly affect Turkey as a major trade partner of Iran. Similar to the EU, this decision can decrease the trade volume between the two countries. Turkish politicians read the situation from the same page, and Turkey is likely to join the resistance against the U.S. decision. From a legal point of view, due to the uncertainty of a criminal trial brought against two Turkish citizens, namely Reza Zarrab and Hakan Atilla, Turkey will act cautiously in their commercial ties with Iran, at least in the early stage of re-instituting sanctions against Iran.

It is most likely that these possible actions within international law are largely ignored by the Trump administration. In his speech, he did not explicitly refer to any issues arising from international law. For example, the future of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 remained unaddressed. While the Trump administration’s decision may cause increased conflict with Europe, the disregard for the international community’s interests and laws was not a complete surprise for the international community, and neither was the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal.

The post What are the Legal Implications of Withdrawing from the Iran Nuclear Deal? appeared first on Politics Today.

]]> Uninvited Guests of the Inhospitable Sea https://politicstoday.org/uninvited-guests-of-the-inhospitable-sea/ Tue, 15 May 2018 08:16:36 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/uninvited-guests-of-the-inhospitable-sea/

The EU severely depends on Turkey, as it did regarding the Aegean Sea, in the subjects of the prevention of illegal crossings, interference with criminalization and the halt of migrant deaths in the Black Sea. For this reason, the EU may need to re-knock on Turkey’s door once again.

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In recent years, the influx of immigrants to Europe has created a serious crisis, culminating to one of the leading subjects on the European agenda. In 2015, the year that the crisis deepened, over 1 million migrants reached European shores through the Mediterranean and Aegean seas. Yet, the agreement signed between the European Union and Turkey was the turning point of this issue. It is due to this agreement that there has been a significant decline in the number of illegal immigrants who have reached EU member states through the Aegean. Highly constrained by this agreement signed by the EU and Ankara for forestalling migration movements via the Aegean Sea, human smugglers finally directed a new route to European borders. Thus, the worth of the Black Sea as sharply increased in the eyes of smugglers. On the other hand however, the Black Sea is far more dangerous than the Aegean, due to brutal storms and choppy waters. This is why ancient people defined it as “Axenus,” meaning “the Inhospitable.” Yet, this inhospitable sea, today, has uninvited guests: illegal migrants.

Is the Black Sea a new route?

Migrants who reached the Romanian and Bulgarian shores through the Black Sea were a topical issue in August and September 2017, when around 500 migrants had disembarked on Romanian coasts after their toilsome and long journeys at sea. In September that year, Suleyman Soylu, Turkey’s Minister of the Interior, described this event as ‘suspicious’ and the existence of migrant boats in the Black Sea as an incident that has not occurred before. European media outlets also announced this passing as ‘people smugglers test new migrant route’ or what can be described as an ‘alternative route.’ In fact, this route was active during the Soviet era, for plying illicit goods. After the long silence, this route resurrected again by human smugglers. However, these journeys were not the first in their kind. Between 2014 and 2016, Romanian and Bulgarian authorities detected some 500 migrants that set foot on their shores.

While EU officials were expected to take action on this issue after reaching 2-year figures in the space of two months, they chose to ignore. More, there have been deaths at the sea since 2014. Krzystof Borowski, a spokesman of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) stated that migrants are in big danger due to the crossings being difficult and due to bad weather conditions and a rough sea. According to news published on the Frontex website, crossings were not expected outside of summer months. Contrary to these expectations however, arrivals to Romania through the Black Sea had lasted until November. Frontex also gave place to the ‘Black Sea Route’ in its annual risk report in 2018, describing it as a ‘temporary route.’ Yet once again, current affairs in Turkey and EU politics prove these expectations to be wrong.

The new conjuncture of Syrian and Afghan refugees in Turkey

Turkey, which hosts nearly 3.5 million registered Syrian refugees, also hosts many Afghan, Iranian and Iraqi migrants on the status of international protection. All migrants who reached Romanian shores from Turkey are from these four ethnic origins. While Turkey has already spent nearly 30 billion dollars in order to meet the needs of Syrian refugees, Ankara is also building new camps in the secured areas in Northern Syria, which have been neutralized by successful military operations. Many Syrians were envisaged to be sent to these camps at their homeland. Syrians who do not want to return to Syria also began to choose to move to European countries in the pursuit of better living conditions. This life expectations can also be a factor taken into consideration, which triggered many Syrian refugees to use the Black Sea route in order to reach EU borders. More, thousands of Afghan refugees reached Turkey through Iran due to unemployment and the insecure atmosphere caused by brutal attacks of Daesh and the Taliban groups. There is also a claim that 1.5 million Afghan people have been waiting at the Iran-Turkey border with the hope of entering Turkey somehow. It can also be estimated that these Afghan groups will probably seek ways to pass to Europe through Turkey.

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Until today, Turkey has tried to hamper such passes of migrants as if there is no agreement with the EU for the Black Sea. Although local officials do not show any tolerance to smugglers, blocking them off is not an easy task. The Turkish Coast Guard Command also cooperated with the Romanian Coast Guard on many incidents and they have tried to maintain such a cooperation in the ongoing processes. It needs to be reminded that the crossings from the Black Sea began in the second half of last year. While these passings were described to be seasonal, they lasted until November. It is thus not difficult to guess that the crossings of migrants from this sea will begin at the beginning of the year and continue for a longer period according to last year, in which smugglers already tested.

Migrant-free Schengen zone

Romania’s proximity to Western Europe is the main impetus of migrants crossing to the country through the Black Sea. However, although Romania is a member of the EU, it is not in the visa-free Schengen Area. Therefore, once their journeys are over, migrants fall into a trap. This can be the main reason why Frontex asserts this route to be ‘temporary.’ Migrants, usually from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran, do not know that Romania and Bulgaria are not part of the Schengen Area. In addition to not being Schengen countries, these countries do not have the adequate services for migrants in terms of social security, employment opportunities, language and integration programs, and the access to education. Therefore, Romania and Bulgaria will not be the final destination of migrants who seek welfare in European countries.

Recently, Bulgaria and Romania also made a statement about joining the Schengen Area. These two ‘problematic children’ of the EU wish for this process to be concluded until the end of this year. The union has adopted the ‘acceptance mechanism’ towards its members for a while now in the need of holding member states together and in the direct of its enlargement politics. Angela Merkel even spoke about the Schengen Area and gave support for the accession of all EU member states to this visa-free zone. The accession of Bulgaria and Romania in the Schengen Area will most definitely cause concern for Frontex, as this condition will mean that refugees will be more attracted to pass through the Black Sea into these countries. If this does become the case, Frontex will need to deal with an increasing number of sea arrivals, deaths and criminalization. In order to be able to deal with such a burden, Frontex will need to improve the border security of these two countries, which have a limited capacity to secure their borders on their own.

A new bilateral agreement

Taken collectively, contrary to the view of Frontex, the numbers of migrants trying to reach European borders via the Black Sea are strongly estimated to increase. Turkey’s resettlement policy towards Syrian refugees will also probably encourage Syrians to cross over. The possible participation of Bulgaria and Romania in the Schengen Area will render these countries attractive to all refugees, thus dramatically increasing migrant crossings. Due to all these reasons stated, the EU severely depends on Turkey, as it did regarding the Aegean Sea, in the subjects of the prevention of illegal crossings, interference with criminalization and the halt of migrant deaths in the Black Sea. For this reason, the EU may need to re-knock on Turkey’s door once again.

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]]> The Hunchback of Germany: Right Populism https://politicstoday.org/the-hunchback-of-germany-right-populism/ Mon, 30 Apr 2018 05:57:54 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/the-hunchback-of-germany-right-populism/

The question has to be asked again: What does Germany stand for? Freedom and liberalism or populism? Is this the Germany, which is being dreamt of and which is being constructed for the future? Are universal values being sacrificed for short-term political scores and gains?

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German politicians lately announced that they will debate and probably introduce a headscarf ban for girls under the age of 14 in North Rhine Westphalia (NRW). Announced by the NRW Integration Minister, Joachim Stamp, the initiative for such a ban gained both support and objection.

Right populism has increasingly dominated German politics. Since the foundation and particularly since the success of the right-wing Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in the September 2017 general election, this populist discourse has literally boomed. Although AfD is the youngest political party in Germany, found in 2013, it is arguably one of the most influential actors with its political figures and rhetoric regarding setting the political agenda in the country. So, consequently, we are witnessing how the rest of Germany’s political atmosphere and discourse are shifting to this level and how it is becoming wholly absorbed the right-wing populist rhetoric.

As if it’s not enough that Muslims are criminalized and discriminated in Germany on a daily basis both politically and socially because of their religious identity, the basic human rights of freedom of religion and the right to free practice of religion are literally trampled on within the headscarf debate. The silence while mosques are continuing to be burnt down in Germany, the headscarf ban for Muslim teachers, and the endless debate as to whether Islam belongs to Germany or not are just a couple of events that have been unacceptable so far. With the headscarf ban on pupils however, Germany brings a new of level of hypocrisy, which will inevitably lead to a new level of polarization. Of course, any defender of this ban will try to justify the situation as compatible with the legal order or so-called accepted by society.

One of the defenders of this unconstitutional initiative, Serap Guler (CDU), the undersecretary in the integration ministry of NRW, stated that the headscarf “is what sexualizes the child,” but then added, “when a young woman then says: ‘I want to wear a headscarf,’ that is her right, which we also accept and respect.” Firstly, people may ask, where is the acceptance and respect you seem to offer? Secondly, how many young girls has Mrs. Guler encountered until now who were supposedly forced to wear a headscarf at day-care or elementary school? Thirdly, do the governing people of Germany intend to ban everything they evaluate as wrong or contentious with what is taught to the nation’s children by their own parents? What is the line for that evaluation and estimation? Lastly, what on earth is Germany’s problem with Muslim bodies?

Debates about a headscarf ban, a circumcision ban, a burqa ban and so on… Polemic topics brought to the table from time to time in order to fuel the climate of fear, tension and hate. Pseudo problems that do not exist and evidently solutions that do not help anyone or anything… The fact is, these are all attempts to target Muslim bodies – especially Muslim women bodies – which is an effort of perversion in itself. Politicizing and pointing at other people’s bodies and consequently de-humanizing them is not a rational way of doing politics. On the contrary, it is a sign of the collapse of politics. This type of policy that attempts to discipline and educate Muslim women’s bodies on the one hand and Muslim parenthood on the other reminds us a quote by Foucault’s ‘Discipline and Punish.’ Foucault states that discipline creates individuals as power sees individuals as objects and as instruments. According to Foucault, its purpose is a “permanent economy” for power, which is both modest and suspicious.

Populist politicians in Germany use Muslim bodies as objects and instruments for their political gains. The economy of permanently discrediting Muslims as “problematic” humans who have to be changed in order to be appropriate citizens is being kept alive permanently. Populists also use discriminatory sentiments in grassroots as a capital to strengthen their persistence.

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Long before these discussions, the debate as to whether Germany lost her title as the advocate for freedom and liberal values had emerged. Although the headscarf and modest clothing are both part of a Muslim woman’s identity and as part of her Islamic personality, the whole discussion has always been kept on a political and symbolic level – not by Muslims but by both politicians and society. Pushing minority practices under bans and restrictions is treacherous for politics. While the history of Germany shows the result of populism, liberal values, which have been lost to the AfD, are being tossed aside in order to gain political support.

Moreover, there are different and much more important problems that Germany needs to be discussing rather than the headscarf ban. To remind the reader, Germany has still not been able to solve the NSU case and the related serial murders against innocent people with the help of state agents, which shows us that German politicians and the public opinion are vesting their energy on a wrong debate. Another serious problem is for instance, the lack of freedom, especially for the Muslim population. Apart from these, Germany has a real social and tangible problem that we also have to point out. According to Saarbrücker Zeitung, 4.9 million people in the country barely have a proper meal every other day. More, figures indicate that 30,000 migrants are currently missing in Germany and that out of these, 9,000 are children. This is nothing but catastrophic.

So why is it that politicians carry a minor issue like the headscarf to the center of politics, but do not solve real and tangible social problems? Center parties such as the CDU in Germany have become sympathetic to marginal initiatives. The country currently needs concrete solutions for both anti-Semitist and anti-Muslim sentiments without being selective between different discriminative incidents.

Nevertheless, the headscarf is neither a political symbol nor an accessory. However, this debate is indeed symbolic and target oriented. The main problem is not supposedly the half dozen young girls who wear a headscarf because of very naïve and simple reasons such as pure curiosity etc. The intention here is to normalize and accustom society to similar restrictions and bans. Thus, the next step following this would initially be a headscarf ban for all Muslim women in public. When this becomes the case, there will be no voice of disapproval or even outrage since these pseudo debates suppress people deeply, leading them to internalize discrimination or polarization so that limits against the freedom of others becomes an everyday and ordinary issue.

The nightmare scenario for Germany after the 2017 election was that AfD, with its populist, racist and fascist attitude, could have become a coalition partner in a minority government. It is currently the third biggest political party now. Nonetheless, we are currently witnessing a political leadership in Germany that could potentially replace the AfD in its polarizing politics. This right question has to be asked again: What does Germany stand for? Freedom and liberalism or populism? Is this the Germany, which is being dreamt of and which is being constructed for the future? Are universal values being sacrificed for short-term political scores and gains?

The fact is that Germany has to save herself from being stuck within this populist atmosphere and has to enhance cultural pluralism with all its institutions and instruments. Otherwise, a dangerous social polarization will be inevitable.

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]]> The PKK’s Exploitation of Women: Assumptions vs. Realities https://politicstoday.org/the-pkks-exploitation-of-women-assumptions-vs-realities/ Wed, 25 Apr 2018 07:43:07 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/the-pkks-exploitation-of-women-assumptions-vs-realities/

Although listed as a terror group by many Western states and Western-based institutions such as NATO and the European Union, various Western media outlets have paved the way for the PKK and its offshoots to feature in their reports within a positive and overwhelmingly feministic image.

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The PKK terror group and all of its offshoots use women not only as suicide bombers, but also as propaganda tools in order to soften their negative images among global audiences. Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, particularly female members of the PKK have become famous under the mask of their combat against Daesh in northern Syria. Accordingly, even their uniform, for example, became fashionable and were sold by H&M’s clothing retailer chains. At that time, some rumors about female terrorists were also quite sensational – such as male Daesh fighters being afraid to combat the female branch of the PKK, because they believed that those killed by women will go to hell. The Independent covered this story referring to a PKK-affiliated YPG female member. It does not matter whether it is true or not, it became obvious that it was just an ‘interesting’ story to cover for the media, as long as you ignore the bloody face of the PKK.

Although listed as a terror group by many Western states and Western-based institutions such as NATO and the EU, various Western media outlets have paved the way for the PKK and its offshoots to feature in their reports within a positive and overwhelmingly feministic image. It seems that it is not an aimless effort. Rather, it even may be a conscious editorial policy in order to moderate the image of the PKK and the YPG in the eyes of the global media audience and then open the matter of its illegal status to discussion (and reappraisal). Therefore, the PKK has chosen a feminist discourse in an effort to gain more support from the “free world.”

In 2015, for example, alongside many newspapers such as the Guardian, Daily Mail, even the BBC, made numerous reports about YPJ members and their “heroic” fight against Daesh in Syria. As an example, in 2014, the British broadcaster filmed a short documentary titled ‘Who are the female fighters of the PKK?’ and the following year it published a picture gallery headlined ‘PKK fighters prepare for battle with IS.’ While the first one claims that nearly 40% of PKK members are women with a lot of footage showing them singing, smiling and enjoying their lives, the second one focuses on the personal stories of female members. They literally resemble them as if they are at a girl’s school, although the topic in discussion is an organization that has carried out numerous bloody attacks on officials and civilians on European and Turkish soil.

In fact, this made-up image is not new. Under the rule of Abdullah Ocalan, who has been in prison since 1999, the PKK attempted to reinvent itself as ‘a social movement with self-administration at a local level, an alternative type of economy, ecologism and feminism as central pillars.’ In addition, Jenna Krajeski, an Istanbul-based journalist, conducted an interview with Sebahat Tuncel, a politician under investigation due to suspected links with the PKK, who named the group a feminist movement and its leader Ocalan a feminist. Moreover, a New York Times article, dated January 29, 2018, written by Nujin Derik, a female YPG member, again writes about how female members of the YPG were ‘instrumental in the defense of Kobane and the liberation of Raqqa – where a major objective was the freeing of the Yazidi women the jihadists had taken there as slaves.’ However, the other side of the medallion is completely different, as seen in the PKK’s misuse of females and its emotional exploitation of femaleness.

The other side of the medallion

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The PKK has carried out suicide attacks through female members in many cases. Zeynep Kinaci is known to be the first instance of the PKK using a pregnant woman as a suicide bomber. She killed six Turkish soldiers on June 30, 1996. A few months later, Leyla Kaplan, while pregnant, triggered explosives at a police department in Adana. She reportedly witnessed beforehand a PKK male commander execute a young woman who had denied to carry out the bombing. In the 1990s, female terrorists had performed 11 of the PKK’s 15 suicide attacks in Turkey. The latest example was on January 28, when Avesta Khabur, a 20-year-old from the YPG’s women unit YPJ, blew herself up targeting a Turkish battle tank and soldiers in Syria’s Afrin. After the attack, her unit called her “a model of free Kurdish women,” likening her to prior female PKK suicide bombers.

It is such a contradiction for a self-proclaimed ‘feministic’ organization to use its women members as suicide bombers, whether they are pregnant or not. This is not just limited to these events. The women have also been abused by male members of the PKK. According to a report by the Interior Ministry of the Republic of Turkey, the PKK regards the family as an institution of the feudal system and Abdullah Ocalan expressed that women shouldn’t be limited to a single male.

Many high-ranking leaders of the group, including Ocalan, sexually abused women who were subsequently executed due to false accusations of being agents. In late 1984 (or early 1985), Saime Askin, a senior female member and harsh critic of sexual abuse in PKK ranks, faced execution in the group’s Lolan camp based in Iraq. Besides, the Report on Trafficking in Persons issued by the U.S. State Department claimed that the YPG, the Syrian wing of the PKK, continues to recruit and use boys and girls, including children under the age of 15. In a similar vein, the Human Rights Watch’s interviews reveal that many children appeared in the YPG’s “youth centers” without the knowledge of their families. Families later found out that their children were forcibly recruited by the YPG. Since 2012, the group has used boys and girls under the age of 18 at checkpoints and bases in the Afrin, Kobane and Jazira cities of Syria.

Apparently, the outlawed PKK uses women not only as suicide bombers but also abuses and even executes them if they oppose the decisions of their so-called “top leaders.”  Furthermore, the organization emotionally exploits ‘femaleness’ by instrumentalizing female members as means of propaganda. Its feminist discourse makes the group in no way innocent, but the female-dominated portrayal of the PKK has already earned sympathy in the Western world. The PKK’s bloody face against the Turkish state, Turkish and Kurdish civilians and even its own members who oppose the group cannot be justified by the media. Shouldn’t the international media take action against these human rights abuses instead of praising them? Doesn’t the indifferent attitude of the media agents, which falsely portray the women in the PKK, mean that they are playing an indirect role in crimes committed by the terrorist organization? These are questions that are worthy of extensive thought.

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]]> Does Pentagon’s 2019 Budget Deny Trump’s Latest Syria Statement? https://politicstoday.org/does-pentagons-2019-budget-deny-trumps-latest-syria-statement/ Mon, 09 Apr 2018 10:18:52 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/does-pentagons-2019-budget-deny-trumps-latest-syria-statement/

The Pentagon’s agenda for Syria lacks strategic guidance and it is short-sighted and single-minded as it prioritizes the U.S. partnership with the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces over U.S. long-term interests in the Middle East. However, the internal U.S. wrangle over their policy will most likely continue.

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U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. will be “coming out of Syria, like, very soon. Let the other people take care of it now.” However, Trump previously promised the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan that he will immediately stop arm deliveries to the YPG in Syria, which didn’t happen. As the Pentagon’s 2019 Budget projection illustrates, the Pentagon predicts that U.S. troops will not leave Syria at least until the end of 2019. Within the State Department there is an internal dispute about U.S. policy on Syria. However, it’s not the Trump administration who seek to leave Syria soon, but the military and Pentagon deciding on U.S. affairs in Syria. Pentagon, CENTCOM and SOCOM are prioritizing their partnership with the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces over U.S. long-term interests.

The U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request, Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) COUNTER-ISIS

From fighting Daesh to becoming strategic partners

The Obama administration decided to work with the Syrian branch of the PKK in order to fight Daesh. The US-YPG cooperation to fight Daesh rapidly advanced to a strategic partnership in Syria. Pentagon and CENTCOM’s partnership with the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces expanded to more than just fighting Daesh as U.S. soldiers joined a demonstration against Turkey in Manbij where Abdullah Ocalan posters and pro-PKK banners were seen everywhere.

Over time, the U.S. Army established at least 18 military bases in Syria, except two in south Syria. All of them are located in areas controlled by the YPG. Two of the military bases in northern Syria are used as military airports where U.S. Apache helicopters are stationed.

In addition to the military bases in northern Syria, which indicates the U.S. projection to stay long, the Justification for Fiscal Year 2019 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Train and Equip Fund (CTEF) foresees the U.S.-YPG partnership in Syria at least until the end of 2019. The Pentagon’s budget projection for support to the YPG in 2019 doesn’t hint at big clashes and military operations against Daesh, but rather depicts a growing U.S.-YPG partnership.

300 million U.S.-dollars are planned as funds for the U.S.-YPG partnership in 2019. While half of the funds are reserved for weapons, ammunition and vehicles, 12% are planned to be invested in military bases costs and transportation costs. One third of the budget is expected to be spent in operational sustainability.

