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overnment bond markets across the United States, Japan and Europe are sending a warning to policymakers as long-term borrowing costs reach levels not seen in years, driven by rising government debt, inflation concerns and geopolitical uncertainty.

The sharp increase in bond yields is raising borrowing costs for governments, companies and households while making it more difficult for central banks to balance inflation against economic growth.

In the United States, 30-year Treasury yields rose above 5% to their highest level since 2007. Japan’s 10-year government bond yield climbed to just below 3%, its highest level in three decades. German, French and British long-term borrowing costs also reached multiyear or multi-decade highs.

The moves reflect growing concerns about the sustainability of government finances and the inflation outlook as geopolitical tensions, tariffs and the continuing war involving Iran reshape the global economy.

Rising debt and inflation pressure bond markets

The U.S. government debt burden is approaching $40 trillion, while other developed economies are also facing large fiscal deficits and growing borrowing requirements.

The prolonged conflict involving Iran has pushed oil prices higher, with crude recently rising above $90 a barrel. Higher energy prices are adding to inflation concerns and reducing expectations that central banks will be able to cut interest rates quickly.

At the same time, technology companies are borrowing heavily to finance the expansion of artificial intelligence infrastructure and data centers. That demand for capital is increasing competition with governments seeking to sell large amounts of debt.

“Bond yields’ recent surge suggests investors are losing patience with fiscal profligacy,” said Jonas Goltermann, chief markets economist at Capital Economics.

U.S. 30-year Treasury yields later eased slightly, with the yield last down 2.4 basis points at 5.286%. The 10-year Treasury yield stood around 4.71%, a level that markets are watching closely, with 5% increasingly viewed as an important threshold.

The New York Federal Reserve estimates the term premium — the additional return investors demand for holding longer-term government debt — at around 80 basis points, close to its highest level in 12 years.

Recent U.S. Treasury auctions have also highlighted rising borrowing costs. A 10-year Treasury sale cleared at a yield of 4.683%, the highest in 19 years, while a 30-year auction reached 5.216%, a 25-year high.

The increase in government bond yields has also weighed on stocks, with major indexes including the Nasdaq and Europe’s STOXX 600 falling on Tuesday.

Japan and Europe face growing pressure

Japan is experiencing a particularly significant shift in its bond market. Its 10-year borrowing costs have climbed to nearly 3%, while 30-year yields have moved above 4%.

Investors are increasingly expecting the Bank of Japan to raise interest rates as early as September as inflation concerns grow.

Higher Japanese bond yields could also affect U.S. markets because Japanese investors have traditionally been major buyers of U.S. government debt. More attractive returns at home could encourage them to reduce purchases of Treasuries.

Foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries declined in June, according to U.S. Treasury Department data, with Japan, Britain and China among the countries reducing their holdings.

European governments are facing similar pressures. Germany’s 10-year bond yield reached its highest level since 2011, while French yields rose to their highest since 2008. Britain’s 30-year borrowing costs approached levels last seen in May, which were the highest since 1998.

High government spending and debt in countries such as France and Britain have contributed to investor concerns. Climate-related events are also expected to increase pressure on government budgets.

The bond market selloff is significant because government bond yields serve as a benchmark for borrowing across the economy. Higher sovereign yields can translate into more expensive corporate loans, consumer credit and household mortgages.

Some investors, however, believe the recent rise in yields could make government bonds increasingly attractive and eventually encourage buyers to return to the market.

The broader concern for policymakers is whether higher yields represent a temporary adjustment or the beginning of a longer period in which investors demand substantially greater compensation for lending to governments.

With inflation still vulnerable to higher energy prices, government debt continuing to rise and geopolitical risks increasing, bond markets are placing greater pressure on policymakers to demonstrate control over both fiscal policy and inflation.

(Source: Reuters)

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merican President Donald Trump’s approval rating has fallen to 33%, the lowest level of his current presidency, as growing concerns over the war with Iran and rising gasoline prices weigh on his standing with American voters, according to a Reuters/Ipsos poll released Monday.

The four-day survey found that 64% of Americans disapproved of Trump’s performance, compared with 33% who approved. His approval rating fell from 35% in an earlier poll this month and matched the lowest level recorded during his previous presidency, in December 2017.

Trump returned to the White House in 2025 with approval from just under half of Americans, but his standing has weakened as the conflict with Iran has continued. The war has disrupted a significant share of global oil trade and pushed gasoline prices higher, adding pressure on U.S. households.

Most Americans expect Iran war to continue

The poll showed widespread concern that U.S. involvement in the conflict will last much longer than Trump initially suggested.

About 80% of Americans said they believed U.S. involvement in Iran would continue for an extended period, including 87% of Democrats and 71% of Republicans. Only 16% expected the conflict to end within a few weeks.

Trump initially suggested that the war could be resolved within weeks, but Iran has continued resisting U.S. and Israeli military pressure. The conflict has also disrupted oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, contributing to higher energy prices.

Trump has defended the rising cost of gasoline as necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. At a rally in New York on Friday, he told supporters that paying somewhat more for gasoline was worthwhile to prevent what he described as an evil country from obtaining nuclear weapons.

However, only about one in five Americans said the war was worth the cost. Among Republicans, only about half considered the conflict worthwhile.

The economic impact of the war could become a major issue ahead of the Nov. 3 congressional elections, with Republicans seeking to defend narrow majorities in the House while Democrats increasingly see an opportunity to gain control of the Senate.

Democrats gain ground on economy

The poll also showed Democrats gaining an advantage over Republicans on economic issues. About 38% of registered voters said Democrats would handle the economy better, compared with 35% who preferred Republicans.

That represents a significant shift from previous years and comes as voters express increasing concern about the cost of living and gasoline prices.

Democrats were also viewed as better equipped to manage the cost of living, while Republicans continued to hold a narrow advantage on immigration.

About 40% of voters said Republicans had the better approach to immigration, compared with 38% who favored Democrats. The two-point Republican advantage was the smallest recorded during Trump’s current presidency. Republicans had held a 26-point advantage on immigration in January 2025.

Although Trump’s administration has overseen a sharp decline in border crossings and expanded immigration enforcement, Republicans have faced political pressure over deadly confrontations and the growing number of people held in immigration detention, including children.

The Reuters/Ipsos poll was conducted online among 1,166 U.S. adults nationwide and had a margin of error of three percentage points in either direction.

The findings point to growing political challenges for Trump as voters confront the economic consequences of the Iran conflict and prepare to vote in the November midterm elections.

(Source: Reuters)

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razil has begun consultations on possible retaliatory measures against the United States after Washington imposed new tariffs on Brazilian exports, escalating trade tensions between the two countries.

The Brazilian government said the new U.S. tariffs were “unjustified and arbitrary” and vowed to defend the country’s interests through all appropriate channels.

The consultations mark the first step in a process that could eventually lead Brazil to impose countermeasures on U.S. goods and services. No final decision has been made, and Brazilian officials are expected to hold further discussions with U.S. trade authorities before determining how to respond.

Brazil considers range of measures

The United States imposed a 25% surcharge in July on Brazilian goods, citing what Washington described as unfair trade practices. Brazil is also subject to a separate 12.5% tariff linked to allegations concerning enforcement of bans on forced labor.

Under Brazil’s “Reciprocity Law,” the government could respond with measures beyond traditional tariffs. Options under consideration include restrictions on U.S. audiovisual companies and the possible suspension of pharmaceutical and agricultural patents, according to sources cited by Reuters.

Brazilian officials are weighing the potential economic consequences, including possible disruptions to supply chains and higher domestic inflation, before deciding whether to proceed with retaliation.

Trade dispute escalates

The dispute is part of a broader expansion of U.S. tariffs under President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly argued that tariffs are necessary to address trade imbalances and protect American industries.

Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva had previously pledged to invoke the Reciprocity Law if Washington imposed the new duties. The government has now begun the formal process by requesting further diplomatic consultations with U.S. trade authorities.

The move comes as relations between Brasilia and Washington have become increasingly strained. Brazil has described the U.S. tariffs as unjustified while seeking to defend its interests through diplomatic and legal channels.

For now, Brasilia has stopped short of imposing countermeasures. The coming consultations will determine whether the dispute can be resolved through negotiations or whether Brazil moves ahead with retaliatory actions that could further deepen trade tensions between the two countries.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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he Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed on August 7, 2026, in Mecca between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, marks a significant transformation in the security equation between the Middle East and South Asia. At the heart of the agreement lies the principle that an armed attack directed against one of the parties shall be deemed to have been directed against all three states. This provision goes beyond traditional defense  cooperation to establish a new security mechanism based on the principle of collective deterrence.

The agreement’s primary significance in terms of international relations stems from the convergence of the signatory states’ diverse power elements within a single security framework. Turkey possesses NATO’s second-largest military force, advanced operational capabilities and a defence industry that has grown significantly in recent years. Pakistan is the only Muslim state to possess nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, stands out for its energy resources, financial capacity and influence in Gulf geopolitics. For this reason, the Mecca Agreement constitutes a strategic configuration of complementary capabilities formed by complementary strategic capabilities, rather than a traditional military alliance between three similar states.

The international context in which the agreement emerged is also significant. Rising military tensions in the Middle East, the security of energy transport routes, Iran-centred conflict dynamics and the tendency of regional states to diversify their security guarantees are reinforcing the search for a new regional security order. Within this framework, the Mecca Agreement can be interpreted as a demonstration of the will of regional states to support their security needs increasingly through mechanisms established amongst themselves, rather than through guarantees provided from outside.

The concept of strategic autonomy is particularly significant here. Since the end of the Cold War, one of the fundamental pillars of the Middle Eastern security system has been the US military presence and bilateral security relations. The Mecca Agreement does not directly abolish this system. It is also explicitly stated that the parties’ existing bilateral or multilateral obligations remain in force. However, the agreement demonstrates the will of regional actors to establish their own deterrence mechanisms alongside the Washington- centred security architecture. This situation can be interpreted as a transition from a dependence on a single security centre to a multi-layered security architecture.

The significance of the agreement for the participants

From Turkey’s perspective, the agreement also has a unique dimension. Turkey is a member of NATO. The Mecca Agreement, whilst enabling Ankara to maintain its NATO membership, also allows it to expand its institutionalised defense relations with regional powers outside NATO. Turkey is thus positioning itself strategically from which it can forge links between the Euro-Atlantic security system and the Middle East–South Asia security spheres. However, the relationship between the collective defense obligation under the Mecca Agreement and Article 5 of the NATO Treaty will require detailed legal and strategic scrutiny in the coming period, particularly in the event of simultaneous crises.

Pakistan’s participation in the agreement, meanwhile, shifts the deterrence debate to a different level. Pakistan’s nuclear capability enhances the agreement’s psychological and strategic weight. However, it cannot be concluded from current statements that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence has been extended to Turkey or Saudi Arabia. Saudi officials have also stated that the agreement is not linked to nuclear purposes or an arms race. Consequently, based on the current data, it does not appear appropriate to characterise the Mecca Agreement as a nuclear umbrella agreement.

From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the agreement represents a continuation of its policy of diversifying security partnerships. By linking its economic capacity with Turkey’s defense industry and Pakistan’s military capabilities, Riyadh may secure a greater degree of strategic manoeuvre. To the extent that this framework extends to areas such as defense industry investments, joint production, technology transfer, training, intelligence sharing and maritime security, it will acquire a lasting institutional character.

The principle of collective defense

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Agreement is the principle of ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’. This provision is reminiscent of NATO’s logic of collective defense. However, there is currently a significant institutional difference between the two organizations NATO is an institutional alliance with over seventy years’ history, underpinned by a military command structure, joint defense planning, force structure, standards and permanent political bodies. The implementation mechanisms of the Mecca Agreement, however, are not yet as transparent, based on the information made public.

For this reason, the true strength of the agreement will be measured not so much by its signing as by the extent to which it becomes institutionalized. Should a joint military committee be established, joint operational plans drawn up, regular exercises conducted, an intelligence-sharing mechanism put in place and defense industry projects undertaken jointly, the Mecca Agreement could evolve into a genuine collective defense system.

From Iran’s perspective, interpreting the agreement as a direct counter-alliance requires caution. The parties have specifically emphasized that the agreement does not target any particular state. Given Turkey’s shared border with Iran, its economic ties and regional diplomatic channels, the agreement’s potential to take on a sectarian dimension could entail significant strategic costs for Ankara. Consequently, the sustainability of the agreement will depend on maintaining a balance between the principle of collective defense and the policy of avoiding regional polarization.

Towards a new regional security architecture

From Israel’s perspective, the new framework presents a distinct area for strategic calculation. The convergence of Turkey’s NATO capabilities, Pakistan’s military strength and Saudi Arabia’s regional influence within a common security mechanism holds the potential to influence the balance of power in the Middle East. However, it is not possible to draw a definitive conclusion from current statements suggesting that the agreement constitutes an alliance formed against Israel.

A broader implication of the Mecca Agreement is the possibility of institutionalizing security cooperation within the Islamic world. Whilst the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is a broad political organization with 57 members, it lacks an effective collective defense mechanism. The tripartite structure emerging in Mecca could, if successful, form the core of a narrower yet highly operational security platform that could expand with the participation of other states.

At this point, the fact that the agreement is named ‘Mecca’ also carries symbolic significance. The signing of the agreement at the most important holy centre of the Islamic world lends it political and historical visibility beyond that of a purely military text. However, the agreement’s future legitimacy will be shaped not so much by its symbolic value as by its contribution to regional peace, its compliance with international law, and its capacity to prevent crises.

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he geopolitical upheavals experienced in the international security environment in recent years are fundamentally altering the position of defense spending within economic policy. Increasing strategic competition on a global scale – particularly deepening security risks in the Middle East, such as the Russia-Ukraine War and the US/Israel-Iran War– alongside energy supply security, supply chain continuity and the global race for critical technologies, is leading to a reshaping of defense spending. In particular, NATO’s decision to raise member states’ defense spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the long term signals the start of a new era, not only in security policies but also in global industrial production and technology investment. This has sparked a debate as to whether defense spending could become the new engine of economic growth.

For many years, defense spending has been assessed within the framework of the opportunity cost approach. This approach argues that public resources allocated to defense have a restrictive effect—albeit to a relative degree—on economic growth, as they are diverted from productive sectors such as education, healthcare or infrastructure investment. However, the technological transformation and changes in the security architecture over the past twenty years have necessitated a reassessment of this approach. Today, defense expenditure is viewed not merely as current expenditure-focused public spending aimed at building military capability, but as multifaceted investments that support high-tech production, research and development (R&D) activities, and export capacity.

How do defense expenditures affect economic equilibrium?

The economic effects of defense expenditures are now analyzed not only from the perspective of fiscal policy but also from the perspectives of industrial policy and technological transformation. The economic impact of defense expenditures is realized through a multi-stage transmission mechanism. In the first stage, public expenditure stimulates demand, thereby increasing aggregate demand, expanding production volumes, raising capacity utilization rates and supporting industrial production. Due to their high capital intensity, defense projects generate increased production across numerous sub-sectors, notably machinery manufacturing, electronics, metallurgy, composite materials, software and communications technologies. Thus, defense expenditure creates a powerful multiplier mechanism that mobilizes a broad supply chain.

In the second stage, R&D investments come into play. Defense projects involve significant R&D expenditure due to their high-technology nature. Technologies developed within the defense industry are transferred to other sectors over time, thereby creating long-term positive effects on productivity.

The third stage is the external balance channel. Owing to its high technology intensity, the defense industry is one of the sectors with the highest export value per kilogram. The export of defense products contributes to the current account balance and, at the same time, enables countries to move up the global technology value chain. For this reason, the defense industry is today recognized as one of the strategic determinants of high-value-added exports.

However, the effectiveness of this transfer mechanism depends largely on domestic production capacity. In countries that procure defense systems largely through imports, increasing defense budgets lead to significant outflows of foreign exchange, whereas in economies with domestic production capacity, the same expenditure is channeled back into the economy in the form of increased production, employment, technology development and exports. Consequently, the economic return on defense expenditure is linked not so much to the size of the budget as to the extent to which expenditure can be channeled into the domestic industry.

In this new global context, Türkiye’s production capacity constitutes a notable advantage. As a result of the localization policies implemented over the past twenty years, dependence on foreign sources in the defense industry has been significantly reduced. Within the defense industry, capabilities in design, system integration and high-technology production have been markedly enhanced. Consequently, defense expenditure has evolved from a structure heavily reliant on imports to a production model that generates domestic added value.

What is the contribution of Turkish defense industry companies to the economy?

One of the most significant indicators of this transformation is Türkiye’s rise in global defense exports. Over the past twenty years, Türkiye’s share of global defense exports has grown steadily and, as a result, Türkiye has become one of the key suppliers in the global defense market. This rise in export performance demonstrates that the defense industry has transformed into a strategic production ecosystem that competes in international markets, exports technology and generates foreign exchange.

Institutional transformation is equally noteworthy. Whilst in 2009 ASELSAN was the sole company representing Türkiye amongst the world’s top 100 defense industry firms, in recent years TUSAŞ, ROKETSAN, ASFAT and MKE have joined ASELSAN on the same list. The fact that companies such as STM, HAVELSAN, FNSS and BMC have entered the global top 100 defense industry companies in different years demonstrates that Türkiye’s defense industry has evolved from a single-company-centered structure into a multi-stakeholder, deepened and technologically diversified industrial ecosystem.

This rise in international company rankings is directly reflected in Türkiye’s industrial performance. An analysis of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry’s ISO 500 survey reveals that defense industry companies are steadily strengthening their positions among Türkiye’s largest industrial organizations in terms of sales from production. It is particularly noteworthy that, as of 2025, TUSAŞ has become Türkiye’s seventh-largest industrial organization, while ASELSAN has become the ninth-largest. Export performance at the company level also confirms this transformation. While ASELSAN’s export revenues have reached an all-time high in recent years, TUSAŞ has risen to the status of a key manufacturer within global aerospace and defense supply chains, with export volumes hovering at the billion-dollar level. This picture demonstrates that the Turkish defense industry has gained international competitiveness not only in platform production but also in areas such as electronic systems, avionics solutions, software, engineering services and systems integration.

How will defense expenditure take shape in the coming period?

In this regard, NATO’s plan to accelerate defense investments over the next decade is of considerable importance for Türkiye. This does not merely signify a larger export market for Türkiye. It also holds the potential to strengthen Türkiye’s strategic position within the supply chains of NATO countries, thanks to its production infrastructure with high local content, advanced engineering capabilities and defense companies capable of competing on a global scale. The growing demand from Alliance countries for defense industry products is creating long-term investment and export opportunities for the Turkish defense industry.

In conclusion, the global defense economy has entered a new phase of structural transformation. Defense expenditure is regarded not merely as public spending to meet security needs, but as strategic investments that support technology development, high-value-added production and export capacity. In the coming period, competition between countries will be shaped not so much by the size of defense budgets, but by the capacity of industrial ecosystems to convert these budgets into production, technology and exports.

The defense industry infrastructure that Türkiye has established over the past 20 years, and in particular its clusters, will provide a significant competitive advantage during this new period of expansion in global defense spending. For this reason, the defense industry will continue to be one of the key pillars of both national security and Türkiye’s development strategy, which is based on sustainable growth, high-tech production and exports.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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proposed agreement being discussed by Iran and Oman to help end five months of conflict between Iran and the United States would give Tehran authority over commercial vessels entering the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz, according to Iranian and regional sources, potentially marking one of the most significant shifts in Gulf maritime security in decades.

The proposal, if finalized, would grant Iran oversight of inbound shipping through the strategic waterway, through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil trade passed before the conflict disrupted maritime traffic. Regional officials said negotiations remain ongoing, with key issues still unresolved, despite Iranian officials reporting substantial progress.

There was no immediate comment from Washington on the reported proposal. U.S. officials have consistently maintained that they would not accept Iranian control over navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, despite President Donald Trump’s recent assertions that an agreement to reopen the waterway could be close.

The talks are taking place amid broader diplomatic efforts to end the conflict that erupted in late February, when U.S. and Israeli military operations against Iran triggered months of fighting across the region.

According to a senior Iranian source and two regional officials familiar with the negotiations, the draft arrangement would require commercial vessels entering the Gulf to transit through Iranian-controlled waters, giving Tehran an unprecedented administrative role over maritime traffic.

Some form of control

One regional official described the proposal as representing “some form of control” already conceded in principle, though negotiators remain divided over how that authority would be implemented in practice.

“The concession has already been made regarding some form of control over Hormuz,” one regional source said, adding that details regarding inspections and oversight remain under discussion.

Another regional source said Gulf states are seeking a framework in which regional countries would supervise any inspections of commercial vessels and ensure that any payments required from shipping companies remain voluntary.

A senior Iranian official said Tehran is seeking to levy fees of between 5% and 7% of cargo values on ships using the strait, while Oman has proposed charges closer to 3%. The United States, however, continues to oppose any transit fees, insisting that Hormuz remain an international waterway with unrestricted access.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said negotiations with Oman had reached “fundamental understandings” and suggested an agreement was nearing completion.

Speaking to Iran’s official IRNA news agency, Gharibabadi said the proposed arrangement was designed so that commercial vessels would pass through Iranian territorial waters on both inbound and outbound voyages.

He added that discussions had reached “the verge of being finalized.”

However, regional officials cautioned that significant differences remain, particularly over whether Iran’s authority would extend equally to ships leaving the Gulf, as well as the legal basis for any administrative role Tehran would exercise.

Regional energy infrastructure

The negotiations come as Iran has simultaneously intensified its warnings to Gulf Arab states against supporting any renewed U.S. military action.

According to several regional sources, Tehran has privately warned neighboring Gulf countries that any future American attack on Iranian territory would trigger retaliation against critical regional energy infrastructure.

“The Iranian warning was unequivocal: if America targeted Iran’s infrastructure, they would retaliate by striking Gulf energy facilities and other regional targets,” one Gulf source said.

Since the conflict began, Iran has repeatedly targeted regional allies of the United States with missile and drone attacks while also disrupting commercial shipping through Hormuz.

Iran says more than 3,400 people have been killed since the war began, while the United States has reported the deaths of 18 military personnel.

President Trump has increasingly emphasized diplomacy after months of military operations failed to reopen the waterway fully or compel Tehran to accept Washington’s demands.

Addressing supporters in Las Vegas, Trump said he preferred a negotiated solution despite warning that military action remained an option.

“I’d rather make a deal because I don’t want to kill people,” Trump said. “I do not want to kill people, but at some point we’re gonna.”

The reported negotiations reflect a notable evolution in the conflict, which has increasingly centered on maritime access rather than direct military confrontation.

Iran has argued that previous flexibility in negotiations only encouraged greater pressure from Washington, leading its leadership to conclude that stronger leverage is necessary before meaningful talks can proceed.

A major strategic shift from the pre-war status quo

The proposed arrangement would also represent a major strategic shift from the pre-war status quo, when commercial vessels transited the Strait of Hormuz without paying fees or seeking authorization from Iran.

The waterway remains one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors, serving as the primary export route for Gulf oil and liquefied natural gas.

Despite optimistic statements from Tehran and Washington about the prospects for diplomacy, officials involved in the talks stressed that no final agreement has been reached.

Political disagreements over shipping fees, inspection authority and the precise definition of Iranian control continue to complicate negotiations, while broader questions surrounding the future security architecture of the Gulf remain unresolved.

The talks also come as Trump faces growing domestic pressure to end a conflict that opinion polls suggest remains unpopular with American voters ahead of November’s congressional midterm elections.

Oil prices fell in recent days after Trump suspended plans for renewed military strikes, citing ongoing diplomatic efforts that he said could eventually lead to the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

(Source: Reuters)

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ran is increasingly relying on economic disruption rather than direct military confrontation to pressure the United States into making concessions over the Strait of Hormuz, expanding threats to regional shipping routes and energy infrastructure as the conflict enters a prolonged phase.

According to Gulf officials, regional sources and analysts, Tehran believes that sustained pressure on global trade and energy markets will prove more effective than conventional military escalation in forcing Washington to reconsider its position.

Rather than seeking a decisive battlefield victory, Iran has adopted a strategy of calibrated escalation designed to steadily raise the economic and political costs of the conflict while avoiding an all-out regional war. The objective, analysts say, is to convince the United States and its allies that accommodating Iran’s demands over the Strait of Hormuz is less costly than continuing the current confrontation.

“Iran, from the beginning, has tried to out-escalate the United States by stretching out its escalation options so that it always has something new to bring every week — a new geography, a new type of weapon, a new type of target,” Michael Knights of the Washington Institute told Reuters.

He argued that Iran’s greatest leverage lies not in its ability to inflict military damage on the United States or Israel, but in its capacity to disrupt regional economies and global commerce.

“The bigger advantage they have is not that they can hurt America or Israel,” Knights said. “Their big advantage is that they can hurt the regional states and the global economy.”

Pressure beyond Hormuz

After demonstrating its ability to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz — a waterway that carried around one-fifth of global oil consumption before the conflict — Iran has signaled that its pressure campaign could extend well beyond the strategic chokepoint.

