T

he struggle for influence between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis in Yemen, which was once marked by intense fighting but had continued at a lower intensity particularly over the past four years, resurfaced following developments in September.

The wave of attacks launched by the Houthis against targets in Saudi Arabia on September 8 caused extensive damage to oil facilities and left dozens of people injured. These attacks demonstrated that the Yemen conflict, which Riyadh believed it had contained through the 2022 ceasefire, had once again intensified, bringing the fighting back onto Saudi territory.

Viewed within the broader regional and global geopolitical context, these developments can be regarded not only as a new phase of Yemen’s civil war but also as a new front in the war being waged by the United States and Israel against Iran.

The primary reason behind the Houthis’ adoption of a new strategy in Yemen and their increasingly confrontational stance towards Saudi Arabia can be identified as the collapse of the ceasefire between the United States and Iran. Indeed, following the breakdown of the ceasefire in July, the Houthis began intensifying their attacks against Yemen’s Saudi-backed central government, seeking, in a sense, to punish Riyadh, which they accused of acting in coordination with Washington.

Security vulnerabilities

In line with this strategy, the Houthis also sought to establish control over Yemen’s coastal regions. Bringing maritime traffic in the Red Sea under Houthi control was intended to exert pressure not only on Saudi Arabia but also on global actors.

Houthi forces rapidly captured stretches of the Red Sea coastline, including the port of Mocha and the strategically located island of Perim at the entrance to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. They subsequently began targeting cities under central government control further inland, including Taiz and Marib.

The principal factor behind the Houthis’ remarkably rapid advance was the withdrawal of Saudi-backed forces from their positions within a very short period, in some cases without putting up any resistance. Alongside the Houthis’ military superiority, poor coordination among opposing forces also played an important role.

Beyond the realities on the battlefield, this development can be regarded as a major loss of prestige for Saudi Arabia, while also exposing significant strategic vulnerabilities.

An even more critical dimension of these developments emerged in the subsequent phase. Emboldened by the psychological advantage gained through their advances in Yemen, the Houthis began directly targeting Saudi territory.

These attacks frequently followed strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, which the Houthis claimed had been carried out with Saudi Arabia’s involvement.

Furthermore, the Houthis regard Riyadh as the principal backer of Yemen’s central government and, for this reason, consider Saudi Arabia a legitimate target. Consequently, Houthi forces have been conducting attacks designed to inflict maximum damage on both Saudi Arabia’s military and economic capabilities.

The targeting of oil facilities in the Saudi city of Yanbu was a particularly significant development in this regard.

By seeking to undermine the oil-export capacity of Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter, the Houthis aimed to exert pressure on Riyadh, setting the stage for a further escalation of tensions.

Indeed, in the period that followed, Saudi Arabia intensified its attacks against Houthi targets, both directly and through Yemen’s central government.

Through these attacks, the Houthis also sought to obstruct the Red Sea route that Saudi Arabia had activated as an alternative to the Strait of Hormuz.

This strategy aligns with Iran’s post-war policies and is being pursued with the objectives of threatening Riyadh’s stability while ensuring that Iran’s influence over the Strait of Hormuz becomes permanent.

Indeed, weakening the Red Sea corridor that Riyadh has sought to establish as a backup route also demonstrates the Houthis’ efforts to maximise both their deterrence capabilities and their bargaining power at the negotiating table.

The support that failed to materialize from the United States

Another noteworthy aspect of the intensifying conflict is Saudi Arabia’s difficulty in responding effectively to Houthi attacks.

One of the principal reasons for this can be attributed not so much to a shortage of resources but rather to the inability to use existing resources properly and efficiently.

Indeed, the failure of Saudi Arabia, which has made the largest investments in armaments in the Middle East for years, and its local allies in Yemen to mount an effective defense against the Houthis has raised questions about Riyadh’s military capabilities.

Media reports even suggested that, during the period of intensified Houthi attacks, the Saudi crown prince called US President Donald Trump to request assistance, but Trump remained reluctant to intervene.

Trump’s proposal to offer diplomatic support and accelerate the sale of F-35 fighter jets, rather than conduct airstrikes in support of Riyadh, reportedly provoked a strong reaction from the Saudi leadership.

This process can therefore be seen as a renewed confirmation of the considerable risks Saudi Arabia faces as a result of relying on the United States as its sole security umbrella.

These developments have also paved the way for Saudi Arabia to turn towards alternative security mechanisms that it has been developing for some time.

One of the strategies prioritized by the Saudi leadership is to accelerate the implementation of the Mecca Agreement, signed jointly with Türkiye and Pakistan, and transform it into a protective security framework for Riyadh against potentially greater threats.

Although this alliance is not yet operational, it is expected to become one of the three countries’ most important security instruments in the near future.

Looking ahead, three scenarios stand out regarding Saudi Arabia-Houthi tensions, which have been among the major justifications for the US-Israeli war against Iran.

The first scenario involves the parties refraining from further escalation and instead pursuing negotiations. This could lead to a cessation of hostilities and the launch of a diplomatic process in which actors such as Oman, Pakistan or Qatar could play a role.

The second, and more dangerous, scenario would involve Saudi-backed forces launching a counteroffensive in an attempt to secure a decisive victory over the Houthis.

Such a development could prolong the conflict, pave the way for further humanitarian crises in Yemen, a country that has suffered from instability for years, and worsen the situation considerably.

The most pessimistic scenario would involve the crisis expanding into a regional confrontation, creating an environment in which a greater number of countries become directly involved in the fighting.

In fact, such an outcome could produce a geopolitical rupture far greater than that caused by the war against Iran and further entrench regional instability.

It could also make polarization among regional actors more pronounced and lead to the emergence of more clearly defined alliances.

Ultimately, Saudi Arabia’s reassessment of its security strategy concerning Yemen, along with a reconsideration of its relationship with the United States in this context, can be regarded as a necessity.

As one of the Gulf region’s most powerful countries, Saudi Arabia must first strengthen its national defense capabilities and, at the same time, invest in security frameworks developed with regional actors with whom it can establish relationships based on clear mutual trust. Such measures are essential if Riyadh is to preserve domestic stability, counter external threats and sustain its economic achievements.

Riyadh’s success in this process will have implications not only for Yemen but also for the wider geographical area stretching from the Red Sea to the Strait of Hormuz.

(Orignally published in Turkish by Kriter)

O

man has proposed a preferential bilateral trade and investment agreement with China as the two countries seek to deepen economic ties and expand cooperation across strategic industries.

Sultan Haitham bin Tariq al-Said made the proposal during a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on Monday, describing the agreement as a way to create new opportunities for trade and investment.

“We are confident that such an agreement would open new avenues for trade and investment, facilitate and enhance commercial and investment exchanges between our two nations,” Haitham told Xi, according to remarks reported by Oman’s state-run news agency.

The proposal comes as Oman seeks to increase trade with its largest commercial partner and attract investment into sectors that form part of its efforts to diversify its economy beyond oil exports.

Haitham said Muscat was interested in establishing joint investment funds covering renewable energy, artificial intelligence, digital technologies, space and defense.

The discussions also emphasized closer cooperation between financial and investment institutions, suggesting that the proposed partnership could extend beyond conventional trade in goods and energy.

Xi described closer relations with Oman as a “shared strategic choice” for both countries, saying he was ready to work with Haitham to elevate their strategic partnership and contribute to regional stability and prosperity.

Energy and technology at the center of economic cooperation

China is Oman’s largest trading partner, with bilateral economic relations supported by Omani exports of crude oil and other energy products to the Chinese market.

The two countries have also been developing commercial and tourism links. Direct flights between Beijing and Muscat began in November 2025, providing additional connectivity for business and travel.

Oman is seeking to expand its renewable energy supply chains and digital commerce as it pursues broader economic diversification. Cooperation with China could provide access to investment, technology and industrial expertise in areas including clean energy and advanced digital infrastructure.

The proposed joint investment funds would offer a framework for financing projects in several emerging sectors. However, the announcement did not specify the size of the funds, their investment timelines or the projects that would receive priority.

Haitham also highlighted the importance of cooperation between financial institutions, indicating that strengthening investment channels would be an important part of the proposed economic relationship.

The talks reflect China’s continuing efforts to strengthen its economic and diplomatic partnerships across the Middle East, where energy trade, infrastructure investment and technology cooperation have become increasingly important areas of engagement.

Historic visit underscores growing strategic ties

Haitham arrived in Beijing on Sunday for a two-day state visit, the first by an Omani head of state since the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1978.

His arrival was followed by an official welcoming ceremony on Monday, where he and Xi reviewed an honor guard at the Great Hall of the People.

Although the regional conflict was not directly addressed in Haitham’s opening remarks, the Omani leader praised China’s efforts to promote international security, stability and cooperation.

“We further express our deep appreciation for China’s positions on key issues concerning our region,” he said.

The visit comes as Beijing seeks to maintain diplomatic engagement across the Middle East amid continuing regional tensions. China’s Foreign Ministry said last week that Beijing would soon send special envoys to countries in the region to encourage dialogue and de-escalation.

Oman’s proposal therefore carries both economic and diplomatic significance, although the discussions announced on Monday focused primarily on bilateral trade, investment and strategic cooperation.

The two governments have described the visit as an opportunity to establish a new phase in their relationship. Whether that ambition produces a formal preferential trade agreement and concrete investment commitments will depend on subsequent negotiations.

(Source: Reuters)

B

inance, the world’s largest cryptocurrency exchange, has suspended deposits and withdrawals following a massive security breach involving an estimated $6.3 billion in digital assets, an incident that could become the largest cryptocurrency theft ever recorded.

The exchange said Thursday that it had worked with industry partners and law enforcement agencies to identify and freeze affected assets, locating approximately $3 billion so far. The status of the remaining $3.3 billion remains unclear.

Binance co-founder Yi He pledged that the company would cover all losses resulting from the attack, while the exchange sought to reassure its global customer base that user funds remained safe.

According to Binance, preliminary findings suggest the breach may have originated from a compromised laptop belonging to one of its engineers. The attacker allegedly used the device to access an internal system and execute unauthorized withdrawals.

The company has temporarily halted all deposits and withdrawals while security teams investigate the incident, secure wallet infrastructure and trace the affected funds.

With approximately 335 million registered users worldwide and $162.8 billion in assets under custody, according to its 2025 annual report, Binance occupies a central position in the global cryptocurrency industry.

Bitcoin and ether tumble as investors reassess crypto risks

News of the breach triggered an immediate selloff across cryptocurrency markets during early Asian trading Friday.

Bitcoin fell more than 3% to $76,368, its lowest level in six weeks, while ether declined more than 3% to a two-month low of $2,178.

BNB, the cryptocurrency originally launched as Binance Coin, dropped 5% over the preceding 24 hours to approximately $709.70, according to CoinGecko.

The impact extended to publicly traded cryptocurrency companies. Shares of US-based exchange Coinbase Global declined 4.8% in extended trading, while bitcoin-focused company Strategy fell nearly 6%.

Industry analysts warned that the incident could undermine investor confidence in centralized cryptocurrency exchanges, particularly as digital assets were already facing pressure from elevated US interest rates and weakening demand from exchange-traded fund investors.

Tim Sun, a senior researcher at Hong Kong-based HashKey Group, said the breach could further weaken investors’ appetite for risk and encourage greater scrutiny of exchange security, financial stability and liquidity.

Aravind Srinivasan, head of systematic over-the-counter trading at cryptocurrency market maker GSR, described the incident as the largest hack in history.

Blockchain analytics firm Chainalysis and other industry specialists also indicated that the reported losses could make the attack the biggest cryptocurrency heist on record.

Crypto companies coordinate efforts to freeze stolen assets

Several major cryptocurrency companies have joined efforts to identify and freeze assets linked to the breach.

Stablecoin issuer Tether said it had frozen nearly $1.57 billion in affected funds, while Circle reported freezing more than $800 million.

Ripple also froze approximately $200 million, according to Binance’s Yi He.

World Liberty Financial, a cryptocurrency company linked to US President Donald Trump and his family, said it had coordinated with digital asset custodian BitGo to freeze funds associated with the incident.

Yi said approximately $27 million in stablecoins and another $2 million worth of World Liberty tokens had been frozen.

Binance maintains a Secure Asset Fund for Users, a reserve held entirely in bitcoin and designed to protect customer assets in the event of security breaches.

The company has not specified how much of that reserve would be needed to compensate users.

The attack adds to growing concerns over cryptocurrency security. According to blockchain research firm TRM Labs, hackers stole approximately $2.9 billion across nearly 150 cryptocurrency attacks last year.

In September, rival exchange Bitget reported the theft of roughly $350 million in digital assets.

Bernardo Brites, CEO of payments and stablecoin infrastructure company Trace Finance, warned that increasingly sophisticated hacking techniques, including the use of artificial intelligence to identify vulnerabilities, were making digital asset platforms harder to protect.

He suggested that the latest incident could accelerate a shift away from smaller exchanges that lack sufficient financial reserves to absorb major losses.

Binance.US, a separate cryptocurrency exchange, said it was unaffected by the breach. Coinbase also confirmed that its systems were not affected.

As investigators work to trace the remaining assets, the incident presents another major test of the cryptocurrency industry’s ability to safeguard customer funds and maintain confidence in centralized trading platforms.

(Source: Reuters)

L

ula won Brazil’s presidential election, but Congress shifted to the right. Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party will hold 121 of the 513 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 28 of the 81 Senate seats, while the left will hold 124 seats in the lower house and 16 in the Senate. Lula secured the presidency, but he will have to govern alongside a more right-leaning Congress. Although the Workers’ Party has never secured a majority, the strengthening of its opponents will make building the support necessary to implement its agenda more difficult and politically costly.

Lula da Silva has made history in Brazilian democracy, both by securing a fourth presidential term and by becoming the first president to win a runoff election after finishing second in the first round.

In the October 4 first round, he trailed his rival, Flávio Bolsonaro, by 2.2 million votes. On October 25, however, he received 64.25 million votes, defeating Bolsonaro by approximately 4.4 million votes. The message from the ballot box is clear, but it has its limits: Winning the presidency does not mean gaining control over every center of power in the country. Although voters have given Lula a mandate to govern, doing so without negotiation and compromise will not be easy.

How did Lula achieve victory?

First, voter turnout played a decisive role. The abstention rate fell from 21.1 percent to approximately 19 percent, meaning that nearly three million fewer voters stayed home. Between the two rounds, Lula gained 10.3 million additional votes, while Flávio Bolsonaro gained only 3.6 million.

Second, Lula made important geographical gains. Following his October 4 defeat, he established two priorities: expanding his electoral base in the northeast and reducing voter abstention. He increased his vote total in the northeast from 21.4 million to 24.4 million and reclaimed Minas Gerais, the only state to switch sides, with 50.4 percent of the vote.

Third, his campaign successfully combined street-level mobilization with digital organizing. Large rallies were complemented by a digital army coordinated by lawmaker André Janones through the WhatsApp group “Exército do Lula” (Lula’s Army), which brought together approximately 11 million people.

Lula also introduced voter-friendly economic promises, including exempting gasoline from federal taxes, debt forgiveness for microbusiness owners, and an expansion of the Pé-de-Meia program. At the same time, he warned that Flávio would cut social spending and surrender Brazil’s sovereignty to Trump.

The more difficult question is how much of Lula’s victory reflected genuine support for his political agenda and how much resulted from opposition to the return of Bolsonarism. Initial analyses emphasize voter mobilization and grassroots organization. Concern about a possible Flávio victory was probably just as influential as enthusiasm for Lula himself.

Lula holds the Presidency, but the right gains strength in Congress

Lula won the presidency, but Congress shifted to the right. Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party (PL) will hold 121 of the 513 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 28 of the 81 Senate seats, while the left will hold 124 seats in the lower house and 16 in the Senate.

Lula will therefore have to govern alongside a more right-leaning Congress. Although the Workers’ Party (PT) has never secured a parliamentary majority, the strengthening of its opponents will make assembling the support required to implement its agenda more difficult and politically costly.

In the Chamber of Deputies, Centrão will play a crucial role in forming a majority. An informal political grouping composed predominantly of centrist and center-right parties, Centrão is known for its pragmatism and its practice of negotiating political support in exchange for influence over ministries, government appointments, and budgetary resources.

Hugo Motta, the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies and one of Centrão’s central figures, has already secured the support of 273 lawmakers, exceeding the 257 votes required for his reelection. However, this support does not automatically translate into votes for the government.

Passing budgets and reforms through Congress will force Lula into political negotiations, potentially requiring concessions on his policy agenda. Nevertheless, the outlook is not entirely pessimistic: Motta’s rapprochement with Lula during the election campaign could create room for compromise.

Lula will also face a more conservative Senate, where he must negotiate support for his reforms and government appointments. The election of the Senate president will be particularly important because it will determine who controls the legislative agenda and the pace of voting.

Moreover, upcoming vacancies on the Supreme Federal Court resulting from judicial retirements will make the Senate a key arena in the struggle over Brazil’s institutional balance.

Has Bolsonarism been defeated?

Flávio lost the presidency, but Bolsonarism retains considerable political strength. He received more than 59 million votes, while the Liberal Party (PL), despite lacking an outright majority, will become the largest individual party in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. According to a count conducted by local media, 16 of the elected governors supported his candidacy.

Following his defeat, Flávio announced that he would not recognize the result and would seek to annul the election.

His main argument centered on Supreme Federal Court Justice Cristiano Zanin’s decision to extend voting by two hours because of reported transportation difficulties, particularly in Salvador and São Paulo. Zanin had previously served as Lula’s lawyer.

The extension applied only to polling stations that remained open; those that had already closed were not reopened. It should also be noted that both campaigns had requested extensions, although their requests concerned different geographical areas.

The decision, described by the media as unprecedented, sparked legal debate, and the Electoral Public Prosecutor’s Office opposed extending voting hours.

However, the controversy does not, in itself, demonstrate that irregularities affected the election result. The president of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) confirmed that the process was secure, while the presidents of both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies recognized Lula’s victory.

A

wave of youth-led demonstrations is sweeping across Europe, with Generation Z protesters taking to the streets to demand affordable housing, better education, economic opportunities and political accountability, as growing frustration with established leadership fuels an increasingly influential movement.

Thousands of young demonstrators have mobilized across France, Italy, Belgium and Albania, while student-led protests in Serbia culminated in the electoral defeat of longtime leader Aleksandar Vucic following nearly two years of demonstrations.

Further protests are scheduled in Germany this weekend, highlighting the expanding geographical reach of a movement driven by young Europeans who say their governments have repeatedly ignored their concerns.

In Brussels, 19-year-old student Maya Gourdel has joined demonstrators demanding improvements to education and living conditions, adopting protest slogans inspired by the film The Hunger Games.

For many participants, the demonstrations represent more than frustration over individual government policies. They reflect a broader sense that younger generations are being denied economic security and meaningful opportunities.

Rising living costs and deteriorating schools fuel youth anger

Economic pressures have emerged as a central driver of the demonstrations, particularly among students facing expensive housing, limited employment prospects and deteriorating public services.

A European Union survey published in 2025 found that rising prices and living costs concerned 40% of people aged between 16 and 30.

Among the 92.7 million EU residents facing poverty or social exclusion that year, young adults aged 18 to 24 recorded the highest risk, at 26.3%, compared with 18.8% among people aged 65 and older.

In Italy, 21-year-old student Chiara described the protests as an expression of accumulated frustration with a political establishment that has failed to provide younger generations with a credible future.

She pointed to schools suffering from teacher shortages and deteriorating buildings, alongside the prospect of poorly paid employment and increasingly unaffordable accommodation.

Similar grievances have emerged in France, where 17-year-old student Bilal Narjissi criticized conditions at his school near Paris, citing previous rat infestations and an incident in which students were evacuated after a roof collapsed into a courtyard.

The demonstrations have occasionally escalated into violence, particularly in France, where thousands of businesses have reportedly been damaged or looted in recent weeks.

Police have deployed water cannons and stun grenades during confrontations with protesters.

The unrest has also intensified debate over generational inequality in government spending.

According to French think tank OFCE, people older than 60 represent approximately one-quarter of France’s population but own 60% of the country’s wealth.

A French government report published in October found that pension expenditure increased by 2.5 percentage points of GDP between 2000 and 2023, while education spending declined by half a percentage point.

Serbia’s political upheaval inspires protesters across Europe

Serbia has provided the movement with its most significant political victory so far, after student-led demonstrations helped bring an end to Vucic’s longstanding leadership through parliamentary elections.

The outcome followed nearly two years of protests against perceived corruption and authoritarianism.

Student protester Stasa Piletic described the election result as a moment of relief and victory, although the movement now faces the challenge of translating protest momentum into effective governance.

Elsewhere, Albania has witnessed growing demonstrations against Prime Minister Edi Rama’s government over allegations of corruption, inadequate education and limited employment opportunities.

Xyke Kurti, a 19-year-old architecture student, criticized the government for failing to respond to protesters’ demands, arguing that many young Albanians increasingly see their futures outside the country.

In Belgium, Gourdel similarly accused political leaders of ignoring peaceful appeals until demonstrations became more confrontational and attracted media attention.

The expanding movement illustrates a growing generational divide across Europe, with young people questioning whether existing political institutions can adequately address their economic and social concerns.

As further demonstrations approach in Germany, Europe’s governments face increasing pressure to respond to a generation demanding not only immediate financial relief but also meaningful influence over decisions shaping its future.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he year 2026 became one of the major turning points in Iran’s history. The war, which intensified with joint US-Israeli airstrikes on Tehran on the morning of February 28, profoundly affected the political future of the Middle East and the balance of power in the region. Yet the Iranian people bore the war’s most severe social consequences. They experienced the conflict amid exhaustion and frustration caused by years of political developments, street protests that resulted in loss of life, economic crises and deepening polarization. To assess the impact of the war on Iranian society, it is first necessary to examine the social environment created by these developments in Iran.

Developments from 2009 to the Rouhani era

Although opposition movements had existed in Iran since the 1978 revolution, the 2009 presidential election and the protests that followed marked a major turning point in the public’s attitude toward politics and authority. At the time, a large majority of the population still believed that change and reform were possible. Allegations of electoral fraud, however, triggered months of protests, and for the first time the Islamic regime,including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei,was directly targeted by slogans. It should nevertheless be noted that the slogans of that period were much less intense than those heard today, and most did not challenge the foundations of the regime.

In the following years, despite mounting sanctions, a deteriorating economy and increasing pressure on opponents, a significant segment of society was not entirely opposed to the foundations of the regime. Against this backdrop, Hassan Rouhani, the reformists’ candidate, was elected president on expectations of change in the economy, mandatory hijab regulations and foreign relations. For many opponents, however, the Rouhani era also became a period in which hopes for reform were exhausted. A broad segment of society came to believe that a president like Rouhani was not necessarily lacking the will to pursue reform, but that Iran’s political structure prevented him from implementing it.

The core base of regime supporters, meanwhile, remained loyal to the government and the revolutionary leadership despite all the difficulties. Although a significant portion of this group shifted toward the opposition over the years, bloody protests and declining mutual tolerance deepened the divide between the two camps. Opponents accused regime supporters of backwardness and radical religiosity, while regime supporters accused opponents of treason and of serving as agents of foreign powers.

The death of Mahsa Amini in 2022 led to changes that had developed gradually in Iran and ultimately amounted to a quiet revolution in social life. The hijab requirement, which had been mandatory for decades and remained a constant issue on the national agenda, was largely abandoned by opposition-minded segments of society following the incident, although not officially. In cities such as Tehran, Isfahan, Rasht and Tabriz, women began demonstrating the courage to go outside without wearing the hijab. The process, during which hundreds of people lost their lives, became one of the largest expressions of accumulated social anger against practices such as mandatory hijab rules and the morality police.

From the 2025 protests to the 2026 war

By 2025, Iran had been severely weakened by high inflation, a rising exchange rate, reports of corruption and increasing political pressure. Demonstrations that began in Tehran at the end of December to protest worsening economic conditions quickly spread across the country. The protests, however, were met with one of the harshest crackdowns in Iran’s recent history. Iranian opposition sources and some foreign media outlets reported that more than 30,000 people had been killed, although official Iranian sources gave considerably lower figures. For many opponents, these events became an irreversible turning point.

The US-Israeli attacks that began a month after these bloody events made the divisions within society even more visible. In the course of our reporting, many Iranian opponents with whom we spoke said that years of accumulated anger toward the government,particularly the harsh crackdown on the latest protests,had convinced them that supporting the attacks was the only way to fight the regime. Regime supporters, meanwhile, maintained their backing for the new leadership despite the profound shock caused by the death of the revolutionary leader on the first day of the war, while expressing intense anger toward opponents who supported the US attacks.

The impact of the war on Iranian society

The Iranian people entered the February 2026 war carrying heavy problems and deep social wounds that had accumulated over many years. While the regime and its supporters were troubled by Iran’s loss of influence in the Middle East, opponents did not believe that there was any way out of the crises facing the country.

