In politics the term ‘security’ has traditionally related to issues of stability, conflict, peace, and diplomacy. However, in a globalized environment the concept has broadened further to include relations among world governments. These relations between states cannot be understood in isolation as they closely connect several actors such as states and international organizations; social structures and processes such as economies, culture, and policies, and geographical and historical influences. To some extent, Turkey is emerging as a “pivot state” – as it has strategic assets and it is located at a seam of the international system – due to its ties with global actors. Among these, the European Union is the most important. The first institutional links between Turkey and the EU date back to the 1960’s, which later led to Turkey gaining status as an EU candidate state at the Helsinki Summit in 1999, and to formally start negotiations to become a full EU member in 2005.

The process of EU membership has been slow and difficult and Turkey has encountered a series of obstacles contradicting the spirit of negotiations. As is well known, the main problem on the path towards EU membership has been the attitude of Europe. Mainly due to the negative stance of some member states towards Ankara, and the difficulties of opening up further chapters in EU negotiations. Formalisms aside, it is unequivocal that Turkey is already in Europe, not only by its geographical location, but also thanks to the mutual strategic interests that keep the two partners connected. In this regard, the Turkish side has often stated that “the security of Europe starts from Turkey”. On closer inspection there are many reasons supporting this thesis, and considerable points which prove how much Turkey and Europe need each other.

Turkey’s role in the Syrian refugee crisis

First of all, it is worth underlining Turkey’s commendable policy of hosting Syrian refugees. Turkey is considered to be one of the biggest humanitarian donors and key policy-makers towards Syrian refugees. Thanks to its spirit of brotherhood, Turkey today hosts more than four million refugees. This was a responsibility which began much earlier than the March 2016 agreement with the EU, which specifically aimed to stem the irregular migration flow across the Aegean Sea, by adopting more stringent measures against human traffickers and by improving living conditions for the Syrian refugees in Turkey. This important responsibility was undertaken on a voluntary basis by Turkey, and the “good progress” of migration and asylum policies are reflected “in the drastic reduction of migrants at sea”, as acknowledged by the EU. Moreover, a recent Amnesty International report even states that in 2015 the number of refugees that arrived on the Greek islands were about 800,000, while in 2017 the number dropped to 27,000.

However, one of the conditions of the EU refugee deal was a promise by the EU to accelerate Turkey’s membership process and the liberalization of entrance visas for Turkish citizens to Schengen passport-free countries. However, Brussels has not fulfilled its side of the agreement while Turkey continues to bear the weight of a large number of refugees, a number which may increase even further in the face of possible military escalation in Syria.

The situation in Syria’s Idlib may further complicate the issue. In the beginning through a combination of diplomacy and political effort with Russia, an agreement was made to prevent a new flow of people from Syria. Nowadays, there is room to be concerned. If the situation in Idlib were to get out of control, an exodus of about three million people is expected, including some 3,000 terrorists, whose first landing would be the Turkish border. Therefore, the establishment of a safe zone in Syria becomes vital in protecting the integrity of Turkey – against human trafficking, foreign fighters and terrorists – and consequently for the interests of Europe as well.

As the huge flow of irregular migrants was something that nobody had foreseen in Europe, the EU’s response reflected this unpreparedness as well as the general unwillingness to host a large number of refugees. Europe’s approach towards the issue may continue to develop even more negatively, especially in a time when the influence of the far-right is increasing and anti-immigrant stances are more commonplace. While Europe has demonstrated its inability to find solutions to cope with the migrant flow, Islamophobia, nationalism, racism and other forms of xenophobia breeds suspicion among citizens. Hence, the main problem in the EU, beside its political cohesion, is related to social solidarity, and to debates over the identity of the “Old Continent”.

Besides that, there is a feeling that Brussels is sort of dictating and patronizing some core policies by managing the lines of agreements, without keeping promises or eventually making them discretionary. Europe was born as a peace project; it helped to develop countries, to integrate economies and to accommodate minorities, but nowadays is not responding to the requests of Turkey, and the EU seems to be a victim of a lack of vision.

Turkey and Europe is economically complementary

On the other side, economically speaking, the complementarity of Turkey and Europe is notable. For Ankara, the biggest trade flow is with the EU and this is a factor that cannot be denied. Turkey stands as one of the most valuable partners with its population of 85 million people, a young population and growing economy. From the European perspective, there is a deep trust towards the Turkish market and its resilience in coping with crisis. In a time of trade wars and the instability of global order, Turkey is for Europe a guarantor of economic stability and as a center for investments thanks to its role as a regional and international hub.

Furthermore, China’s expansionism along the Belt and Road initiative may make Ankara a worthier partner to Europe. The Chinese project aims to build both a terrestrial corridor across central Asia and a maritime corridor across the Indian Ocean and Africa. In order to do so, it requires investments on railways, ports, roads, telecommunications, and energy grids of 1,000 billion dollars in over 70 countries. Beijing has already signed several agreements in Europe, despite the suspicion of the EU that in recent times stated that “China has become a systemic adversary who has different models of governance” therefore, Europe needs to “defend its own principles and values”. Nevertheless, Turkey looks at China with more positive eyes as their relations are long-standing and have recently intensified. Currently, around 800 Chinese companies operate in Turkey; already solid on a banking and commercial level, relations are destined to consolidate in infrastructure and industrial projects. Indeed, as a bridge between Europe and Asia, Turkey occupies a strategic position, which can be useful to help mediate between Europe and China, and to bring Chinese investments to the West.

Although Turkey does not produce energy thanks to its geography and good relations with neighbors, Turkey has a significant strategic role in transporting resources to Europe. Indeed, Europe gets 30 percent of its gas from Russia therefore their relations are symmetrically interdependent: the EU is heavily dependent on Russia for its energy needs and Russia supplies the European Union with over 35 percent of its crude oil imports and 30 percent of its natural gas imports.

In order to develop alternatives to Russian gas and oil, the EU previously tried to promote the development of a southern energy corridor aimed at connecting European markets to natural sources of gas in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East. This project, however, was not able to find adequate sources of supply thus in an alternative, the EU gave its support to the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). This will be connected to the Trans Anatolian line (TANAP), which transports gas from Shah Deniz through Turkey to the Greek-Turkish border. From there it will be conveyed from Greece and Albania, across the Adriatic Sea to Italy and to the rest of Europe. The implementation of TANAP has the capacity to have a great impact on Turkey’s role as a pivot country for the southern corridor as well as for the energy security of Europe. In any case, serious criticism and concern remain regarding the most recent hydrocarbon activities around the island of Cyprus, and where cooperation seems to be more difficult as the EU acts primarily in the name of Greek Cypriot interests, neglecting the right of the Turkish community.

These are all significant pieces of a mosaic whose final design is the close interconnection of Turkey with Europe. Turkey and the EU draw together as guarantors of security encompassing military issues and regional stability and their social and economic issues. In a globalized world, the safety of one actor entails the stability of the other. In addition to the real politic, what matters is building relationships of trust and confidence with actions. Until now, Turkey has proven to be a generous and reliable partner as well as a security provider, in this role, it has taken some responsibilities almost unilaterally. Unfortunately, the same is not so for Europe, who are unable to see that the price of not having Turkey would be very high.

Departing from the Japanese-American political scientist Francis Fukuyama’s contention in his “The End of History” thesis that liberal democracy is the final form of political regime that humanity has achieved so far, it can be inferred that the latest turbulences confronted in recent years in the West, especially in Austria, signalize a crisis in democracy. If we assume that right and left-wing populists and far-right groups are within the realm of democracy, it would not be correct to mention a democracy crisis in Austria and the Western world. Presently, far-right groups, who are on the rise and enjoying quite an influence, are trying to underline that they are acting within the limits of democracy by arguing that they are against the establishment. The latest developments have indicated that the discussions will center upon the question of who stays within the limits of democracy. At this point, it is crucial to note that the force who will determine the prominent discourses will have the upper hand in politics. 

Democracy crisis in Austria

In this manner, it is required to note that the most important political assault affecting the outbreak of a democracy crisis in the West and Austria has both external and internal sources. The internal political effects comprise radical political movements seen in Western democracies. It can be observed in the case of Austria that the conventional center-right and center-left parties have declined in political influence whereas the forces with far-right or far-left engagement have become more mainstream and appealed to larger masses.

Although the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) has been present in the Austrian political scene as the most prominent far-right actor, a notable organization representing the far-left is not on the horizon yet. This is probably due to the fact that the Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ), the leading political group likely to fill this gap, has not yet recovered from the trauma of the Soviet Union’s dissolution. Nevertheless, since this situation is incidental, it is not a remote possibility that a change might happen in the political composition of the opposite side, as FPÖ develops xenophobic and Islamophobic policies that were promised and expected to be practiced by the party.

As already known, alongside Putin’s Russia that has been aspiring to interfere with European politics, the source of the greatest external threat posed to the system in Europe has been U.S. President Donald Trump for the past two years. In this context, it is important to remember that Trump’s former chief strategist Steve Bannon strived to form an “international right” by trying to gather the far-right groups in Europe under a single roof.

Trump’s former chief strategist Steve Bannon strived to form an “international right” by trying to gather all far-right groups in Europe under a single roof. 

Accordingly, we must note that the United States, who “exports” human rights and democracy to other countries across the world according to experts, is now endeavoring to instill right-wing populism in Europe. Through this “movement” led by Bannon, the U.S. is seeking to strengthen the nation-state notion in the EU and stir an internal chaos within the continent as the country sees the Union as a considerable rival. So, the U.S. is trying to maximize its own interests with its pure power policy it practices by liberating itself from one of the “soft” impediments of the liberal democratic order.

Apparently, the FPÖ representatives were afraid that this direction of the U.S. might show themselves as traitors before the eyes of the Austrian public, so they announced that they would avoid a comprehensive cooperation with Bannon for the European Parliament elections to be held on May 23-26, 2019. Along with that, they displayed pragmatic behavior and welcomed Bannon’s works in virtual platform that are in favor of them.