Weapons that are intended to be supplied to the YPG include AK-47 rifles, Machine Guns (PKM), Heavy Machine Guns (DShK), RPG-7 Launcher, Sniper Rifles, 60mm and 120mm Mortars.

The Pentagon’s budget projection also foresees around 30 thousand militants to be trained and to the frontlines in addition to another 35 thousand militants of the YPG as so-called Internal Security Forces. According to the budget projection, the Pentagon plans to pay each fighter a monthly stipend payment range from $200 to $400. As written in the budget projection, the Pentagon is currently paying 10 thousand militants a monthly stipend payment.

In contrast to Trump’s declaration to withdraw from Syria, policy makers in the U.S., the military and Pentagon reportedly have other plans.

While for now the requested budget for the “train & equip” program in Syria for 2019 has to be accepted, the budget program for 2018 is already ongoing. It is unclear if the budget projection for 2019 will be blocked by the Trump administration, but until the end of 2018 the program will continue.

The increase of directly paid militants to 65 thousand until the end of 2018, the maintenance of military bases and the continuing support for the YPG even long after the forecasted end of Daesh in Syria suggests that the U.S. will remain in Syria for a long time, with their new strategic partner: Marxist-Leninist YPG militants.

Inter U.S. state conflict about Syrian policy

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President Donald Trump told his advisers he wants an early exit of U.S. troops from Syria and he publically announced, “We’ll be coming out of Syria, like, very soon.”

A short period after Trump’s announcement, Brett McGurk, U.S. Special Envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS said at the U.S. Institute for Peace in Washington: “We are in Syria to defeat ISIS. That is our mission and our mission isn’t over and we are going to complete that mission.”

Brett McGurk’s statement that Turkey failed to advance along the Marea line, but that the SDF (YPG) have been very successful, especially in Manbij, shows how short-sighted and single-minded the perspective of U.S. cadres in charge of U.S. policies around Syria are. Much wrong his statement is in military terms, as Operation Olive Branch illustrated, both politically and logically it is not a smart idea to compare a NATO army with a militant organization.

Shortly after Trump declared his intention to leave Syria, the U.S. Army were busy in establishing new military bases around Manbij in order to protect a designated terrorist organization from its NATO ally Turkey and the Syrian Opposition factions who were supported by the U.S. as well. The establishment of two additional bases in the Manbij region should not only be seen as a message to Turkey and the Syrian Opposition, but also a message towards internal conflicts within the U.S. as the bases became public after the announcement of the President.

The U.S. military deciding on the country’s foreign policies and its relations with other allied states is a story we’ve seen before in Syria. Shortly before the visit of former U.S. Foreign Minister Rex Tillerson, Maj. Gen. Jamie Jarrard, the Special Operations commander said: “We’re very proud of our positions here, and we want to make sure everybody knows it.” Lt. Gen. Paul Funk who accompanied Jamie Jarrard on his visit to Manbij went further and said: “You hit us, we will respond aggressively. We will defend ourselves.”

The U.S. Foreign Department under Rex Tillerson tried to find another policy for the Syrian crisis, especially regarding NATO ally Turkey. His dismissal is also a de-facto end to his efforts to de-escalate tension between Turkey and the U.S. over U.S. support for YPG militants. As Anadolu Agency reports, the U.S.-Turkey working group meeting has been delayed until the new U.S. Secretary of State takes office.

U.S. SOCOM commanders are growingly frustrated at policymakers in Washington for a lack of strategic guidance to further the counter-Daesh mission according to a report by NBCNews. The limited military view of SOCOM commanders backs their partners in the Syrian Democratic Forces more than U.S. strategic long-term interests.

Trump agreed in a National Security Council meeting this week to keep U.S. troops in Syria a little longer in order to defeat Daesh but wants them out relatively soon, a senior administration official said on Wednesday.

However, it seems that it is the Pentagon and CENTCOM who decide over when to finish Daesh entirely in Syria. As known for followers of the Syrian war, the International Coalition stopped fighting Daesh and months before the start of the Operation Olive Branch.

Later, Pentagon and CENTCOM blamed Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch for their pause in fighting Daesh, merely because YPG militants left the frontlines in order to fight against the Turkish military and Free Syrian Army. In reality, this development made clear that the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces are dominated by the YPG, disabling any military operation if the YPG militants refuse to fight.

While once the International Coalition conducted up to 1500 airstrikes per month in summer last year, the number of airstrikes against Daesh have been reduced to below 150 per month this year according to Press Releases by Centcom.

On the other side, according to Associated Press during the National Security council meeting, Trump insisted for a rapid withdrawal from Syria. As has been reported, the President was presented with several consequences that would occur if the U.S. were to remain in Syria, and only one if they were to withdraw – which was that with full withdrawal, Russia and Iran would take advantage.

The Trump administration has not the political vision and capacity for a genuine Syria policy. The weakened administration has effectively empowered the military over deciding on issues relating to foreign policy and issues that will have long-term impacts on U.S. relations with regional actors. The Pentagon’s agenda for Syria lacks strategic guidance and it is short-sighted and single-minded as it prioritizes the U.S. partnership with the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces over U.S. long-term interests in the Middle East. However, the internal U.S. wrangle over their policy will most likely continue.

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]]> Turco-Qatari Military Buildup and its Regional Impact https://politicstoday.org/turco-qatari-military-build-up-and-its-regional-impact/ Wed, 04 Apr 2018 08:39:47 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/turco-qatari-military-build-up-and-its-regional-impact/

The Turco-Qatari military cooperation holds a great potential in countering the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the Middle East and thus the increased balance against them.

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After launching the military base for more than 3000 personnel, Turkey and Qatar has decided on building a naval base at Doha International Maritime Defence Exhibition & Conference (DIMDEX), which is going to be funded by the Qatari government. There have been other significant developments such as the very first exportation of the BAYRAKTAR TB2 tactical UAV to Qatar for a patch of 6 aircraft, 3 control stations with a training simulator. Moreover, the two countries decided on the establishment of a joint venture between national companies Aselsan and Barzan, which is called the BARQ. Through both military technology and security collaboration, Turkey and Qatar have been building a robust security alliance that directly affects the balance of power in the Gulf region.

For decades, small Gulf states were dependent or more realistically “threatened” by Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Saudi-Iran rivalry has shaped a tense structure that has enforced Gulf states to try and fit themselves within right motives and positions. However, with Turkey’s increasing presence in Gulf politics, whether this be through soft power or latently with military presence, this structure has been in a transformative phase. In this sense, the deepening military cooperation between Qatar and Turkey provides a platform for Turkey to penetrate into the Gulf security atmosphere.

Since Qatar has such a strategic geography between Iran and Saudi Arabia, having a military presence in Qatar plays a vital role in the rivalry between these two states. The fact that the U.S. is present in Qatar with over 10,000 soldiers illustrates how important the country’s geo-strategic position is. With Kuwait hosting 15,000, the United Arab Emirates 5,000 and Bahrain 7,000 U.S. soldiers in their territory implicates that the U.S. has a significant bargain in this region. To put plainly, the most significant gain is about balancing and encircling Iran within this territorial dimension.

Turkey’s presence in Qatar

Qatar holds a central position in between all of the military bases established by Turkey in the Middle East. Without Qatar’s inclusion as a military station for Turkey, Ankara’s military presence in the Middle East would be lacking a hub for military transfers and naval warfare. The Turco-Qatari military alliance has a considerable impact on increasing the Turkish influence in the Persian Gulf and the south of the Arabian Peninsula. Although Turkey had several military bases in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia, there was no naval base for Turkish frigates and vessels to utilize as a hub in patrolling overseas.

Middle Eastern geography necessitates a strong maritime capability that will be able to control the Mediterranean, Red and the Arabian Seas in a coordinated and functioning way. In modern methods of warfare holding a strong and capable naval power is key to controlling any kind of region. For the Middle Eastern case, the most important geo-strategic positions are the Eastern Mediterranean sea, which Turkey tries to control through Northern Cyprus, the Gulf of Aden, which Turkey endeavors to grasp control through Somalia and Sudan, and the Persian Gulf which Turkey has now increased its control through the military cooperation with Qatar.

In this sense Turkey’s military cooperation with Qatar and the establishment of a naval base holds the potential to have regional and even global implications. In terms of regional implications, Turkey’s increasing military presence and its influence means a direct reduction and setback for the Saudi Arabian and Iranian influence in the Middle East. Turkey, in this respect, has been advancing to balance the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the Middle East as a whole and creating a three-unit game.

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The impact of this rivalry is most entrenched in the Gulf. Who would imagine that a small state like Qatar would have managed to resist an embargo of Saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt together 10 years ago? Qatar managed this successfully during the crisis in 2017 – to such an extent that its national Qatar Airways was hardly affected regardless of the fact that embargo states had shut down their airspaces to Qatari planes.

As of now the Middle East military balance tends to incline towards a two-sided power struggle where Turkey, Qatar, Egypt and Iran are closing on the Russian partnership and Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are deepening their cooperation with the United States. This analogy is on a grand strategy dimension where there are micro rivalries for increased influence in the region between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran while Israel endeavors ensuring its survival through close ties with Saudi Arabia.

10 years ago, if some theorist said that one day Qatari airplanes will not be able to use the Saudi air space but Israel will be, nobody would have believed them. However, this is the actual case for the Middle East, where there is an enlarging rift between Saudi Arabia, the other Arab states and Qatar. Turkey has been at the heart of the matter for Qatar’s ability to weather the storm, through the political support empowered and practiced with the joint military base. However, that rift posed an entrance for Turkey to include itself into Gulf regional security. For the small Gulf states, there is now an alternative regional power [Turkey] to collaborate with rather than collaborating with Saudi Arabia and/or Iran.

Increased Turkish influence and control in each place that witnessed a power vacuum such as the Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf, Syria and Lebanon obstructs Turkey’s exclusion from the construction of the Middle East balance of power, as well. Therefore, since Turkey is involved and included into the crises that occur in the region, Ankara is establishing a robust defining role of the distribution of power in the Middle East. At the end, the main idea behind increased military presence and balancing Saudi Arabia and Iran, is establishing a more peaceful region with reduced potential of a bilateral conflict.

Turning the Saudi-Iran quagmire into a three parties bargain necessitates the penetration into the political sphere where Saudi-Iranian duos are dominant. The most salient of these states are Syria and Lebanon. The Turco-Qatari cooperation had an unprecedented impact on the Syrian Civil War as this cooperation turned the tide for the much vanishing Syrian opposition. The second step would be creating a maneuver zone for Lebanese politicians through shaping an alternative structure to Saudi-Iranian rivalry over the Hezbollah-Amal movement and Hariri alongside with pro-Saudi politicians. This two-edged type of politics excludes any type of third party influence, but the Turco-Qatari partnership can pave the way for political engagement through the backdoors.

Up until present, Turkey has been achieving ends strategically designed for this ideal despite having many internal problems. Domestic problems did have the potential to affect the region as a whole since in the actual snapshot, Turkey holds a significant amount of power in the region and any type of destabilization would have a negative reflect on the Middle East. Additionally, the internal struggles that the AK Party government experienced can be considered another motivation behind this cooperative foreign policy.

The Turco-Qatari military cooperation holds a great potential in countering the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the Middle East and thus the increased balance against them. In the end, if Turkey succeeds balancing Iran and Saudi Arabia without losing much potential in the process, there will be a more collaborative and peaceful security complex considering the methods Turkey utilizes in its military affairs.

The post Turco-Qatari Military Buildup and its Regional Impact appeared first on Politics Today.

]]> New Cold War heats up around Cyprus https://politicstoday.org/new-cold-war-heats-up-around-cyprus/ Sat, 24 Mar 2018 02:28:42 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/new-cold-war-heats-up-around-cyprus/

Conflict appears to be closer in Cyprus than peace, despite the sincere will of its people to achieve it. While Turkish and Greek Cypriots discuss reunification, the dispute between external players may end up splitting them further apart.

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In October 2015, my analysis article titled “War in Syria today could spell war for Cyprus tomorrow” was published in the Cyprus Mail newspaper. In the article, I argued that the war in Syria was actually about control of the Eastern Mediterranean, where hydrocarbon reserves were recently discovered. I said the situation could give rise to a new Russian-led axis in the region which would test Turkey’s allegiances, and warned of proxy conflicts emerging in Cyprus between Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

Much has changed since then, but tensions over the Eastern Mediterranean’s offshore gas reserves remain. As regional players move to exploit those reserves, the threat of war returning to Cyprus is the closest it’s been since 1974, when a Greek-inspired coup triggered a Turkish military intervention that split the island into a Turkish Cypriot north and Greek Cypriot south.

Turkey has warned the internationally recognized Greek Cypriot administration not to act unilaterally until a satisfactory agreement is reached with the Turkish Cypriots in the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. As the co-owners of Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots should be equal partners in any deal made over the gas, Turkey argues. The Greek Cypriots, however, say the Turkish Cypriots will benefit from the profits made from the reserves only after a peace deal is agreed.

Despite Turkey’s warnings, the Greek Cypriots contracted Italian energy giant Eni, which in mid-February sent its Saipem 12000 drillship to the region to search for gas in Block 3 of the island’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In response, Turkey deployed its navy to intercept the drillship, saying it could not allow the ship to pass because of maneuvers taking place in the area. After a standoff lasting many days, Eni withdrew its ship and postponed its mission.

Following the incident, a statement made by the UN on February 14 said Secretary General Antonio Guterres “regrets that tensions over hydrocarbons exploration have escalated once again.” The UN chief “recalls that the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders in negotiations had previously agreed that natural resources in a unified Cyprus would lie within the competence of the future federal government,” Guterres’ deputy spokesman Farhan Haq added.

This was a small victory for Turkey, especially when the spokesman underlined the UN Secretariat will not “take a position on the rights of member states under the treaties to which they are party or under general international law,” in reference to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, signed by Turkey, Greece, Britain and Cyprus. It was under the auspices of this treaty that Turkey exercised its right as a guarantor of peace in Cyprus and sent its troops to the island to overturn the Greek-led coup.

This is the same treaty the Greek Cypriots want to tear up under a new peace deal. UN-endorsed talks to reunite Cyprus as a bizonal federation collapsed last July precisely because of the Greek Cypriots’ refusal to accept Turkey as a guarantor, while the Turkish Cypriots insisted there could be no deal otherwise.

The collapse of the talks had a negative impact on morale on both sides, as the bizonal plan had long been hailed the last chance Cyprus had for peace. Nonetheless, Turkish Cypriots demonstrated their desire for reunification in parliamentary elections held in the north on January 7. Although the right-wing, pro-status quo National Unity Party (UBP) won the largest share of votes with 35.6 percent, the pro-reunification parties won enough seats to form a four-way coalition. Three weeks later, incumbent center-right Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades was re-elected in the south, indicating public support for the peace process, albeit with his hardline approach.

But, as has always been the case, the solution to the Cyprus problem also relies on external factors. Considering gas now plays a major role in negotiations, neighboring countries Israel, Egypt and Greece are increasingly interested in how the talks unfold. Having already started work on the Aphrodite reservoir in Block 12, the Greek Cypriot administration is currently in talks with Israel and Egypt on how to combine their resources to export gas directly to Europe via Greece, bypassing Turkey.

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This would not only be a blow to Turkey’s ambition to become a regional energy hub, but also isolate the country and limit its hydrocarbon exploration rights to a narrow strip of sea along its southern coast. According to an agreement between the Greek Cypriot administration in Nicosia and Athens, Cyprus is able to link its EEZ with that of Greece thanks to the tiny Greek island of Kastellorizo, just two kilometers off Turkey’s southwestern coast. The agreement, which was made without consulting Turkey, sees the size of Turkey’s claimed EEZ west of Cyprus significantly reduced.

In February, while Turkish warships were blocking the Eni ship, Greece sent its own ships to the disputed Aegean islets of Imia/Kardak, provoking a confrontation with Turkey. Tensions between the two NATO neighbors have persisted since they almost went to war over the islets in 1996. The European Union weighed in after these incidents, with EU Council President Donald Tusk calling on Turkey to “terminate” its activities, without admonishing Greece.

To add, Egypt has also adopted an anti-Turkish stance, rejecting Ankara’s objection to a maritime demarcation agreement between Cairo and the Greek Cypriots. Meanwhile Israel, which in February secured a multi-billion dollar deal to export gas to Egypt, has suggested a decision on a proposed 2,000-kilometre undersea pipeline linking the Eastern Mediterranean directly to Greece could be made in 2019.

However, irrespective of the position of the regional players, experts have dismissed Eastern Mediterranean gas as uneconomical when compared to Russian gas, upon which both Turkey and the EU are heavily reliant. Experts have also said the proposed undersea pipeline is not feasible due to extreme depths and seismic activity in the region.

Even then, the failure to topple Bashar al Assad’s regime in Syria has not only allowed Russia to remain in the warm waters of the Eastern Mediterranean, but expand its presence in the region. Greece and the Greek Cypriots are increasingly dependent on Russian money, and under President Abdel Fattah el Sisi, Egypt’s relationship with Russia has been improving as Moscow seeks a foothold in what under former leader Hosni Mubarak was once solely a Western playground.

Russia is also in a position to mediate in the event of a proxy conflict between Iran and Israel. So, for those in Europe hoping to diversify their gas imports away from Russia, it appears that they will still have to play by Russia’s rules, especially if they want easy shipping access to the strategically vital choke point that is the Suez Canal.

Where this leaves the people of Cyprus depends on how, or if, Turkey will fit into this new status quo. If the U.S. continues to support the PKK-linked YPG in northern Syria while EU members harbor suspects connected to a coup attempt in July 2016 to forcibly oust Turkey’s democratically elected government, Turkey may align itself with Russia. Then again, such a move wouldn’t be without its risks and possible concessions. But if the West acknowledges Turkey’s geo-strategic significance in breaking the Russian-led Eastern Mediterranean axis, Turkey may realign itself with the West.

Either way, conflict appears to be closer in Cyprus than peace, despite the sincere will of its people to achieve it. While Turkish and Greek Cypriots discuss reunification, the dispute between external players may end up splitting them further apart.

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]]> Presidential Elections in Egypt and the Future of the Authoritarian Regime https://politicstoday.org/presidential-elections-in-egypt-and-the-future-of-the-authoritarian-regime/ Mon, 19 Mar 2018 08:08:42 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/presidential-elections-in-egypt-and-the-future-of-the-authoritarian-regime/

The presidential elections in Egypt in March 2018 is a new step toward consolidating the oppressive regime, which was established with a global political support rather than a step towards democratization.

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Over the past few years, the political arena in Egypt has witnessed an unprecedented period of oppression. The leading indicators of this situation can be listed as Abdel Fattah al-Sisi administration’s harsh stance towards the peaceful opposition after seizing control of the state with a military coup in 2013, the exclusion of the civilian agents in the country from political processes and growing human rights violations. One of the main reasons for the Sisi regime’s ease in practicing such oppressive policies is the silence of the leading Western democracies to the Cairo administration, as has been clearly observed throughout the period running up to the presidential election, that is to be held on 26-28 March, 2018.

Egyptians will vote for one of the two candidates, President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and Moussa Mostafa Moussa, the leader of liberal Al-Ghad Party, who has been a strong supporter of Sisi regime. It is observed that Moussa does not pose any threat to Sisi in the presidential race. All possible rivals of Sisi have been eliminated in varieties of ways by the state authorities in the pre-election period. What is shocking with this process is that no Western democracy issued a condemnation of Sisi regime’s ruling out all its possible rivals in the election by arresting or intimidating them. In order to illustrate the situation in a more explicit way, it would be useful to take a look at the events leading to the election period.

Several candidates stood out as potential candidates for the presidential election in Egypt, including Ahmed Shefik, who is among the prominent actors of the old regime and was a resident of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for the past five years, the former Chief of General Staff Sami Anan, the lawyer and activist Khaled Ali who is known for his remarks opposing the Sisi regime, and Egypt’s former top auditor Hisham Geneina, who was discharged from duty in March 2016, following his statement that he would unravel the corruption in the country. After the National Elections Commission announced the election schedule, these names kicked off their efforts to officially run for the election, during which people had a glimmer of hope that different names might compete for the presidential seat. But what happened during the candidacy application period displayed the Sisi regime’s determination to hold on to the ruling power.

Sisi purges the dissidents

Ahmed Shefik, a candidate for the election, returned to Egypt from the UAE, where he has lived for the past five years, after he published a video announcing his candidacy on social media. Brought under the surveillance of security apparatus as soon as he entered the country, Shefik had to waive his candidacy following the contacts he made with intelligence officials. It was alleged that the pressure of the Sisi regime’s intelligence service has been instrumental in Shefik’s decision.

Sami Anan’s candidacy application was also rescinded as he was taken into custody because of his intention to run for the presidency. The ground for the cancellation is shown as “political engagement during his military service.” Although Egyptian authorities issued statements in line with this justification, it can be said that the cancellation of Anan’s candidacy has impeded one of Sisi’s strongest rivals.

Meanwhile, Khaled Ali and Hisham Geneina, who also attempted to run for the election, decided to withdraw after considering the judicial and physical assaults against them, the experiences of the other candidates and the political oppression prevalent in the country. Ali announced in a press statement that he would not become a candidate whereas Geneina announced his withdrawal after he was subjected to a knife attack.

On the other hand, another development that occurred in February showed that the political oppression in the country targets not only those running for the presidential election, but all the dissidents. Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, who adopted a conservative-liberal political stance after leaving the Muslim Brotherhood following the Egyptian Revolution in 2011 and achieved a considerable popular support with the Strong Egypt Party he initiated, was detained after his house was raided following his criticisms of the Sisi administration in a TV broadcast. It is argued that Aboul Fotouh was detained only because of his criticisms to the regime. This incident is noteworthy as it clearly illustrates the extent the political oppression in Egypt has reached. Arrest of Aboul Fotouh drew reactions from various dissident groups in the country and human rights organizations.

