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he United Arab Emirates has announced it will leave OPEC effective May 1, in a move that could reshape global energy dynamics and weaken the oil producers’ group at a time of mounting geopolitical tensions in the Gulf.

The decision comes as an escalating conflict involving Iran disrupts energy flows through the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint that typically handles about a fifth of the world’s crude oil and liquefied natural gas shipments. Ongoing threats and attacks on vessels have significantly constrained exports, adding strain to global energy markets already facing volatility.

UAE Energy Minister Suhail Mohamed al-Mazrouei said the decision to exit the group followed a comprehensive review of the country’s long-term energy strategy. In remarks to Reuters, he described the move as a “policy decision” based on current and future production considerations, emphasizing that it was made independently and without consultation with other member states.

“This is a policy decision, taken after a careful look at current and future production policies,” Mazrouei said, adding that global energy demand is expected to rise, positioning the UAE to play a larger role in meeting supply needs.

The UAE, one of OPEC’s largest producers and among the few with significant spare capacity, has long been bound by the group’s production quotas designed to manage oil prices. Its departure will free Abu Dhabi to increase output once logistical constraints ease, potentially boosting its share of global markets.

Undermining OPEC’s ability to regulate supply

Analysts say the move could undermine OPEC’s ability to regulate supply and stabilize prices. According to data from the International Energy Agency, the broader OPEC+ alliance — which includes non-OPEC producers — saw its share of global oil output fall to 44% in March from about 48% in February. That figure is expected to decline further in the coming months as disruptions intensify and the UAE formally exits the group.

“This opens the door for the UAE to expand its production and capture greater market share,” said Monica Malik, chief economist at Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank. “It also raises questions about the future cohesion and influence of OPEC.”

The exit highlights a growing rift between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s de facto leader and the world’s largest oil exporter. Once close allies, the two Gulf powers have increasingly diverged on energy policy, regional strategy, and economic priorities.

Tensions have been fueled by competition over foreign investment, regional influence, and differing approaches to managing oil output. While Riyadh has often favored tighter supply controls to support prices, Abu Dhabi has signaled a willingness to expand production capacity and pursue a more flexible strategy.

The geopolitical backdrop has further complicated the situation. Gulf nations have faced a wave of missile and drone attacks since the United States and Israel launched military operations against Iran earlier this year. In response, regional leaders have held emergency consultations to coordinate security and economic responses.

Aligning with long-standing U.S. criticism of OPEC

The UAE, which normalized relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords, has also strengthened ties with Washington, positioning itself as a key regional partner. Its exit from OPEC may align with long-standing U.S. criticism of the group, particularly from President Donald Trump, who has accused the organization of artificially inflating oil prices.

Trump has repeatedly linked U.S. security commitments in the Gulf to oil pricing policies, arguing that producers benefit from American military protection while maintaining high prices. Analysts suggest the UAE’s move could be seen as a partial response to such pressure, while also advancing its own strategic interests.

Despite the announcement, immediate market reactions have been muted. Oil prices trimmed earlier gains following the news, with traders focusing more on supply disruptions in the Gulf than on structural shifts within OPEC. Mazrouei said he did not expect significant short-term impacts, citing ongoing export constraints through the Strait of Hormuz.

Still, longer-term implications could be substantial. With greater autonomy over production, the UAE may increase output rapidly once regional tensions ease, adding supply to global markets and potentially putting downward pressure on prices.

For OPEC, the departure represents a significant challenge to its cohesion and influence. As one of the group’s most capable producers steps away, questions are mounting about the sustainability of the alliance’s strategy — and about Saudi Arabia’s role as the central stabilizing force in global oil markets.

As the energy crisis deepens and geopolitical risks persist, the UAE’s decision marks a pivotal moment for the global oil industry, signaling a shift toward a more fragmented and competitive landscape.

(Source: Reuters)

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ollowing the mass protests that erupted in many Arab countries after 2010, regional actors adopted significant policy changes and formed alliances with like-minded countries. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia were among the most prominent examples of such alliances. Posing as anti-revolutionary, these two countries coordinated their actions in many countries. This partnership included the air, land, and sea blockade of Qatar, another Gulf country. Saudi Arabia and the UAE also cooperated in Yemen. Their cooperation escalated to the point of military intervention.

Over time, both the political alliance formed on the basis of opposition to Qatar and the military cooperation established in Yemen have become increasingly damaging for both countries. One of the first signs of this was seen in the different approaches to normalising relations with Qatar following the crisis. While Saudi Arabia rapidly normalised relations with Qatar through the Al-Ula Summit in 2021, the United Arab Emirates, although involved in this process, did not exhibit the same willingness or warmth as Riyadh.

For Saudi Arabia, intra-Gulf reconciliation meant ensuring regional stability and reasserting its leadership claim; however, the UAE preferred a more distant, cautious approach to relations with Qatar. This divergence can be interpreted as an early sign that the two countries’ strategic priorities were beginning to diverge subtly.

By the end of 2025, this divergence had transcended mere competition over Yemen, revealing that serious problems between the parties could no longer be concealed. In December 2025, Saudi Arabia and the UAE confronted each other directly in Yemen, marking one of the most severe crises in recent years. The crisis escalated to the point of open accusations, ultimately reaching a new phase with the UAE’s announcement of its complete withdrawal from Yemen.

What happened?

In December 2025, events in Yemen exposed the long-suppressed strategic differences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Arab coalition, formed in 2015 under the banner of ‘restoring the legitimate Yemeni government’ and countering the Houthis, had evolved by 2025 into an increasingly covert power rivalry, having started out as a joint security intervention. Differences in goals, means, and priorities within the coalition became particularly pronounced from 2018 onwards, and December 2025 marked a turning point at which these differences were formalized.

Saudi Arabia’s airstrikes targeting Southern Transitional Council (STC) elements in Mukalla, Hadramut, and Mehri between 26 and 31 December 2025 concretised this rupture. By targeting forces that were effectively its partners, which had been trained and supported by the UAE, Riyadh created an unprecedented situation in the history of the coalition. Consequently, Yemen became a conflict zone where actors within the same alliance used force against each other.

Hadramut and Mehri have assumed a central role in this new phase. These two eastern provinces, which remained relatively uninvolved in direct conflict with the Houthis for a long time, have now become the main testing ground for intra-coalition rivalry. The STC’s expansion into these provinces, which consolidated its control over South Yemen by early December 2025, was perceived by Saudi Arabia as crossing a red line. In an article for The Conversation, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, an expert on the Gulf, noted that the timing of this move, which coincided with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit, reinforced Riyadh’s belief that Abu Dhabi was aware of and approved this step.

This crisis has once again confirmed that the divisions within the coalition are nothing new. The clashes in Aden in 2018, between UAE-backed Security Belt forces and Yemeni government troops, were the first serious test of the coalition’s unity. In 2019, Riyadh interpreted the UAE’s reduction of its military presence and continued influence through local armed groups as the Emirates’ abandonment of Saudi Arabia. Betül Doğan Akkaş of Ankara University explains this process in her article for Anadolu Agency as a ‘buck-passing’ approach.

According to this approach, while the UAE remained part of the coalition, it largely shifted the political and military costs of the Yemen intervention onto Saudi Arabia. The Riyadh Agreement, signed in the same year, and the Presidential Council, established in 2022, were arrangements that masked, but did not eliminate, this structural division. Competition shifting to the eastern provinces in 2023 and 2024 set the stage for a process that culminated in the coalition becoming effectively dysfunctional in December 2025.

Why is South Yemen important?

The competition over Hadramut and Mahra is driven by deep geostrategic considerations. According to the US-based MBN, Hadramut holds Yemen’s most significant oil and natural gas reserves. This makes it critically important for the country’s economy and energy security, given its long coastline on the Arabian Sea and its potential export ports. In contrast, Mahri is directly linked to Saudi Arabia’s efforts to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, thanks to its proximity to the Omani border, access to the open sea, and alternative energy and transport corridors. The UAE, however, views these areas as part of a broader network of ports and maritime trade extending from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa.

Therefore, the crisis in Yemen reflects a clash of strategic approaches between the two countries regarding the future of the regional order, rather than a temporary military dispute. Saudi Arabia considers Yemen strategically important to its national security and regional position within its 2030 Vision, whereas the UAE is pursuing a riskier path, involving collaboration with non-state actors and establishing influence through ports and security networks.

Gulf rivalry beyond Yemen?

According to Arab News, a news agency close to Saudi Arabia, tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have deepened, extending beyond Yemen to broader regional politics. The report, citing CNN, suggests that the crisis may have been caused by misinformation conveyed to Abu Dhabi, namely that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had requested sanctions against the UAE from President Donald Trump during his November visit to Washington.

Riyadh categorically denies this claim and believes that the misinformation has led to the mobilization of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council in Yemeni provinces near the Saudi border. Tensions escalated into open conflict on 30 December, when Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes targeting what it claims is a military deployment in Yemen linked to the UAE that was not coordinated with the coalition.

According to Arab News, the disagreement is not limited to Yemen, pointing to a deeper strategic divergence between the two countries. Saudi Arabia believes the UAE is collaborating with destabilizing actors in Yemen, Sudan, the Horn of Africa, and Syria, and it criticizes Abu Dhabi’s normalization process with Israel, which began in 2020. Although the UAE has withdrawn its troops from Yemen and emphasized its commitment to Saudi Arabia’s security, the situation reveals that the relationship between the two countries has shifted from one of tacit harmony to one of overt and structural competition.

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ewly released documents from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) show that disgraced financier and convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein attempted to cultivate relationships with influential political and business figures across the Middle East.

The most immediate fallout in the region came with the resignation of Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem, chief executive and chair of Dubai-based ports operator DP World.

According to two sources familiar with the matter, the decision followed increased scrutiny after Bin Sulayem’s name appeared in the DOJ’s document release. DP World confirmed the leadership change but declined further comment. Bin Sulayem did not respond to requests for comment.

Dubai’s ruler also issued a decree appointing a new chairman for Dubai’s Ports, Customs and Free Zone Corporation, one of several roles previously held by Bin Sulayem.

Email exchanges and personal correspondence

Some of the correspondence reviewed by Reuters included personal email exchanges between Epstein and Bin Sulayem. In one 2007 email, Bin Sulayem described meeting a woman in New York with whom Epstein had helped arrange contact.

An undated photograph included in the files shows Epstein and Bin Sulayem cooking together in what appears to be a relaxed setting.

Being named in the files does not constitute evidence of criminal wrongdoing. However, following the disclosure, some of DP World’s international financial partners raised concerns.

The UK development finance agency British International Investment (BII) and Canadian pension fund La Caisse announced they would pause new investments in DP World pending clarification. After the resignation was announced, both institutions signaled their willingness to continue cooperation under new leadership.

Attempted political influence during Qatar blockade

The DOJ documents suggest Epstein also attempted to engage political figures during the 2017–2021 blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt.

In exchanges with Sheikh Jabor Yousuf Jassim Al Thani, a Qatari businessman and member of the ruling family, Epstein offered strategic advice during the diplomatic crisis. He reportedly criticized Qatar’s leadership at the time and suggested steps to improve relations with Washington.

Epstein urged Doha to consider strengthening ties with Israel to maintain favorable relations with then–U.S. President Donald Trump. Qatar ultimately maintained its policy course, and the regional blockade ended in 2021 when ties were restored.

Qatar’s current prime minister and foreign minister, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, has not publicly commented on Epstein’s characterizations in the documents.

The files also reveal that Epstein discussed the potential public listing of Saudi Aramco in multiple email exchanges.

In correspondence dating back to 2016 and 2017, Epstein warned that a public offering could expose Saudi Arabia to legal risks and asset seizures. He also floated alternative proposals, including selling a major stake to China rather than pursuing a traditional IPO.

Saudi Aramco declined to comment on the emails.

Outreach to Egypt’s Mubarak family

Epstein’s network appeared to extend to Egypt as well. Documents show that following the 2011 ouster of former President Hosni Mubarak, a request for assistance from a family member — reportedly connected to Gamal Mubarak — was passed on to Epstein.

The nature of the requested assistance remains unclear, and Reuters was unable to determine whether Epstein took any action.

The large cache of emails, text messages and related documents reinforces what investigators have previously alleged: that Epstein sought to leverage his wealth and global access to build relationships with powerful figures in politics, finance, academia and business worldwide — including across the Middle East.

Reuters reported it could not determine how successful Epstein was in influencing decision-makers in the region.

The latest revelations add to ongoing scrutiny surrounding Epstein’s international connections, years after his 2019 death while in federal custody in the United States.

(Source: Reuters)

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thiopia is hosting a secret training camp for thousands of fighters from Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), according to officials, diplomats and satellite imagery reviewed by Reuters, in what analysts say is a major sign that Sudan’s civil war is increasingly pulling in outside powers.

The site lies in the remote western Ethiopian region of Benishangul-Gumuz, not far from the Sudan border. If confirmed, the development would mark the clearest indication yet of Addis Ababa playing a direct role that could significantly bolster the paramilitary group as new fronts open in Sudan’s south.

Ethiopia’s government, its military and the RSF did not respond to detailed requests for comment. Sudan’s army also did not reply.

Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, said the United Arab Emirates financed construction of the camp and helped provide trainers and logistical assistance. An internal Ethiopian security memo and a diplomatic cable reviewed by Reuters described similar arrangements.

Reuters said it could not independently verify the UAE’s involvement or the exact purpose of the camp. In response to questions, the Emirati foreign ministry denied it was a party to the conflict or involved “in any way” in the fighting.

Sudan’s military has long accused Abu Dhabi of arming and funding the RSF, allegations that U.N. experts and some U.S. lawmakers have previously said they find credible. The UAE has repeatedly rejected those claims.

What the satellite images show

Imagery indicates the camp was carved from forested land near the district of Menge, roughly 32 km from Sudan. Initial clearing began around April, followed by construction of permanent structures to the north. From October, large numbers of tents began appearing.

By late November, images showed hundreds of small tents, heavy machinery and transport vehicles. A January 22 photo captured further expansion, new earthworks and rows of shipping containers ringing the compound.

Based on tent numbers and size, defense intelligence firm Janes estimated the camp could house several thousand people, though it said imagery alone could not prove the site was military.

As of early January, around 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing training there, according to the Ethiopian security note. Several officials said the total capacity might be far higher.

Two senior military figures who spoke to Reuters described seeing long truck convoys in November heading toward the camp, each vehicle believed to be carrying dozens of recruits. Reuters could not confirm who was inside the trucks.

Six officials said trainees included Ethiopians as well as Sudanese and South Sudanese nationals. A senior figure from the SPLM-N, a Sudanese rebel movement, denied his forces had any presence at the facility.

According to the sources, many of those trained are expected to reinforce RSF operations in Blue Nile state. Some fighters had already crossed the border in recent weeks, two officials said.

Ethiopian command role

The internal memo identified General Getachew Gudina, head of the Ethiopian National Defense Force’s intelligence department, as the official responsible for establishing the camp. A senior government figure and several diplomatic and security sources confirmed he played a central role.

Getachew did not respond to requests for comment.

Roughly 53 km away, Asosa airport has also seen extensive development since mid-2025. Satellite imagery shows new hangars, paved areas and equipment that outside experts say resembles drone ground-control infrastructure.

Ethiopian officials said the military aims to strengthen air capabilities along its western flank, partly to guard against potential instability spilling over from Sudan and to protect strategic projects such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

Other analysts and diplomats, however, said the upgraded airport has become an important hub for supplying the RSF across the frontier.

Some sources alleged Emirati financing for the works, though Reuters said it could not independently verify that.

Wider regional implications

Sudan’s war erupted in 2023 from a struggle between the national army and the RSF during a stalled transition to civilian rule. The conflict has driven millions from their homes, pushed parts of the country toward famine and drawn accusations of ethnically targeted violence.

Both sides are widely believed to receive varying degrees of foreign support, raising fears the war could evolve into a broader regional proxy fight.

In early January, Ethiopia and the UAE issued a joint statement calling for a ceasefire in Sudan while highlighting close security cooperation between the two countries.

Diplomats say the reported emergence of the Menge training camp is likely to intensify scrutiny of that relationship – and heighten concern about how far the conflict may spread.

(Source: Reuters)

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audi Arabia said on Tuesday that its national security was a “red line” and backed a demand for United Arab Emirates forces to leave Yemen within 24 hours, marking Riyadh’s strongest language yet toward its Gulf ally amid escalating tensions in the war-torn country.

The warning came hours after a Saudi-led coalition carried out an airstrike on the southern Yemeni port of Mukalla, targeting what it described as unauthorized foreign military support for UAE-backed southern separatist forces.

Yemen’s Saudi-backed presidential council head, Rashad al-Alimi, ordered Emirati forces to withdraw and announced the cancellation of a defense pact with the UAE, accusing Abu Dhabi of fueling internal conflict through its support for the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group seeking autonomy in southern Yemen.

