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he recent allegations regarding North Korea’s supply of military equipment and munitions to Russia have provoked international condemnation from countries including South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. These countries have expressed their deep concerns, claiming that such transfers exacerbate the human toll of Russia’s ongoing conflict in Ukraine.

A joint statement, released by the top diplomats from South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, offers a unified stance against what they perceive as a destabilizing factor in an already precarious global situation. South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa together asserted that these weapon deliveries, some of which have been confirmed, “will significantly increase the human toll of Russia’s war of aggression.”

The geopolitical implications of this alliance are manifold. Historically, North Korea and Russia, both engaged in separate confrontations with the U.S. and its allies, have often found common ground in their mutual interests. This bond seems to have tightened recently, as evidenced by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s visit to Russia, where he met President Vladimir Putin and toured several key military installations.

Significant shift in the balance of power

The fears of Japan, South Korea and the U.S. aren’t unfounded. Reports suggest that North Korea isn’t just making a one-sided deal; it seeks advanced weapons technologies from Russia to augment its nuclear program. If these speculations hold water, they could represent a significant shift in the balance of power in the region, posing a direct threat to many countries, especially given North Korea’s historic volatility.

The U.S., South Korea, and other concerned nations suspect this alliance to be a two-way street. While North Korea allegedly provides Russia with conventional arms to supplement its dwindling arsenal, Russia, in return, is believed to be supplying North Korea with sophisticated weapons technologies. This would not only bolster North Korea’s nuclear capabilities but could also lead to more reliable and advanced weapons systems.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, however, dismissed these allegations. During a recent trip to Pyongyang, he emphasized Russia’s appreciation for North Korea’s “unwavering” support in its Ukraine conflict. Upon his return to Moscow, and in response to these claims, he stated that “the Americans keep accusing everyone” and refused to comment further, labeling them as mere “rumors.”

1,000 containers of military equipment

However, contrary to Lavrov’s dismissive stance, the White House recently disclosed evidence suggesting North Korea had indeed delivered over 1,000 containers of military equipment and munitions to Russia. These containers, the U.S. claimed, were transferred to a Russian-flagged ship and subsequently transported via train to southwestern Russia.

The international community’s concerns aren’t limited to the ongoing Ukraine conflict. Since the previous year, North Korea has conducted over 100 missile tests, many simulating nuclear strikes against the U.S. and South Korea. With Russia potentially providing advanced weapon technologies, Kim Jong Un could develop more reliable nuclear weapons systems, threatening global stability.

To counter North Korea’s increasing nuclear prowess, the U.S. and South Korea have intensified their regular military exercises. In a show of collective defense, they have even reinstated some joint training exercises with Japan. This week witnessed the three nations’ armed forces carrying out their inaugural trilateral aerial exercise close to the Korean Peninsula.

Maritime exercise

Moreover, South Korea’s navy announced a comprehensive maritime exercise off the Korean Peninsula’s western coast. This training, encompassing live-fire drills, also saw participation from U.S. military helicopters and patrol aircraft.

While North Korea has yet to comment on this maritime drill, it has a history of perceiving such U.S.-South Korean exercises as precursors to invasion, often retaliating with missile tests.

The evolving dynamics in the region underscore the intricate balance of power and the high stakes involved. As alliances shift and nations recalibrate their strategies, the world watches closely, hoping that diplomacy and dialogue will prevail over confrontation.

Sources: The Independent, Japan Today, AP News

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n a surprising move, China’s Defense Minister Li Shangfu has been removed from his post, just seven months after assuming the role. This announcement comes after he vanished from the public eye two months ago, sparking widespread speculation about his whereabouts.

While the specific reason for his removal remains undisclosed, U.S. officials believe it may be related to corruption charges tied to his former role overseeing military procurement.

Alongside Minister Li, former Foreign Minister Qin Gang has also been stripped of his position as state councilor. Qin’s removal from the foreign minister post in July was followed by his predecessor, Wang Yi, reassuming the role.

Strong Xi

These abrupt changes have prompted questions regarding the decision-making process of China’s powerful leader, Xi Jinping, who is perceived to have a more direct influence over the Communist Party’s personnel decisions than his predecessors.

Both Li and Qin were considered by many as pivotal figures in President Xi’s vision to elevate China’s status on the global stage. The nature of their dismissals, occurring in such quick succession, has heightened concerns about the stability and transparency of Xi’s leadership.

Experts argue that while these changes might seem dramatic, they are unlikely to influence China’s overarching military or diplomatic strategies. However, they do shed light on the challenges Xi faces in his endeavor to rid the nation’s defense apparatus of corruption. The recent events highlight an ongoing effort by the Chinese leadership to strengthen its military capabilities and establish a world-class defense force by mid-century.

Anti-corruption?

Xi’s rigorous anti-corruption drive, while often viewed as a way to consolidate his own power and eliminate political threats, has also been a response to internal and external pressures to clean up the nation’s political and defense establishments.

Despite the shake-ups, the international community awaits clarity on the fate of the removed officials and whether they will face legal consequences. The nature of China’s political system, known for its opaqueness, has left many questions unanswered, fueling speculations about the real motives behind these high-profile dismissals.

Source: CNN, Aljazeera and the Washington Post

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he spheres of politics and fashion are two separate realms that are constantly merging to exert influence and shape perceptions. As interconnected spheres, politics and fashion govern both our bodies and our identities; they establish norms and traditions that affect our lives. From regulating how we present ourselves in public to how we interact with others, fashion has become a powerful tool of expression and diplomacy. A closer look reveals that the exchange between politics and fashion goes far beyond the trivial and has profound implications for diplomacy and soft power.

Trousers: A symbol of freedom and equality for women

Trousers have always been a symbol of freedom and equality for women. In the mid-1800s, bloomers challenged traditional gender norms and changed society’s perception of women’s roles and abilities. In the 20th century, during World War II, women wore trousers as they stepped into traditionally male roles due to labor shortages and economic necessity. But it wasn’t until 1993 that a momentous shift occurred when Carol Moseley Braun became the first woman to wear trousers in the United States Senate, breaking gender barriers and inspiring future female senators to embrace their personal style and comfort.

Dressing for civil rights

Political messaging through dress played a role in the civil rights movement as well. Martin Luther King Jr., a prominent figure in the fight for civil rights, was revered for his impeccable style, always appearing in perfectly tailored suits. King believed that a respectable, middle-class image was central to combating racial stereotypes. His sartorial choices sent a strong message of professionalism, dignity, and the importance of appearance in the pursuit of social justice. By always presenting himself impeccably dressed, King challenged discriminatory perceptions and sought to gain credibility through his tireless advocacy for civil rights.

Dress and political messaging

One of the most obvious examples of the political significance of fashion is the importance of the color white for women’s suffrage. White was the color worn by the pioneers of the women’s movement in the United States, the suffragettes. The suffragettes wanted to create a new image for the suffrage movement and women’s rights, and they needed a tangible symbol that would represent their goals. They sought to remind people of their resistance wherever they went, and they conveyed their message by using the color white, which represents purity and innocence. To this day, women in U.S. politics wear white on certain occasions as a tribute to the spirit of the suffragette movement. U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris wore a white pant suit to her swearing-in ceremony as a tribute to the women who fought for women’s suffrage.

As the first African-American First Lady of the United States Michelle Obama understood the power of the clothes one wears as a means of communication and influence. Her sartorial choices went beyond mere aesthetics and served as a tool to spread ideas, influence public opinion, and support causes. Michelle Obama is good at selecting designers from diverse backgrounds and supporting American fashion designers. She knows how to use fashion to bridge cultures and promote inclusion. Like Jackie Kennedy, when she visited foreign countries, she wore clothes that incorporated elements of the host country’s culture. She wore clothes with messages of inclusivity, such as her “Vote” necklace during the 2020 presidential election. But perhaps one of the her most important influences was to promote affordable and sustainable fashion by wearing pieces from brands such as Zara and H&M.

Dressing for political messaging is not unique to the Western world, as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s choice of plaid jackets shows. President Erdoğan has been purposefully wearing plaid jackets on various occasions, particularly during rallies and visits to Turkey’s eastern regions. According to fashion designer Levon Kordonciyan, “The use of plaid jackets and patterned shirts gives the message ‘I am one of you’ and shows that he is easily accessible. It provides closeness in communication.”

The appearance of political figures emphasizes the importance of fashion as a tool of diplomacy. First ladies, such as Jackie Kennedy, use their fashion choices to represent their countries, emphasizing grace and cultural understanding. Jackie Kennedy was known for her incomparable style and elegance. She worked with French-born American designer Oleg Cassini to create a wardrobe that embodied timeless sophistication.

During her visits abroad, Jackie Kennedy carefully studied the local fashions and colors, blending in seamlessly while elegantly representing the United States. Her fashion choices not only demonstrated her style, but also conveyed a deep sense of cultural presence and understanding.

During her international travels, she regularly wore clothes created by designers from the countries she visited, promoting cultural exchange and soft power through the universal language of fashion. Her 1962 so-called goodwill tour to India and Pakistan highlighted her role as an ambassador of U.S. foreign policy, while indirectly promoting U.S. soft power through her visual image.

Queen Elizabeth II was one of the most influential actors of fashion diplomacy. As a visually distinctive figure, the Queen knew the importance of her appearance in conveying political messages. Her elegantly crafted clothes served as a symbol of her role as a representative of the British monarchy and its soft power as well as an embodiment of national identity.

In 2011, Queen Elizabeth visited Ireland wearing an emerald green cloak and a St. Patrick’s blue dress as a tribute to the two states’ reconciliation. Since the Irish War of Independence, there has been bad blood between the two countries, so this was a particularly important visit. During the same visit, at the state dinner, the Queen’s evening gown was specially made to honor her Irish hosts: silk shamrocks adorned the top of her dress, while a Celtic harp made of crystals replaced her traditional brooch.

The Queen’s choice of dress had the power to both flatter and impress. On her visit to China, she wore a dress emblazoned with China’s national flower, extending the goodwill between the two countries.

Even in matters of religious affairs, the Queen’s dress played an important role: a queen wears black only in times of mourning. But during her meetings with the Pope, she followed papal protocol and wore a black dress and veil to symbolize her respect for papal traditions and to improve relations with the Vatican.

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, NATO and its close partners have increasingly provided military support to Ukraine. The  nature of the support has changed over time and some policies that were previously avoided in order not to cross Russia’s “red lines” have been chosen. For instance, after much controversy, Germany authorized the delivery of Leopard tanks to Ukraine. Britain provided Challenger tanks. Poland and Slovakia gave Ukraine MiG-29 aircraft. This military support has had a significant impact on the course of the war. Thanks to the military aid given to Ukraine, countries have removed Soviet legacy weapons from their inventories. These were mostly replaced by American military equipment. With the intensive military support provided, the Ukrainian army has become considerably more modernized than it was before the war.

However, Ukraine does not believe that the current military support is sufficient, at least in the long term. On July 11, the first day of NATO’s Vilnius Summit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy slammed NATO for its lack of a timeline for his country’s future NATO membership, calling it “unprecedented and absurd.” Ukraine’s main goal in the summit is to be presented with a road map for NATO membership. In this regard, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and senior Ukrainian officials have frequently made statements and succeeded in putting pressure on NATO. It was even stated that Zelensky’s participation in the summit would be meaningless if there was no signal from the Alliance in this direction. Thus, Ukraine’s possible future NATO membership and the security guarantees that could be provided until then became one of the main items on the agenda ahead of the Vilnius summit.

