T

he Ankara Summit clearly demonstrated which issues lie at the heart of NATO’s security agenda. The strong emphasis in the summit communiqué on collective defense, the transatlantic bond and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty once again underscored that the Alliance’s fundamental priority is deterrence and defense. Russia’s long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security, continued support for Ukraine, increased defense spending, the expansion of industrial production capacity and the development of new military capabilities formed the main framework of the Ankara Summit.

This picture is perfectly clear. Whilst the Russia-Ukraine War continues, it was to be expected that NATO would prioritize deterrence on its eastern flank. Indeed, the summit communiqué provides for the provision of 70 billion euros’ worth of military equipment, aid and training support to Ukraine by 2026, and for at least equivalent levels to be maintained in 2027. Similarly, the increase in defense investment by European allies and Canada, the announcement of new procurement worth over 50 billion dollars, and the emphasis on expanding defense industry production capacity demonstrate that NATO prioritizes the conversion of expenditure into tangible military capability, alongside its spending ratios.

360-degree security and the southern dimension of NATO in Africa

Another statement in the Ankara Summit Declaration indicates that this discussion must be addressed within a broader context. NATO states that it is continuing its 360-degree approach to deterrence and defense. This approach acknowledges that the Alliance’s security is not limited solely to its eastern flank, the Russian threat, or conventional military capabilities. Strategic competition, widespread instability, hybrid threats, terrorism, energy security, sea lanes, cyberspace, space, unmanned systems, artificial intelligence and critical infrastructure are all different components of the same security landscape.

It is precisely for this reason that NATO’s southern flank is one of the areas that requires more careful consideration following the Ankara Summit. However, Africa is not at the centre of this debate. NATO’s main agenda is, of course, not centered on Africa. Nor should it be expected to be. Nevertheless, Africa is a dimension that cannot be overlooked when seeking to understand the security architecture of the southern flank. The vast geography stretching from the southern Mediterranean to the Sahel, and from the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa, is one of the areas that tests what NATO’s 360-degree security approach means in practice.

At this point, it is necessary to make a conceptual distinction. NATO’s approach to Africa is not the same as the Africa policies of individual NATO member states. NATO is an organization comprising allies with different historical experiences, geopolitical priorities and bilateral relations. France, Italy, Turkey, the US, the UK and Spain do not all view Africa in the same way. Some allies focus more on North Africa, some on the Sahel, some on the Horn of Africa, whilst others prioritize maritime security and trade routes. Furthermore, the fact that many countries are members of both NATO and the European Union can, at times, lead to a blurring of priorities and instruments.

This diversity need not be a weakness. If managed correctly, it could foster a richer debate within NATO regarding its southern flank. After all, each ally possesses field experience, diplomatic networks, defense capabilities and development tools in different geographical regions. The real challenge lies in transforming this diversity into a shared understanding of security. Following the Ankara Summit, what NATO needs is not to produce a centralized, one-size-fits-all policy towards Africa, but rather to develop more realistic channels of cooperation with security institutions, regional organizations and relevant countries in Africa.

A security line stretching from migration to the Red Sea

The issue of migration is one of the most visible aspects of this. In European public discourse, Africa is often brought to the fore through debates on irregular migration. Locations such as Lampedusa, Ceuta and the Canary Islands highlight the link between stability in North Africa and Europe’s border management. However, viewing migration solely as a security threat is an incomplete approach. War, poverty, climate pressures, food insecurity and weaknesses in state capacity are among the root causes of human mobility. NATO’s recognition of climate change as a threat multiplier is also significant in this regard. Climate change may not, in and of itself, directly cause conflict. However, it can exacerbate resource scarcity, economic vulnerability, displacement and local tensions.

That said, the scale of migration originating from Africa should not be exaggerated. African migrants do not constitute the largest group of migrants accepted by NATO countries. A significant proportion of migration movements in Africa take place within the continent itself. Consequently, viewing Africa solely as the source of migration towards Europe is both analytically flawed and fails to establish a sound basis for partnership. A more appropriate approach is to develop sustainable mechanisms that strike a balance between shared responsibility, humanitarian protection, border management, development and the building of local capacity with countries along migration routes.

The second key issue that makes the African dimension of the Southern Flank significant is maritime security and trade routes. The call in the Ankara Summit Declaration for Iran to fully respect freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates that NATO views maritime security not merely as a traditional military issue, but as a strategic matter linked to global trade and energy security. The same logic applies to the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb–Suez corridor. The Houthis’ attacks on commercial vessels have highlighted just how vulnerable this corridor is. The diversion of ships around the Cape of Good Hope has increased transit times, fuel costs, insurance expenses and the strain on global logistics.

For this reason, Red Sea security is not merely a matter for the countries in the region. Europe’s energy supply, production chains and commercial competitiveness also depend on this route remaining open and secure. The war in Sudan, the fight against terrorism in Somalia, inter-state tensions in the Horn of Africa and security vacuums in the Sahel are developments that indirectly but significantly affect NATO’s southern flank. The conclusion to be drawn from this is not that NATO should expand militarily into Africa. A more realistic need is to establish more regular cooperation with African countries and regional institutions in the areas of maritime security, early warning, intelligence sharing, border security, counter-terrorism capabilities and crisis prevention.

Partnership amidst competition and Turkey’s contribution

Great power competition is also a significant part of this picture. Russia’s efforts to deepen its security ties in areas such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Sudan, and to develop a more institutionalized presence through mechanisms such as the post-Wagner African Corps, are trends being closely monitored by NATO. China’s influence in Africa, meanwhile, is advancing through ports, transport corridors, digital infrastructure, mining and investments in critical minerals. Resources such as cobalt, manganese, platinum group metals, lithium and graphite have become critical for the defense industry, the energy transition and advanced technology production.

Nevertheless, it would be an oversimplification to view Africa merely as a stage for competition between Russia, China, the US or Europe. African states are the actors who determine their own security preferences and development priorities. For NATO and its allies, the path to achieving a lasting impact lies in establishing partnerships with Africa based on respect for sovereignty, local ownership, technology sharing and mutual benefit. Relations with Africa’s security architecture must also be built upon this understanding. The African Union, regional economic communities, IGAD, ECOWAS and other regional structures are the pillars of joint security production.

Turkey’s experience offers a notable example in this debate. As a NATO ally, Turkey is one of the countries that has transformed its defense industry capacity into tangible military capability. The developing capabilities in areas such as unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic warfare, munitions, and land and sea platforms are directly linked to the discussions on industrial base and production depth emphasized at NATO’s Ankara Summit. However, Turkey’s role in Africa should not be interpreted solely through the prism of defense industry exports.

The training activities carried out in Somalia through TURKSOM represent an approach focused on capacity-building for local security institutions. Turkey’s integration of humanitarian aid, education, health, infrastructure and diplomacy with security support demonstrates that a more holistic approach to security is possible for the southern flank. The Ankara Declaration, signed between Ethiopia and Somalia, has also highlighted the importance of preventive diplomacy. Whilst mediation is not an alternative to military deterrence, it is a complementary element of the security architecture in terms of managing crises before they escalate into armed conflict.

T

he official visit to Türkiye by Niger’s President Abdourahamane Tchiani, at the invitation of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, marks a new strategic milestone in relations between Ankara and Niamey. The fact that Tchiani was accompanied during his visit by a large delegation, including the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, energy, mining, the economy, agriculture and trade, demonstrates that relations between the two countries are progressing on the basis of multi-dimensional cooperation spanning from security to energy, and from trade to institutional capacity-building. For this reason, the visit should be assessed not merely as a routine diplomatic engagement between the two countries, but within the context of shifting power balances in the Sahel and Niger’s quest to diversify its external partnerships.

According to a statement from the Communications Directorate of Türkiye, following the meetings between President Erdoğan and Tchiani at the Presidential Complex in Ankara, three agreements and a joint declaration were signed between Türkiye and Niger in the fields of education, health, trade and diplomacy. Within this framework, a protocol regarding the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation in higher education for the period 2026–2030, a joint declaration on the establishment of the Economic and Trade Partnership Commission (JETCO), a protocol on the joint operation and handover of the Niger-Türkiye Friendship Hospital, and a memorandum of understanding between the Diplomacy Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye and the National Institute for Diplomatic and Strategic Studies of the Republic of Niger.

To interpret the cooperation that has developed between Türkiye and Niger in recent years solely as a result of current security and economic needs would be an oversimplification. Relations between the two countries are based on a multidimensional cooperation where historical heritage, the pursuit of mutual trust and a shared strategic vision for the future intersect. The ties between the two countries stretch back to the cultural, political and strategic influence of the Ottoman Empire in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Niger, during the 16th century. The relationships based on mutual trust that the Ottoman Empire established with local communities in the region, such as the Tebu and Tuareg peoples, who came under its administration, have left a historical legacy that continues to foster a positive perception of Türkiye in Niger.

Türkiye’s Africa policy

This historical legacy of the Ottomans gained further significance following Ankara’s institutionalization of its Africa policy through the ‘Action Plan for Opening Up to Africa’, launched by Türkiye in 1998. This process of opening up paved the way for diplomatic contacts with Niger to gain momentum from the 2000s onwards. The mutual opening of embassies by Türkiye and Niger in 2012, and the official visit to Niger by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in his capacity as Prime Minister in 2013, marked the beginning of a new era in bilateral relations.

Since then, Türkiye’s relations with Niger, which it regards as a strategic partner in Africa, have moved beyond diplomatic contacts to take on a more concrete character in areas such as energy, defense, trade, education and cultural cooperation. Ankara is strengthening the historical and cultural ties between the two countries through the Programme Coordination Office (PKO) of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and the schools run by the Türkiye Maarif Foundation. In the health sector, one of the most significant steps,  the Niger-Türkiye Friendship Hospital, was opened in October 2019. Through these measures, Türkiye aims to establish a long-term, multi-dimensional partnership with Niger, rather than pursuing a policy focused solely on economic interests.

Following the coup in Niger in 2023, Türkiye did not sever its diplomatic ties and continued its strategic investments whilst maintaining its interest in Niger. On 17 July 2024, a high-level delegation, including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Minister of National Defence Yaşar Güler and Minister of Energy Alparslan Bayraktar, visited Niamey. During the visit, significant agreements were signed in the fields of security, energy and trade, whilst decisions on cooperation in the fields of education and health were also taken. Furthermore, the signing of a declaration of intent for cooperation in the oil and natural gas sector during these talks, and the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation in the mining sector in October 2024, demonstrate that relations between the two countries have now extended to the energy and mining sectors as well.

The fight against terrorism

Other key issue that came to the fore between the two countries in recent years is cooperation in the fight against terrorism and in the field of security. Niger is one of the countries most affected by the rise in terrorist incidents in the Sahel in recent years. The country is exposed to terrorist activities by the Al-Qaeda-linked JNIM and the ISIS-linked ISSP, particularly in its western border regions via the Liptako-Gourma security zone, and by ISWAP and Boko Haram elements in the south-east via the Lake Chad Basin. In this context, where Niger has terminated its military cooperation with Western partners, notably France and the US, Türkiye is emerging as a reliable strategic partner thanks to its growing defense industry capacity, experience in counter-terrorism, security cooperation and active diplomatic initiatives.

These factors are strengthening the strategic dimension of relations between the two countries and ensuring that Türkiye is viewed as an important partner by Niger. In this context, Niger, which cooperates with Türkiye in the fields of defense and security, is importing various defence industry products from Türkiye to enhance its capacity in the fight against terrorism. Furthermore, the On-Site Training Support Protocol signed in April 2026 demonstrates that security cooperation between the two countries is not limited to the supply of defence industry products, but also encompasses military training support and intelligence. It is evident that, through these collaborations, Niger aims to achieve its objective of conducting more effective and successful counter-terrorism operations.

One of the key pillars of the developing relations between the two countries is the strengthening of economic ties and trade. Following the military intervention in Niger in 2023, the country has gone through a difficult period due to sanctions imposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the suspension of financial support and security cooperation by Western partners. During this difficult period, Niger’s Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance, Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine, visited Türkiye to strengthen economic and political ties. Within this framework, Türkiye has continued to develop its economic relations with Niger.

Investments in the energy, mining, construction and trade sectors have not only enhanced Türkiye’s economic presence in Niger but have also contributed to Niger’s efforts to diversify its development and external partnerships. Indeed, the fact that the volume of trade between Türkiye and Niger is projected to rise from approximately 38.9 million dollars in 2012 to 273 million dollars by 2025 is one of the concrete indicators of this economic rapprochement. In the same year, Türkiye’s exports to Niger amounted to 214 million dollars, whilst imports from Niger stood at 59 million dollars. Furthermore, the signing of the joint declaration on the establishment of JETCO during Tchiani’s visit to Ankara can be regarded as a significant step towards conducting economic cooperation on a more structured and institutionalized basis.

In conclusion, these developments demonstrate that the multi-dimensional cooperation between Türkiye and Niger, which has gained momentum since 2020, has moved beyond diplomatic rhetoric and has begun to produce tangible results through trade, institutional agreements and sectoral partnerships.

(Originally published in Turkish by the Middle East Africa website)

D

evelopments in Mali over recent months indicate that the security crisis in the Sahel region has entered a new phase. In particular, the “tactical cooperation” that has emerged between the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin – JNIM) and the Azawad Liberation Front (Front de Libération de l’Azawad – FLA), which represents the Tuareg separatist faction, has exerted serious military pressure on the Bamako administration.

The recapture of Kidal in April 2026, the targeting of the areas around Bamako and Kati, and the assassination of Defence Minister Sadio Camara have demonstrated that Assimi Goita’s administration is facing one of the most severe security crises of recent years. However, the emerging picture suggests, contrary to initial appearances, not the regime’s imminent collapse in the short term, but rather the deepening of a protracted war of attrition between state authority and armed groups in Mali.

The fundamental issue in Mali today is not so much the military capacity of the armed groups, but whether this capacity can be transformed into a sustainable political order. Indeed, whilst the recent coordination between JNIM and the FLA has yielded significant results in terms of wearing down the regime, it has failed to articulate a shared political vision capable of jointly governing Mali. Consequently, whilst this alliance may be able to put pressure on the Goita administration in the short term, it remains far from producing a comprehensive alternative capable of establishing a new model of governance across the country.

Recent background

Developments in Mali over the past two years have brought this structural problem into sharper focus. Whilst clashes between the FLA—which reorganised in the north by the end of 2024—and the Malian army intensified, JNIM also expanded its influence, particularly in central and western Mali. Attacks carried out along the Dioura, Boulikessi and Timbuktu line throughout 2025 have highlighted the Malian army’s capacity issues. Meanwhile, JNIM’s systematic attacks on fuel convoys along the Senegal-Mali border during the same period have demonstrated that the group effectively employs not only military but also economic pressure tactics. The fuel crisis, power cuts and transport problems in the capital, Bamako, have laid bare the erosion of the state’s capacity to provide basic services.

In response, the Goita administration has further restricted the political sphere in parallel with the security crisis. The closure of political parties, the suppression of opposition figures and the postponement of the electoral process on the grounds of ‘pacifying the country’ have reinforced the trend towards the institutionalisation of military rule in Mali. The Goita administration has transformed the security crisis into a tool of legitimacy not only in military but also in political terms. In particular, anti-French rhetoric and an emphasis on sovereignty play a significant role in the Goita regime’s ability to generate social support.

In fact, this is precisely the fundamental reason why the Goita regime remains in power today. It survives not because the regime is strong, but because its rivals have failed to present a common state project. The armed opposition in Mali, whilst appearing militarily effective, is politically fragmented. At the heart of this fragmentation lie the structural differences between JNIM and the FLA. JNIM is an al-Qaeda-linked organisation that ‘exploits Islam’, and this radical group claims that its long-term objective is to establish a Sharia-based order in Mali. The organisation is attempting to establish alternative governance mechanisms, particularly in rural areas.

It is filling the state vacuum through methods such as tax collection, setting up checkpoints, mediating local disputes and operating Sharia courts. Consequently, JNIM has become a hybrid actor seeking to establish influence not only in the military sphere but also in the social and economic spheres, deriving legitimacy from these domains. The relationships it has developed with Fulani communities, particularly those spreading across the Sahel region, have given the organisation significant social depth in central Mali.

Ethno-regional motivation?

In contrast, the FLA’s primary motivation is not ideological but ethno-regional. The Tuareg separatist movements have for many years been advocating for autonomy or independence centered on Azavad in northern Mali. Consequently, the FLA’s priority is not to Islamize the Malian state, but to establish a Tuareg-dominated political sphere in the north. This explains why the relationship between JNIM and the FLA is limited and fragile. Both actors seek to weaken the Bamako administration; however, they have quite different political projects regarding ‘how Mali should be governed’.

This difference becomes particularly apparent in discussions regarding the ‘post-victory order’. Whilst JNIM aims to establish ideological hegemony across the whole of Mali, the FLA appears to be seeking regional dominance in the north. In other words, whilst one seeks ideological transformation of the unitary state, the other advocates a political model based on the fragmentation of the state. Consequently, whilst joint military operations may be possible, a joint governance model appears a highly unlikely prospect.

Moreover, the difference between these two structures is not merely ideological. Their spheres of legitimacy also differ. The FLA’s social support is largely confined to the Tuareg region in the north and lacks a strong political counterpart in southern regions such as Bamako, Sikasso or Kayes. JNIM, on the other hand, is able to operate across a wider geographical area, particularly in regions where state violence is intense, presenting itself as an ‘alternative security provider’.

However, even this does not grant the organization a sustainable governance capacity across the country. Indeed, as seen in the case of Mali, armed groups in the Sahel, whilst possessing the military capacity to erode state authority, are unable to produce a sustainable and inclusive governance model capable of replacing it. JNIM’s economic blockade and rural control capacity may exert pressure on Bamako, but it lacks the administrative and economic infrastructure to replace modern state mechanisms. The same applies to the FLA. There is a significant difference between establishing control over symbolic areas such as Kidal and governing a country with a population of over 20 million, which is ethnically fragmented and economically oriented towards the south. Consequently, the current situation in Mali represents the ‘spread of multiple spheres of authority’ rather than the ‘construction of an alternative state’.

External support commitments

The Goita administration’s external support commitments are also bolstering the regime’s resilience. The security vacuum created following France’s withdrawal and the conclusion of MINUSMA has been attempted to be filled by Russian-backed security structures. The transition from Wagner to the Africa Corps demonstrates that Russian influence is taking on a new form. Although Russian support has not fully ensured security in Mali, it constitutes a significant security buffer preventing the regime’s sudden collapse. Furthermore, the Sahel States Alliance (Alliance des États du Sahel – AES) axis, developed by Mali alongside Burkina Faso and Niger, provides the regime with a regional sphere of solidarity.

Consequently, the most likely scenario in Mali in the coming period is the deepening of a fragmented security order rather than the country falling entirely under the control of a single party. A prolonged war of attrition, in which the FLA increases its influence in the north and JNIM in the central regions, whilst the Bamako-based military core maintains its presence, appears a more realistic prospect. In this process, internal power struggles within the regime and new military alignments may also come to the fore.

However, current data suggests that whilst JNIM and the FLA do not possess the capacity or a shared vision to jointly govern the whole of Mali, JNIM is strengthening its position within the FLA and pursuing a medium- to long-term strategy. Consequently, the crisis unfolding in Mali today is not merely a security issue. It is also a crisis of state capacity, representation, centre-periphery relations and legitimacy. One of the factors fueling JNIM’s growth is the inadequacy of state capacity and exclusionary security policies. The factor fueling the FLA’s resistance, however, is the chronic issue of autonomy and representation in the north. Yet the common ground between these two structures is merely their opposition to the current regime. Indeed, this alliance is insufficient to produce a sustainable political vision and also fuels the underlying rivalry between these groups.

Consequently, the picture emerging in Mali today reflects a ‘crisis of mutual governance’ rather than a regime change. The Goita administration is unable to establish effective sovereignty across the entire country, yet its rivals are also unable to offer a comprehensive political order capable of replacing it. Therefore, however remarkable the recent “military successes” of the JNIM and Tuareg groups may be, it is quite difficult for these successes to translate into a sustainable state model. In Mali, the determining factor in the short term will not be the decisive victory of one side, but rather how this long-term balance of attrition between the state and armed groups will shape the nerve centers inside and outside Bamako.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

W

hen we hear news of a conflict in the Middle East or across the Sahel, one of the first images that comes to mind is the pickup truck with a heavy machine gun mounted on its bed. Racing along desert roads, sometimes accompanying the convoy of a state army, sometimes forming part of a militia raid, these vehicles have become one of the most familiar images of modern warfare.

The footage that emerged from Mali on the morning of April 25, 2026, revived that memory once again. Coordinated attacks carried out by al-Qaeda-linked JNIM and the FLA forces advocating Azawad independence brought these desert cavalrymen back into the global spotlight.

Yet, of course, no “victory” won in this region comes merely through off-road vehicles fitted with PK machine guns. So before asking who is financing and directing the war in the Sahel today, it is worth looking at who first turned these vehicles into some of the most iconic war machines of irregular warfare, and under what circumstances.

The 1986–1987 Libya–Chad War, a.k.a. the Toyota War

At the heart of the crisis unfolding in the Sahara in the second half of the 1980s lay the Aouzou Strip, located along the Chad–Libya border. This desert territory, covering roughly 114,000 square kilometers, carried the burden of vague, arbitrarily drawn borders inherited from the colonial era. Libya, under Muammar Gaddafi, regarded the area as a matter of historical right, while Chad saw this claim as a direct threat to its national sovereignty.

When the war began, the military balance on paper heavily favored Libya. The Libyan army resembled a Soviet-equipped steel fist. Gaddafi’s regime controlled the Aouzou Strip with roughly 8,000 troops, T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery units, and Mi-24 helicopters, famously known as “flying tanks.” Facing them were the Chadian National Armed Forces, who knew the terrain far better but had only limited technological capabilities.

By 1987, however, the intelligence, weapons, and air support provided by France under Opération Épervier quickly shifted the course of the war in Chad’s favor. France was the most critical actor behind the Chadian government, seeking both to protect Western bloc interests and to break Libya’s influence south of the Sahara. These were, after all, the years when Cold War rivalry increasingly turned local conflicts into proxy wars.

The Battle of Fada on January 2, 1987, marked the turning point in this shift. The French Air Force had suppressed Libyan air operations and largely neutralized Gaddafi’s air superiority. Alongside this, hundreds of Toyota pickups supplied by France, together with MILAN anti-tank missiles capable of destroying a tank from roughly two kilometers away, were among the main factors that turned the battlefield equation against Libya. Indeed, Khalifa Haftar, one of the most influential figures in Libyan politics today, was among those captured by Chadian forces during that period.

100 kilometers into Libyan territory

By September 1987, Chadian units carried out a daring raid, infiltrating roughly 100 kilometers into Libyan territory and striking the Maaten al-Sarra Air Base. Numerous aircraft, ammunition stocks, and military assets belonging to the Libyan air force were destroyed before they could even take off. Conducted under French command, this raid became one of the most critical moves in undermining Libya’s air superiority in the region and forcing Gaddafi toward the diplomatic table.

The Chad–Libya War of 1986–87 is now remembered as the “Toyota War.” These low-cost pickup trucks, brought into the country with French support and fitted with heavy machine guns and anti-tank missiles, had been transformed into mobile war machines capable of destroying million-dollar T-55 tanks from hundreds of meters away. While Libya’s heavy Soviet tanks sank into the sand and turned into static targets, the lightweight Toyotas, with their wide tires, seemed almost to float across the desert surface. According to an account that even found its way into military reports, Chadian soldiers would cross Libyan minefields at speeds exceeding 100 kilometers per hour. They moved so fast that even if a wheel triggered the fuse of an anti-tank mine, by the time the explosion occurred the pickup had already left the blast radius.

The real strength of these vehicles, known in modern military literature as “technicals,” lay not in their armor but in their speed and simplicity. When a tank broke down, it required a team of specialist engineers, heavy maintenance infrastructure, and a complex supply chain for spare parts. When a Toyota broke down, basic technical knowledge, limited equipment, and a bit of ingenuity were often enough.

Of course, these vehicles were not what won the war on their own. Without France’s suppression of Libya’s air superiority, the MILAN anti-tank missiles it supplied, the flow of intelligence, and the political-military guarantee provided by Paris, such an outcome would not have been possible. For this reason, the Toyota War is remembered not merely as a story of light vehicles defeating heavy tanks, but as a striking example of how asymmetric warfare, when combined with external support, can change the outcome of a conflict.

The Toyota Hilux and similar vehicles, which have entered popular culture as the archetypal “terror pickup,” have become a constant feature of conflict zones stretching from the Middle East to the Sahel due to their durability, low cost, and ease of weaponization. Having first emerged in the deserts of Chad in the 1980s, where speed, simplicity, and geography gave them an edge against heavy tanks, these vehicles are now back on the battlefield in Mali.

So, are the pickups and drones now pushing southward in Mali truly being commanded by the rebel alliance alone?

I

n the heat and dust of Zimbabwe’s lithium belt, trucks that once rolled straight to port now sit idle, waiting for new paperwork that no one has fully written yet. For miners, this looks like disruption. For Harare, it is more like a test. How far can an African government push global buyers when the world suddenly needs what lies under its soil?

