Despite President Donald Trump repeatedly saying that US troops are staying in Syria in order to ‘secure the oil’, data indicates that Syria has no remarkable oil reserves. When considering the US’s position as the world’s richest oil-producing country, specialists say that Washington does not need Syrian oil at all.  So why are the Northern Syrian oil fields so important to Trump? A recent panel discussion at SETA, Istanbul provided some answers.

During Turkey’s Operation Peace Spring on the Northern Syria border, US President Donald Trump made a number of statements on his twitter account and at press conferences. There were several subjects he showed particular attention to during this period, and one of them was the oil fields in Northern Syria.

Despite agreeing to withdraw all troops from the region, a small contingent of US troops stayed behind. After a meeting between the Turkish government and a US delegation led by the US Vice President Mike Pence, Trump stated: “Early this morning, the government of Turkey informed my administration that they would be stopping combat and their offensive in Syria, and making the ceasefire permanent… We’ve secured the oil, and, therefore, a small number of U.S. troops will remain in the area where they have the oil. And we’re going to be protecting it, and we’ll be deciding what we’re going to do with it in the future”.

After his statements on Syrian oil responses were made by the President of the Syrian Arab Republic Bashar al-Assad, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

Al-Assad made a striking statement about Trump on Syrian State Television saying. “I tell you he’s the best American president. Why? Not because his policies are good, but because he’s the most transparent president. All American presidents commit crimes and end up taking the Nobel Prize and appear as a defender of human rights and the ‘unique’ and ‘brilliant’ American or western principles. But all they are is a group of criminals who only represent the interests of the American lobbies of large corporations in weapons, oil and others” he said.

Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu speaking from the 24th Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Council of Ministers Meeting in Turkey’s Mediterranean resort city of Antalya highlighted that the US or any other country does not have legitimate right to Syrian oil according to international law. He commented “the US admits that it is in Syria especially for the oil reservoirs. We are talking about a country that does not hide it is there to seize it for oil wealth, and we see that it also supports terrorist organizations such as YPG and PKK with the income obtained from the revenue” he stated.

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that the U.S’s attempts to control the Syrian oil fields are illegal. “Their attempt, deep down, to rob the Syrian Arab Republic and take control of the oil fields, it is illegal and does not bring anything good to the Syrian settlement, it only retains a serious irritant, a serious threat in this part of Syria” he highlighted.

In spite of the US government’s interest in the Syrian oil fields, the numbers simply do not add up. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s 2018 data (EIA), Syria is ranked 75th in the world for the total production of petroleum and other liquids. EIA’s data also show that the US is the world’s richest country according to oil production rates. According to EIA the ten oil-rich countries are; United States, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Canada, China, Iraq, Iran, United Arab Emirates, Brazil, and Kuwait.

EIA’s report also shows that the US produces almost 17.936,000 barrels per day (bpd). On the other hand, Syria’s oil production is 28,000 bpd according to 2018 numbers. Based on the same report, in 2011, the US’s oil production was 10.150,000 bpd while the Syrian Arab Republic’s production was 370,000 bpd. The report shows that after the Syrian civil war began, the production of oil in Syria sharply decreased.

During a panel discussion organized by SETA Istanbul Office titled ‘Syrian Oil Source: The role of the US, Russia, and regional actors’, Syrian Interim Government Treasury Secretary Abdulhakim Almassri, a member of Syrian Interim Government, Fatih Shaban, and a specialist from the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM) Oytun Orhan explained the situation on the ground.

According to Almassri, prior to the Syrian civil war, official records stated that there was 380,000 barrels of oil produced per day. On the other hand, unofficial records which are based on Almassri’s source, suggest that the more accurate figure is one million barrels. “The production of oil was just twenty per cent of Assad regime’s income. However, just seven per cent of this income used to be added the government budget. The rest of it was passed to personal accounts.” he said at the program.

Further to Almassri’s comments, a recent TRT World news broadcast ‘The War in Syria: Protests over oil in SDF controlled Deir Ezzor‘ highlighted the importance of oil on the ground. The report found that oil is the key to everyday life in the region. One of the traditional refinery owners interviewed on the program, Ali Jasem told TRT World that despite there being 1,500 traditional refineries, only one or two of them operate every day. “No one knows where the oil is taken. Despite the fact we are in oil-rich area, we bring the oil from Al Jafra, other oil fields. Men are working hard to earn just two dollars every day. Our condition is becoming difficult here. And we are also losing money” Jasem said. According to TRT’s other local sources, the oil fields were controlled by the SDF, and this terrorist organization only gave a limited amount of oil to locals.

Almassri also argued that the US transferred control over the oil fields to the SDF, led by the YPG terrorist organization, to keep them under the control of Washington and that manoeuvers by Russia were a motivation for the US’s actions in the region. “Washington works with the SDF. Russia took control of the coasts. So where is Iran in the region? Russia tries to move away Iran from the region. Particularly, the places that have natural gas” said Almassri, and added that Russia entered into a 25 years deal with the Syrian regime to search for gas on the Syrian Mediterranean shore. Almassri emphasized that the Mediterranean shore of Syria has great potential for natural gas sources.” If this natural gas is found in the next three years, Syria will be the 3rd richest country in the world on the natural resource table,” he said.

Like Almassri, Shaban argued that the actual motivation for occupying the oil fields were more strategic, with the US trying to strengthen its position in the region. “The US is trying to keep a balance between the sides, and the rise of Turkey in the area has disturbed the US administration. There is also the issue of protecting Israel, otherwise, Syrian oil does not have significant importance for the US” Shaban said.

Shaban further pointed out that after the deal between Russia and the Syrian, Moscow made striking movement in the area. “In fact, the US is not interested in Syrian oil at all. Russia’s existence in the region and the establishment of a base on the Mediterranean caused the US’s existence there. Because the shore Russia took control of has great potential for natural gas reserves. In the near future, Russia is going to have a Syrian energy source, and Moscow sees the Syrian civil war as an important step to becoming a superpower again” he added.

Oytun Orhan, a specialist from the Center for Middle Eastern Studies (ORSAM) also shared his perspective on the Northern Syria energy sources saying “Syria has limited energy sources. The important thing here is the geopolitical position of Syria. If we consider Syria’s location, whoever controls this country, they are going to have a great power over the region”.

Written by Yeter Ada Şeko – ISTANBUL

Operation Peace Spring launched by Turkey last month with the aim of securing its border with Syria against the threat posed by terrorist organizations such as the YPG and Daesh aroused very strong reactions in the international community, and especially within the European Union.

Perceived as a sudden invasion, the EU immediately condemned Turkey for its unilateral action. A prompt reaction came firstly from the High Representative on behalf of the EU, calling on Turkey to ‘cease the unilateral military reaction’ and adding that ‘Turkish military action risks to protract instability in northeast Syria, providing fertile ground for the resurgence of Daesh”.

Actually, the EU’s top foreign policy official’s statement echoed what was previously declared by the President of EU Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, who asked Turkey to “stop operations’’ and stated that “if the Turkish plan involves the creation of a so-called safe zone, don’t expect the European Union to pay for any of it.”

Following these statements, reactions of the individual member states did not wait long. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said that ‘the Turkish offensive threatens to cause a new humanitarian disaster … Turkey is willingly risking further destabilizing the region and a resurgence of IS’ (Daesh)’.  The same security concern was shared by the UK and France, whose Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian urged Turkey to stop the operation as ‘it calls into question the security and humanitarian efforts of the coalition against Daesh and risks undermining Europeans’ security’. Moreover, several European countries summoned Turkish envoys to condemn the military action, Dutch Foreign Minister, representing the general political spirit of the EU, underlined the possibility of a “terrible humanitarian crisis that can trigger new refugee flows and harm the fight against IS and stability in the region.”

At the same time, the main squares of several European cities hosted protest against Turkey, where in some cases YPG flags, effigies of Abdullah Ocalan, and posters in favor of the outlawed PKK have appeared. It was clear an approximate media campaign began to demonize Ankara.

In fact, according to most European observers on Syria, Turkey would have conducted an operation of ethnic cleansing against the Kurds, confirming not only a prejudicial approach, but above all a certain difficulty in understanding the dynamics of the region. It also demonstrated on their behalf the failure of setting a clear distinction between terrorist organizations and the Kurdish population. Furthermore, a narrative of the forced repatriation of Syrian refugees hosted by Turkey has started to become viral.

Although this was the third Turkish operation across the border to guarantee its own security, coming after the operations Euphrates Shield in 2016 and Olive Branch in 2018, this time European leaders and the public opinion reacted almost univocally in condemning Turkey as an aggressor state, marking the apex of a bias and to some extent of a hypocritically contradictory approach.

Indeed, the EU bloc’s foreign ministers pledged to suspend weapons exports to Turkey, although consensus was delayed by the intervention of some voices in the EU such as the UK who supported a softer stance towards Turkey as because as “a key partner of the European Union.”  

Nevertheless, EU nations succeeded in banning arms sales to Ankara, marking the first time such a move was made against a partner and a NATO ally. In the same spirit of rare consensus, the European Parliament also voted on a resolution condemning ‘Turkey’s military intervention’ and urging Ankara to ‘withdraw all of its forces from Syrian territory’. The European Parliament also called for “appropriate and targeted economic measures against Turkey” and the freezing of preferential treatment for Turkish agriculture exports to the EU. Moreover, it further called upon the European Council ‘to introduce a series of targeted sanctions and to impose visa bans on Turkish officials responsible for human rights abuses during the current military intervention” adding ‘the suspension of the EU customs union with Ankara’.

Eventually, along with the statements by European MPs referring to the words of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as ‘weaponized’ by threatening Europe with refugees, some other measures aimed at freezing any new funds in support of Turkey for hosting almost four million of Syrian refugees was to be considered, even though it seems unlikely to happen.

As a matter of fact, Turkey’s hospitality towards Syrians has to be considered good practice and an example for the world as from the beginning of the war in Syria Ankara had been taking on the burden almost unilaterally, and much before the March 2016 agreement with EU entered into force. Indeed, it is recognized worldwide that Turkey is one of the biggest humanitarian donors and key policy-makers towards Syrian refugees. In recent progress reports, the EU itself underlined Turkey’s good progress on migration and asylum policies.

Despite migration and refugees being a thorny issue for the EU, it has not yet implemented any efficient policy on this issue.  While Turkey has been treated as a sort of useful tool in containing the flow of refugees and avoiding the spread of social tensions across Europe.

EU nations succeeded in banning arms sales to Ankara, marking the first time such a move was made against a partner and a NATO ally.

However, as in all marriages of convenience, problems arise when conditions are not met. Although the final purpose of the 2016 agreement has been widely honored, there are serious shortcomings in fully satisfying its terms. Ones which contradict the guiding spirit of the international law based on the principle of pacta sunt servanda or simply, deals must be respected.

In exchange for Turkey’s great effort of welcoming and accommodating Syrians fleeing the war, Brussels was to facilitate the visa liberalization process for Turkish citizens within the Schengen area, as well as providing large funds for humanitarian purposes. Both conditions have not been fulfilled by the EU while Turkey has continued to honor its commitments to Syrian refugees and to the European Union.

Along the current operation, fears of new waves of asylum seekers have alarmed Europe and especially those gateway states. Greece and Hungary underlined the need of not being caught off  guard in case new waves of refugees were to occur and called upon additional financial assistance by the EU to Turkey, acknowledging that the 2016 agreement has been the only effective mechanism in coping with the crisis. However, these are isolated voices and the issue is still extremely divisive within the Union. In this regard, the attitude of Brussels and its representatives resembles a capricious child, who gets without being satisfied, blames without taking responsibility, and refuses without proposing alternatives.

This is observed in the tension over the creation of the safe zone on the Turkish-Syrian border as strategically planned by Ankara. A main aim of Operation Peace Spring according to the Turkish government is to establish an approximately 30 km long safe area where a large number of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey would eventually return.

Despite being a complex issue and a fairly ambitious long-term goal, for Ankara this seems to be the only plausible solution to the growing number of refugees, particularly considering its frustration of not feeling sufficiently supported by the international community in responding to  the humanitarian crisis. In other words, Turkey felt alone in bearing the weight of millions of lives and investing billions of dollars in humanitarian aid, and the establishment of a safe zone is vital for enhancing Turkish domestic security finding a lasting solution to cope with the immigration issue, and to restore social cohesion. Nevertheless, the EU Parliament has ‘firmly rejected’ this ambition and it called for a UN-led security zone. The same idea has been endorsed by Germany’s defense minister who proposed sending German soldiers to Syria, an outcome which would further complicate the situation.

In short, Turkey’s operation brought to the surface all of the unresolved issues and tensions existing between Turkey and the European Union and further exacerbated their respective frustrations. Once again it seems that there is merely a chorus of condemnation rather than any attempt to find or implement sustainable solutions for both parties. In this context, ideologically oriented street protests seen in Europe are only one aspect of the serious gap in the relations between Ankara and Brussels, which over the years have been fed by a profound hypocrisy and zigzagging approaches by the EU which goes far beyond the logic of real-politik.

When the war in Syria attracted radicals from across the globe, almost all of them were not hindered from leaving their countries despite being listed as potential suspects. The governments and their intelligence agencies, especially European states, wanted their problems to be exported to Syria. The laws in these countries are not equipped to properly address the criminal issues arising from their activities abroad, and leaving them to die in Syria appeared to be an easy choice. However, things turned out differently. The suspected terrorists went to Syria, facilitated the buildup of an alleged caliphate, murdered thousands of people, created a mess in the Middle East, conducted terror attacks in European capitals and survived.

After the territorial defeat of Daesh, the home countries are now confronted with new challenges. In contrast to their expectation, the suspected terrorists did not die but had children and survived. Many of them are now imprisoned in Syria, Iraq and Turkey. Taking those foreign terrorist fighters back is the legal obligation of their home countries, but most know that their laws are incapable of declaring a proper sentence against them. If their terror export returns, they will import battle-hardened militants who may be released from prison in a short period of time. All of this happens while the European Union denies Turkish citizens visa free entry to the EU due to the ‘harsh’ terror laws in Turkey.

European states are for the first time really facing the dilemma of terrorists and the problems of dealing with them within existing legal frameworks. If the laws of the EU are not adjusted, returning fighters might exploit it and become a new security threat. There is also an increase of Islamophobia that could in turn radicalize a number of Muslims living in Europe. If this is combined with former Daesh members released due to insufficient laws, it would potentially be a national security threat for the EU states in the near future. On the other hand, if the EU does adjust its laws, it won’t fit into the legal standards the EU demands from the candidates wanting to join the Union.

The Turkish government’s declaration that Turkey won’t be a hotel for terror exported by foreign states, did not come out of nowhere. It fits into a broader process. Turkey has signed a refugee deal with the EU to hinder the flow of refugees into Europe but complains that the other side does not act in line with the agreed terms. As Turkey is carrying the burden of 3.6 million refugees alone, and sees nothing but obstacles from the EU to accelerate the return of refugees back to the safe-zone planned by Turkey, the Turkish government’s patience is low. Ankara is not willing to take on the burden of foreign terrorist fighters as well. In addition to the European terrorists, the Turkish government also has indirect control over foreign terrorists from the Operation Euphrates Shield areas and the Operation Peace Spring areas. In total, the number of Daesh prisoners is almost 1,500 with a significant number of foreigners.

At the current moment, European states are shirking their duties to handle their self-created terror problem. The EU’s attempt to export its terror threat has seemingly backfired in a more dangerous way. Either the European governments take responsibility by accepting their citizens back, or the EU will be dependent on Turkey, Iraq and non-state actors in Syria, all of whom will use the inmates as a legitimate tool of pressure with little interest in taking care of them. If a terrorist is being released by the YPG for example, the EU will have limited means to prevent that person from smuggling into the EU and conducting a terror attack.

As the basis of the international system, sovereignty is understood as the capability of a country to govern itself, prevent the intervention of other countries, and its recognition in the international arena. Beyond its traditional meanings, in his famous book Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy Stephen D. Krasner broke down sovereignty into four types. ‘Interdependence sovereignty’ is the one of them and it is the requirement that a state have effective control of its borders in order to maintain its domestic security. Krasner discusses this and says “if a state cannot regulate what happens across its borders, it will not be able to control what happens within”. In light of this approach, I invite the readers of this piece to think of Turkey’s position, a country which shares its southern border with a fragmented state in a desperate civil war, with terrorist groups close to its border, and facing the risk of a huge flow of further refugees from Syria, in addition to more than 3.5 million already living in the country.

Indeed, Turkey’s latest military operation should have been understood within the framework of border security. However, Operation Peace Spring launched by the Turkish Armed Forces in collaboration with the Syrian National Army generated an entirely different debate in the international arena—whether Turkey’s operation was an invasion or not. These discussions also focused on the supposed political ambitions of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as a potential motivation for the operation. Putting these misleading perceptions aside, the collective support by the Turkish people for the military operation provides robust evidence of how people from different political backgrounds attach utmost importance to state sovereignty, especially when it comes to questions of national security. Interpreting the operation as an invasion misunderstands a major factor that drives Turkish foreign policy, that it is thoroughly about Turkey’s national security.

To clearly understand this, one should look back to the recent history of Turkish politics. A new security agenda for Turkey surfaced in the 1970s when the first Kurdish opposition groups emerged, and soon after evolved into an ethnic based separatist movement. This generated the PKK, which was recognized as a terrorist organization by the U.S. and EU and took over 40,000 lives in its 30 years of terrorist activity, the PKK terror group became a primary challenge for Turkey’s territorial integrity.

Despite the fact that since the 2000s, the root causes that brought forth the PKK were handled using democratic methods, the territorial integrity issue was not negotiable. Since the 1990s, in line with domestic policy, foreign policymakers responding to the PKK threat sought alliances in the Middle East and cooperated with the US to avert the possibility of an independent Kurdish state. Stances towards the PKK have become a main determinant for Turkish foreign policy. As was demonstrated when Syrian state support to the PKK brought the two countries to the brink of war in 1998.

Since 2011, the Syrian Civil War triggered an ongoing humanitarian catastrophe and turmoil in the region and led to an elevated security concern for Turkey. From the perspective of Turkish policymakers, the refugee crisis and the armament race among terrorist groups at Turkey’s southern borders put the country in a risky position, pushing it to apply stricter and more responsive security measures. The armament of the PYD and YPG, offshoots of the PKK, with the help of the US and European states particularly intensified Turkey’s security concerns. The unending war in Syria,  the insufficient intervention by international actors to address the crisis, and the persistent downgrading of Turkey’s efforts to address the Syrian refugee crisis by European states caused distrust between Turkey and its allies.

Moreover, Turkey had to witness the formation of a terrorist corridor in northern Syria that would pose a long-term security threats to its territorial integrity. Turkey’s concerns about this development and calls for a safe zone were left unanswered until the recent deal was announced with the United States. This signaled the first public affirmation of the need to prioritize Turkey’s security needs as a NATO ally. However, the territorial integrity and border security of Turkey are still largely disregarded by its allies, as reflected in the hostile responses of other NATO members to Turkey’s operation.

The constant conflation of the YPG, PYD and the PKK with the broader Kurdish community, as has been the practice of international media and commentators reveals a complete lack of awareness of regional realities in the simplest terms. The YPG’s ambition to capture territory from warn-torn areas under the Syrian war’s cover the darkness, fed turmoil in the region and caused millions of people to be displaced.

Turkey now hosts almost four million Syrian refugees. Despite the abundant number of refugees compared with other states, such Germany, Turkey has shown the most welcoming response to hosting refugees fleeing the Syrian crisis. However, the latest developments undeniably bring both domestic and international problems for Turkey. Between the build-up of the YPG and Daesh (ISIS) terrorist groups near Turkey’s borders and the huge refugee population, Turkey should have taken further steps to protect its security and ensure more effective control of its borders. Across domestic and foreign policy, responding to the refugee crisis and terror threat become a sovereignty problem of increasing concern to the Turkish public. The creation of safe zone and the push back of terrorists from its southern borders became an obligation.