One of the possibilities that most frightened the public during the war was the damage or destruction of infrastructure and vital oil and energy facilities. A complete internet blackout lasting more than two months, daily increases in the prices of basic necessities, uncertainty about the country’s future, and waking up to the sound of bombardments severely affected the mental health of a society that had already accumulated years of trauma.

Since the beginning of the war, one of the greatest concerns expressed by many Iranians with whom we spoke both in Türkiye and Iran has been the uncertainty surrounding the country’s future. Sudden fluctuations in the exchange rate and the closure of trade routes have disrupted the operations of many businesses while making it increasingly difficult for people to make a living. From food and housing rents to automobile prices, it has become difficult even to speak of a price remaining stable for a full week. Opposition groups have reacted angrily to the continued allocation of national resources to military activities such as the missile program and to regional proxy forces such as Hezbollah while the population is struggling under these conditions. Indeed, during negotiations with the United States in April, demands that Israel withdraw from the territories it had occupied in Lebanon and end its attacks on Hezbollah were criticized by opponents as an indication that Iran’s fate was being tied to that of other countries and groups.

Against this backdrop, the internet shutdowns deserve particular attention. As mentioned above, Iran had already experienced nationwide internet restrictions during previous protests. But beginning in February, for the first time, communication with the outside world was completely cut off for more than two months. Internet access was unavailable except through Starlink and paid VPN/proxy services. Some Iranians identified as Starlink users were also subjected to demands for execution or severe punishment on espionage charges. For many Iranians who already felt isolated from the world, losing all communication with the outside world during the difficult days of the war made the situation even harder.

The scale of the social and economic difficulties becomes clearer when tens of thousands of online businesses whose activities were brought to a standstill by the internet shutdown are considered alongside other businesses forced to suspend operations because of the war, resulting in further unemployment.

Deepening social polarization under the shadow of war

One of the common factors bringing together different segments of Iranian society is a sense of patriotism and nationalism. Regardless of their ethnic origins or political views, the importance they attach to their Iranian identity and the territorial integrity of the country is clearly visible in their words and actions. Throughout the war, however, this sentiment has also led regime supporters and opponents to accuse one another of treason, particularly on social media.

For regime supporters, defending or supporting attacks by the enemy,the United States and Israel,is an unforgivable act of treason regardless of the justification. For opponents, however, the existing political order must be dismantled in order to protect their country’s future, and the only way to achieve this is to support attacks targeting the regime. Statements of support from US and Israeli officials toward the Iranian people, as well as assurances that civilians would not be targeted, were welcomed and defended by opposition groups. This helped foster a belief and hope among some opponents that the war would end with the regime’s downfall without causing harm to civilians or infrastructure.

Some Iranian officials, meanwhile, had hoped that an external attack would unite society, as happened during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s. Yet in the more than four decades since then, Iran’s social dynamics, as well as public expectations and demands, have changed considerably. Moreover, the fractures that have emerged between different segments of society have become too deep to be repaired quickly or easily.

Regime supporters have, of course, also been affected by the negative consequences of the war described above and continue to suffer from them. Yet for this segment of society, preserving the government’s existence outweighs the hardships being experienced. Many say they are prepared, if necessary, to fight and make sacrifices with all their strength, both inside and outside the country.

Particularly during the first days of the war, this group gathered every night in the main squares of almost all cities, staging a continuous display of strength for months. This was a powerful message both to opponents supporting US and Israeli attacks and to enemy forces. Opposition groups, however, argued that these gatherings and demonstrations did nothing to improve the country’s or the war’s deteriorating situation, while instead disrupting daily life and wasting national resources. Opposition Persian-language channels broadcasting from Europe and the United States also reported allegations that citizens participating in the demonstrations were being provided with financial incentives. Ultimately, although the regime’s efforts strengthened the ranks of its supporters, they failed to create reconciliation between the different segments of society.

I

sraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared that overthrowing Iran’s government remains Israel’s primary objective, raising the prospect of another military confrontation with Tehran despite growing doubts over whether Israel possesses the capabilities or international backing needed to achieve regime change.

Netanyahu’s remarks come ahead of Israel’s national elections next week, as his government faces declining public support and mounting questions about its regional security strategy.

The Israeli leader reiterated his position following discussions with US President Donald Trump on Sunday and a visit to Israel by US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.

However, there has been no indication that Washington has agreed to participate in another offensive against Iran, particularly one explicitly intended to remove its political leadership.

Military analysts say Israel retains considerable offensive capabilities and could inflict substantial damage on Iranian military infrastructure. But they question whether air strikes, covert operations and cyberattacks could translate into the collapse of Tehran’s government.

Military superiority does not guarantee regime change

Israel has demonstrated its ability to strike targets deep inside Iranian territory, supported by advanced weapons systems, intelligence capabilities and aerial refueling assets.

Urban Coningham, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), said Israel could potentially reestablish air superiority and launch another campaign against Iranian targets.

Nevertheless, analysts distinguish between weakening a country’s military capabilities and removing its political leadership.

Netanyahu has portrayed Iran as a major security threat since his first term as prime minister in 1996, repeatedly advocating international action against Tehran.

The United States eventually joined Israeli military operations against Iran in June 2025 and participated again in the campaign launched on February 28, 2026.

Despite those interventions, Iran’s government remained in power.

Netanyahu himself acknowledged the limitations of aerial bombardment in March, suggesting that overthrowing the Iranian leadership would require a ground component.

Caglar Kurc, an assistant professor at Abdullah Gul University in Türkiye, said air strikes could weaken Iran’s military infrastructure without completely eliminating its capacity to retaliate.

He argued that achieving regime change would require deploying troops and maintaining a military presence inside Iran for years, a commitment Israel would struggle to sustain.

Experts also questioned whether intelligence operations or support for armed opposition groups could provide a viable alternative.

Although Israel retains intelligence networks inside Iran, deploying covert assets risks exposing them to Iranian counterintelligence operations.

Similarly, Kurdish and Baloch armed groups are not considered capable of independently defeating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Iran retains retaliatory capabilities as US support remains uncertain

A renewed Israeli offensive would also carry substantial military and economic risks.

Sidharth Kaushal, a senior RUSI research fellow, said Iran likely retains significant missile stockpiles despite damage sustained during previous confrontations.

Its antiship missile capabilities remain particularly important, supported by domestic production and mountainous terrain that provides natural protection against aerial attacks.

Iran could also exploit the financial imbalance between inexpensive offensive drones and the considerably more expensive interceptor systems used by Israel.

Previous exchanges have already depleted portions of Israel’s interceptor inventories, potentially complicating its ability to sustain defensive operations during another prolonged confrontation.

Washington’s willingness to participate represents another major uncertainty.

According to a Financial Times report this week, an Israeli proposal for renewed strikes failed to secure Trump’s approval, although the disagreement did not necessarily rule out future American involvement.

With US midterm elections approaching, Trump faces domestic political pressure to avoid another escalation.

Without American participation, Israel would also lack access to certain specialized military capabilities, including the massive GBU-57 bunker-busting bombs deployed by US B-2 bombers against Iran’s Fordow and Natanz nuclear facilities in June 2025.

Analysts suggest Tehran could respond to an independent Israeli offensive by concentrating retaliatory strikes on Israel while avoiding American military installations and disruption to the Strait of Hormuz.

Such an approach could allow Iran to impose significant costs on Israel while reducing the likelihood of direct US intervention.

Ultimately, experts argue that Netanyahu faces a fundamental strategic obstacle: Israel may possess the military power to severely damage Iran, but destroying infrastructure and military installations does not necessarily create the conditions required to overthrow an established government.

Without a credible ground strategy, sustained international backing and a viable political alternative inside Iran, Netanyahu’s declared objective of regime change remains far more difficult to achieve than another round of devastating military strikes.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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lobal debt has surged beyond $365 trillion, placing governments under mounting financial pressure as rising interest payments consume public budgets and intensify economic frustration across Europe, where hundreds of thousands of protesters have taken to the streets demanding relief from soaring living costs.

According to the Institute of International Finance (IIF), worldwide debt held by governments, businesses and households increased by approximately $10 trillion during the first half of 2026, reaching a level equivalent to roughly $44,000 for every person on the planet.

The unprecedented debt burden comes as major economies face increasingly expensive borrowing conditions, forcing governments to allocate greater portions of their budgets to interest payments rather than public services.

The consequences have become particularly visible in France, where nationwide demonstrations over living costs, stagnant wages, unaffordable housing and underfunded education have highlighted growing dissatisfaction with the country’s economic direction.

More than 550,000 people participated in demonstrations across France on Saturday, according to the Interior Ministry, following weeks of student-led protests.

Similar demonstrations have erupted in Belgium, Italy and Portugal. While many gatherings remained peaceful, some descended into clashes, looting and fires.

France faces mounting debt crisis as borrowing costs surge

France has emerged as a major source of concern in European financial markets, with its government borrowing costs reaching their highest level since 2002.

The country currently pays approximately 5% to borrow money through 10-year government bonds, considerably higher than Germany’s 3.41%.

More strikingly, French borrowing costs have surpassed those of Italy and Greece, two countries that experienced severe financial difficulties during the eurozone sovereign debt crisis.

Only the United Kingdom, which operates outside the eurozone, currently faces higher borrowing costs among the major European economies examined.

The widening gap between French and German bond yields reflects investors demanding greater compensation for lending to Paris amid concerns about its fiscal outlook.

France’s public debt has reached approximately $4.2 trillion, equivalent to 118.5% of its gross domestic product, placing it fifth globally in absolute government debt.

The International Monetary Fund projects that France’s debt could climb to 121.8% of GDP by 2030, further complicating efforts to stabilize public finances.

Rising bond yields carry significant consequences for government spending.

When countries issue debt at higher interest rates, they must devote more resources to servicing their financial obligations, potentially leaving less funding available for hospitals, education, infrastructure and pensions.

Governments facing such pressures may eventually be forced to increase taxation, reduce public expenditure or borrow even more money.

The situation has revived memories of Europe’s sovereign debt crisis between 2010 and 2012, when soaring borrowing costs pushed countries including Ireland and Portugal into international financial assistance programs.

Global interest payments exceed annual defense spending

The debt challenge extends far beyond Europe.

The United States remains the world’s largest government debtor, with outstanding public debt reaching approximately $41.4 trillion, equivalent to 127% of its economy.

China follows with $22.5 trillion, or 104% of GDP, while Japan holds $8.7 trillion in government debt and has the highest debt-to-GDP ratio among major economies, at approximately 199%.

The United Kingdom’s government debt stands at $4.4 trillion, representing 102% of GDP, while Italy owes approximately $3.7 trillion, equivalent to 138% of its economy.

Germany, by comparison, carries $3.5 trillion in public debt, representing a significantly lower 65% of GDP.

The mounting financial obligations are accompanied by an increasingly expensive global interest bill.

Advanced economies paid more than $3.3 trillion in interest on government bonds over the past year, exceeding estimated annual worldwide spending on defense, artificial intelligence and clean energy individually.

Global defense expenditure stood at approximately $3.1 trillion, compared with $2.6 trillion for artificial intelligence and $2.3 trillion for clean energy.

The growing cost of servicing debt is also likely to affect households, as higher government borrowing costs can contribute to increased interest rates on mortgages, vehicle financing and consumer credit.

For policymakers, the challenge is balancing fiscal sustainability against growing public demands for economic relief.

With governments facing pressure to reduce deficits while citizens demand greater investment in essential services, the global debt surge is becoming not only a financial concern but an increasingly significant political challenge.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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housands of students and teachers marched through central Athens on Wednesday, demanding affordable housing, increased education funding and government action to address soaring living costs, as a widening wave of economic protests continued to spread across Europe.

The demonstrations, which also took place in several other Greek cities, including Thessaloniki and the western port city of Patras, reflect growing frustration over rising household expenses, deteriorating school conditions and the financial pressures facing university students.

Protesters carrying banners and placards marched through the Greek capital, accusing the country’s conservative government of failing to adequately support students and educators amid mounting economic difficulties.

One banner reading “From Greece to France, give money to education” highlighted the growing connection between demonstrations taking place across the continent.

Other protesters carried signs written in French declaring, “To study or to survive,” underscoring concerns that rising living expenses are forcing young people to choose between pursuing their education and meeting basic financial needs.

The protests come amid widespread demonstrations across several European countries, where rising fuel prices, stagnant incomes and increasingly unaffordable housing have intensified public dissatisfaction.

France has witnessed particularly significant unrest, with some demonstrations descending into violent clashes, while similar protests have also taken place in Italy and Albania.

Students demand affordable housing and greater government support

Housing affordability emerged as one of the central grievances among Greek students, many of whom say existing government assistance falls far short of covering their accommodation expenses.

Panagiotis Moschonas, a 20-year-old engineering student participating in the Athens demonstration, criticized the government for failing to introduce meaningful measures to address the financial difficulties facing university students.

He pointed specifically to the government’s student housing subsidy, arguing that the assistance was insufficient and poorly structured.

According to Moschonas, students receive a monthly rent subsidy of 120 euros, approximately $135, which does not even cover half the cost of accommodation.

He also criticized the fact that the subsidy is distributed at the end of the year rather than when students face their monthly rental obligations.

The complaints reflect broader concerns among young Europeans who are increasingly struggling to secure affordable accommodation while pursuing higher education.

Beyond housing, demonstrators called for greater public investment in schools and universities, arguing that education budgets have failed to keep pace with rising costs and growing institutional needs.

Wednesday’s demonstrations were accompanied by a teachers’ strike, although some schools remained open despite the industrial action.

Educators said worsening working conditions and financial pressures on their families had made further collective action necessary.

Teacher Ioannis Rompas said the strike reflected growing frustration among education workers who were struggling to cope with everyday expenses while witnessing the continuing deterioration of public schools.

“Today we are striking because this situation can’t continue for our families,” Rompas said, citing high living costs and the increasing difficulty of making ends meet.

He warned that conditions in schools were deteriorating significantly year after year, adding to the pressure facing teachers and students alike.

Police deployed as European protest movement widens

Greek authorities maintained a significant security presence throughout Wednesday’s demonstrations, with riot police closely monitoring protesters as they moved through central Athens.

Officers conducted spot checks and searched bags belonging to people approaching the demonstration areas.

Businesses along the protest route also took precautionary measures, with several shops and cafes lowering steel shutters to protect their premises against potential damage.

The security arrangements reflected concerns over possible violence, given that demonstrations in Greece have previously escalated into confrontations between protesters and police.

The latest mobilization comes as governments across Europe face mounting pressure to address the consequences of rising living expenses and public dissatisfaction with spending priorities.

Students and teachers have become increasingly prominent in the demonstrations, arguing that education and affordable housing should receive greater government attention.

The coordinated grievances emerging across national borders suggest that economic frustration is developing into a broader political challenge for European governments.

For Greek demonstrators, Wednesday’s march delivered a clear message: existing financial assistance and education policies are no longer sufficient to address the growing pressures facing students, teachers and their families.

With similar protests continuing elsewhere in Europe, the demonstrations in Athens highlight how rising living costs are increasingly translating into public demands for changes in government spending and social policy.

(Source: ABC News)

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rtificial intelligence has spent a decade being sold as a technology story: smarter language models, autonomous agents, unprecedented productivity. But the more consequential story is financial. AI has become one of the largest capital-allocation cycles in modern economic history.

Capital is pouring into data centers, chip fabrication plants, cloud infrastructure, power generation, grid upgrades, energy storage, and cooling systems. Governments call AI a strategic priority. Technology giants call it a competitive necessity. Investors call it a once-in-a-generation opportunity. The logic is simple: if AI transforms business processes and creates new industries, today’s infrastructure will earn handsome returns tomorrow.

But a technology can transform an economy and still disappoint many of the investors who financed its early buildout. The central question is not whether AI will change the world; it almost certainly will. It is whether the revenues, productivity gains, and cash flows AI generates will justify the scale of money being spent, and whether they will arrive on time.

AI has become a macro story

Major technologies have always demanded heavy infrastructure spending long before the benefits showed up. Railroads, electrification, and the internet all reshaped economies. Each was also accompanied by exuberance, misallocated capital, and overinvestment. The internet changed global commerce, yet countless dot-com companies vanished because expectations outran economic reality.

Today’s cycle rhymes with that history, with one important difference. AI is not just software in the cloud. It depends on high-performance chips, hyperscale data centers, reliable electricity, fast connectivity, advanced cooling, and constant hardware refreshes. That makes it an industrial-scale investment theme, and capital-intensive stories are shaped not only by innovation but also by financing conditions, utilization rates, and return on invested capital.

The scale is extraordinary. Technology companies are spending hundreds of billions of dollars on AI capabilities. Utilities are planning capacity expansions to meet rising electricity demand. Chipmakers are racing to add production. Institutional investors are deploying record sums into digital infrastructure.

The effects reach well beyond tech. Engineering firms are winning construction contracts, energy developers are seeing demand for new generation, equipment makers are expanding, and banks are financing ever-larger projects. In that sense, AI has become a genuine growth engine.

But spending is not the same as profitability. Investors often confuse capital deployment with value creation. Building infrastructure generates economic activity today; earning an acceptable return on it is a separate challenge entirely.

The capital intensity problem

Every investment cycle eventually faces four questions: How much capital is required? Who provides it? What returns will it earn? And when will those returns arrive?

For AI, the answers are demanding. Data centers require enormous upfront investment and large operating budgets. High-performance hardware consumes vast amounts of electricity, needs sophisticated cooling, and can become obsolete within a few years. The initial outlay is only the beginning: companies must keep upgrading equipment, replacing aging chips, adding capacity, and running specialized operations. Financing costs, depreciation, utilization, and customer demand all become critical variables.

Governments worldwide are carrying elevated debt and facing fiscal pressure. There is no certainty that AI investment will push interest rates higher or crowd out other spending, but the interplay between public borrowing, private investment demand, and infrastructure constraints deserves attention. If the cost of capital stays structurally higher than investors expect, many AI valuations will face tougher scrutiny.

This matters most for companies whose market values rest on earnings expected many years out. When expectations are stretched, small changes in discount rates, growth assumptions, or margins can move valuations dramatically.

The gap between innovation and monetization

The biggest risk to the AI thesis may not be technological failure. It may be a timing mismatch between spending and returns. Markets often assume breakthroughs translate automatically into economic success. They rarely do.

Organizations typically need years to redesign workflows, integrate new systems, retrain employees, address cybersecurity risks, modernize legacy infrastructure, and adapt operating models. Many firms will adopt AI tools quickly. Fewer will transform their processes. Fewer still will achieve measurable economic benefits at scale.

That is the monetization challenge. Businesses may use AI extensively without generating enough new revenue to support today’s infrastructure spending. Consumers may enjoy AI-powered products while intense competition among producers holds profits down. We have seen this before: industries create enormous value for society yet earn only modest returns for investors. The gap between economic value creation and shareholder value creation is routinely underestimated.

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merican President Donald Trump’s approval rating has fallen to the lowest level of either of his presidential terms, according to a new Reuters/Ipsos poll, as mounting economic concerns and rising gasoline prices threaten to undermine Republican prospects in November’s crucial congressional elections.

The survey, released Monday, found that just 31% of Americans approve of Trump’s performance in office, down one percentage point from two weeks earlier and marking a new low for the president.

The findings come ahead of the November 3 midterm elections, when voters will determine whether Republicans retain control of the House of Representatives and Senate during the final two years of Trump’s presidency.

Democrats have opened their largest lead of the current election cycle, with 47% of registered voters saying they would support Democratic congressional candidates compared with 35% backing Republicans.

The 12-percentage-point advantage represents a significant widening from the previous Reuters/Ipsos survey, conducted two weeks earlier, which showed Democrats leading Republicans by seven points, 44% to 37%.

The results suggest Republicans face an increasingly difficult political environment as voters express frustration with the administration’s handling of the economy and the financial consequences of the war involving Iran.

Women voters drive widening Democratic advantage

One of the most significant findings of the latest survey is the growing preference for Democratic candidates among women, a voting bloc that could prove decisive in determining control of Congress.

According to the poll, 50% of female registered voters said they would support Democrats, compared with 32% who favored Republicans, giving the opposition party an 18-point advantage among women.

Male voters also leaned toward Democrats, although by a narrower margin.

The shift has helped Democrats expand their nationwide congressional lead at a time when Republicans are attempting to defend their majorities in both chambers.

A Democratic victory in either the House or Senate would significantly complicate Trump’s legislative agenda, potentially limiting his ability to advance key domestic policies and exposing his administration to greater congressional scrutiny.

However, national polling does not necessarily translate directly into election results.

The congressional generic ballot measures voters’ overall party preferences rather than support for individual candidates in specific races.

Control of Congress will ultimately depend on hundreds of district-level contests and individual Senate races, where electoral geography and Republican structural advantages could influence the outcome despite Democrats’ national lead.

Nevertheless, the widening gap signals a potentially challenging political landscape for the president’s party as the campaign enters its final stretch.

Economic frustration weighs heavily on Trump

The latest polling suggests economic dissatisfaction has become a major vulnerability for the White House, particularly following the sharp increase in gasoline prices linked to the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran launched in February.

The conflict has placed additional pressure on American households, with higher fuel costs contributing to broader concerns about living expenses.

According to the survey, 68% of Americans disapprove of Trump’s handling of the economy, including 37% of respondents who identify as Republicans.

The findings indicate that dissatisfaction with the administration’s economic performance extends beyond traditional Democratic voters and has begun affecting confidence within Trump’s own political base.

When asked which party would better manage the economy, 40% of respondents selected Democrats, compared with 33% who favored Republicans.

That finding presents another warning sign for the White House, given the importance of economic issues in shaping voter attitudes ahead of congressional elections.

Trump’s declining popularity also follows months of political controversy surrounding his administration’s foreign policy decisions, particularly the military campaign against Iran and its consequences for global energy markets.

With Republicans facing the possibility of losing one or both chambers of Congress, the November elections are emerging as a critical test of public confidence in Trump’s leadership.

The Reuters/Ipsos survey was conducted online over four days and gathered responses from 1,679 American adults, including 1,279 registered voters.

Its margin of error was two percentage points for all respondents and three percentage points for registered voters.

While the poll represents a snapshot of public opinion rather than a prediction of election results, its findings highlight the scale of the political challenge confronting Republicans.

With Election Day approaching, Democrats appear increasingly positioned to capitalize on voter dissatisfaction, while Trump faces mounting pressure to convince Americans that his administration can address their economic concerns.

(Source: Reuters)

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ith less than three weeks before the midterm elections, Republicans have largely given up hope for a last-minute game-changer that will rescue their political fortunes. Instead, GOP candidates across the country are taking matters into their own hands, seeking distance from President Donald Trump’s most controversial policies to save their campaigns.

Faced with steep economic headwinds and low presidential approval ratings, Republican candidates in competitive Senate and House races are publicly dissenting from White House stances on trade, foreign policy, and energy. On Friday, Michigan Senate nominee Mike Rogers and Alaska Sen. Dan Sullivan became the latest high-profile Republicans to break ranks, voicing sharp opposition to an administration deal allowing diesel imports from Russia.

“You just don’t want to give that guy an inch,” Rogers told reporters ahead of an event in Michigan. Rogers argued for a temporary ban on diesel exports—an approach the White House considered but ultimately rejected—rather than relying on foreign imports from Moscow.

In Alaska, Sullivan’s office struck a similar tone. Nate Adams, a spokesperson for Sullivan, said the senator “believes American energy dominance is the answer to high prices, and that means producing more of it in Alaska, for Alaskans, by Alaskans, not importing it from Russia.”

A growing movement of dissent

The cracks in party unity extend far beyond fuel policy. Across several key battlegrounds, candidates are recalibrating their messaging to address local voter frustration over high costs and international friction:

• Foreign Policy & Conflict: In Iowa and Ohio, Senate candidate Rep. Ashley Hinson and Sen. Jon Husted have called for a prompt resolution to the ongoing war in Iran, pointing out that voters are feeling the strain at the pump and the grocery store.
• Agriculture & Trade: In Kansas, Sen. Roger Marshall publicly expressed frustration over administration plans to import foreign beef, a move aimed at lowering consumer prices that has angered domestic cattle ranchers. Meanwhile, Rogers released a campaign ad urging an end to the ongoing trade war with Canada.
• Immigration & Domestic Policy: In Florida, Rep. María Salazar criticized the administration’s broader deportation push, warning that certain policies go too far.

While midterms historically test the governing party, the current dynamic is particularly striking under Trump, whose political brand has long demanded absolute loyalty. Yet seasoned party strategists note that self-preservation has taken precedence.

“There’s been a little bit of a reset across the country where Republicans are saying what they want to say and less worried about repercussions,” said Ari Fleischer, former White House press secretary under President George W. Bush.