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The West is silent to the violation of rights

Another noteworthy aspect with regard to this oppressive environment throughout the Egyptian presidential election is the silence of the Western countries in the face of the incidents. As a matter of fact, this situation is parallel to the Western political attitudes towards Egypt in the aftermath of the coup d’état in 2013. It has been observed that many Western countries displayed a positive approach towards the Sisi regime despite the antidemocratic practices, violations of rights and economic instability in Egypt. Western countries and the Sisi regime organized many official contacts, signed partnership agreements and engaged in coordinating activities in many fields after the coup, all of which are concrete indicators of their support to Cairo.

Sisi paid an array of official visits to Italy, the Vatican and France in November 2014 as part of his European tour. Having paid visits to Germany and Hungary in June 2015, Britain in November 2015, and Greece in December 2015, Sisi also made official contacts in Portugal and France in 2016 and 2017 respectively. Similarly, many European leaders visited Egypt and contributed to the recognition of the Sisi administration as a legitimate government despite all the human rights violations it engages in. A number of politicians including the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, Austrian Chancellor Christian Kern, Vatican Leader Pope Francis, former French President Francois Hollande and the U.S. Vice President Mike Pence paid visits to Egypt in the post-coup period.

Among these countries, France has provided a considerable degree of support to the Sisi administration in many respects. During Sisi’s France visit in 2014, Paris approved the selling of high-tech defense products, including fighter jets and battleships, to Cairo, which stirred a reaction among human rights groups. Having gained profits corresponding to multi-billion dollars from the agreements, France has maintained this approach up until today. The incumbent French President Emmanuel Macron also hosted Sisi in Paris in October 2017 and expressed his pleasure in the continuation of the cooperation between the two countries.

In response to the criticisms made on the violation of human rights in Egypt, Macron said the following words at the joint news conference with Sisi: “I believe in the sovereignty of states, and therefore, just as I don’t accept being lectured on how to govern my country, I don’t lecture others […] My deeply held conviction is that it’s in President Sisi’s interest to accompany the defense and consolidation of human rights by the Egyptian state, in the context that only he can be the judge of.” His remarks stirred controversy both in France and abroad.

Although thousands of dissident civilians have been jailed, democratic values have been breached and a strict policy that disregards the freedom of expression and press has been pursued since 2013, Macron avoided issuing any criticism on these matters, which is significant in terms of displaying the Western countries’ general approach on Egypt and the Islamic world.

Western countries have also provided economic support to the Sisi administration. Several giant financial institutions such as IMF and World Bank, credit rating agencies, global capital owners and international corporations displayed a positive approach to Egypt in the aftermath of the coup in order to consolidate the power of the Sisi regime. Long-term loans were granted to the country whereas efforts have been exerted to create a positive image for the Egypt’s economy, and attempts have been made to create an impression that global capital is eager to enter the Egyptian market. Therefore, various engagements corresponding to multi-billion dollars were contracted in the economy and investment forums organized to that end.

Along with the actors in Egypt and the Middle East, the Western democracies have a major role in the oppressive regime’s increasing anti-democratic practices that do not allow any dissident voice. Considering the stance of these countries after the Egyptian coup, it can be contended that they do not have any concerns regarding democracy or human rights and are shaping their policies in line with certain economic and political interests. It is more accurate to regard the Egyptian presidential elections as a new step toward consolidating the oppressive regime, which was established with a global political support rather than a step towards democratization, indeed the country is far from it.

The post Presidential Elections in Egypt and the Future of the Authoritarian Regime appeared first on Politics Today.

]]> The Future of CHP and Turkey’s Democracy https://politicstoday.org/the-future-of-chp-and-turkeys-democracy/ Mon, 19 Mar 2018 07:30:04 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/the-future-of-chp-and-turkeys-democracy/

Will CHP be able to break the vicious cycle, contribute to democracy, find solutions to problems and inspire hope in the public? I truly hope so, but it’s a tough challenge for the CHP.

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Having a legitimate, open and official opposition in a country is a vital indicator of democracy. In terms of concentration of power, every country has a government; the oppositions also exist in a similar fashion. Yet, in antidemocratic countries, the oppositions are obstructed and declared illegitimate through various methods. For this reason, it’s not the presence of a government that distinguishes democracy from other regimes; in fact, it’s the existence of an open and legitimate opposition that validates democracy.

In this respect, we might assert that oppositions as well as the government should have certain features in a democracy. The opposition’s duty is to keep the government in check within democratic boundaries and give the public the hope that a solution exists for each problem. This is where the government and opposition should stand. Having an open and legitimate opposition allows democracy, which is perceived as relatively unstable when compared to antidemocratic methods in the short-term, to be more stable than its alternatives on the long run.

CHP: more than an opposition

For a long time, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) has been carrying the mantle of the main opposition. Administrators of the party don’t seem troubled by this because securing more or less the same percentage of votes in every election allows the party to acquire a number of seats in the parliament and ensures them a presence in politics without too much effort. It seems that the CHP has grown accustomed to this mode of existence and doesn’t want to be disturbed. Or, maybe the party does want to break away from being the main opposition party but possibly is unable to break the cycle it created.

However the party congress held recently didn’t provide any hope for the possibility of breaking this vicious cycle. It’s the same old story for CHP and this saddens me greatly, as I believe that it is one of the most important political parties of Turkey and could contribute immensely to our democracy and our country.

What issues plague the CHP? I believe their issues could be discussed under two categories: procedures and principles.

CHP and procedures

Democracy is usually defined over the essence; however, these definitions are inadequate most of the time. They are even misleading sometimes. Exaggerated emphasis on the essence and every movements’ attempts to identify with democracy prevent democracy from consolidating. In order to annul this handicap, we should understand that democracy is about both procedures and principles; as it has always been the case in Turkey, we shouldn’t disregard and neglect the rules pertaining to procedure.

CHP’s democratic records are full of procedural failures. The party has pursued policies and acted in a way that cast justifiable suspicion upon its allegiance to democracy’s procedural rules in the last ten years.

Historically the CHP always sided with the junta after every coup in Turkey. The party either supported coups openly or was pleased by their realization implicitly. CHP finally distanced itself from coups during late Bülent Ecevit’s chairmanship. Unfortunately, his efforts couldn’t change the encoded values of the party; moreover, during the February 28 coup, Ecevit himself relinquished his anti-coup stance, rendering all of his efforts vain.

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The CHP mentality always perceives coup d’états as a tool against democratic politics in its own favor. In recent years, the party has expanded the spectrum. CHP didn’t openly side with democracy in the fight between the legitimate government and the Gulenist criminal cult (FETO) that has been going on since February 7, 2012. It supported the Gezi Park violent protests, which was the rejection of democracy’s procedural rules by its own voter base, and incited the public. Moreover, CHP Chair Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu didn’t oppose the December 17/25 juristic coup and the party utilized the illegitimate tools FETO acquired through illegal means to attempt to depose the government.

Kılıçdaroğlu played the illegal and fabricated tapes in the Parliament. Even the July 15 coup wasn’t enough to sober up the CHP. With a late and hesitant statement, Kılıçdaroğlu expressed his opposition to the coup. A short while after, he renounced his stance. He put aside the actual coup, illogically distorted the term and called it a “civilian coup”; furthermore, he accused the government of perpetrating the coup and continues to advocate this claim, no matter how baseless it is. For this reason, CHP has to sincerely reaffirm its allegiance to democratic procedures and rules pertaining to it, showing the public that they are trustworthy.

CHP and principles

Indeed, CHP is a political party; however, this doesn’t ensure being democratic. Communists and fascists also had political parties. Therefore, the main issue is whether CHP is democratic or not.

We can’t answer this question just by looking at CHP’s party congresses, the number of candidates for chairmanship or whether certain administrators are elected by delegates. In this respect, there is a mass confusion in Turkey. Intra-party democracy and democracy as a regime are associated and usually confused with each other. Democratic-ness is determined by inter-party competition rather than intra-party. Meanwhile, a political party’s actual discourses and actions are more indicative of its democratic-ness instead of its party manifesto.

CHP usually acts like it single-handedly owns democracy, but its mentality and ideology is plagued with a myriad of issues. Firstly, the party sympathizes with putschists. This is a matter of principle as well as procedure. It could be claimed that there are certain individuals or cliques within CHP that tend to advocate for illegitimate methods of acquiring power, such as coups or violent rebellions, because the public seem to have condemned the party to a permanent impotency. This has to be acknowledged. However, there is more.

CHP’s ideology is not compatible with democracy. Let’s put the discussions about whether Kemalism is contradictory to democracy aside; the classical Kemalist understanding which dominates CHP doesn’t allow any space for principles, rules and procedures of democracy. In this respect, Kemalism is enthusiastic about creating the “ideal” individual and society through the power of the state; furthermore, it wouldn’t shy away from pruning the ethnic, religious and even the cultural majority. This actually summarizes CHP’s political history. Despite the need for an overhaul, CHP does nothing in this regard. The most CHP does is to pretend it interprets Kemalism in a way that is compatible with democracy through masterful rhetoric. Yet, it’s a challenge to persuade the public to believe this.

CHP is an ideological hodgepodge. The party’s antidemocratic mentality is also nourished by their understanding of social democracy. CHP believes social democracy is only about state intervention to economy; more importantly to the society itself. This is one of the reasons why Turkish social democrats are more antidemocratic than Turkish conservatives or even nationalists. If we leave extreme leftist parties and Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) aside, CHP has the most radical vision of a society among the three parties that have seats in the Parliament.

CHP definitely needs to shift its ideology, and thus mentality, towards democratization. Maybe expecting this to be an intra-party process is in vain and unjust. Unfortunately, such effort doesn’t exist in social democratic and Kemalist circles. Indeed, it’s becoming worse. Stuck between hatred toward Erdogan and a lack of new ideas, CHP is having a hard time putting distance between itself and violent methods. I’m not talking about the limited violence that was encountered during the Gezi Park violent protests; I’m referring to the violence employed by terrorist organizations. CHP is unable to distance itself from both PKK’s and DHKP-C’s violence. It’s unable to react in the same way as it reacted to Daesh. This situation renders CHP untrustable and dangerous in the eyes of the public.

Will CHP be able to break the vicious cycle, contribute to democracy, find solutions to problems and inspire hope in the public? I truly hope so, but it’s a tough challenge for the CHP.

The post The Future of CHP and Turkey’s Democracy appeared first on Politics Today.

]]> The PYD’s Forced Migration Policy in Syria https://politicstoday.org/25639-2/ Sun, 18 Mar 2018 06:17:34 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/25639-2/

Not only Arabs but also Turkmens, Kurds and Assyrians have suffered from the PYD's forced migration policy in Syria. The displaced people, now living in very hard conditions, are dreaming of the day they will return to their homes.

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In June, 2015, I came across two Syrians in Şanlıurfa’s Akçakale district who were contemplating the Syrian border facing Tell Abyad with hopeless eyes. A black smoke remaining from the U.S. bombardment wreathed the town, which was covered with yellow dust as far as the eye could reach. Having received a substantial amount of military aid from the U.S., the terror group PKK and its Syrian offshoot Democratic Union Party (PYD) were advancing towards Daesh deployments in Tell Abyad thanks to the generous help of the American jets. However; that war, which was almost visible to the naked eye, was not similar to the wars on the other fronts of Syria. Daesh was leaving the areas it occupied without hardly any resistance and heading towards Raqqa, the city the terror group used as its Syrian headquarters at the time. Daesh militants looked as if they were willfully handing over Tell Abyad to the PYD.

The PYD’s attempt to carry out a demographic massacre in north Syria came to light with this war. In Tell Abyad, the PKK blatantly displaced the locals from the land they had been living on for centuries, which eventually started to be vocally expressed and recorded in various international reports. However, nothing was done to stop this crime against humanity. Of course, the PKK and the PYD’s displacement policy did not begin in Tell Abyad. The organization, which started organizing and collecting a base under the name of “Apocular” in eastern and southeastern Turkey during the 1970s, initially kicked off a sweeping process of destruction against religious functionaries along with the members of various Kurdish organizations such as the Revolutionary Democratic Culture Association (DDKD), the Revolutionary Eastern Culture Clubs (DDKO), Kawa and Rizgari. Becoming the only dominant organization in the region through this method, the PKK implemented the exact same method 40 years later in Syria.

The Baath regime, which got into trouble with its armed opponents in Syria in 2011, made an agreement with the PKK leadership in Mount Qandil and assigned the security to the PKK militants in many regions, including Qamishli, Al-Hasakah, Afrin and Ayn al-Arab (Kobani). In return for this generosity of the Assad regime, the PKK took over the role of silencing the opponents of the regime in these areas. On June 27, 2013, the PKK militants launched a fusillade attack on a group of Kurdish civilians who were protesting against the regime in Amuda district. Five civilians, including a 5-year-old girl, were killed in the incident. The terror group’s attacks on dissident Kurds continued. Several leaders including Mashaal Tammo, Abdullah Bedro and Sherzad Rashid were assassinated by the PYD militants. With these methods, the PYD built an empire of fear in north Syria and consolidated its power. No one was able to raise their voice against the organization. The terror group’s next step was displacing the Kurds who were not supporting the PKK. With compulsory military service, detentions, arrests, arbitrary fines and heavy taxes, the Kurds not adhering to the PYD and the PKK were displaced. Tens of thousands of Syrians were forced to leave Afrin, Qamishli, Amuda, Ayn al-Arab and Al-Hasakah.

The legitimacy guise tailored for the PYD

After eliminating the potential problems, the PYD focused on its efforts to form a state in these areas. During the first weeks of 2014, the PKK declared three cantons in north Syria named Afrin, Kobani and Jazira. Nine months later, Daesh took action to capture Kobani. A legitimacy guise was tailored for the PYD during the Daesh-PYD war with the contributions of the international press. Daesh’s attack on Kobani became the top topic on the international agenda whereas foreign correspondents paid visits to Kobani to market the terror group. So, the PYD militants were declared “heroes who defended their people against barbaric Daesh militants.” During this period, many countries offered considerable military support to the PYD. From then on, Washington became the PYD’s boss instead of Damascus. The U.S. authorities firstly helped the establishment of an operational group named Euphrates Volcano by uniting the PYD’s armed wing People’s Protection Units (YPG) with several minor armed groups. Soon after, the group was renamed as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

After Kobani was “liberated”, many trucks carrying weapons and ammunition were sent to the SDF, in which the YPG operatives formed the backbone whilst the PKK commanded all the decision mechanisms. The aids were coordinated from a U.S. base established in Rimelan district. The YPG militants, who were endeavoring to secure a few checkpoints with ineffective weapons until that point, were being transformed into a regular army.

The next target after Kobani was Tell Abyad, which was occupied by Daesh at the time. Following a low-intensity conflict that lasted a few days, Daesh abandoned Tell Abyad. But the nightmare was not over for the locals. Having lived under the oppression of Daesh for more than two years, the locals of Tell Abyad were forced to leave their villages after the district was captured from Daesh.

On June 23, 2015, a source of mine whose family lives in Tell Abyad sent this text message to me:

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“The PKK members gathered families in a school in Hammam Turkmen and threatened them saying ‘This place has become a military zone, so leave the village. If you don’t leave, we will make American jets bomb your houses by giving your coordinates as Daesh targets.’ Some families are now leaving the village out of fear.”

To research this incident, I made a few more contacts and after verifying it published the story in a national newspaper. The neighborhoods of the locals who refused to leave their homes were shelled the next day, upon which they had to be abandoned and most of the victims are currently living in refugee camps. Following this event many people brought this issue to the agenda. As someone bearing witness to this atrocity, I can safely say that the PKK/PYD and the U.S. connived on this crime against humanity in Tell Abyad. In Hammam Turkmen neighborhood, where the closest Daesh positions were 30 kilometers away at the time, 20.000 Syrian Turkmens were displaced in this manner.

The PYD has changed the demographics of Syria

Afterwards, hundreds of thousands of Syrians were forcibly displaced from the towns of Manbij, Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa, which were occupied by the PKK/PYD with the support of U.S. air forces. All of this happened before the eyes of the U.S. The terror group, seeking to consolidate its territorial power in Syria, used many methods to change the demographic structure of the country. Hundreds of Arabs were imprisoned and tortured after being accused of Daesh membership. Those who raised livestock had their cattle seized. Those who owned farmlands had their farms burned. People who did not want to leave had their children forcibly conscripted and sent to the front lines. Most of the people who lived in these areas had to leave to escape such treatment.

The city of Tell Rifaat, belonging to the district of Azaz just south of the Turkish border, is one of the places where PYD/PKK’s strategy of forced displacement has been employed to its greatest extent. PYD/PKK surrounded Tell Rifaat, which lies along the Azaz-Aleppo road, in 2016 and subsequently started shelling civilian settlements in the region. The rebels in Tell Rifaat, seeing no other way out of this situation, had to hand over the region to the PYD to save the lives of the civilians living there. However, despite being spared death, they were not spared exile. The PYD forced 250.000 civilians to leave this region by employing the methods described. Tell Rifaat, once one of the largest settlements in the area, is now a ghost town.

The PKK turned the Daesh attack on Iraq/Sinjar, just like the one on Kobani, into propaganda, and used it to dominate the Yazidi population. The PYD began conscripting Yazidis once the attack was repelled even though during the Daesh attack on Sinjar it did not take a position that would change the course of the battle. The PKK, which had previously created a division called YPJ (Yekineyen Parastina Jin/Women’s Defense Units), created a division consisting solely of Yazidis called YPŞ (Yekineyen Parastina Şengal/Sinjar Resistance Units). Many young Yazidis were transported to Syria over the Rabia border crossing and given mandatory military training by the PKK in the organization’s military camp in Qamishli. Syrian Yazidis were also brought to this camp. After receiving a short military training, some Iraqi Yazidis were sent back to Sinjar while others were sent to Syrian front-lines.

Undoubtedly, the crimes and the demographic massacre of the PKK and the PYD are not limited by these actions. Some local councils founded by Syrian rebels are keeping records of some of the exiled Syrians. But these records are very limited. No credible number exists on how many people have been forcibly displaced from their homes so far. According to current records, the number of Syrians exiled from towns such as Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, Qamishli, Al-Darbasiyah, Al-Shaddadah, Rmelan, Al-Qahtaniyah, Al-Hasakah, Tell Brak and Tabqa exceeds two million. Not only Arabs but also Turkmens, Kurds and Assyrians have suffered from these policies. The displaced people, now living in very hard conditions, are dreaming of the day they will return to their homes.

The post The PYD’s Forced Migration Policy in Syria appeared first on Politics Today.

]]> Who will land on both feet after the Afrin Operation? https://politicstoday.org/who-will-land-on-both-feet-after-the-afrin-operation/ Sat, 17 Mar 2018 09:50:34 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/who-will-land-on-both-feet-after-the-afrin-operation/

Since Turkey implemented “boots on the ground” strategy in northern Syria, the Syrian crisis has become more complicated. Only those who are determined will land on both feet at the end of this crisis.

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Aiming to eliminate terrorist elements of PKK/YPG, The Operation Olive Branch (OOB) launched by Turkey on January 20 revealed how local, regional and international actors in the Syrian crisis are intertwined. Both Syrian “revisionist actors” and regional actors, trying to maintain or maximize their gains along with minimizing damage, openly voiced their discomfort regarding Turkey’s novel “boots on the ground” strategy, which priorities Turkey’s military power as a foreign policy tool. More than just voicing, they have also taken certain steps seeking to obstruct Turkey’s military depth in Afrin. Iranian-led Shiite militia in support of Assad moving to Afrin to fight against Turkey, together with PKK/YPG last month, was one of the most significant indicators of the aforementioned situation. Meanwhile, despite having different motives, we have seen both Russia and the U.S. become agitated because of the Afrin operation.

Even though it is wary about Turkey’s “boots on the ground” strategy, Moscow calculates that this strategy will escalate the tensions between Ankara and Washington and force Turkey to become closer with Russia; therefore, their approach towards Turkey remains the same. Meanwhile, Washington doesn’t want to strengthen Russia’s hand and is aware that disregarding threats to Ankara’s very existence may deteriorate Turkish-American relations further, evolving into something more than a conjunctural crisis. In this respect, the recent diplomatic traffic between Turkey and the U.S. indicates that the U.S. policymakers have become “more concerned” about Turkey’s assertiveness in Syria and that the U.S. desires to reconcile with Turkey rather than exacerbate the schism between the two NATO partners.

The “boots on the ground” strategy which could be defined as eliminating threats before they reach the country’s borders is clearly yielding positive results for Turkey’s national security. The picture is actually clear; taking the Operation Euphrates Shield and outposts being established in Idlib into consideration, Ankara will achieve a military and political depth in Syria that includes territories northwest of the Euphrates with OOB; a depth that Turkey won’t relinquish in the near future. With the possible addition of Manbij to the aforementioned territories as a result of negotiations with the U.S., Turkey might secure targets in its “game plan” more easily in the short-term.

Turkey’s Game Plan in Afrin

Turkey’s Afrin operation is the continuation of the new national security strategy that was shaped more clearly after the July 15 coup attempt. According to this strategy, Turkey could only contain threats emerging in Syria and Iraq, as a result of the power vacuum, with efficient deployment of military assets. In this respect, the strategy foresees the utilization of military power in the field and in cross-border operations instead of reserving it.

Considering the larger region which includes Syria and Iraq along with protruding military power and the said region’s political and geopolitical realities, the following are Ankara’s aims for the future:

  • Minimizing the PKK existence on both Syrian and Iraqi borders
  • Consolidating diplomacy in order to assure Syria’s territorial integrity
  • Consolidating diplomatic compromise with Russia and Iran achieved in Astana and Sochi
  • Weakening the U.S.’ political and military ties with PKK/YPG

In order to simultaneously achieve the aforementioned targets, Turkey has to overcome certain trials. Ankara’s security strategy mostly focuses on the minimization of the PKK threat. However, the efficient deployment of military power won’t suffice on its own; the complex network of regional and international relations has to be managed simultaneously.