Threats directed at the Red Sea and Saudi energy infrastructure suggest Tehran is seeking to widen the geographical scope of the crisis, increasing the cost of protecting international shipping while testing Washington’s willingness to sustain a prolonged confrontation.

One Gulf source said commanders in Iran’s Revolutionary Guards believe recent developments have strengthened Tehran’s negotiating position.

“The Iranians believe that by widening the war and increasing the pressure, he will eventually give in,” the source said, referring to U.S. President Donald Trump. “Trump thinks he can hit the Iranians hard and bring them to the negotiating table, but they won’t bend.”

That assessment has shaped Tehran’s negotiating strategy, according to Iranian and regional sources.

Trump said on Monday that negotiations with Iran would take place after he canceled a planned military strike in hopes of securing an agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials, however, denied that talks with Washington were currently underway.

A senior Iranian source said Tehran’s leadership has concluded that previous attempts at flexibility only encouraged greater pressure from Washington, reinforcing the belief that meaningful negotiations can occur only after Iran establishes stronger leverage.

In Tehran’s view, the source said, Trump interprets concessions as weakness and responds only to sustained pressure.

Michael Singh, another senior fellow at the Washington Institute, said Iranian leaders appear convinced they still hold the initiative because the Trump administration remains uncertain about how far it is willing to escalate militarily.

“The Iranians are trying to press their advantage,” Singh said. “They’re interested in establishing sovereignty over the strait and exercising selective control over the waterway.”

Dispute over the Strait

At the heart of the standoff is the future administration of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors.

Regional sources say Oman has presented Tehran with a Gulf-backed proposal that would establish a mechanism for managing shipping through the strait, including voluntary user fees.

Iran, however, is reportedly seeking administrative authority over the waterway and the right to impose service charges on vessels passing through it.

Washington has rejected any arrangement that would allow Iran to exercise control over the strait, insisting it must remain an international waterway open to unrestricted commercial navigation.

Former U.S. diplomat Alan Eyre said Iran’s broader strategy is intended to deter further American military action while forcing Washington to lift its naval blockade and reconsider its negotiating position.

“They don’t want the U.S. to dictate the pace of events,” Eyre said.

War of endurance

Analysts say Iran’s campaign has already shifted the focus of regional and international efforts.

Rather than intensifying military pressure on Tehran, Gulf states and Western governments are increasingly concentrating on protecting commercial shipping and critical energy infrastructure.

The formation of a Saudi-led maritime coalition reflects that shift. According to Gulf sources, the initiative is primarily defensive, focusing on escorting commercial vessels, sharing intelligence and safeguarding vital sea lanes instead of confronting Iran directly.

Knights compared the effort to Europe’s Aspides naval mission in the Red Sea, which was established to protect merchant shipping rather than alter the regional military balance.

For Tehran, forcing rivals into an expensive defensive posture represents a strategic success despite its military disadvantages.

Unable to match U.S. military capabilities directly, Iran can still impose significant costs by compelling regional governments and foreign navies to devote increasing resources to securing global trade routes.

Each new threat, whether in the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait or elsewhere, increases the financial and military burden of keeping international commerce flowing.

Analysts describe the conflict as increasingly becoming a contest of endurance.

Iranian leaders appear to believe they can withstand economic pressure longer than the United States and its partners can tolerate repeated disruptions to global energy supplies and maritime trade.

The strategy also serves a diplomatic purpose.

By demonstrating an ability to expand the crisis whenever necessary, Tehran hopes to strengthen its bargaining position before any future negotiations.

“If there are going to be negotiations, they will define the terms,” said Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations. “Both sides are matching escalation with escalation.”

Despite intermittent diplomatic efforts, neither Washington nor Tehran has shown signs of backing down.

As both sides continue to test each other’s resolve through economic pressure, military deterrence and political signaling, analysts warn that a strategy intended to maximize leverage could still spiral into a wider conflict that neither side intends or is fully able to control.

(Source: Reuters)

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ildfires continued to burn across France, Spain and Greece on Thursday as scorching temperatures, strong winds and dry conditions fueled blazes that have killed firefighters, forced mass evacuations and destroyed thousands of hectares of land.

In southwestern France, authorities said a wildfire near Bordeaux was brought under control overnight after burning around 42,000 hectares of forest. Police arrested two people on suspicion of arson, though officials released no further details.

The fires have forced about 220,000 residents and tourists to evacuate, although around 60,000 have since returned as conditions improved. Businesses that had temporarily closed were gradually reopening.

Weather conditions around Bordeaux were expected to improve later Thursday, with forecasts of cooler temperatures, higher humidity and possible thunderstorms. However, authorities warned that the fire danger remained high.

In Greece, three firefighters were killed as crews battled separate wildfires driven by gale-force winds.

Deaths in Crete

Two firefighters died after becoming trapped between advancing fire fronts on the island of Crete, where hundreds of residents and tourists were evacuated by land and sea from communities threatened by fast-moving flames. A third firefighter was killed while responding to another wildfire in the Peloponnese.

Strong winds prevented firefighting aircraft from operating over parts of Crete, hampering efforts to contain the blaze.

Spain also remained on alert as firefighters battled at least 10 active wildfires across the country.

Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez described the situation as “extreme,” citing high temperatures, low humidity and powerful winds that have created dangerous fire conditions.

The largest fire continued to spread in the eastern province of Castellón, where more than 9,300 hectares have burned. Fire officials said crews worked overnight to secure the fire’s 82-kilometer perimeter in hopes of stabilizing it before temperatures rose again.

New wildfires also broke out in the northwestern provinces of Zamora and León, forcing more than 1,300 people to leave their homes, including residents near Arribes del Duero Natural Park.

A European Union wildfire response center

Sánchez said he had asked European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen to support establishing a European Union wildfire response center for the western Mediterranean on Spain’s Balearic Islands.

Europe has endured repeated heatwaves this summer, with temperatures remaining well above seasonal averages across much of the continent.

Scientists say prolonged drought, extreme heat and strong winds have increased the frequency and intensity of wildfires across southern Europe, where emergency services have faced near-continuous firefighting operations in recent weeks.

The current wildfire season has already burned more land across the European Union than at the same point last year, underscoring the growing challenge posed by increasingly severe summer fire seasons.

(Source: Reuters)

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ran is expected to receive the first shipment of hundreds of Chinese-made shoulder-fired air defense missile systems within weeks under a deal valued at between $60 million and $70 million, according to three sources familiar with the agreement cited by Reuters.

If completed, the purchase would represent one of Tehran’s largest known efforts to rebuild its short-range air defenses since months of fighting with the United States and Israel exposed weaknesses in its ability to protect military facilities and strategic infrastructure.

The contract reportedly covers between 300 and 400 man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), including the Chinese-made QW-12 and FN-16 missile systems.

According to Reuters, the agreement was signed through Zhongqing Baoshang International Investment, which the sources said acted as an intermediary between Iran and the Chinese supplier.

The total value of the contract is estimated at $60–70 million, although the sources cautioned that delivery schedules, quantities and implementation details could still change.

Iran’s foreign ministry did not immediately comment on the report.

China’s foreign ministry denied the claims, stating:

“The relevant reports are completely groundless. China has consistently played a role in promoting peace and ending the conflict.”

The parent company, Zhong Qing Bao Shang Group, also did not immediately respond to Reuters’ request for comment.

Air defense overhaul after months of war

Reuters said Iran is seeking to strengthen its defenses after U.S. and Israeli strikes targeted facilities connected to its missile, drone and air defense programs during the recent conflict.

Military analysts note that portable air defense systems are particularly valuable because they can be quickly deployed by small teams and relocated frequently, making them less vulnerable than fixed air defense batteries.

The reported purchase would significantly expand Iran’s inventory of short-range air defense weapons designed to engage Low-flying aircraft, helicopters, and drones.

The QW-12 and FN-16 are infrared-guided missile systems intended to protect military bases, energy infrastructure and other sensitive locations against aerial threats.

Defense experts cited by Reuters consider the QW-12 less advanced than newer Chinese systems such as the QW-18 and QW-19 but say it remains capable of providing an effective layer of short-range protection.

According to the sources, initial shipments were expected to leave Urumqi in western China before transiting through Pakistan into Iran.

The sources did not specify whether the transfers would occur by air or overland.

Pakistan firmly denied any involvement.

The military’s media wing, the Inter-Services Public Relations, called reports linking Pakistan to the transfer of Chinese air defense systems “absolutely concocted and false.”

Reuters also reported that Iran has explored overland transportation routes for Chinese military equipment and dual-use components to reduce the risk of disruption.

Growing military ties with China

The reported procurement comes amid expanding defense cooperation between China and Iran despite years of international sanctions on Tehran.

European and Middle Eastern security sources told Reuters they were aware of discussions involving possible Iranian purchases of several QW-series MANPADS, including the QW-12, QW-18 and QW-19 variants.

Reuters previously reported that Iran was also negotiating with China to acquire anti-ship cruise missiles, although it could not determine whether that agreement was finalized.

If the current deal proceeds, it would underscore Iran’s continued reliance on a combination of domestic weapons production and foreign suppliers as it rebuilds military capabilities following months of conflict.

(Source: Reuters)

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ommercial shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait dropped to its lowest level in months after Yemen’s Houthi movement launched attacks on Saudi oil installations along the Red Sea coast, raising fresh concerns over maritime security and global energy supplies.

Shipping data from Kpler showed that only 11 commodity vessels transited the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on Sunday, reflecting a sharp decline in traffic as ship operators reassessed risks following the latest escalation. The disruption comes as the Tehran-aligned Houthis seek to impose a blockade on Saudi exports, broadening the regional fallout from the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict.

The reduced vessel traffic has already pushed physical crude prices in the Middle East, Europe, and Africa to two-month highs, highlighting growing concerns over the stability of key global shipping routes.

Among the vessels that passed through the strait were seven oil tankers, including two very large crude carriers (VLCCs) bound for Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu port to load crude oil. Another tanker linked to Russia also entered the Red Sea.

Hong Kong-flagged New Explorer

Meanwhile, four tankers exited the Red Sea carrying crude destined for Asian markets. These included the Hong Kong-flagged New Explorer, transporting approximately 2 million barrels of Saudi and Emirati crude to Ningbo, China, another tanker carrying 1 million barrels of Russian crude for China, and a vessel delivering roughly 750,000 barrels of Saudi crude to Pakistan.

A second Hong Kong-flagged VLCC, New Pearl, carrying 2 million barrels of Saudi crude to Zhoushan, China, was also reported leaving the Red Sea, becoming the fourth Chinese supertanker to transit the route since the Houthis declared a naval blockade.

The Houthi military said it targeted facilities operated by Saudi state-owned oil giant Aramco in the Red Sea cities of Yanbu and Jizan on Saturday, further escalating tensions in the region.

Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz also remained subdued over the weekend despite a pause in direct U.S. and Iranian strikes. Fewer than 10 commodity vessels crossed the strategic waterway each day, according to Kpler data.

On Sunday, seven vessels transited Hormuz, including three Iranian-linked product tankers leaving the Gulf. The previous day, only three vessels passed through the strait with their tracking systems switched off, including a VLCC heading to Qatar, a liquefied petroleum gas tanker bound for the United Arab Emirates, and a tanker carrying Qatari naphtha to Japan.

The continued disruption across both the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz underscores mounting risks to global shipping and energy markets as regional tensions remain high.

F

ebruary 28, 2025 was one of the darkest days of the Ukraine-Russia War. Yet, for Ukraine, the catastrophe is unfolding not on the front lines but in Washington, right at the gates of the White House. In the early days of his second presidential term, Donald Trump opens proceedings by publicly mocking Ukrainian President Zelensky’s attire in front of the press, in a manner contrary to diplomatic protocol, before the President has even had a chance to enter the residence. Whilst Zelenskyy thought he would have to make do with this cold shower at the door, inside the White House he was subjected to a barrage of heavy criticism, this time joined by Vice-President James David Vance.

In a sense, those 10 minutes – during which all the aid the US had provided over the past three years was thrown in his face – must have felt like a decade, not only to the Ukrainian President but also to the European countries that had supported Ukraine. Donald Trump consistently maintained his line of accusing his predecessor, Joe Biden, over the Ukraine–Russia War right up until August 2025.

The Trump–Putin summit held on August 15, 2025, at Elmendorf–Richardson Air Force Base in Alaska had further reinforced the impression that all hope for Ukraine had been completely dashed. Furthermore, events at the White House just three days later, on August 18, 2025, reinforced the perception that the US had completely capitulated to Russia’s position on the war in Ukraine. That day, Trump lined up European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Finnish President Stubb, French President Macron, German Chancellor Merz, Italian Prime Minister Meloni, British Prime Minister Starmer, Ukrainian President Zelensky and NATO Secretary-General Rutte before him, and dictated his expectations regarding the course of the Ukraine–Russia War.

Furthermore, by catching this group off guard in front of the media, he forced them to speak on the validity of his own views. However, the evolving relations between the People’s Republic of China and Russia, the support Moscow provided to the Tehran regime during the Iran war, and Russia’s reluctance to sit down at the negotiating table have shifted the course of events.

A changing wind from Alaska to Ankara

On 8 July 2026, the image presented by the Trump–Zelensky duo when they faced the media at the NATO Summit in Ankara was very different from the unpleasant scenes witnessed a year and a half earlier. Beyond the positive messages conveyed, Trump had warmed relations to the point of joking with Zelensky about Ukraine’s drone and missile strikes on Moscow. When Trump asked, “Would you like to go to Moscow?”, Zelensky replied, “I don’t think so; there are far too many Ukrainian drones there.”

Clearly, the US President was also extremely pleased with Ukraine’s dominance, achieved through drones and guided missiles, extending as far as 2,000 kilometers into Russian airspace. Indeed, during the summit, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte remarked: “Some key targets deep inside Russia have been struck. ‘Over the past two months, Ukraine has been hitting targets more successfully’.” It is clear that Ukraine has not only made significant strides in the field of FPV drones and guided missiles.

There has also been an increase—the details of which we are not yet fully aware—in the quality and quantity of satellite-based electronic intelligence provided to Ukraine by NATO member states. The fact that around 100 naval vessels operating for the Russian ‘Ghost Fleet’ were struck by Ukrainian drone attacks in the Sea of Azov in the week following the NATO Summit is a matter that warrants attention in terms of the level these capabilities have reached. Looking back a little further, we can conclude that events took place which led Trump to lose hope that Russia and Putin would make peace with Ukraine in the final quarter of 2025.

The balance of power was redrawn in 2026

From the very first days of 2026, the nature and scale of Ukraine’s drone attacks saw a significant increase. Whilst all logistics routes supplying food and fuel to Crimea were paralyzed, almost all of the peninsula’s fuel depots and main electricity transmission stations were taken out of action by July. Petrochemical plants and refineries across Russia were struck 200 times in six months. This represents an 11-fold increase compared with the first six months of 2025. In May alone, 16 highly successful attacks were carried out against Russian refineries.

It has become commonplace for Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs to reach a range of 2,000 kilometers, or for FPV drones to strike targets more than 100 kilometers behind the front line. Having lost 40 per cent of its oil refining capacity, Russia has reached the point of banning diesel exports following its decision to ban the export of petrol and aviation fuel. Having been reduced to the point of having to import refined oil from India, Russia was unable to parade tanks and mobile missile launchers on Red Square during the traditional Second World War Victory Day commemorations on May 9.

As the military balance rapidly shifted against Russia, US President Trump’s behavior towards Ukrainian President Zelensky at the G7 Summit in Paris and the NATO Summit in Ankara, held between and June 15-17, signaled that even tougher times lay ahead for Moscow. At the summit, a commitment of 70 billion euros was made to provide Ukraine with military equipment, ammunition and training by 2026. Furthermore, following statements from some NATO member states that ‘we have nothing left to give to Ukraine’, the alliance decided to take an unprecedented step. Led by Canada, an initiative was launched to establish the ‘Defense, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB)’ with the participation of certain NATO member states.

The bank, scheduled to become operational in 2027, aims to provide low-cost financing of up to 100 billion pounds for defense projects. The members set to participate in this bank project include Turkey, Albania, Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania and Ukraine. It is clear that the Alliance does not wish to see a repeat of the chaos that ensued regarding support for the Kyiv administration from the outset of the war in Ukraine and intends to find an institutional solution to this.

The US has no further expectations of a Russia under Putin’s rule

Returning to the final communiqué of the NATO Summit in Ankara, it appears that the mobilization launched against the Russian threat directed at Ukraine – and even Poland and the Baltic states – will continue with an open-ended timeline. The communiqué, referencing the NATO Hague Summit Communiqué dated June 25, 2025, emphasised that Russia poses a long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. In other words, NATO members will channel more of their economic capacity into deterrence and defense against threats originating from Russia.

The emphasis on Russia as a “long-term threat” could be interpreted as the US having given up hope on the Putin administration. The visits to Moscow by US Special Envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff – which the Kremlin has been awaiting for nearly two months but which have yet to materialize – could also be seen as a manifestation of this “loss of hope”. Reports by the Russian TASS news agency in the first week of July stated that this visit, which Moscow was apparently eagerly awaiting, “could take place by the end of the summer, though a definite date has not yet been set”.

A report published in the British newspaper The Telegraph on July 10, 2026, however, indicates that the growing aversion towards Russia, particularly in Washington and other NATO capitals, is set to increase exponentially. According to the British newspaper’s report, the Dutch intelligence services, the AIVD (Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service) and the MIVD (Military Intelligence and Security Service), have discovered that doorbell cameras at hundreds of homes along the routes leading from NATO bases in the Netherlands to airports and seaports have been hacked. So, who would want access to the footage from hundreds of doorbell cameras?

According to the Dutch intelligence services, the culprits are cybercriminals backed by Moscow. Their aim is to determine the contents and quantities of arms shipments to Ukraine. According to The Telegraph, this Russian operation is not limited to the Netherlands. Across Europe, thousands of doorbell cameras are under the control of Russian intelligence. In other words, the Ukraine-Russia War has reverted to the ‘factory settings’ established at the outset by the US-UK duo. The objective is no longer limited to simply expelling Russia from Crimea and the Donbas region, which it has annexed. The ultimate goal has been updated to create the conditions necessary to topple Putin’s regime in Moscow.

(This article was originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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hen one thinks of the Middle East and Iraq, the first thing that springs to mind is often oil. However, developments in Iraq over recent weeks have once again demonstrated that oil is no longer merely an economic resource, but a strategic factor that determines state capacity, foreign policy and the regional balance of power.

Following the tensions between Iran and the West, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz provided short-term relief in global energy markets. However, for Iraq, this process did not merely signify a return to normal oil sales. The Baghdad administration has also brought back onto the agenda its long-delayed objectives of increasing production and securing a higher quota within OPEC.

Whilst this may appear at first glance to be merely a matter of energy policy, there is a larger story behind the issue. As is well known, oil is both the most vulnerable and the seemingly strongest aspect of the Iraqi economy. Oil revenues bear the main burden of the state budget. Many sectors, ranging from public sector wages to infrastructure investment, and from security expenditure to social payments, are dependent on this revenue. Consequently, every fluctuation in international markets comes to the attention not only of the economic bureaucracy but also of political decision-makers in Baghdad. Even a slight decline in oil revenue can place significant pressure on the state.

The messages conveyed by the Iraqi government in recent weeks are therefore noteworthy. On the one hand, new international investments are being discussed; on the other, it is stated that production capacity can be rapidly increased. The recent interest shown by major energy companies in oil fields suggests that Baghdad wishes to draw up a long-term growth plan. The recent increase in production in the southern oil fields also emerges as a development serving the effort to boost capacity.

Turkey-Iraq talks

However, the main issue in Iraq is not merely about producing oil. The real challenge facing Iraq is determining via which routes, with what political guarantees and within what economic framework it will deliver the oil it produces to the world market. From this perspective, the renewed intensive energy talks between Turkey and Iraq carry particular significance. The topics on the agenda between Ankara and Baghdad point to a broader framework than merely the technical operation and capacity expansion of the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline: oil, natural gas, electricity, energy supply security and the energy dimension of the Development Corridor.

The Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline, which has passed through Turkey for years, has become one of the most critical elements of this equation. The recent talks between Ankara and Baghdad, which have focused on energy cooperation, do not merely signify the renewal of a technical agreement. It appears that the two countries are seeking ways to establish a new energy architecture that will adapt to the changing regional geopolitical landscape. The duration of the agreement, the pipeline’s capacity, the transport of oil to the Mediterranean, and Iraq’s need to diversify its export routes are all being discussed at the same table.

The situation is equally significant not only from Iraq’s perspective but also from Turkey’s. Turkey has long aimed to be a country that manages energy corridors. One of the fundamental and most important pillars of this strategy is the secure delivery of Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean. For this reason, stable energy relations with Baghdad will also serve as a key tool in building political trust. An energy corridor stretching from southern Iraq to the north, and from there to Turkey and the Mediterranean, will form part of a broader picture encompassing regional trade, transport and security.

Iraq, meanwhile, has learnt the hard way in recent years the risks of relying on a single export route or a single regional balance of power. Crises in the Strait of Hormuz, the prospect of regional war and the occasional disruption of export routes in the north are prompting Baghdad to develop alternative routes. Iraq must now define its energy security not only in terms of production capacity but also through the diversity of its export routes. Consequently, the future of the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline has become a key indicator of Iraq’s capacity for economic sovereignty.

Anti-corruption operations

Amidst all this, another notable development has been the anti-corruption operations being carried out domestically. The operations in Baghdad, which have targeted high-ranking figures, send a significant message regarding the corruption networks that have long been the subject of discussion within state institutions. Of course, it cannot be expected that a few operations will eliminate decades-old institutional problems. However, the rule of law and transparency in public administration will be just as decisive as oil in shaping international investors’ view of Iraq.

Similarly, the US’s resumption of dollar transfers to Iraq should not be interpreted merely as a technical financial decision. This step demonstrates that economic ties between Washington and Baghdad have not been completely severed, but that issues of security, militias and financial oversight remain on the table. It has once again become clear that economic and security issues cannot be addressed in isolation from one another.

Viewed in the light of these developments, Iraq today stands at what is perhaps one of the most critical economic thresholds of the post-2003 era. Whilst the country is striving to attract major energy investments on the one hand, on the other it is seeking to strengthen public administration, strike a balance in its foreign relations and keep as far away as possible from regional crises. If successful, it could not only become a country that increases its oil production but also emerge as a new regional actor at the centre of energy, trade and transport corridors.

However, it is clear that oil revenues alone will not be sufficient for this to happen. Institutional reforms, legal predictability, investment security and sustainable relations with neighbours are just as important as new oil fields. The fundamental challenge facing Iraq is not actually extracting oil, but utilising oil revenues for the benefit of the state. To the extent that Baghdad succeeds in this, it may cease to be a conflict zone where regional crises persist.

From Turkey’s perspective, too, it would be insufficient to view developments solely through the prism of the oil trade. Iraq’s transformation into a stable, economically strengthening country open to regional integration will serve Ankara’s interests across many areas, from security to trade, and from logistics to energy. Consequently, in the coming months, we will be monitoring not only whether Iraq can produce more oil, but also whether it can channel this oil into political stability and economic development.

(Originally published by Middle East Africa website in Turkish)

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urkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan warned on Thursday against the expansion of the Russia-Ukraine war into the Black Sea, saying attacks on civilian maritime infrastructure threaten regional stability and should not be tolerated.

Speaking alongside Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha after talks in Kyiv, Fidan said Türkiye remains committed to preventing the conflict from spreading into the strategically important waterway.

“We do not want the war to spread to the Black Sea,” Fidan said, stressing that peace and security in the region must be preserved.

He condemned attacks targeting civilian maritime assets, saying ports, oil tankers and fishing vessels should not become military targets.

“Targeting ports, tankers and fishing boats and putting civilians’ lives at risk is not something that can be justified,” Fidan said, urging all parties to act with restraint and responsibility.

Fidan said Türkiye continues to explore new strategic approaches with the warring parties and international mediators to break the deadlock in the conflict.

Call for negotiations

He reaffirmed Ankara’s support for continuing negotiations under the Istanbul format, arguing that direct talks between Russian and Ukrainian officials had produced valuable transparency and dialogue.

“I believe it would be very beneficial for the Türkiye negotiations, particularly the Istanbul talks, to continue,” Fidan said, adding that ongoing hostilities should not prevent diplomatic engagement.

The Turkish foreign minister noted that while U.S. negotiators later became involved in efforts to achieve a broader settlement, the conflict continues with an increasing risk of escalation.

Addressing potential post-war security arrangements, Fidan said security guarantees for Ukraine would likely include land, air and naval components.

He revealed that Türkiye has agreed to lead the maritime component of those guarantees in coordination with allied countries.

“Türkiye has accepted to lead the maritime component, and we have a common understanding with our allies on this issue,” he said, adding that planning work is already being carried out by the naval forces of participating allied nations.