The previous and recent military operation of Turkey occurred in such a context. Turkish officials repeatedly declared that the territorial integrity of Syria will be protected and the only aim of the operation was to prevent the creation of terror corridor and to establish a safe zone for refugees. Therefore, calling it an invasion falls short of explaining the conditions that brought Turkey to this threshold. Indeed, the latest operation of Turkey is a matter of self-defense. The recent pause in Turkey’s operation in response to the YPG leaving the 20 mile deep safe zone demonstrates that Turkey is sticking to its declarations. Degrading the operation to the level of a leader’s ambition, or portraying it as an invasion is both inaccurate and lazy. Unfortunately, this has become a frequent feature of Western media analysis of Turkish foreign policy. Regardless of the government, assessing foreign policy over time ensures more accurate assessment. Allowing a zone full of terrorists at its southern borders is an unacceptable condition for Turkey and any sovereign state would not accept it. Thus, the Operation Peace Spring is a matter of border security to protect the sovereignty of Turkey rather than the nonsense argument of invasion.

New realities have surfaced on the ground in Syria after the US and Turkey inked their mutual agreement. The partial withdrawal of the US’s troops from Syria led the PKK/PYD to cooperate with the Assad regime,m an alliance designed to restrain Turkey’s intervention by inviting regime forces to areas of critical importance. The PKK/PYD’s also attempted to keep the US’s support at the south of Turkey’s security corridor, in order to reduce the burdens of its new pledges to the Assad regime and Russia. The balance in Syria has clearly changed from its previous position. Less interested actors, such as European states, are still late to perceive the overall picture. And although Turkey has often been accused of an ‘axis shift’ due to its collaboration with Russia, this allegation may also be applied to other actors in the region who face new decisions. Hence both ‘friends and foes’ will have to reassess each other and determine to whom they can lean on. In order to understand the overall picture in Syria, the positions of each actor should be individually scrutinized.

The U.S.

The US was keen to provide support to the PKK/PYD and benefit from them as a tool in their plans to redesign a narrower Middle East, from Iran to Syria. But the US devastated its own policy after a long awaited decision by President Trump, most probably because of the PKK/PYD’s lack of capacity despite the billions of dollars spent by the US government.

However, internal political dynamics confused the overall process, President Trump made a U-turn in order to reiterate the ‘America First’ narrative of his election campaign. The way Trump sees the Syrian case is actually smart and pragmatic. The US has gained nothing from its relationship with the PKK/PYD, who falsely claimed credit for defeating Daesh, while the role of US Special and Air Forces in this victory has always been underestimated.

In parallel to the Iranian case and the energy politics in the Middle East, President Trump projected long term goals of the US that required him to erase the PKK/PYD folder from his cache. Although he still confused whether to embrace or repel Turkey based on his contradictory tweets, the wider politics of the Middle East, along with the Mediterranean and Black Sea region pushed President Trump to review his engagement with Turkey.

Russia

Russia’s approach has been to emphasize the Adana Agreement of Turkey and Syria which allows Turkey to intervene between 5 to 10 kilometers into Syria in case there exists a terror threat inside Syrian territory. The goal of Russia’s recent discussions at the Tehran, Moscow and Ankara summits were to have Turkey and the Assad regime engage with each other in favor of Russian interests. Such an expectation appears impossible for Turkey since Turkey expects the Genova Process to find a political solution, one that could see Assad removed pending constitutional amendments and the facilitation of free elections. Hence Russia can only push one button: choose the PKK/PYD or the Genova Process.

However, Russia does have the ‘luxury’ of including the PKK and its affiliate organizations in a new Syrian apparatus after the US’s withdrawal. The PKK/PYD’s rapprochement with both the Assad regime and Russia facilitated the expansion of Russia’s sphere of influence in shaping what will be the ultimate outcome of the Syria crisis. Meanwhile, Russia provided a shield to the Assad regime to achieve more territorial gains while the PKK/PYD terror network has been left humiliated by the imposed conditions, destined to compromise with Assad.  After all, the main question for Russia appears to be if it needs to stick with the Turkish cause as was agreed to before Operation Peace Spring or allow the PKK/PYD to serve in Syria unless the US Government changes the Syria policy one more time. On the other hand, the Genova Process seems to be a wise option for Russia in order to achieve a cost-effective resolution to the overall crisis.

Turkey

The PKK/PYD has exhibited how incapable it is, and how it must lean on another actor for its own protection and survival. The release of Daesh (ISIS) prisoners proved it cannot handle its responsibilities. The success of Turkey’s military operation has marginalized its status in the eyes of its sympathizers and has tarnished its dream of building an autonomous region in Syria. The PKK/PYD has now subjected itself to a higher authority and clearly demonstrated its inability to sustain an armed movement except for the use of terror strategies. As the reality of the PKK/PYD is being understood by both Russia and the US Government, Turkey is now in-between both countries to find a wise solution to the decade-long Syria conflict.  

Turkey’s political balance needs to be understood to determine its preferred course. It is a fact that the big picture of the Middle East and global politics requires Turkey to align itself with Russia. But long-term conditions will push Turkey to mend its ties with the US. However, the parameters are not that easy. Turkey need to enjoy the support of both parties to destroy the PKK/PYD threat and at the same time deescalate tense inter-state relations facilitate smoother regional politics with the USA.

At the final stage, Turkey’s growing relations with Russia and the US, along with the moderate opposition under the authority of the Syrian Transition Government, are relations which will offer new opportunities for de-escalation of the Syrian conflict. Turkey will be a bridge between the big players and effective local actors. Then should we not we think about a trilateral summit between the US, Russia, and Turkey to end the Syrian crisis?

Turkey will no longer tolerate the presence of a terrorist group on its southern borders as the country’s leading figures recently announced their determination to start a military operation as soon as possible. As has been globally observed in recent days, the U.S.-backing of the YPG/PYD has decreased at the U.S. presidential level despite the heavy criticism and pressure from both the Republicans and Democrats. The following days will most likely involve a greater clarification of positions towards Turkey’s planned military operations.

Besides the operation’s potential scope and its military purpose which will be discussed in detail, it is interesting to observe that most of the U.S. and Western voices in general take a position that blindly supports the YPG, which is the Syrian branch of the PKK terrorist organization.

Turkey’s alliance with the U.S. and NATO has 67 years of history. The country has positioned itself long ago in the Western alliance, viewing it as a strategic partnership in the fight against regional and global terrorism. Given this, it is not understandable why most Western politicians, media representatives and social media users directly or indirectly prefer the YPG despite Turkey’s serious security concerns.

Turkey’s struggle against the PKK terrorism is disregarded. Instead, the U.S. and other Western democracies describe “Kurds” as friends or allies. Referring to “Kurds” instead of the more accurate YPG/PKK, reinforces a false narrative because not every Kurdish person is a YPG/PKK member or supporter, and further implies that opposition to the YPG and PKK is in reality opposition to the Kurdish people themselves. The more accurate question is whether the West has ever truly been friends of the Kurdish people when they have themselves been facing PKK terrorism for more than 35 years. But this reality is ignored when PKK propaganda in the form of political liaisons with PYD/YPG is widespread.

Unfortunately, this attitude is of fundamental concern and should not be ignored while Turkey conducts military strikes in the upcoming days. There should be research to discover the roots of Western and even some domestic support for the PKK. This issue is perhaps not well addressed today, but for future readers and researchers, it is important to understand the current positions of Western democracies, their media and even their civil representatives in favour of the PKK/PYD.

How it is possible that democracies and their media hide, disregard, downplay the activities of a neo-Marxist and ethnic-separatist terrorist organization? How can a terrorist organization such as the PKK, which is regarded as a prohibited terrorist organization both in Europe and the U.S. enjoy comfortable support by Western powers? This happens despite several reports, opinion pieces, studies, and interviews with experts from the Western world that prove the obvious connection between the PKK and PYD/YPG.

I doubt that a realism-based approach is able to explain such irrational positions. Furthermore, the preferred arguments that “defeating Daesh terrorism has to be the priority” does not answer why a terrorist organization such as the YPG is actively preferred by Western policymakers and even supported by civilians in order to fight another terror organization such as Daesh. Actually, this narrative has been reiterated for more than six to seven years and therefore more people in the West are inclined to play down the PKK’s actual role as a terrorist organization while disregarding the fundamental concerns of an ally.

The direct or indirect support of the PKK through its offshoot in Syria has perhaps functioned until now but it is clear that this blind stance will not guarantee a long-term approach. It is not acceptable that an ethnic-separatist and neo-Marxist terrorist organization is normalized.

In Turkey, there is one political party, the HDP, and only a few supporters from among radical Marxist groups that declared their support for the YPG. Turkey’s main opposition party, the CHP’s current stance is not to support a Turkish military strike openly against the YPG in Northern Syria. But this should not confuse observers. Although there are sympathizers of Kurdish separatism among the ranks of the CHP administration, the party rejects the existence of the YPG/PKK and supports the fight against it. This also counts for all other terrorist groups no matter what their political agendas are. A high majority of Turkish citizens oppose the PKK/PYD, Daesh, FETO and all other terrorist groups, and this is a stance which should be reflected in the allies of Turkey, which at the moment appears to only be Spain.

As a result of Turkey’s decisiveness, the White House announced that the U.S. forces in Syria will withdraw in expectation of a Turkish military operation into the region, opening the way for Turkey and the Syrian opposition to go after the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK terrorist organization. Since then, many experts have been discussing the potential scope and implications of the operation, but it is most likely that the operational plan of the joint Syrian-Turkish military operation will occur in Arab areas between Tal Abyad and Rasulayn and in the region of Manbij west of the Euphrates.

Immediately before and since the announcement by the White House, many developments have occurred on the ground in Syria and Turkey. Most notably, the U.S. soldiers evacuated their bases along the Turkish-Syrian border and left the area. With this move, the U.S opened the way for a joint Syrian-Turkish military operation between Tal Abyad and Rasulayn. A second development is ongoing on the Turkish side of the border where Turkish Armed Forces are amassing troops and equipment between Akcakale and Ceylanpinar, which are on the other side of the border from Tal Abyad and Rasulayn. This Turkish preparation also includes the buildup of howitzer and artillery positions suitably located to shell the strip between Tal Abyad to Rasulayn. The armed Syrian opposition, the Syrian National Army, has sent reinforcements to Jarablus to cross into Turkey and take position along the Syrian-Turkish border strip between Tal Abyad and Rasulayn.

On the other side, the region of Manbij is seeing an intensive arrival of reinforcements by the Syrian National Army and the Turkish Armed Forces. The Syrian opposition has sent massive reinforcements to the frontlines of Manbij chanting that they will liberate Manbij from the terrorists occupying the area. Additionally, the Turkish Armed Forces have been sending heavy armory and Special Forces through Jarablus towards the region of Manbij.

The region of Manbij is crucial as the Assad regime in the south and the Syrian opposition in the north are of equal distance to Manbij city, and both sides have ambitions to control this strategic area. This includes the Tishreen dam, which is located at the Euphrates in Manbij and is the second most important dam in Syria after the Tabqah dam. In case of a military operation, both sides may race for control over this area, and the YPG is likely to hand the region to the Assad regime which will improve its speed of advance. In this regard, the Syrian opposition may try to cut the advance route of the regime as they are stationed west of Manbij and received training on air-landing with Turkish helicopters. By cutting the route of the regime to Manbij, the Syrian National army can guarantee its control over the region. However, if they cannot act fast enough, the region will fall to the regime, opening its way towards the east of the Euphrates. From the Turkish perspective, Manbij is also of upmost importance as its liberation will enable the return of the Sulayman Shah tomb to its original place by the Euphrates River.

The joint Syrian-Turkish operation will firstly aim to liberate Arab areas from the YPG. By doing so, the operation will in its initial phase contradict critics who state that the main goal of the operation is demographic engineering. Additionally, by liberating Arab areas first, the number of recruits in the Syrian National Army may increase massively as the local Arab population and tribes are strong supporters of the Syrian opposition. The scope and possibility of a second stage towards Arab areas in the south or towards mainly Kurdish populated areas in Ayn al Arab and Qamishli may most likely be decided after the Trump-Erdogan summit on November 13.

After long-lasting negotiations between Turkey and the United States, a cross-border military operation in Syria has been decided. Although President Erdoğan emphasized many times that Turkey would conduct a military operation in Northern Syria for the creation a safe zone, the conditions of the operation and the US’s role were ambiguous. That ambiguity ended on Sunday night when the White House Office of the Press Secretary announced that “Turkey is preparing to launch a military operation in Northern Syria, and the United States will withdraw its troops in the area ahead of the long-planned attack”. Thus, the US will not join the military operation and will not intervene, contrary to pro-YPG claims.

Since the operation was announced, there has been a lot of debate about how it will impact regional dynamics and Turkey’s foreign policy in general. How will ongoing alliances among political parties be affected by the operation? Will the operation deepen the current conflicts between the CHP and Iyi Party? What will be the early responses of political parties to the operation?

It seems that there are two different approaches to the upcoming military operation among political parties in Turkey. The AK Party, the MHP, and the Iyi Party support the military operation in Northern Syria but the CHP and the HDP are clearly against it. Three parties supporting the military operation see it as an obligation to provide regional security and protect Turkey’s interests in the region. As the members of People’s Alliance, the AK Party and the MHP already had a consensus on this issue for a long time. However, the Iyi Party, contrary to its partners in the Nation Alliance, also supports the operation. Meral Akşener, leader of the Iyi Party, has often underlined that Turkish military should take the necessary steps in Syria and Iraq to overcome threats against Turkey’s security.

When it comes to the CHP and HDP, both parties are against the military operation in Northern Syria. Indeed, the CHP’s approach towards the operation can be seen from the outcomes of their recently-conducted conference on Syria. As I stated in my latest column, the CHP regards Turkey’s efforts to create a safe zone on the border as a “demographic engineering” project and underestimates the threat of the YPG against Turkey. For the CHP, Turkey should negotiate with the Assad regime rather than conducting an operation. Despite this, the CHP does not offer any roadmap to overcome the existing threat or how the involvement of the Assad regime in the negotiation process will help to overcome these threats. The CHP’s early response to the operation also demonstrated this. CHP Group Deputy Chairman Engin Özkoç stated that Turkey should get out of the “Middle East quagmire” rather than conduct a military operation for political interests of the government.

The HDP is also clearly against the operation. According to the official statement of the party, this operation will not bring stability and peace to the region. Since the party perceived the previous military operations as “ethnic cleansing” against the Kurds in the region, it is obvious that they will have the same reaction to the recent operation, too.

How will the operation affect the alliances between the parties in Turkey? As Burhanettin Duran stated in his latest column, the variation of approaches towards the military operation of Turkey in Syria will escalate ongoing conflicts among political parties in Turkey. Thus, if the CHP choose to show the same reaction as the HDP against the military operation, it will deepen the current conflicts in the Nation Alliance since the Iyi Party has underlined that cooperation with the HDP is the Iyi Party’s redline. And the party will not stand for the rapprochement between the CHP and HDP anymore. Because of this reason, the military operation will potentially be a significant determinant for the future of political alliances in Turkey.

Turkey’s main opposition party has held a conference in Istanbul on Syria recently. While the conference was mostly conducted with the participation of academics and journalists interested in the issue, its aim was to bring together middle level officials from the Syrian government in an informal platform. However, the conference could not achieve its intended impact since it did not include broader participation and the outcome of the conference was one sided.

Before understanding the reasons behind holding the conference, it is necessary to evaluate the critical junctures of the CHP’s Syria policy. After the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011, the CHP’s approach to finding a resolution to the conflict was to support a power-sharing mechanism bringing together all parties, including the Assad regime. From the CHP’s perspective, involvement of representatives of the Assad regime was crucial to a peaceful transition. In accordance with this, the CHP made three formal visits to Assad from 2011 to 2013.

However, after the war escalated and reports by international organizations proved that the Assad regime used chemical weapons against civilians in 2013, the CHP ended meetings with the regime and adopted a relatively neutral approach compared to their previous one. Even with the rising nationalism in Turkey after 2016, the CHP kept this approach towards the Syrian conflict. For instance, the party supported cross-border military operations in Syria although it had reservations on the issue.  

Nonetheless, the party has been experiencing another shift in its Syria policy and the conference reflects this change. Since the last year, the CHP had again started to underline the importance of Assad’s involvement in the negotiation process. Because of this, the party invited representatives of the regime to the conference, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not give them permission to enter Turkey.

It is not exaggeration to say that since the CHP has strengthened its position in domestic politics, it has also started to deal with foreign policy issues more. The party’s relative success in the latest local elections accelerated the CHP’s quest for a new strategy in foreign policy. Thus, the CHP’s recent shift in its Syria policy should be evaluated within this framework.

Nevertheless, the party did not completely leave its relatively neutral approach in Syrian conflict. Since a potential cross-border military operation is on the table, the CHP did not invite any official YPG representatives to the conference. But at the same time, the party did invite some pro-YPG experts such as Professor Amy Austin Holmes to hear their perspectives.

After the conference, the invitation of Amy Austin Holmes caused a crisis for the party, and the decision to invite her was harshly criticized especially on social media. Beyond this issue, the most problematic issue of the CHP’s initiative was the final declaration of the conference.

As the report states, the party sees the safe zone as “demographic engineering” which may deteriorate the future relations between various ethnic groups in the region. According to the report, the stakeholders should count on peace building rather than further escalation of the conflict to find an effective solution. Furthermore, the party clearly stated that they want the Turkish government to work with the Syrian regime for a resolution of the conflict. Another problematic issue was the final declaration report’s lack of attention to the YPG’s threat to Turkey’s security in the region.

All of these factors show that CHP’s new approach to Syrian policy will get a negative reaction from the public including its own voters. Since the YPG threat is still alive and Turkey will prioritize its security, the CHP’s new policy may get even more negative reactions from the public.

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had said earlier in September that he would discuss the problems between Turkey and the United States when he met with the U.S. President Donald Trump on September 25, as part of his trip to New York for the opening of the United Nations General Assembly. But neither side has revealed what was discussed and if anything was resolved.

There was no shortage of issues for the two leaders to talk about. There are still Americans imprisoned in Turkey. The U.S. refuses to deport Fetullah Gülen, whom Ankara holds responsible for the 2016 coup attempt. There is an ongoing dispute over the enforcement of sanctions on Iran. Perhaps most immediately and gravely, Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 anti-aircraft system from Russia will, by the letter of American law, incur sanctions that could do serious harm to the Turkish economy.

Still, there are creative ways around most of these issues. For example, the U.A.E. has strong economic ties with Iran, and the U.S. abides it. Proposals have already been put forth to finesse the S-400 issue, and so on. The crux of the U.S.-Turkey dispute, and the one where interests are radically incompatible, is Syria.

In the summer of 2011, after months of trying to find a peaceful resolution between Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and protesters failed because of the regime’s  continuing murder of civilians, the Turkish government, which already provided a safe haven for refugees fleeing the carnage, began supporting the nascent armed rebellion. The U.S. ostensibly supported the revolutionary movement, though never seriously tried to tip the balance in its favor and over time shifted its policy ever-more-firmly in Assad’s favour for reasons related to Iran policy.

When the U.S. was eventually forced to intervene in Syria in late 2014 by the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS / Daesh), the U.S. tried to engage in counter-terrorism alone. The U.S. wanted to avoid entanglement in the underlying Syrian war, particularly any anti-Assad activity, because the Iranians had made it clear that they would walk away from nuclear negotiations if their proxy regime in Syria was threatened. The attempt by the U.S. to run a narrow counter-terrorism war in Syria was inherently flawed on its own terms, since Assad was the incubator of ISIS and counter-terrorism cannot be separated from the political context. But in the choice of partner for this mission, the U.S. created a whole new crisis.

