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proposed agreement being discussed by Iran and Oman to help end five months of conflict between Iran and the United States would give Tehran authority over commercial vessels entering the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz, according to Iranian and regional sources, potentially marking one of the most significant shifts in Gulf maritime security in decades.

The proposal, if finalized, would grant Iran oversight of inbound shipping through the strategic waterway, through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil trade passed before the conflict disrupted maritime traffic. Regional officials said negotiations remain ongoing, with key issues still unresolved, despite Iranian officials reporting substantial progress.

There was no immediate comment from Washington on the reported proposal. U.S. officials have consistently maintained that they would not accept Iranian control over navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, despite President Donald Trump’s recent assertions that an agreement to reopen the waterway could be close.

The talks are taking place amid broader diplomatic efforts to end the conflict that erupted in late February, when U.S. and Israeli military operations against Iran triggered months of fighting across the region.

According to a senior Iranian source and two regional officials familiar with the negotiations, the draft arrangement would require commercial vessels entering the Gulf to transit through Iranian-controlled waters, giving Tehran an unprecedented administrative role over maritime traffic.

Some form of control

One regional official described the proposal as representing “some form of control” already conceded in principle, though negotiators remain divided over how that authority would be implemented in practice.

“The concession has already been made regarding some form of control over Hormuz,” one regional source said, adding that details regarding inspections and oversight remain under discussion.

Another regional source said Gulf states are seeking a framework in which regional countries would supervise any inspections of commercial vessels and ensure that any payments required from shipping companies remain voluntary.

A senior Iranian official said Tehran is seeking to levy fees of between 5% and 7% of cargo values on ships using the strait, while Oman has proposed charges closer to 3%. The United States, however, continues to oppose any transit fees, insisting that Hormuz remain an international waterway with unrestricted access.

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi said negotiations with Oman had reached “fundamental understandings” and suggested an agreement was nearing completion.

Speaking to Iran’s official IRNA news agency, Gharibabadi said the proposed arrangement was designed so that commercial vessels would pass through Iranian territorial waters on both inbound and outbound voyages.

He added that discussions had reached “the verge of being finalized.”

However, regional officials cautioned that significant differences remain, particularly over whether Iran’s authority would extend equally to ships leaving the Gulf, as well as the legal basis for any administrative role Tehran would exercise.

Regional energy infrastructure

The negotiations come as Iran has simultaneously intensified its warnings to Gulf Arab states against supporting any renewed U.S. military action.

According to several regional sources, Tehran has privately warned neighboring Gulf countries that any future American attack on Iranian territory would trigger retaliation against critical regional energy infrastructure.

“The Iranian warning was unequivocal: if America targeted Iran’s infrastructure, they would retaliate by striking Gulf energy facilities and other regional targets,” one Gulf source said.

Since the conflict began, Iran has repeatedly targeted regional allies of the United States with missile and drone attacks while also disrupting commercial shipping through Hormuz.

Iran says more than 3,400 people have been killed since the war began, while the United States has reported the deaths of 18 military personnel.

President Trump has increasingly emphasized diplomacy after months of military operations failed to reopen the waterway fully or compel Tehran to accept Washington’s demands.

Addressing supporters in Las Vegas, Trump said he preferred a negotiated solution despite warning that military action remained an option.

“I’d rather make a deal because I don’t want to kill people,” Trump said. “I do not want to kill people, but at some point we’re gonna.”

The reported negotiations reflect a notable evolution in the conflict, which has increasingly centered on maritime access rather than direct military confrontation.

Iran has argued that previous flexibility in negotiations only encouraged greater pressure from Washington, leading its leadership to conclude that stronger leverage is necessary before meaningful talks can proceed.

A major strategic shift from the pre-war status quo

The proposed arrangement would also represent a major strategic shift from the pre-war status quo, when commercial vessels transited the Strait of Hormuz without paying fees or seeking authorization from Iran.

The waterway remains one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors, serving as the primary export route for Gulf oil and liquefied natural gas.

Despite optimistic statements from Tehran and Washington about the prospects for diplomacy, officials involved in the talks stressed that no final agreement has been reached.

Political disagreements over shipping fees, inspection authority and the precise definition of Iranian control continue to complicate negotiations, while broader questions surrounding the future security architecture of the Gulf remain unresolved.

The talks also come as Trump faces growing domestic pressure to end a conflict that opinion polls suggest remains unpopular with American voters ahead of November’s congressional midterm elections.

Oil prices fell in recent days after Trump suspended plans for renewed military strikes, citing ongoing diplomatic efforts that he said could eventually lead to the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

(Source: Reuters)

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ran is increasingly relying on economic disruption rather than direct military confrontation to pressure the United States into making concessions over the Strait of Hormuz, expanding threats to regional shipping routes and energy infrastructure as the conflict enters a prolonged phase.

According to Gulf officials, regional sources and analysts, Tehran believes that sustained pressure on global trade and energy markets will prove more effective than conventional military escalation in forcing Washington to reconsider its position.

Rather than seeking a decisive battlefield victory, Iran has adopted a strategy of calibrated escalation designed to steadily raise the economic and political costs of the conflict while avoiding an all-out regional war. The objective, analysts say, is to convince the United States and its allies that accommodating Iran’s demands over the Strait of Hormuz is less costly than continuing the current confrontation.

“Iran, from the beginning, has tried to out-escalate the United States by stretching out its escalation options so that it always has something new to bring every week — a new geography, a new type of weapon, a new type of target,” Michael Knights of the Washington Institute told Reuters.

He argued that Iran’s greatest leverage lies not in its ability to inflict military damage on the United States or Israel, but in its capacity to disrupt regional economies and global commerce.

“The bigger advantage they have is not that they can hurt America or Israel,” Knights said. “Their big advantage is that they can hurt the regional states and the global economy.”

Pressure beyond Hormuz

After demonstrating its ability to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz — a waterway that carried around one-fifth of global oil consumption before the conflict — Iran has signaled that its pressure campaign could extend well beyond the strategic chokepoint.

Threats directed at the Red Sea and Saudi energy infrastructure suggest Tehran is seeking to widen the geographical scope of the crisis, increasing the cost of protecting international shipping while testing Washington’s willingness to sustain a prolonged confrontation.

One Gulf source said commanders in Iran’s Revolutionary Guards believe recent developments have strengthened Tehran’s negotiating position.

“The Iranians believe that by widening the war and increasing the pressure, he will eventually give in,” the source said, referring to U.S. President Donald Trump. “Trump thinks he can hit the Iranians hard and bring them to the negotiating table, but they won’t bend.”

That assessment has shaped Tehran’s negotiating strategy, according to Iranian and regional sources.

Trump said on Monday that negotiations with Iran would take place after he canceled a planned military strike in hopes of securing an agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials, however, denied that talks with Washington were currently underway.

A senior Iranian source said Tehran’s leadership has concluded that previous attempts at flexibility only encouraged greater pressure from Washington, reinforcing the belief that meaningful negotiations can occur only after Iran establishes stronger leverage.

In Tehran’s view, the source said, Trump interprets concessions as weakness and responds only to sustained pressure.

Michael Singh, another senior fellow at the Washington Institute, said Iranian leaders appear convinced they still hold the initiative because the Trump administration remains uncertain about how far it is willing to escalate militarily.

“The Iranians are trying to press their advantage,” Singh said. “They’re interested in establishing sovereignty over the strait and exercising selective control over the waterway.”

Dispute over the Strait

At the heart of the standoff is the future administration of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors.

Regional sources say Oman has presented Tehran with a Gulf-backed proposal that would establish a mechanism for managing shipping through the strait, including voluntary user fees.

Iran, however, is reportedly seeking administrative authority over the waterway and the right to impose service charges on vessels passing through it.

Washington has rejected any arrangement that would allow Iran to exercise control over the strait, insisting it must remain an international waterway open to unrestricted commercial navigation.

Former U.S. diplomat Alan Eyre said Iran’s broader strategy is intended to deter further American military action while forcing Washington to lift its naval blockade and reconsider its negotiating position.

“They don’t want the U.S. to dictate the pace of events,” Eyre said.

War of endurance

Analysts say Iran’s campaign has already shifted the focus of regional and international efforts.

Rather than intensifying military pressure on Tehran, Gulf states and Western governments are increasingly concentrating on protecting commercial shipping and critical energy infrastructure.

The formation of a Saudi-led maritime coalition reflects that shift. According to Gulf sources, the initiative is primarily defensive, focusing on escorting commercial vessels, sharing intelligence and safeguarding vital sea lanes instead of confronting Iran directly.

Knights compared the effort to Europe’s Aspides naval mission in the Red Sea, which was established to protect merchant shipping rather than alter the regional military balance.

For Tehran, forcing rivals into an expensive defensive posture represents a strategic success despite its military disadvantages.

Unable to match U.S. military capabilities directly, Iran can still impose significant costs by compelling regional governments and foreign navies to devote increasing resources to securing global trade routes.

Each new threat, whether in the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait or elsewhere, increases the financial and military burden of keeping international commerce flowing.

Analysts describe the conflict as increasingly becoming a contest of endurance.

Iranian leaders appear to believe they can withstand economic pressure longer than the United States and its partners can tolerate repeated disruptions to global energy supplies and maritime trade.

The strategy also serves a diplomatic purpose.

By demonstrating an ability to expand the crisis whenever necessary, Tehran hopes to strengthen its bargaining position before any future negotiations.

“If there are going to be negotiations, they will define the terms,” said Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations. “Both sides are matching escalation with escalation.”

Despite intermittent diplomatic efforts, neither Washington nor Tehran has shown signs of backing down.

As both sides continue to test each other’s resolve through economic pressure, military deterrence and political signaling, analysts warn that a strategy intended to maximize leverage could still spiral into a wider conflict that neither side intends or is fully able to control.

(Source: Reuters)

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ommercial shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait dropped to its lowest level in months after Yemen’s Houthi movement launched attacks on Saudi oil installations along the Red Sea coast, raising fresh concerns over maritime security and global energy supplies.

Shipping data from Kpler showed that only 11 commodity vessels transited the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on Sunday, reflecting a sharp decline in traffic as ship operators reassessed risks following the latest escalation. The disruption comes as the Tehran-aligned Houthis seek to impose a blockade on Saudi exports, broadening the regional fallout from the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict.

The reduced vessel traffic has already pushed physical crude prices in the Middle East, Europe, and Africa to two-month highs, highlighting growing concerns over the stability of key global shipping routes.

Among the vessels that passed through the strait were seven oil tankers, including two very large crude carriers (VLCCs) bound for Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu port to load crude oil. Another tanker linked to Russia also entered the Red Sea.

Hong Kong-flagged New Explorer

Meanwhile, four tankers exited the Red Sea carrying crude destined for Asian markets. These included the Hong Kong-flagged New Explorer, transporting approximately 2 million barrels of Saudi and Emirati crude to Ningbo, China, another tanker carrying 1 million barrels of Russian crude for China, and a vessel delivering roughly 750,000 barrels of Saudi crude to Pakistan.