Austrian Muslims

Unfortunately, the following days do not seem very promising for Austrian Muslims. Re-founded among the ruins of World War II, Austria’s governments have always been based on a political conciliation named “Grand Coalition,” formed by the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) and the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), other than a few exceptions. This situation persisted until the late 1990s. Over the course of that period, Muslims and Turks were not subjected to serious pressure by the political arena, media or public whereas people of color were mostly considered the “others” of Austria.

Through an “international right” movement sought to be established by Steve Bannon, the U.S. endeavors to install right-wing populism in Europe in order to stir internal chaos within the EU – which it sees as a considerable rival. 

A new orientation that began with the discharge of the liberals within the FPÖ during Jörg Haider’s chairmanship of the party in the mid-1980s allowed for more visibility for foreigners and people of color. Both SPÖ and ÖVP tepidly responded to this situation, and even though these parties enjoyed short-term election victories, the FPÖ had the upper hand in terms of discourse since the others inclined towards reflecting far-right ideas. In time, in accordance with the strategy of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP), FPÖ started to assert that it represents the interests of the conventional voter base of the center parties including SPÖ.

And as the aftereffects of the 9/11 incidents started to hit Austria, Muslims were designated as the new “other” among Austrian people, which worsened the course of events. The center parties SPÖ and ÖVP did not draw any lessons from their past mistakes and chose to impose pressures on Muslims and practice socio-political restrictions on foreigners in order to break the effect of FPÖ’s discourse. The epitome of these policies is undoubtedly the “Islam Law” that entered into force on March 31, 2015, which restricted the legal rights of the Muslims compared to other official religions of Austria.

The formation of a coalition government by ÖVP’s Sebastian Kurz and FPÖ’s Heinz-Christian Strache is in itself a phenomenon that characterizes the democracy crisis in Austria. Along with the Islam Law, there are many other practices that gradually deprive Muslims of their rights. Haunted by the specter of the February 28 postmodern coup in Turkey, the current practices in Austria such as the efforts to ban headscarf for Muslim women and restrict Muslim people’s education and working rights show parallelism with Turkey during the 1990s. These practices are also reminiscent of the atrocities against foreigners, especially the Jewish people, prior to World War II. 

The United States, which apparently “exports” human rights and democracy to other countries across the world, is now aiming to install right-wing populism in Europe.

Turkey provides a mental relief for Muslims in Austria

Paradoxically, Turkey benefits from the turbulent situation prevailing in the West. The Western countries, who used to try to control Turkey by acting as a bloc, are now obliged to negotiate with Turkey without any sign of the past collectivism. The old peremptory nature of the West has also changed. Now, the West can no longer impose pressure on Turkey, but rather Turkey points at Western countries for their Islamophobic, xenophobic tendencies and contradictory behaviors. Although this approach of Turkey does not seem to favor the repressed Austrian Muslims at first sight, it must be underlined that the presence of a harbor to shelter in the long term does at least provide a mental relief for Muslims.

A European Union public opinion survey conducted last month by Eurobarometer shows the latest sentiments regarding the EU. The official results which were revealed on October 17 indicate that half of the European citizens are dissatisfied with the direction that the EU is heading towards.

The European Commission’s Eurobarometer conducts official surveys of the EU and regularly monitors the public opinion among the EU member countries at regular intervals to “assess the attitudes and opinions of Europeans about cultural heritage” by “investigating their personal involvement, interests, and the perceived importance and values they attach to Europe’s cultural heritage.”

The latest survey’s fieldwork was conducted between the second and last weeks of September where 27,474 European citizens over the age of 16 were surveyed across 28 member countries.

The results of the survey showed that 50% of European citizens are dissatisfied with the direction that the European Union is headed towards whilst appreciation with EU membership is evident and has reached a 25 year high of 68%. The continued publicization of Brexit and its potential consequences in many EU and British media outlets seems to have worked in keeping Euroscepticism somewhat contained.

The Euroskepticism in Romania has increased 10% since the last survey which was carried out in April this year and results reveal that less than half of Romanian citizens feel the benefit of EU membership. This drastic drop was regarded as “unprecedented” compared to statistics in the last ten years.

Czech Republic is in the lead of Eurosceptic nations among EU member states with a mere 39% who regard EU membership positively for their country followed by Italy at 42%, Croatia at 44%, Greece, which is still battling a series of unabating economic difficulties, at 45%, UK which has already voted out at 48%, Austria at 48% and Romania at 49%.

Eurobarometer also disclosed the major concerns considered as problems by European Union citizens and immigration topped the list at 50%, a foreseeable concern given how it plays into the agenda of many European politicians in their respective local elections amid other recent drastic prospects such as that of closing airports to bar the transfer of migrants indicating the degree as to which this issue is still considered a major crisis across Europe. This was followed by the economy at 47% on par with youth unemployment also at 47%, followed by combatting terrorism at 44%.

EU member states are at odds again and are competing to shun responsibilities of refugees and asylum seekers. Italy’s far-right interior minister, Matteo Salvini, who also serves as Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister, recently announced that they would shut down airports to planes carrying migrants from Germany.

Italy and Germany had been working on an agreement that would enable Germany, currently the EU member state with the highest number of refugees, to send back the refugees who had initially applied for asylum in Italy. While the agreement is not signed as of yet, this move sparked outrage amongst Italian authorities and Italian Interior Minister Matteo Salvini asserted that there would be “no airport there” to land the flights carrying migrants.

Aside from the basic dignity that these EU member states are depriving the refugees of, with France’s public burning of refugee camps and Germany losing track of 9000 refugee children -who have been speculated to have their organs harvested by mafia- still fresh in memories, the gross publicization of this row and the disproportionate reactions by EU leaders is beyond logic.

After hearing about mails being sent to migrants informing them of a scheduled transfer back to Italy in a week, Italian authorities were enraged.  Matteo Salvini said: “If someone, in Berlin or Brussels, thinks of dumping dozens of immigrants in Italy via unauthorized charter flights, they should know that there is not and there will be no airport available.

“We will close the airports as we closed the ports.” This remark is a well substantiated one as Salvini came into office vowing to reduce immigration. He stayed true to his promise and under his iron rule Italy closed its sea ports and turned away rescue ships in the Mediterranean.

EU’s Dublin regulation dictates that the asylum seekers are to be handled by the member state that they initially arrive in. Italy challenges this article and states that this regulation doesn’t account for the fact that most of the migrants arrive initially by boat and sea which places a heavier burden on coastal states like Greece and Italy whereas central member states are much less exposed to this “problem”.

This row takes place in the backdrop of Turkey who is hosting over 4 million refugees, 80% of the 5 million externally displaced Syrian refugees worldwide, and who has spent over $33 billion from its own national resources for this cause. EU is yet to mobilize the €6 billion that it had promised and handle a mere 1 million refugees among 28 member states.

Out of its initial promise a mere installment of €1.7 billion has been made to date. When taking into consideration the disproportionate fear and chaos that the notion of refugees plays in EU politics and its capacity to steer EU local elections, it is becoming more evident that EU is taking Turkey’s responsibility and humanity for granted.

President Erdoğan, speaking at a Turkey-Hungary Business Forum meeting, noted that Turkey has footage of refugees being left for dead in the Mediterranean and Aegean seas: “I say it sadly, the international community failed to fulfill its responsibility to find a solution to the refugee issues,”

Prevention is surely better than cure, maybe next time a hot conflict in the Middle East is about to take place, European states can act with better foresight.

Turkey hosts the highest number of refugees worldwide with over 4 million refugees currently residing in Turkey, ranks first in humanitarian aid globally and while UN has barely managed to provide a measly $0.7 Bn, Turkey has spent over $32 Bn for Syrian refugees.

Turkey’s rich history of hospitality continues to date as the country supports words with action. The World has largely remained silent to many of the atrocities over the last decade, with world leaders being “concerned” and international organizations “condemning” war crimes, few have taken actually responsibility to foster to the needs of the victims of ruthless wars which were waged publicly and thus normally bound to stimulate the consciences. Turkey has challenged the status quo, stood against the global inclination to remain oblivious and has taken the most progressive measures to aid the victims of wars.

Some of its European neighbors caged refugees, while some others burned their camps, while some “inadvertently” lost over a thousand child refugees, while others deflated the boats of refugees trying to find recluse midway in international waters, while others beat down refugees, while yet others publicly humiliated refugees, Turkey took tangible steps to provide food, shelter, healthcare, job opportunities, business prospects and social inclusion with sincere steps taken for integration.

The discrepancy between the rhetoric and action of many countries in their stance towards the bloody wars waged in the Middle East is repugnant to say the least. Publicly legitimizing & justifying whilst secretly waging and aiding wars, the “concerns” and “condemnations” of some countries undermine the intellect of the global community.

The conscience of the Turkish community has stood firmly against this violence and ruthless aggression and has demonstrated to the world what it means to be genuinely concerned. The largest donations in humanitarian aid globally come from Turkey. The Turkish community has always publicly and proactively protested those responsible for wars, whether they were Turkey’s “ally” or foe, they have taken to the streets to protest for days in front of various embassies or formed a human convoy stretching out of its borders against the atrocities that no true “human” should be able to stand idly blind to.

“Turkey has been an example in terms of hosting refugee populations. Over 3 million people are still living in Turkey as refugees. And I think really from that perspective, Turkey has been a model of hospitality and providing services to a population who was really in need.” Alanna Armitage, United Nations Population Fund’s regional director for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, said in an interview with Anadolu Agency.

Whilst refugees, or the threat thereof, has become a political leverage to win elections in many European countries left and right, the world needs no more false mannerisms, feinted “concerns”, parades of “sympathy” or mocking “condemnations”, but real action. Turkey has backed its words with actions, it is time for others to do the same.

On Monday, SETA in collaboration with one of its key publications, Insight Turkey, has organized a panel titled “EU and its fault lines”. The panel discussed the main dynamics shaping EU policies, the emerging regional actors and the influence of new World powers steering the currents in & around the EU. After each issue, Insight Turkey organizes a panel in accord with the themes of its latest issue, this panel followed its latest EU special edition focusing on the EU and featured three panelists authoring the journal as well as a guest keynote speaker.

