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hinese President Xi Jinping called on China to maintain an “indomitable fighting spirit” in confronting challenges and defending the country’s interests, while praising the Communist Party’s handling of the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests.

Xi made the remarks Monday during a major speech marking the 100th anniversary of the birth of former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin, who led the country from 1993 to 2002 and died in 2022.

Speaking before thousands of officials and delegates at the Great Hall of the People, Xi portrayed China as facing difficult challenges but said the country would remain resilient.

“With an indomitable fighting spirit and exceptional capabilities, we will actively confront major challenges, whether they be rough seas or even raging storms,” Xi said.

He called for the defense of China’s sovereignty, security and development interests, saying the country would continue building on what he described as its achievements in economic development and social stability.

The speech was notable for its reference to the 1989 Tiananmen protests, a subject that remains highly sensitive in China. Xi praised Jiang for supporting the Communist Party leadership’s decision during the crisis and for helping maintain stability in Shanghai.

Xi highlights Jiang’s role in 1989 crackdown

The Tiananmen protests began in April 1989 following the death of former Communist Party leader Hu Yaobang, whose removal from power had been associated with a political shift away from liberalization.

Thousands of students and other protesters gathered in Beijing and called for political reforms and greater democracy. On June 4, Chinese troops moved into central Beijing and fired on protesters, bringing the demonstrations to an end.

Jiang rose rapidly within the Communist Party after the crackdown. He became party general secretary later that year and eventually China’s top leader in 1993.

Xi’s remarks represented a rare acknowledgment in official Chinese discourse of the political turmoil surrounding Tiananmen. Discussion of the crackdown remains heavily restricted in mainland China, while references to the deaths and images of the violence are subject to censorship.

State media also recently highlighted Jiang’s support for the party leadership’s response in a documentary series marking his life, although it did not show footage of the killings.

China faces economic and geopolitical challenges

Xi also praised Jiang’s broader legacy, including the economic reforms and opening to the outside world that accelerated during his leadership.

China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 with strong support from the United States, helping fuel a period of rapid economic growth and deeper integration into global markets.

Relations between Beijing and Washington have since deteriorated, with trade disputes and broader geopolitical tensions increasingly shaping the relationship.

Xi is expected to meet U.S. President Donald Trump in late September, with trade, artificial intelligence and Taiwan among the issues expected to feature in their discussions.

In Monday’s speech, Xi highlighted improvements in living standards and China’s economic achievements, while insisting that the country’s long-term prospects remained strong.

“The prospects for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation are bright,” Xi said, adding that the goal pursued by generations of Chinese leaders was gradually becoming a reality.

(Source: CNN)

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overnment bond markets across the United States, Japan and Europe are sending a warning to policymakers as long-term borrowing costs reach levels not seen in years, driven by rising government debt, inflation concerns and geopolitical uncertainty.

The sharp increase in bond yields is raising borrowing costs for governments, companies and households while making it more difficult for central banks to balance inflation against economic growth.

In the United States, 30-year Treasury yields rose above 5% to their highest level since 2007. Japan’s 10-year government bond yield climbed to just below 3%, its highest level in three decades. German, French and British long-term borrowing costs also reached multiyear or multi-decade highs.

The moves reflect growing concerns about the sustainability of government finances and the inflation outlook as geopolitical tensions, tariffs and the continuing war involving Iran reshape the global economy.

Rising debt and inflation pressure bond markets

The U.S. government debt burden is approaching $40 trillion, while other developed economies are also facing large fiscal deficits and growing borrowing requirements.

The prolonged conflict involving Iran has pushed oil prices higher, with crude recently rising above $90 a barrel. Higher energy prices are adding to inflation concerns and reducing expectations that central banks will be able to cut interest rates quickly.

At the same time, technology companies are borrowing heavily to finance the expansion of artificial intelligence infrastructure and data centers. That demand for capital is increasing competition with governments seeking to sell large amounts of debt.

“Bond yields’ recent surge suggests investors are losing patience with fiscal profligacy,” said Jonas Goltermann, chief markets economist at Capital Economics.

U.S. 30-year Treasury yields later eased slightly, with the yield last down 2.4 basis points at 5.286%. The 10-year Treasury yield stood around 4.71%, a level that markets are watching closely, with 5% increasingly viewed as an important threshold.

The New York Federal Reserve estimates the term premium — the additional return investors demand for holding longer-term government debt — at around 80 basis points, close to its highest level in 12 years.

Recent U.S. Treasury auctions have also highlighted rising borrowing costs. A 10-year Treasury sale cleared at a yield of 4.683%, the highest in 19 years, while a 30-year auction reached 5.216%, a 25-year high.

The increase in government bond yields has also weighed on stocks, with major indexes including the Nasdaq and Europe’s STOXX 600 falling on Tuesday.

Japan and Europe face growing pressure

Japan is experiencing a particularly significant shift in its bond market. Its 10-year borrowing costs have climbed to nearly 3%, while 30-year yields have moved above 4%.

Investors are increasingly expecting the Bank of Japan to raise interest rates as early as September as inflation concerns grow.

Higher Japanese bond yields could also affect U.S. markets because Japanese investors have traditionally been major buyers of U.S. government debt. More attractive returns at home could encourage them to reduce purchases of Treasuries.

Foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries declined in June, according to U.S. Treasury Department data, with Japan, Britain and China among the countries reducing their holdings.

European governments are facing similar pressures. Germany’s 10-year bond yield reached its highest level since 2011, while French yields rose to their highest since 2008. Britain’s 30-year borrowing costs approached levels last seen in May, which were the highest since 1998.

High government spending and debt in countries such as France and Britain have contributed to investor concerns. Climate-related events are also expected to increase pressure on government budgets.

The bond market selloff is significant because government bond yields serve as a benchmark for borrowing across the economy. Higher sovereign yields can translate into more expensive corporate loans, consumer credit and household mortgages.

Some investors, however, believe the recent rise in yields could make government bonds increasingly attractive and eventually encourage buyers to return to the market.

The broader concern for policymakers is whether higher yields represent a temporary adjustment or the beginning of a longer period in which investors demand substantially greater compensation for lending to governments.

With inflation still vulnerable to higher energy prices, government debt continuing to rise and geopolitical risks increasing, bond markets are placing greater pressure on policymakers to demonstrate control over both fiscal policy and inflation.

(Source: Reuters)

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ran is expected to receive the first shipment of hundreds of Chinese-made shoulder-fired air defense missile systems within weeks under a deal valued at between $60 million and $70 million, according to three sources familiar with the agreement cited by Reuters.

If completed, the purchase would represent one of Tehran’s largest known efforts to rebuild its short-range air defenses since months of fighting with the United States and Israel exposed weaknesses in its ability to protect military facilities and strategic infrastructure.

The contract reportedly covers between 300 and 400 man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), including the Chinese-made QW-12 and FN-16 missile systems.

According to Reuters, the agreement was signed through Zhongqing Baoshang International Investment, which the sources said acted as an intermediary between Iran and the Chinese supplier.

The total value of the contract is estimated at $60–70 million, although the sources cautioned that delivery schedules, quantities and implementation details could still change.

Iran’s foreign ministry did not immediately comment on the report.

China’s foreign ministry denied the claims, stating:

“The relevant reports are completely groundless. China has consistently played a role in promoting peace and ending the conflict.”

The parent company, Zhong Qing Bao Shang Group, also did not immediately respond to Reuters’ request for comment.

Air defense overhaul after months of war

Reuters said Iran is seeking to strengthen its defenses after U.S. and Israeli strikes targeted facilities connected to its missile, drone and air defense programs during the recent conflict.

Military analysts note that portable air defense systems are particularly valuable because they can be quickly deployed by small teams and relocated frequently, making them less vulnerable than fixed air defense batteries.

The reported purchase would significantly expand Iran’s inventory of short-range air defense weapons designed to engage Low-flying aircraft, helicopters, and drones.

The QW-12 and FN-16 are infrared-guided missile systems intended to protect military bases, energy infrastructure and other sensitive locations against aerial threats.

Defense experts cited by Reuters consider the QW-12 less advanced than newer Chinese systems such as the QW-18 and QW-19 but say it remains capable of providing an effective layer of short-range protection.

According to the sources, initial shipments were expected to leave Urumqi in western China before transiting through Pakistan into Iran.

The sources did not specify whether the transfers would occur by air or overland.

Pakistan firmly denied any involvement.

The military’s media wing, the Inter-Services Public Relations, called reports linking Pakistan to the transfer of Chinese air defense systems “absolutely concocted and false.”

Reuters also reported that Iran has explored overland transportation routes for Chinese military equipment and dual-use components to reduce the risk of disruption.

Growing military ties with China

The reported procurement comes amid expanding defense cooperation between China and Iran despite years of international sanctions on Tehran.

European and Middle Eastern security sources told Reuters they were aware of discussions involving possible Iranian purchases of several QW-series MANPADS, including the QW-12, QW-18 and QW-19 variants.

Reuters previously reported that Iran was also negotiating with China to acquire anti-ship cruise missiles, although it could not determine whether that agreement was finalized.

If the current deal proceeds, it would underscore Iran’s continued reliance on a combination of domestic weapons production and foreign suppliers as it rebuilds military capabilities following months of conflict.

(Source: Reuters)

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.S. President Donald Trump on Thursday declassified a series of documents that he said revealed Chinese interference in U.S. elections, renewing his long-standing focus on election security despite previous intelligence assessments concluding that Beijing did not alter the outcome of the 2020 presidential election.

In a 25-minute televised address from the White House, Trump claimed the documents exposed “shocking vulnerabilities” in the U.S. electoral system and alleged that China had obtained personal information from approximately 220 million American voter records.

The president also accused members of the U.S. intelligence community of suppressing information about China’s activities and urged Congress to pass stricter election laws, including voter identification requirements, proof of citizenship for voter registration and limits on mail-in voting.

The address comes ahead of November’s midterm elections, as Republicans seek to defend narrow majorities in Congress amid political headwinds linked to the Iran conflict and rising energy prices.

However, Trump’s claims appeared to conflict with findings by the U.S. intelligence community. A declassified intelligence assessment issued in 2021 concluded that no foreign government attempted to alter any technical aspect of the 2020 presidential election, including voter registration systems, ballots, vote tabulation or certified results.

CIA thinks otherwise

The assessment, conducted under then-Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe—now serving as CIA director under Trump—found that while China had collected publicly available information on American voters and political trends for years, it did not attempt to interfere directly in the election outcome.

According to Reuters, two people familiar with the matter said the voter data cited by Trump consisted largely of publicly available voter files that political campaigns and consultants routinely purchase and could not be manipulated to alter election results.

Some White House officials reportedly expressed concern before the speech that releasing the documents could create a misleading impression about the nature of China’s activities.

Trump nevertheless argued that the newly declassified material demonstrated significant weaknesses in U.S. election security and reiterated claims that large numbers of non-citizens were registered to vote, although he did not provide evidence that those registrations resulted in illegal ballots being cast.

Rare voter fraud

Election experts and previous studies have consistently found that voter fraud and non-citizen voting in U.S. elections are rare.

Democratic Senator Mark Warner, vice chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, rejected Trump’s assertions, saying the U.S. intelligence community had unanimously concluded that China “did not even try to change a single vote” in the 2020 election.

The president also renewed his call for lawmakers to approve the SAVE America Act, legislation that would require photo identification to vote, proof of U.S. citizenship for voter registration and tighter restrictions on mail-in ballots. The measure has passed the Republican-controlled House of Representatives but remains stalled in the Senate amid Democratic opposition.

Despite Trump’s assertions about election vulnerabilities, the declassified documents released Thursday did not provide evidence that votes in the 2020 election were altered or manipulated, according to Reuters.

(Source: Reuters)

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hina has successfully recovered the first-stage booster of an orbital launch vehicle for the first time, marking a significant advance in its efforts to develop reusable rocket technology and narrow the gap with the United States in commercial and strategic space capabilities.

The breakthrough came during the launch of the Long March-10B rocket from the Wenchang Spacecraft Launch Site on Hainan Island on Friday. According to Chinese state broadcaster CCTV, the rocket’s first-stage booster separated approximately six minutes after liftoff before returning to a floating platform, where it executed a controlled vertical landing.

Video released by state media showed the booster descending under powered flight and touching down on the offshore platform, with smoke visible near its upper section during the landing.

The mission also successfully placed a satellite into orbit, state media reported.

Historic breakthrough

China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), the state-owned company that developed the rocket, described the achievement as a “historic breakthrough” for the country’s reusable launch technology.

“This mission signifies a historic breakthrough in China’s reusable rocket technology and lays a solid foundation for accelerating improvements in China’s space access capabilities,” the company said in a statement.

The successful recovery represents a key step in Beijing’s broader ambition to become a leading space power while reducing the cost and turnaround time of future launches.

Reusable rockets have transformed the commercial launch industry by allowing expensive boosters to be recovered and flown multiple times, significantly lowering launch costs. The technology has become a cornerstone of U.S.-based SpaceX’s dominance of the global launch market after the company pioneered routine booster landings nearly a decade ago.

Blue Origin, another American space company, also achieved its first successful recovery of the New Glenn rocket’s first-stage booster last November.

Reusable rocket tests

China has intensified efforts to develop comparable capabilities through both its state-backed aerospace program and an expanding commercial space sector. Several Chinese companies have conducted reusable rocket tests in recent months, although earlier attempts experienced setbacks.

The Long March-10 series is expected to play a central role in China’s long-term space ambitions, including planned crewed missions to the Moon. Chinese authorities have identified reusable launch systems as a strategic priority for strengthening the country’s access to space and supporting future satellite, exploration and defense-related missions.

(Source: CNN)

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aiwan has conducted its most comprehensive civil defense and wartime preparedness exercise to date, simulating a cascading national emergency that began with a Chinese blockade and earthquake before escalating into cyberattacks, sabotage, civil unrest and a full-scale military invasion. The drills, observed exclusively by Reuters, underscore Taipei’s growing efforts to strengthen national resilience as military pressure from China continues to intensify.

Held over two days in central Taiwan’s Nantou County, the exercise brought together more than 370 government officials, military officers and emergency responders. Organizers described the scenario as a realistic test of the island’s ability to maintain essential government functions during a complex, multi-dimensional crisis.

The exercise reflected President Lai Ching-te’s broader strategy to prepare Taiwan’s civilian institutions for conflict, drawing lessons from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, where attacks on civilian infrastructure, information warfare and prolonged disruptions have become defining features of modern warfare.

Officials participating in the drill confronted a rapidly deteriorating scenario beginning with a Chinese naval blockade coinciding with a magnitude 6.8 earthquake that killed dozens of people and damaged critical infrastructure. According to the exercise, Beijing exploited the natural disaster to launch cyberattacks, spread disinformation, hijack television broadcasts and sabotage key facilities before initiating a full-scale military assault.

Rare access to the closed-door exercise

Reuters, which was granted rare access to the closed-door exercise, reported that officials were required to coordinate responses across multiple agencies while simultaneously maintaining emergency services, public order and communications under wartime conditions.

“Our adversary is right on our doorstep, just across the Taiwan Strait. That is very close,” Chi Lien-cheng, Taiwan’s minister without portfolio overseeing the exercise, told Reuters.

“If you don’t defend your own country, who else will defend you?” he added, while acknowledging that Taiwan still faced significant shortcomings in resources and preparedness.

The drills represent a shift from Taiwan’s previous emergency exercises, which had often been criticized as overly scripted and symbolic. This year’s program was designed to expose weaknesses and force officials to make decisions under increasingly realistic battlefield conditions.

The first day focused on a lengthy tabletop simulation, while the second featured field exercises that included counter-drone operations, emergency food distribution and coordination between civilian authorities and military reserve forces.

One scenario involved a Chinese drone strike on the county’s emergency response headquarters, forcing officials to activate a backup command center after 75 personnel were declared missing.

Emergency responders also rehearsed protecting power stations, maintaining healthcare services and restoring communications while coping with widespread infrastructure failures.

Civil-military coordination takes center stage

A key objective of the exercise was strengthening cooperation between Taiwan’s civilian institutions and its armed forces.

Military reserve units coordinated directly with local governments, while officials monitored unfolding events through advanced tactical mapping systems and interactive digital platforms that tracked emergency resources in real time.

Lin Fei-fan, deputy secretary-general of Taiwan’s National Security Council, said demonstrating societal resilience was intended to strengthen deterrence against Beijing.

“The message to our adversary is clear: when they know Taiwan’s society is prepared, they will have to think very carefully about whether to launch such a costly war against Taiwan — one that may not succeed,” he said.

Taiwanese officials have increasingly argued that modern conflicts require not only military readiness but also the ability of civilian governments, businesses and communities to continue functioning during sustained attacks.

Lessons from Ukraine have featured prominently in Taiwan’s planning, particularly regarding the importance of decentralized command structures, resilient communications networks and maintaining essential public services.

This year’s drills included moving hospital operations underground, testing backup government facilities and inviting professional cybersecurity experts to attack official networks in simulated cyber warfare.

Participants also faced extensive information warfare scenarios.

In one simulation, local television broadcasts were replaced with Chinese propaganda while false information spread rapidly through social media and printed leaflets. Officials were required to identify disinformation, hold emergency press briefings and reassure the public.

Community leaders also took part in the training

Lee I-yuan, a 75-year-old borough chief who participated in the exercise, said the simulations highlighted the growing importance of combating false information during crises.

“If the other side attacks, they will definitely use AI to spread false information,” he said.

The drills assigned Nantou County, Taiwan’s only landlocked county, a strategic wartime role as a logistical rear base where civilians fleeing frontline regions could seek shelter while government agencies relocated critical operations inland.

Local officials were questioned extensively about emergency preparedness, including the availability of food supplies, infant formula, reserve manpower and medical resources.

Some participants struggled to answer detailed questions as commanders deliberately increased pressure throughout the exercise.

“We can’t actually put them through a real war, so we can only use scenarios to help them understand that war is extremely cruel — all situations will be severe and urgent,” one official involved in the exercise told Reuters.

China, which considers democratically governed Taiwan part of its territory, has never ruled out using force to achieve reunification.

While the resilience exercise concluded, Taiwan’s defense ministry reported that China had simultaneously conducted another combat readiness patrol around the island involving warships and at least 22 military aircraft, including nuclear-capable H-6 bombers.

Beijing accused President Lai of escalating tensions across the Taiwan Strait.

Chinese Foreign Ministry and Taiwan Affairs Office officials said Lai’s policies were increasing the risk of conflict, describing him as a “creator of crises” in cross-strait relations.

Taiwan rejects China’s sovereignty claims, insisting that only the island’s 23 million people can determine their future.

As military activity around Taiwan continues to increase, Taipei hopes its expanding civil defense program will strengthen national resilience while reinforcing its message that any attempt to seize the island by force would face not only military resistance but also a prepared and functioning civilian society.

(Source: Reuters)

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ussia’s defense minister personally approved a covert military training program in China for Russian forces linked to the war in Ukraine, with at least four senior generals from both countries directly involved, according to European officials and classified documents reviewed by Reuters.

The program, conducted in 2025, included instruction in radiological, chemical and biological (RCB) warfare, underscoring the increasingly strategic nature of defense cooperation between Moscow and Beijing despite China’s repeated insistence that it remains neutral in the Ukraine conflict.

The revelations have heightened concern among European governments, which are already reassessing China’s role in supporting Russia’s military capabilities while balancing extensive economic ties with Beijing.

According to the documents, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov authorized the initiative through an internal decree issued in August 2025, allowing Russian military delegations to travel to China for specialized training at facilities operated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

One classified report described a three-week course held at a military academy in Beijing in November 2025, where Russian personnel received instruction on radiological, chemical and biological protection. Images attached to the report showed Russian officers attending lectures by Chinese instructors, examining a model nuclear reactor and participating in exercises on chemical and radiation reconnaissance as well as protection of ventilation systems from contamination.

European officials told Reuters that the participation of senior military commanders from both countries demonstrated that the program enjoyed backing at the highest levels of government and reflected the strategic importance Moscow and Beijing attach to expanding military cooperation.

The defense ministries of both Russia and China did not respond to Reuters’ requests for comment.

China’s Foreign Ministry rejected the allegations, describing them as “entirely unfounded” and reiterating that Beijing’s position on the Ukraine conflict has remained consistent. Chinese officials continue to present the country as a neutral actor seeking to promote peace negotiations.

The latest disclosures follow an earlier Reuters investigation published in June, which cited European intelligence agencies and military documents indicating that approximately 200 Russian soldiers underwent military training in China during November 2025 before returning to participate in the war in Ukraine.

At the time, the Kremlin declined to comment directly on the report but dismissed Western media coverage as “false information.”

European concerns grow over strategic partnership

The newly revealed documents identify senior military officials who oversaw the program. According to European officials, a July 2 agreement establishing the training was signed by Russian Major General Rustam Khusainov and Chinese Senior Colonel Sun Dayun.

Russian Colonel General Rustam Muradov, deputy commander-in-chief of Russia’s land forces, led the Russian delegation, according to participant lists reviewed by Reuters. Chinese Major General Li Jinsun, head of the PLA’s Military Academy of Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defense, participated in the opening of one of the courses, while Russian Major General Vitaly Gerasimov also attended training sessions in Bengbu.

The documents included detailed participant information, listing military ranks, birth dates, institutional affiliations and security clearance levels.

European officials said the emphasis on radiological, biological and chemical warfare highlighted the strategic significance of the exchanges, noting that such training is considered highly sensitive by armed forces worldwide.

The disclosures come as European policymakers debate how to respond to expanding defense ties between Russia and China.

Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, European governments have regarded Moscow as the continent’s primary security threat. At the same time, China remains one of the European Union’s largest trading partners, complicating efforts to formulate a unified policy.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said earlier this month that the European Union had independently confirmed the training had taken place and was evaluating its implications.

Beijing dismissed her remarks as “nothing but smears.”