The U.S. chose to work with the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), to defeat ISIS. The PYD/YPG has had close relations with the Assad regime, Russia, and Iran for decades, and retained cordial relations with the pro-Assad coalition after the war began. The PYD/YPG thus could be trusted not to draw the U.S. into a confrontation with the regime. As a side-effect of the anti-ISIS war, the PYD/YPG was left in control of nearly one-third of Syria that ISIS had taken away from the rebels—a radical redrawing of the political map in Syria that the U.S. was publicly opposed to meddling in. And this created problems that were not limited to Syria.

The PYD/YPG that the U.S. has so vastly empowered is a department of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a terrorist group that has waged war on Turkey since the mid-1980s. The attempt to rebrand this force as the “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF) by attaching a few dependent Arab groups might suffice to convince the Western media that “Rojava” is a multi-ethnic democracy, but it is hardly convincing to the people who live under its authoritarian rule.

Whatever the ethnic composition of the SDF and its civilian affiliates, the PKK retains sole military-political control. Within Syria, this has created an explosive situation where a demographically and politically alien party is ruling over resistant Arab populations, and for Turkey a PKK state on its borders is seen, not unreasonably, as a dire security threat. That the U.S. is underwriting this project has created a rift in NATO that Russia has been quick to exploit.

Turkey has twice intervened in Syria, in 2016 and 2018, to push the PKK away from areas of its border in the west and continues to hold these zones through Syrian Arab proxies. These operations left the PKK holding territory mostly to the east of the Euphrates, and Erdogan has repeatedly threatened to initiate a third operation against this zone.

The U.S.’s response to this has been to try to avert a Turkish incursion in eastern Syria where its own forces are based. To do this, the U.S. proposed the “Manbij roadmap”, a model that would, in theory, assuage Ankara’s concerns by removing YPG/PKK control of various urban centres and setting up joint U.S.-Turkish patrols. This has since morphed into a proposal for a “safe zone” that would buffer between Turkey’s border and the PKK-held areas. Given the failure of this concept in Manbij, where the PKK simply reflagged its cadres, Ankara was understandably sceptical to begin with and negotiations have duly stalled. While there has been misdirection on all sides, and proposals for the U.S. to arm-and-equip a 100,000-man PKK force in Syria indefinitely do little to improve the atmosphere, the fundamental problem is less bad faith than diametrically opposed priorities.

Turkey sees the PKK as the primary issue and wants a twenty-mile (30 km) zone under its control inside Syria to deal with this. The U.S., focused monomaniacally on ISIS, wishes to preserve “stability”, however short-termist the definition, and is therefore prepared to grant a much more limited Turkish presence in an area it intends to continue to control, but which is supposedly clear of PKK forces. Displeased with the process, the Turkish government has attempted to gain leverage by signaling a willingness to act unilaterally.

In early August, Erdogan said that Turkey could “only be patient for so long”. At the end of that month, the Turkish president said, “If our soldiers do not control the region [east of the Euphrates] within a few weeks, we will put our own operation plan into effect”. On 18 September, Erdogan said the U.S. has two weeks (to 2 October) to deliver “results”, or else Turkey would go it alone. Most recently, in his U.N. speech, just hours before he met Trump, Erdogan spoke of establishing a 30-km “peace corridor” along a 480-km stretch of the Syria-Turkey border into which two million Syrian refugees in Turkey could be resettled. To underline his point, Erdogan brought along a map.

So, what happens now?

It is extremely unlikely that Turkey will intervene east of the Euphrates by the early October deadline, and highly unlikely that Ankara will risk clashing with U.S. forces at any other time. As such, some version of the status quo—with the U.S. buying time and Turkey preparing to intervene but never quite getting there—could perpetuate for quite some time. That said, low probability, high impact events are not unknown in the Middle East, and this is a situation that has two major wildcards, Erdogan and Trump, plus a trendline that from several angles favours one particular outcome.

From the Trump side, he wants to leave Syria—he has tried twice and been restrained by his officials—and it is possible that he might finally get his way, especially with people like National Security Adviser John Bolton now out of the administration. Trump’s “maximum pressure” rhetoric is a thin veneer for his desire for a deal with Iran, and he might well follow Obama in trading Syria away to get Tehran’s signature.

If the U.S. withdraws under a deal to let the Turks in, it could significantly mend U.S.-Turkey relations; without a deal, Erdogan could still get what he wants but there would be much less political windfall to the alliance. It is also possible, however, that the U.S. would withdraw after organizing with Russia to reconcile the PKK and the Assad/Iran system. Even if Turkey got a narrow buffer zone under this latter arrangement, it would fully restore to Damascus the PKK weapon it used for decades against Turkey.

On the other side, because it is so clear Trump wants out—the number of U.S. troops has been halved to 1,000 this year—Erdogan might calculate that an incursion would not result in triggering the U.S. tripwire, but in Trump deciding to wash his hands of the Syria dilemma altogether. He might even be correct, though it would be a reckless gambit with profound political costs to a relationship with America that is, after all, and despite the current President’s view, about more than just Trump.

On September 16, 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani visited Ankara in order to continue Astana trilateral peace talks on Syrian settlement and to meet face to face with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan separately.

On the eve of the meeting, many skeptics in Russia voiced that Turkey was not fulfilling its obligations under the Sochi agreement signed a year ago. According to them, Syria’s last de-escalation zone in Idlib had turned into a nest of terrorists (mostly from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham) who regularly carry out attacks against Russian military bases in Syria in Tartus and Khmeimim.

Consequently, most Russian observers agreed that the hour for a full-scale operation in Idlib by Damascus backed by Iran on the ground and Russia from the air, was fast approaching. The Sochi agreement was not working, and, therefore, it was time for Russia to look for another way to resolve the issue, namely, through a large-scale military intervention. These Russian observers expected to get such a message from President Putin as the result of his trip to Ankara on September 16, 2019.

Three Assads

Bashar al-Assad has not been the same politician throughout the crisis. The Assads of 2011, 2015 and 2019 are considerably different. It is even possible to say that these are three different political figures with three different types of behavior.

In 2011, Middle Eastern autocracies fell like dominoes and it seemed that Syria would quickly follow behind Egypt and Libya, and that Bashar al Assad would follow Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Gaddafi. The prospect of a rapid overthrow loomed in front of Damascus.

In 2015, Assad, who several years earlier managed to transfer the seemingly inevitable collapse into a protracted civil war, was completely exhausted and went to the last frontier. So, Russia decided to directly intervene into the Syrian civil war, which the Russian leadership avoided up to the last moment. The result we may see today.

In contrast to 2011 and 2015, in 2019, Assad feels like a winner in the Syrian civil war, after recapturing most of the lost territory. Of course, statements by some officials, including Russian ones, claiming that “the war in Syria is over” and “the country is returning to a peaceful life,” should be considered at least premature. However, it is clear that Assad today has the psychological state of a winner who has pulled back from the edge of the abyss. This radical change in the civil war has transformed the psychological state of Assad and may lead to a change in how he acts.

The first task of Syria in turning the tide of the civil war is a final restoration of control over the country’s territory. Here there are two geographies: Idlib, controlled by the Democratic Union Party; and the east of the Euphrates, by the People’s Protection Units (YPG) with the support of the U.S.

There is no one-step solution available to Damascus in the east of the Euphrates River. As long as the U.S supports the PYD and YPG, then Damascus can do nothing about the YPG enclave that was established with U.S.’ support and protection. Some hopes, although very uncertain, have been raised by the announcement made by President Trump at the end of last year to withdraw American soldiers from Syria. However, nothing indicates that this decision may, even theoretically, be implemented in the foreseeable future. Attempts to replace American troops with Europeans have still not led to a result.

Syrian Civil War Cannot Be Won Militarily

The task of Russia looks much more complex and goes beyond specific case of the Syrian civil war. As a global player, Russia takes into account much more factors than just supporting Damascus. Which, in fact, President Putin once again demonstrated during his visit to Ankara. 

Firstly, the civil war in Syria cannot be won with a mere military victory and it would not be enough for establishing peace and tranquility. At this stage what is required is the arrangement of political dialogue between all parties of the conflict. It is clear that an exclusively military solution of the Idlib problem will only contribute to solving the short-term task of establishing control over an important part of the country by Damascus. However, it will deepen the problem of the country’s division. Therefore, it will not solve the problem of ensuring sustainable peace in the country, about which, Russian President Putin constantly speaks.

Secondly, at this stage, Russia considers Bashar al Assad as the only political figure who can keep the country together. Therefore, Russia seeks to restore his legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, primarily in the West, including the European Union. Russian diplomats are nowadays making noticeable efforts to reopen international diplomatic missions in Damascus.

Thirdly, Russia wants to return as a full-fledged player in the Mediterranean basin through Syria. This task has two dimensions: one of them is military, and the other is political. The military dimension is already ensured by the presence of Russian military bases in Syria – both aviation (Khmeimim) and naval (Tartus). The political dimension is impossible without Russia itself being able to engage in dialogue with various forces in the region, which it trying to hold in Syria.

And finally, it is clear that Russia cannot be an equidistant player in the Middle East. However, the Russian Foreign Ministry is trying its best to be able to maintain a dialogue with all regional players. Even with those with whom there are serious disagreements. Therefore, interrupting dialogue is a bad option, which it is trying to avoid.

In the context of Russian-Turkish relations, this means that for now in the eyes of Russia, the continuation of dialogue between Moscow and Ankara and the joint large strategic projects (such as the Turkish Stream gas pipeline, Akkuyu NPP, the supply of S-400), outweigh both the failure in the implementation of the Sochi agreement signed a year ago, as well as Turkey’s pursuit of its own policy in Syria, which differs markedly from Russia.

In its dialogue with Turkey, the Russian side still hopes that Turkey will gradually increase the level of its dialogue with Damascus, anticipating that, in the end, Turkey will finally abandon the expectation that “Assad must leave,” as a condition for beginning an active political dialogue in Syria.

Taking into account the motivation of the Russian leadership disclosed above, it becomes clear why at the final press conference of the trilateral meetings not a single word was said either about the Sochi Agreement or about the situation in Idlib.

Although, Russia is extremely concerned that Turkey’s fulfillment of its obligations under the Sochi Agreement is being delayed, this didn’t prevent the leaders of the three countries, including President Putin, from demonstrating a good mood, and together with the Presidents Erdogan and Rouhani, from making jokes with the audience during the final press-conference after the Summit on September 16, 2016.

Astana bigger than Astana

In its regional affairs Russia is guided by the position of strategic patience, obviously not wanting to risk its relations with Turkey – both existing and promising (including cooperation and contracts in the defense industry). Hence, it is ready to move towards the formation of the Constitutional Committee and the adoption of a new constitution for the country as per the Astana Peace Plan despite the unresolved case of Idlib.

There is one more circumstance that can be discerned from the results of President Putin’s trip to Ankara, it is the desire to make “Astana bigger than Astana”. That is to turn the Astana format of the Syrian settlement into a permanent Astana platform to solve regional issues in the Middle East. It creates a precedent for resolving difficult regional problems exclusively by regional powers in a “micro format” without resorting to large, slow, and inefficient instruments like the UN, and is a breakthrough towards a new world order. It is in this context, that the statements made by the three presidents in Ankara towards Yemen, and their willingness to contribute to the settlement of the crisis should be understood. No doubt, the existence of such a strategic goal outweighs the difficulties faced on the road towards peaceful settlement in Syria or the existence of disagreements between Russia, Turkey and Iran. Moreover, all three countries are united by a commitment to the territorial integrity of Syria.

On 16 September, 2019 the leaders of Turkey, Russia and Iran came together in Ankara for a trilateral summit in line with the Astana process. One of the main outcomes of the summit was the announcement of the formation of a participants list for the Syrian constitutional committee.

On 23 September, United Nations chief, Antonio Guterres said an agreement was reached on the composition of the constitutional committee and that the UN considers the committee to be the next step in efforts to find a political solution to end the more than eight-year-long war in Syria. Despite this significant progress, the formation of the constitutional committee isn’t final as the procedures of the committee are yet to be decided, and it is here that the differences between the Astana states will become more critical. The decision over the procedures of the committee will set the framework for Syria’s new constitution. Therefore, before the committee commences, the outcome of these discussions will be the most significant building block towards the reconstruction of Syria.

The formation of the constitutional committee in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 2254 has been a major obstacle for over the past eight years and only the Astana format has proven itself able to achieve progress. After the guarantors of the Astana process formulated their willingness to push along this process, the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition managed to come up with a list of 50 participants from their sides. Both sides were supported by their fellow backers in their efforts to formulate their own list, which is Iran and Russia for the regime and Turkey for the opposition. However, a third list was to be prepared by the UN of 50 independent figures but this faced several obstacles. This third list of independent members is of decisive importance, as whoever can manage to influence more than half of the independent members might secure its majority within the constitutional committee.

At first, the Assad regime protested against the decision-making role of the UN arguing that the UN’s role has to be limited to monitoring rather than taking an active role. Only with the pressure from the Astana format did the regime step back and accept the UN’s role in forming the list of independent members. However, the regime again blocked the process when the UN shared its list with all sides. The Assad regime argued that some of the independent members should have been in the list of the Syrian opposition instead. After diplomatic back and forths, the number of independent people considered problematic by the regime was reduced step-by-step, first to six then three until there was finally agreement on the last person during the Ankara summit.

At the current stage, the procedures of the committee have to be decided, but now the differences will be even bigger and won’t be limited to the Syrian opposition and the regime, but will include the differences between Turkey, Iran and Russia. Among other issues, the most visible will the question of who will head the committee. While Iran and Russia argue that the regime is the legal authority of Syria in the UN and deserves to head the constitutional committee, Turkey underlines that such a move will be fruitless and cannot result in a political solution, as such, the UN has to head the committee. From the Turkish standpoint, the Assad regime can be seen as a legitimate actor only if it wins an election after a genuine political transition process, but for Iran and Russia the regime is already a legitimate actor. After years of cooperation, the Astana process now comes to a point in which they have to decide if the opposition and the regime should be equal, or if both sides should find a solution under the regime’s direction.

Since groups such as the YPG and the SDF, extensions of the PKK terrorist organization, have started to gain international legitimacy and dominance politically and militarily, the Syrian crisis has become not only a regional problem for Turkey, but also an internal security threat. These terrorist groups have been depicted in the Western media as “freedom fighters” with the claim that they were fighting against Daesh. In contrast, Turkey’s security operations were portrayed as “attacks against the Kurds”. These were the most obvious indicators of an extensive and long-term strategy adopted by some western “allies” risking Ankara’s national security.

During the civil war in Syria, opposition groups close to Turkey lost their power while the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK, gained territorial control. Turkey, in the meantime, was not free from an intermittently active FETO threat. A controversial event that took place before the July 15 coup attempt concerning the capture of National Intelligence Organization (MIT) trucks allegedly carrying weapons to Syrian opposition groups, illustrates how fragile Turkey’s possible security operations abroad could have been. Therefore, Turkey had to delay a real encounter in Syria and tried to resolve its concerns through diplomatic negotiations.

After the fall of Aleppo to the Syrian regime and the start of the Astana process, the volume of armed conflicts in Syria drastically decreased. This was caused by the strong military response by the US against several Syrian army initiatives east of the Euphrates, which kept the region out of active military operations. As well as the regime’s own relief regarding its future security.

Recent developments in both Idlib province and the Eastern Euphrates have created different security concerns for Turkey. In Idlib, immigration is a significant challenge while the possibility of the establishment of a YPG led state east of the Euphrates has been the main concern. Turkey has pursued diplomatic channels in Idlib by engaging with Russia and Iran.  However, despite the Astana process, regions in the east and south of Syria were seized by the regime without much resistance from the opposition. But the Idlib region on the border with Turkey was left aside because of Ankara’s sensitivity. However, all the efforts by Turkey to find a diplomatic solution failed and the Syrian regime gained control of the Seyhun region after intensive attacks in August. This lead to a large number of Syrian civilians moving close to the Turkish border. In addition to concerns over Idlib, Turkey has also pursued a proactive path regarding the developments in the Eastern Euphrates. Adverse developments in the region threatening Turkish national security led Turkish authorities to take concrete measures. The unfulfilled promises made by the US to Turkey as well as the robust evidence showing the US’s delivered weapons to the YPG caused serious disappointments. President Erdogan finally made a statement saying that “if concrete steps are not taken [by the US] to resolve our concerns, we will start the operation in the safe zone to the east of the Euphrates until the end of September”.

Changing the status quo in Syria

Iran has supported the Syrian regime since the beginning of the Syrian crisis. When it was transformed from a popular revolution movement into outright civil war, Iran was involved in direct clashes in Syria through its proxy forces and military advisers.  As a result, although Iran has suffered from significant military and economic losses, it has been the most decisive country in terms of supporting the survival of the Ba’ath regime. Helping the regime maintain control over 70% of the country. Recently, Iran has been trying to solidify its gains in Syria by signing long-term trade agreements with the regime. Therefore, it would not be realistic to expect Iran will reduce its recent political support of Bashar al-Assad.

A large area with strategic value in terms of natural resources and farmland is still controlled by US-backed separatist groups (such as YPG and PYD). The region is still the subject of international intervention. These factors have led to the Syrian regime and its main supporters to understand that main threats to its survival come from the US, and not from Turkey. This situation has led to the intersection of mutual concerns about the YPG between Turkey and the Syrian regime.

These developments coupled with Israel’s increasing attacks on Syria and Iraq, have played a role in reestablishing Israel, the US and their Syrian partners like the YPG, as the main threat to both the Syrian regime and Iran, rather than the Syrian opposition.

For example, if as claimed, unmanned aerial vehicles used in the attacks on the Hashd-i Shabi bases in Iraq were removed from the areas under the control of YPG. This shows that the YPG participated in the anti-Iran coalition in the region.

Iran under pressure

Iran has been subject to heavy sanctions for the past six months, and the serious decrease in oil sales to around 200,000 barrels per day since May has left it facing a deep economic crisis. The ruling elite of Iran has been trying to minimize the public impact of the crisis by using its limited foreign exchange reserves, but it cannot prevent the economic indicators from worsening day by day. Iran’s major trading partners, particularly China, India, and the EU have significantly reduced their trade with them, and the alternative payment instrument INSTEX, which European countries have committed to, is practically ineffective since it does not cover oil sales. In this isolated position, trade with neighboring countries such as Iraq and Turkey have gained vital importance for Iran.

For this reason, Iran is now working to reduce the impact of problem areas with Turkey, to minimize its participation in Idlib operations, and to soften the rhetoric against Turkey in the press. Indeed, some Iranian observers connect the attitude change of Iran to the critical importance of Turkey during this sanctions period. In an environment where an immediate solution for the nuclear crisis between the US and Iran isn’t expected, Iran is unlikely to react to Turkey’s operations against terrorist positions in its southern border.

Tehran’s unwillingness to respond to Turkey’s actions in Syria is likely influenced by the fact that the Ankara administration has not challenged the legitimacy of the Damascus regime for quite some time, arguing that a new system is only possible through joint negotiations between all parties participating in the Astana and Geneva processes. Therefore, Turkey’s operations to remove the YPG within a limited area, and to enable a significant number of the Syrian refugees to move back, will not violate Iran’s red line.

Turkey’s operations against YPG will most likely stretch Turkey-US relations even more. In recent years, the tension between Turkey and the United States has been welcomed by Russia and Iran. The stress in Turkey-US relations will be reflected in Turkey’s policy towards the region and Iran. If the US takes punitive steps towards Turkey, then Turkey will undertake its own countermeasures. For example, by showing less sensitivity towards the US’s unilateral sanctions on Iran. Such a situation would be an appropriate scenario for Iran.

The creation of safe zones by Turkey in agreement with the United States is the main problem for Iran. Because the Tehran administration is aware that the US and its regional allies pose the greatest challenge to its survival and its regional policies. If Turkey takes steps for its own national security rather than participating in the US-led coalition, this will be seen as a lesser evil.

