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overnment bond markets across the United States, Japan and Europe are sending a warning to policymakers as long-term borrowing costs reach levels not seen in years, driven by rising government debt, inflation concerns and geopolitical uncertainty.

The sharp increase in bond yields is raising borrowing costs for governments, companies and households while making it more difficult for central banks to balance inflation against economic growth.

In the United States, 30-year Treasury yields rose above 5% to their highest level since 2007. Japan’s 10-year government bond yield climbed to just below 3%, its highest level in three decades. German, French and British long-term borrowing costs also reached multiyear or multi-decade highs.

The moves reflect growing concerns about the sustainability of government finances and the inflation outlook as geopolitical tensions, tariffs and the continuing war involving Iran reshape the global economy.

Rising debt and inflation pressure bond markets

The U.S. government debt burden is approaching $40 trillion, while other developed economies are also facing large fiscal deficits and growing borrowing requirements.

The prolonged conflict involving Iran has pushed oil prices higher, with crude recently rising above $90 a barrel. Higher energy prices are adding to inflation concerns and reducing expectations that central banks will be able to cut interest rates quickly.

At the same time, technology companies are borrowing heavily to finance the expansion of artificial intelligence infrastructure and data centers. That demand for capital is increasing competition with governments seeking to sell large amounts of debt.

“Bond yields’ recent surge suggests investors are losing patience with fiscal profligacy,” said Jonas Goltermann, chief markets economist at Capital Economics.

U.S. 30-year Treasury yields later eased slightly, with the yield last down 2.4 basis points at 5.286%. The 10-year Treasury yield stood around 4.71%, a level that markets are watching closely, with 5% increasingly viewed as an important threshold.

The New York Federal Reserve estimates the term premium — the additional return investors demand for holding longer-term government debt — at around 80 basis points, close to its highest level in 12 years.

Recent U.S. Treasury auctions have also highlighted rising borrowing costs. A 10-year Treasury sale cleared at a yield of 4.683%, the highest in 19 years, while a 30-year auction reached 5.216%, a 25-year high.

The increase in government bond yields has also weighed on stocks, with major indexes including the Nasdaq and Europe’s STOXX 600 falling on Tuesday.

Japan and Europe face growing pressure

Japan is experiencing a particularly significant shift in its bond market. Its 10-year borrowing costs have climbed to nearly 3%, while 30-year yields have moved above 4%.

Investors are increasingly expecting the Bank of Japan to raise interest rates as early as September as inflation concerns grow.

Higher Japanese bond yields could also affect U.S. markets because Japanese investors have traditionally been major buyers of U.S. government debt. More attractive returns at home could encourage them to reduce purchases of Treasuries.

Foreign holdings of U.S. Treasuries declined in June, according to U.S. Treasury Department data, with Japan, Britain and China among the countries reducing their holdings.

European governments are facing similar pressures. Germany’s 10-year bond yield reached its highest level since 2011, while French yields rose to their highest since 2008. Britain’s 30-year borrowing costs approached levels last seen in May, which were the highest since 1998.

High government spending and debt in countries such as France and Britain have contributed to investor concerns. Climate-related events are also expected to increase pressure on government budgets.

The bond market selloff is significant because government bond yields serve as a benchmark for borrowing across the economy. Higher sovereign yields can translate into more expensive corporate loans, consumer credit and household mortgages.

Some investors, however, believe the recent rise in yields could make government bonds increasingly attractive and eventually encourage buyers to return to the market.

The broader concern for policymakers is whether higher yields represent a temporary adjustment or the beginning of a longer period in which investors demand substantially greater compensation for lending to governments.

With inflation still vulnerable to higher energy prices, government debt continuing to rise and geopolitical risks increasing, bond markets are placing greater pressure on policymakers to demonstrate control over both fiscal policy and inflation.

(Source: Reuters)

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yria and Russia have reached an agreement that will significantly reshape Moscow’s military presence along Syria’s Mediterranean coast, with Damascus set to take control of two strategically important facilities previously used as Russian military outposts.

Under the agreement announced by Syria’s Foreign Ministry, Syria will assume control of the Hmeimem air base near Latakia and the commercial berth at Tartus port as part of its civil administration. Military facilities at both locations will instead be transformed into joint training and qualification centers.

The ministry described the arrangement as a “reorganizing of the Russian presence” along Syria’s coast and said it represented the most significant development since negotiations began about a year and a half ago.

Russia’s military presence in Syria

Russia had been the most important political and military ally of former President Bashar Assad throughout Syria’s civil war. The Hmeimem air base and Tartus naval facility became central pillars of Russia’s military presence in the eastern Mediterranean, allowing Moscow to project air and naval power into the region.

The agreement comes after Assad was overthrown following a lightning insurgency. Russia did not intervene to prevent his removal but subsequently granted asylum to Assad and his family. Russian forces remaining in Syria have gradually withdrawn since the change of government.

Despite the reduction of Russia’s military role, Syria’s new leadership has sought to maintain relations with Moscow. Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa has visited Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow twice since taking power, with the future of the two Mediterranean facilities among the key issues discussed.

The latest agreement does not appear to end Russian-Syrian cooperation altogether. Instead, the conversion of the military facilities into joint training centers suggests that Damascus and Moscow intend to preserve some form of defense and institutional relationship while reducing Russia’s role as a military power stationed on Syrian territory.

Russia had not immediately issued a public comment on the agreement.

Syria’s new foreign policy

The development also reflects a broader transformation in Syria’s foreign policy following Assad’s fall. While Damascus has maintained ties with Moscow, it has simultaneously strengthened relations with Western governments and neighboring Arab states that had distanced themselves from Syria during Assad’s crackdown on opposition protests.

The United States has lifted most of its sanctions on Syria, while European countries have also begun rebuilding diplomatic relations with Damascus.

French President Emmanuel Macron visited Syria in July, during which he announced that France and Syria would appoint ambassadors for the first time in 14 years.

The shift has placed Syria at the center of a wider geopolitical realignment. For years, Russia’s military presence in Syria provided Moscow with a strategic foothold in the Mediterranean and helped sustain Assad’s government. The new arrangement indicates that this role is now being substantially reduced under Syria’s new leadership.

For Damascus, taking control of Hmeimem and the commercial facilities at Tartus represents an important assertion of sovereignty over strategic infrastructure. For Moscow, maintaining joint training facilities could preserve elements of its longstanding relationship with Syria even as its former military footprint is scaled back.

The agreement is likely to become an important marker of Syria’s transition from the Assad era, as the country seeks to balance its longstanding relationship with Russia against growing engagement with Türkiye Europe, the United States and Arab countries.

(Source: CNN)

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he Russia-Ukraine War continues to be the primary catalyst for the process of change and adaptation that NATO is currently undergoing. Russia’s loss of its status as a partner within the Western security architecture following the attack it launched in February 2022, and its subsequent classification as a ‘threat’, has shaped the political and geopolitical dimension of the issue, whilst the military and technological aspects of the war’s conduct have also presented challenges to the Alliance’s defense and deterrence capabilities. Measures relating to this process featured as key issues on the agenda of the Ankara Summit and in the Summit Declaration.

Political-geopolitical dimension

It comes as no surprise that the Ankara Summit Declaration defines Russia as a long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security and stability, as the prevailing view amongst the vast majority of allies is that Russia’s objectives are not limited to Ukraine. This view underpins the rapid increase in defense spending across the Alliance, the removal of barriers to defence industry production, and the strong continuation of military and non-military support for Ukraine.

Since February 2022, NATO’s top priority has been to strengthen the Alliance’s capabilities, whilst the second has been to ensure the sustainability of Ukraine’s combat capabilities. To date, 99 per cent of the military aid provided to Ukraine has come from NATO allies. We can see that this resolve has been maintained at the Ankara Summit, as evidenced by the scale of the support package announced. Whilst the allies have pledged 70 billion euros’ worth of military aid to Ukraine for 2026, this figure has also been set as the baseline for the following year.

What is particularly noteworthy here is that this aid will be funded largely by the European Union (EU). With the Ukraine Support Facility adopted in April 2026, the EU had decided to provide Ukraine with 30 billion euros in financial aid and 60 billion euros in military aid for the period 2026–2027. It should be recalled that in March 2025, all US military aid to Ukraine was cut off, and the flow of American weapons to Ukraine could only be maintained through the intervention of European countries.

On the other hand, the statement in the Ankara Summit Declaration that Ukraine is contributing to transatlantic security by fighting against Russia is significant, as it indicates that the allies recognize Ukraine as a major military power. Speaking at the Defence Industry Forum held on the sidelines of the summit, Ukrainian President Zelensky emphasized that his country is no longer an actor seeking security but one that produces it, and that Ukraine has become an ‘extraordinary source of defense capability’ for Europe. Whilst there is some truth in Zelensky’s remarks, linking this to NATO membership does not seem realistic at this stage, as the war is ongoing and, even if a lasting peace were to be achieved, the US administration’s unequivocally negative stance on the matter is well known.

Military and industrial dimension

The Russia-Ukraine War has highlighted the critical importance of defense industry production and innovation in the theatre of war. With the intensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), artillery munitions and various missile systems, the war has turned into an industrial race in design and production. The rapid, innovative and high-volume production of these systems has had a direct impact on the combatants’ success on the ground. This can be seen in the changing nature of UAV warfare. Today, on the battlefield, UAV systems are being used not merely to target isolated tactical elements, but to shape the battlefield itself.

New-generation UAV systems have played a major role in the war taking on a distinctly positional character from late 2023 onwards and in manoevristic operations coming to a virtual standstill. The ‘kill zones’—areas 10–15 kilometers deep where artillery fire and electronic warfare have intensified alongside the use of UAV systems—have transformed the war into a series of battles taking place in isolated areas. Efforts by the opposing sides to gain the upper hand, whether through kamikaze attacks using UAVs or by deploying them to drop explosives from above, are concentrated in these zones.

The race for innovation, which is characterized by constant dynamism on the Russia-Ukraine warfront, is also taking place in the field of unmanned maritime and land vehicles. For example, whilst it has been observed over the past year that Ukraine has begun to utilize unmanned maritime systems (UMS) much more intensively and effectively, we are now seeing new-generation amphibious operation trials aimed at deploying unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) – transported by UMS – to critical areas. Ukraine’s recent operation on the Kinburn Peninsula has been described as the first unmanned amphibious operation in history.

Ukraine’s increasing military power

Looking at the current course of the war, it is clear that Ukraine has, over the past few months, acquired an increasing ability to strike targets within Russia. Ukraine is specifically targeting bridges, motorways, railways and fuel tankers with the aim of disrupting Russia’s logistical capabilities. The reason for this is to thwart Russia’s ability to launch a new offensive during the spring and summer months. Similarly, these attacks aim to isolate the Donbas region from occupied Crimea through the selection of specific geographical targets (thereby blocking the use of the corridor between them). Judging by the results of Ukraine’s attacks and the pace of Russian advances, it appears that this objective has so far been achieved with considerable success.

The impact of these systems on the war extends beyond the battlefield. As a result of drone and missile attacks by both sides, the agricultural sectors of both Ukraine and Russia have suffered serious damage. Long-range missile and UAV attacks are disrupting the production of grain, wheat and sunflower oil, either directly or indirectly, whilst the targeting of Russian ships carrying wheat in the Sea of Azov by UAV systems is also producing negative consequences for the global market.

Similarly, it must be noted that unmanned systems are also having an impact on the sociological dimension of the war. For example, it is well known that UAV systems flying at low altitude and then diving create great fear amongst the civilian population. Last week, a spokesperson for the Ukrainian Air Force highlighted this situation, emphasizing that Russia’s jet-powered Shahed UAVs were flying at high speed at low altitude and that Russia’s aim was to force the residents of Kyiv to flee the city. In this regard, the prospect of unmanned systems becoming part of systematic intimidation and terror-inducing operations targeting the civilian population in the medium to long term represents a critical risk.

NATO’s comprehensive budget

All these factors have led NATO to establish a comprehensive budget and adopt reform processes in the fields of unmanned systems and their countermeasures (counter-UAS). Whilst it was announced at the Ankara Summit that the Alliance would undertake defense procurement worth 50 billion dollars, the ‘Drone Edge’ initiative, worth 40 billion dollars, was also launched to support anti-UAV systems. By the end of 2027, the allies have committed to increasing the number of UAV operators fivefold. Consequently, unmanned systems – which are shaping modern warfare – constitute a significant part of NATO’s military capability requirements, an issue that has largely been brought to the fore through discussions on budget increases.

Similarly, new steps are being taken to remove obstacles to defense industry cooperation – an area Turkey has long advocated for, but whose importance within the Alliance has only become apparent in recent years, and which can be understood in the context of production shortcomings. Initiatives announced at the Ankara Summit, such as ‘NATO Front Door for Industry’ and ‘NATO Engine’, aim to achieve greater integration of defense industries on a transatlantic scale.

Until now, the focus within NATO has been on military interoperability; however, modern warfare has highlighted the necessity of industrial interoperability to meet defense industry requirements. Indeed, the interoperability issues observed with Western-manufactured 155-millimeter artillery ammunition in the Ukrainian theatre had already demonstrated the inevitable need for close coordination between military operations and defense production.

Consequently, the Russia-Ukraine War remains NATO’s top priority. Despite transatlantic divisions and pro-Russian allegations leveled at Donald Trump, the fact that Russia continues to be defined as a long-term threat in the Ankara Summit Declaration is noteworthy in this regard. Similarly, the continuation of strong support for Ukraine also points to the same conclusion. In this sense, whilst the dynamics of transatlantic relations will determine the political dimension of the transformation taking place within NATO, the Russia–Ukraine War and the war’s innovation dynamics will continue to shape the process of change and adaptation in the Alliance’s military capabilities.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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ebruary 28, 2025 was one of the darkest days of the Ukraine-Russia War. Yet, for Ukraine, the catastrophe is unfolding not on the front lines but in Washington, right at the gates of the White House. In the early days of his second presidential term, Donald Trump opens proceedings by publicly mocking Ukrainian President Zelensky’s attire in front of the press, in a manner contrary to diplomatic protocol, before the President has even had a chance to enter the residence. Whilst Zelenskyy thought he would have to make do with this cold shower at the door, inside the White House he was subjected to a barrage of heavy criticism, this time joined by Vice-President James David Vance.

In a sense, those 10 minutes – during which all the aid the US had provided over the past three years was thrown in his face – must have felt like a decade, not only to the Ukrainian President but also to the European countries that had supported Ukraine. Donald Trump consistently maintained his line of accusing his predecessor, Joe Biden, over the Ukraine–Russia War right up until August 2025.

The Trump–Putin summit held on August 15, 2025, at Elmendorf–Richardson Air Force Base in Alaska had further reinforced the impression that all hope for Ukraine had been completely dashed. Furthermore, events at the White House just three days later, on August 18, 2025, reinforced the perception that the US had completely capitulated to Russia’s position on the war in Ukraine. That day, Trump lined up European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Finnish President Stubb, French President Macron, German Chancellor Merz, Italian Prime Minister Meloni, British Prime Minister Starmer, Ukrainian President Zelensky and NATO Secretary-General Rutte before him, and dictated his expectations regarding the course of the Ukraine–Russia War.

Furthermore, by catching this group off guard in front of the media, he forced them to speak on the validity of his own views. However, the evolving relations between the People’s Republic of China and Russia, the support Moscow provided to the Tehran regime during the Iran war, and Russia’s reluctance to sit down at the negotiating table have shifted the course of events.

A changing wind from Alaska to Ankara

On 8 July 2026, the image presented by the Trump–Zelensky duo when they faced the media at the NATO Summit in Ankara was very different from the unpleasant scenes witnessed a year and a half earlier. Beyond the positive messages conveyed, Trump had warmed relations to the point of joking with Zelensky about Ukraine’s drone and missile strikes on Moscow. When Trump asked, “Would you like to go to Moscow?”, Zelensky replied, “I don’t think so; there are far too many Ukrainian drones there.”

Clearly, the US President was also extremely pleased with Ukraine’s dominance, achieved through drones and guided missiles, extending as far as 2,000 kilometers into Russian airspace. Indeed, during the summit, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte remarked: “Some key targets deep inside Russia have been struck. ‘Over the past two months, Ukraine has been hitting targets more successfully’.” It is clear that Ukraine has not only made significant strides in the field of FPV drones and guided missiles.

There has also been an increase—the details of which we are not yet fully aware—in the quality and quantity of satellite-based electronic intelligence provided to Ukraine by NATO member states. The fact that around 100 naval vessels operating for the Russian ‘Ghost Fleet’ were struck by Ukrainian drone attacks in the Sea of Azov in the week following the NATO Summit is a matter that warrants attention in terms of the level these capabilities have reached. Looking back a little further, we can conclude that events took place which led Trump to lose hope that Russia and Putin would make peace with Ukraine in the final quarter of 2025.

The balance of power was redrawn in 2026

From the very first days of 2026, the nature and scale of Ukraine’s drone attacks saw a significant increase. Whilst all logistics routes supplying food and fuel to Crimea were paralyzed, almost all of the peninsula’s fuel depots and main electricity transmission stations were taken out of action by July. Petrochemical plants and refineries across Russia were struck 200 times in six months. This represents an 11-fold increase compared with the first six months of 2025. In May alone, 16 highly successful attacks were carried out against Russian refineries.

It has become commonplace for Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs to reach a range of 2,000 kilometers, or for FPV drones to strike targets more than 100 kilometers behind the front line. Having lost 40 per cent of its oil refining capacity, Russia has reached the point of banning diesel exports following its decision to ban the export of petrol and aviation fuel. Having been reduced to the point of having to import refined oil from India, Russia was unable to parade tanks and mobile missile launchers on Red Square during the traditional Second World War Victory Day commemorations on May 9.

As the military balance rapidly shifted against Russia, US President Trump’s behavior towards Ukrainian President Zelensky at the G7 Summit in Paris and the NATO Summit in Ankara, held between and June 15-17, signaled that even tougher times lay ahead for Moscow. At the summit, a commitment of 70 billion euros was made to provide Ukraine with military equipment, ammunition and training by 2026. Furthermore, following statements from some NATO member states that ‘we have nothing left to give to Ukraine’, the alliance decided to take an unprecedented step. Led by Canada, an initiative was launched to establish the ‘Defense, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB)’ with the participation of certain NATO member states.

The bank, scheduled to become operational in 2027, aims to provide low-cost financing of up to 100 billion pounds for defense projects. The members set to participate in this bank project include Turkey, Albania, Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania and Ukraine. It is clear that the Alliance does not wish to see a repeat of the chaos that ensued regarding support for the Kyiv administration from the outset of the war in Ukraine and intends to find an institutional solution to this.

The US has no further expectations of a Russia under Putin’s rule

Returning to the final communiqué of the NATO Summit in Ankara, it appears that the mobilization launched against the Russian threat directed at Ukraine – and even Poland and the Baltic states – will continue with an open-ended timeline. The communiqué, referencing the NATO Hague Summit Communiqué dated June 25, 2025, emphasised that Russia poses a long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. In other words, NATO members will channel more of their economic capacity into deterrence and defense against threats originating from Russia.

The emphasis on Russia as a “long-term threat” could be interpreted as the US having given up hope on the Putin administration. The visits to Moscow by US Special Envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff – which the Kremlin has been awaiting for nearly two months but which have yet to materialize – could also be seen as a manifestation of this “loss of hope”. Reports by the Russian TASS news agency in the first week of July stated that this visit, which Moscow was apparently eagerly awaiting, “could take place by the end of the summer, though a definite date has not yet been set”.

A report published in the British newspaper The Telegraph on July 10, 2026, however, indicates that the growing aversion towards Russia, particularly in Washington and other NATO capitals, is set to increase exponentially. According to the British newspaper’s report, the Dutch intelligence services, the AIVD (Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service) and the MIVD (Military Intelligence and Security Service), have discovered that doorbell cameras at hundreds of homes along the routes leading from NATO bases in the Netherlands to airports and seaports have been hacked. So, who would want access to the footage from hundreds of doorbell cameras?

According to the Dutch intelligence services, the culprits are cybercriminals backed by Moscow. Their aim is to determine the contents and quantities of arms shipments to Ukraine. According to The Telegraph, this Russian operation is not limited to the Netherlands. Across Europe, thousands of doorbell cameras are under the control of Russian intelligence. In other words, the Ukraine-Russia War has reverted to the ‘factory settings’ established at the outset by the US-UK duo. The objective is no longer limited to simply expelling Russia from Crimea and the Donbas region, which it has annexed. The ultimate goal has been updated to create the conditions necessary to topple Putin’s regime in Moscow.

(This article was originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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.S. President Donald Trump on Thursday declassified a series of documents that he said revealed Chinese interference in U.S. elections, renewing his long-standing focus on election security despite previous intelligence assessments concluding that Beijing did not alter the outcome of the 2020 presidential election.

In a 25-minute televised address from the White House, Trump claimed the documents exposed “shocking vulnerabilities” in the U.S. electoral system and alleged that China had obtained personal information from approximately 220 million American voter records.

The president also accused members of the U.S. intelligence community of suppressing information about China’s activities and urged Congress to pass stricter election laws, including voter identification requirements, proof of citizenship for voter registration and limits on mail-in voting.

The address comes ahead of November’s midterm elections, as Republicans seek to defend narrow majorities in Congress amid political headwinds linked to the Iran conflict and rising energy prices.