Across the continent, from cobalt in Congo to manganese in the Sahel, similar questions are being asked in quieter rooms. This time, the answer is not simply “export more and hope for the best.” Not this time, at least not entirely.

From bans to bargaining chips

Zimbabwe has been edging toward this moment for years. In 2022 it banned exports of unprocessed lithium ore, arguing that shipping rocks abroad made little sense for a country trying to move up the value chain. Then came the June 2025 announcement: from January 2027, lithium concentrates would also be stopped at the border unless they took the form of processed products like lithium sulphate. Last week, Harare went further, suspending exports of all raw minerals and lithium concentrates already in transit, citing “ongoing malpractices” and the need to tighten control over national resources.

On paper, this sounds radical. In practice, it is a bargaining position. The government knows that Chinese, European and other investors have already sunk serious money into Zimbabwe’s lithium sector. Stopping exports concentrates minds. It forces companies to accelerate domestic processing plans and gives Harare more space to renegotiate terms on royalties, tax and local content.

Zimbabwe is not alone. The Democratic Republic of Congo has introduced export quotas and temporary suspensions on cobalt intermediates, disrupting flows to Chinese refineries that dominate global supply. With about 70 percent of global cobalt production coming from the DRC, even short interruptions send ripples through the battery industry. Other African states, from Namibia to Ghana, have experimented with higher royalties, local‑beneficiation rules or outright bans on unprocessed mineral exports. Some measures get watered down, others quietly reversed. But the trend line is clear enough: raw minerals are no longer treated as a one‑way ticket out of the continent. They are becoming bargaining chips.

That was the easy part. Turning bans into lasting leverage is something else.

Washington’s critical minerals charm offensive

While African governments recalibrate, the United States has launched its own critical minerals push on the continent. Washington now officially lists around 60 minerals – from lithium and cobalt to rare earths and graphite – as “critical” for its energy transition and defense industries. Early this month it announced a new strategic reserve initiative and hosted a ministerial with African partners, a clear sign that African deposits are seen as part of a wider security puzzle.

In the Sahel, this shows up as what some analysts call security‑for‑minerals diplomacy. Senior US officials have shuttled between capitals like Bamako and Niamey, offering equipment packages, intelligence sharing and counter‑terrorism support, while quietly mapping manganese, uranium and other deposits that could feed American supply chains. The language is one of partnership and resilience. The subtext is access and influence in a region where France has been pushed out and Russia’s Africa Corps is trying to move in.

It is not only the US. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce now speaks openly of “strategic ground”, calling for long‑term critical minerals partnerships that support African value addition and midstream refining, not just extraction. That sounds encouraging on paper, and some of it is genuine. But African officials have heard many such promises before.

So, a basic question hangs in the air: is this new diplomacy about correcting old imbalances, or about dressing up familiar extraction models in the language of climate and security? Many African leaders will try to treat it as both an opportunity and a risk. What they are asking for now is not simply aid, nor another training mission. They want hard guarantees on processing, jobs and infrastructure staying on African soil.

Between Beijing and Brussels: leverage or new dependency?

Mineral nationalism does not play out in a vacuum. For two decades, China has built an integrated presence across Africa’s copper, cobalt and lithium belts, from the DRC’s Copperbelt to Zimbabwe’s lithium fields. Chinese companies like CMOC and Huayou Cobalt control major assets and have helped finance roads, power lines and processing facilities that Western investors often considered too risky. In battery metals alone, Chinese refiners still handle nearly 70 percent of global capacity, a share that makes every African export decision instantly geopolitical.

Now the European Union has entered the race with its own Critical Raw Materials Act and “strategic partnerships” in countries such as Namibia and Zambia, promising cleaner supply chains and more stringent environmental standards. India and Gulf states are also testing the waters, offering different blends of investment, technology and political support.

On good days, African governments manage to play these suitors off against one another. Congo’s cobalt curbs, for example, exposed how dependent Chinese processors had become on a single source and created space for Kinshasa to demand better terms. Zimbabwe’s lithium gambit is similarly aimed at forcing investors – many of them Chinese – to accelerate domestic refining plans. Some deals are starting to include clearer commitments on local processing, training and infrastructure.

On bad days, though, the picture looks less like leverage and more like a new dependency cycle. Opaque licensing, politically connected intermediaries and security bargains can hollow out sovereignty just as surely as old‑style concessions did. In parts of the Sahel, mining rights and counter‑insurgency operations now blur into each other, with foreign partners providing drones and advisors while securing access to sub‑soil wealth. That mix is unstable. It can deepen resentment on the ground and make mines themselves targets in wider conflicts.

On a hot morning in Bamako, Mali’s junta lined up before cameras to bless a new Russian‑backed gold refinery, promising “greater control” over national resources. Yet the project is more than a ribbon‑cutting. It sits inside a wider package: Talks on civil nuclear cooperation, exploration of uranium and lithium, a long‑term play on critical minerals in a sanctioned, fragile state. The deal only moved after Mali rewrote its mining code to give the state a larger share and the power to reopen old contracts, unsettling Western firms that had grown used to easier terms.​

At first glance, this looks like yet another scene in a familiar drama: Big powers chasing African resources, ports and UN votes while local governments scramble for attention. Look a little closer and the script changes. From the Sahel to Southern Africa, governments are using Russian security and mining offers, Chinese training schemes and Western climate and energy money to renegotiate conditions, delay deals that no longer suit them and quietly diversify their options.​

From security contracts to mineral leverage

Russia’s new African story is usually told in uniforms and hardware. Arms deliveries, military advisers and the rebranding of Wagner into the “Africa Corps” turned Mali and its neighbors into symbols of Moscow’s return to the Sahel. But the security tale now blends into a deeper one: A “security‑for‑resources” model that trades battlefield support and diplomatic protection for access to gold, uranium and other strategic minerals.​

Mali is the central case. Since 2023, Bamako and Moscow have moved from ad‑hoc cooperation to more formal road maps: The refinery, geological surveys, nuclear collaboration, a growing presence around gold and promising lithium deposits. Security trainers and mining geologists travel separate circuits, yet they reinforce the same bargain: Russian backing in exchange for a real say over who profits from Mali’s subsoil. In Niger, audits and the suspension of new mining licenses send a similar message: Contracts around uranium and other minerals will be written on new terms, whoever the partner may be.​

This is not a neat pro‑Russian bloc. Far from it. Sahel capitals still talk to Gulf funds, keep lines open to European lenders, leave space for Chinese investors. What has changed is the negotiating table. The option of handing a concession to a Russian company – or swapping Western trainers for Africa Corps units – gives local authorities harder leverage when they sit down with Western or Chinese teams. Even when Moscow does not win a project, its shadow helps African leaders push for higher state participation, tougher local content rules, and offers them political cover when they break with old security patrons.​

China’s training offensive and the power of quiet networks

While Russia leans on guns and gold, China has spent years building a quieter, slower kind of influence. Beyond ports and railways, Beijing has turned scholarships and training into one of the central tools of its Africa policy. Chinese Government Scholarship schemes for African students now offer fully funded master’s and PhD positions, often in coordination with the African Union and national ministries. Parallel mid‑career courses for civil servants and local officials, including “Youth of Excellence” programs, package public administration, infrastructure management and governance skills into short, intensive modules.​

This people‑to‑people offensive is less dramatic than a port or a dam, but it may prove more durable. Thousands of African students and officials pass through Chinese universities, provincial academies and party schools, exposed to how Beijing manages industrial zones, digital infrastructure and local finance. Over time, that creates something softer than dependency and harder to undo than a single loan: Shared jargon, institutional templates, a comfort with Chinese systems. It also produces quiet networks: Alumni chats, WhatsApp groups, personal contacts that can bypass embassies when a problem or opportunity appears.​

African actors treat these offers with a cool eye. Students in Lagos or Addis Ababa apply for Chinese scholarships while still chasing European or Gulf‑funded programs. Officials might spend two weeks in Beijing, then appear a month later at an EU‑funded seminar on climate data or migration management. Not everyone in these capitals is betting on Moscow or Beijing. They are shopping around, collecting tools and contacts, deciding what fits domestic politics and discarding what does not. In an environment where Western technical help often comes wrapped in sharper political conditions, simply having several training and scholarship channels gives bureaucracies breathing space.​

The Trump factor and a tired West

Donald Trump’s return to the White House has not rewritten Washington’s Africa playbook so much as stripped it down. The mood is more openly transactional: Security cooperation and financing tied to clear quid pro quos on critical minerals, migration control and voting behavior in international forums. Aid lines and development programs feel less secure, subject to sudden reviews or cuts if they collide with domestic messaging or budget battles in Washington. African governments have already seen how quickly a “priority” can disappear.​

Europe, on paper, looks like the steadier partner. Brussels continues to talk up a multi‑billion Global Gateway investment package for digital, energy and transport links with Africa, branding the relationship as “equal” and “green”. Yet behind the sums sit dense conditions on governance, refugee returns and climate performance, written into development and energy deals. At the same time, the EU’s decision to phase out Russian gas and speed up its energy transition is pulling African producers deeper into its plans, from LNG and pipeline gas to green hydrogen.

For African capitals, the past decade has offered enough reminders. Western priorities swing from counterterrorism to pandemics, from Ukraine to critical minerals; the money follows those swings. This does not mean U.S. security guarantees or European technology have lost their appeal. It does mean fewer governments are willing to pin their budgets or their armies on a single Western pillar, and more are ready to fold U.S. and E.U. offers into a wider mix of Russian, Chinese and Gulf options.​

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rom the banks of the Niger River, the view of the world looks drastically different than it does from Washington or Beijing. In Bamako, the mood oscillates between besieged defiance and a grim realization of isolation. The jihadist coalition JNIM (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) has tightened its chokehold on supply lines, effectively blockading the city. Yet, amidst this volatility, a new political architecture is being welded together. When Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger forged the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—formally created in 2023 and later upgraded into a confederation—they did more than disrupt a regional bloc. They declared that the era of managing African insecurity through Western-prescribed normative frameworks was over.

This snapshot reveals an uncomfortable truth: Africa is no longer merely a periphery defined by “terrorism and migration.” Instead, the Sahel has transformed into a high-stakes laboratory. Here, the grand strategies of great powers are being stripped of their diplomatic gloss and subjected to a raw stress test. From Niger’s uranium mines to the digital surveillance grids rising in Ouagadougou, the competition is not just about resources; it is about which model of state-building—Western liberal interventionism, Russian security patronage, or Chinese developmental authoritarianism—can survive contact with reality.

From ECOWAS to AES: The geopolitics of sovereignty

The fracture began in earnest following the July 2023 coup in Niger. When ECOWAS threatened military intervention to restore constitutional order, the bloc inadvertently accelerated the very disintegration it sought to prevent. For the military regimes in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey, this threat was interpreted not as a defense of democracy, but as a proxy maneuver by Western powers to maintain a waning hegemony. The subsequent formation of the AES was a direct repudiation of the liberal peace-building architecture that had dominated West Africa since the end of the Cold War.

The Western model collapsed here because of the glaring disparity between promises and results. For over a decade, operations like Serval and Barkhane promised stability. Yet, as the French military withdrawal became a reality, the security vacuum was palpable. Fatigued by a war with no end and no clear frontline, the local populace grew receptive to a new narrative: sovereignty first, democracy later. The AES is not merely a defense pact; it is a political statement asserting that the security of the regime is synonymous with the security of the state.

The departure of Western troops created a marketplace. In this bazaar of security and development, the currency is not just cash, but the willingness to provide regime-insulating protection.

Bayonets and Bytes: Russia and China enter the fray

As Western forces exit, two distinct challengers have stepped into the arena. Russia brings the bayonets; China brings the bytes and the concrete.

Russia’s entry into the Sahel has been kinetic and focused on the immediate preservation of military rulers. Through the Africa Corps and official defense accords, Moscow offers a “regime survival package.” This involves direct military assistance and praetorian guard services. Critics label this as a neocolonial extraction model masked as security cooperation. However, for a leader in Bamako facing an existential threat, the Russian offer has a clarity that Western partnership agreements—laden with conditionalities—often lacked.

China, conversely, plays a longer, quieter game. While Russian mercenaries guard the presidential palaces, Chinese firms are wiring the ministries. Beijing’s approach secures access to strategic resources while embedding itself in the administrative backbone of the state. The recent move by Burkina Faso to award a contract for new biometric passports to a Chinese firm is emblematic of this shift: a transition from “boots on the ground” to “data in the server.”

Can these two non-Western powers coexist? Russia provides the shield, allowing military rulers to sleep at night, and China provides the infrastructure that might allow the state to function during the day. The current China-Russia-U.S. competition in Africa suggests that while Moscow and Beijing are aligned in displacing Western influence, their methods remain distinct. Russia seeks disruption and leverage; China seeks stability and markets. At some point, the chaos required by the former may threaten the investments made by the latter.

Debt trap or bargaining window?

No analysis of this triangulation is complete without addressing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the “debt trap” narrative. Western capitals have long warned that Chinese loans are a Trojan horse. But is this empirically sound, or is it a normative stick used to beat Beijing?

The reality is more nuanced. African governments are not naive victims walking blindly into servitude; they view Chinese lending as a vital alternative to the austerity-driven financing of the IMF. As noted in recent analyses of debt-trap diplomacy, the “trap” is often less about predatory intent and more about opacity and the sheer scale of infrastructure needs. For a Sahelian state cut off from Western budget support due to a coup, a Chinese loan is a lifeline, not a trap.

Yet, a new form of debt is emerging: security debt. Just as financial debt to Beijing can mortgage a country’s economic future, reliance on Moscow for physical safety creates a sovereignty mortgage. When a government relies on foreign paramilitaries to hold its capital—as seen in cases like Mali and the Central African Republic—the cost is often paid in gold and mineral concessions, bypassing the national treasury entirely. This shadow economy may prove far harder to untangle than any standard loan agreement.

Furthermore, the BRI itself is evolving towards “small and beautiful” investments—digital infrastructure and connectivity. Beijing realizes that in volatile regions like the Sahel, laying fiber optic cables is safer and more profitable than building railways vulnerable to insurgent attacks.

The rise of the African agenda

What we are witnessing in the Sahel is not merely a reshuffling of external patrons. It is the violent birth of a new African agency. The leaders of the AES are stress-testing the global order. They are gambling that they can dismantle the old French-dominated security architecture, utilize Russian muscle to hold the line, and leverage Chinese investment to build a future, all while keeping the West at arm’s length.

This is a dangerous game. The escalating violence suggests that the “sovereignty first” model has yet to ensure safety for the general public. But to view this solely as a failure is to miss the point. The Sahel has become the graveyard of the post-Cold War consensus.

If the 2000s were defined by China’s “silent rise,” and the 2010s by the “War on Terror,” the 2020s will likely be remembered as the decade in which African states began to seek partners aggressively. The question is no longer “Who owns Africa?”—a colonial mindset that refuses to die—but rather, “Who can survive Africa’s terms?” The bayonets of Russian contractors and the bytes of Chinese tech giants are current features, but the ultimate arbiters will not be found in Moscow or Beijing. They will be found in the streets of Bamako and Niamey, waiting to see if these new partnerships deliver the dignity and security that the old ones promised, but never provided.

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he developments in North Africa have had a decisive impact on the current climate of instability in Mali. In this context, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged during the Algerian civil war in the 1990s and continues to operate in the Sahel. A group of Tuareg fighters received military training under Gaddafi’s ‘Islamic Legion’ project in Libya and came to northern Mali following NATO’s 2011 operation in Libya. These fighters established the Azavad Liberation Movement (MNLA) organisation and rebelled against the Malian state. These are the most fundamental examples of this claim.

The Tuaregs, constituting around 10 per cent of Mali’s population, organised under the MNLA and demanded an autonomous state. In order to repel state forces in the north, they formed alliances with various radical organisations, including AQIM, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar Dine. In March 2012, Amadou Toumani Touré, Mali’s president at the time, was overthrown in a coup by the army, who claimed that the government was unable to quell the rebellion.

The collapse of state institutions in the north enabled the MNLA to seize strategic centres such as Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. However, a dominant group within the MNLA that embraced a secular-nationalist ideology caused a deep split within the organisation. The MNLA subsequently withdrew from the alliance because its secular-nationalist ideology was incompatible with that of the other radical groups, and the MNLA entered into armed conflict with them. Following clashes that began in Gao, the radical groups eliminated the MNLA.

Initially pursuing a secular goal of independence, the insurgency turned into a terrorist threat dominated by jihadist Salafi ideology when radical groups advanced southwards to capture cities in central Mali. Amid increasing instability, the Malian government accepted Algeria’s comprehensive peace plan and signed a peace agreement with a coalition of independence movements in the Azawad region, including the MNLA. However, excluding radical groups from this coalition has allowed them to expand their influence and spread their control towards central Mali and neighbouring countries, such as Burkina Faso and Niger.

In 2017, the Sahel branch of AQIM, Ansar Dine, the Katiba Macina Front and al-Mourabitoun merged to form Jemaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Led by the Tuareg leader Iyad Ag Ghali, JNIM pledged allegiance to the al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and the Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada following its formation. Since 2017, the organisation has increased its activities in the Sahel region, centred in Mali.

JNIM’s new strategy: Economic warfare

In landlocked Mali, which has a population of around 25 million, terrorist and violent acts that have been ongoing for over a decade reached a critical threshold in 2025. In recent months, the country has faced an intensifying siege as JNIM has cut off vital supply routes to the capital, Bamako. Moving beyond classic guerrilla tactics, JNIM has begun to target transport convoys and logistical routes, exploiting the state’s economic vulnerabilities.

In September 2025, JNIM announced a ban on fuel imports into Mali from Senegal, Mauritania, the Ivory Coast and Guinea, effectively aiming to isolate Bamako from the outside world. This embargo has led to one of the most serious crises in Mali’s history. JNIM militants have targeted fuel tankers and transport companies in the Kayes-Nioro corridor in the west of the country, destroying hundreds of tankers and cutting off the main roads connecting Mali to Mauritania and Senegal. This has effectively besieged the capital, Bamako. As a result of this economic blockade, fuel supplies to Bamako came to a standstill.

Additionally, JNIM has targeted gold and lithium mines operated by foreign investors, kidnapping foreign engineers and demanding high ransoms in exchange. The fuel blockade is part of JNIM’s evolving operational strategy, which now encompasses economic warfare. Rather than seizing the capital Bamako directly, JNIM aims to weaken the government in the eyes of the people by tightening the circle around the regime using economic tools. As a result of these attacks, the country has experienced fuel shortages, price increases, power cuts, and supply chain disruptions. These issues are having a paralyzing effect on daily life, creating both psychological and political pressure on the regime.

The governance gaps within the Malian state, coupled with the socio-economic and cultural divisions in the north and centre, have played a decisive role in JNIM’s rapid rise. The central authority’s inability to respond to the demands of rural areas in particular, coupled with the economic and social neglect of the population, has facilitated the establishment of shadow governance structures by JNIM. These structures have fuelled JNIM’s growing support and influence by forging local agreements with different sub-communities in Mali. Mali’s political turmoil in recent years has also deepened the security vacuum. Military coups in August 2020 and May 2021 brought Colonel Assimi Goita to power. Although the Goita regime promised to address security issues in the north of the country, it has not yet achieved this.

The role of international actors and failed security models

Since 2012, security measures, military operations and regional and international cooperation have played an important role in countering ongoing terrorist and violent acts by radical groups in Mali. In 2013, Mali requested assistance from France to counter the terrorist threat spreading southwards. France responded with Operation Serval in 2013. This operation later evolved into Operation Barkhane, which is centred in Chad and targets radical groups in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. It involves 3,000 personnel. This operation helped the Malian forces to recapture key cities.

However, large areas of the countryside remained outside state control, enabling armed groups to proliferate. Not only did the presence of French forces on the ground fail to end terrorism, it also led to growing resentment among the local population. Anti-French sentiment, stemming from the colonial past, fuelled a series of military coups in the region, particularly in Mali. The Goita regime expelled French and UN troops from Mali, claiming that France was violating the country’s sovereignty.

Following France’s failed military missions in Mali and its subsequent withdrawal from the region, this has presented both an opportunity and a challenge for Russia. Since 2021, the Wagner Group, a private military company with links to the Kremlin, has been operating in Mali, supporting counter-terrorism operations and internal security missions. The recapture of the symbolically important city of Kidal was initially regarded as a triumph for the Mali-Russia alliance. However, in July 2024, around 80 Russian mercenaries and 50 Malian soldiers were killed in an ambush by Tuareg rebels and JNIM near the Algerian border.

These developments demonstrate that the Malian army is facing serious challenges on the ground, despite receiving external support. Furthermore, reports that Ukraine may have shared intelligence with Tuareg forces against the Wagner Group highlight the increasingly complex and internationalised nature of the conflict in Mali. Following the death of Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin in mid-2023, the Russian presence in Mali was reorganised as the ‘African Corps’. However, Russian forces have largely withdrawn to their bases and have not succeeded in stopping radical groups from advancing across the country.

The regional security environment has deteriorated further following the 2023 coup in Niger. This has led to fragmentation within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES): a military and political alliance between Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. The AES was formed on 16 September 2023 through the Liptako-Gourma Charter. It was designed as a response to the West’s withdrawal from the region and the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS against military regimes. The AES aims to establish an alternative security architecture that is independent of Western influence and asserts ‘regional strategic autonomy’.

Since 2012, the collapse of state authority in northern Mali and the rise of radical movements have created an environment of insecurity that threatens the entire country. The Russian mercenary model, introduced as a replacement for France’s failed counter-terrorism strategy, has resulted in greater instability and increased civilian casualties, with terrorism now reaching the capital. This situation demonstrates that security crises cannot be resolved solely by military means or by relying on external actors. In the short and medium term, the most serious threat to Mali is the erosion of the state’s legitimacy and the strengthening of JNIM as an alternative authority. Mali’s return to lasting stability will only be possible through local solutions centred on inclusive governance, socio-economic development and regional cooperation.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

M

adagascar’s President Andry Rajoelina was ousted on Tuesday in a military coup following weeks of massive, youth-led protests demanding his resignation over poverty, corruption, and chronic power outages that have crippled the country. The takeover marks another turbulent chapter in the island nation’s history of political instability, coming 16 years after Rajoelina himself seized power in a similar coup.

The move came hours after Madagascar’s parliament voted overwhelmingly to impeach the 51-year-old leader, who had already fled the country fearing for his life. In a dramatic announcement outside the ceremonial presidential palace in Antananarivo, Colonel Michael Randrianirina — commander of the elite CAPSAT military unit — declared that the armed forces had assumed control of the government and would form a transitional council composed of army and gendarmerie officers.

“We are taking power,” Randrianirina told reporters to the cheers of thousands of protesters gathered nearby. “The constitution is suspended. We will organize a referendum within two years to establish a new democratic order.”

The military’s declaration effectively ended Rajoelina’s presidency, which had already been under intense pressure from the streets. In a last-ditch attempt to cling to power, Rajoelina issued a decree from an undisclosed location on Tuesday seeking to dissolve parliament’s lower house — but lawmakers ignored him and proceeded with the impeachment vote.

A coup amid growing unrest

The coup followed weeks of protests driven largely by Gen Z activists frustrated with what they described as years of government mismanagement and neglect. What began as small gatherings over rolling blackouts and water shortages quickly evolved into a nationwide movement demanding an end to corruption and inequality.

“I study in darkness every night because we have no electricity,” said 18-year-old university student Shaniah Rakotohania, who joined the protests in Antananarivo. “If the government cannot even give us light, how can we have a future?”

Protesters flooded the capital’s Independence Avenue and other major squares, waving the national flag and chanting “Rajoelina must go!” as security forces initially responded with tear gas and arrests. But momentum shifted dramatically over the weekend when the powerful CAPSAT unit, long considered loyal to Rajoelina, defected and joined the protesters — a move that sealed his fate.

CAPSAT, which also played a key role in Rajoelina’s own rise to power during the 2009 coup, said on Saturday that it was assuming command of all armed forces. By Tuesday, new military and gendarmerie heads had been appointed, signaling the consolidation of military control.

Rajoelina in exile, government condemns ‘illegal takeover’

From hiding, Rajoelina released a video statement Monday night saying he had fled the country for “a safe place” after what he called “a rebellion and an attempt to seize power illegally.” His office later issued a written statement condemning Randrianirina’s declaration as “a serious breach of the rule of law” and vowed that “the Republic of Madagascar cannot be taken hostage by force.”

The ousted president’s whereabouts remain unclear, though sources close to his office said he was believed to have left Madagascar by private plane late Monday.

Rajoelina first came to prominence as the youthful mayor of Antananarivo before leading protests that toppled then-President Marc Ravalomanana in 2009. He later won elections in 2018 and was re-elected in 2023, amid opposition claims of voter manipulation and corruption.

A country in crisis

Home to about 30 million people, Madagascar is one of the poorest nations in the world, despite its rich natural resources and biodiversity. It is the largest global producer of vanilla but has long struggled with political upheaval and economic inequality. According to the World Bank, more than 75 percent of its population lives below the poverty line.

The protests that culminated in Rajoelina’s downfall were fueled by deep frustration among the country’s young population, who make up more than half of Madagascar’s citizens. Many demonstrators cited inspiration from other Gen Z-led movements that toppled leaders in Sri Lanka and Nepal in recent years.

“This was not just about politics — it was about dignity,” said 23-year-old protester Soavololona Faraniaina. “We want electricity, jobs, and a future in our own country. We will not stop until Madagascar belongs to its people.”