Another reason that Turkey’s probable operations in Syria will pose less of a problem for Iran is related to the deepening cooperation of the PKK/YPG with the US instead of regional patrons. These groups are frequently mentioned in policies against Iran. As the summer has shown, although the US maintains its policy of maximum pressure on Iran, it seems unwilling to retaliate against Iran’s steps to escalate military tensions. Although the US   has relied on the Israeli air force in the region, the need for surrogate organizations will increase in the coming days. Therefore, Iran will not be disturbed by the weakening of the YPG, as a US proxy organization, adjacent to the Iraq-Syria border.

As a result, at the current stage of the Syrian crisis, Turkey has noted the failure of relying on diplomatic efforts. The countries that have influence over Syria and the armed organizations controlling some areas achieved these gains through direct military involvement, not through diplomatic negotiations. In such an environment, it was not a realistic approach by Turkey to expect that other parties would understand and support responses to its own security threats. From Iran to the United States, from Israel to Hezbollah, all parties have tested the nerve endings of each other and have opted for the most dangerous options. The lack of immediate action by Turkey may lead to the situation in Idlib expanding across the entire country, and Turkey’s already damaged reputation will be thoroughly questioned. If Turkey enters into the field in Syria using its hard power, it will be closely followed by other parties including Iran, but the only country that could demonstrate a practical response would be the United States.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) released a new report about humanitarian developments in Idlib, stating that 576,000 people were displaced between 1 May and August 18 in 2019. The OCHA report gives a strong warning to the world and to Turkey in particular. Since Turkey stands alone in Idlib, European states have avoided taking strategic responsibility, the US has sidelined itself and Gulf States like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates view Idlib as a zero-sum game to undermine Turkey. Turkey also failed to use any of its four options to prevent its observation posts in Morek being besieged by the Assad regime. I argued that Turkey needs a new approach for Idlib, but what if the worst case scenario happens? One where a humanitarian disaster in Idlib cannot be prevented and the UN warning that 2 million refugees may flee to Turkey occurs?

According to UNHCR, the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey has reached 3,650,000 making Turkey the biggest host country for refugees in the world. However, the situation has its burdens for Turkey. Ignoring the economical, humanitarian and political costs, social tensions within Turkish society and hate speech against Syrian refugees are increasing. As a step to manager the refugee population, authorities in Istanbul announced new regulations that required unregistered Syrian refugees to return to cities in which they were registered by 20 August. However, after demands by the Syrian community, the deadline was extended for two months. While tensions against Syrian refugees are on rise in Turkey, the prospect of a further two million refugees from Idlib would be a catastrophe.

Turkey may be forced to establish transfer routes to the Greek and Bulgarian borders, opening the way for Syrian refugees to pass into Europe.

One of the main reasons behind such a worst case scenario would indeed be that Turkey stands alone in Idlib. While Turkey has taken on the burden of preventing a humanitarian disaster in Idlib alone, the country should not also carry the burden of the costs and risks of hosting two more million refugees. Turkey needs to force the world to take responsibility. Closing the borders to Syrians who face death in Idlib is not an option for Turkey, and if the worst case scenario happens, Turkey must open its borders to Syrians. However, while Turkey has no other option but to let Syrians in, it also has no other option but to let Syrians out. In order to prevent unregistered movement of refugees inside the country, Turkey may be forced to establish transfer routes to the Greek and Bulgarian borders. In such a case, the refugee deal between the EU and Turkey would end, opening the way for refugees in Turkey to pass into Europe. The countries that rejected taking responsibility for Syrian refugees and let Turkey do so on its own would then be forced to carry some of the burden. Turkey cannot take full responsibility if such a worst case scenario were to occur even if they provided with financial support to do so.

However, a second option also remains. With the support of the EU states and the US, Turkey could convince Russia to establish a security belt in Idlib. Such a move would require Turkey to take control over a certain area in Idlib following the Euphrates Shield model. Until now, Russia and the Assad regime want a military solution for Idlib, but the pressure of European States and the US, and Turkey’s decisiveness may help to facilitate a security belt free from bombs, terrorists and Assad’s forces. A security belt would also require commitments from the EU and the US. While details like depth and timeline of such a safe zone have to be decided, the new Turkish base north of Khan Sheikhoun, where the Turkish convoy remained after raids, could be a good guide for a new line. In this context, the upcoming Erdogan-Putin meeting in Russia will determine the fate of Idlib, the fate of millions of civilians and whether this worst-case scenario will happen.

In my previous column on the fate of the Turkish observation point in Morek I argued  that Turkey had four options to prevent its soldiers from a siege by the Assad regime: Withdrawing, preventing, escalating or postponing. On August 19, Turkey did not utilize any of these options, and the supply route to the observation point in Morek was cut off. A last-minute attempt by the Turkish Armed Forces to send in a convoy failed as regime attacks prevented the convoy from reaching Khan Sheikhoun.

Assuming that no miracle will happen soon, the Turkish authorities need a new approach for Idlib. This should start with reaching an evacuation deal and securing the safety of trapped soldiers in Morek. Otherwise, if the Turkish soldiers aren’t evacuated, a terrible fate might come true. It is not known what the regime and its militias will do, nor is it guaranteed that Russia can prevent the regime or its militias from unilateral actions against Turkish soldiers. At this stage, there are still options for Turkey in Idlib to form a new approach.

In the morning of August 19, the Turkish Armed Forces sent in a huge convoy of tanks and armored vehicles towards Khan Sheikhoun. The aim was to establish a base in the strategic town located on the M5 highway in order to secure the supply route towards the observation point in Morek. When the convoy came close to Khan Sheikhoun, a strike landed in front of the convoy and stopped it from moving further. Minutes afterwards, a second strike hit the rear of the convoy hitting Syrian opposition fighters escorting the Turkish convoy. Five hours later the Turkish Defence Ministry condemned the incident. However, when the convoy attempted to move forward again, the road was hit by another strike and the convoy stopped again. After failing to prevent this besiegement from occurring, the Turkish side have not risked escalation as well. No retaliation or any other kind of escalation towards the Assad regime has happened. Furthermore, a deal with Russia to postpone any actions towards the Turkish forces seemingly did not happen.

In order to not risk the lives of the Turkish soldiers, Turkey needs to evacuate or withdraw its soldiers starting with the one in Morek.

Since then, the Turkish convoy remains in the open area and waits. In the meantime, the Assad regime managed to capture the Al Nimr checkpoint and cut the M5 highway to Khan Sheikhoun and Morek. During the night, the regime started an operation into Khan Sheikhoun with their new night vision equipment supplied by Russia and managed to capture parts of the city by dawn. With the inevitable loss of Khan Sheikhoun, the Syrian opposition mostly evacuated from the pocket in northern Hama, but the Turkish soldiers in Morek stayed. This made the last option of withdrawing obsolete and the worst-case scenario of a siege against Turkish soldiers in the observation point in Morek happened.

After this development, the Turkish observation points in Idlib became pointless and the Assad regime and Russia may do the same with the other eleven observation points as well. In order to not risk the lives of the Turkish soldiers, Turkey needs to evacuate or withdraw its soldiers starting with the one in Morek. Such a move would also open the way for a humanitarian disaster in Idlib in which 3.5 million civilians would be targeted by the Assad regime. According to different estimates, one to two million Syrians may attempt to cross into Turkey as refugees. As such a scenario is unacceptable, Turkey needs to find a way to prevent this from happening. Safeguarding the rebels in Idlib by granting a special protection or a different mechanism like a security belt along the border might help in this regard. Nevertheless, the option of escalating always remains but risking a war against the Assad regime and Russia seems very unlikely under current circumstances.

Since the ceasefire announcement was made during the 13th round of the Astana process, there has been an escalation of fighting in Idlib. The regime axis supported by heavy Russian airpower has made gains with significant implications for the political process and Turkey’s position and role in Idlib. I argued before that Turkey and Russia have a way out of the escalation in Idlib, but that Russia may use the escalation in Idlib to seek favorable terms in the constitutional committee formation process which could not have been finalized in the last Astana summit held in the Kazakh capital Nur Sultan. The advance of the regime axis in Idlib has captured Habit and Sukayk. If the regime succeeds in capturing Khan Sheikhun from the Syrian opposition, it will threaten to besiege the Turkish observation point in Morek. Even if Turkey and Russia want to avoid a direct escalation, the Assad regime is progressing towards a military solution which it believes can only happen if Turkey withdraws from Idlib. Turkey must therefore decide the fate of its observation point and with it the fate of Idlib.

There seem to be four pathways for Turkey: Withdrawing, escalating, postponing or preventing. Each of which will have its own implications and risks. Starting with the first, withdrawing from one observation point to prevent its besiegement will open the way for the Assad regime to do the same with the other 11 observation points. This will make the observation point meaningless and undermine the Turkish role in Idlib, the Astana process and in the overall geostrategic situation in the region. The withdrawal from a Turkish observation point would mark a precedent affecting the entire Turkish deterrence strategy, which is important to Turkish foreign policy from the Eastern Mediterranean to northern Iraq. While the withdrawal of Turkish troops may be the main goal of the Assad regime, the implications for Idlib and the region would be too high for Turkey. Therefore, this option seems to be the less likely.

Current frontline around the Turkish observation point in Morek as of 14 August 2019

The second option for Turkey is direct escalation by confronting the Assad regime ground forces with a harsh response to prevent the regime from attempting to besiege the Turkish observation point. Turkey would need to declare a red line over Khan Sheikhoun and directly strike the regime to advance further. Previous experiences have shown that the regime understands the language of violence. The regime attacks on the Turkish observation point in Sher Maghar, which also aimed to force Turkey to withdraw, stopped after Turkey retaliated against the regime. To prevent the regime from cutting the supply line to the Turkish observation point in Morek, the Turkish Armed Forces may consider punishing the regime hard. However, too much escalation may also play into the hands of the Assad regime as it may trigger an escalation between Turkey and Russia as well.

Another option for Turkey would be to negotiate a new line of de-escalation with Russia and to withdraw the observation points further north. However, such a move would not only mean the handover of essential territory to the regime axis, but would postpone addressing the dilemma of the observation points weakening the Turkish hand for another time. Lastly, Turkey can work to prevent besiegement of its observation point by extensively supplying the Syrian opposition. In this case, the Turkish position in Idlib would continue as it stands. But what if the Syrian opposition fails? Without a plan B or extensive support to ensure that a regime advance would be stopped, Turkish soldiers may be placed at risk of being trapped in a siege. In this case, a new crisis over Turkey’s role in Syria will become inevitable.

The province of Idlib currently stands center stage in the Syrian Civil War. In the past three years, the Assad regime has gained ground throughout the country, making Idlib the last rebel-held stronghold. Russia and Turkey, key players in the Syrian conflict, brokered a significant ceasefire in Idlib last September. The agreement created a nine-mile demilitarized zone which called for the withdrawal of “radically minded” opposition forces. Patrol groups, consisting of Russian and Turkish units, were tasked with ensuring the agreement’s integrity. However, with almost a year passed, the tenuous ceasefire has nearly collapsed. Since April, intense fighting has erupted in the region. With humanitarian costs soaring and no solution currently in sight, Idlib’s future grows more uncertain by the day.

Since the ceasefire was instituted last October, both sides have been accused of violating terms. The “radically minded” forces, which referred to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), have not only refrained from evacuating the buffer zone but have since expanded their power. By January 2019, HTS had gained control over the majority of the Idlib, portions of Aleppo and Hama, and parts of major roadways and border-crossings. Due to the group’s former ties with al-Qaeda, pro-regime forces have labelled HTS a terrorist threat, and used the group’s past association as a rationale for military engagement. With heavy artillery, pro-government forces have bombarded communities along the demilitarized zone. Over the past three months, they have also conducted a joint air campaign with Russian forces. Airstrikes have rained down cluster munitions and incendiary weapons on Idlib from above, while snipers on the ground fire on the city. Despite the great odds they face, the opposition has prevented the regime from gaining large swaths of territory. Senior rebel commanders, however, recently reported that Russian forces fought directly on the battlefield for the first time in northern Hama. If this instance was not an anomaly, and Russian troops regularly join ground forces, the opposition will face even more challenging odds.

Meanwhile, as a consequence of the current stalemate, more than three million civilians living in Idlib are suffering the costs of war. The regime’s campaign has attacked civilian centers indiscriminately: strikes have targeted residential neighborhoods, medical facilities, schools, markets, and sites housing the displaced. According to the UN, at least 450 civilians have been killed in Idlib since Spring, with over one hundred of these causalities having occurred during a ten-day period this July. Michelle Bachelet, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, declared that those who have intentionally attacked civilians will be held responsible for war crimes. She also stressed that civilian suffering has been largely ignored by the international community. Bachelet spoke of a “paralyzed” UN Security Council, and its failure to pressure Assad to stop the fighting. While speaking to the Security Council this week, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs stated, “You know what is happening and you have done nothing for 90 days as the carnage continues in front of your eyes.” He continued, “Are you going to…do something about it?” If the international community does not work together to deter the regime, many fear the government will further intensify its use of force in Idlib. If pro-government troops launch a full-scale attack on the city, the UN predicts a humanitarian disaster. Such a crisis will leave countless more civilians to a fate of suffering, death, and displacement.

The most recent offensives launched by the Assad regime have forced hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee to camps at the sealed Turkish-Syrian border. The UN has predicted that two million more could flood to Turkey’s border if Idlib is infiltrated.

As the potential for extreme escalation looms, humanitarian officials have looked to Russia and Turkey to renegotiate a political solution. With over three million Syrian refugees living in its territory, Turkey has accepted more Syrians fleeing violence than any other country. The most recent offensives launched by the regime have already forced hundreds of thousands of civilians to flee to camps at the sealed Turkish-Syrian border. The UN has predicted that two million more could flood to Turkey’s border if Idlib is infiltrated—a predicament Turkey greatly hopes to avoid. To prevent this potential influx, President Erdogan has broached the topic in communications with President Putin. They have discussed plans to hold another summit, along with Iran, to continue dialogue on the Astana peace process. The two leaders, however, may diverge in what they hope to actually accomplish. While President Erdogan aims to prevent carnage in Idlib from threatening the Turkish border, President Putin’s objectives are less discernable, and perhaps more nefarious. After supporting the regime for four years, Russia may seek to help Assad stamp out the country’s rebels once and for all. Alternatively, Russia may strive for Idlib to remain deadlocked in a conflict-ridden ceasefire. In eastern Ukraine, Russia has denied military involvement in the Donbass while maintaining a significant foothold in the region. The country may aim to secure a similar type of influence in northwestern Syria. Overall, whatever their motivations may be, Turkey and Russia are once again the two powers that hold the most sway in Idlib. Although Russia’s long-term intentions remain unknown, negotiations are likely the best chance for altering the status quo.

Though Idlib’s future has yet to be decided, the city’s crumbling ceasefire has made some realties clear. Firstly, Russia has achieved some of its goals. Through its intervention into the civil conflict, the country has gained influence in the Middle East and shifted the war in Assad’s favor. In doing so, Russia has continued to assert its relevancy as a regional power. Secondly, Turkey is still waiting for back-up. The international community has yet to exert pressure on the Assad regime for blatant violations of international law. Countries have also refrained from verbally sounding the alarm on Idlib in any significant way. Thirdly, Idlib’s people are the latest to pay the price in an eight-year civil war that has proved enduring and gruesome. It should not be lost on the world, however, that Idlib’s current state could easily worsen. If the regime attacks the city without restraint, a new state of chaos will erupt in northwestern Syria. Grave consequences will undoubtedly result.

The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that Turkey had informed the US and Russia about a planned military operation against the YPG (also known as the People’s Protection Units). An important question in this regard is: Can the YPG fight and resist against a joint Turkish-Syrian military operation? To put the answer with the words of Aldar Xelil, a leading Kurdish figure, “If they [Turkey] enter, our territory will be destroyed,” stating that they have no illusion of a victory against Turkey. However, the answer to the question of why the YPG has no chance against a joint Turkish-Syrian military operation also answers how the US has miscalculated its position in negotiations with Turkey for long.

First of all, the terrain along the Syrian-Turkish border east of the Euphrates is clearly favorable for a joint Turkish-Syrian military operation and a huge disadvantage for the YPG who lack fire power superiority, air superiority and technology. The Turkish Armed Forces as the second biggest army in the NATO alliance has an asymmetric superiority against the YPG in all military terms, and the Syrian National Army as Turkey’s partner forces is the equal counterpart to the YPG. While Turkey will change the balance of power immensely, the Syrian National Army will diminish the advantages of a non-state armed actor in a war environment against a conventional army. Briefly, when the most effective non-state armed actor Daesh lost the same terrain against the YPG who enjoyed US air support, the YPG has no chance against a joint operation by Syrian National Army and the Turkish Armed Forces.

A second reason for the YPG to lose will be its untrustworthy alliance formed with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and its limited number of voluntary fighters. The SDF was formed to combat Daesh, not Turkey and not the Syrian opposition. When Turkey enters the region, the YPG will find itself surrounded by “betrayers” who will refuse to put up a fight which is not theirs as the alliance’ commitment to the SDF components are low. Also many non-YPG elements of the SDF have sympathies either with the Syrian opposition or with Turkey and, in addition to this, many US-trained recruits may desert to the winning side. The pragmatic nature of the alliance won’t prove itself reliable in case of a hopeless war. Additionally, the border stretch from which Turkey will launch its operation is just too long for the YPG to patrol, and the YPG has been too reliant on forced recruitment that are not the most stable force. Holes in the frontline are unavoidable for the YPG. On the other side, the Syrian National Army comprises of voluntary fighters alone.

The last reason is that US support has made the YPG vulnerable. The YPG controls cities and towns with administrative buildings, military bases and permanent stations. The group also acquired vehicles and other supplies from the US. All of these reduce the mobility of the YPG, make them a static force and therefore turn them into easy targets for the Turkish Armed Forces. Over the years of incessant US support, the YPG has been fighting under air backing which will prove devastating if they were to change sides and be attacked by airstrikes. The YPG doesn’t have the experience of the rebels in Idlib who have fought for years against an enemy with air-power. The YPG has become too used to air-support and their experience in war without air support is mainly limited to its loss of 200 villages in a week south of Ayn al-Arab (Kobane) in its fight against Daesh.

For over two months, shelling, air strikes and clashes at the front in Idlib have become a way of life. In this period, over 300 civilians have been killed, thousands more have been injured and over 330,000 fled their homes. On the battle front, the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition mourn heavy causalities, and no side has come out winning. Even if the Assad regime, supported by heavy Russian air support, has managed to reverse all gains by the counter-offensives of the Syrian opposition, the main question remains: Where is the escalation in Idlib heading and what is its purpose?

When de-escalation in Idlib ended, Russia’s purpose may have been to force Turkey to implement the Sochi memorandum, or to open the way for the regime axis; but as Turkey stood its ground firm and responded, both sides entered a stalemate. Since then, the spiral of violence continues. Since the initial progress by the regime axis at the beginning of the ground assault, the Syrian opposition managed to capture other areas in counter-offensives, but over the weekend the regime managed to gain control over lost terrain. This development opens the question: Will the regime push further, or after restoring lost terrain will de-escalation somehow achieved?

I argued before that recent developments in northwest Syria could in fact give Turkey and Russia the opportunity to re-enforce the Sochi arrangement. However since then, there isn’t any real change on the ground or a diplomatic sign towards a new rapprochement between Turkey and Russia in regards to Idlib. Those arguing that the escalation in Idlib was designed to push Turkey to fulfill its purchase of the S-400 were proven wrong by the continued bombardment despite Turkey’s purchase of the air-defense systems. The purpose of the current escalation hasn’t yet become clear.