However, Trump’s claims appeared to conflict with findings by the U.S. intelligence community. A declassified intelligence assessment issued in 2021 concluded that no foreign government attempted to alter any technical aspect of the 2020 presidential election, including voter registration systems, ballots, vote tabulation or certified results.

CIA thinks otherwise

The assessment, conducted under then-Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe—now serving as CIA director under Trump—found that while China had collected publicly available information on American voters and political trends for years, it did not attempt to interfere directly in the election outcome.

According to Reuters, two people familiar with the matter said the voter data cited by Trump consisted largely of publicly available voter files that political campaigns and consultants routinely purchase and could not be manipulated to alter election results.

Some White House officials reportedly expressed concern before the speech that releasing the documents could create a misleading impression about the nature of China’s activities.

Trump nevertheless argued that the newly declassified material demonstrated significant weaknesses in U.S. election security and reiterated claims that large numbers of non-citizens were registered to vote, although he did not provide evidence that those registrations resulted in illegal ballots being cast.

Rare voter fraud

Election experts and previous studies have consistently found that voter fraud and non-citizen voting in U.S. elections are rare.

Democratic Senator Mark Warner, vice chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, rejected Trump’s assertions, saying the U.S. intelligence community had unanimously concluded that China “did not even try to change a single vote” in the 2020 election.

The president also renewed his call for lawmakers to approve the SAVE America Act, legislation that would require photo identification to vote, proof of U.S. citizenship for voter registration and tighter restrictions on mail-in ballots. The measure has passed the Republican-controlled House of Representatives but remains stalled in the Senate amid Democratic opposition.

Despite Trump’s assertions about election vulnerabilities, the declassified documents released Thursday did not provide evidence that votes in the 2020 election were altered or manipulated, according to Reuters.

(Source: Reuters)

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urkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan warned on Thursday against the expansion of the Russia-Ukraine war into the Black Sea, saying attacks on civilian maritime infrastructure threaten regional stability and should not be tolerated.

Speaking alongside Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha after talks in Kyiv, Fidan said Türkiye remains committed to preventing the conflict from spreading into the strategically important waterway.

“We do not want the war to spread to the Black Sea,” Fidan said, stressing that peace and security in the region must be preserved.

He condemned attacks targeting civilian maritime assets, saying ports, oil tankers and fishing vessels should not become military targets.

“Targeting ports, tankers and fishing boats and putting civilians’ lives at risk is not something that can be justified,” Fidan said, urging all parties to act with restraint and responsibility.

Fidan said Türkiye continues to explore new strategic approaches with the warring parties and international mediators to break the deadlock in the conflict.

Call for negotiations

He reaffirmed Ankara’s support for continuing negotiations under the Istanbul format, arguing that direct talks between Russian and Ukrainian officials had produced valuable transparency and dialogue.

“I believe it would be very beneficial for the Türkiye negotiations, particularly the Istanbul talks, to continue,” Fidan said, adding that ongoing hostilities should not prevent diplomatic engagement.

The Turkish foreign minister noted that while U.S. negotiators later became involved in efforts to achieve a broader settlement, the conflict continues with an increasing risk of escalation.

Addressing potential post-war security arrangements, Fidan said security guarantees for Ukraine would likely include land, air and naval components.

He revealed that Türkiye has agreed to lead the maritime component of those guarantees in coordination with allied countries.

“Türkiye has accepted to lead the maritime component, and we have a common understanding with our allies on this issue,” he said, adding that planning work is already being carried out by the naval forces of participating allied nations.

Ukraine is ready for a ceasefire

For his part, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha reiterated Kyiv’s readiness for a ceasefire and voiced support for Türkiye as the venue for future high-level peace negotiations.

“We believe that negotiations, especially a possible meeting between President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and President Vladimir Putin, could take place in Türkiye,” Sybiha said.

He added that only a summit between the two leaders could inject new momentum into the peace process.

“As Ukraine, we are ready for a ceasefire,” Sybiha said.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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kraine and nine European countries have announced the creation of a joint anti-ballistic missile coalition aimed at strengthening the continent’s defenses against emerging missile threats through closer military, technological and industrial cooperation.

The initiative, unveiled by the leaders of Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom, seeks to develop an integrated European missile defense architecture designed to improve protection against ballistic missile attacks.

In a joint declaration issued on Sunday, the participating countries described the coalition as a “purely defensive” initiative intended to bolster Europe’s collective security amid evolving regional threats.

“We believe that the protection of Europe requires a global solution of integrated missile defense architecture to deter and defeat future missile threats,” the leaders said.

The coalition’s centerpiece will be a flagship project to develop a shared anti-ballistic missile capability. Member states will coordinate on common operational requirements, technical standards and defense industrial cooperation while establishing a roadmap for deploying the coalition’s first operational systems.

Complement, rather than replace

Officials said the new initiative is intended to complement, rather than replace, existing national and multinational missile defense programs already operated or planned by participating countries.

“By bringing together our defense industrial base, our research, and our operational experience, we aim to build a shared anti-ballistic missile capacity for Europe,” the declaration stated.

The coalition also emphasized Ukraine’s battlefield experience gained during its defense against Russia’s invasion, describing Kyiv’s operational knowledge as a valuable contribution to the project.

“We acknowledge the unique experience of Ukraine, gained in defense against Russia’s war of aggression,” the statement said.

Beyond missile interception capabilities, participating countries agreed to explore joint research and development projects, expanded funding mechanisms, enhanced defense industrial collaboration and improved sharing of defense-related information and operational data.

The founding members said the coalition would remain open to additional countries that share its objectives and are willing to contribute to the development of a common European missile defense capability.

The announcement comes as European governments continue to increase defense spending and deepen military cooperation in response to heightened security challenges across the continent, with missile defense emerging as a key priority for NATO members and partner countries.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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ATO leaders gathered in Ankara on Wednesday for the second day of a high-stakes summit dominated by renewed military tensions between the United States and Iran, the ongoing war in Ukraine, and growing debates over defense spending and alliance unity.

The summit, hosted by Türkiye, was expected to focus primarily on strengthening NATO’s collective defense capabilities. However, fresh military exchanges in the Middle East quickly shifted attention toward regional security and the risk of a broader conflict.

The United States launched new strikes against Iranian targets overnight, saying the attacks were a response to Iranian assaults on commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Iran retaliated by launching missiles and drones at U.S. military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, marking the most significant escalation since the two countries reached a preliminary ceasefire agreement last month.

Speaking alongside NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte before the main summit session, U.S. President Donald Trump declared that the interim understanding with Tehran was effectively finished.

Defense spending remained another major issue throughout the summit. Rutte praised Trump’s long-standing pressure on allies to increase military expenditures, arguing that recent commitments represented a significant transformation in European defense policy.

“When you have achieved this, this is a huge win,” Rutte said, noting that European allies and Canada had dramatically increased investments in military capabilities over recent years.

Trump nevertheless criticized several NATO members, reserving particularly strong criticism for Spain, which he accused of failing to contribute adequately to the alliance. He even suggested ending trade with Spain, calling it “a terrible partner in NATO.”

Ukraine on the Agenda

Meanwhile, Ukraine remained high on the summit agenda as Russia continued large-scale attacks across the country.

According to Ukrainian officials, Russia launched another overnight assault involving missiles and drones, highlighting Kyiv’s continued need for advanced air defense systems. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy urged NATO partners to accelerate military assistance, particularly in strengthening Ukraine’s ability to intercept cruise missiles and other aerial threats.

Russia, for its part, reported intercepting hundreds of Ukrainian drones overnight while accusing Kyiv of attacking energy infrastructure deep inside Russian territory, including oil refineries and fuel facilities.

The renewed violence reinforced concerns that diplomatic efforts to end the more than four-year war have stalled despite repeated international mediation attempts.

A comprehensive 360-degree security approach

Beyond immediate military challenges, NATO leaders also discussed the alliance’s long-term strategy. Türkiye emphasized the importance of maintaining a comprehensive 360-degree security approach that addresses threats on both NATO’s eastern and southern flanks while strengthening cooperation on cyber security, infrastructure protection, and defense industrial production.

Alliance officials stressed that military readiness now extends beyond traditional armed forces and includes resilient supply chains, secure communications, and the ability to counter cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.

The deteriorating security situation in both Eastern Europe and the Middle East has underscored NATO’s growing challenge of responding simultaneously to multiple crises while maintaining unity among its members.

As discussions continued behind closed doors, leaders faced mounting pressure to produce concrete commitments on defense capabilities, support for Ukraine, and coordinated responses to instability in the Middle East.

With tensions rising on several fronts, the Ankara summit is expected to shape NATO’s strategic priorities for the coming years, testing the alliance’s ability to balance collective defense, crisis management, and political cohesion in an increasingly uncertain global security environment.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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ussia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has resulted in more than 2 million military casualties on both sides, making it one of the deadliest conflicts since the Second World War, according to a new study by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

The report estimates that Russia has suffered approximately 1.4 million casualties, including soldiers killed, wounded and missing, while Ukraine has endured between 525,000 and 625,000 casualties. Combined, the figures place the total human cost of the war above 2 million military casualties.

Researchers said Russia has lost around 450,000 troops killed, representing roughly 1% of the country’s population. Ukraine’s military fatalities were estimated at between 125,000 and 150,000.

Neither Moscow nor Kyiv regularly publishes official casualty figures, making independent verification difficult. However, the CSIS estimates broadly align with assessments previously released by Western governments and intelligence agencies.

The study, authored by Seth G. Jones and Riley McCabe, describes Russia’s losses as unprecedented in the post-World War II era.

“These rates are astounding,” the authors wrote, arguing that Russian fatalities in Ukraine now exceed the combined U.S. military deaths in all conflicts since World War II and are substantially higher than total Soviet and Russian military deaths across all wars during the same period.

According to the report, casualty rates have become increasingly uneven as the conflict has evolved.

During much of the war, Russian forces suffered approximately two to three casualties for every Ukrainian casualty. In the first half of 2026, however, researchers estimate the ratio has widened to nearly eight Russian casualties for every Ukrainian casualty.

The report attributes much of that shift to Ukraine’s expanding drone warfare capabilities.

Researchers said Kyiv has significantly enlarged what they describe as the battlefield “kill zone,” using drones to make it increasingly difficult for Russian forces to advance toward Ukrainian defensive positions.

“Ukraine’s defense-in-depth strategy has been effective in killing and wounding Russian soldiers, as well as limiting Russian maneuver,” the study concluded.

Recruitment challenges mount as battlefield losses increase

Beyond Ukraine’s technological improvements, the researchers identified several structural weaknesses contributing to Russia’s growing losses.

These include Moscow’s reliance on attrition warfare, shortcomings in combined-arms operations, poor tactical planning, inadequate troop training, corruption and declining morale among frontline forces.

The study also suggests Russia is no longer recruiting replacement soldiers at the same pace that it is sustaining battlefield losses, raising questions about the long-term sustainability of its military campaign.

The burden of casualties has fallen disproportionately on Russia’s poorer regions and ethnic minority communities, according to the report.

Researchers noted that economically disadvantaged regions have supplied a significant share of military recruits, with Russian independent media increasingly reporting that some remote villages have lost much of their male population during the conflict.

Although Russia has continued to mobilize volunteers through financial incentives and recruitment campaigns, the study argues that mounting casualties are placing increasing strain on the country’s manpower resources.

The report also highlights the broader historical significance of the conflict.

With military casualties now estimated to exceed 2 million, researchers said the war has likely surpassed the total casualties suffered during the Battle of Stalingrad, long regarded as one of history’s bloodiest battles.

The findings underscore the enormous human cost of a war that has entered its fifth year with no comprehensive peace agreement in sight. Despite repeated diplomatic initiatives, fighting continues across multiple fronts as both Russia and Ukraine seek military advantages while preparing for potential future negotiations.

The CSIS report concludes that although Ukraine continues to face severe military and humanitarian challenges, Russia is bearing increasingly heavy battlefield losses as technological changes, particularly the widespread use of drones, reshape the nature of modern warfare.

(Source: CNN)

G

erman federal prosecutors have charged a 50-year-old Ukrainian national with helping coordinate the 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines, marking the most significant legal step yet in one of Europe’s most consequential infrastructure attacks.

The suspect, identified only as Serhii K under German privacy laws, is accused of playing a leading role in the operation that destroyed the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines beneath the Baltic Sea, severing a major route for Russian natural gas exports to Europe months after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Federal prosecutors filed the indictment on Wednesday but declined to comment on its specific contents.

According to German public broadcaster ARD, Serhii K faces charges of attacking civilian energy infrastructure, causing explosions and destroying critical infrastructure.

The charges stem from an investigation into the September 2022 underwater blasts near Denmark’s Bornholm Island, which severely damaged both pipelines and disrupted Russian gas supplies to Europe during an already escalating energy crisis.

Court documents from December 2025 allege that Serhii K coordinated a team that used the sailing yacht Andromeda to transport explosives to the pipelines. Prosecutors claim he acted as the team’s on-board coordinator and operational leader rather than serving as a diver or explosives specialist.

The Berlin-based law firm Menaker, which represents the accused, has not commented publicly on the indictment.

German prosecutors confirmed that Serhii K is the same individual arrested in Italy in August 2025 following a German arrest warrant. Italy’s highest court later approved his extradition to Germany, where he was transferred in November 2025 to face investigation.

At the time of his arrest, German authorities alleged that the suspect had used forged identity documents to charter the Andromeda in the northern German port of Rostock before the vessel departed on the mission that investigators believe culminated in the sabotage operation.

Serhii K has denied any involvement in the explosions. His defense has maintained that he was serving with the Ukrainian armed forces and was inside Ukraine when the attacks occurred. His lawyers have argued that, even if military service were established, he would be entitled to what they describe as “functional immunity” under international law.

Ukraine denies involvement as investigation continues

The Nord Stream explosions remain among the most politically sensitive investigations in Europe, given their impact on regional energy security and the absence of any formal attribution of responsibility nearly four years after the attack.

Ukraine has consistently denied any state involvement in the sabotage or knowledge of any plot targeting the pipelines.

Speaking at a news conference in Dublin on Wednesday, Volodymyr Zelenskyy said it was too early to comment on the German indictment because Kyiv had not officially received details of the case.

“We have not officially received any details; at least I have not seen them,” Zelenskyy said, adding that it was premature to draw conclusions.

The twin Nord Stream pipelines, running beneath the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany, had been central to Russian gas exports to Europe before relations between Moscow and the West deteriorated sharply following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Although Nord Stream 2 had never entered commercial operation, both pipelines were rendered inoperable by the explosions, eliminating a key component of Europe’s energy infrastructure.

The investigation has involved authorities from Germany, Denmark and Sweden, with investigators examining evidence including vessel movements, explosive residue and maritime records.

The indictment represents the first formal criminal case brought by German prosecutors against an individual alleged to have participated directly in the sabotage. However, investigators have not publicly alleged that the Ukrainian government authorized or directed the operation.

The case is expected to proceed through Germany’s federal court system, where prosecutors will seek to prove that Serhii K coordinated the team responsible for carrying out one of the most significant attacks on critical energy infrastructure in recent European history.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

R

ussia’s defense minister personally approved a covert military training program in China for Russian forces linked to the war in Ukraine, with at least four senior generals from both countries directly involved, according to European officials and classified documents reviewed by Reuters.

The program, conducted in 2025, included instruction in radiological, chemical and biological (RCB) warfare, underscoring the increasingly strategic nature of defense cooperation between Moscow and Beijing despite China’s repeated insistence that it remains neutral in the Ukraine conflict.

The revelations have heightened concern among European governments, which are already reassessing China’s role in supporting Russia’s military capabilities while balancing extensive economic ties with Beijing.

According to the documents, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov authorized the initiative through an internal decree issued in August 2025, allowing Russian military delegations to travel to China for specialized training at facilities operated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

One classified report described a three-week course held at a military academy in Beijing in November 2025, where Russian personnel received instruction on radiological, chemical and biological protection. Images attached to the report showed Russian officers attending lectures by Chinese instructors, examining a model nuclear reactor and participating in exercises on chemical and radiation reconnaissance as well as protection of ventilation systems from contamination.

European officials told Reuters that the participation of senior military commanders from both countries demonstrated that the program enjoyed backing at the highest levels of government and reflected the strategic importance Moscow and Beijing attach to expanding military cooperation.

The defense ministries of both Russia and China did not respond to Reuters’ requests for comment.

China’s Foreign Ministry rejected the allegations, describing them as “entirely unfounded” and reiterating that Beijing’s position on the Ukraine conflict has remained consistent. Chinese officials continue to present the country as a neutral actor seeking to promote peace negotiations.

The latest disclosures follow an earlier Reuters investigation published in June, which cited European intelligence agencies and military documents indicating that approximately 200 Russian soldiers underwent military training in China during November 2025 before returning to participate in the war in Ukraine.

At the time, the Kremlin declined to comment directly on the report but dismissed Western media coverage as “false information.”

European concerns grow over strategic partnership

The newly revealed documents identify senior military officials who oversaw the program. According to European officials, a July 2 agreement establishing the training was signed by Russian Major General Rustam Khusainov and Chinese Senior Colonel Sun Dayun.

Russian Colonel General Rustam Muradov, deputy commander-in-chief of Russia’s land forces, led the Russian delegation, according to participant lists reviewed by Reuters. Chinese Major General Li Jinsun, head of the PLA’s Military Academy of Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defense, participated in the opening of one of the courses, while Russian Major General Vitaly Gerasimov also attended training sessions in Bengbu.

The documents included detailed participant information, listing military ranks, birth dates, institutional affiliations and security clearance levels.

European officials said the emphasis on radiological, biological and chemical warfare highlighted the strategic significance of the exchanges, noting that such training is considered highly sensitive by armed forces worldwide.

The disclosures come as European policymakers debate how to respond to expanding defense ties between Russia and China.

Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, European governments have regarded Moscow as the continent’s primary security threat. At the same time, China remains one of the European Union’s largest trading partners, complicating efforts to formulate a unified policy.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said earlier this month that the European Union had independently confirmed the training had taken place and was evaluating its implications.

Beijing dismissed her remarks as “nothing but smears.”

A Brussels-based European official told Reuters that the bloc should increasingly assess China through a security rather than purely economic lens, arguing that Beijing has become what Kallas previously described as a “decisive enabler of Russia’s war.”

The European Union has already imposed sanctions on several Chinese companies accused of supporting Russia’s defense industry.

Despite the growing military relationship, Russian officials have publicly downplayed any need to learn from China’s armed forces.

Russian lawmaker Andrei Kartapolov, who heads the defense committee in Russia’s parliament, dismissed Reuters’ reporting as “complete nonsense” and argued that Russia’s military had nothing to learn from China.

However, internal Russian military evaluations reviewed by Reuters offered a more nuanced assessment.

The quality of Chinese military equipment

The reports praised the quality of Chinese military equipment, the extensive use of training simulators and the high theoretical expertise of Chinese instructors. At the same time, they noted a significant limitation: China’s lack of recent combat experience.

While Russia has accumulated extensive battlefield experience during more than four years of fighting in Ukraine, China’s military has not engaged in a major war for decades.

The latest revelations are likely to intensify Western scrutiny of China’s role in Russia’s military campaign. Although Beijing continues to deny providing direct military assistance, European governments increasingly view cooperation such as specialized military training as evidence of deepening strategic alignment between the two powers.

The findings also reinforce broader concerns that the partnership between Moscow and Beijing extends beyond diplomatic coordination and economic cooperation into increasingly sophisticated military collaboration, even as China maintains its public position of neutrality regarding the conflict in Ukraine.

(Source: Reuters)

U

krainian drones struck a major oil refinery in southeast Moscow for the second time in three days on Thursday, triggering a massive fire, disrupting transportation across the Russian capital, and underscoring Kyiv’s growing ability to carry the war deep inside Russian territory.

The attack targeted one of Moscow’s key fuel-processing facilities, located just 16 kilometers (10 miles) from the Kremlin and within the city’s ring road, making it one of the most symbolically significant strikes on Russian infrastructure since the war began more than four years ago.

Video footage shared on social media showed thick black smoke billowing into the sky above the refinery after a powerful explosion. Witnesses reported that the blast was so intense that the giant metal lid of an oil storage tank was hurled into the air.

The strike appeared to evade Russian air defenses and ignited a blaze that emergency crews battled for hours.

War reaches the heart of Russia

The attack forms part of a broader Ukrainian campaign targeting Russia’s energy sector, which Kyiv argues provides crucial revenue for Moscow’s military operations in Ukraine.

But beyond the economic impact, the strike carried substantial symbolic significance.

By successfully targeting infrastructure inside the Russian capital, Ukraine appears intent on demonstrating to ordinary Russians that the consequences of the war are no longer confined to distant battlefields.

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister, Andrii Sybiha, used social media to directly address residents of Moscow following the attack.

“One of the most popular questions asked by Muscovites this morning is ‘What is going on?'” Sybiha wrote. “Your country started a war of aggression against ours. For years, it has been killing our people.”

The comments reflected Kyiv’s effort to frame the attacks as a response to Russia’s invasion rather than an escalation of the conflict.

Disruption across Moscow

The strike caused widespread disruption throughout the Russian capital, home to more than 13 million people.

Authorities temporarily suspended flights at all Moscow airports as security services assessed the threat posed by additional drones.

Operations were halted at Sheremetyevo Airport, Russia’s busiest air hub, and parts of the airport were evacuated as a precaution.

Traffic was also disrupted along major roads surrounding the refinery, creating significant delays for commuters.