A second Hong Kong-flagged VLCC, New Pearl, carrying 2 million barrels of Saudi crude to Zhoushan, China, was also reported leaving the Red Sea, becoming the fourth Chinese supertanker to transit the route since the Houthis declared a naval blockade.

The Houthi military said it targeted facilities operated by Saudi state-owned oil giant Aramco in the Red Sea cities of Yanbu and Jizan on Saturday, further escalating tensions in the region.

Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz also remained subdued over the weekend despite a pause in direct U.S. and Iranian strikes. Fewer than 10 commodity vessels crossed the strategic waterway each day, according to Kpler data.

On Sunday, seven vessels transited Hormuz, including three Iranian-linked product tankers leaving the Gulf. The previous day, only three vessels passed through the strait with their tracking systems switched off, including a VLCC heading to Qatar, a liquefied petroleum gas tanker bound for the United Arab Emirates, and a tanker carrying Qatari naphtha to Japan.

The continued disruption across both the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz underscores mounting risks to global shipping and energy markets as regional tensions remain high.

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emen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement announced a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia on Monday, threatening to expand the regional conflict linked to the ongoing U.S.-Iran war and raising concerns over global energy supplies and international shipping.

The Houthis said the “maritime embargo” would take effect immediately, describing it as retaliation against what they called Saudi Arabia’s continued blockade of Yemen. The announcement broadens the conflict beyond the Gulf, bringing the strategically vital Bab el-Mandeb Strait into focus after shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has already been severely disrupted.

The Saudi-led coalition said it would respond “with force” to the Houthi announcement and confirmed that additional security measures had been implemented to protect commercial and military vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a critical route for Saudi oil exports.

The latest development raises the possibility of simultaneous disruptions at both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb, two of the world’s most important maritime energy corridors.

Analysts warn that a prolonged closure of Bab el-Mandeb could significantly reduce Saudi oil exports and further strain global energy markets already affected by the fighting in the Gulf.

Diplomacy continues despite escalation

The Houthi announcement came as diplomatic efforts to restore a ceasefire between Washington and Tehran appeared to continue.

A senior Iranian official told Reuters that mediators had presented Tehran with a proposal for a 10-day ceasefire aimed at preserving the interim agreement reached last month.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry confirmed that mediators had submitted proposals but did not disclose further details.

Separately, Pakistani officials said Iranian Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni had requested Islamabad to resume mediation efforts between the United States and Iran.

Despite renewed diplomatic contacts, military operations continued across the region.

U.S. Central Command launched another wave of strikes against targets in Iran, while President Donald Trump defended the attacks, saying they were carried out in response to recent Iranian attacks that killed American service members.

The Pentagon identified two U.S. soldiers killed in an Iranian strike on a U.S. base in Jordan last week and said unidentified remains believed to belong to a third missing soldier had been recovered. A fourth U.S. service member was killed separately in northern Iraq during the controlled detonation of unexploded ordnance from an Iranian drone.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it launched missile attacks against U.S. military facilities in Jordan, Kuwait and Syria, while Bahrain reported repeated air raid sirens and Kuwait said its air defense systems intercepted Iranian drones overnight.

Shipping and oil markets under pressure

The Houthis’ announcement briefly pushed oil prices higher before markets stabilized amid hopes that diplomatic negotiations could prevent a broader regional war.

Insurance premiums for vessels operating in the Red Sea increased as shipping companies assessed the heightened security risks.

Meanwhile, the IRGC said two oil tankers had exploded after attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz via what it described as an “unsafe” route, though Reuters was unable to independently verify the claim.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) also reported that a commercial vessel had been struck by an unidentified projectile off the coast of Oman.

The latest escalation underscores the widening geographic scope of the conflict, with military operations now stretching from Iran and the Gulf to Yemen, Jordan, Syria and Iraq.

While diplomatic initiatives remain underway, continued exchanges of military strikes and expanding maritime threats have raised fears that the conflict could further destabilize regional security and disrupt global energy and trade routes.

(Source: Reuters)

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hen one thinks of the Middle East and Iraq, the first thing that springs to mind is often oil. However, developments in Iraq over recent weeks have once again demonstrated that oil is no longer merely an economic resource, but a strategic factor that determines state capacity, foreign policy and the regional balance of power.

Following the tensions between Iran and the West, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz provided short-term relief in global energy markets. However, for Iraq, this process did not merely signify a return to normal oil sales. The Baghdad administration has also brought back onto the agenda its long-delayed objectives of increasing production and securing a higher quota within OPEC.

Whilst this may appear at first glance to be merely a matter of energy policy, there is a larger story behind the issue. As is well known, oil is both the most vulnerable and the seemingly strongest aspect of the Iraqi economy. Oil revenues bear the main burden of the state budget. Many sectors, ranging from public sector wages to infrastructure investment, and from security expenditure to social payments, are dependent on this revenue. Consequently, every fluctuation in international markets comes to the attention not only of the economic bureaucracy but also of political decision-makers in Baghdad. Even a slight decline in oil revenue can place significant pressure on the state.

The messages conveyed by the Iraqi government in recent weeks are therefore noteworthy. On the one hand, new international investments are being discussed; on the other, it is stated that production capacity can be rapidly increased. The recent interest shown by major energy companies in oil fields suggests that Baghdad wishes to draw up a long-term growth plan. The recent increase in production in the southern oil fields also emerges as a development serving the effort to boost capacity.

Turkey-Iraq talks

However, the main issue in Iraq is not merely about producing oil. The real challenge facing Iraq is determining via which routes, with what political guarantees and within what economic framework it will deliver the oil it produces to the world market. From this perspective, the renewed intensive energy talks between Turkey and Iraq carry particular significance. The topics on the agenda between Ankara and Baghdad point to a broader framework than merely the technical operation and capacity expansion of the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline: oil, natural gas, electricity, energy supply security and the energy dimension of the Development Corridor.

The Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline, which has passed through Turkey for years, has become one of the most critical elements of this equation. The recent talks between Ankara and Baghdad, which have focused on energy cooperation, do not merely signify the renewal of a technical agreement. It appears that the two countries are seeking ways to establish a new energy architecture that will adapt to the changing regional geopolitical landscape. The duration of the agreement, the pipeline’s capacity, the transport of oil to the Mediterranean, and Iraq’s need to diversify its export routes are all being discussed at the same table.

The situation is equally significant not only from Iraq’s perspective but also from Turkey’s. Turkey has long aimed to be a country that manages energy corridors. One of the fundamental and most important pillars of this strategy is the secure delivery of Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean. For this reason, stable energy relations with Baghdad will also serve as a key tool in building political trust. An energy corridor stretching from southern Iraq to the north, and from there to Turkey and the Mediterranean, will form part of a broader picture encompassing regional trade, transport and security.

Iraq, meanwhile, has learnt the hard way in recent years the risks of relying on a single export route or a single regional balance of power. Crises in the Strait of Hormuz, the prospect of regional war and the occasional disruption of export routes in the north are prompting Baghdad to develop alternative routes. Iraq must now define its energy security not only in terms of production capacity but also through the diversity of its export routes. Consequently, the future of the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline has become a key indicator of Iraq’s capacity for economic sovereignty.

Anti-corruption operations

Amidst all this, another notable development has been the anti-corruption operations being carried out domestically. The operations in Baghdad, which have targeted high-ranking figures, send a significant message regarding the corruption networks that have long been the subject of discussion within state institutions. Of course, it cannot be expected that a few operations will eliminate decades-old institutional problems. However, the rule of law and transparency in public administration will be just as decisive as oil in shaping international investors’ view of Iraq.

Similarly, the US’s resumption of dollar transfers to Iraq should not be interpreted merely as a technical financial decision. This step demonstrates that economic ties between Washington and Baghdad have not been completely severed, but that issues of security, militias and financial oversight remain on the table. It has once again become clear that economic and security issues cannot be addressed in isolation from one another.

Viewed in the light of these developments, Iraq today stands at what is perhaps one of the most critical economic thresholds of the post-2003 era. Whilst the country is striving to attract major energy investments on the one hand, on the other it is seeking to strengthen public administration, strike a balance in its foreign relations and keep as far away as possible from regional crises. If successful, it could not only become a country that increases its oil production but also emerge as a new regional actor at the centre of energy, trade and transport corridors.

However, it is clear that oil revenues alone will not be sufficient for this to happen. Institutional reforms, legal predictability, investment security and sustainable relations with neighbours are just as important as new oil fields. The fundamental challenge facing Iraq is not actually extracting oil, but utilising oil revenues for the benefit of the state. To the extent that Baghdad succeeds in this, it may cease to be a conflict zone where regional crises persist.

From Turkey’s perspective, too, it would be insufficient to view developments solely through the prism of the oil trade. Iraq’s transformation into a stable, economically strengthening country open to regional integration will serve Ankara’s interests across many areas, from security to trade, and from logistics to energy. Consequently, in the coming months, we will be monitoring not only whether Iraq can produce more oil, but also whether it can channel this oil into political stability and economic development.

(Originally published by Middle East Africa website in Turkish)

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he United States and Iran exchanged their heaviest military strikes since last month’s ceasefire on Wednesday, raising fears that the fragile truce between the two longtime adversaries has effectively collapsed as President Donald Trump declared the interim agreement with Tehran was “over.”

The renewed escalation unfolded as NATO leaders gathered in Ankara, where Trump confirmed that Washington had resumed military operations against Iran following what U.S. officials described as Iranian attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

According to the United States, the latest strikes were launched in response to Iranian attacks on three commercial vessels transiting the strategic waterway, one of the world’s most important oil shipping routes.

Iran responded by announcing missile and drone strikes against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, marking one of the most significant direct confrontations between the two countries since fighting resumed.

The exchange represents the most serious breach of the preliminary ceasefire reached last month following weeks of conflict and negotiations mediated by regional partners.

“I think it’s over”

Speaking alongside NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on the sidelines of the alliance summit, Trump signaled that Washington no longer viewed the interim memorandum of understanding with Tehran as viable.

“I think it’s over,” Trump told reporters when asked about the agreement that had temporarily halted fighting.

The U.S. president also dismissed prospects for renewed engagement with Iran, saying he no longer wished to negotiate with Iranian leaders, whom he described as “sick people.”

His remarks suggested the diplomatic process that had accompanied the ceasefire has effectively broken down, even as military exchanges continue to intensify.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry accused Washington of undermining the agreement through both military action and economic pressure.

In a statement released Wednesday, Tehran said recent U.S. airstrikes, together with Washington’s decision to revoke Iran’s oil sales license, had rendered key parts of the ceasefire arrangement “ineffective.”

Iran also accused the United States of interfering with maritime arrangements governing passage through the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that such actions had made implementation of the truce increasingly impossible.