If the regime axis wants to capture all of Idlib, or at least all the region to the M4 and M5 highways, the current strategy won’t achieve this goal. The Assad regime would need to open several different fronts; and the Russians would need to expand their air campaign towards the Turkish-Syrian border, the Russians would need to call Iran in as the Iranian militias could turn the table in favor of a military ‘solution’ in Idlib. Regardless of the implications of such steps, until today they remain untaken.

The escalation’s current nature is more suitable as a strategy to force the other side to make concessions at the negotiation table rather than to enforce a military solution. In this regard, the purpose of the current escalation in Idlib may have changed during the course of the spiral of violence due to Turkey’s response, but the Russians may attempt to channel the escalation into a deal in the next Astana meeting on August 1 on 2. It’s known that Turkey and the Syrian opposition insist on a genuine political transition process, and that the details of the formation of a constitutional committee and its working procedure have to be set yet. Therefore, Russia may try to use the escalation in Idlib as a bargaining chip to enforce its terms on Turkey and the Syrian opposition, which will favor Assad and aim to prevent real power-sharing.

If this is the case, and Turkey once again doesn’t knock over under Russian pressure of escalation, what will happen to the Astana process and what will happen to the escalation in Idlib? The answer to this question underlines the importance of Idlib; and the importance of Turkey’s role. If Turkey and the Syrian opposition fail to stand firm, the political transition process towards peace in Syria might fail. The international community has to understand that only their stance with the Syrian opposition can really pressure the regime axis to implement and accept changes towards a brighter future for Syria. Neither the threat of sanctions and the promise of reconstruction funds, nor reliance on a local actor following a separate agenda outside the regime-opposition dispute will result in the acceptance of demands by the regime axis.

Since the start of the war in Syria, many debates erupted around the future of Bashar al-Assad and that he will not play any role in the future of Syria. However, the Syrian opposition demands the change of the regime, not just an individual. Until today, the Iranians and Russians succeeded in securing Assad his position, long enough that the U.S. does not speak about regime-change anymore. Saudi Arabia is trying to push the Syrian opposition to accept a political transition process with Assad. But Assad remains as a symbolic obstacle for peace in Syria. Thus, the question is: If Russia decides to oust Assad from power to accelerate the political process in Syria and tries to impose a trustful and reliable ally in the country, will it succeed?

To date, two different names come up in this regard: Ali Mamlouk, the former head of the National Security Bureau, and the Syrian Commander Gen. Suhail al-Hassan, nicknamed the “Tiger,” who leads the Russian-backed famous Tiger Forces. Suhail al-Hassan as a predecessor to Assad came into discussion when he was rewarded by Russian generals at the Humeimin base and his congratulations letter to the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. Ali Mamlouk on the other hand, remains as one of the only people who allegedly is in contact with other states such as the U.S., Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and others, solely due to this position as being the head of intelligence.

The recent re-shuffle in the Syrian regime has seemingly strengthened the Russian position and Russia-allied figures have been appointed to critical positions.

Going on with the case of Suhail al-Hassan, in his report, Can Kasapoglu argues: “[…] evidence suggest that Syria could witness a serious intra-regime power struggle between General Suheil al-Hassan, the commander of the battle-hardened Tiger Forces (Qawat al Nimr), and the incumbent Baathist military elite” and that “to materialize its political goals in Syria, Russia should rein in profiteer paramilitary formations, restrict Iran-orchestrated Shiite militancy’s presence in the Syrian security sector, and ensure a unified chain of command to lay the foundations of the post-civil war doctrinal order of battle of the Syrian Arab Armed Forces.”

Ali Mamlouk on the other hand might help Russia have a less problematic ousting of Assad as his stance within the Baathist military and political elite is strong. In this regard, during the beginning of July 2019, Russia placed Ali Mamlouk as the deputy of Bashar al-Assad and appointed Mohamed Deeb Zeitoun as the head of the National Security Bureau. Zeitoun is also a close ally of Russia.  

The general re-shuffle in the regime apparatus has seemingly strengthened the Russian position and Russia-allied figures have been appointed to critical positions. However, a main obstacle remains in front of Russia – its ally, Iran.

If Russia ousts Assad, then it would risk confrontation with Iran in Syria as the regime apparatus is divided between Iranian and Russian allies.

Currently, the alliance between both parties is being symbolized by Assad himself. If Russia ousts Assad, then it would risk confrontation with Iran in Syria as the regime apparatus is divided between Iranian and Russian allies, who are in competition over power. While the Russian side has more political power, the Iranian side is overwhelmingly stronger in terms of allied militias. In short, if Russia ousts Assad, Syria might enter a new dynamic in which the current regime axis would split and fight within themselves. Also, the current escalation in Idlib has proven the Russian limits without the active support of Iran. As long as the war continues or even further escalates, Russia is dependent on Iranian support.

All in all, Russia can find its Syrian Kadyrov. However, in contrast to Chechnya, Russia needs to balance and share power with another actor or risk an entire new conflict dynamic to evolve in Syria. Therefore, as long as Bashar al-Assad succeeds in managing the balance between Iran and Russia, he may remain as the formal head of Syria. However, if the political transition process finally occurs, even this balancing act may not help him stay in his position for which Assad burned Syria down and handed over his Powers to his protectors in Tehran and Moscow.

In response to Turkey’s assembling of troops along the Syria-Tukey border to areas held by the YPG terror group, the U.S. warned Turkey against launching any cross-border military operation in Syria. As I wrote, U.S. sanctions over the purchase of the Russian S-400 systems by Turkey might trigger a Turkish military operation in northeast Syria, but it will remain the duty of the U.S. to resolve the situation and avoid a confrontation with Turkey in Syria.

As negotiations over the safe-zone have stalled and a Turkish military operation seems imminent, the U.S. has to accept Turkey establishing a safe-zone by military means and has to withdraw south from the area and left the YPG face the same fate they did in Afrin. The defeat of the YPG by Turkey would allow the U.S. to form a new Syrian Democratic Forces with only non-YPG elements and join forces with Turkey.

As negotiations over the safe-zone have stalled and a Turkish military operation seems imminent, the U.S. has to accept Turkey establishing a safe-zone by military means.

Firstly, the U.S. expressed its concerns that U.S. troops deployed in Syria might be caught up in a potential cross-border Turkish military operation. In reality, Turkey does not need to care about U.S. concerns, as the U.S. has repeatedly ignored Turkey’s national security concerns by supplying the Syrian branch of the PKK. When the U.S., as a NATO partner, ignored an essential threat to the territorial integrity of Turkey and supplied terrorists, then why should Turkey stop itself from pursuing its national interest due to U.S. concerns over the situation of around 2,600 U.S. troops in Syria?

Secondly, the U.S. suggested that dialogue is the only way to secure the Turkey-Syria border in a sustainable manner. If so, why hasn’t the Manbij roadmap been implemented? Or, why have negotiations over a potential safe-zone stalled? While Turkey maintains dialogue, the U.S. and YPG are creating facts on the ground, such as the formation of 15 different military councils.

If the U.S. would have applied the withdrawal decision by Trump instead of annulling it, Turkey and the U.S. would have built a strong partnership in Syria. However, in case of a Turkish unilateral military operation, both sides can avoid confrontation. Turkey and the U.S. can agree to form the safe-zone by military means. Judging on the events of the past, neither the American administration nor its special envoy James Jeffrey are capable of enforcing its vision on CENTCOM officials operating in Syria, nor is the YPG willing to withdraw and allow a safe-zone torpedoing the long-term vision of the PKK.

If the U.S. would have applied the withdrawal decision by Trump instead of annulling it, Turkey and the U.S. would have built a strong partnership in Syria.

A common understanding between Turkey and the U.S. is the establishment of a safe-zone in northeast Syria. However, both sides cannot agree on the depth and the forces controlling the region. Turkey wants full depth and full control, the U.S. wants limited depth and no Turkish control. Even if both sides would have agreed on anything, the question of how the U.S. would enforce the agreement terms on the YPG still remains unanswered.

If the U.S. is as much concerned as they claim about the situation of U.S. troops in Syria, then the U.S. should make sure that its soldiers will withdraw south before the start of a potential Turkish military operation in Syria. The U.S. should let Turkey, the Syrian opposition and the YPG fight it out, and concentrate on the non-YPG elements of the SDF, focusing on reconstruction and governance. When the fighting in the north is over, the U.S. can engage with the new realities on the ground and work with Turkey.

The Afrin region in Syria was liberated by the Turkish Armed Forces and the Syrian National Army during Operation Olive Branch. Since then, the security of the region has been a main topic. Based on a dataset of two months of YPG attacks, I wrote earlier how the YPG is trying to sabotage security and how the YPG propaganda machine defends these terrorist attacks. Bellingcat published a report about the insurgency of the YPG in Afrin. The YPG has explicitly tried to undermine efforts to increase security as a strategy, but security is also undermined by crimes of Syrian National Army fighters and as a result of mass migration towards Afrin due to the forced displacement by the Assad regime of residents living in Ghouta, Homs, Hama and Deraa. While security in Afrin is better than in Deir Ezzor, Raqqa, Idlib, or Deraa, especially after the ‘Peace Operation’ targeting criminal gangs, it is very important to improve the security of the region for the sake of the people. This column will discuss some possible ways of improving security in Afrin.

1. Cleansing of Tel Rifaat

One of the main sources of the relative insecurity in Afrin is Tel Rifaat. The YPG is using the area protected by the Russians and the Assad regime in order to infiltrate Afrin, conduct terrorist attacks and intimidate locals cooperating with the Turkish authorities. As long as Tel Rifaat remains a safe-haven for the YPG, the security in Afrin will always be threatened. Turkey needs to find a way to clean the area, but until now, the Russian and Assad regime are rejecting any attempts, while not doing anything against the YPG themselves. The source of insecurity in Afrin will likely remain over the foreseeable future. Therefore, the only way of dealing with Tel Rifaat remains in trying to prevent infiltration from Tel Rifaat to Afrin as much as possible. In this regard, the wall in construction between Afrin and Tel Rifaat might ease the threat.

As long as Tel Rifaat remains a safe-haven for the YPG, the security in Afrin will always be threatened.

2. Strong Turkish footprint model

The Turkish Armed Forces currently have a light footprint in Afrin. Turkish soldiers are mainly located inside their bases and go on patrols with massive precautions and protective measures. The Turkish role is limited to advice, training and logistic support to the Syrian National Army and the Free Syrian Police in Afrin. If this changes and Turkey implements its New Southeast Strategy in Afrin, the security of the region might improve significantly. On the other side, a strong Turkish footprint model would directly risk Turkish soldiers and result in the impression of a Turkish annexation of Afrin, which may have other diplomatic and political consequences. Turkey’s engagement in Syria is based on the aim to preserve Syria’s territorial integrity and such a move might harm Turkey’s reliability.

If Turkey implements its New Southeast Strategy in Afrin, the security of the region might improve significantly. 

3. Forming a hierarchic governance

The security apparatus in Afrin is divided into four autonomous sections: The Free Syrian Police, the Syrian National Army, the free courts and local councils. All are officially related to the Syrian interim government. This could be changed entirely towards hierarchic governance in which a government oversees the work of all three sections and has full control over them, basically to establish an alternative government to the Assad regime in the northwest of the country. This move could also be empowered by popular elections in the region. However, this move is a double edged sword. While on the one hand it may boost the role of the Syrian opposition and challenge the Assad regime in its entirety, on the other, it will re-draw the dynamics of the Syrian conflict with its risks as well as its opportunities.

“I long for freedom. I long for it.

The people are unsafe in their homes.

Young and old they all know whoever kills their own people is a traitor.

Freedom is what the people demand.

From Homs, to Daraa, to Banias.”

– Abdul Basit Saroot

These are the words of a song written and sung by Abdul Basit Saroot, who was the voice of a nation ripped apart by a crimson dictator hell bent on keeping power at any cost.

Before the war he was a young and promising goal keeper for the junior Syrian national football club.

When protesters hit the streets he decided to join them and take a stand against the violence, arrests, torture, and treachery of the regime towards civilians.

Of course, his time as a member of the junior national football club didn’t give him preferential status.

Instead it made him and his family a direct target for regime attacks. Eventually, he and four of his siblings, as well as his father were are killed in regime attacks.

During protests anti-Assad revolutionaries could pick out his voice from a crowd of tens of thousands.

With a hoarse tone and a mellow melody about it, his voice became the calling cry of Syrian revolutionaries around the world.

He spent many months besieged in Homs and reluctantly left in a deal struck between the opposition and the regime in 2014.

Activists like Abdul Basit Saroot have become icons for the Syrian opposition and are endeared by many Syrians searching for an alternative to the dictatorial rule of the Assad regime.

Following his death in a hospital in southern Turkey on June 8, his funeral procession was attended by tens of thousands of Syrians displaced by years of war.

Even though there are always deaths, natural and otherwise, the Syrian community in southern Turkey responded voraciously to the news of Abdul Basit Saroot’s death.

Activists like Abdul Basit Saroot have become icons for the Syrian opposition and are endeared by many Syrians searching for an alternative to the dictatorial rule of the Assad regime.

Thousands of displaced Syrians gathered at a mosque in Reyhanlı, Turkey and held funeral prayers for him and then delivered his body to Idlib where another procession of mourners took him to a graveyard and buried Saroot next to his brother. Syrians who couldn’t reach there held their own prayers for Saroot around the world as well.

The mobilization of all these people revived a sense of purpose to the Syrian revolution and triggered serious discussions about reviving the revolutionary spirit among Syrians.

Losing an icon like Abdul Basit Saroot is a tragedy for the family, friends, and even the revolution. However, his death brought people together and rekindled a revolutionary spirit that had faded in the hearts of many Syrians suffering from the fatigue of non-stop war and death for eight years.

Why is all of this significant?

This reality reveals a state of the Syrian conflict that is contrary to that which claims the Syrian revolution is over and Assad has won the war.

Syrians that have been displaced, more than 10 million, about half of Syria’s prewar population, are still committed to the revolutionary change that they set out for in 2011.

Saroot’s songs are famous for invoking freedom and bringing down the Assad regime. His songs also reminded people of their homes and serenaded the idea of once again returning to them – without Assad.

Upon his death those lyrics were sung in unison via social media and in demonstrations inside Syria and around the world commemorating the revolutionary spirit that Saroot stirred among the masses. Uniting a large cohort of the Syrian people who many suspected were no longer united.

Another revelation is that Syrians, especially those that have fled the war, do have an opinion. They haven’t grown callous from many years of war as some might suggest.

The reality reveals a state of the Syrian conflict that is contrary to that which claims the Syrian revolution is over and Assad has won the war.

Currently the regime, backed by Russia and Iran, and with incentivized reconstruction programs from the international community via the UN, is trying to change the focus of the conflict from violent military action to reconstruction and a political process.

Part of that effort, according to the UN resolution 2254, requires that an election would take place after an 18 month transition period.

According to the agreement even those Syrians that are displaced, living in non-regime controlled areas of Syria, as well as abroad, should be able to take part in such a vote.

As we can see from their reaction to the news of Saroot’s death, it’s clear that those Syrians are willing to let their voices be heard.

Whether Syrians will get the chance to go to the ballot box and choose who will lead them next is yet to be determined.

But what Saroot’s death tells us for sure is that there is real opposition to Assad’s rule that may disagree on many issues, but are united by a voice that called for overthrowing Assad and eventually gave his life for the cause.

As the Russian backed regime bombing campaign stacks up a higher death toll and the destruction of critical infrastructure cripples civilian life, the millions of people affected by the violence are not going to easily forget what and who caused their loss and suffering.

Signs of such sentiment can be found in other parts of Syria as well, where with Russia’s help, the regime managed to take over.

For example in Daraa, on the Syrian-Jordanian border, Syrians that entered into so-called reconciliation agreements continue to show opposition to Assad rule through demonstrations, protests, and armed resistance.

This came after regime and Iranian forces entered the area and began arresting, abducting, and abusing the locals. They were even forcefully conscripting former armed opposition fighters and forcing them to fight on the front lines in northern Hama, southern Idlib and rural Latakia.

But those fighters that actually reached the front lines were unwilling to fight, or ran away, and on the whole were ineffective in the fighting since May.

The regimes and its allies have employed these failed policies since the regime took full control of the region in southern Syria.

However unlikely it seems now, if the regime did manage to take all 4,800 square kilometers of the remaining northwestern pocket, Syrians there and in the region will surely voice their objection to living under the rule of a dictatorial regime backed by international allies who have no regard for international law and don’t represent the interests of the Syrian people.

When the demonstrations in Syria started, the U.S. was fast on the very forefront, declaring its support to the demands for a democratic and free Syria. However, after 8 years of war, the U.S. has sidelined itself in the dispute between the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition, abandoning the later entirely. Nevertheless, the formulated U.S. ambitions in Syria bring up the need for the U.S. to re-engage with the Syrian opposition, namely the Syrian National Army. Otherwise, the U.S. goals for Syria will remain as meaningless words, likely to be redrafted by military measures of the regime axis.

According to U.S. Special Envoy James Jeffrey, the main goals of the U.S. in Syria are to ensure the defeat of Daesh, force Iran out of Syria and change the behavior of the Assad regime. While many in Washington think that they can enforce these terms by economic means – like sanctions as a stick and funds for reconstruction as a carrot – and staying inside Syria until U.S. terms are accepted, the regime axis does not seem impressed. The current carrot and stick strategy is based upon the assumption that the regime and Russia has a huge interest in re-building the formerly opposition-held areas it destroyed itself, and the miscalculation of the regime’s behavior. If economic sanctions would be enough to enforce terms on the regime, the regime would have accepted them when it was on the verge of collapse before the Russian intervention in 2015 and in 2013, when the regime almost lost control over all of Syria.

Many in Washington think that the U.S. can enforce its terms in Syria only by economic means – like sanctions as a stick and funds for reconstruction as a carrot.

In regards to Iran, I argued last week that the U.S. has limited options in Syria and has no real effective way of dealing with Iran in Syria. The last U.S. ambition in Syria is the enduring defeat of Daesh in which the U.S. has reportedly invested about $14.3 billion until June 30, 2017, but now the organization is re-grouping underground and conducting several attacks in Syria and Iraq. Some analysts like the ISW report suggests that Daesh has the capacity to capture an urban center. Focusing on Syria; there is a huge correlation between YPG-held areas and Daesh attacks.

Source: Tomasz Rolbieck

In order to be capable of achieving any goals in Syria, the U.S. needs to re-engage with the Syrian opposition. I am not suggesting that the U.S. change its horses, but that it should come back to its first horse again. The U.S. has mainly abandoned the opposition for two reasons: First, the fight against Daesh, in which the U.S. has regarded the Syrian branch of the PKK the most effective, and second, the ties between the Syrian opposition and extremists.

Regardless of the truth in these arguments, currently none of them apply. The first fight against Daesh is now in a new era in which popular support and acceptable governance will be the main effective tools to grab the extremists from their pool of recruitment and target their survivability. In regards to Iran, the Syrian opposition is a natural enemy of Iran and empowering them will ultimately help to force Iranians out of Syria. By supporting the Syrian opposition, the U.S. will have more room to ‘change the behavior’ of the regime in line with the UN-coordinated process.

The U.S. needs to re-engage with the Syrian opposition. I am not suggesting that the U.S. change its horses, but that it should come back to its first horse again.

In this matter, the Syrian National Army (SNA) provides the U.S. with a good opportunity. Composed of Arabs, Turkmens and Kurds, the SNA is the official armed structure of the Syrian Interim Government, which was formed by the Syrian opposition. The areas held by the SNA are totally separated from any extremist faction. Of the 28 factions in the SNA, 13 were previously supported by the U.S., 11 were established after U.S. support came to an end, and 22 fought against Daesh.