Residents in online forums complained that no air raid sirens or emergency alerts were issued before the attack.

Some suburban residents reported finding oily residue on vehicles and windows after rainfall passed through areas affected by smoke from the refinery fire.

The incident highlighted the growing vulnerability of Russia’s largest city to long-range Ukrainian drone operations.

While Moscow has experienced occasional drone attacks since 2023, including an incident involving the Kremlin itself, such strikes have generally had limited impact on daily life.

Thursday’s attack represented one of the most disruptive incidents the capital has experienced since the conflict began.

Economic impact growing

The latest refinery strike also points to the increasing economic consequences of Ukraine’s campaign against Russia’s energy infrastructure.

Russia remains one of the world’s largest oil producers and a major exporter of crude oil and refined fuel products.

Repeated attacks on refineries, storage facilities, and transportation networks have begun affecting domestic fuel supplies.

Industry sources told Reuters that Russia is expected to import fuel by sea this month, an unusual step for a country that is normally a major fuel exporter.

Reports of gasoline shortages have emerged in several regions in recent weeks.

Although Moscow city authorities insisted that fuel supplies in and around the capital remain stable, Russia’s federal anti-monopoly service has launched an inquiry after one major retailer reportedly increased gasoline prices by nearly 19 percent within a week.

Energy analysts say sustained attacks on refining capacity could place additional pressure on domestic fuel markets while increasing operational costs for Russia’s economy.

C

hinese President Xi Jinping arrived in North Korea on Monday for his first visit to the country since 2019, in a move widely seen as an effort by Beijing to reinforce its influence over Pyongyang amid growing concerns about North Korea’s increasingly close military and economic relationship with Russia.

Xi’s visit comes at a critical moment for regional security in Northeast Asia, with North Korea accelerating its weapons programs, deepening cooperation with Moscow, and further distancing itself from South Korea. Analysts say the Chinese leader’s decision to travel personally to Pyongyang underscores the strategic importance Beijing places on maintaining its longstanding alliance with North Korea.

The visit marks a departure from Xi’s recent diplomatic pattern. Since the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese president has significantly reduced his overseas travel, preferring to host foreign leaders in Beijing. Against that backdrop, his trip to Pyongyang is viewed as a strong signal of China’s commitment to preserving its role as North Korea’s most important partner.

Xi is expected to hold extensive talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on regional security, economic cooperation, and the changing geopolitical environment in East Asia.

Growing Russian influence

A key factor behind the visit is believed to be North Korea’s rapidly expanding relationship with Russia.

Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Pyongyang has emerged as one of Moscow’s most important partners. North Korea has reportedly supplied Russia with artillery shells, missiles, military equipment, and manpower to support its war effort. In return, Moscow is believed to have provided economic assistance and potentially advanced military technologies.

The partnership has generated concern in Beijing, which has historically been North Korea’s principal economic supporter and diplomatic protector. For decades, China accounted for the overwhelming majority of North Korea’s foreign trade and served as the country’s primary source of fuel, food, and investment.

While China and Russia maintain close strategic ties, Beijing is wary of losing influence over its isolated neighbor. Analysts say Xi’s visit is intended in part to ensure that Pyongyang does not drift too far into Moscow’s orbit.

“China wants to remind North Korea that it remains an indispensable partner,” regional analysts have noted. “The relationship with Russia may be useful for Pyongyang, but Beijing still offers economic and political support that no other country can fully replace.”

The growing Russia-North Korea partnership has also raised concerns about military cooperation. Experts believe Russia may be sharing technologies that could accelerate North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs, developments that could alter the security balance on the Korean Peninsula.

Concerns over military advancements

China’s leadership is believed to be closely monitoring North Korea’s recent military activities.

North Korea has conducted multiple missile tests this year and continues to modernize its arsenal. In May, state media reported the successful development of an artificial intelligence-guided tactical cruise missile, while recent images released by Pyongyang showed Kim Jong Un inspecting facilities linked to the production of nuclear materials.

The North Korean leader has repeatedly emphasized the need to expand the country’s nuclear deterrent and strengthen its military capabilities in response to what he describes as growing threats from the United States and its allies.

Although China supports North Korea as a strategic buffer separating Chinese territory from US forces stationed in South Korea, Beijing has traditionally favored stability on the peninsula over military escalation. Chinese officials fear that an emboldened North Korea could provoke regional tensions and trigger stronger military cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and Japan.

Analysts believe Xi will seek greater clarity on Pyongyang’s military ambitions and may encourage restraint to avoid destabilizing the region.

Regional security challenges

The visit also takes place amid growing concerns over shifting security dynamics in East Asia.

Relations between North and South Korea have deteriorated sharply in recent years. In 2024, Kim Jong Un formally abandoned the long-standing goal of peaceful reunification with South Korea, declaring the South a hostile state. Since then, communication channels between the two sides have largely remained frozen.

At the same time, security cooperation between South Korea and Japan has expanded. The two US allies have increased intelligence sharing and military coordination in response to North Korea’s weapons development and broader regional security concerns.

Recent discussions regarding a possible military logistics support agreement between Seoul and Tokyo have further alarmed Beijing, which views closer cooperation among US allies as part of a broader effort to contain China’s influence in the region.

Against this backdrop, Xi’s trip serves not only to strengthen bilateral ties with North Korea but also to demonstrate China’s continued role as a central actor in regional security affairs.

O

n May 13, in Astana’s Palace of Independence, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Kassym-Jomart Tokayev stood before cameras and announced what they called an “eternal friendship declaration”, a phrase that sounds ceremonial until you read the fine print. Bilateral trade exceeding $5 billion, around 3,800 Turkish companies operating on Kazakh soil, a $15 billion trade target set as the new horizon, and, cutting across all of it, the Middle Corridor. Not as background noise, but as the explicit spine of the entire visit.

Two days later, in the ancient city of Turkistan, the Organization of Turkic States held its informal leaders’ summit under the theme of artificial intelligence and digital development. Erdoğan, addressing the gathering, went beyond the official agenda. He connected the Iranian crisis in the Strait of Hormuz directly to the urgency of the Middle Corridor, a land-and-sea route stretching from China across Kazakhstan, the Caspian, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and into Turkey before reaching European markets. The logic was blunt: when maritime arteries choke, overland corridors breathe.

That argument is no longer speculative. It is, increasingly, a fact confirmed by freight data, political decisions, and the quiet repositioning of powers that prefer not to make headlines.

The numbers tell their own story

The Trans-Caspian corridor carried 4.5 million tons of cargo in 2025, up fivefold from the 800,000 tons recorded just seven years ago. Container traffic along the route grew 36% in 2025 alone. Kazakhstan, which handles 85% of the freight flowing through this corridor, now aims to push that figure to 10 million tons. Rail cargo between Ankara and Astana rose 35% this year. Delivery times on the route have already been cut from 28-32 days to 13-17 days, and there is still room to compress them further.

These are not projections dressed up as achievements. They reflect a structural shift that began quietly after 2022, when the war in Ukraine made the northern Russia-bound routes functionally untenable for many European and Asian shippers. The Middle Corridor absorbed that displacement. Turkey sat at the western end of that displacement, and it knew it.

Where Turkey actually stands

Turkey is not simply a transit country on the Middle Corridor. It is the corridor’s European gateway. Every container that moves from Kazakhstan across the Caspian, through Azerbaijan and Georgia, must pass through Turkish territory before reaching European markets, whether by rail through Edirne or by sea from Istanbul and Mersin. Turkish ports handled a record 553 million tons of cargo in 2025. That record did not emerge from thin air. It reflects years of investment in port capacity, rail connectivity, and customs infrastructure.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, the iron thread connecting Central Asia to Turkey’s rail network, remains still underutilized relative to its potential. Capacity expansion has lagged behind demand. There are bottlenecks. Anyone who follows this sector knows that the Kars junction is one of them. Erdoğan’s Astana statements signaled awareness of this, yet the speed of institutional follow-through remains the actual variable in the equation.

What Turkey brings to the corridor, beyond geography, is institutional leverage. Ankara sits inside NATO, maintains active trade relations with the European Union, and holds the presidency of the Organization of Turkic States for the coming period. That combination, Western institutional membership paired with Turkic world leadership, gives Turkey a bridging function that no other country on the corridor can replicate. Kazakhstan cannot speak to Brussels the way Ankara can. Brussels cannot speak to Astana the way Ankara can. That is not a minor advantage; it is the corridor’s political operating system.

The OTS summit: More than a photo opportunity

The informal summit in Turkistan produced, on its surface, communiqués about artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, and joint language models. Uzbekistan proposed what its delegation called a “Digital Turkic Corridor”, a fibre optic and data centre network mirroring the physical trade route. These are not trivial ambitions. A digital corridor that piggybacks on a physical one creates compounding returns: shared data sovereignty, reduced dependency on non-Turkic tech infrastructure, and a political narrative of self-sufficiency that resonates across the region.

For Turkey, the digital corridor proposal is both an opening and a quiet pressure. Istanbul already functions as one of the most significant internet exchange points between Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia. If a unified Turkic digital infrastructure takes shape, and Turkey helps define its architecture, the strategic weight of Turkish territory compounds further. Should Ankara move decisively, that architecture will be shaped on Turkish terms, not by outside players already embedded in the region. The Turkestan summit named the ambition. Whether Turkish institutions can match it with speed will be one of the defining questions heading into the formal OTS summit this autumn.

Yet the political subtext of the Turkistan summit deserves as much attention as its official agenda. Tokayev’s statement, publicly opposing any military dimension for the OTS, was a counterweight to Turkey’s offer to share its defense industry experience with Turkic states

That exchange, which received far less media attention than the signing ceremonies, exposes the OTS’s central unresolved question: Is this organization a civilizational platform, a trade bloc, or the embryo of something with harder edges? Astana, balancing its northern and eastern dependencies with Russia and China, prefers the answer to remain vague. Ankara would not mind a slightly sharper answer.

This is not a crisis. It is a negotiation, one that will run through the 13th formal OTS summit in Turkey this autumn, and well beyond it.

R

ussia launched one of its largest aerial assaults on Kyiv since the start of the war, firing hundreds of drones and missiles overnight, including a rare strike using the nuclear-capable Oreshnik hypersonic missile, Ukrainian officials said Sunday.

The massive bombardment killed at least four people in and around the Ukrainian capital and wounded nearly 100 others, while damaging residential neighborhoods, schools, cultural landmarks, and government buildings across the city.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy condemned the attack and called on Western allies to respond more forcefully.

“It’s important that this does not remain without consequences for Russia,” Zelenskiy said on Telegram. “Decisions are needed — from the United States, from Europe and others.”

According to Ukraine’s air force, Russia launched 90 missiles and 600 drones during the hours-long overnight attack. Officials said it was only the third time Moscow had used the Oreshnik missile since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022.

The strike targeted Kyiv and surrounding areas, including the city of Bila Tserkva, located about 64 kilometers south of the capital. Analysts reviewing footage of the attack said the Oreshnik warhead appeared to split into dozens of submunitions before impact.

European leaders condemn ‘escalation’

European leaders swiftly denounced the attack, particularly Russia’s use of the Oreshnik missile, which is capable of carrying nuclear warheads and has a range of several thousand kilometers.

Kaja Kallas accused Moscow of engaging in “reckless nuclear brinkmanship” and using the missile as a political intimidation tactic.

Britain and Germany also described the use of the missile as a dangerous escalation in the conflict, now entering its fifth year.

Russia’s Defense Ministry said the strikes were retaliation for alleged Ukrainian attacks on civilian targets inside Russia. Moscow claimed it had targeted military command centers, intelligence facilities, air bases, and defense-industrial infrastructure using Oreshnik, Iskander, Kinzhal, and Zircon missiles.

Ukraine denies targeting civilians in Russia and says Moscow continues to deliberately strike civilian infrastructure in Ukrainian cities.

The assault also caused minor damage to Ukraine’s cabinet building and the Foreign Ministry headquarters. Cultural institutions suffered heavily, including Kyiv’s national art museum and philharmonic hall, both located in the city center.

“This is a war against our culture, memory, and identity,” said Kyrylo Budanov. “For centuries, Moscow has tried to destroy everything that makes us Ukrainian.”

One strike destroyed a newly opened museum dedicated to the 1986 Chornobyl nuclear disaster, drawing anger from Ukrainian officials.

Residents describe ‘terrifying’ night

Much of the destruction was concentrated in Kyiv’s Lukyanivka district, an area north of the city center that houses a missile production plant and has repeatedly been targeted during the war.

A shopping center and nearby market were engulfed in flames, while apartment buildings sustained severe damage. Mayor Vitali Klitschko said around 30 buildings across the capital were damaged or destroyed.

As air raid sirens sounded overnight, thousands of residents sought refuge in metro stations and underground shelters.

“It was terrifying, scary,” said 62-year-old resident Nataliia Zvarych, who fled to a subway station as explosions rocked the city.

In central Kyiv, workers at a café that had celebrated its opening only a day earlier swept shattered glass and debris from the floor while continuing to serve customers.

“Once the emotions die down a bit, we’ll think about whether to restore everything,” said co-owner Yevhenii Prusak.

The latest attack comes amid heightened tensions following weeks of intensified fighting and stalled diplomatic efforts. Ukrainian officials warned that Russia’s strikes on water supply facilities suggested Moscow may be attempting to create additional humanitarian pressure ahead of the summer months.

Despite international condemnation, there was no immediate indication that the assault would alter the course of the conflict, which remains locked in a prolonged and increasingly destructive phase.

(Source: Reuters)

E

uropean intelligence agencies believe China secretly trained around 200 Russian military personnel last year, with some of those soldiers later returning to fight in Ukraine, according to intelligence sources and documents reviewed by Reuters.

The covert training program, reportedly focused heavily on drone warfare and counter-drone tactics, represents one of the clearest indications yet of direct Chinese military support connected to Russia’s war effort, despite Beijing’s repeated claims that it remains neutral in the conflict.

According to Reuters, the training was outlined in a Russian-Chinese military agreement signed in Beijing on July 2, 2025. The document reportedly detailed plans for Russian troops to receive instruction at Chinese military facilities in cities including Beijing and Nanjing, while Chinese personnel would also participate in training programs inside Russia.

European intelligence officials told Reuters that some Russian soldiers trained in China later took part in combat operations involving drones in occupied Crimea and the Zaporizhzhia region.

Drone warfare at center of training

The reported courses concentrated on modern battlefield technologies that have become central to the war in Ukraine.

Reuters said the training included instruction in:

• Drone operations and first-person-view (FPV) drones
• Electronic warfare
• Counter-drone systems
• Combined arms warfare
• Explosives handling and demining
• Armored infantry tactics
• Army aviation

One internal Russian military report reviewed by Reuters described a December 2025 training course involving around 50 Russian personnel at a branch of the People’s Liberation Army Infantry Academy in Shijiazhuang.

According to the document, Russian soldiers trained with 82mm mortars while using drones to identify targets — a tactic widely employed on the Ukrainian battlefield.

Another course reportedly focused on counter-drone measures, including electronic warfare rifles and net-launching systems designed to disable incoming drones.

Reuters also described a training session at a PLA aviation center in Yibin where Russian troops used drone flight simulators and practiced operating several FPV drone systems.

China denies direct involvement in war

China’s foreign ministry rejected suggestions that Beijing was directly involved in the conflict.

In a statement to Reuters, Chinese officials said Beijing had consistently maintained an “objective and impartial stance” and supported peace negotiations.

The report nevertheless raises new questions about the depth of military cooperation between China and Russia, whose leaders have repeatedly emphasized their “no limits” strategic partnership since shortly before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

The intelligence findings emerge just as Chinese President Xi Jinping hosts Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing for high-level talks focused on energy, security and global geopolitics.

Western governments have long accused China of indirectly supporting Russia through purchases of Russian energy exports and the supply of dual-use technologies. But training Russian troops at operational and tactical levels would mark a more direct form of assistance.

Russia increasingly dependent on Chinese support

The report highlights the growing military and economic ties between Beijing and Moscow.

China has become a critical economic partner for Russia since Western sanctions were imposed after the invasion of Ukraine. Chinese purchases of Russian oil, gas and coal have helped stabilize Moscow’s economy, while Chinese technology and manufacturing networks have helped offset some Western export restrictions.

European intelligence officials told Reuters that Russia benefits particularly from China’s advanced drone industry and training infrastructure.

Although Russia has extensive combat experience from Ukraine, China’s rapidly expanding drone sector offers technological expertise, simulation systems and industrial capacity that Russian forces increasingly value.

One intelligence agency said many of the Russian personnel trained in China were instructors themselves, meaning the knowledge gained there could spread through Russia’s military structure after their return.

C

hinese President Xi Jinping is set to welcome Russian President Vladimir Putin to Beijing just days after hosting U.S. President Donald Trump, highlighting China’s effort to position itself at the center of global diplomacy amid escalating international conflicts.

Putin’s arrival for a state visit underscores the increasingly close relationship between China and Russia, as both countries seek to challenge U.S. global influence while navigating growing instability caused by the wars in Iran and Ukraine.

The Kremlin said Putin and Xi are expected to discuss energy cooperation, the Middle East conflict, the war in Ukraine and their shared vision of a “multipolar world” less dominated by Washington and Western alliances.

The visit will be Putin’s 25th trip to China during his presidency and reflects the deepening partnership between the two powers, built around expanding trade ties, military coordination and shared opposition to U.S. policies.

China projects itself as alternative global power

The back-to-back visits by Trump and Putin are being portrayed by Chinese state media as evidence that Beijing has become a central player in world affairs.

Chinese outlets described the China-Russia relationship as “unshakeable” despite growing geopolitical tensions, while emphasizing Beijing’s role as what officials call a more stable and responsible global actor.

Analysts say Xi is carefully balancing relations with both Washington and Moscow at a time when the United States is deeply involved in the Iran conflict and Russia remains isolated by Western sanctions over the Ukraine war.

Trump’s visit last week focused heavily on the war with Iran and efforts to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. The White House said Trump and Xi agreed that Iran should not obtain nuclear weapons and supported restoring maritime traffic through the strait.

But Beijing has also maintained strong ties with Tehran and Moscow, complicating its position.

China remains Iran’s largest oil customer and has resisted U.S. pressure to cut economic ties with Tehran. Meanwhile, Russia has reportedly provided intelligence support to Iran during the conflict, according to CNN.

Energy cooperation central to Beijing-Moscow ties

Energy is expected to be one of the key issues discussed during the Xi-Putin meeting.

China has become Russia’s largest energy customer since Western sanctions were imposed after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Chinese companies have increased purchases of discounted Russian oil, helping support Russia’s economy and war effort.

The leaders are also expected to discuss the proposed Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline, a long-delayed project that would significantly expand Russian natural gas exports to China.

Analysts say instability in the Middle East and uncertainty around Iranian oil supplies may increase Beijing’s interest in securing more long-term Russian energy imports.

The growing economic relationship, however, has also made Russia increasingly dependent on China, particularly in technology, trade and access to international markets.

Iran conflict creates new diplomatic calculations

The ongoing war involving Iran is likely to feature heavily in the talks.

Both China and Russia maintain close relations with Tehran and have helped shield Iran from Western sanctions over recent years. China purchases large amounts of sanctioned Iranian crude oil, while Moscow and Beijing have both criticized U.S. military actions against Iran.

At the same time, analysts say Beijing and Moscow are cautious about becoming too deeply involved in efforts to negotiate peace between Washington and Tehran.

Iran has reportedly expressed interest in China and Russia acting as security guarantors in a future agreement, but both countries appear focused primarily on protecting their own strategic interests.

For Xi, the simultaneous engagement with Trump and Putin reflects an effort to strengthen China’s image as a global power capable of speaking to all sides while advancing its own geopolitical ambitions.

For Putin, the visit comes at a difficult moment as Russia faces continued military pressure in Ukraine and growing dependence on Chinese economic support.

The summit is expected to reinforce the message that despite U.S. efforts to isolate Moscow and pressure Beijing, the strategic partnership between China and Russia remains strong.

(Source: CNN)

W

hen we hear news of a conflict in the Middle East or across the Sahel, one of the first images that comes to mind is the pickup truck with a heavy machine gun mounted on its bed. Racing along desert roads, sometimes accompanying the convoy of a state army, sometimes forming part of a militia raid, these vehicles have become one of the most familiar images of modern warfare.

The footage that emerged from Mali on the morning of April 25, 2026, revived that memory once again. Coordinated attacks carried out by al-Qaeda-linked JNIM and the FLA forces advocating Azawad independence brought these desert cavalrymen back into the global spotlight.

Yet, of course, no “victory” won in this region comes merely through off-road vehicles fitted with PK machine guns. So before asking who is financing and directing the war in the Sahel today, it is worth looking at who first turned these vehicles into some of the most iconic war machines of irregular warfare, and under what circumstances.

The 1986–1987 Libya–Chad War, a.k.a. the Toyota War

At the heart of the crisis unfolding in the Sahara in the second half of the 1980s lay the Aouzou Strip, located along the Chad–Libya border. This desert territory, covering roughly 114,000 square kilometers, carried the burden of vague, arbitrarily drawn borders inherited from the colonial era. Libya, under Muammar Gaddafi, regarded the area as a matter of historical right, while Chad saw this claim as a direct threat to its national sovereignty.