While protesters celebrated the military’s intervention as a victory for the people, concerns have emerged about the return of military rule in a country that has seen multiple coups since gaining independence from France in 1960.

R

ussia has held its first official military consultations with the juntas ruling Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, sealing a defense cooperation memorandum as Moscow accelerates efforts to expand its strategic influence in Africa’s volatile Sahel region.

The meeting, announced Thursday by Russia’s Defense Ministry, brought together Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov and his counterparts from the three West African states, all of which have pivoted sharply away from France and other Western partners since taking power in a series of military coups.

“Today we are holding the first consultations between the heads of the defense ministries of the Russian Federation and the countries participating in the Sahel States Confederation,” Belousov said, using the name for the recently formed alliance between the three nations. The bloc — formally known as the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) — was created earlier this year as a counterweight to the Western-leaning Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Strategic Shift from the West

Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have in recent years ejected French troops, shuttered Western military cooperation programs, and embraced closer security ties with Russia. In each country, the military seized power citing frustration over the inability of civilian governments and their Western allies to contain a worsening jihadist insurgency.

The AES members accuse ECOWAS of acting under France’s influence, especially after the bloc imposed sanctions in response to the coups. In January, all three formally withdrew from ECOWAS, marking a major break with the region’s dominant diplomatic and economic framework.

Mali’s defense minister, Colonel Sadio Camara — considered a leading pro-Russian voice within the junta — said military cooperation is already the “largest area” of engagement with Moscow. “This meeting represents a strengthening of the partnership needed to guarantee the security and sovereignty of our states,” he said.

The Russian offer: “comprehensive assistance”

According to the Russian Defense Ministry, the talks concluded with the signing of a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation, though no specifics were made public. Belousov said Moscow was prepared to provide “comprehensive assistance” to help stabilize the region, where militant violence linked to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State has killed thousands and displaced millions over the past decade.

Russia’s military footprint in Africa has grown significantly in recent years, often through the deployment of private security contractors, including the Wagner Group. Although Wagner’s formal operations in Mali have reportedly scaled back following the death of its founder Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian mercenaries remain active under new structures integrated more closely with the Russian state.

Analysts say Moscow’s security exports — training, equipment, and combat support — appeal to Sahel juntas facing persistent insurgent threats, especially as Western governments condition aid on democratic governance and human rights standards.

Geopolitical stakes in the Sahel

The Sahel region, a semi-arid belt stretching across Africa south of the Sahara, has become one of the world’s fastest-growing arenas of geopolitical competition. Its strategic importance stems from its natural resources — including gold, uranium, and other minerals — and its role as a transit hub for migration toward North Africa and Europe.

By deepening military ties with AES members, Russia is positioning itself as the primary security guarantor for regimes that reject Western partnership models. The move is also seen as part of Moscow’s broader strategy to offset diplomatic isolation following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

“Russia is offering unconditional military aid and political backing, which is very attractive to juntas that are under Western sanctions,” said an African security analyst in Dakar. “For the Kremlin, the Sahel is a place where it can project power cheaply and undermine France, the EU, and the U.S.”

T

he overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi’s 42-year-long regime in 2011, following public uprisings, plunged Libya into a political, social, and military crisis. Even after 13 years, the country has yet to achieve unity and integrity. The uprising, ignited on February 17, 2011, is considered by some as the root cause of today’s conflict environment, while others view it as a justified and legitimate quest for a new order.

Revolution dilemma

Although the February 17 revolution emerged as a popular movement, the post-revolution phase, particularly two years later with the enactment of the “political isolation law’” that marginalized former Gaddafi-era soldiers and bureaucrats from the political scene, followed by the military polarization of 2014, indicated that the revolution had been co-opted by certain political and military cliques into a struggle for power.

This scenario and the historical flow extending to the present day reveal that the masses, aspiring for better living conditions and a fairer governance model, have relinquished control of the revolution to the country’s political elites. The fragile and fragmented security atmosphere, perceived as a window of opportunity by tribal and militia groups active in the east and west, led to deep divisions and polarizations across various sectors, constructed through narratives and policies securitized within the narrow agendas and interests of the relevant actors.

Over time, this division evolved into armed conflict, leading to the deaths of tens of thousands of Libyans in the civil wars of 2014 and 2019, and further laying the groundwork for the emergence of regional animosity and seeking of revenge. Despite being ethnically more homogeneous compared to many countries in the Middle East and Africa, the North African nation witnessed its initial revolutionary vs. anti-revolutionary divide deepen into Islamist vs. secular, east vs. west, and even city vs. town polarizations, all of which have hindered the processes of reconciliation and state reconstruction.

For instance, the city of Misrata stood out as both a stronghold of the revolution and in favor of the influential Islamist Muslim Brotherhood movement, while the city of Benghazi transformed into a hub for revolution opponents and former Gaddafi-era soldiers and bureaucrats, especially following the rise of militia leader Khalifa Haftar in the east. Additionally, the capital, Tripoli, along with influential western cities like Misrata, Zawiya, and Zintan, became strategic points where armed groups are engaged in a power struggle, specifically aiming to expand their spheres of influence and augment their control over official institutions in the post-revolutionary era.

Disruptive interventions by external actors

Parallel to these internal balances, Western countries within NATO, which planned and executed air strikes against Gaddafi in 2011, have continued to intervene in the process. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), established under the auspices of the UN, has remained inadequate in terms of providing a foundation for permanent and sustainable solutions, instead supporting interim governments and similar power-sharing agreements formed in 2015 and 2021.

More importantly, NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya, the first peacekeeping operation implemented under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, neglected the responsibility to rebuild, a crucial component of the R2P approach. The post-Gaddafi reconstruction process was left to Libya’s incomplete institutions and a society lacking a developed sense of citizenship. Subsequent international conferences, such as those in Palermo and Berlin, witnessed meetings that veered into a dominance struggle, far from solving issues, and were marked by disagreements stemming from conflicting interests among Western nations.

On the other hand, the authority vacuum and weak borders have transformed Libya into a hub for mercenaries, on the brink of regional crises, where fighters are gathered and dispatched. The period during which Gulf countries and the Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner Group financed numerous Syrian, Chadian, and Sudanese foreign fighters within Haftar’s ranks was documented in several open sources. From this perspective, it can be stated that external interventions have been as detrimental to Libya’s unity and integrity as internal factors.

The Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), convened under the auspices of the UN in Switzerland on February 5, 2021, designated the Government of National Unity (GNU), led by the businessman from Misrata Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, as the new transitional administration to guide the country towards the elections planned for December 2021. Gaining relative support from rival figures in a short period, the GNU prioritized economic and political reforms. However, the postponement of the planned elections due to controversies over candidate criteria and constitutional debates led to a broader division, culminating in the establishment of a new parallel government in February 2022. The developments following this date can be identified as primary causes for the conflicts erupting in and around Tripoli, closures of oil facilities, and the resultant economic and political crises.

Militias and Libyan politics

The current situation has enabled militia groups in the country to evolve into political entities over time, leveraging the privileges and powers they have accumulated. This transformation is elucidated by the concept of “militia diplomacy,” which denotes the distribution of shares in military and political institutions. According to this approach, militias affiliated with tribes or community-based in the east, west, and south aim to position actors sympathetic to them in government during transitional processes.

The deviation from this scenario not only questions the legitimacy of the new structure in the eyes of these groups but also leads to potentially destabilizing endeavors. Many analysts focusing on Libya argue that militia groups, which have been integrated into the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and Presidential Council since 2011, have become “statized,” positing this as a significant impediment to democratic processes.

Currently, it is possible to discuss some initiatives regarding the reorganization of the December 2021 elections that were canceled. Alongside mechanisms involving local and international actors led by the UNSMIL, priority should be given to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs. A united Libya requires unified institutions and, more importantly, a unified military. At this point, both the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA), comprised of Haftar’s forces in the east, and the fragmented security bureaucracy in the west of the country indicate chronic problems for the future.

T

he agreement signed between the defense ministers of Turkey and Somalia on February 8, 2024, has had a significant impact on national, regional, and global politics. At the current stage, there is no official statement regarding the details of this agreement, and examining its possible repercussions is a more promising endeavor than attempting to make assertive statements about it.

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahamud stated, “Our Turkish brothers will only protect our seas for ten years under this agreement. After ten years of cooperation, we will have a navy that will protect our seas.” The president’s statement reveals an important detail about the content of the agreement between Ankara and Mogadishu, namely the signing of a 10-year cooperation agreement between the two countries regarding maritime security. It also discloses that Turkey’s presence in Somalia, which began in 2011, and its influence in the Horn of Africa are on even more solid ground following this latest development.

If the agreement with Somalia is evaluated alongside the defense agreement signed with Djibouti on February 19, it becomes clear that Turkey’s presence in the Horn of Africa has increased. The U.S., the United Kingdom, France, China, Italy, and Japan have military bases in Djibouti, while Germany and Spain have military assets in the region, but no military bases. In the medium term, Turkey’s growing presence in the Horn of Africa may also lead to the establishment of a naval base in Somalia or Djibouti.

In addition, given Turkey’s recent rapprochement with the West and its already good relations with Djibouti, Turkey can be expected to contribute to the risks and threats in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. If Turkey were to become a security actor in the Gulf of Aden, this would likely put Iran in a position of concern. Thus, although the agreement was signed between Turkey and Somalia, it has regional implications as well.

Moreover, as Turkey continues its rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, one of the critical issues is likely to be the Houthis. One way to eliminate the parameter of Houthi violence in terms of the security of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is to stop the arms shipments. This, however, could create a situation that directly concerns Iran and Saudi Arabia; as a result, the moves in Somalia and Djibouti are seen as very critical in the context of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

The Houthis’ asymmetric attacks, especially in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Gulf of Aden, have continued since October 19. The attacks are perpetuated primarily with weapons of Iranian origin; if arms smuggling in the region is prevented, the Houthis could be neutralized—a situation that could become a concern for Iran.

The agreement with Somalia paves the way for Turkey to make frequent naval deployments in Somali waters. The presence of the Turkish navy in Somali waters could create a situation that would help curb the illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing activities of countries such as Iran and China, as well as the recent resurgence of piracy off the Somali coast. Both in the long and medium term, the Turkey-Somalia agreement is likely to strengthen Somalia’s navy and coast guard, with the potential to further deter illegal fishing and piracy. In this context, it is projected that Somalia is losing at least $500 million in revenue annually due to illegal fishing activities.

The economic problem, in fact, is as significant as the current terrorism problem in Somalia. After being elected president of Somalia for the second time, in his speech during his visit to SETA in Ankara July 2022, President Mahamud stated that he would focus very seriously on the fight against terrorism. At the same time, Somalia’s economic development will eliminate many of the security problems caused by al-Shabaab and other militants.

Regional implications of the agreement with Somalia

President Erdoğan visited Somalia in 2011 when the country had been left to its fate. That year was a new beginning for Somalia, and now, the new agreement between Turkey and Somalia, which heralds a renewed alliance between the two countries, can be regarded as a “second 2011.”

The agreement has the potential to allow steps to be taken towards the security of Somalia’s territorial waters, allowing investments in Somalia and tourism activities in the coastal area to increase. What is more, economic prosperity in Somalia can be expected to increase and security problems to decrease. At the same time, the improved security environment, supported in part by Turkey, will also provide an opportunity to increase investments in relevant regions.

An important aspect of the agreement is the compatibility of the development with Egypt’s foreign policy. Recently, immediately after the meeting between President Erdoğan and Egyptian President Sisi, the Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister for African Affairs visited the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The possible cooperation between Turkey and Egypt in Africa was discussed during the meeting, establishing that Egypt has accepted the presence of Turkey in East Africa.

In addition, the Turkey-Somalia agreement has the potential to affect the Egypt-Ethiopia-Sudan equation in the context of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in terms of regional competition in the Horn of Africa and East Africa. Of course, the agreement does not directly affect this issue; however, the expectation of increased cooperation with the Egypt-Turkey normalization can potentially affect the security perspective of Egypt’s attitude towards Ethiopia regarding the dam with Ethiopia. It should be noted, though, that Turkey should not be expected to intervene directly on the issue.

Egypt also supports the Federal Government of Somalia against the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU. At this point, Turkey and Egypt stated that they stand by international law against Ethiopia’s move into Somalia. Yet, it should be noted that the agreement that Turkey made with Somalia was not related to the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU, and that Turkey has good relations with Ethiopia. In fact, in addition to the economic ties between Ethiopia and Turkey, which is the second country with the most investments in Ethiopia after China, they seem to stay away from attitudes that would negatively affect mutual relations.

Global Actors’ Reactions to Turkey’s presence in the Horn of Africa

After the agreement signed by the defense ministers of Turkey and Somalia, the United States and the United Kingdom, which had previously been active in Somalia, took initiatives to hold meetings there with the Somalian government. Global and regional actors are likely to be concerned about Turkey’s increased influence and footprint in the Horn of Africa, and the U.S. can be seen to have expectations of cooperation with Turkey in the region.

Somalia has a federal structure, and the U.S. and the UK are working closely with the administrations of Puntland and Somaliland, respectively. It is possible that the U.S. will cooperate with police forces and maritime security in Puntland, which borders Somaliland and has a coast on both the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. In fact, Puntland’s maritime security forces are being trained by the U.S. At the same time, the UK is implementing a similar plan in Somaliland.

Following the agreement with Somalia, the U.S. expects cooperation with Turkey in new areas. Turkey and the U.S. are already cooperating against al-Shabaab terrorism in Somalia. However, the gains that Turkey and Somalia can achieve together in Somali waters, especially for Somalia’s blue economy, can potentially affect U.S. economic interests. On the whole, Turkey and the U.S. are not expected to directly confront each other regarding the conflict and challenge in Somalia, and have the potential to cooperate on specific files both in Somalia and throughout Africa. At the forefront of these issues is the fight against terrorism.

Overall, although Turkey and the U.S. are two allied countries within the NATO alliance system, they pursue very different policies in the context of Africa. Energy and economic policies play an essential role in U.S. policy in Somalia and Africa as a whole. On the other hand, Turkey’s success story in Somalia and across the African continent is rooted in a policy that is “people-oriented,” and based on the principles of “winning together” and “partnership.” In this light, Turkey and the U.S. have different approaches to Africa.

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taly’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni hosted African leaders in Rome on Monday to unveil her long-anticipated development plan for Africa, known as the Mattei Plan. This initiative, aimed at reshaping Italy’s relations with African nations, comes at a crucial time when global powers are intensifying their presence on the African continent.

Prime Minister Meloni, known for her far-right stance on migration, introduced the Mattei Plan, a strategic vision inspired by Enrico Mattei, founder of Italy’s state-owned energy giant Eni. The plan positions Italy as a pivotal bridge between Africa and Europe, proposing a unique approach – swapping energy investments for efforts by African nations to curb migration, particularly across the Mediterranean Sea.

The Mattei Plan, initially funded at €5.5 billion ($5.9 billion), includes investments in various sectors such as energy, agriculture, water, health, and education. Meloni envisions Italy becoming a central energy gateway, aligning with European countries’ goals to reduce dependence on Russian gas.

Global context and critics’ concerns

This ambitious plan unfolds against the backdrop of Italy’s heightened interest in Africa and its G7 presidency in 2024. However, critics argue that Italy, burdened by substantial debt, may struggle to compete with other global players like China, Russia, and Gulf states, all vying for influence in Africa. Some detractors also highlight the plan’s emphasis on fossil fuels, calling for a more substantial focus on renewable energy to address the urgent needs of over 40% of Africans lacking energy access.

As Italy engages with Africa, the Mattei Plan intersects with broader foreign policy objectives. It follows Prime Minister Meloni’s recent visit to Turkey, where she aimed to strengthen ties with key nations. Italy seeks to expand trade and defense deals while addressing migration challenges collaboratively, notably with Libya.

The summit, titled “A bridge for common growth,” witnessed representatives from more than 25 countries, including European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and officials from UN agencies and the World Bank. Meloni hailed the summit as successful, emphasizing the potential for cooperation, particularly in the energy sector.

However, discord emerged during the summit, with Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairman of the African Union Commission, expressing the desire for prior African consultation on priorities. He stressed the need to move from promises to concrete actions, urging participants to honor commitments.

Italy’s geostrategic focus and global competitions

Italy’s strategic focus on Africa aligns with a global trend where major powers are expanding their influence on the continent. While Italy aims to position itself as a key player, it faces stiff competition from other nations actively engaging with Africa, including China, Russia, India, Japan, and Turkey.

The Mattei Plan involves pilot projects addressing issues at the root of migration, such as modernizing grain production in Egypt, purifying water in Ethiopia, and providing renewable energy training in Morocco. The success of these initiatives will depend on effective collaboration, addressing concerns of African nations, and navigating the complexities of international partnerships in a highly competitive global context.

Italy’s diplomatic initiatives under Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni mark a significant shift in strategy, positioning the country as a key actor on the global stage. As the Mattei Plan unfolds, its repercussions are poised to reverberate throughout the African continent and European geopolitics in the coming years. Italy’s diplomatic ambitions, encompassing both Africa and Turkey, indicate a calculated effort to carve out a unique and influential role in the ever-evolving landscape of international relations.

India and Italy

In a poignant reflection on the robust relationship between Italy and India, Italian Ambassador Vincenzo De Luca highlights the strides made in bilateral ties throughout 2023. With Italy poised to assume the G7 presidency in 2024, the Ambassador acknowledges India’s exemplary role in addressing global concerns and underscores the mutual commitment of both nations to building a stable and interconnected world.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s visit to India in March 2023 marked a watershed moment in bilateral relations. The meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi set the stage for a new era of collaboration, emphasizing key areas such as defense, space, connectivity, and energy transition. A joint statement emerged, providing a robust framework for future cooperation.

The diplomatic momentum continued with PM Meloni’s visit to India for the G20 summit in September. This engagement facilitated high-level talks, involving Deputy PM and Foreign Affairs Minister Antonio Tajani, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh, and Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal from Italy, along with India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar and Defense Minister Rajnath Singh. These interactions solidified the foundation for a multifaceted partnership.

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he 2024 projection for Africa contains a variety of risks and opportunities. The issues that are expected to be most prominent in Africa during this year are the elections scheduled for 2024 in Africa, the security of the Sahel region, the geopolitics of the Red Sea, the risks posed by terrorist organizations across the continent, and economic growth and food security. As an important crossroads in the transformation of the global system, Africa’s role is likely to increase in 2024.

The year 2024 is projected to be a test for democracy for almost half of the world. Forty countries, 3.2 billion people, and economies with a combined GDP of $44.2 trillion will go to the polls. Africa will play a major role in this test as elections will be held in countries covering a third of Africa and affecting more than 335 million people. South Africa, Mozambique, Botswana, Namibia, Mauritius, Comoros, Rwanda, Ghana, Burkina Faso, South Sudan, Chad, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Mauritania, Tunisia, and Algeria will hold elections in 2024. Somalia’s Somaliland will also hold elections in 2024.

South Africa, Algeria, and Ghana stand out. These countries, especially South Africa and Algeria, have stronger economies than others in Africa, and the political risk is likely to be high. On the other hand, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad are due to hold presidential elections in 2024, creating an alternative corridor of military rule in the Sahel. The current conflicts in Sudan are likely to spill over into Chad. There is also a serious risk that the ongoing conflict in Sudan will continue to affect the region and increase instability.

The social tensions, refugee movements, and possible armed conflicts that will result from the elections have the potential to increase tensions in the region. Meanwhile, the process is unlikely to bring democratic change, given the control of state institutions by candidates backed by military juntas. South Sudan is a relatively new state and a census has yet to be conducted; the country is scheduled to have the last election of 2024, but it is very likely that it will be postponed for 2025.

Security, Terrorism, and Geopolitics in Africa

The Sahel region was on the agenda in 2023 with frequent military interventions. Elections scheduled for 2024 in Sahelian countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad, which have seen military interventions in recent years, are raising regional security concerns. Developments in recent years have led to the emergence of an alternative corridor of military rule in the Sahel. At the same time, the presence of terrorist organizations in the Sahel is another risk factor that increases security concerns.

Furthermore, the departure of France, which ended its military presence in Niger at the end of 2023, is likely to increase the activities of terrorist organizations in the region. The situation also has the potential to complicate security issues further. While France’s presence has so far not reduced terrorism in the region, its absence in Niger could increase instability in the region, depending on the capabilities and capacities of local security elements.

If security gaps emerge in 2024, terrorist organizations may increase their attacks to fill these gaps, deepening regional instability. It is likely that such gaps will be seen as a window of opportunity by terrorist organizations and there is a high risk that terrorist organizations, able to expand their sphere of influence, will exploit ethnic and religious tensions to threaten civilians in the countries of the region. Conflict thus risks worsening the security situation and triggering waves of migration and displacement.

Economic Prospects and Risks

According to the African Union Development Bank, Africa is expected to grow by 3.8%. East Africa stands out as the region with the highest expected growth: it is expected to grow at an average rate of 6.3%, almost twice as fast as the continent as a whole. However, economic growth in Africa is also expected to be relatively slow in 2024 because of food insecurity, high food inflation, and hence high food prices, as well as high energy prices and the disruption of the global supply chain, or developments in the global system and the instability they create, leading to inflationary pressures. Double-digit inflation is expected in 2024 in countries such as Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt, and Ghana.

The aftermath of the Russia-Ukraine war and the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic in previous years have had a significant impact on food and energy prices. However, when the effects of global climate change are taken into account, food insecurity caused by droughts and floods, particularly in East Africa, is causing significant disruption. In addition, ongoing conflicts between states or between states and non-state (armed) actors on the continent are exacerbating the already bad situation and further destabilizing the continent. There is also a risk that the current escalation of geopolitical tensions in the Middle East will lead to further volatility in energy markets. This is likely to trigger new inflationary pressures and have a negative impact on global growth. This process may therefore have a direct impact on Africa’s growth in the medium and long term, if not in the short term.

What is more, many African countries are likely to feel the financial distress caused by excessive debt and heavy fiscal burdens. While Zambia is close to completing its debt restructuring, the process is likely to be protracted. This creates considerable economic uncertainty.

Risks and Opportunities for Food Security

Food security is one of the most important issues for African countries in 2024. African countries, which have large amounts of arable land, water resources, and labor, are food importers. In the simplest sense, if the countries in Africa that import food are unable to do so, their people will face famine and death. Due to the Russia-Ukraine war, countries in Africa had problems importing grain from the warring countries; while the Black Sea Grain Initiative was in place, this was possible, but imports ended when Russia withdrew from the agreement. In fact, 25 African countries now depend on Russia and Ukraine for more than a third of their wheat imports.

Following Russia’s withdrawal from the Black Sea Grain Initiative, it announced that it would unilaterally resume grain aid to six African countries. However, the fact that the remaining countries do not have secure access to grain is a major concern. It is expected that the Black Sea Grain Initiative will be put back on the agenda in 2024, but the repercussions of the war have been an important lesson for African countries.

African countries should take advantage of their fertile, arable land and seize opportunities to become at least self-sufficient, implement agricultural reforms, and increase their cereal production. Yet, seizing these opportunities requires more than focusing on agricultural infrastructure and reforms: it also requires comprehensive planning for various factors such as technology transfer, education, and infrastructure. Prioritizing efforts to ensure the sustainability of these factors should be a priority for African countries in 2024.

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he Israeli-Palestinian conflict has polarized Africa. The earlier reflection of this was seen in Israel’s attempt to join the African Union. It has become clear that African countries that have cordial relations with Western countries side with Israel on Gaza. The Middle East and Gaza in particular has divided African nations one more time.

The Palestinian cause, whose origin dates back to 1917, remains important in the global system today. Israel’s occupation of Palestine, which began in 1948, is important not only for the Middle East, but also for countries struggling against colonialism, such as numerous countries in Africa. Israel’s inhumane practices in Palestine, i.e., apartheid, displacement, injustice, and disregard for human rights, are practices that African countries have also been subjected to and have similar intersections with many of the practices of colonial forces in Africa in the past, such as capitalism and dispossession.

Israel’s occupation of Palestine based on strategies similar to those that underpinned colonialism and apartheid in Africa has survived despite 75 years of criticism and reactions. In fact, Israel’s unfair land acquisition/usurpation of Palestinian lands, the blockade in Gaza, the apartheid wall in the West Bank, the failure to treat the real owners of the land as human beings, its discriminatory policies, and practices in place stopping the Palestinian people from practicing their culture and beliefs as they wish are all part of Africa’s dark legacy. It all feels like a familiar memory. These difficulties are an important factor in the Palestinian people empathizing with the injuries and inequalities experienced during the colonial period, on the one side, and in the peoples of Africa supporting the Palestinians’ struggle for freedom, on the other.

This intersectionality is emphasized in the statement by Nelson Mandela, the former president of South Africa, who said, “Our freedom will be incomplete without the freedom of the Palestinian people.” The fact that South Africa’s support for Palestine has attracted the most attention in Africa is a reflection of a sensitivity towards the apartheid system. While this is an example of solidarity extending from one continent to another, it is also a strong message that emphasizes support for societies that share similar difficulties, evils, and injustices.