A Brussels-based European official told Reuters that the bloc should increasingly assess China through a security rather than purely economic lens, arguing that Beijing has become what Kallas previously described as a “decisive enabler of Russia’s war.”

The European Union has already imposed sanctions on several Chinese companies accused of supporting Russia’s defense industry.

Despite the growing military relationship, Russian officials have publicly downplayed any need to learn from China’s armed forces.

Russian lawmaker Andrei Kartapolov, who heads the defense committee in Russia’s parliament, dismissed Reuters’ reporting as “complete nonsense” and argued that Russia’s military had nothing to learn from China.

However, internal Russian military evaluations reviewed by Reuters offered a more nuanced assessment.

The quality of Chinese military equipment

The reports praised the quality of Chinese military equipment, the extensive use of training simulators and the high theoretical expertise of Chinese instructors. At the same time, they noted a significant limitation: China’s lack of recent combat experience.

While Russia has accumulated extensive battlefield experience during more than four years of fighting in Ukraine, China’s military has not engaged in a major war for decades.

The latest revelations are likely to intensify Western scrutiny of China’s role in Russia’s military campaign. Although Beijing continues to deny providing direct military assistance, European governments increasingly view cooperation such as specialized military training as evidence of deepening strategic alignment between the two powers.

The findings also reinforce broader concerns that the partnership between Moscow and Beijing extends beyond diplomatic coordination and economic cooperation into increasingly sophisticated military collaboration, even as China maintains its public position of neutrality regarding the conflict in Ukraine.

(Source: Reuters)

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entral banks around the world are planning to reduce their holdings of U.S. dollars over the coming decade for the first time, reflecting growing concerns over geopolitical risks and policy uncertainty surrounding the world’s dominant reserve currency, according to a new survey released on Tuesday.

The findings, published by the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF), mark the first time its annual survey has found that more central banks intend to decrease their dollar allocations than increase them over the next 10 years.

The survey, which gathered responses from 90 central banks, sovereign wealth funds and public pension funds managing a combined $10 trillion in assets, points to a gradual transformation in global reserve management as policymakers prepare for a more fragmented international financial system.

Although the U.S. dollar remains the world’s primary reserve currency and has gained around 3% this year, respondents increasingly cited political uncertainty in the United States and rising geopolitical tensions as reasons to diversify their portfolios.

The shift comes amid broader debate over the future of the global monetary system following heightened international tensions, including the recent U.S.-Iran conflict, and changing global economic dynamics.

OMFIF Senior Economist Yara Aziz said public investors increasingly regard market volatility as a permanent feature rather than a temporary disruption.

“The old assumption that public investors can wait for the environment to normalize looks increasingly unrealistic,” Aziz wrote in the report.

Gold strengthens its role in reserve management

Despite expectations of reduced dollar holdings, the survey found no clear replacement for the U.S. currency.

Instead, reserve managers are gradually expanding holdings across a wider range of currencies while significantly increasing allocations to gold.

Nearly four out of five central banks surveyed, along with 60% of public investment funds, believe the international monetary system is evolving toward a more multipolar structure in which reserve assets become more diversified.

Currencies outside the traditional major reserve group are attracting greater attention.

Respondents reported increasing allocations to the Norwegian krone and the New Zealand dollar, while interest in the British pound also continued to grow.

Central banks also maintained plans to increase holdings of the euro and China’s renminbi, although respondents said structural limitations continue to constrain both currencies from becoming dominant alternatives to the dollar.

Even so, almost all respondents viewed the Chinese yuan as an effective tool for portfolio diversification.

Gold emerged as one of the strongest beneficiaries of changing reserve strategies.

Held by 82% of surveyed central banks, the precious metal has moved to the center of reserve management policies after reaching successive record highs over recent years.

In the next one to two years, gold is expected to see the largest increase in allocations among reserve assets, with a net 30% of respondents planning to expand their holdings.

Analysts say central banks increasingly value gold as a hedge against inflation, geopolitical instability and financial market volatility.

Artificial intelligence reshapes investment strategies

Beyond reserve diversification, the survey highlighted a rapid acceleration in the adoption of artificial intelligence across public financial institutions.

More than two-thirds of central banks said they plan to expand the use of AI in the near future, while none of the advanced economy central banks surveyed indicated they were satisfied with current levels of AI deployment.

Overall, only 9% of central banks said existing AI integration met their needs.

Most institutions currently use artificial intelligence for data analysis, research and administrative functions, although adoption varies significantly between developed and emerging economies.

Nearly 90% of central banks in advanced economies already use AI, compared with just 44% of those in emerging markets.

The report also found growing investor interest in physical assets.

Almost 60% of public investment funds intend to increase allocations to infrastructure and real estate over the next two years, making them the most popular asset classes outside traditional financial markets.

Emerging markets are also attracting renewed attention

Thirty-eight percent of public funds plan to increase investment in emerging economies, up sharply from 27% in last year’s survey.

At the same time, interest in expanding exposure to developed economies declined significantly, with only one-quarter of respondents planning to increase allocations compared with nearly half a year earlier.

Despite diversification efforts, the United States and China remained the most attractive investment destinations, largely because of their leading positions in artificial intelligence development and technological innovation.

The survey suggests that while the U.S. dollar is likely to remain the world’s dominant reserve currency for the foreseeable future, central banks are increasingly seeking broader diversification through gold, alternative currencies, emerging markets and new technologies to navigate a more uncertain global economic environment.

(Source: Reuters)

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ore than 5,300 people remain trapped in online scam compounds in Myanmar near the Thai border despite a multinational crackdown launched last year, according to a Thai-based human rights organization that has urged authorities to intensify rescue efforts.

The Civil Society Network for Human Trafficking Victim Assistance (CSNHTV) said thousands of victims continue to be held in four scam compounds located in territory controlled by the Myanmar Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), where criminal syndicates continue to operate extensive online fraud and human trafficking networks.

In a letter addressed to Thai police, the organization called for immediate action to dismantle the remaining compounds and free those still being held against their will.

According to the group, approximately 1,600 of those trapped are Chinese nationals, while around 200 are from Myanmar. Victims also include citizens of the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brazil, Russia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe.

“Many of these compounds have yet to be dismantled or subjected to rescue operations to free all remaining victims,” the organization said.

It warned that the criminal syndicates continue to carry out online fraud targeting victims across the world, particularly in the United States and Europe.

Multibillion-dollar criminal industry

Scam centers across Southeast Asia, especially in Myanmar and Cambodia, have evolved into a sophisticated transnational criminal industry worth billions of dollars.

Originally linked to casinos and online gambling operations during the COVID-19 pandemic, the compounds have expanded into hubs for online investment scams, romance fraud, cryptocurrency schemes and other cybercrimes targeting victims worldwide.

Many of those recruited to work in the centers were lured by false job offers before being trafficked across borders and forced to participate in online scams.

A report released by the United Nations in February found that many scam compounds are staffed by foreign nationals trafficked by organized criminal gangs and subjected to serious human rights abuses.

The report documented widespread cases of torture, sexual abuse, forced abortions, food deprivation, solitary confinement and other forms of cruel treatment used to coerce victims into carrying out online fraud.

“The litany of abuse is staggering and at the same time heart-breaking,” said Volker Türk.

Türk added that many survivors face additional hardships after escaping the compounds, often encountering disbelief, stigma or even punishment instead of receiving protection and rehabilitation.

Calls for stronger regional cooperation

Rights groups say dismantling scam compounds requires closer cooperation between governments in the region, as many operations are protected by armed groups controlling parts of Myanmar’s border areas.

Although thousands of trafficking victims have been rescued during joint operations conducted by Thailand, Myanmar and neighboring countries over the past year, humanitarian organizations warn that thousands more remain trapped, highlighting the continued reach of criminal networks exploiting vulnerable migrants through forced labor and online fraud.

(Source: Aljazeera)

T

aiwan’s military conducted a large-scale coastal defense exercise on Tuesday, simulating the destruction of an invading Chinese force in what officials described as a more realistic combat scenario designed to strengthen the island’s readiness against a potential amphibious assault.

The drill, held along Taiwan’s western coastline facing mainland China, involved the coordinated use of rockets, artillery, mortars, anti-tank missiles, and mobile weapons systems to create a defensive “kill zone” aimed at stopping enemy forces before they could establish a beachhead.

The exercise comes amid growing military pressure from China, which claims Taiwan as its territory and has not ruled out the use of force to bring the self-governed island under Beijing’s control. Chinese military aircraft and naval vessels regularly operate around Taiwan, while Beijing has intensified military activities in the Taiwan Strait in recent years.

The drills were conducted simultaneously from eight locations across a 20-kilometer stretch of coastline near the central city of Taichung, an area considered one of the most likely landing points for a potential Chinese invasion.

Military officials said the exercise reflected a broader effort to make Taiwan’s armed forces more agile and prepared for actual battlefield conditions.

“What is different about this training compared with the past is that we are no longer conducting heavy artillery firing in a fixed, routine formation,” artillery commander Ong Yih-ming told reporters during the exercise.

“The timing for entering positions this time was based on realistic combat conditions. Therefore, the level of difficulty for our troops was considerably higher,” he said.

Overhauling military doctrine

Taiwan has been overhauling its military doctrine in recent years, shifting away from traditional large-scale formations toward a more flexible defense strategy focused on mobility, survivability, and rapid response.

The latest exercise showcased several key weapons systems, including the domestically produced Thunderbolt-2000 multiple launch rocket system, a truck-mounted platform designed to deliver concentrated firepower while maintaining high mobility.

Military officials said Tuesday marked the first time in seven years that the Thunderbolt-2000 had conducted live-fire operations in an active deployment area.

Rocket commander Liao Neng-cheng said the exercise significantly reduced preparation times to better mirror wartime conditions.

“In previous years, units would often arrive at firing positions a week in advance and spend several days preparing,” he said.

“This time, we arrived only one day before the exercise and completed all preparations within a much shorter timeframe.”

Improving military’s ability

The changes are intended to improve the military’s ability to survive and operate under conditions where enemy surveillance, missile attacks, and electronic warfare could limit opportunities for lengthy preparations.

Alongside the Thunderbolt-2000 systems, troops deployed U.S.-made Paladin self-propelled howitzers, anti-tank missiles, conventional artillery pieces, and mortar units. The weapons were used in a simulated operation designed to halt an amphibious landing force approaching Taiwan’s shores.

Military planners have long regarded Taiwan’s western coast as one of the most vulnerable areas in any future conflict. The region’s beaches and mudflats provide some of the few locations suitable for large-scale amphibious landings by the Chinese military.

The exercise took place as tensions between Taipei and Beijing remain elevated.

Taiwan’s government rejects China’s sovereignty claims, insisting that only the island’s 23 million people have the right to determine their future. Beijing, however, considers Taiwan a breakaway province and has repeatedly stated that reunification is inevitable.

Chinese officials have increased military and political pressure on Taiwan since the election of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, whom Beijing has labeled a separatist.

China’s growing intolerance of Taipei

China has also suspended formal communications with Taipei and stepped up military patrols near the island. Taiwanese authorities have reported an increase in Chinese coast guard activities around Taiwan’s waters, including near the Taiwan-controlled Pratas Islands in the northern South China Sea.

Speaking to local media on Tuesday, Chiu Chui-cheng, head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, accused Beijing of attempting to alter the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

“The one trying to change the status quo is the Chinese Communist Party,” Chiu said.

“We will use strength and sufficient deterrent capability to prevent the Chinese communists from changing the status quo by force.”

The Chinese government’s Taiwan Affairs Office did not immediately comment on the exercise.

Security analysts say Taiwan’s military modernization efforts reflect growing concerns over China’s expanding military capabilities and increasingly frequent operations near the island. While many experts believe an invasion would remain an extraordinarily complex undertaking, Taiwan continues to strengthen its defenses and improve readiness for a range of possible conflict scenarios.

Tuesday’s exercise highlighted Taipei’s determination to demonstrate its ability to defend the island’s coastline and respond quickly to potential threats, even as cross-strait relations remain among the most sensitive flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific region.

The drill also underscored Taiwan’s ongoing efforts to adapt its military strategy to an evolving security environment, one increasingly shaped by China’s military rise and the growing strategic competition between Beijing and the United States.

(Source: Reuters)

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hinese President Xi Jinping arrived in North Korea on Monday for his first visit to the country since 2019, in a move widely seen as an effort by Beijing to reinforce its influence over Pyongyang amid growing concerns about North Korea’s increasingly close military and economic relationship with Russia.

Xi’s visit comes at a critical moment for regional security in Northeast Asia, with North Korea accelerating its weapons programs, deepening cooperation with Moscow, and further distancing itself from South Korea. Analysts say the Chinese leader’s decision to travel personally to Pyongyang underscores the strategic importance Beijing places on maintaining its longstanding alliance with North Korea.

The visit marks a departure from Xi’s recent diplomatic pattern. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese president has significantly reduced his overseas travel, preferring to host foreign leaders in Beijing. Against that backdrop, his trip to Pyongyang is viewed as a strong signal of China’s commitment to preserving its role as North Korea’s most important partner.

Xi is expected to hold extensive talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on regional security, economic cooperation, and the changing geopolitical environment in East Asia.

Growing Russian influence

A key factor behind the visit is believed to be North Korea’s rapidly expanding relationship with Russia.

Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Pyongyang has emerged as one of Moscow’s most important partners. North Korea has reportedly supplied Russia with artillery shells, missiles, military equipment, and manpower to support its war effort. In return, Moscow is believed to have provided economic assistance and potentially advanced military technologies.

The partnership has generated concern in Beijing, which has historically been North Korea’s principal economic supporter and diplomatic protector. For decades, China accounted for the overwhelming majority of North Korea’s foreign trade and served as the country’s primary source of fuel, food, and investment.

While China and Russia maintain close strategic ties, Beijing is wary of losing influence over its isolated neighbor. Analysts say Xi’s visit is intended in part to ensure that Pyongyang does not drift too far into Moscow’s orbit.

“China wants to remind North Korea that it remains an indispensable partner,” regional analysts have noted. “The relationship with Russia may be useful for Pyongyang, but Beijing still offers economic and political support that no other country can fully replace.”

The growing Russia-North Korea partnership has also raised concerns about military cooperation. Experts believe Russia may be sharing technologies that could accelerate North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs, developments that could alter the security balance on the Korean Peninsula.

Concerns over military advancements

China’s leadership is believed to be closely monitoring North Korea’s recent military activities.

North Korea has conducted multiple missile tests this year and continues to modernize its arsenal. In May, state media reported the successful development of an artificial intelligence-guided tactical cruise missile, while recent images released by Pyongyang showed Kim Jong Un inspecting facilities linked to the production of nuclear materials.

The North Korean leader has repeatedly emphasized the need to expand the country’s nuclear deterrent and strengthen its military capabilities in response to what he describes as growing threats from the United States and its allies.

Although China supports North Korea as a strategic buffer separating Chinese territory from US forces stationed in South Korea, Beijing has traditionally favored stability on the peninsula over military escalation. Chinese officials fear that an emboldened North Korea could provoke regional tensions and trigger stronger military cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and Japan.

Analysts believe Xi will seek greater clarity on Pyongyang’s military ambitions and may encourage restraint to avoid destabilizing the region.

Regional security challenges

The visit also takes place amid growing concerns over shifting security dynamics in East Asia.

Relations between North and South Korea have deteriorated sharply in recent years. In 2024, Kim Jong Un formally abandoned the long-standing goal of peaceful reunification with South Korea, declaring the South a hostile state. Since then, communication channels between the two sides have largely remained frozen.

At the same time, security cooperation between South Korea and Japan has expanded. The two US allies have increased intelligence sharing and military coordination in response to North Korea’s weapons development and broader regional security concerns.

Recent discussions regarding a possible military logistics support agreement between Seoul and Tokyo have further alarmed Beijing, which views closer cooperation among US allies as part of a broader effort to contain China’s influence in the region.

Against this backdrop, Xi’s trip serves not only to strengthen bilateral ties with North Korea but also to demonstrate China’s continued role as a central actor in regional security affairs.

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n May 13, in Astana’s Palace of Independence, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Kassym-Jomart Tokayev stood before cameras and announced what they called an “eternal friendship declaration”, a phrase that sounds ceremonial until you read the fine print. Bilateral trade exceeding $5 billion, around 3,800 Turkish companies operating on Kazakh soil, a $15 billion trade target set as the new horizon, and, cutting across all of it, the Middle Corridor. Not as background noise, but as the explicit spine of the entire visit.

Two days later, in the ancient city of Turkistan, the Organization of Turkic States held its informal leaders’ summit under the theme of artificial intelligence and digital development. Erdoğan, addressing the gathering, went beyond the official agenda. He connected the Iranian crisis in the Strait of Hormuz directly to the urgency of the Middle Corridor, a land-and-sea route stretching from China across Kazakhstan, the Caspian, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and into Turkey before reaching European markets. The logic was blunt: when maritime arteries choke, overland corridors breathe.

That argument is no longer speculative. It is, increasingly, a fact confirmed by freight data, political decisions, and the quiet repositioning of powers that prefer not to make headlines.

The numbers tell their own story

The Trans-Caspian corridor carried 4.5 million tons of cargo in 2025, up fivefold from the 800,000 tons recorded just seven years ago. Container traffic along the route grew 36% in 2025 alone. Kazakhstan, which handles 85% of the freight flowing through this corridor, now aims to push that figure to 10 million tons. Rail cargo between Ankara and Astana rose 35% this year. Delivery times on the route have already been cut from 28-32 days to 13-17 days, and there is still room to compress them further.

These are not projections dressed up as achievements. They reflect a structural shift that began quietly after 2022, when the war in Ukraine made the northern Russia-bound routes functionally untenable for many European and Asian shippers. The Middle Corridor absorbed that displacement. Turkey sat at the western end of that displacement, and it knew it.

Where Turkey actually stands

Turkey is not simply a transit country on the Middle Corridor. It is the corridor’s European gateway. Every container that moves from Kazakhstan across the Caspian, through Azerbaijan and Georgia, must pass through Turkish territory before reaching European markets, whether by rail through Edirne or by sea from Istanbul and Mersin. Turkish ports handled a record 553 million tons of cargo in 2025. That record did not emerge from thin air. It reflects years of investment in port capacity, rail connectivity, and customs infrastructure.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, the iron thread connecting Central Asia to Turkey’s rail network, remains still underutilized relative to its potential. Capacity expansion has lagged behind demand. There are bottlenecks. Anyone who follows this sector knows that the Kars junction is one of them. Erdoğan’s Astana statements signaled awareness of this, yet the speed of institutional follow-through remains the actual variable in the equation.

What Turkey brings to the corridor, beyond geography, is institutional leverage. Ankara sits inside NATO, maintains active trade relations with the European Union, and holds the presidency of the Organization of Turkic States for the coming period. That combination, Western institutional membership paired with Turkic world leadership, gives Turkey a bridging function that no other country on the corridor can replicate. Kazakhstan cannot speak to Brussels the way Ankara can. Brussels cannot speak to Astana the way Ankara can. That is not a minor advantage; it is the corridor’s political operating system.

The OTS summit: More than a photo opportunity

The informal summit in Turkistan produced, on its surface, communiqués about artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, and joint language models. Uzbekistan proposed what its delegation called a “Digital Turkic Corridor”, a fibre optic and data centre network mirroring the physical trade route. These are not trivial ambitions. A digital corridor that piggybacks on a physical one creates compounding returns: shared data sovereignty, reduced dependency on non-Turkic tech infrastructure, and a political narrative of self-sufficiency that resonates across the region.

For Turkey, the digital corridor proposal is both an opening and a quiet pressure. Istanbul already functions as one of the most significant internet exchange points between Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia. If a unified Turkic digital infrastructure takes shape, and Turkey helps define its architecture, the strategic weight of Turkish territory compounds further. Should Ankara move decisively, that architecture will be shaped on Turkish terms, not by outside players already embedded in the region. The Turkestan summit named the ambition. Whether Turkish institutions can match it with speed will be one of the defining questions heading into the formal OTS summit this autumn.

Yet the political subtext of the Turkistan summit deserves as much attention as its official agenda. Tokayev’s statement, publicly opposing any military dimension for the OTS, was a counterweight to Turkey’s offer to share its defense industry experience with Turkic states

That exchange, which received far less media attention than the signing ceremonies, exposes the OTS’s central unresolved question: Is this organization a civilizational platform, a trade bloc, or the embryo of something with harder edges? Astana, balancing its northern and eastern dependencies with Russia and China, prefers the answer to remain vague. Ankara would not mind a slightly sharper answer.

This is not a crisis. It is a negotiation, one that will run through the 13th formal OTS summit in Turkey this autumn, and well beyond it.

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rms sales by the United States to Taiwan have once again become a focal point of tensions between Washington and Beijing following reports that President Donald Trump has delayed signing a $14 billion weapons package approved by Congress.

The issue gained renewed attention after Trump’s summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping earlier this month, during which Xi reportedly warned that Taiwan remains the most sensitive issue in relations between the two powers and could become “a very dangerous situation” if mishandled.

While Trump described the proposed arms package as a valuable negotiating tool in discussions with Beijing, Taiwan’s Defense Ministry said it had not received any official notification of a delay in military sales.

The debate highlights a long-running dispute that has shaped U.S.-China relations for decades and remains central to regional security in East Asia.

Taiwan relations act underpins US support

The foundation of U.S. military support for Taiwan dates back to 1979, when President Jimmy Carter switched diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China.

The move ended Washington’s formal defense treaty with Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China. In response, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, requiring the United States to provide Taiwan with defensive weapons and maintain the island’s capacity for self-defense.

Beijing views Taiwan as part of China and has never ruled out using force to bring the island under its control. Chinese leaders strongly oppose U.S. arms sales, arguing that they interfere in China’s internal affairs and encourage Taiwanese resistance to reunification.