The panel was moderated by Muhitttin Ataman, Editor-in-Chief of Insight Turkey, and keynote speakers who gave insight were Simon Bulmer from University of Sheffield, Çiğdem Yas from Yıldız Technical Univeristy and Ali Resul Usul from Medipol University.

Simon Bulmer discussed the rising position & role of Germany in a post Brexit EU. He covered the various challenges posed by a number of EU crises, the politicization and the breakdown of domestic crises and the outlook for Germany. He underlined that German power was always focal for European integration. From a historical perspective, European integration was partly important for managing and handling German power following the Nazi regime. Germany has had a pivotal role in handling various crises over the last decade including the Eurozone crisis, the Ukraine crisis, the Refugee crisis and the shifting dynamics in the wake of Trumpian politics amid an existing leadership crisis within the EU, EU’s struggle for democratic legitimacy and the rise of populism and anti-elitist sentiments that harbor Eurosceptic reactions.

Discussing the biggest foreseeable effects of Brexit, Bulmer noted that Germany will be much more exposed and be forced to take on a bigger responsibility with the loss of Britain, a major liberal trade ally, a leading EU budget contributor, and an important global player from the EU. “I have two main projections, two possible scenarios: Franco-German relations can gain momentum and revive. Or perhaps Germany can emerge stronger as a potential hegemon in the EU. It has the structural power but lacks the diplomatic leadership due to its domestic politics. And perhaps another option is the slow disintegration of the EU.” Bulmer noted.

Çiğdem Nas discussed the latest developments and crises in the EU, the effects of these crises on the EU-Turkey relations and whether a phase of normalization in bilateral relations was foreseeable. Since the 90s EU has been facing crises which are ongoing and still unresolved. In the beginning of 2000s where there was a peak in relations with Turkey, there was an optimistic outlook from an EU perspective since the EU at the time felt more optimistic of its own future. Çiğdem Nas underscored that the candidacy offer to Turkey may perhaps even have been based on the fact that EU at the time had less internal problems and the power to cope with and manage its existing problems. But later, especially after the 2005 veto of France and Holland on establishing a Constitution for Europe following local referendums, the public opinion was particularly telling in terms of the rise of Euroscepticism and there were doubting questions raised on the prospect of a more integrated and plausibly a Federal Europe.

Prof. Nas added that the 2008 global financial crisis that took a toll on Greece, the Ukraine-Russia tensions, Russia’s expansionist policies and refugee crises have all respectively triggered concentric pressures on Europe. EU’s internal problems and the weakening of mainstream parties who played a pivotal role in determining EU policies have had a direct impact on the enlargement process including the prospects for Turkey. “Turkey plays a crucial role in the refugee crisis and considering its failure to resolve this crisis, EU should comprehend the value of Turkey for its own interests” said Çiğdem Nas. Although many reports have argued that Turkey is allegedly distancing itself from EU principles, it is starkly evident that EU isn’t taking the necessary steps to keep Turkey close.

Ali Resul Usul discussed the Chinese influence since the 2000s and underscored that there is a crucial China factor that must be taken into consideration and that the new Belt and Road Initiative will have multifold effects on EU and that EU’s reaction to  these forces is unforeseeable as of yet. “I claim that China as a global power has direct impacts in the EU, especially in southeastern Europe and western Balkan countries which is manifesting itself more evidently over the recent years and can spread further thus forming a new fault line within the EU” said Prof. Ali Resul Usul.

Prof. Usul emphasized that the EU project is a homogenizing project and that currently there is a certain level of homogeneity in itself. EU’s general motto is “United in diversity”. “There is an emphasis of plurality but there are also frictions and evident tensions between the homogenizing and disintegrating or centrifugal forces and centripetal forces. These tensions have been inherent ones and have existed since the onset of the EU” Prof. Usul noted.

The recent developments have had benefits especially for the centrifugal forces, Prof. Usul argued. The centrifugal forces in the EU are increasing and among the integration and enlargement dynamics of the EU, whether it be North-South, East-West, Mediterranean-North, Widening-Deepening, German-Franco axes, the geopolitical fault lines were always present. In 2004, the new fault lines and the existing fault lines became more complex with the significant enlargement. Many decision-making processes became difficult. “France didn’t want the integration of the eastern Balkan states, since France feared the natural and gradual shift in the centripetal force of the EU towards the East and despite its strong and continued resistance it had to eventually face what it feared”, said Prof. Usul.

Today, since the 2004 enlargement of the EU, the largest enlargement to date, there have been significant tensions with regards to integration between central and eastern EU states due to several factors: the financial crisis, the questions posed by the post Brexit phase, rising xenophobia and anti-refugee sentiments and EU enlargements which have all fueled Euroscepticism and strengthened centrifugal forces.

Following and amid these tensions, a global power, namely China enters the stage, Prof. Usul highlighted: “China has increased its influence in southeastern Europe, central and eastern Europe, the Mediterranean and a large part of the Balkan states and even candidate states and in turn these states have been bolstered to leverage on this Chinese influence and activities in the region utilizing this new gained strength against the centripetal European forces.”

The Belt and Road Initiative is a new and very significant issue with global ramifications but it is still too early to make clear-cut predictions since the Chinese authorities have not published any specific and definitive details of the project. While the EU currently has its hands full with local problems, it still hasn’t formulated a tangible policy to handle this Chinese influence. While on the one hand it welcomes foreign investments including Chinese investments, on the other hand it is still warily suspicious of China’s deeper intentions.

In cooperation with the Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, SETA Istanbul held a panel today discussing the changing dynamics in Turkey’s foreign policy. Under the title “Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the New Period: Opportunities and Challenges,” the speakers were Kemal Inat, Talha Kose, Samir Salha, and Said Elhaj.

Kemal Inat began by stating that Turkey is currently trying to follow an “independent foreign policy,” meaning that Ankara is prioritizing its own interests due to the clash it has found itself in with its Western partners.

Increasingly, Turkey’s Western allies have been falling distant to the threats that Turkey has encountered in terms of fighting against terrorism and the Syrian Civil War that has caused mass migration into the country.

In terms of the current problems that Turkey is facing, Inat stated that the problems that Turkey has witnessed “are greatly related to Ankara’s foreign policy position.”

Providing a historical background on the relations between Turkey and the U.S., Inat reminded the audience that the initial beginning of a relationship between Ankara and Washington was during the Cold War era, when Turkey needed the protection of the U.S. against Soviet expansionism.

“There was no equal relationship at first. The U.S. is trying to maintain this power relationship, while Turkey wants an equal relationship.”

In regards to Turkey’s attempts to form equal relationships between its allies, Inat also added an “alternative” dimension to the discussions on Turkish foreign policy. Inat stated that it is “natural” for Turkey to seek alternative allies – including Russia – due to its deteriorating relations with its Western allies.

“Ankara wants to form relationships based on mutual interdependence. Who ever is close to this idea, then Turkey will form good relations with that country. This is the answer to who Turkey will form relations with.”

In spite of all discussions surrounding relations between Turkey and the West, Inat also reminded the audience that the European Union is still Turkey’s largest trading partner and that the two blocs are mutually dependent on each other in terms of trade.

In agreement, Talha Kose also mentioned that while there have been ups and downs in the bilateral relation between the U.S. and Turkey, there has never been such a systematic clog.

Kose stated how anti-Turkey lobbies in the U.S. gained power after the Iraq war and were finally at a peak where they had a direct affect on relations between the two countries.

Regional powers that want to maintain the current status quo in the Middle East – namely, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt – have all maintained good relations with the U.S., while mutual insecurity has haunted the Turkey-U.S. relationship.

Speaking after Talha Kose, Said Elhaj also added the FETO dimension. Elhaj stated how the U.S. support for Fetullah Gulen and FETO has been a major detriment to relations between Washington and Ankara.

Emphasizing that the relationship between Turkey and the U.S. is an important one, Elhaj added that “Turkey does not want to lose the U.S. or NATO.”

Apart from Turkey’s relations with the U.S., Elhaj also re-iterated why some countries in the Arab world support a deteriorated Turkey-U.S. relationship. The reason for this according to Elhaj is due to the fact that “Turkey is a country observed as supporting the Arab Spring.” More, Turkey was very open in its support to Qatar during the Gulf crisis – something that initially went against the interests of Saudi Arabia.

The famous European Union-Turkey deal, based on the Joint Action-Plan (JAP) pertaining to the readmission of irregular migrants to Turkey, has sparked off debates around the new EU strategies on migration management. Its implementation and commitments, in a way, directly affects EU-Turkey relations that have followed a fragile line for a long period.

In the agreement, Turkey has been demanding €3bn + €3bn funding allocated for the expenditures of Syrian refugees hosted in the camps located in different cities across the country. In return, it was predicted that EU countries will implement a visa exemption for Turkish citizens in the following months. Regarding the deal, Turkey has pledged to cooperate with the EU in order to disrupt human-smuggling networks, thereby curbing the massive migrant flows into Europe.

Road to compromise: Joint-Action Plan

On 18 March 2016, the EU and the Turkish delegations agreed upon the cooperation for struggling with irregular migration. Accordingly, as of 20 March 2016, it was decided that “all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands will be returned to Turkey.” For every Syrian migrant being returned to Turkey, a Syrian who fulfills the conditions for international protection will be resettled in an EU member country. That’s why this is also known as “the 1:1 deal.” In doing so, Turkey has pledged “to take any necessary measures” to eradicate the irregular migration in the Aegean Sea.

With the agreement, the EU would allocate €3 billion under the given financial aid program – the Facility for Refugees in Turkey. Once these funds are entirely spent, the EU also pledged to mobilize an additional €3 billion to the end of 2018. The most significant article of the agreement was the most disputed, in return for the cooperation, Turkey’s visa liberalization roadmap would be accelerated with a view to lifting the visa requirements for Turkish citizens.