Ukraine is ready for a ceasefire

For his part, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha reiterated Kyiv’s readiness for a ceasefire and voiced support for Türkiye as the venue for future high-level peace negotiations.

“We believe that negotiations, especially a possible meeting between President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and President Vladimir Putin, could take place in Türkiye,” Sybiha said.

He added that only a summit between the two leaders could inject new momentum into the peace process.

“As Ukraine, we are ready for a ceasefire,” Sybiha said.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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he United States has used unmanned surface vessels (USVs) in combat for the first time, marking a significant milestone in modern naval warfare after the US military confirmed that autonomous sea drones were employed in strikes against an Iranian naval facility.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) said three one-way Corsair sea drones struck a submarine and ship maintenance facility at Iran’s Bandar Abbas Naval Base on Monday as part of operations aimed at reducing Iran’s capacity to target commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

The attack represents the first known offensive use of US autonomous surface vessels, highlighting a shift in naval strategy toward unmanned maritime systems after similar technologies gained prominence during the Russia-Ukraine war.

Autonomous sea drones enter frontline combat

The Corsair is an autonomous surface vessel developed by Texas-based defense technology company Saronic. Measuring approximately 24 feet (7.3 meters) in length, the vessel has a range exceeding 1,000 nautical miles, can travel at speeds above 35 knots, and is capable of carrying payloads of nearly 1,000 pounds (453 kilograms).

Designed with a modular architecture, the platform can perform intelligence, surveillance, logistics, force protection and one-way strike missions while operating with limited human intervention.

Until now, USVs in the US military had primarily been deployed for reconnaissance, maritime security and search-and-rescue operations rather than offensive missions.

The combat debut follows Saronic’s rapid growth since its establishment in 2022.

The company expanded its shipbuilding capacity by acquiring Louisiana-based Gulf Craft in 2025 and later announced a $300 million expansion of its production facilities. In December 2025, the US Navy awarded Saronic a $392 million production contract for the Corsair, accelerating the transition from prototype development to operational deployment.

Since then, the company has secured $1.75 billion in funding, reaching a valuation of $9.25 billion while broadening its portfolio of autonomous maritime systems and command-and-control technologies.

Shift in naval warfare

Military analysts increasingly view unmanned surface vessels as a transformative capability for future naval operations.

Compared with conventional warships that require large crews and significant financial investment, autonomous vessels can be produced at lower cost, deployed in larger numbers and operate in high-risk environments without exposing personnel to danger.

The concept gained prominence during the Russia-Ukraine war, where Ukraine employed maritime drones to challenge Russia’s naval superiority in the Black Sea, forcing Moscow’s fleet to adapt its operations.

Iran and Yemen’s Houthi movement have also used one-way naval drones to threaten commercial shipping in strategic waterways.

The latest strike follows another milestone for the Corsair after the vessel was reportedly used last month to help rescue two crew members from a downed US Army helicopter off the coast of Oman.

The vessel was operated by Task Force 59, the US Navy’s unit dedicated to unmanned maritime systems.

Defense analysts say the Bandar Abbas operation could signal a broader transformation in US naval doctrine, with autonomous vessels increasingly operating alongside traditional warships as part of distributed and networked fleets capable of carrying out reconnaissance, logistics and combat missions.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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anadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has described Saudi Arabia and Türkiye as the two most influential countries in shaping potential solutions to the Middle East’s ongoing crises, emphasizing the importance of direct engagement with regional powers over public criticism.

Speaking to reporters during an official visit to Jeddah on Friday, Carney said that meaningful progress on regional conflicts would depend largely on the role played by Riyadh and Ankara.

“The two most influential countries regarding potential solutions in the Middle East are Saudi Arabia and Türkiye,” Carney said.

Carney stressed that Canada remains deeply committed to developments in the Middle East but argued that constructive dialogue is more effective than criticizing governments from afar.

He said engaging directly with regional leaders does not imply endorsement of all their policies.

“Lecturing countries from a distance is an ineffective strategy,” Carney said. “It may be satisfying, but it is ineffective. Engagement can be effective. That does not mean it will always be decisive, but it can produce results.”

Talks with Erdoğan

Addressing Canada’s relations with Türkiye, Carney said he discussed unresolved bilateral issues during his recent meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Ankara.

He noted that the direct dialogue had yielded positive outcomes that would not have been possible through diplomacy conducted from Ottawa.

Diversifying Canada’s partnerships

The Canadian prime minister also highlighted his government’s efforts to reduce Canada’s heavy reliance on the United States by expanding international partnerships.

“We are overly dependent on the United States. That has been demonstrated,” Carney said. “Every Canadian strongly recognizes this, and we are seeking diversification.”

His remarks reflect Ottawa’s broader strategy of strengthening diplomatic and economic ties with a wider range of global partners as Canada seeks a more diversified foreign policy and trade agenda.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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he United States and Iran exchanged another round of military strikes on Thursday, sharply escalating tensions in the Gulf and raising fresh concerns over the stability of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global energy corridor.

The latest escalation came after U.S. forces launched a second wave of attacks against Iranian military infrastructure overnight, with Washington saying the operation was intended to safeguard freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz following Iranian attacks on commercial shipping.

Iran responded hours later by launching missile and drone strikes against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, marking another direct exchange between the two countries despite previous diplomatic efforts to halt the conflict.

The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said its latest operation struck approximately 90 military targets across Iran, including air defense systems, coastal surveillance installations, missile and drone storage sites, naval assets and military logistics infrastructure along Iran’s southern coastline.

The strikes followed an earlier round of attacks this week in which U.S. forces targeted more than 80 Iranian military sites.

Speaking to reporters while returning from the NATO summit in Türkiye, U.S. President Donald Trump defended the operation, describing it as retaliation for Iran’s attacks on commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

“We just hit them very hard,” Trump said. “Every time they hit us, we’re going to hit them 20.”

Earlier, Trump declared that the interim agreement intended to halt fighting between Washington and Tehran was effectively “over.”

Iran retaliates against US bases

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced that it had carried out strikes against U.S. military positions in Bahrain and Kuwait in response to the American attacks.

The Guards warned that further retaliation would follow if the United States launched additional strikes against Iranian territory.

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf said the Strait of Hormuz would operate only under what he described as “Iranian arrangements,” adding that U.S. “bullying and breaking its commitments no longer come without a cost.”

Iranian state media reported that three people were killed and several others injured in U.S. strikes near Ahvaz in southwestern Iran.

Multiple locations along Iran’s southern coast were reportedly hit, including Bandar Abbas, home to Iran’s largest commercial port and major naval facilities belonging to both the Iranian Navy and the Revolutionary Guards.

Additional strikes were reported in Konarak, Chabahar and Iranshahr, where a firefighter was killed during an attack on the city’s airport. Iranian media also reported damage to a railway bridge near Aqqala in northern Iran.

Oil prices climb

Global oil prices rose as markets reacted to renewed fighting and concerns that continued hostilities could threaten shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies normally pass.

Brent crude futures rose more than 1% to nearly $79 per barrel, while U.S. West Texas Intermediate crude also gained more than 1%.

The latest exchange follows a familiar pattern seen during previous rounds of fighting, with Iranian attacks on commercial shipping followed by U.S. military retaliation and subsequent Iranian strikes on American military facilities in the Gulf.

Despite the escalating military exchanges, analysts say both sides may still be seeking to strengthen their negotiating positions while avoiding a broader regional war, although the collapse of the interim agreement has significantly reduced prospects for an immediate diplomatic breakthrough.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he United States and Iran exchanged their heaviest military strikes since last month’s ceasefire on Wednesday, raising fears that the fragile truce between the two longtime adversaries has effectively collapsed as President Donald Trump declared the interim agreement with Tehran was “over.”

The renewed escalation unfolded as NATO leaders gathered in Ankara, where Trump confirmed that Washington had resumed military operations against Iran following what U.S. officials described as Iranian attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

According to the United States, the latest strikes were launched in response to Iranian attacks on three commercial vessels transiting the strategic waterway, one of the world’s most important oil shipping routes.

Iran responded by announcing missile and drone strikes against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, marking one of the most significant direct confrontations between the two countries since fighting resumed.

The exchange represents the most serious breach of the preliminary ceasefire reached last month following weeks of conflict and negotiations mediated by regional partners.

“I think it’s over”

Speaking alongside NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on the sidelines of the alliance summit, Trump signaled that Washington no longer viewed the interim memorandum of understanding with Tehran as viable.

“I think it’s over,” Trump told reporters when asked about the agreement that had temporarily halted fighting.

The U.S. president also dismissed prospects for renewed engagement with Iran, saying he no longer wished to negotiate with Iranian leaders, whom he described as “sick people.”

His remarks suggested the diplomatic process that had accompanied the ceasefire has effectively broken down, even as military exchanges continue to intensify.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry accused Washington of undermining the agreement through both military action and economic pressure.

In a statement released Wednesday, Tehran said recent U.S. airstrikes, together with Washington’s decision to revoke Iran’s oil sales license, had rendered key parts of the ceasefire arrangement “ineffective.”

Iran also accused the United States of interfering with maritime arrangements governing passage through the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that such actions had made implementation of the truce increasingly impossible.

The ministry warned neighboring countries hosting U.S. military forces not to allow their territories to be used for further American attacks against Iran, an apparent reference to Gulf states including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

The warning followed Iran’s announcement that it had launched missiles and drones against U.S. military targets in Bahrain and Kuwait earlier in the day.

Iran’s Revolutionary Guards also reported that one member of its naval forces had been killed while confronting U.S. drones near the southern port of Mashahr.

The latest military exchanges have raised concerns that the conflict could once again spread across the wider Gulf region, threatening global energy supplies and commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil exports.

Regional tensions grow as aviation warning expanded

The renewed fighting has already prompted international aviation authorities to strengthen safety warnings across the Middle East.

The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) announced that commercial airlines should avoid operating within both Iranian and Iraqi airspace because of the heightened risk of military activity.

The updated advisory remains in effect until August 31 and replaces an earlier warning that had also covered Lebanese airspace.

EASA continues to advise airlines to exercise caution when operating near Bahrain, Kuwait, Israel, Jordan, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates because of the potential for further military escalation.

The deteriorating security situation overshadowed discussions at the NATO summit in Ankara, where alliance leaders were expected to focus on defense spending, regional security and support for Ukraine.

Instead, much of the attention shifted to Trump’s remarks on Iran and his broader comments on NATO allies.

Criticism against Spain

The U.S. president also launched a sharp attack on Spain, accusing Madrid of failing to meet its defense commitments within NATO.

Trump said he had instructed Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to halt all trade with Spain, calling the country “a terrible partner” in the alliance.

“I don’t want anything to do with Spain,” Trump told reporters.

He also criticized NATO over Greenland, renewing longstanding complaints about the Arctic territory and alliance burden-sharing.

The renewed conflict between Washington and Tehran comes after weeks of fragile diplomacy aimed at preventing another prolonged regional war.

Although the interim agreement had reduced direct military confrontation, tensions remained high over Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions, maritime security and regional influence.

With both sides exchanging military attacks and publicly questioning the viability of previous agreements, regional governments are increasingly concerned that the Gulf could once again become the center of a wider confrontation involving U.S. forces and Iranian-backed groups.

The latest developments also place additional pressure on NATO leaders meeting in Ankara, many of whom have emphasized the importance of preventing further instability in the Middle East while maintaining freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

As military operations continue and diplomatic rhetoric hardens, the future of any negotiated settlement between Washington and Tehran appears increasingly uncertain.

(Source: Reuters)

I

n the current climate, where the global energy architecture is undergoing structural upheavals and supply chains are being reconfigured, Turkey is rising far beyond the role of a mere ‘transit country’ or ‘bridge’ to become a ‘hub’ that shapes the rules of Eurasian energy geopolitics. The energy partnerships established with Azerbaijan form the most solid foundation and strategic complement to this vision, which Ankara has built with a long-term strategic vision. The infrastructure initiatives, whose foundations were laid with the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and which have reached an intercontinental dimension through the Southern Gas Corridor, confirm that Turkey is the sole strategic gateway opening up the Caspian Basin’s resources to global markets. This equation, in which Turkey plays a central role, not only constitutes one of the greatest supporters of regional stability but also acts as an asymmetric power element that counterbalances external interventions.

Turkey’s geopolitical leverage in Europe’s energy security

The radical disruptions in Europe’s energy supply chains, triggered by the Russia-Ukraine War, have elevated Turkey’s indispensable role in global energy security to an existential level. In this crisis environment, the security of Europe’s energy supply has become directly dependent on Turkey’s diplomatic and infrastructural capabilities. The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which forms the backbone of the Southern Gas Corridor, and its European extension, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), position Turkey as the system’s primary controller and distributor in the delivery of Caspian gas to the West. The planned phased increase in TANAP’s capacity to over 30 billion cubic metres and the integration of new fields in the Caspian Sea into the system mean that Europe’s energy strategy will run directly through Ankara. Through these projects, Turkey is not only contributing to the energy security of the European continent but is also gaining a very powerful geopolitical lever.

The Hormuz crisis and Ankara-centered stability for neighboring countries

Turkey’s pipeline diplomacy, which has demonstrated the country’s capabilities and maturity in energy geopolitics, is also the only rational way out for regions such as the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, where border disputes and political deadlocks are rife. In particular, the crises that have erupted recently around the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea clearly demonstrate the structural fragility caused by excessive reliance on maritime chokepoints in global energy trade. These routes, through which approximately one-fifth of global oil supplies and a significant portion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade pass, are extremely vulnerable to asymmetric attacks by non-state actors and the risks of regional conflict.

This situation, which constantly generates a geopolitical risk premium in global markets, makes secure land-based alternatives for the transport of Middle Eastern hydrocarbons to the West an existential necessity. It is precisely at this point that the seamless pipeline infrastructure established by Turkey with Azerbaijan offers a tried-and-tested, ready-made integration model for Gulf resources as well. In response to the high-cost and high-risk nature of maritime routes, Turkey is building a reliable land-based bridgehead connecting the Gulf directly to Europe through projects such as the Development Corridor, which runs via Iraq. Ankara’s vision could enable Middle Eastern resources to be channelled to global markets via Turkey’s secure transmission network, bypassing fragile chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz.

A similar situation applies to the Eastern Mediterranean. It has become clear that all alternative routes—such as EastMed, which have sought to bypass and exclude Turkey from the commercialization and delivery of the region’s hydrocarbon resources to Western markets—have failed from technical, political and financial perspectives. The flexibility of Turkey’s onshore infrastructure is positioning Ankara as one of the key decision-makers and a distribution hub for the integration of resources from the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean into global markets, following on from Caspian resources.

Turkey as a ‘green energy hub’ beyond fossil fuels

In the wake of wars and supply crises, Turkey has emerged as the most reliable hub to which global players are turning in their search for dependable suppliers. However, the future of this geopolitical capacity built by Ankara is not limited to conventional hydrocarbon resources or existing natural gas pipelines. In this new order, where the energy transition is gathering momentum, Turkey is also systematically implementing its strategy to transform itself into a regional clean energy hub in line with carbon-neutral targets.

The renewable energy potential of the Caspian region – comprising not only the Caspian Sea’s 157 gigawatt technical wind energy potential but also the ‘green energy’ capacity of the Karabakh and Eastern Zangezur regions – can only be integrated into global markets via Turkey’s national grid and transmission infrastructure. Plans to transport the renewable energy to be generated – in the form of electricity and green hydrogen – to Europe via the Nakhchivan corridor and Turkey could completely change the rules of the game. Adapting existing natural gas infrastructure—particularly TANAP—to facilitate hydrogen transport in the future will transform Turkey from a traditional natural gas trading hub into one of the key players shaping the clean energy markets of the future.

The shift from physical transportation to setting commercial rules

All these physical infrastructure and green transition projects lay the groundwork for Turkey’s strategy to evolve beyond its ultimate vision in energy geopolitics—that of being a ‘bridge country’—and become a price-setting hub. Ankara is crowning the physical network it has established through pipelines and electricity grids with the aim of creating an international trading centre where energy prices are set. In this regard, the natural gas trading centre being established in Thrace and initiatives to deepen national energy markets are transforming Turkey from merely a transit route for energy flows into a financial magnet where regional market conditions are shaped. The fact that critical suppliers such as Azerbaijan are adding volume and depth to this trading hub not only strengthens Ankara’s hand in global markets but also compels neighbouring countries to integrate into the market architecture established by Turkey in energy trade.

Within the context of Turkey’s national energy strategy, the relations it has developed with Azerbaijan go beyond a conventional trade agreement to constitute the construction of a geo-economic integration centred on Ankara. Turkey, which has served as a shield against Europe’s crises and assumed a rule-setting role in the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean under the traditional concept of energy security, is also striving to utilise its vast infrastructure advantage in integrating with the renewable energy revolution. As the energy architecture of the future is redesigned in line with the goals of a ‘carbon-neutral economy’, Turkey, with its autonomy, strategic vision and strong alliances, will continue to be one of the indispensable centres of gravity in the global energy order for decades to come.

(Originally published in Turkish by SETA Foundation)

F

ollowing approximately 100 days of tension, Iran and the US announced on Sunday 14 June that they had reached an agreement on a memorandum of understanding. On 17 June, the text of the 14-point memorandum of understanding was signed by US President Donald Trump and Iranian President Mesud Pezeşkiyan. Thus, an agreement has been reached that will launch a 60-day negotiation process between the two countries. The final outcome will be determined by the agreement reached at the conclusion of these 60 days of negotiations. From this perspective, it is fair to say that the current memorandum of understanding serves as a sort of ‘goodwill document’ to initiate the negotiation process between the two countries. This document also serves as a guide regarding the issues to be addressed during the negotiation process. In this context, it is worth examining in detail the matters covered by the Memorandum of Understanding.

Matters covered by the memorandum of understanding

The provisions set out in the 14-article Memorandum of Understanding are broadly divided into two categories. Some of these are provisions that come into force upon the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, whilst others are provisions expected to come into force subject to the outcome of the 60-day negotiations.

Accordingly, Articles 1, 4, 5, 10 and 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding cover the matters that come into force upon its signing. Article 1 stipulates that the US, Iran and their allies must immediately and permanently cease hostilities on all fronts where tensions persist, particularly in Lebanon. This article also emphasises that the parties shall henceforth refrain from initiating war or military operations against one another, shall not issue threats, and that Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity shall be guaranteed. Consequently, the implementation of this article extends not only to the US and Iran but also to Israel and Hezbollah. Indeed, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi stated in a statement that one party to the agreement consists of the US and Israel, whilst the other comprises Iran and Hezbollah. From this perspective, any potential conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is of critical importance. Given Israel’s statements that it will not withdraw from the territories it occupies in Lebanon, it is clear that this provision is also one of the factors rendering the agreement fragile.

Another important issue—the keeping of the Strait of Hormuz open and the regulation of transit—is addressed in Articles 4 and 5 of the Memorandum of Understanding. Accordingly, the US will lift its naval blockade against Iran within 30 days, commencing immediately after the signing of the agreement. In return, Iran will ensure that traffic through the Strait of Hormuz returns to pre-war levels within 30 days. It has been stated that Iran will not charge fees to ships transiting through the Strait of Hormuz for a period of 60 days. Once the 60-day period has ended, it is envisaged that Iran will reach an agreement with Gulf states, primarily Oman, regarding transit arrangements. It has also been stated that the US will withdraw its troops from the vicinity of Iran. According to statements by US officials, this does not imply that the US will withdraw from its bases in the region; rather, it refers to the restoration of the US military presence to its pre-war status.

Iran’s frozen assets

Another issue expected to be implemented following the signing of the memorandum of understanding concerns Iran’s frozen assets and restrictions on its oil sales. Under Articles 10 and 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding, the US Department of the Treasury will issue the necessary authorizations regarding Iran’s oil sales and related insurance, transport and banking transactions, which will remain in force until sanctions are lifted. In addition, Iran’s frozen assets will be released. The details regarding the implementation of these articles will be determined during the negotiation process.

In addition to the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding that come into force upon signature, there are also provisions that will come into force with the final agreement, which is expected to be signed following 60 days of negotiations. These provisions cover more fundamental issues than those that come into force upon the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding and require detailed technical information.

The sanctions imposed on Iran in connection with its nuclear program also constitute one of the provisions contained in the Memorandum of Understanding. The sanctions are addressed in Articles 6 and 7 of the Memorandum of Understanding. Accordingly, all sanctions imposed on Iran – primarily those enacted through United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and those unilaterally imposed by the US – will be lifted. In addition, the US will plan an investment program worth at least 300 billion dollars, with the assistance of its regional allies, to support Iran’s economic development. The program will operate entirely under US supervision. It is stated that this program has been established by the US as an alternative to Iran’s claim for war reparations. [OO1] The implementation of the program is contingent upon a final agreement following the negotiations. The issue of sanctions, meanwhile, constitutes one of the first matters to be addressed upon the commencement of negotiations.

An examination of the articles of the Memorandum of Understanding reveals that, alongside operational provisions, there are also articles containing general provisions. For example, Article 2 of the Memorandum emphasizes that Iran and the US shall respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and shall not interfere in each other’s internal affairs.

Finally, Articles 12, 13 and 14 regulate the operation of the Memorandum of Understanding. According to these articles, a mechanism will be established to monitor the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding. Once the provisions set out in Articles 1, 4, 5, 10 and 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding have entered into force, the two parties will commence 60 days of negotiations. The final agreement reached following the 60-day negotiations will also be confirmed by a UN Security Council resolution.

Risks and opportunities

One of the most significant aspects envisaged by the Memorandum of Understanding concerns Lebanon. Accordingly, it provides for an immediate cessation of hostilities in Lebanon and guarantees of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, Israel has stated that it will not withdraw from the territories it occupies in Lebanon; not content with this, it has also launched attacks on Lebanese territory following the announcement that an agreement had been reached between Iran and the US. Similarly, the memorandum of understanding signed between Iran and the US has drawn predominantly negative reactions from within Israeli domestic politics.

Channel 14, based in Israel and a staunch supporter of Netanyahu, has levelled harsh criticism at Trump over the signed memorandum of understanding. This situation has prompted a reaction from US Vice-President JD Vance. Consequently, it is evident that the memorandum of understanding is highly fragile, given that Israel – one of its indirect parties – has adopted such an adversarial stance. However, as can be inferred from the reactions of Trump and his deputy Vance, the US administration appears determined to secure a final agreement. Yet, only time will tell whether this US determination will be sufficient to rein in Israel.

Another risk factor is the potential for new regulations governing transit through the Strait of Hormuz. According to the provision in the memorandum of understanding, Iran will temporarily allow transit through the Strait of Hormuz without charging any fees. However, once the 60-day period has expired, a new arrangement will be put in place in consultation with other Gulf states, primarily Oman. Indeed, Iran has previously held discussions with Oman on this matter. Iran maintains that transit through the Strait of Hormuz should be under the control of both Oman and Iran. In this regard, it proposes that a specific fee be charged in return for the service provided. Furthermore, Iran has raised the issue of distinguishing between military and civilian transit. Iran’s refusal to back down from these demands, coupled with the other side’s refusal to accept them, poses a risk to the negotiation process.

Although the signed memorandum of understanding contains elements of risk, it represents the highest-level interaction between the two countries since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. For the first time since then, the presidents of the two countries have signed a document aimed at securing peace. This not only signals the beginning of a new era but also demonstrates that 47 years of hostility have borne no fruit. The most concrete example of this is the tensions and conflicts that have arisen between the two sides over the past year. For this reason, the memorandum of understanding signed is more likely to evolve into a lasting agreement than previous ones.

Unlike other negotiations, the current talks are taking place against a backdrop where other options – primarily war – have already been tried alongside diplomacy. Given that war, as the most radical option, has proved fruitless, it is clear that the two sides have no alternative to diplomacy. Consequently, it is highly likely that the new process that has been initiated will result in peace. However, given that the negotiations leading to the KOEP lasted 18 months, it is clear that a 60-day period is not sufficient for a comprehensive agreement. It is therefore reasonable to assume that this period will be extended and that a longer-term process is on the cards.

(Originally published in Turkish by SETA Foundation)

T

he United States has declined to extend the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in its current form, triggering a 10-year countdown toward the trade pact’s expiration while opening negotiations aimed at reshaping North America’s trading relationship.

The decision, announced Wednesday following the agreement’s first six-year review, keeps the USMCA in force until 2036 but subjects it to annual reviews unless the three member countries agree to renew and amend the pact.

The move reflects the Trump administration’s push to bring more manufacturing back to the United States, reduce trade deficits with Canada and Mexico, and tighten rules designed to limit China’s access to North American supply chains.

“The United States did not agree to renew the USMCA in its current form,” U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greersaid in a statement.

“As a result, the USMCA is not renewed. The United States will continue to engage with Mexico and Canada to address the agreement’s shortcomings and our trade deficits with these countries.”