In September 2022, Zelensky announced that Ukraine was already a de facto NATO member and that it was applying for membership in order to formalize its status. Ukraine is currently awaiting an official invitation to become a member in response to this application. In Ukraine’s view, if accession to NATO is not assured at the end of the war, a new war with Russia will be inevitable. The only way to prevent this is to deter Russia by Ukraine becoming a NATO member.

While Ukraine’s NATO membership will only be possible after the end of the war, it will be difficult to draw a clear road map with concrete security guarantees in the interim period, as security guarantees are inherently ambiguous. In a climate of uncertainty, many countries are more likely to avoid such commitments and to show a desire to maintain military support for Ukraine. Only a clear commitment by the United States can resolve this dilemma.

On the other hand, NATO’s top priority since the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has naturally been to strengthen the Alliance’s eastern flank. In this scope, various measures have been taken, in particular to increase the Alliance’s level of combat readiness. New multinational battlegroups were established and deployed to Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia; Turkish soldiers are serving in the groups deployed to Bulgaria and Hungary.

Of course, mobilizing such a large multinational force in a short period of time is a very demanding and costly endeavor which requires the member states to increase their military expenditures in many dimensions such as personnel, logistics, and equipment.

Lastly, by ratifying Finland’s accession in March 2023, Turkey had demonstrated its historic and principled support for NATO’s open-door policy and sent a message to Sweden, which was given the green light by Turkey on the first day of the Summit. Indeed, the trilateral memorandum had broken the deadlock in Madrid last year and shown that a diplomatic compromise could be reached quickly. This is because such major summits always offer the possibility of last-minute solutions, and this was the case with Turkey’s last-minute green light for Sweden’s NATO membership. Turkey will expect Sweden to continue to increase its efforts against the fight against terrorism in its all forms in the coming period.

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, the scope of support for Ukraine has been diverse and constantly expanding. Supporting Ukraine has now become a trend with weapons and platforms of strategic value being provided to the country. The support has been effective, especially in Ukraine’s newly launched operation. Yet, this effect is only visible in certain areas and the military support is not enough to ensure Russia’s withdrawal from all regions it occupied. The main reason for this is that such support could deepen the war or escalate the conflict by provoking unpredictable responses from Russia.

Military support in the absence of air superiority—as is currently the case of Ukraine against Russia—prevents Ukraine from achieving the capability to drive Russia completely out of the region and regain some of its territory. There may be different and more rapid developments once the F-16s are delivered and deployed to the battlefield after the training period. But for now, military support is not enough to ensure Russia’s defeat or to force Moscow to negotiate peace.

Can Ukraine become a NATO member? It seems unlikely that NATO will support this. Yes, at least 21 NATO members support Ukraine’s membership, but the continued occupation is one of the biggest obstacles to membership. NATO is unlikely to take such a risk.

Security guarantees could be considered in this context, but they are not very possible without agreement and foresight on how the future of the war will develop. Even now, security guarantees are unlikely within NATO. Even with the support of countries at the level of bilateral relations, it seems that member countries will not be able to provide Ukraine with a security guarantee that could end the conflict with Russia.

In the meantime, NATO’s strategy document, the new Strategic Concept, published last year, does not address the China issue in detail. However, this is the first time that China has been identified as a strategic challenge, given NATO’s post-Cold War history and transformation. At this stage, China poses more of a political and economic challenge than a military threat to NATO, the Alliance’s member countries, and the region they shape. It appears that NATO is not yet ready to portray China as a threat.

The U.S. perspective in the Sino-American rivalry is to transform NATO into a global organization, but not all NATO members share this view. For the time being, it does not seem possible for NATO as a whole to act against China. However, depending on how the dimensions of the Washington-Beijing rivalry evolve in the coming period, NATO may renew its position internally. That said, in the short term, it is not possible to define China as a threat.

Military assistance to Ukraine and its NATO membership are two separate matters. In fact, there is almost complete consensus among Alliance members to provide military assistance to Ukraine. Although some NATO members, such as Germany, were initially reluctant, they have come around to Washington’s line under pressure from their domestic public opinion, Europe, and the United States.

In the early stages of the Russia-Ukraine war, Berlin was only prepared to provide Ukraine with troops, but it has now supplied the country with Leopard 2 tanks and advanced air defence missiles. From this point of view, NATO, which has organized itself very quickly and decisively to support Ukraine militarily, will continue this support until it achieves its goals with regard to Russia.

There are already problems with the production of ammunition for certain weapons due to their intensive use on the Ukrainian front, yet, one of the most important factors determining the course of the struggle between NATO and Russia will be the production of weapons and ammunition, given that Russia is experiencing similar problems to a much greater extent.

The issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership, which is expected to be one of the main items on the agenda at the Vilnius summit, has caused serious disagreement between member states. Some, particularly the Baltic and several Eastern European countries, argue that Ukraine should become a member of NATO quickly, while others, such as the United States and Germany, where there is intense internal debate on the issue, oppose such a quick decision.

Those in favor of a more cautious approach suggest to wait until the end of the war to decide on the issue, fearing that Ukraine’s possible NATO membership during the war would draw them into direct armed conflict with Russia and would also complicate peace negotiations with Russia. They are considering postponing a decision in the hope that, at the end of the war, there will be a weakened Russia unable to oppose Ukraine’s NATO membership. Therefore, it seems unlikely that a decision on Ukraine’s NATO membership will be taken at the Vilnius summit.

However, given the establishment of a NATO-Ukraine Council and the strong likelihood that Ukraine will not be required to meet the preconditions of the Membership Action Plan for the accession of new members, such as the fight against corruption, which was previously included in the Membership Action Plan adopted at the Bucharest Summit, the door will be left open for Ukraine’s membership in the medium term. This issue will be closely linked to the development of NATO’s Russia policy and the outcome of the war. Moreover, Russia’s policy towards the West will be crucial to Ukraine’s NATO membership.

For NATO members, such as Italy and Spain, which have not yet resolved their economic problems caused by the Euro debt crisis, increasing their military spending from 1.5% to more than 2% would mean additional problems for their budget balances. In addition, the military spending of NATO members such as Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and Ireland remains well below the Alliance’s target. It should be recalled that NATO has set the 2% limit as a minimum target, and Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has persistently called for more than 2% military spending in the member states he has visited.

While Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has created a strong motivation for NATO to increase military spending, the disruptions it has caused to energy and food supplies, and prices, and the resulting economic challenges have left many members struggling to find the financial resources to increase their military spending. It is worth noting that NATO members, especially those with growing economic problems, will find it difficult to meet the Alliance’s targets for increasing military spending.

Meanwhile, the U.S. administration wants to see its NATO allies on its side in the fight against China, just as it has done with Russia. Yet, it is no secret that there are members who have reservations about this; Germany, France, and Turkey are among such countries, albeit for different reasons.

In the aftermath of the Trump era, European NATO members are struggling to trust the United States, making it difficult for them to follow Washington’s lead, especially when it comes to a policy towards China. The same reluctance was also present about a policy towards Russia; however, the Russia-Ukraine war helped to remove this reluctance and align countries behind the U.S. Now Washington wants to capitalize on this shock momentum and rally its European allies behind its line against China.

In addition to the shock effect of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the U.S. has another advantage in rallying the Europeans behind it: “American friends” in Europe. These “American friends,” commonly known as Atlanticists, are everywhere in Europe. They are in power in countries like Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland, and are partners in coalition governments in countries like Germany.

Given that China has not made a mistake similar to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, but instead is trying to create a sphere of influence for itself through economic cooperation, and given its close economic ties with some European countries, it will not be as easy for Washington to rally NATO members behind its fight against Beijing as it has been to rally them against Moscow.

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he Taiwan Strait has emerged as a geopolitical hotspot, garnering significant attention due to the escalating tensions between the United States and China. This narrow body of water, separating the island of Taiwan from mainland China, has become a focal point of power struggles and competing interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

China’s rise as a global power, both economically and militarily, has fueled concerns over its pursuit of reunification with Taiwan, which currently enjoys de facto independence from China. President Xi Jinping has made reunification a cornerstone of his administration, employing a combination of diplomatic pressure, military posturing, and economic incentives to isolate Taiwan diplomatically and erode its international standing. China’s military modernization, including the development of advanced weaponry and naval capabilities, has increased its capacity to forcefully assert its territorial claims. Meanwhile, the U.S. engages with Taiwan in a way China views as provocative. Should we be concerned?

In War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait, Scott L. Kastner delves into the increasingly tense relationship between China and Taiwan. As fears of a potential military conflict loom large, Kastner offers readers a comprehensive and nuanced analysis of the factors that could lead to hostilities while emphasizing that the situation should not be exaggerated. This book not only sheds new light on the prospects for cross-strait military conflict but also explores the pathways that could either lead to or help prevent such a crisis.

Kastner begins by examining the complex implications of deepening economic integration between China and Taiwan. While economic ties have historically been seen as a stabilizing force, the author delves into the potential risks that arise as a result of this interdependence. He further explores the shifting balance of military power in the region, considering the implications of China’s military modernization efforts and the potential impact on Taiwan’s defense capabilities. These dynamics, coupled with uncertainty surrounding the future of U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security, contribute to the complex landscape of the Taiwan Strait. A crucial question Kastner considers in his book is whether the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense.

The author also highlights the significance of domestic political changes in both China and Taiwan. By analyzing the internal dynamics within these two entities, Kastner provides readers with a deeper understanding of how domestic factors can shape cross-strait relations and potentially impact the likelihood of military conflict. Kastner delves into an in-depth examination of the intricately intertwined economies of Taiwan and China, as well as their historical background and the significance of freedom in the Taiwanese context.

While the risks of conflict are indeed real, Kastner’s analysis offers a more tempered perspective, emphasizing that war in the Taiwan Strait is far from inevitable. He argues that there are multiple distinct pathways that could lead to hostilities, and the mechanisms that may mitigate one type of conflict might not necessarily be applicable to others. However, the book underlines the presence of powerful mitigating factors, combined with plausible steps to reduce the likelihood of military conflict, providing a glimmer of hope for avoiding a catastrophic outcome.

Combining international relations theory with meticulous empirical analysis of regional trends, Kastner presents readers with valuable insights into the potential occurrence of war in the Taiwan Strait and, more importantly, how such a conflict can be averted. The book equips policymakers, scholars, and interested readers with the knowledge necessary to navigate this complex geopolitical landscape.

War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait is a timely work that provides a comprehensive examination of the risks and possibilities surrounding military conflict in the region. Kastner’s expertise and meticulous research contribute to a vital perspective that not only deepens our understanding of the Taiwan Strait issue but also provides valuable insights into maintaining peace and stability in the region.

Scott L. Kastner, War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Columbia University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780231198653, 272 pages

Written by Dilara Özer

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razil has been at the center of speculations between Western expectations towards a renewed regional leadership and the increasing ties with BRICS. In April 2023, Lula da Silva, or simply Lula, Brazil’s president, visited China, welcomed Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s minister of foreign affairs, in Brasilia, and sent Celso Amorim, his closest foreign policy advisor, to meet Volodímir Zelenski. While Lula is showing democratic credentials and holds hard feelings towards Washington, Brazil’s  new international strategy looks to take advantage of the great power competition with an active nonaligned perspective. Latin America seems to be going in the same direction but not necessarily due of Brazil’s new active diplomacy.