The visa liberalization roadmap was bound to a list of requirements that are expected from the Turkish counterpart to fulfil them. The long list of 72, including 5 major political and technical arrangements were involved in changing the anti-terror laws. Three points are listed as “not fulfilled” in the EU Commission document published on 6 September, “Seventh Report on the Progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement.” There are technical points such as applying biometric technology compatible with the EU standards, pursuing cooperation with Europol and the European judicial authorities, some reforms on personal data protection, and fully implementing the readmission agreement. However, the EU requested two other controversial points such as measures against corruption and revising the anti-terrorism laws, that means too much interference within a country’s domestic policy especially one that fights against several terrorist organizations.

Turkey kept its promises

Despite the disagreement on the defined sine qua non reforms, Ankara did not refrain from discharging its duties under the agreement. On April 4, 2016, the readmission plan began to be applied between Greece and Turkey, so that over 200 refugees were sent back to Turkey under the plan. A week after the activation of the plan, the-then Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu reminded the commitments under the deal to his European counterparts: “I maintain my belief that, God willing, we will have the visa exemption in June. In the absence of that, then, of course, no one can expect Turkey to adhere to its commitments.” Similarly, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu underlined that the EU needs Turkey in order to stem the tide of massive migrant flows.

Nowadays, with the many successful maritime operations by the Turkish Coastguard, the figures dropped down to 24,739 in 2017, as of 5 November. This number was 173,450 in the erstwhile year, while over 1 million people were reaching the Greek islands via Turkey in 2015. Germany saw a 69% drop in the numbers of migrants arriving the country, partially thanks to the working of the deal thereby closing the Western Balkan route.

Would the deal be cancelled?

As of 4 September 2017, the total number of Syrian refugees resettled from Turkey to the EU under the 1:1 scheme was 8,834. This year, Turkey has submitted to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees a new referral lists with almost 23,500 persons to be resettled.

In the EU’s perspective, it is hard to describe the EU-Turkey deal as a dead duck considering these outcomes. However, since none of Turkey’s demands have been implemented yet, it can easily be conceded as a dead-duck agreement. The right to cancel the agreement has been reserved to the Turkish part, without any explanation. So, when taking into consideration the recent statements from Turkish officials, the possibility of cancellation seems not so far away: “We may cancel the readmission agreement. The EU has been wasting our time on the visa liberalization issue. We are not applying the readmission agreement at the moment, and we are evaluating the refugee deal,” said Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. Similarly, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned the EU as they could forget about Turkey re-admitting asylum seekers. Recently, during a trade visit in Poland, he said the EU had “only sent €885 million of its promised €3 billion plus.”

Just after 4 months of signing the agreement with the EU, Turkey witnessed a coup attempt, which left 249 dead and thousands injured. During this period, it became clear that the requirement of revising anti-terror legislation was not to be in consideration. While Turkey is in a fight against the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO), which orchestrated the coup, the country remains fighting DAESH and the PKK/PYD – a struggle in which its European neighbours and allies have not supported. Therefore, if the EU insists upon the revision of Turkey’s anti-terror laws, it will not be surprising to see a cancelation of the readmission agreement.

Europe is set to form a new army whose membership would encompass, minus Britain, Denmark and a few others, all the European Union states. In what has been considered as a “historic” moment on Monday, 23 members of the EU, led by France and Germany, signed a pledge to form a united army. The move has triggered major debate, with proponents calling it as complementary and opponents as competitive to NATO.

EU Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini stated that “23 member states engaging both on capabilities and on operational steps is something big.” Keeping the door open for those who did not join the army, Mogherini said Pesco, backed by the EU defense fund, “will enable member states to use the economy of scale of Europe and in this manner to fulfil the gap of output that we have.”

The member states’ signatures signify the political will but only legal endorsement, which is expected in December, can confirm the program’s force. Sources within the EU said that the agreement is not just going to be a bureaucratic co-operation, but real investment that will help develop Europe’s defense industry and spur research and development in military capabilities that the bloc needs most.

Though the campaign for joining forces had started in the 1950s, the timing of the agreement is ever more significant. It comes in the backdrop of Brexit, rising right wing forces in Europe, member countries’ dwindling support for NATO and more importantly Turkey’s lack of trust over its NATO partners and warming up of relations between Turkey and NATO’s arch rival Russia. Turkey is the largest man-power contributor to NATO.

The proponent officials such as Mogherini hail the European army arguing that it will be complementary to NATO: “The EU has tools to fight hybrid warfare – the use of conventional weapons mixed with things such as propaganda and cyber-attacks – that NATO does not have at its disposal.”

German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel said that the agreement was “a great step towards self-sufficiency and strengthening the European Union’s security and defense policy – really a milestone in European development.”

Britain, which is set to leave the EU, did not veto the formation of a “permanent structured co-operation (Pesco),” as it has been named, though, as was expected, refused to sign the pledge. Denmark, Ireland, Portugal and Malta also abstained. The fact that Britain did not block the initiative to form a EU army – rather tacitly supporting its formation – is expected to attract furious response from the country’s Brexit supporters.

David Banks of Veterans for Britain had only a few days ago stated that British involvement in the European defense union would sharply undermine Brexit. He emphasized that any form of EU defense unity should not involve Britain as the force would allow the EU to oversee increasingly blurred lines between the armed forces of different states. As a supporter of Brexit, according to Banks, opposition to an EU Army was one of the few things which united “Yes” and “No” voters during the Brexit referendum.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM), has urged all parties to meet their commitments on the European refugee crisis, stating that the EU-Turkey deal achieved significant success.

Speaking in Geneva, on Tuesday, IOM spokesperson Joel Millman said that the number of asylum seekers crossing into Greece had fallen sharply due to measures adopted by Turkey last year after the deal.

In March 2016, Turkey and the EU signed a refugee deal which aimed at discouraging irregular migration through the Aegean Sea by taking stricter measures against human traffickers and improving the conditions of the nearly three million Syrian refugees in Turkey.

According to latest IOM figures, nearly 23,000 people passed to Greece from Turkey in the first 10 months of this year while the number was about 170,000 last year, and 780,000 in 2015.

The deal also included a €6 billion ($6.8 billion) aid package to help Turkey care for the approximately 3.5 million refugees hosted in the country.

The EU promised to initially allocate €3 billion ($3.5 billion) in its first tranche for projects to support Syrian refugees. However, only €800 million ($930 million) has been transferred so far.

Ankara says it has spent more than €20 billion ($24.1 billion) from its own national resources on helping and sheltering refugees since the beginning of the Syrian civil war.

Rohingya crisis on the table in the UK

In parallel, an event attended by the Union of Turkish Democrats (UETD) and Burma Campaign UK held in the UK Parliament, was concerned about the intensifying atrocities against Rohingya Muslims.

Mark Farmaner, director of Burma Campaign UK, emphasized that thousands of children had lost their lives due to the restrictions on aid to Rakhine State.

Hosted by Lord Nazir Ahmed, the event “A Silent Ethnic Cleansing: the Rohingya Muslims” was and also attended by Turkey’s ruling AK Party MP Ziya Altunyaldiz.

During his speech, Farmaner describing the living standards of the Rohingya, stating that thousands of people live in squalid camps with almost no access to health care.

Giving examples of some horrific incidents that took place during the genocide against the Muslim minority in the region since August 25, Farmaner underlined that the Buddhist majority oppressed other minorities for decades.

“The current situation in Burma is the systematic failure by the international community to protect the Rohingya Muslims,” he said.

He called for the international community to reach a consensus in order to end the violence as soon as possible.

Until this day, the UN have reported 607,000 Rohingya Muslims that have crossed from Myanmar to Bangladesh since August 25, with arrivals still continuing.

The UN has documented mass gang rapes, killings – including those of infants and young children — brutal beatings and disappearances committed by security personnel.

Former US President Barack Obama had designated Turkey as a model partner in his first term. However, regional priorities of the Obama administration shifted drastically after 2012. The attack on the US diplomatic mission in Benghazi in September 2012, which resulted in the death of the US ambassador, is thought to be one of the main reasons behind this shift. After 2014, a new US foreign policy approach led to the containment of Turkey from all sides. The Obama Administration’s decision to form an alliance with the terrorist PYD/YPG against DAESH in Syria was a turning point for Turkey.

The US political and military support for PYD encouraged the PKK and other terrorist organizations to target Turkey. The PKK ended the reconciliation process in the summer of 2015 and commenced its terror attacks against the country. Simultaneously, DAESH started to increase the frequency of its attacks against Turkey. The US’s clear stance against Turkey might have been a factor behind the failed coup attempt by FETO (the Fetullah Gülenist Terror Organization) in the Summer of 2016. The leaders of FETO had probably calculated that given the Erdoğan administration’s unpopularity in Washington policy circles, not many actors in the US would resist such a coup attempt. They were right in the sense that not so many people among the Obama administration clearly and vociferously condemned the putschists that tried to topple the democratically elected government of Turkey. However, FETO leaders miscalculated the Turkish people’s own resistance and strong reaction to the coup attempt.

Obama’s foreign policy approach was not just directed against Turkey. Although the second term of the Obama administration was a nightmare for traditional US allies including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Ukraine, Obama’s policies produced a favorable environment for the US’s rivals like Iran, Cuba, and Russia. The containment of Sunni countries with a “Shiite crescent” was truly ensured during the Obama administration. Nuclear talks with Iran, political developments in Iraq and the US’s military retreat from Iraq paved the way for Iran and its sectarian geopolitics. Iran was the primary beneficiary of the Obama Administration’s Middle East policy. “The strategy to balance old allies with old rivals” was costly for the US’s traditional allies. However, all actors started to seek new means to compensate for their losses. Turkey’s balancing strategy and recalibration efforts were the result of such a quest.

Turkey was in search of a new partner to overcome the internal and trans-border security challenges that the country was facing. Turkey’s attempts to improve relations with Russia and contacts with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization were a direct result of this search. Indeed, Operation Euphrates Shield that aimed to cleanse the Turkish-Syrian border from terrorist elements commenced only after mutual agreement with Russia. The search for new cooperation opportunities in Turkish foreign policy does not entail becoming a part of a new alliance system in the short term; however, it caused Turkey to distance itself from the alliance system that it is a member of. The new orientation of Turkish foreign policy may cause it to form issue or region-based strategic partnerships or limited alliances. The adoption of a dynamically balanced policy instead of relying on a particular alliance for increasing security in the short and midterm seems a more probable option.