The military escalation in the northern Hama countryside is part of the pressure on Turkey to resolve its options and make concessions. The escalation also reflects the stalemate of the Astana process and the growing differences between its three sides. However, it is not expected that the current escalation will produce or lead to any political results in the light of the inability to end the military campaign and while indicators show there could be a new situation in the area.

The 12th round of the Astana negotiations, which took place on April 25-26, 2019, failed to achieve a breakthrough in the presented files especially the Constitutional Committee and the detainees, which was followed by several Russian statements of escalation, especially the statement of Russian President Vladimir Putin from Beijing in which he said “the possibility of the battle on Idlib still exists but the timing is not.”

Several days following Putin’s statement, the Syrian regime backed by its Russian ally began a military campaign in Hama northern countryside on 5 May, 2019, and captured several towns and villages, most notably Kafr Nabudahand and Qalat al-Madiq. Before this campaign started, the Syrian regime and Russian warplanes launched intense airstrikes on the northern and western Hama countryside and later extended to Idlib southern countryside.

The continuation of battles in Hama, the regime force’s difficulty in advance, the high number of casualties and the increasing tone of official statements from Turkey prompted analysts to provide multiple readings of the recent field escalation.

The Turkish stance towards this process was initially overshadowed by silence while European countries and the U.S. only issued timid statements. This came while opposition forces were able to temporary advance in the Tal Rifat area before it withdrew, which was interpreted as a “swap deal” between the Turkish and Russian sides. But the continuation of battles and the difficulty of the progress of the regime forces in addition to the high number of casualties and the escalation of the Turkish statements later, prompted analysts to provide multiple readings of the field escalation outside the framework of the “swap deal,” and this piece is trying to analyze the military escalation, the Russian and Syrian regime motives and exploring the limits of the current field escalation and the consequences on the political and field situation.

Military escalation: the indications

The failure of round 12 of the Astana negotiations to achieve a breakthrough in the file of the detainees and the Constitutional Committee, was followed by Russian statements on a possible operation in Idlib which it didn’t set a date for. These statements were accompanied by a marked escalation in the field since the beginning of May.

14 areas were hit by regime artillery, 40 were hit by Russian airstrikes, and 14 by regime airstrikes in Idlib and southern countryside of Idlib, Hama northern countryside and Aleppo western countryside were targeted between 1 and 5 May, 2019. Then regime forces with its militias backed by Russian forces launched a ground attack in northern Hama countryside while the shelling and airstrikes that targeted other areas continued.

From 6 to 14 May, 2019, (ground attack period): Southern Idlib, northern Hama, and western Aleppo witnessed 429 Regime artillery, 104 RuAF raids, and 95 SyAF raids, bringing the total number of Regime ‘violations’ of the DMZ agreement to 3598 artillery attacks, 131 SyAF and 281 RuAF airstrikes since 17 Sep 2018 until 14 May 2019.

Syrian regime forces and its backed militias, due to the firefight and the intensive shelling, have made progress on the ground and captured several towns and villages such as Kfarabouda, Qalqat al-Madiq and others. The size of the area that the regime’s forces captured recently from the armed opposition forces is 60 square kilometers.

Map (1): Northern Front Situation Map – 18 May 2019

The progress of the regime’s forces in Hama northern countryside, accompanied by the temporary progress of the Turkish-backed opposition groups in Tal Rifat area and the lack of clarity of the Turkish position on the current military situation, indicated that there was a “swap deal” between the Turkish and Russian sides. However, this analysis is hasty and inaccurate due to the following reasons:

• The withdrawal of the Euphrates Shield forces from the three locations controlled which they captured from PYD less than 3 hours.
• The strength of opposition defenses against regime attacks and ground militias in the northern Hama countryside.
• The Russian raids are random and include many sites in Idlib and not just the axes of the ground attack.
• The Turkish observation point in Sheer Mughar in south Idlib was targeted by regime artillery, forcing civilians in their vicinity to move into Idlib governorate.
• Recent Turkish statements that criticized Idlib military operation by the Russian and the Regime

The current military escalation in the field can be traced back to the stalemate in Astana and the growing differences between its parties, as demonstrated by the failure of the Round 12 negotiations to make any progress. Moscow’s desire to change the field’s equations so that it can move the negotiations and push its political vision for resolution and to pressure Turkey to ease its opposition to the Russian efforts within the course of Astana, and push it to respond to Russian demands in the de-escalation zone.

Moscow is trying to intensify pressure on Ankara to resolve its position on the S-400 deal, and to sabotage the understandings emerging between Turkey and the U.S. in multiple files.

Moscow is also trying to intensify pressure on Ankara to resolve its position on the S-400 deal, and try to sabotage the understandings emerging between Turkey and the United States in multiple files such as the situation in the east of the Euphrates. On the other hand, Iran and the regime want to invest military escalation to sabotage the Turkish-Russian understandings. This is what Turkish president Erdogan pointed out in the telephone conversation with his Russian counterpart saying that the regime is trying to inflame the situation on the ground to serve its political agendas and stalling the formation of the Constitutional Committee. While Iran wants to impose itself as a partner in the Sochi Agreement through its co-operative militias on the ground, as well as sabotage of emerging understandings aimed at its interests and influence in Syria.

10 May 2019, in the first six days of the battles, the Iranian-backed militia’s participation was confirmed on the following axes:

• The Lebanese Hezbollah – Tall Othman axis
• Qwat al-Ghaith (Part of the 4th division) – Kafr Nabudahand axis
• Qwat al-Ghadab (LDF) – Qalaat al-Madiq axis

The limits of military escalation and its political and field implications

Moscow bet on the completion of rapid field progress similar to what happened in the southern Syrian region last year (a military collapse followed by reconciliations), also bet on the growing Turkish-U.S. conflict and Ankara’s preoccupation with internal files but failed in part to achieve what it sought despite the intense airstrikes and the size of the forces participating in the ground attack, where the opposition factions and jihadi groups were able to absorb the shock and began to launch counter-attacks against the regime forces, the field operations showed the weakness of the ground forces backed by Russia (such as 5th Corps, Tiger Forces and Liwa al-Quds) and the significant casualties among its ranks.

As well as the field, operations did not affect the positions of Ankara and didn’t push Turkey to compromise as Moscow believed. In light of the current situation, it is likely a weak cease-fire will be reached but will be open to the possibility of resumption of escalation in the field and each party will seek to invest in the situation on the field and use it in political negotiations in Astana or the Sochi agreement. In conclusion, the Sochi deal cannot be bet on, as the deal faced several problems in the long run and it is unlikely to collapse in the future.

In the pre-war era of Syria, Arab tribes would send their youth to Gulf countries in order to provide families with additional income. With the war, many tribespeople had to flee and are now working in Turkey. For the tribes of Syria, the civil war has partially moved Turkey to the previous role of Gulf countries. Tribesmen in Turkey are sending parts of their income to their relatives in Syria and are organizing themselves in political and social structures. The tribes of Syria, and especially those in YPG-held areas, could play a significant role in enabling Turkey to push against the terror threat posed by the YPG on the bases of mutual interest.

For example, the tribes of Manbij have been divided geographically. While some live in Turkey and the Euphrates Shield areas, others still live in Manbij. In order to unite again in their hometowns, the tribes of Manbij released a statement that they reject the Manbij roadmap between Turkey and the U.S. and that they demand a direct Turkey-supported military operation by the National Army to liberate their hometowns from the YPG. Bushaban – the biggest tribe in Manbij – was historically moved by the Assad regime to Manbij as part of the Arabization policy. Therefore, the Bushaban tribe has a historical dispute with Syrian Kurds and is alienated by the current Kurdish governance within their hometowns. In the eyes of the tribes of Manbij, Turkey is the only foreign actor involved in Syria, who might enable them to get rid of the Marxist-Kurdish YPG.

The tribes of Syria, and especially those in YPG-held areas, could play a significant role in enabling Turkey to push against the terror threat posed by the YPG on the bases of mutual interest.

The tribes of Raqqa and DeirEzzor, which are located in the south of the discussed safe-zone, have their share in pushing Turkey to the east of the Euphrates. The six biggest tribes in the regions are Walda, Afadla, Sabkha, Ougaidat, Baggara, and Busaraya. Being grounded in historical enmities, territorial disputes, ethnic and ideological tensions, the tribes of the region have a hostile relation to the YPG. The Walda tribe for example was partially moved by the Assad regime in the 60s to Qamishli and Hasakah and are seen by the Syrian Kurds as ‘strangers who took their historic lands’ and were excluded by the YPG from any participation or voting in Qamishli and Hasakah. The Baggara tribe has a violent past with Syrian Kurds as they helped the Assad regime crackdown the Kurdish rebellion in 2004 and fought against the alliance between Syrian Kurds and the Bedouin Shammar tribe in 1944.

The Bedouin Shammar tribe is an exception among the tribes in eastern Syria, hostile to the Arab tribes and allied with the Syrian Kurds. Currently, the Shammar tribe is militarily organized under the Sanadid Forces as a close ally of the YPG. The Ougaidat tribe also played an important role in the said crackdown and the war. While the Afadla and the Busaraya tribe have expressed their rejection of the YPG in Arab cities, the Sabkha tribe demanded that cities should be governed by its own people.

While all these tribes have fellow tribespeople living in Turkey as refugees, they also welcome a bigger Turkish role in their hometowns and prefer Turkey and Turkey-trained armed Syrian opposition to the U.S.-backed YPG forces. The Walda, Afadla, and Sabkha tribes have welcomed the possible role of Turkey in the liberation of Raqqa, but were frustrated to see the U.S. preferring to work with the YPG. In the eyes of the Busaraya tribe, Turkey is a natural ally to contain the role of the YPG and Iran in Syria. The Baggara tribe also prefers Turkey and Turkey-backed Syrian rebels over the YPG and Iran, and has been specially organized and trained under the 20th Brigade by Turkey in northern Aleppo. Turkey has welcomed many leaders of the Ougaidat tribe in Turkey and is organized in northern Aleppo under the Jaysh al Sharqiyyah formation.

As tribes in Northern Syria share Turkey’s interest of kicking YPG out and US’ interest to contain Iran, they are looking forward for a Turkish operation in the east of the Euphrates.

Many tribesmen of the listed six above are also fighting under the umbrella of the National Army. In the past, all of these listed six tribes were formerly important supporters of the Free Syrian Army and provided many factions with supply and fighters. For these tribes, Turkey has to back a military operation east of the Euphrates to get rid of the invaders, and to re-gain control back over their hometowns. Therefore, in addition to many smaller tribes, these tribes are trying to push Turkey to take action. Another reason why these tribes prefer Turkey is their animosity against Iran and Iranian-backed Shia militias. The rejection of the Iranian role in Syria is hugely spread among the tribespeople. As tribes in Northern Syria share Turkey’s interest of kicking YPG out and US’ interest to contain Iran, they are looking forward for a Turkish operation in the east of the Euphrates.

The non-YPG elements in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) obtained different attitudes in their relation within this umbrella. While some like the Sanadid Forces allied with the YPG based on mutual interests, others joined them because they perceived the YPG as the lesser evil in comparison to Daesh. For example, many of the fighters in south DeirEzzor are from the Shaitat tribe, while many others joined the Turkish-trained Ahrar al-Sharqiyyah in northern Aleppo. In case Turkey gets into these areas, many of the non-YPG elements within the SDF might defect and join the Turkish-trained umbrella as many of their relatives already joined the National Army.

In general, the tribes in YPG-held areas are sympathetic towards Turkey with the exception of the Shammar tribe. While Turkey and the U.S. discuss a potential safe-zone in northern Syria, especially in the areas below the 20-mile line, there are tribes who are close to Turkey and see opportunities in cooperating with Ankara in order to get rid of the YPG, prevent an Iranian expansion, and to ensure their own governance. While discussions about the declared partial withdrawal of the U.S. continues, depending on the goodwill of the U.S. and Turkey, the tribes in the region could function as a vehicle to ensure an agreement while preserving Turkish and American interests.

News agencies reported yesterday that the Syrian regime is dispatching forces and equipment to the village of Arimah, 25 km west of Manbij.

Reporting from the region, news agencies stated that 40 pickup trucks, 2 military tanks, several trucks with military equipment and military personnel together with armored vehicles have entered Armiyah, a village near Manbij.

Reuters claimed that the Syrian regime backed by Russian forces are in coordination with YPG leaders in the Manbij region and are working together in order to respond to the expected military assault by Turkey-backed Syrian rebels who are waiting for the ‘signal’ to come from the Turkish military. Yousef Hamoud – a spokesman for the National Army – the main rebel force in the region backed by Turkey – said “the battle will start soon.”

According to experts in Turkey, after the decision of Turkey to enter the east of Euphrates and the decision of the US administration to withdraw its troops from Syria, the recent move of Syrian regime will once again change the balances in the region. The move of Syrian regime is understood by some experts as the ‘move’ of Russia indicating that ‘Russia cannot be left aside’ after the withdrawal decision taken by Trump in consultation with Erdogan.

Speaking to the Turkish press yesterday, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu remarked that Turkey is determined for a military operation in the east of the Euphrates. He added that Turkey is pleased with the withdrawal decision of the U.S. administration and will continue its military and diplomatic conducts in the process of this withdrawal.

Cavusoglu also remarked that both the U.S. and Turkish governments agreed on the Manbij issue and informed reporters that both countries are working closely in order to complete the process. It is reported that Cavusoglu will visit Russia in the upcoming days in order to discuss the U.S. withdrawal process.

The Turkish Ministry of Defense also commented on the developments in Manbij by tweeting, “In accordance with the developments in Manbij, the activity in the Arimah area has been observed to belong to the Syrian regime, which has been in the mentioned area since 2017. The developments are being followed.”

Anadolu Agency reported that the military equipment and trucks of the Turkish army have reached Elbeyli, Kilis – less than 150km north of Manbij.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi  

Yesterday in Geneva, Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Russia and Iran – Mevlut Cavusoglu, Sergey Lavrov, Muhammad Javad Zarif – agreed upon the establishment of a constitutional commission of which the composition is yet to be set.  

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov read the joint statement after the three ministers met UN Syria peace envoy Staffan de Mistura yesterday in Geneva, Switzerland. The statement emphasized that the agreement will be oriented “by a sense of compromise and constructive engagement.” 

Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu said that the three countries have reached an important phase in the establishment of the commission, which will write the future constitution of Syria, speaking to the press after the meeting.

Cavusoglu stated that there is no disagreement on the names proposed by both the Syrian regime and the opposition; he added “However, there are some differences of opinion on the list of non-governmental actors. In this matter, as the guarantor states we are working with the United Nations.”

Cavusoglu added that the three ministers also discussed the rules of procedure of the constitutional commission and said “In what percentage the commission has to take decisions, two-third or more, will there be a president or will he have deputies, will there be a co-president. We have discussed these kind of issues. So, we are coming towards an end gradually.”

Highlighting the intensifying efforts of the three countries in order to establish the commission as soon as possible, Cavusoglu said, “We anticipate that the first meeting of this commission will take place in the first month of next year. As the Astana guarantors of the process, we will continue the process by intensifying our efforts. In this regard, today’s meeting has been very productive. We hope that these meetings will bear best results for the political solution and the future of Syria. As an important actor, we (Turkey) will continue to retain our contribution to the process.”

On the other hand, according to Sputnik News, spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry – Bahram Qasimi – told Tasmin news agency that if the military operation, which Turkey wants to initiate towards the YPG/PYD in north of Syria, starts without the consent of the Syrian regime, the application of the agreements that have been agreed upon in Astana process will be difficult. 

Meanwhile, speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, Siban Hamo – the leader of YPG in northern Syria – said that Russian officials are pleased with Turkish threats to the U.S.-backed YPG in northern Syria and complained that the Syrian regime is not doing anything to defend its northern border. Hamo added “Turkey is seeking through all means to eliminate the gains made by the YPG and has mobilized its troops on the border and bombed terrorists inside Syria. We are ready for a joint action (with Syria) to deter Turkey.”

While Turkey is waiting for the ‘moment’ to start its military operation against the YPG controlled areas in Northeast Syria, Sputnik News reported that the one of the commanders of the Syrian Peshmerga under the autonomous Kurdistan administration in north of Iraq – Badal Bandi – stated that their forces will move to Syria soon.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi

President Erdogan recently announced that Turkey’s next military operation against the YPG/PKK in northeastern Syria might be launched “within a few days,” which became the top high-level statement made in Ankara most recently. The details such as time, particular target place and duration of the military operation are not precise yet, but Turkey’s strategic objective is clear: to de-territorialize the YPG/PYD alongside its Syrian border, fix relations with the U.S. in Syria and recalibrate its military presence.

More importantly, since Turkey previously conducted military operations in Syria, policymakers realized that without any military action Turkey could not reach any of its strategic objectives in Syria. Therefore, eliminating the PKK presence alongside Turkey’s Syrian border and maintaining an army presence there might provide Ankara with an additional political maneuver to consolidate its political stance within the Syrian crisis. This, especially, will be the case when the international actors begin to shape the future of Syria.

Turkey’s strategic objective is clear: to de-territorialize the YPG/PYD alongside its Syrian border, fix relations with the U.S. in Syria and recalibrate its military presence.

Although Turkey has an obvious agenda and strategic objective in the Syrian crisis and towards the PKK/YPG presence in Syria; others, especially the U.S., hold different strategic calculations and concerns regarding Turkey’s next military move in northeastern Syria especially a comprehensive military operation against the U.S.-backed YPG group. The U.S. attempt to establish observation points in the eastern part of Euphrates was clearly a strong signal to discourage Turkey to launch a military operation against the YPG’s strongholds such as Ayn El-Arab, Tal Abyad, and Rasulayn.

Following President Erdogan’ precise statement about Turkey’s next military operation, the Pentagon said that the military operation against the “SDG is not acceptable.” However, news coming from the ground shows that the U.S. began to withdraw its military forces from Tal Abyad. This development strongly demonstrates that Turkey’s military operation is underway.  Then two questions concerning Turkey’s upcoming military operation need to be answered. While the first one is the question of how Turkey is planning the military move on an operational level, the second one is the question of how Turkey’s next military action against the YPG will potentially reshape relations between Ankara and Washington.

News coming from the ground shows that the U.S. began to withdraw its military forces from Tal Abyad. This development strongly demonstrates that Turkey’s military operation is underway.

Regarding the operational dimension of military intervention, it seems that Turkey’s military operation at this stage will not be comprehensive compared to the previous cross-border operations such as OES and OOB. Even though there are different operational scenarios in the hands of the Turkish Armed Forces, such as conducting a comprehensive and full-scale direct intervention including the infiltration of ground troops into northeastern Syria, Ankara’s first aim is to discourage the U.S. from continuing its observation points alongside Turkey’s Syrian border to protect the YPG. Ankara believes that it would be too late if the U.S. continues to establish observation points.

Ankara’s primary objective is to create a militarily protected safe zone which will be liberated from the terrorist entities and then open up a territorial zone not only to protect Turkey’s border against the terrorist infiltration but also to prevent the YPG’s territorial continuity in the eastern part of the Euphrates River. This will undoubtedly be a game changer for Turkey on the ground. The new operation, therefore, would focus on forming a region liberated from the YPG along the Syrian border and controlling critical points. The first signal coming from the ground is that Tal Abyad might be the initial target of Turkey.

Turkey will certainly use its legitimate right of self-defense or intervention. For Turkey, the YPG issue is not negotiable.

Regarding relations between Turkey and the U.S., there are many strategic domains that both sides have to rethink through. If there is an agreement over Turkey’s military operation, then one side should certainly step back. President Erdogan said that the U.S. forces would not be the target of Turkey by underlying the potential cooperation between Ankara and Washington in the fight against the remaining element of Daesh. Erdogan strongly underlined that Turkey could take full-responsibility to fight against Daesh. More importantly, Turkey will certainly use its legitimate right of self-defense or intervention, as President Erdogan stated two days ago in Ankara. For Turkey, the YPG issue is not negotiable. Under this circumstance, Turkey, one way or another, will want to keep its eyes over the YPG and northeastern Syria until a political solution is reached across Syria.