Brazil is back

After overcoming a judicial process that included serving a period in prison and returning to the political arena, Lula’s 2023 electoral victory allowed him to resume an active foreign policy with an autonomist orientation that seeks a balance between developed Western powers and revisionist visions of the global order. As Ryan Berg, director of the Americas Program at the at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), argues, Brazil is hedging among great powers and pursuing an agenda of nonalignment, as exemplified in Lula’s visit to Beijing.

Lula has made clear that his priority is to focus on Brazil’s international reinsertion, strongly criticizing the Bolsonaro era both for its authoritarian attitudes domestically and for its erratic foreign policy. Among the main priorities of his new international agenda are the search for peace in the Ukrainian conflict, the establishment of a new regional leadership, and an active and determined projection in the Global South. Special attention has been given to regions where Brazil had regressed in the Bolsonaro era, such as the Middle East and Africa.

However, the new administration faces significant challenges due to the current international landscape, which differs considerably from when it left power. Back then, Brazil was considered a rising star and major powers had a generally positive perception of its role in the global governance agenda—at least until the signing of the tripartite agreement with Iran and Turkey. Today, however, strategic competition among major powers imposes constraints on pursuing a more autonomous foreign policy, especially vis-à-vis traditional partners such as Washington or new strategic partners such as Moscow.

Autonomous decisions have a higher cost. Moreover, the regional context has changed. During the Bolsonaro era, Brazil became a major non-NATO ally (MNNA), which increased its degree of strategic interdependence with the U.S., while the growing presence of China forces Brazil to have a more balanced position given the existing tensions between China and the U.S.

Finally, Lula intends to rebuild the Union of South American Nations (USAN, or UNASUR in Spanish), but South America is less ideologically and politically homogenous than it used to be, which in some ways hinders plans to relaunch this regional body that was deactivated during the previous administration.

Latin America and the Russo-Ukrainian War

The Russian presence has not gone unnoticed in discussions in Latin America. The war in Ukraine is the focus of foreign policy debate in most of Latin America; the discussions are framed in a context of how the region should navigate the rise of China and the emergence of new global actors such as Russia. Among academics, experts, and decision-makers, there are broadly two perspectives on Latin America’s place in an increasingly multipolar world: on the one side, to side with the U.S., or China and/or Russia in the new great power competition, or, on the other, to remain outside of the competition.

The alignment calls for a choice between the United States and China. This option is generally marginal in Latin American foreign policy discussions, and often has a strong liberal ideological component. The strong pro-democratic and liberal affinities generally favor a special closeness with the United States and the Western world, but there are also growing pro-China sympathies, for example, in Venezuela and among some of Latin America’s left-wing movements.

Across the region there is a near consensus not to engage in the new great power competition, while seeking opportunities for economic development and strategic alliances with other countries. The second option has different expressions but can be summarized as a form of nonalignment. The recent book “Latin American Foreign Policies in the New World Order: The Active Non-Alignment Option” edited by Fortin, Heine and Ominami reunites different voices which call for an equidistant position between the White House and Beijing while seeking to deepen regional integration and more active diplomacy both with rising players and in the Global South.

For example, facing the Russo-Ukrainian War, the major Latin American regional players—Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico—have shown a more pragmatic and less forceful stance with respect to condemnation, with a mixture of balanced positions and a search for compensation. Thus, no country in Latin America adopted sanctions against Russia. The case of Brazil is particularly interesting since it shows an important degree of continuity between Bolsonaro and Lula except for the new “peace coalition” project which has been at the core of the current presidential diplomatic maneuvers. Although Bolsonaro’s and Lula’s diplomatic responses offered different nuances within and across different regional players, they signaled an autonomous perspective facing global pressures.

What does active nonalignment mean for Latin America?

Are Brazil and Latin America nonaligned? The answer is yes. Neutrality and nonalignment have been at the center of Latin America’s external choices both in relation to the Russo-Ukrainian War and the U.S.-China strategic competition. However, only to stand aside in a changing global environment is not enough to strengthen agency in world politics. Latin America suffers from a structural relevance deficit in the global scenario, so a more active and prompt approach towards global affairs is needed. Diversification, open regionalism, multilateralism, and soft power are optimal routes to increase regional presence and relative weight in international affairs.

While nonalignment is a fact in current times, the active side of the equation seems to be far behind regional needs. Regional fragmentation and stagnation have been increasing in recent years and the multilateral position does not mean that the regional players coordinate their policies—even those related to the Russo-Ukrainian War— while diversification and soft power policies fluctuate in relation to the importance that governments give to international issues. The relations between Turkey and Latin America are a vivid example of the lack of continuity, with the initiative usually coming from Ankara. In the end, Lula’s new Brazil offers an opportunity to put the region back on the international stage, although it will most likely be following Brasilia’s and not a collective agenda.

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he Pacific is heating up. The rise of China rocks the balance of power making room for an emerging new order. In this month’s book bundle, we present eight books about the hottest topic of international affairs: the U.S.-China rivalry. What awaits the world as tensions rise? This selection approaches the topic from comprehensive and diverse angles ranging from international relations theory assumptions to the most outstanding topics of the U.S.-China rivalry such as economic leadership and information war.

The competition between the two great powers has overtaken the world agenda and is shaping foreign policy decisions globally. Therefore, this book bundle was compiled with special attention to the reactions of middle and smaller powers in the face of this competition, aiming to give the reader a broader perspective to interpret what awaits the world more holistically.

Will the shift in the balance of power between the U.S. and China lead to a war? International relations theory predicts that shifts between a hegemon and a rising power may trigger actions with such consequences. Steve Chan examines how many of these theories hold true in the case of U.S.-China relations with Taiwan remaining a flash point for a possible Sino-American conflict.

Rumbles of Thunder: Power Shifts and the Danger of Sino-American War further explores the risk-oriented popular narratives on the topic with sound and well-grounded judgement, considering whether several factors that can raise or lower international tension apply to the current situation. Chan criticizes overly mechanistic frameworks and shows that power shifts do not predetermine violent outcomes—and neither does their absence ensure peace. In fact, many factors like domestic politics, international political economy, and the choices of individual leaders come into play.

Rumbles of Thunder demonstrates that claims of a “rising China” catching up and overtaking the United States are alarmist, and Chan predicts that American structural advantages will endure for some time to come. Contrary to popular belief, Chan does not maintain that China acts like a revisionist power seeking to overturn the system or that the U.S. is defending the international order. Rumbles of Thunder brings a fresh analytical outlook to the table and challenges conventional wisdom on the likelihood of war between the United States and China.

Steve Chan, Rumbles of Thunder: Power Shifts and the Danger of Sino-American War (Columbia University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780231208451, 336 pages

In Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives, Stephan Roach argues that the conflict between the U.S. and China wouldn’t have emerged were it not for a needless clash of false narratives, and that much of the rhetoric on both sides is dangerously misguided, amplified by information distortion, and should be seen more like a reflection of each nation’s fears and vulnerabilities than a credible assessment of the risks they face. The U.S. blames its trade and technology threats on China yet overlooks its shaky saving foundation. Meanwhile, China blames its growth challenges on the alleged U.S. containment of market-based socialism, ignoring its failed economic rebalancing.

Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives provides an analysis of both nations’ economies, politics, and policies, and offers a new road map for restoring a mutually advantageous relationship. The book will be available in paperback on June 6, 2023.

Stephan Roach, Accidental Conflict: America, China, and the Clash of False Narratives (Yale University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780300259643, 448 pages

Kevin Rudd, a former Australian prime minister who spent more than forty years in China, puts the turbulent relationship between the U.S. and China under the spotlight with insightful analyses based on his firsthand understanding of the mindsets of the leadership whose judgment will determine whether the future course of events will escalate to a war.

Rudd provides context as to why the U.S.-China relationship rests on a seismic fault: cultural misunderstanding, historical grievance, and ideological incompatibility are all pivotal antecedents. The antagonism between the two superpowers is starkly visible, among others, in the field of military, intelligence, technology, and trade, while either country’s capacity to draw the last straw grows daily.

Against this gloomy backdrop, Rudd constructively argues that the relationship is not doomed to escalating tension and war. If both sides can sustain a “managed strategic competition” by coexisting without betraying their core interests, conflict could be avoided. However, the opposite could be catastrophic. The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China demystifies the actions of both sides, explaining and translating them for the benefit of the other.

Kevin Rudd, The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China (PublicAffairs, 2022) ISBN-13 9781541701304, 432 pages

As the U.S. faces the first real challenge to its economic hegemony with the rise of China, The United States vs. China: The Quest for Global Economic Leadership sees experienced policymaker, economist, and scholar C. Fred Bergsten analyze the two great powers’ competition from the scope of global economic leadership. Is economic conflict beyond the existing trade war inevitable between China and the U.S.? Will their clash produce a new economic leadership vacuum? What can the consequences of a world economy adopting Chinese characteristics be?

According to Bergsten a confrontation between the two would be calamitous. He further argues that it would be self-defeating for the U.S. to attempt to “decouple” from its rival. Bergsten advices the U.S. to pursue “conditional competitive cooperation” to lead, rather than destroy, the world economy instead of a policy of containment. As for China, he recommends exercising constructive global leadership.

Fred Bergsten, The United States vs. China: The Quest for Global Economic Leadership (Polity Press, 2022) ISBN-13 978-1509547357, 384 pages

Is China really a threat to the U.S. or just a threat to its unilateral superpower status? According to Paolo Urio, the U.S. has historically disguised the true nature of its relations with the nations that have stood in the way of its ambitions, often projecting fear of harm from other nations even as it was expanding its dominion over them. America and the China Threat: From the End of History to the End of Empire revisits and debunks the idea of the universality of U.S. values, and the perception of the imperial, dictatorial, and state capitalist character of today’s China. It provides a historical analysis of the divergent ideologies of the U.S. and China, and reveals the source of strain the U.S. faces in adapting to the changes occurring in the international system that has moved beyond its exceptionalism and uncontested leadership, now challenged by China.

Urio challenges the U.S. proclamation that it alone can assure stability and prosperity in the international system, while demonstrating that Chinese ideology has achieved greater flexibility by integrating values imported from the West and several Confucian values. Urio argues that China is better able to adapt its public policies to changes in the national and international environments. America and the China Threat: From the End of History to the End of Empire further addresses China’s significant military and economic advances and its new investments.

Paolo Urio, America and the China Threat: From the End of History to the End of Empire (Clarity Press, 2022) ISBN-10 1949762505, 476 pages

Information War: How Artificial Intelligence Is Driving U.S.-China Military Competition addresses a crucial variable shaping the intensifying confrontation between the U.S. and China: the struggle to control information. How will modern technology be wielded in a rising conflict between the two superpowers?

Technology and national security expert Tom Stefanick argues that the two contemporary superpowers will base their security competition primarily on the fight to dominate information and perception. How will the adversaries attack the other’s information architecture while protecting their own? Stefanick highlights that the way each country chooses to employ information countermeasures will determine the amount of friction and uncertainty in the conflict.

Stefanick draws attention to artificial intelligence, which will play an important role. Information War: How Artificial Intelligence Is Driving U.S.-China Military Competition reviews the recent Chinese research and trends in AI to determine how it will approach the conflict, and provides a sober view of how artificial intelligence will be weaponized in the new information war.

Tom Stefanick, Information War: How Artificial Intelligence Is Driving U.S.-China Military Competition (Brookings Institution Press, 2022) ISBN-13: 9780815738824, 280 pages

China expert Andrew Small offers an eclectic view of a rivalry ranging far beyond “great power” politics. He provides the inside story of a revolution in the China policy of countries from around the world. The Rupture: China and the Global Race for the Future explains a diverse range of topics such as how many of the Western politicians and business leaders closest to Beijing have now become its sharpest opponents, how the COVID-19 pandemic dramatically accelerated this trend, and why 5G represents the first test case as to whether China can win the race for the future.