The United States, while recognizing Beijing diplomatically, maintains unofficial relations with Taiwan and continues to supply military equipment under the Taiwan Relations Act.

American officials have repeatedly stated that U.S. policy remains unchanged despite tensions over recent weapons sales.

Delays and backlogs shape Taiwan’s defense planning

Since 1979, Taiwan has purchased tens of billions of dollars in American military equipment, including fighter jets, warships, tanks, missile systems, and advanced defense technology.

However, many purchases have taken years to arrive.

Analysts estimate Taiwan currently faces a weapons backlog approaching $30 billion. Some major systems approved years ago remain under production or awaiting delivery.

For example, 108 M1 Abrams tanks ordered in 2019 required nearly seven years to arrive. Meanwhile, advanced F-16V Fighting Falcon jets approved the same year are still undergoing production and testing.

Taiwan’s Defense Ministry says that among 23 major U.S. weapons packages approved over the past decade, only five have been fully delivered, while most remain in production.

The latest $14 billion package reportedly includes air-defense systems such as Patriot Missile System batteries and counter-drone capabilities. Analysts note that even if approved immediately, production timelines mean some systems would not reach Taiwan until 2028 or later.

The delays have intensified debate within Taiwan over whether it should continue purchasing expensive conventional platforms or focus more heavily on a so-called “porcupine strategy” emphasizing domestically produced drones, anti-ship missiles, and other asymmetric weapons designed to deter a larger Chinese military.

Why China opposes the sales

For Beijing, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan represent more than a military issue. Chinese leaders see them as political support for a government they consider part of Chinese territory.

China argues that American weapons transfers violate past understandings between the two countries and undermine efforts toward eventual reunification.

Washington rejects that interpretation, maintaining that it has never agreed to end arms sales to Taiwan and that decisions regarding military support are made independently under U.S. law.

As strategic competition between the United States and China intensifies, Taiwan remains at the center of one of the world’s most sensitive geopolitical disputes. While military sales are intended to strengthen the island’s defenses, they continue to provoke strong objections from Beijing and remain a recurring source of friction between the two superpowers.

(Source: CNN)

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ountries across the Indo-Pacific are accelerating military cooperation and strengthening defense partnerships as they seek to balance China’s growing military power while preparing for uncertainty over future U.S. engagement in the region.

The trend was on full display at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, where defense ministers and military leaders highlighted a growing push for regional security cooperation that extends beyond traditional reliance on Washington.

While U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth reassured allies that Washington remains committed to the Indo-Pacific despite its involvement in other global crises, regional leaders emphasized the need to build stronger security networks among themselves.

“We can do two things at one time,” Hegseth said when questioned about whether tensions in Iran could distract the United States from Asia.

Despite those assurances, officials from several countries acknowledged that concerns about shifting American priorities have encouraged nations to enhance their own military capabilities and expand partnerships across the region.

Regional powers expand security cooperation

Among the countries taking a more active role is Japan, which is positioning itself as a central hub for regional defense cooperation.

Japanese Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi said Tokyo aims to serve as a “connecting point” for security partnerships throughout the Indo-Pacific.

In April, Japan introduced the most significant overhaul of its defense export policies in decades, removing restrictions on overseas weapons sales and paving the way for exports of warships, missiles, and other military equipment.

“Japan will be even more proactive in defense equipment cooperation,” Koizumi said. “Our aim is to ensure that each country has the capabilities it needs and to make them available when needed.”

The Philippines has also expanded defense cooperation with Japan, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand as it faces growing tensions with China in the South China Sea.

Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro said regional defense leaders broadly agreed on the need to rapidly strengthen military capabilities.

He described the effort as a way of reinforcing, rather than replacing, America’s traditional security role.

“The commitment of the United States becomes more solid when more actors come in because there is a common threat,” Teodoro said.

Confidence in U.S. alliance remains strong

Despite efforts to diversify security relationships, many Indo-Pacific officials stressed that the United States remains the cornerstone of regional deterrence.

Singapore Defense Minister Chan Chun Sing said countries should pursue flexible partnerships with like-minded nations and create “coalitions of the able and willing” to address emerging security challenges.

Meanwhile, Canada and New Zealand are increasing their involvement in the region.

Canadian Chief of Defense Staff Jennie Carignan said Canadian forces are expanding cooperation with Japan and the Philippines through maritime exercises and cybersecurity initiatives.

New Zealand Defense Minister Chris Penk said Wellington is considering the purchase of Japanese and British naval vessels to replace its aging frigate fleet while exploring deeper cooperation under the long-standing Five Power Defense Arrangements involving Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore.

Although concerns persist about Washington’s long-term strategic focus, regional leaders largely rejected suggestions that U.S. commitment has weakened because of conflicts elsewhere.

For the Philippines, Teodoro said confidence in Washington remains intact despite U.S. involvement in the Middle East.

Similarly, Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles described the alliance with the United States as “absolutely fundamental” to Australia’s national security.

As China continues its military modernization and expands its regional influence, Indo-Pacific nations appear increasingly determined to strengthen both their own defence capabilities and a broader network of partnerships designed to preserve regional stability, regardless of future shifts in global power dynamics.

(Source: Reuters)

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uropean intelligence agencies believe China secretly trained around 200 Russian military personnel last year, with some of those soldiers later returning to fight in Ukraine, according to intelligence sources and documents reviewed by Reuters.

The covert training program, reportedly focused heavily on drone warfare and counter-drone tactics, represents one of the clearest indications yet of direct Chinese military support connected to Russia’s war effort, despite Beijing’s repeated claims that it remains neutral in the conflict.

According to Reuters, the training was outlined in a Russian-Chinese military agreement signed in Beijing on July 2, 2025. The document reportedly detailed plans for Russian troops to receive instruction at Chinese military facilities in cities including Beijing and Nanjing, while Chinese personnel would also participate in training programs inside Russia.

European intelligence officials told Reuters that some Russian soldiers trained in China later took part in combat operations involving drones in occupied Crimea and the Zaporizhzhia region.

Drone warfare at center of training

The reported courses concentrated on modern battlefield technologies that have become central to the war in Ukraine.

Reuters said the training included instruction in:

• Drone operations and first-person-view (FPV) drones
• Electronic warfare
• Counter-drone systems
• Combined arms warfare
• Explosives handling and demining
• Armored infantry tactics
• Army aviation

One internal Russian military report reviewed by Reuters described a December 2025 training course involving around 50 Russian personnel at a branch of the People’s Liberation Army Infantry Academy in Shijiazhuang.

According to the document, Russian soldiers trained with 82mm mortars while using drones to identify targets — a tactic widely employed on the Ukrainian battlefield.

Another course reportedly focused on counter-drone measures, including electronic warfare rifles and net-launching systems designed to disable incoming drones.

Reuters also described a training session at a PLA aviation center in Yibin where Russian troops used drone flight simulators and practiced operating several FPV drone systems.

China denies direct involvement in war

China’s foreign ministry rejected suggestions that Beijing was directly involved in the conflict.

In a statement to Reuters, Chinese officials said Beijing had consistently maintained an “objective and impartial stance” and supported peace negotiations.

The report nevertheless raises new questions about the depth of military cooperation between China and Russia, whose leaders have repeatedly emphasized their “no limits” strategic partnership since shortly before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

The intelligence findings emerge just as Chinese President Xi Jinping hosts Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing for high-level talks focused on energy, security and global geopolitics.

Western governments have long accused China of indirectly supporting Russia through purchases of Russian energy exports and the supply of dual-use technologies. But training Russian troops at operational and tactical levels would mark a more direct form of assistance.

Russia increasingly dependent on Chinese support

The report highlights the growing military and economic ties between Beijing and Moscow.

China has become a critical economic partner for Russia since Western sanctions were imposed after the invasion of Ukraine. Chinese purchases of Russian oil, gas and coal have helped stabilize Moscow’s economy, while Chinese technology and manufacturing networks have helped offset some Western export restrictions.

European intelligence officials told Reuters that Russia benefits particularly from China’s advanced drone industry and training infrastructure.

Although Russia has extensive combat experience from Ukraine, China’s rapidly expanding drone sector offers technological expertise, simulation systems and industrial capacity that Russian forces increasingly value.

One intelligence agency said many of the Russian personnel trained in China were instructors themselves, meaning the knowledge gained there could spread through Russia’s military structure after their return.

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hinese President Xi Jinping is set to welcome Russian President Vladimir Putin to Beijing just days after hosting U.S. President Donald Trump, highlighting China’s effort to position itself at the center of global diplomacy amid escalating international conflicts.

Putin’s arrival for a state visit underscores the increasingly close relationship between China and Russia, as both countries seek to challenge U.S. global influence while navigating growing instability caused by the wars in Iran and Ukraine.

The Kremlin said Putin and Xi are expected to discuss energy cooperation, the Middle East conflict, the war in Ukraine and their shared vision of a “multipolar world” less dominated by Washington and Western alliances.

The visit will be Putin’s 25th trip to China during his presidency and reflects the deepening partnership between the two powers, built around expanding trade ties, military coordination and shared opposition to U.S. policies.

China projects itself as alternative global power

The back-to-back visits by Trump and Putin are being portrayed by Chinese state media as evidence that Beijing has become a central player in world affairs.

Chinese outlets described the China-Russia relationship as “unshakeable” despite growing geopolitical tensions, while emphasizing Beijing’s role as what officials call a more stable and responsible global actor.

Analysts say Xi is carefully balancing relations with both Washington and Moscow at a time when the United States is deeply involved in the Iran conflict and Russia remains isolated by Western sanctions over the Ukraine war.

Trump’s visit last week focused heavily on the war with Iran and efforts to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The White House said Trump and Xi agreed that Iran should not obtain nuclear weapons and supported restoring maritime traffic through the strait.

But Beijing has also maintained strong ties with Tehran and Moscow, complicating its position.

China remains Iran’s largest oil customer and has resisted U.S. pressure to cut economic ties with Tehran. Meanwhile, Russia has reportedly provided intelligence support to Iran during the conflict, according to CNN.

Energy cooperation central to Beijing-Moscow ties

Energy is expected to be one of the key issues discussed during the Xi-Putin meeting.

China has become Russia’s largest energy customer since Western sanctions were imposed after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Chinese companies have increased purchases of discounted Russian oil, helping support Russia’s economy and war effort.

The leaders are also expected to discuss the proposed Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, a long-delayed project that would significantly expand Russian natural gas exports to China.

Analysts say instability in the Middle East and uncertainty around Iranian oil supplies may increase Beijing’s interest in securing more long-term Russian energy imports.

The growing economic relationship, however, has also made Russia increasingly dependent on China, particularly in technology, trade and access to international markets.

Iran conflict creates new diplomatic calculations

The ongoing war involving Iran is likely to feature heavily in the talks.

Both China and Russia maintain close relations with Tehran and have helped shield Iran from Western sanctions over recent years. China purchases large amounts of sanctioned Iranian crude oil, while Moscow and Beijing have both criticized U.S. military actions against Iran.

At the same time, analysts say Beijing and Moscow are cautious about becoming too deeply involved in efforts to negotiate peace between Washington and Tehran.

Iran has reportedly expressed interest in China and Russia acting as security guarantors in a future agreement, but both countries appear focused primarily on protecting their own strategic interests.

For Xi, the simultaneous engagement with Trump and Putin reflects an effort to strengthen China’s image as a global power capable of speaking to all sides while advancing its own geopolitical ambitions.

For Putin, the visit comes at a difficult moment as Russia faces continued military pressure in Ukraine and growing dependence on Chinese economic support.

The summit is expected to reinforce the message that despite U.S. efforts to isolate Moscow and pressure Beijing, the strategic partnership between China and Russia remains strong.

(Source: CNN)

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.S. President Donald Trump said his patience with Iran is “running out” after talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, as tensions in the Gulf escalated with new attacks on commercial shipping near the Strait of Hormuz.

Speaking in an interview on Fox News’ “Hannity” program, Trump urged Tehran to agree to a deal with Washington after negotiations stalled over Iran’s nuclear program and its stockpile of enriched uranium.

“I am not going to be much more patient,” Trump said. “They should make a deal.”

The White House said Trump and Xi agreed during their meetings that the Strait of Hormuz must remain open to international shipping and that Iran should never obtain nuclear weapons.

According to the White House readout, Xi also opposed militarization of the strait and rejected any effort to impose tolls on ships passing through the waterway, which carries a significant share of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies.

Trump further claimed Xi promised China would not provide military equipment to Iran.

“He said he’s not going to give military equipment, that’s a big statement,” Trump said during the interview.

Shipping incidents raise tensions in Gulf waters

The comments came as maritime security concerns intensified in the Gulf region.

An Indian cargo vessel transporting livestock from Africa to the United Arab Emirates sank off the coast of Oman on Wednesday after what security officials believe was a missile or drone strike. India said all 14 crew members were rescued by the Omani coast guard.

Separately, British maritime security authorities reported that unidentified personnel boarded a ship anchored near the UAE port of Fujairah and redirected it toward Iran. Security consultancy Vanguard said the vessel was believed to have been seized by Iranian personnel.

Fujairah is strategically important because it allows some oil exports to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has partially restricted since the conflict began following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran in February.

Iran appears to be selectively allowing some vessels through the strait under negotiated arrangements with certain countries. Iranian media reported agreements enabling some Chinese ships to pass, while a Japanese tanker also crossed after diplomatic contacts between Tokyo and Tehran.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said 30 vessels had passed through the strait since Wednesday evening, although shipping volumes remain far below pre-war levels.

Diplomacy remains stalled

Despite the Trump-Xi talks, negotiations between Washington and Tehran remain frozen.

The United States is demanding that Iran surrender its enriched uranium stockpile and permanently halt uranium enrichment activities. Tehran, meanwhile, is seeking sanctions relief, compensation for war damage and international recognition of its authority over the Strait of Hormuz.

Analysts say Trump is eager to secure diplomatic progress as the war increasingly affects domestic politics ahead of U.S. midterm elections later this year.

However, experts remain skeptical that China will pressure Iran aggressively. Beijing relies heavily on Iranian oil and views Tehran as an important strategic partner against U.S. influence in the Middle East and Asia.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said in Beijing that China would likely support efforts to reopen shipping routes because stability in the strait is “very much in their interest.”

U.S. says Iran’s military capabilities weakened

Trump defended the military campaign against Iran, saying its goals were to damage Iran’s nuclear program, reduce its ability to threaten neighboring states and weaken the country’s leadership.

A senior U.S. military commander told a Senate committee on Thursday that Iran’s capacity to threaten regional partners had been “significantly degraded.”

Admiral Brad Cooper said Iran no longer posed the same level of threat across multiple military domains, though he declined to comment directly on reports that Tehran still retains substantial missile and drone capabilities.

Despite the prolonged conflict and thousands of casualties from U.S. and Israeli strikes, Iran’s leadership has remained in control domestically. Analysts say Tehran’s continued influence over the Strait of Hormuz has given it additional leverage in negotiations with Washington.

(Source: Reuters)

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.S. President Donald Trump is expected to press Chinese leader Xi Jinping for assistance in ending the war with Iranduring high-level talks in Beijing this week, but analysts say China is unlikely to offer the decisive support Washington wants.

According to Reuters, Trump’s administration sees Beijing as one of the few governments with enough economic and political influence over Tehran to encourage Iranian leaders back toward negotiations. China remains Iran’s largest oil customer and an important economic lifeline amid Western sanctions.

However, experts say Beijing’s broader strategic interests make it reluctant to pressure Tehran too aggressively.

While China wants stability in the Middle East and an open Strait of Hormuz — through which much of its imported oil passes — Iran also serves as a key regional partner and a geopolitical counterweight to the United States.

Analysts note that the conflict has already benefited Beijing in some ways by shifting U.S. military and diplomatic attention away from the Indo-Pacific region, where China is focused on expanding its influence.

Henrietta Levin of the Council for Strategic and International Relations said Xi is approaching the summit with growing confidence, particularly after Trump eased back from last year’s aggressive tariff campaign against China.

China balances economic interests with strategic alliances

Beijing faces competing priorities as the Iran war continues.

On one side, China depends heavily on energy imports passing through the Strait of Hormuz and has suffered economically from rising oil prices and disruptions caused by the conflict. Iranian military actions in the waterway have threatened a route carrying roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies.

On the other hand, China values its long-term relationship with Iran. Analysts say Beijing is unlikely to cut economic support or halt the supply of dual-use goods that Tehran’s military can use for both civilian and defense purposes.

Chinese officials have publicly rejected U.S. pressure tactics. Liu Pengyu, spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, criticized what he described as “illicit unilateral sanctions” and called instead for preventing a renewed escalation in fighting.

Trump has insisted publicly that the United States does not depend on China to force Iranian concessions, arguing that the U.S. naval blockade around Iran already gives Washington leverage. Still, people briefed on the summit preparations told Reuters that U.S. officials privately hope Beijing can help stabilize the situation.

The report highlights the limited options available to the Trump administration in trying to force Chinese cooperation.

The United States has already sanctioned some Chinese firms accused of helping Iran evade restrictions or support military activities. However, experts say Washington has avoided taking action against the major Chinese banks facilitating trade with Iran because of fears of severe economic retaliation.

Brett Erickson of Obsidian Risk Advisors said existing sanctions have had little effect because the U.S. Treasury has avoided targeting the most important financial institutions involved.

Analysts warn that sanctions against major Chinese state-owned banks could trigger a wider economic confrontation between the world’s two largest economies, potentially reviving the tariff war that both sides paused last year.

Edward Fishman of the Council on Foreign Relations said even penalties against a smaller Chinese bank could spark a cycle of retaliatory measures damaging to both economies.

Such escalation could also worsen inflation inside the United States at a politically sensitive moment for Trump, whose approval ratings have already been hurt by the Iran conflict.

Rare earths remain a powerful Chinese leverage tool

Another major concern for Washington is China’s dominance in rare earth processing.

China controls much of the global refining capacity for rare earth minerals used in advanced electronics, electric vehicles and military technologies. During last year’s trade tensions, Beijing signaled it could restrict exports of those materials, alarming Western governments and industries.

Analysts say the threat of renewed Chinese export restrictions continues to limit how aggressively Washington is willing to confront Beijing economically.

Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said China has likely learned from watching previous American interventions in the Middle East and will avoid becoming deeply entangled in the conflict.

“They will want to be careful because they can see political quicksand,” Campbell told Reuters.

As Trump and Xi meet in Beijing, the summit is expected to reveal not only the limits of U.S.-China cooperation over Iran, but also the growing complexity of a relationship shaped simultaneously by rivalry, economic interdependence and competing global ambitions.

(Source: Reuters)

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.S. President Donald Trump arrives in China this week facing mounting political and economic pressure at home, with analysts saying he now needs cooperation from Chinese President Xi Jinping more than ever as the war with Iran weighs on his presidency.

The May 14-15 summit in Beijing marks the first major face-to-face talks between the two leaders since they agreed last October to pause an escalating trade war that had shaken global markets. Expectations for the meeting, however, are far lower than during Trump’s earlier confrontations with Beijing, when he promised sweeping tariffs would force China into major concessions.

Instead of broad economic victories, analysts expect only limited agreements focused on agricultural exports, aircraft sales and mechanisms to manage future trade disputes. According to officials involved in preparations for the summit, it remains uncertain whether Washington and Beijing will even extend their fragile trade truce.

Political analysts say the shift reflects how Trump’s hardline strategy has struggled to produce clear gains. Alejandro Reyes, a professor specializing in Chinese foreign policy at the University of Hong Kong, said Trump is now searching for a foreign policy success that could restore confidence in his leadership.

“Trump kind of needs China more than China needs him,” Reyes said, arguing that the U.S. president wants to show voters he can stabilize international affairs rather than deepen global tensions.

The summit will include high-profile ceremonial events in Beijing, including meetings at the Great Hall of the People, a visit to the Temple of Heaven and a state banquet. Trump will also be accompanied by a delegation of American business leaders, including executives from Tesla and Apple, although the group is reportedly smaller than during his 2017 China visit.

Iran war reshapes Trump’s priorities

The ongoing conflict with Iran has become a central factor shaping Trump’s diplomatic agenda. Reuters reported that the president hopes China can use its influence with Tehran to help secure a deal that could reduce tensions and eventually end the war.

China remains one of Iran’s most important economic partners and continues to purchase significant amounts of Iranian oil despite Western pressure. Beijing has also maintained diplomatic relations with Tehran throughout the conflict.

The war has increasingly become a political liability for Trump. A recent Reuters/Ipsos poll found that more than 60% of Americans disapprove of his handling of the Iran conflict, amid concerns over rising energy prices and growing instability in the Middle East.

At the same time, Beijing appears positioned to demand concessions in return for any cooperation over Iran. Analysts say China’s top priority remains Taiwan, the self-governing island claimed by Beijing.

Chinese officials and policy advisers are expected to push Trump to reaffirm opposition to Taiwanese independence and avoid actions that could strengthen Taipei diplomatically or militarily. Even subtle changes in Washington’s language on Taiwan could raise concerns among U.S. allies across Asia about America’s long-term commitments in the region.

Trade tensions remain unresolved

Despite the temporary tariff truce reached last year, major trade disputes between the world’s two largest economies remain unresolved.

China has expanded its economic leverage in recent months, particularly through tighter controls on rare earth exports — materials critical for electric vehicles, semiconductors and military equipment. Beijing has also introduced laws designed to punish foreign companies that relocate supply chains away from China.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration continues to face legal and political challenges over its tariff policies. U.S. courts have questioned aspects of Trump’s trade measures, weakening the administration’s negotiating position ahead of the Beijing summit.

China is reportedly seeking guarantees that Washington will avoid imposing new technology restrictions and may push for the rollback of existing controls targeting advanced chipmaking equipment and memory chips.

Some analysts believe the most realistic outcome of the summit is simply maintaining stable relations and avoiding another escalation in trade tensions.