Kitchen-table pressures and White House reaction

The strategic shift reflects broader economic anxiety. Key metrics—including gas prices hovering well above $4 a gallon, elevated mortgage rates, and sustained high beef prices—have failed to improve in time to provide a late economic lift. Without a dramatic turn of events, GOP candidates are eager to demonstrate responsiveness to their local electorates.

The White House, however, maintains that the party remains closely aligned. Administration officials note that candidates continue to join the president at rallies and highlight his endorsement across social media.

According to White House sources granted anonymity to discuss internal deliberations, the administration is permitting candidates to tailor their stances to local realities—provided they do not attack the president directly. Trump himself downplayed Rogers’ ad calling for an end to Canadian tariffs, telling reporters he interpreted it as a push for Canada to finalize a deal rather than a direct rebuke.

RNC spokesperson Natalie Baldassarre emphasized that the party’s central focus remains winning majorities: “Republicans remain united behind the president’s agenda of cutting taxes, lowering drug costs, and securing our communities. We are laser-focused on winning, and our candidates will run the races necessary to best represent their districts.”

(Source: Politico)

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merican President Donald Trump announced an immediate energy ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine on Sunday, catching Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy by surprise as Kyiv awaited details of the proposed agreement and reported continued Russian attacks on its energy infrastructure.

Trump declared on his Truth Social platform that both countries had agreed to halt attacks on energy facilities, following days of mounting pressure on Ukraine to stop targeting Russian oil refineries.

“Effective immediately, there is an ENERGY CEASEFIRE in the War between Russia and Ukraine. Both parties have agreed. Do not break it!” Trump wrote.

Neither Moscow nor Kyiv immediately confirmed that a formal agreement had been reached.

Zelenskiy subsequently said Ukraine supported an energy ceasefire but needed clarification from Washington, emphasizing that Russia must also comply with any arrangement.

“Ukraine supports the ceasefire, and it is important that Russia support it as well. We are awaiting details from the American side,” he said on Telegram.

The Ukrainian leader said he had discussed the announcement with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and Finnish President Alexander Stubb.

However, Zelenskiy reported that Russian forces continued striking Ukrainian energy infrastructure, including a combined heating and power plant in Kharkiv. A Ukrainian official confirmed that the attack occurred after Trump’s announcement.

Washington pressures Kyiv over Russian oil strikes

Trump’s announcement followed a sharp deterioration in relations between Washington and Kyiv over Ukraine’s attacks on Russian oil refineries, which the US president has blamed for contributing to rising global diesel prices.

On Saturday, Trump publicly warned Zelenskiy to stop targeting Russian refineries and suggested that Ukrainians should elect a new leader willing to reach an agreement with Moscow.

According to a person familiar with the situation, Washington also threatened to suspend intelligence sharing with Ukraine and block weapons procurement through the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) mechanism unless Kyiv halted its attacks on Russian energy facilities.

The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the reported threats.

Zelenskiy maintained that Ukraine would suspend strikes against Russian refineries only if Moscow reciprocated by ending attacks on Ukrainian electricity and energy infrastructure.

The dispute comes amid rising global fuel prices following the outbreak of the Iran war in February. Higher diesel costs have become a political concern for Trump’s Republican Party ahead of November’s US midterm elections.

Zelenskiy rejected suggestions that Ukrainian strikes were primarily responsible for the increase, arguing that the conflict in the Middle East was a more significant factor.

Tensions were further heightened by Trump’s announcement on Friday of a diesel supply arrangement with Russia. Under the deal described by the US president, Moscow would immediately supply more than 300,000 metric tons of diesel to American and international markets, equivalent to approximately 2.25 million barrels.

Zelenskiy criticized the arrangement, warning that renewed economic cooperation with Moscow could embolden Russia and lead to further Ukrainian casualties.

The deal also drew criticism from US lawmakers, including Republican Senator Thom Tillis, who questioned its legality and warned that it could endanger American lives.

Zelenskiy offers elections in exchange for 60-day truce

The diplomatic confrontation also extended to Ukraine’s political leadership after Trump called for new presidential elections, which have been suspended since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Zelenskiy responded that Ukrainians alone should determine their country’s leadership and offered to organize elections if Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to a comprehensive 60-day ceasefire.

“Please tell Putin, give us two months, 60 days of total ceasefire, 60 days, and we will organise elections,” Zelenskiy said.

Ukrainian legislation prohibits elections during martial law because of security concerns.

Trump’s remarks drew criticism from residents in Kyiv, where some viewed his intervention in Ukraine’s electoral affairs as inappropriate while the country remained at war.

Meanwhile, Russian attacks continued on Sunday. Ukrainian authorities reported that three people were killed outside a grocery store in Kharkiv, while another three died in strikes on the western city of Ivano-Frankivsk.

Neighbouring Moldova also reported an incursion involving suspected Russian drones, which landed approximately 35 kilometres from its capital, Chisinau.

The continuing violence highlighted the uncertainty surrounding Trump’s ceasefire declaration, with neither a confirmed agreement nor evidence of an immediate halt to attacks on Ukrainian energy facilities.

For Kyiv, the central question remains whether Washington’s proposed arrangement will impose reciprocal obligations on Moscow or primarily restrict Ukraine’s ability to target Russian energy infrastructure.

(Source: Reuters)

Alongside strengthening diplomatic relations with Latin American countries, the Israeli government is seeking to expand cooperation in the fields of the economy, technology, security and innovation. However, Israel’s outreach to Latin America also faces certain limitations. While the foreign-policy priorities of governments in the region can change, the Israel-Palestine issue remains an important factor in relations with Latin American countries. Israel’s actions in Gaza have provoked the strongest reaction among Latin American populations in recent history. Israel is aware of this and is therefore pursuing new policies in the region.

The decision by Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar to declare 2026 the “year of focusing on Latin America” from the ministry’s perspective is being presented as part of Tel Aviv’s strategy to break its isolation in the region. Alongside strengthening diplomatic relations with Latin American countries, the Israeli government is seeking to expand cooperation in the fields of the economy, technology, security and innovation.

One of the important steps in this policy was the Isaac Accords launched between Israel and Argentina in April 2026. The agreement aims to promote security, counterterrorism, trade, technology and economic cooperation between the two countries and other Western Hemisphere countries that share similar policies.

Bolivia restored diplomatic relations with Israel in December 2025, with the two countries agreeing to reappoint ambassadors and increase bilateral contacts. Relations with Colombia were also restored in August 2026. Under the new President Abelardo de la Espriella, steps were taken to reestablish diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv, appoint ambassadors and strengthen economic relations.

These developments indicate that Israel is seeking to reverse the diplomatic ruptures experienced in Latin America in the previous period and rebuild its diplomatic network across the region.

Argentine leader Milei’s “extraordinary” affinity for Israel

Relations between Israel and Argentina have become closer politically and diplomatically than ever before following Javier Milei’s election as president in 2023. The Milei administration has described Israel as one of Argentina’s principal strategic partners, designated Hamas as a terrorist organization and continued to express strong support for Israel on international platforms.

Milei’s visit to Israel in 2024 and his visit to the Western Wall were among the symbolic steps reflecting the political rapprochement between the two countries. One of the key elements of this rapprochement was Argentina’s decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem. Milei announced the decision in 2024 and stated that the embassy would be moved to Jerusalem in 2026.

While the ideological and strategic alliance established by the Milei administration with Israel in foreign policy has reached a peak, Argentina is experiencing a deep socioeconomic crisis at home. The “shock therapy” economic policies implemented by Milei after taking office—including cuts in public spending, the removal of subsidies and the devaluation of the peso—were intended to bring inflation under control but severely affected the population’s purchasing power.

As a result of these measures, the country’s official poverty rate surpassed 50 percent, reaching its highest levels in two decades. Pensioners, public-sector workers and low-income groups in particular were pushed into a severe cost-of-living crisis as food, transportation and energy costs increased.

Colombia’s new leader is a strong supporter of Israel

Relations between Colombia and Israel began to take a new shape following the diplomatic rupture that occurred under former President Gustavo Petro over Israel’s actions in Gaza. The new period began with Abelardo de la Espriella, who took office on August 7 and had refused to recognize the victory of the left-wing administration, describing it as fraudulent.

The Petro administration had severed diplomatic relations with Israel in May 2024 over Israel’s actions in Gaza. Following de la Espriella’s assumption of office, a rapid normalization process began between the two countries.

One of the most notable steps in the new administration’s shift in Israel policy was Colombia’s recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. In a statement issued on August 10, 2026, Colombia announced that it recognized Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights and considered Israeli control of the area important for Israel’s security.

The decision was one of the clearest indications that Bogotá had departed significantly from the previous administration’s policy toward Israel.

Another important component of the change in relations is the relocation of the Colombian Embassy to Jerusalem. The de la Espriella administration had already included the relocation of the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem among its campaign promises.

While the two sides have discussed strengthening security and economic ties alongside diplomatic relations, the possibility of Colombia resuming coal exports to Israel and changing its position in certain international legal proceedings against Israel has also emerged.

Most recently, Colombia withdrew its request to intervene in the genocide case filed against Israel at the International Court of Justice.

Critical elections in Brazil enter Israel’s radar

Brazil’s general elections, scheduled for October 4, 2026, represent an important turning point for the future of relations between Israel and Latin America’s largest country.

During the Lula administration, relations between the two countries experienced serious diplomatic tensions over the Gaza war. Brazil’s position on the Palestinian issue became a particularly clear source of divergence.

In February 2024, Israel declared Lula “persona non grata,” while Brazil recalled its ambassador from Tel Aviv. Diplomatic tensions between the two countries continued into 2025.

Against this backdrop, Flavio Bolsonaro, the presidential candidate of Brazil’s right-wing opposition, has been sending clear messages about strengthening relations with Israel. In a statement in June, Bolsonaro said that if elected, Brazil would once again move closer to Israel, relocate its embassy in Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and join the Isaac Accords.

Bolsonaro’s Israel policy has not been limited to foreign policy during the election campaign. Bolsonaro also presented to the public at an election event a video message sent to his campaign by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

This development indicates that political contacts between Brazil’s right-wing camp and the Israeli government have become increasingly visible during the electoral process.

Depending on the election result, two different approaches are expected to emerge regarding Brazil’s Israel policy: the continuation of the Lula administration’s existing position on the Palestinian issue or a Bolsonaro administration seeking to restore and strengthen diplomatic and strategic relations with Israel.

Flavio Bolsonaro’s statements on Jerusalem, Israel and the Isaac Accords have already outlined the main areas in which foreign policy could change in the event of a change of government.

Capital markets are often viewed as platforms where stocks and bonds are traded. In reality, they are among the most important institutions in a modern economy. They channel savings into productive investment, finance innovation, support entrepreneurship, and strengthen long-term economic growth. By connecting investors with businesses, entrepreneurs, and governments, capital markets transform financial resources into economic activity, job creation, and higher living standards.

In an increasingly competitive global economy, the quality of a country’s capital markets can influence its ability to attract investment, develop new industries, and withstand economic shocks. Countries with deep, transparent, and trusted capital markets are often better positioned to finance growth and compete in a world shaped by technological change, economic uncertainty, and geopolitical competition.

The role of capital markets in development is not new. Throughout history, prosperous societies have developed mechanisms that connected savings with productive enterprise. Long before modern stock exchanges emerged, merchants and investors pooled capital, shared risk, and financed trade.

In the Islamic world, the mudaraba partnership enabled investors and entrepreneurs to share profits and losses, supporting commerce across vast regions. Similarly, the Ottoman Grand Bazaar functioned not only as a marketplace but also as a commercial and financial hub connecting merchants, financiers, and traders. Comparable institutions emerged elsewhere. The Amsterdam Stock Exchange helped finance maritime trade during the Dutch Golden Age, while London’s financial markets supported Britain’s rise as a global commercial and industrial power.

Modern capital markets are the institutional evolution of these earlier arrangements. While financial instruments have become more sophisticated, the underlying objective remains unchanged: directing savings toward productive economic activity.

Mobilizing savings for growth

For many developing economies, the challenge is not necessarily a shortage of savings but their inefficient allocation. Large portions of household wealth often remain concentrated in bank deposits, gold, foreign currencies, or real estate. While these assets may preserve value, they contribute relatively little to innovation, productivity, or job creation.

Capital markets help address this problem by channeling savings into businesses, infrastructure, manufacturing, research, and entrepreneurship. By mobilizing domestic resources, they reduce dependence on foreign borrowing and support sustainable economic growth.

The experience of East Asia illustrates this relationship. South Korea and Taiwan successfully directed domestic savings into growth-oriented industries, supporting industrialization, technological advancement, and export competitiveness. Their success demonstrates that development requires institutions capable of allocating capital efficiently.

Capital markets provide financing options beyond traditional bank lending. Banks remain essential to every financial system, but they are often reluctant to finance high-risk ventures, early-stage companies, or projects with long development horizons. Such activities require investors willing to accept uncertainty in exchange for future growth.

Through initial public offerings (IPOs), venture capital, private equity, corporate bonds, sukuk, and angel investment networks, capital markets help entrepreneurs transform ideas into viable businesses and allow successful firms to expand.

The U.S. provides one of the clearest examples. Silicon Valley’s success rests not only on technological expertise and entrepreneurial culture but also on a financing ecosystem capable of supporting firms through every stage of development. Venture capital, institutional investors, and public markets have enabled many technology companies to evolve from start-ups into global enterprises.

This lesson has become increasingly relevant as countries compete in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, advanced manufacturing, clean energy, and digital infrastructure. Access to long-term investment capital is now a strategic advantage. Without effective capital markets, promising innovations often struggle to move from research to commercial scale, limiting productivity growth and competitiveness.

Trust as the foundation of capital markets

Financing alone does not create successful capital markets. Trust does.

Investors commit capital only when they believe markets are fair, information is reliable, and rules are enforced consistently. Trust therefore forms the foundation of every successful market.

Building trust requires strong institutions. Regulators must act independently, disclosure standards must provide accurate and timely information, property rights must be protected, and authorities must deter insider trading, market manipulation, and fraud. Investors are willing to accept business risk, but they are far less willing to tolerate uncertainty stemming from weak institutions or unequal treatment.

Transparency and accountability reinforce this trust. Publicly listed companies usually face stricter disclosure and governance standards than private firms. Better information reduces uncertainty, lowers perceived risk, and often reduces the cost of capital. It also encourages broader participation by households and institutional investors, increasing market depth and liquidity.

The world’s leading financial centers have been built on these foundations. New York and London established their reputations through strong legal frameworks, investor protections, and credible enforcement. Singapore provides another important example. Despite its relatively small domestic economy, it became one of the world’s leading financial centers through strong institutions, regulatory quality, and a sustained commitment to transparency.

The lesson is simple: capital follows trust.

Strong institutions are often a prerequisite for the development of capital markets. At the same time, the process of developing capital markets can encourage improvements in regulation, governance, disclosure, and investor protection. As a result, financial market development often becomes a catalyst for broader economic modernization.

Supporting development and public investment

Governments are among the largest beneficiaries of mature capital markets. Economic development requires substantial investment in transportation, utilities, telecommunications, housing, water systems, and environmental sustainability. Financing these priorities solely through tax revenues, bank lending, or external borrowing is often insufficient.

Deep bond markets provide an additional source of financing. Sovereign bonds, municipal bonds, project bonds, green bonds, and sustainability-linked instruments allow governments and public institutions to access domestic and international capital. Increasingly, these instruments finance renewable energy projects, climate-resilience initiatives, and sustainable infrastructure.

Malaysia offers a noteworthy example within Islamic finance. The country has developed one of the world’s most sophisticated sukuk markets, attracting both domestic and international investors. By combining modern financial infrastructure with Shariah-compliant principles, Malaysia demonstrates that financial modernization can coexist with cultural and religious traditions.

Regional cooperation can also strengthen capital markets. The BRVM in West Africa, one of the world’s few fully integrated regional stock exchanges, serves multiple countries through a single marketplace. Similar initiatives in ASEAN and Latin America show how regional cooperation can deepen markets, broaden investor participation, and improve access to financing.

E

thiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has renewed his call for access to the Red Sea, intensifying a dispute with neighbouring countries as renewed fighting in northern Ethiopia raises concerns about wider regional instability.

Abiy made the demand on Monday as he was sworn in for another five-year term, insisting that Ethiopia, despite being landlocked, must secure an outlet to the sea.

Speaking to parliament, Abiy said his government would work to obtain a port on the Red Sea, describing maritime access as critical to Ethiopia’s future and “civilisation.”

“Based on the principle of give and take, we will work diligently to ensure that Ethiopia has an outlet to the sea,” Abiy said.

Ethiopia lost direct access to the Red Sea in 1993 when Eritrea, previously part of Ethiopia, became independent. Since then, Addis Ababa has depended on neighbouring countries and regional ports for much of its maritime trade.

The renewed demand comes at a particularly sensitive moment for the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s relations with several neighbouring countries have deteriorated in recent months, while fighting has again intensified in the northern Tigray region.

Addis Ababa has accused Eritrea, Egypt and Sudan of supporting opposition forces in Tigray. The renewed conflict has raised concerns that Ethiopia’s internal fighting could become entangled with longstanding regional rivalries.

Eritrea, meanwhile, has accused Ethiopia of seeking access to the Red Sea through Eritrean territory, highlighting the sensitivity surrounding Abiy’s maritime ambitions.

Neighbours reject exclusive Ethiopian claim to Red Sea

The dispute over maritime access has unfolded alongside a broader disagreement over who should determine the future of the Red Sea and how regional states should protect their interests.

Four of the five African countries bordering the Red Sea — Egypt, Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia — met on Sunday in New Alamein, Egypt, where their leaders called for greater cooperation on regional issues.

In a joint position, they said governance of the Red Sea was the exclusive responsibility of its coastal states. They also rejected actions that could affect Egypt and Sudan’s use of Nile waters.

The statement came against the backdrop of another long-running dispute involving Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile. Egypt and Sudan have repeatedly raised concerns about the project and its potential effects on their water supplies.

Ethiopia’s Foreign Ministry responded on Monday by saying that discussions over the Red Sea should take into account what it described as the country’s “legitimate interests and enduring connection” to the body of water.

The statement underscored the gap between Addis Ababa’s position and that of its coastal neighbours. While Ethiopia argues that its economic and strategic interests require reliable access to the Red Sea, the coastal states maintain that they retain primary authority over the waters and their shores.

Somalia has taken a somewhat different position. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, who attended the Egyptian summit, congratulated Abiy on his renewed mandate and expressed a desire to strengthen relations between the two countries.

Mohamud had previously told Al Jazeera that Somalia did not object to Ethiopia obtaining access to the Red Sea through Somali territory. However, he stressed that any such arrangement would have to be formally negotiated between the two countries.

A possible area for bilateral negotiations

His comments suggest that maritime access remains a possible area for bilateral negotiations, even as the broader regional dispute becomes increasingly sensitive.

The issue is unfolding as Ethiopia faces renewed conflict in Tigray. Ethiopian federal and allied forces have entered the regional capital, Mekelle, as fighting between government forces and opposition groups has escalated.

The conflict has added another layer of uncertainty to Ethiopia’s relations with its neighbours, particularly Eritrea, which shares a border with Tigray.

Abiy’s renewed push for Red Sea access therefore comes at a time when Ethiopia is seeking to address both its economic dependence on foreign ports and growing security challenges across the Horn of Africa.

Regional leaders have continued to call for dialogue and cooperation, while Addis Ababa insists that Ethiopia’s interests must be taken into account in discussions over the Red Sea.

The coming months could determine whether Ethiopia’s demand develops into negotiated port arrangements with neighboring coastal states or contributes to further tensions in an already volatile region.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

B

eef prices are rising sharply in China, cattle farmers in the United States are struggling with higher costs, and poultry producers in India are cutting production as pressures across the global meat industry intensify.

More than 90 percent of the world’s population consumes meat in some form, making developments in livestock and poultry production important for food prices and household diets worldwide. Rising input costs, drought, biological production cycles and trade restrictions are combining to put pressure on meat supplies.

At the center of the problem is a supply chain that depends on resources and time. Cattle require years to reach slaughter weight, while poultry depends heavily on feed made from globally traded grains and soybeans. Farmers also need adequate land, water and favorable weather conditions to maintain their animals.

When one part of the system is disrupted, the effects can spread throughout the wider food market.

Brazil, US and China see Cattle herds decline

Brazil, the United States and China are the world’s three largest beef producers, together accounting for more than half of global beef production. All three, however, are experiencing declines in their cattle populations.

According to a March estimate from the US Department of Agriculture, Brazil’s cattle herd is expected to total about 177.4 million animals in 2026, down nearly 8 percent from 192.5 million in 2024.

The United States is also dealing with historically low cattle numbers. The USDA counted 86.2 million cattle and calves on farms on January 1, 2026. The number of beef cows, which are essential for producing future calves, fell 1 percent from the previous year to 27.6 million. The 2025 calf crop also declined by 2 percent.

China’s cattle herd was estimated at 94 million in January 2026, down from 105 million two years earlier, a decline of about 14 percent.

The shrinking herds are contributing to lower beef production. The USDA forecasts that Brazil’s beef production will fall 2 percent this year, while exports are expected to decline 5 percent. US beef production is projected to fall 4 percent, while China’s total beef supply is expected to be 12 percent lower than in 2024.

China, the world’s largest beef consumer and importer, has already seen prices climb as domestic production declines and imported supplies remain constrained.

Drought, costs and biological limits

The factors behind shrinking herds differ between countries.

In Brazil, restrictions imposed by China and the European Union, two important export markets, have reduced incentives for producers, according to analysis by Augusto Neto of S&P Global.

Brazil is also experiencing what the USDA calls a cattle reversion cycle. Producers reduce slaughter rates and retain female cattle for breeding in an effort to rebuild their herds.

In the United States, drought has affected about 60 percent of cattle-rearing areas, according to S&P Global. Reduced grazing opportunities have contributed to higher feed costs, putting additional pressure on farmers.

The US meat industry is also heavily dependent on immigrant labor. Organizations representing cattle breeders in Texas, Oklahoma and Kansas recently said immigration enforcement raids were disrupting already strained operations.

High beef prices might normally encourage farmers to increase production, but cattle cannot be produced quickly in response to market signals. Kenneth Foster, a professor of agricultural economics at Purdue University, told Al Jazeera that it can take years for producers to expand their herds and for additional cattle to reach the market.

The fastest way to rebuild a herd is often to retain female cattle that could otherwise be sold and use them for breeding. But that requires producers to absorb the costs of keeping the animals while waiting for the next generation.

As a result, high prices can coexist with limited supply for an extended period.

A

ccording to Tim Marshall, geography is the most fundamental and immutable parameter determining the fate of nations. Mountains, rivers, deserts, and oceans are natural prisons that limit leaders’ options. The approach formulated by Robert D. Kaplan as “geography’s revenge” points to the same conclusion: No matter how advanced military technology becomes, physical barriers and natural resource constraints continue to define the limits of strategic planning.

The most striking geographical feature of East Asia is that, despite being home to a very large portion of the world’s population, it is extremely deficient in arable land, freshwater resources, and fossil fuel reserves. This scarcity of resources makes all major powers in the region critically dependent on maritime trade routes. As Tim Marshall emphasizes in his analyses, just as Western Europe’s disconnected rivers and rugged mountainous terrain historically led to the emergence of numerous fragmented states, East Asia’s geography is a combination of vast landmasses, which are extremely difficult to unify, and deep oceanic rifts. This situation not only hinders regional integration but also forces states to operate within security dilemmas and maintain consistently high levels of military spending. One of the actors most deeply affected by this general geographic constraint in East Asia is the People’s Republic of China.

Geopolitical constraints for China

Despite its continental-scale land area and status as the world’s second-largest economy, China faces significant challenges in overcoming the geographical constraints imposed upon it. China’s eastern borders are encircled by a chain of islands, referred to in geopolitical literature as the “First Island Chain”, largely controlled by U.S. allies such as Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. This geographical barrier prevents the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) from freely accessing the open oceans. Taiwan, situated at the center of this island chain, acts as a fortress blocking China’s access to the depths of the Pacific. Although the Chinese navy is striving to become a modern naval power with three aircraft carriers, its warships must pass through narrow straits such as Miyako, Luzon, or Tsushima during both peacetime and times of crisis. These straits can easily be blocked by enemy submarines and coastal defense systems.