As competition grows between systems, the Western model itself is transforming given that China’s rise changes both the balance of ideas and the balance of power. Small traces U.S. efforts to recast relations with old allies, examining Europe’s growing role in the technological and economic contest, and Beijing’s attempts to build a coalition of its own.

Andrew Small, The Rupture: China and the Global Race for the Future (Hurst Publishers, 2022) ISBN 9781787387782, 304 pages

What path does a middle power take when engrossed in the competition between great powers? Do they get caught up between the two or forge a path of their own? In the heating U.S.-China rivalry, what are the strategic responses of middle powers in the Asia-Pacific? The Strategic Options of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific examines these questions through the specific case studies of South Korea, Australia, Japan, India, Taiwan, and Vietnam from their local perspectives.

With each chapter, written by experts, the book provides comprehensive studies of the regional powers in the Asia-Pacific with an in-depth examination of the contemporary geopolitics of the region, including the impact of both the Trump and Biden administrations, Beijing’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy, cross-strait relations with Taiwan, and the influences of Japan, Vietnam, Australia, and South Korea. The Strategic Options of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific reveals that regional middle powers actually exert influence on the direction of regional cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, and develops theories of foreign policy analyses, forming a systematic framework through initiating crucial concepts, including reluctant hedging, economic statecraft, and strategic position-taking.

Chien-Wen Kou, Chiung-Chiu Huang, Brian Job, The Strategic Options of Middle Powers in the Asia-Pacific (Routledge, 2022) ISBN 9781003156314, 278 pages

B

oth in Turkey and in many capitals across the world, Turkey’s presidential and parliamentary elections to be held on May 14 are considered among the most important events of the year. Washington and most European capitals view the elections as an opportunity to end Erdoğan’s rule in Turkey, which they view unfavorably. In a speech during his presidential candidacy, U.S. president Joe Biden made it clear that he wanted to overthrow Erdoğan by supporting “those elements of the Turkish leadership that [he thought] still exist, and get more from them and embolden them to be able to take on and defeat Erdoğan.” Biden also alleged in the same speech that he wanted to overthrow Erdoğan “not by a coup, not by a coup, but by the electoral process.”

It is not possible to know exactly what the Biden administration has done to achieve this goal. What partnerships Biden has formed to date with—in his own words—”elements of the Turkish leadership” in order to overthrow Erdoğan, how much “yield” he has gotten from them so far, and how much this will affect the election results in Turkey are all unknown.

No doubt, Turkey’s presidential elections and foreign policy preferences are interconnected: the ruling AK Party’s foreign policy preferences affect the election process and its results, and, at the same time, the election results determine Turkey’s foreign policy direction.

How do the AK Party’s foreign policy preferences affect the elections?

President Erdoğan’s foreign policy trajectory is one of the main reasons behind the aforementioned U.S. stance on the upcoming Turkish elections. The way Turkish-American relations were built in the aftermath of World War II and the course of relations thereafter led Washington, which had supported Turkey in the face of threats emanating from Soviet Russia, to think that it could directly intervene in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy in return for this support.

In line with this understanding, during the Cold War, the U.S. administration did not hesitate to intervene in Turkish politics when it deemed necessary, either with tanks on the streets or other methods. Turkey was not the only NATO member to be subjected to Washington’s direct or indirect interventions under Cold War conditions. However, during the AK Party era, Turkey’s pursuit of a more independent foreign policy, both through the self-confidence of its rapid increase in economic and military capacity and the leadership qualities of Tayyip Erdoğan, led to serious crises between Washington and Ankara.

The United States, uncomfortable with Ankara’s shift away from Washington’s line, especially in its Middle East policy, has intensified its pressure on Turkey, while Ankara, to balance these pressures, has turned to cooperation with countries such as Russia within the framework of its multidimensional foreign policy approach. This, in turn, has led to an increase in Washington’s pressure, creating a vicious circle in the relations between the two countries that is difficult to overcome.

The main reason for this development is the unwillingness of the United States to accept Turkey’s desire for a more balanced relationship between the two countries based on sovereign equality. The AK Party government’s foreign policy approach, which has been more independent and has prioritized Turkey’s interests, has not aimed to turn Ankara’s back on the West, but rather to enhance the security partnership with the U.S. within the NATO framework.

Turkey’s desire has simply been to contribute as an equal sovereign partner to the shaping of NATO and U.S. security policies in the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. Ankara wanted and continues to want to end of policies formulated in Washington or other Western capitals on Turkey. The efforts of anti-Erdoğan and anti-AK Party circles in the U.S. security bureaucracy, politics, and media to force Turkey into the Western orbit instead of accepting its new identity have plunged relations between the two countries into one of the deepest crises in history.

At this point, we are faced with a United States that openly supports the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK, which is the biggest security threat to Turkey, an America that pursues an anti-Turkey policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, and an American president who aims to overthrow President Erdoğan through elections.

Will the election results affect Turkish foreign policy

Tayyip Erdoğan is a politician determined to maintain the multidimensional foreign policy approach Turkey has practiced so far, while his opponent Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is expected to rebuild the old style of relations between Turkey and the West. In fact, while it is clear what the two major components of the People’s Alliance, the AK Party and the MHP, stand for in foreign policy, it is not clear how the two major components of the Nation Alliance, the CHP and Iyi Party, and the HDP, which has entered into a named electoral alliance with them, will compromise on foreign policy. The goal of overthrowing President Erdoğan seems to be the only common point that unites these two parties—in this respect, they share a similar goal to Biden.

But can we talk about a harmony between the components of the Nation Alliance on what Turkey’s policy towards the PKK/YPG should be? The HDP, the Kurdish ethno-nationalist separatist party, supports the PKK/YPG and, in line with the Biden administration, backs the YPG in Northern Syria and shares the goal of overthrowing Erdoğan. However, the nationalist Iyi Party has a different understanding on this issue for sure.

The CHP, on the other hand, seems to be a political party that includes people close to both sides of the PKK/YPG issue. If the Nation Alliance, which is united around the simple goal of toppling Erdoğan, wins the elections, Turkey is likely to face a major fight over its PKK/YPG policy. This is because the U.S. and the HDP are not expected to give up the “gains” the PKK/YPG has made thus far in Syria.

In short, if Erdoğan and the People’s Alliance win the elections, Turkey will maintain its multidimensional foreign policy approach based on national independence. If Kılıçdaroğlu and the Nation Alliance win the elections, serious problems will inevitably arise between those who advocate that Turkey should pursue a foreign policy in line with the U.S. and those who argue that Turkey should stand against the U.S., especially on security issues harming Turkey’s interests.

In this case, it is likely that the Biden administration, which aspires to intervene in Turkey’s elections with the aim of ousting Erdoğan, will re-engage and try to design a government that will not pose a problem for U.S. interests by contacting those “elements of the Turkish leadership…, get[ting] more out of them, and embolden[ing] them.” This could take the form of removing some of the Nation Alliance’s current components and making the HDP a direct partner in the government.

The formation of such a government would mean that Turkey would abandon its multidimensional foreign policy and return to one that is U.S.-oriented. However, for this to happen, the Nation Alliance and the HDP would have to win both the presidential and parliamentary elections, and then the U.S.-aligned actors would have to maintain their majority in parliament. The results of the upcoming elections will reveal a lot about how the Turkish public evaluates politics and how these differences in foreign policy approaches are reflected in voter preferences.

A

state’s foreign policy comprises its activities and initiatives to defend its relationships and interests in relation to other states, governmental and non-governmental actors, political entities, etc. as represented by a state-centric logic through a well-defined strategy.

According to the realist foreign policy understanding, the state, the legitimate actor in the eyes of the international community, aims to realize a set of predefined goals of achieving its survival, on the one hand, or the survival of the regime, leader, or public that it perceives as the backbone of its existence. Foreign policies may also prioritize specific concerns of states, leaders, elites, etc.

The Westphalian notion of sovereignty (1648) and the 1815 Congress of Vienna have played a vital role in forming modern foreign policy and diplomacy. Nevertheless, the decades after the Cold War paved the way for the emergence of a new foreign policy model which transformed diplomacy through a new interpretation. The framing and implementation of foreign policy has changed per its officialized methodology, actors, and emerging themes or proceedings.

Methodology

The method of conducting new foreign policy has become a mixture of old-fashioned practices and newly emerging ones. Diplomacy still serves to shape foreign policy while the latter is exposed to new priorities. For example, foreign policy could espouse a facilitative role for non-state actors imitating a state function. In this sense, new foreign policy is no longer about only representing the head of state abroad, but involves a whole array of complementary functions.

Foreign services, for instance, now defend not only the state’s political interests but also the tax-paying corporations’ expectations through cordial visits to the ministries and institutions of other countries. The Libyan crisis is an excellent case in point. In 2019, the interested states were supportive of either Khalifa Haftar or the Government of National Accord (GNA) of Tripoli, while the defeat of Haftar’s army changed third parties’ foreign policies giving them leverage over private enterprises by virtue of the former having a share in business opportunities. This shifted the issue of direct or indirect military support to conflicting parties towards a mood of cooperation.

On the other hand, intelligence agencies assume more active roles in recommending foreign policy options. Foreign services have become executive organs of political leadership guided by intelligence organizations and security advisers as is evident in the U.S. involvement in Syria. Both CENTCOM and the CIA, in coordination with the security advisers to the U.S. President, were influential in shaping the United States’ Syria policy. Hence there is a sort of new centralization and decentralization in foreign policy-making that involves the multiplicity of organizations active in shaping the process.

Track II diplomacy has added another dimension since civil society organizations, either backed by foreign services or acting independently, pave another way to infiltrate foreign policy options. Track II diplomacy has been perceived as a useful method to persuade the interlocutor in the long run. It is actually the initial step taken by civil society initiatives to change the public’s or decision-makers’ opinions. Nevertheless, it is still the state that finalizes a folder.

Actors

Like the Track II procedure of foreign policy-making, actors in foreign policy multiply through various processes such as managing, administering, or implementing.

State actors can sometimes be assisted or challenged by non-state actors that may result in the breaching of the fundamental principle of foreign policy – legitimacy. The U.S. support to PKK offshoots in northern Syria is a significant example of loss of legitimacy since foreign policymakers seek their own interests bypassing international legitimacy and ethics.

At the same time, there are think tanks and academics, rising actors of foreign policy, that have the great potential to shape public opinion through publishing credible reports. The prestige of such civil initiatives has pushed the foreign services of many countries to provide funding to these institutions.

Another case is the privatization of foreign policy. The last two decades witnessed private companies attempting to mediate between conflicting parties through funding provided by governments. Yet, in certain cases, the source of funding can render these initiatives uncredible in the eyes of the concerned parties.

Themes of foreign policies

Other than the methodologies and actors of foreign policy, the themes have changed from hard politics to a combination of hard and soft politics. Themes of interest in foreign policy-making, like the field of security, were widened and deepened. Foreign policy is now prone to track current phenomena like climate, market economy, society, culture, and sports.

Military and defense issues are still matters of grave interest, and intelligence and defense institutions are involved in designing strategies in these fields. Aside from themes beyond the capacity of states, requiring a collective response, governments outwardly promote a cooperative foreign policy but behind the scenes compete for relative gains. Furthermore, newly emerging themes of foreign policy push foreign services to further compartmentalization. A competition in a certain field, say political disputes, does not impede cooperation other fields, say energy or commerce.