Scott Kennedy of the Center for Strategic and International Studies described the likely result as “a superficial ceasefire that is largely to China’s advantage.”

Still, for Trump, even a limited diplomatic success could help counter growing criticism over the Iran war and demonstrate that his administration remains capable of managing increasingly complex global crises.

(Source: Reuters)

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lobal military expenditure reached a record $2.887 trillion in 2025, marking the 11th consecutive year of growth, as countries responded to heightened geopolitical tensions, ongoing conflicts and long-term security concerns with sustained defense investments. The latest data shows a 2.9 percent increase in real terms compared to 2024, according to newly released figures by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

Although the overall growth rate slowed compared to the sharp 9.7 percent rise recorded in 2024, the increase underscores a continued global trend toward rearmament. The deceleration was largely driven by a decline in United States spending, while most other regions recorded substantial gains. Excluding the US, global military expenditure rose by 9.2 percent in 2025.

The combined spending of the world’s top three military powers—the United States, China and Russia—amounted to $1.48 trillion, representing 51 percent of total global expenditure. This concentration highlights the continued dominance of major powers in shaping global defense dynamics.

The global military burden, defined as military spending as a share of gross domestic product (GDP), rose to 2.5 percent, its highest level since 2009. Analysts attribute the sustained increase to persistent insecurity, protracted wars and rising competition among major powers.

Temporary reduction by Washington

Despite remaining the world’s largest military spender, the United States reduced its expenditure by 7.5 percent to $954 billion in 2025. The decline was primarily due to the absence of newly approved military aid packages for Ukraine, contrasting with the $127 billion allocated over the previous three years.

However, the reduction is expected to be temporary. Washington continues to invest heavily in both nuclear and conventional capabilities, with a strategic focus on maintaining military superiority and countering China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Approved spending for 2026 already exceeds $1 trillion and could climb significantly higher in the coming years.

In contrast, Europe saw one of the sharpest increases in military spending, rising by 14 percent to $864 billion. The surge was largely driven by the ongoing war in Ukraine and intensified efforts by NATO members to strengthen defense capabilities and meet updated alliance spending targets.

Russia’s military expenditure grew by 5.9 percent to $190 billion, accounting for 7.5 percent of its GDP. Ukraine, meanwhile, recorded a 20 percent increase, reaching $84.1 billion—equivalent to a staggering 40 percent of its GDP—reflecting the immense cost of sustaining its defense amid the prolonged conflict.

Europe’s NATO members

European NATO members collectively spent $559 billion in 2025, with 22 out of 29 countries meeting or exceeding the alliance’s benchmark of allocating at least 2 percent of GDP to defense. Germany emerged as the largest spender within the group, increasing its budget by 24 percent to $114 billion. This pushed its military burden to 2.3 percent of GDP, surpassing the NATO threshold for the first time since reunification.

Spain also recorded a significant rise, boosting its military expenditure by 50 percent to $40.2 billion, similarly crossing the 2 percent threshold for the first time in decades. Analysts note that this rapid growth reflects both a drive for greater European strategic autonomy and pressure from the United States for increased burden sharing within NATO.

In the Middle East, military spending remained relatively stable at $218 billion, with only a marginal 0.1 percent increase. Israel’s expenditure declined by 4.9 percent to $48.3 billion following a reduction in the intensity of the Gaza genocide after a ceasefire in early 2025. Nonetheless, Israel’s spending remains nearly double its 2022 level.

Türkiye’s military spending

Türkiye’s military budget rose by 7.2 percent to $30 billion, driven partly by its ongoing operations in Iraq, Syria and Somalia. Meanwhile, Iran’s military expenditure fell by 5.6 percent in real terms to $7.4 billion, largely due to high inflation, although actual spending levels may be higher due to off-budget financing mechanisms.

Asia and Oceania recorded the fastest growth in military spending, increasing by 8.1 percent to $681 billion—the region’s largest rise since 2009. China, the world’s second-largest military spender, expanded its budget by 7.4 percent to $336 billion, marking its 31st consecutive annual increase as it continues a long-term military modernization program.

Japan’s military expenditure rose by 9.7 percent to $62.2 billion, reaching 1.4 percent of GDP—the highest level since 1958. Taiwan also posted a significant increase of 14 percent to $18.2 billion amid rising tensions and increased military activity around the island.

Experts suggest that growing uncertainty about US security commitments has prompted allies in the region, including Japan, Australia and the Philippines, to boost their defense spending independently.

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ne of the most pronounced tensions in the current process of transformation within the international system stems from the ever-widening gap between the global responsibility claims of major powers and their actual behavior. Whilst these gaps may appear manageable at the level of rhetoric during ordinary times, they inevitably surface during crises, bringing the question of who is actually bearing the burden of the system back to the fore.

Underlying this analysis is the fact that the focus of this study lies not merely in China’s economic size or military capacity, but in its redefined great power identity over the past two decades. For whilst Beijing positions itself as an actor resolutely defending its ‘core interests’, it simultaneously claims to be a ‘responsible architect of the international order’. The tension between these two roles inevitably surfaces at times of deepening crisis, bringing the question of which order China truly belongs to back into the spotlight.

Indeed, with the launch of the joint US-Israeli air operation against Iran on 28 February, this question has taken the form of a concrete and challenging test for China. As the Middle East is dragged towards a new systemic breaking point, the crisis’s repercussions for energy security have been projected onto a global scale via the Strait of Hormuz, thereby exposing the fragilities of the global energy order once again through a regional conflict. Beijing, however, is not merely an external observer of this situation; it is portrayed as an actor compelled to confront the crisis as one of the parties directly affected.

The 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement

For China’s relationship with Iran is built upon a multi-layered structure of interdependence, ranging from oil purchases worth tens of billions of dollars and technology transfers to the 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement signed in 2021, and the parallel financial networks and shadow fleets that enable the circumvention of sanctions. The deeply intertwined nature of this structure leaves Beijing with neither the option of maintaining a complete distance nor the luxury of intervening openly on the ground during a crisis. Precisely for this reason, Beijing’s stance in the US/Israel-Iran conflict must be viewed not merely as a diplomatic reaction, but as a multi-layered strategic landscape that simultaneously tests China’s vision for the global order, the structural vulnerabilities arising from energy dependence, and its positioning reflexes within great power competition.

Spanning from the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz within the energy system to the asymmetrical depth of China-Iran relations, this landscape requires analysis along an axis extending from Beijing’s official statements to the ongoing practical facilitation measures on the ground. In this context, the Strait of Hormuz represents the pinnacle of the systemic tension China is currently experiencing. Following the launch of a coordinated air operation by the US and Israel against Iran, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps issued explicit warnings via VHF radio channels to all foreign vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

These warnings quickly escalated into a de facto closure, with tanker traffic declining by approximately 70 per cent and hundreds of vessels forced to anchor outside the strait. This situation threatened the energy corridors that supply 20 per cent of global oil supply, significant volumes of liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports, and a large portion of Asian economies, whilst leading to a rise in Brent crude oil prices. The head of the International Energy Agency described this situation as “the most severe global energy security crisis in history”, thereby concretely demonstrating how a regional war can transform into a structural global threat.

Comprehensive strategic partnership and energy

From China’s perspective, Beijing’s primary security concern in this process is of a directly economic nature and stems from the very structure of its energy supply. Seeking to maintain control over its own energy supply, China meets over 63 per cent of its oil requirements through maritime imports, with half of these imports passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Furthermore, China is the primary buyer of Iranian oil, as Beijing’s purchases account for approximately 90 per cent of Iran’s oil exports, generating tens of billions of dollars in annual revenue that funds the Iranian government’s budget and military activities. Given this structural dependency, the strait’s paralysis ceases to be merely a foreign policy issue for Beijing and becomes a direct matter of economic governance.

Indeed, prior to the crisis, China turned a blind eye to the accumulation of oil tankers from both Iran and Venezuela in its coastal waters; this floating reserve of approximately forty million barrels served as an emergency buffer against a potential prolonged closure of the Strait. The pre-stockpiling of strategic reserves clearly demonstrates that Beijing had anticipated such scenarios and treated energy security as a matter of strategic preparedness; however, the protracted duration of the crisis and the concurrent depletion of stocks are rendering this preparedness increasingly inadequate.

On the other hand, the 25-year ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement’ signed in 2021 confirms that the relationship between China and Iran cannot be explained solely by market dynamics or energy considerations. Encompassing economic, security and technological cooperation, this agreement serves as a testament to the evolution of the relationship between the two countries from limited cooperation over the decades to a broad strategic depth; and a significant portion of this partnership directly conflicts with US foreign policy and national security interests.

Behind Beijing’s positioning of Iran as such a central partner lies not only energy but also a geopolitical need for Tehran, which is viewed as a strategic asset that could be used to counterbalance US influence and reshape the US-led global order. However, despite its comprehensive nature, the partnership also harbors a deep asymmetry. Whilst Iran is heavily dependent on China for energy export revenues and diplomatic support, Beijing continues to pursue a cautious balancing act to avoid jeopardizing its relations with other Gulf partners such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Risk-free pragmatism

The practical manifestation of this balance is clearly evident in the form of China’s support for Iran. By enabling Iran to effectively circumvent global sanctions through trade and financial networks, technology transfers and dual-use trade, China takes care to keep this support strictly separate from any official defense commitments. Beijing, which is alleged to have facilitated access to dual-use technology—including oil transactions, covert tanker fleets, and Iran’s missile and unmanned aerial vehicle programs—through Chinese banks, front companies and intermediary firms, has refrained from making official commitments to Iran in the defense sector.

Although Tehran seeks a deeper strategic rapprochement, bilateral defense cooperation has remained limited in recent years, with both countries conducting their military coordination primarily through trilateral mechanisms with Russia and multilateral platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or BRICS. Reports that, following the outbreak of the crisis, two Iranian vessels in a Chinese port were allowed to be loaded with sodium perchlorate—a solid rocket propellant used in missiles—suggest that this balance of ‘official distance, practical facilitation’ persists. As of November 2025, there were 366 China- and Hong Kong-based entities on the SDN List due to sanctions programs related to Iran; when this figure is taken into account, it paints a picture that illustrates the depth and institutional reach of these networks.

When analyzed at the diplomatic level, it is evident that Beijing has adopted a carefully calibrated language in this crisis, as it has in many other global crises. At a press conference on 3 March, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson emphasized that “energy security is of great importance to the world economy, and all parties bear the responsibility to ensure an uninterrupted energy supply” and called on all relevant parties to take action to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and China’s Permanent Representative to the UN have characterized the US and Israeli attacks as violations of international law, condemned the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and called for an immediate halt to military operations and the resumption of dialogue.

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n a dramatic shift in Middle East politics, tensions between the United States and Iran have eased following the announcement of a two-week ceasefire, described by observers as a potential “last chance” to prevent a wider regional war.

The breakthrough came after Donald Trump confirmed that Washington had agreed to halt military operations against Iran for two weeks, citing a 10-point proposal from Tehran as a “workable basis for negotiations.” The announcement was made just hours before a deadline previously set by the U.S. administration.

The ceasefire, facilitated through mediation by Pakistan, includes an immediate halt to hostilities across multiple fronts, including Lebanon and other areas affected by the broader war. Pakistani officials have invited delegations from both sides to meet in Islamabad on Friday for continued negotiations, marking what could be the first face-to-face talks since the war began.

Trump stated that “significant progress” had been made toward a long-term agreement, adding that the temporary pause in military action would provide the necessary space to finalize a comprehensive deal.

Widespread international support

The agreement has been met with broad international approval, with countries across Asia and beyond urging both sides to use the opportunity to pursue lasting peace.

Indonesia called on all parties to respect sovereignty and prioritize diplomacy, as Australia welcomed the ceasefire as a step toward ending the war. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said his country is working with international partners to support diplomatic efforts and reopen the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz.

Similarly, Japan emphasized continued diplomatic engagement, particularly regarding the safe reopening of the strait, a critical global energy route. Malaysia also expressed support, with Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim calling for the Iranian proposal to evolve into a comprehensive peace agreement benefiting not only Iran but also Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.

UN and regional reactions

The United Nations welcomed the ceasefire, with Secretary-General António Guterres urging all parties to commit to international law and work toward a sustainable resolution. His spokesperson stressed the importance of adhering to the ceasefire terms as a pathway to comprehensive peace in the region.

Regional powers also reacted positively. Egypt described the move as a significant step toward de-escalation and stability, highlighting its importance for global security and international navigation. Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty reportedly discussed the development with U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff, expressing strong support for renewed diplomatic efforts.

Meanwhile, Iraq’s Foreign Ministry called for a “serious and sustained dialogue” between Washington and Tehran to address the root causes of their tensions and build mutual trust.

Next steps and uncertainties

According to U.S. officials cited by American media, the ceasefire is expected to take effect once Iran reopens the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for global oil shipments. Sources indicate that the upcoming talks in Pakistan could mark a turning point, as they would be the first direct negotiations between the two sides since the outbreak of war.

However, some uncertainty remains. Reports suggest discrepancies between the Persian and English versions of Iran’s ceasefire proposal, particularly regarding uranium enrichment—an issue likely to remain central in upcoming negotiations.

While the agreement has sparked optimism worldwide, analysts caution that the two-week ceasefire represents only a narrow window for diplomacy. Whether it leads to a lasting peace or merely a pause in hostilities will depend on the willingness of both sides to compromise on long-standing disputes.

For now, the deal offers a rare moment of hope in a region long marked by instability, with global leaders urging both Washington and Tehran to seize what may be their final opportunity to avoid a broader war.

(Source: News Agencies)

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ccording to the report, satellite imagery and Chinese government documents indicate that entire villages in Sichuan province were demolished and residents evicted beginning in 2021–2022 to make way for expanded nuclear facilities.

Local residents reportedly received minimal explanation for the land seizures, with officials citing “state secrecy.”

The construction includes large reinforced industrial structures, upgraded transportation links, and expanded facilities believed to be connected to nuclear weapons production and research.

The investigation highlights extensive development at sites identified as Site 906 and Site 931, part of a broader network of facilities linked to China’s nuclear program.

Among the most notable additions is a large dome-like structure described by experts as potentially designed for handling highly radioactive materials such as uranium and plutonium.

Analysts cited in the report say the scale and design of the facilities suggest a major modernization effort that could significantly increase China’s nuclear production capacity.

China’s growing arsenal and strategic shift

China is currently estimated to possess over 600 nuclear warheads, placing it behind the United States and Russia, but ahead of other nuclear powers such as France.

Defense analysts say China is the fastest-growing nuclear power globally, even as it maintains its official policy of “no first use.”

Beijing has repeatedly stated that its nuclear strategy is defensive in nature, with its Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejecting claims of weapons escalation and insisting China does not engage in nuclear threats against non-nuclear states.

The report comes at a time of increasing global uncertainty over nuclear arms control. The expiration of the New START Treaty between the United States and Russia has further weakened the international framework limiting strategic weapons.

Former U.S. President Donald Trump has previously called for a new arms control agreement that would also include China, though Beijing has shown little indication it is willing to join such negotiations.

Some analysts believe China’s expansion is linked to broader geopolitical tensions and a desire to strengthen deterrence, particularly in relation to Taiwan and rising military competition with the United States.

Concerns over a new arms race

Experts warn that the simultaneous modernization of nuclear forces by multiple major powers could lead to a more complex and unstable arms race than during the Cold War era.

Analysts also suggest that perceptions of China’s capabilities—whether accurate or exaggerated—could influence U.S. defense planning and potentially accelerate global nuclear proliferation.

Meanwhile, tensions in other regions, including conflicts involving Iran, are also seen by some experts as factors contributing to rising global nuclear insecurity.

(Source: CNN)

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lobal transfers of major arms rose sharply in the past five years, with European demand surging to unprecedented levels, according to new data released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The report highlights a 9.2 per cent increase in the volume of international arms transfers between 2016–20 and 2021–25, marking the largest rise in over a decade.

The increase was driven primarily by a dramatic escalation in arms imports to Europe, which more than tripled during the period. European states accounted for 33 per cent of global arms imports, making the region the world’s largest recipient for the first time in recent history. The surge reflects growing security concerns linked to Russia and the ongoing war in Ukraine, which alone received 9.7 per cent of all global arms transfers.

SIPRI researchers pointed to a broader shift in European defense policy. “Most European states have significantly increased their arms imports to strengthen military capabilities against a perceived growing threat from Russia,” said Mathew George, director of the institute’s Arms Transfers Program. In addition to Ukraine, countries such as Poland and the United Kingdom were among the region’s largest importers.

Dominance of the United States of the arms market

The data also underscores the expanding dominance of the United States in the global arms market. The U.S. accounted for 42 per cent of all arms exports in 2021–25, up from 36 per cent in the previous five-year period. American exports rose by 27 per cent overall, with shipments to Europe increasing by a striking 217 per cent.

For the first time in two decades, Europe replaced the Middle East as the largest destination for U.S. arms exports, receiving 38 per cent of total shipments compared to 33 per cent for Middle Eastern states. Despite this shift, Saudi Arabia remained the single largest recipient of U.S. arms, accounting for 12 per cent of total American exports.

Analysts say Washington’s growing share reflects both demand for advanced military technology and the strategic use of arms exports as a foreign policy tool. “For importers, U.S. arms offer advanced capabilities and a way of fostering strong political ties,” said Pieter Wezeman, a senior SIPRI researcher.

While the United States strengthened its position, Russia experienced a dramatic decline. Russian arms exports fell by 64 per cent, reducing its global market share from 21 per cent to just 6.8 per cent. The drop is widely attributed to the impact of sanctions, the diversion of equipment to its own military operations, and decreased demand from traditional buyers.

The world’s second-largest arms exporter

France emerged as the world’s second-largest arms exporter, increasing its share to 9.8 per cent of global exports. French shipments grew by 21 per cent, with major clients including India, Egypt and Greece. Meanwhile, Germany rose to fourth place globally, partly due to significant arms deliveries to Ukraine.

Other exporters also recorded notable gains. Italy saw its arms exports increase by 157 per cent, while Israel expanded its share of global exports to 4.4 per cent, overtaking the United Kingdom for the first time.

In contrast to Europe, arms imports declined in several other regions. Asia and Oceania saw a 20 per cent drop in imports, largely due to a sharp reduction in China’s purchases as it expanded its domestic arms production. Nevertheless, countries such as India, Pakistan, Japan and Australia remained among the world’s top importers, reflecting ongoing regional tensions.

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar

The Middle East also recorded a decline, with arms imports falling by 13 per cent. However, the region continues to be a major market, with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait ranking among the world’s top importers. The United States remained the dominant supplier to the region, accounting for more than half of all imports.

Elsewhere, Africa experienced a steep 41 per cent drop in arms imports, while the Americas saw a more modest increase of 12 per cent. In South America, imports rose by 31 per cent, driven largely by a significant increase in Brazil’s acquisitions.

SIPRI’s findings point to a rapidly evolving global arms landscape shaped by geopolitical tensions and shifting alliances. The surge in European demand, combined with the United States’ growing export dominance and Russia’s declining role, signals a reconfiguration of the international arms trade.

As conflicts persist and security concerns intensify across multiple regions, analysts warn that the upward trend in arms transfers could continue in the coming years, further entrenching global militarization and strategic competition.

(Source: SIPRI)

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s the war between the United States and Israel against Iran enters its second month with no clear path to de-escalation, China is increasingly positioning itself as a voice for peace. Yet analysts say Beijing’s actions suggest caution, raising doubts about whether it is ready to take on a central role as a mediator in one of the world’s most volatile geopolitical crises.

China’s diplomatic posture came into sharper focus this week following high-level talks in Beijing between Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The two sides issued a joint statement calling for an “immediate ceasefire,” the swift launch of peace negotiations, and a long-term settlement backed by the United Nations.

The initiative, described by officials as a five-point proposal, also emphasized the protection of civilians, the security of critical shipping lanes, and respect for the sovereignty of all states involved. While the statement marked one of China’s most detailed responses to the ongoing war, it stopped short of outlining concrete mechanisms for achieving these goals.

Balancing diplomacy and risk

China’s approach reflects a broader strategic calculation. Under President Xi Jinping, Beijing has sought to expand its global diplomatic footprint and present itself as a stabilizing force in contrast to what it characterizes as Western interventionism. Calling for dialogue and restraint allows China to project influence without becoming entangled in the operational complexities of conflict resolution.

However, experts note that taking on a genuine peace broker role would require commitments Beijing has historically avoided. Acting as a guarantor of any agreement—ensuring compliance or responding to violations—could draw China into direct confrontation or force it to deploy military or monitoring capabilities abroad.

“China wants the credit of mediation without the burden of enforcement,” said one regional analyst, pointing to Beijing’s longstanding reluctance to engage in security alliances or military interventions beyond its immediate periphery.

Pakistan steps forward

While China has voiced support for diplomacy, Pakistan has emerged as a more active player in mediation efforts. Islamabad has offered to host talks between Washington and Tehran, leveraging its diplomatic ties with both sides. Pakistani officials have also reportedly explored the possibility of China acting as a guarantor in a future agreement, though no formal commitment has been made.

Behind the scenes, coordination appears to be ongoing. Reports indicate that Pakistani leadership has engaged with Chinese officials to discuss potential frameworks for de-escalation, including multilateral arrangements involving regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Türkiye.

Still, China has maintained a measured tone. In response to questions about a guarantor role, its foreign ministry reiterated that Beijing supports mediation efforts by “relevant parties” and is willing to play a “constructive role,” without specifying what that role would entail.

Lessons from past mediation

China’s diplomatic ambitions are not without precedent. In 2023, Beijing successfully brokered a normalization agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, a breakthrough widely seen as a milestone in its Middle East engagement. That deal demonstrated China’s ability to leverage its economic ties and political neutrality to facilitate dialogue.