The African Union’s position

Africa’s solidarity with Palestine is based on Palestine’s solidarity with Africa. Historically, the Palestinians see their struggle for liberation in the context of the struggles of most African countries against Western colonialism. Resolution 77 (XII) adopted by the African Union in 1975 states, “The racist regime in occupied Palestine and the racist regimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa have common imperialist origins, form a whole and have the same racist structure and policies aimed at the suppression of human dignity and integrity.”

The African Union has taken decisions on Palestine that are fundamentally supportive of its independence and sovereignty, and aim at ensuring a just and lasting peace between the two countries. The African Union supports the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian question, and takes the position that the capital of the Palestinian state will be East Jerusalem. However, not all members of the African Union, which has 55 members in total, have the same opinion, and each country takes a position within the framework of different national interests. For example, countries such as Ghana, Kenya, and Rwanda support Israel and condemn Hamas.

Competition and new opportunities for cooperation on the African continent are leading some countries to move away from the united stance of the past and towards pragmatic relations. In this context, Israel’s initiative to become an observer member of the African Union in 2021 was viewed by the African Union Commission as controversial. However, following this decision, several countries such as South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Namibia, Botswana, Comoros, Tunisia, Djibouti, and Mauritania announced their opposition to the decision.

The African Union responded to the ongoing conflict between Hamas and Israel with a statement issued through the African Union Commission calling for an end to the attacks and encouraging the parties to negotiate a two-state agreement as the only solution to the conflict.

Forty-six of the 55 African Union member states have established diplomatic, economic, and development cooperation with Israel. This cooperation has not, however

Division in Africa after October 7

The conflict between Hamas and Israel which began on October 7, 2023 has revealed divisions in public opinion in Africa and world. While some states claim that Israel has the right to defend itself against Hamas’s attacks, others stress that Israel continues to occupy Palestine and separate the Palestinian people living in Gaza and the West Bank, viewing Hamas’s attacks on Israel as justified.

In the face of Israel’s massacres in Gaza, some African countries abstained from voting for a ceasefire at the UN General Assembly, namely Tunisia, Gabon, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Zambia. Countries such as Kenya and Rwanda are among those supporting Israel. While Rwanda issued a statement “expressing its deepest condolences and sympathy to the government and people of Israel following the attacks on Israeli territory,” Kenya’s foreign minister also condemned the attack in Israel and said he was “saddened by the tragedy.”

Meanwhile, Israel’s interest in African countries has increased in recent years. As diplomatic relations have grown, so has cooperation in areas such as defense and security, counterterrorism, intelligence, and border control. In addition, arms transfers between African countries and Israel have reached a remarkable level. In fact, over the past decade, various arms transfers have taken place between Israel and countries such as Senegal, Morocco, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Seychelles, Uganda, and Zambia. In fact, the silence of some African countries on Israel’s genocide and massacres in Gaza is due to their dependence on the West and Israel in political, economic, and security terms.

Determined support for Palestine in Africa

According to research by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Israel’s military operations against Gaza have sparked a wave of protests and rallies around the world. Protests over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which account for 38% of global demonstrations, are estimated at 4,200 in total. More than 3,700 of these demonstrations were pro-Palestinian and more than 520 pro-Israeli. Morocco is the country with the most pro-Palestinian protests (267 protests in total) despite its government remaining close to Israel.

There are also countries on the continent that are reacting against Israel’s bloody policy, massacres, and genocide in Gaza. Countries such as South Africa, Nigeria, Chad, and Algeria have taken actions that go beyond expressing support for Palestine. For example, while the Nigerian Senate called for a ceasefire and the start of negotiations for a two-state solution, South Africa called for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. South Africa went a step further and issued statements accusing Israel of genocide and war crimes. Chad also supported South Africa, which recalled its diplomats from Israel and withdrew its ambassador from Tel Aviv.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has polarized Africa. An earlier reflection of this polarization was seen in Israel’s attempt to join the African Union. African countries that have friendly relations with Western countries side with Israel on the Palestinian issue. However, the people of these countries, who have experienced pain similar to that of Palestine in the past, do not always agree with their governments. The structure of the international system is reflected in today’s relations between states and the countries with which they are heavily interdependent. Areas of economic cooperation are undoubtedly reflected in global politics, and Africa’s positions and reactions on the Palestinian issue should be read in this context.

However, the African people, who have brutally experienced firsthand mankind’s disregard for human life, stand by the Palestinian people, regardless of their rulers and policies that support Israel against Palestine. Africans’ principled stances and the positions of the governments that govern them are not aligned. All in all, Africa’s position on the Palestinian issue is weakening the continent’s standing with divisions between governments and societies, and between countries supporting Palestine and those supporting Israel.

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comprehensive study reveals that the total energy finance to Africa from the Group of Twenty (G20) countries and multilateral development banks (MDBs) between 2012 and 2021 amounted to $345.76 billion. While this figure falls within the estimated range needed to address Africa’s annual energy finance gap, the distribution has been highly uneven.

Ten countries received a staggering 77% of the total finance over the ten-year period, leaving many African nations with substantial gaps in their energy financing necessities.

The study, conducted by Oyintarelado Moses, the data analyst and database manager for the Global China Initiative at the Boston University Global Development Policy Center, highlights that a few countries and multilateral financing entities, including China, France, Italy, the United States, and the World Bank Group, supplied the majority of energy finance to Africa during the specified period. This concentration of funding from a limited number of sources raises concerns about the potential volatility in funding priorities.

The breakdown of the $345.76 billion reveals that $197.17 billion (57%) came from public institutions, while $148.59 billion (43%) came from private corporations. Notably, gas/liquefied natural gas (LNG), mixed fossil fuels, and solar energy sources were the primary recipients of this finance.

A significant reduction in funding for coal projects

The study also points out that there was a significant reduction in funding for coal projects from around 2018, aligning with the global shift away from financing overseas coal projects.

While public finance was directed to projects with more diverse energy sources, private finance exhibited a higher proportion directed to fossil fuel projects. The findings underscore the need for policymakers in financing countries to consider more equitable distribution based on annual demands from historically low-level recipients, diversify financiers by redirecting financing to African regional banks and investors, and use public finance strategically to attract private investment for projects with high potential for energy access in Africa.

The study calls attention to the challenges and opportunities for energy finance growth in Africa, emphasizing the importance of addressing the unequal distribution for sustainable development in the region.

Distinct patterns between public and private sectors

The allocation of energy finance to Africa reflects distinct patterns between public and private sectors, unveiling the diverse motivations and preferences of financiers. Public energy finance predominantly targeted electric power generation, transmission, and distribution, emphasizing essential infrastructure. In contrast, private finance was more inclined towards exploration and extraction projects, particularly in the fossil fuel sector, with approximately half of private finance dedicated to activities for export purposes.

Notably, public finance played a crucial role in supporting electricity generation projects, constituting 47% of the total, while private finance leaned slightly more towards diverse end uses, including manufacturing, petrochemicals, and technical assistance.

The distribution of energy finance across African countries exhibited a concentration on a select few. A group of twenty nations secured a substantial portion, receiving $307.91 billion, equivalent to 89% of the total finance. Southern Africa emerged as the primary beneficiary, garnering 34%, with notable contributions from countries like Egypt, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, and Morocco.

This regional distribution highlights disparities in the accessibility of energy finance, with Southern and North Africa leading in financial support. The concentration of funding underscores the need for more inclusive strategies to address energy financing gaps in other regions.

Source: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

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n a significant shift in defense partnerships, Niger has terminated its security and defense collaborations with the European Union, opting instead to fortify its military cooperation with Russia.

The move, announced by Niger’s Foreign Ministry on November 4, entails the discontinuation of the European Union Military Partnership Mission (EUMPM) in Niger, which had been initiated in February with the objective of bolstering the Niger Armed Forces’ capabilities to combat terrorist threats. The termination of this mission was accompanied by the revocation of privileges and immunities previously granted under the partnership.

Concurrently, the junta in Niger has also put an end to the 2012 EU civilian mission aimed at enhancing the country’s internal security forces. This cancellation of EU defense agreements coincides with a significant meeting in Niamey between Niger’s military leadership and a Russian delegation, culminating in a defense cooperation agreement signed by Russian Deputy Minister of Defense Colonel-General Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and Nigerien Defense Minister Gen. Salifou Mody.

The pivot towards Russia

This pivot towards Russia follows a suspension of financial aid and security assistance by the EU in response to the military intervention in July that ousted Niger’s elected President Mohamed Bazoum. In a related development, on August 3rd, Niger’s military rulers had already declared the annulment of military pacts with France, a move that was met with skepticism from Paris due to concerns about legitimacy.

Despite these tensions, French President Emmanuel Macron announced in September the planned end-of-year withdrawal of approximately 1,500 French troops stationed in Niger as part of a broader regional counterinsurgency operation.

Niger’s realignment towards Russian military support marks a notable change in the geopolitical landscape of West Africa and reflects the increasing Russian influence in the region’s military affairs. The consequences of this shift, both for Niger’s internal stability and regional security dynamics, are yet to unfold as international observers watch closely.

Implications for the West African region

This pursuit has recently led to a notable pivot away from Western alliances towards Russia. The junta’s actions suggest a strategic realignment and a search for partners more aligned with its current political stance.

The broader implications of this shift are significant for the West African region, where France and the EU have traditionally held considerable influence. The departure of French troops and the cessation of EU security missions represent a withdrawal of Western military presence and, potentially, a vacuum that could be filled by other powers like Russia, as indicated by the newly signed defense cooperation agreement.

As Niger navigates these sanctions and repositions itself on the global stage, the dynamics of power and influence in the region are poised for change, with the junta’s maneuvers likely to invite further scrutiny from both regional bodies and the broader international community.

Sources: Anadolu Agency and AP

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frican leaders have intensified their longstanding campaign for permanent representation on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), a push that has recently gained the backing of France and Germany.

President Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea, while addressing the African Union Committee of Ten (C-10) summit in La Paz, Equatorial Guinea, emphasized the historical injustice faced by the continent due to its lack of permanent representation on the UNSC.

Since 2005, African nations have been unified in their demand for equitable representation, calling for two permanent seats with veto power and two additional non-permanent seats.

The call for renewed and united action was echoed by Nguema, who urged that African states remain vigilant and speak with one voice to avoid being sidelined by other countries’ alliances. He stressed the urgency of accelerating reforms to ensure “equitable representation of Africa through expanded membership.”

UNSC reforms

The meeting, which saw the convergence of African heads of state and representatives from UN and African Union agencies, sought to solidify a common position on UNSC reforms.

In a significant development, German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock and French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna, during a visit to the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, expressed support for the African position. Baerbock acknowledged the changing global dynamics since World War II, advocating for two permanent African seats on the Security Council.

The UNSC currently has five permanent members – the U.S., UK, France, China, and Russia – and non-permanent members who serve on a rotational basis. At present, Mozambique, Gabon, and Ghana represent Africa.

The push for African seats on the Security Council comes amid growing calls for reforming the body to better reflect contemporary global realities. African Union Chairperson Moussa Faki, alongside outgoing AU Chairman and Senegalese President Macky Sall, have voiced this demand at various international platforms, including the U.N. General Assembly.

Biden for Africa

U.S. President Joe Biden has also shown support for Africa’s representation in global economic and security forums, including the G-20 and the Security Council.

As the European Union and the African Union strengthen their relations, particularly in light of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Baerbock highlighted the necessity of African support in “defending the European peace order.” She also condemned Russia’s blockade of Ukrainian grain exports, which has exacerbated the food crisis in the Horn of Africa.

The support from Germany and France marks a crucial step for Africa’s aspirations at the UNSC. The summit in Equatorial Guinea is expected to finalize the African common position in the quest for increased representation on the global stage.

Sources: Anadolu Agency and VOA

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n a sobering announcement from the World Food Program (WFP) on November 7, 2023, the United Nations agency forecasted a grim future for the children of South Sudan. Over 1.6 million children under the age of five are anticipated to face acute malnutrition in 2024 as the country grapples with the repercussions of severe flooding and the ensuing spread of waterborne diseases.

The WFP, utilizing data from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), indicated that malnutrition rates are soaring, particularly in flood-affected areas where the population struggles with limited access to food and sustainable livelihoods. South Sudan’s youngest citizens are expected to bear the brunt of these challenges.

Mary-Ellen McGroarty, the WFP’s Country Director in South Sudan, highlighted the dire circumstances in a recent statement. “Living on the frontline of the climate crisis, we are witnessing an alarming increase in malnutrition rates, primarily due to overcrowded and waterlogged living conditions,” she said.

Significant flooding

Rubkona County has been identified as a region of concern, where catastrophic levels of hunger are predicted by April 2024. This area has experienced significant flooding since 2021, leading to a dramatic spike in food prices and forcing communities to inhabit makeshift islands. The WFP notes that staple food costs in the county have surged by over 120 percent since April.

The situation is exacerbated by the influx of refugees returning from Sudan, where recent conflict has resulted in significant loss of life and raised concerns about a potential regional humanitarian crisis. South Sudan itself is no stranger to conflict, having spent a substantial portion of its post-independence years in civil war, leading to devastating human and economic tolls.

According to the World Bank, despite its oil reserves, South Sudan remains mired in a “serious humanitarian crisis” with approximately 9.4 million people, or 76 percent of the population, in need of humanitarian aid in 2023.

World Food Program

The WFP adds that the persistent flooding in South Sudan can be attributed to the Nile basins spilling over, notably Lake Victoria, which experienced higher than usual rainfall last year, signaling that the excessive water levels may continue unabated.

The United Nations has repeatedly condemned South Sudan’s leaders for their contributions to the ongoing violence and political repression, as well as for widespread corruption that has depleted the nation’s resources.

As the international community responds to the WFP’s urgent call for assistance, the world watches, hoping for swift action to avert a tragedy of unimaginable proportions for the children of South Sudan.

Sources: AFP, Anadolu

T

he coup in Niger has the potential to create significant problems for regional security. Sharing a 1,500-kilometer border with Nigeria, Niger also neighbors Benin. At the intersection of these three countries, there is the presence of the terrorist organization Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), which might seek to fill the power vacuum that may emerge in the region.

The existence of such a risk has the potential to affect North and West Africa, and could pose a threat to Turkey’s interests in the region, especially in Libya. These risks could also affect Turkey’s trade with Africa, which has been developing and gaining momentum in recent years.

Turkey’s increasing engagement in the region

Turkey’s trade with the African continent is estimated at about $35 billion with Sub-Saharan African countries accounting for $12.9 billion. Moreover, according to TurkStat data, Turkey’s trade with West Africa is estimated at $6.5 billion and $4.1 billion with the Sahel region, which includes Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, and Eritrea.

Graph 1 and Graph 2 show the details of this trade. With the exception of Eritrea and Sudan, all countries are in the West African sub-regional system, while the countries shown in orange are also in the Sahel sub-regional system.

West Africa and the Sahel region also account for 18.5% and 11.7% of Africa’s overall trade volume, respectively. In other words, as seen in Graph 2, Turkey’s trade volume with the region shows a significant rise, when 2013 TurkStat data are taken into account. In 2013, Turkey’s total foreign trade volume with Africa was $21.5 billion.

The latest figures show that Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for 32% of Turkey’s trade volume across Africa. However, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the share of trade with West Africa is 34.7% with a trade volume of $2.4 billion and the share of trade with the Sahel region countries is 18.8% with a trade volume of $1.3 billion. In 2013, West Africa and the Sahel region accounted for 11.1% and 6% of Africa’s overall trade volume, respectively.

This economic data shows Turkey’s growing economic presence in the Sahel and West Africa over the last decade. In addition, Turkey’s political and military influence in the region has also increased in recent years. In order to ensure that the increasing trade volume does not decline and that Turkey’s strategic interests in the regional and other subregional systems do not affect Ankara’s security, it is of utmost importance for Turkey to contribute to the resolution of crises in the region without delay.

Regional security risks and challenges for Turkey

The effects of the coup d’état that took place in Niger at the end of July, which is in a strategic position to affect all regional dynamics, will occupy the agenda for a long time. Therefore, not only the Sahel and West Africa but also Libya and Algeria in North Africa, where Turkey has strategic interests, have the potential to be affected by the crisis in Niger.

Taking a broader perspective, the presence of al-Qaeda and DAESH-linked terrorist organizations in the region is a dire reality. If the environment gives terrorist organizations the opportunity to increase their presence, their influence may increase in the east of the Sahel.

In such a scenario, the al-Shabaab terrorist organization, which is an extension of al-Qaeda in Somalia in East Africa, and other terrorist organizations have the potential to cooperate and cause major instability beyond the Sahel region.

Respecting the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries and the principle of “African solutions to African problems,” Turkey can take diplomatic and cooperation initiatives to mitigate the impact of the crisis in Niger and support the maintenance of regional stability.

Especially in the face of the junta’s negative stance towards the return to power of ousted president Mohamed Bazoum, Turkey is capable to take steps to ensure a fair and transparent election, promote social reconciliation, and resolve the crisis as quickly as possible through diplomatic means.

In addition to its support to the governments of various countries in Africa in the fight against terrorism, Turkey can share its experiences and help the countries in the Sahel region improve their capacities, specifically in the field of security cooperation. This is essential for Turkey to protect its strategic interests, first in the context of West Africa and the Sahel region, and then in Libya.

Turkey has many investments in the countries of the region. For instance, two companies that stand out in Turkey’s commercial activities in West Africa and the Sahel are Karpowership, which carries out energy activities in West African countries such as Senegal, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, and Gambia; and SUMMA, which carries out large-scale infrastructure and superstructure projects in West African countries such as Niger, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.

Turkey’s continued presence in the region is important primarily for its commercial interests which are not only valuable for Turkish companies, but also play an important role in supporting the development efforts of the countries in the region.

Turkey’s defense and security cooperation with the region

In recent years, Turkey has been increasing its presence in the region with defense industry products alongside economic activities. In addition to sharing experience in the fight against terrorism, the transfer of effective and deterrent defense industry tools helps to increase the security and military capacities of regional countries.

Turkish Defense Industry (TSS) products are preferred by countries in the region, especially after 2018. In line with the information obtained from open sources, Turkey cooperates with 11 countries in the region in the field of defense industry. The contribution of TSS products stand out with their high technology and modern capabilities.

In addition, these products have the potential to provide regional countries with a more effective defense fighting capacity, primarily in the fight against terrorism, by offering solutions tailored to their needs.

Recent developments in the Sahel region risk affecting Turkey’s strategic interests, and it, therefore, must take advantage of its existing economic, diplomatic, and military/security cooperation and partnerships to seize new opportunities as an alternative in the current competitive environment. Partnerships developed with countries in the region over security equipment stand out as important steps to strengthen not only military but also economic and strategic ties.

There is a potential for Turkey to become a more valuable actor in the region by providing diplomatic solutions and facilitating support in countries where it is already active. But first Turkey needs to monitor carefully the emerging risks in Libya, which could suffer from spillover effects if the Niger crisis takes a turn for the worse.

D

ecolonization is a multifaceted and transformative process which has left an indelible mark on the course of modern history. Emerging in the wake of the Second World War, it signaled a seismic shift in the global landscape as nations across Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean reclaimed their autonomy from the grasp of colonial powers. This epochal phenomenon was not merely a political or territorial change; it was a profound reconfiguration of identities, cultures, economies, and societies.

At its core, decolonization was a rebellion against the unjust and oppressive systems of colonial rule that had prevailed for centuries. It was a response to the exploitative economic structures, cultural hegemony, and political subjugation that defined the colonial experience. Yet, this once  vital and necessary struggle for self-determination and freedom from Western colonial dominance, has, in recent times, taken a curious and unsettling turn.

In his thought-provoking book Against Decolonisation: Taking African Agency Seriously, Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò, a leading African political philosopher, takes a critical stance on the contemporary trajectory of decolonization, arguing that it has deviated from its original purpose. He makes an important distinction between the past and present trajectory of decolonization; The very ideals that once fueled the fight for independence have undergone a transformation, morphing into a vague and all-encompassing concept.

The unintended consequences of this shift, he argues, demand our attention. Táíwò asserts that decolonization has become a convenient tool for virtue signaling, ultimately stifling African intellectual thought and eroding African agency.

Táíwò’s main contention is that the term ‘decolonization’ has been applied indiscriminately to fields ranging from literature, language, and philosophy to sociology, psychology, and medicine. While this expansion has allowed for critical examination, it has also given rise to a complex and sometimes contentious debate.

Táíwò’s intervention in this discourse is a powerful and much-needed one. He questions whether today’s notion of ‘decolonization’ genuinely serves the empowerment of Africans or if it has been co-opted for other agendas. He calls for a reevaluation of the treatment of African intellectuals that should be recognized as innovative adapters and synthesizers of ideas they have always regarded as universally relevant. He aims to shed light on the delicate balance between rectifying historical wrongs and respecting the intellectual agency and creativity of African voices.

Against Decolonisation: Taking African Agency Seriously offers a bold and critical perspective on the current state of decolonization. It is an intervention that prompts readers to reconsider the genuine objectives and consequences of the decolonization movement, advocating for a more nuanced and respectful approach to African intellectual contributions.

Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò, Against Decolonisation: Taking African Agency Seriously (Hurst Publishers,2022) ISBN: 9781787386921, 368 pages

I

n a significant move, U.S. President Joe Biden announced plans to remove Uganda, Gabon, Niger, and the Central African Republic from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade program, effective from January 1, 2024.

The decision came in light of what President Biden described as “gross violations” of internationally recognized human rights standards by some of the nations, specifically pointing to the controversial anti-homosexuality law enacted in Uganda.

The decision does not mark a permanent exit for these countries. President Biden clarified that there will be ongoing evaluations to determine if they can re-qualify for the program based on the established eligibility criteria.

Gabon and Niger have been cited for their failure to establish or continually progress towards the protection of political pluralism and the rule of law. Despite intensive dialogues and engagements, the U.S. feels that these countries have not addressed key concerns regarding their non-compliance with the AGOA eligibility criteria.

AGOA, established in 2000, offers qualifying African countries duty-free access to the U.S. market for over 1,800 products. Its goal has been to foster economic relations, promote exports, and facilitate job creation among the participating nations. With AGOA set to expire in September 2025, there have been ongoing discussions regarding its extension and future framework.

Economic implications

The decision to remove these nations from the AGOA framework is expected to have economic implications, as the program has been a significant driver for exports and economic growth in the beneficiary countries. The four nations have not yet officially responded to the U.S. government’s announcement.

Many African governments and industrial organizations are advocating for an early extension of the program for an additional decade. They believe that confirming the continuation of AGOA without alterations will provide much-needed assurance to businesses and potential investors, ensuring sustained economic collaboration and growth.

The push for a 10-year extension underscores the significance of AGOA in Africa’s trade ecosystem. It remains to be seen how the U.S. will respond to this appeal, but the ongoing discussions indicate a strong desire to maintain and possibly expand the trade relationship between the U.S. and Africa.

Not all countries benefited the same from AGOA

Variability in the utilization of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) among nations can be attributed to multiple factors, ranging from business climates to policy implementation challenges. AGOA’s export criteria or if the program’s objectives are unclear. Policy conflicts arise when internal stakeholders, from the government to workers, have differing views on AGOA’s vision or strategy.

By 2022, of the 39 beneficiary countries of AGOA, 18 had established a strategy to maximize the program’s benefits. Countries with a structured AGOA plan, such as Mali, Mozambique, and Zambia, saw significant growth in exports to the U.S. However, the positive correlation between having an AGOA strategy and witnessing beneficial outcomes is intricate.

While having supportive elements like political will and resources plays a role, a clear AGOA strategy can also enhance these factors and provide a straightforward path to increase exports.

For instance, Ethiopia, prior to U.S. sanctions, bolstered its AGOA-aligned exports by identifying sector-specific challenges and creating targeted solutions, leading to a significant increase in exports. Similarly, Botswana’s evolving AGOA strategy, which is continuously refined based on stakeholder feedback, may offer a valuable template for other African nations.

Sources: Reuters, TRT World and Brookings

T

he adeptly prepared attack by Hamas from air, sea, and land on October 7 has revealed that traditional threats persist for Israel. Specifically, Hamas at the local level and Iran at the regional level pose an existential threat to Israel.

In addition, although the existence of terrorist threats has always posed a security risk for Israel, further indirect security threats for the country have arisen from the recent coups in Africa, which have created instability; the strengthening of terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and DAESH; and and the presence of factions of the latter across the African continent. In this context, Israel’s security policy in Africa focuses on effective measures against terrorist threats and the expansion of radicalization.

In recent years, Israel has sought to increase its security cooperation by developing relations with African countries through deepening diplomatic ties. Israel maintains cooperation with various new partners in Africa through security intelligence, counterterrorism, border control, and arms transfers. In this way, it aims to gain significant advantages both to ensure its own security more effectively and to increase its legitimacy in the international community.

Africa’s strategic location, especially East Africa, has the potential to offer Israel significant support in combating regional threats. Iran’s growing presence in Africa and the rise of radicalism and terrorism in the continent in recent years have shaped Israel’s approach to the continent in the context of security.

African countries’ positions on the Israel-Palestine conflict

Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni expressed regret over the renewal of violence in Israel-Palestine, emphasized that the issue was the failure to implement the two-state solution and called for restraint. He stated that the targeting of civilians should be condemned. Like Uganda, the governments of Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania have also called for restraint.

The South African government stated that the continued illegal occupation of Palestinian territories, the expansion of settlements, the desecration of Al-Aqsa Mosque and holy sites, and the oppression of the Palestinian people are the main reasons of the current events. South Africa, it must be noted, suffered under an apartheid rule for many years.