Therefore, the most likely scenario for Turkey’s upcoming military operation is a limited intervention to clean the YPG presence by holding a small piece of territory to prevent the terrorist organization from consolidating its territorial and political order. If Turkey and the U.S. can find common ground to mitigate Turkey’s security concerns over the YPG, then the two countries might be able to establish a new modality to work in cooperation for Syria.

The U.S. wants to cooperate with Turkey on all issues related to the Syrian conflict and sees it as critical to end the civil war. The U.S. Syria envoy James Jeffrey points to the Manbij agreement as a good model for broader cooperation. He is reassuring Turkey that the PYD and YPG members are leaving Manbij and that they will not participate in local councils and the police force, as Turkish policymakers have demanded. Progress, however, in Manbij has been slow and Turkey has yet to declare that the YPG members have left to go east of the Euphrates. It is also not clear in what areas specifically this model can be replicated. Some progress is obviously better than none and the U.S.’ willingness to work with Turkey is an encouraging sign, both for stability of northern Syria and also for the end of the broader conflict. Nevertheless, we need to keep in mind that Turkey continues to be concerned about and feel threatened by YPG control and presence east of the Euphrates as well.

The envoy’s remarks about “pulling the plug” on the Astana process was met with criticism both by Turkey and Russia, who believe they have been making progress contrary to outside views about the lack of tangible results. The failure to create a constitutional committee to draft a new constitution has suffered from the dynamics of the conflict at play since the beginning. The opposition remains fragmented and Assad’s supporters, Russia and Iran, remain invested in the continuation of the regime. Determining the composition of the committee has been extremely difficult not only because the guarantor states cannot agree on who will be participating in the constitution writing process but also because of the fundamental dynamics of the conflict.

The only other alternative is for the U.S. to fundamentally shake up the dynamics on the ground and create a different game where other actors may be lured to a framework that excludes Iran.

In other words, if the balance of power is not significantly changed between numerous sides on the ground, there will be no party that is able to impose its will. By refusing to empower the Arab opposition in concert with Turkey, the U.S. has contributed to this fragmentation. It is not a matter simply of diplomatic negotiations over picking the constitution writers but it is also about creating a committee that reflects the power dynamics on the ground for drafting a constitution acceptable to all sides. In this process, the U.S. should actually support Turkey’s efforts and empower the opposition representatives at the negotiation table instead of calling for the replacement of the Astana process with that of the UN process. The Astana process has been effective in creating de-confliction zones and a forum for those with military presence on the ground to have sustained dialogue. It has not produced a political solution so far but it can contribute to it by engaging one of the most crucial actors on the ground, i.e. Iran.

The U.S. has already declared pushing Iran out of Syria as a major policy goal in Syria and Jeffery’s comments about the end of the Astana process appear to reflect that objective in mind. The Trump administration has been talking about confronting and rolling back Iran’s influence in the region, however it does not currently have a clear plan to achieve that. The only other alternative is for the U.S. to fundamentally shake up the dynamics on the ground and create a different game where other actors may be lured to a framework that excludes Iran. This, however, will be extremely difficult given Iran’s investments in Syria and willingness to commit its military and human resources on the ground. Absent a serious American investment to isolate Iran in Syria, Iran will continue to be part of the discussion as it can act as a spoiler militarily, politically, and diplomatically.

The good news is that the U.S. recognizes the crucial role of Turkey in all these goals, however the bad news is all these goals are unlikely to be achieved simultaneously. 

The U.S. balancing act between supporting the PYD and providing reassurances to Turkey to be able to cooperate on the resolution of the Syrian conflict is not an easy one. Moreover, the U.S. hopes to push Iran out of the equation in Syria while achieving a political solution to the civil war, as well as, an “enduring” defeat of Daesh. Granted that the complexity of the terrain has a lot to do with this complicated picture, but the lack of clarity and the mismatch of the U.S. goals with its investments on the ground is the enduring story from the Obama to the Trump administration. The good news is that the U.S. recognizes the crucial role of Turkey in all these goals, however the bad news is all these goals are unlikely to be achieved simultaneously. 

After Turkey and the allied Syrian opposition factions launched Operation Euphrates Shield and Operation Olive Branch, both areas in northern Aleppo and Afrin were cleaned from Daesh and YPG militants. After the success of these military operations, the Syrian opposition and Turkey invested in reconstructing, re-organizing, and re-building these liberated areas. However, the war-torn region faced a new security challenge, especially after the massive arrival of new internally displaced peoples (IDPs) from Ghouta, Homs, Hama, Derra, DeirEzzor, Raqqa, and Manbij. While Daesh and YPG cells have tried to sabotage the new administration of the Syrian opposition with terror attacks, other criminal gangs took advantage of the situation.

Although Turkey invested a lot to help the Free Syrian Police and the National Army recruit and train, criminal gangs exploited the weak security situation to harm the local population. Only after both Turkish-trained structures reached a certain level, on 19 November, the National Army and the Free Syrian Police started a wide-scale operation targeting those criminal gangs with the support of Turkey. The entire operation also gives a hint about the future security problems awaiting in Syria.

After Turkey trained the National Army and the Free Syrian Police, the two structures were able to kick-start a wide-scale operation targeting criminal gangs operating in Syria. 

Catching the big fish first

The security operation by the National Army and the Free Syrian police successfully disbanded the Shuhada al Sharqiyyah faction after a day-long fight. Shuhada al Sharqiyyah is a DeirEzzor originated faction that had to flee from its hometown towards northwest Syria due to the Daesh threat. After the liberation of Al-Bab from Daesh, Shuhada al Sharqiyyah broke the ceasefire with regime forces at Tadef and tried to escalate the situation. After this incident, Ahrar al Sharqiyyah, which is a component of the National Army, cut its ties with Shuhada al Sharqiyyah, and the faction was disbanded.

Over time, Shuhada al Sharqiyyah reorganized itself under the leadership of Abdurrahman el Huseyn, who is also known as Abu Hawl. While some claims suggest the faction to have up to 400 fighters, figures near 100-150 seem more realistic. After the faction reorganized itself in Afrin, it started to commit several crimes against the local population, including robbery, extortion, and other criminal activities.

On the evening of 18 November, a curfew was declared over Afrin, and the day after, the National Army and the Free Syrian Police started a joint operation with the support of the Turkish Armed Forces in order to disband the faction, to arrest its members, and to hand them to the criminal court. With the start of the operation, the Shuhada al Sharqiyyah faction showed fierce armed resistance using heavy weapons. This resistance led to clashes between both sides, which continued over midnight. Nevertheless, the National Army and the Free Syrian Police succeeded and arrested the faction members. During the clashes, several members of Shuhada al Sharqiyyah were killed and injured.

With these clashes ending in a determinate result of disbanding Shuhada al Sharqiyyah, the National Army, the Free Syrian Police and Turkish authorities displayed their decisiveness to combat criminal gangs in northern Aleppo and Afrin. With the end of these clashes, the leadership of the National Army published a new statement, saying:  “Our Security Operation Will Continue!”

In clearing the Shuhada al Sharqiyyah, the Turkish authorities, Free Syrian Police and National Army displayed their decisiveness to combat criminal gangs in northern Aleppo and Afrin. 

The second phase

On 20 November, the National Army leadership published a statement saying that they will continue with their security operation. The operation continued in Al-Bab in which several criminals were arrested and handed over to the Military Police of the Free Syrian Police. In contrast to the first day of the operation, criminal gangs have not attempted to resist against the National Army or the Free Syrian Police, as the decisiveness of the operation had become crystal clear.

Also, in contrast to the first day, the Military Police played a bigger role in arresting several in Al-Bab. However, a commander in the Northern Brigade, which is a component of the National Army told the author that all operations were spearheaded by the National Army. As seen on several images, the operation was conducted with heavy weapons in case of resistance from armed criminal gangs. Among the arrested in Al-Bab were Mohammed Abdulkarim Jard, Abdurrazzaq Waki and some remnants of Shuhada al Sharqiyyah in the village of Tal Aisha, north of Al-Bab.

During the same day, the Free Syrian Police captured a bomb loaded vehicle inside Azaz, which may be another sabotage and terrorism attempt by either YPG or Daesh militants. Due to the geographical situation of Azaz, which is close to YPG-held Tal Rifaat, YPG militants are the most likely suspects. Also, on the same day, Firka Hamza, which is a component of the National Army, handed over its checkpoints in Basuta in the Afrin region to the Free Syrian Police. At the end of the day, the Chief of Staff of the National Army published a statement, which imposed a curfew over Jarabulus for 21 November.

On 21 November, the security operation continued in Jarabulus, and a curfew was imposed on the city. Several criminals were arrested by the National Army and the Military Police of the Free Syrian Police and with the withdrawal of the National Army, the city control was fully handed over to the Free Syrian Police again. Within the third day of the operation, the Jarabulus court published a statement calling for people to file criminal complaints. At the end of the day, the leadership of the National Army published a new statement imposing a curfew over Al-Rai.

With the start of the operation on 22 November in Al-Rai, a criminal subgroup of the Jaysh al Sharqiyyah faction, which is a component of the National Army, surrendered themselves to the National Army and the Military Police. Together with other criminals in Al-Rai, the Military Police arrested 17 people. At the end of the day, the locations of Azaz and Akhtarin were declared as the next target of the operations. On 23 November, the Military Police arrested 3 different criminal gangs and 3 individuals in Azaz and Akhtarin. The Marea and Tel Rifaat Military Councils declared that they will also arrest criminals in Marea and hand them over to the Military Police.

The last operation was conducted on 24 November in Jinderes which is located in the Afrin region. The National Army and the Military Police arrested around 50 criminals and 8 criminals surrendered themselves to the authorities. At the end of the day, the National Army leadership published a statement declaring the end of the operation while pointing out that efforts against criminal gangs will continue.

After the security operation

While the entire operation began with a huge challenge, and all operations following were reported by several media outlets as “internal fighting among Turkey-backed groups,” in reality, it was a “clean up” operation, with the backing of Turkish Armed Forces. An important period of training, organization, supply and supervision by Turkey, the National Army, and the Military Police of the Free Syrian Police, succeeded to disband a strong faction, which proved the effectiveness of Turkish efforts inside Syria.

While some media outlets reported efforts in Syria as “internal fighting among Turkey-backed groups,” in reality, there was a “clean up” operation with the backing of Turkish Armed Forces in order to wipe criminal gangs from Afrin and Aleppo. 

However, the entire operation also gives us a hint about what will affect Syria’s security after peace, or at least after a more permanent ceasefire and de-escalation. Criminal gangs in the war-torn country have profited a lot from unstable conditions of Syria and the absence of state authority.

In all areas in Syria, criminal gangs are causing harm to the civil population. While areas controlled by the Russian and Iranian-backed Assad regime and U.S.-backed YPG still haven’t started wide scale operations to confront these criminal gangs, Turkey has put its weight behind such an operation in order to improve the living conditions of Syrians inside Syria, and to further accelerate the return of refugees.

The final declaration of the Istanbul summit, which included Turkey, Russia, Germany, and France was interpreted by some authorities as Turkey having changed its Syria policy. The reason for those comments was the insistence of Russia and France to include the Assad regime in the process of democratic transition in Syria and Turkey’s silence on the Russian and French demand on that matter.

In effect, during the summit Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan clearly expressed that for Syria to transit to a democracy, Assad had to leave his seat and the future of Syria had to be decided by the Syrian people, including the opposition groups and civilians which now reside outside of the country. Almost 3,5 million of them have taken refuge in Turkey from the start of the civil war.

Indeed, Turkey has followed the policy of regime change or democratic transition from the very beginning of the Arab Revolt in Syria. The inclusion of Assad to the process of democratic transition does not necessarily mean that Turkey’s policy on Syria has changed. To remind the reader, once the toppling of the Assad regime by the opposition through a military struggle proved impossible, especially with the Russian intervention in September 2015 and the U.S.’s policy shift of seeking regime change in Syria to providing support to the YPG against Daesh, the political solution to the Syrian crisis has become more salient. Turkey, to an extent, has conceded to a shift from a military to political solution to the Syrian crisis.

Turkey still maintains its position at the outset to remove the Assad regime in Syria. What has changed is merely the path towards that end, the political solution replaced the military solution to the crisis.

However, it can’t be argued that shifting from military to political means constitutes a policy change. The policy change does include not a change in means but a change in ends. Turkey still maintains its position at the outset to remove the Assad regime in Syria. What has changed is merely the path towards that end, the political solution replaced the military solution to the crisis.

Turkey’s current policy towards Syria is shaped around preparing the ground for political change, shift from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. The final step for ending the crisis in Syria harbors holding free elections in the country, which is expected to be resulted with the loss of Assad and its supporters since they constitute the minority. For that goal, Turkey has been struggling to sustain and enlarge its military presence in the country.

Turkey’s military operations in Syria – Operation Euphrates Shield and Operation Olive Branch – to purge terrorist groups from Jarabulus and Afrin respectively and the Idlib concord with Russia to protect civilians in the region and the Manbij concord with the U.S. to cleanse the region from the terrorist elements can be mentioned in this context.

Turkey’s policy of keeping and enlarging its military presence in Syria has two aims: Sustaining Turkey’s national security against YPG and Daesh terror and achieving democratic change in Syria.

More, President Erdogan declared that after Manbij, Turkey will hold another large-scale military operation towards the east of the Euphrates in order to dismantle terrorist elements from the region. This will also serve the same purpose of sustaining and enlarging Turkey’s military presence in Syria to make possible the political solution to the crisis. Having military presence on the ground and transferring it to political force at the table constitutes Turkey’s current policy towards the Syrian crisis.

Thus, Turkey’s military operation in northern Syria cannot be reduced to its struggle with the YPG. This policy of keeping and enlarging Turkey’s military presence serves for a double purpose: Sustaining Turkey’s national security against YPG and Daesh terror and achieving democratic change in Syria. It includes both defensive and revisionist goals. However, Turkey’s revisionism in Syria should not be interpreted as territorial expansion. One of the clauses of the declaration of the Istanbul summit clearly expresses that Syrian territorial integrity is to be respected and maintained. All countries signing the declaration agree on that Syria should continue its sovereign independence.

Turkey’s position in Syria should not be interpreted as territorial expansion. One of the clauses of the declaration of the Istanbul summit clearly expresses that Syrian territorial integrity is to be respected and maintained.

Nevertheless, it is still not clear that whether the two great powers, the U.S. and Russia, and Iran as well, will adjust to that policy of democratization in Syria. Turkey and European countries, especially Germany, will seek to end the crisis in Syria by finally democratizing the country. Both countries have borne the brunt of the undemocratic political conditions in Syria. Germany suffers from the refuge flood whereas Turkey suffers from both refuge flood and terrorist threats.

Today in Istanbul, four governments — Turkey, Russia, Germany, and France — are meeting for a summit over Syria, attempting to consolidate the Sochi Agreement signed by Russia and Turkey over Idlib, and re-invigorate the international political process. There is little reason to think that these talks can succeed on either front.

Turkey was drawn into the “Astana process” with Russia and Iran at the end of 2016. One of the key aspects of this political track was the creation of four “de-escalation” zones, three of which were then systematically liquidated by the Bashar al-Assad regime and its backers in Iran and Russia. By July of this year, only the Idlib de-escalation zone, the last province in insurgent hands, remained. The pro-Assad forces gave clear indications that Idlib was next and this assumption took hold. Having destroyed or humbled nationalist rebels across the country, and deported jihadist insurgents to Idlib, packing them in among a desperate, displaced population, the regime coalition was able to frame the apparently imminent offensive in “war on terror” terms.

On 17 September, a deal between Turkey and Russia was reached in Sochi as part of the Astana process that called off the pro-Assad offensive, for now, and created a demilitarized zone (DMZ) in Idlib. The zone cut ten miles into the insurgent zone, where Turkey has “observation posts”, and leaves the Assad-Iran forces surrounding Idlib. The responsibility was put on Turkey to clear the DMZ of heavy weapons by 10 October and by 15 October to remove the “radical terrorist groups”—namely Tandheem Hurras al-Deen, al-Qaeda’s new faction in Syria; Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), al-Qaeda’s former branch in Syria and the predominant insurgent force in the province; and the smaller jihadist groups that are dependent on HTS like the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).

It was unclear that HTS would comply with this arrangement, though they did through an ambiguously-worded eleventh-hour  statement. HTS announced that it was taking a “balanced” approach that prevented a sanguinary offensive by the regime coalition, yet at the same time they were not going to be dragged into a political process dominated by the regime’s allies.

The Turkish government has been engaged in a campaign to split apart HTS, drawing its reconcilable elements into the mainstream opposition, grouped with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) factions under the banner of National Liberation Front (NLF), while isolating and eliminating the extremist hard core. HTS understands this danger, and the danger of de-escalation, which has allowed the re-emergence of the protest movement—against Assad and the jihadists. To counter this, over the last two months, HTS has arrested scores of activists to try to dismantle civil society and bring the province under its sole control. The Turkish struggle with these al-Qaeda-linked and al-Qaeda-style jihadists poses a serious threat for the country  since their networks cross into Turkey itself. There is a risk of domestic terrorism from a Turkish crackdown on extremists in Idlib.

There is also a major trap-door in the September agreement for Turkey: assuming the jihadists are neutralized, the pro-Assad coalition remains poised to attack Idlib and might well take advantage of the reduced resistance either to launch a full-scale offensive or to impose a “reconciliation” (surrender) agreement in the province. While Turkey might, in theory, be open to a reconciliation agreement, it has to be known that such an accord would not prevent the wave of refugees and the scattering of terrorists inside Turkey that Ankara so badly fears. It would also invite in an Assad-Iran system that has close relations with Ankara’s sworn enemies, the YPG/PKK, perhaps bringing the Kurdish terrorists into another border area.

The primary factor determining whether a pro-Assad offensive is viable is whether Russia provides air support. The regime itself, as Russia knows better than most, is in tatters. But politically, the ongoing presence of HTS, a fact for the foreseeable future, could provide a pretext more or less at the time of Assad’s choosing. The dilemma for Moscow, finally made to choose sides, is that its feeble position leaves it trying to bluff its way into influence. Moscow has been able to temporarily delay an attack by Assad and Iran to preserve its relations with Turkey, since such relations are the easiest way to undermine and potentially fracture the NATO alliance. If and when the Assad-Iran ground force moves against Idlib, however, it is very unlikely the Russians will withhold airstrikes—they have already begun them, after all, if only to keep the pressure on Turkey, even as negotiations continue.

One way to prevent a regime coalition offensive in Idlib would be if the U.S. stepped in. If the U.S. could come to a more balanced position between Turkey and the PKK it could allow for a so-called “NATO zone” that would put nearly half the country out of reach of the pro-Assad coalition, and place Turkey’s territorial holdings in Syria under the political protection, if not the military protection, of the United States. This scenario remains unlikely since the U.S. has committed itself to the PKK. Over the summer, Russia was able to correctly read U.S. statements of support for rebels in the Deraa area of the south as hollow and managed to convince Israel to hold fire as Assad and Iranian militants seized the border zone. Similarly, while the U.S. and Turkey remain divided, it allows Russia to play one off against the other and advance its cause and that of its client regime.

This situation renders the efforts by Germany and France to energize the peace process moot. The Geneva process has in any case been significantly reshaped along Astana lines by the Russians so that it now favours “peace” on Assad’s terms, and, whether Russia lends an assist or not, the Assad regime—supported by Iran—retains a maximalist position that intends to reconquer every inch of Syria’s territory. The Europeans have no ability to stop this militarily and the belief that “reconstruction” funds do or can offer leverage over the regime is pure fantasy. Firstly, any funds fed into the Assad-held zone will be syphoned off to reinforce a patronage system of organised criminality and sectarianism. Secondly, a regime that has endured the last seven years of warfare will not be swayed from its course — let alone pushed from office  by money. At most, the Europeans could offer political support to Turkey, potentially making it more awkward for Russia to back an attack, though over time attention will fade and Idlib’s fate will likely be settled by force.