When the war began, the military balance on paper heavily favored Libya. The Libyan army resembled a Soviet-equipped steel fist. Gaddafi’s regime controlled the Aouzou Strip with roughly 8,000 troops, T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery units, and Mi-24 helicopters, famously known as “flying tanks.” Facing them were the Chadian National Armed Forces, who knew the terrain far better but had only limited technological capabilities.

By 1987, however, the intelligence, weapons, and air support provided by France under Opération Épervier quickly shifted the course of the war in Chad’s favor. France was the most critical actor behind the Chadian government, seeking both to protect Western bloc interests and to break Libya’s influence south of the Sahara. These were, after all, the years when Cold War rivalry increasingly turned local conflicts into proxy wars.

The Battle of Fada on January 2, 1987, marked the turning point in this shift. The French Air Force had suppressed Libyan air operations and largely neutralized Gaddafi’s air superiority. Alongside this, hundreds of Toyota pickups supplied by France, together with MILAN anti-tank missiles capable of destroying a tank from roughly two kilometers away, were among the main factors that turned the battlefield equation against Libya. Indeed, Khalifa Haftar, one of the most influential figures in Libyan politics today, was among those captured by Chadian forces during that period.

100 kilometers into Libyan territory

By September 1987, Chadian units carried out a daring raid, infiltrating roughly 100 kilometers into Libyan territory and striking the Maaten al-Sarra Air Base. Numerous aircraft, ammunition stocks, and military assets belonging to the Libyan air force were destroyed before they could even take off. Conducted under French command, this raid became one of the most critical moves in undermining Libya’s air superiority in the region and forcing Gaddafi toward the diplomatic table.

The Chad–Libya War of 1986–87 is now remembered as the “Toyota War.” These low-cost pickup trucks, brought into the country with French support and fitted with heavy machine guns and anti-tank missiles, had been transformed into mobile war machines capable of destroying million-dollar T-55 tanks from hundreds of meters away. While Libya’s heavy Soviet tanks sank into the sand and turned into static targets, the lightweight Toyotas, with their wide tires, seemed almost to float across the desert surface. According to an account that even found its way into military reports, Chadian soldiers would cross Libyan minefields at speeds exceeding 100 kilometers per hour. They moved so fast that even if a wheel triggered the fuse of an anti-tank mine, by the time the explosion occurred the pickup had already left the blast radius.

The real strength of these vehicles, known in modern military literature as “technicals,” lay not in their armor but in their speed and simplicity. When a tank broke down, it required a team of specialist engineers, heavy maintenance infrastructure, and a complex supply chain for spare parts. When a Toyota broke down, basic technical knowledge, limited equipment, and a bit of ingenuity were often enough.

Of course, these vehicles were not what won the war on their own. Without France’s suppression of Libya’s air superiority, the MILAN anti-tank missiles it supplied, the flow of intelligence, and the political-military guarantee provided by Paris, such an outcome would not have been possible. For this reason, the Toyota War is remembered not merely as a story of light vehicles defeating heavy tanks, but as a striking example of how asymmetric warfare, when combined with external support, can change the outcome of a conflict.

The Toyota Hilux and similar vehicles, which have entered popular culture as the archetypal “terror pickup,” have become a constant feature of conflict zones stretching from the Middle East to the Sahel due to their durability, low cost, and ease of weaponization. Having first emerged in the deserts of Chad in the 1980s, where speed, simplicity, and geography gave them an edge against heavy tanks, these vehicles are now back on the battlefield in Mali.

So, are the pickups and drones now pushing southward in Mali truly being commanded by the rebel alliance alone?

I

n a dramatic shift in Middle East politics, tensions between the United States and Iran have eased following the announcement of a two-week ceasefire, described by observers as a potential “last chance” to prevent a wider regional war.

The breakthrough came after Donald Trump confirmed that Washington had agreed to halt military operations against Iran for two weeks, citing a 10-point proposal from Tehran as a “workable basis for negotiations.” The announcement was made just hours before a deadline previously set by the U.S. administration.

The ceasefire, facilitated through mediation by Pakistan, includes an immediate halt to hostilities across multiple fronts, including Lebanon and other areas affected by the broader war. Pakistani officials have invited delegations from both sides to meet in Islamabad on Friday for continued negotiations, marking what could be the first face-to-face talks since the war began.

Trump stated that “significant progress” had been made toward a long-term agreement, adding that the temporary pause in military action would provide the necessary space to finalize a comprehensive deal.

Widespread international support

The agreement has been met with broad international approval, with countries across Asia and beyond urging both sides to use the opportunity to pursue lasting peace.

Indonesia called on all parties to respect sovereignty and prioritize diplomacy, as Australia welcomed the ceasefire as a step toward ending the war. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said his country is working with international partners to support diplomatic efforts and reopen the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz.

Similarly, Japan emphasized continued diplomatic engagement, particularly regarding the safe reopening of the strait, a critical global energy route. Malaysia also expressed support, with Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim calling for the Iranian proposal to evolve into a comprehensive peace agreement benefiting not only Iran but also Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.

UN and regional reactions

The United Nations welcomed the ceasefire, with Secretary-General António Guterres urging all parties to commit to international law and work toward a sustainable resolution. His spokesperson stressed the importance of adhering to the ceasefire terms as a pathway to comprehensive peace in the region.

Regional powers also reacted positively. Egypt described the move as a significant step toward de-escalation and stability, highlighting its importance for global security and international navigation. Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty reportedly discussed the development with U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff, expressing strong support for renewed diplomatic efforts.

Meanwhile, Iraq’s Foreign Ministry called for a “serious and sustained dialogue” between Washington and Tehran to address the root causes of their tensions and build mutual trust.

Next steps and uncertainties

According to U.S. officials cited by American media, the ceasefire is expected to take effect once Iran reopens the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for global oil shipments. Sources indicate that the upcoming talks in Pakistan could mark a turning point, as they would be the first direct negotiations between the two sides since the outbreak of war.

However, some uncertainty remains. Reports suggest discrepancies between the Persian and English versions of Iran’s ceasefire proposal, particularly regarding uranium enrichment—an issue likely to remain central in upcoming negotiations.

While the agreement has sparked optimism worldwide, analysts caution that the two-week ceasefire represents only a narrow window for diplomacy. Whether it leads to a lasting peace or merely a pause in hostilities will depend on the willingness of both sides to compromise on long-standing disputes.

For now, the deal offers a rare moment of hope in a region long marked by instability, with global leaders urging both Washington and Tehran to seize what may be their final opportunity to avoid a broader war.

(Source: News Agencies)

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ussia and China have sharply criticized the United States and Israel over their military strikes on Iran, urging an immediate halt to hostilities and warning that the conflict risks accelerating nuclear proliferation across the Middle East.

The diplomatic pushback comes days after joint US-Israeli airstrikes targeted sites inside Iran, prompting retaliation from Tehran and widening regional instability.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Israeli counterpart Gideon Saar on Tuesday that the attacks interrupted negotiations between Washington and Tehran that had “made significant progress,” including discussions addressing Israel’s security concerns.

According to China’s Foreign Ministry, Wang said Beijing “opposes any military strikes launched by Israel and the US against Iran” and called for an immediate cessation of operations to prevent escalation.

“Force cannot truly solve problems; instead, it will bring new problems and serious long-term consequences,” Wang said during the phone call.

China also requested that Israel take “concrete measures” to ensure the safety of Chinese personnel and institutions in Iran. The call followed additional diplomatic outreach by Wang to the foreign ministers of Iran, Oman and France in an apparent effort to stabilize the rapidly deteriorating situation.

Beijing has consistently advocated a diplomatic solution to tensions over Iran’s nuclear program, positioning itself as a mediator in regional disputes.

Lavrov warns of nuclear proliferation

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also criticized the U.S. and Israel, warning that their actions could produce the opposite of their stated objective — preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

Speaking at a news conference, Lavrov said the “logical consequence” of the attacks could be that forces inside Iran might push to acquire a nuclear bomb.

“Because the US doesn’t attack those who have nuclear bombs,” Lavrov remarked, suggesting that military pressure could incentivize deterrence through nuclear capability.

Lavrov further warned that other Arab states might now reconsider their own strategic positions, potentially triggering a broader nuclear arms race in the region.

Israel is widely regarded as the Middle East’s only nuclear-armed state, though it neither confirms nor denies possessing such weapons.

Moscow offers mediation

Lavrov said Russia had seen no evidence that Tehran was developing nuclear weapons and reiterated Moscow’s readiness to assist in finding a diplomatic solution. He spoke on Tuesday with Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, and condemned what he described as “unprovoked military aggression” by the U.S. and Israel.

Earlier, Russia’s Foreign Ministry accused Washington and Tel Aviv of carrying out a “premeditated and unprovoked act of armed aggression” against a sovereign UN member state, warning that the campaign could lead to humanitarian, economic and even radiological consequences.

The ministry said the U.S. and Israel were pushing the region toward “an unpredictable chain reaction and spiraling violence,” placing full responsibility for the fallout on them.

Russia’s criticism comes as Moscow itself continues to face international condemnation for its ongoing war in Ukraine, now entering its fifth year.

China and Russia have both strengthened political and economic ties with Iran in recent years, often opposing US-led sanctions and military pressure on Tehran.

As the conflict between Israel, the United States and Iran intensifies, diplomatic divisions among major global powers appear to be widening, complicating efforts to contain what analysts warn could become a broader regional confrontation.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

T

he European populist right is distancing itself from its origins as it searches for its identity. In a sense, Europe is abandoning itself. Faced with mounting migratory pressure, Europeans are attempting to create a divide between themselves and the newcomers. Yet the Enlightenment established civilized relations between individuals, not societies. The European value system claimed universality.

The phenomenon that legitimized colonialism in continental Europe was this claim of universality. In response, European thought sought ways to live in a multicultural, post-secular society. However, the popular response of European peoples manifested itself in the abandonment of this claim. They will need more time to realize that abandoning the claim to universality also means abandoning the hierarchy of civilizations.

Recognizing the decline

The European value system, based on the Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment, claimed universality and established a hierarchy among civilizations, while also creating a world system. Although not everyone believed in the system, it was important to be seen as part of it and to participate in its rituals, since the system operated in a Eurocentric manner. For around sixty years, dozens of institutions formed around the United Nations were revered as churches, determining the rituals of the new world order. These institutions collaborated with complementary elements of American capitalism, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO.

First, Europe abandoned the claims of its own value system. Then, the rest of the world lost faith in these values. Finally, the organizations that regulated the capitalist market lost their meaning. Furthermore, it has only recently become apparent that these developments signify a collapse rather than a transition. Those who argue that it is a transition claim that the world system is now dominated by five major powers, and that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council have lost their significance. They expect another country to join the US, China, the EU and Russia as the fifth member. Those who speak of the collapse of the system argue that the world is bigger than five.

Europe was not as accustomed to living with different cultures as it claimed to be. The Catholic and Protestant worlds of Europe had always demonstrated their quest for homogeneity through historical massacres. When the Enlightenment replaced religion, this quest for homogeneity became secularized within the context of nationalism. The Holocaust emerged as the catastrophe of modernity’s divisive quest for homogeneity.

After the Second World War, the economy took precedence over politics and the global market necessitated the legitimization of multicultural societies. However, the balance of the world system was disrupted by Turkey’s application for EU membership, the political crisis that began with Islamophobic attacks and the 2008 economic crisis. The influx of refugees, which peaked in 2015, and the shock of the pandemic after 2019 further intensified these crises. The Gaza massacre marked the point at which universal values were exhausted. By the beginning of the 21st century, Europe had lost its economic, political and human credibility.

Europe benefiting

The United States and Russia are the only remaining powers in a depleted Europe. The United States is anxious to protect its economic interests, while Russia is striving to preserve its political presence. Both powers seek to control the continent’s remaining countries, as if to demonstrate that they are not part of Europe. Each power engages with Europe’s populist right and supports nationalist and separatist political movements for different reasons. What they have in common is that neither wants a strong EU.

A fragmented Europe, akin to the Middle Ages, would retain its economic production and market power, but lose its political significance. Unable to produce even a common foreign policy, let alone the planned common army, Europe is doomed to remain an economic community without political will. The protectionist and passive stance of European nationalists coincides with the interests of non-European powers. This is why the populist right in Europe is simultaneously supported by both the US and Russia.

The US, keen to exert influence over the court ruling on Le Pen, is using Greenland as a pretext to crush Europe’s political power. By frightening markets with customs duties, the US is taking advantage of European peoples’ inability to protect their welfare. Meanwhile, Russia was aware that Europe could not fight back when it attacked Ukraine, which is under EU protection both politically and economically. Driven by a desire to preserve welfare without military engagement, Europe is facing significant challenges in both the economic and security spheres. With its market under threat from the US and its security architecture under threat from Russia, it seems unlikely that Europe will be able to preserve its political unity. The likelihood of Europe becoming more fragmented is quite high. Concerned about preserving their own identities, European populations are also being drawn towards federalism and ‘direct democracy’.

The main issue for those who support the European populist right is freedom of expression. However, what is actually meant by freedom of expression, as reflected in the names of Dutch and Austrian European populist right parties, is the ability to espouse views that do not align with democratic values. As provocations and rhetoric designed to attract media attention are increasingly framed in terms of freedom of expression, the fight against disinformation is becoming increasingly important in European countries. Legal regulations legitimized through disinformation originating particularly from Russia are also affecting the European populist right.

Independence

Another facet of freedom is independence. Russia views the European populist right as representing the people against the elites. Therefore, it supports the independence of European peoples in their opposition to their own elites. In European populist literature, politics against the elites is politics against the ‘established parties’. Europe’s established system also tries to prevent populists from participating in decision-making processes by drawing political boundaries.

In every European country, from Austria and the Netherlands to Italy and Hungary and the Czech Republic, politics now revolves around those in favor of and those opposed to integration with the EU. However, from the perspective of the European populist right, the sides in the political struggle are not pro-EU and anti-EU, but real people and Europeanized elites. It is hardly surprising that US populists also claim to support the ‘real people’. In this context, Musk’s speech of support at the AfD congress could be seen as an attempt to free the ‘real people’ from elite domination.

Another favorite topic of the populist right is ‘direct democracy’. The Swiss model of direct Democracy and confederalism are presented as a formula to save the EU’s political existence, but they actually conceal a Europe that has lost its political unity and declined in power. Paradoxically, therefore, the proponents of plebiscitary democracy, supported by both the US and Russia, are the European peoples themselves, who are concerned about preserving their identities. Those who advocate federal ideas based on the romantic notion that a unified political structure will emerge from a world of satisfied social interests also belong to the European populist right.

Another argument of the European populist right is that they alone can internalize the system of democratic values. This tendency makes the European populist right defensive and passive. The exclusionary tendencies of European peoples now stem not from a claim to greatness, but from a claim to authenticity. However, this claim to authenticity is increasingly diminishing amid new divisions. For example, this tendency towards division is evident among Germans, Bavarians and Munich residents. In the French populist right, the shift from Jean-Marie Le Pen’s view of French superiority to Marine Le Pen’s view of protecting ‘Frenchness’ represents an intellectual contraction. Such tendencies towards contraction and isolation are naturally supported by both the US and Russia.

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n its early years, the World Economic Forum was born from a well-intentioned vision, serious intellectual effort and a quest for technical governance. When Klaus Schwab launched the Forum nearly sixty years ago, his primary aim was to strengthen the institutional capacity of Western industry and establish a healthy dialogue between corporate executives and decision-makers.

However, from the second half of the 1990s onwards, the rapid financialization of capitalism, coupled with the growing influence of new types of sponsors and global capital actors on the Forum, began to fundamentally alter the spirit of Davos. The dominance of financial capitalism and the increasingly theatrical nature of the event have eroded its intellectual weight.

It is now debatable whether the World Economic Forum should continue to be held in Davos. Davos’s reputation has suffered serious erosion over time.

The golden age: The centre of neoliberal globalization (1990-2008)

The early 1990s marked a historical turning point for both the international system and Davos’s institutional identity. The unipolar world order that emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union reinforced the global perception that liberal democracy and the free market were ‘without alternative’. This period was symbolized by Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis and marked the ideological triumph of neoliberal globalization.

Davos thus became the most visible showcase of the Western-centric global order in this new atmosphere. The principles of the Washington Consensus — privatization, deregulation, free trade and fiscal discipline — were discussed at Davos and virtually transformed into global norms. The invisible coordination mechanism formed between the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Economic Forum created intellectual and political legitimacy for reform packages that imposed the neoliberal market economy on developing countries.

Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Davos was a platform on which state leaders, central bank governors, financial institution executives, and CEOs of multinational companies effectively shaped global economic policies. Representatives of ‘Third Way’ politics, such as Clinton and Blair, met with global finance and technology figures, such as Soros, Gates and Greenspan, on the same ground. They constantly promoted the idea that market capitalism and neoliberal democracy were compatible and sustainable.

From the early 2000s onwards, the first wave of digitalization played a significant role in the transformation of Davos. The rise of the internet economy saw Silicon Valley–based technology companies join the ranks of the global elite, with Google, Microsoft and Amazon becoming the new stars of the forum. The pioneers of digital capitalism began to represent not only technological innovations at Davos, but also new power relations.

However, this ‘golden age’ turned into a period in which the fragilities of the neoliberal system deepened, in stark contrast to the name given to the era. Excessive financial market liberalization, deteriorating income distribution, weakening real production and uncontrolled speculative capital growth made the global economy increasingly fragile. Sadly, Davos participants largely ignored these risks, and consequently the period from 1990 to 2008 represents both the most brilliant and the most problematic phase in Davos’ history.

Cracks in the neoliberal wing: The 2008 crisis and the erosion of legitimacy (2008-2016)

The global financial crisis of 2008 has gone down in history as the most severe structural test of the neoliberal globalisation model. The collapse that began in the US mortgage market quickly spread to the global banking system, and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers revealed just how fragile the financial system had become. This crisis was not just an economic collapse; it also signified the intellectual bankruptcy of the market-centred order that had been staunchly defended at the World Economic Forum’s Davos Summit for years.

Following the crisis, Western governments were forced to implement extraordinary interventions that contradicted the free market rhetoric of previous years. Trillions of dollars of public funds were used to bail out banks that were ‘too big to fail’; losses were socialised while profits remained in the private sector. This situation undermined the justice and legitimacy of market capitalism profoundly.

For Davos, this period marked the beginning of a serious loss of credibility. Many of the forum’s leading figures had supported policies advocating financial liberalisation and downplaying risks, which led to the crisis. Despite this, there was no real process of self-criticism by these same actors at Davos in the post-crisis period; responsibility was attributed to ‘wrong practices’ rather than the system’s structural problems.

The Occupy Wall Street movement and similar protests that emerged in this environment were among the first major indicators of a mass reaction against the global elite order represented by Davos. The slogan ‘the 99% against the 1%’ symbolised the collapse of the neoliberal system’s social legitimacy. Davos was now perceived as both an economic forum and a symbol of global inequality.

By the mid-2010s, the Davos Summit had become a ‘post-crisis platform’, attempting to mitigate the effects of the crisis rather than determining the direction of the global economy. Consequently, the period between 2008 and 2016 can be viewed as a transitional phase leading to the ‘inevitable end’ of Davos. The confidence of the neoliberal golden age gave way to uncertainty, with ideological certainty making way for defensive rhetoric. The erosion of legitimacy deepened during these years.

The Trump Earthquake, Brexit and the Dissolution of the Atlantic (2016-2022)

2016 was a turning point for the global liberal order represented by Davos. The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union and Donald Trump’s election as US president revealed the collapse of the political and economic consensus that had been established in the Western world for decades. These developments were not just a matter of domestic policy preferences, but also reflected accumulated social reactions against globalization in politics.

Trump’s ‘America First’ doctrine conflicted directly with Davos’s fundamental values, such as free trade, multilateralism, and institutional cooperation. The US pursued policies that rendered the World Trade Organization ineffective, initiated trade wars with its allies and demonstrated a tendency to withdraw unilaterally from international agreements. In this process, Washington became the biggest challenger to the liberal order it had defended for many years. In his second term, Trump has taken his policies and strategies even further.

Brexit showed that the idea of the irreversibility of European integration was a misconception. The British referendum clearly exposed structural problems in the economic and political architecture of the European Union, and the discourse of national sovereignty regained strength.

During this period, NATO’s role has also been subject to serious scrutiny. Meanwhile, China’s economic and technological growth has further complicated the global balance of power.

Against this backdrop of geopolitical fragmentation, the World Economic Forum in Davos has sought to defend globalization and preserve the existing order. However, Davos’s greatest weakness during this period was its tendency to view rising nationalism and sovereignty demands as a ‘temporary deviation’. The socio-economic causes of populist movements were not analyzed in depth; it was assumed that the process could be managed through cosmetic reforms to the system.

By 2020, Davos had regressed from determining the direction of the global system to defending an order that was seemingly disintegrating. Political fragmentation along the Atlantic axis has also greatly eroded the forum’s historical role. Therefore, the period from 2016 to 2022 can be defined as a phase of ‘inability to adapt’ for Davos.

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he United States has agreed to cut tariffs on Indian goods to 18% from as high as 50% in exchange for India halting purchases of Russian oil and lowering trade barriers, US President Donald Trump announced on Monday.

Trump said the agreement followed a call with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and would see India replace Russian oil with purchases from the United States and potentially Venezuela.

A White House official told Reuters the US would remove a punitive 25% duty imposed over India’s Russian oil imports, which had been added to a separate 25% “reciprocal” tariff.