It also emphasized the need for a two-state solution and a credible peace process that will fulfill previous United Nations resolutions for a just and comprehensive solution for both sides. He went on to express the necessity of establishing lasting peace by creating a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital and its territorial integrity intact based on the 1967 borders.

Moussa Faki Mahamat, chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC), stated that the denial of the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, in particular the denial of an independent and sovereign state, is the main cause of the persistent Israeli-Palestinian tension. North African countries, among them Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt and Djibouti have also voiced their support for Palestine.

Kenya described the terrorist attack on Israel as “despicable.” It expressed regret over the carnage and senseless loss of life in the region and condemned those who had a hand in the planning, financing, and execution of the attack. Finally, Kenyan representatives emphasized that although Israel has the right to retaliate, it is seeking a “peaceful” way out.

President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Felix Tshisekedi stated that the attack on Israel was an act of terrorism and that his country would always cooperate with Tel Aviv in the fight against terrorism. Zambia was also among the countries supporting Israel with a statement condemning the Hamas attacks and emphasizing a diplomatic solution.

Possible scenarios

Ethiopia and Kenya are two of the most prominent countries in the region in terms of Israel’s interests in East Africa. Israel’s development of bilateral relations with Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda has the potential to promote the idea of an “alliance” in the face of the unstable and threatening reality that currently characterizes the Middle East. Meanwhile, Israel has embassies in Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, and Rwanda in East Africa, and its interests in the Horn of Africa are more salient in the regional subsystem.

In 2006, Hamas’s victory in the elections in Gaza was perceived as a precursor of the wind of change in the Middle East. Since then, local actors have voiced rumors that Hamas would launch a major offensive. However, Hamas’s Al-Aqsa Flood Operation on October 7 was a great shock for Israel, similar to the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

In the past, Israel has responded to attacks with retaliation. After recovering from the shock, Israel is likely to continue its intensive bombardment and attacks on Gaza, which it frames as deterrent measures, for a prolonged time. In this process, it seems possible that actors such as Hezbollah, Hashd al-Shaabi, and Houthis will support Hamas in different ways due to the magnitude of the attack on Gaza.

In this scenario, there is also a risk that the war will move from an Israel-Hamas dimension to a regional dimension. Even in the mid-term, if not in the short term, various groups in Africa may support this war from different standpoints. In Nigeria, for example, Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky, the Shiite leader of the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), has long had close ties with Iran.

If the war gains a regional dimension, it is possible that Zakzaky may mobilize in support of Palestine. Yet, different problems may arise at this point: just as the IMN wants an Islamic state based on Islamic law in Nigeria, Boko Haram, which declared its allegiance to DAESH, also wants an Islamic state based on Islamic law.

The existence of this common desire gives rise to the possibility that Boko Haram, which is effective in Nigeria and its surroundings, may declare a global jihad. As a matter of fact, the coups that have been taking place in the Sahel for a long time and the instability caused by these coups have created power vacuums in the region, which various terrorist organizations have attempted to fill.

Meanwhile, the involvement of al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Al-Qaeda affiliates in Africa, especially in the Sahel, in line with the call for a global jihad may also arise. However, even if a global jihad is declared, Hamas will not welcome another non-state armed actor fighting alongside it in Gaza.

Considering the presence of DAESH in Morocco and at certain points in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, as well as the current environment in Libya, a conflict with Israel over the Sinai Peninsula should also be considered among the possibilities.

Therefore, this situation may make it possible for the above actors to attack Israel through different geographies. If there is a possibility of radical groups and terrorist organizations in Africa attacking Israel, it is likely to happen in two ways:

• From the Sahel Belt, through Libya to the Egyptian-Sinai Peninsula and east through Port Sudan to the Red Sea to reach the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula.
• A direct threat to Israel with access to the Gulf of Aqaba.

T

he popular uprising that started in late 2018 in Sudan, one of Africa’s most prominent countries culturally and geo- and socio-politically, has not only failed to bring the country out of its rut, but has dragged it to the brink of a major disaster.

Following the fall of the al-Bashir administration, the successive coup attempts have brought the Sudanese people face to face with a humanitarian crisis. In order to reveal the magnitude of the crisis, it is useful to briefly overview the process of coups.

The beginning of the chaos: The fall of Omar al-Bashir’s government

The desired recovery in Sudan’s economy was prevented by the division of the country in two in 2011 after years of civil wars, the fact that oil, the state’s most important source of income, remained in the southern region, the embargo imposed by the U.S., etc. Meanwhile, the embargo and the foreign trade deficit led to a major contraction in foreign exchange.

The economic distress in the country forced the Omar al-Bashir administration to raise the prices of basic consumer goods at astronomical rates. The hikes, coupled with widespread rumors of corruption, nepotism, etc., brought the anger of the Sudanese people to a peak. In April 2019, the people took to the streets and deposed al-Bashir.

However, the fall of al-Bashir’s regime did not lead to an economic recovery and plunged Sudan into one of the most critical instabilities in its history. Four years after the coup, the country has not recovered and the political and economic chaos has become unmanageable.

The main driver of the people who took to the streets in the capital Khartoum was the economic hardship and corruption that they had suffered for many years. There was no specific ideological ground driving the uprisings, and there was no foresight or plan for what would happen after the fall of al-Bashir.

Meanwhile, the army, which following independence has always been powerful position in the country after independence, did not want to let go of the reins. Realizing that it was no longer possible for the current government to remain, military officers took the lead and tried to seize power. The insistence of the protesters on civilian rule forced the military to back down, albeit to a limited extent, and a joint military-civilian transition administration was formed.

The Transitional Sovereignty Council, which was established to serve as a collective head of state, consisted of six military and five civilian members. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the commander of the army, was appointed as the chairman of the council, and Mahammed Hamdan Dagalu, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, was appointed as his deputy.

Although the Sovereignty Council is dominated by the military wing, the government formed under the leadership of Abdalla Hamdok is predominantly civilian. In a sense, the military and civilian wings were forced into a union. The discord among the members of the Sovereignty Council, the differences of opinion between the council and the government, the disagreements with armed groups, and the discomfort caused by Sudan’s cosmopolitan nature were the precursors of the current crisis.

The civilian wing’s ideological stance

Although the military dominated the Sovereignty Council, the civilian wing, which formed the government and received strong international support, had the opportunity to move the country towards democratic rule. There was an expectation that the newly formed government would prevent corruption and put an end to the high cost of living in the country.

With these expectations, the Sudanese people gave the government almost unlimited credit and strong support in the first period of the transition. However, instead of fulfilling these expectations, the Hamdok government turned towards the ideological aims of a small minority.

The overwhelming majority of Sudanese people are religiously conservative. It was clear that any adverse developments in this area would be met with a public backlash. Yet, Hamdok’s government, instead of laying the groundwork and taking the country to elections, turned to making radical changes with no constitutional basis.

Hamdok tried to close down the country’s well-established religious institutions and Quran courses. The private properties of many businesspeople were confiscated on the basis of links to the al-Bashir administration. All diplomats and bureaucrats who were appointed in the preceding period were dismissed.

A large section of the society was excluded from the political and economic spheres on the grounds that they belonged to the Islamic Movement. The government’s ideological attitude caused great discontent among the religious population. Moreover, during this period, there was no improvement in the economic situation, which, in fact, became much worse compared to al-Bashir’s era.

Military-civilian conflict deepens crisis

The active position of the administration’s civilian wing had bothered the military from the very beginning, but it stayed silent out of fear of international reactions. In a way, the attitude of the Hamdok government served the military wing the opportunity it had been waiting for on a silver platter.

The military claimed that the government was unable to manage the state and worsened the economy, and put pressure on Prime Minister Hamdok to resign. Hamdok’s resignation was not contested by the public in light of his government’s policies and economic failure. Thus, the country’s sovereignty passed into the hands of the military.

However, this change further isolated the Sudanese government in the international arena: foreign aid to Sudan was significantly cut, the pressure on the Sudanese economy intensified, and, the country declared bankruptcy. By taking an ideological stance, the civilian administration under Hamdok squandered an important opportunity.

Power struggle in the military wing

The military wing, which had completely seized the reins with the purge of the civilian wing, this time faced an internal power struggle. Although General al-Burhan was the head of the Sovereignty Council, Dagalu, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, which is said to have more than 100,000 mercenaries, was in charge of a huge, highly mobilizable, medium-weight armed military force that was loyal to him.

Dagalu’s maverick behavior, encouraged by his military and economic power, caused great disturbance within the military wing and led to a power struggle between him and the army commander al-Burhan. Al-Burhan had long wanted to integrate the Rapid Support Forces into the army and eliminate this dual structure in the security forces.

Dagalu, recognizing that this integration would destroy his power, strongly opposed it. The covert power struggle between the two began to be conducted openly with the military buildup in Merawi. The situation evolved into a civil war with an armed clash between the two forces in the capital Khartoum on April 15, 2023, spreading to other regions shortly afterwards.

L

ibya has not been on the international political agenda since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war as much as it was in the prewar period, yet recent major developments in the country have the capacity to influence both local Libyan and international actors involved in Libya. In fact, the protracted military and political developments in Libya have been triggered by the vacuum created by this relative decline in “international interest.”

With the end of the post of Stephanie Williams, the dominant leader of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) and, more generally, the political transition process has been left “unattended.” In this vacuum, the power struggle among Libyan actors escalated, military conflicts erupted occasionally, and the atmosphere of relative stability brought about by the political transition became extremely fragile.

With the disengagement of the UNSMIL, regional actors, especially Egypt, gained a lot of room for maneuver, and through their influence over certain Libyan actors, they were able to shape the political developments in the country and even attempted to redesign the political arena. These attempts naturally deepened the existing fault lines between Libyan actors and made conflicts inevitable.

When Aguila Saleh, the speaker of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, announced that he withdrew his vote of confidence from the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU)—effectively acting on behalf of parliament—and when the Government of National Accord (GNA) appointed Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha as prime minister to form the the Government of National Stability; when Khaled al-Mishri, the head of the Tripoli-based Supreme State Council (SCC), initiated a series of negotiations to establish a legal basis for the elections—effectively taking over the political transition process—and when Mishri and Abdul Hamid al-Dbeibeh dismantled the GNA and attempted to form a new “unity government,” they all found Cairo as a strong supporter and benefactor.

Cairo’s activism in the western (Tripoli) region, taking advantage of the vacuum, was met with reactions and counter-mobilizations from Western regional actors, and periodic waves of instability in Libya. For a long time, Libya has been unable to achieve internal instability due to the influence of external actors. Important political and military developments in its periphery and on its borders seem destined to add fuel to the fire in a country struggling to gain internal unity, reach a political solution, and overcome its fragmented structure.

The Fezzan equation in the region

Although Fezzan, one of Libya’s three main geographical regions, has a much more modest role in influencing Libya’s destiny compared to the eastern (Barka) and western (Tripoli) regions, it constitutes a small African component of the country. Arab identity, as an extension of the Gaddafi regime, is, of course, a phenomenon that encompasses the whole of Libya, but this identity is somewhat more “diluted” in Fezzan compared to other regions. This is certainly due to Fezzan’s geographical, demographic, social, and cultural proximity and strong links with Libya’s African neighbors.

In the period after Gaddafi’s ouster, the borders, due to the disappearance of the state mechanism and the fragmented military and political structure, have become even more uncontrolled and porous. While completely controlling all of Libya’s borders is impossible both in terms of length and the difficulties inherent in desert regions, the southern border of Libya is the least controlled of all. The situation of Fezzan’s border with Chad and Niger has natural, humanitarian, man-made and criminal dimensions.

The social contact between the northern regions of Chad and Niger and Fezzan through tribal and kinship ties constitutes the natural and human aspect of uncontrolled borders. On the other hand, smuggling is the main economic activity in these border regions due to their largely desert nature and the sparseness of population density and settlements. In other words, in addition to natural social ties and interactions, economic and illicit activities and interactions are also very strong.

Libya’s African connection and its potential to be affected by Africa’s “problems” are not limited to the fact that it neighbors Chad and Niger via the Fezzan region. The positioning of Libya in the envisioning and geopolitical projections of the country by the external actors which have been involved in Libya also connects Libya to Africa. France, the most prominent of the European countries involved in Libya and so far the most decisive actor in the dynamics of the crisis, has strongly supported Haftar in many respects, and not only because it shares Haftar’s revolutionary and anti-“Islamist” ideological stance.

France’s goal of maintaining its presence and influence in the Sahel region, in general, and Operation Barkhane, in particular, has led to its interest and active intervention in Libya, which by virtue of its geographical and demographic elements is a natural part of this region, In fact, France’s perception of Turkey’s presence in Libya as having a potential impact beyond Libya, for example in North Africa in general or in the Sahel region, is behind France’s sharp anti-Turkey moves in its Libya policy.

Likewise, for Russia, another of the most influential external actors involved in Libya, Libya functions as an important part of its more macro-level African designs. The Wagner mercenary army, which is the mediator of Russian influence and presence in many African countries, has also been Russia’s choice in Libya. The regions where the Wagner mercenary army, which is estimated to number around 2,000 today, is engaged, deployed, and operating on Libyan soil show that Russia attaches particular importance to the “Africa-facing” side of Libya and makes its operational investments there.

In short, Libya is inevitably becoming part of Africa, not only because of the strong land connection of its southern Fezzan region with Sahel countries like Chad and Niger, but also because of the policies pursued by influential external actors. The juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and now Niger are notable for their anti-French and pro-Russian rhetoric. If the series of coups in the Sahel turns into an active struggle for influence between France and Russia, the countries of the Sahel region will be destabilized.

With the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner mercenary army’s head, Russia’s African network is entering a transition period. The importance of Libya within this African network was demonstrated when Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov made his first visit to Libya on the day of Prigozhin’s death. Both the possible instability of the Sahel countries and Wagner’s active physical presence in the Fezzan region increase the risk of Libya being affected by the power struggle and instability of this region in the coming period.

I

n East Africa, radicalization has targeted specific societal groups that experience real or perceived threats that are easy for terrorist organizations to exploit. The terrorist groups recruit members willingly into the ranks of their organizations to gain support for their acts of violence against groups they perceive as enemies.

It continues to be an issue of debate whether radicalization actually leads to violence. One side argues that there is no causal link between radicalization and violence, and that radicalization does not necessarily lead to violence. They contend that individuals should be allowed to hold radical views and that this should be recognized as part of social freedoms, including freedom of thought and expression.

The argument goes that there should be a limit to the extent to which security services should intervene when people believed to be radicalized are involved in violent acts. People believe that there are other factors that contribute to involvement in violence and radicalization, the surrounding environment being one of them.

A second group places more emphasis on the root causes of radicalization. They argue that individual factors, including psychological factors, are the main cause, and that certain types of people are more prone to being radicalized than others. Of course, in addition to these two groups, there are also those who argue in favor of social factors causing radicalization.

However, this argument raises the question of whether every individual is equally susceptible to radical views and beliefs. The social primacy thesis is gaining momentum because it tends to link radicalization to social interactions and factors in the individual’s social environment which include exposure to poverty, education, environmental challenges, technological equipment, and access to technology.

The nature of radicalization and the means it uses have led to new debates including the question of whether individuals can become radicalized on their own, without the help or radical views of a third party. Even with little exposure to radical content, individuals have gained enormous potential for self-radicalization with the help of the internet whose impact on the field of radicalization has led to further differences of opinion.

For example, why when the internet provides easy access to radical content, some segments of society and individuals are potentially radicalized simply by accessing and consuming radical content, while others are not? Radical content is being accessed and processed differently by an increasing number of different internet users, but mass radicalization is not occurring. Online communication technologies have increased the likelihood that individuals who do not engage in violent acts will become radicalized.

How and why are they radicalized?

How do these actors conduct their radicalization and terror campaigns in East Africa? Who are their main targets and why? Violent actors have proven to be highly adaptable, particularly in response to counterterrorism measures implemented by legitimate authorities in the region. Initially, groups such as al-Shabaab used public spaces, including mosques and schools, to disseminate radical ideologies, particularly to young people. In Kenya, for example, where counterinsurgency operations can claim to be the most discreet, a number of iconic public mosques in Nairobi and Mombasa were infiltrated by pro-al-Shabaab clerics who conducted radicalization campaigns targeting young people.

Some of the clerics were high-profile Islamic figures who commanded respect among their followers, likely increasing the impact of their message and popularizing calls for violence in the name of jihad.

In addition to illiterate segments of the population, al-Shabaab also benefits from large numbers of educated and highly skilled but unemployed youth. The organization places great emphasis on using ethnic diversity, regional circumstances, and even family connections for radicalization and recruitment. Individuals targeted for radicalization are approached by people who are familiar and close to them, such as wives tasked with radicalizing their husbands. The increased reconnaissance and surveillance of open areas suitable for radicalization has limited the group’s activities to rural areas, where it targets young people.

Closer surveillance of open areas has also forced these groups to turn to online communication technologies, where they can target wider audiences with tailored messages, including translation into local languages. However, better regulation and control of online content by the authorities is preventing prolonged online radicalization. A fierce competition has emerged between the authorities and terrorist groups to open and close social media accounts, which, in turn, has led to almost instantaneous censorship of many online channels.

Measures against extremism and terrorism

It is important to focus on the counter-radicalization measures taken by the authorities in East Africa. In terms of the effectiveness of these measures, the authorities have initiated three main approaches in partnership with civil society organizations and other groups within society, while developing key measures to increase society’s overall awareness and resilience to terrorist recruitment and radicalization. In the case of Kenya, key interventions have been decentralized to the county and grassroots levels for maximum impact.

Through public awareness programs such as “Epuka Ugaidi” (Shunning Terrorism), community members in Kenya were sensitized and equipped with the necessary skills to prevent radicalization at onset. Other measures include the use of intercommunity forums and even sensitizing critical sectors of society to increase the effectiveness of their role in countering radicalization. Somalia has prioritized the sensitization of academics, religious figures, and community leaders to maximize their influence in eradicating al-Shabaab narratives.

The second category of measures are more specific interventions targeting groups considered high risk and vulnerable to radicalization. However, such classifications are essentially meaningless and can undermine the effectiveness of counter-radicalization programs. Such profiling potentially fuels resistance and increases the likelihood of mass community radicalization.

Secondary measures to counter this are, therefore, more comprehensive and more likely to be community-led violence prevention initiatives. Reputable civil society organizations and faith-based groups have been involved in supporting community-led processes. The implementation of targeted secondary measures prioritizes the highest levels of transparency, respect, and honesty to achieve better results.

The final category of measures, called tertiary, targets those who have already been radicalized and joined violent groups. Rather than actively preventing violent groups from recruiting new members, tertiary programs aim to disadvantage violent groups by creating discord and discontent among new members, potentially leading to defections. Interventions have included disarmament, demobilization, deradicalization, and reintegration programs, particularly for those who have defected, been rescued, or returned from al-Shabaab.

For counter-radicalization purposes, the Kenyan and Somali authorities have granted amnesty to defectors and returnees in return for them sharing their views on their horrific experiences within the organization. The employment of defectors and returnees sends a strong anti-radicalization message to the general population. The exploitation and victimization of these individuals for the purposes of radicalization and recruitment to terrorist violence using religious texts to justify or explain acts of violence and terrorism.

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he rise of terrorism in the Sahel has created an atmosphere of instability that has led to military interventions in Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and, most recently, Niger. The states of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa share certain characteristics that make the emergence of terrorism possible: the states in these two regions are weak, non-institutionalized, while the lack of transparency and accountability continues to hamper effective governance processes.

The rise of terrorism in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa is a major concern, not only for the well-being of citizens in these regions, but also because of the impact of instability on neighboring countries and regions. The Sahel region typically includes Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. The Horn of Africa includes Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. Frequent intrastate and interstate conflicts in these regions create an environment conducive to terrorist activity, and the 2011 crisis and overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya made the Sahel a center of terrorism in Africa.

After participating in the conflict in Libya, Tuareg fighters returned to Mali in 2012 and joined the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) as part of its efforts to create a breakaway state. Violent extremist groups have also taken advantage of the political instability in Mali to expand their operations into Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. This has been achieved with the help of DAESH and al-Qaeda. In the Horn of Africa, al-Shabaab also received support from DAESH to expand its operations from Somalia into Kenya.

Terrorist threats in the Sahel

The countries of the Sahel are struggling with bad governance, economic decline, and complex processes of state development. Various efforts to achieve growth and development have been hampered by the rise of violent extremism perpetrated by terrorist groups. The main terrorist groups supporting violent extremism in the Sahel include Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM).

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was formed in 2006. It was led by Abdelmalek Droukdel until 2020, when he was killed. AQIM was mainly made up of dissidents who had participated in the Algerian civil war in the 1990s. In the 1990s, the group was called the “Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat.” In the 2000s, the GSPC pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and aligned its operations with it. As a result, it adopted the name “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” in 2007. Between 2007 and 2010, AQIM operated almost exclusively in Algeria, with some limited operations in Mauritania in late 2007 and Niger in 2008. AQIM was involved in alliances with the Tuareg. In 2012, it led the MNLA against Malian forces.

Al-Qaeda’s activities have far-reaching implications for regional and global politics. As a transnational terrorist organization, al-Qaeda benefits from the use of violence to advance its religious-political agenda. The ever-expanding characteristics of this non-state armed group and its ability to adapt and mutate in different geographical locations make it increasingly difficult to combat. Between 2008 and 2014, AQIM is estimated to have generated $125 million from kidnappings. The ambiguous nature of AQIM’s operations makes it increasingly difficult to track the exact amount of money generated from arms, human trafficking, and kidnapping. Whatever the case, the funding from these illegal activities has allowed the groups to strengthen their fighting capabilities by purchasing modern weapons and attracting young followers.

Violent extremism in the Horn of Africa

Almost all countries in the Horn of Africa have experienced terrorist activity with al-Shabaab standing out as the region’s most significant terrorist group. Al-Shabaab emerged in Somalia in 2004, and in addition to its terrorist activities there, it has also carried out attacks in the neighboring countries of Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. The aim of al-Shabaab is to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic state governed by Sharia law. The group has exploited the weakness of the Somali government to establish bases which it uses to prepare and launch attacks against civilians and the military.

In 2013, al-Shabaab attacked a shopping mall in Kenya, killing 67 people. In 2015, another 148 people were killed in an attack by the group on a university in Kenya. The group organized 14 hotel attacks in Nairobi in 2019. Al-Shabaab’s terrorist activities remain a major concern in Somalia as well. In 2019, the group carried out truck bombings that killed 80 people, while car bombings in Mogadishu killed more than 100 people in 2022.

What is more, both Ethiopia and Eritrea face internal ethnic and political tensions, further complicating regional security dynamics. Yemen may not be part of the region but its proximity means that the Sahel is also vulnerable to the spillover effects of the conflict there.

Counterterrorism efforts

Various efforts are being made to counter the threat of terrorism in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. Operation Serval was one of the first counterterrorism operations launched by the French army in Mali in 2013. It succeeded in preventing AQIM, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), and Ansar Dine from taking over the Malian capital, Bamako. The operation included numerous air strikes against jihadist groups.

Operation Barkhane, which followed Operation Serval in August 2014, is now responsible for counterterrorism operations in Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso. These countries cooperate on security along the G5 Sahel coast. France deployed around 5,100 troops at the height of Operation Barkhane. In Operation Sabre, France deployed special forces and also led the multinational Takuba Task Force, which included special forces from Sweden, Estonia, and the Czech Republic.

The joint multinational task force was established in 2014 to counter the threat of Boko Haram, banditry, and organized crime. The Takuba Task Force was composed of Benin, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Nigeria. In 2017, the Sahel states of Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger came together to form the G5 Sahel Force mentioned above. This regional counterterrorism force has gathered more than 5,000 troops to neutralize militant groups in the Sahel. In the case of the Horn of Africa, the United States launched a special operation against al-Shabaab.

U.S. forces conducted air strikes, provided military intelligence, and built the capacity of local partner forces to conduct ground operations. This counterinsurgency operation significantly reduced al-Shabaab’s influence. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) also played an important role: AMISOM’s operations created the security conditions that allowed humanitarian organizations to operate outside Mogadishu. Between 2011 and 2012, AMISOM was able to reduce the areas under al-Shabaab control.

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he coup against Niger’s President Mohamed Bazoum, one of the most important allies of the West in the Sahel, paves the way for the consolidation of the influence of other global actors seen as alternatives by regional states, Russia in particular. The fact that people organized rallies in support of the junta intervention in Niger and unfurled the flags of other foreign actors, especially Russia, in the squares is a result of the growing reaction against the West and the search for trusted alternative partners.

The coups taking place in the Sahel since 2020 stem from the fact that the African society, nourished by pan-Africanist ideas, has consolidated its military forces to intervene against the governments in the face of antagonism towards the French.

Following the military intervention in Niger, the governments of the Sahel countries are divided into two factions: those which support the junta and those who support ousted president Bazoum. In the Sahel region, Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso are supported by Russia, while the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) countries, which have pursued their democratization processes more steadily than others, have deepened their relations with Western actors, particularly France.

The polarization in the region and ECOWAS’ plan to intervene militarily against the junta government in Niger is one of the main items on the international community’s agenda. From this point of view, the planned military intervention in Niger by ECOWAS, which is supported by Western countries, in particular France, may prevent regional development and weaken West African states in general, rather than weakening the junta regimes.