The agreement, negotiated during President Donald Trump’s first administration and implemented in 2020, replaced the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It governs approximately $1.6 trillion in annual trade among the three countries and underpins one of the world’s most integrated manufacturing and supply chains.

Although the decision does not immediately alter tariff-free trade across North America, it formally launches negotiations over revisions that Washington says are necessary to strengthen domestic manufacturing and improve economic security.

A senior U.S. administration official said bilateral negotiations with Mexico are scheduled to resume during the week of July 20 in Mexico City. The talks will focus on strengthening regional rules of origin for automobiles and other industrial products while preventing countries such as China from benefiting indirectly from preferential North American trade access.

The United States argues that stricter local-content requirements would encourage manufacturers to relocate more production and supply chains to the United States.

Mexico and Canada seek compromise amid industry concerns

Mexican Economy Minister Marcelo Ebrard acknowledged that negotiations remain divided over Washington’s demands for stricter automotive content rules but expressed confidence that a compromise remains achievable.

“There is no difference that I can identify between Mexico, the United States and Canada that is so big that we cannot resolve it,” Ebrard said after holding virtual discussions with Greer and Canadian trade minister Dominic LeBlanc.

Mexico has resisted U.S. proposals requiring North American-built vehicles to contain 50% U.S.-made components, a measure that would increase the overall regional content requirement to 82%.

“We wouldn’t allow our industry to be at a disadvantage,” Ebrard said, describing protection of Mexico’s automotive sector as the central issue in ongoing negotiations.

LeBlanc said Canada would continue discussions with Washington while seeking the removal of U.S. tariffs on Canadian steel, aluminum, automobiles and lumber.

The Trump administration has argued that additional time is needed to address persistent U.S. trade imbalances, noting that America’s goods trade deficit reached $197 billion with Mexico and $48.3 billion with Canada in 2025.

Officials acknowledge that much of the Canadian deficit reflects U.S. energy imports, while the growing deficit with Mexico has been driven partly by manufacturers relocating supply chains from China to Mexico in response to U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods.

Although Washington hopes to negotiate revised trade protocols with both neighbors, officials indicated President Trump remains skeptical about the long-term benefits of the agreement despite having negotiated it during his first term.

Trump has repeatedly argued that the United States would perform better economically without the USMCA, even while calling it “the best agreement we’ve ever made” when it entered into force.

Undermining North America’s competitiveness

Business groups across North America have urged governments to preserve the agreement’s tariff-free framework, warning that greater restrictions could undermine the region’s competitiveness against manufacturers in Asia and Europe.

Ivan Espinosa, chief executive of Nissan, warned that requiring substantially higher U.S. content in vehicles could worsen affordability for American consumers.

“You cannot build all the parts in the U.S. The supply chain is not set up to do that,” Espinosa told Reuters. “We need something that is actually executable.”

Agricultural organizations have also urged negotiators to preserve the agreement, noting that Canada and Mexico together purchase more than one-third of U.S. agricultural exports.

Bryan Goodman, spokesperson for the Agricultural Coalition for USMCA, said the agreement remains vital for farmers, ranchers and rural communities that depend on integrated North American markets.

The coming negotiations are expected to determine whether the three countries can modernize the agreement while preserving the free trade framework that has shaped North American commerce for more than three decades.

(Source: Reuters)

G

erman federal prosecutors have charged a 50-year-old Ukrainian national with helping coordinate the 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines, marking the most significant legal step yet in one of Europe’s most consequential infrastructure attacks.

The suspect, identified only as Serhii K under German privacy laws, is accused of playing a leading role in the operation that destroyed the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines beneath the Baltic Sea, severing a major route for Russian natural gas exports to Europe months after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Federal prosecutors filed the indictment on Wednesday but declined to comment on its specific contents.

According to German public broadcaster ARD, Serhii K faces charges of attacking civilian energy infrastructure, causing explosions and destroying critical infrastructure.

The charges stem from an investigation into the September 2022 underwater blasts near Denmark’s Bornholm Island, which severely damaged both pipelines and disrupted Russian gas supplies to Europe during an already escalating energy crisis.

Court documents from December 2025 allege that Serhii K coordinated a team that used the sailing yacht Andromeda to transport explosives to the pipelines. Prosecutors claim he acted as the team’s on-board coordinator and operational leader rather than serving as a diver or explosives specialist.

The Berlin-based law firm Menaker, which represents the accused, has not commented publicly on the indictment.

German prosecutors confirmed that Serhii K is the same individual arrested in Italy in August 2025 following a German arrest warrant. Italy’s highest court later approved his extradition to Germany, where he was transferred in November 2025 to face investigation.

At the time of his arrest, German authorities alleged that the suspect had used forged identity documents to charter the Andromeda in the northern German port of Rostock before the vessel departed on the mission that investigators believe culminated in the sabotage operation.

Serhii K has denied any involvement in the explosions. His defense has maintained that he was serving with the Ukrainian armed forces and was inside Ukraine when the attacks occurred. His lawyers have argued that, even if military service were established, he would be entitled to what they describe as “functional immunity” under international law.

Ukraine denies involvement as investigation continues

The Nord Stream explosions remain among the most politically sensitive investigations in Europe, given their impact on regional energy security and the absence of any formal attribution of responsibility nearly four years after the attack.

Ukraine has consistently denied any state involvement in the sabotage or knowledge of any plot targeting the pipelines.

Speaking at a news conference in Dublin on Wednesday, Volodymyr Zelenskyy said it was too early to comment on the German indictment because Kyiv had not officially received details of the case.

“We have not officially received any details; at least I have not seen them,” Zelenskyy said, adding that it was premature to draw conclusions.

The twin Nord Stream pipelines, running beneath the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany, had been central to Russian gas exports to Europe before relations between Moscow and the West deteriorated sharply following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Although Nord Stream 2 had never entered commercial operation, both pipelines were rendered inoperable by the explosions, eliminating a key component of Europe’s energy infrastructure.

The investigation has involved authorities from Germany, Denmark and Sweden, with investigators examining evidence including vessel movements, explosive residue and maritime records.

The indictment represents the first formal criminal case brought by German prosecutors against an individual alleged to have participated directly in the sabotage. However, investigators have not publicly alleged that the Ukrainian government authorized or directed the operation.

The case is expected to proceed through Germany’s federal court system, where prosecutors will seek to prove that Serhii K coordinated the team responsible for carrying out one of the most significant attacks on critical energy infrastructure in recent European history.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

A

rtificial intelligence is rapidly reshaping the U.S. technology industry, with major companies accelerating workforce reductions as they restructure operations, automate tasks and redirect investment toward AI-driven growth.

Technology firms are increasingly citing artificial intelligence as a primary reason for layoffs, reflecting a broader shift in corporate strategy aimed at boosting productivity, lowering costs and streamlining operations.

Data from outplacement firm Challenger, Gray & Christmas show AI has become the leading justification for announced job cuts in the United States.

Nearly 40% of layoffs announced in May were attributed to artificial intelligence, a sharp increase from 7% in January, 10% in February, 25% in March and 26% in April.

The technology sector has been at the center of the trend.

Layoffs announced by technology companies during the first five months of 2026 rose 66% from the same period a year earlier, reaching 123,653 positions, making it the industry with the highest number of job cuts this year.

Economists caution that artificial intelligence is not the only factor behind the reductions. They say many companies are also responding to overhiring during the COVID-19 pandemic, persistent cost pressures and broader restructuring efforts aimed at improving profitability.

Major technology firms restructure around AI

Software giant Oracle reported one of the largest workforce reductions, revealing that its global full-time employee count declined by 21,000 over the past year.

A filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) showed Oracle employed 141,000 full-time workers as of May 31, down from 162,000 a year earlier.

The company said the adoption and deployment of artificial intelligence technologies across its operations had resulted in workforce reductions and could continue to do so.

Software development platform GitLab also announced significant restructuring as it shifts its business model toward AI-powered services.

The company said it will reduce its workforce by about 14%, eliminating roughly 350 jobs while simplifying management structures and withdrawing operations from 22 countries as it expands infrastructure for AI-related workloads.

Meta is pursuing a different strategy, combining layoffs with workforce redeployment.

According to U.S. media reports, the social media company plans to cut around 8,000 jobs while transferring approximately 7,000 employees into new AI-focused positions.

Chief Executive Mark Zuckerberg reportedly told employees that the restructuring was necessary as competition in artificial intelligence intensifies, warning that success in the sector is not guaranteed.

Meta has already implemented multiple rounds of layoffs this year, including a 10% reduction in staff at its Reality Labs division in January, followed by additional cuts affecting hundreds of employees in March.

Broader industry transformation

Several other major technology companies have also announced workforce reductions linked to AI investments and organizational restructuring.

Financial software company Intuit said it will eliminate 17% of its full-time workforce to improve operational efficiency and focus more resources on strategic priorities, including artificial intelligence.

Networking equipment maker Cisco plans to cut approximately 4,000 jobs as it redirects investment toward AI and other growth businesses.

Cloudflare announced the elimination of more than 1,100 positions as it redesigns its organizational structure and internal processes for the AI era.

Cryptocurrency exchange Coinbase said it would reduce its workforce by around 14%, citing market conditions and its ongoing AI transformation.

Financial technology company PayPal has announced plans to reduce its workforce by 20% over the next three years while integrating artificial intelligence throughout its operations.

Social media platform Snap also joined the growing list of companies restructuring around AI, announcing plans to lay off about 1,000 employees—roughly 16% of its workforce—and eliminate more than 300 vacant positions.

Chief Executive Evan Spiegel said rapid advances in artificial intelligence were reducing repetitive tasks and accelerating business processes, making organizational changes necessary.

Other companies undertaking AI-related restructuring this year include Angi, Atlassian, Block, Crypto.com and Wix.

The wave of layoffs highlights how artificial intelligence is reshaping employment across the technology industry, with companies increasingly seeking to automate routine work while investing heavily in AI infrastructure and specialized talent.

While businesses argue the changes are necessary to remain competitive in a rapidly evolving market, the trend has also intensified concerns about the long-term impact of artificial intelligence on employment, particularly in administrative, software development and support functions.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

C

entral banks around the world are planning to reduce their holdings of U.S. dollars over the coming decade for the first time, reflecting growing concerns over geopolitical risks and policy uncertainty surrounding the world’s dominant reserve currency, according to a new survey released on Tuesday.

The findings, published by the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF), mark the first time its annual survey has found that more central banks intend to decrease their dollar allocations than increase them over the next 10 years.

The survey, which gathered responses from 90 central banks, sovereign wealth funds and public pension funds managing a combined $10 trillion in assets, points to a gradual transformation in global reserve management as policymakers prepare for a more fragmented international financial system.

Although the U.S. dollar remains the world’s primary reserve currency and has gained around 3% this year, respondents increasingly cited political uncertainty in the United States and rising geopolitical tensions as reasons to diversify their portfolios.

The shift comes amid broader debate over the future of the global monetary system following heightened international tensions, including the recent U.S.-Iran conflict, and changing global economic dynamics.

OMFIF Senior Economist Yara Aziz said public investors increasingly regard market volatility as a permanent feature rather than a temporary disruption.

“The old assumption that public investors can wait for the environment to normalize looks increasingly unrealistic,” Aziz wrote in the report.

Gold strengthens its role in reserve management

Despite expectations of reduced dollar holdings, the survey found no clear replacement for the U.S. currency.

Instead, reserve managers are gradually expanding holdings across a wider range of currencies while significantly increasing allocations to gold.

Nearly four out of five central banks surveyed, along with 60% of public investment funds, believe the international monetary system is evolving toward a more multipolar structure in which reserve assets become more diversified.

Currencies outside the traditional major reserve group are attracting greater attention.

Respondents reported increasing allocations to the Norwegian krone and the New Zealand dollar, while interest in the British pound also continued to grow.

Central banks also maintained plans to increase holdings of the euro and China’s renminbi, although respondents said structural limitations continue to constrain both currencies from becoming dominant alternatives to the dollar.

Even so, almost all respondents viewed the Chinese yuan as an effective tool for portfolio diversification.

Gold emerged as one of the strongest beneficiaries of changing reserve strategies.

Held by 82% of surveyed central banks, the precious metal has moved to the center of reserve management policies after reaching successive record highs over recent years.

In the next one to two years, gold is expected to see the largest increase in allocations among reserve assets, with a net 30% of respondents planning to expand their holdings.

Analysts say central banks increasingly value gold as a hedge against inflation, geopolitical instability and financial market volatility.

Artificial intelligence reshapes investment strategies

Beyond reserve diversification, the survey highlighted a rapid acceleration in the adoption of artificial intelligence across public financial institutions.

More than two-thirds of central banks said they plan to expand the use of AI in the near future, while none of the advanced economy central banks surveyed indicated they were satisfied with current levels of AI deployment.

Overall, only 9% of central banks said existing AI integration met their needs.

Most institutions currently use artificial intelligence for data analysis, research and administrative functions, although adoption varies significantly between developed and emerging economies.

Nearly 90% of central banks in advanced economies already use AI, compared with just 44% of those in emerging markets.

The report also found growing investor interest in physical assets.

Almost 60% of public investment funds intend to increase allocations to infrastructure and real estate over the next two years, making them the most popular asset classes outside traditional financial markets.

Emerging markets are also attracting renewed attention

Thirty-eight percent of public funds plan to increase investment in emerging economies, up sharply from 27% in last year’s survey.

At the same time, interest in expanding exposure to developed economies declined significantly, with only one-quarter of respondents planning to increase allocations compared with nearly half a year earlier.

Despite diversification efforts, the United States and China remained the most attractive investment destinations, largely because of their leading positions in artificial intelligence development and technological innovation.

The survey suggests that while the U.S. dollar is likely to remain the world’s dominant reserve currency for the foreseeable future, central banks are increasingly seeking broader diversification through gold, alternative currencies, emerging markets and new technologies to navigate a more uncertain global economic environment.

(Source: Reuters)

G

ulf Arab states are reassessing their long-standing security relationship with the United States following Washington’s emerging agreement with Iran, amid concerns that the proposed deal could reshape the regional balance of power and leave key security issues unresolved.

The framework agreement between the United States and Iran, announced after months of conflict and negotiations, has been welcomed across the Gulf as a step away from a wider regional war. However, analysts and diplomats say many governments in the region remain deeply uneasy about its long-term implications, particularly regarding Iran’s military capabilities and growing regional influence.

The agreement seeks to end hostilities between Washington and Tehran, reopen the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping and establish a process for broader negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions relief and economic reconstruction. While Gulf capitals support efforts to prevent another devastating conflict, many officials are questioning whether the arrangement adequately addresses their security concerns.

Trust in US erodes

For decades, Gulf monarchies have relied heavily on the United States as their principal security guarantor. American military bases, naval deployments and defence partnerships have formed the backbone of regional deterrence against external threats, particularly from Iran.

Yet confidence in those guarantees has gradually weakened over the past several years.

Regional observers point to a series of developments that have fuelled doubts, including the limited U.S. response to attacks on Saudi oil facilities in 2019 and Washington’s broader shift toward reducing its military footprint in the Middle East.

Those concerns have resurfaced following the latest U.S.-Iran agreement, which many Gulf officials view as another indication that Washington is increasingly prioritising diplomacy and strategic disengagement over long-term military commitments in the region.

The agreement also introduces new arrangements affecting navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors. Under the framework, Iran is expected to play a role in future discussions on managing commercial shipping alongside Oman and other regional stakeholders.

Possible Iranian influence on maritime security

For Gulf countries whose economies depend heavily on energy exports passing through the waterway, the prospect of expanded Iranian influence over maritime security has generated considerable debate.

Analysts argue that while reopening shipping lanes would benefit global energy markets, Gulf governments remain cautious about any arrangement that could strengthen Tehran’s leverage over regional trade.

The deal also leaves several contentious issues unresolved.

Although negotiations on Iran’s nuclear activities are expected to continue during a 60-day transition period, the current framework does not directly address Tehran’s ballistic missile programme or its relationships with armed groups across the Middle East.

Many Gulf governments have long regarded those issues as posing a more immediate security challenge than Iran’s nuclear ambitions alone.

During a regional tour following the announcement of the agreement, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio sought to reassure Gulf allies that Washington would continue consulting closely with them throughout negotiations and would not pursue policies that undermine their security.

Rubio emphasised that future discussions concerning Iran’s missile program would be coordinated with regional partners and reaffirmed America’s commitment to longstanding alliances in the Gulf.

Despite those assurances, regional analysts say trust has been weakened by years of uncertainty surrounding U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Diversifying military partnerships

Several experts argue that Gulf states increasingly believe they must prepare for a future in which they shoulder greater responsibility for their own defense.

As a result, some governments have accelerated efforts to diversify their military partnerships and defence procurement beyond traditional suppliers.

Turkey has emerged as one potential alternative source of military equipment and defense cooperation, reflecting a broader strategy of reducing dependence on any single security partner.

At the same time, Gulf countries continue to strengthen economic ties with the United States. Major investment commitments announced in recent years demonstrate that while questions persist over security arrangements, economic cooperation remains a central pillar of bilateral relations.

The proposed agreement with Iran also includes plans for a multibillion-dollar reconstruction and investment fund intended to support Iran’s economic recovery after the conflict.

Although Washington has indicated that Gulf participation would be important, several regional governments have said they have not yet committed funding and are awaiting further details before making any decisions.

For many Gulf leaders, preventing another regional war remains the immediate priority.

The recent conflict exposed the vulnerability of Gulf states to missile and drone attacks and highlighted the economic consequences of disruptions to energy exports and international shipping.

M

ore than 5,300 people remain trapped in online scam compounds in Myanmar near the Thai border despite a multinational crackdown launched last year, according to a Thai-based human rights organization that has urged authorities to intensify rescue efforts.

The Civil Society Network for Human Trafficking Victim Assistance (CSNHTV) said thousands of victims continue to be held in four scam compounds located in territory controlled by the Myanmar Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), where criminal syndicates continue to operate extensive online fraud and human trafficking networks.

In a letter addressed to Thai police, the organization called for immediate action to dismantle the remaining compounds and free those still being held against their will.

According to the group, approximately 1,600 of those trapped are Chinese nationals, while around 200 are from Myanmar. Victims also include citizens of the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brazil, Russia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Zimbabwe.

“Many of these compounds have yet to be dismantled or subjected to rescue operations to free all remaining victims,” the organization said.

It warned that the criminal syndicates continue to carry out online fraud targeting victims across the world, particularly in the United States and Europe.

Multibillion-dollar criminal industry

Scam centers across Southeast Asia, especially in Myanmar and Cambodia, have evolved into a sophisticated transnational criminal industry worth billions of dollars.

Originally linked to casinos and online gambling operations during the COVID-19 pandemic, the compounds have expanded into hubs for online investment scams, romance fraud, cryptocurrency schemes and other cybercrimes targeting victims worldwide.

Many of those recruited to work in the centers were lured by false job offers before being trafficked across borders and forced to participate in online scams.

A report released by the United Nations in February found that many scam compounds are staffed by foreign nationals trafficked by organized criminal gangs and subjected to serious human rights abuses.

The report documented widespread cases of torture, sexual abuse, forced abortions, food deprivation, solitary confinement and other forms of cruel treatment used to coerce victims into carrying out online fraud.

“The litany of abuse is staggering and at the same time heart-breaking,” said Volker Türk.

Türk added that many survivors face additional hardships after escaping the compounds, often encountering disbelief, stigma or even punishment instead of receiving protection and rehabilitation.

Calls for stronger regional cooperation

Rights groups say dismantling scam compounds requires closer cooperation between governments in the region, as many operations are protected by armed groups controlling parts of Myanmar’s border areas.

Although thousands of trafficking victims have been rescued during joint operations conducted by Thailand, Myanmar and neighboring countries over the past year, humanitarian organizations warn that thousands more remain trapped, highlighting the continued reach of criminal networks exploiting vulnerable migrants through forced labor and online fraud.

(Source: Aljazeera)

A

t least 32 people have been confirmed dead and around 700 injured after two powerful earthquakes struck Venezuela, causing widespread destruction in the capital Caracas and other parts of the country, according to authorities.

The twin quakes, measuring 7.2 and 7.5 in magnitude, hit less than a minute apart about 160 kilometers west of Caracas, triggering building collapses, damaging infrastructure and prompting fears that the final death toll could rise significantly as rescue efforts continue.

Emergency crews raced through the night to search for survivors trapped beneath the rubble of collapsed buildings. Images from Caracas showed rescue workers combing through debris while families gathered anxiously near disaster sites awaiting news of missing relatives.

Interim President Delcy Rodríguez said at least 32 people had been killed and hundreds injured, though officials cautioned that casualty figures remained preliminary.

Rescue efforts intensify

Search-and-rescue teams have been deployed across affected areas, with authorities focusing on collapsed residential buildings and heavily damaged neighborhoods.

Eyewitnesses described scenes of panic and devastation. One survivor in Caracas said residents struggled to escape amid dust clouds and falling debris.

“The scene was like a horror movie,” the survivor told Reuters, describing how people climbed over rubble to reach safety.

Several aftershocks have been recorded since the initial earthquakes, complicating rescue operations and raising concerns about further structural collapses.

Thousands of deaths feared

While official casualty figures remain relatively low so far, the U.S. Geological Survey’s Prompt Assessment of Global Earthquakes for Response (PAGER) system has warned that the eventual toll could be much higher.

According to updated USGS modeling, there is a 39% probability that fatalities could range between 1,000 and 10,000 people, and a 37% chance the death toll could reach between 10,000 and 100,000 if the most severely affected areas suffered extensive structural failures.

The agency also estimates economic losses equivalent to between 1% and 4% of Venezuela’s gross domestic product.

The United States announced it has activated a disaster assistance team and emergency task force to coordinate humanitarian support.

According to the U.S. State Department, Washington plans to send search-and-rescue specialists, medical supplies and humanitarian aid in cooperation with Venezuela’s interim government.

U.S. President Donald Trump said the earthquakes may have caused a “devastating number of deaths” and pledged American support for relief efforts.

Oil sector appears largely unaffected

Despite concerns about Venezuela’s energy infrastructure, authorities reported no immediate damage to major oil facilities.

Officials in Maracaibo, near the country’s main oil-producing region around Lake Maracaibo, said there were no reports of injuries or significant damage affecting petroleum operations.

Energy companies operating in Venezuela have begun assessing facilities, although industry sources warned that prolonged power outages could disrupt crude production in the coming days.

The disaster comes at a sensitive moment for Venezuela, which is undergoing a political transition following the removal of former President Nicolás Maduro earlier this year.

The country continues to face severe economic difficulties, with widespread poverty, fragile infrastructure and ongoing efforts to rebuild institutions after years of political turmoil.

As rescue operations continue and damage assessments expand, authorities fear the human and economic cost of the disaster could become one of the most severe natural catastrophes to strike Venezuela in decades.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he official visit to Türkiye by Niger’s President Abdourahamane Tchiani, at the invitation of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, marks a new strategic milestone in relations between Ankara and Niamey. The fact that Tchiani was accompanied during his visit by a large delegation, including the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, energy, mining, the economy, agriculture and trade, demonstrates that relations between the two countries are progressing on the basis of multi-dimensional cooperation spanning from security to energy, and from trade to institutional capacity-building. For this reason, the visit should be assessed not merely as a routine diplomatic engagement between the two countries, but within the context of shifting power balances in the Sahel and Niger’s quest to diversify its external partnerships.

According to a statement from the Communications Directorate of Türkiye, following the meetings between President Erdoğan and Tchiani at the Presidential Complex in Ankara, three agreements and a joint declaration were signed between Türkiye and Niger in the fields of education, health, trade and diplomacy. Within this framework, a protocol regarding the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation in higher education for the period 2026–2030, a joint declaration on the establishment of the Economic and Trade Partnership Commission (JETCO), a protocol on the joint operation and handover of the Niger-Türkiye Friendship Hospital, and a memorandum of understanding between the Diplomacy Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye and the National Institute for Diplomatic and Strategic Studies of the Republic of Niger.

To interpret the cooperation that has developed between Türkiye and Niger in recent years solely as a result of current security and economic needs would be an oversimplification. Relations between the two countries are based on a multidimensional cooperation where historical heritage, the pursuit of mutual trust and a shared strategic vision for the future intersect. The ties between the two countries stretch back to the cultural, political and strategic influence of the Ottoman Empire in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Niger, during the 16th century. The relationships based on mutual trust that the Ottoman Empire established with local communities in the region, such as the Tebu and Tuareg peoples, who came under its administration, have left a historical legacy that continues to foster a positive perception of Türkiye in Niger.

Türkiye’s Africa policy

This historical legacy of the Ottomans gained further significance following Ankara’s institutionalization of its Africa policy through the ‘Action Plan for Opening Up to Africa’, launched by Türkiye in 1998. This process of opening up paved the way for diplomatic contacts with Niger to gain momentum from the 2000s onwards. The mutual opening of embassies by Türkiye and Niger in 2012, and the official visit to Niger by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in his capacity as Prime Minister in 2013, marked the beginning of a new era in bilateral relations.