The ministry warned neighboring countries hosting U.S. military forces not to allow their territories to be used for further American attacks against Iran, an apparent reference to Gulf states including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

The warning followed Iran’s announcement that it had launched missiles and drones against U.S. military targets in Bahrain and Kuwait earlier in the day.

Iran’s Revolutionary Guards also reported that one member of its naval forces had been killed while confronting U.S. drones near the southern port of Mashahr.

The latest military exchanges have raised concerns that the conflict could once again spread across the wider Gulf region, threatening global energy supplies and commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil exports.

Regional tensions grow as aviation warning expanded

The renewed fighting has already prompted international aviation authorities to strengthen safety warnings across the Middle East.

The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) announced that commercial airlines should avoid operating within both Iranian and Iraqi airspace because of the heightened risk of military activity.

The updated advisory remains in effect until August 31 and replaces an earlier warning that had also covered Lebanese airspace.

EASA continues to advise airlines to exercise caution when operating near Bahrain, Kuwait, Israel, Jordan, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates because of the potential for further military escalation.

The deteriorating security situation overshadowed discussions at the NATO summit in Ankara, where alliance leaders were expected to focus on defense spending, regional security and support for Ukraine.

Instead, much of the attention shifted to Trump’s remarks on Iran and his broader comments on NATO allies.

Criticism against Spain

The U.S. president also launched a sharp attack on Spain, accusing Madrid of failing to meet its defense commitments within NATO.

Trump said he had instructed Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to halt all trade with Spain, calling the country “a terrible partner” in the alliance.

“I don’t want anything to do with Spain,” Trump told reporters.

He also criticized NATO over Greenland, renewing longstanding complaints about the Arctic territory and alliance burden-sharing.

The renewed conflict between Washington and Tehran comes after weeks of fragile diplomacy aimed at preventing another prolonged regional war.

Although the interim agreement had reduced direct military confrontation, tensions remained high over Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions, maritime security and regional influence.

With both sides exchanging military attacks and publicly questioning the viability of previous agreements, regional governments are increasingly concerned that the Gulf could once again become the center of a wider confrontation involving U.S. forces and Iranian-backed groups.

The latest developments also place additional pressure on NATO leaders meeting in Ankara, many of whom have emphasized the importance of preventing further instability in the Middle East while maintaining freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

As military operations continue and diplomatic rhetoric hardens, the future of any negotiated settlement between Washington and Tehran appears increasingly uncertain.

(Source: Reuters)

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n the current climate, where the global energy architecture is undergoing structural upheavals and supply chains are being reconfigured, Turkey is rising far beyond the role of a mere ‘transit country’ or ‘bridge’ to become a ‘hub’ that shapes the rules of Eurasian energy geopolitics. The energy partnerships established with Azerbaijan form the most solid foundation and strategic complement to this vision, which Ankara has built with a long-term strategic vision. The infrastructure initiatives, whose foundations were laid with the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and which have reached an intercontinental dimension through the Southern Gas Corridor, confirm that Turkey is the sole strategic gateway opening up the Caspian Basin’s resources to global markets. This equation, in which Turkey plays a central role, not only constitutes one of the greatest supporters of regional stability but also acts as an asymmetric power element that counterbalances external interventions.

Turkey’s geopolitical leverage in Europe’s energy security

The radical disruptions in Europe’s energy supply chains, triggered by the Russia-Ukraine War, have elevated Turkey’s indispensable role in global energy security to an existential level. In this crisis environment, the security of Europe’s energy supply has become directly dependent on Turkey’s diplomatic and infrastructural capabilities. The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which forms the backbone of the Southern Gas Corridor, and its European extension, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), position Turkey as the system’s primary controller and distributor in the delivery of Caspian gas to the West. The planned phased increase in TANAP’s capacity to over 30 billion cubic metres and the integration of new fields in the Caspian Sea into the system mean that Europe’s energy strategy will run directly through Ankara. Through these projects, Turkey is not only contributing to the energy security of the European continent but is also gaining a very powerful geopolitical lever.

The Hormuz crisis and Ankara-centered stability for neighboring countries

Turkey’s pipeline diplomacy, which has demonstrated the country’s capabilities and maturity in energy geopolitics, is also the only rational way out for regions such as the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, where border disputes and political deadlocks are rife. In particular, the crises that have erupted recently around the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea clearly demonstrate the structural fragility caused by excessive reliance on maritime chokepoints in global energy trade. These routes, through which approximately one-fifth of global oil supplies and a significant portion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade pass, are extremely vulnerable to asymmetric attacks by non-state actors and the risks of regional conflict.

This situation, which constantly generates a geopolitical risk premium in global markets, makes secure land-based alternatives for the transport of Middle Eastern hydrocarbons to the West an existential necessity. It is precisely at this point that the seamless pipeline infrastructure established by Turkey with Azerbaijan offers a tried-and-tested, ready-made integration model for Gulf resources as well. In response to the high-cost and high-risk nature of maritime routes, Turkey is building a reliable land-based bridgehead connecting the Gulf directly to Europe through projects such as the Development Corridor, which runs via Iraq. Ankara’s vision could enable Middle Eastern resources to be channelled to global markets via Turkey’s secure transmission network, bypassing fragile chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz.

A similar situation applies to the Eastern Mediterranean. It has become clear that all alternative routes—such as EastMed, which have sought to bypass and exclude Turkey from the commercialization and delivery of the region’s hydrocarbon resources to Western markets—have failed from technical, political and financial perspectives. The flexibility of Turkey’s onshore infrastructure is positioning Ankara as one of the key decision-makers and a distribution hub for the integration of resources from the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean into global markets, following on from Caspian resources.

Turkey as a ‘green energy hub’ beyond fossil fuels

In the wake of wars and supply crises, Turkey has emerged as the most reliable hub to which global players are turning in their search for dependable suppliers. However, the future of this geopolitical capacity built by Ankara is not limited to conventional hydrocarbon resources or existing natural gas pipelines. In this new order, where the energy transition is gathering momentum, Turkey is also systematically implementing its strategy to transform itself into a regional clean energy hub in line with carbon-neutral targets.

The renewable energy potential of the Caspian region – comprising not only the Caspian Sea’s 157 gigawatt technical wind energy potential but also the ‘green energy’ capacity of the Karabakh and Eastern Zangezur regions – can only be integrated into global markets via Turkey’s national grid and transmission infrastructure. Plans to transport the renewable energy to be generated – in the form of electricity and green hydrogen – to Europe via the Nakhchivan corridor and Turkey could completely change the rules of the game. Adapting existing natural gas infrastructure—particularly TANAP—to facilitate hydrogen transport in the future will transform Turkey from a traditional natural gas trading hub into one of the key players shaping the clean energy markets of the future.

The shift from physical transportation to setting commercial rules

All these physical infrastructure and green transition projects lay the groundwork for Turkey’s strategy to evolve beyond its ultimate vision in energy geopolitics—that of being a ‘bridge country’—and become a price-setting hub. Ankara is crowning the physical network it has established through pipelines and electricity grids with the aim of creating an international trading centre where energy prices are set. In this regard, the natural gas trading centre being established in Thrace and initiatives to deepen national energy markets are transforming Turkey from merely a transit route for energy flows into a financial magnet where regional market conditions are shaped. The fact that critical suppliers such as Azerbaijan are adding volume and depth to this trading hub not only strengthens Ankara’s hand in global markets but also compels neighbouring countries to integrate into the market architecture established by Turkey in energy trade.

Within the context of Turkey’s national energy strategy, the relations it has developed with Azerbaijan go beyond a conventional trade agreement to constitute the construction of a geo-economic integration centred on Ankara. Turkey, which has served as a shield against Europe’s crises and assumed a rule-setting role in the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean under the traditional concept of energy security, is also striving to utilise its vast infrastructure advantage in integrating with the renewable energy revolution. As the energy architecture of the future is redesigned in line with the goals of a ‘carbon-neutral economy’, Turkey, with its autonomy, strategic vision and strong alliances, will continue to be one of the indispensable centres of gravity in the global energy order for decades to come.

(Originally published in Turkish by SETA Foundation)

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erman federal prosecutors have charged a 50-year-old Ukrainian national with helping coordinate the 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines, marking the most significant legal step yet in one of Europe’s most consequential infrastructure attacks.

The suspect, identified only as Serhii K under German privacy laws, is accused of playing a leading role in the operation that destroyed the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines beneath the Baltic Sea, severing a major route for Russian natural gas exports to Europe months after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Federal prosecutors filed the indictment on Wednesday but declined to comment on its specific contents.

According to German public broadcaster ARD, Serhii K faces charges of attacking civilian energy infrastructure, causing explosions and destroying critical infrastructure.

The charges stem from an investigation into the September 2022 underwater blasts near Denmark’s Bornholm Island, which severely damaged both pipelines and disrupted Russian gas supplies to Europe during an already escalating energy crisis.

Court documents from December 2025 allege that Serhii K coordinated a team that used the sailing yacht Andromeda to transport explosives to the pipelines. Prosecutors claim he acted as the team’s on-board coordinator and operational leader rather than serving as a diver or explosives specialist.

The Berlin-based law firm Menaker, which represents the accused, has not commented publicly on the indictment.

German prosecutors confirmed that Serhii K is the same individual arrested in Italy in August 2025 following a German arrest warrant. Italy’s highest court later approved his extradition to Germany, where he was transferred in November 2025 to face investigation.

At the time of his arrest, German authorities alleged that the suspect had used forged identity documents to charter the Andromeda in the northern German port of Rostock before the vessel departed on the mission that investigators believe culminated in the sabotage operation.

Serhii K has denied any involvement in the explosions. His defense has maintained that he was serving with the Ukrainian armed forces and was inside Ukraine when the attacks occurred. His lawyers have argued that, even if military service were established, he would be entitled to what they describe as “functional immunity” under international law.

Ukraine denies involvement as investigation continues

The Nord Stream explosions remain among the most politically sensitive investigations in Europe, given their impact on regional energy security and the absence of any formal attribution of responsibility nearly four years after the attack.

Ukraine has consistently denied any state involvement in the sabotage or knowledge of any plot targeting the pipelines.

Speaking at a news conference in Dublin on Wednesday, Volodymyr Zelenskyy said it was too early to comment on the German indictment because Kyiv had not officially received details of the case.

“We have not officially received any details; at least I have not seen them,” Zelenskyy said, adding that it was premature to draw conclusions.

The twin Nord Stream pipelines, running beneath the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany, had been central to Russian gas exports to Europe before relations between Moscow and the West deteriorated sharply following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Although Nord Stream 2 had never entered commercial operation, both pipelines were rendered inoperable by the explosions, eliminating a key component of Europe’s energy infrastructure.

The investigation has involved authorities from Germany, Denmark and Sweden, with investigators examining evidence including vessel movements, explosive residue and maritime records.