On Thursday, President Erdogan spoke at the TRT World Forum, which is currently taking place in Istanbul. The Forum, which began on Wednesday, brought many speakers from all across the world, with the theme “Envisioning Peace and Security in a Fragmented World.”

During his speech, President Erdogan repeated his call for serious reforms within the United Nations Security Council – an issue that he also emphasized during his speech at the United Nations General Assembly that took place in September in New York.

Speaking at the closing session of the Forum, Erdogan said, “We need to achieve a United Nations Security Council with participation from seven continents.”

Turkey’s criticism against the United Nations and the UNSC in particular has heightened due to the organization’s failure to successfully deal with the Syrian crisis, which has led to a mass refugee problem across the world.

Erdogan repeated his “The world is bigger than five” motto, and argued that reforms need to be initiated in accordance with this acceptance.

Reminding the audience of the historical context of the UN, and that it was constructed in this manner due to the circumstances of the Second World War, the Turkish President stated, “The era of the five permanent members of the UNSC is over, we are not living under the same circumstances.”

Apart from Syria, Erdogan underlined the issue of Palestine. Arguing that the Palestine issue is one that can be solved, the President argued that the main reason why this issue has been prolonged is because the UN fails to ensure that Israel puts to practice the decisions that have been made against it.

“There are many decisions that have been taken against Israel at the UN, but none of them is implementable.”

Turkey-EU relations

During his speech, President Erdogan also touched upon Turkey’s bid to the European Union. Talking about this historical process, the President also mentioned that there could be a potential referendum in Turkey regarding this issue.

“There are many things that we can contribute to the European Union. They may have things to contribute to us but what should be done is, I suppose, to consult with 81 million people [in Turkey] and see what they will decide.”

Syrian Civil War

Turkey has been an active and key player in trying to end the Syrian Civil War. While party to the Astana process, in which Iran and Russia are also guarantor states, recently Ankara and Moscow reached an agreement on the Idlib issue.

Idlib is the only stronghold for Syrian rebels, and throughout the last month the political agenda was full with news that the Assad regime in Syria were to attack the city with Russian air support.

In regards to the issues in Syria, President Erdogan emphasized that Turkish troops are currently in Syria because the Syrian people want them to be there.

“The people of Syria invited us there. ‘Come here to save us’ they said.”

Touching upon the fragile Turkey-U.S. relations, President Erdogan also accused the U.S. of sending 19,000 truckloads of weapons and ammunition to terrorist groups in Syria.

The PKK/PYD issue and the continuous support that the U.S. has provided for the group continues to be a main obstacle in healing relations between the two countries.

The speeches delivered by world leaders on the 73rd anniversary of the United Nations in New York City proved once again that the UN is not capable of addressing the issues of international politics comprehensively. There was no common discourse regarding international terrorism, there was no common understanding of global security issues, and more importantly, there was no common agenda to reform the current UN structure.

We witnessed the fall of multilateral discourse and ignorance towards the fault lines of world politics. The problem here is not solely related to the organizational structure of the UN per se. Instead, the problems lie at the very nature of international politics, which have been under fundamental transformation particularly since the end of the Cold War.

International politics is becoming more fragmented, more competitive and more unpredictable. The Trumpian understanding of international politics deepens the ongoing crises around the world and causes uncertainty.

The UN was initially established to construct an international society mobilized around the idea of universal values to protect shared humanitarian norms and prevent conflicts. “The UN was not created to take humanity to heaven but to save it from hell;” the former United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold once said. Since the Cold War, however, the UN has not been successful in delivering peace, stability, and security in the international system. More importantly, the UN as a universal supranational organization has been ineffective and unproductive in dealing with global security issues.

At the very end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama put forth the argument that the universalization of Western liberal democracy might be the final form of human government surpassing socialist views. He underlined that there was no other alternative socio-political system against the western countries that can console their superiority in the international order. Therefore, non-western societies were obliged to move toward the West and eventually embrace the western way of thinking.

However, Fukuyama’s the end of history thesis failed to predict the very nature of international politics, particularly its changing dynamics. The continuation of ethnic, religious, and sectarian conflicts across the world, the changing dynamics of international terrorism and the emergence of various global terrorist groups such as DAESH proved that the history did not end, and the west is not the only direction that the non-western societies have to look up to.

The Trump administration’s anti-globalist, nationalist, protectionist and well-established white supremacist rhetoric provokes us to rethink about the UN. The U.S. at the end of World War II created the UN, but today the U.S. itself is destroying it.

The problems are not only related to the U.S. perception of international politics and the UN’s role. The other powerful member-states are also responsible for the decreasing role of the UN in creating a more stable position in international politics. Russia, China, the U.K., and France are the same when it comes to building a shared sense regarding the role of the UN. More importantly, these states are responsible for creating instabilities. The Syrian Civil War is a textbook example to see the inefficiencies of the UN.

Even though the Assad regime has been disregarding principles of the UN Charter by using chemical weapons, barrel bombs and other internationally banned weapons against civilians since the beginning of the uprising in the country, the UN Security Council could not come up with any solution. The structure of the UNSC is influenced by the priorities of the five countries in regards to the Syrian Civil War in particular, the Middle East, and the rest of the world in general. As President Erdogan repeatedly underlines, the five permanent member states of the Security Council hold the will of the oppressed people in Syria.

The current organizational structure of the UN and the power-sharing mechanism do not represent an accurate geopolitical picture of international politics. The rise of new power centers and emerging regional actors should also be included in the decision making processes at the UN. There are no Muslim countries represented in the decision-making process.

The UN General Assembly recently condemned the U.S. decision on Al-Quds, but the veto power of the U.S. in the Security Council prevents the international society to rage against the pro-Israeli decision. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the existing UN structure will not only solve the crisis but also deepen the crisis towards a more radical line.

As can be seen in the case of the Syrian Civil War, the UN cannot even act timely to prevent a humanitarian disaster, and it is not effective in protecting human life from state violence. As President Erdogan underlined in his speech at the UNGA, the UN could only provide Turkey with 700 million USD to improve the conditions of refugees that Turkey is currently hosting.

In order to start a new initiative for UN reform, the UNGA should question President Trump’s speech as it reveals the main issues with the UN, and then, should refer to President Erdogan’s statements as a baseline to start thinking about its structure and possible reforms.

Turkish President Erdogan met his counterpart Putin in Russia’s Sochi on Monday. In a joint news conference with Erdogan, Putin stated that “We agreed that by October 15 (we will) create along the contact line between the armed opposition and government troops a demilitarized zone of a depth of 15-20 km, with the withdrawal from there of radically-minded rebels, including al-Nusra.” Further, he also expressed that the Turkish and Russian mobile patrol units will monitor the demilitarized zone. The agreed points were released days after the meeting but the list just adds a few more details to the statement on Monday without changing the substance.

The buffer zone to separate the hostile forces with a demilitarized corridor surrounding Idlib sounds all good. This is exactly what Turkey wanted to achieve as the Idlib deal is going towards a sharp edge. Nevertheless, there is a significant caveat in this deal: the expiration date. There is a reason why Putin specifically referred to October 15. What happens if the projected demilitarized zone cannot be established by then? What happens if the groups in Idlib refuse to return their heavy arms to show no threat to Russia? What if an actor from inside or outside of Idlib spoils the process by an attack of provocation? These are all significant questions worth to think about.

But no matter what, Turkey’s Idlib deal gave the rebels one more month to consider their options. It gave Turkey another month to make its preparations for the worst case scenario. It also presented another successful test for the Turkish-Russian cooperation in Syria. Especially Iran seemed to be less proactive towards the final decision of Monday. With the diminishing pressure felt from the Assad and Iranian regimes, Turkey and Russia will find a lot more to agree on.

As for Iran, they must have no hard feelings. As Turkey did not spoil their plans to maintain security around Damascus and further down the south, Iran should and seems like did respect Turkey’s concerns just across its border in Idlib. Perhaps it was not Iran but Russia who came to this conclusion and kept Iran out in the most recent phase of the deal, but regardless of that, Turkey and Russia should be and for now are the actors to negotiate over the fate of Idlib. This intermediary solution over Idlib is still just a plan whose implementation will be challenging. Further, it is more like a temporary resolution until the involved actors decide and negotiate what to do next.

And finally, this deal is just about Idlib and does not cover the neighboring Tel Rifaat let alone the rest of Syria. But all these concerns do not make the Idlib deal a bad one. This plan was needed for its implementation and for a long-lasting resolution in Idlib. Simply, you cannot continue without a start even though there is still a long path to walk through from Idlib to Tel Rifaat and to the rest of Syria. But you have to start from somewhere and, at this stage, it is Idlib.

What Turkey needed in Idlib was a stable situation in the city that will not destabilize Turkish territory across the border and will not harm the Turkish-Russian deal. Turkey so far has been onto this goal but the question as to what will happen to the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is still a question to decide about. In their recent statements, some pro-HTS accounts showed no sign of change in their hostile attitudes toward Turkey and Russia.

It almost seems like some rebel factions think that Idlib will not be like Northern Aleppo, Deraa, or Eastern Ghouta. It almost seems like they are confident that they will not lose a possible battle in Idlib. Yes, they can perhaps go underground and plan for a long-lasting insurgency in Idlib. But the simple fact about a possible Idlib offensive will guarantee a large-scale demolition of the city and loss of lives in great numbers. We will see whether we can see some sense of responsibility and rationality from the involved actors and we do not have much time to see the result as the expiration date of October 15 will come fast.

The Idlib uncertainty is temporarily over. However, following the Sochi Summit held on Monday, September 17, debates about the real winner in the Idlib case remains unclear. From a humanitarian standpoint, protecting more than 3 million civilians from a full-scale military assault carried out by the Syrian regime is a real achievement. However, from a geopolitical perspective, Idlib — as the last territorial stronghold of the opposition armed groups — turns into a chess-board between Russia and Turkey. At first sight, it seems that Turkey played a vital role in preventing a potential unilateral Russian-Syrian military offensive and found a new opportunity to maintain the existing border of the Idlib region; to consolidate its military presence through the extension of its military outposts, and to protect moderate opposition groups’ territorial control. However, the question of how Turkey will be able to deliver its gains on the ground is an open question and depends on how Russia thinks about the future of Idlib at the end of the expiration date of the deal signed between Moscow and Ankara in Sochi. But the strategic importance of the Russian-Turkish dialogue is valuable to maintain the deal. More importantly, Turkey’s Idlib projection might bring many new dynamics not only for Ankara’s own calculations regarding its position alongside its Syrian border but also for the future of the Syrian crisis.

From a very rationalist perspective, Turkey has many challenges as well as opportunities in the post-Sochi agreement period regarding its entire Syrian strategy. Turkey has to deal with challenging tasks in Syria. Among them, preventing the PYD-PKK’s consolidation of military and political leverage across Syria is the most crucial one, while the U.S. continues to reshuffle its original strategy about the Kurds in the eastern part of the Euphrates river. Maintaining the territorial control of the Afrin-Azaz-Jarablus triangle and protecting the Free Syrian Army’s status in this region are the secondary objectives that Turkey wishes to achieve. Consolidating the Free Syrian Army’s position militarily and empowering the Syrian political opposition within the wider geopolitical struggle regarding the solution of the Syrian crisis is another challenge that Turkey faces. Idlib is located at the center of these geopolitical concerns of Turkey. Fighting against the PKK means fighting against the U.S. at the same time, and struggling for a secure place for the Syrian opposition on the table means a deal has to be made with Russia.

From the Turkish perspective, winning Idlib at this stage has many strategic values. First and foremost, preventing a possible humanitarian catastrophe provides Turkey a real advantage not only for its already-deepening refugee issue but also for its economy. Before the Turkish-Russian deal in Sochi, in case of a unilateral offensive, the UN announced that more than half a million people from the Idlib region would be displaced and move towards Turkey’s border. Under the current circumstances and changing public perception towards the refuges, this would bring real trouble into Turkish politics, particularly before the upcoming local election. More importantly, during the time of economic uncertainty of the country, the refugee flow would bring the extra cost for the Turkish economy.

The second one is significant regarding the protection of human life from a full-scale military operation. In the post-Astana process of the Syrian crisis, Turkey has been consolidating the Syrian opposition under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army. The FSA played a vital role during Operation Olive Branch and Turkey could maintain its military presence in the Afrin region with the assistance of the FSA and restructured the very nature of the local politics there throughout the mobilization period of the FSA. In the post-Astana process in Idlib, Turkey did the same thing without clashing with any radical armed groups and regrouped the moderate armed group under the umbrella of the National Liberation Army. The deal which has been agreed upon between Turkey and Russia means that Turkey can maintain the existing territorial management of the moderate armed group and that it also gets to keep its military posts in Idlib. If Turkey can manage to disband and dissolve the radical groups on the ground, such as the HTS, then it can keep maintaining its control over the Idlib region to consolidate its political leverage in the Syrian crisis for the foreseeable future.

The third strategic value for Turkey is to protect Turkish-Russian dialogue on the ground. Turkey and Russia have been closely working since the Astana initiative started. Even though the two countries do not fully agree over the Syrian crisis since they have been supporting different parties, both sides can compartmentalize their tactical and operational priorities on the ground. The Idlib deal represents that both countries agree on a full-scale military solution would prolong the war itself. More importantly, losing Turkey at this stage would bring a new wave of uncertainty for Russia in the Syrian crisis. Even though the roughly one-month time frame for Turkey to dissolve the radical group is not enough, the strategic dialogue between Russia and Turkey can provide an extension to do this objective.

When taking the dimensions above into consideration for the new Idlib deal, Turkey also gets to keep its role in the Syrian crisis. Controlling remarkable territories alongside its borders with its armed forces in the opposition armed groups’ presence, Turkey is still playing a vital role for the future of the Syrian crisis in the international arena. At this stage, the most important objective for Turkey is to solve the potential radicalization of the armed groups. If Turkey can deliver its objective, then it can keep its overall position in the Syrian civil war.

The Turkish-Russian agreement arrived in Sochi in a meeting between President Erdogan and President Putin comes just in time to avert a major humanitarian crisis. The agreement is to create a demilitarized buffer zone between the opposition and the Assad regime from where heavy weapons would be pulled out. The 10 to 12-mile corridor would be free of al-Qaeda related terror groups under the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the zone would be patrolled by Turkish and Russian forces. It is clear that the implementation will be key in determining the ultimate success of the deal but preventing hundreds of thousands from rushing to the north is already a huge relief for Turkey.

The agreement, which will come into effect by October 10, is a diplomatic win for Turkey as well. Turkey has been lobbying Russia and Iran to prevent the Assad regime from committing more war crimes and creating yet another humanitarian disaster. Through the Astana process, Turkey has worked to deescalate the conflict and to create safe zones. The Assad regime has been using the presence of terror groups like the HTS to justify a major military operation against Idlib, which houses around three million civilians. The Turkish-Russian agreement sends a signal to the regime that it cannot ignore Turkey’s interests and export insecurity to its northern neighbor.

Turkey has adopted a forward leaning military posture since the summer of 2016 to ensure that security threats emanating from Syria no longer threaten the Turkish border towns. Both the Euphrates Shield and Afrin operations accomplished this goal to a large extent by pushing the YPG, Daesh, and regime control away from the border. A large-scale military operation by the regime against Idlib would upset the hard-achieved stability in the areas controlled by Turkey and Turkish-supported opposition groups. It would not only weaken Turkey’s ability to manage the humanitarian challenges on the ground but also threaten Turkish border security.

The most difficult part for Turkey will probably be ensuring that the HTS are removed from the buffer zone areas. The continued HTS presence has given the Assad regime an excuse to make a case for attacking Idlib. While it is extremely difficult and unrealistic for Turkey to eliminate HTS completely, the agreement gives Turkey time to force the group’s hardcore elements, which are in fact in the minority, to separate from the more local Syrian fighters and leave the area. This will be critical in removing the Assad regime’s excuse to attack Idlib.

In strategic terms, Idlib is the last bastion of the moderate opposition supported by Turkey. The agreement would require the opposition to pull its heavy weapons out of the buffer zone, which would remove the chance of an imminent clash with the regime forces supported by Russia and Iran. It is not yet clear whether Iran would abide by this agreement but it was already clear that Iranians did not necessarily alienate Turkey at this point. It would be extremely difficult for the regime to launch an offensive on its own without Iran’s help. If the opposition can feel somewhat secure as a result of this agreement, given that Turkish troops will be patrolling the buffer zone, they may be able to focus on other priorities such as providing security and confronting al-Qaeda related groups.

Turkey’s diplomatic success may have just saved thousands of innocent lives as well as yet another unnecessary humanitarian crisis. However, the Assad regime will certainly seek to take over Idlib eventually. If the Turkish-Russian deal succeeds, the opposition can survive and the contours of a future political deal can be based more on realities on the ground rather than the political goals of the Assad regime.

After last Friday’s tripartite summit of Iran, Russia, and Turkey in Tehran, there was another meeting this Friday, bringing Turkey, Russia, France, and Germany together in Istanbul. The meeting enabled France and Germany to be more involved in the resolution of the crisis. France and Germany’s positions on Idlib are very similar to that of Turkey for different reasons. Hence, we can talk about a European perspective on Idlib and it also includes Turkey’s. Going back to Friday’s meeting, all parties agreed on the necessity of a political solution for Idlib according to the statement of Turkey’s Presidential Spokesman Ibrahim Kalin. As these diplomatic exchanges continue, Turkey feels to have more time to facilitate a peaceful solution on Idlib.

Turkey is trying real hard to prevent a devastating battle from occurring in Idlib. The diplomatic talks that occurred in Tehran and this Friday in Istanbul are just one side of these efforts. The other side is pure realpolitik. Turkey increased its tone against a fait accompli regime offensive in Idlib and it further made its deterrence discourse more credible with new deployments on the ground. While the open sources did not give the specifics, what we know is that Turkey’s reinforcement included new troops and armored vehicles around its observation posts in Idlib and along its border with Idlib.

The reinforcement, on the one hand, serves the purpose of deterring a possible regime offensive, but on the other hand, it is also vital for Turkey if its deterrence strategy fails to deter the regime from starting the offensive. In such a scenario, these reinforcements will play a significant role for Turkey to defend its already-settled troops in Idlib. These troops had been deployed to serve in Turkey’s observation posts that were established in the Astana process of Turkey, Russia, and Iran. They were not designed for defensive purposes but merely for the reconnaissance mission. Now Turkey is making these posts defendable with new reinforcements and, hence, also deterring the regime and other hostile forces from attacking them.

What is crucial at this moment for Turkey is meeting on a middle ground with Russia. As long as Turkey and Russia can keep a common position based on mutual respect for their security perceptions, the situation in Idlib and elsewhere in Syria should be solved peacefully and satisfactorily for both countries.

Excluding the American sphere of control in Syria, Turkey’s primary concern is the PYD’s role in Tel Rıfaat and Russia’s primary concern is the armed groups in Idlib. Turkey has already designated the the Hey’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as a terror organization and it seems like Turkey will increase its pressure on the HTS to dissolve itself or leave Idlib. As long as Russia plays a supportive role in Idlib, the city can be cleaned from groups like the HTS without burning down the entire city and causing another humanitarian catastrophe.

Turkey’s primary strategy in this game is to deter the Syrian regime from a brutal offensive while trying to find a middle ground with Russia and bringing the similar minded European powers closer to the game. This strategy seems to not be a maximalist one but quite a reasonable and applicable strategy that can convince both Russia and European powers. What Turkey and the rest of the reasonable actors need now is to prevent spoilers from undermining this well-crafted strategy.