Today’s foreign policy interacts more with individuals be they voters, social entities, or interest groups. Foreign policy is designed to take into account reactions of citizens and the public interest. In the age of justification through public opinion, foreign services rely on surveys, sociological and cultural analyses, and social media monitoring. In this context, foreign policy not only comprises the formal engagement of governments, it is a composition of many newly emerged, influential units together with the already established ones.

Middle powers are states that rank neither as great powers nor as small actors in international relations. There is no single definition or straightforward approach to conceptualize their role other than the commonly held view that such countries are key players in the geopolitics of their regions. The variety of roles and aims assumed by middle powers also vary according to their regional context. Some middle powers such as Turkey are traditionally seen as key military allies by the West, while others such as Canada and Japan are considered major trade partners.

However, despite such fundamental differences in their strength or standing, countries like Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, India, South Korea, South Africa, and Turkey are increasingly involved in international crises and developments. Below, I shall outline both challenges and opportunities provided by the current global context for middle powers. I ultimately argue that middle powers can implement collective strategies on the basis of their common interests and gain more say in global affairs.

Middle Powers’ Organizational Capacity

The foremost challenge facing middle powers is organizational. There are many international organizations populated by middle powers, but almost none of them are exclusively middle-power oriented. Middle powers are often members of the global institutions dominated by great powers, like G20 and BRICS, whose agendas mainly benefit the great powers involved. An exclusively middle power organization is yet to be formed, the closest organization of such a nature being MIKTA. MITKA is an exclusive club of a number of middle powers with quite limited membership, namely Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea, and Australia.

In the absence of an organization representing their interests vocally, middle powers cannot assume a bigger role in international politics. The security architecture of the UN privileges the five permanent members of the UN Security Council; NATO, the world’s most significant military alliance, is under American leadership; and the EU, the largest trading bloc, is led by a Franco-German alliance. Middle powers such as Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, and India are all key players in their region but none seems capable of exerting global influence. An alliance or an organization exclusive to middle powers can change the overall dynamic.

Middle powers such as Brazil, Turkey, and India can agree among themselves on pushing for a reform of the UN.

One of the first goals of any middle power club should be a reform of the UN system. Middle powers individually, or collectively, should have more say in the UN’s decision-making on international security crises. Such reform may stipulate more quotas for each region and some rotational representation for middle powers, and particularly African, Latin American, and Middle Eastern middle power states should be afforded more representation at the UN’s Security Council. However, the reform proposal first requires a consensus among middle powers and that may prove hard to achieve.

Middle powers such as Brazil, Turkey, and India are all part of the liberal international system. As democratic countries with huge potential for economic growth and no significant military or strategic conflict with the West, they can agree among themselves on pushing for a reform of the UN. More established and traditional middle powers like Australia, Canada, Japan, and Sweden may also join the reform call, as this may benefit them as well. The less democratic, or authoritarian ones, such as Egypt, Iran, or Saudi Arabia, however, may have more radical demands concerning the UN reform and might not join a collective reform movement.

As mentioned above, the most straightforward path forward could be a reform of the UN’s security architecture allowing more say to middle power states, maybe through a recognition of their status which may provide them some form of collective representation. In order to make that happen, middle powers need to agree on their common interests and goals.

Middle powers are mostly liberal democratic states, so they should highlight the fact that they are in favor of the liberal order, e.g., the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the UN system. Mediation and peacekeeping should remain their most preferred means of international crisis diplomacy, though they must publicize their efforts and seek more recognition for their contributions.

An effective alliance or organization of middle power diplomacy should be formed and take sides in global crises since leaving such crises to be mainly decided by great power politics will only downgrade the middle power cause.

In short, middle powers need more concerted actions and efforts in highlighting their undeniable role in world affairs. The world is no longer divided into two or three competing strategic blocs. Global affairs are much more complex and require collective action of actors with different levels of international standing. Middle powers are no longer bound to side with one or the other alliance; these days, more than ever before, they collectively command a much more serious economic and military might.

Organizational problems can be tackled and collective interests can be furthered particularly if the leading middle powers such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, India, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey can agree on a collective initiative. The list of countries mentioned is just indicative – more states can be welcomed into this group, and even small nations can join their forces with middle powers as they see that international peace and stability can be furthered through a collective movement.

Sweden prides and projects itself as being a very modern and liberal society, and an integral and active member of the international community. It is a country that seeks “to punch above its weight.” In practical terms this refers to its desire to have an effect on shaping global developments that is above and beyond its tangible resource availability.

Branding and reputation management play a key role in Swedish foreign policy as an attempted perception force multiplier and with special attention given to curating the impression of Sweden as a value entrepreneur in 21^st-century international relations. This begs the logical and critical question: does the communication hype match the substance of the practical implementation of Sweden’s foreign policy?

Ideological Basis of Swedish Foreign Policy

One of the central components of Swedish foreign policy is its international brand, used as a means to legitimize its actions and ideologically informed by politically central-based norms and values. There are four key profile areas in the “Brand Sweden” strategy that has been active since 2013: society, creativity, innovation, and sustainability. This is about how Sweden has officially defined Swedes, and how they desire to project Sweden and Swedishness to the world in its foreign policy as a template for others to follow. For example, “Brand Sweden” defines Swedish society in the following idealistic picture:

The Swedish social model inspires interest from around the world. The “Swedish model” is built on a core of economic growth, social responsibility and trust expressed through a universal welfare system and strong institutions. This profile area also includes values such as gender equality, respect for human rights, sustainable development, low corruption, and use of new technologies, and it can therefore be used in different ways to create trust in international contexts.

There is a palpable level of idealism and arrogance in the manner “official” Sweden views itself in relation to other countries and other peoples, which it pursues with a messianic zeal in spite of the obvious flaws and physical realm realities that paint a very different picture. The “unofficial” accounts of a system, such as the work of Masoud Kamali on the effects of neo-liberalism in and on Sweden, do not follow what it is preaching to the rest of the world.

The four profile areas noted above from the Brand Sweden campaign are in turn used to inform key Swedish foreign policy programs and approaches. This is where Sweden tries to project itself on the world stage as a progressive and forward-looking norm and value entrepreneur, and a “responsible” member of the international community.

Swedish Foreign Policy in Practice in the 21st Century

There are concrete practical and pragmatic reasons for Sweden’s efforts to cultivate a strong international brand image, which is used as the basis for realizing political objectives; encouraging scientific and cultural exchanges; attracting tourism, investment, and human talent; and promoting trade. It also serves the basis for what are considered as being negative rumors and disinformation.

Recently, institutional mechanisms have been created that are intended to uphold the official narrative in Sweden and abroad, such as the Department for Psychological Defense. These act as gatekeepers and defenders of the country’s idealized and curated image. The cracks are becoming more numerous and obvious in the utopian promises of Swedish foreign policy, and the dysfunctional reality is coming through.

Sweden intends to be an international actor serving for the good in the world. However, the country exports weapons to states involved in armed conflicts.

The notions and practices of Sweden’s humanitarian superpower brand and feminist foreign policy are coming under increasing critical scrutiny owing to obvious discrepancies and contradictions between word and practice. For example, the promise of Swedish feminist foreign policy is for Sweden to be an international actor and a force for good in the world. However, Sweden exports weapons to belligerent states involved in armed conflicts, such as the Gulf states and their war of attrition against Yemen.

The fact that Sweden is willing to arm non-democracies involved in a protracted bloody conflict such as that in Yemen and other conflicts, defies the rhetorical promises and gives a very hollow ring to the idea of Sweden as a responsible international actor bringing enlightenment, innovation, and sustainability to marginalized and dispossessed global peoples.

In contradiction to the idea of Sweden’s positive and peaceful contribution to international relations, encapsulated in such norms as neutrality or non-alignment with international brands, discrepancies are obvious. Thus, the Swedish political establishment elite is increasingly integrating into Euro-Atlantic structures and hosting NATO military exercises on Swedish soil. This suggests a general idea to build up hard power, not as an independent actor, but within the context of an existing military alliance.

Perhaps one of the major reasons for the failure of Sweden’s ideologically informed foreign policy is that this is better suited to a Western-centric global order, where the United States is the unipolar hegemonic power. In the global information and cognitive realm where liberalism was the ideological lens, the Swedish approach made sense. This is no longer the case as a non-Western-centric and multipolar order is gradually gaining power and influence, where pragmatic and non-ideological approaches and styles of communication are more effective.

Sweden is not detached from the mainstream, but rather is integrated into the global mainstream and the liberal politics establishment. It rarely ventures too far from the strategic priorities of mainstream liberal politics, and, on occasion, can engage with some leeway in foreign politics of lesser importance. In spite of all of the talk and rhetoric, Sweden does not follow an independent and innovative path of foreign policy – it follows the lead of such institutions as the European Union and the United Nations. At this point in time, the distinction between the promises of the ideological façade and the resulting dysfunctional reality cannot be more obvious.

To understand the changing structure of global intelligence, we must keep the following concepts and terminology in mind: technology-centered development, the increasing cyber espionage capacity of intelligence services, the developing relations between intelligence services and private intelligence companies, new-generation threats and risks that emerge with the rise of social media, open-source intelligence (OSINT) collection methods, and the concept of intelligence diplomacy.

Today, technology affects every walk of life. The speed of life has increased by the spread of the internet and social media. Daily lives, public spaces, and commercial activities are digitized, while the COVID19 pandemic gave a great push to this process. However, our dependence on technology and digitization also increase the risk of cyber espionage.

Governments and global companies carry out a significant part of their activities through internet-based technologies, and this brings important challenges with it regarding the privacy of information. Confidential information belonging to governments, global companies, and individuals is disclosed via manipulative tools created for cyber espionage operations which leak information to the public through various means. This forces intelligence services to increase their capacity to conduct sophisticated cyber espionage operations and to increase their cyber defense capabilities.

The increasing relationship between private intelligence companies and intelligence services brought about a significant change to the classical structure of intelligence. Private intelligence companies have been playing an important role, especially within the United States intelligence structure for decades. On the other hand, Russian intelligence services have been active in this field in recent years through the private intelligence company Wagner.

Commercial capacities of private intelligence companies increased with “the war on terror” doctrine as formulated by the United States after 9/11.

Commercial capacities of private intelligence companies increased with “the war on terror” doctrine as formulated by the United States after 9/11. Private intelligence companies refashioned their activities in accordance with the changing threat perceptions, asymmetrical threats, and the global demand for risk analyses needed for international investments. Private U.S. intelligence companies operate with the support and guidance of the state secret services. The U.S. private intelligence market with increasing trade volumes and profitability paved the way for global companies to invest further in the field.

It has been claimed that a private intelligence and security company such as Blackwater had close commercial ties with the CIA including carrying out assassinations, interrogation activities, kidnappings, and other technical and physical pursuits in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq to combat radical terrorist elements. This commercial relationship could also breach fundamental human rights and freedoms.

Users can hide their real identities in social media and this helps criminal and terrorist organizations to access and spread information flexibly and cheaply. In parallel with the increase in the use of smartphones in daily life after 2010, criminal and terrorist organizations make effective use of social media.

Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are ably using social media in action planning, propaganda, and internal training.

Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are ably using social media in action planning, propaganda, and internal training. The smartphone application ByLock that was used by the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETÖ) allowed the encrypted identification of anonymous users and is another good example of how a terrorist organization can use the internet infrastructure to plan terrorist activities.