The indictment represents the first formal criminal case brought by German prosecutors against an individual alleged to have participated directly in the sabotage. However, investigators have not publicly alleged that the Ukrainian government authorized or directed the operation.

The case is expected to proceed through Germany’s federal court system, where prosecutors will seek to prove that Serhii K coordinated the team responsible for carrying out one of the most significant attacks on critical energy infrastructure in recent European history.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

U

krainian drones struck a major oil refinery in southeast Moscow for the second time in three days on Thursday, triggering a massive fire, disrupting transportation across the Russian capital, and underscoring Kyiv’s growing ability to carry the war deep inside Russian territory.

The attack targeted one of Moscow’s key fuel-processing facilities, located just 16 kilometers (10 miles) from the Kremlin and within the city’s ring road, making it one of the most symbolically significant strikes on Russian infrastructure since the war began more than four years ago.

Video footage shared on social media showed thick black smoke billowing into the sky above the refinery after a powerful explosion. Witnesses reported that the blast was so intense that the giant metal lid of an oil storage tank was hurled into the air.

The strike appeared to evade Russian air defenses and ignited a blaze that emergency crews battled for hours.

War reaches the heart of Russia

The attack forms part of a broader Ukrainian campaign targeting Russia’s energy sector, which Kyiv argues provides crucial revenue for Moscow’s military operations in Ukraine.

But beyond the economic impact, the strike carried substantial symbolic significance.

By successfully targeting infrastructure inside the Russian capital, Ukraine appears intent on demonstrating to ordinary Russians that the consequences of the war are no longer confined to distant battlefields.

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister, Andrii Sybiha, used social media to directly address residents of Moscow following the attack.

“One of the most popular questions asked by Muscovites this morning is ‘What is going on?'” Sybiha wrote. “Your country started a war of aggression against ours. For years, it has been killing our people.”

The comments reflected Kyiv’s effort to frame the attacks as a response to Russia’s invasion rather than an escalation of the conflict.

Disruption across Moscow

The strike caused widespread disruption throughout the Russian capital, home to more than 13 million people.

Authorities temporarily suspended flights at all Moscow airports as security services assessed the threat posed by additional drones.

Operations were halted at Sheremetyevo Airport, Russia’s busiest air hub, and parts of the airport were evacuated as a precaution.

Traffic was also disrupted along major roads surrounding the refinery, creating significant delays for commuters.

Residents in online forums complained that no air raid sirens or emergency alerts were issued before the attack.

Some suburban residents reported finding oily residue on vehicles and windows after rainfall passed through areas affected by smoke from the refinery fire.

The incident highlighted the growing vulnerability of Russia’s largest city to long-range Ukrainian drone operations.

While Moscow has experienced occasional drone attacks since 2023, including an incident involving the Kremlin itself, such strikes have generally had limited impact on daily life.

Thursday’s attack represented one of the most disruptive incidents the capital has experienced since the conflict began.

Economic impact growing

The latest refinery strike also points to the increasing economic consequences of Ukraine’s campaign against Russia’s energy infrastructure.

Russia remains one of the world’s largest oil producers and a major exporter of crude oil and refined fuel products.

Repeated attacks on refineries, storage facilities, and transportation networks have begun affecting domestic fuel supplies.

Industry sources told Reuters that Russia is expected to import fuel by sea this month, an unusual step for a country that is normally a major fuel exporter.

Reports of gasoline shortages have emerged in several regions in recent weeks.

Although Moscow city authorities insisted that fuel supplies in and around the capital remain stable, Russia’s federal anti-monopoly service has launched an inquiry after one major retailer reportedly increased gasoline prices by nearly 19 percent within a week.

Energy analysts say sustained attacks on refining capacity could place additional pressure on domestic fuel markets while increasing operational costs for Russia’s economy.

I

srael and Iran exchanged direct military strikes on Monday for the first time since a ceasefire was declared in April, raising fresh concerns about a wider regional conflict and threatening diplomatic efforts led by the United States to end months of hostilities.

The renewed confrontation began after Israel launched strikes on military targets in western and central Iran, prompting Tehran to respond with missile attacks targeting Israeli military facilities. The exchanges mark the most serious escalation between the two regional rivals since the ceasefire halted direct hostilities earlier this year.

The latest violence comes despite efforts by U.S. President Donald Trump to preserve ongoing negotiations with Tehran and prevent a collapse of the fragile truce that has largely held since April.

Israeli military officials said air force jets struck military installations in Iran during overnight operations. Iranian authorities reported explosions in several cities, including Tehran, Tabriz, and Isfahan, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) accused Israel of carrying out attacks using air-launched ballistic missiles.

Hours later, the IRGC announced retaliatory strikes against Israel’s Nevatim and Tel Nof air bases. Iranian state media described the attacks as a warning and said Iran was prepared for broader military operations if Israeli attacks continued.

“The armed forces are ready for any scenario,” the IRGC said in a statement carried by Iranian media, warning that future responses could be more extensive.

Israeli authorities confirmed that missiles had been launched from Iran and said air defense systems were activated to intercept incoming threats. No immediate reports of casualties or significant damage were released.

Energy infrastructure hit

The escalation took a significant turn when Israeli strikes reportedly hit facilities within Iran’s energy sector.

Iranian officials said the Karun petrochemical plant near the southwestern city of Bandar-e-Mahshahr sustained damage during the attacks. Shortly afterward, the Israeli military confirmed that it had targeted several sites within the Mahshahr petrochemical complex.

Iranian state media reported that authorities had begun evacuating the Mahshahr Special Petrochemical Economic Zone, a major industrial hub located near the Persian Gulf.

The strikes marked the first reported attack on Iranian energy infrastructure since the ceasefire was announced in April, raising fears that the conflict could increasingly target economically strategic facilities.

Energy analysts warned that attacks on petrochemical installations could have broader implications for global energy markets if hostilities continue to expand.

Financial markets reacted quickly to the renewed fighting.

Brent crude futures rose more than $3 per barrel, climbing above $96, while U.S. crude futures also posted gains of more than 3 percent. The increases erased losses recorded late last week when hopes for diplomatic progress between Washington and Tehran had boosted investor confidence.

Oil prices have remained highly sensitive to developments in the Middle East, particularly since the wider conflict involving Iran, Israel, and Iran-backed groups intensified earlier this year.

Traders fear that any prolonged disruption to energy infrastructure or shipping routes could threaten supplies from one of the world’s most important oil-producing regions.

Trump pushes for diplomacy

The renewed violence unfolded despite reports that Trump personally urged Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to avoid further military escalation.

According to U.S. officials cited by American media, Trump told Netanyahu during a phone conversation that additional attacks could jeopardize ongoing efforts to secure a broader agreement with Iran.

“We are close to doing something good in terms of a deal,” Trump reportedly told the Israeli leader.

Speaking to the Financial Times before the latest strikes, Trump downplayed concerns that renewed military action would derail negotiations.

“It is not going to have any impact on the deal,” Trump said. “I call the shots. I call all the shots. He doesn’t call the shots.”

The comments reflected growing tensions between Washington and the Israeli government over how to manage the conflict. Reports indicate that Trump has repeatedly pressed Israel to limit military operations in Lebanon and elsewhere to create space for diplomacy.

Last week, the U.S. president publicly expressed frustration with Netanyahu’s approach to the conflict, signaling rare daylight between Washington and its closest regional ally.

The latest exchange comes after Israel launched strikes near Beirut on Sunday, targeting positions linked to Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Lebanese armed group.

Those attacks represented Israel’s first military action in the Beirut area since Washington proposed a truce plan for Lebanon last week.

Iran has repeatedly stated that any long-term peace arrangement with the United States would depend on a sustained ceasefire not only between Israel and Iran but also in Lebanon, where fighting involving Hezbollah has continued intermittently.

Before Sunday’s missile exchange, Iran had not directly attacked Israel since the ceasefire took effect in April, although Hezbollah and other groups aligned with Tehran have continued occasional attacks against Israeli targets.

The situation became even more complicated when Israel’s military reported a missile launch from Yemen toward Israeli territory. While details remained limited, the launch highlighted the involvement of multiple regional actors in the broader conflict.

What is the path forward?

Diplomatic observers warn that the latest confrontation could undermine efforts to achieve a comprehensive agreement aimed at ending months of regional warfare.

While both Israel and Iran have framed their actions as responses to previous attacks, the direct exchange of strikes suggests that the ceasefire remains fragile and vulnerable to collapse.

The targeting of military facilities, energy infrastructure, and strategic installations has increased concerns that future attacks could become more damaging and difficult to contain.

For now, both governments appear determined to demonstrate military resolve while avoiding a full-scale war. However, with missiles flying across borders, energy markets reacting sharply, and diplomatic negotiations hanging in the balance, the latest escalation has underscored how quickly tensions in the Middle East can reignite despite international efforts to secure peace.

As Washington continues to push for a negotiated settlement, the coming days may prove critical in determining whether the region returns to a path of diplomacy or slides back toward a broader conflict involving multiple fronts and regional powers.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he late Nelson Mandela said, “work to support courage where there is fear, foster agreement where there is conflict, and inspire hope where there is despair”. This may well apply to Pakistan’s position during a critical period of the escalating conflict between the United States and Iran. Many parties were unable to, or perhaps remained either reluctant or hesitant to get involved amidst waves of retaliatory strikes, a political and media discourse that had reached a new peak since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and a division in stances regarding the ongoing conflict.

However, one thing there was absolute agreement on the necessity of reaching a détente that would lead to the opening of the Strait of Hormuz to international navigation, thus restoring global economic activity, and ensuring the continued export of energy supply to consumers, including Pakistan, which considers the stability of the Strait and the region crucial to its economy and maritime security. The Pakistani initiative came at a pivotal moment, acting as a decisive factor in achieving a ceasefire, in an attempt to reach a consensus between both parties to end the conflict and quash its repercussions.

The initiative raised numerous questions about Islamabad’s role, which some might interpret as exploiting a political vacuum that other parties were unable to fill, adding to Pakistan’s regional influence, especially in view of the escalating tensions. There are also ongoing concerns about the continuation of the crisis, and its repercussions at the regional and international levels, as well as its economic and security implications for Pakistan itself. There is a conviction that an early effort at mediation allows more room for negotiation, and that the longer the initiative is delayed, the less willing the conflicting parties will be to accept a compromise. Therefore, Pakistan’s involvement at this juncture is commendable, even if it is limited, as it occurred during a period of transition, not after the situation had already stabilized.