Markets rally

US-listed shares of major Indian firms rose sharply after the announcement. Infosys gained 4.3%, Wipro rose 6.8%, HDFC Bank climbed 4.4%, and the iShares MSCI India ETF jumped 3%.

The deal also boosted broader US market sentiment, particularly among technology and semiconductor stocks.

Trump said India would “BUY AMERICAN at a much higher level,” including more than $500 billion in US energy purchases, as well as technology, agricultural, and other products. He added that India would move to reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers on US goods to zero.

However, few details were provided on implementation timelines, enforcement mechanisms, or the scope of India’s commitments. As of Monday afternoon, no presidential proclamation or Federal Register notice had been issued to formalize the changes.

India’s commerce and foreign ministries did not immediately comment, and Russia’s embassy in Washington also declined to respond.

Mixed reaction in the U..S

Economists said the deal brings India closer to tariff levels faced by other major Asian exporters.

“This puts India broadly in line with its Asian peers on tariff rates,” said Madhavi Arora of Emkay Global, adding that it would ease pressure on Indian exports and the rupee after months of investor outflows triggered by higher U.S. tariffs.

US business groups reacted cautiously. The US Chamber of Commerce called the announcement a positive step toward a broader trade agreement.

But a coalition of more than 800 small businesses, operating under the name “We Pay the Tariffs,” warned the deal still represents a sharp increase in costs for US importers, noting tariffs on Indian goods were around 2% to 3% in 2024.

Modi welcomed the announcement, thanking Trump for lowering tariffs on Indian products.

“Delighted that Made in India products will now have a reduced tariff of 18%,” Modi wrote on X, calling the move beneficial for India’s 1.4 billion people.

India’s Trade Minister Piyush Goyal said the deal would deepen economic ties and help India access US technology.

Oil geopolitics

India, the world’s third-largest oil importer, relies on imports for about 90% of its needs. Cheaper Russian crude has been central to its energy strategy since the war in Ukraine, though purchases have begun to decline in recent months.

Analysts said U.S. and Venezuelan oil could partly replace Russian supplies, reshaping energy flows as Washington pushes trade partners to distance themselves from Moscow.

The agreement comes amid a broader push by the Trump administration to finalize trade frameworks with key partners ahead of a US Supreme Court ruling on the legality of Trump’s “reciprocal” tariffs.

(Source: Reuters)

E

ight decades after the establishment of United Nations, humanity still faces an alarming rise in conflict. According to the Global Peace Index, more countries are involved in active conflict today than at any given time since World War II.

Lacking effective enforcement mechanisms, the U.N. remains embedded in a post-colonial power hierarchy that privileges dominant states and functions more as a mechanism that reflects existing power dynamics.

Post-1945 conflict trends emphasize this structural weakness. Significant here is the role of the United States. The U.S. military has been engaged in conflicts across the world at virtually all times over the past century. The United States has never experienced a period in which its armed forces were entirely disengaged from conflict. Post second world war, U.S. military action has increasingly occurred without formal declarations of war, relying instead on executive authority, congressional authorizations (such as the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force ), or broad interpretations of self-defense and preemptive wars.

Washington has invoked the U.N. to confer legality and legitimacy on the use of force when multilateral authorization has aligned with U.S. strategic interests. When it has not, the U.S. has demonstrated a consistent willingness to act unilaterally or through alliances of willing bypassing the U.N. framework altogether.

This selective multilateralism has often been justified through expansive references to the “international world order”, a term frequently employed as a flexible political narrative that legitimizes U.S. action while accommodating exceptions for itself. In practice, international law is treated arbitrarily, invoked when useful and sidelined when constrained.

Is International Law subordinate to power?

Today’s American behavior is reminiscent of a declining power which feels increasingly threatened by external forces and is therefore willing to contradict the very architecture of international law it once helped create.

On January 7, 2026, President Donald J. Trump signed a memorandum initiating U.S. withdrawal from 66 international organizations, including 31 United Nations bodies such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) , and UN Women. Since returning to office for a second term, Trump has cut funds to the United Nations, exited from the Human Rights Council and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), continued suspension of support for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), withdrew from the World Health Organization (WHO)  as well as the Paris Climate Agreement.

The institutions deemed expendable are overwhelmingly those concerned with human rights, climate governance, and humanitarian relief. The administration has justified these moves on the grounds of “national interest.” This, however, is a display of selective disengagement from norms that impose political or economic costs.

As such hegemonic actors violate international norms, where enforcement mechanisms effectively collapse. Condemnation alone is insufficient.

The same logic is applicable in Washington’s actions in Venezuela. In a direct violation of state sovereignty, the United States led an intervention to seize President Nicolás Maduro and assert indefinite control over Venezuelan oil revenues. U.N. human rights bodies condemned the act as a breach of the U.N. Charter and international law, warning of its destabilizing consequences.

Trump’s open statements regarding Greenland further extend this posture. By explicitly keeping the use of force “on the table,” the U.S. president normalized territorial acquisition rhetoric that international law was designed to eliminate in the first place. Any such action would constitute an unprecedented intra-NATO confrontation, threatening the coherence of the alliance system itself.

This moment has also bought forth growing transatlantic divergence. European leaders have criticized Washington’s increasingly unilateral and coercive approach. For the first time in decades, the United States and Europe appear contradicting the fundamental principles holding the post-war international order.

Humanitarian discourse has become strategically selective. While the U.S. administration has voiced concern for Iranian protesters amid domestic unrest, it has simultaneously shielded and supported Israeli actions in Gaza. The value of human life varies with geography.

The import of democracy has always been pursued in continuation of U.S. geopolitical interests rather than supporting idea of democracy in principle. U.S. interventions are shaped only by strategic interests, particularly around oil and regional influence. Interventions in energy-rich regions, rising unilateralism, and institutional retreat, indicate anxiety over economic instability, mounting debt, and the weakening centrality of the dollar.

United States’s retreat from international institutions and violations of international law only further damaged an already fragile global system. As power politics reassert themselves, international law lays formally intact but practically hollow. International systems, long shaped by colonial hierarchies and power asymmetries, have been fraying for decades. What is new is its plain brazenness.

Global solidarity is not a finite resource 

Historically, some conflicts have attracted far more international attention than others.

What, then, determines whose suffering matters most? Why does the global response to contemporary wars reveal a clear hierarchy of concern and intervention?

In principle, international law exists to promote peace and equality. In practice, however, the international system is deeply anarchic and increasingly governed by power politics. This dynamic produces selective engagement, in which humanitarian response is activated through geopolitical relevance.

Patterns of neglect persist across parts of Africa; Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and the Sahel, where prolonged violence generates little more than episodic concern. By contrast, conflicts situated along critical energy corridors, alliance systems, or great-power rivalries prompt emergency summits, sanctions regimes, and continuous media attention.

Both military intervention and strategic non-intervention have consistently generated large-scale displacement, producing refugee flows that are later treated as external burdens rather than consequences. Rising anti-migrant sentiment and increasingly restrictive asylum policies are against the spirit of international humanitarian laws. If migration is framed as a threat, then its root causes must also be acknowledged as policy outcomes but the same states that shape these conflicts often adopt restrictive and exclusionary migration policies when displacement reaches their borders.

Are humanitarian principles universal?

Humanitarian principles, therefore, are not universally applied. Intervention is guided by political calculation. In such a system, human suffering is bound to become stratified, with some lives rendered more visible, and more valuable, than others. Beyond ethical inconsistency, this selective engagement erodes the credibility of global humanitarian advocacy and weakens collective leverage within international institutions, allowing entire regions to remain structurally marginalized.

U.N. possesses normative authority grounded in international law, but its decisions have often remained unenforceable in practice, beyond mere verbal criticism. It lacks enforcement power and effectiveness as a mechanism for both conflict prevention and management. Entrenched power asymmetries, most visibly within the U.N. Security Council, have hollowed out the organization’s capacity to act impartially. Compliance has largely remained contingent upon the political will of states rather than legal obligation. Over the years, this has significantly damaged the credibility of international law, as state interests repeatedly superseded collective wellbeing.

Global solidarity within the U.N. framework is not a finite resource but unless international institutions are restructured to prioritize the idea of universal human rights over strategic hierarchy, conflict prevention will remain aspirational.

On a hot morning in Bamako, Mali’s junta lined up before cameras to bless a new Russian‑backed gold refinery, promising “greater control” over national resources. Yet the project is more than a ribbon‑cutting. It sits inside a wider package: Talks on civil nuclear cooperation, exploration of uranium and lithium, a long‑term play on critical minerals in a sanctioned, fragile state. The deal only moved after Mali rewrote its mining code to give the state a larger share and the power to reopen old contracts, unsettling Western firms that had grown used to easier terms.​

At first glance, this looks like yet another scene in a familiar drama: Big powers chasing African resources, ports and UN votes while local governments scramble for attention. Look a little closer and the script changes. From the Sahel to Southern Africa, governments are using Russian security and mining offers, Chinese training schemes and Western climate and energy money to renegotiate conditions, delay deals that no longer suit them and quietly diversify their options.​

From security contracts to mineral leverage

Russia’s new African story is usually told in uniforms and hardware. Arms deliveries, military advisers and the rebranding of Wagner into the “Africa Corps” turned Mali and its neighbors into symbols of Moscow’s return to the Sahel. But the security tale now blends into a deeper one: A “security‑for‑resources” model that trades battlefield support and diplomatic protection for access to gold, uranium and other strategic minerals.​

Mali is the central case. Since 2023, Bamako and Moscow have moved from ad‑hoc cooperation to more formal road maps: The refinery, geological surveys, nuclear collaboration, a growing presence around gold and promising lithium deposits. Security trainers and mining geologists travel separate circuits, yet they reinforce the same bargain: Russian backing in exchange for a real say over who profits from Mali’s subsoil. In Niger, audits and the suspension of new mining licenses send a similar message: Contracts around uranium and other minerals will be written on new terms, whoever the partner may be.​

This is not a neat pro‑Russian bloc. Far from it. Sahel capitals still talk to Gulf funds, keep lines open to European lenders, leave space for Chinese investors. What has changed is the negotiating table. The option of handing a concession to a Russian company – or swapping Western trainers for Africa Corps units – gives local authorities harder leverage when they sit down with Western or Chinese teams. Even when Moscow does not win a project, its shadow helps African leaders push for higher state participation, tougher local content rules, and offers them political cover when they break with old security patrons.​

China’s training offensive and the power of quiet networks

While Russia leans on guns and gold, China has spent years building a quieter, slower kind of influence. Beyond ports and railways, Beijing has turned scholarships and training into one of the central tools of its Africa policy. Chinese Government Scholarship schemes for African students now offer fully funded master’s and PhD positions, often in coordination with the African Union and national ministries. Parallel mid‑career courses for civil servants and local officials, including “Youth of Excellence” programs, package public administration, infrastructure management and governance skills into short, intensive modules.​

This people‑to‑people offensive is less dramatic than a port or a dam, but it may prove more durable. Thousands of African students and officials pass through Chinese universities, provincial academies and party schools, exposed to how Beijing manages industrial zones, digital infrastructure and local finance. Over time, that creates something softer than dependency and harder to undo than a single loan: Shared jargon, institutional templates, a comfort with Chinese systems. It also produces quiet networks: Alumni chats, WhatsApp groups, personal contacts that can bypass embassies when a problem or opportunity appears.​

African actors treat these offers with a cool eye. Students in Lagos or Addis Ababa apply for Chinese scholarships while still chasing European or Gulf‑funded programs. Officials might spend two weeks in Beijing, then appear a month later at an EU‑funded seminar on climate data or migration management. Not everyone in these capitals is betting on Moscow or Beijing. They are shopping around, collecting tools and contacts, deciding what fits domestic politics and discarding what does not. In an environment where Western technical help often comes wrapped in sharper political conditions, simply having several training and scholarship channels gives bureaucracies breathing space.​

The Trump factor and a tired West

Donald Trump’s return to the White House has not rewritten Washington’s Africa playbook so much as stripped it down. The mood is more openly transactional: Security cooperation and financing tied to clear quid pro quos on critical minerals, migration control and voting behavior in international forums. Aid lines and development programs feel less secure, subject to sudden reviews or cuts if they collide with domestic messaging or budget battles in Washington. African governments have already seen how quickly a “priority” can disappear.​

Europe, on paper, looks like the steadier partner. Brussels continues to talk up a multi‑billion Global Gateway investment package for digital, energy and transport links with Africa, branding the relationship as “equal” and “green”. Yet behind the sums sit dense conditions on governance, refugee returns and climate performance, written into development and energy deals. At the same time, the EU’s decision to phase out Russian gas and speed up its energy transition is pulling African producers deeper into its plans, from LNG and pipeline gas to green hydrogen.

For African capitals, the past decade has offered enough reminders. Western priorities swing from counterterrorism to pandemics, from Ukraine to critical minerals; the money follows those swings. This does not mean U.S. security guarantees or European technology have lost their appeal. It does mean fewer governments are willing to pin their budgets or their armies on a single Western pillar, and more are ready to fold U.S. and E.U. offers into a wider mix of Russian, Chinese and Gulf options.​

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ATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said Wednesday that Ukraine must remain the alliance’s top priority, warning against distractions such as territorial disputes over Greenland while Russia continues its attacks on Ukraine.

Speaking at a panel discussion during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Rutte emphasized that European and US security depends on sustained military, financial, and political support for Kyiv.

Rutte stressed that while issues like Greenland should be addressed through dialogue, they should not overshadow the war in Ukraine.

“Focus in Ukraine should be our number one priority, and then we can discuss all the issues, including Greenland,” he said, noting that Russian missiles and drones are continuing to strike Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

Warning against diplomatic distractions

The NATO chief expressed concern that excessive attention to secondary disputes could weaken collective resolve at a critical moment in the conflict.

“As we speak, Russian attacks are ongoing,” Rutte said, warning that losing focus could undermine efforts to support Ukraine’s defense.

Rutte acknowledged the importance of diplomatic initiatives and financial backing, including the EU-led €90 billion ($105 billion) support package, but said immediate military assistance remains essential.

He underscored the need to ensure Ukraine has sufficient resources to defend itself against Russian aggression.

Transatlantic unity at the core of NATO

Highlighting NATO’s integrated defense system, Rutte reaffirmed the alliance’s reliance on strong cooperation between Europe and the United States.

He noted that European countries have increased defense spending in response to US expectations and stressed mutual commitment within the alliance.

“I have no doubt the US will come to the rescue here, and we will come to the rescue of the US,” Rutte said, emphasizing NATO’s collective security principle.

Rutte concluded by stressing that NATO’s effectiveness depends on unity and sustained investment in defense capabilities on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly as the war in Ukraine continues to shape the security landscape in Europe and beyond.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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merican President Donald Trump is moving forward with plans to establish a new international body known as the “Board of Peace,” an initiative that began as a mechanism to oversee the Gaza ceasefire but has since expanded into a far broader concept with global ambitions.

The Trump administration now envisions the board as a wide-ranging peace-building forum that could broker conflicts beyond Gaza and potentially rival the United Nations, particularly the U.N. Security Council. More details are expected Thursday, when Trump is scheduled to discuss the initiative at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

Speaking at the White House on Tuesday, Trump sharply criticized the United Nations, saying it “has never lived up to its potential” and suggesting the Board of Peace “might” replace it, though he added that the U.N. should continue to exist.

Broad mandate, centralized authority

While the board’s charter has not yet been publicly released, a draft obtained by The Associated Press indicates that significant authority would be concentrated in the hands of the chairman — a role Trump has said he will hold. Under the draft, the chairman would have the power to invite members, break tie votes, determine meeting schedules, and create or dissolve subsidiary bodies.

The document describes the board as a “more nimble and effective international peace-building body,” arguing that existing institutions have too often failed to deliver lasting peace. Funding would come from member-state contributions, with three-year terms for members. Countries contributing more than $1 billion in cash during their first year would be eligible for permanent membership.

U.S. officials stressed that the draft remains under revision and could change significantly before being shown publicly.

Countries invited and responses so far

According to U.S. and diplomatic sources, several countries have already agreed to participate, including the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, Hungary, Argentina and Belarus.

Invitation letters have also been sent to leaders including Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Paraguayan President Santiago Peña. Russia, Israel, India, Slovenia, Thailand and the European Union’s executive arm have confirmed receiving invitations.

The Kremlin said it is reviewing the proposal, with spokesman Dmitry Peskov stating that Moscow seeks clarification on “all the nuances.” Trump confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin has been invited.

Israel has also been asked to join, though it remains unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will accept. Israeli officials have voiced concerns about the board’s composition, particularly Türkiye’s inclusion, which they say was not coordinated with Israel.

France has already declined to participate. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said Paris supports implementing the Gaza peace plan but opposes creating a new organization that could replace the United Nations.

Additional boards and Gaza implementation

The White House announced that an executive board will support the Board of Peace’s broader vision. Its members include U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Trump envoy Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Apollo Global Management CEO Marc Rowan, World Bank President Ajay Banga and Deputy National Security Adviser Robert Gabriel.

A separate Gaza Executive Board will oversee implementation of the second phase of the Gaza ceasefire, including deploying an international security force, disarming Hamas and rebuilding the territory. Former U.N. Middle East envoy Nickolay Mladenov is expected to manage day-to-day operations, alongside representatives from the U.S., Türkiye, Qatar, Egypt, the UAE, Israel and Europe.

The Gaza Executive Board will also supervise a committee of Palestinian technocrats tasked with managing Gaza’s daily civil affairs.

As invitations continue and details remain fluid, the Board of Peace is shaping up as one of the most ambitious foreign policy initiatives of Trump’s presidency.

(Source: The Associated Press)

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n early December, the Trump administration published the 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS), which will guide the administration’s actions in the coming year. From a general perspective, it is clear that this strategy signals a significant shift in American foreign policy priorities. It reflects a deeper transformation in how the United States understands power itself. In this broader context, technology, particularly artificial intelligence, is not merely a means to an end, but a strategy in and of itself. Economic security, military deterrence, alliance management, and competition with China are all reframed through technological control, access, and leverage.

This marks a departure from the values-driven, institution-centered multilateralism that shaped earlier strategies. The new NSS instead advances a transactional, pragmatic, and interest-based vision, measuring national advantage by who controls the critical technological systems that underpin the global economy and modern warfare. In this framework, AI, advanced semiconductors, data infrastructure, and supply chains are not neutral tools; rather, they are the terrain on which geopolitical influence is exercised.

Technology as the core of national US interests

The strategy narrows the definition of U.S. national interests, focusing on tangible economic and security outcomes. Technology sits at the center of this calculation. Leadership in artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, autonomous systems, and enabling digital infrastructure is essential not only to innovation, but also to military superiority and global influence. The NSS makes this clear: Losing technological primacy would erode deterrence, weaken the industrial base, and diminish U.S. leverage abroad.

This technological framing reshapes traditional notions of power. While earlier strategies — especially the one released by the Biden administration — emphasized international norms, institutions, and democratic alignment, the 2025 NSS prioritizes control over technological ecosystems (i.e., standards, platforms, data flows, and supply chains). Power is no longer primarily defined by who sets the rules of international order but by who builds, owns, and governs the systems on which others depend. This new tech-dominated type of realpolitik has been apparent for some time, but the strategy is unusually explicit in acknowledging it and adapting U.S. policy to the new strategic environment.

Economic security is technological security

This is most evident in the treatment of economic policy. Trade, tariffs, export controls, industrial policy, and reshoring have been elevated from economic instruments to core tools of national security. The strategy explicitly endorses the use of tariffs and regulatory leverage to promote reindustrialization and protect domestic production in critical and emerging technology sectors.

This is not just about jobs or competitiveness. It’s about ensuring the technological resources necessary for AI, such as advanced chips, rare earth elements, energy, and data infrastructure, remain secure and accessible to the United States and its allies. Supply chains are described as strategic vulnerabilities and critical minerals as assets whose control will shape the future balance of technological power.

Compared to the Biden administration’s emphasis on “friend-shoring” and incentive-based coordination, the 2025 NSS takes a more coercive approach. Alignment is enforced through access and restriction. Markets are opened or closed based on strategic usefulness. Economic openness becomes conditional on technological alignment.

Export controls illustrate this shift most clearly. While the NSS maintains many Biden-era restrictions on advanced semiconductors and AI-related technologies, it reframes these restrictions in explicitly transactional terms. Export controls are not just about denying adversaries access; they are also about establishing a hierarchy of technological access.

Countries that align their export control regimes with U.S. standards are rewarded with preferential licensing, deeper technological cooperation, and access to the U.S. “AI stack” — the integrated ecosystem of advanced semiconductors, cloud infrastructure, data platforms, software frameworks, and standards that underpin modern AI development and deployment. Conversely, those countries that do not align with U.S. standards risk exclusion. In effect, export controls become tools for managing alliances and promoting technological discipline, shaping global innovation pathways through incentives and constraints. Simply put, this is a new form of the “carrot and stick” policy.

This approach signals a shift from multilateral governance to managed technological blocs. Standards are no longer negotiated as global public goods but rather leveraged as instruments of influence. Consequently, technology governance becomes a form of geopolitical bargaining.

China: Technological competition without ideological crusade

The strategy’s treatment of China reinforces this logic. Although China was officially and explicitly defined as a strategic competitor and a revisionist power challenging U.S. interests through technology, economics, and military modernization in Trump’s 2017 NSS, the latest NSS still identifies China as the central strategic competitor. However, the strategy avoids framing the relationship as a rivalry. Instead, the strategy emphasizes the technological and economic competition relating to subsidies, intellectual property theft, supply chain leverage, and market distortion.