“It has been definitively confirmed that the United Arab Emirates pressured and directed the STC to undermine state authority through military escalation,” Alimi said in a televised address, according to Yemen’s state news agency.

Saudi Arabia urged the UAE to comply with the withdrawal demand. The UAE’s foreign ministry did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Gulf stock markets fell following the flare-up, reflecting investor concern over rising tensions between the two longtime allies.

Mukalla strike and separatist advance

The Saudi-led coalition said the airstrike on Mukalla port caused no casualties or collateral damage. Two sources told Reuters the strike targeted a dock where cargo from two vessels had been unloaded.

Coalition officials said the ships arrived over the weekend from the UAE port of Fujairah without authorization, disabled their tracking systems, and unloaded weapons and combat vehicles intended to support the STC.

Yemeni state television aired footage showing black smoke rising from the port and burned vehicles in the area.

The STC, backed by the UAE, has recently made significant advances in southern Yemen, breaking years of military stalemate and seizing control of large areas, including parts of the strategic Hadramout province, which borders Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia had warned the STC against further military moves in Hadramout and demanded a withdrawal, a call the group rejected.

Deepening rift among allies

The UAE was part of the Saudi-led coalition fighting Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement from 2015. Although Abu Dhabi began reducing its troop presence in 2019, it has continued to wield influence through local allied forces, including the STC.

The recent STC offensive has brought Saudi Arabia and the UAE closer to direct confrontation, exposing fractures within the coalition that once fought the Houthis together.

In response to the escalation, Alimi imposed a 72-hour no-fly zone and a sea and land blockade on ports and crossings, with limited exemptions authorized by the coalition.

The STC’s leadership in Hadramout rejected the withdrawal demand, calling the Mukalla strike “a blatant attack on Hadramout and its people,” and described the UAE as an ally that should not be abandoned.

Yemen’s internationally recognized government accused the STC of staging an armed rebellion and serving Houthi interests, while praising Saudi Arabia for acting to prevent eastern Yemen from descending into chaos.

The Houthis continue to control northern Yemen, including the capital Sanaa, while the conflict remains fragmented among rival factions despite years of international efforts to end the war.

(Source: Reuters and Aljazeera)

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he Gulf region is one of the areas with which Türkiye has had the most intense foreign policy interactions in recent years. Since 2020, this rapprochement has intensified, and Türkiye’s partnerships with the region’s leading foreign policy actors have grown. Notably, its long-standing close relations with Qatar have evolved into a strategic partnership. Meanwhile, relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which were once defined by competition, have transformed into cooperative engagements.

Meanwhile, Ankara has also maintained contact with other countries in the region, including Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain. These interactions have brought potential cooperation opportunities in various sectors, including the defense industry, trade, energy, and manufacturing, to the forefront. In line with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s approach of establishing direct contact with Gulf countries, reciprocal visits have increased.

From October 21 to 23, 2025, President Erdoğan undertook a Gulf tour covering three countries. Accompanied by numerous ministers, bureaucrats, and journalists, he visited Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman. There, he engaged in activities aimed at strengthening Türkiye’s relations with Gulf countries, particularly in areas such as the defense industry and energy. The signing of 24 cooperation and partnership agreements during the visit suggests that the relationship is evolving into a stronger partnership.

What makes Qatar, Oman and Kuwait different?

There are certain points that distinguish Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman—the three countries visited by President Erdoğan on his recent tour of the Gulf region—from other Gulf countries. First, these three countries differ from others in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain, particularly in terms of their foreign policy approaches and orientations. Notably, Qatar’s relations with Türkiye, its North African policies, and its moderate stance on the Muslim Brotherhood distinguish it from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Conversely, unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Oman and Kuwait tend to adopt a neutral and conciliatory stance in their foreign relations.

Another aspect that sets Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman apart from other Gulf countries is how they handle the Palestinian issue. Notably, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain normalized relations with Israel by signing the Abraham Accords in 2020. Recently, there has been discussion about the possibility of Saudi Arabia taking a similar step. In contrast, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman have opposed Israel’s occupation policies in Palestine on many regional and international platforms.

These countries also use their diplomatic influence on the global stage to advocate for Palestinian rights. For example, Qatar has hosted Hamas members for many years and uses the Aljazeera channel to create international public pressure against Israel. Since October 7, Oman has strongly criticized Israel’s massacres in Gaza in official statements. This reaction is also evident at the societal level. In Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait, Friday sermons, television broadcasts, and civil society organizations have condemned Israel while expressing solidarity with Gaza and the Palestinians.

Qatar and Oman: Diverting from Saudi Arabia and the UAE

On the other hand, one could argue that Qatar and Oman have diverged from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain in their policies toward Iran. In fact, Qatar is closely aligned with Tehran due to its cooperation with Iran in the Persian Gulf and their similar policies on other regional issues. During the 2017 blockade, Iran and Türkiye provided Qatar with significant support, particularly by supplying food products.

Oman, on the other hand, is said to have the strongest historical and cultural ties to Iran of any country in the Gulf region. Recently, these two countries conducted military exercises involving land and naval forces. In contrast, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Manama have adopted policies closer to those of the U.S. and Israel regarding Iran. Thus, they differ from Doha and Muscat in this respect.

Finally, it is known that all three countries closely cooperate with the United Kingdom in the defense industry. In this context, Türkiye has been planning to purchase Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets for some time. Due to growing regional risks and security concerns, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman have added 22, 15, and 12 Eurofighter jets, respectively, to their air forces in recent years.

Despite their security partnerships with the U.S. and the U.K., these countries have been striving to develop their own capabilities. According to reports, Qatar ordered 36 Eurofighters, Kuwait ordered 28, and Oman ordered 12. Considering that Türkiye has put the purchase of used Eurofighters on its agenda, President Erdogan’s choice of these three countries for his Gulf visit becomes more meaningful. Indeed, statements made after the visit indicated that the purchase of Eurofighter jets was specifically negotiated with Oman and Qatar.

From cooperation to strategic partnership

President Erdoğan’s Gulf tour from October 21 to 23 is significant because it elevates Türkiye’s relations with regional countries beyond traditional cooperation into strategic partnerships. Considering the nature of relations and partnerships in recent years, this has already been achieved with Qatar. Türkiye provided critical support to Qatar when it became the target of a political blockade initiated by its neighbors on June 5, 2017. As a result, relations between the two countries strengthened. Following the blockade, Türkiye established a military base in Qatar, becoming one of the Doha administration’s most reliable global partners.

Over the following years, Türkiye and Qatar continued to strengthen their relationship, particularly with regard to regional policies. They pursued common policies in regions such as the Horn of Africa and North Africa. Most recently, during Israel’s attacks on Gaza, Ankara and Doha pursued overlapping policies, calling for Tel Aviv and the Benjamin Netanyahu government to be held accountable under international law. Disturbed by Qatar’s stance, Israel bombed the offices of Aljazeera and the Qatar Red Crescent in Gaza.

Then, in September, Israel directly targeted Doha, the capital of Qatar, carrying out an attack against Hamas members there. Despite Israel’s aggression, Turkey continued to support Qatar. After the attack, President Erdoğan attended the Doha summit and expressed his support for Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. As part of his Gulf tour, Erdoğan also made his second visit to Qatar within two months.

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merican mercenaries, who claim they were paid by the UAE to carry out extrajudicial killings in Yemen and subsequently trained Yemenis to carry out the killings, have spoken candidly about their “work” to BBC international correspondent Nawal Al-Maghafi.

In a discussion about her documentary American Mercenaries: Killing in Yemen at London’s Frontline Club, Al-Maghafi said: “This has been one of the most rewarding films. I received hundreds of messages from people in southern Yemen saying thank you so much for making this film. My uncle was killed last year. We know who it was but were too afraid to say so. My cousin was killed last year and finally someone is shining a light on this. People in the south are absolutely terrified because they know the UAE has incredible surveillance capabilities  – they do not want to talk  on the phone, they don’t want to text. A lot of the work behind the scenes on this investigation was done face to face because it is almost impossible to get information online or on text.”

“In this investigation the bits you think are going to be hard were the easiest and the things that I thought would be the easiest were the hardest. I thought it would be so hard to get to the mercenaries. We  have such great access in Yemen that part [speaking to Yemenis] would be easy. And it was the exact opposite. The Yemen side was so difficult because of the climate of fear. We did speak lots of people who had had family members assassinated but getting people to go on the record was always impossible. But they really fed into our research.”

The death of hundreds of thousands

Yemen’s nine year-long civil war has led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands and created one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. When a coalition formed by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia invaded Yemen in 2015, its stated aim was to return the elected government ousted by Houthis in the north of the country, to power, and to fight terrorism.

But an investigation by BBC Arabic Investigations found evidence that the UAE has been funding a method of covert warfare in southern Yemen – assassinating those who have spoken out against its operations in the country.

The documentary features an interview with Issac Gilmore, a former Navy Seal who later became second in command of a private U.S. military firm Spear Operations Group. Human rights lawyers are trying to prosecute Spear for war crimes in Yemen. Abraham Golan, the founder of Spear, did not respond to the allegations in the film.

Gilmore told BBC he was paid $1.5m a month for this operation. He spoke of a meeting “with appropriate bodies” in the UAE government at an Emirate army base. “The pitch was to put pressure on ISIS and Al Qaeda in Yemen and make sure it did not become another hub of chaotic terrorist activity,” Gilmore said.

A war on Al Qaeda?

But in an exclusive interview, a Yemeni whistleblower alleged that the mercenaries helped in the continuation of the assassinations program by training UAE officers, who in turn trained Yemenis. He also claimed that far from prosecuting the war on Al Qaeda in Yemen, the UAE instead pardoned Al Qaeda members and recruited them as killers for its program of assassinations.

One of the pardoned former Al Qaeda operatives was allegedly Nasser Al-Shibah, a suspect in the attack on the U.S. navy destroyer Cole during a refuelling stop in Aden which killed 17 American sailors. The BBC had a picture of Al-Shibah with the head of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) Aideroos Al Zubaydi. The STC is a political grouping campaigning for the independence of South Yemen from the north. One of its roles was to run security in the south. Al Zubaydi denied that Al-Shibah had an active role in the STC and was head of one of its units.

“We are fighting terrorism so it is impossible we would be working with them [Al Qaeda],” Zubaydi said. 

The BBC gained access to one of the UAE’s 2018 ‘Kill Lists’ and learned that Yemeni politicians, clerics and even human rights lawyers who had spoken out against the UAE’s actions in Yemen, were targets.

A Kill list

The mercenary Gilmore admitted that Ansaf Mayo, an MP and Leader of the Islah Party, who escaped an assassination attempt, was on the kill list. Al Islah, one of the largest political parties in Yemen, is the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is banned in the UAE. Its political activism and support for elections is seen as a threat to the Emirati royal family. Gilmore agreed to a meeting, but Mayo did not show up.

The name of Huda Al-Sarari, a lawyer investigating the UAE’s human rights abuses in Yemen, was also on the list. Her son was killed. “We hoped the UAE would support law and order but what happened is the exact opposite,” Al-Sarari told the BBC.

In a statement to the BBC, the UAE government said the allegations made against it in the film were false. The U.S. State Department and the Department of Defence declined to comment on a list of questions put to them about Spear. A CIA spokesman said: “The idea the CIA signed off on such activity is false.”

At  the meeting at the Frontline Club  when Al-Maghafi was asked during the question and answer session whether we can now conclude that the south of Yemen is being terrorized by six or seven or eight militias, there is no government, there are no services and all the nice things the Southern Transition Council is saying about inaugurating a House of  Commons in is a lot of eyewash, she replied ‘yes’.

American Mercenaries: Killing in Yemen BBC documentary – Director  Jess Kelly,  Reporter: Nawal Al-Maghafi,  Executive Producer: Monica Garnsey

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ussia’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) reveal a multifaceted and increasingly strategic nature as recently witnessed by the visits of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Discussions on issues such as the Russia-Ukraine war, Israeli attacks on Gaza, and OPEC+ point to a deepening engagement beyond traditional energy cooperation.

President Putin visited the UAE and Saudi Arabia on December 6. The visits were notable as they were among the rare visits made by the Russian president after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for him. As a result of the arrest warrant, for example, Putin did not attend the recent BRICS summit in South Africa or the G20 summit in India.

While Putin’s visit to the Gulf is critical in many respects, it is also fundamentally related to the structure of Russia-Gulf relations after the Russia-Ukraine war that began in February 2022. The visits to the UAE and Saudi Arabia focused on the Russia-Ukraine war, Israel’s attacks on Gaza, OPEC+ energy issues, and the Yemen issue.

Analysis of conjunctional developments on the Russia-Gulf line

With the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war, the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, showed a neutral foreign policy tendency. In essence, the Gulf countries’ refusal to participate in the sanctions against Russia imposed by Western countries—led by the United States—was similar to the foreign policy trends before the Russia-Ukraine war.

The Gulf states were already having problems in their relations with the U.S. because of its rhetoric and actions about withdrawing from the region; however, after the Taliban took power in Afghanistan, relations entered a crisis of confidence. In addition, the U.S., which has problems with Saudi Arabia over, among others, the Biden-Muhammad bin Salman tension and oil production policy, has also experienced tensions in its relations with the UAE over issues such as Russia-UAE relations and the UAE’s relations with the Assad government in Syria.

In fact, the Gulf countries, which have intensified their search for both regional and international partnerships, did not participate in the sanctions against Russia imposed by Western countries. At the same time, within the framework of this search for partnership, normalization processes with Israel, Iran, and Turkey have been carried out since 2020, albeit at different levels. The depth of the Gulf states’ positions on the Russia-Ukraine war, in fact, can be attributed to signs of a multipolar world order prevailing among them.

The Gulf views Russia as an alternative power in a multipolar world order and a critical actor in terms of energy policy, strategic partnerships, and regional security concerns. The decline in global demand for oil and natural gas derivatives from 2019 onwards, in the context of pandemic measures and the transition to renewable energy projects, was the point at which Russia and the Gulf countries sought a common solution. At a time when the discourse on reducing the use of fossil fuels was one of the most important dimensions of the fight against global climate change, the loss of global oil and gas supplies made Russia and the Gulf countries strategic energy actors once again.

The sanctions imposed by Western countries on Russia’s oil and gas exports as of February 2022 enabled Russia and the Gulf countries to effectively use the OPEC+ platform in global international relations. Despite serious criticism and sometimes veiled threats from the U.S., since 2019, the largest producers, Russia and Saudi Arabia, have taken decisions to reduce oil production within OPEC+ several times, and price stability in the oil market has been achieved.

At the same time, Russian oligarchs are protecting their financial resources mainly in Middle Eastern countries and, in particular, in places like the Emirate of Dubai, and  do not want to lose them due to the pursuit of sanctions by Western regimes. According to 2022 data, Russian citizens came first in the purchase of houses in Dubai, leaving behind British and Indian citizens—a sign that explains Russia’s strategic relations with the Gulf countries.

Background of the strategic security and defense partnerships

Russia’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates date back beyond recent years, when signs of a multipolar world order were seen, and the Russia-Ukraine war. It should be remembered that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been developing military, defense, and security cooperation with Russia since the 2010s. Saudi Arabia’s purchase of the S-400 air defense system, Kornet-EM anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) systems, and other specific military equipment from Russia was on the agenda. The two countries also signed a military cooperation agreement in August 2021. At the time, the move by Saudi Arabia was interpreted as a strategy to build relationships with influential international actors and achieve relative autonomy through partnerships, rather than relying solely on the United States in security and defense policy.

Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE has long been engaged in military, defense, and security partnership cooperation with Russia. So much so that Russia is known to be negotiating with the UAE and India on the joint production of the fifth-generation SU-57 fighter jet. At the same time, defense and security cooperation between Russia and the UAE has manifested itself in Russia’s interventions in Syria and Libya since 2015, while the UAE has sought to harmonize its strategy and power with Russia’s strategy in both regions. In addition, the two countries seem to be pursuing a joint strategy in South Yemen. Also, between 2009 and 2013, Russia supplied the UAE with Pantsir-S air defense systems, which were subsequently reformed.

For many years, Russian companies have been able to present their current products at international exhibitions held in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the UAE. Such platforms can be used to broker contracts for the supply of military equipment. All in all, it should be noted that the UAE’s defense/security partnership with Russia is a strategic diversification choice rather than a conjunctional necessity.

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n April 2023, war broke out in Sudan between the Sudanese National Army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), killing thousands and displacing millions. As the fighting has spread, many now fear that the entire country could be plunged into a full-blown war.

This war has its investors and beneficiaries; for years, the UAE has pursued its narrow interests by providing the RSF with a lifeline of money and weapons to carry out its genocide in Darfur. It’s time for the world to put pressure on the UAE to stop perpetuating this vicious cycle of violence.