Background of the events unfolding in Niger: The “coup ecosystem” born of Anti-Westernism

Niger, which gained independence from French colonial rule in 1960, has experienced four coups to date. On July 26, 2023, soldiers led by General Omar Tchiani, commander of the Presidential Guard Regiment, intervened against the Bazoum administration which had been elected in February 2021. The coup attempt was successful and currently, there is a junta government led by Tchiani, resulting in the polarization of the region with the support of global actors. The reasons for the military intervention can be explained in the context of both domestic and foreign policy.

Although Bazoum’s administration failed to solve the country’s security and economy problems in the context of the fight against terrorism, the main problem was Tchiani’s demand for power and his close relationship with Bazoum’s predecessor, Mahmoud Isafu. It is claimed that Bazoum wanted to remove Tchiani from office before the intervention, and that, therefore, the main reason for the military intervention in terms of domestic politics was the power dispute between the two actors.

Regional and global interactions are another factor underpinning the disagreements between the political and military leaders in domestic politics. During the last decade, the Sahel crisis, which involves the three border lines of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger of the Sahel geography, encompassing the arid topography extending from the Green Cape of Senegal to the Cape of Somalia, has witnessed the spread of al-Qaeda- and DAESH-linked terrorist organizations.

In this context, the peacemaking and peacekeeping operations carried out by Western actors in the region, France in particular, have not yielded any significant results, leading to a backlash among the local societies. Riding the wave created by this reaction, military leaders have created a “coup ecosystem” in the Sahel that interacts with the anti-French sentiments of the societies and has resulted since 2020 in coups in Mali, then in Guinea, and Burkina Faso. The intervention against the Bazoum regime in Niger is also part of this coup ecosystem.

Western actors’ influence in the Sahel and possible ECOWAS intervention in Niger

In the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, Western actors provide equipment and training support to countries in the field of security. As of 2022, however, France announced that it will withdraw its 5,100 troops, which have been in the region since 2013, first under the banner of Operation Serval and then Operation Barkhane. Instead though France shifted its personnel from Mali and Burkina Faso to Niger.

The United States, on the other hand, supports counterterrorism operations in Niger with 1,000 security personnel and an unmanned aerial vehicle base in the Agadez region. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which was established by a UN Security Council resolution in 2014, is supported by 53 countries with approximately 11,000 personnel.

Western actors might appear to be acting within the framework of common interests regarding the junta regime in Niger, but we know from international politics that actors may act under the same umbrella organization.

It should not be forgotten that the U.S. would have to impose sanctions on Niger if it used the word “coup” and chose instead to emphasize diplomatic efforts and differentiate itself from France’s rigid stance.

The diplomatic pressure exerted on the junta by ECOWAS, led by Nigeria, to hand over power to Bazoum, as well as the announcement by Burkina Faso and Mali that they would declare war against a possible Western-backed military intervention by ECOWAS against Niger, indicate that geopolitical ruptures in the Sahel may deepen. In this sense, Algeria has also stated that an ECOWAS intervention against Niger would escalate regional instability and that it will not use force against neighboring countries.

Algeria’s decision has a significant impact on the decision of ECOWAS countries to intervene militarily in Niger. Indeed, Algeria is a key country both for its strong economy among the countries in the region and for Nigeria’s Trans-Sahara gas pipeline project, which will join the existing natural gas pipeline connecting to Europe in Algeria via Niger. Therefore, it is clear that if ECOWAS intervenes militarily in Niger, it will not find full regional support.

On the other hand, an ECOWAS intervention scenario could accelerate the East-West confrontation in the Sahel, with proxy forces in the form of terrorist movements. This would have a significant negative impact on the demographic gains and the exploitation of natural resources by the regional countries.

Military intervention in Niger risks expanding the coup ecosystem

The military intervention against the Bazoum regime in Niger is a regional security concern due to the growing terrorist threat in the Sahel over the last decade and the success of coups since 2020. It is likely that the military intervention in Niger will bring Chad into the coup ecosystem after Libya, Sudan, Mali, and Burkina Faso. As a matter of fact, there is a growing and suppressed opposition to the current government in Chadian society,  as in the cases of Sudan, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

The planned military intervention by ECOWAS against the junta in Niger led by Western actors will deepen regional instability rather than weaken the junta regimes. Indeed, in the event of such a scenario, proxy wars will emerge from an environment where terrorist movements spread and Eastern actors, especially Russia, fill the vacuum created by anti-Western sentiment.

Even if junta governments in the Sahel lose power, instability in the region will deepen and economic development will be negatively affected. A reasonable solution could be to accelerate diplomatic processes to ensure the transition of junta governments to democratic governance and development based on the equitable distribution of resources with the support of Western actors.

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n Wednesday, August 23, a private jet that took off from Moscow and was headed towards St. Petersburg, lost radio communication at around 17:30 Moscow time, once again putting Russia at the top of the news headlines. The world was quick to hear the news of the probable death of Yevgeni Prigozhin, the chief of the Wagner army, as videos of the moment of the crash and the wreckage site were posted on social media.

The fact that even the Russian news agency TASS was quick—by Russian standards—to announce that Prigozhin and the Wagner management team were on board the crashed plane signaled that the finale many had been waiting for had arrived.

After his death, commentary focused on Prigozhin’s personality and eccentric biography. However, for the purpose of providing a useful perspective on what the future holds for Russia, it is useful to focus less on who Prigozhin was and more on what he stood for. This approach is also more useful for answering questions about the future of the Wagner structure and Russia’s goals.

Post-USSR needs: Oligarchs and Wagner

Russia’s urgent search for a free-market economy organization to replace the Soviet system that collapsed in 1991 produced a class of elite capital labeled “oligarchs,” the likes of which are not found anywhere else in the world. This capitalist class, which at first, in cooperation with Western countries, siphoned off the resources of the Russian state, inevitably underwent a structural transformation after 1999, with Putin’s rise to power.

The oligarchs of the first era were replaced by the business circles that Putin cultivated while running the city of St. Petersburg, and both resources and wealth changed hands rapidly. When the first oligarchs of the post-Soviet era insisted on doing things their own way, they were purged, either by being forced to flee abroad or imprisoned. Prigozhin, thanks to his St. Petersburg roots, was able to carve out a niche for himself in the food industry as a chef within the oligarch structure of this second period.

What differentiated Prigozhin from his peers was that he recognized the Kremlin’s needs in time and invested in these areas at the right time and place. Caught unprepared for the rules of the free market economy in 1991, the Russian state found itself at the mercy of the oligarchs. From 1999 onwards, with NATO’s eastward expansion, it was discovered that a similar mistake had been made in foreign policy. In fact, the consequences of this mistake were the factor that brought Putin to power. What was the mistake?

By 1999, it was clear that the verbal assurances given to Gorbachev, then first secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, by his Western counterparts and even NATO officials that NATO would not expand eastwards were in vain. However, by this time, Russia had abandoned its spheres of influence not only in Europe but also in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Asia-Pacific region. This vulnerability allowed the U.S. to intervene in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, Serbia, and Venezuela without deterrence. The Kremlin urgently needed to find a solution to this imbalance created by the unipolar world.

Prigozhin: The man of opportunity

It was at this point that Prigozhin realized the advantages that the conflicts in Ukraine’s Donbas region and in Syria and Libya could bring Russia in terms of geopolitical competition. It was clear that a dynamic military force, in line with Russian Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov’s concept of “hybrid warfare,” would have a role to play in helping Russia reclaim its spheres of influence. This was the “opportunity” that set Prigozhin apart from other similar oligarchs and earned him worldwide recognition, even leading to his tragic end.

Russia needed a shadow army, whose powers were deliberately left ambiguous and whose legal position was not clearly defined, to protect its presence in overseas territories. Prigozhin provided this need with the Wagner Group. Representing the entrepreneurial personality, organizational skills, and patriotism he brought from his business life, the Wagner Group soon turned the tide of events in Russia’s favor on the Syrian, Libyan, Belarusian, and Ukrainian fronts. The geopolitical balance, which had turned against the Kremlin with the disintegration of the USSR, had reoriented itself and Moscow’s fate had begun to change.

Wagner’s operational success soon became a way out for African countries seeking to free themselves from the influence of France and the United States. Not only that, similar demands began to come from Latin American countries. The U.S. and France were now facing Wagner’s phantom in the countries they had plundered recklessly in the aftermath of the First Cold War.

Things were going well, even better than expected, for both the Kremlin and Prigozhin, until February 24, 2022. As much as the leadership in Moscow did not want to acknowledge it, when their plan to seize the capital Kyiv and fully occupy Ukraine, or at the very least change the government, failed, news of the cracks between Prigozhin and the ruling class around the Kremlin reached the media.

Russia-Ukraine war rocks the Wagner-Kremlin balance

The situation in which the Russian army found itself when facing the Ukrainian defenses forced it to adopt a defensive posture and led Prigozhin to make statements directly targeting Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov before the international community. Moreover, ultranationalist figures such as Dmitry Utkin had rallied around Prigozhin.

Although the Wagner army appeared to remain loyal to Putin, it was now clear that they wanted to change the balance of power around the Kremlin. After Prigozhin’s death, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov stated, “Prigozhin was a nationally significant person. But he either did not see or did not want to see the whole picture of what has been happening in the country lately. I wanted him to give up his personal ambitions for bigger national issues, but that’s the kind of person Prigozhin was. He had a character of steel and a desire to achieve what he wanted immediately.”

The Battle of Bakhmut, which began in August 2022, marked the beginning of the final turning point in the future of the relations between Wagner and the Kremlin. Prigozhin’s criticism of Shoigu and Gerasimov became increasingly harsh and reckless, arguing that both the capture and retention of Bakhmut were the work of Wagner. Prigozhin’s statements targeting Defense Minister Shoigu on May 5, 2023 were a sign that the tipping point had been reached.

Prigozhin was burning bridges with words like “Wagner is suffering tens of thousands of casualties so that you can sit like a fat cat in your luxurious office.” The Kremlin’s response to this was ordering an agreement to integrate Wagner into the Defense Ministry. Prigozhin refused to sign this and on June 23, repeating the words of the Roman general and statesman Julius Caesar, he said “Alea iacta est,” the die is cast, in other words. Prigozhin had now crossed all red lines,  but his future was not to be as bright as Caesar’s.

Prigozhin published a video message claiming that Russia’s attempt to invade Ukraine was based on lies and that defense minister Shoigu had deceived both President Putin and the Russian people about the war. The next day, the Wagner army launched a mutiny unlike any other in modern history. Within 24 hours, Wagner reached within 95 kilometers of Moscow according to some sources and 310 kilometers according to others, shooting down Russian army attack helicopters and even an intelligence plane on its way at an unexpected speed.

However, the Wagner mutiny did not find the support it had hoped for from within the Russian army. In fact, Prigozhin’s mutiny hit the rocks when Ramzan Kadyrov, who shared Prigozhin’s criticisms against the Minister of Defense and the Chief of General Staff but had redefined his side in this power struggle as of March, also turned against the mutiny.

The failure of General Sergey Surovikin, nicknamed “General Armageddon” for his activities in Syria and the commander of the Russian forces that began the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, to make a move in favor of Wagner was instrumental in ending the mutiny. According to Western sources, General Surovikin, who was the commander of the Russian Aerospace and Air Forces at the time of the mutiny, was intercepted by forces loyal to Putin, who had received advance notice of the attempt.

After his Telegram message on June 24 to stop the mutiny, Surovikin never appeared in public again and was relieved of all his duties the day before the plane crash that killed Prigozhin. It is now common knowledge that Surovikin is under house arrest and will never appear in public again, as happened to disgraced generals during the USSR. House arrest is, in fact, the best-case scenario for him.

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ince 2020, the Sahel region has witnessed a significant number of military coups with various political implications at the regional and global levels. Tunç Demirtaş, a researcher at the Ankara-based think tank SETA, attributed the regular occurrence of military coups in the Sahel to regional dynamics. Demirtaş argues that regional dynamics such as terrorism, insurgency, inequitable income distribution, poor governance, security issues, and anti-French sentiment stemming from the colonial past were the main factors behind the recent military coups in Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Chad. Building on this, he claims that security gaps in particular disrupt processes of democratic institutionalization and lead to military coups.

As a landlocked country in the Sahel with a population of about 26 million, Niger was also subject to the aforementioned dynamics that paved the way for military coups. Niger is a former French colony: it became a French overseas territory in 1946 and gained independence in 1960. Since then, the country has experienced a total of four coups.

Before the most recent military coup in 2023, Niger’s government was aligned with the U.S.- and French-backed counter-insurgency efforts in the Sahel. Recent military coups in Mali and Burkina Faso ended the longstanding French military presence in the Sahel, with the exception of Niger. This was largely due to the anti-French rhetoric used by military regimes to legitimize their rule and consolidate popular support.

The 2023 coup in Niger

 On July 26, 2023, the military in Niger led by General Abdourahmane Tchiani staged a successful coup d’état in Niger, overthrowing President Mohamed Bazoum, who is under house arrest. The military cited poor governance and lack of security in the country as the reasons for the coup.

Niger’s army spokesman, Amadou Abdramane, announced on national television that the country’s borders had been closed, a nationwide curfew had been imposed, and political institutions had been suspended until further notice.

On July 27, the Nigerien army declared that it would support the coup to avoid a “murderous confrontation” that could potentially turn into a “bloodbath.”

On July 28, General Tchiani proclaimed himself head of state.

Ousted President Bazoum wrote on X, formerly known as Twitter, that “hard-won gains will be safeguarded” and that “all Nigeriens who love democracy and freedom would want this.” This was Bazoum’s first communication since the military coup. Bazoum’s foreign minister, Hassoumi Massoudou, also wrote on X, calling on “democrats and patriots” to make this “dangerous adventure” fail.

How did Africa respond to the coup d’état?

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), backed by the U.S. and France, held a summit three days after the military coup in Niger. ECOWAS condemned the coup and called for the restoration of constitutional order and the unconditional release and reinstatement of President Bazoum. It used the rhetoric of military intervention if the ruling military regime didn’t meet the conditions for a return to constitutional order and the reinstatement of President Bazoum, setting a deadline for August 6, 2023.

Following the expiry of the ECOWAS ultimatum, ECOWAS did not launch a military intervention. However, it ordered the activation of its standby force on August 10. In its statement, ECOWAS pointed out that all options, including the “use of force,” were on the table to restore constitutional order in Niger. On August 18, ECOWAS announced that it set an undisclosed D-day for the military intervention to restore constitutional order in Niger. Whether or not ECOWAS will intervene militarily still remains an unanswered question at this point.

ECOWAS immediately closed Niger’s borders and banned commercial flights to the country. As part of the economic sanctions, it halted financial transactions with Niger and froze its national assets and aid.

The African Union (AU) also condemned the military coup, calling for the “immediate and unconditional return of the offending soldiers to their barracks” in a press release. On August 22, the AU suspended Niger over the military coup.

With ECOWAS threatening military intervention, the military junta in Niger called for mass mobilization. On June 5, the Volunteers for the Defence of Niger, a pro-coup NGO, launched a recruitment drive across the country. Amsarou Bako, one of the founders, told the Associated Press: “It’s a contingency; we have to be ready whenever it happens. Anyone over the age of 18 can register and the list will be given to the Nigerien military so they can call on people if necessary.” “The junta was not involved in the recruitment drive, but was aware of the initiative,” he added.

At the same time, African countries such as Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Algeria have sided with the military in Niger. They issued a joint statement saying they were opposed to the threat of military intervention by ECOWAS. They also mentioned that they would intervene militarily in support of the military in Niger if necessary.

French and U.S. reaction to Niger coup d’état

 France strongly supported the ECOWAS rhetoric of military intervention to restore constitutional order and ousted President Bazoum to power. It announced the immediate suspension of all development and aid to Niger. On August 3, it also suspended military cooperation with Niger until further notice.

Interestingly, France refused the military regime’s request to withdraw its troops. An opinion piece in the Atlantic Council attributed France’s proactive role in countering the military coup to its declining influence in the Sahel. It argued that because France’s interests were at stake following the military takeovers in the region, and before the military coup Niger was the last stronghold of French military presence, France resorted to a military solution under the umbrella of ECOWAS.

In contrast to France, the United States has been hesitant about responding to the coup. Unlike France, the U.S. has not called it a “coup” and has opted for a diplomatic solution by sending an envoy to meet with the ruling military. Nevertheless, the U.S. suspended security cooperation with Niger and, like France, cut off development aid.

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evgeny Prigozhin, the founding head of the private military company (PMC) Wagner Group and known as “Putin’s boss,” was killed in an air strike near Moscow on August 23. In addition to Prigozhin, Dimitry Utkin, Wagner’s second in command, and six others were killed in the accident. A former special forces officer, Utkin was considered one of the strategic brains behind Wagner’s operational activities in various conflict zones. Prigozhin’s death raised questions about the future of Wagner’s activities on the African continent. Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Libya, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, and Niger are among the countries where Wagner has left its mark.

Wagner’s activities in Africa and the mutiny

Wagner’s presence in Africa serves as a lever for Russia, which is in economic, political, and military competition with Western countries. Wagner, which has no legal basis within Russia’s borders, provides security services based on agreements and in cooperation with authoritarian governments in African countries. In return for these services, Wagner receives various economic concessions. By taking control of precious metals such as gold, diamonds, and oil, the paramilitary group acts in line with Russia’s economic, security, and political interests. The PMC also opens up new markets for Russia at a time when international sanctions are being tightened.

Moscow, which has gained significant influence through the paramilitary group under plausible deniability, does not want to lose this power in the future. In this context, the first discussion about Wagner’s future in Africa came to the fore after the mutiny that began on June 23. However, the rebellion was ended by mutual agreement and three different alternatives were offered to the Wagner staff: demobilization, exile in Belarus, and integration into the Ministry of Defense. In addition, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov acknowledged the existence of Wagner and announced that the PMC would continue its “successful” activities in Africa. These developments sent positive signals to Wagner’s partners in Africa.

Prigozhin’s death and possible scenarios regarding Wagner’s future in Africa

The timing of the visit to Benghazi by Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov is very critical. Yevkurov’s visit took place two days before the accident that killed Prigozhin and his colleagues. Based on this, Yevkurov’s visit raised the scenario that Wagner’s military operations in Libya would be taken over by another private military company working with Russia under a new plan. Shortly before and immediately after Prigozhin’s death, many Wagner personnel were found to have defected to another Russian PMC, Redut. Redut operates under the control of the GRU, Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency, and the Ministry of Defense.

Another scenario is that the Kremlin is reconsidering its military involvement in Sudan, the Central African Republic, the Sahel countries (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger), and Libya. Accordingly, Russia’s abandonment of its covert intervention approach and the shift of its military presence in Africa to a more official dimension can be interpreted as a card against authoritarian governments in Africa that depend on Wagner’s security services in the fight against violent extremism and terrorism.

In this scenario, the flexibility offered by Wagner to the countries concerned could be lost. Instead, there may be more bureaucracy and inertia. Prigozhin’s death some two months after the mutiny suggests that the Ministry of Defense and the intelligence services are trying to buy time to take over Wagner’s network and relationships in Africa during a transition period.

The third scenario is that Wagner continues its activities in new forms despite the loss of its leader. Wagner’s strong network in different parts of Africa, built in the space of ten years, highlights the pragmatic possibility of reshaping the relations that Prigozhin established with the current administrations in line with Russia’s foreign policy interests, rather than disbanding the group.

On the other hand, Wagner’s ability to operate where Moscow has no official or legal presence makes it an indispensable and highly valuable tool of the Kremlin’s foreign policy. However, as a non-state armed actor, Wagner has been associated with Prigozhin since its inception and, as a result, many analysts equate the death of Prigozhin with the end of Wagner.

Wagner after Prigozhin

Regardless of these scenarios, Prigozhin left behind a semi-independent criminal security agency in Africa. For the Kremlin, the economic and geopolitical benefits of Wagner are too critical to be completely abandoned. The coups in the Sahel over the past three years and the ousting of France from the region were part of a strategy in which Wagner plays a key role.

The relative weakening of Wagner, which is an important counterterrorism partner in unstable countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Sudan, and the Central African Republic, will create a fragile security environment for the armies of these countries and lead them to face difficulties in the fight against terrorism.

Y

evgeny Prigozhin, the founding head of the private military company (PMC) Wagner Group and known as “Putin’s boss,” was killed in an air strike near Moscow on August 23. In addition to Prigozhin, Dimitry Utkin, Wagner’s second in command, and six others were killed in the accident. A former special forces officer, Utkin was considered one of the strategic brains behind Wagner’s operational activities in various conflict zones. Prigozhin’s death raised questions about the future of Wagner’s activities on the African continent. Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, Libya, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, and Niger are among the countries where Wagner has left its mark.

Wagner’s activities in Africa and the mutiny

Wagner’s presence in Africa serves as a lever for Russia, which is in economic, political, and military competition with Western countries. Wagner, which has no legal basis within Russia’s borders, provides security services based on agreements and in cooperation with authoritarian governments in African countries. In return for these services, Wagner receives various economic concessions. By taking control of precious metals such as gold, diamonds, and oil, the paramilitary group acts in line with Russia’s economic, security, and political interests. The PMC also opens up new markets for Russia at a time when international sanctions are being tightened.

Moscow, which has gained significant influence through the paramilitary group under plausible deniability, does not want to lose this power in the future. In this context, the first discussion about Wagner’s future in Africa came to the fore after the mutiny that began on June 23. However, the rebellion was ended by mutual agreement and three different alternatives were offered to the Wagner staff: demobilization, exile in Belarus, and integration into the Ministry of Defense. In addition, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov acknowledged the existence of Wagner and announced that the PMC would continue its “successful” activities in Africa. These developments sent positive signals to Wagner’s partners in Africa.

Prigozhin’s death and possible scenarios regarding Wagner’s future in Africa

The timing of the visit to Benghazi by Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov is very critical. Yevkurov’s visit took place two days before the accident that killed Prigozhin and his colleagues. Based on this, Yevkurov’s visit raised the scenario that Wagner’s military operations in Libya would be taken over by another private military company working with Russia under a new plan. Shortly before and immediately after Prigozhin’s death, many Wagner personnel were found to have defected to another Russian PMC, Redut. Redut operates under the control of the GRU, Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency, and the Ministry of Defense.

Another scenario is that the Kremlin is reconsidering its military involvement in Sudan, the Central African Republic, the Sahel countries (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger), and Libya. Accordingly, Russia’s abandonment of its covert intervention approach and the shift of its military presence in Africa to a more official dimension can be interpreted as a card against authoritarian governments in Africa that depend on Wagner’s security services in the fight against violent extremism and terrorism.

In this scenario, the flexibility offered by Wagner to the countries concerned could be lost. Instead, there may be more bureaucracy and inertia. Prigozhin’s death some two months after the mutiny suggests that the Ministry of Defense and the intelligence services are trying to buy time to take over Wagner’s network and relationships in Africa during a transition period.

The third scenario is that Wagner continues its activities in new forms despite the loss of its leader. Wagner’s strong network in different parts of Africa, built in the space of ten years, highlights the pragmatic possibility of reshaping the relations that Prigozhin established with the current administrations in line with Russia’s foreign policy interests, rather than disbanding the group.

On the other hand, Wagner’s ability to operate where Moscow has no official or legal presence makes it an indispensable and highly valuable tool of the Kremlin’s foreign policy. However, as a non-state armed actor, Wagner has been associated with Prigozhin since its inception and, as a result, many analysts equate the death of Prigozhin with the end of Wagner.

Wagner after Prigozhin

Regardless of these scenarios, Prigozhin left behind a semi-independent criminal security agency in Africa. For the Kremlin, the economic and geopolitical benefits of Wagner are too critical to be completely abandoned. The coups in the Sahel over the past three years and the ousting of France from the region were part of a strategy in which Wagner plays a key role.

The relative weakening of Wagner, which is an important counterterrorism partner in unstable countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Sudan, and the Central African Republic, will create a fragile security environment for the armies of these countries and lead them to face difficulties in the fight against terrorism.

S

ince 2020, a trend has emerged in African politics which has seen nearly a dozen military coups or attempts take place. While some have failed, most have succeeded. Those who staged the coups claim they are freeing their countries from Western influence, namely France and the United States. Other coup leaders have referred to domestic politics and the worsening economic situation in their countries as the factors behind their coups. Most notably, there is an increasing sign of solidarity among the military regimes being formed after these coups.

For instance, the Burkina Faso and Chad military regimes threated to send armies to Niger in case of foreign intervention. Below is a list of coups and coup attempts that have taken place since 2020 in Africa in chronological order.

Mali (August 2020)

This takeover involved a group of mutinous soldiers who took control of the government. The epicenter of the coup was the the Sundiata Keita military base in Kati, a town 15 km from the capital Bamako. During the coup, key government officials, including President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, were arrested, ultimately leading to Keïta’s resignation and the dissolution of the government.

The coup was triggered by widespread protests against Keïta’s government, which had been plagued by allegations of corruption, poor governance, and an inability to tackle the country’s security problems. The protests were ongoing since June 2020 and had gradually increased in size and fervor, paving the way for the eventual coup.

The consequences of the coup were far-reaching, unsettling Mali’s stability and exacerbating its ongoing security challenges. The Malian armed forces were severely weakened by the coup.