Pakistan’s initiative to find a solution to the crisis between the United States and Iran may be viewed through the lens of political, economic, and geographical factors. The country has good relations with both sides, and is utilizing other channels of communication, such as with Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye, to advance its mediation efforts. It is worth noting that regional stability, and internal stability in Iran itself is important to Pakistan, which shares a long border of 900 km with its western neighbor. Islamabad fears the spillover of any political turmoil in Iran that may have sectarian and security repercussions for Pakistan, not to mention other repercussions on the energy markets, and on regional and global trade. Thus, Islamabad saw an opportunity to draw attention to itself as an important regional player and a diplomatic power capable of playing a prominent role during crises, which enhances its political standing and its international relations. Despite all this, the Pakistani initiative has raised many questions and perhaps drawn skepticism about Pakistan’s intentions and its role at this particular time.

Pakistan and the parties to the conflict

The relationship between Pakistan and the Western powers, particularly the United States, has always been complex and volatile. It can be described as a pragmatic partnership rather than an alliance based on mutual trust. This relationship has witnessed periods of intense rapprochement but also periods of sharp tension, depending on the changing circumstances and strategic interests of each party. During the Cold War, the relationship was very close, allowing Pakistan to join US-backed alliances such as the Baghdad Pact and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), in exchange for military and financial aid. This cooperation reached its peak during the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when Pakistan played a prominent role in supporting the ‘Mujahideen’, while receiving direct assistance from the United States. However, this harmony did not last long.

After the end of the Cold War in 1991, the relationship cooled off, especially with the emergence of Pakistan’s nuclear program, which led the United States to impose sanctions. The attacks of September 11, however, revived Pakistan’s ties with the United States, through the logistical and intelligence support provided by Islamabad to Washington, despite lingering suspicions about Pakistan’s duplicity in its dealings with the West. Its unstable surroundings worried western analysts, and in recent years the United States’ suspicions of Pakistan’s intentions have increased, especially following Islamabad’s growing rapprochement with Beijing through a series of economic projects and defense partnerships, particularly in military manufacturing and technology transfer. Consequently, the relationship between the two sides is determined by regional and international power balances, without any guarantee of a lasting political and strategic convergence.

Conversely, since its separation from India in 1947, Islamabad has maintained a relatively good relationship with Tehran, recognizing its direct proximity to its western neighbor, and understanding that any regional conflict in which Iran is directly involved will immediately affect Pakistan. This would have several repercussions, including disruptions to the transport of natural resources such as oil and gas, the potential for refugee flows, and the possibility of an escalation in sectarian tensions within Pakistan, given that approximately 20% of the population is Shia, who could potentially ignite an internal crisis. Therefore, in any escalation between Iran and the United States, such as the one that occurred following the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force in 2020, Islamabad has been quick to intervene diplomatically, emphasizing the need to respect the sovereignty of states and renounce the use of force.

Pakistan has also stressed that it will not allow its territory to be used in any conflict against any neighboring country, especially since Islamabad intends to maintain good relations with Tehran, Washington, Riyadh, and other regional actors. Meanwhile, tensions occasionally surface between Iran and its Gulf neighbors, albeit with some noticeable variations. Consequently, Islamabad knows it will have to maintain the delicate balance that grants it a regional role, and presents itself to the world as an influential state capable of resolving conflicts, thus giving it greater diplomatic weight.

Current regional events have cast a shadow over the political and economic landscape, given the difficulty of reaching a formula for consensus between the United States and Iran. This has prompted Islamabad to intervene and adopt a mediation initiative, hosting direct negotiations at the highest level. This step has been described by many as the result of precise political and security calculations that take into consideration the repercussions of escalation in the region and its impact on Iran’s neighbors, and on the region as a whole.

The Pakistani initiative did not come about as a reaction at a particularly sensitive moment, but rather as a direct protection of its internal security and its economy, which cannot withstand the devastating effects of being drawn into regional conflicts, which in itself seems a justifiable reason for such action. However, the timing of Islamabad’s entry as a mediator has raised many questions, at a time when countries such as Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Egypt were themselves seeking to bridge the divide and reduce tension. Therefore, what was it that prompted Islamabad this time to adopt the mediation role that Oman has played between the United States and Iran for many decades?

A regional role or an opportunistic approach?

There may be several interpretations of Pakistan’s decision to take a mediation role at this critical juncture, involving two parties whose relationship has been marked by open hostility since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Some believe that Islamabad’s move stems from a desire to ensure regional stability, which is essential for the smooth flow of maritime traffic, the uninterrupted flow of energy resources to consumers, and the avoidance of internal tensions in Iran. This is to say nothing of the potential influx of refugees and border tensions, as well as the economic shocks associated with disruption to energy prices, trade, shipping, and insurance. Therefore, according to this argument, Islamabad has adopted a mediating stance to prevent escalation and seek diplomatic solutions to the crisis, given that a protracted conflict threatens both regional and internal Pakistani security. Thus, the mediation role reflects a desire to prevent the expansion of the regional war, an attempt to de-escalate tensions between competing powers, and a commitment to maintaining a strategic balance between all parties to the conflict, without siding with any of them. The initiative embodies Pakistani political traditions of keeping channels of communication open with all competing powers.

On the contrary, some believe Pakistan’s move is driven by opportunistic motives. Perhaps, Islamabad saw an opportunity to regain its diminishing standing and bolster its international presence, at a time when it is grappling with economic difficulties and political instability. Others view this as less credible, arguing that it is seeking to improve its image abroad, particularly in the United States, and strengthen its ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Such a move would grant it diplomatic prestige and the ability to present itself as an indispensable regional power.

This comes within the framework of repositioning itself after years of relative isolation and attempting to balance its relationships with regional actors like Iran and Saudi Arabia, especially given the Joint Defense Agreement (JDA) with Riyadh, which places Islamabad in a precarious position, particularly in the event of a potential clash between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, it seeks to maintain balanced relations with other regional and international players such as Türkiye and the United States, a position which could lead to economic gain, broader security cooperation, defense-industry partnerships, and debt relief. With the disruption to energy supplies, Islamabad has been forced to implement austerity measures, shortening school days and working hours to conserve energy.

Ensuring a de-escalation of the regional situation would in fact bring significant benefits to Pakistan. These include guaranteeing access to Iranian oil at affordable prices once sanctions are lifted, and the completion of the long-awaited Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. By avoiding further escalation, Islamabad would also secure a safe trade corridor to Central Asia via Iran, as evidenced by the shipment of the first batch of Pakistani frozen meat to Uzbekistan in April 2026. This is particularly important given that trade routes through Torkham and Chaman, key strategic border crossings and vital trade arteries from Afghanistan to Central Asia, remain closed due to ongoing strained relations between Islamabad and Kabul. Furthermore, internal stability in Iran would prevent Indian attempts to infiltrate Pakistan’s Baluchistan via the Chabahar project, thus thwarting any encirclement efforts by New Delhi. These benefits would also prevent India from attempting to extend its influence through Iran into Pakistani Baluchistan.

According to an extreme view, still others believe that Islamabad may be complicit in a conspiracy against Tehran, given the actions of the United States, Pakistan’s historical ally, and Iran, its ideological antithesis and the primary rival of Saudi Arabia, a key Pakistani ally in the region. Maintaining complete neutrality in these circumstances would therefore be extremely difficult. This view is supported by the mobilization of forces and the stringent sentiment that the United States continued to express while negotiations were underway.

US and Pakistani forces in Saudi Arabia

This included the entry of two American destroyers into Saudi waters in the Arabian Gulf and the arrival of Pakistani forces at King Abdulaziz Air Base in the Eastern Province, accompanied by fighter jets and various weapons. Some interpreted this as an activation of the JDA between the two countries, an agreement considered a strategic buffer for Saudi Arabia and an additional layer of deterrence. It is worth noting that there were also reports that Pakistan simultaneously hosted some Iranian aircraft at Nur Khan Air Base, to protect them from any American military strikes. These included RC-130 intelligence and reconnaissance aircraft and C-130 transport aircraft. Conflicting views call for a deep reassessment of Pakistan’s actual role in the negotiations, which means that Islamabad’s initiative appeared to be not so much altruistic as a geostrategic maneuver to achieve substantial gains under the guise of ensuring the region’s security.

There remains the factor of China, which strongly supports the negotiating track adopted by Pakistan, preferring a diplomatic solution to escalation. China supports Iran, not only because the latter is a key partner in trade and energy, but also because it is a reliable strategic ally in any future confrontation with the United States. Beijing does not want any disruption to shipping lanes, and at the same time seeks a balanced relationship with Washington, as was evident during US President Donald Trump’s visit to China on May 13, 2026. Therefore, it prefers to play a supporting role in negotiations rather than leading them. Reports indicate that Beijing pressured Tehran to accept de-escalation and enter negotiations, exploiting Iran’s need to export its oil to the Chinese market.

In short, Islamabad’s hosting of negotiations between two parties that are extremely important to its national security involves several possible motives, including that this is at the request of the United States, which is trying to end the crisis with the least number of losses and concurrently to save face. It may also be driven by other parties such as Saudi Arabia, which is keen on the security of the region at a time when it is accelerating towards achieving its economic ambitions that require a degree of regional stability.

Despite the regional competition with Iran, Riyadh sees the stability and prosperity of its northern neighbor as a greater opportunity for rapprochement, at a time when its relationship with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is shrouded in much ambiguity. Thus, the outcomes of Pakistan’s role and what the conflict will lead to is likely to indicate much of what the region will face, which also means that the true implications behind the role that Pakistan is playing may become clear later, for Pakistan itself, for the two parties to the conflict, and for the entire region.

I

n recent years, Türkiye’s presence in Somalia has deepened significantly. Whilst energy and space initiatives feature prominently, the foundation of this process lies in security, infrastructure and institutional capacity-building. In particular, the multi-layered cooperation model established after 2011 has laid the groundwork for the steps being taken in the energy sector today.

Türkiye’s commencement of oil exploration activities in Somalia may, at first glance, appear to be a purely technical energy initiative. However, this development is part of a much broader strategic framework. The operations currently being carried out by the deep-sea drilling vessel Çağrı Bey off the coast of Somalia are situated at the intersection of security, the economy, state capacity and geopolitical competition. Therefore, assessing the matter solely under the heading of energy exploration amounts to failing to grasp the bigger picture.

The strategic significance of Çağrı Bey

When evaluated within this broader framework, Türkiye’s oil exploration activities in Somalia represent a new phase. The work to be carried out by the domestically built and operated drilling vessel Çağrı Bey in the Curad-1 field goes far beyond a mere technical operation. The drilling, capable of reaching a depth of approximately 7,500 metres, is a process requiring advanced technology and high engineering capacity. Expected to last 288 days, this activity is considered a long-term strategic investment.

One of the most significant aspects of this initiative is the development of Somalia’s capacity to discover and manage its own resources. The potential discovery of an energy reserve could be a turning point for the Somali economy. This would not only mean an increase in revenue but also the strengthening of the state’s financial capacity and the acceleration of development processes.