However, analysts caution that the current war presents far greater challenges. Unlike the Saudi-Iran rapprochement, which involved two regional rivals seeking to reduce tensions, the present war involves active military confrontation and deep-seated hostility between Iran and the United States and Israel.

Moreover, trust between the parties remains minimal. Iranian officials have indicated openness to a ceasefire only under strict conditions, including guarantees against future attacks, while U.S. leadership faces its own domestic and strategic pressures.

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hina has deployed large numbers of obsolete fighter jets converted into attack drones at air bases near the Taiwan Strait, according to a new report that highlights Beijing’s evolving military strategy toward Taiwan. The study, published by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, draws on satellite imagery and open-source intelligence to show rows of modified J-6 aircraft positioned at six bases across Fujian and Guangdong provinces, both located close to the strategically sensitive waterway separating mainland China from Taiwan.

The J-6, a Chinese-built version of a 1950s Soviet fighter, was once a core part of China’s air force but has long since been retired from frontline service. Analysts now say that hundreds of these aging jets have been repurposed into unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), designated as J-6W drones. By removing onboard weapon systems and installing automated flight controls and navigation technology, the Chinese military has transformed these legacy aircraft into expendable strike platforms capable of carrying out high-risk missions without endangering pilots.

According to the report’s author, former U.S. naval intelligence officer J. Michael Dahm, China may have converted more than 500 of these aircraft into drones, with at least 200 already deployed near the Taiwan Strait. He told Reuters that these drones are likely to play a key role in the opening phase of any potential military operation against Taiwan. Rather than functioning like conventional remotely piloted drones, they are expected to operate more like cruise missiles—launched in large waves toward predetermined targets.

Overwhelming Taiwan’s air defense systems

Military experts believe the primary purpose of these converted drones would be to overwhelm Taiwan’s air defense systems through sheer volume. By sending large numbers of relatively inexpensive drones toward high-value targets, China could force Taiwan and its allies to expend costly interceptor missiles. This tactic, often described as a form of asymmetric warfare, seeks to exploit the imbalance between the low cost of offensive systems and the high cost of defensive countermeasures.

A senior Taiwanese security official, speaking to Reuters, said the threat posed by these drones is significant precisely because of this cost imbalance. “To prevent strikes on critical infrastructure, we will inevitably face the challenge of using expensive missiles to intercept them,” the official said. In response, Taiwan is accelerating plans to acquire new counter-drone technologies designed to neutralize such threats more efficiently.

The development comes amid rising tensions between China and Taiwan, which Beijing considers part of its territory despite strong opposition from the island’s government. China has not ruled out the use of force to achieve reunification, while Taiwan maintains that its future should be decided solely by its people. Although recent assessments by the U.S. intelligence community suggest that China is not currently planning an invasion by 2027, other defense analyses indicate that Beijing is rapidly building the capabilities needed to carry out such an operation if it chooses to do so.

A diverse mix of airpower

Experts say the deployment of J-6 drones is only one component of a broader Chinese military strategy that emphasizes a diverse mix of airpower. In a potential conflict scenario, waves of drones could be launched alongside ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, advanced fighter jets, and long-range bombers, all arriving at different speeds and altitudes. This multi-layered assault would complicate defensive efforts and create what one analyst described as an “air defense nightmare.”

Peter Layton, a former Australian air force officer and visiting fellow at Griffith University, said such an approach would aim to saturate defenses and create confusion. “There would be a lot of diverse threats all coming at once,” he said. “The goal is to overwhelm the system so that some weapons inevitably get through.” He added that the J-6 drones, despite being based on outdated technology, would still require advanced and expensive missile systems to intercept due to their speed and size.

The increasing reliance on drones reflects broader changes in modern warfare, where unmanned systems have become central to military operations. Conflicts such as the Russia-Ukraine War have demonstrated the effectiveness of deploying drones in large numbers for reconnaissance, targeting, and direct attacks. These systems can often be produced quickly and at relatively low cost, making them well-suited for sustained, high-intensity conflicts.

Stealth UAVs and carrier-based unmanned systems

China has also been investing heavily in more advanced drone technologies, including stealth UAVs and carrier-based unmanned systems. Analysts believe these newer platforms could be used in conjunction with converted legacy aircraft like the J-6, creating a layered drone force capable of both high-end precision strikes and mass saturation attacks. In addition, there are indications that China is experimenting with using drones in deception operations, potentially to confuse adversaries and test defensive responses.

Despite their potential effectiveness, the deployment of J-6 drones is not without risks. The air bases where they are stationed are located relatively close to Taiwan and could be vulnerable to preemptive strikes in the event of a conflict. Nevertheless, analysts suggest that their role as expendable assets means they would likely be launched early in any military campaign, reducing their exposure to counterattacks on the ground.

The report underscores the growing complexity of the military balance in the Taiwan Strait and the increasing importance of drone warfare in shaping future conflicts. As both China and Taiwan continue to adapt to these evolving threats, the risk of miscalculation remains a concern for regional stability. For now, the presence of these converted drones serves as a stark reminder of how even outdated technology can be repurposed into a significant strategic tool in modern warfare.

(Source: Reuters)

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n the digital age, social media platforms have transformed into tools of social engineering and informal educational spaces that shape the worldview of young people. Content promoted by algorithms has now transcended individual preferences and become a matter of social and national security. TikTok is a striking example of this. Launched in 2016 by the China-based company ByteDance, it surpassed 1 billion users worldwide within a few years and became the most popular platform among young people. The secret to its unique success lies in its special recommendation algorithm, which captivates users from the very first moment by offering an endless stream of videos. Unlike classic social networks, the platform offers an independent viral discovery mechanism, allowing videos from unknown content creators to reach millions.

However, perhaps the darker side of this algorithmic power lies in content selection and allegations of invisible censorship. Leaked communications from 2020 revealed that TikTok applied filters to ‘create a desirable vibe’, hiding users deemed unattractive, poor or disabled from the feed. Similarly, leaks revealed that videos with dilapidated or slum-like backgrounds were deemed ‘not cool enough’ and not shown to a wider audience. Interestingly, many news sites around the world that reported on these leaks were forced to remove their articles in 2021 and 2022. Without this information about the 2020 TikTok leaks, we might not have found these articles.

How does the TikTok algorithm work?

TikTok’s recommendation algorithm, which offers personalized video streams, is the most important factor that makes the app so popular and addictive. But how well is this algorithm developed in relation to neural networks? How does it trigger the neural system? Is it solely related to social psychology or is there an algorithm and content system compatible with the hormonal system? How does it create the cycle that causes a dopamine surge in the brain? Is there a new system that deciphers the neural system directly, replacing the film, television, and advertising industries shaped by archetypes? These are topics for other articles.

Returning to our research topic, the “For You” page on TikTok is designed to offer each user new videos tailored to their interests. When a new user joins the platform, the algorithm gathers interest signals by initially showing popular videos in different categories. Interactions, such as which videos the user watches and how much they like or share, quickly create a profile. If a user watches a video all the way through or rewatches it, the algorithm assumes they are interested in that content and recommends similar videos more frequently. Thus, TikTok’s recommendation algorithm creates a kind of “vulnerability map” of the user by analyzing every micro-interaction.

Although personalization enables users to swiftly discover content they may enjoy, it can also foster a hazardous cycle of dependency. Rather than being about digital platform loyalty, it is more accurate to say that this is an addiction involving the brain’s stimulation centers. Because the TikTok feed is designed for endless scrolling, users have difficulty controlling their content consumption. Each video is optimized to be short and attention-grabbing, constantly triggering the brain’s reward mechanism and releasing dopamine. Young people, especially children, have not yet fully developed impulse control, making it easier for them to get caught up in this rapid reward cycle and spend hours on the app. The platform constantly prompts users with the question, “What will the next video be?” This makes them lose track of time. Indeed, research shows that compared to other platforms, TikTok users lose control of their time more quickly and stay on the app much longer than planned.

This can be explained by TikTok’s psychological use of a “variable reward” principle. With each scroll, users experience uncertainty about what the next video will be. Although some mundane content appears occasionally, the frequent appearance of entertaining or interesting videos reinforces addictive behavior similar to pulling the lever on a slot machine in the hope of winning a big prize. The Washington, D.C., attorney general’s indictment also describes the TikTok algorithm as “intentionally addictive”, emphasizing that it keeps young people online for hours, which can lead to mental health issues such as depression, anxiety and attention deficit disorder.

Another concerning aspect of TikTok’s algorithm is its tendency to show users sensitive and harmful content. Various studies have revealed weaknesses in the platform’s content moderation. For instance, Global Witness’s 2025 experiment involved creating new accounts that appeared to belong to 13-year-olds. Even with “Restricted Mode” enabled, sexually explicit terms were suggested to these accounts in the search bar. After a few clicks, the platform itself suggested pornographic and inappropriate content. The suggestions were so inappropriate that researchers had to report videos featuring individuals who appeared to be under 16 to the relevant authorities for suspected child abuse. In short, not only does TikTok fail to fully implement the rules it claims to have introduced to protect young users but its algorithm also directs them toward objectionable content.

Persona experiment

To understand how the TikTok algorithm influences users, we conducted an experiment with fictional users who had different profiles and interests. We created 12 distinct personas that varied in age, gender and interests and opened a new TikTok account for each persona. These personas included children, teenagers, young adults and middle-aged individuals. Their interests ranged from humor and gaming to music, religious content, news, history and recipes. On the first day, each persona signaled their interests to the algorithm by searching for or watching a few related videos. For the next week, each persona passively watched content that appeared on their “For You” feed. On the third and seventh days, we recorded and compared the algorithm’s suggested content profiles for each persona. This allowed us to observe how the algorithm constructed user profiles and trapped them in specific content bubbles over the course of a week.

The findings at the end of the experiment were quite striking. In particular, the initial interests of children and adolescents quickly shifted towards inappropriate and potentially harmful content. For instance, a 13-year-old male persona initially watched gaming videos and innocent jokes but by the third day, his feed was dominated by crude humor and dangerous “challenge” videos. By the seventh day, he was being exposed to violent content, including street fights and the glorification of carrying knives and other sharp objects.

Similarly, a 15-year-old female persona initially watched popular dance trends and posts from high school students. Within a few days, however, the algorithm pulled her toward more sexually suggestive dance videos and erotically suggestive content. Even with “Restricted Mode” enabled, TikTok was showing sexually explicit search suggestions in the young account’s search section. After a week, the girl’s feed was filled with lewd jokes, exhibitionist dances and advertisements for adult dating apps. These examples clearly demonstrate how inadequate TikTok’s content filtering mechanisms are for children and teenagers.

Extreme content among young people

The algorithm was also seen pushing users toward increasingly extreme content, particularly among young adults and middle-aged individuals. An 18-year-old female user, who was initially interested in makeup tutorials and college entrance exam preparation videos, found that her feed was soon filled with videos promoting consumption and the luxurious lifestyles of popular influencers. By the seventh day, she was inundated with perfectionist beauty trends, cosmetic surgery advertisements and content glorifying wealthy lifestyles. This led her to question her own appearance and living standards.

A 30-year-old male user who initially consumed tech news and economic content was bombarded with conspiracy theory-like political videos by the third day. His feed was flooded with unverified and sensationalist claims about topics such as the pandemic or the global economic crisis. By the end of the week, this person was overwhelmed with ideologically polarizing and provocative content. In fact, an independent test by Guardian Australia reported that even a completely new TikTok account, created without any interaction, was quickly flooded with violent, far-right content and racist videos, which is parallel to our research.

One of our religiously inclined personas underwent a complete transformation. Initially, the 40-year-old conservative woman watched content related to religious discussions and family values. However, by the third day, TikTok began presenting her with increasingly nationalistic yet secular content. There was an increase in posts with racist and Turkish nationalist themes, and Islamic references were relegated to the background in the videos. After a week, this devout profile was confronted with harsh Turkish nationalist discourse that largely relegated religious identity to the background. These findings suggest that the platform prioritizes content that serves a specific agenda in Türkiye. Some news pages on social media have been accused in the press of being controlled by Zionist groups that promote “Turkishness without Islam.” Similarly, despite her religious sensibilities, this persona was exposed to anti-religious, nationalist content by the algorithm.

O

ver the past century, the geopolitical pulse of the Middle East has been measured in barrels of crude oil. The oil shocks of the 1970s shaped behavioral patterns within the international system, determined alliances, and established a global security architecture dependent on the flow of Persian Gulf hydrocarbons to Western industrial centers.

However, by the mid-2020s, a new agenda had emerged alongside oil: rare earth elements, especially neodymium and praseodymium (NdPr), which are part of the lanthanide series, as well as critical minerals, including battery metals such as lithium and cobalt. These materials have transcended industrial use and have become the strategic raw materials of the 21st century. The supply chain architecture of these elements across the Middle East is triggering a profound realignment of the balance of power stretching from Tehran to Riyadh.

Today, the region is no longer content with its usual role. The Middle East is striving to position itself as a vital hub for refining and extracting materials for the green and digital transformation. Undoubtedly, this transition is not uniform. It is divided by two competing visions: Iran’s alternative economic approach, which is based on self-sufficiency, and the Gulf states’ future-oriented diversification strategy, which is based on global integration. In this article, we will examine the Iran-Gulf divergence and its impact on U.S.-China supply chain security within the framework of rare earth elements (REE) and attempt to go beyond Iran-focused analyses.

Iran’s mineral “resistance”

In Tehran, the search for natural resources is a matter of survival. Although sanctions have sometimes crippled oil exports, the Islamic Republic is turning to its geological wealth. Total mineral reserves are estimated to be worth tens of trillions of dollars. The country frames this as insurance against Western isolation.

The opening of a domestic monazite processing plant in April 2025, as well as the regime’s 2023 announcement of massive lithium deposits discovered in Hamadan, are emerging as lines of defense. Nuclear, orthopedic, and warfare capabilities are critical for a state that specializes in asymmetric warfare. Permanent magnets in missile guidance systems are indispensable for the Revolutionary Guard’s sophisticated radars and electronic warfare systems, which are central to modern Iranian deterrence.

Aiming for vertical integration, Iran is seeking to build a sanctions-resistant technological-military complex starting from monazite mines in Yazd and extending to the domestic extraction of high-purity elements. This strategy is based on the comprehensive agreement signed with Russia in January 2025 and on strengthening ties with China. In essence, Tehran is trading its raw mineral potential for processing technology, thereby positioning itself within a non-Western axis of rare earth elements that challenges the U.S.-led supply security framework.

High-risk insurance in the Gulf

A different picture emerges on the opposite shore of the Persian Gulf. For Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), critical minerals are emerging as a bridge to a post-oil future. Unlike Iran’s defensive stance, the Gulf’s strategy is aggressively expansionist and collaborative.

In May 2025, Maaden and MP Materials announced a cooperation framework to develop the rare earth value chain. Then, in November 2025, a refining and separation investment materialized in Saudi Arabia through a joint venture supported by the U.S. Department of Defense. Maaden holds at least a 51% majority stake in this structure, while MP Materials and the US Department of Defense together hold up to 49%. Through this arrangement, Riyadh positions itself as a Western alternative to Chinese dominance, demonstrating an example of modern risk management. While maintaining its role in BRICS and welcoming Chinese investments in the electric vehicle sector, Riyadh is also building mineral cooperation with Washington.

The scale of capital involved is staggering. Gulf states are investing tens of billions of dollars in overseas acquisitions in Africa and Indonesia, using their existing wealth to acquire new wealth. The UAE’s $1.4 billion lithium processing plant and Saudi Arabia’s processing center in Yanbu are designed to break China’s midstream refining bottleneck. In this sense, the Gulf states are seeking a new way forward in an alternative future where internal combustion engines are obsolete.

Regional comparison: Dominance or synergy?

The divergence between the approaches of Iran and the Gulf states is creating a new source of tension in Middle Eastern security. The “Lanthanide Rift,” which stretches along the Persian Gulf, represents two irreconcilable philosophies regarding state strategy. Tehran views its mineral wealth as essential to survival and autonomy. In the Iranian economy, every gram of neodymium extracted from Yazd symbolizes resistance to Western pressure.

The ultimate goal is to secure the survival of the regime and its military self-sufficiency, ensuring that its missile and drone programs are not dependent on shipments from a hostile capital. This inward-looking strategy relies on overtly aligning with a non-Western axis, such as Russia, China, and the BRICS bloc. Rather than seeking capital in traditional markets, Iran relies on state-funded ventures and complex barter arrangements with ideological allies.

In stark contrast, the Gulf monarchies, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are pursuing global integration and future-oriented diversification. For Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, critical minerals are tools that will propel their new energy and economies into the post-hydrocarbon era and establish them as indispensable global hubs. Unlike Iran, the Gulf states are practicing the art of multiple alignments. They leverage U.S. security guarantees and joint venture capital, as exemplified by the 2025 minerals pact with Washington. Simultaneously, they act as major trading partners and energy suppliers to China.

While Iran focuses on domestic resistance, the Gulf region is aggressively pursuing global supply chain integration. It is leveraging the pull of sovereign wealth funds to partner in the world’s most lucrative mining projects. While Tehran is exchanging goods, the Gulf is investing. This creates a regional paradox: one is building shields while the other is building bridges.

This situation points to an impending “Resource Cold War” in the region. Iran’s advances in NTE processing capacity could strengthen the “Axis of Resistance,” making Iran a more autonomous and formidable player in regional conflicts. Conversely, the Gulf’s alliance with the US on minerals could strengthen the security architecture that Iran seeks to dismantle. The U.S. State Department’s announcement of the 2026 Critical Minerals Meeting indicates that the strategic mineral stockpile, known as “Project Vault,” may increasingly rely on Gulf stability. Thus, the security of Riyadh’s mines becomes as critical to U.S. national security as the Strait of Hormuz.

A

s powerful nations are getting alarmingly entangled in active confrontation, the world stands dangerously close to a catastrophic war. The destructive nature of modern-day warfare means that even a single misstep could have irreversible consequences. Therefore, making the preservation of state sovereignty and independent security capabilities a critical priority for states across the international system.

Military interventions, whimsical enforcement of international law, and shifting strategic commitments contribute to the growing skepticism regarding the reliability and commitments of American leadership. An increasing number of states have begun to reassess their dependence on U.S. security umbrella.

Coinciding with the dramatic rise of China, East Asia has emerged as one of the most strategically significant regions in global politics. Nowhere is this risk of miscalculation more pronounced than in the maritime and territorial fractures of the Far East. The rapid economic and military rise of China challenges the long-standing regional dominance of the United States and intensified geopolitical competition across the Indo-Pacific.

Within this framework, the U.S.–Japan alliance is central in maintaining regional stability and deterrence. Following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, Japan was made to adopt a post-war security framework centered on constitutional pacifism and peaceful coexistence. During the American occupation, the United States oversaw the drafting of the new Japanese constitution, fundamentally reshaping the country’s political and military structure. At the core of this framework was Article 9, which renounced war as a sovereign right and prohibited Japan from maintaining traditional military forces capable of waging offensive conflict.

Japan’s global identity

For decades, this constitutional restriction defined Japan’s global identity. The country projected an image built on economic power, diplomatic engagement, and a deliberately restrained defense posture. Yet, over the decades, Japan’s strategic role evolved as one of the most critical logistical platforms for American military operations in Asia.

Geopolitically, Japan occupies a key position within the First Island Chain, a series of islands stretching from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines that effectively forms a maritime barrier limiting Chinese and Russian naval access to the wider Pacific Ocean. Control over this chain is central to maintaining naval dominance in East Asia.

Taiwan is at the geographic center of this strategic arc; its location gives it disproportionate strategic importance. Should Beijing gain control of the island, the structural integrity of the First Island Chain would be fundamentally altered. The barrier constraining China’s naval expansion could effectively be breached.

Such a shift may dramatically reshape the regional balance of power. Control of Taiwan would provide China with direct access to deeper Pacific waters, allowing its submarine forces greater freedom of maneuver beyond the confined seas near its coastline. For nuclear-powered submarines carrying ballistic missiles, the ability to operate in deep-water environments is crucial for survivability and credible second-strike capability.

55,000 US troops stationed across Japanese territory

Presently, Japan serves as the primary logistical hub for U.S. military activity across the Indo-Pacific. The United States maintains more than 55,000 troops stationed across Japanese territory, its largest overseas deployment anywhere in the world. Japan is the world’s fourth-largest economy, providing a stable, high-tech industrial base that is deeply integrated into the U.S. supply chain, particularly in high-technology sectors such as semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, and precision engineering.

Tokyo still upholds its official non-nuclear principles, but its broader security posture is becoming more complex and strategically ambiguous than its public doctrine suggests. Domestically, a gradual rise in nationalist sentiment and increasing anxiety over territorial disputes, particularly surrounding the Senkaku Islands, further amplified calls for a more assertive security doctrine. These pressures are generating internal debates that challenge Japan’s long-standing postwar identity as deemed to be a pacifist state.

In the February 8, 2026, general election, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi led the Liberal Democratic Party to a historic landslide victory, securing a postwar record of 316 seats in parliament. For the first time in the postwar era, a strongly hawkish conservative government commands a single-party supermajority.

As of March 2026, Japan is beginning to display clear “self-ambitions”, driven by the fear that the U.S. is becoming an unpredictable and “objective-only” actor, Tokyo is aggressively pursuing the idea of strategic autonomy. While Japan is not currently a nuclear power, it is a “paranuclear” state, possessing the advanced technology and plutonium stockpiles necessary to develop a nuclear deterrent in as little as six months.

‘Managed Rivalry’

U.S.-Japan alliance has entered a phase of ‘Managed Rivalry.’ While the 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy maintains the First Island Chain as a priority, the transactional nature of the new administration’s ‘America First’ posture has introduced a ‘credibility gap.’ This has compelled Japan to accelerate its own counterstrike capabilities, most notably the March 2026 deployment of long-range standoff missiles, further antagonizing Beijing and tightening the ‘Triangular Trap’.