In the short-term, Turkey will try to have a much more balanced relationship with the US, Russia and EU. To have a reasonable balanced policy, Turkey should do its best to avoid any situation that could bring these three actors in line against itself. At the regional level, on the other hand balancing Iranian expansionism, and sectarian rhetoric as well as the containment of the PKK/PYD and DAESH will be Turkey’s top priorities.

Being surrounded by the PKK/PYD, DAESH and Iranian-backed sectarian militias is the worst-case scenario for Turkey. However, Turkey is not the only actor unhappy with the activism of the aforementioned violent non-state actors and militia groups. Turkey may be in a position to take risks against these actors because unlike for the US, EU and Russia; PKK/PYD, DAESH and the sectarian militias constitute an existential threat against Turkey’s security. Turkey’s more assertive struggle against these actors in the field may encourage three major actors (US, EU and Russia) to cooperate or at least to stop resisting against Turkey. These diverse objectives may eventually contradict each other, which is the main challenge for Turkey.

Transition from Axis to Balance Policy

Turkey abstained from direct military intervention in the Syrian civil war and this was something unexpected by Washington, which, previously too, had not received logistical support from Turkey during the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The US administration seems to have been frustrated by Turkey’s military refraining from intervening in Syria in the framework of the alliance with the US, and started to question the necessity of an ally that didn’t act in the interest of Washington. On the other hand, relations with President Erdoğan and the AK Party government became tense.

The period following the downing of a Russian fighter jet near the Syrian border by the Turkish Air Force in November 2015 had been painful for Turkey. The country’s relations with both the US and Russia became tense since early 2015. Meanwhile the EU was also indifferent towards Turkey’s sensitivities in its struggle against terrorism. All factors combined, each and every one of these actors tried to benefit from the fragility of the country and expected Turkey to go along with their interests. The Gülenist coup attempt of July 15, 2016, took place in such a fragile environment.

Today, Turkey’s top priority is to have more balanced relationships with the US, Russia, and EU. Improving the relations or being on friendly terms with at least two of these actors is a key to Turkey’s economic and political stability. Keeping a delicate balance between the US, Russia and EU is quite significant for maintaining Turkey’s relative autonomy in its foreign relations as much as in its domestic security. On the other hand, however, balancing interests in the economy and security is another challenge for Turkey. There is no magic formula to reach these objectives at the same time but the balancing policy should henceforth be the pivotal term for Turkish foreign policy. Having tense relationships with more than one global actor accompanied by other regional security challenges makes Turkey less immune to domestic and international shocks.

The turbulent era of Turkish foreign policy, especially during Barack Obama’s second term, is the reflection of the struggle to adapt to the new foreign policy approach. It is probable to have a more rational policy, based on the mutual interests of the two countries during the Donald Trump presidency. At some point, the Trump administration will have to make a strategic choice between Turkey and the PKK/PYD in Syria and it will shape the future of Turkish-American relations. The competition between US CENTCOM and the US EUCOM will also influence the end result. While US CENTCOM has chosen PKK/PYD as its strategic partner, EUCOM may choose to improve cooperation and collaboration with Turkey in critical security issues regarding Europe.

On the other hand, Turkey’s efforts to coordinate its Syria policy with Russia, despite certain difficulties, may have positive outcomes for Turkey’s security. If the Astana Process for the resolution of the Syrian conflict produces some productive outcomes, this might help the resolution of other issues as well. We have to keep in mind that Turkey and Russia are still far from reaching a strategic agreement in any significant security related issue including the future of Syria.

The EU is a more complicated counterpart for Turkey. Although there are more areas of potential cooperation and mutual interests between Turkey and the EU, especially in the fields of economy and security, the possibility of strengthening ties in the near future is quite grim due to internal political complications and challenges of both actors. The results of parliamentary elections in Germany in September 2017 and French presidential elections will have a significant influence on the leadership of the EU. Until then, EU-Turkey relations may be unstable at best.

The legacy of openings to other regions such as Africa, Latin America and East Asia is positive but these regions do not have strategic value for Turkey’s foreign policy agenda. If the EU institutions decide to continue more hostile relations with Turkey and try to isolate Turkey, alternative options including the Shangai Cooperation Organization may be considered more seriously. Fluctuations and instabilities in US-Russian relations will have a direct impact on Turkey’s strategic decisions and choices. That is why the decision makers in Turkey will be following this relationship closely. Turkey is entering a new era where diplomacy has to be conducted meticulously to meet the new challenges.

Turkey is having difficulty communicating its current foreign policy objectives and practices, which are closely linked to the country’s recent domestic challenges. Both Turkey’s traditional NATO allies and Russia are unwilling to cooperate with it in its efforts to meet security challenges related to the spillover effects of the Syrian war and the problems related to the FETO (Fetullah Gülenist Terror Organization). Indeed this reluctance is beyond the scope of a simple communication problem.

Turkish decision makers feel that the country’s traditional allies are now implicitly containing Turkey with their tacit encouragement of the terror organizations that are targeting Turkey. Both the US as well as EU members seem to have strong ties with terrorist elements such as the PKK and the FETO which constitute an existential threat to Turkish national security. The CENTCOM commanders do not hide their strategic cooperation and collaboration with the PYD and the PKK in Syria. Those terror organizations constantly target Turkey with the weapons provided by the US and other coalition partners.

The anti-DAESH coalition provided limited support to Turkey in its fight against the terror group, however the coalition partners also set some limits for Turkey in its fight against the terror group in the course of Operation Euphrates Shield. EU institutions and European politicians are pursuing biased policies to tarnish Turkey’s international image rather than cooperating in the areas where both sides have common interests. These are the main reasons why Turkey has to make a structural transformation in its foreign policy approach as well as in its priorities in its relations with the US, EU, and Russia.

This transformation is directly linked to Turkey’s rising security concerns in which change in the policies of Ankara’s historical allies is the main reason behind it. The new yet complex security environment and challenges made Turkey more introverted within the last two years. Turkish foreign policy did not choose an isolationist path, however unlike the more idealist era Turkey’s imminent security concerns necessitated a more balanced approach. Defensive and coercive foreign policy tools started to assume a more significant place in Turkish foreign policy decision-making. Turkey seemed less prepared in coercive foreign policy, besides the use of military might, and faced more international resistance despite the fact that it was used against DAESH.

The priority of the AK Party era Turkish foreign policy was to diversify its relations in terms of regions/countries and to expand the autonomy of Turkey’s foreign policy. This diversification also tried to strike a balance between economic, political, and security related interests. Turkey tried to resolve its problems with neighboring countries and institutionalize strong political, economic and cultural ties during the AK Party administration until 2013. This diversification effort was not shaped at the expense of any specific third party. This approach also aimed to decrease Turkey’s dependency on its traditional allies in terms of defense and security.

The inclusion of the EU integration process into Turkey’s policy agenda played constructive roles within the political and economic fields. However, with the EU decision to block Turkey’s membership process under the pretext of the Cyprus issue, Turkey turned to improve its ties with other regions, and thus the policy was labeled as an “opening period.”  Turkish foreign policy tried to improve ties with the Middle East, Russia, and African and Latin American countries during this time. Rather than shifting its axis towards other forces, Turkey prioritized the country’s national interests. This policy was frequently criticized by Turkey’s traditional allies as well as by the local affiliates of these allies. Turkey’s allies put pressure on Turkey through rhetoric like “shift of axis,” “Neo-Ottomanism,” “Middle-Easternization,” “Eurasianism,” and “Islamization of Turkey’s foreign policy.”

On the other hand, Turkey adopted an idealist foreign policy vision between 2004 and 2013 with the claim to be an actor that can help to facilitate more collaborative relations around its neighboring region. This policy emphasized an “order instituting” actor role for Turkey. In accordance with this idealist vision, Turkey decided to become a proactive mediator or facilitator for the resolution of numerous regional crises. Regional cooperation and trade opportunities were improved with comprehensive international platforms. These policies were quite effective until the early stages of the Arab Spring. The regional atmosphere was conducive to the implementation of such a constructive agenda. Turkey also paid attention to coordinate its efforts with its Western allies.

The outbreak of the Syrian Civil War and the destabilization of Iraq due to the rise of terror organizations and ethnic and sectarian militia groups radically changed the security environment of Turkey. The country felt the risk of destabilization due to immediate challenges. Terrorist organizations found a suitable environment to spread along Turkey’s southern border. NATO mostly stood still against these changing security trends; only precautions against DAESH were taken. NATO involvement was quite weak and insufficient to provide safeguards for Turkey. Threats posed to Turkey’s security by terror organizations such as the PKK, DHKP-C and FETO, were mostly disregarded.

The lukewarm stance of Turkey’s NATO allies with regard to Turkey’s security challenges resulted in the isolation of Turkey in terms of security and foreign policy. Turkey was left alone in its fight against terror and this strategic choice of Turkey’s “Western allies” was at the same time a strategy to constrain and balance Turkey’s pro-active role in regional politics. Turkey was expected to renounce its proactive role and return back to a traditional defensive role that was designated for it during the Cold War era. Turkey resisted in adapting its regional foreign policy to the traditional defensive model.

Turkey, being surrounded by a mix of violent non-state actors/ terror groups, felt it necessity to deploy its military on the field with Operation Euphrates Shield. Turkey’s active presence intensified its relations with the US, Russia and Iran since mid-2014. However, the attempts to recalibrate the Turkish foreign policy to this new security oriented paradigm started in mid-2016. Turkish foreign policy is switching into a more pragmatic approach. Border security and the struggle against terrorism will be prioritized, yet non-coercive approaches such as humanitarian and development aid, conflict resolution and mediation approaches, trade diplomacy and soft power will continue to be on the agenda.

Reducing dependence on defense industry and expanding and strengthening its network of non-state partners in the regional context are other medium term goals. Having been disappointed by the hostile policies of its traditional allies, Turkey will now emphasize an issue-based balancing strategy. Turkey is experiencing a seesaw pattern and disappointments in its foreign policy are the byproduct of this recalibration effort. Turkey does not refrain from using its hard power against terror elements on both sides of its borders, despite criticism by the US, Russia and other regional actors.