From Türkiye’s perspective, this step represents the extension of its energy supply security strategy to an overseas dimension. Expanding into new fields in line with Türkiye’s objective of reducing its dependence on energy imports will contribute to it assuming a more active role in the global energy equation. Türkiye’s commencement of oil exploration in Somalia is not merely a one-dimensional energy investment. This development constitutes a multi-layered strategic move where security, economy, sovereignty and geopolitics are intertwined. The steps being taken in Somalia today will not only yield short-term results but will also shape the country’s economic and political transformation in the long term. Similarly, from Türkiye’s perspective, this process is a significant indicator of its transformation from a country that consumes energy to an active player in the energy sector.

If this process is successfully concluded, Somalia will cease to be a country associated with crises and will emerge as a new ‘safe haven’ and economic actor at both regional and global levels. Türkiye, as one of the key partners in this transformation, has the potential to further strengthen its strategic position in Africa.

From security to the economy: How did the groundwork come about?

For many years, the most fundamental issue in Somalia has been security. The weakness of state capacity and the influence of terrorist organisations have severely limited the development of economic activity. Türkiye’s approach in this regard has evolved from humanitarian aid to development assistance, and subsequently continued with military training tailored to local needs. However, this approach has not been limited to a purely military perspective but has aimed to build a more comprehensive security architecture.

At the current stage, Türkiye’s contributions are playing a decisive role in enhancing Somalia’s counter-terrorism capabilities. Reconnaissance and surveillance support provided by unmanned aerial vehicles, the operational contribution of air assets, and military training programmes have shifted the balance on the ground in favour of the Somali state. This has had both a military and a psychological impact. The narrowing of terrorist organisations’ operational space and the reduction in their attack capacity have contributed to the re-establishment of state authority.

The relative improvement in security has also paved the way for economic activities and investment. The rapid urbanization observed in Mogadishu in recent years, along with increased construction activities and private sector investment, are concrete indicators of this transformation. The active role of Turkish companies in infrastructure and superstructure projects serves as a significant lever in the revitalisation of the Somali economy.

One of Somalia’s greatest untapped potentials lies in its marine resources, which have remained underutilised for many years. From a blue economy perspective, fisheries, maritime transport and energy resources present critical opportunities for Somalia. Within the framework of the partnerships developed with Türkiye, fishing activities to be carried out in Somali territorial waters represent a significant step towards harnessing this potential. This process will not only generate economic revenue but will also strengthen Somalia’s control over its maritime zones.

In parallel, the process of building up Somalia’s naval forces is also noteworthy. These efforts, carried out with Türkiye’s support, are of critical importance in combating piracy and ensuring maritime security. Maritime security, whilst a military matter, is also decisive for the sustainability of trade and economic activities.

Furthermore, the operation of port and airport facilities in Somalia by Turkish companies constitutes a significant aspect of Türkiye’s economic presence in the country. However, as the Somali economy grows, the existing infrastructure is beginning to prove inadequate. This situation brings new port and airport projects to the fore. Another notable development, in terms of accelerating trade and reducing costs, is the increasing use of the Somali flag on commercial vessels. This step has the potential to significantly shorten trade transit times. This will not only accelerate Somalia’s integration into global trade networks but also enhance its competitive strength.

Geopolitical dimension: A new balance in a critical geography

Somalia’s geopolitical position makes these developments all the more significant. The Gulf of Aden, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea route constitute one of the most critical chokepoints for global trade and energy transportation. Any instability in this region has repercussions on a global scale.

Recent Houthi attacks in Yemen and regional tensions have made the security of the Gulf of Aden, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea route more fragile. Furthermore, the possibility of Israel unilaterally recognizing the Somaliland administration, or engaging in political contacts in this direction, is making the issue of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity even more sensitive. For such a step would imply that Israel is jeopardizing Somalia’s national integrity in pursuit of its own security and geopolitical interests in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

This situation could have serious consequences not only for Somalia’s domestic politics but also in terms of the emergence of a new crisis of legitimacy and sovereignty in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, there is growing discussion that such a scenario could increase the likelihood of the Houthis in Yemen targeting the Somaliland administration or locations in the region believed to be linked to Israel. In this context, ensuring Somalia’s stability and maritime security holds national, regional and global significance. The ability of vessels flying the Somali flag to navigate this high-risk region more effectively is one of the factors enhancing the country’s geopolitical value.

Alongside these developments, the fact that vessels flying the Somali flag will now be able to sail across the globe represents a significant step forward. This situation holds, above all, symbolic and strategic importance for Somalia’s international representation. Furthermore, the Federal Government of Somalia aims to establish the Somali flag as one of the region’s trusted flags. Particularly at a time when threats in maritime chokepoints are on the rise, Somalia’s friendly relations in the region and its balanced foreign policy could transform the Somali flag into a key advantage in potential future crises.

Furthermore, the enactment of the cabotage law in Somalia has further strengthened this process. Under this law, vessels not flying the Somali flag will be restricted from conducting commercial activities in Somali territorial waters; such vessels will only be permitted to utilize the right of transit passage. This represents an extremely important step in strengthening Somalia’s sovereignty over its maritime zones.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

I

n the context of the effects of the war launched by the U.S. and Israel against Iran on February 28 on the Gulf region, the saying “Geography is destiny” is a particularly apt description. The Gulf states, which were not direct parties to the war, have been affected almost as negatively as the warring parties by this process. From the war’s very first days, the Gulf states, known as the “oasis of prosperity” in the Middle East, began to emerge as the biggest losers of this process, following Iran’s retaliations. While not all have been affected equally, the myth of the “Gulf’s inviolability” has ended, opening the door to a bleak future for the region’s monarchies.

In this context, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which could be considered the actors closest to the US politically, have borne the brunt of the blow. Their cautious statements in the early days of the war gave the impression that they were avoiding taking sides. However, the use of US military bases on their territory during the conflict was viewed by Iran as an unacceptable pretext.

They attempted to maintain security ties with Washington while keeping tensions with Tehran under control, but the rapidly rising tension and chaos soon made it impossible for these countries to avoid becoming targets. Bahrain and Kuwait, which pursue low-intensity foreign policies, were similarly affected. In both countries, critical infrastructure, including US military bases, ports, and water treatment facilities, was targeted by Iran at various times.

Position towards Iran

The differing reactions of the Gulf countries during the war resulted in varying impacts of the conflict. From this perspective, Oman and Qatar’s positions during the war set them apart from other Gulf states. Although Qatar sustained heavy damage and expelled Iranian diplomats, the Doha administration’s decision to maintain dialogue with Tehran was notable. Oman, on the other hand, stood apart from all other Gulf states. It became one of the few Gulf countries not targeted by ballistic missiles from Tehran and emerged as one of the most important mediators between Iran and the US.

Throughout this process, both countries adopted a measured approach. However, Oman engaged in intensive mediation efforts to prevent the outbreak of war in the pre-conflict period. It can be argued that the common ground underpinning these countries’ approaches lies in their distanced stance toward the U.S. and Israel, coupled with a relatively closer position regarding their relations with Iran.

A common factor among the Gulf states, which have been affected by the war to varying degrees, is growing security concerns. The deployment of air defense systems in the Gulf following drone and missile attacks on critical infrastructure, particularly energy facilities, marked a turning point in terms of defense for the Gulf states. Iran’s unexpectedly aggressive stance, coupled with the Gulf states’ realization that they were facing this aggression alone, constituted a significant turning point.

The Gulf states were disappointed by the failure of the security architecture, which had been based on the assumption that the US would protect them, to withstand this severe test. This disappointment has driven the Gulf states to develop alternative security mechanisms. Consequently, while the Gulf states realized during this war that the U.S. would not directly protect them, they also recognized the need to form alliances with other actors to ensure their security and prepare for a potential Iranian threat after the war. It has become evident that countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar are trying to strengthen security cooperation by working with important regional actors, including Türkiye, Pakistan, and Egypt.

Economic impact

The economy is another area where the concrete effects of the war have been particularly felt in the region. The Gulf region, one of the most important hubs for the global energy supply, found itself in the midst of the conflict. The initial impact was felt in the form of rising oil prices. While some shipments were diverted to alternative routes due to the war, this has increased costs and extended delivery times.

Although rising oil prices above $100 per barrel might appear favorable for the Gulf states, which are exporters, the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for hydrocarbon products reaching global markets, remained at the center of military activity. Coupled with rising insurance costs and the complete halt of transit, the Gulf states were deprived of one of their main sources of income.

In this context, Oman is the only country that stands apart from the other Gulf states. Due to its geographical location, Oman is not dependent on the Strait of Hormuz. Consequently, its oil revenues have risen in line with the increase in prices during this period. Oman continued to export oil, particularly to Asian countries, from its LNG facility in Kalhat, even during the war. Shipments also continued from Mina al Fahal, the country’s most important oil export hub. Omani crude oil traded at $120 per barrel when global oil prices were at $100. This played a critical role in the country’s economy.

Beyond hydrocarbon trade, the economic impacts of the war on Gulf countries have also been highly destructive. In the United Arab Emirates, a key tourism hub in the region, tourist activities came to a complete standstill. Hundreds of hotels in Dubai were left entirely empty within a short period, and thousands of future bookings were canceled. Following the damage to the region’s “safe haven” image, there was a capital outflow amounting to billions of dollars, particularly from Dubai, a recognized global financial center. While the Abu Dhabi and Dubai stock exchanges suffered significant losses, the property market declined by up to 30 percent.

Another sector severely affected by the war is the aviation industry. Major Gulf airports, such as those in Dubai, Doha, and Abu Dhabi, which serve as key hubs for global air transport, became completely non-operational in the early days of the war. They were subsequently forced to operate at minimum capacity. As a result, tens of thousands of foreign workers, who form the backbone of the Gulf labor market, have left the region, negatively impacting consumption and the labor market. Due to these factors, many Gulf countries, including the UAE, are expected to experience severe economic contraction by 2026.

Social impact and expectations of peace

On the other hand, the war has undoubtedly impacted societies in the Gulf. While the effects were limited to daily life and the food supply chain during the war, the erosion of the region’s sense of security has had a traumatic effect on Gulf societies accustomed to nothing but prosperity and development for decades. Consequently, some Gulf citizens have reportedly temporarily relocated with their families to safe havens such as London, Zurich, Singapore, and Istanbul. Uncertainty has also rapidly increased for the millions of foreign workers who play a key role in daily life and the labor market across the Gulf states. The fact that some of the migrant workforce, particularly in the energy and construction sectors, is considering returning to their home countries risks disrupting the already fragile labor market balance. Meanwhile, rising energy and logistics costs are reflected in daily living expenses, and price increases have been observed in food and essential consumer goods.

Although the effects of the war are gradually subsiding following a temporary ceasefire, the Gulf states are prioritizing lasting peace. The Gulf states’ key priorities in the post-war period include the cessation of cross-border threats, particularly from Iran; the guarantee of regime security; and the permanent removal of barriers to energy exports. The Gulf states also expect Iran to struggle for regional influence through proxy forces and to limit Tehran’s nuclear capabilities. Finally, establishing a new security architecture and implementing defense mechanisms to ensure regional security are of critical importance to the Gulf states.