The RSF was primarily created in 2013 by restructuring the notorious Janjaweed militia to support the central government’s counterinsurgency operations in Darfur and South Kordofan. In 2017, the Sudanese parliament passed a law legitimizing its activities, even though the militia has reportedly committed countless crimes and atrocities, including the destruction of villages, the killing of protesters, sexual assault and rape, and the unlawful detention of activists.

The UAE’s support for the militia comes in various forms, from direct funding to logistics and military equipment. In December 2019, an investigative report revealed that the militia received vehicles from the UAE that could be easily modified and equipped with machine guns. The report also revealed how UAE-based front companies, such as Tradive, were used to channel the funds to the militia.

Escalated military support

During the ongoing war, and in flagrant violation of the UN arms embargo resolution, the UAE escalated its military support to the militias through Chad, where, under the guise of a humanitarian operation, it established an airport and a hospital to transfer weapons and ammunition to the militias and to treat militia fighters. The national army reportedly destroyed a UAE military shipment to the militia in Nyala, South Darfur.

According to military sources, the shipment included drones, ammunition, advanced rocket launchers, and sophisticated communications systems. At the beginning of the war, the RSF militia received military aid from the Wagner Group through the al-Khadim airbase in eastern Libya, which was controlled by General Haftar, the notorious UAE-backed warlord. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, the Wagner Group also supplied the RSF with surface-to-air missiles.

The UAE is also the hub for the RSF militia’s social media team, which the militia brothers run to disinform the world about their ongoing genocides and violations. Previously, an investigative report revealed that a Dubai-based private equity firm was helping the militia lobby British parliamentarians and influence their opinions about the RSF militia’s crimes in the ongoing war.

The UAE support extends to diplomatic and political support for the militia. For example, the UAE has so far failed to cooperate and implement the sanctions imposed by the U.S. on the companies and leaders of the RSF militia. The UAE is also a safe haven for the militias’ leader. Recently, Dagalo made his first appearance since the outbreak of the war; flight records show that he arrived in Addis Ababa on a royal jet that had flown from Abu Dhabi to Uganda’s Entebbe International Airport.

Why does the UAE support the RSF?

In fact, there are several reasons for the UAE to invest heavily in the RSF militia. In recent years, the UAE has begun working on agricultural projects and signed a $6 billion contract to build a Red Sea port. In April 2020, the UAE hired a firm to lobby the military council, of which the militia was then a core part, to take control of the PortSudan Facility, the country’s most important facility.

Assuming the militia emerges victorious in this war, the UAE will have a strong ally to complete these plans and further its political agenda. In this scenario, the UAE will import more raw gold from Sudan to the UAE. The UAE will also find it easier to resume its shadowy recruitment of Sudanese and send them as soldiers to fight in Libya. Thus, it could be argued that the UAE is not interested in seeing any democratic experiment in the Middle East region that might influence the regime dissidents at home.

This military support provided the militias with the necessary tools to commit countless crimes, such as attacking hospitals, churches, and media facilities, and setting up markets to sell women as slaves. In the city of Wad Madani, the militias engaged in large-scale looting of homes and markets, as well as the UN World Food Programme’s warehouses, which provide life-saving food and nutrition to 20,000 children and pregnant and lactating women. In addition, tens of thousands were forced to leave the city to escape this hell—their flight, however, was prevented by the militia. In a serious development, the militia offered to protect villages in exchange for youth joining their ranks.

Impact on the Darfur region

The UAE’s support for militias has had a more significant and devastating impact in the Darfur region, where the militias have committed several acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Armed citizens descended from African tribes, particularly the Masalit, were raped and buried in mass graves in Ardamata and El Geneina. Independent reports have documented that the RSF militias and the Arab militias they supported humiliated their victims and called them slaves as they chased from street to street. In some cases, RSF militiamen recorded innocent civilians as they were being executed. In other areas of Darfur, refugee camps have been besieged, killing and injuring thousands.

The UAE’s irresponsible intervention also caused diplomatic tensions in the region and threatened to exacerbate the situation in Darfur. In December 2023, after being publicly accused by a Sudanese official of facilitating arms transfers to the RSF militia, the Chadian government declared four Sudanese diplomats personae non gratae. In return, the Sudanese government announced that it would take reciprocal measures soon thereafter. Chad initially decided not to intervene directly, and later reversed this decision after the UAE signed several agreements and memorandums promising to help Chad with some energy projects.

By fueling the war in Sudan through its RSF alliance, the UAE insidiously risks threatening the entire Sudanese social fabric and deepening the divisions between tribal and ethnic groups. It can’t be overlooked that the tribes and local communities from which most of the militias come will be targeted and discriminated against in postwar Sudan.

So far, many voices have condemned this military support. For example, a group of Democratic members of the U.S. Congress sent a letter to the UAE Foreign Minister expressing their concern about the continued funding of the militias. The move was welcomed by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee. In addition, scholars, human rights advocates, and a leading expert on Sudan, international law, and the prevention of atrocities issued a statement calling for an end to all sources of UAE funding for the militias. Meanwhile, Sudanese around the world have taken to the streets and launched social media campaigns demanding an end to this military support.

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n a startling revelation, General Yassir al-Atta of Sudan has publicly accused the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of providing support to the controversial Rapid Support Forces (RSF), marking the first official accusation of the UAE’s involvement in Sudan’s intricate war. The conflict has already caused massive displacement and widespread ethnically driven violence, particularly in the Darfur region.

During a speech to the General Intelligence Service, which was later circulated on social media and reported by Reuters, al-Atta claimed that intelligence sources, including military and diplomatic channels, have confirmed the UAE’s logistical backing of the RSF. The RSF, which evolved from the Janjaweed militias, has been a significant force in the government’s efforts to quell rebellions, most notably the crisis in Darfur during the 2000s.

The UAE, when solicited for comments, reiterated its stance advocating for de-escalation and peace talks in Sudan, contrasting with al-Atta’s allegations. Emphasizing its humanitarian role, the UAE pointed to the establishment of a field hospital in Chad to support those affected by the conflict.

Aid to the RSF

General al-Atta also asserted that the UAE had channeled aid to the RSF via other African nations, including Uganda, the Central African Republic, and Chad. This week, aid was reported to have arrived at Ndjamena’s airport in Chad, which had previously seen aid routed through the city of Amdjarass.

In an unexpected turn, al-Atta commended Russia for its action against the Wagner Group, a paramilitary organization allegedly involved in supporting the RSF. The RSF has refuted any connections with Wagner Group.

The RSF has recently gained a strategic advantage in the conflict, seizing several states within the Darfur region and accumulating advanced military equipment, including drones and artillery. This has led to increased scrutiny of the origins of such weaponry, with some claiming it was captured from military bases.

Mixed responses

Responses to General al-Atta’s claims have been mixed, with Uganda’s state minister for foreign affairs dismissing them as “absolute rubbish.” Meanwhile, the Sudanese army, Chad, and the CAR have yet to provide official statements.

In a video released by the army, references to the UAE were notably absent, which some observers have interpreted as a potential edit. This comes as General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the army leader and al-Atta’s superior, announced an impending visit to the UAE, coinciding with the U.N. climate summit COP28.

The UAE’s involvement in Sudan has been multifaceted, including supporting a failed political transition post-2019 and engaging in economic ventures, such as building a Red Sea port and investing in agriculture.

As the conflict in Sudan escalates, the international community watches closely, weighing the implications of foreign interference and the prospects for peace and stability in a region long-torn by strife and political upheaval.

Source: Reuters

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ccording to the Qatar-based Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, discussions have taken place regarding the establishment of a joint naval force involving Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman. The primary objective of this coalition is to ensure the safety of navigation in the strategically significant Persian Gulf. China has actively participated in mediating the talks between Tehran, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi. On June 3, following this news, Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, Commander of the Iranian Navy, stated that several regional countries, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, will form a new naval coalition in the northern parts of the Indian Ocean.

During a television program, the Iranian Navy Commander stated that almost all littoral countries in the northern parts of the Indian Ocean are willing to support Iran and collaborate collectively to ensure security. He went on to say that while Iran and Oman have conducted numerous joint naval exercises in the past, other countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, Pakistan, and India are also keen on engaging in joint naval cooperation. Irani claimed that the “unjust” presence of foreign powers in the region would soon come to an end, and that the countries of the region would take responsibility for safeguarding it. Irani did not provide specific details about this development, and there have been no statements from the countries allegedly involved in the formation of this alliance.

On June 6, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin announced that Beijing is in favor of the concept of a joint naval force consisting of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other regional countries. During a press conference, Wenbin stated that the preservation of peace and stability in the Middle East’s Persian Gulf region is crucial for the prosperity of the countries and people in the area, and plays a vital role in global peace, the advancement of global economic growth, and ensuring a sustainable energy supply. Wenbin highlighted China’s commitment to playing a positive and constructive role in promoting peace and stability in the region.

Response to Middle East NATO?

According to Iran’s state broadcaster, Press TV, the proposal to establish a regional naval alliance is seen as a response to U.S. and Israeli suggestions made last year to create a Middle East NATO. Commander Tim Hawkins, the spokesman for the U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces, criticized Iran’s claim of forming a maritime security alliance, stating that Iran is the primary cause of regional instability and cannot claim to protect the waters it threatens. Hawkins mentioned that Iran has attacked or seized 15 international-flagged merchant ships in the past two years, and stated that the U.S. is reinforcing defenses around the Strait of Hormuz with its partners.

In contrast, the UAE government announced its withdrawal from the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) on May 31, expressing disappointment with the U.S. military’s perceived lack of response to Iran’s seizure of commercial tankers in April and May. Although UAE officials denied that their withdrawal from the CMF was a direct result of U.S. inaction against Iran’s maritime activities, a phone call on June 2 between UAE National Security Advisor Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan and his American counterpart Jake Sullivan suggests uncertainty and tension regarding the course of action in the absence of U.S. security guarantees.

Abu Dhabi’s disappointment with the perceived weaker U.S. commitments has led to a shift in the UAE’s foreign policy, emphasizing diplomacy and partnerships with China and Russia to address regional threats from Iran. This approach may reflect both the recognition of declining U.S. influence in a multipolar geopolitical environment and a strategy to secure stronger American commitments.

GCC Challenges

The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) member states have faced challenges in establishing effective joint military structures and agreeing on a common vision regarding threats and challenges. Factors contributing to this include a lack of appropriate strategic culture and military power, significant divisions and rivalries within the GCC, concerns about Saudi Arabia’s dominance, and the presence of private interests.

Despite making joint declarations, the GCC states are not a unified entity, and a joint military operation in the event of a conflict would likely have a limited value. Decision-makers within the GCC primarily focus on the quantity and technological advancement of their military equipment, rather than their ability to use it effectively. As a result, the security of these countries is seen as fragile. The issue of the GCC states’ actual combat value, effectiveness, and ability to cooperate in warfare remains unresolved.

Despite significant military expenditures, the GCC states have heavily relied on Western countries for military protection and security. However, the perception of the United States as an unreliable security guarantor has led the Gulf states to seek closer ties with major powers like China and Russia. They have also increased diplomatic efforts to counter the perceived threat from Iran. Consequently, the possibility of security cooperation between Iran and the Gulf states is not entirely out of question. Nour News, a news website close to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, suggested on Tuesday that Iran’s nuclear technology could even be potentially transferred to Saudi Arabia under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accordance with international law.

Given that the countries involved have not denied the plan to establish a joint naval force, it can be inferred that discussions on this matter have taken place. However, it is important to note that the focus might be more on joint action or planning rather than forming a formal naval alliance. The Iranian Navy Commander’s statement regarding previous joint naval exercises by Iran and Oman, as well as the interest shown by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, and other countries in naval cooperation with Iran, could indicate Iran’s plans for joint exercises in the Gulf or Sea of Oman, similar to their annual exercises with China and Russia in the Indian Ocean.

Change in the course of relations

While the joint Iranian-Arab naval exercises will not be more than messaging, they will be an indication that Iran and the Gulf countries are making efforts to change the course of their relations. Although the details of this project have yet to be disclosed, it nonetheless is indicative of an important geopolitical shift that is taking place in the Middle East.

Both Riyadh and Tehran are looking for new options to manage regional equations, and Washington is no longer seen by the Gulf states as a security guarantor and a regional problem-solver. This includes China’s economic partnership plans in the region. Moreover, Washington’s pledge to build an alliance of democracies against autocracies in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine has also irritated some Gulf Arab countries.

The timing of an incident involving alleged “harassment” in the Strait of Hormuz amidst these ongoing developments is significant. On June 5, the U.S. Navy announced that its sailors, along with the UK Navy, had come to the aid of a ship reportedly harassed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the strategically important Strait of Hormuz.

In response to these allegations, on Monday, June 5, IRGC Navy Commander Abbas Gholamshahi stated that a distress call had been made by a Marshall Islands-flagged ship through the international channel, and Iranian forces had responded accordingly. Gholamshahi emphasized that certain hostile media outlets in violation of media ethics were attempting to spread misinformation, incite unrest, and legitimize the “illegitimate and unjustified presence of non-regional countries in the Persian Gulf.”

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multipolar regional order is in the making in the Middle East, the preponderance of the U.S. is waning and rising powers, primarily China and Russia, are deepening their involvement in the region. For the U.S., the Middle East has been losing its significance and the Asia Pacific region is considered economically and militarily more vital. The stable supply of oil from the Middle East is no more a top U.S. concern as the booming shale oil production in North America helps towards energy independence.

The badly ended invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq showed the limits of the U.S. power and influence in the region, which makes American policymakers less willing to play a major role in Middle Eastern affairs. The most recent escalation of violence between Israel and Palestinians in Jenin was met with mere calls for calm by the U.S. and President Biden so far has been quite unwilling to reinitiate the Middle East peace process. As the U.S. interest in the region diminishes, the rising powers of China and Russia are increasingly more interested in strengthening their ties with the Middle East.

The longstanding U.S. allies in the Middle East, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Turkey, are forming new intra and extra regional alliances. The Abraham Accords (2020) largely ended Israel’s isolation in the region, on an official level, as it established diplomatic relations with the UAE and Bahrain. In 2020, Morocco also recognized Israel and Sudan declared such an intention, which has not materialized yet. After four years of rupture, diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey were restored in December 2022. Even Saudi Arabia’s relations with Israel are on the mend, though a normalization between the two is still not in the offing. In short, Israel is no more isolated officially and hence less dependent on the U.S. for its security.

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE are all establishing stronger ties with China and Russia. Egypt and China have fast growing economic and military ties, and Egypt is one of the major focus countries of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The two countries call their relationship a “strategic partnership.” Saudi Arabia is strengthening its strategic ties with China. Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Riyadh in December 2022 and the two sides agreed that “they firmly support each other’s core interests” and would strengthen their partnership on energy and defense. President Jinping also met with representatives of other oil-producing Gulf states and the Arab League countries in the same visit, and called for the use of Chinese yuan, instead of U.S. dollars, in oil and gas transactions as he promised that China would continue its large volume oil imports from the region.

The increasing trade with the region is not simply driven by oil, there is also strong demand for the Chinese goods in the Middle East. Most strikingly, U.S.-banned Huawei technologies, such as its 5G equipment, are welcomed in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The U.S. refusal to sell certain advanced technology weapons to a number of Middle East countries, along with Russia’s focus on its war in Ukraine, have led China to become “the secondary arms supplier of choice for many Middle East countries” in 2022.

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are already partners of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s dialogue. Russia is also making inroads in the region beyond its already entrenched regional alliances, e.g., with Syria. The Saudi-Russia cooperation is particularly strong in OPEC+, where both countries seek to cut oil supplies to prevent a drop in oil prices. Saudi Arabia’s oil alliance with Russia is a serious concern for the U.S., and American policymakers argue that this alliance benefits Russia for continuing its invasion of Ukraine. Egypt and Turkey also have close ties with Russia.

Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made S400 air defense system and the ongoing construction of the first Turkish nuclear power plant by a Russian state-owned company are notable examples of the strengthening Turkish-Russian relationship. In July 2022, Egypt and Russia signed a deal for Egypt’s first nuclear power plant to the chagrin of the West, which has placed economic sanctions on Russia due to the war in Ukraine. Both Egypt and Turkey have maintained neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war and chose not to implement any economic sanctions against Russia. That’s also the case with all other major U.S. allies in the Middle East: neither UAE nor Israel or Saudi Arabia has taken sides in the war.

China maintains a close relationship with Iran, the main U.S. rival in the region. The trade between Iran and China provides Iran with the badly needed cash for its economic survival in the face of U.S.-led sanctions imposed on Tehran for its nuclear program. Although Iran is worried over China’s growing cooperation with Saudi Arabia, China has thus far managed to develop its ties with the two rival countries. The U.S. is particularly worried about China’s increasing cheap oil imports from Iran.