The logic driving these developments ultimately returns to the unique role of nuclear weapons in international geopolitics. The destructive nature of nuclear weapons provides what is often described as “ultimate deterrence.” While the possession of nuclear weapons raises profound moral and humanitarian concerns, the geopolitical reality remains that the five recognized nuclear powers under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons, along with India Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, continue to modernize their arsenals rather than dismantle them. This ongoing modernization risks leading to collapse of long-term viability of the global non-proliferation regime.

Compounding this instability is the erosion of the broader nuclear arms control architecture. With the expiration of the New START treaty, which previously limited the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems possessed by the United States and Russia, the global system of nuclear restraint has effectively entered an unregulated era. For the first time in more than five decades, there is no comprehensive, legally binding agreement constraining the nuclear arsenals of the world powers.

This development has generated deep unease among technologically advanced non-nuclear states that rely on extended deterrence guarantees. Countries such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea are now openly debating whether long-standing commitments to nuclear proliferation remain viable in an increasingly unstable security environment.

Tokyo is gradually asserting the capabilities necessary to defend its interests with greater autonomy. While it cannot abandon the alliance with Washington, Japan’s ongoing rearmament and doctrinal evolution signal that the era of complete strategic dependency may be drawing to a close. As such, Japan is preparing for a possibility that its geographic position will once again require it to act as a fully sovereign strategic power rather than merely an extension of American regional policy.

R

ussia and China have sharply criticized the United States and Israel over their military strikes on Iran, urging an immediate halt to hostilities and warning that the conflict risks accelerating nuclear proliferation across the Middle East.

The diplomatic pushback comes days after joint US-Israeli airstrikes targeted sites inside Iran, prompting retaliation from Tehran and widening regional instability.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Israeli counterpart Gideon Saar on Tuesday that the attacks interrupted negotiations between Washington and Tehran that had “made significant progress,” including discussions addressing Israel’s security concerns.

According to China’s Foreign Ministry, Wang said Beijing “opposes any military strikes launched by Israel and the US against Iran” and called for an immediate cessation of operations to prevent escalation.

“Force cannot truly solve problems; instead, it will bring new problems and serious long-term consequences,” Wang said during the phone call.

China also requested that Israel take “concrete measures” to ensure the safety of Chinese personnel and institutions in Iran. The call followed additional diplomatic outreach by Wang to the foreign ministers of Iran, Oman and France in an apparent effort to stabilize the rapidly deteriorating situation.

Beijing has consistently advocated a diplomatic solution to tensions over Iran’s nuclear program, positioning itself as a mediator in regional disputes.

Lavrov warns of nuclear proliferation

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also criticized the U.S. and Israel, warning that their actions could produce the opposite of their stated objective — preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

Speaking at a news conference, Lavrov said the “logical consequence” of the attacks could be that forces inside Iran might push to acquire a nuclear bomb.

“Because the US doesn’t attack those who have nuclear bombs,” Lavrov remarked, suggesting that military pressure could incentivize deterrence through nuclear capability.

Lavrov further warned that other Arab states might now reconsider their own strategic positions, potentially triggering a broader nuclear arms race in the region.

Israel is widely regarded as the Middle East’s only nuclear-armed state, though it neither confirms nor denies possessing such weapons.

Moscow offers mediation

Lavrov said Russia had seen no evidence that Tehran was developing nuclear weapons and reiterated Moscow’s readiness to assist in finding a diplomatic solution. He spoke on Tuesday with Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, and condemned what he described as “unprovoked military aggression” by the U.S. and Israel.

Earlier, Russia’s Foreign Ministry accused Washington and Tel Aviv of carrying out a “premeditated and unprovoked act of armed aggression” against a sovereign UN member state, warning that the campaign could lead to humanitarian, economic and even radiological consequences.

The ministry said the U.S. and Israel were pushing the region toward “an unpredictable chain reaction and spiraling violence,” placing full responsibility for the fallout on them.

Russia’s criticism comes as Moscow itself continues to face international condemnation for its ongoing war in Ukraine, now entering its fifth year.

China and Russia have both strengthened political and economic ties with Iran in recent years, often opposing US-led sanctions and military pressure on Tehran.

As the conflict between Israel, the United States and Iran intensifies, diplomatic divisions among major global powers appear to be widening, complicating efforts to contain what analysts warn could become a broader regional confrontation.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

I

n its early years, the World Economic Forum was born from a well-intentioned vision, serious intellectual effort and a quest for technical governance. When Klaus Schwab launched the Forum nearly sixty years ago, his primary aim was to strengthen the institutional capacity of Western industry and establish a healthy dialogue between corporate executives and decision-makers.

However, from the second half of the 1990s onwards, the rapid financialization of capitalism, coupled with the growing influence of new types of sponsors and global capital actors on the Forum, began to fundamentally alter the spirit of Davos. The dominance of financial capitalism and the increasingly theatrical nature of the event have eroded its intellectual weight.

It is now debatable whether the World Economic Forum should continue to be held in Davos. Davos’s reputation has suffered serious erosion over time.

The golden age: The centre of neoliberal globalization (1990-2008)

The early 1990s marked a historical turning point for both the international system and Davos’s institutional identity. The unipolar world order that emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union reinforced the global perception that liberal democracy and the free market were ‘without alternative’. This period was symbolized by Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis and marked the ideological triumph of neoliberal globalization.

Davos thus became the most visible showcase of the Western-centric global order in this new atmosphere. The principles of the Washington Consensus — privatization, deregulation, free trade and fiscal discipline — were discussed at Davos and virtually transformed into global norms. The invisible coordination mechanism formed between the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Economic Forum created intellectual and political legitimacy for reform packages that imposed the neoliberal market economy on developing countries.

Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Davos was a platform on which state leaders, central bank governors, financial institution executives, and CEOs of multinational companies effectively shaped global economic policies. Representatives of ‘Third Way’ politics, such as Clinton and Blair, met with global finance and technology figures, such as Soros, Gates and Greenspan, on the same ground. They constantly promoted the idea that market capitalism and neoliberal democracy were compatible and sustainable.

From the early 2000s onwards, the first wave of digitalization played a significant role in the transformation of Davos. The rise of the internet economy saw Silicon Valley–based technology companies join the ranks of the global elite, with Google, Microsoft and Amazon becoming the new stars of the forum. The pioneers of digital capitalism began to represent not only technological innovations at Davos, but also new power relations.

However, this ‘golden age’ turned into a period in which the fragilities of the neoliberal system deepened, in stark contrast to the name given to the era. Excessive financial market liberalization, deteriorating income distribution, weakening real production and uncontrolled speculative capital growth made the global economy increasingly fragile. Sadly, Davos participants largely ignored these risks, and consequently the period from 1990 to 2008 represents both the most brilliant and the most problematic phase in Davos’ history.

Cracks in the neoliberal wing: The 2008 crisis and the erosion of legitimacy (2008-2016)

The global financial crisis of 2008 has gone down in history as the most severe structural test of the neoliberal globalisation model. The collapse that began in the US mortgage market quickly spread to the global banking system, and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers revealed just how fragile the financial system had become. This crisis was not just an economic collapse; it also signified the intellectual bankruptcy of the market-centred order that had been staunchly defended at the World Economic Forum’s Davos Summit for years.

Following the crisis, Western governments were forced to implement extraordinary interventions that contradicted the free market rhetoric of previous years. Trillions of dollars of public funds were used to bail out banks that were ‘too big to fail’; losses were socialised while profits remained in the private sector. This situation undermined the justice and legitimacy of market capitalism profoundly.

For Davos, this period marked the beginning of a serious loss of credibility. Many of the forum’s leading figures had supported policies advocating financial liberalisation and downplaying risks, which led to the crisis. Despite this, there was no real process of self-criticism by these same actors at Davos in the post-crisis period; responsibility was attributed to ‘wrong practices’ rather than the system’s structural problems.

The Occupy Wall Street movement and similar protests that emerged in this environment were among the first major indicators of a mass reaction against the global elite order represented by Davos. The slogan ‘the 99% against the 1%’ symbolised the collapse of the neoliberal system’s social legitimacy. Davos was now perceived as both an economic forum and a symbol of global inequality.

By the mid-2010s, the Davos Summit had become a ‘post-crisis platform’, attempting to mitigate the effects of the crisis rather than determining the direction of the global economy. Consequently, the period between 2008 and 2016 can be viewed as a transitional phase leading to the ‘inevitable end’ of Davos. The confidence of the neoliberal golden age gave way to uncertainty, with ideological certainty making way for defensive rhetoric. The erosion of legitimacy deepened during these years.

The Trump Earthquake, Brexit and the Dissolution of the Atlantic (2016-2022)

2016 was a turning point for the global liberal order represented by Davos. The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union and Donald Trump’s election as US president revealed the collapse of the political and economic consensus that had been established in the Western world for decades. These developments were not just a matter of domestic policy preferences, but also reflected accumulated social reactions against globalization in politics.

Trump’s ‘America First’ doctrine conflicted directly with Davos’s fundamental values, such as free trade, multilateralism, and institutional cooperation. The US pursued policies that rendered the World Trade Organization ineffective, initiated trade wars with its allies and demonstrated a tendency to withdraw unilaterally from international agreements. In this process, Washington became the biggest challenger to the liberal order it had defended for many years. In his second term, Trump has taken his policies and strategies even further.

Brexit showed that the idea of the irreversibility of European integration was a misconception. The British referendum clearly exposed structural problems in the economic and political architecture of the European Union, and the discourse of national sovereignty regained strength.

During this period, NATO’s role has also been subject to serious scrutiny. Meanwhile, China’s economic and technological growth has further complicated the global balance of power.

Against this backdrop of geopolitical fragmentation, the World Economic Forum in Davos has sought to defend globalization and preserve the existing order. However, Davos’s greatest weakness during this period was its tendency to view rising nationalism and sovereignty demands as a ‘temporary deviation’. The socio-economic causes of populist movements were not analyzed in depth; it was assumed that the process could be managed through cosmetic reforms to the system.

By 2020, Davos had regressed from determining the direction of the global system to defending an order that was seemingly disintegrating. Political fragmentation along the Atlantic axis has also greatly eroded the forum’s historical role. Therefore, the period from 2016 to 2022 can be defined as a phase of ‘inability to adapt’ for Davos.

A

ustralia and Indonesia signed a landmark security agreement on Friday, deepening defense cooperation in what Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese described as a “watershed moment” in relations between the two neighbors.

The deal was signed in Jakarta during a meeting between Albanese and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, marking a significant expansion of security and defense collaboration between the two Indo-Pacific nations.

“It represents a major extension of our security and defense cooperation and demonstrates that our relationship is as strong as it has ever been,” Albanese said ahead of the visit.

The agreement with Indonesia is part of a broader push by Canberra to strengthen ties across the Pacific region. Since taking office in 2022, Australia’s center-left government has signed multiple defense, police, and aid agreements aimed at reinforcing its regional influence and counterbalancing China’s growing presence.

Expert view: Indonesia in a different category

This effort has intensified under US President Donald Trump, whose administration has encouraged allies to shoulder more responsibility in deterring Beijing’s expanding military power.

Late last year, Australia concluded a security pact with Papua New Guinea, and in January Albanese signed a new aid and support agreement during a visit to East Timor.

“The government can be very pleased with the agreements it signed across the Pacific,” said Sam Roggeveen, director of the security program at the Lowy Institute.

However, he noted that Indonesia stands apart.

“Indonesia is in a different category because of its size and also because of this historic commitment to non-alignment,” Roggeveen said, referring to Jakarta’s long-standing effort to balance relations between major powers.

Diplomacy and the South China Sea

The new pact builds on earlier agreements, including a 1990s security deal signed by former Australian prime minister Paul Keating and Indonesian leader Suharto, as well as the 2006 Lombok Treaty, which laid foundations for defense cooperation.

Relations between Canberra and Jakarta have evolved from Cold War-era tensions to more stable and cooperative ties in recent years, as Indonesia continues to pursue a balanced foreign policy between Western nations and the developing world.

Roggeveen said Indonesia’s rising economic and demographic power is likely to make it a major regional force, potentially surpassing Australia economically.

Canberra, he added, is signaling that Indonesia is as vital to Australia’s security as the United States.

“Indonesia’s interests and China’s ambitions in Southeast Asia are going to clash more directly over time,” Roggeveen said, pointing to existing tensions in the South China Sea.

As China’s maritime reach expands, the new agreement may help Indonesia strengthen its defense capabilities while preserving its strategic independence.

(Source: South China Morning Post)

B

ritish Prime Minister Keir Starmer said he wants to build a “sophisticated relationship” with China as he met President Xi Jinping in Beijing on Thursday, signaling a reset in ties after years of diplomatic strain.

Starmer’s four-day visit—the first by a British prime minister since 2018—comes as London seeks closer engagement with the world’s second-largest economy to stimulate growth and strengthen security cooperation.

Starmer and Xi held an 80-minute meeting at the Great Hall of the People, followed by a working lunch. The British leader is also scheduled to meet Chinese Premier Li Qiang later in the day.

At the start of the talks, Starmer described China as a “vital player on the global stage,” stressing the need for cooperation where interests align, while maintaining open dialogue on areas of disagreement, including human rights.

Xi said relations between the two countries had experienced “twists and turns” that served neither side and expressed China’s readiness to develop a long-term strategic partnership with Britain.

Economic diplomacy and global context

Starmer’s engagement with Beijing comes amid heightened global uncertainty and strained relations between several Western allies and the United States under President Donald Trump. Recent U.S. trade threats and geopolitical disputes have prompted countries to hedge their diplomatic and economic strategies.

The British leader is accompanied by more than 50 business executives, underscoring his government’s focus on securing economic gains. Analysts expect several commercial and cooperation agreements to be announced during the visit.

In a concrete outcome of the talks, Britain and China are expected to announce a joint initiative to combat migrant-smuggling networks. According to Downing Street, the agreement will target supply chains used by organized crime groups, including the use of Chinese-made engines on small boats transporting migrants across Europe.

The plan includes intelligence sharing between British and Chinese authorities and cooperation with manufacturers to prevent legitimate businesses from being exploited by traffickers.

Domestic debate and human rights concerns

Starmer’s approach marks a shift from previous Conservative governments, which restricted some Chinese investments over national security concerns and criticized Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong.

Opposition Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch criticized the visit, citing security risks posed by China. British security agencies have accused Beijing of espionage, allegations China denies.

Starmer said he would raise human rights issues with Xi, including the case of British citizen Jimmy Lai, the Hong Kong media tycoon convicted last year on national security charges.

After arriving in Beijing on Wednesday evening, Starmer dined at a well-known local restaurant and was seen practicing basic Mandarin phrases with staff, footage of which circulated on Chinese social media—small gestures reflecting his effort to strike a warmer diplomatic tone.

(Source: Reuters)

E

ight decades after the establishment of United Nations, humanity still faces an alarming rise in conflict. According to the Global Peace Index, more countries are involved in active conflict today than at any given time since World War II.

Lacking effective enforcement mechanisms, the U.N. remains embedded in a post-colonial power hierarchy that privileges dominant states and functions more as a mechanism that reflects existing power dynamics.

Post-1945 conflict trends emphasize this structural weakness. Significant here is the role of the United States. The U.S. military has been engaged in conflicts across the world at virtually all times over the past century. The United States has never experienced a period in which its armed forces were entirely disengaged from conflict. Post second world war, U.S. military action has increasingly occurred without formal declarations of war, relying instead on executive authority, congressional authorizations (such as the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force ), or broad interpretations of self-defense and preemptive wars.

Washington has invoked the U.N. to confer legality and legitimacy on the use of force when multilateral authorization has aligned with U.S. strategic interests. When it has not, the U.S. has demonstrated a consistent willingness to act unilaterally or through alliances of willing bypassing the U.N. framework altogether.

This selective multilateralism has often been justified through expansive references to the “international world order”, a term frequently employed as a flexible political narrative that legitimizes U.S. action while accommodating exceptions for itself. In practice, international law is treated arbitrarily, invoked when useful and sidelined when constrained.

Is International Law subordinate to power?

Today’s American behavior is reminiscent of a declining power which feels increasingly threatened by external forces and is therefore willing to contradict the very architecture of international law it once helped create.

On January 7, 2026, President Donald J. Trump signed a memorandum initiating U.S. withdrawal from 66 international organizations, including 31 United Nations bodies such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) , and UN Women. Since returning to office for a second term, Trump has cut funds to the United Nations, exited from the Human Rights Council and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), continued suspension of support for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), withdrew from the World Health Organization (WHO)  as well as the Paris Climate Agreement.

The institutions deemed expendable are overwhelmingly those concerned with human rights, climate governance, and humanitarian relief. The administration has justified these moves on the grounds of “national interest.” This, however, is a display of selective disengagement from norms that impose political or economic costs.

As such hegemonic actors violate international norms, where enforcement mechanisms effectively collapse. Condemnation alone is insufficient.

The same logic is applicable in Washington’s actions in Venezuela. In a direct violation of state sovereignty, the United States led an intervention to seize President Nicolás Maduro and assert indefinite control over Venezuelan oil revenues. U.N. human rights bodies condemned the act as a breach of the U.N. Charter and international law, warning of its destabilizing consequences.

Trump’s open statements regarding Greenland further extend this posture. By explicitly keeping the use of force “on the table,” the U.S. president normalized territorial acquisition rhetoric that international law was designed to eliminate in the first place. Any such action would constitute an unprecedented intra-NATO confrontation, threatening the coherence of the alliance system itself.

This moment has also bought forth growing transatlantic divergence. European leaders have criticized Washington’s increasingly unilateral and coercive approach. For the first time in decades, the United States and Europe appear contradicting the fundamental principles holding the post-war international order.

Humanitarian discourse has become strategically selective. While the U.S. administration has voiced concern for Iranian protesters amid domestic unrest, it has simultaneously shielded and supported Israeli actions in Gaza. The value of human life varies with geography.

The import of democracy has always been pursued in continuation of U.S. geopolitical interests rather than supporting idea of democracy in principle. U.S. interventions are shaped only by strategic interests, particularly around oil and regional influence. Interventions in energy-rich regions, rising unilateralism, and institutional retreat, indicate anxiety over economic instability, mounting debt, and the weakening centrality of the dollar.

United States’s retreat from international institutions and violations of international law only further damaged an already fragile global system. As power politics reassert themselves, international law lays formally intact but practically hollow. International systems, long shaped by colonial hierarchies and power asymmetries, have been fraying for decades. What is new is its plain brazenness.

Global solidarity is not a finite resource 

Historically, some conflicts have attracted far more international attention than others.

What, then, determines whose suffering matters most? Why does the global response to contemporary wars reveal a clear hierarchy of concern and intervention?

In principle, international law exists to promote peace and equality. In practice, however, the international system is deeply anarchic and increasingly governed by power politics. This dynamic produces selective engagement, in which humanitarian response is activated through geopolitical relevance.

Patterns of neglect persist across parts of Africa; Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and the Sahel, where prolonged violence generates little more than episodic concern. By contrast, conflicts situated along critical energy corridors, alliance systems, or great-power rivalries prompt emergency summits, sanctions regimes, and continuous media attention.

Both military intervention and strategic non-intervention have consistently generated large-scale displacement, producing refugee flows that are later treated as external burdens rather than consequences. Rising anti-migrant sentiment and increasingly restrictive asylum policies are against the spirit of international humanitarian laws. If migration is framed as a threat, then its root causes must also be acknowledged as policy outcomes but the same states that shape these conflicts often adopt restrictive and exclusionary migration policies when displacement reaches their borders.

Are humanitarian principles universal?

Humanitarian principles, therefore, are not universally applied. Intervention is guided by political calculation. In such a system, human suffering is bound to become stratified, with some lives rendered more visible, and more valuable, than others. Beyond ethical inconsistency, this selective engagement erodes the credibility of global humanitarian advocacy and weakens collective leverage within international institutions, allowing entire regions to remain structurally marginalized.

U.N. possesses normative authority grounded in international law, but its decisions have often remained unenforceable in practice, beyond mere verbal criticism. It lacks enforcement power and effectiveness as a mechanism for both conflict prevention and management. Entrenched power asymmetries, most visibly within the U.N. Security Council, have hollowed out the organization’s capacity to act impartially. Compliance has largely remained contingent upon the political will of states rather than legal obligation. Over the years, this has significantly damaged the credibility of international law, as state interests repeatedly superseded collective wellbeing.

Global solidarity within the U.N. framework is not a finite resource but unless international institutions are restructured to prioritize the idea of universal human rights over strategic hierarchy, conflict prevention will remain aspirational.