The PKK propaganda to defame the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) on social media during Turkey’s Peace Spring and Olive Branch Operations are two other good examples. For example, during these military operations, PKK militants and sympathizers made great efforts to serve the world public opinion fake news on social media that the TAF killed, tortured, and forced innocent civilians to migrate within Syria.

The concept of intelligence diplomacy is frequently discussed in recent years. In this context, the role of certain countries’ intelligence service directors within the scope of foreign policy decision-making can be analyzed. For example, the negotiations by former director of Mossad Yossi Cohen, in 2020, within the scope of the normalization of relations between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel can be given as an example of intelligence diplomacy. At the end of Cohen’s covert and secret contacts throughout 2020, the UAE officially declared its recognition of Israel on August 13, 2020.

The meetings held in Russia in November 2021 by CIA Director William Burns, who has served successfully as a diplomat for many years, can be evaluated within the scope of intelligence diplomacy. During his visit, it was leaked to the public that Burns warned Russia within the scope of the Ukraine Crisis and made secret negotiations with the Russian side regarding this issue.

It is known that Hakan Fidan, director of Turkish intelligence (Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MİT), has played a very active role in the decision-making processes of Turkish foreign policy. For example, in the past years, Fidan held secret meetings about the normalization of Turkey’s bilateral relations with Egypt and Israel in the two countries respectively. Nowadays, it is speculated in Ankara political circles that all three countries are ready to take steps to normalize relations.

German foreign policy during the Merkel era was characterized by pragmatism and balance. Merkel’s focus in foreign policy was clearly on the stability of the EU and maintaining relations with important third countries. The future German government, probably consisting of a traffic light coalition, may experience several conflicts in foreign policy decision-making. Accordingly, these conflicts may lead to Germany increasingly losing influence in international politics.

Merkel’s foreign policy

When Merkel took over the chancellorship in 2005, the first item on the agenda was to repair the damaged transatlantic relationship with the U.S. The Schröder-Fischer government had opposed the Iraq war in 2003, which caused the U.S. to put its relations with Germany on hold. Merkel’s election led to Germany acting again in a pro-transatlantic manner and adopting a more distanced stance towards Russia. However, the EU no longer acted as independently as it had during Schröder’s time, but had increasingly come under the influence of the United States.

The ongoing euro crisis since 2009, the Ukraine crisis in 2014, the ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015, and Brexit in 2016 were to endanger Europe’s stability and put Germany to the test. The fact that Trump was elected in 2016 was to make the situation much more difficult for Germany and Europe. Merkel was left on her own to find new approaches for her foreign policy strategy. She had increasingly distanced herself from her initial strategy of looking to Western partners for foreign policy, and instead shifted to a foreign policy strategy characterized by pragmatism and balance, with German state interests at the forefront.

However, the pragmatic approach was also necessary for Germany to remain relevant in international politics. The EU was threatening to break apart more and more, especially due to the influx of refugees. By opening EU borders, Merkel accepted to endanger the stability of her own national borders. By virtue of its Eurosceptic stance, the far-right party AFD (Alternative for Germany) had already gained fundamental support from a certain section of the population anyway. The ‘refugee crisis’ and the approach of the ostensibly conservative CDU (Christian Democratic Union) further strengthened the right-wing extremists.

The fact that there has been so little focus on foreign policy so far could have to do with the fact that no real foreign policy strategy has yet been formulated by the future German government.

Experts have little hope

CDU chancellor candidate Armin Laschet has already criticized the fact that in the coalition negotiations there was little talk of foreign and security policy issues. This is very worrying, he said, as Germany plays an important role in international politics and should also assume this role in order not to lose its influence as an important player. The fact that there has been so little focus on foreign policy so far could have to do with the fact that no real foreign policy strategy has yet been formulated by the future German government. Most experts are critical of the absence of hardly any overlapping points in  foreign policy strategy.

Political scientist Johannes Varwick has commented that apart from general commitments to NATO and the EU, which he describes as “usual foreign policy platitudes,” no concrete points have been formulated. Expert Gustav C. Gressel of the European Council on Foreign Relations also denounces the little attention that has been paid to foreign policy issues and emphasizes that the points of overlap between the coalition parties are very few.

The fundamental difference with the Merkel era is that the German federal foreign office will most likely be run by the Greens. The Greens are known for their transatlantic foreign policy, so, on the one hand, the focus will be on the stability of relations with the U.S., and, on the other hand, a tougher stance on Russia and China are expected.

It should also be underlined that in German foreign policy the dominant role is usually played by the chancellor. Therefore, it can be expected that Olaf Scholz and the SPD will try and probably succeed to a large extent in realizing their foreign policy ideas. This, in turn, will inevitably lead to tensions within the coalition, as the Greens and the FDP will not always want to subordinate themselves to the SPD.

If the SPD has a different idea than its coalition partners on fundamental issues such as the Russia and China policy, which is also quite possible, and if it always gets its way on these important points, the other parties in government will clash with the SPD as a result of not being able to implement their promises and act according to their political stances.

That is why experts justifiably fear that Germany will continue to play a reactive rather than an active role in the international arena. A German foreign policy strategy based on consensus cannot exist at all if there are hardly any overlaps. The result will be that the German government will act far too cautiously in international politics and, as before, will find answers to emerging crises too late. In a nutshell, one should not put too much hope in the future federal government being an influential player in international politics.

The issue of vaccine diplomacy is increasingly impacting pandemic-driven foreign policy decision-making. Evidence suggests that medically advanced high- and upper-income countries – those that developed their own vaccines against COVID19 – exhibit different foreign policy behaviors and crisis management techniques in terms of global vaccine distribution and international cooperation. The situation is becoming even more complex considering the fact that there are not only states that act as primary and unitary actors, but also non-state actors (e.g., vaccine producers) that influence international relations.

There are a few selected examples that show the different foreign policy behaviors of state and non-state actors regarding vaccine diplomacy. The U.S., for instance, pursues rather multilateral mechanisms for vaccine administering, largely financially supporting the World Health Organization’s (WHO) COVAX initiative to provide vaccines to the poor and underdeveloped countries.

However, the U.S. is reluctant to direct commitments for vaccine distribution before the inoculation of American citizens is completed. Russia, on the other hand, mostly focuses on bilateral negotiations and agreements. Through the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), the country manages global manufacturing, promoting, and distributing its Sputnik V vaccine worldwide. To date, more than sixty countries have approved Sputnik V and the number is gradually increasing.

The U.K.-Sweden company that developed the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine is currently experiencing delivery delays over which the European Commission has launched legal actions given that the vaccine is in high demand in the EU. Despite such actions, the company reaffirmed its commitments to COVAX. Finally, Johnson & Johnson’s single-shot vaccine producer signed an advance purchase agreement with the African Union’s 55 member states but also committed to a not-for-profit basis vaccine distribution through the COVAX facility although no earlier than 2022.

In all cases, policy-making has already moved to crisis management aiming to achieve health security, but also to produce results on a profit basis that are equally acceptable to both national audiences and the international community.

Both, state and non-state actors pursue their own goals when it comes to the way they act on the international stage, while balancing between promoting national interests, making international commitments, and seeking commercial advancement.

In all cases, policy-making has already moved to crisis management aiming to achieve health security, but also to produce results on a profit basis that are equally acceptable to both national audiences and the international community. The hypothesis here is that vaccine diplomacy lies in the space of the rational choice approach which is a method for assessing a nation state’s individual, goal-oriented foreign policy decision making and behavior.

In this regard, vaccine diplomacy appears to be an effective practice that puts together various international actors, collective entities, and issues that they all address within the space of a rationalist approach. The rational choice approach model includes: (1) strategic communication and strategic interaction; (2) negotiation and bargaining; and (3) international treaties and agreements that lead to international commitments. Taken together, these elements compose and define vaccine diplomacy, making it an essential mechanism of international cooperation.

During a pandemic, crisis-driven vaccine diplomacy can become the core element of international relations and international cooperation. Here is why. The ideational and material accounts of international cooperation are influenced and orchestrated by leading and medically advanced countries.

Foreign policy behaviors among and between actors and the issues they address promptly leads to complex interdependence, making international cooperation the only option at a time punctuated by the crisis. It’s foreseeable that communication, negotiation, and bargaining lead the way to increasing the number of international treaties and commitments.

The role of communication and strategic interaction in promoting international cooperation is critical. On the one hand, there is bilateral interstate communication which is often less transparent but presumably more effective considering the small number of parties involved in the diplomatic negotiation. On the other hand, there are large international organizations that are the agents of international cooperation.

International organizations are more observable and transparent. They also secure the membership and conditional participation of less developed countries in the communication process. Either way, bilateral or multilateral communication facilitates cooperation among states in which rational approaches prevail. This might explain the impressive number of Russia’s bilateral agreements in vaccine distribution, and the multilateral COVAX initiative. Either way what promotes global health, puts the global health security forward.

Negotiations and bargaining are the elements of statecraft and statesmanship that help pursue interests and propose solutions. From the rationalist approach perspective, it could be that negotiating sides don’t delve into ideological or political differences as these might put constraints on the negotiation outcome. . Even countries or groups distinct from one another are motivated to work together. Such countries or groups desire solutions and attempt to find the potential to compromise using bargaining strategies and scenarios to identify mutual benefits and maximize their international advantage rather than seeking absolute gains within the win-lose paradigm.

From a practical perspective, when countries or companies produce more treaties and agreements on the distribution of vaccines, this signifies that the effort to combat the pandemic on a global scale is underway. Thus, vaccine diplomacy negotiations and bargaining, emerging from strategic communication and strategic interaction, appear to be the tools of rational choice in the context of complex interdependence at the levels of bilateral and multilateral relations.

Throughout the two centuries of the existence of the Russian Empire, Orthodoxy was the ideology and the main moral justification of the empire’s foreign policy expansion. This was especially the case in the “southern direction,” namely in the Black Sea and Caucasus regions, where the Ottoman Empire was traditionally the main and only military and political opponent of the Russian Empire.

Saint Petersburg and Istanbul fought each other eight times over the course of these two centuries. Both empires contained elements of theocracy in their state principles. The monarch was simultaneously the head of the official church, and in that sense, both rulers were the leaders of their respective community of believers, and shared both political and religious authority in their person. Therefore, the struggle between the Russian and Ottoman Empires traditionally not only bore military-political characteristics, but was also a religious confrontation.

Particularly indicative of this matter was the so-called Byzantine project of Catherine the Great, who in the last quarter of the 18th century intended to recapture Istanbul from the Ottomans and take the capital of the Orthodox world under the Russian protectorate. This idea was the dominant feature of Russian foreign policy for almost a century and a half. Russian troops were closest to capturing Istanbul during the Russian-Ottoman wars of 1828-1829 and 1877-1878, but these plans were not destined to materialize.

The last attempt to revive and implement the “Byzantine project” took place during World War I, when the forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet with army formations attached to them prepared to conduct a Bosphorus landing operation in 1916, following the example of the failed Dardanelles landing operation of Russia’s allies in the Entente. During World War I, the Ottomans managed to defend their capital, which automatically put an end to Russia’s “Byzantine project.” Russia’s failure to capture Istanbul exhausted the potential of the idea of uniting all the world’s Orthodox peoples under the auspices of Orthodox Russia.

Between 1920 and 1930, over 7,000 Orthodox churches in Russia were closed, and about 15,000 clergy and 200,000 ordinary people were arrested, shot, or sent to forced labor camps for following Orthodox Christianity.