China weakens U.S. influence in the Middle East and Iran sustains its economy through trade with China. There is no reason for China and Iran to abandon such mutually beneficial trade. The relationship between Iran and Russia is also deepening as Iran supplies Russia with drones and other military equipment in its war against Ukraine, and Russia remains a key Iranian ally in countering the U.S.-led sanctions.

Regional powers in the Middle East seem to have already benefited from the lessening of U.S. interest in the region. The growing ties with China and Russia enable regional actors in the Middle East to withstand U.S. influence. However, this does not entail a breakup of their relations with the U.S. Egypt, Israel, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are not going to part ways with the U.S. They are rather more likely to hold on to the middle ground, being neither fully committed allies nor rivals to the U.S. If that path is to be continued by regional actors, we may well be witnessing the emergence of a multipolar order in the Middle East, one that is not dominated by any external or regional player.

On the other hand, China’s growing influence in the Middle East is a fact that does not necessarily mean replacing the U.S. The Chinese are keen on improving their economic and trade ties with the Middle East, but there is no evidence of any plans for military presence in the region. The U.S. still remains the major power in the Middle East, though its influence is in decline. The regional actors in the Middle East are likely to exploit the U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia rivalries at the global and regional levels to strengthen their positions. A multipolar order in the Middle East is definitely not the guaranteed outcome of shifting alliances and growing ties between regional and rising powers, but it appears as the most likely option.

If the war in Ukraine reveals a single globally valid truth, it is the fact that today states operate under a very different political and security order than a decade ago.

The most striking example of this new international structure manifests itself in how Saudi and Emirati national interests dictated and enabled these Gulf monarchies to respond to the Russian attacks in Ukraine more cautiously and openly refusing an automatic alignment with the United States.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought the broadened range of political, economic, and strategic partnerships of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with Russia and China to the fore, and renewed a scholarly focus on the two Gulf states’ pivot to the East.

Gulf pivot to Asia: The shift is real

It is hardly surprising that economic cooperation has been the linchpin of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) pivot to China, and to a much lesser extend to Russia, given the interdependent structures of their economies.

Over the last years, the economic relations of the GCC states with Russia and China are blooming at an unprecedented pace. In 2020, China replaced the European Union as the GCC’s top trading partner, as the bilateral trade volume reached $161.4 billion.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are China’s most important economic partners in the Gulf region. According to Saudi custom data, Saudi Arabia was China’s top supplier of crude oil and held 17 percent of the Chinese market. In 2021, China was Saudi Arabia’s main trade partner, both in terms of exports (17.3 percent) and imports (20.7 percent).

Similarly, China is the top trade partner of the UAE as the bilateral trade volume exceeded $49 billion in the first nine months of 2021, showing a 38.1 percent increase compared to the same period in 2020. Furthermore, the UAE is a key destination for re-exports of Chinese goods into the Middle East and Africa.

On January 10, in an unprecedented move, foreign ministers from Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman, and the secretary general of the GCC paid a visit to China to deepen bilateral partnerships. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Gulf GCC Secretary General Nayef Falah Mubarak Al-Hajraf during the visit.

Both sides agreed that conditions are ripe for the establishment of a China-GCC strategic partnership and both sides will speed up the process so as to push bilateral relations to a new level,” the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement. The visit is expected to give impetus to China-GCC Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations, which were launched in 2004. Although absent from the visit, the UAE expressed its support for the FTA and reiterated Abu Dhabi’s willingness to deepen cooperation with China.

The UAE and China already agreed to upgrade their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership, the highest form of diplomatic relationship, during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the UAE in 2018.

Beijing was also the venue for Qatar’s Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani’s meeting with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in February 2022, for the first time since the end of the Gulf rift in 2021.

Military cooperation between the GCC, China, and Russia

The militarization and digitalization of Saudi-Emirati relations with China and Russia show the widened scope of the Gulf pivot to Asia beyond bilateral trade. China has long been absent in the direct security engagements in the Gulf. Yet, the recent reports signal a change in Beijing’s position. Based on a U.S. intelligence report, in 2021, the Wall Street Journal claimed that China was secretly building a military facility near a port in Abu Dhabi. The fate and the details of the Chinese facility remain unknown; yet, it is clear that China started to engage with the Gulf states through military diplomacy, including niche arm sales and joint military exercises.

The recent pledge to increase military cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia falls into these efforts. Chinese arms sales to Saudi Arabia rose from $35 million to $170 million between 2015 and 2020, and to the UAE from $45 million to $121 million over the same period.

On the Russian side, increasing arms transfers from Moscow to the Gulf, particularly to the UAE, is well documented. Russia and the UAE signed a declaration of strategic partnership in 2018 and engaged in joint investments in the military industrial sectors. Saudi acquisition of Russian S-400 air defense systems was reportedly on Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s agenda on his 2021 visit.

Digital infrastructure and cybersecurity cooperation is another sign of the Gulf pivot to Asia, particularly to China. The UAE Telecommunication Company signed a deal with Chinese Huawei to provide 5G services to the Emirates in 2019. More recently, in February 2021, Huawei and Emirati partners leveraged 5G multi-access edge computing to live broadcast the UAE President’s Cup, an annual cycling event.

In March 2022, the UAE Cybersecurity Council inked a deal with Huawei to launch a jointly established independent think-tank on cybersecurity. More recently, Saudi Arabia has announced that Riyadh is becoming a regional hub for Chinese Alibaba Cloud operations, as the company pledged up to $500 million in investments in Saudi Arabia over the next five years.

Testing the limits of hedging

The UAE’s decision to suspend a billion-dollar deal of U.S.-made F-35 fighter jets in December 2021 over Washington’s attempts to bloc technology transfer from China to the Emirates, which shows the extended limits of hedging strategies of the small Gulf monarchies.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is another striking example of changing U.S.-Gulf relations as Gulf states refused to pump oil into the market, and have kept cordial relations with Russia’s Putin with which they deepened bilateral cooperation in many areas.

Washington’s relations with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have recently become strained over a number of issues and the two Gulf monarchies’ deepened cooperation with Russia and China has been one of them. “Washington is dealing with a far more assertive, confident generation of Gulf leaders who have been hedging their relationships to be more independent of the U.S.,” notes a recent article in the Financial Times, underlining the Gulf states’ closer relations with Moscow and Beijing.

In response to the recent events at al-Aqsa Mosque, nearly every Middle Eastern and North African government has condemned the Israeli occupiers’ brutality against the Palestinians. Despite the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan normalizing relations with Tel Aviv in 2020, these four Arab states joined the region by denouncing Israel for its violent actions such as storming Al-Aqsa on multiple occasions amid the holy month of Ramadan.

In response, the UAE’s minister of state for international cooperation Reem bint Ibrahim Al-Hashemy summoned the Israeli ambassador to Abu Dhabi, Amir Hayek, on April 19 to express the Emirati leadership’s disapproval of Israel’s actions in Jerusalem and the West Bank. According to the UAE’s state-run WAM, “Al-Hashemy stressed the need to immediately stop these events, provide full protection for worshipers, respect the right of Palestinians to practice their religious rites, and halt any practices that violate the sanctity of Al Aqsa Mosque.”

Against the backdrop of increased violence against Palestinians, the Emiratis canceled Etihad Airways and Wizz Air Abu Dhabi’s participation in an Israeli air show, scheduled for May 5 to mark the 74th anniversary of Israel’s establishment in 1948. The UAE’s foreign ministry cited violence in Jerusalem, stressing “the need to immediately stop these events, provide full protection for worshipers, respect the right of Palestinians to practice their religious rites, and halt any practices that violate the sanctity of al-Aqsa Mosque.”

To be sure, one must not interpret these two actions as the UAE signaling an end to its honeymoon with Israel. Rather, euphoria over the deal is still prominent as UAE-Israel relations evolve, and as the states learn more about the other’s sticking points. Indeed, both Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv remain highly optimistic about normalization and opportunities stemming from it, especially as both states have deep economic and security interests in the partnership growing further.

But Abu Dhabi faces domestic and regional pressure to take mild actions in response to the increased violence against Palestinians. Although symbolic, these signals to Arabs and Muslims in the Emirates and across the region highlight how the UAE’s leadership will not remain silent in the face of Israeli brutality.

However, while Abu Dhabi summoning Israeli’s ambassador marks the biggest public rebuke of Israel since the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, the UAE could have taken much more serious action, particularly given the scope of Emirati-Israeli relations and Abu Dhabi’s supposed support for Palestinians through the Abraham Accords—a key justification for signing the deal in the first place.

“Knowing the Emirates well, having spent years visiting there and developing friendships with very high-ranking officials, academics, opinion makers, and businessmen—I don’t think that the majority of Emiratis are really comfortable with the speed and with the direction of normalization,” Khalil Jahshan, executive director of the Arab Center Washington DC, told Politics Today. “They might not have issue with the concept, that it is for them convincingly in the interests of the Emirates as a country, but there is a limit.”

It is important to realize that under the leadership of Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, who ruled the UAE for more than three decades and is hailed as the country’s founder, Abu Dhabi had a significantly different attitude toward the Palestinian issue.

“The Emirates was leading the Arab world in adherence to unwavering support for Palestine as a matter of principle,” Jahshan pointed out. “I heard Sheikh Zayed in person on several occasions state that normal relations [with Israel], fine, but not before solving the Palestine problem. So now the Emirates definitely has changed and taken a different stand. But that doesn’t mean that the public has shifted gears on this issue.”

Regional factors, particularly concerning Jordan, also play a role. Amman seems to be the Arab capital most active in soliciting pan-Arab support for standing against the recent Israeli violence against Palestinians in the occupied territories, partly underscored by its apparent refusal to attend the recent Negev Summit.

Jordanian King Abdullah II likely intended to signal to the Abraham Accord members his frustration that minimal focus has been placed on Palestine by holding a parallel meeting with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas on the same day. These actions are easy to understand considering the Hashemite Kingdom’s custodianship over Jerusalem’s holy places and substantial Palestinian population.

Maintaining a deep relationship with the UAE, Jordan appealed to Abu Dhabi for support this month in relation to the Palestinian issue. A subsequent April 24 meeting in Cairo between the heads of the UAE, Jordan, and Egypt to discuss tensions in Jerusalem, jointly calling on Israel to “respect the status quo of Al Aqsa mosque.” Therefore, the UAE’s decision to denounce Israel was not only about standing up for Palestinians, but also accounting for Jordanian interests.

Also important are the considerations of other Arab members of the Abraham Accord members: Bahrain, Moroccan and Sudan. These countries and the UAE coordinated their condemnations of Israel’s aggression, releasing statements within hours of each other on April 16. Strategically, it is wise for these states to present a united front hedging against the unknowns of how Israel may respond to criticism amid a normalization honeymoon.

Ultimately, the UAE is attempting to strike a balance whereby they continue to build on the Abraham Accords and grow bilateral relations with Israel while also officially opposing the occupation of Palestinian lands annexed in 1967. Abu Dhabi is nowhere near walking away from its normalized relationship with Israel as it believes there is much to gain from this partnership, not limited to defense, tourism, investment, and technology gains. Such interests take precedence over Palestinian issues, exemplified by the lackluster support for Palestine in recent years.

Yet the Emiratis understand the Palestinian issue is not resolved nor irrelevant, and simply trying to bury it is extremely difficult. If recent events at al-Aqsa further regionalize and lead to growing anger at Israel from Arab populations, it will be increasingly challenging for the UAE to maintain such a balance.

The Gulf reconciliation at the Al-Ula Summit suddenly changed the regional atmosphere and the rhetoric of war among Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari decision-makers. The themes of building trust and confidence over broader regional security moved out of the Gulf context, given the new trend of Gulf diplomacy that favors economic interest over political conflict. The emerging Gulf portrait requires Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar to polish their international image as the region’s natural stabilizers and peaceful actors.

Although the Al-Ula Summit put an official end to the Gulf crisis, it threw a veil over political divergences for an unpredictable period of time, at which point it may lead to the redefinition of the Gulf states’ security interests. In fact, there is an intolerant ambiance in the post-Al-Ula era. Peace appears on the surface; however, beneath it lies the spirit of competition and aggression via the indirect foreign policies of Qatari and Emirati decision-makers who hide behind the foreign policy rhetoric of peace and stability for the eyes of the international community and, particularly, the United States.

Both Qatar and the UAE use their financial and media powers to challenge each other’s narratives as the central stabilizer establishing regional order. While other regional powers like Turkey, Israel, and Iran expect to benefit from the new Gulf diplomacy and its economic offers, the overall security perceptions of political actors in the Gulf and the Middle East continue to be unstable.

The central question here is to what extent Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE can tolerate each other’s regional aspirations in negotiating the process of regional order? As the Gulf states don’t have a joint foreign policy and a common defense agenda, establishing bilateral military relations with Gulf and non-Gulf actors independently seems inevitable.

It has been over a year now since Qatar and the UAE agreed on restoring bilateral ties and ending adverse statements against each other. However, the institutional rhetoric of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) on foreign policy and bilateral relations do not change rapidly as illustrated in a speech by Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, the foreign minister of Qatar, who stated, “It could take some time to move past this difficult period.”

Official delegations of Qatar and the UAE held a meeting in Doha in early February 2022, and stated their commitment to creating joint mechanisms and procedures for implementing the Al-Ula Declaration. Afterwards, the photograph of Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani and Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan shaking hands during the opening of the Olympic Games Beijing 2022 demonstrated the intention of the parties to portray a positive diplomatic ambiance at the highest level.

Before the Al-Ula declaration, Qatar and the Emirates continuously utilized their financial power through media and lobbying abroad to put pressure on each other. Recently, Qatar objected to the Abraham Accords signed between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain, by criticizing the UAE’s efforts to initiate a diplomatic move without negotiating a solution to the Palestinian cause.

After the Al-Ula declaration, one might mention the continuity of the indirect competition over the Hollywood movie The Misfits that portrays Qatar as “Jazeeristan,” a terrorist state and a global financier of terrorism.

The movie, co-produced by the UAE, Paramount Pictures, and Highland Film Group, mentions actual Qatari institutions such as Al-Emadi Hospital, the Lekhwiya police force, and Al Jazeera supporting the state’s “terrorist” activities. Another incident of behind-the-scenes competition can be seen in the UAE’s attempts to encourage journalists in Africa to campaign against Qatar’s hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup.

In another case, the UAE’s ambassador to Israel, Mohamed Al Khaja, accused Al Jazeera of continuously manipulating the narrative of the Palestinian cause and shifting the credibility of the events from the truth.

Likewise, Qatari newspapers published the visit of Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, the foreign minister of the UAE, the first Emirati official to visit Damascus since 2011, to discuss “new horizons” by referring to the Syrian civil war as a brutal and multifaceted war that has killed innocent civilians.

One can also come across news in Qatari media criticizing the UAE’s labor sponsorship system as problematic given that thousands of migrant children lack schooling and access to healthcare because they are not issued birth certificates by the authorities as a result of being born to unmarried or single parents and not paying medical bills.

The marring of the UAE’s international image during its military involvement in the Yemeni civil war decreased the chances of the Biden administration perceiving the UAE as the primary peacebuilder in the Gulf. The Biden administration’s recent selection of Qatar as a major non-NATO ally to cooperate in security and investment sectors demonstrated that the U.S. foreign policymaking would not tolerate aggressive foreign policies against the region’s instability and neighbors.

The Biden administration’s intolerance of aggressive foreign policies and military activities benefited Qatar’s previous regional narratives during the blockade period.

As the issue of Muslim Brotherhood is no longer on the table in intra-Gulf discussions or a factor in the Gulf states’ relations with other countries, ideological war narratives  are now replaced with a competition over the display of state capacity to promote peace-building and regional stability.

The process favors Qatar for now, but all this is tied to the U.S. administration’s foreign policy. Upon realizing that, the UAE recently established a new foreign policy built upon the theme of “good neighborliness” so as not to return to the hostile competitive environment and to avoid recalling its notorious military aggression in Yemen.

The UAE’s diplomatic move to reconcile and improve ties with Turkey through highest level visits and positive statements about the visit of Israel President Isaac Herzog to the country in January 2022  indicate the UAE’s determination to diversify regional allies peacefully and independently of its Gulf neighbors. In this new era of narrative wars built upon peace rhetoric, Qatar as a major non-NATO ally of the United States, appears to be the UAE’s primary competitor.

Since the last months of 2021, the UAE’s diplomatic moves in foreign policy have been attracting the attention of Gulf scholars and observers. In an interview, Dr. Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, the UAE’s minister of industry and advanced technology, noted that the recent diplomatic moves by the UAE are critical to the country’s new foreign policy. “The art of partnership is part of our DNA, and it has been key to our success over the years,” said Al Jaber. Signals of change and using diplomacy instead of military power from Hormuz to the Suez constitute a sharp rupture for UAE foreign policy.