Conversely, one could argue that the collapse of the Iranian regime or the country’s descent into deep instability in the post-war era would also pose a risk to the Gulf states. A resulting power vacuum could lead to uncontrollable consequences that go beyond the current threats. The emergence of a more radical Iranian regime would also pose risks to the Gulf states. A Tehran administration capable of holding the Gulf regimes accountable for events during the war could threaten the Gulf states for decades to come. From this perspective, the Gulf states would prefer Iran to remain an actor whose capacity to generate security concerns is limited and with whom limited dialogue can be maintained rather than being perceived as a threat. Consequently, the Gulf states greatly value entering the post-war period in an environment free of threats from Iran.

The war initiated on February 28 by the U.S. and Israel targeting Iran has had its most intense regional impact on the Gulf states at this stage. The Persian Gulf’s role as the logistical hub and economic heart of the war is the primary reason for this. Consequently, although a temporary ceasefire has been established, the Gulf states now face a vortex of uncertainty within their own borders, as this war has transformed from a crisis unfolding elsewhere. This serves as a reminder that crises seemingly far removed from the Gulf states are much closer than they appear. As the most vulnerable actors in the climate of uncertainty created by the war, the Gulf states are calling for an immediate end to the conflict while attempting to prepare for the new political, military, and economic order set to emerge.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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ince almost the very beginning of the attacks carried out by the US and Israel against Iran, the Strait of Hormuz has been one of the most significant factors influencing the course of the war. The Strait of Hormuz also fundamentally affects whether the current peace talks stall or progress. The most significant reason for this is that economic and commercial considerations have come to the fore amongst the global repercussions of armed conflicts today.

Since passage through international straits, particularly the Strait of Hormuz, is critical, the regime governing passage has become a significant concern. In this context, questions have arisen about whether any state has the right to close an international strait and whether restricting, closing, or imposing a blockade on international straits during wartime is legally permissible.

Given the illegality of many actions in the US/Israel-Iran conflict, it would be beneficial to clarify the legal principles governing transit through the Strait of Hormuz, a vital international maritime transport route, during wartime.

The importance of international straits and channels

Apart from the Strait of Hormuz, there are other straits and channels around the world that are of central importance to international maritime transport. The Strait of Gibraltar, the Turkish Straits, and the Straits of Singapore and Malacca are among the most important of these. The Strait of Gibraltar is the only maritime passageway connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the open ocean. The Straits of Singapore and Malacca are maritime passages between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea in Southeast Asia. Stretching between Singapore and the Riau Islands of Indonesia, these straits are among the busiest waterways in global maritime trade. Approximately 40 percent of the world’s merchant vessels pass through them. They form the route for most oil and raw material shipments destined for Asia’s industrial giants, such as China, Japan, and South Korea.

The Turkish Straits system, comprising the Straits of Istanbul and Çanakkale and the Sea of Marmara, is the only waterway connecting the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. The Turkish Straits are of vital importance to the economies and military security of countries bordering the Black Sea. Currently, over 50,000 ships, including more than 10,000 tankers, pass through the Turkish Straits each year, making them crucial for the transit of food, oil, natural gas, and commercial goods.

Meanwhile, the Strait of Hormuz is one of the world’s most important oil transit points. This strait is the sole route connecting Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain to the rest of the world, and it is also the only functional maritime transport route for oil exports from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In 2024 and 2025, more than a quarter of total global seaborne oil trade and approximately one-fifth of global oil and petroleum product consumption passed through the Strait of Hormuz. Furthermore, approximately one-fifth of the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade passed through the strait in 2024, primarily from Qatar. Consequently, even temporarily halting the passage of oil or LNG tankers through the strait is likely to increase global energy prices, shipping costs, and lead to significant supply delays.

Man-made waterways that connect seas are known as sea canals. The Panama and Suez Canals are the most prominent examples. The Panama Canal was constructed under the 1903 Washington Treaty between Panama and the United States and completed in 1914. Governed by the “Treaty on Permanent Neutrality and the Operation of the Panama Canal,” signed by the United States and Panama in 1977, the Panama Canal provides a direct passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Meanwhile, the Suez Canal is an artificial waterway that is approximately 190 kilometers long and connects the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea. Transit through the canal is regulated by the Istanbul Convention, a multilateral treaty signed in 1888, which permits all ships, regardless of nationality or purpose, to pass through. The canal handles approximately 10–15 percent of global maritime trade. It serves as a critical transit point for the transport of oil, natural gas, and container freight in particular.

Transit through international straits during armed conflicts

According to international law, the right to transit through international straits during peacetime is considered a “right of innocent passage.” However, this right is not absolute, meaning the coastal state may suspend transit if it becomes harmful. This suspension does not essentially amount to a total ban on passage; rather, it is an exceptional power that the coastal state may exercise when the passage of a specific vessel or vessels becomes “detrimental” to the coastal state’s peace, security, or order. In situations where transit has become entirely harmful, exceptional circumstances may arise in which transit may be suspended entirely, provided that the suspension is not indefinite and is for reasons such as health inspections.

Unlike the right of innocent passage, the “right of transit passage” through international straits is an inalienable right recognized by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which 172 states are currently parties. According to Article 38 of the Convention, all ships and aircraft have the right of transit passage, which shall not be impeded.

However, it can be said that the rules governing the right of passage through international straits change significantly during wartime. In the event of war, two situations may arise. The first situation occurs when one or more states bordering the strait is involved in the war. These straits may be characterized as “international straits involved in the war.” The second scenario is when none of the states bordering the strait are involved in the war. These straits are referred to as “neutral,” or non-belligerent, straits.

International straits involved in a war that do not consist entirely of a single state’s territorial waters, where a route passes through the high seas or exclusive economic zone, cannot be exercised by the coastal states beyond their own territorial waters.

If an international strait involved in a war consists entirely of territorial waters, then those waters also form part of the general theater of hostilities. This means that the entire strait becomes a theater of war. Subject to the relevant provisions of the laws of war, enemy ships and aircraft in these straits may be attacked, and enemy and neutral merchant ships may be stopped and seized. The coastal state has the right to deny passage to all enemy ships and aircraft.

Neutral ships

However, these straits cannot be closed to ships belonging to states that are not parties to the conflict, i.e., neutral ships. There is a prevailing view that peaceful shipping traffic should be allowed to pass through the straits with minimal disruption. While states bordering an international strait may be inclined to close it, even to peaceful shipping, if they are parties to an international armed conflict, completely closing international straits, particularly by using sea mines, would not be lawful. This was stated in the International Court of Justice’s judgment on April 9, 1949, in the Corfu Channel case. Neutral warships and merchant vessels must not be deprived of their right of passage, or their inalienable right of innocent passage, through international straits belonging to parties to an international armed conflict.

As for neutral international straits not involved in the war, transit generally takes place under peacetime conditions. According to Article 38(2) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, a “right of transit passage” exists through neutral straits, which must not be impeded. Transit must be continuous and expeditious for the purpose of passing through the strait. As in peacetime, warships of belligerent states in transit must proceed without delay in accordance with designated sea lanes and traffic separation schemes. Belligerent warships and military aircraft transiting a neutral international strait may take all necessary measures to defend themselves.

In neutral international straits, the right of transit passage does not apply if the straits do not coincide entirely with the coastal state’s territorial waters. In these cases, vessels and aircraft of all nations enjoy freedom of navigation and overflight in the remaining corridor, even if an exclusive economic zone has been declared. In parts of the strait that are part of a coastal state’s territorial waters, ships and aircraft only have a suspensible right of innocent passage.

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ince the war began on February 28, the US administration has suffered from profound strategic blindness in assessing the crisis between Washington and Tehran. This is particularly evident in its misjudgement of Iran’s strategic resilience and decision-making mechanisms. Washington continues to formulate strategy based on a flawed analogy with Venezuela, one entirely detached from on-the-ground realities, just as with its decapitation strategy aimed at regime change in Iran.

The idea that President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance see Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf as similar to Venezuela’s pragmatic politician Delcy Rodríguez and believe he could be pressured to negotiate is wishful thinking. In reality, however, the final decision-making authority in Iran does not lie with civilians or individual politicians. Rather, it is the exclusive preserve of a rigid military-security core consolidated around the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

This new hegemonic elite, which includes Kalibaf, is firmly committed to the fundamental ideological tenets of the Islamic Republic. The idea that individuals like Kalibaf could transcend military tutelage, alter Iran’s strategic trajectory, and become negotiating partners is a delusion on Washington’s part. This notion disregards the regime’s decision-making structure.

At the heart of the current impasse between Washington and Tehran is the asymmetry between the U.S.’s coercive approach to diplomacy and Iran’s survival priorities. The Trump administration’s classic “carrot-and-stick” approach, based on the assumption that every actor will yield at a certain cost, is ineffective against Tehran. The issues that the US brings to the negotiating table—the right to enrich uranium in its nuclear program, ballistic missile capabilities, regional proxy forces, and freedom of movement in the Strait of Hormuz—are not negotiable for Tehran.

The Iranian leadership interprets American demands that would undermine these existential pillars as a call for surrender. Tehran is prepared to bear enormous economic and military costs rather than yield to these demands because simply surviving American pressure is a victory in itself. As long as both sides persist in their mutual illusion of self-confidence—believing that their gains on the ground have forced the other side to make concessions and that the other side has suffered more damage from this crisis than they have—the formation of a credible basis for diplomatic agreement seems highly unlikely.

The ‘neither war nor peace’ dilemma and the naval blockade

The Trump administration’s decision to extend the ceasefire was not a quest for peace but a strategy of attrition aimed at altering the nature of the conflict in the US’s favor. Tehran perceives the indefinite extension of the ceasefire while the de facto naval blockade against Iran continues as the worst-case scenario, which is intended to gradually erode its strategic capabilities. Iran rejects this state of suspension — this “neither war nor peace” limbo. A report in The Wall Street Journal on April 28 detailed Donald Trump’s directive for an expanded naval blockade aimed at choking off Iran’s oil exports. This indicates that the crisis has not subsided, but rather been tactically recalibrated. However, according to Iran’s strategic community, this move is a psychological delaying tactic designed to create the illusion that active hostilities have ended. This would weaken the country’s security mechanisms and pave the way for a surprise US-Israeli attack.

Conversely, the belief that Washington could force Iran to submit through a naval blockade is as misguided as expecting regime change. Iran has developed asymmetric resistance against economic sanctions for decades, so a naval blockade is not just another routine embargo for them; it is a declaration of war waged through other means. Therefore, from Iran’s perspective, the current situation is not a de-escalation, but rather the beginning of an escalation phase that will, sooner or later, trigger a more intense wave of asymmetric conflict. Iran will not confine its response to its own waters but will spread the cost across the global system.