After the end of the Russian Empire and the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1917, the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and the state in Russia fundamentally changed. The Bolsheviks saw in Orthodoxy not only an ideological opponent, but also their direct competitors in influencing the minds of the majority of the Russian population, and therefore subjected the Church to harsh political repression and even terror. This process was initiated by the decree of the Soviet government of February 2, 1918, entitled “On the Separation of Church from State and School from Church.”

Between 1920 and 1930, over 7,000 Orthodox churches in Russia were closed, and about 15,000 clergy and 200,000 ordinary people were arrested, shot, or sent to forced labor camps for following Orthodox Christianity. The apogee of the persecution of the Church in Russia came in 1932 with the opening in the Kazan Cathedral in St. Petersburg of the State Museum of the History of Religion by the USSR Academy of Sciences. During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, as part of World War II, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin stopped the repressive practice against the Russian Orthodox Church, since he decided to use Orthodoxy to mobilize the Russian ethnic majority of the country’s population to fight fascism, which he succeeded in doing in full.

During Yeltsin’s presidency, the process of returning previously nationalized property and cultural artifacts to the Russian Orthodox Church began and the practice of financially supporting the Church from the state budget was initiated. The latter was perceived by the authorities and society as a certain compensation for the Church’s persecution during the years of the USSR.

The influence of Orthodoxy on Russia’s foreign policy in those years was minimal and manifested itself in a significant way only once – that is, in the first half of the 1990s, during the peacekeeping operation of the Russian military in former Yugoslavia.

However, to a greater extent, the peacekeeping mission was an allusion to the historical events of the 1870s in the Balkans, rather than a manifestation of geopolitical doctrine. Russian peacekeepers in Croatia, Kosovo, and Metohija protected not only the territory inhabited by the Orthodox Serb population during the interethnic conflict, but also physically defended the property of Orthodox monasteries and temples.

President Vladimir Putin, who was elected head of Russia in 2000, decided to turn Orthodoxy into a tool of soft power in the country’s foreign policy. During the third term of Putin’s presidency (2012-2018), an ambitious geopolitical project began to be implemented to revolutionize Russia’s influence in the Orthodox ecumene by transferring the seat of the ecumenical patriarch from Istanbul to Moscow.

These efforts were planned to be made official at the Pan-Orthodox Council in the summer of 2016, but at the insistence of the Moscow Patriarchate the location was moved to a “neutral” site – the Greek island of Crete, where the semi-independent Church of Crete operates under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in Istanbul.

In order to subordinate the entire Orthodox world to the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church’s Moscow Patriarchate and, consequently, the Kremlin, it was necessary to ensure the numerical majority of its representatives among the participants of the Pan-Orthodox Council, which is attended by patriarchs and archbishops from the fourteen autocephalous Orthodox Churches, with the exception of Rome. To this end, in 2011, an artificial increase in the number of dioceses and vicariates began in Russia by establishing 2-3 new dioceses and the mass appointment of vicars (bishops without dioceses) on the basis of the previously existing dioceses of the Russian Orthodox Church.

As a result of such actions, the number of potential participants in the Pan-Orthodox Council on the part of the Russian Orthodox Church tripled, which from a technical point of view guaranteed the Russian Church a numerical majority in representation in comparison with the other 13 generally recognized Orthodox Churches. The Moscow Patriarchate’s actions were fully supported and financed by the Russian political leadership, since the patriarchate itself, without the assistance of the state, could not independently maintain a bureaucratic structure artificially inflated for the implementation of geopolitical ambitions.

The main question to be determined at the Cretan Pan-Orthodox Council was the following: which of the two patriarchates, Constantinople or Moscow, would lead the Orthodox ecumene? If we look at this issue more broadly, in the context of global geopolitics, the question then becomes which of the two countries, Turkey or Russia, will be the legal successor and heir to the ideological, cultural, and even political heritage of Byzantium as a world center.

Thus, the issue went far beyond the framework of purely intra-Church or intra-Orthodox discussions and trends, and acquired a global geopolitical context that inevitably affected the content and nature of Russian-Turkish relations at the time. Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople resorted to ultra-radical measures within the framework of Church canons in order to repel Moscow Patriarch Kirill’s claims to Byzantine heritage.

This included the recognition of the autocephaly (full independence) of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyiv Patriarchate from the Moscow Patriarchate, which would have been completely impossible under other historical conditions. With this move, the number of firm supporters of the Moscow Patriarchate was reduced by a third, after which it was no longer necessary to talk about a Church revolution in its interests.

Whilst modern-day official diplomatic relations between Malaysia and Turkey were established in 1964, the ties between the two countries predate the modern era. Early relations can be traced back to the early sixteenth century when the Malay Sultanate of Malacca received the Ottoman help to fend off an attack by the Portuguese.

In the nineteenth century, a number of Malay states had close relations with the Ottoman Empire and notable amongst these was the personal ties between Sultan Abu Bakar of Johor and the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II.

High-level visits between Malaysia and Turkey started in 1974 and since 2000 there has been undoubtedly greater interaction between the two states. Both countries are active members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation. In 2014, relations between the two countries received yet another impetus when they were elevated to a strategic partnership.

Trade and investment between Turkey and Malaysia have been growing significantly especially since August 2015 when a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the states entered into force. For Turkey, the FTA with Malaysia was its first with a member state of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its second in the Asia-Pacific region.

There is also the Turkey-Malaysia Business Council, which was created in 1995 to facilitate trade. In 2019 alone, total trade between Malaysia and Turkey was valued at US$2.2 billion, with the balance of trade in favor of the former.

In the same vein, while Malaysia is Turkey’s largest trading partner in Southeast Asia, for Malaysia, Turkey is its third most important trading partner in West Asia. A number of Turkish companies also operate in Malaysia and these include FNSS A.S., Evyap, Haus, Yonca-Onuk, Prota Asia, Novaplast, Dorce, Tepe Kimya, Polin Waterparkbuilds, Arcelik-Beko, Dalin, LC Waikiki, Aselsan, and De Facto – to name a few.

Similarly, a few Malaysian companies too have invested in Turkey, notable amongst which is the Malaysian Airports Holding Berhad (MAHB) that not only operates but is, in fact, the largest shareholder in Istanbul’s Sabiha Gökçen International Airport, Turkey’s second busiest airport.

In terms of trade and investment, Turkey views Malaysia as its gateway to Southeast and East Asia, and likewise Malaysia sees Turkey as its doorway into the West Asian and European regions.

In the defense sector, Turkey is one of Malaysia’s main source of defense procurement, namely armored vehicles and military communications. During the visit by President Erdoğan to Malaysia in December 2019, a number of agreements between firms in the defense sector were signed.

At the global level, both Malaysia and Turkey have been described as emerging middle powers often playing a pro-active role in international affairs, and especially on issues concerning the Islamic world.

A recent example of this role was when Malaysia convened the Kuala Lumpur Summit (KL Summit or Perdana Dialogue) with the theme “The Role of Development in Achieving National Security” in December 2019. The summit was attended by 450 delegates from 56 countries.

Notable among the attendees were Turkish President Erdogan, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, and Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani, the Emir of Qatar. The summit’s main agenda was to discuss problems besetting Muslim nations and undertake efforts to enhance unity in the Islamic world.

Notwithstanding the above, there were those who viewed the KL Summit as an attempt by Malaysia (and perhaps even Turkey) to create a new bloc in the Islamic world and provide an alternative to the Saudi-led OIC. The non-attendance of Saudi Arabia and even Pakistan (apparently at the insistence of the former) gave further credence to such views.

Compounded with the KL Summit were attempts by the Mahathir government to distance itself from Saudi Arabia, witnessed especially its decision to shut down the King Salman Center for International Peace (KSCIP) in Putrajaya in August 2018.

That said, the KL Summit was also very much in line with Malaysia’s new Foreign Policy Framework (FPF), launched in September 2019, which amongst others envisions a greater role for the country vis-à-vis the Islamic world.

However, barely three months after the summit, in late February 2020, the Mahathir government fell and since then little has been heard of the whole scheme. With Mahathir, the driving force behind the summit, out of power, it appears that the whole initiative to provide leadership and some form of direction in the Islamic world may have passed into oblivion.

History is rewritten in the United States today. Even the most pessimistic about the prospects of American democracy have rarely ventured out this far while offering a bleak analysis of America’s future, whether in terms of political polarization at home or global standing abroad.

As shocking and certainly telling as the images of thousands of American protesters taking over the symbols of America’s federal, representative democracy in Washington D.C. on January 6, it was only a facet in a far more complex and devastating political trajectory that has been in the making for years.

While mainstream U.S. media has conveniently attributed all of America’s ills to the unruly character of outgoing President Donald Trump, the truth is not quite so convenient. The U.S. has been experiencing an unprecedented political influx at every level of society for years, leading us to believe that the rowdy years of Trump’s Presidency were a mere symptom, not the cause, of America’s political instability.

Even the storming of the congressional halls by angry pro-Trump crowds did not fundamentally alter the make-up of America’s political affiliations. Not only did Democrats remain firmly Democrats, but Republicans also remained entrenched in their republicanism and their allegiance to President Trump.

The House of Representatives’ vote on impeaching Trump, which was held on January 13, hardly registered a significant shift even among establishment Republicans. Only ten Republican members of Congress voted to impeach Trump. But how about ordinary people? Have they changed their views on Trump following the congressional insurrection? Hardly.

According to an Economist/YouGov poll published on January 13, 69% of all Republicans surveyed said that activists from the anti-fascist, leftist group, Antifa, are to be blamed for the takeover of the Capitol. While 22% said, they are unsure, a meager 9% agreed that Trump’s supporters instigated the violent events which, even then, should not automatically be understood to be an admission of guilt.

These results should not come as a surprise. The mistrust in the government and media in the U.S. is so widespread to the extent that the country is experiencing two parallel political realities, each committed to a fundamentally different set of aspirations. Each side perceives the other as the enemy, and while still believing in its own version of democracy, it no longer agrees to any functional definition of the term.

This has not always been the case.

In their seminal book, “Manufacturing Consent”, Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman provided a comprehensive analysis of how the ‘system,’ the government/ruling classes, big business and mainstream media, has invented the most effective mechanism which allowed the U.S. to ensure two naturally contradicting realities: persistent popular consent within a seemingly democratic governance.

Years later, Chomsky contested that, underneath this facade of democracy, the U.S. is, in actuality, a plutocracy, a country that is dedicated to serving the interests of the powerful few. He also argued that, while the U.S. does operate based on formal democratic structures, these are largely dysfunctional. In an interview with Global Policy Journal in 2019, the famed linguist and historian further asserted that “the U.S. Constitution was framed to thwart the democratic aspirations of most of the public.”

While these realizations have served as the core of the U.S. Left’s ideology, it was most interesting to see American Right constituencies leading what they call the ‘revolution,’ referred to by mainstream media as ‘insurrection.’ Equally interesting, many of Trump’s supporters actually come from working-class and lower-middle-class America, itself a fascinating subject in its own right.

U.S. political polarization, the breakdown of trust between the public and the ruling elites, along with their media allies, will continue unabated.

Regardless of what may transpire in the official investigation of the Capitol’s upheaval, U.S. political polarization, the breakdown of trust between the public and the ruling elites, along with their media allies, will continue unabated. Undoubtedly, the consequences will be dire.