First of all, eliminating the cross-border threat of the PKK with military force requires a meticulous balance between the seemingly conflicting interests of Russia and the U.S. Every improvement in Turkish-Russian relations in regards to PKK/YPG and Syria has an impact on Turkish-American relations; therefore, the relations between Turkey and Russia is at the center of it all. On the other hand, consolidation of diplomacy and the maintenance of the reconciliation between Turkey, Russia and Iran are necessity for preserving Syria’s territorial integrity. Inclusion of Washington to this process might bring balance between Moscow-Regime-Tehran, consolidate the diplomatic initiative and work in favor of Turkey. It shouldn’t be forgotten that certain regional actors like Israel and Iran might attempt to undermine this diplomatic process. Tehran’s approach to Turkey could be clearly understood from Iran’s deployment of militia and armed forces of the Syrian regime which forced Russia to become the intermediary between PKK/YPG and the Syrian regime in Afrin. Iran could be asserted as the leading “most unreliable” actor that could prevent Turkey from achieving its aforementioned goals.

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Syria’s territorial integrity isn’t all about the dynamics between Turkey and PKK/YPG. In other words, Turkey may have thwarted PKK/YPG from controlling a united swath of land with Operation Euphrates Shield and OOB; however, it isn’t possible to foresee how the diplomatic process along with the preparation of a new constitution will shape Syria, especially east of the Euphrates. This is important as it is a reminder that the Syrian conflict isn’t only about the power struggle between the regime and the opposition.

A part of Turkey’s game plan, consolidation of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Ankara is relatively easy. Russia desires the schism between Turkey and the U.S. to widen and deepen. Meanwhile, we know that Russia needs Turkey in resolving the Syrian crisis and this is the main reason for Russia giving the green light to Turkey’s Afrin operation. Moscow knows that Turkey’s presence on the field tests the relations between the U.S. and PKK/YPG, forcing the U.S. to act more carefully. On the other hand, Moscow also believes that counterbalancing Iran’s field advantage and prominent influence over the regime with Turkey is useful. Besides the Syrian crisis the tensions between Turkey and NATO, along with the EU, makes Russia’s investment in Turkey even more worthwhile. Therefore, the consolidation of relations between Ankara and Moscow has become one of the pillars of security policies. Yet, symmetricity of this consolidation is crucial.

Turkey-U.S. Relations

The aim to weaken the U.S.’ relations with PKK/YPG and reinforcing cooperation rather than conflicts have become a crystallized subject in terms of the ever-complicating network of regional and international relations. In order to dismiss the PKK as an issue between Turkey and the U.S., territories under the control of the terrorist organization on both banks of Euphrates has to diminish, its armed capacity has to be minimized and its partnership with the U.S. should end. Even though the PKK won’t be able to hold on to the west side of the Euphrates because of OOB, Iran’s and the Syrian regime’s certain initiatives on the field might make it harder for Turkey to completely control Afrin.

Yet, Turkey needs to “reconcile” and “find a midway” with the U.S. to realize the remaining two aims. Minimizing PKK/YPG activities to the east of the Euphrates through military intervention is among the options. However, realization of this intervention without any kind of reconciliation with the U.S. might escalate the crisis in Turkish-American relations. There is hope for a settlement between Turkey and the U.S. after the former U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson’s visit to Ankara. If the U.S. leaves Manbij to the Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army, Ankara might revise the options regarding the east of the Euphrates. This obviously doesn’t mean Turkey will consent to the PKK existence in the said region.

The other options include reinforcing the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which consists mostly of PKK/YPG militants with Arabs and Kurds that aren’t affiliated with the terrorist organization, thus diluting the existence of terrorist elements, and recalling all the heavy weaponry provided to the YPG after the military phase against Daesh is over. A concrete step has to be yet taken to realize these options. Meanwhile, if Washington seeks a “local power” to limit Iranian influence over Syria in a post-Daesh setting, it has to be aware of the issues that might emerge as a result of building this strategy on the YPG. Therefore, Turkey is still one of the leading actors that could prevent revitalization of Daesh and aide the dismantling of Iran’s influence in Syria.

It’s definite that Turkey won’t back down and will force the U.S. to sever its ties with PKK/YPG. At this point, Turkey has to be militarily active on the field; Turkey’s military activities might persuade the U.S. to agree with Turkey’s demands.

Secondly, the necessity to implement a strategy that would thwart both Russia and Iran’s attempts to undermine Turkey’s fight against PKK in Syria. Iran is the most “anti-Turkey” country involved in the Syrian crisis. While Moscow handles issues in a more pragmatic way, Tehran always sees events through an ideological lens; the Shiite militia’s latest performance in Afrin proves this. It should be remembered that “military activism” and deterrence will be key in counterbalancing Iran.

Since Turkey implemented “boots on the ground” strategy in northern Syria, the Syrian crisis has become more complicated. Only those who are determined will land on both feet at the end of this crisis.

The post Who will land on both feet after the Afrin Operation? appeared first on Politics Today.

]]> What are Israel’s Red Lines in Syria? https://politicstoday.org/what-are-israels-red-lines-in-syria/ Thu, 15 Mar 2018 10:40:53 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/what-are-israels-red-lines-in-syria/

Israel will continue its precision airstrikes in Syria and increase its focus on the Israel-Syria border as well as its attempts to limit the Iranian presence in Syria within its own capacity and keep waiting for the U.S. to implement a more extensive strategy to fight Iranian influence.

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Israel has become increasingly mentioned in matters regarding the conflict in Syria, but this was not the case during the past seven years. Over the course of the conflict, Israel closely followed the developments in Syria, did not hesitate to interfere when it saw it as necessary, and tried to shape the Syria-Israel border according to its own priorities.

Israel has had two main priorities in Syria since March 2011. The first has been preventing Hezbollah from acquiring any weapons from Iran that could be considered “game changers.” With this purpose, several locations in Syria, including the capital Damascus, were targeted by Israeli airstrikes. Existing deployments were also targeted to prevent the military capacity of militia groups acting under the guidance of Hezbollah and Iran from advancing in terms of the threat they posed on Israel. For until 2011, the Iranian threat on Israel was perceived as coming from the Israel-Lebanon border and the limited military capacity of Hezbollah. Israel paid the price of Iran’s technology transfer to Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon War, during which the number of military vehicles lost was enough to change the course of the conflict. Due to this reason, preventing a similar situation from occurring again has been one of Israel’s top priorities in Syria.

The second priority of Israel in Syria has been preventing any groups acting under the guidance of Iran from acquiring territory along its border with Syria. The Israeli-Syrian border had been the most secure border of Israel since the 1980s. Even though the war between the two countries was ongoing on paper and Israel was occupying Syrian land (the Golan Heights), the Assad regime never sought an aggressive policy towards Israel. Attempts at infiltration and harassment over the border were thwarted by troops under the direct command of Maher Assad. On the other hand, Israel achieved critical strategic dominance by building observation and radar systems on Mount Hermon that enabled to observe the military activities in Damascus in real time. But after March 2011, the calculations of Israel had to be changed due to the Syrian regime’s loss of control over the lands along the border, the pouring of many pro-Iranian militia members into Syria and the control of the border passing to rebel groups. Israel, which had previously preferred the Assad regime as a “familiar enemy” over the unfamiliar rebel groups, prioritized the establishment of a de facto buffer zone along the Israeli-Syrian border after the regime lost control of the region.

Limited Intervention in Syria

Despite the military actions taken by Israel to implement the priorities discussed above, the Assad regime continuously avoided reacting in a manner that would completely oppose Israel. Despite Israeli airstrikes that did not only target Hezbollah and Iran but also the regime, Syria chose to remain silent. More precisely, the discursive responses never turned into military actions. This had two main reasons. One was that the Syrian regime did not want to oppose a strong actor like Israel when it was already dealing with rebels and facing an erosion of its power and influence to such a great extent that it warranted an intervention by Russia. Any damage to the regime’s air force capabilities would compound the threat posed against it by the rebels. The second was that Russia, which evolved from a trusted ally to the regime’s main reason for survival during the conflict, did not allow any attacks against Israel. Ultimately, the control of air defense equipment that would deter or defend against Israeli airstrikes was in the hands of the Russians. For these reasons, Israeli airstrikes were not reciprocated by military action.

But the tension between Israel and Iran was one of the conflicts put on hold in Syria. As Iran gained ground in Syria, Israel, still perceiving Iran as an existential threat, sought to build global and regional alliances in response.  Previously, Israel had only “bordered” Iran through Hezbollah, now it also had to face a powerful Iranian presence on the ground in neighboring Syria. The most critical development at this point was the election of Donald Trump as the president of the U.S. and the subsequent start of a new and special period in U.S.-Israel relations. Both nations decided that limiting Iranian influence in the region was a priority for themselves, even though they are yet to develop a concrete strategy on the issue. An attempt to reach a regional understanding against Iran was made with the active participation of the U.S., Gulf countries, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), chose to become a part of this understanding.

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However, it is difficult to argue that this understanding has caused any real change in the situation in Syria. Differences in national priorities, the lack of a concrete strategy and ideological narrow-mindedness have brought a new dimension and form in the aim of limiting Iranian influence. While the U.S. sought to limit Iranian influence in Syria through cooperating with the PKK, this strategy became even more meaningless with the start of the Operation Olive Branch. Gulf countries completely lost their focus on Syria. With the failure to turn this understanding into a concrete will, Israel began to work on achieving its above mentioned priorities within its own capacity.

The Red Line is the Israeli-Syrian Border

Israel did not change its low-profile yet active course on Syria even after the downing of an Israeli F-16 by the Syrian regime, which was an exceptional case in the history of the conflict. In other words, even though an escalation of tensions between Israel and Iran was expected following the downing of the F-16, both Israel and Iran (along with the Assad regime) prevented such an escalation from occurring. Israel prefers to continue its approach of limiting the military capacity of Hezbollah and keeping pro-Iran groups distant from its border via airstrikes over an escalation of tensions. At this moment it assumes that the Assad regime will continue to not respond seriously to Israeli airstrikes. With these considerations it reserves its right of intervention.

At the same time, Israel is preparing in the background to consolidate its de facto buffer zone if needed. It is known that Tel Aviv, considering the presence of the regime and Iranian-backed militia along its border a red line, is now in an effort to deepen its relations with some rebel groups. It should also be noted that this red line is also being respected by both the regime and Iran. The protection and fortification of a de facto buffer zone similar to the one built by Jordan in Daraa will continue to be one of Israel’s strategic priorities in Syria.

In the future, we will see Israel continue its precision airstrikes in Syria and increase its focus on the Israel-Syria border and the border crossings between Syria and Lebanon. Israel will continue its attempts to limit the Iranian presence in Syria within its own capacity and keep waiting for the U.S. to implement a more extensive strategy to fight Iranian influence, since the limited interventions of Israel in Syria will not be enough to effectively limit the rising Iranian influence.

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]]> French Secularism: Towards Republican Authoritarianism? https://politicstoday.org/french-secularism-towards-republican-authoritarianism/ Wed, 07 Mar 2018 10:29:53 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/french-secularism-towards-republican-authoritarianism/

If French secularism turns into full-fledged republican authoritarianism, as the course of events illustrate, Islamophobia will just be another worrisome signal of a huge shadow falling on the old continent.

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Islamophobia in Europe is not a new phenomenon. With the rising right, including AfD in Germany and the National Front in France, the question of whether secularism (or what the French call lacïté) in France is feeding anti-Muslim sentiment and whether the notion of secularism itself is becoming republican authoritarianism has re-risen on the agenda. The latest event that sparked the secularism debate was when a far-right local authority in southern France scrapped pork-free school meals in January this year. Before focusing on examples that support the argument that French secularism is becoming republican authoritarianism, it’s important we fully understand the foundations of these concepts.

While there exists varied definitions of the term ‘secularism,’ and many arguments as to how it should be applied, secularism generally accounts to the separation of the state from religion in order to ensure political neutrality. One important divergence in the secularism debate is the difference between “liberal” and “republican” secularism. In ‘Secularism and Freedom of Conscience,’ Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor distinguish between the two. While liberal secularism is defined as a “model of governance whose function is to find the optimal balance between respect for moral equality and respect for freedom of conscience,” republican secularism is defined as the “emancipation of individuals and the growth of a common civic identity, which requires marginalizing religious affiliations and forcing them back into the private sphere” (Maclure and Taylor 2011, p34). French lacïté, or republican secularism, is one of its kind as it is deeply rooted in the French Revolution of 1789.

The contemporary secularism debate in France first sparked with the 2004 French Law on Secularity and Conspicuous Religious Symbols, which banned the headscarf, Jewish kippah and Sikh turban in public spaces. While this law was enacted in order to ensure the “neutrality” of schools, it is highly ironic that the French state continues to fund religious – mainly Catholic – schools. The 2004 law did not only apply in the sphere of education and employment, but for example, a Muslim mother was not allowed to accompany her child at the cinema on a school trip due to wearing a headscarf. Youssra was told that if she wanted to accompany her three-year-old son she had to remove her hijab, as it was apparently an “affront to the secular French Republic.” This is just a simple example of how extreme the idea of creating a “common civic identity,” which is the aim of republican secularism, can become. Thus, more recent laws and regulations strengthen the argument that the French understanding of republican secularism has left itself to authoritarianism, which not only increases and deepens Islamophobia in the country, but also allows for the success of structural racism and discrimination.

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As mentioned in the introduction, in January this year Julien Sanchez, the National Front mayor of Beaucaire, a town south of Avignon, abolished “substitution meals,” or pork-free school meals, on the first day of the new school term. This step affects about 150 – mainly Muslim – students, who take the “substitution meals.” Sanchez defended his position by claiming that pork-free meals were “anti-Republican.” This, again, could be interpreted by some as an attempt to create a “common civic identity” and therefore could be somehow justified in the name of republican secularism. However, as opposition leader in Beaucaire, Laure Cordelet, put it, this very act is an “attack on the rights of children,” which can in no way be “justified in the name of secularism.” Not only does this act infringe upon one’s basic right to practice religion, it merely reduces an individual’s freedom of choice.

What is problematic is the normalization of such discourse and such bans. Due to political factors, including the terror attacks that happened in France over the past two years, the French state, as noted by Yasser Louati in ‘Islamophobia in France,’ “in addition to the systematic backlash from ordinary people and the hysteric news coverage,” has “engaged in a brutal counterterror campaign that deliberately targets Muslims.” Living in a neo-liberal world, we can argue that the legitimization of such discourse from the state will lead to an increase of Islamophobic attacks. According to figures published by the Coordination Centre Against Racism and Islamophobia (CRI), in 2016 a total of 567 Islamophobic attacks were registered, of which 356 cases were related to the state of emergency. 95 of these registered cases were related to public services and administrations, including schools and hospitals.

The couple of examples referenced to in this short piece are mere micro illustrations of the greater picture in France. By discriminating against particular religions and ethnic groups, the French state is unaware of the fact that it will lead to greater isolation in society, which can open the door for radicalization. This is not to say that people will automatically fall for radicalization due to such policies, but it is an emphasis on the very fact that as individuals feel increasingly marginalized and unaccepted in society, radical terrorist groups will find it easier to utilize on this sense of non-belonging. If French secularism turns into full-fledged republican authoritarianism, as the course of events illustrate, Islamophobia will just be another worrisome signal of a huge shadow falling on the old continent.

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]]> The US must end Support to the YPG to repair Ties with Turkey https://politicstoday.org/the-us-must-end-support-to-the-ypg-to-repair-ties-with-turkey/ Mon, 05 Mar 2018 22:13:29 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/the-us-must-end-support-to-the-ypg-to-repair-ties-with-turkey/

Recent visits by Trump administration officials have resulted in the creation of a strategic conversation mechanism but it is not clear how much progress can be made. After all, administration officials have not signaled a serious rethinking of the U.S. support for the YPG.

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The U.S. must end its military and political support to the YPG not only to repair ties with Turkey but also to bring long lasting stability to Syria. If the U.S. is interested in a semblance of stability in Syria, it is a no brainer that it needs to work with Turkey and not with the PKK’s Syrian branch. The YPG is a direct threat to Turkey’s national security and it is not a reliable insurer of stability in any meaningful sense of the word. It only makes sense for the U.S. the U.S. to work with its state allies like Turkey, not a terror group’s extension.

The PKK’s Syrian branch, the YPG, has sought to carve out an autonomous zone in northern Syria by securing U.S. support under the pretext of fighting Daesh and by kicking Arab populations out of their lands. The PKK utilized the rise of Daesh and secured this as an opportunity by promising the U.S. that it will fight the terrorist organization in return for military and political support. The Obama administration played along starting with the Kobani fight and bought into PKK’s game plan despite Turkey’s multiple warnings. However, starting with Operation Euphrates Shield, Turkey displayed its determination in terms that it will not tolerate the PKK’s efforts to create a statelet for itself with U.S. support.

While rebranding the PKK’s Syrian forces and integrating them into the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) may have looked like a clever move, it was simply a gimmick to evade Turkey’s reaction and avoid legal complications, as U.S. law does not permit providing support to terror organizations. By investing in a partnership with the YPG, the U.S. created a center of gravity around it, driving many smaller groups to be part of the SDF. The SDF might include many non-YPG fighters but the YPG has remained the dominant group accomplishing its military and political goals.

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The already existing command structure owed to the PKK made it easier for U.S. planners to invest in the YPG and to promote them as the most “effective fighters.” In reality, though, their “success” against Daesh always entailed U.S. air cover and military support including heavy weaponry. If one of the central goals of U.S. policy is stability, a group that depends on U.S. support so much cannot deliver it.

The YPG systematically pushed Arab populations out from their lands in northern Syria, rendering them refugees in Turkey. The YPG was able to justify this demographic engineering under the pretext that many of these Sunni Arabs might have ties to Daesh. With the blessing and support of the U.S. forces, they are now the dominant force controlling Arab majority cities like Raqqa. U.S. policymakers must recognize the reality that the YPG they have invested in is a destabilizing factor itself. Turkey’s Afrin operation has shown that the YPG has its own political agenda and it is not only interested in fighting Daesh. Moreover, it is ready to make deals with all actors, including the Assad regime.

Turkey is out of patience. Multiple promises by the Obama and Trump administrations have proven to be empty rhetoric. Recent visits by Trump administration officials have resulted in the creation of a strategic conversation mechanism but it is not clear how much progress can be made. After all, administration officials have not signaled a serious rethinking of the U.S. support for the YPG. If the U.S. treats the discussions in this new mechanism as brainstorming sessions with no concrete action on the ground, they may prove to be futile. “Working through” Turkey’s concerns may not cut it this time around; a real strategic conversation needs to start addressing Turkey’s national security requirements.

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]]> Does the 1997 Coup Trial Suffice to Confront the History of Coups? https://politicstoday.org/does-the-1997-coup-trial-suffice-to-confront-the-history-of-coups/ Sat, 03 Mar 2018 02:14:18 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/does-the-1997-coup-trial-suffice-to-confront-the-history-of-coups/

The room for maneuver created by the strong reaction to the 2016 coup attempt by the Turkish public and politicians must be well employed. The required actions in this context are that the 1997 coup trial must be concluded, other participants must face the consequences of their actions and all effects of the process must be negated.

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The trial for the February 28, 1997, coup, heard by the Ankara 5th High Penal Court, is about to be finalized. A total of 103 defendants are being tried as part of the case, including Gen. Ismail Hakki Karadayi, the Chief of General Staff during the coup, and his deputy retired Gen. Cevik Bir, former Land Forces Commander retired Gen. Erdal Ceylanoglu, who was responsible for the symbolic release of tanks through the Sincan district in Ankara, Teoman Koman and Cetin Dogan as well as a number of civilians such as Kemal Guruz, former head of the Higher Education Board (YOK). On November 23, 2011, the Ankara Prosecutor’s Office announced that an investigation had began on the 1997 coup as part of Article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code, which reads: “Any person attempting, by the use of force and violence, to overthrow the government of the Republic of Turkey, or to prevent it, in part or in full, from fulfilling its duties, shall be sentenced to a penalty of aggravated life imprisonment.” The indictment was submitted to the court on May 22, 2013. Following the hearings that lasted for over four years, the trial was concluded on December 21, 2017, and the prosecutor asked for aggravated life sentences for the 60 defendants who were within the chain of command at the time of the coup. The defendants posted their final pleas in response to the prosecutor’s opinion between January 8 and 10, 2018 whereas the hearings had been postponed to February 12. By this time, the court is expected to give a final verdict after all the final pleas are presented. Thus, recent developments over the past couple of months brought the forgotten trial back onto the agenda.

Prior to the July 15, 2016, coup attempt, the judiciary in Turkey sided with previous putschists and tutelage regimes. It was only until recently that the country’s judiciary stood with and supported the national will and legitimate government for the first time. As a matter of fact, this change in the judicial system began with the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) elections held in 2014 and presented significant possibilities for the fight against the Gulenist Terror Group (FETO). The judiciary has been the leading institution running an effective and determined fight against FETO during the December 17-25, 2013, judicial coup attempts and before and after the July 15, 2016, coup attempt. Despite some problems stemming from FETO-linked members of the judiciary during the early stages of the investigation, the 1997 trial constitutes a considerable phase of the fight against putschist conventions and tutelage regimes.

The  “postmodern” character of February 28 and the trial process

Some groups assert that the actions leading to the Feb. 28 process cannot be regarded as a coup attempt and do not constitute an offense in terms of penal responsibility since the military did not virtually seize power. We have also witnessed defendants presenting their pleas within this scope. The pleas of defendants within the 1997 coup trial stressed that former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan resigned from office voluntarily, that politics in the country underwent a transformation in its own right, the military did not intervene virtually, all actions were in accordance with the duties and authorities vested by the Constitution and law, and that laws were not breached.