The adoption of pre-emptive security operations on both sides of Turkey’s border was a major shift for Turkey’s security doctrine. Turkey shifted its foreign policy approach along its southern and eastern borders. This shift can be portrayed as a change from pro-active constructive diplomacy to pre-emptive security. This change also has effects on domestic politics and bureaucratic configuration. More nationalist discourses started to dominate multilateralist voices and security diplomacy started to become more central actors to Turkey’s foreign policy making since both the Turkish public and Turkish decision makers are getting increasingly disappointed by the US and EU’s indifference to its security concerns.

Universities are one of the very few institutions which have existed for a long period of time. Fundamentally changing throughout centuries due to both internal and external causes, universities and other higher education institutions continue to exist today by assuming a variety of functions. Especially in the last fifty years, higher education institutions have experienced structural reforms at the behest of the public. All countries eased the access to higher education and experienced a tremendous rise in enrollment in higher education systems. The financial burden of increased enrollment forced the higher education systems to use their resources more efficiently and to respond to the demands of the public and the market. In this respect, quality assurance systems and procedures came to the fore.

On the other hand, the fierce and relentless competition in the world economy imposed more burdens on higher education institutions: universities are now expected to be a center of attraction for international students and academics. Internationalization began to be seen as a source of revenue, an element of public diplomacy, and an instrument to attract the most intelligent and diligent people in the world to increase the research capacity in economic competition. All of these processes necessitated universities to position themselves in accordance with external factors. Since its conception, universities had never faced such pressure. The impact of these processes, expectations from higher education institutions and how higher education institutions respond to societal and external factors continue to be the subjects of heated discussions today.

University Ranking Criteria and the Higher Education Market

Especially in the last twenty years, university rankings which originally were regional and created to aid students and researchers have become increasingly global, establishing a prominent market. There are new ranking institutions being founded every day. While the countries publish national ranking lists employing various criteria, they start to carry these rankings to a global level as they gain legitimacy. As the rankings were recognized by countries, these rankings started to have an increasingly transformative effect on higher education systems. Despite all the discussions about the criteria being extremely narrow and the ranking system’s possible failure in reflecting quality, the world university rankings increased the pressure and made it a matter of prestige for countries to have higher ranking universities on the list. Those who set the criteria and standards rule the higher education market. Moreover, those who set the criteria are able to direct the flow of money due to the investments on higher education. Especially developing countries have started to allot tremendous budgets to found world-class universities and to be on these lists.

Considering the impact of world university rankings on higher education institutions’ behaviors and the immense budgets allotted to rank higher on the list, it is important to mention several crucial matters and risks. Firstly, the top 25 universities on the lists which are world-renowned and, thus, have a vast area of legitimacy, have almost never changed. Moreover, the universities ranking between 25th and 100th on the list have only experienced minimal changes. Hence, there is a monopoly in the highest ranking segment of the lists and this monopoly is expected to perpetuate itself in the near future, unless the criteria are changed (see John Aubrey Douglass’s book The New Flagship University: Changing the Paradigm from Global Ranking to National Relevancy). Prestige and past performances determine the future rankings. As the wealthy have the potential to become wealthier, these ranking systems allow higher education institutions which have extensive experience and a powerful research and publication capacity to maintain their positions on the list. Therefore, the newcomers will not be able to make leaps forward on the list in the near future, even if they allot tremendous budgets to rank higher.

As the ranking systems which rely on a limited set of criteria are facing increasing criticism, alternative ranking systems are being researched. For instance, most of the European countries ranking lower than the US and the UK on the list forced the EU to take action; as they believed rankings would not face a change in the short term, they started to work on an alternative ranking system which also takes the quality of education into consideration. As a result of their efforts, a new ranking system known as U-Multirank, multidimensional ranking of higher education institutions, emerged. As it was not completely acknowledged by the US and the UK, its recognition was limited to European countries. Therefore, the new ranking systems changing the main trend on world university rankings have a limited recognition and legitimacy.

On the other hand, the pressure to publish and cite more in order to rank higher on the existing world universities ranking creates the risk of academics of developing countries focusing more on the issues of those countries which dominate the network of publication and citations, instead of local, national or regional issues that their countries experience. While the universities of developing countries are expected to be more sensitive towards their own countries’ issues for economic improvement, they are also pressured to rank higher on the world universities ranking. Due to the simultaneous pressure on both ends, the most powerful universities of the developing countries are forced to be desensitized towards national issues. This constitutes a paradox which is hard to resolve.

Especially during the recent years, it is being discussed that there is an increasing trend in a brain drain due to the inconsistency between the economic opportunities provided by having a world-class university and the quality of graduates.

What should be done?

The criteria employed by world universities rankings are definitely important and they should be also deemed important by higher education institutions, which are already restructuring themselves according to the common criteria. However, the world universities ranking is not everything and it should be taken with a grain of salt due to the reasons stated. The most important aspect is to have powerful higher education institutions which are connected with local, national and regional issues. This does not entail isolation or a disconnection from the global issues; besides, national and regional issues are not independent of the global ones. Therefore, while creating solutions for national and regional issues, the universities also contribute to the global knowledge database. Nevertheless, there is nothing more natural than a higher education institution prioritizing its immediate environment, thus the country it is in.

On the other hand, the higher education system should have a flexible structure which will allow institutions to create dynamic resolutions for the country’s issues. Balanced and efficient planning of all processes, along with increasing diversification which will allow higher education institutions to have distinct missions are the most important aspects. In other words, national needs and demands have to be taken into consideration. Meticulous and stable steps must be taken to further a small number of flagship universities in certain fields in the world through distribution of roles and careful allotment of national resources, while ensuring these universities continue to prioritize national interests and issues.

The discourses of Islamophobic parties and politicians whose influence has been increased throughout Europe are effecting all European institutions, including judiciary bodies.

Could you give some information about the European Court of Justice, which has taken the headscarf decision? What is its structure and task?

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the highest court in the European Union (EU). It is a three-tiered organization that consists of the Court of Justice, the General Court and courts of expertise. The main objective of the Court of Justice is to ensure the uniformity of the interpretation and implementation of the European Union law. The Court performs the functions of ensuring legal adherence to the interpretation and application of the Union law; harmonization of the national legal orders with the EU legal order; legal administration; commentary; conflict resolution; and legislation. The Court is also authorized to rule a few cases arising from the EU law. These are cases about lawsuits examining the member states and EU institutions’ compliance with the Union law; and interpretation of the EU law when it is necessary for the settlement of the cases in the national courts. The Court consists of one judge from each member state, the General Court consists of 28 judges, which comprises at least one judge from each member state. Judges hold office for a renewable term of six years with the consensus of the member state governments. The independence of the Judges of the Court is ensured by various provisions that regulate the status of the judges. The EU Court of Justice is seated in Luxembourg.

Is there a relationship between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights in terms of their duties and decisions?

First of all, it must be noted that the Court of Justice is not a human rights court and it should not be confused with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The ECHR is the international Court of courts established by the European Convention of Human Rights of which Turkey is a member whereas the ECHR is not a member of the EU. The Court, as mentioned above, is the highest court of the EU and its duty is not to safeguard human rights, but the interpretation and implementation of the EU law. For this reason, it should be mentioned that the decision that we will discuss was not a lawsuit directly related to and aiming to reverse a human rights violation, but it was related to the violation of the EU legislation that directly affects the right to freedom of religion. Therefore, we may argue that similar cases on this subject are likely to go to the ECHR in the future.

Earlier rulings on the banning of the headscarf by the ECHR were based on the reasoning that it could be prohibited for reasons, for example, when it is considered “a threat to public order”. However, we can say that recent political developments and the current political climate which has influenced the Court’s leanings on this issue are also valid for the ECHR, and that negative decisions giving way to the prohibition are likely to arise as a consequence of this disposition.

Can you summarize the controversial headscarf decision of the European Court of Justice? What is the content of the case? How did it come to this stage? What is the grounds for the decision of the court?

The complaint regarding the headscarf ruling was initially made by a Muslim woman named Samira Achbita, who resides in Belgium. Since 2003, Achbita had been working for the security firm G4S as a receptionist. She had been there for three years when she informed her employee that she would begin wearing the headscarf. Her employer has rejected the request by reasoning that wearing signs that symbolize and visualize political, philosophical, or religious views would be contrary to the principle of neutrality towards customers, and this is among the internal, unwritten rules of the company. Despite this ruling, Achbita informed her workplace that she intended to­ wear her headscarf to work. On the day following Achbita’s decision, a written prohibition on religious and philosophical symbols in the work place was added to the employee code of conduct. Achbita insisted on wearing her headscarf and consequently was dismissed from her position as she was acting in violation of the workplace regulation.

Samira Achbita initially filed a lawsuit in the Belgian courts, which reached the Belgian Court of Appeals. The Belgian Court of Cassation then applied to the European Court of Justice to see whether the ban on headscarves at work is in line with the EU’s 2000 Directive on equal treatment in employment and occupation. The case file and the dispute came before the Court. In other words, the Court review was not in regards of whether the prohibition was a violation of human rights and freedom of religion, but rather if it was in compliance with the EU Directive on equal treatment.

The Court ruled that the G4S security firm implemented a regulation of the workplace that did not discriminate based on religion or belief and that there was evidence to suggest that no specific discrimination was directed towards the person who filed the case and therefore it could not be ruled as a discrimination case under the EU Directive. In this particular case it was argued that there was no discrimination against a specific religion or worldview within the regulation which warranted an “indirect discrimination” case. In addition, it has been noted that it is legitimate for an employer to seek the protection of political, religious, and philosophical neutrality towards their employees and clients. It is emphasized that this rule is of particular importance for people who are in direct contact with customers.

As a result, the Court ruled that the prohibition of the wearing of visible signs of political, philosophical or religious beliefs by companies would not constitute discrimination and the prohibition with the aim of “dress neutrality” was not contrary to the EU Directive regarding the direct and indirect. Finally, the Court abstained from making a decision in a similar case in which a woman in France was also dismissed from her workplace, because in that particular case, the dismissal was due to a complaint of a customer.