Since then, Türkiye’s relations with Niger, which it regards as a strategic partner in Africa, have moved beyond diplomatic contacts to take on a more concrete character in areas such as energy, defense, trade, education and cultural cooperation. Ankara is strengthening the historical and cultural ties between the two countries through the Programme Coordination Office (PKO) of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and the schools run by the Türkiye Maarif Foundation. In the health sector, one of the most significant steps,  the Niger-Türkiye Friendship Hospital, was opened in October 2019. Through these measures, Türkiye aims to establish a long-term, multi-dimensional partnership with Niger, rather than pursuing a policy focused solely on economic interests.

Following the coup in Niger in 2023, Türkiye did not sever its diplomatic ties and continued its strategic investments whilst maintaining its interest in Niger. On 17 July 2024, a high-level delegation, including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Minister of National Defence Yaşar Güler and Minister of Energy Alparslan Bayraktar, visited Niamey. During the visit, significant agreements were signed in the fields of security, energy and trade, whilst decisions on cooperation in the fields of education and health were also taken. Furthermore, the signing of a declaration of intent for cooperation in the oil and natural gas sector during these talks, and the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation in the mining sector in October 2024, demonstrate that relations between the two countries have now extended to the energy and mining sectors as well.

The fight against terrorism

Other key issue that came to the fore between the two countries in recent years is cooperation in the fight against terrorism and in the field of security. Niger is one of the countries most affected by the rise in terrorist incidents in the Sahel in recent years. The country is exposed to terrorist activities by the Al-Qaeda-linked JNIM and the ISIS-linked ISSP, particularly in its western border regions via the Liptako-Gourma security zone, and by ISWAP and Boko Haram elements in the south-east via the Lake Chad Basin. In this context, where Niger has terminated its military cooperation with Western partners, notably France and the US, Türkiye is emerging as a reliable strategic partner thanks to its growing defense industry capacity, experience in counter-terrorism, security cooperation and active diplomatic initiatives.

These factors are strengthening the strategic dimension of relations between the two countries and ensuring that Türkiye is viewed as an important partner by Niger. In this context, Niger, which cooperates with Türkiye in the fields of defense and security, is importing various defence industry products from Türkiye to enhance its capacity in the fight against terrorism. Furthermore, the On-Site Training Support Protocol signed in April 2026 demonstrates that security cooperation between the two countries is not limited to the supply of defence industry products, but also encompasses military training support and intelligence. It is evident that, through these collaborations, Niger aims to achieve its objective of conducting more effective and successful counter-terrorism operations.

One of the key pillars of the developing relations between the two countries is the strengthening of economic ties and trade. Following the military intervention in Niger in 2023, the country has gone through a difficult period due to sanctions imposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the suspension of financial support and security cooperation by Western partners. During this difficult period, Niger’s Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance, Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine, visited Türkiye to strengthen economic and political ties. Within this framework, Türkiye has continued to develop its economic relations with Niger.

Investments in the energy, mining, construction and trade sectors have not only enhanced Türkiye’s economic presence in Niger but have also contributed to Niger’s efforts to diversify its development and external partnerships. Indeed, the fact that the volume of trade between Türkiye and Niger is projected to rise from approximately 38.9 million dollars in 2012 to 273 million dollars by 2025 is one of the concrete indicators of this economic rapprochement. In the same year, Türkiye’s exports to Niger amounted to 214 million dollars, whilst imports from Niger stood at 59 million dollars. Furthermore, the signing of the joint declaration on the establishment of JETCO during Tchiani’s visit to Ankara can be regarded as a significant step towards conducting economic cooperation on a more structured and institutionalized basis.

In conclusion, these developments demonstrate that the multi-dimensional cooperation between Türkiye and Niger, which has gained momentum since 2020, has moved beyond diplomatic rhetoric and has begun to produce tangible results through trade, institutional agreements and sectoral partnerships.

(Originally published in Turkish by the Middle East Africa website)

T

he U.S. Senate has voted to direct President Donald Trump to halt military action against Iran, marking the first time since the passage of the 1973 War Powers Act that both chambers of Congress have approved a resolution seeking to end a president’s involvement in an ongoing conflict.

The Senate approved the measure on Tuesday by a vote of 50-48, following its earlier passage in the House of Representatives. The resolution reflects growing unease in Congress over the war that began on February 28, when U.S. and Israeli forces launched attacks on Iran, and signals a widening split between Trump and some members of his own Republican Party.

Although the practical effect of the resolution remains uncertain, the vote represents one of the most significant congressional challenges to Trump’s foreign policy since he returned to office.

Historic congressional action

The measure was passed under the framework of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, legislation enacted after the Vietnam War to limit presidential authority to conduct military operations without congressional approval.

No previous war powers resolution had successfully passed both the House and Senate.

Under the legislation, Congress directed the president to remove U.S. armed forces from hostilities involving Iran. However, the White House maintains that the resolution has no legal force because it is not submitted to the president for signature or veto.

The administration also argues that active hostilities effectively ended following a ceasefire reached on April 7.

A White House official dismissed the vote as largely symbolic, saying it had “no significance” and noting that the resolution passed only because two Republican senators were absent.

Trump responded sharply to the vote, calling it “poorly timed and meaningless” in a social media post. He accused lawmakers who supported the measure of making negotiations with Tehran more difficult and providing “comfort” to Iran.

Republican support signals growing unease

The Senate vote largely followed party lines, but four Republicans broke ranks to support the resolution.

The Republican senators voting in favor were Susan Collins, Rand Paul, Bill Cassidy, and Lisa Murkowski.

Meanwhile, Democratic Senator John Fetterman voted against the measure, becoming the only Democrat to oppose it.

Two Republican senators, Mitch McConnell and David McCormick, did not participate in the vote.

The House had approved the same measure earlier this month by a margin of 215-208, with four Republicans joining Democrats in support.

The vote highlights growing frustration among lawmakers over a conflict that has become increasingly unpopular with the American public.

Public opinion turning against the war

According to a Reuters/Ipsos poll released Tuesday, only one-quarter of Americans believe the war against Iran has been worth its costs. A majority of respondents also expressed concern that any ceasefire or peace agreement could collapse.

The conflict has generated political challenges for the Trump administration as it seeks congressional approval for tens of billions of dollars in additional funding linked to military operations.

At the same time, several Republican lawmakers have recently shown greater willingness to oppose the president on key issues, including immigration spending and a proposed fund intended to compensate political allies whom Trump says were unfairly targeted by federal authorities.

C

onservative candidate Abelardo De La Espriella has secured a narrow victory in Colombia’s presidential runoff election, defeating leftist Senator Ivan Cepeda in a closely contested race that signals a significant political shift in one of Latin America’s largest economies.

According to preliminary results released by Colombia’s national registrar on Sunday, De La Espriella won 49.66 percent of the vote, while Cepeda received 48.70 percent, leaving a margin of approximately 250,000 votes with nearly all ballots counted.

The result marks a major setback for the political movement of outgoing President Gustavo Petro, Colombia’s first left-wing president, whose reform agenda and security policies became central issues during the election campaign.

De La Espriella, a lawyer and political newcomer, campaigned on promises to crack down on crime, revive economic growth, reduce government spending and strengthen Colombia’s oil and gas sector.

Speaking to supporters in the coastal city of Barranquilla after the results were announced, he pledged to govern for all Colombians regardless of political affiliation.

“I will govern for all Colombians, for those who voted for me and for those who chose the other candidate,” De La Espriella told cheering supporters.

His campaign centered on criticism of Petro’s administration, which he accused of failing to contain armed groups, drug trafficking and insecurity in several regions of the country. He vowed to end negotiations with rebel and criminal organizations while expanding investment in the energy sector and reducing the size of the state by as much as 40 percent.

Despite advocating major economic reforms, De La Espriella has also promised to maintain some of Petro’s most popular social measures, including a 23 percent increase in the minimum wage and assistance programs for vulnerable communities.

The president-elect also received a congratulatory call from Donald Trump, who had publicly endorsed his candidacy during the campaign. The endorsement attracted attention both inside Colombia and internationally, highlighting growing ties between conservative political movements across the Americas.

Cepeda refuses to concede immediately

Although the preliminary count favored De La Espriella, Cepeda stopped short of immediately conceding defeat.

Addressing supporters in Bogotá, the veteran leftist politician said his campaign would await the completion of Colombia’s official verification process, which involves a ballot-by-ballot review supervised by judges and notaries.

Cepeda said his campaign was contesting results from roughly 33,000 ballot boxes out of more than 122,000 nationwide.

“We are open to dialogue; we are willing to reach agreements as long as they are respectful, genuine, and reflected in political actions that benefit the nation,” he told supporters.

While acknowledging the narrow margin, Cepeda emphasized that his supporters remain a powerful political force that must be represented in future national decisions.

The close result reflects a deeply polarized electorate divided between demands for stronger security measures and support for the social and environmental reforms introduced under Petro’s government.

De La Espriella will take office facing significant political and economic challenges.

Despite winning the presidency, he is expected to encounter resistance in Congress, where Cepeda’s coalition, the Historic Pact, remains one of the largest political blocs. No party controls a majority, meaning the incoming president will likely need to negotiate extensively to pass legislation.

Analysts say this reality may force De La Espriella to moderate some of his more ambitious proposals, particularly plans to dramatically reduce government spending and reshape state institutions.

The new administration must also address mounting public debt and sluggish economic growth while balancing demands for increased security spending.

Questions have additionally been raised about De La Espriella’s business record. During the campaign, Colombian media reported that several of his companies had been dissolved or faced financial difficulties, though his legal practice remained profitable. The president-elect rejected suggestions that these issues undermine his economic credentials.

Security concerns dominated the election

Security emerged as one of the defining issues of the campaign.

Many Colombians remain concerned about growing violence linked to drug trafficking organizations, dissident guerrilla factions and criminal networks operating in remote regions.

Supporters of De La Espriella argued that a tougher approach is necessary to restore public order and combat extortion, kidnappings and narcotics trafficking.

However, critics fear his confrontational rhetoric could undermine ongoing peace initiatives and potentially reignite broader conflict in a country that has endured more than six decades of violence involving left-wing insurgents, right-wing paramilitary groups and criminal organizations.

At Cepeda’s election-night gathering, several supporters voiced concerns that Colombia could move away from reconciliation efforts pursued in recent years.

Colombia’s election adds to a broader trend across Latin America, where several countries have recently elected conservative leaders.

Voters in countries including Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Bolivia and Ecuador have shifted toward right-leaning governments amid concerns about inflation, crime and economic performance.

More than 26.3 million Colombians participated in the runoff vote, representing a strong turnout among the country’s 41.4 million eligible voters. More than 427,000 voters submitted blank ballots, often viewed as a form of protest against both candidates.

While the final certified results are still pending, De La Espriella’s victory appears set to usher in a new political era for Colombia, one focused on security, economic liberalization and closer relations with conservative governments across the region.

(Source: Reuters)

I

n recent years, the Eastern Mediterranean has become one of the most sensitive arenas of regional competition shaped around energy resources. The main reason for this sensitivity is that regional resources are viewed not merely as economic assets, but also as strategic instruments in terms of sovereignty, security, and power politics. Indeed, the intensifying competition in the Eastern Mediterranean has further deepened the existing political and military tensions in the region. One of the most striking examples of this tension today is Israel’s attempt to render ineffective the maritime border understanding reached between Lebanon and Israel in October 2022 under US mediation through unilateral and coercive moves.

The process leading to the agreement was the outcome of a long-standing maritime jurisdiction dispute. The area between Lebanon’s Line 29 claim and the border approach imposed by Israel in its own favour had gone far beyond a technical issue of maritime delimitation because of its high hydrocarbon potential. Under the understanding reached, the maritime boundary was drawn on the basis of Line 23. Thus, while Israel secured its sovereign rights over the Karish field, which was ready for natural gas production, Lebanon was given the opportunity to continue exploration activities in Block 9, which includes the Qana field. However, the Beirut administration, under a severe economic crisis, not only had to step back from its Line 29 claim, but was also forced to accept the concession of granting Tel Aviv a share of the possible revenues from the part of the Qana field extending into the Israeli side.

Nevertheless, Lebanon has not yet been able to obtain the short-term economic gains it expected from this understanding. The identification of commercially viable reserves in the Qana field and the transition to actual production are, by their nature, processes that will take time. Moreover, political instability, institutional weaknesses, and uncertainty in the investment environment make Beirut’s energy planning even more fragile. The current conjuncture, in turn, feeds Israel’s effort to transform Lebanon’s political and economic vulnerabilities into an asymmetric advantage in its own favor. Tel Aviv’s approach should therefore be read as part of a broader strategy aimed at eroding Lebanon’s rights over the Qana field and establishing a new hegemonic sphere in favour of Israel within the Eastern Mediterranean energy equation.

The historical continuity of geopolitical conflict

Essentially, although the tension surrounding Lebanese gas in the Eastern Mediterranean may at first appear to be a current maritime jurisdiction dispute between two states, it is part of a broader struggle for power shaped by the control of energy resources.  Throughout the twentieth century, oil in the Middle East, and following the dissolution of the Soviet Union,, energy resources in the Caspian Basin, were among the main factors fuelling sovereignty disputes, external interventions, and struggles for regional influence. From this perspective, the dispute over Lebanese gas can also be read as the contemporary reflection in the Eastern Mediterranean of the historical role of energy resources in generating geopolitical rivalry and power competition.

However, it is not sufficient to explain Israel’s position only through the general conflictual logic of energy geopolitics. The main point that deserves attention here is that Tel Aviv has brought an agreement signed through international mediation back into question in such a short period of time and has sought to create the ground for its unilateral termination. The regional conflicts that have intensified since October 2023, the silence of Western states in the face of Israel’s genocidpole in Gaza, and Tel Aviv’s strategy of leaving Beirut helpless on the ground through military pressure directly extended into the Lebanese arena have turned Israel into a maximalist and revisionist actor that recklessly violates the limits of the international legal order.

Indeed, Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen’s statement in March 2026 describing the 2022 Maritime Border Agreement as a “document of surrender” for Israel and bringing the option of cancellation onto the agenda shows that Tel Aviv is trying to exploit the regional chaos it has deepened in order to reopen Lebanon’s maritime jurisdiction areas to discussion. In other words, Israel’s move targeting Lebanon’s maritime jurisdiction areas and natural gas fields points directly to a development that can be described as an “energy grab”.

The west’s double standards and Europe’s energy supply security

The United States, which was the main architect and mediator of the maritime border understanding in 2022, has not shown any significant reaction to the Israeli Energy Minister’s statements aimed at cancelling the agreement. On the one hand, the Washington administration explains Tel Aviv’s military operations in the region through the discourse of “self-defense”; on the other hand, it does not raise a strong objection to the de facto reopening of maritime borders to discussion or to Israel’s moves that put pressure on Lebanon’s sovereign rights.

Europe’s stance is not very different from that of the United States. Brussels’ position is shaped not by the protection of international law, sovereign rights, or Lebanon’s legitimate claims, but rather by the potential value of Eastern Mediterranean gas for European energy supply security. For the European Union, which significantly reduced its dependence on Russian gas after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022, Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon reserves have become one of the important alternatives due to their geographical proximity and potential for supply diversification.

In this new geopolitical environment, the Tel Aviv administration seeks to realize its objective of becoming the dominant actor in the control of energy resources and transport routes in the Eastern Mediterranean by pursuing a more aggressive strategy. Despite this, the silence of Western actors in the face of Israel’s moves to narrow Lebanon’s maritime jurisdiction areas and establish de facto superiority over energy resources reveals the existence of a clear double standard. While the Western world strongly emphasizes territorial integrity and international law when Ukraine is at stake, its reluctance to defend the same principles against Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean reveals a clear double standard.

Lebanon’s economic future and investment risk

For Lebanon, which is grappling with political instability, economic challenges and infrastructure collapse, the potential revenues from the Qana field are viewed not merely as an economic gain, but as a significant opportunity for the state’s recovery and the strengthening of its institutional capacity. However, for a country such as Lebanon, marked by limited economic resources, a fragmented political system and vulnerability to external interference, any uncertainty surrounding energy projects carries serious consequences. In this regard, Israel’s attempt to revive the maritime border dispute has the potential to undermine not only the future of a specific gas field, but also the broader investment climate in Lebanon’s energy sector.

This is because offshore natural gas projects are high-cost, long-term investments that are highly sensitive to political stability. An increase in legal and political uncertainty in such projects may heighten investors’ risk perception, thereby further weakening Lebanon’s position in the regional energy equation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the statements about unilateral cancellation and the threatening rhetoric issued by Tel Aviv clearly show that the issue in the Eastern Mediterranean is not merely a technical border dispute. The picture before us is Israel’s attempt, relying on its military superiority and the silence of Western actors, to erode Lebanon’s right to exercise control over its legitimate energy resources and to establish de facto superiority on the ground. In other words, this process should be read not as a diplomatic disagreement, but as a systematic state-led “energy grab.”

Tel Aviv’s approach once again reveals that Israel is far from being a predictable actor committed to its obligations under international law. International law, diplomatic agreements and border arrangements can easily be eroded in the face of Israel’s Zionist expansionist reflexes. For this reason, Israel’s stance once again confirms the existence of a deep and structural trust problem regarding the sustainability of long-term agreements with Tel Aviv.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

I

ndia’s 2026 state elections did not produce a simple story of victory and defeat. They revealed a country moving in two directions at once. From above, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) looks stronger, more confident and more geographically expanded. From below, Indian politics looks restless, younger and increasingly impatient with old forms of authority. The same political season that gave the BJP a historic breakthrough in West Bengal also gave India the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), a satirical youth movement that has turned insult, unemployment and examination scandals into a new language of protest.

This contradiction is the real meaning of the elections. India is not only becoming more BJP-dominated. It is also becoming more politically uneven. The ruling party is expanding into regions once considered resistant to its ideological project, while regional parties, opposition alliances and younger voters search for new vehicles of expression. The result is an India that looks more consolidated on the electoral map, but less settled in society.

BJP expansion from above

The most symbolic result came from West Bengal. According to the Election Commission of India, the BJP won 207 seats in the 294-member assembly, while the All India Trinamool Congress, widely known as Trinamool Congress (TMC), fell to 80. The result ended Mamata Banerjee’s long dominance and broke one of the last major regional exceptions to BJP power. For decades, Bengal’s politics drew strength from leftist memory, regional pride, linguistic culture and a self-image of secular resistance. That image was always more complicated than its defenders admitted.

West Bengal was central to the opposition’s imagination because it showed that a regional leader could resist the BJP and speak against New Delhi from a position of strength. That model now looks broken. The BJP’s victory gives the party a psychological advantage ahead of the 2029 general election. It also weakens the opposition’s claim that regional strongholds can contain the BJP’s national expansion.

Yet the election was not a simple BJP wave. Tamil Nadu told a different story. The Election Commission’s results showed actor-politician Vijay’s Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) as the single largest party with 108 seats in the 234-member assembly, ahead of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK). Tamil Nadu shows that voter fatigue can disrupt established regional parties without automatically benefiting the BJP. Vijay’s rise suggests that younger voters may move beyond older Dravidian formations without accepting the BJP as the only alternative.

Assam, Kerala and Puducherry added further nuance. Assam confirmed the BJP’s strength in the northeast, with the party winning 82 seats in a 126-member assembly. Kerala produced a Congress-led result rather than a BJP breakthrough, while Puducherry showed that alliance management still matters in smaller political spaces. Taken together, these results put pressure on the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA), the opposition bloc formed to challenge the BJP nationally. Its problem is not only ideological, it is organizational and psychological.

The BJP, by contrast, has regained momentum after the limits exposed in the 2024 general election, when it remained the largest party but lost its single-party majority in the Lok Sabha. West Bengal gives it a new eastern frontier. Assam confirms its northeastern hold. Even where it did not dominate, as in Tamil Nadu, the weakening of older opposition parties may serve its long-term interests.

Cockroach anger from below

The rise of the Cockroach Janta Party is the clearest sign. The movement began after Chief Justice of India Surya Kant reportedly compared some unemployed youth and fake-degree holders to “cockroaches” and “parasites.” He later said sections of the media had misquoted his oral observations. But the phrase had already escaped the courtroom. Abhijeet Dipke, a U.S.-educated Indian activist, turned the insult into satire. The cockroach became a symbol of humiliation, survival and stubborn resistance.

The movement is funny, but it is not trivial. Its slogans are playful, but its anger is real. Young Indians are protesting because education has become uncertain, examinations have become scandal-prone, jobs are scarce and official responses often sound dismissive. Reuters reported that the CJP’s first street protest in New Delhi on June 6, 2026, focused on youth unemployment and examination-related grievances, including demands for Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan’s resignation over repeated paper leaks and grading errors.

This matters because exams are not a small question in India. For millions of families, they are the promised bridge between poverty and dignity. When that bridge begins to look broken, satire becomes serious. The CJP says what many young Indians feel but cannot easily organize around: they are over-tested, under-employed, mocked by power and expected to remain grateful.

The CJP may not become a conventional political party. It may fade, split or be absorbed by larger forces. But even if the organization disappears, the mood behind it will remain. India has a young population with rising aspirations and shrinking patience. That generation is asking whether nationalism, development slogans and electoral victories can answer the practical anxieties of jobs, exams and dignity.

Why this matters beyond India

This is where the 2026 elections and the Cockroach movement meet. The elections show the strength of political power. The movement shows the weakness of social consent. A party can win states and still face a generation that feels unheard. A government can expand geographically and still struggle to answer the desperation of students, job seekers and young graduates.

The consequences will not remain only domestic. In West Bengal, the BJP’s rise may harden politics around migration, citizenship, border security and Bangladesh. For Dhaka, Kathmandu, Colombo and other regional capitals, India’s internal political shifts matter because New Delhi’s domestic debates often shape regional behavior. If identity politics becomes stronger in Bengal, border communities and minorities may feel the pressure before foreign ministries do.

India after the 2026 state elections is therefore neither fully triumphant nor fully unstable. It is powerful, but tense. The BJP has expanded its map, but the opposition is not the only source of challenge. The challenge is also social, generational and emotional. It comes from young people who may not yet have a full program, but who have found a symbol in the cockroach: despised, difficult to eliminate and strangely capable of surviving.

For the BJP, the lesson is clear. Electoral expansion can create authority, but it cannot replace accountability. For the opposition, the lesson is equally sharp. Anti-BJP politics cannot rely only on old regional faces and emergency alliances. It must speak to the anxieties of the young, the unemployed, the exam-weary and the socially humiliated.

The 2026 elections changed India’s political map. The Cockroach Janta Party revealed something deeper: maps do not show pressure building under the surface. India today is governed from above with confidence, but questioned from below with increasing impatience. That tension may shape the road to 2029 more than any single state result.

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ithin the framework of international relations, powerful states often act with an excessive demonstration of power to protect their political and economic interests, even if this behavior goes on to negatively impact weaker states. They employ various means to achieve this, including military alliances, economic influence, political and military intervention, and sanctions on their perceived enemies. These actions embody the characteristic of “states’ arrogance” since such an act is not exercised within the framework of accepted international legitimacy, and without a mandate from international institutions such as the United Nations. The stronger party uses its greater power and develops the belief that it has the right to impose its vision on other parties, conceiving this from the notion of holding an obligation to achieve a situation of peace and stability. Nevertheless, this is in fact solely derived from the desire to reach certain objectives within its own national security interests, using only the logic of power.

The development of the concept of “states’ arrogance” represents a radical shift in international relations, explaining as it does the inability of powerful states to adapt to a changing global order. These states tend to believe that their political system, economic influence, and military power grant them the right to dominate international affairs and exert pressure so as to steer other countries’ positions in their favor. This has led to a fundamental transformation in the role played by powerful actors, a role that may be driven by both internal and external pressures. This article intends to shed the light on the behavior of the United States in recent decades and how it embodies the role of an arrogant power deviating from the traditional concept of international relations.

States’ arrogance in International Relations

The concept of arrogance within approaches to international relations has differed according to how it is situated in terms of each state’s interaction with the outside world. Although not directly addressed with this term, “states’ arrogance”, it is often referred to using terms that hold similar meanings, such as “vanity” and “domination”. Within the realist approach, Thomas Hobbes addressed the concept in his ideas on the social contract, describing human nature as being driven by glory and pride, which leads to conflict with others. In 1948, the German-American Hans Morgenthau published his book “Politics Among Nations”, arguing that the concept is “the selfish manifestation” of a subjective stance of states to adopt narcissistic and often “hostile” policies. Employing a more extreme definition of arrogance, Kenneth Waltz suggests that the term involves a degree of reckless policies in pursuit of national security.

In the liberal school, arrogance is viewed as an obstacle to the achievement of peace and freedom. David Hume, the philosopher, historian, and economist, argues that a world driven by commercial competition cannot avoid conflicts without also avoiding the arrogance and selfishness of the more powerful states. In his book “Beyond Hegemony: Cooperation and Conflict in the World Political Economy”, Robert Cohen emphasizes the need for “strong communication” to fill the gap between strong and less powerful states, and therefore, enhance cooperation in order to achieve peace. The constructivist approach assumes that the arrogant behavior of states is a reality that is a social construct which states respond to according to their particular perspectives.