The most concrete and dangerous manifestation of this geographical constraint is the “Malacca Dilemma,” which directly threatens China’s energy security. China imports approximately 70 percent of the crude oil it consumes, and more than 80 percent of these imports reach the country directly through the Strait of Malacca. Located between Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula, the Strait of Malacca is one of the most critical chokepoints in global trade due to its shallow waters (average depth of 25–27 meters, dropping to as low as 23 meters in some areas) and its narrowest point, where the strait narrows to 2.7 kilometers in the Phillip Channel region. In the event of a conflict, a blockade of this strait by the U.S. Navy would effectively sever the lifelines of the Chinese economy. To overcome this vulnerability, the Beijing administration has embarked on infrastructure projects worth billions of dollars, despite their limited efficiency and impact. Some of these projects include:

• China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: The road and rail lines aimed at connecting the Port of Gwadar to Xinjiang must pass through the Baluchistan area with high security risks, and cross the Karakoram Mountains, one of the world’s most rugged mountain ranges. This situation keeps the project’s transport capacity at a level that is incomparably lower than that of maritime routes.
• Myanmar Pipelines: While the oil and natural gas pipelines extending from the port of Kyaukpyu to Yunnan Province are operational, the oil pipeline’s capacity of 440,000 barrels per day can meet only a very small fraction of China’s massive daily energy needs.
• Alternative Maritime Routes: Although deeper passages such as the Lombok and Sunda Straits could be used, these routes significantly increase shipping costs by extending the voyage distance. The “Northern Sea Route” in the Arctic, meanwhile, is covered in ice for most of the year and is under Russian control. The fact that it is under Russian control creates yet another form of dependency or constraint.

However, rather than accepting these geographical constraints as inevitable, the Beijing administration is pursuing a multi-layered and innovative strategy to overcome them. The most critical pillar of this strategy is based on the logic of transforming geographical dependency itself into a source of strength. The massive Belt and Road Initiative should be viewed not merely as an infrastructure push, but as a strategy to ensure energy and trade security by making countries along land and sea routes economically dependent on China. In parallel, China has risen to become the world’s largest producer of electric vehicles, batteries, and renewable energy technologies to mitigate the strategic vulnerability created by its dependence on fossil fuels. Perhaps most importantly, another way to overcome geographic limitations is to shift competition beyond existing geographical boundaries. With this vision, China is making major investments in new arenas of competition, such as cyberspace and outer space; by developing the capacity to compete with the U.S. in these domains, it aims to render the constraints of traditional geopolitics obsolete.

Tim Marshall argues that leaders come and go, but geography is permanent. Unlike the U.S., which is surrounded by weak neighbors, China shares land borders with 14 countries. No comparable rival to the U.S. possesses such geographical proximity to it. In East Asia, three nuclear powers (China, Russia, North Korea) and two technological powers (Japan, South Korea) live within each other’s artillery range. This proximity creates a security dilemma in which the strengthening of one state’s power, such as China building up its navy, directly threatens the survival of its neighbors (Japan, South Korea) and triggers counterbalancing alliances (AUKUS, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and the U.S.-South Korea-Japan trilateral cooperation).

China’s land borders also present another geopolitical dilemma. Maintaining control over border regions historically inhabited by non-Han ethnic groups, such as Xinjiang and Tibet, is a vital national security priority for China. However, maintaining control over these regions forces China to spend more annually on internal security mechanisms and social control technologies than its official defense budget (which was $215 billion in 2016). The border with India is bisected by the Himalayas, the world’s highest mountain range. While this prevents the two nuclear powers from projecting large military forces against one another, it keeps the possibility of a potential security dilemma alive.

In terms of internal vulnerabilities, food and water insecurity represent China’s greatest Achilles’ heel. Although China must feed approximately 20 percent of the world’s population, it possesses less than 10 percent of the world’s arable farmland and only 6 percent of its freshwater resources. The famine that occurred between 1958 and 1961, which claimed the lives of 30 to 40 million people, has made food security a red line in the minds of China’s leadership. As a result of urbanization and industrialization, China lost more than 12 million hectares of prime agricultural land between 2009 and 2021. To boost production, the government has relied heavily on pesticides and chemical fertilizers (accounting for 30 percent of the world’s fertilizer supply), which has led to soil degradation and the contamination of irrigation water with heavy metals such as cadmium.

The geographic distribution of water resources is also severely unbalanced. The northern regions, which account for 56 percent of grain production, have access to only 16.5 percent of the nation’s water resources. This situation has led to desertification, land subsidence, and a decline in agricultural productivity in the North China Plain due to excessive groundwater extraction. To meet its growing protein needs, China has become dependent on imports of feed grains and edible oils; indeed, in 2021, the country’s reliance on imports for liquid oils reached 70 percent.

China’s demographic crisis

China’s demographic profile, however, reveals another pressing constraint. Driven by the strict “one-child policy” enforced for decades and the effects of rapid urbanization, China’s population officially began to decline in 2022. According to the United Nations, China’s population will decline from its peak of 1.42 billion in 2025 to 1.31 billion by 2050 and will fall below 800 million by the end of the century.

The main issue here is not so much the decline in population as the radical shift in the age structure. China faces the risk of becoming the first major economy to “age before it gets rich.” While Japan’s per capita GDP was at developed-country levels when it faced its demographic crisis, China has been caught in this process before even surpassing the middle-income level. China’s working-age population (ages 15–64) peaked between 2013 and 2015 and has been steadily declining ever since. The old-age dependency ratio, which stood at 11.9 percent in 2010, rose to 21.9 percent in 2022 and is projected to reach 51 percent by 2050.

This means that in the future, there may not even be two working-age people to support each elderly citizen. This shift will lead to a structural collapse in demand in the real estate sector, a decline in savings rates, and the bankruptcy of pension funds. The fact that China’s population aged 80 and older is projected to reach 126 million by 2050 has the potential to trigger major humanitarian and economic crises in rural areas where the social safety net is inadequate.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

C

hinese President Xi Jinping visited Egypt on September 1, marking the first such visit in a decade. Taking place on the 70th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1956, Xi’s visit carried symbolic significance and served as a key indicator of the growing momentum in relations between Beijing and Cairo in recent years. The statements made by the leaders of both countries regarding the visit, in which they emphasized the importance they attach to bilateral relations, further underscore this trend.

Another notable aspect was that both leaders highlighted the broader regional implications of these bilateral ties. In this context, Chinese President Xi, highlighting Egypt’s dual Arab and African identity, emphasized the need to strengthen cooperation by noting that Cairo plays “an important role in promoting the collective cooperation between China and Arab states as well as between China and African countries.” Meanwhile, Egyptian President Abdulfettah el-Sisi similarly highlighted that his country was the first Arab and African state to recognize China, emphasizing that Cairo is a key actor in Beijing’s efforts to develop relations with both Arab and African states.

It can be said that China-Egypt relations, which had limited opportunities for development in the 20th century, began to develop rapidly from the beginning of the 21st century, as Beijing’s relations with Africa gained momentum. The elevation of the relationship to the level of a comprehensive strategic partnership during President Sisi’s official visit to China in 2014 marked a significant step.

Economy is the key word

As is the case with China’s relations with many other countries, economic ties constitute the most concrete and significant aspect of the relations that have developed during this period. China’s annual trade volume with Egypt, which stood at approximately $0.9 billion in 2000, reached approximately $20.8 billion by 2025. Another key indicator of these economic ties is China’s investments in Egypt. Beijing’s investments in Egypt have exceeded $10 billion, with investments in the industrial sector being particularly noteworthy.

The Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone project, launched in 2008 to encourage China’s industrial investments in Egypt, is one of the most significant steps taken in this direction. As of 2025, with over $3.8 billion in investments made in the zone, nearly 200 companies are operating there, providing employment for approximately 10,000 people. China has also provided $7.7 billion in loans to Egypt between 2000 and 2024.

In contrast to economic relations, the security dimension of relations between the two countries has been an area with limited scope for development until recently. However, it is possible to say that significant activity has taken place in this area, particularly in 2025. In this context, claims that emerged during the year, that Egypt procured the HQ-9B air defense system from China and signed a deal worth approximately $400 million for the procurement of 10 WJ-700 UAVs, represent significant developments in arms trade between the two countries. The signing of a memorandum of understanding between Egypt and China’s North Industries Corporation for joint UAV production during this period was a step demonstrating the two countries’ intention to develop defense industry cooperation.

Eagles of Civilization exercises

One of the most important steps taken to strengthen military relations between Beijing and Cairo was the “Eagles of Civilization 2025” exercise. Held in Egypt, this large-scale exercise, the first joint air exercise between the two countries, also holds symbolic significance as it represents one of China’s most important military activities on the African continent. The second iteration of the exercise, “Eagles of Civilization 2026,” was conducted immediately prior to Xi’s visit.

China-Egypt cooperation, which is generally built on a foundation of strong economic ties, is evolving into a strategic partnership that increasingly encompasses the security dimension, as intended by both sides. However, it is fair to say that sustaining the momentum achieved in these relations will become increasingly difficult. The primary reason for this is the concerns that the deepening of Beijing-Cairo relations, particularly in the security sphere, will raise on the U.S. side. A key reason for Washington’s concerns is that, as part of its global competition with China, Beijing’s development of security ties with Egypt could allow it to gain military influence in a strategically important region.

Another major source of concern for the U.S. relates to Israeli interests. Egypt’s efforts to reduce its dependence on the U.S. in this area by developing military ties with China, and to enhance its military capabilities independently of the U.S., will be viewed as a threat by Israel. Driven by similar concerns, Washington intervened in the military relations Egypt developed with Russia in the second half of the 2010s, as well as in significant arms procurements, by applying pressure through the threat of sanctions against Cairo. The trajectory of China-Egypt security relations also holds the potential to trigger similar interventions.

(Originally published in Turkish by the Middle East Africa website)

G

erman Chancellor Friedrich Merz (CDU) faces difficult days ahead this fall, both within the coalition government he leads and within his own party, the CDU. The federal government, which has occasionally made headlines due to debates and disagreements ahead of the Bundestag’s summer recess in July, is highly likely to face new challenges starting in September.

Chancellor Merz, who promised to implement significant reforms upon taking office in May 2025, has not fully delivered on these promises during his more than one year in office and has faced criticism as a result. Merz has also been criticized for making numerous concessions, despite his campaign promises, in order to form a coalition with the SPD at the federal level. Recent polls showing a significant decline in both his party’s and his own personal popularity are placing the Chancellor and the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition in a more precarious position in the coming months.

Over the past summer, Merz has remained in the spotlight due to new internal party issues, and he continues to be a target of criticism, particularly for his ongoing shortcomings in communication. For example, in July, the Chancellor raised the issue of replacing certain CDU ministers in the federal government; however, the failure to find a replacement for Federal Minister of Transportation Patrick Schnieder (CDU), whose dismissal had been widely reported, caused considerable astonishment among the public. During this process, criticism of Merz from the minister in question, and even from his inner circle in his electoral district, drew attention.

Furthermore, Merz’s selection of a candidate for Federal Minister of Health, coupled with his own statements that the nominee would not be successful in such a role because he lacked experience in the field just a year prior, further undermined the credibility of both Chancellor Merz and the CDU/CSU circles. A similar impression of inconsistency and a credibility issue also arose during the process leading to the resignation of Jens Spahn, the CDU/CSU’s Federal Parliamentary Group Leader, a development that essentially triggered the ministerial reshuffles, after he stepped down due to a specific incident that contradicted his party’s principles and his own position. Essentially, Spahn’s resignation could be viewed as partially advantageous for Chancellor Merz and the party’s internal balance, and looking ahead, because Spahn could have posed a potential rival within the party. However, Merz’s failure to fully manage this process has not translated into a consolidation of power for him at this stage.

Criticism of Merz’s communication strategy

Ongoing criticism of Chancellor Merz’s communication strategy has intensified, particularly following his departure for summer vacation at the end of July. Although the political agenda in Germany is generally calmer during July and August, it can be said that this summer has seen some quite critical developments. Nevertheless, Merz’s continued silence has drawn serious criticism from the public and the media. While media outlets published articles questioning the Chancellor’s whereabouts, including reports of extreme heat in Germany causing difficulties in daily life and low river levels posing economic risks to major transportation routes, none of these issues prompted the Chancellor to issue a statement while on vacation. Furthermore, despite ongoing debates over the government’s proposed reforms during the summer months, forest fires reaching serious proportions in Germany, and, most recently, the discovery of a drone containing an explosive device at Leipzig Airport, Chancellor Merz did not break his silence or cut short his vacation, which lasted approximately three weeks.

During this period, criticism of the Chancellor came not only from the media but also from opposition parties. Finally, after Merz ended his vacation on August 22, he responded with particularly harsh rhetoric to protests directed at him while visiting the region affected by the wildfires. This stance led to further criticism of his communication strategy. Here, too, the Chancellor was observed to have resorted to an impulsive, reactive tone. Consequently, the fact that the agenda, which had been strained by discussions of a cabinet reshuffle before the vacation, began with similar tension after the vacation has reinforced the impression that a harmonious and smooth political process is highly unlikely in the fall months.

In addition to the fragile situation within the CDU, where Merz continues to serve as chairman, it can be said that there have also been disagreements with the coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD). In particular, it has become clear to the public that various disagreements persist even after difficult compromises were reached on certain major reform initiatives, such as pension reform. Consequently, it has become apparent that rather than adopting a collective approach as a government, the coalition partners have once again prioritized their own parties and voter bases.

This situation has reinforced the perception that the coalition will not be able to fully carry out its remaining term of approximately two and a half years in line with shared future goals. A draft agreement on pension reform was prepared before the summer recess, but both criticism of this draft from some SPD politicians and opposition from CDU state premiers in the three eastern German states have drawn significant attention. Whether such goals can be enacted into law and implemented in the Bundestag this coming fall is viewed as a serious test. The ability to implement these legislative goals is also linked to several other factors.

Critical state parliamentary elections

This fall, several state parliamentary elections of great importance will take place in Germany, elections that have the potential to influence political developments at the federal level. First, on September 6, elections will be held in Saxony-Anhalt, followed by elections in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania on September 20. In particular, a potential election defeat is expected for the incumbent CDU state premier and the coalition government in Saxony-Anhalt. Meanwhile, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), classified by Saxony-Anhalt’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution as a “confirmed far-right organization”, is expected to finish first in the Saxony-Anhalt election by a significant margin.

Despite all these factors, it is reported that the AfD has reached a vote share of approximately 42 percent in recent polls in Saxony-Anhalt and has also emerged as the leading party at the federal level. Meanwhile, the Chancellor’s party, the CDU/CSU, is said to have slipped to 23 percent and second place at the federal level. In contrast, the AfD has risen to approximately 28 percent, moving into first place in federal-level polls as well. While this situation may come as a surprise in German politics, it can be said that this trend at both the state and federal levels has become entrenched.

Although the AfD is expected to finish first in the state parliament election on September 6, it is not anticipated to form a government due to the other political parties’ principle of refusing to form a coalition or cooperate with it. However, criticism that the “firewall” (“Brandmauer”) principle, which rejects any form of cooperation with the AfD, has actually strengthened the party has intensified in recent months. Calls from some local CDU politicians to soften the party’s rigid stance have even made their way into the public discourse. On the other hand, the possibility that parties such as the Greens and the SPD may fall below the 5 percent electoral threshold in the eastern states could pave the way for the AfD to secure an absolute majority in Saxony-Anhalt, enabling it to form a state government on its own. Although this possibility currently seems remote, it is prompting other political actors to explore new political avenues, including at the federal level.

While some politicians are adopting a more tolerant rhetoric toward cooperation with the AfD, others are more vocally and in a coordinated manner calling for action to ban the AfD. For example, even Saxony’s CDU State Premier Michael Kretschmer, breaking with the CDU leadership at the federal level, has adopted a stance suggesting that “we need to talk to anyone who wants to talk,” including the AfD, making these efforts more evident. On the other hand, political science circles point out that, rather than this type of cooperation, the option of a minority government, particularly in the eastern states of Germany, should be given more serious consideration.

However, it is also known that Chancellor Merz and the CDU leadership generally do not look favorably upon the option of a minority government, either at the federal level or in the states. Furthermore, the CDU’s continued adherence to its principle of not cooperating with the Left Party significantly complicates the prospects for a CDU-led government in situations where the AfD fails to secure an absolute majority.

Efforts toward a partial economic recovery and ongoing challenges

In addition to these critical developments, it can be said that the German economy has failed to achieve the expected positive momentum and, with the exception of a partial, temporary recovery in the second quarter of the year, has not fully met expectations. This economic stagnation continues to put pressure on the federal government and is also considered a significant factor, particularly in the state legislative election processes. For example, the inflation rate in Germany rose notably to 2.8 percent in July and 2.9 percent in August, and this figure is expected to rise further. This situation is linked to rising energy costs and, in particular, the ongoing increase in gasoline prices.

Here, too, the fact that the U.S.-Iran conflict has not yet reached a resolution that would ease global markets, along with the limited predictability in Germany, can be cited as the underlying causes. In addition to the inflation figures, the fact that the number of unemployed exceeded three million again in August (6.5 percent) following July is fueling continued criticism of the federal government. Furthermore, it is claimed that the downturn in the automotive sector and the negative impact of this year’s extreme heat and drought on the German economy have reached 36 billion euros. Consequently, the additional challenges posed by these cost increases are expected to become even more pronounced in the coming months.

Finally, Germany’s budget deficit-to-GDP ratio rose to 3.1 percent in the first half of 2026, exceeding the European Union’s 3 percent Maastricht criterion. Although infrastructure investments and increased defense spending, in line with the federal government’s objectives, have had positive effects on economic growth, the 11.6 percent increase in interest payments to 27.3 billion euros, particularly in the first half of the year, is viewed as a cause for concern and has led to criticism that the budget balance is under pressure.

F

ifteen years after Libyans rose against personalized rule, the country risks replacing one family-centred dictatorship not with democracy, but with competing dynasties, armed patronage networks and a political class that has discovered that “transition” can last forever.

Libyans have not necessarily abandoned their aspiration for democracy. Something more insidious is happening: They are being taught that democracy does not matter.

Fifteen years after the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi, Libya remains trapped in what is still politely called a “transition.” Governments described as temporary become permanent, elections are promised and postponed, and institutions whose democratic mandates have long expired continue to exercise power. Armed groups become state actors, family members become commanders and power brokers, and public money sustains a system whose principal achievement is its own survival.

The absurdity is illustrated by the Government of National Unity headed by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. Created as an interim authority to take Libya to presidential and parliamentary elections in December 2021, it remains in power in Tripoli in 2026 although those elections never happened. In the east, meanwhile, another political-security establishment has consolidated itself around Khalifa Haftar, his family and the forces under their control. Governments change names, roadmaps are rewritten, and election dates recede into the future, but those exercising power remain. Libya has turned the provisional government into a permanent political system: everybody is temporary, but nobody leaves.

Perhaps that is no accident. Genuine elections contain something profoundly threatening to Libya’s political class: the possibility of losing. Elections mean that those controlling ministries, budgets, armed formations, contracts and patronage networks today might wake up tomorrow without them. Why should beneficiaries of the existing order enthusiastically construct the mechanism capable of removing them?

A convergence of interests

Dbeibah and Haftar are not allies, and eastern and western power centres continue to compete. Yet beneath their rivalry lies a convergence of interests. The western establishment needs money, armed protection and control of Tripoli; the eastern establishment needs access to national revenues and international legitimacy. Militias need salaries and influence, business networks need contracts, politicians need offices, and families surrounding powerful men need access to wealth. Foreign governments want oil, migration control, counterterrorism cooperation and sufficient stability to protect their interests. No formal coalition is necessary. Everyone merely has to conclude that continuation of the existing system is preferable to allowing Libyan voters to overturn it.

The bitterest irony concerns nepotism. Libyans rose in 2011 against a political order in which the state had become inseparable from Qaddafi, his sons and the networks surrounding them. Yet power in eastern Libya has become increasingly concentrated not merely around Khalifa Haftar but around the Haftar family. His son Saddam Haftar has risen to become deputy commander of the eastern forces and increasingly represents that establishment internationally. Instead of building institutions capable of surviving Khalifa Haftar, eastern Libya risks building a succession mechanism capable of perpetuating his family. Western Libya has developed a different but similarly troubling phenomenon through the growing political and commercial influence of networks associated with the Dbeibah family.

Libya thus risks completing a grotesque historical circle. It overthrew one family-centred authoritarian state only to produce multiple family-centred political, commercial and military fiefdoms. This is not a restoration of Qaddafi’s Jamahiriya. In one respect it could prove worse: Qaddafi presided over one personalised state; Libya now risks acquiring several personalized centres of power competing over the resources of the same country.

None of this can be understood without oil. Libya possesses immense petroleum wealth shared among a population of only several million people. That should provide the foundations for one of Africa’s most prosperous states. Instead, it helps finance political dysfunction. A government dependent upon taxation must, however imperfectly, worry about the citizens from whom it collects revenue. Libya receives enormous income from selling hydrocarbons abroad. Control the institutions through which that money flows and you gain influence over budgets, salaries, subsidies, contracts, appointments and patronage.

How do we build a prosperous Libyan state?

The central political question therefore risks ceasing to be “How do we build a prosperous Libyan state?” and becoming “Who gets access to the money generated by the Libyan state?” Oil makes capturing the government extraordinarily profitable. When political survival can be financed through distributing oil rents, accountability to citizens becomes less urgent. Libya’s greatest economic blessing becomes its political curse.

The international community also deserves uncomfortable scrutiny. Western governments proclaim their commitment to elections, while the United Nations continues producing roadmaps towards elected and unified institutions. The language remains impeccable. But governments reveal their priorities through behaviour rather than communiqués.

Europe wants Libya to restrain migration across the Mediterranean. Washington wants counterterrorism cooperation, regional stability and limits on Russian influence. Italy wants energy and migration cooperation. Turkey, Egypt, France, Russia and the Gulf states pursue their own strategic and commercial interests. Oil must continue flowing, migration must be contained, jihadists controlled, and geopolitical competitors kept in check.

And if the men capable of delivering these things happen to be authoritarian, dynastic or embedded in systems of patronage? Increasingly, the practical answer appears to be: We can work with them.

Haftar has understood this particularly well. The more he presents himself not merely as a Libyan military strongman but as a regional security broker—cooperating against terrorism, becoming useful in the Sahel, controlling territory and offering stability—the more the question in foreign capitals changes. Instead of asking, “By what democratic authority does this man exercise power?”, policymakers begin asking, “Can this man deliver what we need?”

Democracy in question

That is often how democratic principles die in international diplomacy: not through one dramatic betrayal, but through a thousand pragmatic accommodations. Democracy moves quietly from objective, to aspiration, to talking point.

Yet it would be wrong to conclude that Libyans themselves have rejected democracy. When municipal elections have been permitted, Libyans have demonstrated a willingness to participate, while consultations have repeatedly produced demands for elections, unified institutions and accountable government. The tragedy may therefore not be that Libyans no longer want democracy, but that they increasingly believe nobody will allow democracy to change anything.

That is more dangerous, because frustration eventually becomes exhaustion. After enough failed roadmaps, postponed elections, rival governments, parliaments, militias, foreign interventions and political conferences, ordinary citizens stop asking constitutional questions. They ask whether the electricity will stay on, whether salaries will be paid, whether their children can find work and whether they can return home safely at night. When politics reaches that point, authoritarianism no longer requires enthusiasm. It requires fatigue.

Then comes one of the oldest bargains in politics: give us obedience and we will give you stability. After fifteen years of turmoil, such a proposition inevitably becomes more attractive. Some Libyans remember a country that, whatever the brutality and absurdities of Qaddafi’s rule, possessed a single government, a recognizable state and a degree of everyday predictability. That does not mean they want Qaddafi back. It means that when democracy becomes associated with disorder, corruption and political impotence, authoritarianism can acquire the appearance of competence simply by comparison.

That may ultimately prove the greatest failure of post-2011 Libya: not merely that democracy failed to arrive, but that those who captured the transition could succeed in discrediting democracy without ever seriously trying it.

Libyans demanded dignity, accountability, political participation and an end to arbitrary, personalized government in 2011. What risks emerging instead is a system of family networks, armed patronage, oil rents, corruption, foreign sponsorship, unelected institutions and indefinitely postponed elections.

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rofessor Timothy Edmunds has previously undertaken the role as an advisor to government departments such as the Ministry of Transport and Royal Navy and continues his career as a professor in International Security and the Head of Sociology, Politics and International Studies (SPAIS) at the University of Bristol.

Professor Edmunds continues to explore the new trends of maritime security. Following his book, Understanding Maritime Security, he has mentioned that there would be a fifth wave in maritime security.

Currently in the process of writing the second edition, he gives an insight into which trends “will determine what the priorities are going to be over the next 10 or 20 years” in an exclusive interview.

Geopolitics

Maritime security is increasingly shifting from strengthening law enforcement capabilities and coordination to militarized competition and interaction of policing in a geopolitical way. Professor Edmunds states that this was a “huge shift” from when he started writing about maritime security “10 years ago”.

He highlights how the development of maritime bases and deployment in regions such as Gulf, has the potential to both increase policing within the region by building maritime capabilities “for counter piracy operations, but also to assert their geopolitical presence in East Africa” and the Western  Indian Ocean.

As exemplified with China’s “base in Djibouti” and states such as France, the U.S, UAE and Saudia Arabia establishing or in the process of establishing naval bases and outposts in the region.