The focus has shifted from reshaping China’s behavior through international norms or institutions to constraining its capacity to dominate the technological foundations of the global economy. Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, cloud infrastructure, and digital platforms have emerged as the primary arenas of competition. In this sense, the strategy reflects a shift in objectives and instruments—from an explicit decoupling logic to a rebalancing one. The aim is to limit China’s technological reach while maintaining a certain degree of managed economic interaction.

In this light, the shift is both pragmatic and understandable. Elements of decoupling are already underway and are unlikely to be reversed. They have simply receded into the background of policy discourse. China’s intensified focus on advanced chip design and the U.S.’s efforts to bring semiconductor manufacturing back home, expand fabrication capacity, and secure alternative supply chains for rare earth minerals all point to a gradual but ongoing process of technological separation.

These dynamics suggest that decoupling is unfolding structurally, even if it is no longer articulated as a central policy objective. Rather than accelerating this process rhetorically, the United States appears to accept its long time horizon, choosing to manage competition in the present while the deeper reconfiguration of technological interdependence continues in parallel.

This approach reflects the belief that technological dominance, rather than ideological alignment, will determine long-term power. China is not portrayed as an adversary to be defeated but rather as a system to be counterbalanced through tariffs, export controls, and the strategic promotion of U.S. technologies abroad.

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ussian President Vladimir Putin visited India for the 23rd annual Russia-India summit on December 4-5, after a four-year absence. His visit signaled that the two countries’ fundamental national interests remain aligned as the global order shifts. India relies on Russia for defense equipment and affordable energy, while Russia needs a reliable economic and strategic partner outside the West. The most important takeaway from the visit was that the relationship between the two countries is strategic, not merely transactional, despite global turbulence.

Putin’s visit coincided with a challenging period for both countries. For Delhi, 2025 was the most challenging year in terms of foreign policy. The four-day conflict between India and Pakistan in May marked the worst period of hostility between the two countries in a long time. During Donald Trump’s second term as US president, he accused India of purchasing Russian crude oil, causing a sudden and sharp decline in India-US relations. Trump’s summit with Putin in Alaska signaled a strategic realignment of US policy aimed at repairing Washington’s frayed ties with Moscow. However, Trump’s overall stance is inconsistent. Moscow is dissatisfied with Washington due to its inconsistent support for Ukraine.

Due to their current problems with the US since Trump’s second term, both countries are turning to each other. India-Russia relations are strengthened by reliable arms supply and energy access, which serve as a buffer against isolation and Chinese dominance. However, expecting Russia to help India resolve its border disputes with China would be too much to ask of Russia. However, India’s ties with Russia are forcing the US to offer better terms, and Russia’s interaction with the US is forcing it to keep India as a partner.

Putin’s visit confirmed that maintaining Delhi’s strategic autonomy requires keeping all channels open. It also sent a clear signal that India and Russia are strong allies. Turbulence in India-U.S. relations, caused by Trump’s pressure tactics, led Delhi to realize that it was not indispensable. Ultimately, Prime Minister Narendra Modi misread India’s influence on the global stage, a fact that both Trump and Chinese President Xi made clear.

The roots of the relationship

Let’s start by listening to what Modi said when he first came to power, despite often being criticized in India as pro-US:

“If you ask any of the more than one billion people living in India who our country’s greatest friend is, everyone knows it’s Russia. India’s ties with Russia are incomparable. Since 1947, India-Russia relations have been the only constant in a rapidly changing world. They have stood the test of time and grown stronger. The resilience of our relationship is based on the principles of equality, trust, and mutual benefit.”

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, geopolitical pressure from the United States, China, and Pakistan kept India away from the West, led by the United States, and steered it toward closer relations with the Soviet Union. The Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation Treaty, signed in 1971, established a foundation of trust between the two countries. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, close trade partnerships and strategic ties were further strengthened.

The India-Soviet Union rapprochement, whose foundations were firmly laid during that period, continues to manifest itself in India-Russia relations today. Although Delhi displays a closer stance toward the US today, its deep-rooted ties with Moscow remain important as a “balancing alternative.” China’s assertiveness and Washington’s unpredictability make Moscow an important factor in India’s calculations.

During the Cold War, India emerged as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement. At the same time, however, India sought to develop a “special relationship” with the Soviet Union. Incidentally, the nonalignment policy itself was problematic because members of the Non-Aligned Movement were tied to the superpower blocs to some extent. As bilateral relations developed, the Soviets became an “irreplaceable counterbalancing force” in addressing India’s regional and international concerns.

The Soviets remained India’s largest trading partner until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their material and technical support formed the basis of many local industries in India. They provided India with all military production lines, from aircraft to tanks, and played a significant role in developing the Indian Navy. Mindful of the balance between the U.S. and China, the Soviet Union focused on strengthening India’s military capabilities (and Russia still does today).

Although intense interactions in bilateral relations were disrupted during the first decade after the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, the foundation of trust and friendship established during that time continued. Relations with the Russian Federation after the Cold War were restructured. Moscow’s primary motivation was and remains the pursuit of multipolarity. Moscow proposes creating a “strategic triangle” among India, Russia, and China to stabilize international security and effectively counterbalance the unipolarity led by the U.S. after the Cold War. However, the lack of trust between Delhi and Beijing hinders this goal. Nevertheless, the quest for multipolarity spearheaded by Moscow remains common ground among the three countries.

India-Russia relations grew closer when Vladimir Putin became president in 2000, and the two countries upgraded their relationship from a strategic partnership to a special and privileged strategic partnership in 2010. The most important pillar of bilateral relations is defense cooperation, and Russia is a “proven and tested” partner in this regard. Moscow provides Delhi with advanced defense equipment and sensitive military technologies. Russia is also the only country with which India has an institutionalized mechanism for high-tech transfer and joint production. Civil nuclear cooperation is particularly important; Russia is currently the only country building nuclear power plants in India.

However, India is concerned about Russia’s strategic coordination with China and its growing closeness to Pakistan. Moscow’s stance toward Beijing and Islamabad could lead to a new test of trust in its relations with Delhi. In the past, the Soviet Union was India’s primary supplier of arms, economic partner, and political supporter. Article 9 of the 1971 agreement provided India with a security umbrella against the U.S., China, and Pakistan.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Article 9 was abolished, and India-Russia relations became more normal and less guaranteed. Putin rebuilt the “special strategic partnership” label and has maintained strong defense ties for 25 years. The Indian armed forces remain heavily reliant on inexpensive, reliable, and powerful Russian weapons. However, the war in Ukraine has weakened Russia, brought it closer to China, and complicated India’s relations with the West. Delhi is now caught between needing Russian weapons and oil and needing Western support against Beijing. In a sense, Putin’s December visit was aimed at striking this balance and avoiding being crushed by sanctions or Russia’s war.

Today and tomorrow

Delhi’s enduring relationship with Russia is based on three critical pillars. First, defense has always formed the bedrock of the bilateral relationship. Despite Delhi’s recent efforts toward diversification and indigenous production, Moscow remains India’s primary military hardware supplier. Approximately 60-70 percent of India’s current military inventory is Russian or Soviet-made, ranging from fighter jets to submarines and tanks. High-level political engagement is required to ensure the continuous supply of spare parts, modernization, and maintenance support, all of which are vital for operational readiness.

Consequently, Russia still accounts for approximately 45% of India’s defense exports. Putin’s visit in December was significant in that there was a shift in defense policy from “just buy” to “produce together in India,” though Russia will retain veto power over many exports and core technologies. Putin’s visit further solidified Russia’s role as India’s long-term supplier of oil, fertilizers, critical minerals, nuclear reactors, and access to the Arctic. Despite Trump’s objections, Russia has guaranteed India an “uninterrupted” supply of oil and fuel. Fertilizers and energy are the most pressing issues; without them, Indian farmers and industries would suffer. Therefore, Delhi will not abandon Moscow.

Before 1991, India operated a socialist-style planned economy. Russia (the Soviet Union) was a natural partner because it had the same model and was India’s largest trading partner. When India transitioned to a market economy in 1991, Russia collapsed and experienced economic decline, resulting in the severing of economic ties, though defense ties remained strong. After 1991, Delhi’s real economic partners became Western countries. Moscow itself wanted the West, not India. The post-Ukraine war increase in trade was not real. However, Putin’s December visit reshaped the trade dynamics between the two countries, making the economy a central focus.

The India-Russia Economic Cooperation Program aims to reach an annual trade value of $100 billion by 2030. The two countries are also making progress on a free trade agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union. They are also establishing alternative currency channels using the rupee and the ruble to facilitate trade outside of Western control. Using national currencies for payments will facilitate greater exports from India to Russia. There is a substantial trade imbalance between the two countries. India needs to increase its exports to Russia; otherwise, the rupee pile will become problematic.

T

he United States’ 2025 National Security and Strategy Document is essentially a manifesto of the ‘New American Order’ that Trump has been trying to verbally convey to the world, primarily to the European continent, since his first term as president in 2017. In a sense, the Washington administration has codified what Europe perceives as Trump’s personal delusions into a written set of principles. When examining this document, which consists of 24 key points, it is necessary to begin by recalling two politicians from the 19th century.

The first of these was James Monroe, the fifth President of the United States, who pioneered US policies aimed at isolating the American continent as a whole from the rest of the world. From 1823 onwards, Monroe shaped his country’s global diplomatic course for nearly a century, until the First World War, through the doctrine that bears his name. During Monroe’s presidency, the colonial powers of Europe—France, the United Kingdom, and the Kingdom of Spain—still ruled over territories in North and South America. The state of Texas had not yet joined the United States. Monroe’s doctrine aimed to keep the United States out of the affairs of the rest of the world, while also opposing the presence of European powers on the American continent.

Looking at the 2025 National Security and Strategy Document, as well as the United States’ current military actions in Venezuela, we see that the European powers in the Monroe Doctrine have been replaced by the People’s Republic of China, Russia and even Iran. With the change of government in Bolivia, the US has moved to oust China and Russia from the country’s rare earth element deposits. In Chile, the election of a right-wing president will likely result in the transfer of the country’s rich copper deposits from China to the United States. It is not difficult to predict that Iran and Russia’s dominance over Venezuelan oil will not last long. Let us now turn to another important statesman of the 19th century, whose diagnosis of the United States should not be forgotten.

The United States wants to enjoy the comfort of its geographical position

This person is Otto von Bismarck, the powerful Chancellor of the German Empire, who united a loose confederation of states around the imperial throne. It is said that Bismarck summarised the geopolitical comfort afforded by the United States’ geographical position with these words: ‘Americans are a very fortunate people. They are surrounded by weak neighbours to the north and south, and by fish to the east and west.’ Today’s US administration wants to revive this diagnosis made some 150 years ago.

During the First World War, then US President Woodrow Wilson opened a breach in the Monroe Doctrine by sending troops to the European continent against Germany, sparking enthusiasm for ‘American Mandate’ among nations that did not want to fall into European hands. However, the American people reacted so strongly against involvement in European affairs that Warren Harding’s promise in 1921 to return to the isolationist Monroe Doctrine played a significant role in his election victory over Wilson.

After this date, the US felt compelled to confine itself within very strict legal frameworks of neutrality to avoid becoming involved in another war on European soil. This obsession with neutrality and isolation, which had gone beyond mere restraint and turned into a cage, reached such a point that in 1940, US President Roosevelt was unable to give a direct positive response to Britain’s requests for military aid.

Military aircraft destined for Britain were transported by horse-drawn carts from North Dakota to Canada to avoid violating neutrality laws, and from there they were able to fly to Britain. Traces of this foreign policy legacy can be found today in the US approach to the Ukraine-Russia War and in the 2025 National Strategy and Security Document.

The second Trump term’s pithy saying: ‘This is another continent’s war’

To identify these traces, let us go to a press conference held in Washington on 19 December. At the meeting, which lasted approximately two hours and during which US Secretary of State Marco Rubio answered questions from the press on global issues, the sentence he used when introducing the topic of the Ukraine-Russia War also revealed the current US perception of the world: “The Russia-Ukraine War is not our war. It is a war on another continent.” Indeed, the US National Security and Strategy Document shapes Washington’s perception of the world map as ’the Western Hemisphere and the Eastern Hemisphere.” In other words, it is no longer possible to speak of an Iron Curtain or ideological boundaries like the Berlin Wall, as was the case during the First Cold War.

On the contrary, the American continent, along with Greenland, is quite clearly defined as the United States’ natural sphere of influence, encompassing both the north and the south. This characterisation makes the pressure the US has exerted on Venezuela, its policy towards Nicaragua due to its economic cooperation with the People’s Republic of China, and its intensifying embargo against Cuba more understandable. Furthermore, Trump’s appointment of Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry as Special Representative for Greenland on 21 December 2025 is also closely related to the world map outlined in the National Security and Strategy Document.

It will certainly not be easy for Europe to accept this rhetoric, which isolates the Western Hemisphere, where the US itself is located, from the rest of the world, especially from Europe and transatlantic relations. This is because the US is not only parting ways with Europe. The document gives European civilization 20 years to live. From the US perspective, the European Union’s bureaucratic oligarchy, increasing migration, and insufficient economic resources are preparing the end of contemporary European civilization.

Going a step further than the US diagnosis on the matter, it also points to the inevitable transformation NATO will undergo due to Europe’s insufficient financing. According to the US prediction, in order to secure the financing necessary for the alliance to survive, countries outside Europe may be invited to join the alliance within 10 years. Although no country names are mentioned in the document, when it comes to financing, it is not difficult to guess that the Gulf region countries are the strongest candidates for new NATO membership seats.

Germany is the only voice on the US national security document

So what are European capitals saying about the findings in this document? So far, the only voice we have heard is that of German Chancellor Merz in his speech at the Christian Democratic Union congress in Munich on 13 December 2025. Noting that the era of ‘Pax Americana’ or ‘American Peace’ had come to an end for Germany and Europe, Merz declared that a paradigm shift was imminent, stating, ‘The Americans are aggressively defending their own interests, and we must now defend ours.’ ‘Europe must be prepared for a fundamental change in relations with the US and an increase in the threat posed by Russia,’ said the German Chancellor, pointing out that they are facing a ‘tectonic shift’ at the geopolitical level.

The question of Europe’s fate will remain on the agenda for a long time. Let us now turn to how the United States views Russia and the People’s Republic of China in this document.

R

Attacks on commercial ships in the Black Sea

Although attacks using unmanned maritime vehicles (UMVs) have occurred periodically in the Black Sea, there had not been a series of large-scale attacks until recently. However, this situation changed significantly in the last month. Since November 2025, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has begun targeting commercial vessels in the Black Sea. Ukraine has begun attacking Russia’s “shadow fleet,” which is used to circumvent sanctions. This fleet consists of commercial vessels (including tankers) traveling to Russia, which Ukraine has targeted using UMVs.

In early November, Ukraine increased its attacks on oil export infrastructure in Tuapse and Novorossiysk. Toward the end of November and beginning of December, Ukrainian UAVs hit the Gambian-flagged tankers Kairos and Virat in the Black Sea. The Kairos was attacked in the southwest part of the Black Sea, and the Virat was attacked further east in the central part. These attacks occurred at a time when Ukraine aimed to reduce Russian oil sales and prevent Moscow from financing the war.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that the attack on the Kairos and Virat ships, which were sailing in international waters in the Black Sea, was an “act of terrorism” that Russia condemns. She noted that the ships were sailing under the Gambian flag toward the port of Novorossiysk when they were attacked by unmanned naval vehicles on November 28-29. On December 2, 2025, the Russian tanker Midvolga-2, traveling from Russia to Georgia, was attacked off the coast of Sinop.

In retaliation, Russian forces have increased missile and drone attacks on Ukraine’s Odessa port. These ports are vital to Ukraine’s export-based economy, and have been crucial to the country’s economic survival throughout the nearly four-year war in Ukraine since Russia’s invasion in February 2022.

These attacks have also damaged some Turkish-owned merchant ships in Ukrainian ports. On December 13, 2025, the Turkish-owned, Panama-flagged ro-ro ship Cenk T., which was anchored in the port of Odessa, was hit by a Russian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and caught fire. The ferry was reportedly on a voyage from Karasu to Odessa and was carrying fresh fruit, vegetables, and other foodstuffs. Then, on December 26, three more ships flying the flags of Slovakia, Palau, and Liberia were reportedly damaged by Russian UAV attacks in the ports of Odessa and Mykolaiv.

Turkey’s position

Turkey has condemned the attacks on civilian vessels in the Black Sea and stated that such actions must cease. President Erdoğan emphasized that civilian vessels and critical trade routes, such as the grain corridor in the Black Sea, should not be targeted. He called on all parties to protect civilian infrastructure.

While in Turkmenistan for the International Peace and Security Forum on December 12, he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and expressed concern about attacks on ports and energy facilities in the Black Sea. He called for a “limited ceasefire” in these areas. He stated that “we cannot in any way condone these attacks, which threaten navigation, life, and environmental safety, especially in our own exclusive zone” and said that the attacks also concern Turkey’s rights and authorities in its maritime jurisdiction.

At the Ambassadors’ Conference in Ankara on December 16, the president stated that they were “conveying their warnings” to Ukraine and Russia. He added, “The recent mutual attacks seriously threaten navigation safety in the Black Sea. Targeting merchant ships and civilian vessels benefits no one. We are clearly conveying our warnings to both sides on this matter.”

Assessment

The attacks carried out by Ukraine and Russia in the Black Sea that target civilian merchant ships should undergo legal assessment. First, targeting civilian ships constitutes a violation of the fundamental rules of the law of armed conflict, even under conditions of war and even if a blockade is in place.

According to international maritime law, the movement of ships on the high seas and the authorities that may be exercised over them are regulated by the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The maritime areas beyond the territorial waters of Black Sea-bordering states constitute the relevant states’ exclusive economic zones. As a rule, exclusive economic zones have the status of the high seas for the purpose of navigation. The fundamental principle governing the legal status of the high seas is the principle of “freedom of the high seas.” According to this principle, the high seas are maritime areas not under the sovereignty of any state and can be used freely by all states, regardless of whether they have a coastline. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea also constitutes rules of customary international law, creating rights and responsibilities for all countries, even those that are not parties to the convention, such as Turkey.

Generally, all ships on the high seas (whether civilian or military, privately or state-owned) are subject to the legislative, executive, and judicial authority of the state under whose flag they are registered. In other words, no other state may exercise such authority over these ships.

R

ussia on Thursday condemned the United States’ seizure of a Russian-flagged oil tanker in the North Atlantic, calling the move a “gross violation” of international maritime law and warning it could further escalate tensions between Moscow and Washington.

In a statement, Russia’s Foreign Ministry said the tanker Marinera — formerly known as M/V Bella 1 — was seized by U.S. forces while “innocently passing through international waters” en route to a Russian port. The vessel had received temporary permission to fly the Russian flag on Dec. 24, the ministry said.

Moscow described the action as an “illegal military operation,” stressing that U.S. authorities had been repeatedly informed of the ship’s Russian registry and civilian status.

“International maritime law clearly provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state over vessels on the high seas,” the ministry said, adding that Russia neither consented to the boarding nor accepted Washington’s justification for the seizure.

Tanker was not “stateless or operating under a false flag”

The statement rejected U.S. claims that the tanker was stateless or operating under a false flag, calling such assertions unfounded. It also dismissed Washington’s reliance on U.S. sanctions legislation as lacking any legal basis under international law.

“Under these circumstances, the boarding and seizure of a peaceful vessel by U.S. military personnel, as well as the detention of its crew, can only be interpreted as a gross violation of freedom of navigation,” the ministry said.

Moscow further criticized suggestions by U.S. officials that the operation was part of a broader effort to control Venezuela’s oil exports, describing such remarks as “cynical” and reflective of “neocolonialist pretensions.”

The Foreign Ministry warned that the incident risked fueling “acute international crises,” including in Russian-American relations, and could heighten military and political tensions in the Euro-Atlantic region.

“We call on Washington to immediately cease its illegal actions against the Marinera and other vessels engaged in legitimate activities on the high seas,” the statement said.

“Shadow fleet”

U.S. forces announced on Wednesday that they had seized the tanker for alleged violations of U.S. sanctions. White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt said the vessel was considered part of Venezuela’s so-called “shadow fleet” and was transporting oil subject to U.S. restrictions.

Leavitt said the tanker was deemed stateless after sailing under a false flag and was seized under a judicial order. She added that the crew could face prosecution under U.S. federal law and be brought to the United States if necessary.

There was no immediate comment from the tanker’s operators.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

Recent developments in world politics mark a crucial turning point regarding the establishment of a global political system based on international law. Following World War II, unprecedented initiatives were undertaken to establish a common legal framework at the global level under the United Nations and at the regional level under the European Union. With the aim of preserving global peace, states came together and declared their will for law, not power, to be the determining factor in international relations and they established institutional mechanisms to ensure this.

The common legal framework established under the European Union umbrella and continuously developed since then has indeed been successful in fostering peace among its members. EU countries, which were in a constant state of tension, conflict, and war until the mid-20th century, have not been at war with each other for 80 years, and there is no risk of armed conflict between them. After initially implementing economic integration, member states gradually extended it to the political sphere and security policies. They are also working to establish a common stance toward the outside world.