Following the withdrawal of its military presence from Yemen in mid-2019, the UAE regional security policy entered a de-escalation mode. Political conflicts with neighbors started being replaced with an economic interests-driven foreign policy. The Gulf states’ regional loneliness, partly due to the Biden administration’s hesitancy to take an active role in regional affairs, forced the UAE and other GCC states to fend for themselves within the shifting regional security dynamics and alliances.

While the Al-Ula reconciliation ended the groupings of the GCC states, the post-reconciliation process sparked a diplomacy rivalry among the GCC actors which strived to present themselves as the region’s important stabilizers and peacemakers.

The rhetorical shift in UAE foreign policy can be best understood by looking into the “10 Principles” announced in the “Projects of the 50” campaign in 2021. The projects publicized the strategic roadmap planning for the UAE’s economic, political, and social development. Among the “10 Principles,” “good neighborliness” stands as one of the UAE’s essential principles for stable political, economic, and social relations with its neighbors.

While openness, tolerance, and peace were mentioned as the state’s core values, the UAE calls for peace, harmony, negotiation, and dialogue to resolve all conflicts by envisioning bilateral relations based on a non-security or non-military perspective. This new narrative will help the Emirates to overcome its thorny relations with Turkey.

The Saudi-Emirati tension

Following the UAE’s military withdrawal from Yemen, the UAE-Saudi relations entered a period of standoff where distrust rose. After the 2017 Qatar diplomatic crisis, the UAE had adopted a common security understanding with Saudi Arabia that endured until the withdrawal of the Emirates from Yemen in mid-2019. Although the UAE was also militarily disengaged from several bases like Eritrea or Somaliland, its departure from Yemen made Saudi Arabia the foremost responsible for Yemen’s humanitarian crisis internationally.

The new pragmatism of the UAE foreign policy resulted from the Emirati decision-makers’ abandonment of a proactive foreign policy and military interventions in Syria, Yemen, and Libya. Although the UAE did not experience demonstrations such as those in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, the potential for the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, through the Al-Islah movement that was founded in 1974, was perceived as a threat to the existing state structure and the royal families of the seven emirates of the UAE. This fear caused the demonization and the labeling of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group working against the stability of the Gulf monarchies.

The close rhetoric between Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood for almost ten years, pushed Emirati decision-makers to adopt adverse policies towards Turkey in various regional crises.

The close rhetoric between Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood for almost ten years, pushed Emirati decision-makers to adopt adverse policies towards Turkey in various regional crises like the Syrian Civil War and the Eastern Mediterranean until the visit of Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MBZ), the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and de facto ruler of the Emirates, to Turkey in November 2021.

Before visiting Turkey, Sheikh Mohammed and other UAE decision-makers made diplomatic visits to Jordan, Egypt, and Syria as part of the claimed Emirati diplomatic activism in the region. However, the visit to Turkey attracted more regional and international attention due to the lousy record of bilateral relations since 2011 and accusations over the UAE’s financial support to the foiled coup d’état attempt in Turkey in 2016.

Despite tense political relations, Turkey’s trade ties with the UAE have continued to improve, and UAE exports to Turkey rose to 110 percent while total trade increased by 21 percent from 2019 to 2020. The satisfaction on both sides following the Erdoğan-MBZ meeting and the agreements focusing on the strategic investments to generate steady and safe revenues in the long term, including the logistics, health, and energy sectors, demonstrated both states’ preference to overlook their political divergences for the sake of economic advantages.

As a result, regional cooperation, dialogue, and negotiation themes initiated new diplomacy rhetoric between Turkey and the UAE. Similarly, one might emphasize the change of Turkish foreign policy rhetoric towards the Gulf, such as referring to the six Gulf states as Turkey’s friends – not only “brotherly Qatar” anymore.

UAE exports to Turkey rose to 110 percent while total trade increased by 21 percent from 2019 to 2020.

Throughout the 2017 Qatar crisis, Turkey adopted a security-oriented approach and claimed to provide a security umbrella to the whole Gulf. Turkey adopted this controversial rhetoric to calm the anxieties of Saudi Arabia and the UAE after establishing a Turkish military base in Qatar. Still, it made Turkey’s relations with the prementioned Gulf states even tenser. Now, one can observe a change in the rhetoric of almost every Gulf state towards establishing non-military bilateral ties. This does not harm Turkey’s relations with Qatar, but allows Turkey to include itself in the Gulf regional security architecture through cooperation, trade, and peaceful means.

In contrast to Saudi Arabia, the UAE has been more willing to establish relations regional actors like Iran or Israel. The UAE’s maneuver capacity can be related to the abandonment of religious themes in its foreign policy rhetoric. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has historically adopted a “distinctive” status for itself in the Arab world.

While Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar have always cultivated significant relations with Iran, Saudi and Emirati decision-makers have viewed Iranian regional activities and proxy wars as working against the domestic security of regional states such as Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, or Iraq. Interestingly, Iran’s imports from the UAE reached $5.39 billion in the period of March-August 2021, illustrating the high volume of trade relations between the two even in times of crisis.

However, since April 2021, behind-the-scenes meetings between Iranian and Saudi officials were revealed, which jump-started efforts to normalize  diplomatic ties with Iran. The endeavors of the Gulf states came in the form of re-establishing diplomatic relations with Iran without waiting for the Biden administration’s steps to renew the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal, which would bring Iran a vainglorious opponent to the diplomacy table.

Similar to the Saudi side, at the Baghdad Summit held in August 2021, the UAE’s Vice President and Ruler of Dubai Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum met Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian to discuss the possibilities of a “neighborhood policy and diplomacy.”

On December 3 and 4, 2021, French President Emmanuel Macron traveled to the Gulf for a short visit to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. This is likely to be his last foreign trip outside of Europe, as France has entered election season. The presidential election will take place on April 10 and 24, 2022, and

Macron is preparing to run for re-election.

Macron’s trip highlights the importance of the Gulf countries on at least two levels. First, at a time of the United States’ disengagement from the region, France is trying to occupy its place economically, militarily, and politically.

Second, at a time when the issue of Islam and Muslims is at the center of the presidential campaign, Macron wants to seek support for the French position against “radicalism,” and especially so after the adoption of the “Law against Separatism,” renamed the “Law Reinforcing the Principles of the Republic,” which came into force in August 2021 and which has caused much misunderstanding in the Muslim world (and elsewhere) as it appears to be (and is in fact) a law against Islam and Muslims.

The most successful stopover was in Abu Dhabi, where President Macron has a close personal relationship with the Emirates’ strongman, Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ). The signing of a record contract for the sale of 80 Rafale aircraft was accompanied by the sale of twelve Eurocopter EC725 Caracal helicopters, and the singing of various economic partnership agreements. “This is the biggest military contract with a French component in our history – worth some 17 billion euros,”  Macron said.

For Macron, this is proof of the close ties between Paris and Abu Dhabi. “I think that the Emirates and the Crown Prince saw that France was a solid partner in the fight against terrorism (…), that is to say that we kept our commitments in the region and that we were attached to its balance.” For it is not only a question of arms sales, but of a community of views and coordination between Abu Dhabi and Paris in the “war against terrorism” (notably in Libya), and in the fight against “political Islam,” as shown by the presence on the trip of Laurent Nuñez, the national coordinator of intelligence and the fight against terrorism. MBZ’s support for French laws against “separatism” is particularly appreciated.

We should notice that the French president said nothing about the authoritarian nature of the Abu Dhabi regime, which imprisons and tortures its opponents, about its involvement in the deadly war in Yemen, or about its use of Pegasus spy software. Yet, a few days later, a report by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) highlighted the dark side of the regime and Paris’s complicity in it.

The last and most controversial stop of Macron’s trip to the Gulf, in France at least, was his visit to Saudi Arabia. For the first time since the horrific murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018, a major head of state of the Western world agreed to meet Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), the Saudi crown prince, widely considered the mastermind of this crime.

Relations between MBS and Macron had not been rosy since the French president “rescued” Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in 2018, when he was reportedly kidnapped in Saudi Arabia by MBS and forced to announce his resignation from Riyadh.

Relations between MBS and Macron had not been rosy since the French president “rescued” Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in 2018.

While the aim of the meeting was also to give a boost to bilateral relations – and to take advantage of the rift between Washington and Riyadh, with President Joe Biden refusing any contact with MBS – one of the objectives was a new mediation with Lebanon, which the Saudis are subjecting to a trade embargo that is aggravating the economic crisis in the country. The result was modest: a conversation between Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati and MBS on Macron’s phone. Nothing more came of the visit – no return of ambassadors and no lifting of the embargo.

During the trip, the question of the nuclear agreement with Iran was not at the center of the discussions. Macron made only one declaration asking the Gulf states and Israel to be associated, a non-starter for Iran and even for the U.S. It is also noteworthy that the question of Palestine was not addressed, as France has supported the Abraham Accords and largely abandoned its traditional position on a solution to the Palestinian question.

There are three obvious conclusions to Macron’s visit to the Gulf. First, the trip was notable for the absence of any reference by France to human rights in the region. It is true that since the reception of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in France in December 2020 and his decoration as “Grand Officier de la Légion d’honneur,” President Macron has not seemed to attach much importance to democracy in the Middle East.

Secondly, Macron’s visit made clear the importance of the “Islam” dimension in French foreign policy, a ball and chain that is all heavier since Paris is the only major Western capital to show such an obsession with Islam and Muslims. Finally, Macron’s visit shows that France can still be an actor in the Gulf and the Middle East, and can defend its interests there; however, its weight is limited, especially in the regional conflicts (Iran, Syria, Palestine, Yemen), not only when compared with the United States, but also with regional powers such as Turkey, Iran, or Russia.

Regional security perceptions of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) concurred regarding regional crises and wars in the Middle East since the Arab uprisings, making the two countries work hand in hand in the economic and military fields. Cooperation of the Saudi and Emirati decision-makers rose to the occasion  during the 2017 Qatar crisis, the marginalization of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Yemen war against the Houthi militia since 2015, and lobbying activities in the U.S. against the Iran Nuclear Deal.

However, following the latest failure of the OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) negotiations at the beginning of July 2021, growing discord between the two state actors began attracting attention. On July 5, 2021, the OPEC meeting was cancelled without designating a new date. The disagreement emerged over the UAE’s disapproval of extending the oil production cuts from August 2021 to December 2021. However, on July 14, 2021, Saudi Arabia greed with the UAE to have a higher production baseline of 3.65 million barrels a day from April 2022. In return, the UAE side accepted the earlier decision of the OPEC to extend the production cuts until December 2021.

The OPEC crisis came at the same time as Saudi Arabia’s announcement to amend regulations to exclude the import of products made in free zones, which is the primary income of the UAE. Furthermore, the kingdom decided to impose a travel ban and suspended flights to/from the UAE to stop the spread of the Delta variant of the COVID-19 virus. All of these Saudi decisions, which seemed to come at once against the UAE, signaled the change of the threat perceptions of Saudis and Emiratis regarding regional security.

The recent deterioration of the UAE-Saudi relations did not come out of the blue for Saudis. It happened when Saudi decision-makers realized the emerging security realities in the region, which cannot be dealt with only through economic and military cooperation. Notably, after the decision of the UAE to downsize its military in Yemen in May 2018, Saudi Arabia understood that the humanitarian crisis there would fall on the kingdom’s shoulder. Following the OPEC crisis, Saudis and Emiratis adopted a new narrative shaped by the clash of perceptions based on drastic differences over strategic calculations in the regional security.

Following the OPEC crisis, Saudis and Emiratis adopted a new narrative shaped by the clash of perceptions based on drastic differences over strategic calculations in the regional security.

The traditional Saudi foreign policy of putting political and economic conditionalities to its neighbors in order for their relations to continue began to work against the UAE, undermining its image as a regional ally of Saudi Arabia.

The UAE’s elusive regional perceptions, particularly concerning its economy, forced the Saudi decision-makers to develop a multiple-ally perspective through building trust relations with other regional actors like Qatar, Oman, and Iraq. Likewise, Saudi Arabia underlined the “Gulf unity” in the Al-Ula GCC Summit in January 2021, despite the fact that the summit was facilitated by Kuwait and the U.S. as a sign of the kingdom’s intention to reconstruct its international image as a regional actor favoring stability and peace in the region instead of leading regional crises and wars.

The traditional Saudi foreign policy of putting political and economic conditionalities to its neighbors in order for their relations to continue began to work against the UAE, undermining its image as a regional ally of Saudi Arabia. The most recent demand by the latter was to ask international companies based in the Middle East to move their headquarters to Riyadh if they wish to continue their contracts with the Saudi government.

At this point, the impact of Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) on the domestic and foreign policies of MBS, as well as his access to U.S. decision-making circles, should be noted. As a young prince who spent his life in Riyadh beside his father, King Salman, MBS does not have sufficient diplomatic experience to build relations with international actors.

The threat perception of the UAE decision-makers regarding the tourism sector had been directed to Qatar, particularly after it was selected to host the 2022 World Cup back in December 2010.

Even though MBZ has been the primary supporter of MBS’s development plans as part of their personal relationship, the economic impacts of the pandemic on the UAE’s tourism sector transformed the UAE’s perception of this relationship. Saudi Arabia’s development projects like NEOM, Amaala, AlUla, and the Red Sea projects began threatening the UAE’s regional status of being a tourism and business hub.

The threat perception of the UAE decision-makers regarding the tourism sector had been directed to Qatar, particularly after it was selected to host the 2022 World Cup back in December 2010. During the 2017 Qatar crisis, the UAE successfully influenced the Saudi government to impose an air, sea, and land blockade on Qatar by publicizing the initiative as a Saudi-led intervention.

Overall, backing MBS’s development plans helped MBZ pursue the UAE’s economic and military interests without being the principal responsible actor – instead he led the process from behind the scenes.

The primary area of the divergence in regional interests was in Yemen when the southern separatists backed by the UAE ousted the Saudi-backed Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi’s government from Aden in September 2019. Following this, the UAE downsized its troops in Yemen which left the Saudis alone on the ground and portrayed MBS as the principal architect of the humanitarian crisis of Yemen in the international arena.

The rapidity with which cooperation transformed into a standoff was a lesson concerning the UAE’s regional security policies towards the kingdom for the Saudi government, and particularly for MBS. The policies of the UAE changed, especially when it comes to preserving its economic interests.

The realization by Saudi officials of the UAE’s changing regional security perceptions reconstructed the country’s threat perceptions vis-à-vis the UAE. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia attempted to establish closer ties with Iraq and Oman, to reconciliate with Qatar, and even started a diplomatic dialogue with Iran. As part of its new perspective based on building multiple alliances, Saudi Arabia mentioned establishing a more cordial economic relationship with Oman, like developing an industrial zone in Oman for transporting commodities and goods between two countries.

More significantly, MBS redefined Iran as a respectful neighbor and emphasized the possibility of forging a reconciliation. Since his appointment as the minister of defence of the country in January 2015, MBS has fostered hostile rhetoric towards Iran, such as calling the country extremist, and accusing it of supporting terrorist organizations and interfering in the domestic affairs and stability of countries in the region. In contrast, from the point of view of the UAE, Iran does not constitute a significant concern as it has enormous commercial interests in the country.

The changing tone of MBS’s rhetoric towards Iran demonstrated the kingdom’s intention to decrease the number of its enemies while sending messages to its old or existing allies about the kingdom’s shifting perceptions of regional security dynamics. These shifting perceptions can transform old enemies into possible partners, and vice versa, depending on the commitment of the latter to a mutual understanding of the regional dynamics of the kingdom’s development strategies at home.

Another significant departure in the foreign policies of the Saudis and Emiratis is their threat perception towards the Muslim Brotherhood and their understanding of the regional implications for the normalization process with Israel. Although Saudi Arabia declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization in 2014, the kingdom did not perceive it as an existential threat at home.

On the contrary, according to Emirati decision-makers, the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired organizations that adopt political Islam constitute a direct threat to the survival of the Gulf ruling families. To illustrate, the UAE showed a similar concern to the rise of political Islam in Libya by supporting Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the Libya National Army (LNA), with advanced weapons.

“Stop what you’re doing and read this. This leak is going to be the story of the year,” wrote the eminent NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden last month as Amnesty International and Forbidden Stories obtained a leaked list of 50,000 phone numbers of potential targets of the Israeli spyware company, NSO Group.

NSO’s main service is Pegasus, a malware that infects iPhones and Android devices to enable the tool’s operators to extract messages, photos, and emails; record calls; and secretly activate microphones. The geographical scope of both NSO clients and victims seems limitless – from the Middle East to Europe, the U.S., Africa, East Asia, and Latin America. Traces of the Pegasus malware were most recently discovered on phones in the United Kingdom and France, amongst 45 other countries where the virus was found.