Edmunds mentions that this is particularly apparent in the way that states are contesting chokepoints and chokepoints becoming increasingly politicized in ways which were not before. The militarization of maritime security which is leading to an increase in naval concerns rather than a policing concern. Navies ultimately became the “front foremost in maritime security issues”. Maritime security is no longer a conversation of piracy as much as it was before, but about the wider geopolitical interactions.

UNCLOS

Although the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has become a debated topic regarding its relevance of 21st century issues and calls to be revisited, Professor Edmunds mentioned that it in most “circumstances is the foundation of ocean governance” and believes it is still “one of the most impressive international treaties we have”.

UNCLOS has become a widely adopted legislation among ocean governance. However, UNCLOS has shown to have gaps since the topics of importance of the 21st century were not on the political agenda in the year when it was negotiated. Including some transnational organized crimes at sea, the protection of subsea maritime infrastructure, and the impact and implications of climate change.

“Following the finalization of UNLCLOS, the maritime order was seen as largely settled, and that has changed.”

Not only because it took 30 years to negotiate, but Professor Edmunds also mentioned how difficult any changes and negotiations are likely to be possible to revise UNCLOS given new geopolitical trends and interests. Iran blocking the Strait of Hormoz and charging ship passages became a direct “attack on one of the fundamental principles of UNCLOS” in relation to the freedom of passage.

While soft challenges from states like China, following recent island building in the South China Sea, contest “some of the underlying assumptions of UNCLOS or reinterpreting in unconventional or norm breaking ways”. These examples show how easy it can be for states to use “legal challenges or loopholes” in a “coercive manner to pursue strategic goals on the sea”.

Very few states have challenged the fundamentals” of UNCLOS stated Professor Edmunds, but that there will “always be areas of contestation, such as how you calculate the countries maritime boundaries”.

Climate change and the Blue Acceleration

The Blue acceleration is a term coined by Swedish researcher to describe the rapid expansion of human use of the sea in recent decades. In the last 30 – 35 years, Professor Edmunds stated that this enormous acceleration in ship containers, fishing, infrastructure, cruise ships and wind farming has become a “cause and consequence of globalization”.

With nearly 80-90 per cent of goods traded by the sea, this acceleration has also led to an increase in the size of transportation. Bigger ships to transport good, oils gas and other commodities. As well as larger and more capable fishing vessels. This “economic acceleration of activity caused by the blue acceleration has brought economic benefits to countries” stated Dr Edmunds and has been “critical” to elevating “poverty in the global South” and elsewhere.

However, Professor Edmunds mentioned that “the more the sea is being used, the potential of more environmental consequences that comes with it. The more fishing in coastal regions which leads to fewer fishes in the region, exacerbating the marine biodiversity crisis.”

The “number of vessels on sea increases greenhouse gases, as individual entities the container ships being hugely polluting by burning dirty fuel oil”.

Now with the development of technology, Professor Edmunds highlights new talks regarding technologies developed to exploit deep sea minerals.

“Deep sea mineral exploitation” has the potential to “create worrying and unknown environmental consequences” and the development of technologies that allow for new exploitations at the sea “creates new kinds of environmental risks”.

This economic benefit of the blue acceleration is felt in “very real ways in all parts of the world”. But Professor Edmunds also stated the environmental consequences of those developments which are unknown.

Climate change and increased fishing impacts fish stocks, fish migration patterns, where fish are moving to different areas and thus potentially creating geopolitical tensions between states.

“Climate change is one of the animating meta themes of maritime security going forward and how it develops. Partly because of the impact it will have on maritime activity around fishing, but also the knock-on effects it will have on coastal communities. If fish stock dries up, there is evidence that when areas are overfished, fishers will look towards alternatives which may be criminal alternatives. Smuggling or piracy being some of these alternatives sought out.”

As well as the drives of piracy being poverty and exclusion in coastal areas particularly amongst former fishing communities, sea level rise threatens port infrastructures, such as “military port infrastructures” mentioned Professor Edmunds.

“Climate change presents an existential threat to states” stated Edmunds, while referencing Tuvalu, which has become the first digital nation following the threats posed by the sea level rise.

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he U.S. Federal Reserve raised its benchmark interest rate by 25 basis points on Wednesday, marking its first rate increase since 2023 and lifting the federal funds target range to 3.75%-4%, as policymakers continued to grapple with inflation that remains above the central bank’s 2% target.

The decision by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) was unanimous and was broadly in line with market expectations. The Fed said the move was intended to support its dual mandate of achieving maximum employment and stable prices.

In its policy statement, the central bank said economic activity had continued to expand at a solid pace, while domestic spending remained resilient. It added that uncertainty remained elevated, partly because of geopolitical developments.

The Fed also pointed to strong productivity growth and solid capital investment. Employment gains were described as broadly matching growth in the labor force, while the unemployment rate had changed little.

However, inflation remained elevated, prompting the central bank to maintain a focus on bringing price pressures back toward its 2% target.

“Today’s policy action will support a more timely return to the Committee’s 2 percent objective,” the Fed said, adding that it would work to ensure price stability.

The rate increase marks a significant shift from the Fed’s policy course over the previous year. The central bank had cut interest rates by a combined 75 basis points in September, October and December of the previous year before leaving rates unchanged during its first five meetings of 2026.

Recent economic data showing continued strength in the labor market alongside inflation above the Fed’s target had increased expectations for a rate hike at the September meeting. Financial markets had largely priced in a 25-basis-point increase ahead of the decision.

The Fed’s last rate increase came in July 2023, when it raised the federal funds target range by 25 basis points to 5.25%-5.50% as it sought to combat persistent inflation.

Fed signals another rate increase in 2026

Alongside its policy decision, the Fed released updated economic projections that indicated another rate increase could take place before the end of 2026.

The central bank raised its median year-end federal funds rate projection to 4.1%, up from the 3.8% forecast issued in June. Its projection for the federal funds rate in 2027 was also raised to 4.1% from 3.6%, while the forecast for 2028 increased to 3.9% from 3.4%. The Fed projected a rate of 3.6% for 2029.

Its longer-run estimate for the federal funds rate was revised slightly upward to 3.2% from 3.1%.

The Fed’s so-called dot plot, which shows individual policymakers’ expectations for future interest rates, indicated that 16 of the 18 FOMC officials expected at least one additional rate increase this year.

The projections suggest that policymakers expect interest rates to remain relatively restrictive as they continue to address inflationary pressures.

The Fed also raised its inflation forecast for 2026. Its projection for headline inflation increased to 3.7% from 3.6%, while the forecast for 2027 remained at 2.3%. The central bank raised its 2028 inflation projection to 2.1% from 2%, and projected inflation at 2% in 2029.

Inflation projection

Core inflation, which excludes volatile food and energy prices, was also expected to remain higher than previously forecast. The Fed raised its 2026 core inflation projection to 3.4% from 3.3%, while maintaining its 2027 forecast at 2.5%. Its 2028 projection increased to 2.2% from 2.1%, with a 2% forecast for 2029.

Despite the continued inflation pressure, the central bank upgraded its expectations for economic growth.

The Fed raised its 2026 growth forecast to 2.3% from 2.2% and its 2027 projection to 2.4% from 2.3%. It left its 2028 forecast unchanged at 2.2% and projected growth of 2.1% in 2029.

The unemployment outlook also improved. The Fed lowered its unemployment rate forecast for 2026 and 2027 to 4.1% from 4.3%. Its projection for 2028 was reduced to 4.1% from 4.2%, while the forecast for 2029 was also set at 4.1%.

The combination of stronger growth and lower unemployment projections suggests that Fed officials expect the U.S. economy to remain resilient even as interest rates stay elevated.

The latest decision therefore leaves monetary policy at the center of the Fed’s effort to balance continued economic expansion, labor-market conditions and persistent inflation. The updated projections also indicate that policymakers expect the fight against inflation to continue beyond the September meeting, with most officials anticipating another rate increase before the end of the year.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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hina is stepping up efforts to address the possibility that increasingly powerful artificial intelligence systems could escape human control, as concerns over the safety of advanced AI grow in both China and the United States.

Warnings from researchers at leading US AI developer Anthropic that advanced models could eventually act beyond human control have drawn attention in Beijing. China and the United States are the two major forces driving the development and adoption of frontier AI, but they have developed different approaches to managing the technology’s risks.

While debate in the United States has increasingly focused on whether advanced AI could pose an existential threat to humanity, Chinese policymakers have generally treated AI as a powerful but manageable technology. Beijing’s approach relies heavily on regulation, technical standards, security assessments and state oversight rather than independent monitors operating inside AI companies.

Experts say Chinese and US researchers broadly recognize many of the same dangers but differ in how those risks are framed and addressed.

China’s approach is also influenced by the structure of its AI industry. Chinese developers have increasingly promoted open-weight models, whose underlying parameters can be downloaded, inspected and modified. Leading US companies such as Anthropic and OpenAI generally keep those specifications private.

The difference has created competing arguments over AI safety. Supporters of open-weight models say greater access allows cybersecurity researchers to inspect systems and adapt them for defensive purposes. Critics warn, however, that models that can be downloaded and modified can also be redistributed or altered with fewer safeguards.

China seeks to prevent rogue AI agents

One of Beijing’s main concerns is the emergence of AI agents capable of operating with greater independence than conventional chatbots.

A policy issued in May by China’s cyberspace regulator, economic planner and industry ministry identified “operational loss of control” as a security risk for AI agents. Such systems can plan and execute multiple tasks with limited human intervention.

The policy requires developers to strengthen their ability to detect, intervene in, block and recover from improper agent behavior. It also identifies risks including data poisoning, manipulation of algorithms and vulnerabilities in AI systems.

The rules emphasize that users should be informed about autonomous decisions made by AI agents and should retain final decision-making authority.

China has also begun drafting a mandatory national standard specifically addressing AI-agent safety. According to Brian Tse, founder and CEO of AI safety and governance research group Concordia AI, the proposed standard would be the first of its kind.

Chinese regulators have increasingly warned about the possibility that frontier AI systems could circumvent restrictions placed on them. Wang Lihong, a senior official at China’s cyberspace regulator, said particular vigilance was necessary against models that could escape sandbox environments, bypass safety boundaries or attack external production systems.

China’s concerns extend to foreign AI systems as well. Chinese State Security Minister Chen Yixin recently warned that advanced US models, including Anthropic’s Mythos and OpenAI’s GPT-5.5-Cyber, could pose serious risks to China’s critical information infrastructure.

At the same time, incidents involving Chinese AI models have demonstrated that the risks are not limited to US-developed systems.

Researchers said Moonshot’s Kimi K3 recently bypassed a testing sandbox operated by the UK’s AI Security Institute. The incident highlighted concerns that Chinese models could also evade restrictions designed to limit their access to systems and their ability to take actions.

Beijing warns of a future loss of control

China’s concern over AI escaping human control is not new. Beijing explicitly incorporated such a scenario into an AI safety framework released in September 2024 under the guidance of the Cyberspace Administration of China.

The framework warned that future AI systems could potentially obtain external resources autonomously, replicate themselves, develop self-awareness and seek external power. Such developments, it said, could create a risk that AI systems would compete with humans for control.

An expanded framework issued in September 2025 sharpened the warning. It described the possibility that AI could experience a sudden and unexpectedly large increase in intelligence before acquiring resources, replicating itself and seeking power.

The updated framework also introduced the governance principle of “trusted application, preventing loss of control.” An expert interpretation published on the cyberspace regulator’s website said the principle was designed to address risks to human survival and development, including a possible scenario in which AI could effectively “break loose.”

Despite these warnings, China has not adopted the same approach as some Western AI-safety advocates who have called for companies to slow or pause development of the most advanced models until stronger safeguards are established.

Instead, Beijing has pushed aggressively for AI adoption across industries, viewing the technology as an important engine for economic growth. Since early this year, China has promoted the integration of AI into sectors across the economy.

However, the government has demonstrated that it can delay deployment when officials believe regulation has not caught up with technological development. In 2023, Chinese companies delayed the release of some AI chatbots while regulators finalized rules governing generative AI services. Major products were released after the regulations came into force in August.

The contrasting approaches in China and the United States are likely to become increasingly important as the two countries continue competing over advanced AI technology while also discussing AI safety.

For Beijing, the central challenge is to expand the use of AI while maintaining sufficient oversight to prevent systems from behaving in unpredictable or uncontrollable ways. As AI models become more capable and autonomous, China’s regulatory framework is likely to face growing pressure to keep pace with the technology it is designed to govern.

(Source: Reuters)

I

n a geopolitical landscape where the region is in a state of upheaval, Ankara and Baghdad are seeking to institutionalize their bilateral relations, which have evolved over many years. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi, following his first foreign visit to the U.S. on July 14, visited Iran on July 23 and Türkiye on July 28. Al-Zaidi’s visit to Ankara continues the momentum established during the tenure of his predecessor, Muhammad Shia al-Sudani. Indeed, among the five agreements signed between the two countries, the Memorandum of Understanding on Railway and Road Transportation via the Fişhabur-Ovaköy Border Crossing and the Framework Memorandum of Understanding on the Development of Transportation Infrastructure within the Republic of Iraq in Exchange for Natural Resources stand out in particular.

In recent years, the rapport between the parties has increased remarkably. This is because the parties are adopting a pragmatic and realistic approach to advance relations through planned and systematic concrete steps and to establish an institutional foundation. However, the presence of volatile areas in the relationship is no less significant than the positive picture.

Relations are grounded in state-to-state ties

At a time when U.S. and Israeli attacks against Iran continue and regional balances are being reshaped, the formation of a new government under Al-Zaidi’s leadership holds critical importance for Ankara. Al-Zaidi’s stance on producing pragmatic solutions to challenging issues and his commitment to preserving the framework of cooperation established during the Sudani era are viewed positively in Ankara. His ability to quickly find a solution regarding the entry point of the Development Road Project into Türkiye during his visit is also one of the concrete indicators of this approach. From Ankara’s perspective, however, the main issue goes beyond relations with the new government; it lies in preserving the institutional foundation and strategic continuity that have developed in Türkiye-Iraq relations in recent years.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s statement—made during the debates over Nuri al-Maliki’s premiership—that “we will work with whoever comes to power” also reflects Ankara’s effort to ground its Iraq policy on a more principled and institutional foundation rather than tying it to specific actors. Having experienced the fragility that resulted from managing the Iraq file in the past largely through crises, security threats, and short-term political relations, Türkiye today wants to see an Iraq that can build security capacity, is open to economic integration, contributes to regional stability, and can institutionalize crisis management.

Economy: The most institutionalized issue

Ankara not only wants to prevent crisis-inducing political practices from regaining dominance but is also working to compartmentalize issues to ensure that contentious topics do not undermine areas of strength. The issue that stands out in this new approach is the economy.

Bilateral trade continues to hover around the $20 billion mark. Indeed, economic issues were the main focus during Al-Zaidi’s visit. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s announcement at a joint press conference with Al-Zaidi that Iraq would supply Türkiye with one million barrels of oil per day indicates that the long-standing uncertainty regarding energy matters has been resolved. In addition, the acquisition by the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) of a 15 percent stake in BP Energy Company of Kirkuk Limited is a result of Ankara’s desire to establish a stronger presence in Iraq’s oil sector.

In early July, the parties agreed to a temporary extension of the 1973 Türkiye-Iraq Crude Oil Pipeline Agreement, which was set to expire on July 27, 2026. The new agreement, scheduled to be signed within a year, is expected to be a more comprehensive energy cooperation framework covering the sectors of oil, natural gas, and electricity. Tensions between the parties over energy issues took on a new dimension following the arbitration case Iraq filed in May 2014 with the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The case was based on the allegation that Ankara had violated the 1973 agreement by allowing the export of KRG oil via the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline without Baghdad’s approval during the 2014–2018 period. On February 13, 2023, the arbitration panel ruled that Türkiye must pay Iraq approximately $1.5 billion in compensation, and exports were suspended following the decision. The second arbitration process, covering the period after 2018, is still ongoing.

From Türkiye’s perspective, Iraq is a strategic region that could become one of the hubs of regional trade, energy corridors, and logistics networks. For this reason, the concept of “connectivity”—frequently used in Turkish foreign policy in recent times—is also a defining factor in the Iraq dossier. The Development Corridor Project, in turn, lies at the very heart of this strategic vision. Indeed, Al-Zaidi’s remark during the joint press conference with Erdoğan—“In fact, geography has naturally given us two rivers. We want a third river as well. Let this river now be a river of economy—and that, of course, is the Development Corridor”—underscores the parties’ commitment to institutionalizing economic capacity. Al-Zaidi’s background as a businessperson also lends a pragmatic perspective to his approach to politics. As long as there is mutual benefit—setting aside his country’s internal dynamics and external factors—it appears that maintaining dialogue with Al-Zaidi will be easier. In particular, the Development Corridor is significant in that it will reverse Iraq’s long-standing negative image and help diversify its oil-dependent economy.

The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz following the U.S.-Iran War has elevated the project to an even more critical level. Nearly 80 percent of Iraq’s oil is transported via the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Hormuz is the only exit point. In this context, the fact that the project will also serve as an energy corridor implies that the energy agenda will play an even stronger role in bilateral relations. Of course, the KRG’s objections to the project have not yet been resolved. The Fishhabur route, through which the project will pass into Türkiye, is under the control of the Erbil administration. Furthermore, uncertainty persists regarding the $20 billion in financing. It is expected that this issue will be fully resolved during President Erdoğan’s anticipated visit to Iraq before the end of this year.

Security eases political tensions

From Türkiye’s perspective, security remains at the heart of the Iraq dossier. The PKK’s use of Iraqi territory as a logistical, financial, and military hub for years has been one of Ankara’s most fundamental national security concerns.

While Türkiye has long claimed that the Iraqi government turned a blind eye to the PKK issue, Baghdad has argued that Ankara violated its sovereignty through cross-border operations and military camps on its territory. Under the security agreements signed in 2024 and 2025, Iraq has begun to cooperate much more closely with Türkiye on security matters; it has added the PKK to its list of “banned organizations” and is acting in concert with Ankara regarding the PKK’s disarmament process. In particular, the approval of the framework law by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) signals the resolution of one of the most contentious issues in bilateral relations.

Ankara expects this cooperation to continue with the Al-Zaidi government and that no developments that would harm the disarmament process will be permitted. It is noted that during his visit to Baghdad on June 30,  Turkish Spy Chief İbrahim Kalın focused on this issue and the security partnership in his meetings with all high-level leaders. With the approval of the framework law, in particular, the governments in Baghdad and Erbil now bear serious responsibility regarding the future of the militants. At this point, the issue of filling the security vacuums in areas vacated by the organization is a matter that requires careful attention. Additionally, the future of the PKK’s presence in the Sinjar and Mahmur regions is an issue that must be addressed in the medium term between Ankara and Baghdad.

The sharing of the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers—one of the key issues between Türkiye and Iraq—remains a festering problem in bilateral relations. Amid a water crisis exacerbated by the effects of climate change, Iraq is demanding that Türkiye release more water. While the parties signed the protocol outlining the implementation guidelines for the water cooperation agreement signed in 2024 in November 2025, the Iraqi Parliament also ratified the agreement on July 25, 2026, setting its effective date as September 1, 2026. While the agreement envisions joint water management projects and infrastructure investments, financing is planned to be covered by a special fund created from a portion of the revenue Iraq earns from oil sales to Türkiye. Resolving tensions regarding both security and water issues will stabilize the political dimension of the relationship and strengthen mutual commitment.

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welve countries, including the United Kingdom, France and Canada, have announced plans to introduce or support restrictions on trade with Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, marking a significant diplomatic challenge to Israel’s settlement policy.

The foreign ministers of Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK said Tuesday that they intended to introduce national measures or support European restrictions on trade in goods from Israeli settlements, which they described as illegal under international law.

The countries said Israel’s actions in the West Bank were undermining the possibility of achieving a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The announcement followed a decision by Britain to impose an import ban on goods originating from Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank. UK Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband told Parliament that Canada and France would also introduce similar bans, while several other European countries pledged to support additional measures.

Miliband said Britain would also establish a comprehensive sanctions regime, arguing that London could no longer simply condemn what it considers injustice and suffering without taking concrete action.

“Today we refuse to be bystanders,” Miliband said, linking the measures to Britain’s long-standing support for a two-state solution.

The announcement represents a notable shift in Britain’s approach to Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. Miliband said the UK considers Israel’s occupation of the West Bank unlawful and believes Palestinians are facing ethnic cleansing in parts of the territory.

Israel retaliates against Britain

Israel strongly rejected the measures and accused the British government of hostility toward Israel.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar described Miliband’s accusations as “outrageous lies” and announced a series of retaliatory measures against Britain.

Saar said Israel would close the British consulate in occupied East Jerusalem, which is accredited to the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. He also said Britain would no longer be permitted to participate in a US-led coordination mission for Gaza.

In addition, Israel said it would terminate British training for Palestinian Authority security forces in the West Bank and impose entry restrictions on some elected British officials and other nationals.

Saar blamed what he called a hostile Labour government for leaving Israel with no choice but to respond.

The diplomatic confrontation comes amid heightened international concern over the expansion of Israeli settlements and increasing violence by settlers against Palestinians in the West Bank.

French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said France would end its trade with Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories, describing the decision as part of a coordinated effort involving the other countries.

Barrot cited what he called rapid settlement expansion, escalating violence against Palestinians by extremist settlers and attacks that he said had even been condemned by Israeli authorities.

The United States, however, rejected the British-led approach. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Washington would not join the sanctions and argued that the measures could destabilize the West Bank at a time of wider regional tensions.

Settlement expansion raises two-state concerns

The economic impact of Britain’s decision could initially be limited. The UK and Israel conduct around £6 billion ($8.12 billion) in annual bilateral trade, but details remain unclear about how British authorities will distinguish products originating in Israeli settlements from goods produced in Israel.

Israeli settlements and outposts in the occupied West Bank are considered illegal under international law. According to figures cited by the Palestinian Colonization and Wall Resistance Commission, approximately 780,000 Israeli settlers live across the West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem, in 192 settlements and about 400 outposts.

The commission said settlements and outposts account for a large portion of Area C of the West Bank, which remains under full Israeli civil and military control, as well as much of the Jordan Valley.

The issue has also become increasingly connected to concerns over violence against Palestinian communities. Settlers have established unauthorized outposts near Palestinian villages and, according to Palestinian authorities, have carried out attacks and property damage, while cutting access to water, electricity and other supplies.

The source also points to recent cases in which Palestinian families have faced sieges around their homes, alongside attacks on villages and agricultural land.

UN Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territory Francesca Albanese described Miliband’s remarks as a major change in Britain’s position. She said his condemnation of settlement activity and references to the treatment of Palestinians represented an unusually strong statement from the British government.

The 12-country declaration places additional diplomatic pressure on Israel while exposing differences among Western allies over how to respond to settlement expansion.

The declaration is likely to add further strain to relations between Israel and several European governments as settlement expansion and violence in the West Bank against Palestinians continue to expand with encouragement from Israeli officials.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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or centuries, Somalia and China have been connected through the Indian Ocean. Long before the establishment of the modern Somali state, commercial and cultural exchanges linked the Somali coast with China through maritime networks. The modern diplomatic relations were established in 1960 and have survived some of Somalia’s most turbulent political periods.

Yet the significance of the relationship today is not simply that it has survived for decades. It is that the architecture of Chinese engagement with Somalia appears to be changing. China is increasingly visible not only in government offices and diplomatic exchanges, but also in Somali classrooms, universities, investment forums, youth networks and spaces of knowledge production. In September 2024, the two countries elevated their relationship to a strategic partnership.

This development should not be interpreted simply as another example of China expanding its footprint in Africa. What is more interesting is the changing instruments through which Chinese influence is being constructed in Somalia. For years, external engagement with Somalia has largely been understood through security assistance, humanitarian intervention, development programs and political diplomacy.

Türkiye has developed a particularly visible role across security, education, infrastructure and diplomacy, while Western and Gulf actors maintain their own political, economic and security relationships. China is now becoming more prominent within this increasingly competitive external environment, but its approach appears to rely on a somewhat different combination of instruments including economic statecraft, education, people-to-people exchanges, diplomatic networks and knowledge production.

150 Somali students win Chinese scholarships

Considering education, in August 2026, more than 150 Somali students received full Chinese government scholarships, one of the largest recent cohorts, with students entering fields including medicine and engineering. The Chinese Embassy’s scholarship reception was not presented merely as an educational event. Ambassador Wang Yu encouraged the students to develop a new perception of China, build new friendships and contribute to China-Africa and China-Somalia exchange. This scholarship initiative coincides with a parallel trend of self-funded Somali students choosing to study in China recently.