While the Turkish Armed Forces did not virtually seize power on February 28, 1997, it exercised a tremendous control over politics, state and society with all means. In doing so, the military utilized instruments of the bureaucratic tutelage system that was established with the 1961 Constitution and consolidated with the 1982 Constitution, whereas the National Security Council turned into a shadow government. Although the MGK, according to the Constitution, is only an “advisory body,” it gave instructions to the government and followed these instructions in all the state institutions by means of the MGK’s Secretary-General’s Office. A separate control mechanism named West Working Group (BCG) was also established unlawfully outside of the constitutional state organization. With the briefings given, the judiciary was prompted and hundreds of investigations and lawsuits were filed mostly on political grounds. The opposition parties sided with the military instead of protecting the domain of politics whereas the media became the leading actor of the process. Media outlets went to any length in order to spread fear in society and to legitimize the military intervention. As a result of this, the legitimate government that came to power with free and democratic elections was overthrown, the Welfare Party was closed, political bans were introduced, the True Path Party was dissolved and hundreds of thousands of people suffered from unjust treatment as an outcome of the implementations of the MGK decisions. As opposed to the arguments brought forward in the pleas of the 1997 coup trial defendants, an exceptional period was experienced before the eyes of the public at the time.

In a statement made, Erol Ozkasnak – Secretary General at the office of the Chief of General Staff during the 1997 coup and for whom the prosecution asked for an aggravated life sentence – openly admitted that they “staged a postmodern coup on February 28.” He explained the “postmodern” character of the coup as follows:

“It was a successful process that did not resemble previous coups. There was no bloodshed and nobody was upset. It was through democratic means and with the assistance of nongovernmental organizations.”

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FETO and its shadow on the 28 February trial

February 28 was a process that occurred before the eyes of the Turkish people and which was greatly condemned by a majority in their hearts. This is why the February 28, 1997, coup trial provides a good opportunity for Turkey to face with its history of coups. However, the trials planned and conducted by FETO, for example, Ergenekon, Sledgehammer and the military spying trial, and the injustices that occurred during these trials make it harder for the 1997 coup trial to be conducted fairly and competently in the public eye.

We can see that the perpetrators of the 1997 coup are trying to hide behind the image of a mistreated and falsely accused Turkish soldier generated by these trials. In fact, this strategy can also be observed in the 2016 coup attempt trial. These conspiracies of FETO are now being used to shelter and excuse the real perpetrators of military coups.

When the 1997 trial process first started, it was actively sabotaged by FETO-linked elements active in the judiciary at the time, especially among specially authorized prosecutors and courts. The prosecutor who prepared the indictment of this trial and an important number of judges that presided over it have been expelled from office due to being members of FETO. We can now see that the defendants are using this point as the foundation of their legal defenses. FETO must have considered this trial unimportant and useless for its own interests as the organization did not exert as much effort on this trial as it did on trials regarding coup plans such as the Sledgehammer case. A reason for this is that while the 1997 coup greatly impacted the religious masses, it opened new doors for FETO members.

Despite the attempts of FETO to sabotage the case, the 1997 coup trial process is near to an end. However, this alone is not enough to address the injustices and crimes that occurred within the February 28, 1997, process. A significant number of people involved in this process were left outside of the trial. For example, no steps have been taken against the media, which was the most important and effective element during the process. Obviously, it is not possible to try all media workers involved in court. Legal accusations in the context of punishment law may not be applicable to some people involved. However, it is neither tolerable nor understandable that some media members, despite all their involvement in the 1997 process, are still using various platforms to accuse others of infringing democracy and human rights.

Another issue along with punishing the perpetrators of the 1997 coup is addressing the injustices that happened during the process. With this idea in mind, some measures have already been taken. Public workers who were forced out of their positions due to wearing headscarves were allowed to return to their jobs. People who had no choice but to leave their schools during the February 28 period were given the right to return. However, no solid measures have been taken in regards to the people convicted by the military in trials held during the coup process. It is difficult to make blanket statements regarding legal matters and a case-by-case examination is required to assess the validity of these trials and the sentences dealt. Yet it is noted that around 600 people received heavy sentences during trials in 1997 and some of them are still in prison. Some also put forward that these sentences were generally based on a series of abstract accusations rather than any solid evidence of offenses. The re-evaluation of these cases and consideration of other injustices that may have occurred due to February 28 would be an important step in facing the history of the 1997 coup.

The room for maneuver created by the strong reaction to the 2016 coup attempt by the Turkish public and politicians must be well employed. The required actions in this context are that the 1997 coup trial must be concluded, other participants must face the consequences of their actions and all effects of the process must be negated.

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]]> Multi-speed EU: Cure All Remedy or Dead End? https://politicstoday.org/multi-speed-eu-cure-all-remedy-or-dead-end/ Thu, 01 Mar 2018 12:03:22 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/multi-speed-eu-cure-all-remedy-or-dead-end/

Not only Brexit but the rise of populist movements almost everywhere paired with very vocal desires to have more say at home instead of furthering what is often perceived as an EU super state in the making may have Brussels perhaps think twice.

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About a year ago in early March of 2017 a debate kicked off in earnest which only half a decade earlier would still have resulted in its promoters at best being sidelined, at worst removed from the public eye in their respective political parties – at least with regards to this and probably all other EU-policy making related topics. Most definitely so in central and western Europe, less so if ever in the United Kingdom!

At stake back then: asking the no-no question in the Brussels’ corridors of power; a ‘no-no’ automatically resulting in a reaction alike a father shaking his head whilst looking at his child who just did something wrong; in this context, a response of disbelief to a rather risqué question along the lines of ‘is it not better to allow for a European Union at two, perhaps even more speeds?’

Now things could not have changed more dramatically. A certain air of alarm is surrounding Brussels’ power centers – that is certain. Not only Brexit but the rise of populist movements almost everywhere paired with very vocal desires to have more say at home instead of furthering what is often perceived as an EU super state in the making may have Brussels perhaps think twice.

If a personal reflection is allowed: me and my generation are most naturally deeply grateful for the fact that what used to be the EEC, then EC, thereafter EU guaranteed a safe, peaceful upbringing in the middle of Europe which only fifteen years before my baby-boomer generation’s first wave of millions of births was at war with each other! Yet there is growing unease amongst many segments of the European population and to label each and every citizen who doubts an ever closer political Union as being extremists is nothing but standard arrogance. Which in turn will only steadily increase the share of far-right and far-left movements’ votes, only aiding those intent on destroying a modern peaceful spanning all-Europe society!

So has multispeed become trendy?

Commentators same as politicians must reflect on public mood shifts as and when required. Hence, facts first: recent comments made by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and only last week by Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, about whether it is not better for the EU to focus more on items best suited for a transnational solution, but leave some, or indeed many other policy making items to the regions and member states. Whilst this does not automatically imply a multispeed EU it is a repeat of what was said during the year 2017; together with my following quotes it at least hypothetically redefines the principle of subsidiarity.

Hence to put matters into a wider frame let us briefly travel back in time, first revisiting 7 March, 2017. As EU Observer duly reported on that day (euobserver.com; EU’s big four back ‘multi-speed’ Europe) leaders of Europe’s largest economies France, Germany, Italy and Spain whilst meeting each other, German Chancellor Angela Merkel was quoted as saying: ‘We need to have the courage for some countries to go ahead if not everyone wants to participate. A Europe of different speeds is necessary, otherwise we will probably get stuck.’

Moving on five months and arriving on 30 August, 2017, the same EU insight publication ran a story titled ‘Macron revives multi-speed Europe idea’ wherein the French President was quoted having said ‘We have to think up a Europe with several formats, go further with those who want to go forward, without being hindered by states that want – and it is their right – to go not as fast or not as far.’

But what could have triggered such a U-Turn?

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The EUR-Lex website, the EU’s very own Access to European Law – portal, defines a multispeed Europe as follows: ‘Multi-speed’ Europe is the term used to describe the idea of a method of differentiated integration whereby common objectives are pursued by a group of EU countries both able and willing to advance, it being implied that the others will follow later.’

Hence we detect a certain disagreement EU internally: the leading EU engines so to speak, both France and Germany, and now other nations, too, question the functionality of a one speed EU whereas the EU legal database itself still proclaims that even if a multispeed EU is declared it only means those not following now will follow later. Think Brexit and we realize that this was, and is nothing but wishful EU jargon thinking.

Neither integrationists wish to see a new feudal type of mini fiefdoms instead of a strong EU. Nor would Brexiteers or defenders of more powers being given back to the regions wish to see that scenario either. All want prosperity, trade, peace, stability, welfare besides many other core values same as my very own baby-boomer generation as mentioned above. But as it seems a pure integrative model without allowing for dissent to be heard and without accepting people’s wishes before far right (or far left) movements figuratively speaking collect them at the ballot box is no longer the best solution.

Looking over other future EU’s model’s shoulders

Brexit will not happen before March 2019, if a further negotiation phase is agreed upon not even before March of 2021. A new EU budget will enter into force only early in the third decade of the New Millennium, too. It is negotiated from 2018 onwards and enters into force post-2020.

If we then further consider cooperation on various regional levels, the Visegrad Four Group (Slovakia, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary) must be mentioned; one should further discuss the Nordic Council although it comprises non-EU member states as well; and perhaps a post-Brexit UK-Republic of Ireland (customs and border) deal is in the making – could an EU at various speeds yet modeled after existing regional forms of cooperation win the upper hand?

Phrased differently: unless there is another referendum in the United Kingdom which looks extremely unrealistic, Brexit is going to happen – so will there be a new version of a (trans-) continental Europe? A core including the Eurozone, a wider group with some political decision making agreements and trade but no complete harmonization and integration, and then a third layer or circle basically based on a free trade agreement? Or would this spell the end of modernization and peace and prosperity for Europe?

Best for EU, best for Turkey scenarios

From a candidate country’s perspective of a nation as big and influential such as Turkey one might actually suggest that whatever the outcome, Turkey belongs to the core group unless adopting the Euro will be mandatory for becoming a core group member; whether Turkey would want to switch to the Euro would need be discussed in great detail. At least with regards to Turkey-EU relations multi-speed would have turned into one speed, if everyone pulling in the same direction.

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]]> The Political Economy of the “Post-modern” Coup https://politicstoday.org/the-political-economy-of-the-post-modern-coup/ Wed, 28 Feb 2018 11:12:20 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/the-political-economy-of-the-post-modern-coup/

One of the most tragic features of the era in terms of the relationship between politics and economics was that retired generals were being made members of many private companies and the executive boards of various holdings.

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Exceptional for being a “post-modern coup” in Turkey’s history of coups and triggering one of the largest devastations of the political system in contemporary history, February 28 differs from other coups for being a process rather than a one-off intiative. Unlike conventional military coups that occurred during the multiparty system era, the coup was realized in coordination with actors from the judiciary, mass-media, academia, finance and the business worlds while the material and psychological damage it caused is still observable in various institutions and segments of society. The said damage is a result of the immense socio-psychological traumas triggered by the implementation of the headscarf ban, discriminatory quotients and national security pressure over pious segments of society with the pretense of a so-called “Sharia threat.” While there are ongoing February 28 trials today, the disappointments, tragedies and wasted years of thousands of people who were barred from employment and education are still fresh. On the other hand, it is obvious that the coup caused political and economic devastation due to banned politicians, parties that were closed down, siphoned banks and ransacked public finances. Having multidimensional societal and institutional devastations similar to all other military coups, analyzing the economic and financial damage caused by the February 28, 1997 coup is crucial.

Turkey’s first liberalization experience

Remembering the issues and systemic malfunctions of Turkey’s post-1980 liberalization experience is important in terms of better understanding the economic dimensions of the February 28 process. Turgut Özal led Turkey’s first wave of liberalization and implemented it according to the “Washington Consensus,” which limits state interference and enforces deregulation. During this era, the overlapping visions of the Motherland Party and foreign institutions led by the IMF and World Bank accelerated the process towards an open economy. However, even though a free market economy was advocated, failing to amend regulations and establish control mechanisms necessary for the institutional infrastructure rendered the country’s economy prone to crisis. Meanwhile, the era of fragile coalitions which began in 1991, triggered a ten-year long period of instability as political uncertainties and financial crises aggravated each other. High inflation, burden of uncontrolled public debt and the need for international loans condemned the economy to a vicious cycle in which debts were paid off with new loans. With the 1994 financial crisis, Turkey suffered its first systemic shock after the decision of financial liberalization in 1989.

The divided political structure and vulnerabilities in the management of the economy in the mid-1990s consolidated the spoils system. Public finance deteriorated due to paying high interest to the financial sector over aggravating internal debt. Systemically making losses under the pretense of “duty losses,” state economic enterprises (KITs) were being covered by high interest loans taken from private banks, making it a lucrative business for individuals with immense capital. By loaning the credits taken abroad to public institutions with high interest rates and exploiting the internal debt spiral, a superficial bourgeoisie that had the political power to form and destroy political coalitions was shaped. Along with banks, large-scale industrial enterprises in and around the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (TÜSIAD) amassed a huge capital through internal debt incomes, which were shown as non-operating income. The terms such as industry, investment and production became obsolete in the country.

The Welfare Party’s ‘pool system’ in the Treasury

Winning the elections in 1994 through the discourse of clean politics and crowning this victory by coming first in the 1995 parliamentary elections, the Welfare Party led by Necmettin Erbakan formed a coalition with the True Path Party and was determined to implement a “pool system” that would overhaul the management of macroeconomics. Implemented in 1996, this system created a resource pool among state enterprises and allowed those showing relatively better financial performance to loan with low interest rates. Rather innovative for its time, the pool system limited the vulnerabilities of public finance that was caused by state enterprises and the total public debt started to decline. However, as has been the case throughout Turkey’s political history, the large-scale bourgeoisie objected to this innovation in order to protect their interests, resorting to anti-democratic tactics. The new public finance order caused a great loss to those who were loaning funds to the state institutions with high interest rates. Rejecting to lose their source of easy income, this financial bourgeoisie initiated its plan to either persuade the coalition to give up the pool system or to depose the coalition. A consensus was formed between the military-civilian bureaucracy and large business groups along with their media affiliates who were all ideologically opposed to the Welfare Party’s Islamic discourses. A psychological war was launched during which the economic concerns and calculations were kept hidden as a part of the strategy and some careless statements made by certain members of the Welfare Party were provocatively used to indicate a so-called “Sharia threat.”

Financial operations hidden behind the regression discourse

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What happened next is history. Using the expression “readjusting democracy”, February 28 process created a new type of post-modern coup aiming to change the government through the discourse “secularism is being abolished” rather than just seizing the control of the state through armed forces. Assumed to “last for a thousand years,” this process was expected to shift the economic and social balance along with the political, to obstruct political movements that emphasize Islamic identity and to constrain the conservative representatives of the business world like Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD) and Anatolian Tigers Business Association (ASKON).

While injecting the paranoia of regression into the subconsciousness of society with marginalized figures and images, the coup perpetrators were attempting to cover up the substantial economic and financial operation. Indeed, during the 4-year time period between February 28, 1997, and the 2001 financial crisis, Turkey lost its public finance discipline and experienced the most intense subsequent crises of the country’s political economy. Coming to power in June 1997, the coalition formed between the Motherland Party, Democratic Left Party and True Path Party, also known as the AnaSol-D coalition, removed the pool system and opened the way to the internal debt exploitation cycle. This caused the interest expenditure to national dividend ratio to increase from 5% to 17% within four years. Allowing the financial bourgeoisie to exploit internal debt, this system crashed with the twin crises of 2000 and 2001 – all tax revenue of the state was being used for paying interest and it was not enough.

The financial cost of February 28 process: over $50 billion

Along with having a detrimental effect on public finance, the February 28, 1997 coup also damaged financial supervision and regulation systems. Undermining the financial supervision system, weak coalition governments issued multiple banking licenses together with their allies including the military-civilian bureaucracy and financial bourgeoisie. Transferring public banks to private enterprises without any supervision, issuing banking permits easily, siphoning banks the high volume of international loans taken to be given to public institutions with high interest rates and the fragility of supervisory institutions triggered a banking crisis. During the process, 20 private banks announced bankruptcy and were transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund of Turkey (TMSF). Considering the burden of seized banks, their interests and the burden of public banks, which were at a duty loss, the February 28 process cost over $50 billion to Turkey.

One of the most tragic features of the era in terms of the relationship between politics and economics was that retired generals were being made members of many private companies and the executive boards of various holdings. Under military tutelage, these large-scale enterprises did not shy away from protecting themselves with senior military officers and using their influences for commercial purposes. As the Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök objected to this practice on ethical grounds, this tradition, which only exists in third world countries, came to an end. However, the mysterious relationship between military actors and the financial bourgeoisie is among the main dimensions of February 28, which we are yet to shed light upon. Meanwhile, it should be remembered that the TUSIAD administration – which tries to boast on being pro-democracy and pro-modernization – while reaping the economic benefits of this hefty crime period, was silent to injustices committed against conservative political movements, conservative segments of society and entrepreneurs.

Despite all institutional and democratic gains, as the July 15 coup attempt reminds us that the threat of military coups in Turkey is still alive. For this reason, democratic consolidation, social solidarity and economic institutionalization which render such coup attempts unsuccessful, shall be achieved swiftly and the anti-coup spirit should be kept alive at all times.

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]]> Will the 1997 Memorandum Last a Thousand Years? https://politicstoday.org/will-the-1997-memorandum-last-a-thousand-years/ Wed, 28 Feb 2018 11:10:41 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/will-the-1997-memorandum-last-a-thousand-years/

As pro-democratic political and public actors change power balances in their favor, coup attempts become unable to achieve desired results. Furthermore, as democratic forces accumulate their share of power in the political system, coups will ultimately stop being an effective tool in power struggles.

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The claim that the process started by the 1997 Turkish military memorandum will “last a thousand years” was founded on a wrong answer to the question as to why military coups occur. According to this view, coups are the result of a clash between a state with immense powers or a “progressive” bureaucratic elite and public elements with “reactionary” beliefs. Historically, the coups in Turkey happened due to political and public actors that were unable to internalize the republican regime and Ataturk’s reforms crossed the red lines of the state. Thus, military coups would only end after the entire public internalized reforms through a radical political and cultural shift. The sociological extinction of “reactionary” views and the decreasing number of people subscribing to those views led to the end of coups.

Those who sought alternative answers to this question were also similarly mistaken. For example, people evaluating the issue from the point of political culture reasoned that coups happen due to a statist mindset with authoritarian and patriarchal inclinations. Such mental constructs, present since the Ottoman era, were the real reason for coups. The prevention of new coups required a radical shift in public mentality, which would subsequently lead to a dominance of democratic beliefs in politics. In order to accomplish this, it was necessary for the perpetrators of the coups, namely the state, the military or the bureaucratic elite, to gradually lose its importance and control in politics to a civil society with liberal beliefs.

Another opinion was that coups in Turkey occur as a result of the interference of international powers. This was especially for the cause of the U.S. due to its global influence and self-interest in Turkish politics. According to this belief, any government that adopted internal or foreign policies against the interests of the U.S. would inevitably face a military coup. Therefore, in order to prevent coups, it was necessary to stop toeing the line of the west and end their influence in Turkey.

These three views all disregard the sociological structural factors of the Turkish public. The changes in the balance of power between political and public actors in the country were not being accounted for. Coups could possibly be triggered by an authoritarian and patriarchal mindset endemic in the state, resistance of the public to internalize Kemalist reforms and bureaucracy or international forces seeking to shape Turkish politics according to their own interests. However, none of these factors explain why coups are actively being used as a tool in political power relations. The reason for this is because only the perpetrators of the coup, whether the military, bureaucratic elite or the west were being focused on. The political and sociological forces subject to the coup were being objectified and not being viewed as political agents. The reason why coups were being actively used as a tool in political power relations and succeeding in their intentions was due to the fact that the public subject to such military interventions were weak.

Changing balances of power

To give a substantial answer to the question regarding why coups occur, one must examine and account for the historical developments in political and social balances of power in Turkey. The main power struggles in Turkish politics between the 1840s and the 1920s happened between the Ottoman Sultan and the westernized bureaucratic elite, combined with inner conflicts of the bureaucratic elite itself. During this period, popular democratic forces were not even perceived as actors in politics. Since the 1950s, political power struggles have occurred between the military and the bureaucratic elite, around which gathered the capital-owning class, organic intellectuals, artists, politicians and small portions of the public in line with these elements either due to ideological or financial benefits, versus popular domestic forces of the public. We can identify two main structural breaking points within this period that deeply affected public power balances.

The first is the partial dismantling of state power and its division among democratic forces according to the principles of democratic politics. This turned the long-standing hierarchical structure of political power in the country into an anarchical one (as in power did not belong to anyone). State power that was solely wielded by the Sultan for a long time prior to the 19th century was being shared among bureaucratic oligarchic powers and the Sultan until 1919. Following the abolition of the Sultanate in 1922, political power transferred entirely to the bureaucratic oligarchy. In both cases, government power was not open to the public and had absolute owners.

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The opening of political power to the public with a multi-party parliamentary system was introduced and its subsequent adoption by certain political actors in the 1950s caused a radical change in the situation; it opened the political stage for large masses in search of a democratic regime. Likewise, democracy is a system of government where segments of the population that hold a majority are the principal actors in the government of the state. From this point onwards, political power was being shared between the bureaucracy and large public masses – in other words, between the appointed and the elected. After the 1950s, the struggle for power was the main driver of Turkish politics. The 1960, 1980 and 1997 coups are critical moments in Turkish history where oligarchic powers, along with their bureaucratic and civil counterparts, acted together to keep their hold on political power and to banish the representatives of the people from the power domain via accusations of being “reactionary” and “separatist.” These sudden coups were always followed by periods where via the introduction of new regulatory agencies, power was restored to the bureaucratic oligarchy and further denied to the general public.