The company’s usual targets, which were revealed over the last few years, were mostly journalists, activists, and dissidents – some of whom ended up being tortured, arrested, killed, or forcibly disappeared as a consequence. However, the formidable, leaked list included some targets with unbelievable portfolios; NSO has moved from spying on journalists to spying on presidents, prime ministers, royalty, CEOs, and public figures. One of the most prominent highlights in the leaked list was France’s president Emmanuel Macron and Morocco’s king Mohammed VI.

This prompted the French government to demand an explanation from the Israeli government, which then hurried to send its defense minister to Paris for a few hours to assure France that Israel will take this issue seriously. The French National Agency for the Security of Information Systems has confirmed finding traces of Pegasus malware on the phone of a senior journalist in its state-owned international news network France24.

This latest revelation underlines one crucial conclusion: NSO is out of control. Its malicious hacking services, which are virtually unconstrained, have become a major security threat in cyberspace, and it has the full backing of an Israeli government willing to turn a blind eye to the company’s activities in order to bolster its regional and international relations.

Israel is an international hub for spyware companies whose main personnel almost always comes from the Israeli military.

Indeed, NSO is just the tip of the iceberg. Israel is an international hub for spyware companies whose main personnel almost always comes from the Israeli military, especially the Israeli Military Intelligence Unit 8200. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have perfected a multitude of surveillance strategies as a result of their decades-long abuse of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories in flagrant violation of their right to privacy.

The Israeli government under Benjamin Netanyahu was even NSO’s patron, whereby it promoted and pushed its spyware sales across the world. Wherever Netanyahu traveled on official visits, deals between the visited country’s government and NSO followed – from Hungary to Mexico, India, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and others.

This positions Israel as a force for regional and international destabilization where state-sanctioned – and state-sponsored – private spyware firms like NSO have been the informal arm of the Israeli government that are employed “off the record” to do the dirtiest work, such as espionage and interference in foreign countries.

This can also be seen in the activities of another Israeli cybersecurity firm, Psy-Group, which ran a $2 million voter suppression operation in support of Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign, according to the 2020 report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The operation was paid by George Nader, an advisor to de facto  UAE ruler Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ).

The Israeli government’s complicity with NSO’s cyberweapons should raise more than eyebrows. Accountability is paramount. The very least Israel’s government should do is to immediately revoke NSO’s export license and ban spyware trade.

NSO does not only offer security, it also provides infectious viruses. It does not aim to make the world safer – with its Pegasus cyberattack tool, it aims to make it more vulnerable, more at risk, and more afraid. If NSO can hack into the phones of statesmen, parliamentarians, and CEOs, no phone is safe from its malware until action is taken.

Let me be clear from the beginning: what happened in Tunisia on July 25, 2021 is a coup against the constitution. There is no doubt about it and no argument.

As for the decision of the coup, it was not taken in haste on the Sunday before last nor was it a reaction to the widespread protests taking place that day. There is no doubt that Kais Saied has been planning this coup from at least the beginning of this year, which means that he had already consulted with the army leadership and secured the necessary support before taking these drastic measures.

There is no direct material evidence that there is any foreign involvement in Saied’s decision to embark on this coup. However, there is an important question to be asked: Kais Saied is over sixty years of age, a university lecturer, and was able to win the presidential elections. Is it reasonable to believe that he would suspend the parliament and move to monopolize all of the state’s power in his hands without having coordinated in advance with foreign powers such as the French president to secure international support, and then with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to secure the necessary financial support to cement his coup?

Moreover, there is much to be gleaned from the international response to the coup. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s first public words on the coup were, “I had a good call with President Kais Saied.”

These words indicate that the U.S. administration will not seriously obstruct Saied’s plans to change the political course in Tunisia. The Americans are not interested much in competing with France for influence in Tunisia, and have far more important issues such as Afghanistan, Iraq, China, Russia, and COVID-19.

The social and economic situation in Tunisia has deteriorated significantly since 2011.

Yet it cannot be denied that there is significant popular support for Saied’s decisions. The social and economic situation in Tunisia has deteriorated significantly since 2011. Over the course of the past two years, the newly elected parliament, and the two governments which were bestowed with its vote of confidence, have resoundingly failed to improve the lives of ordinary citizens – just as the previous governments before it. The situation has been compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic that has ripped through the country with devastating impact.

President Kais Saied’s coup against the constitution has, of course, significant effects at home, as well as in Tunisia’s regional surroundings, particularly with regards to neighboring Libya. Among the countries that supported Saied’s measures immediately after they were announced, are two countries that have great interests in Libya, which outweigh their interests in Tunisia – namely, Egypt and the UAE.

President Kais Saied’s coup against the constitution has significant effects at home as well as in Libya.

The leaders of both countries fully understand that Tunisia is a lifeline for the Tripoli government, and that if a regime closer to them is established in Tunis, and they have a tangible influence on it, it will be possible to tighten the noose around the Tripoli government in coordination with their ally Haftar who is ever-present in the east.

Two years ago, Khalifa Haftar was about to enter Tripoli victorious, after he had besieged it with the support of Egypt and the UAE. But, Turkish support and an open border with Tunisia, where the Ennahda movement has enjoyed an advanced political position, saved Tripoli and its rulers from defeat.

But now that Ennahda has been removed from power with the coup of Saied, Egypt and the UAE may hope that what they failed to accomplish in 2019 can now be achieved in coordination with a friendly regime in Tunisia, and with more support for their ambitious Libyan ally, General Hafter.

Of course, the governments of Egypt and the UAE also have a strong alliance with France, with whom they share mutual interests and cooperation on regional issues, and in particular Libya: oil for France; the employment of Egyptian workers and the granting of construction contracts to Egyptian companies for the el-Sisi regime; and uprooting the Muslim Brotherhood movement and ending its presence in Libya for the UAE (which Egypt and France also want to see).

It is very clear, then, that the Tunisian coup has a strong relationship with the Libyan issue. This naturally leads us to consider Algeria, Tunisia’s most important neighbor, and how it will react to the Tunisian coup and its repercussions in the region.

There are no official Algerian statements that can be relied on to know the actual mood among Algerian policymakers. However, there was a call between the Tunisian and Algerian presidents on July 26 and a visit by the Algerian foreign minister to Tunisia the next day, during which he met with Saied.

Algerian comments on social media and press leaks indicate that Algeria will not accept the control of Tunisian foreign policy by Egypt and the UAE – a control that would seek to facilitate Haftar’s bid to gain control of all of Libya’s regions. Algeria views Haftar as an opponent, and he, in turn, reciprocates this stance. Algeria also sees the UAE as an antagonist in the region. Abu Dhabi has established a consulate in the disputed Western Sahara, much to the chagrin of Algiers. Coupled with the normalization of ties with Israel, the intention of the UAE to flex against Algeria by drawing on international support in favor of Morocco is clear.

On this basis, Algeria may put pressure on Saied not to dissolve parliament and not to overextend the period afforded to him to wield emergency powers in order to preserve the position of the Ennahda movement in the Tunisian political scene, and thereby to ensure there is a check on the governments of Egypt and the UAE that prevents them from exercising influence on the foreign policy of Tunisia.

Following the First Gulf War, the foreign ministers of Syria, Egypt, and the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), met in Damascus and agreed on a new security cooperation initiative for the Gulf which came to be known as the “Damascus Declaration.” Although the GCC states later moved away from implementing the declaration, it contained an important aspect related to Turkey which is key to understanding the dynamics that shape the region today.

The thorny relations between Damascus and Ankara in the 1990s due to water and terrorism issues had adversely affected Turkey’s relations with the Arab countries, including those in the Gulf. The declaration, which aimed to pressure Ankara on the international platform, criticized Turkey’s plan to construct a new dam on the Turkish-Syrian border, called foreign contractors not to cooperate with Turkey, and warned Ankara over its actions. The importance of the Damascus Declaration was that, for the first time, the GCC countries expressed public and clear support for Syria in its dispute with Turkey.

However, since then balances have changed rapidly in international politics. When it comes to the Middle East, one of the world’s least peaceful regions, dynamics change even faster. Turkish-GCC relations within the context of the Syrian war is an interesting case to show the degree to which several factors shape the convergence and divergence in their relationship in Syria, which is known as the “heart” of the Arab world.

When protests erupted in 2011 in Syria, the GCC stood by the opposition that aimed to topple the Bashar al-Assad regime and recognized the opposition bloc as the “legitimate representative” of the Syrian people. The GCC states, which were motivated by several factors, most importantly political and sectarian ones, aimed to weaken Iran’s hand and bring Syria, a country predominantly Sunni but ruled by a Nusayri family, back into the Arab sphere of influence. Ankara also was among the most vocal critics of the regime and the staunchest supporter of the opposition when it failed to convince the regime to make reforms.

In Syria, Turkey and the GCC countries stood by the opposition, but supported different factions, as they harbored different visions for the post-Assad era.

In Syria, Turkey and the GCC countries stood by the opposition, but supported different factions, as they harbored different visions for the post-Assad era. Thus, the Syrian theater became the first backdrop of rivalry between Turkey and GCC states, namely Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, based on ideological differences.

In recent years, the power dynamics in the region have started to shift again as some Gulf countries, which cooperated with Turkey against the Syrian regime in the initial years of the crisis, seem to have put their differences aside and in varying degrees have approached Damascus, pitting Syria against Turkey as they did in the 1990s. Now their priority is their interests, both political and economic, rather than the fate of the regime as was the case a decade ago.

Normalization suit 

In December 2018, the UAE, which once supported the Syrian opposition forces alongside Saudi Arabia and Qatar, reopened its embassy in Syria. The UAE justified the move by declaring, “Given the regional expansionism of Iran and Turkey, there is an Arab role to play in Syria that has become even more necessary.” In March 2021, the UAE reiterated its position: “Syria’s return to the Arab fold is essential and has nothing to do with who wants or who does not want it. It is a matter of public interest and the interests of Syria and the region.”

A day after the UAE reopened its mission, Bahrain announced that its mission in Damascus continues its duty, underlining its keenness to maintain relations with what it referred to as a “brotherly” country. Manama, in particular, emphasized the significance of strengthening and activating the “Arab role” in preventing the dangers of regional interference in Syria’s internal affairs.

In October of last year, Oman sent an ambassador to Syria, becoming the first Gulf state to do so since they downgraded or shut missions in Damascus in 2012. Meanwhile Kuwait has said it would reopen its mission in Damascus if there was an agreement among the 22-member Arab League.

So far, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, two countries that firmly supported the opposition, have not taken any step forward. Traditionally, Riyadh pursues a “wait and see” policy and seeks gradual and slow partial normalization. Prospects for change in the Saudi position have increased particularly after the reports that Saudi intelligence chief Khalid al-Humaidan met with his Syrian counterpart in Damascus, the first meeting of its kind since the conflict broke out in Syria.

If there is a change of heart in Riyadh regarding the return of Syria to the Arab fold, Qatar – Turkey’s closest Gulf ally and a critical center for opposition meetings – will be the only Gulf country not involved in the normalization suit with Syria.

Factors driving normalization

The first factor of the Gulf rapprochement to Syria is Russia’s position. In 2015, when Russia, the regime’s staunchest ally, militarily intervened in the war, the balances on the ground rapidly changed. Russia’s interference became the game-changer that also altered the perception of the GCC towards the opposition and eliminated the idea of toppling Assad by force.

In this context, Moscow, which built a perception of Russia as a crucial geopolitical actor in the region, started to deepen its relationship with each GCC state, and engaged in dialogue over the Syria file. In recent years, there has been increasing support by the GCC states of Russia’s role in Syria, particularly at a time when the U.S. influence is fading away.

The second factor that drives the GCC rapprochement with Damascus is related to both the domestic and international context. The assertive members of the GCC, namely the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have started to move away from a foreign policy focusing on hard power (military tools), while prioritizing soft power (diplomacy).

The economy plays a central role in this diplomacy. Restoring relations with Damascus, not only politically, but economically, is significant and especially in terms of the reconstruction of Syria. On the international level, the election of U.S. President Joe Biden has significantly influenced the shift of the Gulf foreign policy from hard to soft power as the new administration, unlike its predecessor, pushes for de-escalation in the region.

The last factor is the antagonism of Turkey’s growing role in Syria. When Turkey conducted military operations in northern Syria (Operation Olive Branch, Operation Peace Spring, Spring Shield) to eliminate terrorist elements, Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE and Bahrain, opposed them on the grounds of “threatening Arab national security.”

Mercenaries are back. No one knows how many billions of dollars slosh around this illicit market. All we know is that business is booming because when you need something absolutely, positively done in war, you call the private sector. Missions once conducted by special operations forces or the CIA are now outsourced — I know because I did them.

Mercenaries are deadlier than most people realize, a grave oversight. In 2018, a group of U.S. Army Rangers, Delta Force, Green Berets and Marines — America’s most elite troops — were pinned down in Syria. Attacking them were 500 mercenaries, hired by Russia. They were not the cartoonish rabble depicted by Hollywood movies. This was the Wagner Group, a high-end mercenary outfit with artillery, armored personnel carriers, and tanks.

The American commandos radioed for help. Warplanes arrived in waves, including Reaper drones, Apache helicopters, F-22 fighter jets, F-15 strike fighters, B-52 bombers, and AC-130 gunships. Scores of airstrikes pummeled the mercenaries, but they did not waver.

Four hours later, the mercenaries finally retreated. No Americans were killed, and the U.S. military touted this as a big win. But it wasn’t. It took America’s best troops and advanced aircraft four hours to push back 500 mercenaries. What happens when they have to face 1000? 5000? More? Even an undefeated military can lose.

Mercenaries are the second oldest profession, and their return is no surprise. Since 2015, mercenaries have flourished in Yemen, Libya, Nigeria, Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Mozambique, Central African Republic, and Venezuela. There are even cyber-mercenaries called “hack back” companies.

The UAE hired mercenaries to kill Houthis during the War in Yemen. Some of these were allegedly U.S. military although most came from Latin America.

There are many reasons why mercenaries are returning now. In fact, they have been gradually reappearing over the past three decades, but always in the shadows and that’s by design. Rich clients with a small or no military can swipe a check and wage war. The UAE hired mercenaries to kill Houthis during the War in Yemen. Some of these were allegedly U.S. military although most came from Latin America. After six failed years of fighting Boko Haram, Nigeria hired mercenaries to push the terrorist group out of their country, which they did in a few weeks. Libya is a mercenaries-on-mercenary war. Perhaps someday ExxonMobil will have its own army, too.

But why do states with big militaries use mercenaries? Because warfare is changing — it’s getting sneakier. We live in an information age, and weapons that provide plausible deniability, like mercenaries, are more important than raw firepower. In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine, not by blitzkrieg but through deception. They covertly deployed Spetsnaz special forces, mercenaries like the Wagner Group, Little Green Men, and fake pro-Russia militias. Dense propaganda, troll factories, and other active measures further concealed the truth, until it was too late. While the West stood befuddled about what was going on, the Crimea was a fait d’accompli.

Moscow created the fog of war, and moved through it for victory. Mercenaries ooze plausible deniability. If they are caught, the client can disavow them. Not so for army soldiers. Plus, Russian citizens (like U.S. ones) hate seeing their dead soldiers coming home in body bags, but do not care about dead contractors. Owing to this, Putin can engage in risky military operations with minimal domestic political consequence. For the first time since the Cold War, Russia has launched expeditionary operations in the Middle East and Africa. The weapon of choice? Mercenaries, like the Wagner Group.

Private warfare is a growing trend with alarming implications, yet few in the West seem to care. Perhaps they assume international law will take care of the problem, but this is magical thinking. Who will go into Libya and arrest all those mercenaries? The UN? NATO? Nobody. Worse, mercenary can shoot law enforcement dead. The market for force literally resists regulation.

Privatizing war changes warfare in profound ways modern generals do not comprehend.

A world awash in mercenaries means more war and suffering. History teaches us that unemployed mercenaries become bandits and racketeers, preying on people and sometimes taking over whole kingdoms, as happened to Milan in the 15^th century. Soldiers of fortune can start and elongate war for profit, and avoid outbreaks of peace. This is one reason why the Thirty Years War (1618-48) in Europe took so long, as mercenaries fought for all sides in great numbers. By the time it ended, Germany lost a greater percentage of its population than in WWII.

Privatizing war changes warfare in profound ways modern generals do not comprehend. If conflict is commoditized, then military and marketplace strategies apply to war. It’s like General Patton goes to the souk. You can win wars by outbidding your enemy for mercenary services, bribing your enemy’s mercenaries to defect, or not paying your mercenaries when the war is over. However, it’s a dangerous game because your enemies and mercenaries can do the same to you, and there is no reliable way to enforce contracts.