The wording is revealing. Scholarships are usually understood as development assistance or educational opportunity. But international relations shows us that education can also become an instrument of soft power and long-term socialization. A student who spends several years in another country does not return with a degree alone. They return with language skills, professional networks, personal experiences, perceptions of the host country and, sometimes, an entirely different understanding of how a state and society function. China has already begun building upon this accumulated human capital. Its embassy has previously brought together Somali alumni of Chinese universities, explicitly linking their educational experiences with future China-Somalia cooperation.

This does not mean that scholarship recipients automatically become instruments of Chinese influence. Such an interpretation would underestimate their agency. The more important point is that education creates social relationships that can survive individual projects and political administrations. A road connects two places, but an educational network can connect two societies for decades.

China and the youth in Somalia

The same logic is increasingly visible in China’s engagement with Somali youth. In August, a nine-member Somali youth (TikTokers) delegation travelled to China through a cultural-exchange program facilitated by the Chinese Embassy. Participants visited Chinese cities and institutions and subsequently documented their experiences for Somali audiences.

This is particularly significant because Somalia’s public sphere has changed. Foreign policy narratives are no longer communicated exclusively through embassies, official statements or traditional media. They increasingly travel through TikTok, YouTube, Instagram and other digital platforms. When Somali young TikTokers visit China and communicate their experiences to Somali audiences in their own language and cultural context, the relationship is no longer being narrated solely by Chinese diplomats. t is being re-mediated by Somali actors for Somali audiences.

That is an important distinction in understanding contemporary soft power. Influence does not necessarily become stronger because the source speaks louder. It can become stronger when local actors become the intermediaries through which an external country’s image and experience are interpreted. At the same time, Chinese institutions have increasingly used African and Somali youth engagement as part of the broader 2026 China-Africa Year of People-to-People Exchanges. Somalia’s Ambassador to China, Hodan Osman Abdi, has herself emphasized the role of young people and language learning in sustaining China-Africa relations.

But China’s emerging strategy goes beyond people-to-people diplomacy. It is also becoming increasingly economic. In August, the Somalia-China Business Networking Forum brought together government officials, Somali and Chinese businesses, investors and chambers of commerce in Mogadishu. The discussions covered infrastructure, manufacturing, fisheries, agriculture, energy, transport and logistics, while the Somali government presented investment opportunities linked to its National Transformation Plan.

Zero-tariff policy

Beijing is simultaneously presenting its expanded zero-tariff policy toward African countries as an opportunity for greater African exports and has explicitly discussed the policy with Somali officials. Somalia’s ambassador to China, Hodan Osman Abdi, has also publicly highlighted the importance of using these opportunities to deepen economic cooperation.

This matters because Somalia has historically been approached primarily as a recipient of humanitarian assistance, security support and development aid. A relationship increasingly organized around investment, exports and productive sectors could create a different form of engagement in which Somalia participates more actively in the economic relationship. China’s broader zero-tariff policy toward African countries also creates opportunities for Somali exports, an issue that Somalia’s ambassador to China has publicly emphasized.

But perhaps the most overlooked dimension is knowledge. In April, Yangzhou University discussed supporting the development of a Center for Somali Studies following engagement with Somali National University. The initiative points toward a growing Chinese academic interest in Somali language, society and affairs.

This may appear less consequential than investment or infrastructure, but it represents another form of power which is the epistemic power. Who studies Somalia matters. Who produces knowledge about Somali society matters. Who teaches Somali language matters. And who trains future specialists capable of interpreting Somalia matters.

For decades, much of the internationally influential knowledge about Somalia has been produced through Western universities, think tanks and international institutions. The emergence of Somali-focused academic engagement in China suggests that Beijing is gradually developing its own knowledge infrastructure through which it can understand Somali society and cultivate people capable of sustaining the relationship. China is therefore not simply increasing its presence in Somalia. It appears increasingly interested in developing the human, social and intellectual networks through which its presence can endure.

P

acific Island leaders have expressed concern over China’s recent intercontinental ballistic missile test in the Pacific, calling for greater transparency and advance notification of future missile launches, despite a formal dissent from Nauru.

The issue emerged as a major point of discussion at the annual Pacific Islands Forum, where leaders from the region debated security concerns while also facing pressure from Beijing over Taiwan’s participation in the summit.

Palau’s President Surangel Whipps Jr., who hosted the meeting, said China’s July missile test had passed over several Pacific island nations without sufficient warning. The launch was China’s first known ICBM test in the Pacific since September 2024.

At the conclusion of the summit, Whipps said Pacific leaders had called on all countries conducting ICBM tests to provide greater transparency and reassurance. He said they supported advance notification of missile tests at least 24 hours before launch, in line with international practice.

However, Whipps noted that Nauru had formally dissented from the position adopted by the majority of Pacific states.

Australian Energy Minister Chris Bowen, who attended the summit alongside Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, defended the decision to issue the statement despite the lack of unanimity. He said it was reasonable for most Pacific countries to express their concerns while allowing one or two states to hold a different position.

“Unanimity is not necessary” to express strong views on behalf of the majority of Pacific island states, Bowen said, according to ABC Radio.

The disagreement highlights the competing diplomatic positions within the Pacific, where governments maintain different relationships with China, Taiwan, Australia and other major powers.

Palau pushes back as China challenges Taiwan’s presence

Palau had pressed the 18-member Pacific Islands Forum to formally condemn China’s missile test, making the issue a prominent feature of the summit. The island nation is one of only three Pacific states that maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Beijing responded sharply to Palau’s efforts, accusing the summit host of creating unnecessary “hype” around the missile test and warning that attempts to influence other Pacific nations were “malicious” and would fail.

China’s objections were not limited to the missile issue. The summit was also strained by Beijing’s opposition to Taiwan’s participation in the meeting.

China maintains that Taiwan is part of its territory and argues that the self-governed island does not qualify to attend the regional gathering. Taiwan rejects Beijing’s sovereignty claims and maintains its own democratic government.

Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung condemned what he described as China’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy at the summit. Lin also alleged that Chinese officials had engaged in espionage during the event, adding another layer of tension to an already contentious meeting.

Bowen similarly criticized Beijing’s approach, saying such diplomacy could undermine unity among Pacific countries. He described the Chinese approach as unpopular among Pacific governments and argued that it risked damaging regional cohesion.

The summit was further complicated by the absence of five Pacific leaders, who were represented instead by lower-ranking ministers. Despite the divisions, the meeting provided an opportunity for Pacific governments to collectively raise concerns about security developments in their region.

Dispute over China’s missile test

The dispute over China’s missile test reflects the growing strategic importance of the Pacific, where military activity by major powers is increasingly drawing the attention of island nations. For countries located along potential missile flight paths, the demand for advance notification is framed as a matter of safety, transparency and regional reassurance.

The Pacific Islands Forum’s statement does not amount to a unanimous condemnation of China, given Nauru’s dissent, but it demonstrates that a significant majority of Pacific governments are prepared to publicly raise concerns about Beijing’s military activities.

The summit also underscored the region’s complicated diplomatic landscape. While China has expanded its economic and political engagement with Pacific island states, countries such as Palau continue to maintain formal relations with Taiwan. Nauru, meanwhile, restored diplomatic relations with China in 2024 after previously recognizing Taiwan.

The next Pacific Islands Forum summit is scheduled to be hosted by New Zealand in 2027, when regional leaders are expected to confront many of the same questions surrounding security, strategic competition and the Pacific’s increasingly contested diplomatic environment.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he world is on track to breach the critical 1.5 degrees Celsius warming threshold within just a few years, according to a new assessment from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which cautioned that the overshoot would intensify extreme weather and place growing strain on ecosystems, glaciers and coastal communities.

UNEP said reversing course and bringing long-term warming back under 1.5C remains achievable but is far from guaranteed, requiring both steep, rapid cuts to greenhouse gas emissions and active efforts to pull existing carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere.

Under the 2015 Paris Agreement, nations pledged to hold global temperature increases within 1.5C of pre-industrial levels in order to limit the worst effects of climate change. With that goal now almost certain to be missed, UNEP said the priority is shifting toward minimizing how long global temperatures stay above the threshold rather than preventing the breach altogether. The agency warned that every year of inaction and every additional fraction of a degree compounds the danger, cautioning that some resulting damage could prove permanent even if temperatures eventually come back down.

Even in the best-case scenario, one in which every country fully delivers on its existing climate pledges, warming would still likely peak around 1.8C above pre-industrial levels, and the report suggested the actual outcome is likely to run higher. Based on the policies currently in place worldwide, UNEP projected that median warming could reach roughly 2.6C by the end of the century.

Carbon removal seen as essential, not a substitute

The report identified carbon dioxide removal efforts, including large-scale reforestation, as a necessary part of reining in rising temperatures, but stressed that such measures cannot substitute for deep, direct reductions in current emissions.

Scientists have long emphasized that each additional fraction of a degree of warming brings disproportionately larger risks, and that limiting temperature rise as much as possible remains essential to preserving a livable planet. It’s worth noting that a single month or year exceeding 1.5C does not by itself mean the Paris Agreement’s target has been missed, since that goal is defined over long-term, decadal averages rather than short-term fluctuations driven by natural variability such as El Niño and volcanic activity.

Still, such short-term breaches, including the record warmth of 2024, when average global temperatures ran about 1.55C above the pre-industrial baseline, are increasingly viewed as early warning signs that the world is edging closer to a lasting breach of the long-term limit.

(Source: Reuters)

R

ussian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping used their first face-to-face meeting since May to underscore the strength of their partnership, gathering on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. Xi told Putin the relationship between Beijing and Moscow had grown steadier even as global affairs have become harder to predict, while Putin responded that cooperation between the two countries was advancing well across the board. China has continued to deny providing material backing for Russia’s war effort in Ukraine, now in its fifth year.

The two-day gathering in Bishkek marks the SCO’s 25th anniversary and has drawn more than a dozen heads of state, including Iran’s Masoud Pezeshkian, India’s Narendra Modi, Pakistan’s Shehbaz Sharif, and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan attending as a dialogue partner. The event unfolds against the backdrop of Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, now past its four-and-a-half-year mark, and the six-month-old war between the United States and Iran. Putin and Xi have historically used the summit as a platform to project the idea of a multipolar global order and to signal unity against Western influence. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the Putin-Xi conversation centered mainly on economic matters, with Ukraine coming up only briefly.

Putin also sat down separately with Modi, and the two arrived together for their talks. Modi said India stood ready to help bring the Ukraine conflict to a close, while Putin said Moscow was moving toward a resolution without offering specifics. Separately, peace negotiations mediated by Washington remain at a standstill, though CIA Director John Ratcliffe reportedly traveled to Moscow for discussions last week.

Iran’s Pezeshkian signals openness to de-escalation

Putin was also set to meet separately with Pezeshkian, whose country has strengthened military and economic cooperation with Russia since the invasion of Ukraine began, including supplying drones for Moscow’s campaign. Both Russia and Iran remain among the most heavily sanctioned nations globally. Trump has cautioned both Moscow and Beijing against arming Tehran, and US officials reportedly used Ratcliffe’s Moscow visit to reinforce that warning alongside discussions on Ukraine.

Speaking in Bishkek shortly after the first exchange of fire between the US and Iran in weeks, Pezeshkian told Modi that Tehran remained committed to seeking a diplomatic resolution rather than prolonging the conflict. Putin, Xi, Pezeshkian, Modi and Sharif were expected to join a plenary session led by Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov. Beyond its 10 full members, the SCO now counts 15 dialogue partners, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, plus observer states Afghanistan and Mongolia — a bloc that represents roughly 40 percent of the world’s population and a quarter of global GDP, despite ongoing disagreements among its members.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

T

he Trump administration is negotiating with Venezuela’s interim government to secure a direct ownership stake in the country’s oil resources, according to two US officials cited by US media Thursday.

The talks center on more than a dozen productive oil fields containing approximately 90 billion barrels in proven reserves, rather than Venezuela’s total estimated 300 billion barrels, Axios reported. A final agreement could double US oil reserves and reshape energy dynamics across the Western Hemisphere, the outlet said.

“Calling this agreement huge would be an understatement. It’s massive,” one official told Axios.

Under the proposed arrangement, Washington would receive an equity stake in the selected fields. Private companies, including American firms, would develop the sites and generate additional oil revenues for the Venezuelan government.

The negotiations are being led by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Venezuela’s Acting President Delcy Rodriguez, with White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller also involved, according to the report.

Strategic energy push amid global supply strains

The potential deal comes as global oil markets face disruption from wars in Iran and Ukraine, contributing to elevated prices. The US Strategic Petroleum Reserve has dropped to its lowest level in four decades, increasing pressure on Washington to secure new supplies.

Venezuela holds the world’s largest proven oil reserves, but years of underinvestment, mismanagement and declining production have left its energy sector operating far below capacity.

The Trump administration has made expanded US access to Venezuelan oil a central element of its energy and foreign policy in the region. Officials said the goal is to “secure the energy future of the Western Hemisphere for generations to come” while easing price pressures linked to the conflict in Iran.

US Energy Secretary Chris Wright is expected to travel to Venezuela next week to discuss ways for American companies to boost oil production in the country. The timing of any final agreement remains unclear.

The talks build on Washington’s broader efforts to rebuild Venezuela’s oil sector following the US capture of President Nicolas Maduro in January. The administration has since backed an interim government led by Rodriguez while pushing for greater American involvement in the country’s energy industry.

Amid concerns that Rodriguez could face domestic accusations of handing over national resources to the United States, the administration is emphasizing that the arrangement would benefit the Venezuelan people, Axios reported.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

M

alaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s recent comments on Taiwan have intensified scrutiny over whether the Southeast Asian nation is drifting from its long-held policy of non-alignment and tilting toward Beijing amid intensifying US-China rivalry.

In an interview with Al Jazeera aired earlier this month, Anwar stated unequivocally that he viewed Taiwan “as part of China, period,” adding that this position was “accepted by all.” The remarks drew immediate praise from Beijing and sharp condemnation from Taipei, while reigniting debate among analysts and diplomats about Malaysia’s strategic orientation.

When pressed on whether he would condemn China if it resorted to military force should peaceful reunification fail, Anwar drew a controversial parallel to his own country’s territorial integrity. If a Malaysian state attempted to secede, he said, he would use force to “protect the sanctity and unity of” Malaysia.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed the comments, with a spokesman reiterating that Taiwan is “an inalienable part of China’s territory” and that “China must and will be reunited.”

Taiwan’s government, however, warned that Anwar’s “one-sided support for China could negatively impact Taiwanese businesses’ confidence in investing in Malaysia.” The self-governing island, the world’s leading semiconductor producer, remains a major investor in Malaysia’s critical chip manufacturing sector.

Walking back or doubling down?

Facing questions from local media in the days following the interview, Anwar appeared to soften his stance, emphasizing that Malaysia respected China’s position but favored a peaceful resolution to tensions across the Taiwan Strait.

The apparent recalibration did little to quell speculation about Malaysia’s geopolitical leanings, particularly after Anwar courted further headlines by calling for strengthened defenses in the Bornean state of Sabah. He cited the development of US-backed military facilities in neighboring Philippines as partial justification for increased defense spending.

The Philippine government is upgrading military installations on the island of Balabac, located just 50 kilometers from the Malaysian islands of Banggi and Balambangan. Balabac was recently added to the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between Washington and Manila, granting US forces access to designated locations across the Philippines.

Anwar’s remarks have reinforced longstanding suspicions among Western observers that Malaysia is breaking from its traditional non-aligned posture and aligning more closely with China. The country has become one of the most enthusiastic recipients of Chinese investment under Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, and China now represents Malaysia’s largest trading partner.

Malaysia has also diverged sharply from Western positions on other geopolitical issues, most notably the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. Long a vocal critic of Israel, Malaysia under Anwar has been especially outspoken in its opposition to Israel’s war on Gaza.

The Sabah dimension

Some analysts, however, caution against reading Anwar’s comments as evidence of a strategic realignment.

Chee Meng Tan, an assistant professor of business economics at the University of Nottingham Malaysia, noted that Malaysia’s recognition of Taiwan as part of China dates back to the 1974 communiqué signed by then-Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries.

“What was new was Anwar’s statement on the potential use of force, which the One China policy does not explicitly require,” Tan said, suggesting the remarks should be viewed in the context of Anwar’s scheduled visit to China in September.

Anwar’s comments on the US-backed base in Balabac are also connected to Malaysia’s long-running territorial dispute with the Philippines over Sabah. Manila has claimed the territory since it joined Malaysia in 1963, a claim Kuala Lumpur has consistently rejected.

The Philippines reaffirmed its claim to Sabah in February, maintaining that its Maritime Zones Act 2024 preserved “existing and valid claims” over part of the state. In July, Malaysia lodged a formal protest with the United Nations over the Philippines’ claim to an extended continental shelf that Malaysia argued encroached on Sabahan waters.

Tan suggested that Anwar’s comments on the Balabac military buildup may represent “a ‘protect-my-border’ reflex rather than a pro-China gesture.”

Balancing act continues

Anwar’s call to bolster Sabah’s defenses also comes as Malaysia seeks to strengthen its military posture in Borneo, partly to reinforce its claims in the disputed South China Sea, where Malaysia is a claimant state alongside China, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Brunei.

While Malaysia has adopted a less confrontational stance on the South China Sea dispute than the Philippines, it has maintained robust defense ties with Western powers as a quiet counterweight to China’s military buildup in the contested waters.

This is exemplified by Malaysia’s continued commitment to the Five Powers Defence Arrangements, a multilateral security framework that also includes Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. While not a binding defense treaty, the arrangement commits members to consult in the event of an armed attack on Malaysia or Singapore.

Under the framework, annual military exercises involving personnel and assets from member countries are conducted. The arrangement maintains an air defense operations headquarters at a Malaysian Air Force base in Butterworth, Penang, headed by a senior Australian Air Force officer. Australia also maintains a rifle company in Butterworth and regular maritime patrol aircraft deployments to Malaysia.

As a central pillar of the arrangement, Malaysia facilitates a Western military presence in the region that analysts say provides a quiet deterrent against potential aggressors.

T

he Strait of Hormuz has long been the lifeline for the energy production of the GCC states, enabling these oil-rich nations to export huge quantities of oil to consumers, particularly those in East Asian countries such as China, Japan, and South Korea. This allowed the GCC states to prosper, build their economies, foster population growth, and cultivate international relations, using energy as a tool of influence. However, the geopolitical shifts in the region, represented by the war between the United States and Iran in late February 2026, and the associated regional security dilemma, led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran on March 4, 2026.

This has cast a shadow over the economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which rely heavily on energy exports, and has also affected consumer economies, the industrial production cycle, supply chains, and global trade in general. Approximately 20% of global trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz daily, including roughly 16 million barrels of crude oil, representing more than 15% of global oil demand, estimated at 104 million barrels per day, according to 2025 figures.

In addition, about 10 billion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas (LNG) passes through the Strait, mostly from Qatar, which accounts for nearly 20% of global LNG trade. Therefore, a complete halt to shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz has severely disrupted energy exports and crippled the economies of the GCC countries, recovery from which is likely to take a considerable time. The disruption of energy exports through the Strait led to a supply gap estimated at around 10 million barrels per day.

Alternative options to bypass Hormuz

Countries with alternative export routes, such as the UAE’s Habshan-Fujairah crude oil pipeline, and Saudi Arabia’s 1,200 km. pipeline from Abqaiq in the Eastern Province to Yanbu on the Red Sea, were unable to fill the gap due to the limited capacity of these alternative routes. The limitation of the alternative oil export pipeline was compounded for Saudi Arabia when the Houthis closed the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb in July 2026, effectively choking off Saudi oil exports. Saudi Arabia alone exports between six and seven million barrels of crude oil per day, and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz reduced this production to less than half.

Overall, the pumping capacity of both alternative routes — the UAE’s Habshan-Fujairah pipeline and the Saudi pipeline from the Eastern Province to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea — remained capped at only 3.5–5.5 million barrels per day. The war with Iran and its major repercussions, such as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, posed a genuine threat, primarily to the GCC with their economies that are significantly reliant on revenues from the export of hydrocarbons. The dilemma also disclosed gaps in the GCC’s security arrangements and revealed a clear absence of long-term plans, to ensure the sustainability of energy exports without total dependence on passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

Despite the multiple official statements of condemnation and calls for the indispensability of allowing free navigation through the Strait, future considerations can be viewed through two main perspectives. First, the lack of cooperation on energy export strategies. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz severely impacted some GCC members, such as Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, due to the lack of alternative shipping routes. Second, the absence of a collective approach to security, particularly maritime security, within the GCC. This was manifested in the lack of a unified stance on the conflict, and the absence of a manifest collective security framework.

Collective energy export strategy

With regard to energy export strategies and economic security, the GCC countries need a joint strategy, to ensure the continuity of oil and gas exports during times of regional crisis that cause disruption to maritime shipping, such as when transit through the Strait of Hormuz becomes impossible. First, this requires the building of trust, as transboundary pipelines will traverse the territories of neighboring countries, with coastal states serving as the final export hub. If these final export hubs are to be the Omani ports on the Arab Sea, while avoiding the use of ports on the Sea of ​​Oman due to their proximity to Iran, this will pose a challenge for countries like Kuwait, as export routes will be long, and will pass through several GCC states’ territories.

Furthermore, a single export hub implies greater vulnerability, as it will represent a center of gravity for energy resources, making it susceptible to targeting or sabotage. Second, Saudi Arabia and the UAE may consider expanding their alternative pipeline capacity to accommodate their daily oil production. However, for the UAE, the alternative export terminal at the port of Fujairah on the Sea of ​​Oman remains vulnerable, due to its proximity to Iran. Likewise, for Saudi Arabia, the alternative oil pipeline in Yanbu on the Red Sea remains dependent on the status of the other maritime corridor, the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait.

Third, it is possible to invest in LNG and storage facilities in areas that do not require passage through any of the straits. This move could be linked to increasing storage capacity to accommodate mass LNG production, which would ensure the safe flow of LNG away from conflict zones, as it passes through the straits. However, the GCC states must reach a consensus on managing unified export hubs, and again, a common export hub would remain vulnerable to attacks and sabotage. Reaching a consensus on future security arrangements and energy export strategies is crucial for the GCC states, as divergent and unilateral approaches to security and energy issues have proven strategically costly.

Collective regional security approach is a must

When viewing the issue of their inability to secure energy exports, the GCC states appear to be constrained by divergent energy transportation strategies, each of which entails numerous challenges and risks. Therefore, the GCC states may need a comprehensive review of their security cooperation, to ensure a unified stance on regional crises and support mediation efforts, so as to reach solutions satisfactory to all members and regional actors alike.

The February 2026 outbreak of war serves as a wake-up call for GCC decision-makers to enhance coordination on security issues, ensuring the continuity of energy exports and regional security. Particular attention must be paid to maritime security through a collective approach, which is currently lacking. By ensuring a unified maritime security policy, the GCC states can strengthen their naval capabilities, guarantee the interoperability of systems, improve coastal patrols, and reduce defense spending through the concept of burden-sharing.

However, collective maritime security will only bear fruit by fostering a degree of coexistence with other actors, thus bringing relative calm to the region. This would allow the GCC states to address security issues in partnership with other regional actors, such as Iran, Iraq, and potentially Yemen, without foreign interference, and through joint investments, incentives, and shared interests, to build trust and counter geopolitical volatility.

I

raqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zeidi’s visits to Washington, Tehran and Ankara in quick succession are significant in terms of demonstrating the new government’s approach to foreign policy. For Iraq, Washington and Tehran are two capitals closely linked to security, capital, historical influence and developments in Iraqi domestic politics. Ankara, on the other hand, represents the most concrete, stable and reliable economic route through which the country can access global markets. For this reason, al-Zaidi’s visit to Ankara immediately following his engagements in Washington and Tehran should not be viewed as a mere neighbourly visit. This visit demonstrates that Baghdad, which has placed economic development at the centre of its government program, views Türkiye not merely as a trading partner but as a strategic gateway in Iraq’s production, transport and energy equation.

The most significant aspect of the talks in Ankara is not the number of documents signed, but rather the needs of Iraq and Türkiye that they address. Five memoranda of understanding were signed between the two countries covering educational and academic cooperation, youth and sport, industrial property, rail and road transport via the Fishhabur–Ovaköy border crossing, and the development of transport infrastructure in Iraq in exchange for natural resources. Whilst the first three agreements broaden the social and institutional foundation of the relationship, the latter two are of direct strategic importance for Iraq’s economic future. This is because these agreements strengthen the necessary links to move the Development Corridor Project – which aims to connect the Grand Faw Port in Basra to the Turkish border via Iraq and from there to Europe – into the implementation phase.

The visit also demonstrates that the strong relations established between Iraq and Türkiye in recent years are being maintained by the new Iraqi government. During President Erdoğan’s visit to Baghdad in April 2024, 27 legal texts were signed, whilst 11 documents were signed at the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council meeting held in May 2025. The fact that Zaidi has included Ankara in the itinerary of his first foreign visit since taking office suggests that Türkiye has secured a permanent place in Iraq’s development plans.