This approach treats the concepts of “pride” and “ego” as elements of states’ arrogance. This means that states with strong nationalist foreign policies act arrogantly toward actors that differ in terms of ideology. Nicholas Onoff, a pioneering advocate of the constructivist school, argues that states that are in conflict and which hold identity and religious differences such as Pakistan and India view each other as being arrogant, while referring to their own behavior as being truthful and legitimate. While states adopting a rhetoric that reflects their culture and identity, such as Iran, are viewed as being arrogant by the United States, the latter represents a clear example of arrogant behavior, with its possession of hard power and its complex network of international relations.

The case of the United States

In recent decades, the behavior of the United States has stood out as a prime example of states’ arrogance, representing a radical shift from behavior within the traditional concept of international relations to a more problematic form of international relations, one from which the concept of states’ arrogance emerges.

Immediately after the end of World War II, the United States emerged as a superpower in a global system, rivaled only by the Soviet Union. It enjoyed military and economic power, as well as a political influence that played a pivotal role in the establishment of numerous international institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Although the United States exploited its influence within these institutions to serve its own interests, these institutions undoubtedly contributed to enhancing a degree of stability and cooperation among member states.

The American role has been manifested in the exercise of its influence and dominance through intervention in the internal affairs of several countries, such as in Korea, Vietnam, Chile, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Such interventions were sometimes justified by the assumption that they were protecting the global order from the threat posed by weaker and relatively unstable states, and at other times under the pretext of protecting democracy and preventing the spread of other political systems such as communism, or because of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in those states, thus undermining the sovereignty of weaker countries and suppressing the desires of their people.

The United States invasion of Iraq is an example of states’ arrogance, supported by some of the United States’ allies such as the UK, where former US President George W. Bush presented the rest of the countries with two choices: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” Following the claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, the international community viewed the United States through the lens of having acted unilaterally and without authorization from international organizations, thereby exploiting its influence and military power, resisting the international community, and showing distrust in the role of the international organizations. Such an act intensified criticism directed at Washington, and damaged the reputation of the United States, its foreign policy, and its international role, which had for long maintained global stability and established a remarkable period of relative calm.

The unipolar international system

Perhaps one of the most significant factors contributing to US arrogance was the transformation of the post-Cold War world order into a unipolar international system, granting the United States absolute hegemony. However, this did not last long, especially as the world witnessed the rise of China and the increasing influence of Russia, demonstrated through its intervention in Ukraine in February 2022 without international authorization, which represents another version of states’ arrogance.

Despite the losses and depletion of resources which the United States suffered in its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, diplomacy and international partnerships were not Washington’s primary options. This has been evident in its recent handling of the Iranian issue, where it has opted for the military option alongside its ally Israel, seizing the initiative at a time when negotiations sponsored by Oman were on the verge of reaching an agreement. Once again, the military option yielded no declared results and, in fact, caused harm to the region and the whole world.

Prior to this, Washington had even attempted to annex Canada after the election of current US President Donald Trump in late 2024, following a wave of threats to impose tariffs, and demands for Canada to increase its military spending. This was followed by talk of annexing Greenland since March 2025, with the primary objective of controlling a region that would allow the United States to monitor economic and military activities across three continents (Europe, Asia, and the Americas). The arrogance of the United States became yet more visible through the kidnapping of the Venezuelan president and his wife in January 2026, and their transfer to New York to await trial on drug trafficking charges. These are a series of actions carried out by Washington within the joint framework of hegemony and arrogance, driven by its military capabilities, which are sometimes overestimated.

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he United States and Iran have reached a preliminary agreement to end months of conflict and reopen the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz, marking the most significant diplomatic breakthrough since the outbreak of war earlier this year and triggering a sharp decline in global oil prices.

The framework agreement, announced by U.S. President Donald Trump and confirmed by Iranian officials on Monday, is intended to halt military operations across multiple fronts and establish a pathway toward broader negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief.

The memorandum of understanding is scheduled to be formally signed in Switzerland on Friday following mediation efforts led by Pakistan.

“The Deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran is now complete,” Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform on Sunday evening. The announcement came shortly after Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif revealed that negotiators had reached an agreement.

If implemented, the deal would represent the most important diplomatic achievement since the conflict began in February with joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran, a war that has killed thousands, destabilized the Middle East, and disrupted global energy markets.

Ceasefire across multiple fronts

According to Pakistani officials, the agreement calls for the immediate and permanent cessation of military operations throughout the region, including in Lebanon, where fighting between Israel and the Iran-backed Hezbollah movement has complicated diplomatic efforts.

Iran’s Supreme National Security Council confirmed that military operations on all fronts would cease beginning Monday night.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said the agreement would establish a 60-day ceasefire period during which negotiators would work toward a more comprehensive settlement.

The future agreement is expected to address some of the most contentious issues dividing Washington and Tehran, including economic sanctions, regional security arrangements, and Iran’s nuclear activities.

Despite the breakthrough, uncertainty remains over how the agreement will affect Israel, which has not participated in the U.S.-Iran negotiations and has repeatedly insisted on maintaining freedom of military action against perceived threats in the region.

There was no immediate official response from the Israeli government following the announcement.

Strait of Hormuz to reopen

One of the most significant elements of the agreement concerns the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow waterway through which a substantial portion of the world’s oil and natural gas exports pass.

Since the escalation of hostilities, Iran has effectively restricted shipping through the strait, while the United States imposed countermeasures targeting Iranian ports and maritime operations.

Trump announced that the waterway would reopen on Friday and said he had ordered an end to the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports.

“Ships of the World, start your engines. Let the oil flow!” Trump wrote.

Financial markets responded immediately to the news.

Brent crude prices fell more than 4 percent in early trading as investors welcomed the prospect of restored energy supplies and reduced geopolitical risk. Stock markets across Asia also posted gains as concerns over disruptions to global trade eased.

Market analysts cautioned, however, that many details of the agreement remain unclear.

“The lack of details, especially on freedom of shipping, is a concern, but not one that should constrain markets today as the surge in risk appetite plays out,” said currency analyst Sean Callow.

Nuclear issue deferred

While the agreement addresses military hostilities and maritime security, negotiators have postponed decisions regarding Iran’s nuclear program, one of the central issues behind the conflict.

Sources familiar with the talks said nuclear negotiations will take place during the 60-day ceasefire period.

Trump has repeatedly stated that any final settlement must ensure Iran cannot develop nuclear weapons.

Iran maintains that its nuclear program is peaceful and has consistently denied seeking a nuclear arsenal.

Before the conflict, Iran had accumulated more than 400 kilograms of uranium enriched to levels approaching weapons-grade purity, according to international estimates. The future of that stockpile is expected to become one of the most difficult issues in upcoming negotiations.

Officials involved in the talks have offered differing accounts of the draft agreement.

A senior American official indicated that the eventual settlement could require the dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program and the removal or destruction of highly enriched uranium stockpiles.

Iranian officials, meanwhile, suggested that Tehran would retain the ability to dilute and manage enriched uranium domestically rather than surrendering it.

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hen simultaneous lockdowns began worldwide in March 2020, the crisis scenarios predicted by economists largely materialized; unemployment increased, consumption contracted and supply chains were disrupted. However, this same process also accelerated an unexpected transformation. As people were confined to their homes, work, social life and money all transitioned behind the screen. This relocation was not merely a practical adaptation but a fundamental reorganization of humanity’s relationship with the world.

Global internet traffic recorded an average increase of 40 percent in the first half of 2020. Video conferencing platforms, electronic commerce sites and digital finance applications gained millions of new users. According to a report by the McKinsey Global Institute, the pandemic advanced digital transformation by five to seven years across multiple sectors. However, this acceleration was not the product of a controlled and planned transition; it was a leap born out of necessity. Consequently, the vulnerabilities it introduced were just as vast as the opportunities.

The rapid expansion of digital finance profoundly disrupted the relationship people have with money. Traditional financial actions such as visiting a bank, trading through a broker and filling out paperwork gave way to instantaneous, invisible and effortless transactions. Money became a mere digit on a screen. This abstraction also brought with it an illusion of ease, earning money began to seem as effortless and even as entertaining, as spending it.

From a neuroscientific perspective, this process is directly related to the human mind’s perception of risk. Studies conducted by researchers at Stanford University indicate that loss aversion weakens when financial decisions are made through digital interfaces rather than in tangible environments. Along this spectrum advancing from physical money to plastic cards and ultimately to abstract numbers, individuals become increasingly inclined to take higher risks. The fact that a vast majority of society encountered investment instruments either for the first time or intensively during the pandemic coincided exactly with this underlying landscape.

Blockchain technology: Centralization or decentralization?

The foundational promise of the cryptocurrency ecosystem was decentralization. The white paper authored in 2008 by the figure known as Satoshi Nakamoto, whose true identity and whereabouts remain a mystery, aimed to eliminate intermediary institutions in the financial system and enable direct, equal and transparent money transfers between individuals. Blockchain technology was presented as the infrastructure that fulfilled this promise. Records were kept in an encrypted format across a distributed network and no single central authority could independently intervene in this network.

From a theoretical perspective, this architecture was presented primarily on social media platforms as a protective mechanism against state oppression and inflation and interestingly, recommendation algorithms placed this narrative in front of millions of people time and time again. Cryptocurrencies were marketed as both a safe haven and a symbol of resistance against the current system, particularly in countries where people had lost faith in their own national currency. Thanks to social media platforms, this perception eventually transformed into a reality embraced by users.

However, the reality in practice painted a very different picture. Although the blockchain infrastructure remained decentralized, the cryptocurrency market gradually evolved into centralized structures. Major exchanges such as Binance, Coinbase and FTX transformed into multinational corporations that control the vast majority of the global volume. A similar concentration occurred on the supply side of the cryptocurrency market. By the end of 2021, calculations showed that approximately 80 percent of the circulating supply of Bitcoin was held by only 2 percent of the total holders. This structure clearly contradicted the claim of democratization put forward by cryptocurrencies.

In other words, while the technology itself was ostensibly decentralized, from a political economy perspective, the market possessed a power asymmetry dominated by major players. Individual investors considered themselves free within this structure, but in reality, they were participating in a game where they could not determine the prices, liquidity or timing. This paradox constitutes a critical foundation for understanding how the easy money vibe operates.

Earning easy money during the pandemic: Bitcoin and other coins

Prior to the pandemic, Bitcoin was trading at approximately 7,300 dollars. Throughout the pandemic year of 2020, prices began to climb alongside investor interest, driven particularly by the recommendation algorithms of social media platforms and by November 2021, Bitcoin reached 69,000 dollars. This corresponded to an increase of approximately 840 percent. Other major coins, notably Ethereum, recorded similar and even steeper increases. According to an analysis published in 2021 by researchers from Columbia Law School, the total value of cryptocurrency markets was under 200 billion dollars at the onset of the pandemic. By November 2021, this figure had skyrocketed to 3 trillion dollars.

This staggering surge transformed into a narrative. Social media emerged as the most powerful amplifier of that narrative. On Twitter, Instagram and TikTok, stories of individuals becoming rich overnight, accounts claiming to have discovered legendary coins early and portfolio screenshots updated almost daily generated a mass sentiment: Fear of Missing Out or FOMO. A qualitative study conducted by researchers from Selcuk University focusing on cryptocurrency investors revealed that the vast majority of participants discovered this market through social media and their social circles. No one had read a technical paper but they had caught a particular vibe. In other words, individuals were making decisions through their System 1 thinking, acting entirely intuitively and devoid of rationality, yet they perceived themselves as rational decision makers.

Türkiye was one of the countries where this process unfolded most vividly. According to the data, as of 2024, Türkiye ranked third globally in cryptocurrency ownership relative to its population, with almost one fifth of the population holding crypto assets. An academic study conducted in 2023 utilizing a logit model analysis on a sample of 947 individuals revealed that 29,4 percent of the respondents invested in crypto assets. The most frequently cited motivation among investors took the form of statements such as “my income is insufficient” or “I want to earn more income.” In other words, a significant portion of those entering the market opened this door not with a technical expectation but driven by the motive to earn more.

The sharp decline in coins following the pandemic and the capital transfer mechanism

Beginning in late 2021, cryptocurrency markets entered a severe downturn. By the summer of 2022, the total market capitalization plummeted from 3 trillion dollars to below 900 billion dollars. Many altcoins lost 90 percent or more of their value. The bankruptcy of FTX, the collapse of Terra and Luna and the successive liquidity crises initiated a brutal liquidation process in which ordinary investors exited the market with massive losses.

At this point, the global monetary policy of the pandemic era requires a separate evaluation. The United States announced a COVID relief package of approximately 5,2 trillion dollars between 2020 and 2021, while the Federal Reserve carried out 4,5 trillion dollars of quantitative easing through bond purchases. According to an analysis published on Nasdaq, the total volume of new money injected into circulation reached 13 trillion dollars by the middle of 2021, constituting an unprecedented sum in historical terms. Normally, a money supply expansion of this magnitude would have triggered severe inflation. However, this time, a portion of the excess liquidity was channeled into global asset markets via digital interfaces, with the cryptocurrency ecosystem functioning as one of the major destinations for this influx.

The ability of cryptocurrency markets to attract the masses was achieved by rapidly inflating the value of certain coins during the period referred to as the bull market phase. The value of some coins multiplied astronomically, and all of these developments were subjected to intense propaganda. The fact that internationally recognized figures such as Elon Musk traded in the cryptocurrency market, launched coins, made positive statements regarding the markets and expressed optimistic expectations heavily captivated the masses.

During this period, a multitude of social media influencers, some operating behind anonymous profiles, emerged to conduct cryptocurrency analyses and offer purchasing recommendations. While not applicable to all of them, a vast majority of these profiles were actually executing paid promotions for coins or artificially inflating the value of their own assets. Their vocalization of expectations for an uninterrupted upward trend in this manner, coupled with the intermittent rise of the coins they recommended, constituted the primary reasons why individuals flocked to these markets.

For investors in economies like Türkiye, the mechanism operated as follows, as the Turkish Lira depreciated, individuals converted their savings first into dollars and subsequently into crypto assets pegged to the dollar. These crypto assets were purchased predominantly in dollars through exchanges headquartered in or regulated by the United States. The capital effectively exited the country. When the price of a coin purchased for 80 dollars by a user from Türkiye dropped to 20 dollars, 60 dollars out of the initial 80 dollars that had left the country vanished with no possibility of return. When this scenario is multiplied across millions of users and hundreds of different assets, a concrete picture emerged demonstrating that tens of billions of dollars in value draining from countries like Türkiye ultimately financed Western markets.

This process represents a narrative not merely of individual losses, but of a structural capital transfer. The 2021 Global Financial Stability Report published by the IMF clearly documents that crypto assets can be utilized as a mechanism for transferring money across borders, particularly in countries experiencing capital flow restrictions. Therefore, the culpability for the regulatory vacuum lies not solely in the naive faith of individual investors, but within the structures that deliberately preserve this vacuum.

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he United States launched a series of strikes against Iranian military targets on Tuesday after President Donald Trump accused Tehran of shooting down a U.S. Apache attack helicopter near the Strait of Hormuz, a dramatic escalation that threatens fragile peace efforts and raises fears of renewed conflict across the Middle East.

The strikes targeted Iranian air defense systems, surveillance radars, and ground control facilities near the strategic waterway, according to the U.S. military, which described the operation as a “proportional response” to recent attacks on American forces and commercial shipping in the region.

The military action marks one of the most significant direct confrontations between Washington and Tehran since a tenuous ceasefire took effect in April, amid ongoing negotiations aimed at ending months of regional warfare.

“I believe the response should be very strong, very powerful, and that’s what this one is,” Trump told ABC News shortly after the operation began.

According to U.S. Central Command, the strikes started at approximately 2100 GMT and concluded several hours later. The military said the targets were selected to degrade Iran’s ability to monitor and challenge military and commercial traffic moving through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy transit routes.

Helicopter incident triggers retaliation

The latest escalation followed the downing of a U.S. Army Apache helicopter during a patrol mission near Oman’s coast early Tuesday.

A U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the aircraft was struck by a one-way Iranian attack drone. The helicopter subsequently went down in waters near Oman, prompting a rescue operation involving a U.S. Navy surface drone.

The two crew members aboard the helicopter were recovered after approximately two hours and were reported to be in stable condition.

Trump sought to downplay the incident during an interview with The Wall Street Journal, saying the crash “wasn’t a big deal” and emphasizing that the pilots survived unharmed.

“The pilot is fine,” Trump said.

Nevertheless, the administration moved quickly to authorize military action, arguing that failure to respond could encourage further attacks on U.S. personnel and regional shipping.

Iranian officials denied responsibility for any offensive military operations in the Strait of Hormuz during the previous 24 hours. State media cited military sources who rejected allegations that Iranian forces had targeted the American helicopter.

Iranian sites hit

Iranian media reported explosions on Qeshm Island and in the port city of Sirik, both located near the Strait of Hormuz. Residents also reported hearing blasts in Bandar Abbas and near Jask, close to the entrance of the strategic waterway.

The attacks appeared aimed at military infrastructure associated with Iran’s coastal defense network.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi condemned the U.S. operation and warned that Tehran would respond to any attack.

“Iran will leave no attack or threat unanswered,” Araqchi wrote on social media.

In an earlier statement, he warned that foreign military forces operating in the region risk becoming involved in accidents or crossfire, adding that the best way to reduce risks would be for outside powers to withdraw from the area.

The latest exchange has further strained already fragile diplomatic efforts aimed at reaching a comprehensive agreement between Washington and Tehran.

Trump has repeatedly insisted that a peace deal remains within reach and has argued that negotiations are progressing despite frequent military incidents. However, analysts warn that direct military clashes could undermine trust and complicate efforts to secure a lasting settlement.

Iran retaliates across the Gulf

Shortly after the U.S. strikes, Iranian media reported retaliatory attacks against American military assets in the Gulf.

According to reports citing Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya military command, some U.S. bases in the region were targeted in response to the American operation.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps also claimed responsibility for a drone attack against the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, warning that additional attacks could follow if hostilities continued.

Bahraini authorities activated warning sirens and urged residents to seek shelter. A media adviser to Bahrain’s king later said the country’s air defenses had successfully intercepted incoming threats.

The Pentagon did not immediately comment on the Iranian claims, and independent verification of battlefield reports remained difficult.

The exchange has heightened concerns that the conflict could spread further across the Gulf, drawing in regional states that host U.S. military facilities.

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srael and Iran exchanged direct military strikes on Monday for the first time since a ceasefire was declared in April, raising fresh concerns about a wider regional conflict and threatening diplomatic efforts led by the United States to end months of hostilities.

The renewed confrontation began after Israel launched strikes on military targets in western and central Iran, prompting Tehran to respond with missile attacks targeting Israeli military facilities. The exchanges mark the most serious escalation between the two regional rivals since the ceasefire halted direct hostilities earlier this year.

The latest violence comes despite efforts by U.S. President Donald Trump to preserve ongoing negotiations with Tehran and prevent a collapse of the fragile truce that has largely held since April.

Israeli military officials said air force jets struck military installations in Iran during overnight operations. Iranian authorities reported explosions in several cities, including Tehran, Tabriz, and Isfahan, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) accused Israel of carrying out attacks using air-launched ballistic missiles.

Hours later, the IRGC announced retaliatory strikes against Israel’s Nevatim and Tel Nof air bases. Iranian state media described the attacks as a warning and said Iran was prepared for broader military operations if Israeli attacks continued.

“The armed forces are ready for any scenario,” the IRGC said in a statement carried by Iranian media, warning that future responses could be more extensive.

Israeli authorities confirmed that missiles had been launched from Iran and said air defense systems were activated to intercept incoming threats. No immediate reports of casualties or significant damage were released.

Energy infrastructure hit

The escalation took a significant turn when Israeli strikes reportedly hit facilities within Iran’s energy sector.

Iranian officials said the Karun petrochemical plant near the southwestern city of Bandar-e-Mahshahr sustained damage during the attacks. Shortly afterward, the Israeli military confirmed that it had targeted several sites within the Mahshahr petrochemical complex.

Iranian state media reported that authorities had begun evacuating the Mahshahr Special Petrochemical Economic Zone, a major industrial hub located near the Persian Gulf.

The strikes marked the first reported attack on Iranian energy infrastructure since the ceasefire was announced in April, raising fears that the conflict could increasingly target economically strategic facilities.

Energy analysts warned that attacks on petrochemical installations could have broader implications for global energy markets if hostilities continue to expand.

Financial markets reacted quickly to the renewed fighting.

Brent crude futures rose more than $3 per barrel, climbing above $96, while U.S. crude futures also posted gains of more than 3 percent. The increases erased losses recorded late last week when hopes for diplomatic progress between Washington and Tehran had boosted investor confidence.

Oil prices have remained highly sensitive to developments in the Middle East, particularly since the wider conflict involving Iran, Israel, and Iran-backed groups intensified earlier this year.

Traders fear that any prolonged disruption to energy infrastructure or shipping routes could threaten supplies from one of the world’s most important oil-producing regions.

Trump pushes for diplomacy

The renewed violence unfolded despite reports that Trump personally urged Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to avoid further military escalation.

According to U.S. officials cited by American media, Trump told Netanyahu during a phone conversation that additional attacks could jeopardize ongoing efforts to secure a broader agreement with Iran.

“We are close to doing something good in terms of a deal,” Trump reportedly told the Israeli leader.

Speaking to the Financial Times before the latest strikes, Trump downplayed concerns that renewed military action would derail negotiations.

“It is not going to have any impact on the deal,” Trump said. “I call the shots. I call all the shots. He doesn’t call the shots.”

The comments reflected growing tensions between Washington and the Israeli government over how to manage the conflict. Reports indicate that Trump has repeatedly pressed Israel to limit military operations in Lebanon and elsewhere to create space for diplomacy.

Last week, the U.S. president publicly expressed frustration with Netanyahu’s approach to the conflict, signaling rare daylight between Washington and its closest regional ally.

The latest exchange comes after Israel launched strikes near Beirut on Sunday, targeting positions linked to Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Lebanese armed group.

Those attacks represented Israel’s first military action in the Beirut area since Washington proposed a truce plan for Lebanon last week.

Iran has repeatedly stated that any long-term peace arrangement with the United States would depend on a sustained ceasefire not only between Israel and Iran but also in Lebanon, where fighting involving Hezbollah has continued intermittently.

Before Sunday’s missile exchange, Iran had not directly attacked Israel since the ceasefire took effect in April, although Hezbollah and other groups aligned with Tehran have continued occasional attacks against Israeli targets.

The situation became even more complicated when Israel’s military reported a missile launch from Yemen toward Israeli territory. While details remained limited, the launch highlighted the involvement of multiple regional actors in the broader conflict.

What is the path forward?

Diplomatic observers warn that the latest confrontation could undermine efforts to achieve a comprehensive agreement aimed at ending months of regional warfare.

While both Israel and Iran have framed their actions as responses to previous attacks, the direct exchange of strikes suggests that the ceasefire remains fragile and vulnerable to collapse.

The targeting of military facilities, energy infrastructure, and strategic installations has increased concerns that future attacks could become more damaging and difficult to contain.

For now, both governments appear determined to demonstrate military resolve while avoiding a full-scale war. However, with missiles flying across borders, energy markets reacting sharply, and diplomatic negotiations hanging in the balance, the latest escalation has underscored how quickly tensions in the Middle East can reignite despite international efforts to secure peace.

As Washington continues to push for a negotiated settlement, the coming days may prove critical in determining whether the region returns to a path of diplomacy or slides back toward a broader conflict involving multiple fronts and regional powers.

(Source: Reuters)

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hinese President Xi Jinping arrived in North Korea on Monday for his first visit to the country since 2019, in a move widely seen as an effort by Beijing to reinforce its influence over Pyongyang amid growing concerns about North Korea’s increasingly close military and economic relationship with Russia.

Xi’s visit comes at a critical moment for regional security in Northeast Asia, with North Korea accelerating its weapons programs, deepening cooperation with Moscow, and further distancing itself from South Korea. Analysts say the Chinese leader’s decision to travel personally to Pyongyang underscores the strategic importance Beijing places on maintaining its longstanding alliance with North Korea.

The visit marks a departure from Xi’s recent diplomatic pattern. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese president has significantly reduced his overseas travel, preferring to host foreign leaders in Beijing. Against that backdrop, his trip to Pyongyang is viewed as a strong signal of China’s commitment to preserving its role as North Korea’s most important partner.

Xi is expected to hold extensive talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on regional security, economic cooperation, and the changing geopolitical environment in East Asia.

Growing Russian influence

A key factor behind the visit is believed to be North Korea’s rapidly expanding relationship with Russia.

Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Pyongyang has emerged as one of Moscow’s most important partners. North Korea has reportedly supplied Russia with artillery shells, missiles, military equipment, and manpower to support its war effort. In return, Moscow is believed to have provided economic assistance and potentially advanced military technologies.

The partnership has generated concern in Beijing, which has historically been North Korea’s principal economic supporter and diplomatic protector. For decades, China accounted for the overwhelming majority of North Korea’s foreign trade and served as the country’s primary source of fuel, food, and investment.

While China and Russia maintain close strategic ties, Beijing is wary of losing influence over its isolated neighbor. Analysts say Xi’s visit is intended in part to ensure that Pyongyang does not drift too far into Moscow’s orbit.

“China wants to remind North Korea that it remains an indispensable partner,” regional analysts have noted. “The relationship with Russia may be useful for Pyongyang, but Beijing still offers economic and political support that no other country can fully replace.”

The growing Russia-North Korea partnership has also raised concerns about military cooperation. Experts believe Russia may be sharing technologies that could accelerate North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs, developments that could alter the security balance on the Korean Peninsula.

Concerns over military advancements

China’s leadership is believed to be closely monitoring North Korea’s recent military activities.

North Korea has conducted multiple missile tests this year and continues to modernize its arsenal. In May, state media reported the successful development of an artificial intelligence-guided tactical cruise missile, while recent images released by Pyongyang showed Kim Jong Un inspecting facilities linked to the production of nuclear materials.

The North Korean leader has repeatedly emphasized the need to expand the country’s nuclear deterrent and strengthen its military capabilities in response to what he describes as growing threats from the United States and its allies.

Although China supports North Korea as a strategic buffer separating Chinese territory from US forces stationed in South Korea, Beijing has traditionally favored stability on the peninsula over military escalation. Chinese officials fear that an emboldened North Korea could provoke regional tensions and trigger stronger military cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and Japan.

Analysts believe Xi will seek greater clarity on Pyongyang’s military ambitions and may encourage restraint to avoid destabilizing the region.

Regional security challenges

The visit also takes place amid growing concerns over shifting security dynamics in East Asia.

Relations between North and South Korea have deteriorated sharply in recent years. In 2024, Kim Jong Un formally abandoned the long-standing goal of peaceful reunification with South Korea, declaring the South a hostile state. Since then, communication channels between the two sides have largely remained frozen.

At the same time, security cooperation between South Korea and Japan has expanded. The two US allies have increased intelligence sharing and military coordination in response to North Korea’s weapons development and broader regional security concerns.

Recent discussions regarding a possible military logistics support agreement between Seoul and Tokyo have further alarmed Beijing, which views closer cooperation among US allies as part of a broader effort to contain China’s influence in the region.

Against this backdrop, Xi’s trip serves not only to strengthen bilateral ties with North Korea but also to demonstrate China’s continued role as a central actor in regional security affairs.

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an an X post become the new handbook for a dying world order? Palantir Technologies recently transformed the 22 key arguments from the book The Technological Republic: Hard Power, Soft Belief, and the Future of the West (2025) by the company’s CEO Alex Karp and Nicholas Zamiska into a concise series of posts on X. This post rejected Silicon Valley’s “app tyranny”, advocated for engineering talent to be directed towards national defense and strategic innovation, and positioned “hard power” as indispensable for the West’s survival. Criticism of the post was not long in coming. From established authors to social media influencers, many people contributed to the debate, writing articles on the subject. Headlines screamed “techno-fascism”. Academics warned against authoritarian tech elites. Social media figures described this vision as a dangerous fusion of artificial intelligence and conservatism.

However, the debates largely failed to move beyond emotional reactions to the bold voices raised by Palantir founder Peter Thiel, Alex Karp, and others against conventional states. As a young academic who has been working on techno-politics and US security mechanisms for years, I strive to examine the issue from a rational perspective. I discuss these studies in greater detail in my book “Security Mechanisms and Techno-Politics in the United States”, to be published by Routledge in August 2026. What truly concerns me, however, is how quickly we resort to slogans rather than historical context. Before labelling the book text that became Palantir’s X post as ‘techno-fascism’, we must ask: Does this book represent a radical break, or does it serve as a new kind of field guide written during a period when the international order is collapsing, much like Sherman Kent’s “Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy” (1949), which was penned at the very moment a new world order was emerging?

The birth of the new order: 1945 and the construction of the American century

Let us return to 1945. The Anglo-Saxon allies had collaborated with the Soviet Union, led by Stalin, to defeat the Hitler regime. This victory gave rise to a rules-based order that established the United Nations, NATO, the Bretton Woods institutions, and the bipolar competition between the democratic West and the communist East. The establishment of Israel in 1948 cemented the US-Israel strategic partnership. The Suez Crisis of 1956 confirmed the end of British hegemony. The US became the undisputed leader of the Western bloc.

Technology and intelligence developed in tandem with this new order. Stanford University, founded in 1891, laid the foundations for what would eventually become Silicon Valley. The Stanford Industrial Park, Hewlett-Packard’s first garage venture, the relocation to the Valley of William Shockley, the inventor of the transistor, and Robert Noyce’s breakthroughs in the field of semiconductors transformed this region into the centre of the microelectronics revolution. All these developments took place in the late 1940s and 1950s. That is, precisely during the period when the CIA (1947), the West’s primary intelligence agency during the Cold War, was established, and the Soviet KGB was formalized in 1954.

It was against this backdrop that Sherman Kent emerged. A member of one of Yale’s founding and rather ‘white’ families, Kent had served in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during the war. Following the organizational crises of the CIA’s early years (1947–1950), figures such as Kent, William Langer and Max Millikan were tasked with professionalizing American intelligence. Kent’s 1949 book was not merely an academic study of analytical methods. It was a practical handbook for American global policy. It guided policymakers on how intelligence should be gathered, analyzed, and utilized to establish and maintain US global hegemony. Kent became the founder of the analytical school that still shapes the US intelligence community today and launched the journal Studies in Intelligence. This journal is still in publication. His work embedded analytical thinking into the very fabric of the American century.

The moment of unravelling: The collapse of the liberal order and the new interregnum

Let us now fast-forward to 2026. The post-1945 liberal international order is not merely undergoing reform; it is effectively unravelling. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz stated at the Munich Security Conference in February: “The world order that has existed for decades no longer exists.” Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, in his speech at Davos, described this moment as “not a transition, but a rupture.” The Trump administration’s latest National Security Strategy made this an explicit doctrine. According to the strategy document, the liberal order led by the US was coming to an end. This was undoubtedly not because the US was weak, but because it chose not to sustain it. The title of the 2026 Munich Security Conference Report, devoid of irony, was: Under Destruction.

The words of Antonio Gramsci, which have become a staple in the vocabulary of many of our politicians, have never been more relevant: “The old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interim period, a multitude of pathological symptoms emerge.” At times when old structures dissolve faster than new ones emerge, new handbooks inevitably appear. These are not impartial academic studies. They are field guides for those who wish to shape what is to come.

The new handbook: Palantir and the search for a techno-political direction

Alongside Peter Thiel’s long-standing intellectual project and the government contracts secured by Palantir, Karp and Zamiska’s book The Technological Republic serves as such a guide. Kent wrote his book at the dawn of a rules-based order built upon American hard power and institutional alliances. Karp and Zamiska, however, are writing The Technological Republic at the twilight of that order. Just as Kent’s generation faced after 1945, they too diagnose the same problem: a fluid world requires purposeful techno-political guidance. However, the direction they propose is clearly conservative. Silicon Valley must repay the ‘moral debt’ it owes to the country that made its rise possible. Engineering talent must be shifted from consumption-focused, distracting fields to defense, intelligence and strategic artificial intelligence. ‘Hard power’ is not a dirty concept; it is the foundation of any viable republic. Pluralism without power is weakness.

This call emerges as an argument that the market-driven, borderless globalization of the past thirty years has eroded the national purpose, weakened sovereignty, and left Western societies defenseless against rivals who have never denied the reality that technology is not neutral. The software Palantir has developed for defense and intelligence agencies is presented not as an expansion of surveillance, but as a necessary fusion of private-sector innovation and public mission. Just as DARPA funding, once under the US Department of Defence, made the birth of Silicon Valley possible.

Palantir’s critics are right to be concerned about the risks of surveillance, the militarization of artificial intelligence, and the concentration of power in private actors. However, labelling the entire project as ‘techno-fascism’ prevents us from seeing the context in which this company and Karp’s book emerged. Kent’s handbook was never value-neutral. It served American hegemony. Karp’s book is similarly biased, politically conservative and technologically grounded in realism. Yet it stems from the same awareness. According to this awareness, power vacuums invite disorder.

T

he late Nelson Mandela said, “work to support courage where there is fear, foster agreement where there is conflict, and inspire hope where there is despair”. This may well apply to Pakistan’s position during a critical period of the escalating conflict between the United States and Iran. Many parties were unable to, or perhaps remained either reluctant or hesitant to get involved amidst waves of retaliatory strikes, a political and media discourse that had reached a new peak since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and a division in stances regarding the ongoing conflict.

However, one thing there was absolute agreement on the necessity of reaching a détente that would lead to the opening of the Strait of Hormuz to international navigation, thus restoring global economic activity, and ensuring the continued export of energy supply to consumers, including Pakistan, which considers the stability of the Strait and the region crucial to its economy and maritime security. The Pakistani initiative came at a pivotal moment, acting as a decisive factor in achieving a ceasefire, in an attempt to reach a consensus between both parties to end the conflict and quash its repercussions.

The initiative raised numerous questions about Islamabad’s role, which some might interpret as exploiting a political vacuum that other parties were unable to fill, adding to Pakistan’s regional influence, especially in view of the escalating tensions. There are also ongoing concerns about the continuation of the crisis, and its repercussions at the regional and international levels, as well as its economic and security implications for Pakistan itself. There is a conviction that an early effort at mediation allows more room for negotiation, and that the longer the initiative is delayed, the less willing the conflicting parties will be to accept a compromise. Therefore, Pakistan’s involvement at this juncture is commendable, even if it is limited, as it occurred during a period of transition, not after the situation had already stabilized.

Pakistan’s initiative to find a solution to the crisis between the United States and Iran may be viewed through the lens of political, economic, and geographical factors. The country has good relations with both sides, and is utilizing other channels of communication, such as with Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye, to advance its mediation efforts. It is worth noting that regional stability, and internal stability in Iran itself is important to Pakistan, which shares a long border of 900 km with its western neighbor. Islamabad fears the spillover of any political turmoil in Iran that may have sectarian and security repercussions for Pakistan, not to mention other repercussions on the energy markets, and on regional and global trade. Thus, Islamabad saw an opportunity to draw attention to itself as an important regional player and a diplomatic power capable of playing a prominent role during crises, which enhances its political standing and its international relations. Despite all this, the Pakistani initiative has raised many questions and perhaps drawn skepticism about Pakistan’s intentions and its role at this particular time.

Pakistan and the parties to the conflict

The relationship between Pakistan and the Western powers, particularly the United States, has always been complex and volatile. It can be described as a pragmatic partnership rather than an alliance based on mutual trust. This relationship has witnessed periods of intense rapprochement but also periods of sharp tension, depending on the changing circumstances and strategic interests of each party. During the Cold War, the relationship was very close, allowing Pakistan to join US-backed alliances such as the Baghdad Pact and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), in exchange for military and financial aid. This cooperation reached its peak during the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when Pakistan played a prominent role in supporting the ‘Mujahideen’, while receiving direct assistance from the United States. However, this harmony did not last long.

After the end of the Cold War in 1991, the relationship cooled off, especially with the emergence of Pakistan’s nuclear program, which led the United States to impose sanctions. The attacks of September 11, however, revived Pakistan’s ties with the United States, through the logistical and intelligence support provided by Islamabad to Washington, despite lingering suspicions about Pakistan’s duplicity in its dealings with the West. Its unstable surroundings worried western analysts, and in recent years the United States’ suspicions of Pakistan’s intentions have increased, especially following Islamabad’s growing rapprochement with Beijing through a series of economic projects and defense partnerships, particularly in military manufacturing and technology transfer. Consequently, the relationship between the two sides is determined by regional and international power balances, without any guarantee of a lasting political and strategic convergence.

Conversely, since its separation from India in 1947, Islamabad has maintained a relatively good relationship with Tehran, recognizing its direct proximity to its western neighbor, and understanding that any regional conflict in which Iran is directly involved will immediately affect Pakistan. This would have several repercussions, including disruptions to the transport of natural resources such as oil and gas, the potential for refugee flows, and the possibility of an escalation in sectarian tensions within Pakistan, given that approximately 20% of the population is Shia, who could potentially ignite an internal crisis. Therefore, in any escalation between Iran and the United States, such as the one that occurred following the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force in 2020, Islamabad has been quick to intervene diplomatically, emphasizing the need to respect the sovereignty of states and renounce the use of force.

Pakistan has also stressed that it will not allow its territory to be used in any conflict against any neighboring country, especially since Islamabad intends to maintain good relations with Tehran, Washington, Riyadh, and other regional actors. Meanwhile, tensions occasionally surface between Iran and its Gulf neighbors, albeit with some noticeable variations. Consequently, Islamabad knows it will have to maintain the delicate balance that grants it a regional role, and presents itself to the world as an influential state capable of resolving conflicts, thus giving it greater diplomatic weight.

Current regional events have cast a shadow over the political and economic landscape, given the difficulty of reaching a formula for consensus between the United States and Iran. This has prompted Islamabad to intervene and adopt a mediation initiative, hosting direct negotiations at the highest level. This step has been described by many as the result of precise political and security calculations that take into consideration the repercussions of escalation in the region and its impact on Iran’s neighbors, and on the region as a whole.

The Pakistani initiative did not come about as a reaction at a particularly sensitive moment, but rather as a direct protection of its internal security and its economy, which cannot withstand the devastating effects of being drawn into regional conflicts, which in itself seems a justifiable reason for such action. However, the timing of Islamabad’s entry as a mediator has raised many questions, at a time when countries such as Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Egypt were themselves seeking to bridge the divide and reduce tension. Therefore, what was it that prompted Islamabad this time to adopt the mediation role that Oman has played between the United States and Iran for many decades?

A regional role or an opportunistic approach?

There may be several interpretations of Pakistan’s decision to take a mediation role at this critical juncture, involving two parties whose relationship has been marked by open hostility since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Some believe that Islamabad’s move stems from a desire to ensure regional stability, which is essential for the smooth flow of maritime traffic, the uninterrupted flow of energy resources to consumers, and the avoidance of internal tensions in Iran. This is to say nothing of the potential influx of refugees and border tensions, as well as the economic shocks associated with disruption to energy prices, trade, shipping, and insurance. Therefore, according to this argument, Islamabad has adopted a mediating stance to prevent escalation and seek diplomatic solutions to the crisis, given that a protracted conflict threatens both regional and internal Pakistani security. Thus, the mediation role reflects a desire to prevent the expansion of the regional war, an attempt to de-escalate tensions between competing powers, and a commitment to maintaining a strategic balance between all parties to the conflict, without siding with any of them. The initiative embodies Pakistani political traditions of keeping channels of communication open with all competing powers.

On the contrary, some believe Pakistan’s move is driven by opportunistic motives. Perhaps, Islamabad saw an opportunity to regain its diminishing standing and bolster its international presence, at a time when it is grappling with economic difficulties and political instability. Others view this as less credible, arguing that it is seeking to improve its image abroad, particularly in the United States, and strengthen its ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Such a move would grant it diplomatic prestige and the ability to present itself as an indispensable regional power.

This comes within the framework of repositioning itself after years of relative isolation and attempting to balance its relationships with regional actors like Iran and Saudi Arabia, especially given the Joint Defense Agreement (JDA) with Riyadh, which places Islamabad in a precarious position, particularly in the event of a potential clash between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, it seeks to maintain balanced relations with other regional and international players such as Türkiye and the United States, a position which could lead to economic gain, broader security cooperation, defense-industry partnerships, and debt relief. With the disruption to energy supplies, Islamabad has been forced to implement austerity measures, shortening school days and working hours to conserve energy.

Ensuring a de-escalation of the regional situation would in fact bring significant benefits to Pakistan. These include guaranteeing access to Iranian oil at affordable prices once sanctions are lifted, and the completion of the long-awaited Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. By avoiding further escalation, Islamabad would also secure a safe trade corridor to Central Asia via Iran, as evidenced by the shipment of the first batch of Pakistani frozen meat to Uzbekistan in April 2026. This is particularly important given that trade routes through Torkham and Chaman, key strategic border crossings and vital trade arteries from Afghanistan to Central Asia, remain closed due to ongoing strained relations between Islamabad and Kabul. Furthermore, internal stability in Iran would prevent Indian attempts to infiltrate Pakistan’s Baluchistan via the Chabahar project, thus thwarting any encirclement efforts by New Delhi. These benefits would also prevent India from attempting to extend its influence through Iran into Pakistani Baluchistan.

According to an extreme view, still others believe that Islamabad may be complicit in a conspiracy against Tehran, given the actions of the United States, Pakistan’s historical ally, and Iran, its ideological antithesis and the primary rival of Saudi Arabia, a key Pakistani ally in the region. Maintaining complete neutrality in these circumstances would therefore be extremely difficult. This view is supported by the mobilization of forces and the stringent sentiment that the United States continued to express while negotiations were underway.

US and Pakistani forces in Saudi Arabia

This included the entry of two American destroyers into Saudi waters in the Arabian Gulf and the arrival of Pakistani forces at King Abdulaziz Air Base in the Eastern Province, accompanied by fighter jets and various weapons. Some interpreted this as an activation of the JDA between the two countries, an agreement considered a strategic buffer for Saudi Arabia and an additional layer of deterrence. It is worth noting that there were also reports that Pakistan simultaneously hosted some Iranian aircraft at Nur Khan Air Base, to protect them from any American military strikes. These included RC-130 intelligence and reconnaissance aircraft and C-130 transport aircraft. Conflicting views call for a deep reassessment of Pakistan’s actual role in the negotiations, which means that Islamabad’s initiative appeared to be not so much altruistic as a geostrategic maneuver to achieve substantial gains under the guise of ensuring the region’s security.

There remains the factor of China, which strongly supports the negotiating track adopted by Pakistan, preferring a diplomatic solution to escalation. China supports Iran, not only because the latter is a key partner in trade and energy, but also because it is a reliable strategic ally in any future confrontation with the United States. Beijing does not want any disruption to shipping lanes, and at the same time seeks a balanced relationship with Washington, as was evident during US President Donald Trump’s visit to China on May 13, 2026. Therefore, it prefers to play a supporting role in negotiations rather than leading them. Reports indicate that Beijing pressured Tehran to accept de-escalation and enter negotiations, exploiting Iran’s need to export its oil to the Chinese market.

In short, Islamabad’s hosting of negotiations between two parties that are extremely important to its national security involves several possible motives, including that this is at the request of the United States, which is trying to end the crisis with the least number of losses and concurrently to save face. It may also be driven by other parties such as Saudi Arabia, which is keen on the security of the region at a time when it is accelerating towards achieving its economic ambitions that require a degree of regional stability.

Despite the regional competition with Iran, Riyadh sees the stability and prosperity of its northern neighbor as a greater opportunity for rapprochement, at a time when its relationship with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is shrouded in much ambiguity. Thus, the outcomes of Pakistan’s role and what the conflict will lead to is likely to indicate much of what the region will face, which also means that the true implications behind the role that Pakistan is playing may become clear later, for Pakistan itself, for the two parties to the conflict, and for the entire region.

S

ince almost the very beginning of the attacks carried out by the US and Israel against Iran, the Strait of Hormuz has been one of the most significant factors influencing the course of the war. The Strait of Hormuz also fundamentally affects whether the current peace talks stall or progress. The most significant reason for this is that economic and commercial considerations have come to the fore amongst the global repercussions of armed conflicts today.

Since passage through international straits, particularly the Strait of Hormuz, is critical, the regime governing passage has become a significant concern. In this context, questions have arisen about whether any state has the right to close an international strait and whether restricting, closing, or imposing a blockade on international straits during wartime is legally permissible.

Given the illegality of many actions in the US/Israel-Iran conflict, it would be beneficial to clarify the legal principles governing transit through the Strait of Hormuz, a vital international maritime transport route, during wartime.

The importance of international straits and channels

Apart from the Strait of Hormuz, there are other straits and channels around the world that are of central importance to international maritime transport. The Strait of Gibraltar, the Turkish Straits, and the Straits of Singapore and Malacca are among the most important of these. The Strait of Gibraltar is the only maritime passageway connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the open ocean. The Straits of Singapore and Malacca are maritime passages between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea in Southeast Asia. Stretching between Singapore and the Riau Islands of Indonesia, these straits are among the busiest waterways in global maritime trade. Approximately 40 percent of the world’s merchant vessels pass through them. They form the route for most oil and raw material shipments destined for Asia’s industrial giants, such as China, Japan, and South Korea.

The Turkish Straits system, comprising the Straits of Istanbul and Çanakkale and the Sea of Marmara, is the only waterway connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. The Turkish Straits are of vital importance to the economies and military security of countries bordering the Black Sea. Currently, over 50,000 ships, including more than 10,000 tankers, pass through the Turkish Straits each year, making them crucial for the transit of food, oil, natural gas, and commercial goods.

Meanwhile, the Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important oil transit points. This strait is the sole route connecting Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain to the rest of the world, and it is also the only functional maritime transport route for oil exports from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In 2024 and 2025, more than a quarter of total global seaborne oil trade and approximately one-fifth of global oil and petroleum product consumption passed through the Strait of Hormuz. Furthermore, approximately one-fifth of the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade passed through the strait in 2024, primarily from Qatar. Consequently, even temporarily halting the passage of oil or LNG tankers through the strait is likely to increase global energy prices, shipping costs, and lead to significant supply delays.

Man-made waterways that connect seas are known as sea canals. The Panama and Suez Canals are the most prominent examples. The Panama Canal was constructed under the 1903 Washington Treaty between Panama and the United States and completed in 1914. Governed by the “Treaty on Permanent Neutrality and the Operation of the Panama Canal,” signed by the United States and Panama in 1977, the Panama Canal provides a direct passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Meanwhile, the Suez Canal is an artificial waterway that is approximately 190 kilometers long and connects the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea. Transit through the canal is regulated by the Istanbul Convention, a multilateral treaty signed in 1888, which permits all ships, regardless of nationality or purpose, to pass through. The canal handles approximately 10–15 percent of global maritime trade. It serves as a critical transit point for the transport of oil, natural gas, and container freight in particular.

Transit through international straits during armed conflicts

According to international law, the right to transit through international straits during peacetime is considered a “right of innocent passage.” However, this right is not absolute, meaning the coastal state may suspend transit if it becomes harmful. This suspension does not essentially amount to a total ban on passage; rather, it is an exceptional power that the coastal state may exercise when the passage of a specific vessel or vessels becomes “detrimental” to the coastal state’s peace, security, or order. In situations where transit has become entirely harmful, exceptional circumstances may arise in which transit may be suspended entirely, provided that the suspension is not indefinite and is for reasons such as health inspections.

Unlike the right of innocent passage, the “right of transit passage” through international straits is an inalienable right recognized by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which 172 states are currently parties. According to Article 38 of the Convention, all ships and aircraft have the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded.

However, it can be said that the rules governing the right of passage through international straits change significantly during wartime. In the event of war, two situations may arise. The first situation occurs when one or more states bordering the strait is involved in the war. These straits may be characterized as “international straits involved in the war.” The second scenario is when none of the states bordering the strait are involved in the war. These straits are referred to as “neutral,” or non-belligerent, straits.

International straits involved in a war that do not consist entirely of a single state’s territorial waters, where a route passes through the high seas or exclusive economic zone, cannot be exercised by the coastal states beyond their own territorial waters.

If an international strait involved in a war consists entirely of territorial waters, then those waters also form part of the general theater of hostilities. This means that the entire strait becomes a theater of war. Subject to the relevant provisions of the laws of war, enemy ships and aircraft in these straits may be attacked, and enemy and neutral merchant ships may be stopped and seized. The coastal state has the right to deny passage to all enemy ships and aircraft.

Neutral ships

However, these straits cannot be closed to ships belonging to states that are not parties to the conflict, i.e., neutral ships. There is a prevailing view that peaceful shipping traffic should be allowed to pass through the straits with minimal disruption. While states bordering an international strait may be inclined to close it, even to peaceful shipping, if they are parties to an international armed conflict, completely closing international straits, particularly by using sea mines, would not be lawful. This was stated in the International Court of Justice’s judgment on April 9, 1949, in the Corfu Channel case. Neutral warships and merchant vessels must not be deprived of their right of passage, or their inalienable right of innocent passage, through international straits belonging to parties to an international armed conflict.

As for neutral international straits not involved in the war, transit generally takes place under peacetime conditions. According to Article 38(2) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a “right of transit passage” exists through neutral straits, which must not be impeded. Transit must be continuous and expeditious for the purpose of passing through the strait. As in peacetime, warships of belligerent states in transit must proceed without delay in accordance with designated sea lanes and traffic separation schemes. Belligerent warships and military aircraft transiting a neutral international strait may take all necessary measures to defend themselves.