Treachery is the watchword of private warfare. The 14^th century Florentine, Niccolò Machiavelli, was ripped off by his own mercenaries in 1500 and 1506, during a war with Pisa, causing Florence to lose to its diminutive neighbor. A few years later, he writes in his book The Prince, that mercenaries are: “disunited, ambitious, without discipline, unfaithful; gallant among friends, vile among enemies; no fear of God, no faith with men.”

Private force will also change world order. Offering the means of war to anyone who can afford it will transform warfare and the future of war. If money can buy firepower, then large corporations and the super-rich will become a new kind of superpower. This will rewrite the rules of global order. Who, how and why people fight will change, and there will be wars without states, accelerating global chaos.

This trend will grow, fueled by a free market for force that generates war but cannot regulate it. Today’s militaries have forgotten how to fight private wars, leaving us all exposed. We must increase our strategic IQs to deal with this problem before it becomes a crisis.

There is good news. Mercenaries are as old as war, yet the world did not devolve into anarchy, as is often portrayed by critics of private force. In fact, they can even do good, if hired to do so. If the industry were properly vetted and transparent, they could support UN peacekeeping operations, stop impending genocides, rescue civilian populations from human predators, hunt crime lords, and launch humanitarian operations quickly to save lives — something the international community cannot do. Mercenaries are like fire: they can burn down the house or power a steam engine. It’s a question of how we use them, so let’s use them for good.

The inauguration of Joe Biden took place on January 20, 2021, after a troublesome process that ended with a mob attack on the United States Capitol. The 59th U.S. presidential elections were carried out with significant concerns and expectations, especially in the Middle East. As Donald Trump marked a turn in the U.S. perspective on the Middle East, almost all of the region’s political leaders were rooting for a less-likely Republican win in the elections.

However, Trump suffered several blows to his prestige throughout his term in office which eventually turned into an election win for the Democratic Party in November. Under these circumstances, the current pressing question regards the impact of the new Democratic administration under Obama’s former reliable aide and current U.S. president Joe Biden on U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East.

The Obama administration cornered some of the Arab states to the extreme on several issues and created impediments on security provision and the economy. Joe Biden was an integral part of these policies and had a substantial responsibility in these decisions. A brief synopsis of these issues reveals that the most salient stalemates regarded certain Middle Eastern countries’ support for Jihadist organizations, neglected security demands, and the unresolved Palestinian issue.

The Obama administration used the 9/11 attacks as leverage against the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, which disturbed bilateral affairs as Saudi assets were jeopardized with 28 ongoing lawsuits. Another issue was the neglected and stalled military procurement deals worth over $130 billion as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates were struggling with the outcomes of the Arab Spring. The Obama-Biden team did not allow the Arab countries to receive the aid that would support them in the political turmoil during and after the revolts which threatened to put an end to the monarchies.

The U.S.-Israel bilateral affairs also suffered great turbulences due to Obama and Biden’s desire to stop the illegal Israeli settlement advancements in the occupied Palestinian territories. The foreign policy choices regarding the Palestinian issue were among the fundamental reasons that brought the Democratic administration to an end in 2017.

The reasons behind the Saudi-Emirati unpleasant experience during the Obama-Biden administration are probably the issues that will keep the Middle East envoys to the U.S. busy in the near future. There were substantial military procurement deals just before the end of Trump’s term, among others, with the UAE for F-35 aircraft (50), AMRAAM long-range missiles (802), and MQ-9B UAVs (18) worth nearly $24 billion, and with Egypt and Kuwait for AH-64E attack helicopter modernization and exports (51).

It was announced that the foreign military sales that were approved at the last minute by Trump were going to be re-assessed by the Biden administration which caused serious concerns for the receiving parties. These concerns were confirmed when the Biden administration decided to halt immediately the foreign military sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, almost one week after the inauguration. President Biden clarified that U.S. foreign policy was not planning to help the Arab states involved in the Yemeni civil war. As this decision was ratified by Biden’s statement on the Yemeni civil war, the White House decided to stop any support for Yemen’s offensive operations, including the relevant arms sales.

The UAE was able to snatch the F-35, MQ-9B, and AMRAAM deals thanks to the Abraham Accords. However, the majority of these weapon systems are offensive and quite likely to be used against the Houthi rebels. Saudi Arabia can also suffer extensively from a U.S. foreign policy that does not actively engage against the Houthi rebels. The military procurement deals signed in 2017 worth $110 billion are not secure from this turbulence.

Furthermore, the Biden administration has already reversed the U.S. designation of the Houthis as terrorists. The U.S. retreat from offensive solutions in Yemen is going to jeopardize the majority of the plans and operations led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. There will be sanction arguments and discourse to enforce the complete Saudi-Emirati retreat from Yemen in the coming years.

The Yemeni civil war and Houthis are going to be a tremendous impediment to the U.S. relations with the GCC countries. This process may evolve into a conflict between the U.S. and Saudi-led countries regarding the offensive against the Houthi rebels – a conflict that will be similar to the tensions Turkey experienced as a result of Syrian border security and the YPG/PKK activities there.

The most significant practical implication of a Democratic administration in the U.S. seems to revolve around security concerns and military operations. However, other substantial issues still undermine bilateral affairs. President Biden’s position on the Abraham Accords was favorable during and after the Arab states reached a historic deal with Israel. However, it was clearly stated that the Biden-Harris administration is going to work towards reaching a two-state solution and that it will only partner with those who believe in this solution.

The two-state solution certainly irritates the Israeli administration, which indicates escalated tension between the U.S. and Israel in the short term. The Palestinian side rightfully complained about the illegal settlements built throughout its occupied land, and always received support on this front from the Obama-Biden administration. This support seems likely to be revived under the Biden-Harris leadership with a larger interest in the coming years.

The U.S. backlash over the Saudi-Emirati support for Jihadist groups is not expected to be as strong as it was during the Obama administration since the former have significantly reduced their illicit support for these organizations. However, the Biden-Harris administration may force the Saudi-Emirati administrations to end their activities in Yemen, Sudan, and Libya.

It is expected that the current U.S. administration will have a say in the ongoing turmoil in Libya. The Saudi-Emirati partnership should expect to be cornered in Yemen and in Libya in the near future as the honeymoon with Trump has come to an end and swift reversals in U.S. foreign policy and future impediments are on the horizon.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE)-Saudi Arabia alliance has been one of the most durable alliances in Middle East politics in the last years. Despite the fact that the two countries have enjoyed strong relations during the past decade, the current form of strategic alliance dates back to 2015 when Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah passed away and Salman bin Abdulaziz came to power. Major players in the alliance have been King Salman’s son Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) and the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ).

The UAE-Saudi alliance involved Egypt and Bahrain over a short period and turned into a political axis. Even though it has many weaknesses, the UAE-Saudi alliance remained solid and somewhat unified in regional and foreign policy issues from Yemen to Libya, the hostility towards Turkey, Iran, and Qatar, and the warming relations with Israel.

Signals of change in Saudi Arabia

Hostility towards Turkey takes the lead in the foreign policy priorities of the axis countries. This situation became more acute following the coup attempt in Turkey in 2016. So much so that it has been debated internationally whether this axis financially supported the coup plotters in Turkey.

During the Riyadh and Abu Dhabi-led blockade against Qatar in 2017, Doha’s cooperation with Turkey was cited as a reason and the two countries stipulated that Turkey’s military base in Qatar needs to be removed. While the UAE-Saudi Arabia axis continued its anti-Turkey policies, it also followed similar policies in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Horn of Africa, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and lately in the Maghreb region.

However, members of this alliance do not have an entirely overlapping motivation in confronting Turkey. Indeed, while the UAE has adopted a stern anti-Turkey position in many respects, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated a somewhat more conciliatory attitude on certain issues than Abu Dhabi. Saudi government officials have different opinions on Turkey and the Saudi has government adopted a softer and warier policy.

Despite divergences, the history of bilateral relations between Saudi Arabia and Turkey shows that the leaderships of both countries have somehow succeeded in protecting the bilateral ties. However, following the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi in Saudi Arabia’s consulate in Istanbul and Turkey’s insistence on bringing those responsible for the murder to justice pushed some actors inside the Saudi government to take a firmer stance against Ankara.

Therefore, the hostility towards Turkey in Saudi Arabia has been local and limited to certain cliques in the Saudi government circles and, hence, should not be generalized to the entire Saudi leadership.

Preparation for the Biden administration?

With Joe Biden winning the 2020 U.S. presidential election, there have been some positive signs by the Saudi government towards Turkey. After the deadly earthquake in Izmir in October 2020, King Salman ordered aid to be sent to Turkey, using the expression “Our brothers in Turkey” – a noted, and important, improvement in bilateral relations. Unlike the UAE, Saudi Arabia was among the first countries to offer condolences to Turkey.

Following this step, a phone call between King Salman and Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan took place before the G-20 Summit, which was held online under the term presidency of Saudi Arabia. The two leaders exchanged views about improving bilateral relations, solving existing problems, and opening the door for dialogue that would further mend ties.

Another indicator was the statements by Prince Faisal bin Farhan, Saudi Arabia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, during a speech, where he stated that the relations with Turkey are “just perfect.” Faisal bin Farhan clarified that the informal boycott against Turkish products in Saudi Arabia was voiced in semi-official sources and argued that there was not even an unofficial boycott of Turkish products.

UAE remains stern against Turkey

Despite the positive developments between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, the UAE strategy towards Turkey does not show any signs of a constructive attitude to date. Even though the Emirati State Minister for Foreign Affairs, Anwar Gargash, made some positive comments on the Turkey-UAE relations, Abu Dhabi has not taken any concrete steps toward Ankara. On the contrary, during the past months, the UAE intensified and strengthened diplomatic relations with Greece, Armenia, and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC), all of which have problems with Turkey.

UAE officials hosted Armenian President Armen Sarkissian and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, and held talks with them on the development of relations and the protection of common interests. The UAE’s improving relations with Armenia pushed the country to adopt a more pro-Armenian policy in the recent Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the rapport with Greece in the East Mediterranean shows that the UAE targets Turkey when it comes to regional politics.

The cooperation declaration and various agreements signed between Greece and the UAE following the meeting between Mohammed bin Zayed and Kyriakos Mitsotakis indicate that they are not reflections of a responsive policy but rather resonate from  a long-term consensus that could trigger further instability in the region.

The latest UAE attempt was to establish cordial relations with France along with Greece, Armenia, and the GCASC. The UAE supported France’s destabilizing policies in the Eastern Mediterranean, Nagorno-Karabagh, and Libya, and stood against Turkey on all fronts.

Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s differing policies toward Turkey are a clear divergence between the alliance. Besides this, both countries are breaking up their partnership over Yemen. Mistrust first surfaced in February 2020, when the UAE withdrew its military presence from Yemen and did not adopt a wholesale aggressive rhetoric against Iran in the region.

The UAE supported France’s destabilizing policies in the Eastern Mediterranean, Nagorno-Karabagh, and Libya, and stood against Turkey on all fronts.

This caused a disturbance in Saudi Arabia and undermined the nature of the alliance. In addition, the UAE’s decision to normalize relations with Israel, pulling Bahrain and Sudan along, substantiated the divergence, caused further discomfort, and attested to the loss of a mutual vision on regional leadership between the two. The UAE’s normalization with Israel increased the pressure on Saudi Arabia.

However, Saudi officials know well that if they sign the normalization deal with Israel, their regional leadership quest will suffer an incurable loss of prestige. The Israeli normalization was another reason Saudi Arabia was disturbed by the UAE.

Given the divergences between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, their formidable alliance seems to be weakening. The UAE has suffered serious damage to its prestige in the eyes of the Arab people for initiating normalization with Israel and this may gradually bring about its isolation in regional politics.

The Saudi–UAE alliance concurrently targeting Turkey, Iran, and Qatar illustrates regional dimensions of rivalry and balance politics. Long before the recent rapprochement between the GCC countries, Saudi Arabia already refrained from a strict boycott on Qatar in 2017 and left the door open for dialogue to solve the political crisis in the Gulf.

However, until recently, the UAE has refused and resisted any dialog concerning the Gulf. Even the Saudi Arabia-initiated normalization with Qatar in early January 2021 was not embraced by the Emirati leadership. Despite Emirati unwillingness, Riyadh was keen on lifting the blockade on Qatar and Abu Dhabi had to follow suit.

Finally, Saudi-UAE divergence on Turkey is another dimension. Turkey’s perspective on the new alliance politics in the MENA region is that it expects the UAE to abandon confrontational language and actions and to adopt a constructive and cooperative attitude. The Turkish government is showing signs that it is willing to give cooperation with the UAE and Egypt a chance similar to the positive approach adopted recently toward Saudi Arabia.

The conflict in Yemen began in September 2014 when the Houthi rebels commenced their gradual, but violent takeover of the capital city Sana’a. This led to a coup that forced President Abdurabbuh Mansour Hadi out to his home town and temporary capital city, Aden in February 2015.

By March, Saudi Arabia formed a military coalition, including the United Arab Emirates, to oust the rebels, restore the government and to bring stability to the region. The coalition became notorious for violating human rights, bombing civilians and destroying vital Yemeni infrastructure.

Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE agree that the Houthis are the main threat to regional security. Despite the rebels’ military capabilities have never been enough to change the balance of power in the region, their strong links to the Iranian regime turns the Houthis into a threat by proxy.

The group, which is based in the northern province of Sa’ada, which borders Saudi Arabia, has the capability to attack major Saudi cities, including Jeddah. Rockets fired from Yemeni territory are regularly intercepted, however in situations where they aren’t, the Houthis are able to inflict damage.

On November 23, 2020, the Houthis claimed responsibility for attacking an Aramco oil company distribution station in the city of Jeddah. Houthi spokesman, Yahya Sarea, warned foreign companies and residents in the neighbouring kingdom, saying they should exercise caution as “operations will continue.”

“The strike was very accurate, and ambulances and fire engines rushed to the target,” Sarea said, explaining that the Houthis used an Iranian-made Quds-2 type winged missile to carry out the attack.

Such attacks not only harm Saudi Arabia, but demoralize the rest of the Gulf Arab countries as weaknesses in their military powerhouse begin to show. Therefore, restoring relative stability and disarming the Houthis in Yemen is paramount to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Where differences begin

Whilst Riyadh and Abu Dhabi agree that a stable Yemen is important to regional security, a problem therein lies in what a stable Yemen looks like and where they are able to secure their separate political and economic interests.

The UAE entered the coalition understanding the way in which Aden is significant to Abu Dhabi’s economic and strategic standing in the region. Having a strong presence in Aden means the UAE would have the luxury of the Bab al-Mandab strait, along with easier access to the Indian Ocean and more control over the Red Sea.

Spreading its sphere of influence to the Socotra Island means the UAE would be able to strengthen its commercial and military projection in the Indian Ocean, as it has shown interest through quietly pumping investment into the island and arming secessionists.

The southern separatists seek renewed independence for southern Yemen, which was ruled as a separate state until 1990.

The UAE also heavily backed local resistance forces in Aden and other parts of the southern regions to liberate them from the Houthis. However, areas from the northern areas such as Taiz, which has a reputation for being a Muslim Brotherhood stronghold, did not receive as much help from the UAE, despite it being besieged by the Houthi rebels.

On August 6, 2019, two fighters from the UAE-backed Southern Security Belt were killed during clashes with pro-Hadi government forces. A day later, the STC deputy leader, Hani bin Breik, marched on the Maasheeq Palace in Aden and called on secessionists to overthrow Hadi’s government in the coastal city.

It became clearer than ever that the UAE is fuelling a “war within a war” inside Yemen; not only distracting from the original aim of ousting the Houthis, but putting its interests in Yemen before achieving the aim of the Saudi-led coalition.

From the outside looking in, the coalition was divided which was creating yet more bloodshed in Yemen in addition to the casualties the indiscriminate coalition airstrikes have caused.

Reconciliation and hope for the future

In a bid to restore relative stability, the two sides signed a power-sharing agreement in Riyadh on November 5, 2019. The ambitious Riyadh Agreement aimed to create a 50-50 cabinet and to work together to restore the Hadi government back to Sana’a.

The unity government was initially supposed to be formed in 30 days, but it took more than a year. By December 19, 2020, the government was formed.

The unity government can be as successful as long as the reasons behind its formation remain stronger than the divisions that continue to haunt northern and southern Yemen. It’s impossible to say that the newly formed government will solve a problem that created wars between the two populations and caused southern separatists to believe that northern Yemen was occupying the south.

In order to nurture a strong unity government that goes beyond temporarily sustaining peace, grievances of both populations need to be heard and longer-term solutions must be brought to the table by creating a democratic space and ample conflict resolution. The unity government must be seen as a stepping stone to lasting stability, not an ultimate achievement.

Women, local leaders and religious and tribal figures need to be included and sustainable vision for a well-represented and localised Yemeni government must be on the table for a fruitful post-war vision. As it stands, the unity government is all-male, creating a cabinet that excludes women for the first time in 20 years.

Can the explosion create more divisions?