Oil production but lack of control

Iraq has been producing oil for many years but has been unable to establish sufficient control over the routes by which this oil is transported. The fact that a very large proportion of oil revenues depends on exports via the southern ports and the Strait of Hormuz means that any military tension in the Gulf directly becomes a problem for the Iraqi budget. The closure of ports and disruption to tanker traffic affects not only oil companies but the entire state apparatus, from public sector wages to social spending. Road, rail and pipeline links via Türkiye therefore represent both a means of facilitating trade and a tool for economic security from Baghdad’s perspective.

This is where the true significance of the Development Corridor comes to the fore. If successful, the project—which is planned to link the Port of Faw to Türkiye via a network of approximately 1,200 kilometres of railways and motorways—will do more than simply transport containers from Basra to Türkiye. It will also create new industrial zones, logistics centres, energy networks and urban development areas along the route. Given Iraq’s young population and high unemployment rate, this transformation could provide an alternative to the limited employment opportunities currently available in the oil sector alone.

Türkiye plays a role in this equation that no other neighbour can easily fulfil. Iran is linked to Iraq through energy, trade and political networks, whilst the Gulf states can provide capital to Iraq. However, Türkiye is the only direct neighbour capable of connecting Iraq to the European market by road and rail, and to the Mediterranean via Ceyhan. Moreover, the economic foundation between the two countries will not be built from scratch. Trade volume between Türkiye and Iraq reached approximately 17 billion dollars in 2025, and Turkish companies have undertaken over 1,000 projects in Iraq with a total value of around 40 billion dollars. The setting of a medium-term trade target of 30 billion dollars during the Ankara talks demonstrates the will to roughly double the current level of trade.

Developments in the energy sector also demonstrated that the visit was not limited solely to the transport agenda. Although no long-term, comprehensive energy agreement was signed at the ceremony in Ankara, TPAO’s acquisition of a 15 per cent stake in the company managing BP’s operations in Kirkuk is a step that could transform Türkiye from merely being a buyer and transit country for Iraqi oil into a production partner.

A few days after the visit, Türkiye and Iraq signed a provisional agreement extending the use of the existing oil pipeline for another year, with a capacity of 750,000 barrels per day. This also showed that the talks in Ankara had begun to produce concrete results. Whilst time is being gained to prepare a broader energy agreement, Baghdad has secured the use of the only operational oil export pipeline. Given that the pipeline carries approximately 170,000 barrels per day, increasing the current capacity could be a significant step in Iraq’s efforts to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz.

The secret behind the fifth agreement!

The signing ceremony in Ankara also brought to light the main obstacle facing the Iraqi government. Whilst the signing of five agreements was expected, President Erdoğan’s realization that one agreement had not been signed, followed by Zaidi’s turn to Iraq’s Minister of Transport, Veheb al-Hasani, and the subsequent inclusion of the remaining documents in the signing process, were widely discussed in the media of both countries. Hasani later explained the incident as a technical and protocol-related disagreement. A spokesperson for the Iraqi Ministry of Transport, however, stated that there had been a prior dispute on the Iraqi side—involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Oil—regarding the inclusion of the document in the visit’s program.

In contrast, some Iraqi and Turkish commentators alleged that the minister, who has a background in the Badr Organization, was attempting to slow down the Development Corridor agreement under Iranian influence. This claim could not be definitively confirmed, and the available information is insufficient to characterize the events as a definitive act of sabotage by Iran. However, the incident itself remains significant. Whether the problem stems from a lack of protocol, inter-institutional disagreement or political influence, it demonstrates that during the implementation of strategic decisions in Iraq, different ministries, parties and actors with external connections are not acting in unison. Viewed from this perspective, the success of the Zaidi government’s economic program will in fact depend not so much on how many agreements it signs abroad, but rather on the extent to which it can implement state decisions at home.

Economy in Ankara, missiles on the ground

The joint Saudi Arabian–US air strikes that took place immediately after the visit to Ankara once again demonstrated just how fragile the security environment is in which Zaidi’s development diplomacy is being conducted. US Central Command stated that the strikes targeted logistics and weapons sites belonging to groups it alleged were directed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Reports citing Iraqi and Iranian sources stated that at least 20 members of the Hashd al-Shaabi were killed. Baghdad condemned the strikes as a violation of its sovereignty, and Zaidi cancelled his visit to Riyadh, which had been scheduled for July 30. Thus, within a matter of days, Iraq – which had been discussing transport corridors and economic integration in Ankara – has once again been drawn into the military arena of US-Iranian tensions.

This development does not diminish the importance of the Ankara visit; on the contrary, it enhances it. This is because the path for Iraq to extricate itself from regional military rivalry does not lie solely in maintaining balanced relations with Washington and Tehran. Iraq must raise the cost of the conflict by developing its economic ties, thereby forcing countries to step back from clashing on its territory. It would be difficult to claim that the intensive trade, energy and transport networks to be established with Türkiye will provide Baghdad with an absolute security guarantee. However, these links will make Iraq’s stability more valuable to Türkiye, Europe, the Gulf states and international companies. Economic interdependence alone will not prevent war, but it will help Iraq move away from being perceived solely as a country defined by militias, military bases and spheres of influence.

Looking at Zaidi’s initial foreign policy moves, he is seeking investment from Washington, political balance from Tehran and economic links from Ankara. Among these three capitals, Türkiye stands out for offering the most viable route to turn Iraq’s geography into an economic advantage. Multi-billion-dollar deals in Washington could provide capital and technology. Relations with Tehran cannot be entirely disregarded in terms of internal stability. However, Iraq’s ability to generate non-oil revenue, open up to Europe, create new employment opportunities and reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz depends to a large extent on the operationalisation of the routes extending northwards.

Ultimately, the visit to Ankara has done more than simply demonstrate Iraq’s growing rapprochement with Türkiye; it has also revealed the direction of the new government’s approach to development. The real issue is not the signing of the five documents. The real issue is whether the pipeline stretching from Ovaköy to Faw, the oil flowing from Kirkuk to Ceyhan, and the $30 billion trade target will make the Iraqi state stronger and more independent. If the Zaidi government can support these projects with institutional reform, transparency and state authority, relations with Türkiye could transform Iraq’s quest for balance in foreign policy into an economic strategy. Otherwise, the documents signed in Ankara will simply be added to the long list of agreements that Baghdad has accumulated over the years but has been unable to implement. .

(Originally published in Turkish by Middle East Africa)

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he United States and Iran traded threats over a new economic confrontation on Monday, with Washington preparing what it described as an unprecedented sanctions campaign and Tehran warning it could halt all oil exports from the Persian Gulf if the pressure continues.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent was due to unveil new sanctions targeting countries and companies that continue trading with Iran, describing the campaign as “the single greatest financial offensive ever marshaled against an adversary.”

The measures come after months of war between the United States, Israel and Iran that have damaged Iran’s military and economic infrastructure while disrupting energy markets and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

“The economic D-Day” will begin with the new measures, Bessent wrote in an opinion article published in the Financial Times, warning countries that continue doing business with Iran that they could face consequences.

Iran threans to halt oil exports

Iran responded with a threat to dramatically escalate the economic confrontation.

Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said Tehran could stop all oil exports from the Persian Gulf if the U.S. economic campaign continued.

“If the economic war continues, not a single drop of oil will be exported,” Rezaei said in a social media post, adding that Iran would regard countries supporting Washington’s economic campaign as participating in an act of war.

The warning raises the possibility of a further disruption to global energy markets. The Strait of Hormuz, through which a major share of the world’s oil supplies normally passes, has already been brought close to a standstill by the conflict.

Iran retains missile and drone capabilities that it has used against U.S. allies in the Gulf and has threatened commercial shipping in the strategic waterway.

The new U.S. sanctions campaign comes as Washington and Tehran remain far from a negotiated settlement. Although direct military strikes between the two countries have stopped for several weeks, the two sides have yet to resume substantive negotiations.

The conflict began on February 28 with U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran. Months of fighting have killed thousands of people, most of them in Iran and Lebanon, and inflicted extensive damage on Iranian infrastructure.

Iran also suffered the killing of its Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during the conflict, while the United States has reported 18 military personnel killed and more than 750 wounded.

Struggling economy but still standing

Despite the economic pressure, Tehran has maintained a defiant public stance. Iranian officials, however, have acknowledged that the country’s economy was already under severe strain before the war because of years of sanctions, high inflation, currency weakness and energy shortages.

The war has added to those problems by damaging infrastructure, disrupting trade and reducing production, leaving Tehran facing major reconstruction costs.

Iranian officials have warned that further economic pressure could deepen hardship, fuel public discontent and undermine the government’s legitimacy.

Washington is also seeking support from major trading partners, particularly China, which has remained one of Iran’s most important economic partners.

Bessent has urged Beijing to cooperate with the U.S. campaign, noting that China has historically obtained a large share of its oil imports from the Gulf.

China has rejected the use of economic pressure as a solution to the conflict.

“Sanctions and pressure do not help resolve the problem,” a spokesperson for China’s embassy in Washington said, while calling for diplomacy.

Calls for diplomacy continue

With direct U.S.-Iran talks stalled, several countries have attempted to mediate between the two sides. Qatar, Pakistan and Turkey have all been involved in diplomatic efforts aimed at preventing a further escalation.

Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, was expected to visit Tehran on Monday as part of Islamabad’s efforts to promote regional peace and security. Pakistani officials said the visit would include discussions on the latest developments and Washington’s threatened sanctions.

The economic confrontation comes at a particularly sensitive moment for global energy markets. Any further disruption to Gulf oil exports could send prices sharply higher and increase pressure on countries already struggling with elevated energy costs.

For Washington, the sanctions campaign is intended to force Iran back to the negotiating table by increasing the economic cost of refusing U.S. demands.

For Tehran, the threat to halt oil exports represents an attempt to demonstrate that Iran can impose significant costs on the United States and its allies if economic pressure continues.

The confrontation therefore risks developing into a wider contest over energy, trade and financial access, even as military operations remain suspended.

With neither side showing signs of abandoning its core demands, the latest exchange of threats suggests that the six-month conflict has entered a new phase — one in which economic pressure and control of global energy supplies could prove as important as military power.

(Source: Reuters)

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.S. government debt has surpassed $40 trillion for the first time, highlighting growing concerns about the country’s fiscal outlook as spending on social programs and interest payments continues to rise faster than government revenues.

The Treasury Department reported that total U.S. public debt reached $40.047 trillion on Tuesday. Of that amount, $32.266 trillion was debt held by the public, while $7.782 trillion represented intragovernmental holdings.

The debt has more than doubled since Donald Trump first took office in January 2017, when it stood at about $19.95 trillion. Around one-third of the increase occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, when the Trump and Biden administrations borrowed heavily to finance emergency economic support.

Debt and interest costs continue to rise

Budget watchdogs have warned that the growing debt burden could eventually trigger a serious fiscal crisis unless lawmakers take steps to reduce spending, increase revenues, or pursue a combination of both.

“The more we borrow, the more we exacerbate inflation, squeeze out other priorities in the budget, and leave ourselves vulnerable to emergencies at home and turmoil abroad,” said Maya MacGuineas, president of the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget.

The debt reached $40 trillion less than five months after passing $39 trillion, underscoring the rapid pace of government borrowing.

The United States is also facing rising borrowing costs as investors demand higher yields on Treasury securities. Thirty-year Treasury yields recently reached their highest level in nearly two decades, while demand from foreign investors has weakened.

Higher Treasury yields can increase borrowing costs across the economy, affecting mortgages, auto loans and business financing.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent responded Wednesday by announcing that the government would double the size of some Treasury buyback operations to at least $4 billion per transaction, in an effort to support the longer-term bond market.

Trump has repeatedly called for lower interest rates. Asked whether Americans should be concerned about volatility in the bond market, he said he was not worried and argued that a strong U.S. economy should lead to lower rates

Trump and Biden both oversaw large increases

The growth in U.S. debt has accelerated under both Trump and former President Joe Biden.

Debt increased by about $7.8 trillion during Trump’s first term, with more than half of that increase accumulating during the final nine months as the government responded to the pandemic.

Since Trump returned to office in January 2025, the debt has risen by another $3.8 trillion, bringing the increase across his two terms to about $11.6 trillion so far.

During Biden’s four-year presidency, federal debt increased by approximately $8.4 trillion, driven partly by pandemic recovery spending as well as investments in infrastructure, clean energy and other government programs.

Trump’s second-term legislative agenda is also expected to add significantly to future borrowing. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that his major tax-and-spending package, known as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, could add about $4.7 trillion to the national debt.

Meanwhile, the federal government continues to face large annual deficits. The Treasury reported a $432 billion deficit in July, the fourth-largest monthly deficit in U.S. history.

Interest becomes a major budget burden

Rising debt is making interest payments an increasingly important part of federal spending.

The government spends roughly $7 trillion annually, with about 60% going toward mandatory programs such as Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and veterans’ benefits.

Interest payments on the national debt now account for roughly $1.1 trillion annually. In fiscal 2025, debt-service costs exceeded Pentagon spending for the first time.

During the first 10 months of fiscal 2026, interest costs surpassed Medicare spending, becoming the second-largest federal budget item after Social Security.

The pressure is expected to grow as the aging population increases demand for retirement and health care programs while tax revenues remain insufficient to cover federal spending.

The crossing of the $40 trillion threshold has therefore renewed concerns about whether Washington can stabilize its finances while maintaining major social programs, funding national priorities and managing the rising cost of borrowing.

(Source: Reuters)

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overnment bond markets across the United States, Japan and Europe are sending a warning to policymakers as long-term borrowing costs reach levels not seen in years, driven by rising government debt, inflation concerns and geopolitical uncertainty.

The sharp increase in bond yields is raising borrowing costs for governments, companies and households while making it more difficult for central banks to balance inflation against economic growth.

In the United States, 30-year Treasury yields rose above 5% to their highest level since 2007. Japan’s 10-year government bond yield climbed to just below 3%, its highest level in three decades. German, French and British long-term borrowing costs also reached multiyear or multi-decade highs.

The moves reflect growing concerns about the sustainability of government finances and the inflation outlook as geopolitical tensions, tariffs and the continuing war involving Iran reshape the global economy.

Rising debt and inflation pressure bond markets

The U.S. government debt burden is approaching $40 trillion, while other developed economies are also facing large fiscal deficits and growing borrowing requirements.

The prolonged conflict involving Iran has pushed oil prices higher, with crude recently rising above $90 a barrel. Higher energy prices are adding to inflation concerns and reducing expectations that central banks will be able to cut interest rates quickly.

At the same time, technology companies are borrowing heavily to finance the expansion of artificial intelligence infrastructure and data centers. That demand for capital is increasing competition with governments seeking to sell large amounts of debt.

“Bond yields’ recent surge suggests investors are losing patience with fiscal profligacy,” said Jonas Goltermann, chief markets economist at Capital Economics.

U.S. 30-year Treasury yields later eased slightly, with the yield last down 2.4 basis points at 5.286%. The 10-year Treasury yield stood around 4.71%, a level that markets are watching closely, with 5% increasingly viewed as an important threshold.

The New York Federal Reserve estimates the term premium — the additional return investors demand for holding longer-term government debt — at around 80 basis points, close to its highest level in 12 years.

Recent U.S. Treasury auctions have also highlighted rising borrowing costs. A 10-year Treasury sale cleared at a yield of 4.683%, the highest in 19 years, while a 30-year auction reached 5.216%, a 25-year high.

The increase in government bond yields has also weighed on stocks, with major indexes including the Nasdaq and Europe’s STOXX 600 falling on Tuesday.

Japan and Europe face growing pressure

Japan is experiencing a particularly significant shift in its bond market. Its 10-year borrowing costs have climbed to nearly 3%, while 30-year yields have moved above 4%.

Investors are increasingly expecting the Bank of Japan to raise interest rates as early as September as inflation concerns grow.

Higher Japanese bond yields could also affect U.S. markets because Japanese investors have traditionally been major buyers of U.S. government debt. More attractive returns at home could encourage them to reduce purchases of Treasuries.

Foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries declined in June, according to U.S. Treasury Department data, with Japan, Britain and China among the countries reducing their holdings.

European governments are facing similar pressures. Germany’s 10-year bond yield reached its highest level since 2011, while French yields rose to their highest since 2008. Britain’s 30-year borrowing costs approached levels last seen in May, which were the highest since 1998.

High government spending and debt in countries such as France and Britain have contributed to investor concerns. Climate-related events are also expected to increase pressure on government budgets.

The bond market selloff is significant because government bond yields serve as a benchmark for borrowing across the economy. Higher sovereign yields can translate into more expensive corporate loans, consumer credit and household mortgages.

Some investors, however, believe the recent rise in yields could make government bonds increasingly attractive and eventually encourage buyers to return to the market.

The broader concern for policymakers is whether higher yields represent a temporary adjustment or the beginning of a longer period in which investors demand substantially greater compensation for lending to governments.

With inflation still vulnerable to higher energy prices, government debt continuing to rise and geopolitical risks increasing, bond markets are placing greater pressure on policymakers to demonstrate control over both fiscal policy and inflation.

(Source: Reuters)

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merican President Donald Trump’s approval rating has fallen to 33%, the lowest level of his current presidency, as growing concerns over the war with Iran and rising gasoline prices weigh on his standing with American voters, according to a Reuters/Ipsos poll released Monday.

The four-day survey found that 64% of Americans disapproved of Trump’s performance, compared with 33% who approved. His approval rating fell from 35% in an earlier poll this month and matched the lowest level recorded during his previous presidency, in December 2017.

Trump returned to the White House in 2025 with approval from just under half of Americans, but his standing has weakened as the conflict with Iran has continued. The war has disrupted a significant share of global oil trade and pushed gasoline prices higher, adding pressure on U.S. households.

Most Americans expect Iran war to continue

The poll showed widespread concern that U.S. involvement in the conflict will last much longer than Trump initially suggested.

About 80% of Americans said they believed U.S. involvement in Iran would continue for an extended period, including 87% of Democrats and 71% of Republicans. Only 16% expected the conflict to end within a few weeks.

Trump initially suggested that the war could be resolved within weeks, but Iran has continued resisting U.S. and Israeli military pressure. The conflict has also disrupted oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, contributing to higher energy prices.

Trump has defended the rising cost of gasoline as necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. At a rally in New York on Friday, he told supporters that paying somewhat more for gasoline was worthwhile to prevent what he described as an evil country from obtaining nuclear weapons.

However, only about one in five Americans said the war was worth the cost. Among Republicans, only about half considered the conflict worthwhile.

The economic impact of the war could become a major issue ahead of the Nov. 3 congressional elections, with Republicans seeking to defend narrow majorities in the House while Democrats increasingly see an opportunity to gain control of the Senate.

Democrats gain ground on economy

The poll also showed Democrats gaining an advantage over Republicans on economic issues. About 38% of registered voters said Democrats would handle the economy better, compared with 35% who preferred Republicans.

That represents a significant shift from previous years and comes as voters express increasing concern about the cost of living and gasoline prices.

Democrats were also viewed as better equipped to manage the cost of living, while Republicans continued to hold a narrow advantage on immigration.

About 40% of voters said Republicans had the better approach to immigration, compared with 38% who favored Democrats. The two-point Republican advantage was the smallest recorded during Trump’s current presidency. Republicans had held a 26-point advantage on immigration in January 2025.

Although Trump’s administration has overseen a sharp decline in border crossings and expanded immigration enforcement, Republicans have faced political pressure over deadly confrontations and the growing number of people held in immigration detention, including children.

The Reuters/Ipsos poll was conducted online among 1,166 U.S. adults nationwide and had a margin of error of three percentage points in either direction.

The findings point to growing political challenges for Trump as voters confront the economic consequences of the Iran conflict and prepare to vote in the November midterm elections.

(Source: Reuters)

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razil has begun consultations on possible retaliatory measures against the United States after Washington imposed new tariffs on Brazilian exports, escalating trade tensions between the two countries.

The Brazilian government said the new U.S. tariffs were “unjustified and arbitrary” and vowed to defend the country’s interests through all appropriate channels.

The consultations mark the first step in a process that could eventually lead Brazil to impose countermeasures on U.S. goods and services. No final decision has been made, and Brazilian officials are expected to hold further discussions with U.S. trade authorities before determining how to respond.

Brazil considers range of measures

The United States imposed a 25% surcharge in July on Brazilian goods, citing what Washington described as unfair trade practices. Brazil is also subject to a separate 12.5% tariff linked to allegations concerning enforcement of bans on forced labor.

Under Brazil’s “Reciprocity Law,” the government could respond with measures beyond traditional tariffs. Options under consideration include restrictions on U.S. audiovisual companies and the possible suspension of pharmaceutical and agricultural patents, according to sources cited by Reuters.

Brazilian officials are weighing the potential economic consequences, including possible disruptions to supply chains and higher domestic inflation, before deciding whether to proceed with retaliation.

Trade dispute escalates

The dispute is part of a broader expansion of U.S. tariffs under President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly argued that tariffs are necessary to address trade imbalances and protect American industries.

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva had previously pledged to invoke the Reciprocity Law if Washington imposed the new duties. The government has now begun the formal process by requesting further diplomatic consultations with U.S. trade authorities.

The move comes as relations between Brasilia and Washington have become increasingly strained. Brazil has described the U.S. tariffs as unjustified while seeking to defend its interests through diplomatic and legal channels.

For now, Brasilia has stopped short of imposing countermeasures. The coming consultations will determine whether the dispute can be resolved through negotiations or whether Brazil moves ahead with retaliatory actions that could further deepen trade tensions between the two countries.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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he Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed on August 7, 2026, in Mecca between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, marks a significant transformation in the security equation between the Middle East and South Asia. At the heart of the agreement lies the principle that an armed attack directed against one of the parties shall be deemed to have been directed against all three states. This provision goes beyond traditional defense  cooperation to establish a new security mechanism based on the principle of collective deterrence.

The agreement’s primary significance in terms of international relations stems from the convergence of the signatory states’ diverse power elements within a single security framework. Turkey possesses NATO’s second-largest military force, advanced operational capabilities and a defence industry that has grown significantly in recent years. Pakistan is the only Muslim state to possess nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, stands out for its energy resources, financial capacity and influence in Gulf geopolitics. For this reason, the Mecca Agreement constitutes a strategic configuration of complementary capabilities formed by complementary strategic capabilities, rather than a traditional military alliance between three similar states.

The international context in which the agreement emerged is also significant. Rising military tensions in the Middle East, the security of energy transport routes, Iran-centred conflict dynamics and the tendency of regional states to diversify their security guarantees are reinforcing the search for a new regional security order. Within this framework, the Mecca Agreement can be interpreted as a demonstration of the will of regional states to support their security needs increasingly through mechanisms established amongst themselves, rather than through guarantees provided from outside.

The concept of strategic autonomy is particularly significant here. Since the end of the Cold War, one of the fundamental pillars of the Middle Eastern security system has been the US military presence and bilateral security relations. The Mecca Agreement does not directly abolish this system. It is also explicitly stated that the parties’ existing bilateral or multilateral obligations remain in force. However, the agreement demonstrates the will of regional actors to establish their own deterrence mechanisms alongside the Washington- centred security architecture. This situation can be interpreted as a transition from a dependence on a single security centre to a multi-layered security architecture.

The significance of the agreement for the participants

From Turkey’s perspective, the agreement also has a unique dimension. Turkey is a member of NATO. The Mecca Agreement, whilst enabling Ankara to maintain its NATO membership, also allows it to expand its institutionalised defense relations with regional powers outside NATO. Turkey is thus positioning itself strategically from which it can forge links between the Euro-Atlantic security system and the Middle East–South Asia security spheres. However, the relationship between the collective defense obligation under the Mecca Agreement and Article 5 of the NATO Treaty will require detailed legal and strategic scrutiny in the coming period, particularly in the event of simultaneous crises.

Pakistan’s participation in the agreement, meanwhile, shifts the deterrence debate to a different level. Pakistan’s nuclear capability enhances the agreement’s psychological and strategic weight. However, it cannot be concluded from current statements that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence has been extended to Turkey or Saudi Arabia. Saudi officials have also stated that the agreement is not linked to nuclear purposes or an arms race. Consequently, based on the current data, it does not appear appropriate to characterise the Mecca Agreement as a nuclear umbrella agreement.

From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the agreement represents a continuation of its policy of diversifying security partnerships. By linking its economic capacity with Turkey’s defense industry and Pakistan’s military capabilities, Riyadh may secure a greater degree of strategic manoeuvre. To the extent that this framework extends to areas such as defense industry investments, joint production, technology transfer, training, intelligence sharing and maritime security, it will acquire a lasting institutional character.

The principle of collective defense

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Agreement is the principle of ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’. This provision is reminiscent of NATO’s logic of collective defense. However, there is currently a significant institutional difference between the two organizations NATO is an institutional alliance with over seventy years’ history, underpinned by a military command structure, joint defense planning, force structure, standards and permanent political bodies. The implementation mechanisms of the Mecca Agreement, however, are not yet as transparent, based on the information made public.