The second structural breaking point was the continuous strengthening of democratic public actors against the oligarchy. This is a situation that must happen in practice if a democratic regime’s ideal of transitioning political power to the public is to be realized. The conservative strata of the public, composed chiefly of people with low socio-economic status from the Turkish countryside, became urbanized and improved their economic and cultural class over the course of a half a century period. The result of this sociological shift is the gradual change of material and moral power balances between the minority oligarchic powers and majority democratic powers in the country. If a small analogy is to be made between this situation and international relations, we can say that the unipolar structure that enabled the hegemony of oligarchy powers and backed coups slowly evolved into a bipolar structure via the strengthening of democratic forces. This bipolar structure enabled the AK Party to assume power in 2002 and allowed it to become even more established and stable in the following periods between 2002 and 2010.

The period from 2010 onwards was defined by the gradual shift of power towards the pole represented by the AK Party and a transition back to a unipolar power structure. Two indicators representative of this are first, the Nationalist Movement Party’s (MHP) – a party that traditionally associated itself with a different segment of society – decision to closely follow the AK Party’s line after the November 1, 2015, elections. The second indicator is the fact that the opposition led by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) had to plan its policies defensively, with the focus of preventing AK Party’s influence and power from increasing rather than offensively, with the focus of reclaiming the government and political power.

Are new coups possible?

Changing power balances explain why the coups of 1960, 1971, 1980 and February 28, 1997, were successful while the memorandum of 27 April 2007, the attempted judiciary coup of December 2013 and the failed military coup of July 15, 2016, were unsuccessful. As pro-democratic political and public actors change power balances in their favor, coup attempts become unable to achieve desired results. Furthermore, as democratic forces accumulate their share of power in the political system, coups will ultimately stop being an effective tool in power struggles. Thus, as coups fail to succeed, the heavy costs of participating in a failed coup attempt, namely the legal punishments of participating in anti-democratic acts, deter future coup attempts.

The court decision of June 2014 that sentenced the participants of the 1980 coup to life imprisonment, the current point arrived in the trial process concerning the 1997 coup and the fast-moving trial process of the 2016 coup attempt signify that Turkey has reached an important milestone with respect to domestic democratization. Coup trials can neither be reduced to, as some say, attempts of revenge, nor can they be reduced to purely apolitical processes where injustices are addressed and justice is served. Attempts to define this process through apolitical points of views disregard the historical structural breaking point that Turkey has gone through. Since the 1950s, large public masses have become political actors and the power balances in Turkey continue to shift in favor of pro-democratic forces. This historical and on-going structural process renders future coups impossible.

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]]> The Praxis of Husamettin Arslan https://politicstoday.org/the-praxis-of-husamettin-arslan/ Wed, 28 Feb 2018 01:16:43 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/the-praxis-of-husamettin-arslan/

Arslan had said that his youth was spent in an interfile social circle due to the fact that he was inflicted with “ideological cancer.” Indeed, he was a “radical, pedantic and a fervent ideologue” at a time when people suffered from contracted mindsets.

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In order to understand the intellectual activities of the late Husamettin Arslan, his character needs to be evaluated. He was interested in multidimensional analysis and had multiple fields of interest. For this reason, he wasn’t systematic, but a little scattered. It is important to know the milestones of his life, from his childhood to his death, in order to make sense of his spirit, quests and his “return home.” We can’t explain his tremendous effort to translate works while working as an academic without talking about his father’s work discipline. Considering the fact that he was aware that he had to perceive life, culture, ideology and any other issue from his own standpoint, these consequences became more important.

In this respect, he once said the following: “Our social and historical practical lives (or praxis) determine our theories, problems and the resolution of these problems.”

Political consciousness, ideology and the aftermath

Throughout his childhood, he took long walks with his father at sunrise. It’s probably due to this that he always preferred sunrise to any time of the day. While he was on the road at 5 am in the morning, his father’s recital of a folk song would accompany the singing birds: “I wish only a wish, O Almighty/Never let me lean on the vile.” Is there any need to imagine the rest? It is obvious that this work discipline is the most precious characteristic he had inherited from his industrious father.

He met with his first “modern dress,” a black school uniform with a white collar and a military hat with a huge visor when he was six. He was exhilarated when he acquired his unofficial school report after attending school without registering for a year. As a child of a family supporting the Democrat Party, he never understood why the village’s imam, Molla Kamil, supported the Republican People’s Party.

In 1963, he encountered one of the first products of modern technology – the battery powered radio. He always remembered that his father listened to the 1 pm broadcast from this radio, which only two families possessed in the entire village. As the situation in Cyprus became increasingly dire at the time, no one would make the faintest noise in the house during the radio broadcast.

Arslan acquired his first “modern political consciousness” from his primary school teacher, who replaced his father in terms of authority. We may call it the unexpected and inexplicable domination of certain moments over human memory. In fact, his teacher told stories about Adnan Menderes and the Democrat Party, which are later known to be false. This encounter was probably the earliest source of his works and speeches on political consciousness, in which he undertakes the role of a social intellectual who observes the world from his de facto standpoint.

When Arslan finished primary school, he left his father and stepped into a world unknown to those in the village. His life truly began with public boarding school. After Tunceli Training School, Arslan went to Ankara. His father always bid farewell to him with the same words: “You know our condition. Work and study accordingly.” Arslan had said that his youth was spent in an interfile social circle due to the fact that he was inflicted with “ideological cancer.” Indeed, he was a “radical, pedantic and a fervent ideologue” at a time when people suffered from contracted mindsets.

Years later, he discussed ideology as a contested, conflicted and possibly unsolvable modern issue with Terry Eagleton at what he called the “center of the universe.” Arslan’s expression of ideologies, which attempt to replicate the functions of religions today, not being an issue for those who lived in the Middle Ages or the Pagan world, was closely tied with his own experiences. Meanwhile, he stated that he was in agreement with Eagleton in terms of his thesis “the end of ideology,” which advocates the idea that ideologies became absolute in Europe after the 1950s, as the welfare state satisfied the needs of the poor and working classes.

During the hard times in which people dug their heels in, he became part of the movement dominated by obedience and loyalty, and which excommunicated those with comprehensive ideas. While he was studying at the History department at Hacettepe University, Arslan was obsessed with the issue of regime. During these years he was in opposition to everything and believed that if the regime were to change everything in life would be perfect. Meanwhile, his father always told him: “These efforts are in vain, leftists or rightists alike.”

After having completed his master’s thesis on Contemporary History of Turkey, he changed his fields. At the Faculty of Literature at Istanbul University, his doctorate dissertation was on the “sociology of knowledge” and then the new sociology discipline, “sociology of science,” which were under the fields of General Sociology and Methodology.

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‘Epistemic Community,’ which made ripples across the fields of philosophy and social science, showed that he was on a very specific, meticulous and precious path to knowledge. A prominent part of his translations was directed towards consolidating the stance against scientism, which his afore mentioned book made a breakthrough. Of course, his readings on philosophy, which became his sole intellectual hobby after the 1980s, played a great role in this. We should probably underscore that he believed hobbies lasted longer than duties. According to Arslan, if history and philosophy are not studied together, sociology is nothing but a technology. For this reason, he defined sociology as the “philosophy of society.” Indeed, sociology is “social philosophy.” For this reason, he always advocated “philosophical” sociology over any “orthodox” understanding of sociology. He strode on the streets of intellectualism with this mindset. It’s not in vain that we’re talking about an attained success.

An oasis in the intellectual wasteland: Arslan’s translations

A social scientist had drawn similarities between translation and sowing couch grass: “Once it’s rooted, you can never get rid of it.” Indeed, translations, especially those after the 1980s, had a crucial role in our cultural life. However, despite its value and the effort spent, the act of translation never obtained the reputation it deserved in our world of thought. Indubitably, this is also true for the whole world. Despite the increase, the numbers of translated texts still remain inadequate. Many crucial philosophical texts were only translated into Turkish during the 2000s, and there are still many others which are yet to be translated. For instance, Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, which is deemed to be one of the most important philosophical texts, wasn’t translated into Turkish until the 2000s. Meanwhile, Heidegger’s Black Notebooks is yet to be translated.

Considering all of this, it is easier to understand the value of Husamettin Arslan’s translations and his sacrifices. As a translator on the verge of rediscovering philosophy and social sciences along with rendering these disciplines as part of a greater destiny, Arslan gained his reputation by translating works including the most distinguished ones on Heidegger. He emphasized the importance of translation and translated many works from English to Turkish. By doing so, Arslan brought to the Turkish reader numerous books on philosophy and sociology.

Life teaches us the following: the beginning determines the end. Life goes on as it has begun. Therefore, it’s important to start strong. Looking at Arslan’s biography, we can see that he has emphasized the importance of translation since the beginning of his academic career.

“Turkey is a good mill. It grinds all, valuable and worthless alike,” said Husamettin Arslan. Arslan’s emergence as a translator was in the late 1980s. After many years in which hope was consumed by disappointments and realizing that his consequent translations did nothing but serve other intellectual circles, Arslan found his own way – the Paradigm – which are verified by his relatives and the chronological listing of his works.

Because of its content and approach, the distinct Epistemic Community became a sensation especially among intellectual circles. It still continues to be cited by numerous academic and non-academic works. Arslan always insisted that the intellectual class in Turkey was a monopoly. In this respect, it’s definite that the critical intellectual circles in Turkey have learned a lot from his translations and works. So, let me say this about the politics of translation: Tell me the translations you’ve read, and I’ll tell you what you’re not.

Praised by Arslan, Terry Eagleton claimed that the cultural clash in the world began after the Cold War. Meanwhile, Arslan was aware that Turkey had been going through a cultural clash since the beginning of the country’s modernization. As a Turkish intellectual, he grasped that one of the most essential issues of the country remained unsolved in the face of the following question: “How can we be ourselves while modernizing and adopting modern ideas?” In this respect, Arslan was the elder version of late Mehmet Kucuk, as they were both translators who admired postmodernist thinkers. This is a fair comparison considering the fact that Arslan left ‘Epistemic Community’ while Kucuk left ‘Contingency Theory’ as their legacies.

Arslan believed that Terry Eagleton, who had a Catholic background, would have a better chance of understanding Turkey. More, he deemed it important that Eagleton defined himself as a heterodox, thus, a traditional Marxist. Yet, Arslan was unable to agree with Eagleton on postmodernism. He never refrained from saying the following about Eagleton: “How can we remain ‘socialists,’ ‘democrats,’ ‘conservatives,’ or ‘rightists’ in a world in which postmodernists exist and where Derrida wrote numerous books and Lyotard’s books are still being read? How can we be leftists when Foucault’s works are here? We cannot. We cannot live in spite of thinkers called ‘postmodernists.’ I wonder how Eagleton could continue to be an old-school Marxist in spite of Derrida, Foucault or even ‘postmodern Marxism.’”

Years later, Husamettin Arslan understood that his father, who gained all his knowledge with the hardships of life, had a fragile heart. When he started to realize that he was transforming into his father after 35, his intellectual interest deviated. For instance, he asked whether Novalis’s “all returns are to home” referred to becoming your own father. He experienced that sons always tried to become something else with the energy bestowed by youth. However, also saw that those very sons began to transform into their fathers when their energies were depleted by the hardships of life and personal obstructions. In this sense, it’s possible to summarize Arslan’s two characteristics with two Russian novels: Turgenev’s Fathers and Sons and Dostoyevsky’s Demons. Russia is synonymous with literature, but we failed to create it. We have to think about this: first with Arslan’s ‘Baban Olsun…’ article, which talks about his father, and second through his translations. Of course, we’ll have a better opportunity in understanding this when his journals, which reflect the search for perceiving the world through an ontological lens, are published.

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]]> The Unknown Side of Boko Haram: How a Salafi Group Spread in Historically Sufi Northern Nigeria https://politicstoday.org/the-unknown-side-of-boko-haram-how-a-salafi-group-spread-in-historically-sufi-northern-nigeria/ Sat, 24 Feb 2018 03:50:41 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/the-unknown-side-of-boko-haram-how-a-salafi-group-spread-in-historically-sufi-northern-nigeria/

Salafism has had a remarkable impact on the transformation of Islamic life in post-colonial Nigeria and it needs to be further explored. Whether sooner or later, Boko Haram will one day disappear, but Salafi thought is a longer-term phenomenon that has been shaping and transforming Islamic life in Nigeria.

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Boko Haram has been perpetrating mass crimes in Nigeria since 2009. The insurgency has massacred thousands of people and has destroyed the entire region’s political structure and economic circulation. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the group has killed over 20,000 people and has forced nearly 2.1 million people to flee their homes. Massive displacement has caused serious consequences for the country such as large-scale famine, which threatens the lives of 7 million people. Just this year, 4.7 million people were left in urgent need of food assistance.

As the group gradually gained infamy in the region as well as the world, discussions have set to investigate the main reasons behind the emergence of Boko Haram. The decade-long deep-rooted political and economic issues have always been pointed out as the main reasons for the birth of Boko Haram. It is true that widespread poverty leaves millions of people impoverished; economic inequality and weak political structures trigger ethno-religious conflicts and violence between the Christian dominated South and the Muslim dominated North; epidemic corruption wipes out the country’s development; and the poor education system fails to transform northern Nigeria through the education of new generations.

Undoubtedly, these chronic problems have had a dramatic influence on many young Nigerians who are pushed to a stalemate where their hope for the future is about to end. However, religious aspects of Boko Haram have usually been ignored in the discussions. In fact, the transformation of Islamic life itself can be regarded as the root cause that gradually gave birth to Boko Haram. By challenging Sufi Islam, which has firmly been established in Nigeria since the fifteenth century, the group built a theological foundation based on Salafi thought, which became a new phenomenon in the 1970’s.

Historically, Sufism was the main Islamic school in the region over the centuries. Although the spread of Islam gradually began to be driven by Sufi orders in the 15th century, the 19th century was marked as a milestone for Sufi Islam. Preaching Sufi Islam and becoming a prominent scholar, Usman Dan Fodio declared a war in 1804 against the rulers due to their oppressive, corrupt and un-Islamic administration. After 5 years of regional war, Fodio with his followers, succeeded to conquer most of the city-states across northern Nigeria, southern Niger and the western part of Cameroon. With this, he formed the biggest Islamic empire in the history of West Africa since the Songhay Empire collapsed in the 15th century. However, the significance of the Sokoto Empire was not its military advancement or political power, but a broad socio-political system that still mostly exists in present northern Nigeria. As a result, Sufi Islam gradually became a predominant form of Islam and a guideline for Nigerians in their lives, as it was institutionalized in both government and civil society.

The picture began to slowly change after Nigeria gained its independence from the United Kingdom, as Sufism faced a new phenomenon, Salafism. Since the 1970s Salafism began to gain its popularity among different sects of Nigerian Muslims. Essentially, social and economic developments, such as high population growth and rapid urbanization, helped Salafi thoughts to be planted in society. From 1960 to 2015, the country’s population quadrupled from 45 million to 182 million people. According to figures published by the World Bank, the number of people in urban areas also skyrocketed from just 6 to 87 million in the same period. The population boom in urban areas brought with it a huge number of young people who didn’t have traditional Sufi education.

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These socioeconomic developments undermined the traditional Sufi establishment and formed a basis for new religious movements and scholars to emerge. Since the 1970s, Salafi scholar Abdulkadir Gumi publicly questioned and criticized Sufism and Izala, one of the largest Salafi organizations in the region, reached to huge audiences from different levels of society.

Middle-class urban Muslims approved Izala’s messages as it provided “a more rational religion.” The anti-Sufi rhetoric that Izala built also meant freedom from the traditional hierarchies for the impoverished youth who moved to the urban cities seeking a better life. Therefore, Salafi thought played a crucial role in the transformation of understanding and practicing Islam in northern Nigeria. Nonetheless, the 90s brought structural changes for Izala. The movement was divided into many sections as intra-Salafi tension increased and it caused radical groups, such as Boko Haram, to flourish.

Two essential details reveal how Boko Haram exploited Salafi thought and used it in order to frame its violence. First, the founder of the group, Muhammed Yusuf, rose as a young Salafi preacher in an Islamic center that was founded by a former Salafi Izala preacher, Jafar Mahmud Adam. Through this network, Yusuf managed to control several mosques and found a significant number of audiences to address his radical sermons. Therefore the system Yusuf created within the Salafi network helped him form Boko Haram.

Secondly, starting from the 1980s, the city of Maiduguri, which is the capital city of northeastern Borno state, became a center for Salafi groups just in less than two decades. The city was where Adam – the Salafi scholar who hired Muhammed Yusuf into his network – was based, and where Boko Haram was born. It may seem that Boko Haram, under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, has moved away from the Salafi concept to a new ideology that favors Daesh-style violence-centered terrorism. However, despite the theological evaluation, Salafi doctrine still remains within the group’s ideological structure.

In order to avoid any possible confusion or assumption, I would like to emphasize that this piece is not written to make a comparison between “peaceful” Sufism and “violent” Salafism, the problematic angle which Western scholars and writers like to use. These two Islamic schools have various sub-branches and numerous interpretations across the Islamic world. However, Salafism has had a remarkable impact on the transformation of Islamic life in post-colonial Nigeria and it needs to be further explored. Whether sooner or later, Boko Haram will one day disappear, but Salafi thought is a longer-term phenomenon that has been shaping and transforming Islamic life in Nigeria. Therefore, this very fact reflects a deeper change for Nigeria, more than does the violence committed by Boko Haram.

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]]> Notes from the Border: What Operation Olive Branch means for the Border Towns of Turkey https://politicstoday.org/notes-from-the-border-what-operation-olive-branch-means-for-the-border-towns-of-turkey/ Thu, 22 Feb 2018 10:08:50 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/notes-from-the-border-what-operation-olive-branch-means-for-the-border-towns-of-turkey/

A young Kilis resident we came across while walking said to us: “When they [terrorists] kill, they don’t care whether we are Turks or Syrians. Here, we are trying to survive together.”

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With the escalation of the Syrian Civil War, attacks on Turkey’s border towns began to increase from 2012 onwards. In order to refresh our memories, let’s remember that 5 Turkish citizens were killed in the Akcakale district of Sanliurfa on October 2, 2012, as a result of attacks conducted from Syria. Meanwhile, the memories of the bomb attack that took place in Reyhanli on May 11, 2013, are still fresh. There is now a clock tower at the location of the bombing in Reyhanli in order to ensure that the passing time never lets us forget our losses. There were numerous attacks in 2015 and 2016, which caused the death of citizens not only in border towns but also in cities like Ankara and Istanbul. Tens of civilians, most of them being children, were massacred at a wedding in Gaziantep as a result of a suicide bomb attack on August 20, 2016. This was the final straw that led Turkey to launch Operation Euphrates Shield (OES) on the Syrian border on August 26, 2016, with the aim to establish a safe zone in the eastern bank of the Euphrates. The operation was accomplished within 7 months.

After cleaning Daesh from Azez, Jarabulus and al-Bab, with the success of the operation, Turkey provided prominent support in terms of education, health and security to the region in order to establish stability and peace. During my visit to Azez in November, I was able to personally witness the efforts of both the Turkish government and Turkish NGOs in the region. Even though the operation was able to provide some security to the border towns, this time there were instances of harassing fire coming from YPG-occupied regions such as Afrin. Launched at 17:00 pm on January 20, 2018, Operation Olive Branch (OOB) forced Turkey to fight cross-border terrorism with similar motives to Operation Euphrates Shield. In this respect, Operation Olive Branch has three sociological motives: (1) establish security and peace within Turkey, (2) help the local populace that is oppressed by the YPG, and (3) provide a secure way and settlement to Syrians in Turkey who want to return to their hometowns.

Considering that Turkish border towns have become the target of demographic-engineering based on ethnicity and sectarianism that terrorist organizations like the YPG and Daesh tried to achieve in Syria, Operation Olive Branch has both a sociological and historical significance. The sociological motivation behind the operation is what ensures it sociological support.

Higher sociological resilience

My visits to Kilis and Hatay prior to Operation Euphrates Shield help me draw a comparison with the contemporary situation. Prior to the OES, Daesh used missile attacks on these cities. When we were frightened by the sounds of two missiles that hit Kilis during a meeting there, those living in the city were rather calm and told us that they were used to it, stating that the missiles had probably fell on an empty field. They seemed careless, but also angry. When I asked for the reason of this attitude, an NGO representative said: “Miss, we are alone here. The people of Kilis are all alone!” For this reason, in comparison to Operation Olive Branch, we were unable to talk about any public support when OES was launched.

In other words, we can assert that there was a lack of social awareness during OES. Meanwhile, I witnessed the solidarity among people in Kilis and Reyhanli, especially those we interviewed during the first week of OOB. We can talk about a higher sociological resilience when compared to the past. Two factors are important in this respect. Firstly, people began to feel more secure in their personal and social lives after OES. Therefore, the success of OES became a leading factor that increased public support and awareness for OOB. A nurse I spoke to who was working at Kilis Public Hospital summarized the shift in public perception with the following words: “Two years ago, we as the people of Kilis, believed that we were all alone. We felt trapped. For this reason, we couldn’t truly understand what OES meant. Now, it’s different. The whole city stands as one.”

During my prior visit to the area, when walking around the cities, I used to often see daytime shows playing on TVs in coffeehouses and stores. However, this time people were watching news channels and following the developments about the operation. When interviewing people, I realized that many of them were using military strategy terms. It was very clear that not only did they care, but they also followed the developments of the operation very closely.

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Standing together with Syrians

One of the aspects that I was interested in during my visit to Kilis and Reyhanli was whether the attacks had raised tensions between the local Turks and the Syrian people living there. I previously witnessed tensions caused due to the swift change in demographics. The main reason of these tensions was the failure of extending public services to the region at the same rate that Syrians were moving in. Syrians almost three-fold of the local populace moved into the city. Otherwise, it is false to draw a correlation between Syrians and criminal activities. After 5 years, we can now see that Turks and Syrians have learned to live together.