On December 30, 2020, an aircraft carrying members of the recently formed unity government landed at Aden International Airport, only for the passengers to be met with explosion and gunfire as they disembarked.

The attack left 25 people dead and 110 others injured, but none of the passengers were hurt. At the wake of the attack, there were concerns how such an assault could affect the unity government.

Both the Hadi government and the STC blamed the Houthi rebels of the attack. Yemen’s Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik sustained accusation that the Houthis were behind the explosions.

“Preliminary investigations indicate that Houthi militias stand behind this crime,” Saeed said as the newly reshuffled Cabinet met for the first time in Aden on December 31, 2020, adding that “intelligence also indicates that some Iranian experts were prepping for such an operation over the last few months.”

On December 9, efforts in the U.S. Senate to block a $23 billion arms sale to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) failed. The votes underscored widespread Republican support for boosting the UAE’s military edge mainly due to Abu Dhabi’s role in the Arab region’s anti-Iran camp.

“The UAE deeply appreciates the consideration of all Senators on today’s votes,” said the oil-rich Gulf country’s ambassador to Washington Yousef al-Otaiba. “Continued US support enables the UAE to take on more of the burden for our collective security — ours, yours and our partners.”

Now pressure from certain politicians and civil society organizations is beginning to come down on President-elect Joe Biden to cancel this historic weapons deal after President Donald Trump leaves the Oval Office. How Biden addresses this sale will be an early test of his administration’s true commitment to changing US foreign policy in order to further prioritize human rights.

In October, Biden-the-candidate vowed to “reassess our relationship with the Kingdom [of Saudi Arabia], end US support for Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, and make sure America does not check its values at the door to sell arms or buy oil.” It is unclear the extent to which the President-elect sees selling arms to the UAE as a violation of Washington’s commitment to U.S. “values”.

Both publicly and privately, the Israeli government defended this massive weapons sale to the UAE, which formalized diplomatic ties with Israel earlier this year as part of the Abraham Accords.

Antony Blinken, Biden’s pick for Secretary of State, has stated that the incoming administration will give the weapons deal a “hard look”. Given the UAE’s controversial interventions in Libya and Yemen, scores of activists are urging Biden to halt this sale, which “would cause devastating harm to both the people in the Middle East and America’s standing in the region”, according to the Democracy for the Arab World Now’s Michael Eisner and Sarah Leah Whitson.

“The harm in the case of the UAE arms deal is wholly foreseeable. Just as you can predict the consequence of selling a loaded pistol to a serial murderer, you can anticipate the damage that will be wrought by this arms deal.”

But some officials in Washington opposed to this arms sale to Abu Dhabi point to the UAE’s relations with Russia and China.

But some officials in Washington opposed to this arms sale to Abu Dhabi point to the UAE’s relations with Russia and China. Democrats are particularly focused on how Abu Dhabi’s security links with these two powers. Given the likelihood that Biden’s administration will take a far more hardline stance against Moscow, this argument about countering Russia could possibly convince the incoming White House to cancel the transfer.

“The UAE is unique – they have very close, active defense partnerships with both China and Russia,” tweeted Democratic Senator Chris Murphy at the beginning of this month. “In the classified briefing, Trump officials could not detail how our most sensitive technology – on the Reapers and our F-35 jets – will not find its way to Russia/China.”

“[Washington] should refrain from exporting F-35s to the UAE until Abu Dhabi takes tangible steps toward decoupling from Russia,” argued Samuel Ramani, a doctoral researcher at Oxford University. “The precedent of suspending F-35 sales to Turkey after it purchased Russia’s S-400 missile defense system and announced plans to cooperate with Russia on constructing the S-500 system should be applied to the UAE.

Unless the UAE distances itself from Russia, there is an unacceptably high risk of inadvertent transfers of U.S. technology to Russia via Abu Dhabi and Russian missile defense systems becoming interoperable with F-35s.”

The Factor of Turkey

How Biden handles this US-UAE arms deal will have important implications for the US-Turkey alliance. As a fellow NATO member, which the US has refused to sell F-35s to, Turkey would strongly object to the UAE receiving such fighter jets, sophisticated drones, and munitions. With Ankara and Abu Dhabi’s relationship continuing to deteriorate in a tense standoff that some experts label a Turkish-Emirati “Cold War”, Turkey would see a completion of this transfer as a major threat to Ankara’s own geopolitical and security interests in the Middle East and North Africa.

As tensions between Turkey and Greece remain high amid maritime disputes, officials in Ankara would see Abu Dhabi and Athens’ military cooperation as a growing threat to Turkey if such a deal goes through. Within this context, the odds are excellent that Biden not upending this arms sale to the UAE would result in Ankara having major problems with Trump’s successor early on in his presidency. Given the extent to which Biden will need to work closely with Ankara, this factor will likely weigh heavily on the minds of foreign policy decision-making in his administration.

Biden, a UAE-Friendly president?

To be sure, the US Senate’s votes against blocking this massive arms deal constituted a major victory for the UAE. The leadership in Abu Dhabi is hopeful that Biden will not cancel this transfer. Considering how the votes were almost entirely along partisan lines, it is clear that the UAE will have to contend with future challenges when it comes to dealing with members of Biden’s party.

By permitting the sale of 50 of these top-of-the-line jets and drones to Abu Dhabi, Biden would be sending a strong message to the UAE about how his administration views this Gulf powerhouse as a trustworthy and critical partner which has interests that align with those of the US. But if the 46^th president decides to nix the transfer, the UAE will realize that it may have difficulties in terms of dealing with the US in the post-Trump period notwithstanding how the Abraham Accords strengthened Abu Dhabi’s image in Washington.

The Club Champions League, the final game of the CAF (Confederation of African Football), took place on November 27, 2020. The game was played between the two biggest Egyptian teams, Al-Ahly and Al-Zamalek in Cairo Stadium and ended by the crowning of Al-Ahly as the African champion for the 9th time. A crowd of fans of both teams would normally be expected to fill the stadium.

However, this was not the case since the Egyptian public and hardcore fans known as “Ultras” have been banned from Egyptian stadiums since 2012. This ban has been part of the anti-revolutionary policies by the military regime in Egypt. These policies especially targeted the Ultras due to their effective social mobilization capacity during the January 25 Revolution that took place in Egypt in 2011.

The political involvement of the Ultras in Egypt was not a spontaneous reaction during the January 25 Revolution. Rather, it was a process that started with the very establishment of the Ultras in 2007. The Ultras of the two clubs in Egypt, Al-Ahly and Al-Zamalek, are called “Ultras Ahlawy” and “White Knights” respectively. From their establishment, both groups condemned police brutality and the dictatorship of the Mubarak regime. They were also influential during the 2011 events, thanks to their discipline, commitment, and their overriding principle of following the orders of their leaders.

In addition, their financial independence gave them a certain freedom and kept them away from any state control. When Mubarak stepped down and the military took control of the country in February 2011, the state aggression against the Ultras started to increase and was crystalized in two major massacres: Port-Said, on February 1, 2011, and the Egyptian Air Defence Stadium massacre on February 8, 2015. These two incidents were followed by mass arrests of members of both groups who were tried in the courts.

The Influence of Turki Al-Sheikh on Egyptian Football

The counterrevolutionary policies of the Egyptian state under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have been supported by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as part of their anti-Arab Spring policies. The Ultras were targeted by this Saudi- and UAE-supported witch hunt that is related to the presence and position of Turki Al-Sheikh in Egypt.

Turki Al-Sheikh is a Saudi adviser of the royal court and is the current chairman of the General Authority for Entertainment in Saudi Arabia. He started to appear on the Egyptian football scene in December 2017. Since then, he was announced as the honorary president of Al-Ahly. Later on, he resigned, refused an offer to preside over Al-Zamalek, but still invested huge amounts of money in transfers for both clubs.

Fans who directed criticism towards Al-Sheikh have had to apologize publicly following legal actions taken against them.

Furthermore, he became involved in many disputes between the clubs and their players, and bought the Egyptian club Al-Assiouty Sport, changed its name to “Pyramids FC,” and then sold it to Emirati businessman Salem Al-Shamsi. Reports of Turki Al-Sheikh’s involvement in Egyptian sports have heavily criticized his policies and their impact on the efforts of the Saudi government under Mohammad bin Salman to influence Egyptian sports

The founders and the early members of the Ultras in Egypt are currently either imprisoned, exiled, or have preferred to disappear from the public scene following the oppression they experienced. In addition, for the past eight years sports fans in general have been banned from interacting with football clubs.

Sport fans in general have been banned from interacting with football clubs for eight years. Thus, the reactions of the new generation of football fans, in general, and Ultras, in particular, can only be observed through social media.

A general observation of social media reveals that Turki Al-Sheikh became the central topic of discussions even after his “official” withdrawal. The attitude he showed towards football fans was problematic as he took legal action against some of them and shared their names publicly on his Facebook account over claims of personal insult allegations.

His position on players such as Abdullah Al-Said and transferring him to the rival team, Al-Zamalek, or the dispute with Al-Ahly’s former captain, Hossam Ashour, and his retirement plans have been hot topics among football fans on social media networks. Al-Sheikh joined controversial Al-Zamalek chairman Mortada Mansour in his attacks and criticisms against the Ultras.

As a result, the discussions of football fans across social media became mainly concerned with Al-Sheikh’s actions. Discussions within groups of fans of one team or between rival fans focused mostly on the problems that Al-Sheikh was involved in, and his influence on both the big clubs and Egyptian football in general.

Al-Sheikh and his interventions in the policies of football clubs were used by rival fans as a sarcastic reference point and to mock each other and belittle their managerial boards. Meanwhile, various political and social events took place when Turki Al-Sheikh was the honorary president of Al-Ahly Club in Egypt and an investor in Egyptian football.

These events include calls made by former military-affiliated contractor Mohamed Ali for protests against the Egyptian regime, or for protests against more recent events such as the demolishing of unlicensed houses, carried out by the Sisi regime.. In addition, a social media campaign was launched against sexual harassment by survivors who started publicly shaming abusers and were supported by celebrities and social media influencers.

These events would have seen a huge reaction from the Ultras, both at the stadiums and on social media, had they taken place eight or nine years ago. Nonetheless, fans on social media networks merely expressed their reactions to the matches and to the actions of Turki Al-Sheikh. Al-Sheikh has already sold Pyramids FC and is currently the owner of the Andalusian club UD Almería. However, Al-Sheikh is still present and influential through his financial support to both Al-Ahly and Al-Zamalek, and his continuous engagement with different media channels and talk shows in Egyptian media.

Al-Sheikh’s presence helped the current Egyptian regime to continue to oppress the Ultras as an effective group of the January 25 Revolution and as a presence that continues to pose a threat to its existence.

Fans who dared to become involved in such political, social, or public discourse have experienced firsthand the state’s reaction towards the Ultras. Fans who directed criticism towards Al-Sheikh and the atmosphere he created in Egyptian football, have had to apologize publicly following legal actions taken against them. These actions of Al-Sheikh, alongside securitizing the Egyptian sports, managed to push football fans away from such sensitive social and political causes. It also served the Saudi-Emirate plans carried out against groups involved in the Arab Spring revolutions.

Thus, the presence of Al-Sheikh helped to immobilize fans across social media and threatened anyone who openly talked about his corrupting influence. Al-Sheikh’s presence helped the current Egyptian regime to continue to oppress the Ultras as an effective group of the January 25 Revolution and as a presence that continues to pose a threat to its existence.

Although Donald Trump’s presidency is coming to an end soon, one of its most catastrophic quid pro quo foreign policies in the Middle East, namely the premature Israeli-Arab normalization, is unlikely to come to an end under Joe Biden’s administration. After all, Biden is a proud Zionist and a close friend of Israel. In August 2020, he hastened to applaud formally the UAE-Israel normalization deal and even took credit for paving its way.

There is, however, a notable difference between the two administrations. Under Trump, his son-in-law Jared Kushner has been tirelessly pressing Arab regimes not only to formalize and make their clandestine relationships with Israel public, but also to besiege the Palestinians economically, to bash their struggle in state-owned media, and to incite troll armies against them.

The Saudis under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) have been the clearest example of this malevolent endeavor. For instance, recently, a prominent Saudi prince, Bandar bin Sultan, whose son and daughter are the Saudi ambassadors to the U.K. and U.S. respectively, made a lengthy appearance on the Saudi TV channel Al-Arabiya in which he spared no effort at demonizing and dehumanizing the Palestinians.

While Biden’s administration is expected to continue to facilitate talks between Israel’s right-wing government and authoritarian Arab regimes, it’s unlikely that Biden would demand similar proof of loyalty from Arab dictators, given that he acknowledges the importance of the Palestinian Authority – not least of all to Israel’s security.

This was promptly reflected by a decline in Emirati trolling of Palestinians when Biden was announced as the winner of the 2020 elections. In no time, the UAE officially praised Biden, even though they engaged in unabashed and open cheering for Trump during the campaign and vote count.

The Motives behind Normalization

The groveling of Arab regimes to Israel’s right-wing politics makes clear the shameful logic that motivates selling out their fellow Palestinians and the consequences of these desperate actions.

There are two motives for the Arab regimes’ desperate efforts to normalize relations with Israel. First, there’s a transactional motive in which reactionary and repressive Arab regimes, such as the UAE, in return for normalization are hoping to get more cutting-edge technology (e.g. spyware, military equipment) from the U.S. and Israel to help them protect and bolster their thrones, boost their regional hegemony, and crackdown more efficiently on dissents, such as critics, activists, and human rights defenders.

The second motive is purely ideological – and this is where the danger lies. Gulf regimes, particularly the Saudis, blindly believe that the way to Washington begins in Tel-Aviv “because Jews control the world” as one Saudi diplomat once told the present author on the condition of anonymity. Unfortunately, Trump’s quid pro quo foreign policy has been adding fuel to the fire, bolstering this misguided belief that Israel is the gateway to please Washington and that seeking legitimacy from Netanyahu and the White House, rather than from their own people, is the way to stay in power.

The Consequences

This ideology of looking up to Israel for salvation and legitimacy not only undermines whatever prospects remain for Palestinian statehood and self-determination, but it also ignites a strong backlash against the protagonists of this sellout for abandoning decades of Arab consensus.

Traditionally, normalization could take the shape of a reward, such as in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative, in which Israel is recognized and integrated regionally after ending occupation, but the API has been stagnant for decades.

Normalization can also be an incentive to rebuild trust and create momentum for progress towards peace, but before any specific advances are signed and sealed. A prominent example is when Egypt’s president Sadat visited Israel’s Knesset in 1977, but such charismatic leadership (albeit still controversial) is absent today in the Arab world where most leaders have lost their legitimacy in the eyes of their populations after the Arab Spring. Additionally, the UAE-Saudi axis is entirely uninterested in pushing progress forward on the Palestinian front. Hence, they purposefully made no mention of the occupied Palestinian territories in the Abraham Accords.

There is also popular normalization, where direct people-to-people initiatives may have a potential of making a breakthrough. The underlying idea is to build peace from the ground up, building trust face-to-face, in parallel with the activities of the political elites, to show the authentic acceptance Israel would receive, should it end its occupation. But this avenue is heavily undermined by the brutalities committed every day under Israel’s occupation and the severe marginalization of Israel’s peace camp by the current government under Netanyahu.

The current normalization frenzy has created a fourth paradigm that embraces the humiliating, defeatist path of normalizing relations with Israel regardless of, and untethered from, any progress on the Palestinian front. This new paradigm is more akin to a diplomatic conquest than to anything else.

So instead of Israel needing Arab recognition of its existence to secure its future, now it’s defeatist Arab dictators that are scrambling for Israel’s approval to secure their fragile thrones. This has allowed Netanyahu to portray himself as a strong conqueror who’s opening one Arab front after the other at no cost.

Netanyahu has been keen on making visible his ability to twist Arab leaders’ arms, humiliating, if not forcing them into submission. When the UAE-Israel normalization deal was announced, the UAE claimed that it would stop annexation. However, Netanyahu hastened to take to the stage to brag that annexation is still on the table.

By cozying up to Israel to bolster their power, Arab regimes are essentially shooting themselves in the foot. Defeatist normalization has portrayed those regimes as fragile, illegitimate, and desperate to secure their thrones by paying tribute to “King Bibi” and President Donald Trump.

This is a surefire recipe for eventually normalizing even more hate and violent rejectionism towards those regimes. Indeed, 90% of the Arab world on social media have been against normalization. Netanyahu himself understands this clearly. He admitted that the biggest threat to normalization is grassroots Arab opposition: “The greatest obstacle to the expansion of peace today is not found in the leaders of the countries around us. The obstacle is public opinion on the Arab street.” Arab rulers don’t seem to understand this reality. They don’t understand that they’re ostensibly shooting themselves in the foot by pursuing Israel’s support to secure their fragile thrones.