On a hot morning in Bamako, Mali’s junta lined up before cameras to bless a new Russian‑backed gold refinery, promising “greater control” over national resources. Yet the project is more than a ribbon‑cutting. It sits inside a wider package: Talks on civil nuclear cooperation, exploration of uranium and lithium, a long‑term play on critical minerals in a sanctioned, fragile state. The deal only moved after Mali rewrote its mining code to give the state a larger share and the power to reopen old contracts, unsettling Western firms that had grown used to easier terms.​

At first glance, this looks like yet another scene in a familiar drama: Big powers chasing African resources, ports and UN votes while local governments scramble for attention. Look a little closer and the script changes. From the Sahel to Southern Africa, governments are using Russian security and mining offers, Chinese training schemes and Western climate and energy money to renegotiate conditions, delay deals that no longer suit them and quietly diversify their options.​

From security contracts to mineral leverage

Russia’s new African story is usually told in uniforms and hardware. Arms deliveries, military advisers and the rebranding of Wagner into the “Africa Corps” turned Mali and its neighbors into symbols of Moscow’s return to the Sahel. But the security tale now blends into a deeper one: A “security‑for‑resources” model that trades battlefield support and diplomatic protection for access to gold, uranium and other strategic minerals.​

Mali is the central case. Since 2023, Bamako and Moscow have moved from ad‑hoc cooperation to more formal road maps: The refinery, geological surveys, nuclear collaboration, a growing presence around gold and promising lithium deposits. Security trainers and mining geologists travel separate circuits, yet they reinforce the same bargain: Russian backing in exchange for a real say over who profits from Mali’s subsoil. In Niger, audits and the suspension of new mining licenses send a similar message: Contracts around uranium and other minerals will be written on new terms, whoever the partner may be.​

This is not a neat pro‑Russian bloc. Far from it. Sahel capitals still talk to Gulf funds, keep lines open to European lenders, leave space for Chinese investors. What has changed is the negotiating table. The option of handing a concession to a Russian company – or swapping Western trainers for Africa Corps units – gives local authorities harder leverage when they sit down with Western or Chinese teams. Even when Moscow does not win a project, its shadow helps African leaders push for higher state participation, tougher local content rules, and offers them political cover when they break with old security patrons.​

China’s training offensive and the power of quiet networks

While Russia leans on guns and gold, China has spent years building a quieter, slower kind of influence. Beyond ports and railways, Beijing has turned scholarships and training into one of the central tools of its Africa policy. Chinese Government Scholarship schemes for African students now offer fully funded master’s and PhD positions, often in coordination with the African Union and national ministries. Parallel mid‑career courses for civil servants and local officials, including “Youth of Excellence” programs, package public administration, infrastructure management and governance skills into short, intensive modules.​

This people‑to‑people offensive is less dramatic than a port or a dam, but it may prove more durable. Thousands of African students and officials pass through Chinese universities, provincial academies and party schools, exposed to how Beijing manages industrial zones, digital infrastructure and local finance. Over time, that creates something softer than dependency and harder to undo than a single loan: Shared jargon, institutional templates, a comfort with Chinese systems. It also produces quiet networks: Alumni chats, WhatsApp groups, personal contacts that can bypass embassies when a problem or opportunity appears.​

African actors treat these offers with a cool eye. Students in Lagos or Addis Ababa apply for Chinese scholarships while still chasing European or Gulf‑funded programs. Officials might spend two weeks in Beijing, then appear a month later at an EU‑funded seminar on climate data or migration management. Not everyone in these capitals is betting on Moscow or Beijing. They are shopping around, collecting tools and contacts, deciding what fits domestic politics and discarding what does not. In an environment where Western technical help often comes wrapped in sharper political conditions, simply having several training and scholarship channels gives bureaucracies breathing space.​

The Trump factor and a tired West

Donald Trump’s return to the White House has not rewritten Washington’s Africa playbook so much as stripped it down. The mood is more openly transactional: Security cooperation and financing tied to clear quid pro quos on critical minerals, migration control and voting behavior in international forums. Aid lines and development programs feel less secure, subject to sudden reviews or cuts if they collide with domestic messaging or budget battles in Washington. African governments have already seen how quickly a “priority” can disappear.​

Europe, on paper, looks like the steadier partner. Brussels continues to talk up a multi‑billion Global Gateway investment package for digital, energy and transport links with Africa, branding the relationship as “equal” and “green”. Yet behind the sums sit dense conditions on governance, refugee returns and climate performance, written into development and energy deals. At the same time, the EU’s decision to phase out Russian gas and speed up its energy transition is pulling African producers deeper into its plans, from LNG and pipeline gas to green hydrogen.

For African capitals, the past decade has offered enough reminders. Western priorities swing from counterterrorism to pandemics, from Ukraine to critical minerals; the money follows those swings. This does not mean U.S. security guarantees or European technology have lost their appeal. It does mean fewer governments are willing to pin their budgets or their armies on a single Western pillar, and more are ready to fold U.S. and E.U. offers into a wider mix of Russian, Chinese and Gulf options.​

C

hinese President Xi Jinping urged Brazil to work closely with China to safeguard the shared interests of the Global South and uphold the central role of the United Nations, China’s state news agency Xinhua reported on Friday.

Speaking during a telephone call with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Xi said China and Brazil are “constructive forces” in promoting world peace and improving global governance, according to Xinhua.

He emphasized the importance of cooperation between major developing nations at a time of shifting global power dynamics.

Xi reiterated China’s long-standing position on strengthening ties with Latin American and Caribbean countries, saying Beijing is willing to remain “a good friend and partner” to the region.

He added that China aims to advance the building of a China–Latin America community with a shared future.

Belt and Road cooperation highlighted

Xi pointed to a 2024 strategic partnership between China and Brazil that aligns Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with Brazil’s development plans, including agriculture, infrastructure, and the energy transition.

The partnership, Xi said, reflects solidarity and cooperation among Global South countries.

At a Group of 20 meeting in 2024, Xi unveiled BRI-related measures alongside science and technology initiatives designed to support Global South development, according to Xinhua.

The conversation comes amid heightened concern in Latin America following the U.S. seizure of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro on narcotics charges, an action that has fueled regional fears of foreign intervention.

The United Nations has criticized the U.S. operation, raising questions about its legality under international law.

(Source: Reuters)

T

ensions between Japan and China escalated sharply in November 2025, plunging the two countries into one of the most serious diplomatic crises in recent years. The crisis was triggered when Japan’s new prime minister, Sanae Takaiçi, stated that a potential Chinese attack on Taiwan could threaten Japan’s survival and provoke a military response. Beijing responded with unusual severity by imposing flight and tourism restrictions, banning imports of Japanese seafood, canceling cultural exchanges, and increasing military activity around Japan.

Thus, the crisis evolved from a mere rhetorical dispute into a multidimensional competition involving historical memory, national identity, military deterrence, and geoeconomic pressure. This analysis evaluates the diplomatic, military, and ideological causes of the crisis and its effects on Asia-Pacific geopolitics, particularly regarding Taiwan and alliance balances, as well as on geoeconomics. Additionally, it examines the position of the United States in the context of its alliance diplomacy and Indo-Pacific strategy.

Causes of the crisis: Diplomatic, military and ideological dimensions

The Moment of Diplomatic Rupture: The crisis began with Prime Minister Takaichi’s November 7, 2025, parliamentary statement on a potential Chinese blockade of Taiwan. Takaichi stated that China’s use of force against Taiwan, particularly against U.S. interests in the region, could create a “life-threatening situation” for Japan. According to Japanese security law, this concept refers to a critical threshold that permits the Self-Defense Forces to intervene under the umbrella of collective self-defense. In this respect, Takaichi is notable as the first Japanese leader in office to explicitly link a Taiwan crisis to Japan’s direct security interests. Consequently, her statement was perceived as signaling a shift away from Tokyo’s traditional strategic ambiguity on Taiwan, which China viewed as “disruptive to the status quo.”

Beijing’s strong reaction and normative framework: China defined Takaichi’s words as “a serious provocation,” accusing Japan of “violating the fundamental norms of international relations.” Beijing’s fundamental claim is that Japan’s rhetoric and potential actions regarding Taiwan interfere with China’s internal affairs and contradict the “One China” principle. The diplomatic rhetoric became excessively harsh during the crisis. The threatening statement shared on social media by the Chinese Consul General in Osaka, which later was deleted, reflects a radicalization that goes beyond diplomatic norms. Furthermore, China’s rhetoric has systematically invoked historical memory. Claims that Japan is questioning the “victorious outcomes of World War II” have been raised at the UN, and emphasis has been placed on Japan’s “resurgence of militarism.”

This ideological framework is closely linked to Beijing’s framing of the Taiwan issue as both strategic and a “core interest” at the heart of its narrative of regime legitimacy and national rebirth. Indeed, Xi Jinping’s assessments that place Taiwan at the center of his “national rejuvenation” vision reinforce Beijing’s intolerance of external intervention.

Tokyo’s rationale: Meanwhile, Japan has emphasized that Takaiichi’s statement does not alter its official “One China” policy, and the approach based on the 1972 agreement remains in place. Nevertheless, Takaiichi’s remarks reflect an increase in Japanese strategic concerns. Taiwan’s geographical location is critical to the lines connecting Japan to Southeast Asia and wider maritime trade routes. If China were to establish control over Taiwan, it could pose serious risks to Japan’s energy supply and trade flows. At the same time, Japan is reevaluating its defense doctrine due to China’s increased military capacity and more aggressive air and maritime activities in the region.

Takaiichi’s “security-oriented” approach (emphasizing stronger defense, constitutional debates, and deterrence) aligns with this trend. Perceptions of China in domestic politics have also become more negative. Notably, Takaiichi’s hard line on Taiwan enjoys broad public support, reducing the likelihood of a retreat. Therefore, the crisis highlights a significant clash between the two sides’ definitions of “core interests”: China considers its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan to be indisputable, while Japan considers the Taiwan scenario to be an integral part of its national security.

Military Dimension and Escalation Risks: The crisis has quickly spilled over into the military sphere. Japan has reported high-risk incidents involving Chinese fighter jets locking fire control radars onto Japanese aircraft, though China has denied some of these claims. China’s intensification of air and sea patrols around Japan increases the risk of accidental conflict, and the weakening of communication channels heightens the possibility of miscalculation. Given these conditions, the crisis is not merely “temporary diplomatic tension” but rather a manifestation of broader security competition.

Impact on Asia-Pacific geopolitics

The crisis in the Asia-Pacific region has further hardened the Taiwan-focused security architecture and increased pressure on regional actors to take sides. Taipei has acted cautiously and kept a low profile to avoid exacerbating the situation. However, Tokyo’s explicit deterrence signal complicates Beijing’s strategic calculations. The likelihood that the use of force against Taiwan would draw the US and Japan more visibly into the conflict has increased. While this may increase deterrence in the short term, it may also fuel China’s hardening response, creating a “new normal” in which crises recur more frequently.

Alliances and regional alignment: The crisis is testing regional alliances and partnerships. South Korea has avoided taking sides and has called for dialogue between the two countries. This reflects Seoul’s attempt to balance its economic dependence on China with its security alliance with the US. However, there are signs that Washington is pressuring Seoul to take regional scenarios, particularly those involving Taiwan, more seriously. Similarly, ASEAN countries are apprehensive. Most maintain the One China policy while limiting themselves to calls for regional stability. In contrast, Japan’s more assertive stance could strengthen the deterrence of China within frameworks such as the Quad (the United States, Japan, India, and Australia).

Tensions in Multilateral Diplomacy: The conflict has spilled over into platforms such as the United Nations. China and Japan have “internationalized” the dispute by sending letters and making strong statements to the UN. China’s UN representative, Fu Cong, implied that Japan’s possible military intervention would be considered “aggression.” However, Japan found these claims “unacceptable.” This demonstrates that the crisis has the potential to erode not only bilateral relations, but also regional norms and institutions.

I

n early December, the Trump administration published the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), which will guide the administration’s actions in the coming year. From a general perspective, it is clear that this strategy signals a significant shift in American foreign policy priorities. It reflects a deeper transformation in how the United States understands power itself. In this broader context, technology, particularly artificial intelligence, is not merely a means to an end, but a strategy in and of itself. Economic security, military deterrence, alliance management, and competition with China are all reframed through technological control, access, and leverage.

This marks a departure from the values-driven, institution-centered multilateralism that shaped earlier strategies. The new NSS instead advances a transactional, pragmatic, and interest-based vision, measuring national advantage by who controls the critical technological systems that underpin the global economy and modern warfare. In this framework, AI, advanced semiconductors, data infrastructure, and supply chains are not neutral tools; rather, they are the terrain on which geopolitical influence is exercised.

Technology as the core of national US interests

The strategy narrows the definition of U.S. national interests, focusing on tangible economic and security outcomes. Technology sits at the center of this calculation. Leadership in artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, autonomous systems, and enabling digital infrastructure is essential not only to innovation, but also to military superiority and global influence. The NSS makes this clear: Losing technological primacy would erode deterrence, weaken the industrial base, and diminish U.S. leverage abroad.

This technological framing reshapes traditional notions of power. While earlier strategies — especially the one released by the Biden administration — emphasized international norms, institutions, and democratic alignment, the 2025 NSS prioritizes control over technological ecosystems (i.e., standards, platforms, data flows, and supply chains). Power is no longer primarily defined by who sets the rules of international order but by who builds, owns, and governs the systems on which others depend. This new tech-dominated type of realpolitik has been apparent for some time, but the strategy is unusually explicit in acknowledging it and adapting U.S. policy to the new strategic environment.

Economic security is technological security

This is most evident in the treatment of economic policy. Trade, tariffs, export controls, industrial policy, and reshoring have been elevated from economic instruments to core tools of national security. The strategy explicitly endorses the use of tariffs and regulatory leverage to promote reindustrialization and protect domestic production in critical and emerging technology sectors.

This is not just about jobs or competitiveness. It’s about ensuring the technological resources necessary for AI, such as advanced chips, rare earth elements, energy, and data infrastructure, remain secure and accessible to the United States and its allies. Supply chains are described as strategic vulnerabilities and critical minerals as assets whose control will shape the future balance of technological power.

Compared to the Biden administration’s emphasis on “friend-shoring” and incentive-based coordination, the 2025 NSS takes a more coercive approach. Alignment is enforced through access and restriction. Markets are opened or closed based on strategic usefulness. Economic openness becomes conditional on technological alignment.

Export controls illustrate this shift most clearly. While the NSS maintains many Biden-era restrictions on advanced semiconductors and AI-related technologies, it reframes these restrictions in explicitly transactional terms. Export controls are not just about denying adversaries access; they are also about establishing a hierarchy of technological access.

Countries that align their export control regimes with U.S. standards are rewarded with preferential licensing, deeper technological cooperation, and access to the U.S. “AI stack” — the integrated ecosystem of advanced semiconductors, cloud infrastructure, data platforms, software frameworks, and standards that underpin modern AI development and deployment. Conversely, those countries that do not align with U.S. standards risk exclusion. In effect, export controls become tools for managing alliances and promoting technological discipline, shaping global innovation pathways through incentives and constraints. Simply put, this is a new form of the “carrot and stick” policy.

This approach signals a shift from multilateral governance to managed technological blocs. Standards are no longer negotiated as global public goods but rather leveraged as instruments of influence. Consequently, technology governance becomes a form of geopolitical bargaining.

China: Technological competition without ideological crusade

The strategy’s treatment of China reinforces this logic. Although China was officially and explicitly defined as a strategic competitor and a revisionist power challenging U.S. interests through technology, economics, and military modernization in Trump’s 2017 NSS, the latest NSS still identifies China as the central strategic competitor. However, the strategy avoids framing the relationship as a rivalry. Instead, the strategy emphasizes the technological and economic competition relating to subsidies, intellectual property theft, supply chain leverage, and market distortion.

The focus has shifted from reshaping China’s behavior through international norms or institutions to constraining its capacity to dominate the technological foundations of the global economy. Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, cloud infrastructure, and digital platforms have emerged as the primary arenas of competition. In this sense, the strategy reflects a shift in objectives and instruments—from an explicit decoupling logic to a rebalancing one. The aim is to limit China’s technological reach while maintaining a certain degree of managed economic interaction.

In this light, the shift is both pragmatic and understandable. Elements of decoupling are already underway and are unlikely to be reversed. They have simply receded into the background of policy discourse. China’s intensified focus on advanced chip design and the U.S.’s efforts to bring semiconductor manufacturing back home, expand fabrication capacity, and secure alternative supply chains for rare earth minerals all point to a gradual but ongoing process of technological separation.

These dynamics suggest that decoupling is unfolding structurally, even if it is no longer articulated as a central policy objective. Rather than accelerating this process rhetorically, the United States appears to accept its long time horizon, choosing to manage competition in the present while the deeper reconfiguration of technological interdependence continues in parallel.

This approach reflects the belief that technological dominance, rather than ideological alignment, will determine long-term power. China is not portrayed as an adversary to be defeated but rather as a system to be counterbalanced through tariffs, export controls, and the strategic promotion of U.S. technologies abroad.

A

s global attention has been absorbed by Trump’s obvious foreign policy manoeuvres from renewed interventionism on Venezuela to provocative remarks on Greenland, other, less theatrical but strategically weightier developments have unfolded with far less scrutiny. Last month, U.S. President Donald Trump went on television to announce a sweeping $11 billion arms sale to Taiwan. Unprecedented in both scale and financial weight, the decision reopened the Taiwan file, one of the most sensitive fault lines in U.S.–China relations and predictably triggered sharp condemnation from Beijing, and recently Chinese sanctions on American defense companies. More importantly, it marked a deliberate escalation in Washington’s competitive posture toward China, raising the likelihood that the Taiwan Strait will witness more frequent and more assertive Chinese military activity. The waters of the Indo-Pacific, already unsettled, are heating up further.

What makes this sale different and why it matters

Valued at roughly $11 billion and structured across eight separate deals, this package is not merely larger than previous arms transfers; it is qualitatively different in strategic intent. At its core lies a clear ambition to furnish Taiwan with a Ukraine-style defensive shield, particularly in air and missile defense. The package includes 82 HIMARS launchers, 420 ATACMS missiles, self-propelled howitzers, drones, advanced military software, Javelin and TOW anti-tank systems, helicopter spare parts, and refurbishment kits for Harpoon missiles.

What makes this sale escalatory is not volume alone, but the convergence of three distinct effects. Materially, the systems supplied are optimised for denial rather than signalling, complicating PLA operational planning by raising the costs of achieving air and missile dominance. Politically, the scale of the package signals a deeper U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s long-term defense posture rather than episodic reassurance. From a reputational vantage point, it narrows Beijing’s room for calibrated response by framing restraint as weakness at a time when Taiwan has been elevated by Chinese leadership into a core marker of national resolve.

The scale is telling. This single sale exceeds the $8.4 billion in arms transfers approved over the entirety of the Biden administration, underscoring a sharp recalibration in Washington’s approach to Taiwan’s defense. It also aligns closely with Taipei’s own reassessment of threat perception. President Lai Ching-te pledged to raise defense spending to 3.3 per cent of GDP by 2026 and to 5 per cent by 2030, which are levels more commonly associated with states preparing for sustained strategic pressure rather than abstract deterrence. Parallel to this, Taiwan plans to develop a $40 billion, multi-layered air defense architecture, the so-called “T Dome”, between 2026 and 2033.

Beijing’s response and the erosion of old guardrails

Beijing does not view the Trump administration’s arms package through the legal framework Washington prefers to cite. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, which authorises the provision of defensive weapons to Taiwan, carries little weight in China’s interpretation. Instead, Beijing frames such sales as interference in its internal affairs and a destabilizing provocation threatening regional peace. Its preferred reference point remains the 1982 Joint Communiqué, which envisaged a gradual reduction in U.S. arms sales to the island.

Yet, this argument rests on selective memory. President Ronald Reagan made clear at the time that any reduction would depend on China’s behaviour in the Taiwan Strait. That behaviour has moved decisively in the opposite direction. PLA exercises in 2025 reveal the maturation of a far more expansive hybrid warfare doctrine, one that is no longer confined to symbolic naval signalling. On April 1–2 alone, 68 of 135 Chinese aircraft crossed the so-called median line in the Taiwan Strait, marking the most brazen incursion since Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taipei.

Beyond air activity, China has conducted simulated precision-strike drills targeting Taiwan’s energy and logistics networks, rehearsed attacks on civilian infrastructure, and expanded coast-guard operations into adjacent zones. Together, these actions indicate a strategy aimed at stretching operational boundaries while gradually reducing Taiwan’s strategic space. Against this backdrop, Beijing’s indignation over U.S. arms sales rings increasingly hollow.

Escalation amid constraint: why pressure has not delivered results

None of this suggests that Beijing faces an unconstrained path toward military action. A Taiwan contingency would impose severe economic costs, risk accelerated technological decoupling and potentially undermine China’s carefully cultivated relations across the Global South. Despite notable advances, uncertainties and limitations persist regarding PLA joint-force integration, amphibious lift capacity, and the ability to sustain high-tempo operations under contested conditions.

Nevertheless, these constraints have not produced restraint. Instead, they appear to have incentivised a strategy of sustained coercive signalling short of war. Repetitive military exercises, however, have failed to deliver meaningful deterrence. If pressure alone were sufficient to coerce Taiwan toward unification, or even to dissuade it from pursuing new arms acquisitions, China would have achieved that outcome long ago. It has not. The uncomfortable reality for Beijing is that its familiar playbook is no longer producing results, even as it increases the risk of miscalculation.

Residual deterrence in an era of U.S. strategic retrenchment

Warnings from U.S. War Secretary Pete Hegseth that China could be militarily ready to invade Taiwan by 2027 should therefore not be dismissed as alarmism. In the current strategic climate, they resemble less a worst-case fantasy than a plausible scenario of Indo-Pacific risk. The picture grows more complex when Japan enters the equation. Long at odds with China over the Senkaku Islands, Tokyo has sharpened its rhetoric, with Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi last month stating that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would constitute a survival threat to Japan. With a binding mutual defense pact linking Tokyo and Washington, Japan’s potential role in a Taiwan contingency remains a critical and unresolved variable.

Complicating matters further is the release of the new U.S. National Security Strategy, which reframes Washington’s global priorities in striking ways. Rather than doubling down on an Indo-Pacific–first posture, the document restores a Western Hemisphere–centred strategic hierarchy, explicitly committing the United States to enforcing a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. Homeland security, border control, hemispheric primacy, and economic reindustrialization dominate Washington’s strategic bandwidth. China is no longer framed as the singular or “pacing” threat, but primarily as an economic competitor and a supply-chain risk, with the Indo-Pacific ranking below the Americas in priority.

This shift raises an uncomfortable but necessary question. Do recent arms sales and heightened signaling toward Taiwan reflect genuine preparation for confrontation, or are they better understood as residual deterrence measures operating alongside a broader U.S. strategic retrenchment toward its traditional sphere of influence? If American attention and resources are increasingly oriented toward Latin America, the credibility of extended deterrence in the Taiwan Strait may rest less on intent than on perception, precisely the ambiguity that fuels instability.