What is your view on the basis of the religious symbols and the justifications of neutrality that the decision is based on?

First of all, this decision is based on the claim that the prohibition was not targeted towards a certain religious or belief group and was a general rearrangement. In the justification of the decision, there were the employer’s defense and general expressions such as religious, political and philosophical symbols. However, it is commonly known that this specifically targets Muslim women and affects those that wear the headscarf and that they are the target of these decisions. As a matter of fact, it’s not all people who wear religious symbols that are affected by this decision but mostly those who are of the Muslim faith. The decision disregards the fact that headscarf was wore with the belief that it is a mandatory requirement of Islam. Furthermore headscarf is regarded as an instrument people use to reflect their faith.

Additionally, the Court ruling regards not wearing a headscarf as “normal/essential/actual”, implies that wearing a head covering is not and that represents impartiality. Thus, the court acted with the prejudice that wearing a headscarf symbolizes a religious affiliation and automatically is contrary to any type of neutrality. This recalls the headscarf discussion that takes place in Turkey time to time, in which the headscarf has been a contested symbol in the public workplace and that this symbol gives the impression that they are in opposition to those they serve.

It must be mentioned here that the headscarf decision is not based solely on legal grounds but has been influenced by the rising overall political atmosphere in Europe. The increased influence of the far right, the Islamophobic and anti-Turkish parties and politicians did not only affect other politicians and governments but also took hold of all of Europe’s institutions as well as its judiciary. This is a political decision that has technical legal aspects.

What are the consequences for European Muslims and Turks in the future?

As I mentioned previously, this decision is not a unique one but a part of politics that began to dominate Europe in a number of areas. Indeed, the Vienna based European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), welcomed the Court’s decision by stating that it was in line with the principles of equal treatment. It certainly would not be at all surprising if we see similar decisions made by various different courts and institutions and that this practice becomes widespread across Europe. We see the statements from different countries supporting the decision. Needless to say, contrary to values such as multiculturalism, human rights, and democracy that Europe has demanded for years and is still demanding from candidate countries such as Turkey, it is very likely that Islamophobia and anti-Turkish sentiment will continue in Europe and make living conditions for Muslims much more difficult.

What began due to the killings of a group of Syrian teenagers, who drew revolutionary slogans on the wall of a school, has inarticulately turned into a catastrophic bellum, which is not likely to end soon. Syria has turned into a battlefield, whereby weapons, belligerents and strategies have come from foreign countries. While Syrian forces are continuing to fight for regaining control over the country, the story of the “civil war” continues. With no doubt, from the very beginning, this war is carried out by foreign powers. Therefore, to name this war solely as a civil war would be misleading. Because of that, the war in Syria, which is presumed to be a local conflict, rather fits in the context of a global geopolitical struggle whereby significant powers are involved with convergent interests.

Destabilization of Europe

Incompetent tinkering on how to approach Syria by European elites has resulted in a zone of chaos and disorder in Europe. Due to global shockwaves of the conflict, not only countries such as Greece and Italy, which form the borders of the EU, have been seriously affected, but also Eastern- and Western European countries. Wars waged in the Middle East have caused millions of people to flee their countries to enter Europe. Especially Eastern European countries have rigorously reacted against the influx of refugees. For example, the foreign minister of Hungary Peter Szijjarto answered the question, “Why has the Hungarian government used racist slogans”? by saying the following: “We can be hypocritical, we can continue being politically correct, so I think it is a stupid debate whether uncontrolled migration has led to the increase of terror in Europe or not, because it did. There were hundreds of thousands of illegal migrants entering the territory of the EU without knowing who they are, without any kind of registration.”

When compared to ten years ago, clearly, there is a world of difference now. Although Middle Eastern and North African states were regarded as authoritarian, at least, they had been stable dictatorships where people who were not involved in politics had decent lives. Europe had good relations with Russia, and Ukraine was a country in peace. Currently, Syria has gone up in flames and has become a source of millions of refugees.

Nevertheless, the Syrian Civil War has not only bothered EU member states with the mass influx of refugees. Prominent member states have been confronted by bloody terrorist attacks by DAESH, which has caused persistent anxiety among their citizens. Heavy responses from terrorist groups have come against the air attacks carried out by states such as France, Germany and Belgium. Subsequent to the Paris attacks, Marine Le Pen, the leader of the far right National Front party stated the following: “France and its citizens are no longer safe. Accordingly, emergency measures need to be taken. Islamic fundamentalism must be annihilated. France must ban Islamist organizations, shutter radical mosques and deport foreign hate preachers, as well as immigrants who have no business being here.” The right-wing leader in the Netherlands, Geert Wilders said the following after the Brussels attacks: “It is time to act. First of all, we must close our national borders and detain all the jihadists whom we have foolishly allowed to return from Syria. We must also tell people the truth. The cause of all this bloodshed is Islam. We need to de-Islamize the West. That is the only way to safeguard our lives and protect our freedom.”

European capitals might have considered that appealing for sanctions via the UN would have no impact on the attitude of the Assad regime. Moreover, due to the fact that the situation in Syria is incredibly complex due to the myriad of organizations and fronts involved in the war, it is feasible to predict possible backlashes.

Besides, a steady increase in far-right politics is observable in European countries in general. Mainly domestic issues, such as high rates of criminality and failed integration are regarded as the leading causes. Nevertheless, EU countries have taken these conditions into account before adopting an attitude towards the refugee crisis. In the end, Europeans are acknowledging that they are fed up with ethnic minorities and are putting the blame of faltering economies and segregated living on them. Therefore, while rightist senses are on the rise, many governments have not applied an open door-migrant policy. The ones who have applied it, have either regretted their decision, or have experienced a serious decrease in support for their parties. The consideration that migrants have not succeeded in integrating into the society, or the idea that states have failed to apply integration policies properly, brings within itself the assumption that certain parts of the society were excluded. In this respect, people who regard themselves as ‘outsiders’, express themselves in radical manners to have a voice, which again leads to harsher reactions from European states.

There is a big difference with regards to the situation of Europeans and Americans when taking the shockwaves of this conflict into account. European states are directly affected because of their geographical location. It is not astonishing that the EU has signed an agreement with Turkey to keep refugees attempting to enter the Union. The EU has received much criticism for being cynical about its adopted attitude towards the refugee crisis. In fact, practice of the Union that consists of 27 member states has nothing to do with ethics. The initial reaction of Europe on the increasing migration flow caused a blind panic. Not only were policymakers under pressure hounded by the envious eyes of far right people, but also the media did not have any idea how to approach the issue, which had obvious effects on the general public. Cancelling legal options for asylum seekers to enter Europe led to human traffickers making a serious profit while engaging in fatally dangerous activities. Also the internal solidarity within Europe has suffered after Eastern European states refused to equally allocate refugees in the continent.

What is predictable is that the shockwaves of this conflict will affect Europe as long as the war continues. Under the pressure of public opinion and right-wing parties, European states put forward statements, which appear as if there is no space for refugees on European soil. The main arguments for not accepting asylum seekers are related to the assumption that refugees will pose a threat to their prosperity and social security. They advocate for the settlement of Syrian refugees in their neighboring countries, however they are not even thinking about their own reception capacities while they are already causing serious tensions. All in all, the EU politics towards the Syrian crisis has not been a sustainable one as they continuously attempt turning a deaf ear to the main problems. Keeping a distance to the refugee crisis and at the same time seeking to maintain domestic stability will lead to a failure, if not to a catastrophic success.

Former president of the World Trade Organization Pascal Lamy, in his recent interview to France Inter TV, became a complainant against Russian media outlets by alleging that there is an editorial alliance between these outlets which works to undermine the EU. Lamy is not the only one who complains about Russia: the US, European Parliament, Germany, and even France, which is in a presidential campaign right now, do so.

According to the complainants, the most important tool for Russia in destabilizing the EU is the Russian media. Russia sometimes employs the “fake news” method; “For instance, they spread disinformation in August to prevent Sweden’s NATO partnership.” Or “They are resorting to black propaganda news which aims to dissolve the EU.” Moreover, “They are undermining political figures with baseless rumors.” The European Parliament has even passed a resolution on these accusations in November. In the resolution, they signified the presence of anti-European propaganda in Russia, and asserted that Russia was utilizing all aspects of its media to do so, through “so-called” outlets like Sputnik and Russia Today, along with trolls. While underscoring that Russia is destabilizing the Old World by supporting far-right movements and populist parties in Europe, the resolution addressing Russia’s alleged activities interestingly also included remarks about the threat posed by jihadist terrorist organizations.

According to statements by Western officials, their intelligence agencies and NATO, the Russian threat to the EU isn’t limited to the utilization of post modern media tools. Several months ago, talking to the British daily The Times, former NATO Joint Forces Commander Richard Barrons said “Russia has the power to dispatch tens of thousands of soldiers to the territory of the EU with the support of its air and naval forces within 48 hours.” Barrons went on to say: “NATO would lose some of its territory along with the total control over the seas and the air while 28 member countries try to agree.”

Recently, in the program called Avenue l’Europe which is aired on the France 3 TV channel, a similar topic was discussed. It was signified that the tension between Russia and Europe rose to a level that wasn’t seen much since the Cold War. Moreover, whether Moscow’s footsteps should be taken seriously by Europe was opened to discussion with interviews held in Poland, Lithuania, and Russia.

So, is the risk of a war between the EU and Russia real? This question was also asked, and former French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin responded: “Saying the risk of war doesn’t exist today is nonsense. Still, the risk isn’t quite here; both sides have to make more and more mistakes to reach there. However, there is an instance which reveals that this situation is valid for both parties: the Ukrainian and Crimean crises.” Answering the questions of Ouest France, Villepin also offered certain countermeasures, but that’s a discussion for another time.