For this reason, the true strength of the agreement will be measured not so much by its signing as by the extent to which it becomes institutionalized. Should a joint military committee be established, joint operational plans drawn up, regular exercises conducted, an intelligence-sharing mechanism put in place and defense industry projects undertaken jointly, the Mecca Agreement could evolve into a genuine collective defense system.

From Iran’s perspective, interpreting the agreement as a direct counter-alliance requires caution. The parties have specifically emphasized that the agreement does not target any particular state. Given Turkey’s shared border with Iran, its economic ties and regional diplomatic channels, the agreement’s potential to take on a sectarian dimension could entail significant strategic costs for Ankara. Consequently, the sustainability of the agreement will depend on maintaining a balance between the principle of collective defense and the policy of avoiding regional polarization.

Towards a new regional security architecture

From Israel’s perspective, the new framework presents a distinct area for strategic calculation. The convergence of Turkey’s NATO capabilities, Pakistan’s military strength and Saudi Arabia’s regional influence within a common security mechanism holds the potential to influence the balance of power in the Middle East. However, it is not possible to draw a definitive conclusion from current statements suggesting that the agreement constitutes an alliance formed against Israel.

A broader implication of the Mecca Agreement is the possibility of institutionalizing security cooperation within the Islamic world. Whilst the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is a broad political organization with 57 members, it lacks an effective collective defense mechanism. The tripartite structure emerging in Mecca could, if successful, form the core of a narrower yet highly operational security platform that could expand with the participation of other states.

At this point, the fact that the agreement is named ‘Mecca’ also carries symbolic significance. The signing of the agreement at the most important holy centre of the Islamic world lends it political and historical visibility beyond that of a purely military text. However, the agreement’s future legitimacy will be shaped not so much by its symbolic value as by its contribution to regional peace, its compliance with international law, and its capacity to prevent crises.

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he geopolitical upheavals experienced in the international security environment in recent years are fundamentally altering the position of defense spending within economic policy. Increasing strategic competition on a global scale – particularly deepening security risks in the Middle East, such as the Russia-Ukraine War and the US/Israel-Iran War– alongside energy supply security, supply chain continuity and the global race for critical technologies, is leading to a reshaping of defense spending. In particular, NATO’s decision to raise member states’ defense spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the long term signals the start of a new era, not only in security policies but also in global industrial production and technology investment. This has sparked a debate as to whether defense spending could become the new engine of economic growth.

For many years, defense spending has been assessed within the framework of the opportunity cost approach. This approach argues that public resources allocated to defense have a restrictive effect—albeit to a relative degree—on economic growth, as they are diverted from productive sectors such as education, healthcare or infrastructure investment. However, the technological transformation and changes in the security architecture over the past twenty years have necessitated a reassessment of this approach. Today, defense expenditure is viewed not merely as current expenditure-focused public spending aimed at building military capability, but as multifaceted investments that support high-tech production, research and development (R&D) activities, and export capacity.

How do defense expenditures affect economic equilibrium?

The economic effects of defense expenditures are now analyzed not only from the perspective of fiscal policy but also from the perspectives of industrial policy and technological transformation. The economic impact of defense expenditures is realized through a multi-stage transmission mechanism. In the first stage, public expenditure stimulates demand, thereby increasing aggregate demand, expanding production volumes, raising capacity utilization rates and supporting industrial production. Due to their high capital intensity, defense projects generate increased production across numerous sub-sectors, notably machinery manufacturing, electronics, metallurgy, composite materials, software and communications technologies. Thus, defense expenditure creates a powerful multiplier mechanism that mobilizes a broad supply chain.

In the second stage, R&D investments come into play. Defense projects involve significant R&D expenditure due to their high-technology nature. Technologies developed within the defense industry are transferred to other sectors over time, thereby creating long-term positive effects on productivity.

The third stage is the external balance channel. Owing to its high technology intensity, the defense industry is one of the sectors with the highest export value per kilogram. The export of defense products contributes to the current account balance and, at the same time, enables countries to move up the global technology value chain. For this reason, the defense industry is today recognized as one of the strategic determinants of high-value-added exports.

However, the effectiveness of this transfer mechanism depends largely on domestic production capacity. In countries that procure defense systems largely through imports, increasing defense budgets lead to significant outflows of foreign exchange, whereas in economies with domestic production capacity, the same expenditure is channeled back into the economy in the form of increased production, employment, technology development and exports. Consequently, the economic return on defense expenditure is linked not so much to the size of the budget as to the extent to which expenditure can be channeled into the domestic industry.

In this new global context, Türkiye’s production capacity constitutes a notable advantage. As a result of the localization policies implemented over the past twenty years, dependence on foreign sources in the defense industry has been significantly reduced. Within the defense industry, capabilities in design, system integration and high-technology production have been markedly enhanced. Consequently, defense expenditure has evolved from a structure heavily reliant on imports to a production model that generates domestic added value.

What is the contribution of Turkish defense industry companies to the economy?

One of the most significant indicators of this transformation is Türkiye’s rise in global defense exports. Over the past twenty years, Türkiye’s share of global defense exports has grown steadily and, as a result, Türkiye has become one of the key suppliers in the global defense market. This rise in export performance demonstrates that the defense industry has transformed into a strategic production ecosystem that competes in international markets, exports technology and generates foreign exchange.

Institutional transformation is equally noteworthy. Whilst in 2009 ASELSAN was the sole company representing Türkiye amongst the world’s top 100 defense industry firms, in recent years TUSAŞ, ROKETSAN, ASFAT and MKE have joined ASELSAN on the same list. The fact that companies such as STM, HAVELSAN, FNSS and BMC have entered the global top 100 defense industry companies in different years demonstrates that Türkiye’s defense industry has evolved from a single-company-centered structure into a multi-stakeholder, deepened and technologically diversified industrial ecosystem.

This rise in international company rankings is directly reflected in Türkiye’s industrial performance. An analysis of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry’s ISO 500 survey reveals that defense industry companies are steadily strengthening their positions among Türkiye’s largest industrial organizations in terms of sales from production. It is particularly noteworthy that, as of 2025, TUSAŞ has become Türkiye’s seventh-largest industrial organization, while ASELSAN has become the ninth-largest. Export performance at the company level also confirms this transformation. While ASELSAN’s export revenues have reached an all-time high in recent years, TUSAŞ has risen to the status of a key manufacturer within global aerospace and defense supply chains, with export volumes hovering at the billion-dollar level. This picture demonstrates that the Turkish defense industry has gained international competitiveness not only in platform production but also in areas such as electronic systems, avionics solutions, software, engineering services and systems integration.

How will defense expenditure take shape in the coming period?

In this regard, NATO’s plan to accelerate defense investments over the next decade is of considerable importance for Türkiye. This does not merely signify a larger export market for Türkiye. It also holds the potential to strengthen Türkiye’s strategic position within the supply chains of NATO countries, thanks to its production infrastructure with high local content, advanced engineering capabilities and defense companies capable of competing on a global scale. The growing demand from Alliance countries for defense industry products is creating long-term investment and export opportunities for the Turkish defense industry.

In conclusion, the global defense economy has entered a new phase of structural transformation. Defense expenditure is regarded not merely as public spending to meet security needs, but as strategic investments that support technology development, high-value-added production and export capacity. In the coming period, competition between countries will be shaped not so much by the size of defense budgets, but by the capacity of industrial ecosystems to convert these budgets into production, technology and exports.

The defense industry infrastructure that Türkiye has established over the past 20 years, and in particular its clusters, will provide a significant competitive advantage during this new period of expansion in global defense spending. For this reason, the defense industry will continue to be one of the key pillars of both national security and Türkiye’s development strategy, which is based on sustainable growth, high-tech production and exports.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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proposed agreement being discussed by Iran and Oman to help end five months of conflict between Iran and the United States would give Tehran authority over commercial vessels entering the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz, according to Iranian and regional sources, potentially marking one of the most significant shifts in Gulf maritime security in decades.

The proposal, if finalized, would grant Iran oversight of inbound shipping through the strategic waterway, through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil trade passed before the conflict disrupted maritime traffic. Regional officials said negotiations remain ongoing, with key issues still unresolved, despite Iranian officials reporting substantial progress.

There was no immediate comment from Washington on the reported proposal. U.S. officials have consistently maintained that they would not accept Iranian control over navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, despite President Donald Trump’s recent assertions that an agreement to reopen the waterway could be close.

The talks are taking place amid broader diplomatic efforts to end the conflict that erupted in late February, when U.S. and Israeli military operations against Iran triggered months of fighting across the region.

According to a senior Iranian source and two regional officials familiar with the negotiations, the draft arrangement would require commercial vessels entering the Gulf to transit through Iranian-controlled waters, giving Tehran an unprecedented administrative role over maritime traffic.

Some form of control

One regional official described the proposal as representing “some form of control” already conceded in principle, though negotiators remain divided over how that authority would be implemented in practice.

“The concession has already been made regarding some form of control over Hormuz,” one regional source said, adding that details regarding inspections and oversight remain under discussion.

Another regional source said Gulf states are seeking a framework in which regional countries would supervise any inspections of commercial vessels and ensure that any payments required from shipping companies remain voluntary.

A senior Iranian official said Tehran is seeking to levy fees of between 5% and 7% of cargo values on ships using the strait, while Oman has proposed charges closer to 3%. The United States, however, continues to oppose any transit fees, insisting that Hormuz remain an international waterway with unrestricted access.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said negotiations with Oman had reached “fundamental understandings” and suggested an agreement was nearing completion.

Speaking to Iran’s official IRNA news agency, Gharibabadi said the proposed arrangement was designed so that commercial vessels would pass through Iranian territorial waters on both inbound and outbound voyages.

He added that discussions had reached “the verge of being finalized.”

However, regional officials cautioned that significant differences remain, particularly over whether Iran’s authority would extend equally to ships leaving the Gulf, as well as the legal basis for any administrative role Tehran would exercise.

Regional energy infrastructure

The negotiations come as Iran has simultaneously intensified its warnings to Gulf Arab states against supporting any renewed U.S. military action.

According to several regional sources, Tehran has privately warned neighboring Gulf countries that any future American attack on Iranian territory would trigger retaliation against critical regional energy infrastructure.

“The Iranian warning was unequivocal: if America targeted Iran’s infrastructure, they would retaliate by striking Gulf energy facilities and other regional targets,” one Gulf source said.

Since the conflict began, Iran has repeatedly targeted regional allies of the United States with missile and drone attacks while also disrupting commercial shipping through Hormuz.

Iran says more than 3,400 people have been killed since the war began, while the United States has reported the deaths of 18 military personnel.

President Trump has increasingly emphasized diplomacy after months of military operations failed to reopen the waterway fully or compel Tehran to accept Washington’s demands.

Addressing supporters in Las Vegas, Trump said he preferred a negotiated solution despite warning that military action remained an option.

“I’d rather make a deal because I don’t want to kill people,” Trump said. “I do not want to kill people, but at some point we’re gonna.”

The reported negotiations reflect a notable evolution in the conflict, which has increasingly centered on maritime access rather than direct military confrontation.

Iran has argued that previous flexibility in negotiations only encouraged greater pressure from Washington, leading its leadership to conclude that stronger leverage is necessary before meaningful talks can proceed.

A major strategic shift from the pre-war status quo

The proposed arrangement would also represent a major strategic shift from the pre-war status quo, when commercial vessels transited the Strait of Hormuz without paying fees or seeking authorization from Iran.

The waterway remains one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors, serving as the primary export route for Gulf oil and liquefied natural gas.

Despite optimistic statements from Tehran and Washington about the prospects for diplomacy, officials involved in the talks stressed that no final agreement has been reached.

Political disagreements over shipping fees, inspection authority and the precise definition of Iranian control continue to complicate negotiations, while broader questions surrounding the future security architecture of the Gulf remain unresolved.

The talks also come as Trump faces growing domestic pressure to end a conflict that opinion polls suggest remains unpopular with American voters ahead of November’s congressional midterm elections.

Oil prices fell in recent days after Trump suspended plans for renewed military strikes, citing ongoing diplomatic efforts that he said could eventually lead to the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

(Source: Reuters)

I

ran is increasingly relying on economic disruption rather than direct military confrontation to pressure the United States into making concessions over the Strait of Hormuz, expanding threats to regional shipping routes and energy infrastructure as the conflict enters a prolonged phase.

According to Gulf officials, regional sources and analysts, Tehran believes that sustained pressure on global trade and energy markets will prove more effective than conventional military escalation in forcing Washington to reconsider its position.

Rather than seeking a decisive battlefield victory, Iran has adopted a strategy of calibrated escalation designed to steadily raise the economic and political costs of the conflict while avoiding an all-out regional war. The objective, analysts say, is to convince the United States and its allies that accommodating Iran’s demands over the Strait of Hormuz is less costly than continuing the current confrontation.

“Iran, from the beginning, has tried to out-escalate the United States by stretching out its escalation options so that it always has something new to bring every week — a new geography, a new type of weapon, a new type of target,” Michael Knights of the Washington Institute told Reuters.

He argued that Iran’s greatest leverage lies not in its ability to inflict military damage on the United States or Israel, but in its capacity to disrupt regional economies and global commerce.

“The bigger advantage they have is not that they can hurt America or Israel,” Knights said. “Their big advantage is that they can hurt the regional states and the global economy.”

Pressure beyond Hormuz

After demonstrating its ability to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz — a waterway that carried around one-fifth of global oil consumption before the conflict — Iran has signaled that its pressure campaign could extend well beyond the strategic chokepoint.

Threats directed at the Red Sea and Saudi energy infrastructure suggest Tehran is seeking to widen the geographical scope of the crisis, increasing the cost of protecting international shipping while testing Washington’s willingness to sustain a prolonged confrontation.

One Gulf source said commanders in Iran’s Revolutionary Guards believe recent developments have strengthened Tehran’s negotiating position.

“The Iranians believe that by widening the war and increasing the pressure, he will eventually give in,” the source said, referring to U.S. President Donald Trump. “Trump thinks he can hit the Iranians hard and bring them to the negotiating table, but they won’t bend.”

That assessment has shaped Tehran’s negotiating strategy, according to Iranian and regional sources.

Trump said on Monday that negotiations with Iran would take place after he canceled a planned military strike in hopes of securing an agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials, however, denied that talks with Washington were currently underway.

A senior Iranian source said Tehran’s leadership has concluded that previous attempts at flexibility only encouraged greater pressure from Washington, reinforcing the belief that meaningful negotiations can occur only after Iran establishes stronger leverage.

In Tehran’s view, the source said, Trump interprets concessions as weakness and responds only to sustained pressure.

Michael Singh, another senior fellow at the Washington Institute, said Iranian leaders appear convinced they still hold the initiative because the Trump administration remains uncertain about how far it is willing to escalate militarily.

“The Iranians are trying to press their advantage,” Singh said. “They’re interested in establishing sovereignty over the strait and exercising selective control over the waterway.”

Dispute over the Strait

At the heart of the standoff is the future administration of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors.

Regional sources say Oman has presented Tehran with a Gulf-backed proposal that would establish a mechanism for managing shipping through the strait, including voluntary user fees.

Iran, however, is reportedly seeking administrative authority over the waterway and the right to impose service charges on vessels passing through it.

Washington has rejected any arrangement that would allow Iran to exercise control over the strait, insisting it must remain an international waterway open to unrestricted commercial navigation.

Former U.S. diplomat Alan Eyre said Iran’s broader strategy is intended to deter further American military action while forcing Washington to lift its naval blockade and reconsider its negotiating position.

“They don’t want the U.S. to dictate the pace of events,” Eyre said.

War of endurance

Analysts say Iran’s campaign has already shifted the focus of regional and international efforts.

Rather than intensifying military pressure on Tehran, Gulf states and Western governments are increasingly concentrating on protecting commercial shipping and critical energy infrastructure.

The formation of a Saudi-led maritime coalition reflects that shift. According to Gulf sources, the initiative is primarily defensive, focusing on escorting commercial vessels, sharing intelligence and safeguarding vital sea lanes instead of confronting Iran directly.

Knights compared the effort to Europe’s Aspides naval mission in the Red Sea, which was established to protect merchant shipping rather than alter the regional military balance.

For Tehran, forcing rivals into an expensive defensive posture represents a strategic success despite its military disadvantages.

Unable to match U.S. military capabilities directly, Iran can still impose significant costs by compelling regional governments and foreign navies to devote increasing resources to securing global trade routes.

Each new threat, whether in the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait or elsewhere, increases the financial and military burden of keeping international commerce flowing.

Analysts describe the conflict as increasingly becoming a contest of endurance.

Iranian leaders appear to believe they can withstand economic pressure longer than the United States and its partners can tolerate repeated disruptions to global energy supplies and maritime trade.

The strategy also serves a diplomatic purpose.

By demonstrating an ability to expand the crisis whenever necessary, Tehran hopes to strengthen its bargaining position before any future negotiations.

“If there are going to be negotiations, they will define the terms,” said Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations. “Both sides are matching escalation with escalation.”

Despite intermittent diplomatic efforts, neither Washington nor Tehran has shown signs of backing down.

As both sides continue to test each other’s resolve through economic pressure, military deterrence and political signaling, analysts warn that a strategy intended to maximize leverage could still spiral into a wider conflict that neither side intends or is fully able to control.

(Source: Reuters)

W

ildfires continued to burn across France, Spain and Greece on Thursday as scorching temperatures, strong winds and dry conditions fueled blazes that have killed firefighters, forced mass evacuations and destroyed thousands of hectares of land.

In southwestern France, authorities said a wildfire near Bordeaux was brought under control overnight after burning around 42,000 hectares of forest. Police arrested two people on suspicion of arson, though officials released no further details.

The fires have forced about 220,000 residents and tourists to evacuate, although around 60,000 have since returned as conditions improved. Businesses that had temporarily closed were gradually reopening.

Weather conditions around Bordeaux were expected to improve later Thursday, with forecasts of cooler temperatures, higher humidity and possible thunderstorms. However, authorities warned that the fire danger remained high.

In Greece, three firefighters were killed as crews battled separate wildfires driven by gale-force winds.

Deaths in Crete

Two firefighters died after becoming trapped between advancing fire fronts on the island of Crete, where hundreds of residents and tourists were evacuated by land and sea from communities threatened by fast-moving flames. A third firefighter was killed while responding to another wildfire in the Peloponnese.

Strong winds prevented firefighting aircraft from operating over parts of Crete, hampering efforts to contain the blaze.

Spain also remained on alert as firefighters battled at least 10 active wildfires across the country.

Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez described the situation as “extreme,” citing high temperatures, low humidity and powerful winds that have created dangerous fire conditions.

The largest fire continued to spread in the eastern province of Castellón, where more than 9,300 hectares have burned. Fire officials said crews worked overnight to secure the fire’s 82-kilometer perimeter in hopes of stabilizing it before temperatures rose again.

New wildfires also broke out in the northwestern provinces of Zamora and León, forcing more than 1,300 people to leave their homes, including residents near Arribes del Duero Natural Park.

A European Union wildfire response center

Sánchez said he had asked European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to support establishing a European Union wildfire response center for the western Mediterranean on Spain’s Balearic Islands.

Europe has endured repeated heatwaves this summer, with temperatures remaining well above seasonal averages across much of the continent.

Scientists say prolonged drought, extreme heat and strong winds have increased the frequency and intensity of wildfires across southern Europe, where emergency services have faced near-continuous firefighting operations in recent weeks.

The current wildfire season has already burned more land across the European Union than at the same point last year, underscoring the growing challenge posed by increasingly severe summer fire seasons.

(Source: Reuters)

I

ran is expected to receive the first shipment of hundreds of Chinese-made shoulder-fired air defense missile systems within weeks under a deal valued at between $60 million and $70 million, according to three sources familiar with the agreement cited by Reuters.

If completed, the purchase would represent one of Tehran’s largest known efforts to rebuild its short-range air defenses since months of fighting with the United States and Israel exposed weaknesses in its ability to protect military facilities and strategic infrastructure.

The contract reportedly covers between 300 and 400 man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), including the Chinese-made QW-12 and FN-16 missile systems.

According to Reuters, the agreement was signed through Zhongqing Baoshang International Investment, which the sources said acted as an intermediary between Iran and the Chinese supplier.

The total value of the contract is estimated at $60–70 million, although the sources cautioned that delivery schedules, quantities and implementation details could still change.

Iran’s foreign ministry did not immediately comment on the report.

China’s foreign ministry denied the claims, stating:

“The relevant reports are completely groundless. China has consistently played a role in promoting peace and ending the conflict.”

The parent company, Zhong Qing Bao Shang Group, also did not immediately respond to Reuters’ request for comment.

Air defense overhaul after months of war

Reuters said Iran is seeking to strengthen its defenses after U.S. and Israeli strikes targeted facilities connected to its missile, drone and air defense programs during the recent conflict.

Military analysts note that portable air defense systems are particularly valuable because they can be quickly deployed by small teams and relocated frequently, making them less vulnerable than fixed air defense batteries.

The reported purchase would significantly expand Iran’s inventory of short-range air defense weapons designed to engage Low-flying aircraft, helicopters, and drones.

The QW-12 and FN-16 are infrared-guided missile systems intended to protect military bases, energy infrastructure and other sensitive locations against aerial threats.

Defense experts cited by Reuters consider the QW-12 less advanced than newer Chinese systems such as the QW-18 and QW-19 but say it remains capable of providing an effective layer of short-range protection.

According to the sources, initial shipments were expected to leave Urumqi in western China before transiting through Pakistan into Iran.

The sources did not specify whether the transfers would occur by air or overland.

Pakistan firmly denied any involvement.

The military’s media wing, the Inter-Services Public Relations, called reports linking Pakistan to the transfer of Chinese air defense systems “absolutely concocted and false.”

Reuters also reported that Iran has explored overland transportation routes for Chinese military equipment and dual-use components to reduce the risk of disruption.

Growing military ties with China

The reported procurement comes amid expanding defense cooperation between China and Iran despite years of international sanctions on Tehran.

European and Middle Eastern security sources told Reuters they were aware of discussions involving possible Iranian purchases of several QW-series MANPADS, including the QW-12, QW-18 and QW-19 variants.

Reuters previously reported that Iran was also negotiating with China to acquire anti-ship cruise missiles, although it could not determine whether that agreement was finalized.

If the current deal proceeds, it would underscore Iran’s continued reliance on a combination of domestic weapons production and foreign suppliers as it rebuilds military capabilities following months of conflict.

(Source: Reuters)

C

ommercial shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait dropped to its lowest level in months after Yemen’s Houthi movement launched attacks on Saudi oil installations along the Red Sea coast, raising fresh concerns over maritime security and global energy supplies.

Shipping data from Kpler showed that only 11 commodity vessels transited the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on Sunday, reflecting a sharp decline in traffic as ship operators reassessed risks following the latest escalation. The disruption comes as the Tehran-aligned Houthis seek to impose a blockade on Saudi exports, broadening the regional fallout from the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict.

The reduced vessel traffic has already pushed physical crude prices in the Middle East, Europe, and Africa to two-month highs, highlighting growing concerns over the stability of key global shipping routes.

Among the vessels that passed through the strait were seven oil tankers, including two very large crude carriers (VLCCs) bound for Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu port to load crude oil. Another tanker linked to Russia also entered the Red Sea.

Hong Kong-flagged New Explorer

Meanwhile, four tankers exited the Red Sea carrying crude destined for Asian markets. These included the Hong Kong-flagged New Explorer, transporting approximately 2 million barrels of Saudi and Emirati crude to Ningbo, China, another tanker carrying 1 million barrels of Russian crude for China, and a vessel delivering roughly 750,000 barrels of Saudi crude to Pakistan.

A second Hong Kong-flagged VLCC, New Pearl, carrying 2 million barrels of Saudi crude to Zhoushan, China, was also reported leaving the Red Sea, becoming the fourth Chinese supertanker to transit the route since the Houthis declared a naval blockade.

The Houthi military said it targeted facilities operated by Saudi state-owned oil giant Aramco in the Red Sea cities of Yanbu and Jizan on Saturday, further escalating tensions in the region.

Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz also remained subdued over the weekend despite a pause in direct U.S. and Iranian strikes. Fewer than 10 commodity vessels crossed the strategic waterway each day, according to Kpler data.

On Sunday, seven vessels transited Hormuz, including three Iranian-linked product tankers leaving the Gulf. The previous day, only three vessels passed through the strait with their tracking systems switched off, including a VLCC heading to Qatar, a liquefied petroleum gas tanker bound for the United Arab Emirates, and a tanker carrying Qatari naphtha to Japan.

The continued disruption across both the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz underscores mounting risks to global shipping and energy markets as regional tensions remain high.