We visited all the locations that YPG missiles hit in Kilis and Reyhanli and spoke with the local people. Despite the recent mosque attack in Kilis, the city center was surprisingly crowded. We walked around the Asit neighborhood, which harbors classical Kilis houses and came to a Syrian household that was victim of a missile attack. We entered the house and spoke with the people living there. “The missile hit around the evening. There were 10 people in the room. It dropped down from the ceiling. Thank God it didn’t explode, so no one was injured,” the householders said. Seeing the damage, it was a miracle that no one got injured. A young Kilis resident we came across while walking said to us: “When they [terrorists] kill, they don’t care whether we are Turks or Syrians. Here, we are trying to survive together.”

During my visit to patients who survived the YPG’s attack on the mosque at Kilis State Hospital, I met Mr. Hasan who migrated from Aleppo to Kilis 4 years ago. “Thank God the missile hit the mosque after the prayer had already finished. Otherwise, the number of losses may have been higher,” he said. He has 6 children and he provides for the family alone. “I need to get out of hospital as soon as I can and return to my family and my work,” he told me, while adding: “May God help Turkey. We know that if God helps Turkey, he would also be helping us.”

We also went to visit the Kilis Oncupinar Temporary Refugee Center, which is right across the Barsaya Mountain. Since my last visit, the security procedures have become stricter. Even though we got the approved permission by the governorate, we were hardly allowed to enter after a meticulous ID check. There are 12,000 refugees living at the center. We were right at the border with Syria and were able to hear very clearly the sounds of conflict. When we were frightened by every sound of shooting, those living there said: “Don’t worry, those are our missiles.” They had enough war experience to distinguish the sounds of “their” missiles and those that belonged to the YPG. Comparing this with the traumas of the Syrian Civil War, these sounds probably mean little for them. They were saying that when the Turkish Armed Forces and the Free Syrian Army take control of villages near Afrin, missiles would no longer be able to hit the city center of Kilis. Despite the smoke rising from the Barsaya Mountain, children at the camp kept playing with their marbles. Refugees, most of whom came from Idlib, believe that the liberation of Afrin will open the way for Idlib. However, they also told me that the stability of Idlib would be determined with their return.

Responsibility of local administrators

Communication between the local administration and the local population in border towns is key for the sociological management of Operation Olive Branch. The approach local administrators in the area take are crucial for the operation. For example, a governor I met emphasized that the immediate response and support for the reconstruction of houses damaged by missiles is more important for the management of the people than we assume during a conflict process. The increasing appearance of local administrators, especially of the governor, in social life, would have a sincere effect on the people living in these cities. A local administrator I interviewed stated: “Actually, we had taken certain precautions against the possible provocations during the funerals of those who have been killed by the YPG’s missile attacks. However, there weren’t any incidents. People stood together. This is an important social support and it also allows us to do our work with high morale and stamina.”

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]]> Iran and the YPG: Friends or Foes? https://politicstoday.org/iran-and-the-ypg-friends-or-foes/ Wed, 21 Feb 2018 00:57:23 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/iran-and-the-ypg-friends-or-foes/

During Operation Olive Branch, the YPG has used, visually confirmed, Iranian weapons. Among them are Iran-produced 107mm rockets, which were also found earlier in Turkey during anti-terror operations against the PKK.

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As the U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson explained the shift in U.S. policy priorities in Syria towards an attempt to limit Iranian influence by close cooperation with the YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), questions have emerged regarding how realistic such policies would be. This is especially relevant in regards to the long YPG-Iran cooperation in Syria, of which signs are still visible in Afrin. Therefore, it is questionable as to how the very same YPG will “limit” Iranian influence in Syria.

Iran’s cooperation with the YPG before Kobane

While the U.S. officially listed the YPG as the Syrian branch of the PKK, with the battles in Ayn al Arab – better known as Kobane – the U.S. suddenly deleted the YPG from their list of terrorists. The U.S. decision to work with the YPG in Syria led to serious concerns in Turkey as the government in Ankara began questioning why a NATO ally was supporting a terrorist organization that threatens the national security of another NATO member.

Before the U.S. began to cooperate with the YPG in Syria, Iran, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Assad regime were among the main allies of the terrorist group. This was to such an extent that the Assad regime handed over certain areas at the southern border of Turkey to the YPG in order to neutralize the Syrian Kurds who were an active part of the Syrian opposition at the time. With such control in Syria, YPG militants eliminated important Kurdish figures and organizations in their areas of control, weakening opposition against the Assad regime.

Before the U.S. began to cooperate with the YPG in Syria, Iran, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Assad regime were among the main allies of the terrorist group.

More, YPG presence in Afrin and Aleppo city made them de-facto allies with Iran and Iran-backed militias. The YPG in the Sheikh Maqsoud district neutralized an important frontline for the besieged regime forces in Aleppo and lately besieged the city. The YPG in Afrin played an important role in supplying the Iran-backed militias in the besieged pockets of Nubbl and Zahra and for the siege of Aleppo, which resulted in the capture of the city by the Assad regime and Iran-backed militias. YPG militants in Afrin, Aleppo city, Ayn al-Arab and rural Hasakah had mainly been supplied by Iran and the Assad regime.

Iran’s cooperation with the YPG-dominated SDF

Tillerson states that the U.S. wants to maintain an open-ended military presence in Syria, not only to fight Daesh, but also to provide a bulwark against Iranian influence, to ensure the departure of the Assad regime, and to create conditions for the safe return of refugees. But these claims, namely supporting the SDF in northeast Syria as a tool against Iran, are problematic.

The SDF alliance was formed to fight Daesh and not Iran or the Assad regime. While some Arab units in the SDF had previous links to Syrian rebels who fought against the Assad regime, others have maintained important relations with the Assad regime and Iran. For example, one of the largest Arab components of the SDF, the al-Sanadid Forces, which are a tribal army of the Shammar tribe, has strong relations with Iran.

YPG militants in Afrin, Aleppo city, Ayn al-Arab and rural Hasakah had mainly been supplied by Iran and the Assad regime.

It is said that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps were cooperating with the Sanadid Forces. Another example is Liwa Suqour al-Raqqa, a brigade that had links to the Assad regime. The largest local Syrian rebel faction in Raqqa – Liwa Thuwwar al-Raqqa – fought against Liwa Suqour al-Raqqa due to its links with the Assad regime and dismantled the group. However, the U.S.-backed and YPG-dominated SDF arrested the leaders of Liwa Thuwwar al-Raqqa.

Until today, the SDF has not fought one single battle against Iran-backed militias. Skirmishes with the Assad regime didn’t last for too long either. The most fragile tension between the SDF and the Assad regime erupted recently in Deir al-Zor over the fight for oil stations as the U.S.-led coalition stroke Assad regime militias, killing at least 100 Assad militias and Russian mercenaries as well. Even if the U.S. manages to break the YPG’s cooperation with Iran, the alliance formed in the SDF was not formed in order to combat Iran.

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Does Iran support the YPG in Afrin?

With the launch of Operation Olive Branch, led by the Turkish Armed Forces and the National Army – a unit of all Free Syrian Army factions operating in the Euphrates Shield areas in northern Aleppo – Iran’s tacit support for the YPG became one of the most interesting topics. Senior Iranian diplomats and the Iranian president called for the end of the operation and emphasized their resentments against the Turkey-led operation.

While Iran’s president Rouhani called on Turkey to stop its military operation in the northern Syrian enclave of Afrin, claiming that it will only result in more deaths on both sides, he also stated: “We wish that Turkey’s operation in Syria will end at the earliest time.”

Statements made in the Iranian parliament were harsher. Member of Parliament, Muhammed Kasim Osmani, labeled President Erdogan a dictator and accused Turkey of committing war crimes worse than Saddam Hussein or Daesh in Syria. More, foreign ministry spokesman Behram Kasimi said: “Iran is following the developments in Afrin closely and concerned. We hope this operation at the Syrian-Turkish border will end soon, finishing the crisis in the area. Chaos in Afrin will enable takfiris to regroup and re-strengthen in Syria’s north.”

While many Turkish analysts and experts claimed that the statements made from Iranian officials were only “rhetoric,” developments in Afrin are confusing. If the claims made by pro-Iranian and pro-regime Al-Masdar News and some others on the ground are true, Iran and the Assad regime might then be providing the YPG in Afrin with supplies through Nubble and Zahra.

As Kino Gabriel, spokesman for the SDF said: “There are different ways to get reinforcements to Afrin, but the fundamental route is via the regime forces. There are understandings between the two…” On February 18, a senior member of the YPG told Reuters in a propagative tone that the terror group and the government of Bashar al-Assad have agreed for the regime army to enter Syria’s Afrin. On the following day, Syrian state TV announced that the regime forces would enter Afrin “within hours.” However, militias allied to the Syrian regime, the so-called National Defense Forces, did not enter Afrin and no official statement in this direction has yet been made.

Interestingly, it would not be the Assad regime, but the Popular Mobilization Forces who would enter Afrin. Popular Mobilization Forces was founded, supplied, backed and controlled by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. As known, the Russians tried to integrate the Popular Mobilization Forces into the 5th Corp of the Syrian Army in order to weaken Iran-backed militias. However, the project was only partially successful.

Who is Supplying the YPG with Iranian Weapons?

During Operation Olive Branch, the YPG has used, visually confirmed, Iranian weapons. Among them are Iran-produced 107mm rockets, which were also found earlier in Turkey during anti-terror operations against the PKK. More remarkable was however the Iranian-produced Toophan guided anti-tank missile, which was used to target Turkish Armed Forces in Afrin. The Toophan missiles are an Iranian copy of the American TOW missiles. In addition to the Toophan system, the YPG in Afrin also used an Iranian Safir 4×4 vehicle with a mounted 106mm M40 A2 gun. These Safir vehicles were previously used in Syria only by Iran-backed Shia militias. The Assad regime is known to have no access to these vehicles. Along these, there is also ambiguity about the number of U.S.-supplied weapons transferred to Afrin.

There now remains intriguing questions as to how, where and when the YPG obtained Iranian military equipment. Does Iran’s military support for the YPG continue after Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch? Does the intense use of ATGMs by YPG militants in Afrin suggest an ongoing supply for the terrorist group? It is claimed that prior to Operation Olive Branch, the YPG in Afrin reportedly never used Konkurs. It was only after the launch of the operation that the YPG began to intensively use Konkurs systems.

It is extremely difficult to trace the chief actors of this arms delivery and it therefore remains an open question as to who supplied the YPG with Iranian weapons: Is it the Iranians themselves, the Assad regime, or the Americans providing Iranian weapons?

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]]> From CHP to HDP: a Hidden Tunnel in Turkish Politics https://politicstoday.org/from-chp-to-hdp-a-hidden-tunnel-in-turkish-politics/ Sat, 17 Feb 2018 02:02:44 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/from-chp-to-hdp-a-hidden-tunnel-in-turkish-politics/

On the way to 2019, despite the discomfort that it creates among its voter base, Kilicdaroglu’s CHP will reintroduce old lies with new facets while adopting a more aggressive approach by increasing cooperation with radical leftist organizations and the HDP/PKK. Worse, they may attempt to ignite a sectarian conflict within Turkey.

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On May 6, 2010, around midnight, a tape was released on the internet. It was a recording of intimacy between former Republican People’s Party (CHP) chairman Deniz Baykal, who had served for 18 years, and his then-assistant CHP deputy Nesrin Baytok. The tape shook the foundation of the CHP. At first it was asserted that the tape was fabricated. However, this claim was not enough. CHP youth gathered in front of Baykal’s house, set up tents and protests. On May 10, Baykal stated that he was resigning (with an implication that he may return one day). During his resignation, he claimed that the whole incident was a scheme that was carried out by the government and not by those in Pennsylvania (referring to FETO leader, Gulen).

Along with Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who had already announced that he would not run for chairmanship, Onder Sav, Baykal’s 53-yearlong brother-in-arm, visited Baykal at his house. Later on May 22, Kilicdaroglu announced his candidacy. Since that day, CHP was re-designed and became a party that was being guided by an invisible hand.

A year and a half later, one of CHP’s former deputy chairs, Onur Oymen, explained how the party was being re-designed. Stating that he found documents revealing that the scheme against Baykal was a “U.S.-backed operation,” Oymen spoke about a report that was relayed to him in early 2009. In a report focused on CHP prepared by an NGO called Silkroad Institute, it was stated that “Baykal will resign and Kilicdaroglu will replace him.”

As was later revealed through Wikileaks, former U.S. Ambassador to Ankara was sending similar reports to Washington, while Hilary Clinton was questioning whether this was possible and feasible in her letters to the U.S. Embassy in Ankara. With a clearly U.S.-based operation, a “more appealing chairman” was brought to lead CHP.

Then, we witnessed the media, and in particular Dogan Media Group, polishing and praising Kilicdaroglu. He was given many titles including, ‘Gandhi Kemal,’ ‘the Calm Power,’ ‘Man of the People,’ and others. Photos illustrating him with Deniz Gezmis’s famous parka were being hung on walls, while he himself utilized the slogan, “I’m Kemal from Dersim. I’m Kemal the revolutionary.”

CHP: repeat what is prompted

None of these developments were enough for CHP to win or to increase its vote in the 2011 elections. In fact, I don’t believe that this was the point at all. This re-shape of CHP had different aims. These aims became clearer when people ravaged private and public properties during the May 2013 Gezi Park protests and was revealed during the December 17-25 judicial coup attempt. Kilicdaroglu played montaged tapes that were acquired through illegal means in Parliament. The aim was clear: Erdogan was to be deposed, he would flee abroad and would be brought back for a trial.

Without questioning validity, the new CHP administration were voicing whatever they were being told. More, they also began to disregard legitimacy in certain events. For instance, their deputies did not recite the parliamentary oath after the 2015 elections. The CHP deliberately elected imprisoned people as their candidates, they did not recognize the result of the April 16 referendum and de-famed members of the judiciary when jurors decided against them. More, the party began to spread false news accusing the government of sending weapons to Daesh. They still propagate this claim. Regardless of being rebutted, another cheap lie CHP continues to use is that the AK Party has 120 deputies using ByLock (a mobile app used by FETO members), or the claim that Erdogan and his family have millions of dollars offshore in the Isle of Man.

The party administration also began to adopt an increasingly aggressive discourse as their lies were uncovered. After the results of the June 7 elections were announced and when the AK Party failed to form a government, CHP’s Gursel Tekin told the media that they were going to seize all “pro-AK Party media outlets,” and question businesspeople.

Moreover, the CHP had began to flirt with the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). HDP Chair Demirtas and CHP’s Safak Pavey said “we shook them [the AK Party] good.” The same CHP also defamed the PKK’s armistice and demanded the trials of all prominent actors of the Reconciliation Process, including a trial of President Erdogan.

The real disaster occurred right after the July 15 coup attempt. Fleeing the airport with the allowance of the putschists and watching the coup attempt from his TV at home, Kilicdaroglu first claimed that the coup was a “theater play” and then asserted that it was a “controlled” coup attempt. Intriguingly, FETO militants also defined the coup attempt with the same words in the same order. Then Kilicdaroglu began talking about a “July 20” coup, in which he was referring to the announcement of the state of emergency aiming to eradicate all FETO elements within public institutions. In short, FETO prompted, and Kilicdaroglu voiced these on “legitimate platforms.”

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Led by Kilicdaroglu, CHP’s “politics” based on lies and incitement continues to be the case nowadays. Last month, after a person attempted to immolate himself in front of Parliament, Kilicdaroglu said: “Why are you burning yourself in front of Parliament? Go and do that in front of the Presidential Palace. Then burn the Palace as well.”

During his parliamentary group meeting on January 16, Kilicdaroglu made a speech that accused the people who resisted the July 15 coup attempt. Referring to the statutory decree which rendered people who resisted the coup immune for their acts on the very night, Kilicdaroglu said the following: “They [AK Party] have lent immunity to civilians who resorted to violence. They have transferred the state’s power to extra-state militants.” Civilians who were targeted by tanks and military aircraft were labelled “militants” and their resistance was described “illegal.” Meanwhile, Kilicdaroglu defines soldiers who fired on civilians on the Bosporus Bridge as “innocent privates who were slaughtered.”

The CHP leader continues to talk slanderously about topics that are sensitive to people and in this respect, he is trying to legitimize the July 15 coup attempt and illegalize the successful resistance. Considering the fact that he is trying to protect certain individuals who have been arrested for being FETO members, Kilicdaroglu is seemingly trying to save the terrorist organization. His aims were the same when he visited closed-down media outlets that belonged to the terrorist organization. This should probably be considered normal for a person who is surrounded by FETO – his chief advisors and deputies have been arrested for collaborating with the group – and whose party employs the same “political” discourse as the organization.

An obstruction in Turkey’s development

Today CHP is becoming an increasingly radical opposition. Using the DHKP-C slogan, “Halkız, haklıyız, kazanacağız,” (“We are the people, we are just, and we will win”) and by appointing Canan Kaftancioglu – who praised the Gezi Park protests – as the Chair of CHP’s Istanbul Provincial Chapter are indicators of this. In my opinion, HDP is digging a tunnel into CHP. It is known that a significant number of CHP members are against HDP/PKK. Indeed, many loyal CHP supporters protested the election of Kaftancioglu.

For instance, referring to Kaftancioglu’s “I’m not a footman of Mustafa Kemal, but his comrade,” Umit Kocasakal, who announced his candidacy to CHP chairmanship said: “Those who have issues with the motto ‘we are the footman of Mustafa Kemal,’ with the unitary structure and those who praise the HDP cannot be part of Ataturk’s party.” Moreover, he accused Kaftancioglu with being the “footman of other powers.” He also added that a “foreign software” was installed to the party.

It is understood that CHP is trying to keep the anti-Erdogan bloc, which it continually attempts to stimulate, alive on the way to 2019. Undertaking the task of politically obstructing Turkey’s march towards a grand future, the CHP administration is bent on achieving their goal. They object to every project. They even objected to the Kanal Istanbul project when its route was announced.

More, CHP is seeking every opportunity to prevent Turkey from having a say in the future of the Middle East. Considering that Kilicdaroglu miraculously became the chair of CHP right before the beginning of the Syrian Civil War, this makes more sense. With the support of the former central media, the CHP bloc are discussing and making people discuss all kinds of matters that would consume most of the government’s energy. In this respect, they are trying to occupy the government in order to ensure that with these trivialities, Turkey would not have time to engage in Syria, Iraq and the wider region.

On the way to 2019, despite the discomfort that it creates among its voter base, Kilicdaroglu’s CHP will reintroduce old lies with new facets while adopting a more aggressive approach by increasing cooperation with radical leftist organizations and the HDP/PKK. Worse, they may attempt to ignite a sectarian conflict within Turkey. They may seek ways to enable a radicalized Alevi youth. In addition, they will definitely try to benefit from trials that are being conducted against Turkey in the U.S. and fabricated documents provided by FETO.

This strategy, which is doomed to fail, may slow down Turkey’s march. However, will never halt it. It will be CHP’s one-way ticket to marginalization.

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]]> The AK Party-MHP Alliance and Turkey’s Presidential System https://politicstoday.org/the-ak-party-mhp-alliance-and-turkeys-presidential-system/ Fri, 16 Feb 2018 00:54:15 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/the-ak-party-mhp-alliance-and-turkeys-presidential-system/

The alliance-forming process between the AK Party and the MHP also revealed another tangible outcome of the presidential system: reconciliation between political parties in a different form other than a coalition in the parliamentary system.

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During his press statement on January 8, 2018, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli clarified certain ambiguities surrounding the 2019 elections that were the main items on the political agenda. In this statement, Bahceli announced that MHP would not nominate any candidate, but support President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the 2019 presidential elections. More, MHP leader highlighted that his party is open to alliance with Erdogan’s AK Party for the parliamentary elections as well. This alliance, it was suggested, should be implemented into a legal framework, allowing parties to maintain their corporate identity and to identify the percentage of votes each party receives. President Erdogan responded to MHP’s call positively, which then led to the two parties establishing their own alliance commissions.

With this, Devlet Bahceli carried out the AK Party-MHP alliance, which was formed after the July 15 coup attempt and which aimed to ensure the survival of the state, on to a next level. This was a requirement necessitated by the presidential system, as political parties have to seek alliances in order to secure the election. Therefore, after party-member presidency, the political reflections of the presidential system began to be apparent on the road to 2019.

The content and political implications of the presidential system were not discussed during the referendum campaign due to the manipulations of the opposition, refusing to allow people to understand the importance of this political transformation in terms of democratization. For instance, the “no” bloc distorted the truth about certain amendments, such as decreasing the age to be eligible for parliamentary candidacy to 18 or increasing the number of deputies to 600. Moreover, opposition leader Kilicdaroglu claimed that the 4 million Syrians who are seeking refuge in Turkey would be naturalized if the referendum succeeded. These kinds of manipulations obstructed the essence of this new system and the political implications it would bring from being understood.

Not polarization, reconciliation

Analyzing the developments in Turkish domestic politics, it becomes obvious that political parties are experiencing changes brought by the presidential system. As it is known, a simple majority is sought in the presidential elections and this condition will shape Turkey’s political landscape.

First of all, the simple majority factor renders political and social reconciliation inevitable. In the new era, political parties will be inclined to be more inclusive, agreeable and appealing to voters. In this respect, “bloc politics” foreseen by the new system enforces political reconciliation instead of polarization. Thanks to these political blocs, the public will observe which parties are working with each other and will decide accordingly. Therefore, the success of the alliance political parties will form in the presidential system is to be determined by their appeal to the public.

In terms of seeking reconciliation and alliance that is brought by the new system, the AK Party and MHP have agreed on national stance and an alliance that appeals to the majority of the public. Considering this alliance, it could be asserted that the MHP is pursuing a realistic political stance. The party sought to transform its existing cooperation with the AK Party into an alliance since the July 15 coup attempt. Bahceli’s statement about being true to the “Yenikapi spirit” and desiring to incorporate the new system is the most important indicator of this. MHP is aware of the necessity of adopting a national unity discourse amid global and regional conflicts and that this discourse appeals to the public.