The news and statements by officials suggest that Russia is trying to undermine the EU by attacking Germany and France, the two major countries of the EU which are also the founders of the organization. Around the end of last year, the German domestic security agency Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution stated that Russia was employing cyber espionage which aimed to weaken and destabilize Germany. Moreover, the risk of a new Cold War was also signified. According to the German officials and the German media, on the other hand, Russia is trying to manage the public perception and manipulate the German public through their media outlets. For instance, “Lisa, a German girl of Russian descent notified the police that she was the victim of a rape. A time after, the Russian media made news which claimed that the rapists were a group of immigrants. Several protests in various cities of Germany were held with the support of neo-Nazis.” It was later revealed that the girl’s statement was nothing but a lie.

In France, which is going through the presidential campaign process, the Socialist President Hollande and Foreign Minister Jean Marc Ayrault voiced their complaints about Russia last week. Ayrault expressed that Russia’s cyber-attacks were unacceptable and that these attacks were focused on pro-EU candidates: “France and the French people will never accept an election which will be dictated by Russia via disinformation and cyber-attacks.” he said.

Before the official statements of both the president and the foreign minister, there were numerous news stories on Russia’s interference in the elections. The weekly satirical magazine Canard Enchaine wrote that the French Foreign Intelligence Service DGSE had found out the Kremlin was helping certain candidates.

Regarding how the Kremlin is helping certain candidates, while sabotaging others, the allegations are the following. The polls until January 27 were showing that Marine Le Pen and François Fillon had the lead. However, when it was revealed that Fillon had put his wife and children on the payroll through imaginary jobs (which is a rooted tradition in France), the independent socialist candidate Emmanuel Macron came to the fore. Nobody talked about Russia’s interference during the scandal which cost Fillon the presidency. However, according to the allegations, as Macron started to lead the race, Russia simultaneously started its own manipulations. Sputnik and Russia Today first claimed that Macron was leading a double life and he was financed by an affluent gay lobby. Later, they published news which implied that the former Minister of Economy Macron had strange relations with US banks. Moreover, Assange, the founder of Wikileaks, gave a statement to Izvestiya daily which claimed that there were interesting pieces of information about Macron in Hillary Clinton’s e-mails.

After all of these events, the Washington Post commented that the Russian media was trying to affect the presidential elections in France by spreading rumors. Ferrand and Griveaux, who are the campaign spokespeople for Macron, complained about “the influence of websites which are controlled completely by the Russian state and the cyber attacks of Russia.”

On the other hand, the leader of Front National, Marine Le Pen, who is accused of being financially and morally supported by Russia, didn’t even refute that they took on a loan from a Russian bank, as French banks didn’t grant the credit. “Are you saying that we have to position ourselves according to the bank that we took a loan from?” she said. However, she later rejected an alleged loan of €28 million from a Russian bank for her party. Meanwhile, Le Pen not only had approved Russia’s annexation of Crimea, but also had condemned the EU’s and the US’ sanctions against Russia.

French journalist Nicolas Henin, the author of the book La France Russe, in a recent TV interview, explained that “Putin’s Russia supports populist, isolationist and sovereignist movements” and added that “even though Macron doesn’t have a political discourse which is against Russia, Fillon’s and Le Pen’s political discourses are more attractive for Russia.” Henin added that “Russia is actually targeting the EU. Macron being relatively less Euroseptic in comparison with the other candidates makes him a target.” A similar comment was made by Ferrand, who is a campaign managers for Macron: “Macron wants a Europe that can stand tall against Russia, while the other candidates have friendlier relations with Russia.”

According to the US intelligence agencies, “Emmanuel Macron should not take these allegations lightly.”

Could these official statements and news stories be interpreted as paranoia? Definitely not! Is it possible to undermine the EU or any country by spreading disinformation, employing cyber-attacks or financing certain parties? It seems possible, as perceptions managed by disinformation are extremely effective. Example? Take Turkey sending weapons to Daesh or Fetullah Gülen’s organizations being innocent non-profits, or Erdoğan wanting the presidential system to become a dictator and for this reason masterminding the July 15 coup attempt and many others. Turkey has suffered and continues to suffer because of the disinformation spread by media in various countries.

Nevertheless, the EU should not be afraid: the dogs bark, but the caravan goes on, as the saying goes saying goes.

In the meantime, the EU is trying to make its members accept around 20 thousand refugees in an equal manner. But all this is happening while thousands of people keep coming into Europe on a daily basis. It is hard to know for sure have many people are risking their lives to get to the European shores, but as an example, only in July 2015, 180 thousand people were recorded as refugees trying to leave Turkey and reach Europe.

Refugee crisis is putting the EU into a difficult position for two main reasonsز

That’s why Europe is not only trying to give its decisions about how many refugees to accept and especially what kind of refugees to accept, but they also look for ways to curb illegal migration.

Refugee crisis is putting the EU into a difficult position for two main reasons: first, the number of the refugees keeps growing and there are now many member states who consider “building walls” as the only way of protection. Second, because of the refugee flows, xenophobic and Islamophobic political parties grow stronger in every election. It is true that terrorist attacks committed by people from the Middle East is increasing as well, and that only exacerbates fears toward immigrants.

When they have elaborated these decisions, European leaders didn’t really ask themselves why Turkey would accept to keep the immigrants in its country. Besides, Russia’s actions in Syria has made it difficult for the Europeans to develop security, trade and energy cooperation with this country as if nothing has happened. That’s why the EU countries have begun thinking more seriously about Turkey.

The EU has urged Turkey to do anything possible to stop those people who keep coming from the East, and to make sure they won’t try to leave Turkey. In order to help Turkey to fulfill this task, European leaders have agreed to give financial and technical assistance. The problem is, whatever one may do, nobody can really stop these people determined to leave Turkey and reach the European shores.

So the EU had soon realized that Turkey can’t stop all the people who want to come to Europe even if it wanted to, that the migration flows will continue and besides, that Europe was no longer able to give more money to Turkey.

This is when the EU has understood that it is time to give “the” strategic decision: it was obvious that it is better to treat Turkey as a candidate country who can one day join in the European Union, rather than as a random neighbor country.

Partnership Conditions

Turkey and the EU have begun once again to treat each other as partners who discuss about ways to deepen their relationship, mainly because of the refugee crisis, but also because of Russia’s aggressive policies.

The new partnership has two main basis: first, stopping together the refugees and fight against illegal migration. Turkey has asked for more financial assistance in order to improve the living conditions of those refugees who will have to stay in Turkey. The EU has proposed to provide 3 billion Euros annually, but the existing European funds at the European Commission’s disposal were not enough to gather this sum. So the EU has first to find the money. It has been agreed that this money will not be taken from the accession funds reserved to Turkey and that the EU will have to find fresh funding.

Turkey has also reminded Europe about another important topic, which is the second base of this new partnership: the visa regime Turkey is being subjected to.

Only the IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) funds that haven’t been used and sent back to Europe by Turkey may be used in this context. Besides, the funding aims to help exclusively the Syrian refugees, but the EU hasn’t decided yet to whom exactly give the money in Turkey and under what mechanisms.

Turkey has also reminded Europe about another important topic, which is the second base of this new partnership: the visa regime Turkey is being subjected to. This is something the two sides should have discussed anyway, in the context of accession negotiations. In other words, this is not directly related to the refugee crisis. Let’s recall that the EU insists the visa regime’s liberalization will be linked to “readmission agreements”.

Visa regime has been liberalized for other candidate countries in the past without this link; but who knows why, the readmission agreement has suddenly become a pre-requisite in regard to Turkey: according to that, Turkey has first to implement the readmission agreement, and if the EU is satisfied with the implementation, the EU Commission will launch the complicated process of visa liberalization for Turkish citizens, in order to allow them to travel freely in Schengen Area.

The two sides have even given a deadline for the liberalization: end of 2016. If Europe doesn’t keep its promise despite the deadline, Turkey may very well suspend the readmission agreement.

The readmission agreements facilitate the expulsion of third-country nationals. So when irregular migrants use Turkish territory to go to Europe, European officials will be able to send them back to Turkey, and not exclusively to their country of origin.

The practical problem being how to prove those irregular migrants have reached Europe through Turkey, so the two sides must agree on the ways to prove it. By definition, an illegal migrant doesn’t carry a passport with official border gate stamps; so the only way may be to make the immigrants in question recognize that they came from Turkey. Will this be enough proof?

Visa liberalization is not without problems, either. As you may recall, France has recently decided to suspend the Schengen Agreement because of security reasons. So if countries start suspending the Schengen Agreement, we’ll not be able to talk about free movement, anyway. The European Commission has no solution on that, because they can’t impose anything to member states when this is about “national security”.

Accession Negotiations

Turkey and the EU didn’t only discuss what to do with the Syrian refugees recently, they have also discussed what to do with Turkey’s accession process. In other words, Turkey and the EU are not talking on the refugee crisis as two random partner sides, but Turkey is rightfully treated as a country which is supposed to become one day a full member of the EU.

Turkey is officially a candidate country for quite some time, but no new chapter had been opened to negotiation since five years. Turkey is especially insisting the EU to deal with the chapters that have been blocked by the Greek Cypriot Government; besides Ankara has asked the opening of the chapter on Economic and Monetary Policy. Moreover, Turkey has reminded that it is not being invited since many years to the EU summits, and told its European counterparts that it wants to figure in the family photos from now on.

The EU has accepted to organize every year two summits with Turkey and to open the Economic and Monetary Policy chapter. So, as of today, 15 chapters out of 32 are temporarily open, while negotiations in one chapter has been accomplished already.

By the way, the two sides have agreed to discuss about the Customs Union as well, and perhaps to turn it into the “Customs Union +” agreement by expanding its content.

Involved parties have the impression that the Cyprus reunification talks will come to a positive end around next April, so it is expected that the Greek Cypriot Government may lift its veto to the opening of several chapters: energy policy; foreign, security and defense policy; judiciary and fundamental rights; justice, freedom and security; education and culture.

From now on

Despite the “positive agenda” and the new roadmap, one cannot say that the EU and Turkey fully trust each other. As long as the EU doesn’t demonstrate its solid determination about Turkey’s membership, the distrust will remain. However, the fact that we have at least reached a point where we can open new negotiation chapters allows us to have some hopes for the future.