In neutral international straits, the right of transit passage does not apply if the straits do not coincide entirely with the coastal state’s territorial waters. In these cases, vessels and aircraft of all nations enjoy freedom of navigation and overflight in the remaining corridor, even if an exclusive economic zone has been declared. In parts of the strait that are part of a coastal state’s territorial waters, ships and aircraft only have a suspensible right of innocent passage.

E

xchanges between US President Donald Trump and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz are becoming increasingly heated. Merz was initially one of the European leaders with whom Trump got on best. While leaders of major European nations, such as France and Spain, found themselves embroiled in disputes with Trump following his inauguration for a second term in early 2025, Merz’s first meeting with Trump at the White House in June 2025 ended without incident. Trump’s warm welcome and words of praise were also well received in the German media.

Merz’s praise for Trump, his avoidance of raising issues between the two countries, and his assertion that the US was an indispensable partner for Germany all played a key role in ensuring the meeting’s positive outcome. Furthermore, Merz brought a copy of his German grandfather’s birth certificate as a gift and did his utmost to win over the American president.

Despite Trump’s threats regarding Greenland and the economic toll of his tariffs on European industry, the positive start to the Trump-Merz relationship proved resilient for a long duration. This was because Merz was one of the European leaders who was most vocal in advocating a cautious and conciliatory approach in response to Trump’s aggressive policies. Unlike France, Spain and the UK, Germany continued to unconditionally support Israel’s actions in the Middle East during Merz’s tenure. While the aforementioned countries recognized the State of Palestine in response to Israel’s actions, Germany’s refusal to recognize Palestine also contributed to Trump’s satisfaction with Merz.

Finally, Merz’s statements supporting the war initiated by the U.S. and Israel against Iran—which was in violation of international law—had also greatly pleased Trump. The German Chancellor, who supported Israel during last year’s 12-Day War by stating, ‘This is the dirty work Israel is doing for all of us,’ entered into a heated dispute with Iranian leaders by demanding regime change prior to the Israel/U.S. offensive that began on February 28 of this year, earning the appreciation of the Trump-Netanyahu duo.

Regarding the US and Israel’s stance on attacking Iran with the aim of changing its regime, Merz argued that this was in accordance with international law. Shortly after the war began, the German chancellor visited Trump at the White House. While he expressed his support for the US and Israel, he remained silent in the face of Trump’s harsh criticism of the Spanish and British prime ministers, who had announced during the meeting that they would not allow their countries’ bases to be used for the war. Clearly, Merz’s stance also pleased the American president.

Angering Trump

It was clear that the German chancellor would anger Trump by changing his stance on Iran and making critical statements as events took a turn for the worse, given that he had pursued an Iran policy aligned with the US and Israel. The deterioration in the relationship between Trump and Merz became apparent when the US and Israel realized that effecting a regime change in Iran would be more difficult than they had anticipated. They had not even managed to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, which had been closed by Tehran. Merz’s rejection of Trump’s request for assistance against Iran in reopening the Strait of Hormuz infuriated the American president.

Merz’s rejection of this request, accompanied by the question, ‘Did they ask us when they started the war?’, led to an intense response from Trump, given that the German chancellor had previously adopted a stance in his pre-war statements along the lines of ‘Yes, the regime in Iran must change’ and ‘Go on, do our dirty work for us’. Now that the process was not going as planned and the global cost of the war was rising daily, Merz’s reluctance to offer support was causing Trump distress.

It should be noted that both parties believed they were justified in their actions. Merz feels vindicated in his stance, arguing: ‘Our support was purely rhetorical; you entered this war confidently without the need to consult us, so do not ask us to join now. We are already occupied with a war against Russia in Ukraine, and our military strength is insufficient. Trump, on the other hand, believed he was in the right, reasoning, ‘You said the regime in Iran must change. You said our attack was in accordance with international law, so why aren’t you supporting us?’

Damaging a relationship

These differences in position and perspective appear to have damaged the relationship between the two leaders, as well as US–German relations, to an extent that will be difficult to repair. The German chancellor’s remarks in a speech on 27 April further enraged Trump. In the speech, she stated that ‘the US would not be able to end the war against Iran in the short term because the Iranians are stronger than anticipated and the Americans lack a truly persuasive negotiating strategy’, and that ‘the entire American nation has been humiliated by the Iranian regime’. Trump, who has threatened to withdraw American troops from Germany, said that ‘it is hardly surprising that Germany is in such a dire state, both economically and in other respects, under the leadership of Merz, who has no idea what he is talking about’.

Unable to contain his anger, Trump took his criticism of the German chancellor a step further, accusing Merz of being ‘completely ineffective’ in the war in Ukraine thus far and stating that ‘instead of meddling in other matters, he should be trying to put his “ruined country” back in order’. Trump’s remarks that the German chancellor should devote more time to ending the war between Russia and Ukraine, followed by his instruction to the defense minister to withdraw 5,000 troops from Germany, may prevent Merz from further escalating this dispute. This is because, while US interest in and support for Ukraine has diminished significantly under Trump, an escalation of tensions between Washington and Berlin could leave Germany and other European countries in an even more difficult position with regard to Russia.

The failure of the US and Israel to achieve their objectives in the unjust war they launched against Iran, coupled with Iranian resistance, is causing a rift among even Trump’s most loyal supporters. The US could face serious problems with its allies and Israel if the Strait of Hormuz were to close for an extended period.

(This article was originally published in Turkish by the Middle East Africa website)

C

hinese President Xi Jinping is set to welcome Russian President Vladimir Putin to Beijing just days after hosting U.S. President Donald Trump, highlighting China’s effort to position itself at the center of global diplomacy amid escalating international conflicts.

Putin’s arrival for a state visit underscores the increasingly close relationship between China and Russia, as both countries seek to challenge U.S. global influence while navigating growing instability caused by the wars in Iran and Ukraine.

The Kremlin said Putin and Xi are expected to discuss energy cooperation, the Middle East conflict, the war in Ukraine and their shared vision of a “multipolar world” less dominated by Washington and Western alliances.

The visit will be Putin’s 25th trip to China during his presidency and reflects the deepening partnership between the two powers, built around expanding trade ties, military coordination and shared opposition to U.S. policies.

China projects itself as alternative global power

The back-to-back visits by Trump and Putin are being portrayed by Chinese state media as evidence that Beijing has become a central player in world affairs.

Chinese outlets described the China-Russia relationship as “unshakeable” despite growing geopolitical tensions, while emphasizing Beijing’s role as what officials call a more stable and responsible global actor.

Analysts say Xi is carefully balancing relations with both Washington and Moscow at a time when the United States is deeply involved in the Iran conflict and Russia remains isolated by Western sanctions over the Ukraine war.

Trump’s visit last week focused heavily on the war with Iran and efforts to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The White House said Trump and Xi agreed that Iran should not obtain nuclear weapons and supported restoring maritime traffic through the strait.

But Beijing has also maintained strong ties with Tehran and Moscow, complicating its position.

China remains Iran’s largest oil customer and has resisted U.S. pressure to cut economic ties with Tehran. Meanwhile, Russia has reportedly provided intelligence support to Iran during the conflict, according to CNN.

Energy cooperation central to Beijing-Moscow ties

Energy is expected to be one of the key issues discussed during the Xi-Putin meeting.

China has become Russia’s largest energy customer since Western sanctions were imposed after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Chinese companies have increased purchases of discounted Russian oil, helping support Russia’s economy and war effort.

The leaders are also expected to discuss the proposed Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, a long-delayed project that would significantly expand Russian natural gas exports to China.

Analysts say instability in the Middle East and uncertainty around Iranian oil supplies may increase Beijing’s interest in securing more long-term Russian energy imports.

The growing economic relationship, however, has also made Russia increasingly dependent on China, particularly in technology, trade and access to international markets.

Iran conflict creates new diplomatic calculations

The ongoing war involving Iran is likely to feature heavily in the talks.

Both China and Russia maintain close relations with Tehran and have helped shield Iran from Western sanctions over recent years. China purchases large amounts of sanctioned Iranian crude oil, while Moscow and Beijing have both criticized U.S. military actions against Iran.

At the same time, analysts say Beijing and Moscow are cautious about becoming too deeply involved in efforts to negotiate peace between Washington and Tehran.

Iran has reportedly expressed interest in China and Russia acting as security guarantors in a future agreement, but both countries appear focused primarily on protecting their own strategic interests.

For Xi, the simultaneous engagement with Trump and Putin reflects an effort to strengthen China’s image as a global power capable of speaking to all sides while advancing its own geopolitical ambitions.

For Putin, the visit comes at a difficult moment as Russia faces continued military pressure in Ukraine and growing dependence on Chinese economic support.

The summit is expected to reinforce the message that despite U.S. efforts to isolate Moscow and pressure Beijing, the strategic partnership between China and Russia remains strong.

(Source: CNN)

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akistan’s desire to mediate stems from a need for peace and a perception of a vital threat. The war in Iran could lead to a direct security crisis for Pakistan. While the Iranian Ministry of Defense’s latest statement suggests that the U.S. is seeking to “save face,” Pakistan has feared from the beginning that the conflict would spread.

Defense Minister Hoca Muhammad Asif’s warning encapsulates Pakistan’s strategic concerns: This war could result in an Israel-aligned “encirclement” encompassing Afghanistan, Iran, and India. In such a scenario, Pakistan would be caught between a threat triangle comprising India to the east, Iran to the west, and Afghanistan/Taliban-aligned forces to the northwest. Although Islamabad dismisses the risk of a direct attack, citing the country’s integration into the international system and its robust defense capabilities, the instability that a proxy war would generate would be unacceptable for Pakistan.

In addition to external security concerns, Pakistan’s status as home to the world’s second-largest Shia population after Iran increases Islamabad’s internal security risks in the event of a potential escalation. In the early days of the war, for example, dissatisfied Shias in Karachi stormed the US Consulate. Meanwhile, the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz for eight weeks constitutes a direct threat to the Pakistani economy. Pakistan is experiencing direct inflationary impacts caused by rising oil prices and global supply chain disruptions. Consequently, Munir’s mediation is viewed as a vital national security and economic imperative, not merely a foreign policy move.

The Rise of the Marshal as a diplomatic actor

As Islamabad-led diplomacy seeks to end the conflict, one name stands out in this critical role: Marshal Asim Munir. Munir’s exceptional performance can be attributed to his unique profile and the extraordinary consolidation of power that has taken place over the past year.

Munir is a new-generation military leader who embodies Pakistan’s institutional memory and pragmatism. Munir is one of the few figures to have previously led both Military Intelligence and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). This experience makes him privy to all of the regime’s secrets. However, what sets him apart from his predecessors is his ability to maneuver on the international stage. While US President Donald Trump called him “my favorite marshal,” Iranian officials have also repeatedly expressed their trust in him. This mutual trust has placed Münir in a unique position.

Last year’s brief war with India marked a turning point in his rise. His measured response during that period earned him respect in Washington and enabled him to establish a direct line of communication with the Trump administration. Moreover, his position in Pakistan, where the military has the final say in domestic and foreign policy, has been further consolidated through constitutional amendments. Promoted to Marshal and granted lifelong judicial immunity, he is now the Chief of Defense Forces (CDF). This title encompasses air, naval, and strategic nuclear command, making him the country’s absolute authority. While Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif is on diplomatic tours, Munir is seen as the true decision-maker and the “strongman.”

The benefits Pakistan hopes to gain from mediation

Pakistan’s mediation initiative is primarily aimed at securing vital economic gains. Sanctions against Iran due to the war and risks in the Strait of Hormuz have sent Pakistan’s energy prices soaring and plunged the country into a serious economic crisis. Pakistan has been forced to implement austerity measures, such as a four-day workweek for public sector employees and school closures. Through this mediation, Pakistan aims to revive the long-delayed Iran-Pakistan natural gas pipeline project. A successful agreement would provide Pakistan with a steady supply of low-cost natural gas, reducing industrial production costs and establishing long-term energy security.

Furthermore, this process has opened the door for Pakistan to form partnerships with the U.S. in cutting-edge strategic sectors, such as rare earth elements and cryptocurrency. The critical mining agreements signed under Marshal Munir’s personal supervision and the agreements reached with a cryptocurrency company linked to the Trump family demonstrate that the war-induced chaos has transformed into an economic opportunity for Pakistan.

In terms of foreign policy, Pakistan aims to achieve a “revision of its reputation” and strategic autonomy on a global scale through this initiative. Often labeled a “destabilizing force” due to its history in Afghanistan and disputes with neighbors, Pakistan seeks to elevate itself to the role of peacemaker. This process is believed to demonstrate Pakistan’s unique ability to conduct simultaneous diplomacy with Washington, Ankara, Tehran, Riyadh, and Beijing.

With the support of a broad international coalition ranging from the UN Secretary-General to China and Turkey to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan aims to position itself not just as a regional crisis manager but as an “indispensable interlocutor” in the eyes of global powers. This situation provides Pakistan

Backed by a broad international coalition ranging from the UN Secretary-General to China and Turkey to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan is positioning itself not just as a regional crisis manager, but as an “indispensable interlocutor” in the eyes of global powers. This provides Pakistan with the maneuvering space to advance the CPEC project with China and establish a strategic partnership with the U.S., alleviating the traditional pressure on the country to “pick sides” in the U.S.-China rivalry to some extent.

In domestic politics, the greatest gain relates to consolidating the army’s institutional legitimacy and political dominance under Marshal Asim Munir’s leadership. Mounting criticism of internal security, fueled by the economic crisis, protests by Imran Khan’s supporters, and the actions of terrorist organizations such as the Pakistani Taliban and the Baluchistan Liberation Army, had fueled debates about the erosion of trust in the army under Munir’s leadership. Despite these criticisms, the 2025 constitutional amendment elevated Munir to become the head of the army and the country’s most powerful leader since Pervez Musharraf. Consequently, this mediation process served as a demonstration of how Munir could project the profile of a “crisis manager” on the international stage using his new powers and secured his legitimacy.

Can Pakistan end the war?

So far, Pakistan has undertaken a functional mission, acting as a party capable of overcoming communication issues and conveying critical information that could end the war. However, as Pakistan lacks the capacity of a third-party Great Power to force concessions or exert pressure on the parties, which would be necessary to end the war completely, its options are limited.

Prior to the second round of talks, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi met with Marshal Munir and Prime Minister Sharif in Islamabad. He praised Pakistan’s efforts, particularly Marshal Munir’s, toward a ceasefire and the end of the war and conveyed Iran’s demands to Pakistani officials. Just as everything was ready for the American delegation to arrive in Islamabad and begin the second round of talks, Trump announced that he had canceled his team’s trip to Pakistan.

This sudden cancellation cast uncertainty over the future of the negotiations but did not bring the mediation process to a complete end. In a telephone conversation with the Iranian president, Prime Minister Sharif reiterated that Pakistan would continue to play the role of an “honest and sincere facilitator.” Trump’s refusal to negotiate appears to be a bargaining tactic that draws attention to the “chaos and internal conflicts” under Iranian leadership. Meanwhile, the U.S. has stated that it obtained this information from Pakistani officials.

Consequently, with the Strait of Hormuz still closed and the parties observing a ceasefire, it cannot be said that Pakistan’s mediation efforts have come to an end. In this context, the world will continue to watch and see if Islamabad can turn this chaos into a diplomatic victory.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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.S. President Donald Trump said his patience with Iran is “running out” after talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, as tensions in the Gulf escalated with new attacks on commercial shipping near the Strait of Hormuz.

Speaking in an interview on Fox News’ “Hannity” program, Trump urged Tehran to agree to a deal with Washington after negotiations stalled over Iran’s nuclear program and its stockpile of enriched uranium.

“I am not going to be much more patient,” Trump said. “They should make a deal.”

The White House said Trump and Xi agreed during their meetings that the Strait of Hormuz must remain open to international shipping and that Iran should never obtain nuclear weapons.

According to the White House readout, Xi also opposed militarization of the strait and rejected any effort to impose tolls on ships passing through the waterway, which carries a significant share of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies.

Trump further claimed Xi promised China would not provide military equipment to Iran.

“He said he’s not going to give military equipment, that’s a big statement,” Trump said during the interview.

Shipping incidents raise tensions in Gulf waters

The comments came as maritime security concerns intensified in the Gulf region.

An Indian cargo vessel transporting livestock from Africa to the United Arab Emirates sank off the coast of Oman on Wednesday after what security officials believe was a missile or drone strike. India said all 14 crew members were rescued by the Omani coast guard.

Separately, British maritime security authorities reported that unidentified personnel boarded a ship anchored near the UAE port of Fujairah and redirected it toward Iran. Security consultancy Vanguard said the vessel was believed to have been seized by Iranian personnel.

Fujairah is strategically important because it allows some oil exports to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has partially restricted since the conflict began following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran in February.

Iran appears to be selectively allowing some vessels through the strait under negotiated arrangements with certain countries. Iranian media reported agreements enabling some Chinese ships to pass, while a Japanese tanker also crossed after diplomatic contacts between Tokyo and Tehran.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said 30 vessels had passed through the strait since Wednesday evening, although shipping volumes remain far below pre-war levels.

Diplomacy remains stalled

Despite the Trump-Xi talks, negotiations between Washington and Tehran remain frozen.

The United States is demanding that Iran surrender its enriched uranium stockpile and permanently halt uranium enrichment activities. Tehran, meanwhile, is seeking sanctions relief, compensation for war damage and international recognition of its authority over the Strait of Hormuz.

Analysts say Trump is eager to secure diplomatic progress as the war increasingly affects domestic politics ahead of U.S. midterm elections later this year.

However, experts remain skeptical that China will pressure Iran aggressively. Beijing relies heavily on Iranian oil and views Tehran as an important strategic partner against U.S. influence in the Middle East and Asia.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said in Beijing that China would likely support efforts to reopen shipping routes because stability in the strait is “very much in their interest.”

U.S. says Iran’s military capabilities weakened

Trump defended the military campaign against Iran, saying its goals were to damage Iran’s nuclear program, reduce its ability to threaten neighboring states and weaken the country’s leadership.

A senior U.S. military commander told a Senate committee on Thursday that Iran’s capacity to threaten regional partners had been “significantly degraded.”

Admiral Brad Cooper said Iran no longer posed the same level of threat across multiple military domains, though he declined to comment directly on reports that Tehran still retains substantial missile and drone capabilities.

Despite the prolonged conflict and thousands of casualties from U.S. and Israeli strikes, Iran’s leadership has remained in control domestically. Analysts say Tehran’s continued influence over the Strait of Hormuz has given it additional leverage in negotiations with Washington.

(Source: Reuters)

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.S. President Donald Trump is expected to press Chinese leader Xi Jinping for assistance in ending the war with Iranduring high-level talks in Beijing this week, but analysts say China is unlikely to offer the decisive support Washington wants.

According to Reuters, Trump’s administration sees Beijing as one of the few governments with enough economic and political influence over Tehran to encourage Iranian leaders back toward negotiations. China remains Iran’s largest oil customer and an important economic lifeline amid Western sanctions.

However, experts say Beijing’s broader strategic interests make it reluctant to pressure Tehran too aggressively.

While China wants stability in the Middle East and an open Strait of Hormuz — through which much of its imported oil passes — Iran also serves as a key regional partner and a geopolitical counterweight to the United States.

Analysts note that the conflict has already benefited Beijing in some ways by shifting U.S. military and diplomatic attention away from the Indo-Pacific region, where China is focused on expanding its influence.

Henrietta Levin of the Council for Strategic and International Relations said Xi is approaching the summit with growing confidence, particularly after Trump eased back from last year’s aggressive tariff campaign against China.

China balances economic interests with strategic alliances

Beijing faces competing priorities as the Iran war continues.

On one side, China depends heavily on energy imports passing through the Strait of Hormuz and has suffered economically from rising oil prices and disruptions caused by the conflict. Iranian military actions in the waterway have threatened a route carrying roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies.

On the other hand, China values its long-term relationship with Iran. Analysts say Beijing is unlikely to cut economic support or halt the supply of dual-use goods that Tehran’s military can use for both civilian and defense purposes.

Chinese officials have publicly rejected U.S. pressure tactics. Liu Pengyu, spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, criticized what he described as “illicit unilateral sanctions” and called instead for preventing a renewed escalation in fighting.

Trump has insisted publicly that the United States does not depend on China to force Iranian concessions, arguing that the U.S. naval blockade around Iran already gives Washington leverage. Still, people briefed on the summit preparations told Reuters that U.S. officials privately hope Beijing can help stabilize the situation.

The report highlights the limited options available to the Trump administration in trying to force Chinese cooperation.

The United States has already sanctioned some Chinese firms accused of helping Iran evade restrictions or support military activities. However, experts say Washington has avoided taking action against the major Chinese banks facilitating trade with Iran because of fears of severe economic retaliation.

Brett Erickson of Obsidian Risk Advisors said existing sanctions have had little effect because the U.S. Treasury has avoided targeting the most important financial institutions involved.

Analysts warn that sanctions against major Chinese state-owned banks could trigger a wider economic confrontation between the world’s two largest economies, potentially reviving the tariff war that both sides paused last year.

Edward Fishman of the Council on Foreign Relations said even penalties against a smaller Chinese bank could spark a cycle of retaliatory measures damaging to both economies.

Such escalation could also worsen inflation inside the United States at a politically sensitive moment for Trump, whose approval ratings have already been hurt by the Iran conflict.

Rare earths remain a powerful Chinese leverage tool

Another major concern for Washington is China’s dominance in rare earth processing.

China controls much of the global refining capacity for rare earth minerals used in advanced electronics, electric vehicles and military technologies. During last year’s trade tensions, Beijing signaled it could restrict exports of those materials, alarming Western governments and industries.

Analysts say the threat of renewed Chinese export restrictions continues to limit how aggressively Washington is willing to confront Beijing economically.

Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said China has likely learned from watching previous American interventions in the Middle East and will avoid becoming deeply entangled in the conflict.

“They will want to be careful because they can see political quicksand,” Campbell told Reuters.

As Trump and Xi meet in Beijing, the summit is expected to reveal not only the limits of U.S.-China cooperation over Iran, but also the growing complexity of a relationship shaped simultaneously by rivalry, economic interdependence and competing global ambitions.

(Source: Reuters)

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audi Arabia secretly launched a series of military strikes against Iran earlier this year in retaliation for attacks on Saudi territory, according to Western and Iranian officials cited by Reuters, revealing a previously undisclosed escalation in the Middle East war.

The strikes, reportedly carried out by the Saudi Air Force in late March, mark the first known direct Saudi military action on Iranian soil. Reuters said two Western officials and two Iranian officials confirmed the operations, though the exact targets inside Iran remain unclear.

The covert attacks came amid a rapidly expanding regional war triggered after U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Iran on February 28. Since then, Iran has launched missiles and drones at Gulf states, targeting military installations, airports, civilian infrastructure and energy facilities across the region.

According to Reuters, the Saudi strikes were followed by a sharp decline in Iranian attacks on the kingdom. A Reuters tally based on Saudi defense ministry statements showed more than 105 missile and drone attacks during the week of March 25-31, compared with just over 25 attacks during April 1-6.

Saudi Arabia shifts toward a more assertive posture

For years, Saudi Arabia relied heavily on the United States for regional protection, particularly against Iranian threats. However, the ongoing war has exposed vulnerabilities in the Gulf security system, with Iranian missiles and drones reportedly penetrating regional defenses.

The reported strikes suggest Riyadh is adopting a more assertive military posture in response to direct attacks on its territory.

While Saudi officials did not confirm the operations publicly, a senior Saudi foreign ministry official reiterated Riyadh’s support for de-escalation and regional stability. Iranian authorities also declined official comment.

Reuters reported that Saudi Arabia informed Iran through diplomatic channels about the strikes while simultaneously warning Tehran against further escalation. Intensive diplomacy followed, eventually producing an informal understanding between the two rivals to reduce hostilities.

Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group said the sequence reflected a “pragmatic recognition” by both sides that unchecked escalation could spiral into a much broader regional conflict.

Gulf states increasingly drawn into conflict

The report also highlights how Gulf Arab states have become more directly involved in the war than previously acknowledged publicly.

According to Reuters and earlier reporting by The Wall Street Journal, the United Arab Emirates also conducted military strikes against Iran during the conflict. Unlike Saudi Arabia, however, the UAE reportedly adopted a more hawkish approach and engaged less frequently in public diplomacy with Tehran.

Despite the covert military exchanges, Saudi Arabia maintained communication channels with Iran, including contacts through Tehran’s ambassador in Riyadh. Analysts say this dual-track strategy — combining military deterrence with diplomacy — reflects Riyadh’s effort to avoid a full-scale regional war while protecting its security interests.

The de-escalation efforts appeared to take effect shortly before Washington and Tehran agreed to a broader ceasefire on April 7.