R

ussian President Vladimir Putin visited India for the 23rd annual Russia-India summit on December 4-5, after a four-year absence. His visit signaled that the two countries’ fundamental national interests remain aligned as the global order shifts. India relies on Russia for defense equipment and affordable energy, while Russia needs a reliable economic and strategic partner outside the West. The most important takeaway from the visit was that the relationship between the two countries is strategic, not merely transactional, despite global turbulence.

Putin’s visit coincided with a challenging period for both countries. For Delhi, 2025 was the most challenging year in terms of foreign policy. The four-day conflict between India and Pakistan in May marked the worst period of hostility between the two countries in a long time. During Donald Trump’s second term as US president, he accused India of purchasing Russian crude oil, causing a sudden and sharp decline in India-US relations. Trump’s summit with Putin in Alaska signaled a strategic realignment of US policy aimed at repairing Washington’s frayed ties with Moscow. However, Trump’s overall stance is inconsistent. Moscow is dissatisfied with Washington due to its inconsistent support for Ukraine.

Due to their current problems with the US since Trump’s second term, both countries are turning to each other. India-Russia relations are strengthened by reliable arms supply and energy access, which serve as a buffer against isolation and Chinese dominance. However, expecting Russia to help India resolve its border disputes with China would be too much to ask of Russia. However, India’s ties with Russia are forcing the US to offer better terms, and Russia’s interaction with the US is forcing it to keep India as a partner.

Putin’s visit confirmed that maintaining Delhi’s strategic autonomy requires keeping all channels open. It also sent a clear signal that India and Russia are strong allies. Turbulence in India-U.S. relations, caused by Trump’s pressure tactics, led Delhi to realize that it was not indispensable. Ultimately, Prime Minister Narendra Modi misread India’s influence on the global stage, a fact that both Trump and Chinese President Xi made clear.

The roots of the relationship

Let’s start by listening to what Modi said when he first came to power, despite often being criticized in India as pro-US:

“If you ask any of the more than one billion people living in India who our country’s greatest friend is, everyone knows it’s Russia. India’s ties with Russia are incomparable. Since 1947, India-Russia relations have been the only constant in a rapidly changing world. They have stood the test of time and grown stronger. The resilience of our relationship is based on the principles of equality, trust, and mutual benefit.”

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, geopolitical pressure from the United States, China, and Pakistan kept India away from the West, led by the United States, and steered it toward closer relations with the Soviet Union. The Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation Treaty, signed in 1971, established a foundation of trust between the two countries. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, close trade partnerships and strategic ties were further strengthened.

The India-Soviet Union rapprochement, whose foundations were firmly laid during that period, continues to manifest itself in India-Russia relations today. Although Delhi displays a closer stance toward the US today, its deep-rooted ties with Moscow remain important as a “balancing alternative.” China’s assertiveness and Washington’s unpredictability make Moscow an important factor in India’s calculations.

During the Cold War, India emerged as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement. At the same time, however, India sought to develop a “special relationship” with the Soviet Union. Incidentally, the nonalignment policy itself was problematic because members of the Non-Aligned Movement were tied to the superpower blocs to some extent. As bilateral relations developed, the Soviets became an “irreplaceable counterbalancing force” in addressing India’s regional and international concerns.

The Soviets remained India’s largest trading partner until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their material and technical support formed the basis of many local industries in India. They provided India with all military production lines, from aircraft to tanks, and played a significant role in developing the Indian Navy. Mindful of the balance between the U.S. and China, the Soviet Union focused on strengthening India’s military capabilities (and Russia still does today).

Although intense interactions in bilateral relations were disrupted during the first decade after the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, the foundation of trust and friendship established during that time continued. Relations with the Russian Federation after the Cold War were restructured. Moscow’s primary motivation was and remains the pursuit of multipolarity. Moscow proposes creating a “strategic triangle” among India, Russia, and China to stabilize international security and effectively counterbalance the unipolarity led by the U.S. after the Cold War. However, the lack of trust between Delhi and Beijing hinders this goal. Nevertheless, the quest for multipolarity spearheaded by Moscow remains common ground among the three countries.

India-Russia relations grew closer when Vladimir Putin became president in 2000, and the two countries upgraded their relationship from a strategic partnership to a special and privileged strategic partnership in 2010. The most important pillar of bilateral relations is defense cooperation, and Russia is a “proven and tested” partner in this regard. Moscow provides Delhi with advanced defense equipment and sensitive military technologies. Russia is also the only country with which India has an institutionalized mechanism for high-tech transfer and joint production. Civil nuclear cooperation is particularly important; Russia is currently the only country building nuclear power plants in India.

However, India is concerned about Russia’s strategic coordination with China and its growing closeness to Pakistan. Moscow’s stance toward Beijing and Islamabad could lead to a new test of trust in its relations with Delhi. In the past, the Soviet Union was India’s primary supplier of arms, economic partner, and political supporter. Article 9 of the 1971 agreement provided India with a security umbrella against the U.S., China, and Pakistan.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Article 9 was abolished, and India-Russia relations became more normal and less guaranteed. Putin rebuilt the “special strategic partnership” label and has maintained strong defense ties for 25 years. The Indian armed forces remain heavily reliant on inexpensive, reliable, and powerful Russian weapons. However, the war in Ukraine has weakened Russia, brought it closer to China, and complicated India’s relations with the West. Delhi is now caught between needing Russian weapons and oil and needing Western support against Beijing. In a sense, Putin’s December visit was aimed at striking this balance and avoiding being crushed by sanctions or Russia’s war.

Today and tomorrow

Delhi’s enduring relationship with Russia is based on three critical pillars. First, defense has always formed the bedrock of the bilateral relationship. Despite Delhi’s recent efforts toward diversification and indigenous production, Moscow remains India’s primary military hardware supplier. Approximately 60-70 percent of India’s current military inventory is Russian or Soviet-made, ranging from fighter jets to submarines and tanks. High-level political engagement is required to ensure the continuous supply of spare parts, modernization, and maintenance support, all of which are vital for operational readiness.

Consequently, Russia still accounts for approximately 45% of India’s defense exports. Putin’s visit in December was significant in that there was a shift in defense policy from “just buy” to “produce together in India,” though Russia will retain veto power over many exports and core technologies. Putin’s visit further solidified Russia’s role as India’s long-term supplier of oil, fertilizers, critical minerals, nuclear reactors, and access to the Arctic. Despite Trump’s objections, Russia has guaranteed India an “uninterrupted” supply of oil and fuel. Fertilizers and energy are the most pressing issues; without them, Indian farmers and industries would suffer. Therefore, Delhi will not abandon Moscow.

Before 1991, India operated a socialist-style planned economy. Russia (the Soviet Union) was a natural partner because it had the same model and was India’s largest trading partner. When India transitioned to a market economy in 1991, Russia collapsed and experienced economic decline, resulting in the severing of economic ties, though defense ties remained strong. After 1991, Delhi’s real economic partners became Western countries. Moscow itself wanted the West, not India. The post-Ukraine war increase in trade was not real. However, Putin’s December visit reshaped the trade dynamics between the two countries, making the economy a central focus.

The India-Russia Economic Cooperation Program aims to reach an annual trade value of $100 billion by 2030. The two countries are also making progress on a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union. They are also establishing alternative currency channels using the rupee and the ruble to facilitate trade outside of Western control. Using national currencies for payments will facilitate greater exports from India to Russia. There is a substantial trade imbalance between the two countries. India needs to increase its exports to Russia; otherwise, the rupee pile will become problematic.

T

he United States’ 2025 National Security and Strategy Document is essentially a manifesto of the ‘New American Order’ that Trump has been trying to verbally convey to the world, primarily to the European continent, since his first term as president in 2017. In a sense, the Washington administration has codified what Europe perceives as Trump’s personal delusions into a written set of principles. When examining this document, which consists of 24 key points, it is necessary to begin by recalling two politicians from the 19th century.

The first of these was James Monroe, the fifth President of the United States, who pioneered US policies aimed at isolating the American continent as a whole from the rest of the world. From 1823 onwards, Monroe shaped his country’s global diplomatic course for nearly a century, until the First World War, through the doctrine that bears his name. During Monroe’s presidency, the colonial powers of Europe—France, the United Kingdom, and the Kingdom of Spain—still ruled over territories in North and South America. The state of Texas had not yet joined the United States. Monroe’s doctrine aimed to keep the United States out of the affairs of the rest of the world, while also opposing the presence of European powers on the American continent.

Looking at the 2025 National Security and Strategy Document, as well as the United States’ current military actions in Venezuela, we see that the European powers in the Monroe Doctrine have been replaced by the People’s Republic of China, Russia and even Iran. With the change of government in Bolivia, the US has moved to oust China and Russia from the country’s rare earth element deposits. In Chile, the election of a right-wing president will likely result in the transfer of the country’s rich copper deposits from China to the United States. It is not difficult to predict that Iran and Russia’s dominance over Venezuelan oil will not last long. Let us now turn to another important statesman of the 19th century, whose diagnosis of the United States should not be forgotten.

The United States wants to enjoy the comfort of its geographical position

This person is Otto von Bismarck, the powerful Chancellor of the German Empire, who united a loose confederation of states around the imperial throne. It is said that Bismarck summarised the geopolitical comfort afforded by the United States’ geographical position with these words: ‘Americans are a very fortunate people. They are surrounded by weak neighbours to the north and south, and by fish to the east and west.’ Today’s US administration wants to revive this diagnosis made some 150 years ago.

During the First World War, then US President Woodrow Wilson opened a breach in the Monroe Doctrine by sending troops to the European continent against Germany, sparking enthusiasm for ‘American Mandate’ among nations that did not want to fall into European hands. However, the American people reacted so strongly against involvement in European affairs that Warren Harding’s promise in 1921 to return to the isolationist Monroe Doctrine played a significant role in his election victory over Wilson.

After this date, the US felt compelled to confine itself within very strict legal frameworks of neutrality to avoid becoming involved in another war on European soil. This obsession with neutrality and isolation, which had gone beyond mere restraint and turned into a cage, reached such a point that in 1940, US President Roosevelt was unable to give a direct positive response to Britain’s requests for military aid.

Military aircraft destined for Britain were transported by horse-drawn carts from North Dakota to Canada to avoid violating neutrality laws, and from there they were able to fly to Britain. Traces of this foreign policy legacy can be found today in the US approach to the Ukraine-Russia War and in the 2025 National Strategy and Security Document.

The second Trump term’s pithy saying: ‘This is another continent’s war’

To identify these traces, let us go to a press conference held in Washington on 19 December. At the meeting, which lasted approximately two hours and during which US Secretary of State Marco Rubio answered questions from the press on global issues, the sentence he used when introducing the topic of the Ukraine-Russia War also revealed the current US perception of the world: “The Russia-Ukraine War is not our war. It is a war on another continent.” Indeed, the US National Security and Strategy Document shapes Washington’s perception of the world map as ’the Western Hemisphere and the Eastern Hemisphere.” In other words, it is no longer possible to speak of an Iron Curtain or ideological boundaries like the Berlin Wall, as was the case during the First Cold War.

On the contrary, the American continent, along with Greenland, is quite clearly defined as the United States’ natural sphere of influence, encompassing both the north and the south. This characterisation makes the pressure the US has exerted on Venezuela, its policy towards Nicaragua due to its economic cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, and its intensifying embargo against Cuba more understandable. Furthermore, Trump’s appointment of Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry as Special Representative for Greenland on 21 December 2025 is also closely related to the world map outlined in the National Security and Strategy Document.

It will certainly not be easy for Europe to accept this rhetoric, which isolates the Western Hemisphere, where the US itself is located, from the rest of the world, especially from Europe and transatlantic relations. This is because the US is not only parting ways with Europe. The document gives European civilization 20 years to live. From the US perspective, the European Union’s bureaucratic oligarchy, increasing migration, and insufficient economic resources are preparing the end of contemporary European civilization.

Going a step further than the US diagnosis on the matter, it also points to the inevitable transformation NATO will undergo due to Europe’s insufficient financing. According to the US prediction, in order to secure the financing necessary for the alliance to survive, countries outside Europe may be invited to join the alliance within 10 years. Although no country names are mentioned in the document, when it comes to financing, it is not difficult to guess that the Gulf region countries are the strongest candidates for new NATO membership seats.

Germany is the only voice on the US national security document

So what are European capitals saying about the findings in this document? So far, the only voice we have heard is that of German Chancellor Merz in his speech at the Christian Democratic Union congress in Munich on 13 December 2025. Noting that the era of ‘Pax Americana’ or ‘American Peace’ had come to an end for Germany and Europe, Merz declared that a paradigm shift was imminent, stating, ‘The Americans are aggressively defending their own interests, and we must now defend ours.’ ‘Europe must be prepared for a fundamental change in relations with the US and an increase in the threat posed by Russia,’ said the German Chancellor, pointing out that they are facing a ‘tectonic shift’ at the geopolitical level.

The question of Europe’s fate will remain on the agenda for a long time. Let us now turn to how the United States views Russia and the People’s Republic of China in this document.

C

anadian Prime Minister Mark Carney is visiting China this week in the first trip by a Canadian leader in nearly a decade, seeking to rebuild strained relations with Beijing and reduce Canada’s heavy economic dependence on the United States.

Carney, who arrives Wednesday, is expected to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping on Friday as part of what Canadian officials describe as an effort to re-energize a long-dormant strategic partnership. The visit comes as relations with Washington have deteriorated amid U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariffs and his remarks suggesting Canada could become “the 51st state.”

“At a time of global trade disruption, Canada is focused on building a more competitive, sustainable and independent economy,” Carney said in a statement, pledging to double Canada’s non-U.S. exports over the next decade.

Trade diversification drive

China is Canada’s second-largest trading partner after the United States, but bilateral ties have been strained for years by diplomatic disputes and retaliatory trade measures. Canadian officials said the visit could lead to progress on some trade irritants, though they cautioned that existing tariffs are unlikely to be fully lifted.

Beijing has imposed tariffs on Canadian products including canola, seafood and pork after Ottawa followed Washington in levying steep duties on Chinese electric vehicles, steel and aluminum. China has signaled it could ease some measures if Canada drops its 100% tariff on EVs.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said Beijing looks forward to the visit as a chance to “consolidate the momentum of improvement in China-Canada relations.”

Political sensitivities

The trip has prompted political debate at home. Two Liberal lawmakers cut short a sponsored visit to Taiwan ahead of Carney’s China trip, citing government advice to avoid confusion over Canada’s China policy. Opposition Conservatives criticized the move as capitulation to Beijing, though the government reiterated that its stance on Taiwan remains unchanged.

China claims self-governed Taiwan as its territory and has vowed to bring it under its control, by force if necessary.

Carney, who has been in office less than a year after succeeding Justin Trudeau, is also seeking to recalibrate ties beyond China. He has begun mending relations with India following a diplomatic rupture in 2024 and is expected to visit later this year.

After concluding his China trip on Saturday, Carney will travel to Qatar before attending the World Economic Forum in Davos next week, as Ottawa accelerates efforts to diversify trade and partnerships amid growing uncertainty in its relationship with Washington.

(Source: The Associated Press)

T

he dramatic U.S. capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has dealt a setback to China’s strategic interests in Latin America, even as it has ignited intense debate on Chinese social media—where some users are hailing the operation as a potential blueprint for Taiwan.

China and Venezuela have long maintained close ties rooted in shared ideology and opposition to U.S. influence. Their relationship was formalized as an “all-weather strategic partnership” in 2023, backed by billions of dollars in Chinese loans, infrastructure projects and preferential access to Venezuelan oil.

That partnership was thrown into doubt after U.S. special forces captured Maduro in Caracas, abruptly removing one of Beijing’s most reliable regional partners. China has been Venezuela’s largest crude buyer in recent years, with analysts estimating that up to 80% of Venezuelan exports in late 2025 went to China, largely at discounted prices attractive to smaller independent refiners.

While energy analysts say the loss of Venezuelan crude is unlikely to seriously disrupt China’s oil supply, the move raises broader questions about Beijing’s political and economic influence in a region Washington has traditionally viewed as its backyard.

Official condemnation, online nationalism

Beijing swiftly condemned the U.S. action, accusing Washington of acting as a global policeman and violating international law. President Xi Jinping appeared to take a veiled swipe at the United States by denouncing “unilateral bullying” that undermines the international order.

State media echoed the criticism, portraying the operation as proof of what it called U.S. hypocrisy over a “rules-based international order.” Accounts linked to China’s military warned that weak defense capabilities invite foreign coercion.

Yet on Chinese social media, the reaction was strikingly different. Topics related to Maduro’s capture drew hundreds of millions of views on Weibo, with some users openly asking whether China could one day carry out a similar operation against Taiwan’s leadership.

“If the U.S. can snatch a leader in its neighborhood,” one common refrain went, “why can’t China?”

Taiwan comparisons rejected

Chinese authorities have avoided endorsing such comparisons. Analysts and officials in Taiwan were quick to dismiss them as unrealistic.

“China is not the U.S., and Taiwan is not Venezuela,” said Wang Ting-yu, a lawmaker from Taiwan’s ruling party, arguing that Beijing lacks feasible means to replicate such an operation across the Taiwan Strait.

Security experts agree that while nationalist fervor online is notable, it is unlikely to alter Beijing’s calculus. Decisions on Taiwan, they say, depend on China’s domestic economy, military readiness, Taiwan’s internal politics and U.S. policy—rather than events in Latin America.

Broader implications

Still, analysts warn the episode could contribute to a shifting global norm. The use of military force to pursue foreign policy objectives, they argue, may increasingly be seen as an option rather than an exception.

For China, the priority is likely to be damage control—protecting its investments and economic interests in Latin America—rather than escalating direct geopolitical competition with Washington.

For Taiwan, the lesson may be more sobering. As one analyst put it, the episode underscores the need for stronger deterrence in a world where powerful states appear more willing to take extraordinary risks to advance their interests.

(Source: CNN)

Recent developments in world politics mark a crucial turning point regarding the establishment of a global political system based on international law. Following World War II, unprecedented initiatives were undertaken to establish a common legal framework at the global level under the United Nations and at the regional level under the European Union. With the aim of preserving global peace, states came together and declared their will for law, not power, to be the determining factor in international relations and they established institutional mechanisms to ensure this.

The common legal framework established under the European Union umbrella and continuously developed since then has indeed been successful in fostering peace among its members. EU countries, which were in a constant state of tension, conflict, and war until the mid-20th century, have not been at war with each other for 80 years, and there is no risk of armed conflict between them. After initially implementing economic integration, member states gradually extended it to the political sphere and security policies. They are also working to establish a common stance toward the outside world.

However, cooperation initiatives on maintaining peace at the UN level have not been as successful as those of the EU. During the post-World War II period, also known as the UN System, many wars involving global and regional actors occurred, notably in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and Iraq. However, significant steps were also taken toward the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the development of international law. Agreements such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) were signed to limit and reduce nuclear weapons, and environmental protection agreements such as the Paris Climate Agreement were established. Global judicial institutions such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) were also formed.

During this period, the West—primarily the United States—was the decisive actor in the global political system. Western countries promoted the image that they upheld international law and defended values such as democracy and liberalism. They argued that an increase in democratic countries with liberal values would make the world more peaceful. They also propagated the idea that international law should be the main element in interstate relations, even though they often violated it themselves. Western academics even proposed the Democratic Peace Theory, which claims that democratic countries pursue more peaceful foreign policies and find it more difficult to decide to go to war.

The West’s hardening face

At this point, however, it is clear that the U.S. no longer values or promotes international law, human rights, liberalism, or democracy. The U.S. increases its military spending significantly every year, pressures other NATO countries to do the same, threatens other countries with military force, and wants to forcibly take Greenland from Denmark, a NATO ally. The U.S. also says it wants to see Canada, another NATO member, as the 51st American state. The U.S. threatens its allies with economic sanctions, shoots down ships in the Caribbean on the grounds that they are carrying drugs, carries out summary executions, threatens to attack Venezuela, and amasses its navy off the country’s coast to attempt to seize its oil reserves.

The U.S. also unilaterally withdraws from agreements, such as the one with Iran, and imposes sanctions that would collapse the country’s economy. The U.S. supports Israel’s war of aggression, bombs Iran’s nuclear facilities, enables Israel’s genocide against the people of Gaza by supplying weapons and providing economic and diplomatic support, and withdraws from international institutions, such as UNESCO and the World Health Organization, and withdraws from international agreements such as the Paris Climate Agreement. President Trump talks about bringing peace to Gaza and Ukraine, but what he presents as peace is nothing more than surrender on the terms imposed by powerful aggressors.

These examples clearly demonstrate the U.S.’s understanding of peace and the type of global political system it desires: One in which the powerful impose their terms on the weak and get what they want. This is not a new phenomenon; international relations have always been shaped by power. Following the catastrophic events of World War II, including the use of nuclear weapons and the loss of approximately 80 million lives, Western countries created the illusion that diplomacy and dialogue would be fundamental to international relations. They believed that problems would be solved through peaceful means rather than force and that the use of military force would only be legitimate in cases of self-defense and with a UN Security Council resolution.

During this period, centered around the UN, the concepts of international law, human rights, democracy, and liberalism were used as tools to intervene in other countries. American interventions in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Chile, Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, and many other countries were justified by the stated objectives of bringing democracy, protecting human rights, preventing violations of international law, and intervening against terrorism.

These justifications, used by Western countries in particular to mask their military, economic, and diplomatic interventions and pressures, have given rise to a substantial body of literature in International Relations centered on these concepts. One could argue that this literature has convinced some audiences that international relations are shaped by law and that Western countries base their foreign policies on democracy, human rights, and liberal values.

However, Israel’s two-year genocide in Gaza, supported by the U.S. and other Western countries, coupled with this aggressive alliance’s simultaneous attacks on Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran, as well as the Zionists’ involvement in the attack on Qatar, signaled to many that the world had entered a new era.