But there is another consequential crisis that is also brewing, ‘American exceptionalism’, a rare meeting point between Democrats and Republicans, is facing its greatest challenge since its coinage sometime in the mid-17th century.

Historically, the U.S. has defined and redefined its mission in the world based on lofty spiritual, moral and political maxims, starting with ‘Manifest Destiny’, to fighting communism, to eventually serving as the defender of human rights and democracy around the world, using violence whenever necessary. In truth, ‘protecting human rights’ or ‘restoring democracy’ were mere pretenses often used to provide a moral cover that allows the U.S. to reorder the world for the sake of expanding its market and ensuring its economic dominance.

The late American historian, Howard Zinn, explained in his essay entitled “The Power and the Glory,” the functional meaning of American exceptionalism as such: “… that the United States alone has the right, whether by divine sanction or moral obligation, to bring civilization, or democracy, or liberty to the rest of the world, by violence if necessary …”

Many examples and numerous violent images can be immediately summoned when Zinn’s definition is translated into historical precedents. From the genocide of the Native Americans, to the enslaving of millions of Africans, to the never-ending interventions in South America – starting with the Monroe doctrine of 1823 – all the way to the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, American exceptionalism has always served the purpose of reinforcing the notion that America possesses a moral, divine right to do as it pleases for the betterment of mankind.

When former U.S. President George W. Bush took it upon himself to ‘restore democracy’ in Iraq as part of the U.S.-championed ‘war on terror’, his ultimatum to the United Nations reflected both American entitlement and its rooted sense of exceptionalism. “You are either with us or with the terrorists,” he said on September 21, 2001. According to that maxim, the world was divided into categories, of ‘moderates’ and ‘extremists’, ‘with us’ or ‘against us’, ‘Old Europe’ and ‘New Europe”, and so on. Despite the palpable irrationality – let alone arrogance – of that logic, U.S. ‘democratic’ institutions and mainstream media cheered Bush on. The ‘war president’s’ ratings seemed to increase as his rhetoric and actions grew more violent.

But the orchestrated ‘popular consent’ is finally breaking down, raising an unprecedented challenge to the notion of American exceptionalism, a banner under which America’s ruling elites have long united. The more political chaos and societal division widen, the more the notion of exceptionalism will be exposed as bizarre, selfish and unsustainable.

Surely, the storming of the U.S. Congress will have global repercussions, not least among them the collective rejection of the outdated notion of American exceptionalism. But with that, there is also an opportunity: first for Americans to swap their ‘manufactured consent’ with real dialogue; to salvage and, eventually, renew trust in their democratic institutions and second, for the world to challenge America’s hegemonic discourse of fraudulent democracy and other self-serving fables.

President-Elect Joe Biden has nominated Antony Blinken, a top Democratic foreign policy official and long-time adviser, as his Secretary of State.

Blinken served in senior foreign policy positions with the National Security Council during the Clinton administration and at the State Department during the Obama administration.

In between those assignments, for more than a decade, Blinken served as a key foreign policy adviser to Biden. Blinken served as the Democratic Staff Director of the influential Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 2002 to 2008, when Biden was alternatively chair and ranking member of the committee.

Before being confirmed as Deputy Secretary of State in 2014 during the Obama administration, Blinken served as Vice President Biden’s National Security Adviser.

It is difficult to discern to what extent Blinken’s public pronouncements on policy issues reflect his personal views and to what extent they serve as faithful barometers of the elected officials he advises.

Since Blinken has never held elected office, it is difficult to discern to what extent his public pronouncements on policy issues reflect his personal views and to what extent they serve as faithful barometers of the elected officials he advises. Most likely, they reflect a combination of the two.

Blinken on Syria

The nearly decade-long civil war in Syria has generated the largest displaced persons crisis in the world, with more than 6.6 million refugees and 6.1 million internally displaced people.

The Assad regime’s brutal response to an initially nonviolent uprising ultimately led to an infinitely more complex situation involving armed militias, transnational terrorist organizations, proxy warfare, and regional and international armed interventions.

The Obama administration “pursued a policy of calculated dithering in Syria, just agonizing over the choices until they no longer existed,” according to Emile Hokayem, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

This muddled policy, which consisted of laying down “red lines” against the use of chemical weapons that were crossed by Assad without consequence, an ineffectual $1 billion program run by the CIA to arm and train Syrian rebels, and direct armed intervention against the Islamic State and other groups, helped the Assad regime reassert control over much of the country and made a mockery of Obama’s early call for regime change.

In 2017, Blinken praised the Trump administration for bombing Syrian airfields in response to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons against civilians and called for “smart diplomacy” to “move toward a negotiated transition of power,” a goal which he admitted “eluded the Obama administration.”

Earlier this year, Blinken expressed greater remorse for the Obama administration’s “failures” in Syria. “The last administration has to acknowledge that we failed, not for want of trying, but we failed. We failed to prevent a horrific loss of life. We failed to prevent massive displacement of people internally in Syria and, of course, externally as refugees. And it’s something that I will take with me for the rest of my days.”

The Biden campaign took a swipe at the Trump administration for having “fallen short on U.S. policy in Syria.” The same could be said about Biden and Blinken’s roles in policy formulation on Syria during the Obama administration. Biden’s vague campaign pledge to “help shape a political settlement to give more Syrians a voice” portends a similarly fuzzy policy.

Blinken on Turkey 

The ongoing civil war in Syria has had dramatic spillover effects in Turkey, which hosts the largest number of Syrian refugees–more than 3.6 million registered with temporary protected status.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been a consistent opponent of the Assad regime since the civil war erupted and Turkey has frequently intervened militarily in Syria to protect its interests. Since 2016 it has maintained a military zone of control in northern Syria.

The Trump administration abruptly decided in October 2019 to withdraw US troops from the area and Turkey went on an offensive against the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Turkey claims that Kurdish elements in the SDF have ties to the PKK, an organization designated by Turkey, EU and the US as a terrorist organization. Trump’s withdrawal of troops and support for the SDF removed one of the primary points of friction that existed between the US and Turkey over Syria policy during the Obama administration.

Despite this policy difference, Blinken in particular placed great value on US relations with Turkey and strongly backed the country against an attempted coup in July 2016.

Speaking to an annual conference on US-Turkey relations later that year, Blinken condemned the coup attempt as a “deplorable affront to the Turkish people. By taking to the streets where they faced down tanks and evaded helicopters, ordinary citizens came to the defense of their nation and sent a powerful message to the world.”

He stated that “Turkey has no greater friend than the United States. As a long-time ally, the United States remain [sic] steadfast in our support of Turkey’s democratically-elected government and institutions.” Recognizing Turkey as a valuable NATO ally, Blinken acknowledged “our share of disagreements, but we discuss them openly, directly, and truthfully as friends and partners do.”

In the past few months Luigi Di Maio, the youngest Italian Foreign Minister since Galeazzo Ciano, who served from 1936 until 1943 in the nefarious government of his father-in-law, Benito Mussolini, has been involved in rebuilding the international supply chain and reopening borders to free circulation after the country was hit hard by COVID-19. However, Di Maio’s second priority has been to protect Italy’s interests in Libya in the new scenario that emerged after Turkish intervention in favor of the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA).

Italian Foreign Policy on Libya

Irregular migration, energy and security are the three main Italian interests in Libya. Despite the diversification policies since the early 1970s, Libya still plays a relevant role in Italy’s energy policy because of the amount of oil imported, the exceptional quality of Libyan crude oil, and the Greenstream subsea gas pipeline laid by the Italian energy giant, ENI (State Hydrocarbons Authority), and opened in 2004. Moreover, for Rome, Libyan gas is probably the only reliable alternative to Russian natural gas.

As in all European countries, the issue of immigration is at the top of the political debate in Italy too. Most of the irregular migrants entering the country come from the shores of Libya. The issue has created enormous tensions domestically – just remember that the Catholic Church has pressed for a policy of open borders, but the Italian right is basing much of their populist discourse on stopping migration by all means. Irregular migration has also created significant tension at the EU level, which is refusing the modification of the Dublin Regulation.

Future perspectives

Thus, Di Maio’s priority is to provide stability in the country, to provide security, the flow of oil and natural gas, and the containment of irregular immigration. For Rome, the ideal option is to reach a political compromise between the different parts and maintain the unity of the country. However, in the present situation, where different regional and global actors have sided with opposing groups, it appears a remote option.

Turkish intervention in favor of the GNA has even reduced the chances for an Italian role and has created a situation that (from Rome’s viewpoint) resembles the first phases of the unending Syrian crisis. Consequently, Italy is now faced with a difficult choice of taking a leading role opposing Ankara or cooperating with it.

Di Maio initially attempted to reduce the GNA’s dependency on Ankara with a more active and independent role. Nevertheless, this would mean a radical shift in Italian foreign policy and unprecedented deployment of its military as well as economic resources. This is unlikely because of three constraining elements. Firstly, foreign policy choices must enjoy domestic support. The Italian media, however, continue to follow the Libyan crisis sporadically and without interest. Italian public opinion also deplores the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy, as an “enemy” is not regarded as an implacable foe that needs to be confronted with military power and, instead, can be more effectively engaged using diplomacy.

Secondly, Italian defense policy, as stated by the White Book of the Italian Ministry of Defense, is concentrated on the Euro-Atlantic geopolitical area and on the Euro-Mediterranean geopolitical area. The Euro-Atlantic security is guaranteed by NATO, EU, “common values” and strong economic and cultural ties. The Euro-Mediterranean area, however, is characterized by anarchy and suffers political and economic instability and intra-state competition. Yet, despite its relevance, it is very unlikely that the Italian Armed Forces can intervene in the Euro-Mediterranean area outside the U.S.-led mission scenario –  something that the Trump administration is not considering.

Consequently, Italy has pointed to a UN-sponsored solution to the crisis and to the reinforcement of Mission Irini, the EU military operation to enforce the arms embargo to Libya. Both efforts appear difficult in materializing when key members of the EU and permanent members of the Security Council either backed Haftar (Russia and France), who aims to destroy the GNA militarily or are uninterested in the crisis (U.S., U.K., and China).

Italy has relatively small economic resources to invest in Libya or to apply pressure. Because of the huge public debt and the poor performance of its economy, the country cannot afford big investments abroad. Private investments are also unlikely. Major companies like FIAT or UniCredit, which have been important actors of Italian foreign policy in Libya and the East Mediterranean, are now focused on the American or internal market. The only relevant economic player is ENI, which has been active in Libya since 1959 and has lobbied the Italian government extensively.

Exactly because of these three restrictions, to not lose a role in North Africa, Italy should look into a compromise with Turkey, which deployed enormous resources in Libya. However, this compromise may need brave decisions: Turkey’s image with the Italian public is particularly poor, and the Rome-Ankara alliance may damage relations with France, Greece, and Egypt. With the first two countries, there is a high level of interconnection that will not be damaged by an eventual competition in Libya. Moreover, Paris has been frequently in conflict with Rome on the issue of migration and proved highly destabilizing in Libya. Italian policymakers define Egypt as an “inescapable partner” in the Middle East. This view has been maintained even after Giulio Regeni’s brutal killing in February 2016, presumably by members of the Egyptian security apparatus, and the fact that none have been brought to justice.

At the moment Italy appears to be in a cul de sac in Libya with a young Foreign Minister who will not be able to change Italian foreign policy because he lacks strong political support; his party is in turmoil and he recently lost its leadership. Everybody hopes, though, that he will not share the young Foreign Minister Ciano’s fate, who watched powerless the decline of Italy’s power in the Mediterranean.