However, cooperation initiatives on maintaining peace at the UN level have not been as successful as those of the EU. During the post-World War II period, also known as the UN System, many wars involving global and regional actors occurred, notably in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and Iraq. However, significant steps were also taken toward the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the development of international law. Agreements such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) were signed to limit and reduce nuclear weapons, and environmental protection agreements such as the Paris Climate Agreement were established. Global judicial institutions such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) were also formed.

During this period, the West—primarily the United States—was the decisive actor in the global political system. Western countries promoted the image that they upheld international law and defended values such as democracy and liberalism. They argued that an increase in democratic countries with liberal values would make the world more peaceful. They also propagated the idea that international law should be the main element in interstate relations, even though they often violated it themselves. Western academics even proposed the Democratic Peace Theory, which claims that democratic countries pursue more peaceful foreign policies and find it more difficult to decide to go to war.

The West’s hardening face

At this point, however, it is clear that the U.S. no longer values or promotes international law, human rights, liberalism, or democracy. The U.S. increases its military spending significantly every year, pressures other NATO countries to do the same, threatens other countries with military force, and wants to forcibly take Greenland from Denmark, a NATO ally. The U.S. also says it wants to see Canada, another NATO member, as the 51st American state. The U.S. threatens its allies with economic sanctions, shoots down ships in the Caribbean on the grounds that they are carrying drugs, carries out summary executions, threatens to attack Venezuela, and amasses its navy off the country’s coast to attempt to seize its oil reserves.

The U.S. also unilaterally withdraws from agreements, such as the one with Iran, and imposes sanctions that would collapse the country’s economy. The U.S. supports Israel’s war of aggression, bombs Iran’s nuclear facilities, enables Israel’s genocide against the people of Gaza by supplying weapons and providing economic and diplomatic support, and withdraws from international institutions, such as UNESCO and the World Health Organization, and withdraws from international agreements such as the Paris Climate Agreement. President Trump talks about bringing peace to Gaza and Ukraine, but what he presents as peace is nothing more than surrender on the terms imposed by powerful aggressors.

These examples clearly demonstrate the U.S.’s understanding of peace and the type of global political system it desires: One in which the powerful impose their terms on the weak and get what they want. This is not a new phenomenon; international relations have always been shaped by power. Following the catastrophic events of World War II, including the use of nuclear weapons and the loss of approximately 80 million lives, Western countries created the illusion that diplomacy and dialogue would be fundamental to international relations. They believed that problems would be solved through peaceful means rather than force and that the use of military force would only be legitimate in cases of self-defense and with a UN Security Council resolution.

During this period, centered around the UN, the concepts of international law, human rights, democracy, and liberalism were used as tools to intervene in other countries. American interventions in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Chile, Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, and many other countries were justified by the stated objectives of bringing democracy, protecting human rights, preventing violations of international law, and intervening against terrorism.

These justifications, used by Western countries in particular to mask their military, economic, and diplomatic interventions and pressures, have given rise to a substantial body of literature in International Relations centered on these concepts. One could argue that this literature has convinced some audiences that international relations are shaped by law and that Western countries base their foreign policies on democracy, human rights, and liberal values.

However, Israel’s two-year genocide in Gaza, supported by the U.S. and other Western countries, coupled with this aggressive alliance’s simultaneous attacks on Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran, as well as the Zionists’ involvement in the attack on Qatar, signaled to many that the world had entered a new era.

Those awoken from the illusion and those still unawaken

The level of Zionist aggression, coupled with Russia’s attacks on Ukraine and the U.S.’s aggressive policies targeting countries such as Venezuela and Iran during the same period, raises the question of whether we have reached the end of an era in which Western countries discussed and propagated international law, human rights, and democratic values. Additionally, the United States’ increasingly protectionist economic policies, threats of sanctions against all countries (including allies), and similar protectionist tendencies among European countries raise questions about the future of the liberal economic order the West has promoted for years.

The question arises as to whether the world is returning to the era before the discourse of international law alongside this transformation in the West. Along with this question, the illusion of “order” created by Western countries around international law and the aforementioned values is being questioned. Some sectors of society are waking up to this illusion. For example, Middle Eastern countries have realized that even being part of the American alliance system cannot protect them from Zionist aggression. Only time will tell if this realization will prompt them to seek an alternative order or cause them to align more closely with the U.S. to avoid facing the same fate as Qatar. However, their insufficient military capacity leaves them vulnerable to greater pressure and influence from the Israel-U.S. Zionist alliance.

Although European countries played a significant role in creating the illusion of values such as international law and human rights, they, too, have been forced to abandon this illusion, particularly in light of the events surrounding the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is reminiscent of its pre-international law practices. Meanwhile, U.S. President Trump attempted to hand Ukraine over to Moscow under the guise of a peace plan. These events have caused Germany and some other European countries, which neglected their military strength for a long time while trusting Washington, to turn to building their own military power.

The world is reverting to a pre-international law era in which countries with strong militaries invade other countries, threaten invasion, and commit genocide in occupied territories without presenting valid justifications. While this reality is clear, it is not consistent with a realistic approach to continue to believe in actors such as the United States, which have built an “illusion of order around the concepts of international law and human rights” over the past 80 years.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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rom the banks of the Niger River, the view of the world looks drastically different than it does from Washington or Beijing. In Bamako, the mood oscillates between besieged defiance and a grim realization of isolation. The jihadist coalition JNIM (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) has tightened its chokehold on supply lines, effectively blockading the city. Yet, amidst this volatility, a new political architecture is being welded together. When Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger forged the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—formally created in 2023 and later upgraded into a confederation—they did more than disrupt a regional bloc. They declared that the era of managing African insecurity through Western-prescribed normative frameworks was over.

This snapshot reveals an uncomfortable truth: Africa is no longer merely a periphery defined by “terrorism and migration.” Instead, the Sahel has transformed into a high-stakes laboratory. Here, the grand strategies of great powers are being stripped of their diplomatic gloss and subjected to a raw stress test. From Niger’s uranium mines to the digital surveillance grids rising in Ouagadougou, the competition is not just about resources; it is about which model of state-building—Western liberal interventionism, Russian security patronage, or Chinese developmental authoritarianism—can survive contact with reality.

From ECOWAS to AES: The geopolitics of sovereignty

The fracture began in earnest following the July 2023 coup in Niger. When ECOWAS threatened military intervention to restore constitutional order, the bloc inadvertently accelerated the very disintegration it sought to prevent. For the military regimes in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey, this threat was interpreted not as a defense of democracy, but as a proxy maneuver by Western powers to maintain a waning hegemony. The subsequent formation of the AES was a direct repudiation of the liberal peace-building architecture that had dominated West Africa since the end of the Cold War.

The Western model collapsed here because of the glaring disparity between promises and results. For over a decade, operations like Serval and Barkhane promised stability. Yet, as the French military withdrawal became a reality, the security vacuum was palpable. Fatigued by a war with no end and no clear frontline, the local populace grew receptive to a new narrative: sovereignty first, democracy later. The AES is not merely a defense pact; it is a political statement asserting that the security of the regime is synonymous with the security of the state.

The departure of Western troops created a marketplace. In this bazaar of security and development, the currency is not just cash, but the willingness to provide regime-insulating protection.

Bayonets and Bytes: Russia and China enter the fray

As Western forces exit, two distinct challengers have stepped into the arena. Russia brings the bayonets; China brings the bytes and the concrete.

Russia’s entry into the Sahel has been kinetic and focused on the immediate preservation of military rulers. Through the Africa Corps and official defense accords, Moscow offers a “regime survival package.” This involves direct military assistance and praetorian guard services. Critics label this as a neocolonial extraction model masked as security cooperation. However, for a leader in Bamako facing an existential threat, the Russian offer has a clarity that Western partnership agreements—laden with conditionalities—often lacked.

China, conversely, plays a longer, quieter game. While Russian mercenaries guard the presidential palaces, Chinese firms are wiring the ministries. Beijing’s approach secures access to strategic resources while embedding itself in the administrative backbone of the state. The recent move by Burkina Faso to award a contract for new biometric passports to a Chinese firm is emblematic of this shift: a transition from “boots on the ground” to “data in the server.”

Can these two non-Western powers coexist? Russia provides the shield, allowing military rulers to sleep at night, and China provides the infrastructure that might allow the state to function during the day. The current China-Russia-U.S. competition in Africa suggests that while Moscow and Beijing are aligned in displacing Western influence, their methods remain distinct. Russia seeks disruption and leverage; China seeks stability and markets. At some point, the chaos required by the former may threaten the investments made by the latter.

Debt trap or bargaining window?

No analysis of this triangulation is complete without addressing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the “debt trap” narrative. Western capitals have long warned that Chinese loans are a Trojan horse. But is this empirically sound, or is it a normative stick used to beat Beijing?

The reality is more nuanced. African governments are not naive victims walking blindly into servitude; they view Chinese lending as a vital alternative to the austerity-driven financing of the IMF. As noted in recent analyses of debt-trap diplomacy, the “trap” is often less about predatory intent and more about opacity and the sheer scale of infrastructure needs. For a Sahelian state cut off from Western budget support due to a coup, a Chinese loan is a lifeline, not a trap.

Yet, a new form of debt is emerging: security debt. Just as financial debt to Beijing can mortgage a country’s economic future, reliance on Moscow for physical safety creates a sovereignty mortgage. When a government relies on foreign paramilitaries to hold its capital—as seen in cases like Mali and the Central African Republic—the cost is often paid in gold and mineral concessions, bypassing the national treasury entirely. This shadow economy may prove far harder to untangle than any standard loan agreement.

Furthermore, the BRI itself is evolving towards “small and beautiful” investments—digital infrastructure and connectivity. Beijing realizes that in volatile regions like the Sahel, laying fiber optic cables is safer and more profitable than building railways vulnerable to insurgent attacks.

The rise of the African agenda

What we are witnessing in the Sahel is not merely a reshuffling of external patrons. It is the violent birth of a new African agency. The leaders of the AES are stress-testing the global order. They are gambling that they can dismantle the old French-dominated security architecture, utilize Russian muscle to hold the line, and leverage Chinese investment to build a future, all while keeping the West at arm’s length.

This is a dangerous game. The escalating violence suggests that the “sovereignty first” model has yet to ensure safety for the general public. But to view this solely as a failure is to miss the point. The Sahel has become the graveyard of the post-Cold War consensus.

If the 2000s were defined by China’s “silent rise,” and the 2010s by the “War on Terror,” the 2020s will likely be remembered as the decade in which African states began to seek partners aggressively. The question is no longer “Who owns Africa?”—a colonial mindset that refuses to die—but rather, “Who can survive Africa’s terms?” The bayonets of Russian contractors and the bytes of Chinese tech giants are current features, but the ultimate arbiters will not be found in Moscow or Beijing. They will be found in the streets of Bamako and Niamey, waiting to see if these new partnerships deliver the dignity and security that the old ones promised, but never provided.

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krainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has for the first time publicly outlined a 20-point draft peace framework being discussed with the United States, describing it as a potential foundation for ending the war with Russia.

Speaking after weeks of negotiations to revise an earlier 28-point proposal, Zelenskiy said Ukraine and Washington had significantly narrowed their differences. However, he confirmed that no agreement has yet been reached on two key issues: territorial control and the future of the Russian-held Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Zelenskiy said further discussions with U.S. President Donald Trump would be necessary to resolve those matters.

The proposal reaffirms Ukraine’s sovereignty and calls for a comprehensive non-aggression agreement between Kyiv and Moscow, supported by space-based monitoring systems to oversee ceasefire lines and detect violations.

Security guarantees, reconstruction and EU membership

Under the framework, Ukraine would retain its current armed forces strength of around 800,000 personnel and receive security guarantees from the United States, NATO and European countries comparable to NATO’s Article 5 collective defense clause.

The plan also envisions Ukraine joining the European Union on a defined timeline, gaining short-term preferential access to EU markets, and receiving a global development package aimed at long-term economic recovery. Several reconstruction and humanitarian funds would be established with the goal of mobilizing up to $800 billion.

Ukraine would remain a non-nuclear state, while Russia would be required to formalize a policy of non-aggression toward Ukraine and Europe through binding domestic legislation.

Territorial issues remain the most contentious element. Kyiv supports halting fighting along current battle lines, while Russia demands Ukrainian withdrawal from parts of eastern Donetsk. The United States has proposed demilitarized zones and a free economic area in contested regions.

The proposal also includes provisions for full prisoner exchanges, the return of civilian detainees and children, freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and Dnipro River, post-war elections in Ukraine, and a legally binding enforcement mechanism overseen by a Peace Council chaired by President Trump.

A full ceasefire would take effect immediately once all parties approve the agreement.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he developments in North Africa have had a decisive impact on the current climate of instability in Mali. In this context, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged during the Algerian civil war in the 1990s and continues to operate in the Sahel. A group of Tuareg fighters received military training under Gaddafi’s ‘Islamic Legion’ project in Libya and came to northern Mali following NATO’s 2011 operation in Libya. These fighters established the Azavad Liberation Movement (MNLA) organisation and rebelled against the Malian state. These are the most fundamental examples of this claim.

The Tuaregs, constituting around 10 per cent of Mali’s population, organised under the MNLA and demanded an autonomous state. In order to repel state forces in the north, they formed alliances with various radical organisations, including AQIM, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar Dine. In March 2012, Amadou Toumani Touré, Mali’s president at the time, was overthrown in a coup by the army, who claimed that the government was unable to quell the rebellion.

The collapse of state institutions in the north enabled the MNLA to seize strategic centres such as Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. However, a dominant group within the MNLA that embraced a secular-nationalist ideology caused a deep split within the organisation. The MNLA subsequently withdrew from the alliance because its secular-nationalist ideology was incompatible with that of the other radical groups, and the MNLA entered into armed conflict with them. Following clashes that began in Gao, the radical groups eliminated the MNLA.

Initially pursuing a secular goal of independence, the insurgency turned into a terrorist threat dominated by jihadist Salafi ideology when radical groups advanced southwards to capture cities in central Mali. Amid increasing instability, the Malian government accepted Algeria’s comprehensive peace plan and signed a peace agreement with a coalition of independence movements in the Azawad region, including the MNLA. However, excluding radical groups from this coalition has allowed them to expand their influence and spread their control towards central Mali and neighbouring countries, such as Burkina Faso and Niger.

In 2017, the Sahel branch of AQIM, Ansar Dine, the Katiba Macina Front and al-Mourabitoun merged to form Jemaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Led by the Tuareg leader Iyad Ag Ghali, JNIM pledged allegiance to the al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and the Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada following its formation. Since 2017, the organisation has increased its activities in the Sahel region, centred in Mali.

JNIM’s new strategy: Economic warfare

In landlocked Mali, which has a population of around 25 million, terrorist and violent acts that have been ongoing for over a decade reached a critical threshold in 2025. In recent months, the country has faced an intensifying siege as JNIM has cut off vital supply routes to the capital, Bamako. Moving beyond classic guerrilla tactics, JNIM has begun to target transport convoys and logistical routes, exploiting the state’s economic vulnerabilities.

In September 2025, JNIM announced a ban on fuel imports into Mali from Senegal, Mauritania, the Ivory Coast and Guinea, effectively aiming to isolate Bamako from the outside world. This embargo has led to one of the most serious crises in Mali’s history. JNIM militants have targeted fuel tankers and transport companies in the Kayes-Nioro corridor in the west of the country, destroying hundreds of tankers and cutting off the main roads connecting Mali to Mauritania and Senegal. This has effectively besieged the capital, Bamako. As a result of this economic blockade, fuel supplies to Bamako came to a standstill.

Additionally, JNIM has targeted gold and lithium mines operated by foreign investors, kidnapping foreign engineers and demanding high ransoms in exchange. The fuel blockade is part of JNIM’s evolving operational strategy, which now encompasses economic warfare. Rather than seizing the capital Bamako directly, JNIM aims to weaken the government in the eyes of the people by tightening the circle around the regime using economic tools. As a result of these attacks, the country has experienced fuel shortages, price increases, power cuts, and supply chain disruptions. These issues are having a paralyzing effect on daily life, creating both psychological and political pressure on the regime.

The governance gaps within the Malian state, coupled with the socio-economic and cultural divisions in the north and centre, have played a decisive role in JNIM’s rapid rise. The central authority’s inability to respond to the demands of rural areas in particular, coupled with the economic and social neglect of the population, has facilitated the establishment of shadow governance structures by JNIM. These structures have fuelled JNIM’s growing support and influence by forging local agreements with different sub-communities in Mali. Mali’s political turmoil in recent years has also deepened the security vacuum. Military coups in August 2020 and May 2021 brought Colonel Assimi Goita to power. Although the Goita regime promised to address security issues in the north of the country, it has not yet achieved this.

The role of international actors and failed security models

Since 2012, security measures, military operations and regional and international cooperation have played an important role in countering ongoing terrorist and violent acts by radical groups in Mali. In 2013, Mali requested assistance from France to counter the terrorist threat spreading southwards. France responded with Operation Serval in 2013. This operation later evolved into Operation Barkhane, which is centred in Chad and targets radical groups in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. It involves 3,000 personnel. This operation helped the Malian forces to recapture key cities.

However, large areas of the countryside remained outside state control, enabling armed groups to proliferate. Not only did the presence of French forces on the ground fail to end terrorism, it also led to growing resentment among the local population. Anti-French sentiment, stemming from the colonial past, fuelled a series of military coups in the region, particularly in Mali. The Goita regime expelled French and UN troops from Mali, claiming that France was violating the country’s sovereignty.

Following France’s failed military missions in Mali and its subsequent withdrawal from the region, this has presented both an opportunity and a challenge for Russia. Since 2021, the Wagner Group, a private military company with links to the Kremlin, has been operating in Mali, supporting counter-terrorism operations and internal security missions. The recapture of the symbolically important city of Kidal was initially regarded as a triumph for the Mali-Russia alliance. However, in July 2024, around 80 Russian mercenaries and 50 Malian soldiers were killed in an ambush by Tuareg rebels and JNIM near the Algerian border.

These developments demonstrate that the Malian army is facing serious challenges on the ground, despite receiving external support. Furthermore, reports that Ukraine may have shared intelligence with Tuareg forces against the Wagner Group highlight the increasingly complex and internationalised nature of the conflict in Mali. Following the death of Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin in mid-2023, the Russian presence in Mali was reorganised as the ‘African Corps’. However, Russian forces have largely withdrawn to their bases and have not succeeded in stopping radical groups from advancing across the country.

The regional security environment has deteriorated further following the 2023 coup in Niger. This has led to fragmentation within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES): a military and political alliance between Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. The AES was formed on 16 September 2023 through the Liptako-Gourma Charter. It was designed as a response to the West’s withdrawal from the region and the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS against military regimes. The AES aims to establish an alternative security architecture that is independent of Western influence and asserts ‘regional strategic autonomy’.

Since 2012, the collapse of state authority in northern Mali and the rise of radical movements have created an environment of insecurity that threatens the entire country. The Russian mercenary model, introduced as a replacement for France’s failed counter-terrorism strategy, has resulted in greater instability and increased civilian casualties, with terrorism now reaching the capital. This situation demonstrates that security crises cannot be resolved solely by military means or by relying on external actors. In the short and medium term, the most serious threat to Mali is the erosion of the state’s legitimacy and the strengthening of JNIM as an alternative authority. Mali’s return to lasting stability will only be possible through local solutions centred on inclusive governance, socio-economic development and regional cooperation.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

T

here is a growing tendency to view the G20 as a “neoliberal system club” that is a relic of the heyday of globalization and is now largely ineffective. The platform has been paralyzed by great power rivalry and has strayed far from the sense of urgency and purpose it had during the 2008 global financial crisis. It has also lost its ability to produce inclusive norms on strategic issues. While this observation is valid, it overlooks the profound transformation that could occur within the G20.

Although the G20 no longer serves a powerful function as an “executive committee” bound by neoliberal rules in a globalized world economy, it could become a new platform for global power interaction and connectivity. This potential is particularly important for medium-sized powers, especially since the leaders of the U.S., China, and Russia didn’t attend this year.

The G20’s structure is inadequate in terms of representation, institutional design, and norm-setting capacity. Nevertheless, it can still serve a purpose in a fragmented world. Its value now lies not in grand narratives or compromises but in the interdependent interaction at digital, physical, and financial levels. Indeed, the G20 remains one of the few platforms where major and medium-sized powers—or the global center and periphery—can engage with each other.

The transformation of the G20

The G20’s legitimacy is based on its numerical weight and function. Its members represent approximately 85 percent of the global GDP, 75 percent of global trade, and two-thirds of the world’s population. Between 2008 and 2010, this economic weight produced coordinated fiscal expansion, financial sector reform, and a commitment to fighting protectionism to overcome the global crisis. At its core was the belief that the current neoliberal system was indispensable.

However, today, this belief has largely eroded. Developments such as US–China strategic competition, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting sanctions, the weaponization of energy and food supplies, and the politicization of supply chains have altered the G20’s role. Rather than being a mechanism that supports a common globalization project, the platform has now become an arena where visions of global order and connectivity compete. Although members remain highly dependent on each other for production, raw materials, capital, data, and technology, there is an increasing divergence of opinion on how to manage this dependency and who should benefit from it.

This is precisely why the concept of “conncectivity” is analytically significant. In order to understand the new era, one must comprehend the dynamics that shape interdependence and, consequently, competition. Topics such as submarine cables, 5G networks, digital payment systems, cloud services, energy lines, ports, rail corridors, development banks, and climate funds are the most important areas of connectivity—and consequently, geopolitical competition. The G20 can play an important role here by becoming a platform where competing connectivity projects interact, are discussed, and sometimes take on new forms. Three main topics have become the cornerstones of G20 connectivity competition: digitalization and data, infrastructure and superstructure, and finance and the economy.