What caused MHP to depart from its previous bloc was the failure of this bloc to maintain a national stance, which inevitably discomforted the public. In other words, unlike the other bloc consisting of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) along with several smaller parties, which prefer to cooperate behind closed scenes, the AK Party and MHP are conducting their alliance negotiations transparently thanks to its public consent.

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No coalition but pre-election alliance

The alliance-forming process between the AK Party and the MHP also revealed another tangible outcome of the presidential system: reconciliation between political parties in a different form other than a coalition in the parliamentary system. During the discussions on transitioning to the presidential system, it was expressed that the new system would eliminate coalition governments and provide opportunities for new forms of reconciliation and cooperation. There is significant difference between presidential and parliamentary systems in terms of reconciliation. Unlike in the parliamentary system, the presidential system also seeks reconciliation among the public instead of only party leaders and political elites.

While the public only observes coalition negotiations in the parliamentary system after casting votes, the presidential system allows the public to shape alliance discussions between political parties. This is due to the fact that alliances have to be formed prior to the elections. If the agreement is only among political elites, the public may punish their political parties by not voting for them. Therefore, the AK Party and MHP are conducting their alliance negotiations transparently and prior to the election, accepting to face any repercussions in the case of public dissatisfaction.

Coalitions formed under the parliamentary system do not necessarily allow the public to know which party will have executive power. However, in the case of the AK Party-MHP alliance, the public is aware that Erdogan will maintain executive power if he is elected. In addition, even if MHP withdraws its support from the AK Party after the elections, it will not create a political crisis, as it would do in a parliamentary system.

For all these reasons, the presidential system does not have coalitions, but pre-election alliances. The process between the AK Party and MHP is a reflection of this. Therefore, criticisms about not being able to eliminate coalitions despite transitioning into the presidential system are just not true.

The process between the AK Party and MHP reveals only a part of the reconciliatory aspect of the presidential system. If the president’s party fails to secure a majority in Parliament, the President will be inclined to reconcile with other parties that possess seats. If the AK Party fails to secure a majority of seats in the 2019 elections, its alliance with MHP will most probably permeate the Parliament as well. Indeed, Bahceli clearly stated that his party will do all that is required to render the new system permanent in 2019-2024 period.

In this sense, the presidential system enforces pre-election alliances, not government coalitions. These alliances will reveal the political blocs indicating social reconciliation rather than social polarizations. Considering its voter base, it had been inevitable for MHP to become party to a different bloc. Meanwhile, the discourse on national unity, which has gathered support by the general public and which is shared by the AK Party has allowed MHP to leave the “no” bloc and join powers with the government.

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]]> US Support to YPG: Violation of US National Law https://politicstoday.org/us-support-to-ypg-violation-of-us-national-law/ Thu, 15 Feb 2018 08:42:56 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/us-support-to-ypg-violation-of-us-national-law/

The support the U.S. administration provides to the offshoots of the PKK constitutes serious contradictions and casts doubts on the rule of law principle.

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Washington’s indefinite policy in Syria and increasing active support to the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and its variations violate U.S. national law alongside international agreements and principles recognized at the international level under the umbrella of the United Nations and other regional organizations.

With the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists (AUMF), which was passed by Congress following the September 11 attacks, the U.S. Armed Forces were authorized to exercise military power across its borders with an aim to prevent possible terror attacks against the country. However, the Obama administration reinterpreted the limits of the authorization and expanded its scope by employing the phrase “Al-Qaeda and associated forces.” With this broad interpretation, the Obama administration also encompassed the military force that would be employed against Daesh within the scope of the authorization. In brief, the national law system acknowledged that the U.S. Armed Forces have been involved in Syria due to the fight against Daesh. Resorting to further military power or unauthorized engagements however is against the AUMF.

In 2015, the Obama administration agreed with several non-state actors including the YPG and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), repeatedly asserting that they would cooperate in the fight against Daesh. The U.S. identified these actors as “coalition partners” by predicating on its own judicial system. However, the notion of coalition partnership comprises some problematic and questionable aspects in legal terms. First of all, the U.S. administration interpreted the AUMF in an utterly broad way and selected and supported a coalition partner within this context. Secondly, the U.S. administration allowed the involvement of the YPG and the PYD among these partners, which are both known for their association with the outlawed PKK. Thirdly, the strategy initially defined as anti-Daesh fight ceased to be the primary objective and sustaining the coalition partnership was prioritized. In this respect, the current situation explicitly violates U.S. national law as the legislative body of the country only authorized to fight against Daesh within the scope of fighting against “Al-Qaeda and associated forces.” The U.S. administration’s defence of any coalition partner means exceeding the authority vested by national law.

Furthermore, the National Defense Authorization Act formed the legal grounds of the U.S. administration’s support to Syrian opposition groups as from 2015 and set certain criteria in choosing the groups to be supported. These groups must be “appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition.” The YPG and the PYD, which are the offshoots of the PKK, do not comply with these criteria in terms of their objectives and other traits. Although these groups are closely allied to the PKK and organize terrorist attacks against Turkey – who is initially accepted as an “ally,” all kinds of military support have been provided to them as they were included in the scope of opponent groups.

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The U.S. Patriot Act, as a federal law, criminalizes providing “material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.” As a result of the authority vested by the law, the PKK has been listed as a terror group by the U.S. Department of State since it has inflicted heavy damage to many countries, particularly to the U.S. and Turkey. Aside from being recognized as a terror group on various lists, the PKK was also recognized as a terrorist organization posing a serious threat by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case “Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.” Hence, the support the U.S. administration provides to the offshoots of the PKK constitutes serious contradictions and casts doubts on the rule of law principle.

The indications of International Law

The situation does not differ when considered from the perspective of international law. Even though terrorism is widely considered a controversial topic in international law, sovereign nations are aware that they must cooperate to prevent terrorist acts and to eradicate terrorist groups. The fact that terrorism is an international issue that does not recognize borders leads nations to cooperate. The norms of international law reiterate that sovereign nations must not support terrorism or any terrorist group. International agreements signed under the umbrella of the UN and many other intergovernmental regional organizations explicitly prohibit providing financial aid and the sales of weapons to terrorist groups.

The duty of vigilance was first accepted by the UN General Assembly and then became “a widely recognized principle of international law. It means that “every state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating” in plans or actions to commit terrorist acts in another state. This very fundamental principle was emphasized in the International Court of Justice, “Armed Activities” case, as customary international law. In the present situation, even a “tactical” relationship between the U.S. and the named terrorist groups is a failure to uphold the duty of vigilance. The toleration displayed by the U.S. Armed Forces towards groups like the YPG and PYD, which harbor terrorist elements, amounts to a violation of international law.

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]]> What to Expect for the Turkish Economy in 2018 https://politicstoday.org/what-to-expect-for-the-turkish-economy-in-2018/ Tue, 13 Feb 2018 05:47:02 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/what-to-expect-for-the-turkish-economy-in-2018/

Turkey will enter 2019, a year with two critical elections, much stronger if economic growth continues and certain improvements are made in fields that currently seem problematic.

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In 2017 the Turkish economy grew above the expectations of many international organizations. With figures examined it becomes clear that this performance was driven by both domestic and foreign demand. Stimulus packages and support provided to the real sector by the government and the tax reductions addressing consumers contributed to the recovery of the economy to a great extent. A substantial increase in total export last year made 2017 one of the best years for Turkey in terms of export performance since the global economy crisis in 2008. All these developments indicate that the Turkish economy is more than ready to take off when appropriate policies are implemented and when clouds of uncertainty over the country dissolve.

Leaving a highly positive year behind, the Turkish economy welcomed the new year with high hopes. The Turkish economy is expected to grow around 5 per cent in 2018. The high rate of capacity utilization ratio in industry and a raising appetite to invest in new areas show that the wheels of the Turkish real sector are turning again. The global economy is also expected to display a strong performance in 2018, which constitutes a positive indicator in terms of Turkish export performance.

Although there are some signals that the government will gear down to a certain degree, several important economic factors that will help revive the economy – such as credit guarantee funds and employment incentives – are expected to remain in certain proportions this year. The omnibus bill proposal the government submitted to Parliament includes incentives that will revive investments and employment. Given that easing monetary policy will be difficult in 2018 due to high inflation and volatile exchange rates, the role of fiscal policy in reviving the economy comes into prominence. While it is reasonable for the government to slow down a little by taking several parameters such as inflation into account, gearing down more than necessary, as occurred in 2012, could have a negative affect on economic activity. This year, it would be more reasonable for the government to adopt a more selective and target-oriented approach in terms of the incentives given to medium and large sized companies. More, the regular cash flow in the real sector can be a priority while supporting small sized companies.

Since Turkey’s costs of imported intermediate goods and energy soar in periods when the country enters a phase of rapid growth, an increase in its current account deficit is unavoidably being experienced. Diversifying incentives on exports and supporting companies that have a potential to produce imported intermediate goods are of critical importance in terms of enabling a sustainable 5 percent growth and minimizing Turkey’s vulnerability to external shocks by decreasing the current deficit. In this scope, it is crucial to implement the plans to incent domestic production of intermediate goods that Turkey has imported, which is included in the Input Procurement Strategy Action Plan (2017-2019) issued by the Ministry of Development.

In order to decrease the current account deficit, Turkey needs to diversify its export markets. Although countries have become keen to protect their own markets with new types of measures, Turkey should utilize available opportunities to diversify its export markets with a focus on regions like Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Increasing domestic energy generation is also crucial to reduce Turkey’s current account deficit. The geopolitical risks and increases in demand driven by global growth contributes to the rise in oil prices. Oil prices that could possibly see $70 this year are creating pressure over the current deficit. The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources took considerable steps last year in regards to increasing domestic energy generation. Policies aiming to diversify domestic energy sources are expected to continue at the same pace during 2018.

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While the Turkish economy experienced significant progress in growth and export last year, statistics regarding inflation and unemployment were worse than expected. Inflation and unemployment rates were in double digits almost the entire year. With the loss of value of the Turkish Lira, rising food and energy prices were the main triggers of this high inflation rate. While it is possible that inflation will return to single digits at the beginning of the second quarter of 2018, the future of exchange rates along with the prices of food and energy will decide whether such single digit rates will be sustainable or not. With Fed signaling that it will continue to increase interest rates, uncertainty regarding the future decisions of the European Central Bank, and due to high inflation and volatile exchange rates, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey is expected to maintain its tight monetary policy.

Since the high inflation rate is mostly being caused by supply-side factors, implementing a tight monetary policy will not be enough to achieve the inflation target alone. Structural reforms regarding problems that hinder domestic production and increase its costs are necessary for the inflation rate to return back to single digits. Policies regarding agriculture and livestock sector, and domestic energy projects that will diversify energy resources are of utmost importance regarding medium to long-term inflation trends.

Another reason for the CBRT’s insistence on a tight monetary policy is highly volatile exchange rates. Speculative movements caused by the increased regional risks during the northern Iraq referendum process, fabricated news suggesting that some European banks will stop lending to Turkey, the visa crisis with the U.S., and the Iran sanctions case in the U.S. caused great fluctuations in exchange rates during the previous year. Latest developments in Syria and the result of the trial process in the U.S., which will be announced in April, will be closely followed by the financial markets. Decisions of major central banks, especially of Fed, regarding interest rates will be another factor that will affect the course of exchange rates.

Even though the Turkish economy is creating new job opportunities, the demand for labor falls short of the supply due to the high labor force participation rates among the youth and women. Combined with the disparity between the skills taught by the education system and demanded by the job market, the Turkish economy fails to achieve its targeted unemployment rate.

In order to solve the unemployment problem, the government has begun to provide important support and incentives addressing employers. Through these incentives and the high economic growth rate, unemployment decreased from 13 to 10.3 percent. Such a decrease is an important achievement. However, there is room for improvement regarding unemployment. To ensure that the increase in welfare caused by economic growth reaches the entire population, the unemployment rate must fall below 10 per cent in the short and stay around 7-8 percent in the medium to long-term. If the Turkish economy does grow around 5 percent this year (as is expected), it can be estimated that the unemployment rate will fall back to single digits. This is likely especially when considering the fact that incentive programs aimed at decreasing unemployment rates last year are still continuing and new incentives aimed at increasing employment among women, young people, and people with disabilities are going to be implemented. However, to reach unemployment levels of 7-8 percent, structural reforms are needed in a wide range of critical subjects such as education, immigration policy and labor regulations.

The strong economic performance Turkey displayed in 2017 despite formidable problems has increased hopes and expectations for 2018. Turkey will enter 2019, a year with two critical elections, much stronger if economic growth continues and certain improvements are made in fields that currently seem problematic.

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]]> A Divided Europe and Turkey https://politicstoday.org/a-divided-europe-and-turkey/ Mon, 12 Feb 2018 01:27:51 +0000 https://politicstoday.org/a-divided-europe-and-turkey/

Hesitant behavior displayed by European countries with regard to the terror groups that target Turkey illustrates the fact that they can still take sides against Ankara and side with the YPG and the PKK during the Afrin operation.

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Relations between Turkey and Europe were already strained and policies adopted by several European countries in regards to the July 15 coup attempt led to more of a crisis between Ankara and the western bloc. Although European countries criticize Turkey on democracy, they did not openly side with democracy throughout the July 15 incidents, which gave the impression that they covertly supported the coup attempt. The bloc’s negative attitude towards the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, which was subjected to the coup attempt, continued throughout 2016. EU member states issued diatribes to the declaration of an emergency state and steps taken by the government to purge the putschist Gulenist Terror Group (FETO) operatives from public institutions. At the end of this tense period, the European Parliament called for the accession negotiations between Turkey and the European Union to be suspended on November 24, 2016. The tension Turkey had particularly with Germany, Austria and the Netherlands reached its peak when Turkish ministers were prevented from attending meetings scheduled in these countries as part of the April 16 referendum campaign.

Trying to reason anti-Turkey policies in Germany

Another development that hindered Ankara’s relations with Brussels was the anti-Turkey propaganda utilized by far-right parties as part of their national election campaigns in the Netherlands, Germany and Austria. Alarmed by the rise of far-right and xenophobic parties in these countries, center parties embraced the arguments of the far-right, employed anti-refugee and Islamophobic rhetoric in their election campaigns and vowed to adopt a harsher stance against Turkey so as not to lose their voter base. These states protected FETO operatives who pose a serious threat to Turkey’s national security and condoned the PKK, which led Ankara to issue severe criticisms to these countries. More, smear campaigns conducted against the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the European media were regarded as disrespect to the democratic will of the Turkish people, and was interpreted as another indication of the bloc’s attempt to interfere in Turkey’s domestic affairs.

Known as Germany’s “backyard” in the EU, both Austria and the Netherlands form a bloc together with Germany, which troubles Turkey-European Union relations.

The fact that Germany, which among European countries has the closest ties with Turkey, and Austria and the Netherlands, known as Germany’s “backyard” in the EU are the leading countries of the bloc that have troubled relations between the two parties, signifies that the main source of the problem is a struggle for influence.

Having a substantial population of Turkish descent and being Turkey’s largest trade partner, Germany has always tried to interfere with Ankara’s policies through various means. This has included supporting the PKK, or using the EU accession negotiations and the issue of economic aid as threats. Over the past years, Berlin began to lose the chance to interfere with Turkey’s domestic polity due to the AK Party’s pro-independence policies. Relations between the two countries reached a new low when Germany supported the July 15 coup attempt and opposed to the April 16 referendum. While the anti-Turkey left in Germany ran propaganda against the AK Party government, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) slammed Chancellor Angela Merkel for the refugee agreement signed with Turkey. This led to the German government to adopt stricter policies against Ankara.

Turkey’s convergence with the United Kingdom, France and Italy

Alongside these problems confronted in relations between Turkey and Germany, the Ankara administration leaned towards other European actors with whom more rational relations could be established. In an attempt to diversify its foreign policy, the government took steps to liberate Turkey’s relations with Europe from the monopoly of the EU and Germany. In this scope, Turkey took a number of steps to improve relations with the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain and eastern European countries, especially in economic terms.

The main factors that played a role in helping to improve relations with the U.K. included Brexit, Donald Trump’s election as the U.S. President and the focus on economic cooperation in foreign policy. As Brexit is expected to cost a high price, London set off a quest to compensate this cost with alternative partnerships, and looked for a way to develop closer relations with Turkey within this framework. As Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim expressed during the visit he paid to London to attend the Somali Conference held in May 2017, unlike other European countries, the U.K. displayed overt support to Turkey during the July 15 coup attempt. This nevertheless has been a factor that accelerated the convergence between Theresa May’s government and Ankara.

In an attempt to diversify its foreign policy, Ankara took steps to liberate Turkey’s relations with Europe from the monopoly of the EU and Germany and tried to improve relations with the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Spain and eastern European countries.

With the election of Trump, who utters unfavorable comments on the European allies of NATO and has adopted the slogan “America first,” the British government is aware that it can no longer rely on the U.S. administration – especially when in the midst of the Brexit process. Departing from the EU and keeping its distance from the U.S, in its search for new partners to balance its foreign policy, the U.K. made a rational choice by cooperating with Turkey. As for Ankara, cooperation with the U.K. is of major importance especially in the field of defense, since Turkey has recently had problems in purchasing military equipment from the U.S. and other European countries such as Germany and Austria.

During Theresa May’s visit to Turkey in January 2017, the British BAE Systems and Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc. (TAI) signed an agreement as a first step towards co-producing fighter jets, which on the Turkish side reflected an improvement of relations with London while confronting other problems in the west. Within the agreement that is worth $125 million, BAE Systems agreed to offer service in designing and developing Turkey’s national TF-X fighter jet and to transfer technologies to Turkish engineers. The production of the first prototype of TF-X jets is set to be complete by 2023. A total of 250 jets are planned to be produced for $7 billion.

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In addition to the U.K., Turkey signed other significant air defense agreements with France and Italy. During President Erdogan’s visit to France on January 5, 2018, an agreement for the co-production of SAMP-T air defense systems was signed between the French-Italian consortium Eurosam and Turkey’s Aselsan and Roketsan. With this agreement, Turkey made it clear that it does not intend to remain dependent on a single country in the field of defense, and that Ankara aims to diversify its security and foreign policies by procuring similar weapon systems from its European allies in addition to the S-400 air defense systems purchased from Russia. During the abovementioned visit, Turkish Airlines also signed an agreement to purchase a total of 25 Airbus A350-900 planes.

Anti-Turkey sentiments are dissolving in Europe

Having minimized problems with the U.K. and France due to partnerships in economy and defense, the Turkish administration has also endeavored to disperse anti-Turkey sentiments created in Europe by Germany and others by taking steps towards improving its relations with Italy, Spain and eastern European EU members. The opposition to the predominance of Germany in the EU by countries such as Italy, Poland and Hungary catalyzed Turkey’s developing ties with these countries. Member states who wish to decrease their dependency on Germany within the EU have not abstained from answering Ankara’s call for cooperation since they regard developing economic relations with Turkey as part of the steps to be taken in this respect.

To restore relations, Berlin needs to give up on regarding Ankara within its own domain of influence and must not allow the anti-Turkey left diaspora in Germany to monopolize the country’s policies on Turkey.

Taking considerable steps with regard to developing relations with European countries, Turkey has repeatedly underlined that it wishes to establish rational relations with Germany on the basis of mutual respect to each other’s sovereignty and cooperation in counter-terrorism. The latest friendly meetings between the foreign ministers of the two countries indicated that the tension between Ankara and Berlin might soon come to an end. In terms of its relations with Turkey, Germany does not wish to remain isolated in Europe with only a few allies such as Austria and the Netherlands. To that end, the country does not want to keep relations strained since other European countries are gradually improving their ties with Ankara. However, in order to restore relations, Berlin needs to give up on regarding Ankara within its own domain of influence and must not allow the anti-Turkey left diaspora in Germany to monopolize the country’s policies on Turkey.

Operation Olive Branch and Europe

Operation Olive Branch kicked off by Turkey against the PKK/YPG deployed in Afrin has been an important test for the European countries wishing to establish rational relations with Ankara. It must be underlined that the European countries that have not so far acted in solidarity with Ankara in its fight against terrorism have faced a serious quandary during Operation Olive Branch. On one hand they assume that the economic relations, which they seek to restore with Turkey, will be undermined if they adopt a policy in favor of the YPG and the PKK. On the other, governments are concerned that if they side with Ankara’s intervention, they will face the pressure of PKK lobbies in the media and political circles of their countries.

Hesitant behavior displayed by European countries with regard to the terror groups that target Turkey illustrates the fact that they still side with the YPG and the PKK during the Afrin operation.

If European states had supported Turkey during the operation, they would have had a chance to restore strained relations with Ankara due to their policies in the aftermath of the July 15 coup attempt. In this way, they could have also prevented the convergence between Turkey and Russia. Some people in Europe defend this view while others regard the Afrin operation as a new opportunity to attack and slam Turkey. Although the Turkish Armed Forces have taken all measures to prevent any harm to civilians, circles claiming that Turkey is violating human rights in the operation with the weapons provided by EU countries are trying to put pressure on European governments.

Despite all these pressures, statements issued by the British and Dutch foreign ministers explicitly underlined Turkey’s right to ensure self-defense and border security, which were read as covert support to Operation Olive Branch. Contrary to this, German and French officials criticized Turkey due to the pressures of PKK proponents and anti-Turkish lobbies in their countries. However, the criticisms issued are much more tepid than expected, which can be seen as an indication of their reluctance to escalate tensions with Turkey.

Nevertheless, hesitant behavior displayed by European countries with regard to the terror groups that target Turkey illustrates the fact that they can still take sides against Ankara and side with the YPG and the PKK during the Afrin operation.

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