Chad (April 2021)

A cohort of military officers, led by Mahamat Idriss Déby, the scion of the late president Idriss Déby Itno, launched a military coup. This was triggered by the death of President Déby on  April 19, 2021 who was killed while fighting rebels in the northern region of the country. The rebel group, known as the “Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT),” had launched an offensive against the government in the weeks leading up to Déby’s death.

Following Déby’s death, the military formally announced the dissolution of the government and the suspension of the constitution. Subsequently, Mahamat Déby was appointed interim president and took over the leadership of a 15-member military council.

The reverberations of this coup have caused a state of upheaval in Chad, As Chad navigates an uncertain path forward, it faces several challenges that must be resolved to pave the way for the restoration of democratic governance.

Guinea (September 2021)

Guinea’s government takeover was orchestrated by a contingent of specialized forces led by Mamady Doumbouya who seized the presidential palace in the capital, Conakry. President Alpha Condé was arrested, released, and placed under house arrest. The coup was sparked by widespread dissatisfaction with Condé’s government, due to allegations of corruption, mismanagement, and human rights abuses. The coup was also fueled by Condé’s controversial decision to amend the constitution to allow him to seek a third term in office.

A transitional government was set up in October 2021, with Doumbouya assuming the role of interim president. This government promised to organize elections within 36 months, a timetable that was met with skepticism due to the prevailing uncertainties.

The aftermath of the coup has had a destabilizing effect on Guinea.

Sudan (October 2021)

General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), seized the country’s government during a period of transitional government. The coup was triggered by internal conflicts within this government, pitting military and civilian leaders against each other. The military faction expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of the transition to democracy and argued for a greater retention of power. The civilian leaders, on the other hand, wanted a rapid transition to civilian rule.

The coup was met with widespread protests in the capital, Khartoum, which were quickly put down. The coup leaders arrested several civilian leaders, including Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and dissolved the existing transitional government. Looking ahead,

The Gambia (December 2021)

An attempted coup d’état was led by a contingent of soldiers who stormed the State House in the capital Banjul. Although President Adama Barrow escaped unharmed, he was subsequently placed under house arrest; however, the coup failed as Barrow effectively regained power with the support of the Gambian armed forces. The leaders responsible for the coup were arrested and charged with treason.

The motivations behind the coup were complex and stemmed from factors such as the country’s ongoing political instability and the vulnerability of its military structure. The Gambia has experienced several coups and attempted coups in recent years, exposing divisions and lack of discipline within the military ranks. The coup highlighted the country’s vulnerability to political instability. The Gambia, characterized by its compact size, has a history of political turbulence, and the coup attempt served as a stark reminder of the fragility of the country’s democratic systems.

These challenges include the need to address political instability, strengthen the military, and tackle corruption.

Burkina Faso (January 2022)

A group of insurgent soldiers, on January 23, 2022, stormed the capital, Ouagadougou. In February 2022, a transitional government was formed, with Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba assuming the role of interim president.

The aftermath of the coup has had a destabilizing effect on Burkina Faso, exacerbating the country’s existing security problems. As Burkina Faso moves forward, it faces a range of challenges that must be resolved to pave the way for democracy.

Guinea-Bissau (February 2022)

The coup attempt was staged by a contingent of rebel soldiers who stormed the government palace in the capital, Bissau. Although President Umaro Sissoco Embaló escaped unharmed, several government officials were arrested. Ultimately, the coup failed and Embaló managed to regain control of the government. The leaders behind the coup were subsequently arrested and charged with treason.

The coup attempt was fueled by several factors, including the country’s ongoing political instability and the fragility of the military apparatus. Guinea-Bissau has experienced several coups and attempted coups in recent times, revealing divisions and lack of discipline within the military ranks. The coup also highlighted the country’s vulnerability to drug trafficking. Guinea-Bissau is a key transit point for cocaine from South America to Europe, and drug trafficking is believed to have played a role in instigating the coup attempt.

Many of the nation’s difficulties need to be resolved in order to promote stability and democratic government. These challenges include the need to address the country’s political volatility, strengthen its armed forces, and combat the scourge of drug trafficking.

São Tomé and Príncipe (February 2022)

On February 24 and 25, 2022, an unsuccessful coup took place on the island nation of São Tomé and Príncipe. The coup was orchestrated by four individuals, including Delfim Neves, the incumbent president of the National Assembly, and a military officer previously linked to an earlier coup attempt. The coup leaders attempted to seize control of both the military barracks and the government headquarters in the capital, São Tomé. However, their efforts were met with fierce resistance from loyal troops and they were eventually defeated.

The coup leaders were subsequently arrested and charged with treason. The São Tomé and Príncipe government condemned the coup attempt and vowed to ensure that the perpetrators would face legal consequences. The coup attempt marked a setback for democracy in São Tomé and Príncipe, a country known for its long-standing political stability. The country has never experienced a successful coup, with the events of February 2022 marking the first coup attempt since 1995.

The episode also highlighted the complexities facing São Tomé and Príncipe, an African island nation with a fledgling democracy which faces challenges of poverty, unemployment, vulnerability to corruption, and the specter of political instability. São Tomé and Príncipe’s path remains uncertain, but the nation’s commitment to democracy and the rule of law remains firm. The government has expressed its determination to strengthen the security apparatus and root out corruption. The country is also actively seeking international support to address its economic difficulties.

C

hina’s lending practices towards developing countries under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have come under heavy criticism from the U.S., which has dubbed it “debt trap diplomacy.” China’s critics argue that it is causing unsustainable debt by financing mega-infrastructure projects whose economic viability is not guaranteed.

Again, according to its critics, some of the implications of the BRI appear to be that Chinese loans will eventually cause developing countries in the Global South to default on their debts, allowing China to take control of strategic assets such as ports, railways, power stations, etc.

China rejects such discourse, claiming that it is criticism invented to discredit it. Referring to the BRI, China portrays itself as a benevolent development partner of developing countries in the Global South.

China argues that its development finance has created a niche for developing countries that lack sufficient national savings to finance their own development investments. The ease of borrowing compared to Western institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) strengthens China’s international reputation.

In fact, China has become the “lender of first resort” for developing countries in the Global South. China emphasizes its role as the largest contributor to the Global South and temporarily suspended interest payments to developing countries canceling 23 interest-free loans to 17 African countries during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Brad Parks, executive director of AidData at William & Mary’s Global Research Institute in Williamsburg, Virginia, told AP News that China’s interest-free loans to Africa were mostly from two decades ago and amounted to “less than 5% of the total” loans it has given to Africa. In addition, Harry Verhoeven, a senior research scholar at Columbia University, told Voice of America that China has forgiven the 23 interest-free loans to African countries in order to counter the West’s debt-trap diplomacy discourse.

How China’s development finance works 

Between the 1950s and 1970s, due to the Cold War context, China’s aid was based on the strategic purpose of funding sympathetic movements and governments. From the 1980s onwards, its development finance started to undergo a paradigm shift that prioritized China’s own economic development. In the newly emerging paradigm, China’s development finance rested on export credits and loans tied to the global expansion of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank) became the pioneering development financiers within this process. SOEs financed developmental investments overseas to stimulate external demand for Chinese goods, services, and capital within the framework of the BRI in a profit-seeking manner. The scope of overseas financing by SOEs covers the construction of railways, ports, and power plants.

What differentiates Chinese loans from those of the West and international organizations such as the UN, the World Bank, and the IMF are as follows:

Chinese SOEs’ financing often begins with Chinese SOEs lobbying the government of developing countries to provide finances for the developmental investments and win the relevant contracts.

China’s SOE-led development finance proceeds through the developing countries’ pursuit of finances to materialize their developmental investments, which contrasts with the conventional approach by the West and international socio-economic institutions which remain simple donors.

An article by Chatham House has argued that the loose governance of overseas financing by Chinese SOEs and banks has created a set of flaws such as closed tendering which are the result of the lobbying activities of Chinese SOEs for overseas projects initiated by developing countries’ governments. The article also claimed that the interplay of Chinese state-owned enterprises’ commercial interests and the policymaking of the political elites in recipient countries makes project viability assessment problematic.

Chinese loans vs. Paris Club’s loans

China’s loans have higher interest rates with shorter grace and maturity periods compared to concessional loans by the World Bank and the Paris Club which makes Chinese loans harder to repay. The Paris Club (or Club de Paris), established in 1956, refers to an informal group of creditor nations whose main objective is to find solutions for various debt repayment issues faced by debtor countries.

In order to mitigate the risk of default posed by the high-interest loans, in some cases, China opts for the collateralization of assets. In Southeast Asia, the Global Career Development Facilitator dataset detected 54 collateralized debt-financed loans, approximately 95% of which was allocated to strategic sectors such as energy, mining, transportation, and communication. What is more, Brad Parks, executive director of AidData, has also discovered that Chinese state-owned enterprises were including clauses in some contracts that required borrowing countries to deposit U.S. dollars in secret escrow accounts. Thus, China’s risk mitigation strategy for debt-financed foreign loans has given rise to the Western-orchestrated discourse of “debt trap diplomacy.”

China often channels its loans to developing countries through Chinese SOEs, joint ventures, and banks, keeping them off government balance sheets. The country’s development finance relies on the commercial interests of SOEs, with government-to-government loans accounting for a small share of Chinese lending.

AidData has revealed that China does not report half of its loans to developing nations in debt statistics. The commercial contracts by Chinese SOEs with the governments of developing countries include confidentiality clauses, precluding borrowers from revealing the content.

Configuration of Chinese loans to the Global South

China’s debt-financed loans heavily outweigh aid-financed loans. Figure 2 demonstrates the configuration of China’s foreign loans to developing countries in Southeast Asia. The findings are in line with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s definition of flow types, namely “official development assistance” (ODA) aid and “other official flows” (OOF).

The drastic change in the aid-debt ratio that started in the early 2010s reflects China’s tendency to provide loans with high interest rates at the market level rather than aid with either zero or concessional interest rates. China’s rising debt-financed loans relative to aid-financed loans to developing countries also coincided with the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiate in 2013. This fueled the Western perception of China pursuing a grand strategy of economic statecraft in the Global South.

T

he Nile River basin is shared by eleven riparian states. The vast portion of the river course originates from Ethiopia’s Blue Nile, or Abbay River, while Egypt and Sudan are the predominant consumers of the Nile River’s waters. As a result, the Nile’s key riparian states are Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan.

After several attempts to deal with integrated basin-wide watercourse management, in 2010, the three states along with the remaining eight riparian states, namely Burundi, D. R. Congo, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, were able to craft the first-ever inclusive legal regime known as the “Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework” that would lay the ground for establishing a basin-wide commission.

Unfortunately, the states were unable to reach a consensus, however, on the fate of the major colonial treaties, mainly the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and its extended 1959 Egypt-Sudan agreement, as Egypt and Sudan insist on their continued enforcement while Ethiopia and other upstream riparian states assert otherwise.

Save the basin-wide deadlocked negotiations on The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) that is awaiting minimum ratification to enter into force, the three riparian states have been in dispute over various issues concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which is being built on the course of the Abbay River since 2011.

Since the commencement of the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the three riparian states have held on-and-off talks regarding the references that would create a conducive environment for their roundtable negotiation over the dam. Accordingly, despite the intermittent nature of the talks, the decade-long negotiations have borne fruit in establishing various technical committees, such as the International Panel of Experts (IPoE) in 2012 and the National Independent Scientific Research Group (NISRG) in 2018. The negotiations also brokered the “Declaration of Principles on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam” in 2015, which is applauded for laying a fertile ground for the forthcoming negotiations, especially, for talks over the dam’s first filling and operation.

With the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as a corner stone, the three riparian states have agreed to be bound to, inter alia, the principles of cooperation, development, no significant harm rule, and equitable and reasonable use per Article I, II, III & IV of the “Declaration of Principles,” respectively. Furthermore, Article V dictates that the three riparian states respect and act as per the outcomes and recommendations of the technical committee. Although the three states have endorsed the IPoE’s final report, they could not agree to do the same for the studies of the other technical committees. Especially, the NISRG, which was tasked with providing alternative procedures on the first filling and operation of the GERD, made promising progress; however, it failed to come to terms with the baseline scenarios, which dragged them toward the colonial agreements.

The African Union and the GERD

Even though the trilateral and/or AU-led negotiations have not been exhaustively utilized, Egypt internationalized the issue and requested the intervention of the UN Security Council. Ethiopia objected to the request stating that the GERD is a regional matter, which procedurally should either be resolved through tripartite negotiation or be dealt with under the auspices of the AU. The UN Security Council backed down and dictated that the three countries come together and solve their differences amicably.

For the last couple of years, negotiation over the GERD has been put on hold due to the conflict in Ethiopia and political instability in Sudan. Although the three riparian states have not issued an official communiqué, there are reports indicating several confidential negotiations have taken place in the United Arab Emirates, but with no significant progress.

Recently, after Ethiopia’s prime minister vowed to delay the fourth filing of the dam until September 2023, a joint statement was issued following a meeting with the Egyptian president in Cairo in early-July 2023. It was agreed to re-initiate tripartite negotiation over the GERD and a pledge was given to conclude negotiations in four months. Despite the unrealistic ambition of the statement given the track record of the last ten years, the statement shows the ambition, willingness, and commitment of the riparian states to solve the sticking issues quickly. The move is a big step and could be a huge relief if the three states pursue the negotiation in good faith, compromise their interests, and come to agreeable terms in a win-win manner.

Currently, more than a month after the joint statement, it was not clear yet where and when these negotiations were going to take place, until it was made public that the negotiations commenced on August 27, 2023 in Cairo, Egypt. Moreover, recalling the ongoing war in Sudan, it is naïve to assume Sudan is going to engage proactively in tripartite negotiations. What is more, the joint statement was issued by two riparian states, and primarily Ethiopia. Thus, the talks are practically going to be bilateral, notably between Ethiopia and Egypt.

As the move impliedly ignores Sudan, it raises trust issues. Reports have already started indicating that Sudan is dismayed by the move. Although Ethiopia and Egypt are the two major riparian states, Sudan’s concerns should not be ignored given its geographical location midstream, and its role and significance in the tripartite negotiations.

There is little doubt that states are free to negotiate openly or secretly whenever and/or wherever they want in the presence or absence of a third party. The three riparian states might openly or secretly pursue their negotiations either in their respective state/city, under the auspices of the AU, in a third country like the U.S. or UAE or agree otherwise and negotiate accordingly. What matters the most is whenever and wherever talks are going on, it has to be pursued in a good faith whereby their respective national interests, tripartite negotiations, and basin-wide cooperation are prioritized in a balanced manner.

Against the above context, before the actual commencement date was made public, there was an assumption that negotiations might have already confidentially begun in the UAE given the experience of the last two years. Recalling the two downstream riparian states’ mechanisms to pressure Ethiopia, and the Arab League’s position on the GERD, there could be scenarios in which the UAE, using its economic leverage, might pressure Ethiopia to sign a binding deal. Had the assumption been true although the UAE, like the Washington-led negotiations, is not expected to pursue an active role in the negotiation process, it would be unwise to rule out such a possibility.

Now that the whereabouts of the negotiations over the GERD are public, the riparian states need to pursue their talks in a way that would address the remaining unresolved issues on the filling and operation of the grand dam. Most importantly, they should consciously pursue their negotiations in such a way that would not affect future basin-wide negotiations over the equitable and reasonable use, and the fair share of the entire Nile River course among all riparian states.

Furthermore, in the past, the AU has sponsored the GERD matter and has not issued a communiqué indicating any new developments. Thus, the righteous approach would be to continue negotiating under the AU. The riparian states need to pursue the dogma of “African solutions to African problems,” retain the GERD matter under the AU, and transparently walk the talk under its chairmanship.

A

gainst the backdrop of the Nile’s flowing currents, a complex struggle unfurls between Egypt and Ethiopia, each driven by their distinct needs and aspirations. As the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) nears completion, tensions rise, underscoring the challenge of balancing development and preservation in a region with scarce water supplies. The Nile River, one of the longest rivers in the world, passes through eleven different countries from south to north, and its appears that Ethiopia and Egypt are unwilling to share it. Egyptians cannot live without the Nile, and they depend on it completely for water. Ethiopia also needs GRED for development.

Throughout history, Egypt has had a profound connection to the Nile. The country consists of more than 90% desert and the Nile is called the “Gift of the gods.” At the same time, Ethiopia needs the Nile water to fill GERD and help the country supercharge its economy. More than 60% of Ethiopia is not connected to the power grid, which is something the government wants to change.

This is where the tension begins between the two countries. Mohammed Mahmoud, director of the Climate and Water Program at the Middle East Institute, warns, “Folks have never actually gone to war just because of water.” “Now, we could be at the point in history where that changes.”

What will Ethiopia gain from GERD?

With a budget of $4.2 billion, GERD is in the western Benishangul-Gumuz region and has been a source of contention between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt since the beginning of its construction in 2011.

Sudan and Egypt fear the Ethiopian project could reduce their share of the Nile waters. Ethiopia insists the dam is the key to its economic development: the dam is Africa’s biggest hydroelectric project to date and is expected to generate over 5,000 megawatts of electricity, doubling the nation’s electricity output when it has been fully completed.

More than 60% of Ethiopians cannot access electricity. Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed stated that “Ethiopia doesn’t have any intention to cause harm to Sudan and Egypt.” “But we also don’t want to live in darkness,” he added. Currently, 90% of construction has been completed.

What has caused the Nile waters crisis?

Egypt is in the grip of a water crisis caused by an increasing population and a limited water supply. The country has less water per person each year and is already below the United Nation’s water poverty threshold. By 2025 the UN predicts that Egypt will be approaching an “absolute water crisis.” Climate change, poor water management, recurring droughts, and the new Ethiopian hydropower dam on the Nile River are worsening the water crisis in the country.

In a report by Fast Company Middle East, Mohamed El-Kamel, the managing director of Alashanek ya Balady Association for Sustainable Development (AYB-SD), mentions a combination of factors that make Egypt susceptible to drought such as diminished rainfall, exacerbated by the increase in greenhouse gas emissions which leads to elevated temperatures. These changes also contribute to a shift in the distribution path of water. The escalating temperatures and impacts of climate change further cause water evaporation and decrease the water levels in Egypt’s lakes and rivers.

Depending solely on the Nile presents a heightened challenge in mitigating water scarcity for the country. The shrinking of the Nile is a result of increasing temperatures and prolonged drought periods. During the Cairo Water Week, Egypt’s Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Dr. Hani Sewilam underscored the country’s significant reliance on the Nile for nearly 97% of its irrigation and drinking water, outlining the interconnected transboundary risks.

Egypt is deeply concerned by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in terms of its water security. According to Dr. Sherine Ahmed El Baradei, associate professor at the Civil Engineering Program at the German University in Cairo, “Filling the reservoir over a more extended period would be a beneficial approach, as Ethiopia’s reservoir filling every five to seven years could lead to a reduction of Egypt’s water share by approximately 12 to 25% during the filling period.”

How to solve the water crisis

With a population that exceeds 109 million now, Egypt’s population is predicted to more than double within 50 years. The population problem is exacerbated by a lack of natural resources and habitable space, although Egypt extends over one million square kilometers. Most Egyptians live in just 7% of the country, mainly along the Nile and the Nile Delta. Due to overpopulation, the government began a family planning campaign to reduce birth rates and control overpopulation, dubbed “Two children are enough.” The government believes that this campaign will be a solution to Egypt’s pending water crisis.

Rice plays an important role in Egyptian cuisine with annual rice consumption standing at 67.5 kg per capita. Egypt switched from a rice exporter to a rice importer following governmental measures reducing rice-cultivated areas due to the water shortage crisis. According to the Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN), the country approved a law to circumvent illegal rice cultivation.

If a farmer is found to be planting rice outside of the allotted rice growing area set by the government, they could face a fine ranging from EGY 3,000 to EGY 10,000, or face a maximum six-month prison sentence. This was another government measure to combat water scarcity. 

Due to climate change, increasing human population pressure, and Ethiopia constructing a giant hydropower dam on the Nile, Africa is facing a water crisis. However, this crisis poses particular challenges for Egypt as the river provides nearly all Egyptians with drinking water. Without water, there can be no Egypt. As part of Egypt’s national strategy to improve accessibility to drinking water, a seawater desalination plant in New Mansoura recently began operations. The project is a part of the first phase of Egypt’s strategy which aims to build 21 seawater desalination plants that will reduce water extraction from the Nile.

The proposed desalination plants will be able to provide the water-stressed nation with an additional 3.3million m³/d of water that can be used to irrigate crops or for public water supply. Once the second phase is completed, the plants are expected to increase the country’s desalination capacity by 8.8 million m³/d at a total cost of $8 billion.

Is a water crisis imminent?

The citizens of Ethiopia are suffering from lack of electricity and hope to remedy this with the Rennaisance Dam. Furthermore, the completion of the Renaissance Dam will boost Addis Ababa’s economy by exporting electricity. However, countries like Egypt, at the end of the trail that receives the water, are worried about not having enough water to survive.

Egyptians have always depended on the Nile for their survival. Meanwhile, the construction of Ethiopia’s dam is currently 90% complete, and many meetings, agreements, and discussions between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan have been held with no mutual agreements.

Egypt and Ethiopia are unlikely to budge as both countries want what is best for their future. At the same time, Egyptians and Ethiopians want a suitable alternative to the impasse – and the sooner the better.

The World Resources Institute (WRI) warned that 25 countries around the world, which make up a quarter of the world’s population, are at risk of water scarcity due to high stress on their available water resources.

According to the organization’s report, published on August 16, 2023, around four billion people in 25 countries are living with high levels of water stress for at least one month, posing imminent risks to human livelihoods, health, crops, livestock and energy security.

In the absence of effective water management, population growth, economic activity and climate change are factors that will exacerbate water stress, the organization says.

Most affected regions

According to World Resources Institute report, the regions most affected by water stress are the Middle East and North Africa, where 83% of the population is experiencing extreme water stress. In South Asia, the percentage drops to 74%.

This situation has prompted many governments to take measures such as regular water cut-offs to combat short-term droughts and impending water shortages.

Currently, 25 countries around the world experience extreme water stress annually, including countries in the Middle East.

With global water demand expected to increase 20%-25% by 2050, WRI estimates that the percentage of the population facing water stress will rise to 100%.

Other countries mentioned in the report and will face water stress includes the United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Iraq, Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Jordan and Syria.

Political stability

The report notes that the impact won’t be limited to consumers and water-dependent industries but could also threaten political stability in regions around the world. For example, protests over mismanagement of water resources which have been seen in Iran.

According to the Global Commission on Adaptation, water management failures could lead to GDP losses of 7-12% in India, China and Central Asia and 6% in most of Africa by 2050.

However, the world’s biggest challenge will be to feed a population of nearly 10 billion by 2050 in the face of increasing water stress, climate change impacts, droughts and floods.

In its report, the organization recommends adopting better water management policies through techniques such as removing water-intensive grasses, desalination, treating and recycling wastewater, implementing efficient irrigation methods and shifting to less water-intensive crops.

The organization concluded its report by stressing that effective water management can help achieve prosperity even in the face of water scarcity, as in the case of Singapore.

Factors behind water scarcity

Global water scarcity is being driven by several key factors, the most important of which is climate change, which is increasing temperatures and leading to increased evaporation and reduced precipitation. This leads to the depletion of water sources such as rivers, lakes and aquifers, exacerbating the challenge of meeting the water needs of both human populations and ecosystems.

The world’s growing population, expected to reach 9.7 billion by 2050, is worsening the situation by straining water resources through increased demand for drinking water, sanitation, agriculture and industry. Water pollution is another critical element, posing a serious threat in many regions, rendering water sources unsafe for consumption and damaging ecosystems.

Inefficiencies in water use complicate the problem, with leaky pipes, outdated irrigation methods and agricultural and industrial practices wasting precious resources. In addition, inadequate infrastructure in certain parts of the world hinders the effective collection, storage and distribution of water, leading to shortages and compromised water quality.

Given these multiple challenges, addressing global water scarcity requires a comprehensive approach that includes climate change mitigation, sustainable practices, improved infrastructure and increased awareness of water conservation.

In addition to the causes mentioned above, several other factors can contribute significantly to the problem of water scarcity.

War and conflict have the potential to disrupt water supplies and infrastructure, further complicating access to water for affected regions. Natural disasters, including floods, droughts and earthquakes, can cause significant damage to water sources and infrastructures, exacerbating the challenge of ensuring consistent water availability.

In addition, inequitable distribution of water resources furthers the problem in different parts of the world, where some populations have abundant water resources while others face scarcity. Addressing these multiple causes of water scarcity requires a comprehensive approach that includes conflict resolution, disaster preparedness and strategies for equitable resource allocation.

O

n July 28, 2023, during a meeting with African leaders in St. Petersburg in Russia, a peculiar authority gave a speech: Russian Patriarch Kirill voiced his desire to expand Russian Orthodox churches in Africa.

Political expansion of the Russian Orthodox Church in Africa

Over the past two years, the Russian Orthodox Church has been expanding in Africa. It has opened more than 200 parishes in 25 African countries even though traditional Orthodox jurisdiction of Africa belongs to the Patriarchy of Alexandria, Egypt.