Digital connectivity: Technological competition and data sovereignty

The most stark and critical form of competition is seen in the digital sphere. On one side are Western states — largely clustered around the G7 — which advocate for cross-border data flows, private-sector innovation, and multi-stakeholder internet governance. On the other side is an approach that prioritizes cyber sovereignty, localization of data, and strong state control over digital infrastructure. Both camps are present within the G20. Additionally, there are “tide countries” positioned between the two poles.

Consequently, discussions on the digital economy, artificial intelligence, cross-border data transfers, digital public infrastructure, the taxation of digital entities, and legal and commercial regulations have recently taken center stage in G20 discussions. Although these discussions are often expressed in technocratic language, the issues are political. This is because control of data, benefits from digital value and production chains, and the de facto global regulatory model will directly affect geopolitical competition.

The G20 could serve as a forum where red lines are clarified and a minimum level of compatibility is negotiated. Trust-based data flows, digital security, and inclusive digitalization could produce commitments and minimal consensus, albeit vague. Otherwise, a world of mutually incompatible, and even fragmented, technology companies and states could emerge, including in digital terms.

Corridors and development

A similar situation applies to infrastructure and superstructure, particularly large-scale connectivity projects. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Western-backed ” infrastructure” programs, regional initiatives such as the Development Road, and economic corridors linking Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe have become the norm in a new era of development competition. These connectivity projects are also of strategic importance as geopolitical instruments that influence trade, secure access to resources, and consolidate political influence.

The G20’s role is limited here, yet important, particularly as it facilitates discussion of technical norms, such as debt sustainability, transparency, environmental and social safeguards, local content, and procurement rules. The G20 enables agreement on these norms in principle. The G20’s set of principles provides a framework for borrowing countries and competing creditors to determine which practices are considered “legitimate.” These principles can then serve as a reference point in negotiations on specific projects.

For medium-sized peripheral states, this represents a significant opportunity. Indeed, such principles and frameworks can be an important tool for demanding better conditions, greater sustainability, and fairer risk-sharing from larger economies. In this sense, the G20 serves as a stage where emerging powers discuss these “standards” and embrace their regional connectivity agendas selectively. Furthermore, this situation provides medium-sized states seeking to preserve their strategic autonomy with the opportunity to develop their own projects or choose between existing ones.

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kraine and 34 other countries on Tuesday formally approved plans to establish an international compensation body to assess and pay for damage caused by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a move hailed as unprecedented by European officials but shadowed by uncertainty over how payments will be enforced.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy addressed leaders gathered in The Hague, urging strong international backing to ensure that “any damage caused by the war can be compensated.” He later told the Dutch parliament that “the aggressor must pay.”

The compensation mechanism, facilitated by the Council of Europe, will operate through an International Claims Commission, allowing Ukrainians to seek redress for “damage, loss or injury” resulting from Russia’s invasion, which began in February 2022. The commission will assess claims submitted to an existing register of damages launched in 2023, which has already received about 80,000 claims.

No clear legal pathway

While the Council of Europe insists Russia should bear the financial burden, there is no clear legal pathway to compel Moscow to pay. One proposal under discussion involves using tens of billions of dollars in frozen Russian assets held in Europe.

Thirty-five countries have backed the commission, though each must now ratify the treaty domestically — a process that typically requires parliamentary approval. Officials described the level of support as unprecedented for a new Council of Europe treaty.

European Union foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said the EU would contribute one million euros to fund the commission’s operations, part of an estimated 3.5 million euros needed overall.

The compensation mechanism

Zelenskyy’s visit followed peace talks in Berlin involving U.S. President Donald Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff, Jared Kushner, and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. Zelenskyy said Ukraine is prepared to forgo NATO membership in exchange for firm Western security guarantees, but rejected proposals to cede Ukrainian territory to Russia.

Several of the same countries supporting the compensation mechanism have also endorsed the creation of a new international court under the Council of Europe to prosecute senior Russian officials for the invasion.

(Source: The Associated Press)

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he head of Britain’s foreign intelligence service MI6 will warn on Monday that Russia poses an “aggressive, expansionist and revisionist” threat to international security, in her first public speech since taking office.

Blaise Metreweli, who became MI6 chief in October and is the first woman to lead the agency in its 116-year history, will say President Vladimir Putin should be in no doubt that Western support for Ukraine remains firm and long-term.

“Putin should be in no doubt — our support is enduring,” Metreweli will say, according to advance extracts of her remarks. “The pressure we apply on Ukraine’s behalf will be sustained.”

She will warn that Moscow deliberately fuels instability abroad, describing Russia’s actions as a deliberate strategy rather than a by-product of foreign policy.

“The export of chaos is a feature, not a bug, in the Russian approach to international engagement,” she will say, adding that such behavior is likely to continue unless Putin is forced to “change his calculus.”

UK maintains sanctions pressure

Britain has imposed sweeping sanctions on Russian business figures, political leaders, companies and vessels since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. London has also sanctioned Russia’s military intelligence agency, the GRU, in its entirety.

Metreweli’s remarks come as diplomatic efforts to halt the conflict continue. Over the weekend, Germany hosted talks involving U.S. and Ukrainian officials on a possible ceasefire, ahead of a summit in Berlin on Monday that will include European leaders.

Metreweli will also emphasize the need for MI6 to deepen its use of technology to counter modern threats, including terrorism, cyber operations and information warfare.

“Mastery of technology must infuse everything we do,” she will say. “We must be as comfortable with lines of code as we are with human sources — as fluent in Python as we are in multiple languages.”

She will argue that technological expertise must extend beyond research labs into frontline intelligence operations and organizational culture.

Broader security warnings

In a separate speech on Monday, Richard Knighton, head of Britain’s armed forces, is expected to call for a “whole society” approach to defence amid growing global instability. He will warn of an increased probability of Russia attempting to invade a NATO member state, underscoring the seriousness of the threat facing Europe.

Metreweli’s address marks a rare public intervention by the MI6 chief and signals a sharpened warning from Britain’s intelligence leadership as tensions with Moscow persist.

(Source: Reuters)

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he world is entering a new and dangerous phase of nuclear instability, with the risk of nuclear weapons being used now at its highest point since the depths of the Cold War, the UN’s top disarmament official warned on Thursday.

In an interview with Anadolu on the sidelines of the Doha Forum, Izumi Nakamitsu, the UN under-secretary-general and high representative for disarmament affairs, said major military powers have already slipped into an accelerating arms race driven by geopolitical rivalry and large-scale modernization of nuclear arsenals.

“I’m afraid we are actually starting to see arms race dynamics already,” Nakamitsu said. “All nuclear weapons states have been investing quite a lot of money in nuclear weapon systems… which is quite worrying.”

Arms race fueled by great-power competition

Nakamitsu stressed that global security had deteriorated long before the Russia-Ukraine war, but the conflict intensified already existing trends. Nuclear-armed states, she said, were expanding and modernizing their stockpiles years before the current crises.

“The dynamics of an arms race started before Ukraine,” she said. “There have already been several years of investment in nuclear weapons modernization programs.”

She warned that the combination of competition, mistrust and modernization has pushed the world closer to a potential nuclear miscalculation than at any point in decades.

‘Highest risk since Cold War’

According to Nakamitsu, today’s nuclear risks exceed those of the post–Cold War period, with weakened arms-control agreements, shrinking diplomatic dialogue and rising regional conflicts.

“I think the risk of nuclear weapons actually being used in conflict is at its highest since the depths of the Cold War,” she said.

She urged all nuclear-armed states to exercise restraint, maintain open communication channels, and adopt immediate risk-reduction measures to prevent an accidental escalation.

Although nuclear stockpile reductions appear unlikely in the near term, Nakamitsu insisted that disarmament remains broader than simply cutting warhead numbers. She outlined a phased approach centered on transparency, confidence-building and the restoration of trust.

“Disarmament doesn’t only mean reduction of arsenals,” she said. “There are other tools that can lead us back toward negotiations.”

These include mutual restraint, crisis-communication mechanisms, and structured dialogue between major powers.

Wars in Gaza and Ukraine undermine global trust

Nakamitsu said the conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine have had a “profound impact” on global disarmament diplomacy, eroding trust—particularly among countries of the Global South—and complicating consensus in multilateral forums.

“Conflict and violations of humanitarian principles in one region affect all other issues,” she said. “Trust required for multilateral negotiations is being eroded.”

This erosion, she warned, threatens core structures such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), viewed as the backbone of global nuclear governance.

With the next NPT Review Conference scheduled for 2026, Nakamitsu called on world leaders to treat the meeting as a diplomatic priority and to arrive prepared to compromise.

“Next year is really important,” she said. “Leaders must come to the NPT Review Conference with shared interest in producing an outcome document.”

She urged governments to reinvest in diplomacy and to recognize that preventing nuclear catastrophe is a shared global responsibility.

“Diplomacy, dialogue and a spirit of common interest — that is international security for all of us,” she said.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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kraine’s military intelligence service says it is preparing to carry out more complex maritime drone operations next year, after the country’s uncrewed surface fleet succeeded in forcing Russia’s Black Sea forces into a defensive posture and limiting their naval movements.

In comments to The Associated Press, the commander of the Defense Intelligence Directorate’s (GUR) Group 13 maritime drone unit said Ukraine’s sea-based attacks have reached a “plateau” in recent months, as Russia adapted its tactics following a series of high-profile strikes earlier in the war. The officer, identified publicly only by the call sign “13th” under Ukrainian security protocol, said the change in Russian behavior demonstrated both the impact and the challenges of Kyiv’s evolving drone program.

“We are effectively limiting the enemy’s movement, but those dramatic, high-profile strikes we saw earlier haven’t happened for some time,” he said. “That’s because the enemy has adapted.”

Ukrainian officials announced last month that maritime drones were used to hit vessels belonging to Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet,” a network of tankers used to evade sanctions. The commander declined to discuss those operations, citing restrictions imposed by the intelligence service.

According to Group 13, Russian naval vessels now stay close to their bases, typically traveling no more than 25–40 kilometers from port to fire cruise missiles before quickly returning. “They barely operate,” the commander said. “They constantly hide. And in a way, that is also a result of our work — because you can imagine the cost of maintaining a fleet that cannot operate at sea.”

The interview took place at an undisclosed location inside Ukraine. The officer wore full uniform, with his face covered and eyes obscured for security reasons. The intelligence agency requested that details of the site, equipment storage, and logistics not be revealed.

Drones on the front line of a naval war

Maritime drones have become one of Ukraine’s most significant tools in countering Russian naval power. Kyiv operates two separate programs — one under its armed forces, the other under its intelligence service. Group 13 oversees the Magura family of sea drones, which have been credited with several major strikes on Russian warships, landing craft, and logistics vessels.

The unit currently uses two primary models: the Magura V5, a compact high-speed ramming drone used in explosive attacks, and the Magura V7, a larger multi-role platform capable of carrying various weapons. Both systems are controlled remotely through compact consoles equipped with joysticks, thermal and optical screens, and safety mechanisms.

During a recent demonstration for journalists, Ukrainian operators displayed a V7 equipped with modified U.S.-made AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. In May, GUR said one such drone downed a Russian fighter jet — a development the commander described as “a breakthrough” in modern naval warfare, marking what Kyiv claims is the first time a maritime surface drone has shot down an aircraft.

Next phase: AI-Enabled strikes

The commander said Ukraine’s next wave of innovation will center on expanded use of artificial intelligence. Current drone operations rely on a combination of human control and software assistance. Operators guide the systems over long distances, while AI assists with horizon scanning, obstacle recognition, and initial target identification.

“Right now, the search process is part operator, part AI,” he said. “In the future, you’ll launch the drone and it will independently search for a target, distinguish civilian ships from military ones, and make more of the decisions.”

Ukraine, he added, has accumulated “a huge amount of operational data” — including video from combat missions, sensor readings, navigation routes, and engagements — which will be used to further train AI algorithms.

Although he declined to provide specifics, the officer said experts in Ukraine and partner states were examining long-range strike options, submersible systems, and potential “mixed-fleet” operations involving coordinated attacks by aerial, surface and underwater drones.

International partnerships growing

Ukraine is also working to expand co-production of maritime drones. During a visit by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to Athens in November, Kyiv and Greece agreed to begin joint projects on maritime uncrewed vehicles, deepen intelligence-sharing on sea-based threats and increase training opportunities for Ukrainian operators.

Officials in Kyiv view cooperation with NATO member states as essential to sustaining Ukraine’s drone capabilities amid Russia’s ongoing attempts to jam, disrupt or intercept uncrewed systems.

Despite Russia’s adaptations, the commander insisted that Ukraine’s naval drone fleet continues to play a decisive role in restricting Moscow’s movements in the Black Sea. Analysts say Russia’s decision to relocate key vessels from Sevastopol to ports farther east — including Novorossiysk — was driven in large part by Ukraine’s repeated drone strikes over the past two years.

“We’re working on many fronts to change the situation and create a turning point,” the commander said. “We haven’t lost effectiveness. We’re holding the enemy in check — and preparing for what comes next.”

(Source: The Associated Press)

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lobal landmine casualties rose to a four-year high in 2024 amid declining international funding and renewed use of banned weapons in several conflict zones, according to the Landmine Monitor 2025 report released Monday by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).

The report recorded 6,279 people killed or injured by landmines and explosive remnants of war last year — the highest annual toll since 2020. The surge was driven largely by escalating conflicts in Myanmar, where “massive use continues,” and in Syria, where civilians returning to contaminated areas face increasing danger.

Civilians made up 90% of all casualties, nearly half of them children. For the second consecutive year, Myanmar registered the highest casualty count worldwide.

“These findings make clear both the scale of new challenges and the need to stay united in upholding commitments and maintaining vital compliance efforts,” said Mark Hiznay, the report’s ban policy editor.

Progress overshadowed by setbacks

Despite the rise in casualties, the 163-page report noted some progress. More than half of the affected states parties reduced contamination in 2024, and 31 countries have completed clearance since the Mine Ban Treaty came into force in 1999. Oman joined that list in 2025.

Two new accessions — the Marshall Islands and Tonga — brought the number of states parties to 166, covering 85% of the world’s countries.

However, the report warned that the goal of a mine-free world is slipping further away. Total area cleared declined in 2024 due to reduced funding and growing insecurity, while support for victim assistance — just 5% of all mine action financing — fell by nearly 25%.

A freeze on US foreign assistance earlier in 2025 “further deepened the crisis,” it added.

“Behind each statistic is a family and a community still living with the consequences of landmines,” said funding editor Ruth Bottomley. “The decline in funding for victim assistance is alarming and must be urgently reversed.”

Rising use and treaty withdrawals raise alarm

The report cited continued or possible new use of landmines by Russia, Myanmar, Ukraine, and others, alongside withdrawals or attempted withdrawals from the Mine Ban Treaty — trends the ICBL said signal a “dangerous erosion of the global norm.”

ICBL Director Tamar Gabelnick emphasized that the treaty remains a crucial tool in reducing human suffering.

“The Mine Ban Treaty remains a powerful instrument, and its obligations and principles must be actively defended,” she said. “Turning back is not an option; we have come too far, and the human cost is simply too high.”

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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krainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Monday that “tough issues” remain unresolved after intensive U.S.–Ukraine talks in Florida, as Kyiv launched a new round of high-level diplomacy across Europe and a top envoy of U.S. President Donald Trump headed to Moscow to brief the Kremlin.

The remarks came amid fast-moving diplomatic activity aimed at reshaping the U.S. peace proposal for ending nearly four years of full-scale war with Russia.

The recent meetings in Florida, hosted by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio at Trump envoy Steve Witkoff’s Shell Bay resort in Florida, marked Washington’s most serious push yet to accelerate negotiations. However, the initial American proposal has drawn significant concerns in Kyiv and among European allies.

The original plan reportedly endorsed key Russian demands—including that Ukraine give up additional territory, limit its military forces, renounce its bid to join NATO, and bar Western troops from its soil. Ukrainian officials have said such terms would amount to “capitulation,” leaving the country vulnerable to future Russian aggression.

“There are some tough issues that still have to be worked through,” Zelenskiy wrote on X, adding that Ukraine faces a “very substantive day” of talks with European leaders following the Florida negotiations.

Zelenskiy met French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris on Monday, receiving a public show of support as both sides emphasized efforts to narrow the gaps with Washington.

“The work for peace continues,” Macron said in a post alongside a photo of the two leaders at the Elysee Palace. Zelenskiy is expected to travel to Ireland next, while Ukraine’s defense minister arrived in Brussels for meetings with NATO officials.

Rubio: ‘We’ve made progress’

Rubio, speaking after the Florida talks, described the discussions as constructive but incomplete.

“We’re realistic about how difficult this is, but optimistic… We’ve made progress,” he said, noting that further steps would depend on the outcome of Witkoff’s visit to Moscow.

Witkoff is due to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday to convey the results of the Florida negotiations.

The diplomatic push comes at a difficult moment for Kyiv. Ukrainian forces have been slowly losing ground along the 1,200-km front line, while a major corruption scandal has shaken the government.

Zelenskiy’s chief of staff—who also led the Ukrainian delegation in the peace talks—resigned on Friday after anti-corruption investigators searched his home. Two ministers have been dismissed, and a former business partner of the president has been named as a suspect.

Trump, who campaigned on ending the war rapidly, voiced frustration over the lack of an agreement. “Ukraine’s got some difficult little problems,” he told reporters on Air Force One, referring to the corruption scandal. Still, he insisted that both Kyiv and Moscow want to end the conflict. “There’s a good chance a deal could be reached,” he said.

Russia advances on frontline, intensifies strikes

Moscow has shown no sign of softening its demands. Russian forces continue to make incremental advances in eastern Ukraine and claimed Monday to have captured the settlement of Klynove in the Donetsk region—part of an offensive aimed at seizing Pokrovsk, which would be Russia’s biggest territorial gain in nearly two years. Reuters could not independently verify the battlefield situation.

Overnight, at least four people were killed and 22 injured in a Russian strike on the city of Dnipro, Ukrainian officials said.

Russia has stepped up long-range attacks on Ukrainian cities, frequently targeting energy infrastructure and plunging residents into darkness as winter sets in.

Ukraine has also intensified its own long-range campaign, striking Russia’s oil infrastructure. On Monday, the Kremlin condemned Ukrainian attacks on the Yuzhny oil-exporting terminal and two tankers in the Black Sea.

Ukraine’s diplomatic outreach across Europe is set to continue throughout the week as Kyiv presses allies to help reshape the U.S. plan before any formal response is delivered.

(Source: Reuters)

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hina’s powerful state-owned defense companies recorded a rare decline in revenues last year as President Xi Jinping’s sweeping anti-corruption campaign disrupted procurement, stalled weapons projects and injected fresh uncertainty into the country’s military modernization drive, according to a new report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

The findings reveal a sharp contrast between China and the rest of the global arms industry, which saw record-breaking growth amid intensified geopolitical tensions and ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza. SIPRI said revenues for the world’s 100 largest defense firms rose by 5.9% to an unprecedented $679 billion in 2024, while China became the only major producer showing a downturn.

Corruption crackdown freezes contracts

SIPRI researchers said revenues for China’s top defense companies dropped 10%, citing a wave of corruption allegations that triggered internal audits, leadership purges and procurement delays across multiple military branches.

“A host of corruption allegations in Chinese arms procurement led to major arms contracts being postponed or cancelled in 2024,” said Nan Tian, director of SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Program. “This deepens uncertainty around the status of China’s military modernization efforts and when new capabilities will materialize.”

China’s anti-graft campaign, launched by Xi shortly after taking power in 2012, has repeatedly struck the military. But the crackdown escalated dramatically in 2023 when the elite PLA Rocket Force, which oversees China’s expanding arsenal of ballistic and hypersonic missiles, became the focus.

In October 2025, eight senior generals — including former vice chairman of the Central Military Commission He Weidong, China’s second-highest-ranking officer — were expelled from the Communist Party on corruption charges. Analysts say the scale of the purge has few precedents in recent military history.

Asia-Oceania bucks global military boom

China’s downturn occurred despite Beijing’s defense budget rising annually for 30 consecutive years, driven by strategic competition with the United States, tensions over Taiwan and territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

SIPRI’s data shows that while China’s revenues fell, other major producing nations posted significant growth, Japan: +40%, Germany: +36%, and United States: +3.8%.

The surge reflects surging global demand for advanced weapons, drones, missiles and ammunition as governments boost their military preparedness.

China’s decline, however, was severe enough to make Asia-Oceania the only region where top arms companies collectively saw revenues contract.

China’s biggest arms makers suffer steep losses

Several of China’s largest defense conglomerates were affected, Norinco, the leading land-systems developer, reported a dramatic 31% drop to $14 billion, SIPRI said — the steepest fall among China’s top firms. CASC, China’s major aerospace and missile manufacturer, also saw declines after corruption-related leadership reshuffles triggered internal reviews and project delays. AVIC, the state-owned aviation giant responsible for fighter jets and military aircraft, recorded slowed deliveries, particularly in the PLA Air Force.

None of the companies responded to requests for comment.

Diplomats in Beijing and foreign defense analysts say the effects of the purge are still unfolding. Some believe the crackdown could expose delays in next-generation missile systems, aircraft development, cyber warfare capabilities and satellite programs.