Patriarch Kirill claims that the Russian Orthodox Church is obliged to open new churches for the faithful in Africa as he asserts that the Patriarchate of Alexandria has lost its legitimacy through political maneuvers. Kirill’s assertion is driven by Alexandria’s decision to recognize the independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

Patriarch Theodore II of Alexandria has also issued a statement against Patriarch Kirill. He pointed out that Kirill was dividing believers through harsh political statements and that he has no right to “mislead Christ’s flock over political issues.”

Spiritual guidance amongst political divisions

The clash between Kirill and Theodore II is deeply rooted in the events of the recent past. The Kyiv Patriarchate separated from Moscow in 2019 due to political reasons—a move that was received with anger in Moscow. The Russian Church excommunicated the Ukrainian clergymen as schismatics. In the same year, Patriarch Theodore II recognized the Kyiv Patriarchate and was a leading actor in the support of Ukraine’s spiritual independence. Thus, he drew the attention of Patriarch Kirill.

The scope of Theodore II’s authority is of particular importance to Kirill as the former holds the title of the “Pope and Patriarch of the Great City of Alexandria, Libya, Pentapolis, Ethiopia, All Egypt and All Africa.” With more than one million Eastern Orthodox believers in the African continent, Theodore’s spiritual authority stretches from Niger to South Africa, while his jurisdiction attracts conflict and is vulnerable to political manipulations.

Meanwhile, Patriarch Kirill believes that increasing his influence is only possible through intervening in Theodore II’s jurisdiction. He publicly denounces the Patriarchate of Alexandria as corrupt and degenerated, and claims that the Patriarchate of Alexandria deprives Africans of spiritual guidance. In so doing, he legitimizes the Russian Orthodox Church providing them with spiritual guidance. Not confining this guidance under religious terms, Patriarch Kirill seeks to guide Russo-African relations through the Church as well.

Russian aid through religious influence

The Central African Republic can serve as an example of the Moscow Patriarchate’s approach to Africa. In the Central African Republic, a senior cleric switched allegiance from Alexandria to Moscow and the Kremlin generously rewarded this with new schools and infrastructure. Dissatisfied with the West and happy to receive Russian aid, the Central African Republic established a security cooperation with Russian private military companies, i.e., mercenary troops.

Patriarch Theodore II’s worries are political: he fears that the Russian influence in the Central African Republic could spread to other countries with Orthodox believers. The Central African Republic ended up with Russia interfering in its bureaucracy, media, economy, and politics.

Orthodoxy is serving as a tool for Russia to pursue influence in Africa, confirming the fact that religion can still serve as an instrument for soft power. Nevertheless, Russia still must beat the Alexandrian Church if it wants to expand its sphere of influence in Africa.

T

he Wagner Group, a private military company based in Russia, has been making a name for itself in the global system since 2014. Wagner’s leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close figure to Putin, is also known as “Putin’s cook.” Prigozhin announced that he founded Wagner specifically to support Russian forces in the Donbas Warin May 2014. Wagner has a presence both in Russia and across the world, including the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and Latin America. The group is a major player in various conflict zones around the world, including Libya, Syria, Ukraine, the Central African Republic, and Mali.

In line with Russia’s interests, Wagner is active in at least 15 countries around the world, at least 10 of which are in Africa, providing military services, including the necessary personnel, training, and logistics. Wagner operates as a private military company, and until the crisis, i.e., the June 23 mutiny, there was no official claim that its activities were carried out in line with national interests and the Russian government.

The leader of the Wagner group, Yevgeni Prigojin, claimed that Russian airstrikes on Wagner camps had caused the deaths of thousands of militiamen. However, the Russian Ministry of Defense dismissed these claims as provocations. The Federal Security Service, on the other hand, accused Prigojin of trying to start an internal conflict and called for his arrest. The Kremlin stated that Putin was aware of Prigojin’s actions and had taken the necessary measures.

In the process, Putin emphasized that those who took up arms would be punished. Prigojin and the Wagner group claimed that a crisis had begun. However, before the crisis escalated, Belarusian President Lukashenko intervened, easing tensions, and the Wagner forces withdrew. Thus, the case against Prigojin was dropped and he was sent to Belarus. As a result, the Wagner fighters were prosecuted and had the option to sign contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense.

The Wagner Group is said to have close links with Vladimir Putin. The mutiny, which began on June 23 and lasted only a short time, has therefore deeply affected Russia. Especially in recent years, Wagner had become an important actor due to the expansion of its sphere of influence in Africa, its influence on the resources in the regions where it is located, and global security reasons. Wagner’s mutiny has thus raised questions about Russia’s domestic and security dynamics as well as the future of its global policy. Although Wagner’s presence in Africa is linked to civil wars, conflicts, and security issues, it is the natural resources and mining activities in the resource-rich regions in which it operates that attract the most attention.

Wagner as an instrument of influence in Africa

With close ties to the Kremlin, Wagner’s role in Russia is characterized by active involvement in crisis zones and regions where global and regional tensions are high. Wagner’s operations in African countries such as the Central African Republic, Mali, Sudan, and Libya have had a ripple effect enabling Russia to establish a presence in strategic regions and play an active role across the continent.

Wagner is known to be present in Mauritania, Algeria, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Madagascar, and Mozambique. Russia’s policy through Wagner helped increase Russia’s influence in Africa, allowing it to achieve its geopolitical and strategic goals. However, the mutiny led by Prigozhin raises questions about the rationality of this policy.

Wagner’s strategic goals in Africa: Political instability and mining

As in the past, Africa’s natural resources and reserves are of strategic importance to many actors today. These resources have the potential to influence the geopolitical interests of global actors and shape regional and global balances of power.

Wagner’s mutiny will have a major impact not only on Russia’s domestic politics and its Africa policy, but on global politics as well: Wagner provided military services and training in African countries, and held lucrative economic interests far beyond military services by being actively involved in trade with African countries.

From an economic perspective, it is well known that Wagner played an active role in the mining sector. Its involvement in countries with natural resources such as gold, diamonds, and cobalt reinforces the perception that it acted in line with Russia’s economic interests and ensured security of supply for Russia.

After the mutiny, Russia, which had consolidated its presence in Africa through Wagner, will have to revise its African policy. It is likely that Wagner’s role in Russia’s Africa policy will be gradually eliminated and replaced by another private military company; Prigozhin will be taken out of the equation; Wagner will be integrated into a position under the Ministry of Defense; and Putin will maintain direct control over Wagner.

Wagner’s future in Africa

Given the economic gains it has made from the natural resources in the regions it controls, Wagner will not want to withdraw from Africa. Most probably, Russia will conduct a “purge” within Wagner, whose long-standing relations with different social structures in African countries should also be taken into account.

In order for Wagner to operate in Africa, a continent with diverse cultures and social structures, it has had to cooperate with the locals. For example, it is known that gold mines and mining operations are concentrated in Kordofan and Darfur in Sudan, Kidal and Sikasso in Mali, and the Bambari-Bria line in the Central African Republic along the country’s western border.

Given that some ethnic elements in these regions have attempted to rebel against state authority in the past, Wagner is likely to view these groups, and anti-government groups in general, as a tool to be used against the current administrations.

Wagner will possibly attempt to protect the areas under its control by incorporating or militarily strengthening potential elements within these groups. The realization of such a scenario could pose a threat to existing governments and disrupt domestic political balances. This could lead to further instability and conflict, and exacerbate regional tensions and global rivalries.

I

n the heart of Kenya’s Shakahola Forest, a shocking discovery has unearthed a haunting story of tragedy and fanaticism. Authorities have uncovered the dark secrets of an alleged starvation cult following a tip-off from a concerned father. In the depths of the forest, more than 400 bodies were found, including innocent children. These victims fell prey to a doomsday cult led by the charismatic televangelist Pastor Paul Nthenge Mackenzie, head of the Good News International Church. The cult preached a disastrous doctrine that promised salvation through self-starvation. As the authorities delved deeper into the cult’s activities, the sinister nature of its their beliefs became evident.

This nightmarish saga dates back to the early 2000s when Pastor Mackenzie, a former taxi driver, founded the cult. Initially attracting followers with fiery sermons, Mackenzie’s messages took a dark turn over time, leading to the rapid radicalization of his followers. By 2010, his teachings focused on “doomsday” prophecies, and he began manipulating his followers for financial gain.

Mackenzie preached that his followers had to give up their earthly possessions to truly follow “the cause”. He built a spiritual camp for his loyal followers in the remote area of Shakahola Forest. He instructed them to abandon education, shun medical care, and refuse vaccinations, branding doctors as worshippers of another god. They were ordered to give up conventional food, dismissing it as “worldly food”, and told to destroy their government documents, including identity cards and birth certificates.

Eyewitness accounts reveal that the cult leader urged parents to strangle their starving children. Shockingly, Mackenzie had previously been arrested for various child deaths in 2017, 2019, and 2023, but was released on bail. When the events of the Shakahola cult came to light, President William Ruto remarked that Mackenzie’s amounted to terrorism and that he belonged in prison.

Criminal cults replicate similar patterns

However, this is not an isolated case. Throughout history, the world has witnessed similar cults with disastrous endings, such as Jonestown, the Rajneesh Movement, and the Ten Commandments of God Movement.

Experts, including Joe Navarro, a veteran of the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Program, suggest that cult leaders are often pathologically narcissistic. They have an exaggerated belief in their own importance, claim to have all the answers, and demand unwavering loyalty. These cults erode individual autonomy and critical thinking, leading members to follow the leader’s orders without question, sometimes leading to their own destruction or violent actions.

The dangers posed by such cults go beyond individual tragedies with unquestioning obedience to authority raising national and international security issues. Historical examples, such as Charles Manson’s cult and the Rajneesh Movement’s armed conflict with local authorities, illustrate the potential for violence and conflict arising from these groups.

The Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments of God (MRTCG) in Uganda is a harrowing example of how such groups can become a serious national and international security threat. In March 2000, the cult’s leaders (Joseph Kibweteere, Joseph Kasapurari, John Kamagara, Dominic Kataribabo, and Credonia Mwerinde) prophesied the end of the world, but when the predicted doomsday did not materialize, chaos broke out within the cult.

On March 17, 2000, more than 530 members, including women and children, were found dead in the cult’s Kanungu commune. The cult leaders had locked their followers in the communal church building and committed mass murder by setting fire to the building.

Cults exploit people’s vulnerabilities

Charismatic and authoritarian cult leaders, such as those involved in the cases above, possess an aura that attracts individuals to their cause. They prey on the vulnerability of their followers, promising salvation, enlightenment, or a vision of the apocalypse that resonates with their deepest fears and desires.

These cults often display hostility towards the outside world, branding it as corrupt or evil. This hostility has translated into conflict and violence, as seen in the Jonestown Massacre and the actions of the Rajneesh Movement.

Moreover, the international reach of cults such as the Rajneesh Movement and Aum Shinrikyo (a Japanese new religious movement and doomsday cult) poses a challenge to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. These cults set up operations in several countries and attract followers from different backgrounds. Their global presence allows them to manipulate vulnerable individuals from various regions, causing damage that transcends national borders. 

Social media and cults

The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo established international centers in various countries, including Russia, the United States, Germany, and others. Similarly, around 1981, the leaders of the Rajneeshee movement (Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh and Ma Anand Sheela) were threatened with punitive action by the Indian authorities. In response, they decided to leave India. They set up a new religious settlement in the United States.

Today cult leaders can exploit communication technologies better, particularly social media and online platforms, to reach potential followers worldwide. This enables them to internationalize their movements and recruit and radicalize individuals across continents. In extreme cases where cults go haywire, they may be involved in acts of terrorism or violence that cross national borders. The breakdown of social norms and governance within these cult communities creates a hotbed for criminal activity and human rights abuses, affecting the international community as a whole.

The cautionary tale of the starvation cult in Kenya’s Shakahola Forest and its predecessors highlight the dangerous appeal of charismatic cult leaders and the tragic consequences of their manipulative doctrines. The grim impact of this cult, which claimed hundreds of lives, including innocent children, serves as a reminder of the dangers posed by such fanatical groups.

W

est Africa is a region that has been plagued by coups since 2020. The most recent coup was in Niger on July 26, 2023. In 1900, Niger was a military zone administered by France. In 1946, it became a French overseas territory and since 1960, it has existed as a “fully independent” state in the international system. Since independence, Niger has suffered four coups d’état and three attempted coups d’état. This has led Niger to be described as one of the most unstable countries in the international system—a development highly related to its colonial legacy.

After the coup d’état in Niger, France, the United States, the West, in general, and, in particular, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union, condemned the coup and issued statements calling for the restoration of constitutional order and democratic conditions as soon as possible. Today, it is clear from the coups that the expectations of West African societies for democracy have not been met.

The serious problems in the security architecture of West African countries cause the security gaps that unfortunately lead to coups. It is difficult for a healthy democracy to function in countries where mutual trust and security cannot be fully guaranteed; in societies where people have lost their loved ones as a result of the practices of the governments and terrorist groups that rule the country, democracy is not a priority.

Niger is one of the ten poorest countries in the world and suffers from the persistence of insecurity due to a series of security problems such as economic problems, corruption, unequal distribution of income, terrorism, insurgency, conflicts and political instability, bad governance, and internal power struggles. All these stand out as the main factors behind the coup. Struggling with terrorism for many years, Niger is unable to guarantee security and France’s lack of success in providing security and stability had led to public outcry. On the other hand, the presence of Russia’s Wagner Group, which provides relative security, leads to the appearance of Russian flags in Niger and increased Russian influence in the region.

The coup in Niger

Unfortunately, coups in the Sahel now seem to be a regular occurrence. The Niger coup was preceded by coups in Mali in August 2020, Guinea in September 2021, Chad in April 2021, and Burkina Faso on January 24, 2022. Following the coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, French soldiers from these countries moved to Niger as part of Operations Barkhane and Sabre.

Together with the soldiers who entered Niger as part of these operations, it is estimated that there are 1,500 French soldiers in the country that have been deployed for counterterrorism training, intelligence, and air support.

Led by General Abdourahamane (Omar) Tchiani and the Nigerien presidential guard, a coup d’état took place on July 26, against Niger’s President Mohammed Bazoum, who had been democratically elected in 2021 with 55.6 percent of the vote. It remains unclear at this stage how the coup will end and what direction the process will take. The coup’s chances of success may also be linked to the intervention of external actors.

Looking at the reasons for the coup in Niger, which occupies a critical position in African politics and in West Africa, the aforementioned internal reasons come to the fore. In this context, while the number of putschist generals in the Sahel is increasing, the coup plotters are using anti-French discourses to legitimize their presence. This discourse is also being used by Russia, which is seeking to expand its presence in the region through Wagner and other means.

By using anti-French rhetoric, the coup generals in the Sahel are also trying to benefit from the global competition in international relations, legitimize their presence, and consolidate their position. At the same time, they are trying to create a balanced situation by forming alliances with other countries in the region that have also been taken over by coups.

Regional implications of the coup 

The Niger coup has implications and consequences both for the country and for actors with imperialist ambitions such as France, China, and Russia. In the process, the confidence in France’s influence in the region has weakened, while regional security risks have increased.

In the aftermath of the coup, the use of the rhetoric of military intervention by ECOWAS to restore the old order can be said to reflect its efforts to prevent instability in the region and ensure regional peace. At the same time, regional actors such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Algeria, have supported the new government in Niger. They issued a joint statement opposing the possible use of force by ECOWAS and stating that they would intervene militarily if necessary. This situation could lead to divisions among the countries in the region and ECOWAS’s ability to provide a coordinated response to such events may be reduced.

Nevertheless, if ECOWAS decides to intervene militarily, conflict in the region is inevitable. In addition, the presence of Nigeria, one of the most important countries in West Africa, Algeria, another important country in North Africa, and Chad, which is not a member of ECOWAS, as key actors in the regional equation will play a crucial role in determining the direction of regional tensions.

There are two alternative approaches that hold the potential to avoid conflict in Niger: the anti-coup military and civilian groups within Niger, and the efforts of Benin and Chad through mediating roles. It is believed that the anti-coup group within the Niger military will not use force against the coup plotters so as to avoid conflict; however, it is possible that a counter-coup could emerge, perhaps if the coup group is weakened. Nevertheless, the threatening messages by coup leaders in neighboring countries are setting in motion a process that is having a significant impact on tensions in Niger and the region.

Global implications of the coup

After the coup in Niger, global competition is intense among actors such as France, the U.S., Russia, and China. France, in particular, has strong relations with West Africa; however, after the coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, it has paid more attention to Niger. The U.S., France, Germany, and Italy also have military bases in Niger. The most important of these military bases is Niger Air Base 201, a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) base, which stands out as an intelligence and surveillance center for the United States.

Niger shares a long border with Nigeria, which has significant energy reserves in the region, and instability in Niger can affect Nigeria’s security. Regional instability is undesirable given the U.S. relationship with Nigeria in the context of energy cooperation and U.S. interests in West Africa. Furthermore, the regional terrorist organization Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP) has the potential to strengthen its presence in the region by taking advantage of the possible conflict situation.

On the other hand, the energy resources in West Africa, where French companies such as Areva are active, are essential for France’s energy security. France depends on nuclear energy with nearly 70% of France’s energy needs being met by nuclear power stations. Niger, which has the seventh-largest uranium reserves in the world and the second-largest in Africa, is France’s third-largest uranium supplier. Niger supplies 19% of France’s uranium needs and exports the largest amount of uranium to France and Canada. At the same time, Niger supplies 25% of the European Union’s uranium needs.

Meanwhile, the China National Petroleum Corporation is building an oil pipeline project between Niger and Benin, most of which will pass through Niger, with a capacity of 90,000 barrels of oil per day. The coup in Niger and the stabilization of the country are therefore crucial to China’s economic interests in the region. In this context, it is also possible that China will take financial initiatives in relation to the coup. Given China’s cooperation with Russia on specific agendas, the global competition may continue in West Africa and these actors might evaluate the situation in the region as an opportunity for Russia to continue the war in Ukraine and squeeze the West in the energy sector.

O

n July 28, General Abdourahmane Tchiani was appointed as the new head of state through a military coup in Niger, ousting President Mohamed Bazoum. General Tchiani and the supporting military forces cited the countries weak security situation and overall ineffective governance as motivations for their actions.

Some analysts speculate that internal power struggles, rather than security concerns, are the true driving forces behind General Tchiani’s actions. President Bazoum has made little commentary since Thursday, only writing “The hard-won gains will be safeguarded,” and “All Nigeriens who love democracy and freedom would want this,” on the social media platform X, previously called Twitter. His location is unknown although it is likely he is being held in the presidential palace.

Large swaths of Niger’s locals approve of the coup, agreeing with the claims of lack of security, specifically in the face of radical militants spreading across the Sahel region. Pro-coup locals hope that this change of power will provide increased protection from this threat. Other grievances from citizens include governmental corruption and difficult economic conditions. In addition, the coup represents the fruits of anti-French attitudes that are held by many in Niger due to France’s colonial history in the country.

Protests supporting General Tchiani, and against the former president’s pro-Western leanings, were seen in the capital, with protestors waving Niger’s and Russia’s flag. Chants in support of Russia’s Putin, Niger’s army and against France were heard during these protests. Pro-coup protestors also burned the French flag and threw stones at the French mission in the capital.

French president Emmanuel Macron responded by saying that their government “will not tolerate any attack on France or its interests.” Russia’s Wagner boss has publicly called the coup “good news” and has offered his fighter’s military power to aid the success of General Tchiani. Wagner is operational in bordering Mali and in other African nations including the Central African Republic.

The world reacts to the coup

Conversely, Niger’s locals have also organized anti-coup protests attended by hundreds across the nation. African and Western countries as well as local and global organizations maintain a backing for the president. The European Union warned of freezing financial support to Niger while the United States may withhold cooperation with Niger’s government. For anti-coup parties, democracy should prevail. In addition, Niger has been a strong ally of the West to combat insurgencies. Western powers are concerned with the possibility of this coup expanding Russian influence in the country.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECWAS) held a summit three days after the coup took place, agreeing that Bazoum should return to his position as president within a week time. If this does not happen, the Community has vowed to use “force” on top of already imposed sanctions on Niger. At the moment, it is unclear what force Niger may face from the ECOWAS.

Niger’s prime minister under President Bazoum has warned that sanctions will be “catastrophic” as Niger “is a country that will not be able to resist these kinds of sanctions.” Sanctions imposed by ECOWAS in other countries have generally been ineffective and have had negative impacts on civilian populations rather than the intended coup governments.

Additional results of this summit include the immediate shutting of Niger’s borders, banning of commercial flights, halted financial transactions, and frozen national assets and aid. U.S Secretary of State Anthony Blinken agreed with ECOWAS’ decisions and called for the immediate release of the president and that state functions be restored under the democratically elected government.

The United Nations said it would still deliver aid in Niger even though it had not had any contact with the military since the coup. U.S: “cease security and other cooperation with the government of Niger.”

General Tchiani’s military actions and supporting civilians represent well established anti-French sentiments and aspirations to create a new power structure while anti-coup individuals and forces seek to maintain the status quo in the region.

T

he news of Nahel Merzouk’s murder by the police took me back to my primary school days in France. In the early 1990s, as a pupil in a public school in Forbach, Metz, I saw what it meant to be excluded and isolated.

That is why, for me, Nahel’s death was not the first death of a migrant in France, nor would it be the last. In 2005, for example, two young men met a fate similar to Nahel’s. Zyed Benna and Bouna Traoré were running from the police after a football match when they hit an electricity transformer in Paris and were electrocuted. There were riots afterwards. It happened again: Nahel Merzouk was killed by the police and riots followed immediately afterwards.

So, what is the basic problem? What is the root cause of the killing of people like Nahel and the events that follow?

The recruitment of labor from the colonial territories: Opening the door to migrants

In order to answer this question properly, it is necessary to look at the process of colonialism or more precisely to review the history of colonialism briefly. In this sense, colonialism,  which started in the 15th century, is the work of Western countries. The slave trade from Africa and the concept of the “attack on Africa” emerged in this context. Today, colonialism has changed its form.

Although it started a little later than Portuguese-Spanish and British colonialism, French colonialism was exceptionally  brutal. After the British Empire, the French colonial empire was the second largest in the world, reaching its peak and expansion between 1919 and 1939. The French colonial territory, including Algeria, amounted to between 8% and 10% of the world’s territory, and continued to exist until the 1960s.

The French treated the peoples of their colonies much more cruelly than other colonizers; those who were not killed, were treated as an underclass. As a result, the French colonies became very poor.  For example, the British colonies of New Zealand and Australia are now very wealthy states, while Algeria, which was subjected to French exploitation, is a poor and troubled country.

The history of French colonialism in Africa is a human tragedy. Starting with the colonization of Algeria in 1830, France began to establish a new colonialism in Africa. The aim was ruthless: to “civilize” African peoples through language and religion. For the French, as for all colonialists, this civilizing goal was, as Jules Ferry, the leading advocate of colonialism, openly declared, “The rights of the superior races over the inferior races.” By the beginning of the 20th century, French colonization gradually extended to most of North, West, and Central Africa, including Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Niger, Chad, and the Central African Republic.

Colonialism, especially French colonialism, gave way to “labor migrations” after World War II. From then onwards, it was a question of providing labor from the colonial territories struggling for independence for the reconstruction of Europe and France, in particular. It should be recalled that, although France withdrew from the countries it had colonized, it imposed two conditions on its withdrawal: first, French should be the official language of the country and the language of education, and second, public education should be compulsory.

By creating the “Community of French-Speaking Countries,” France prevented its former colonies from severing their ties with France. For example, French is the official language of 27 of the 54 countries in Africa. As a result, France had the power to easily carry out many “labor migrations” from its former colonies. Instead of the slaves of the past, especially in Algeria, now, there were the modern-day “workers.”

Slavery underwent a transformation process and took the form of a labor force, but both share a common goal: to exploit the world, and Africa in particular, for the welfare of the West or France in particular. For the continuity of the state’s welfare, migrant labor was brought into the system by extending colonial logic to this new era.

Positioning migrants: Assimilation, integration or segregation?

Despite the importance of migrants as a labor force in the eyes of France and Western countries, the positioning of migrants is somewhat complex. The complexity concerns whether to assimilate, integrate, or segregate migrants.

Assimilation was to be easy in so far as people of migrant origin had to abandon their own culture and become “civilized.” This was already a central step in the colonial experience. If integration were to take place, the situation would be a little more difficult as people with a migrant background would have to be integrated into the existing culture while preserving their own culture.

This means accepting to be on the same level as people with a migrant background—in other words, a step against the colonial logic or the “superior race” mentality. There was also the possibility of segregating those with a migrant background, i.e., making them live in places that were separate and disconnected from society. After all, it was not appropriate for people of migrant origin to breathe the same air as people of the “superior race” and, therefore, migrants belonged in ghettos.

The ghettos, known as “suburbs,” became the address of migrants in France. What was the aim? To assimilate under the guise of integration; if that was not possible, then to exclude migrants, or to ghettoize by segregation.

The suburbs in France have many problems. Their main problem, however, is social isolation or social exclusion. Social exclusion is when a person or group, for one reason or another, is deprived of something; people of migrant origins living in the suburbs in France are deprived of many human rights simply because of their background. For example, the suburbs are areas where even ambulances refuse to go in case of emergency.

Those who live in the suburbs are known to develop their own methods to survive, which they retain even if they later move out of the suburbs. When they face injustice by the police and others, Paris is set on fire.