Although its conventional navy has largely been destroyed, the DMO has built a massive, asymmetric “mosquito fleet” in the Strait of Hormuz. This fleet comprises hundreds of low-cost speedboats, unmanned systems, and advanced sea mines, such as the Maham series. Rather than focusing on controlling the strait, this structure enables Iran to block rivals’ access and retain the leverage to provoke a crisis in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as well as the Strait of Hormuz, should the blockade intensify.

The nuclear paradox and the new security architecture

Military action is also far from resolving the structural issues between the US and Iran. Attacks by the U.S. and Israel targeting missile or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) facilities in the region only temporarily reduce capacity. This tactic, known in military literature as “mowing the grass,” does not permanently eliminate the threat. Iran’s military infrastructure is deeply integrated into the geography and relies largely on domestic production, so it can be rapidly replenished.

Furthermore, the maximum military and economic pressure being applied has created an extremely dangerous paradox regarding the nuclear program. Rather than deterring Iran from its nuclear objectives, the growing existential threat and successive conflicts are reinforcing the belief in nuclear armament within the DMO. In the eyes of Iranian decision-makers, achieving nuclear capability is no longer merely desirable; it is now viewed as an indispensable guarantee of the regime’s survival.

Looking back at the recent past, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei presented a pragmatic profile despite being an ideological leader. He possessed the flexibility to reach a nuclear agreement with the Obama administration and was cautious enough to avoid risks while responding to the period following October 7, 2023, and the direct Israeli attacks in 2024. However, with his death, this delicate balance vanished, giving rise to an Iran that is far more unpredictable and dangerous to regional security. Terminating the 2015 Nuclear Agreement (JCPOA) without a concrete alternative was a major political blunder rather than a strategic move. This move removed international restrictions and monitoring mechanisms on Iran, creating an opportunity for the regime to expand its nuclear capabilities.

As a result, Iran has increased its uranium enrichment level from 3.67 percent to 60 percent, shortened the time needed to acquire a nuclear weapon from one year to a few weeks, and effectively become a “nuclear threshold state.” For Iran, 90 percent enrichment is now a matter of choice, not capability. Since crossing the technological critical threshold, Iran has the ability to process its existing stockpile of 440 kilograms of enriched uranium to the final stage in small-scale facilities. Completely halting the nuclear program by military means would require a ground operation that is virtually impossible in the current situation.

Inevitable escalation

The gap between Iran’s unwavering stance and the US’s minimum acceptable limits is so wide that diplomatic efforts have devolved into mutual accusations rather than compromise. There is no credible way out, nor any room for flexibility, to defuse the tension. Washington’s reliance on sanctions and temporary military interventions, dubbed “mowing the lawn,” is insufficient to resolve this strategic impasse.

Consequently, unless Washington scales back its maximalist objectives or Iran fundamentally alters its security approach, this spiral of coercive pressure will yield neither compromise nor capitulation. This scenario, in which no sustainable diplomatic solution exists, is more likely to usher in a far more destructive phase of conflict. In this phase, costs would be spread across the global system through asymmetric means, transcending borders and rendering predictability entirely lost. This phase would be far worse than simply plunging the parties into a conventional war of attrition.

(Originally published in Turkish by Middle East Africa)

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s tensions between United States and Iran continue to escalate, analysts warn that the confrontation is increasingly becoming a battle of economic endurance rather than a conventional military contest, with global markets and oil supplies emerging as key pressure points.

The crisis has centered on the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important waterways through which a significant share of global oil exports passes daily. Continued instability in the region has already triggered volatility in energy markets and renewed concerns over inflation and economic disruption worldwide.

Although the United States has intensified naval patrols and expanded operations targeting Iranian-linked shipping, Tehran appears focused on using asymmetric tactics to raise the cost of the conflict for Washington and its allies.

US officials say dozens of vessels associated with Iranian trade networks have been intercepted since the beginning of the maritime blockade. Yet despite heavy military pressure, Iranian forces continue to operate small fast-attack boats near the strait, targeting cargo vessels and commercial tankers in what analysts describe as a campaign designed to undermine confidence in regional shipping security.

Observers note that Iran’s strategy does not rely on achieving military superiority over the United States. Instead, Tehran appears determined to sustain enough disruption to global energy flows to increase international pressure for negotiations and concessions.

Oil prices remain highly sensitive to developments in the Gulf. Even limited attacks or threats against shipping routes and energy facilities can sharply increase transportation and insurance costs, affecting economies across Europe, Asia, and North America.

Threats to Gulf energy infrastructure raise alarm

Iranian state-linked media outlets have also escalated rhetoric in recent days by discussing possible future targets across the Gulf region. The semi-official Tasnim news agency highlighted the vulnerability of undersea communication cables concentrated in narrow sections of the Gulf seabed, suggesting that Tehran could expand its tactics beyond direct attacks on ships.

Regional energy infrastructure has also been referenced in Iranian statements and commentary. Facilities such as the Ruwais Refinery in the United Arab Emirates and the Abqaiq Oil Processing Facility in Saudi Arabia have emerged as potential flashpoints.

Security analysts say such threats are intended not only to intimidate regional rivals but also to deepen uncertainty in international financial markets. Previous attacks on Gulf oil facilities caused temporary disruptions in production and triggered sharp reactions in global energy prices.

Meanwhile, US President Donald Trump has continued to publicly project confidence, insisting that Iran is under mounting pressure and that Washington can sustain the confrontation for as long as necessary.

However, economic concerns are beginning to weigh heavily on governments and investors. Rising fuel prices threaten to intensify inflationary pressures at a time when many economies are still struggling with slowing growth and supply chain challenges.

Diplomacy stalls as both sides avoid appearing weak

Efforts to restart negotiations have so far failed to produce a breakthrough. Planned talks in Islamabad reportedly stalled after Iranian representatives failed to attend scheduled meetings, fueling concerns that both sides remain far apart on core demands.

Despite the diplomatic deadlock, analysts familiar with Iran’s negotiating history say Tehran has often relied on patience and gradual pressure during international disputes. Comparisons have been drawn to the lengthy negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, when Iranian negotiators spent years maneuvering diplomatically while resisting Western pressure.

For now, neither Washington nor Tehran appears willing to publicly compromise. Behind the scenes, however, regional mediators are believed to be maintaining quiet contacts in an effort to prevent the crisis from escalating into a wider regional conflict.

As military tensions continue and markets remain volatile, analysts say the conflict is increasingly becoming a test of political stamina and economic resilience. The coming weeks may determine whether the United States can maintain pressure without suffering significant domestic political costs, or whether Iran can continue enduring economic hardship while sustaining disruption in one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.

(Source: CNN)

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he US/Israel-Iran war has reached a scale far beyond that of a war explainable solely by the military capabilities of the parties involved. The course of the war is being shaped by the risks, disruptions and costs generated at an accelerating pace upon the circulatory arteries of the global economy. Consequently, just as much as the military situation on the ground, the question of which sea lanes, energy corridors and logistical hubs the war is putting under pressure has become a decisive factor.

The geopolitical significance of the current war must be discussed beyond the scope of traditional debates on the expansion of fronts. The real issue is that the critical chokepoints of the global system have begun to generate tension simultaneously. The growing uncertainty and risk premium in the Strait of Hormuz are creating a de facto blockage in energy flows. However, the Houthis’ more direct involvement in Yemen carries the risk of turning the Bab el-Mandeb–Red Sea corridor into a second flashpoint. This scenario signifies a threshold that extends the cost of the war beyond regional borders and deepens the fragility of the global economy.

In this context, the US/Israel-Iran War, in a sense, heralds a new geopolitical era that could be defined as the ‘Age of Chokepoints’, originating from the Strait of Hormuz. Indeed, it is no coincidence that geopolitical chokepoints such as the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Malacca, the Bering Strait and Arctic passages in the context of Greenland have come to the fore in recent years. In the current climate, the global economy has become increasingly concentrated. Furthermore, energy, trade, food and data flows now pass through a limited number of chokepoints. Any disruption at these nodes transforms military crises into economic shocks, and economic shocks into political turbulence.

Beyond the Strait of Hormuz

The debate surrounding the Strait of Hormuz is moving beyond the dichotomy of whether it is closed or open. The current situation is generating a risk premium, characterised by a significant slowdown in maritime traffic—even if partial transit continues—along with rising costs for ship insurance, freight rates and trade finance. This risk premium is causing delays and cost increases in global supply chains, going beyond the fluctuations reflected in energy prices.

In this context, the cost of the war is moving towards a scale that cannot be measured solely by the price per barrel. As the risk premium rises, panic over supply security—independent of the physical supply of oil—is spreading through the markets, undermining inflation expectations and weakening the global growth outlook. Furthermore, the persistence of the bottleneck in the Strait of Hormuz is increasing logistics costs for food and industrial inputs, creating new vulnerabilities, particularly in economies reliant on imports. Indeed, logistical issues affecting both petrochemical products and fertilizers carry the risk of directly and profoundly impacting numerous sectors.

A notable aspect of this situation is that a resolution to the Strait of Hormuz impasse will not be achieved by a political decision alone. Even if tensions ease temporarily, it will take significant time for the market to regain confidence. The fact that the insurance and freight markets will not immediately absorb the shock, that companies will not regain their appetite for risk overnight, and that supply chain delays will have cumulative effects, suggests that costs may persist even in the post-war period. Consequently, the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz stems not only from its role as a transit point but also from its function as a pivotal point capable of determining the pace of normalisation within the global system.

Is there a risk of a second ‘gate of shock’ alongside the Houthis?

One of the key factors exacerbating the geopolitical risks of the current war is the Houthis’ more direct involvement. This situation carries the risk of turning the Bab el-Mandeb–Red Sea corridor—one of the most critical points for global maritime trade—into a natural corridor for the war’s expansion. Indeed, just as the Strait of Hormuz is the linchpin of energy flows centred on the Persian Gulf, the Bab el-Mandeb is one of the most critical chokepoints for Europe-Asia trade and access to the Suez Canal.

The increasing risk posed by the Bab el-Mandeb does not merely imply the possibility of attacks on commercial vessels. Tensions along this route carry the risk of increasing global trade costs by forcing route diversions and prolonging delivery times. Furthermore, the Red Sea basin is a region with a significant foreign military presence. Djibouti hosts military bases and forces from various countries, notably the US and China. Consequently, a more direct involvement by the Houthis carries the potential to transform the maritime security crisis into a multi-actor military standoff.

In this scenario, the critical risk is the so-called ‘double-strait crisis’. Whilst the risk premium in the Strait of Hormuz becomes entrenched, the simultaneous pressure on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait would severely constrict the global system’s circulation capacity. In such a scenario, the cost of war would by no means be confined to the Middle East; it would exacerbate inflation and energy supply concerns in Europe, food and logistics costs in Africa, and industrial and supply chain pressures in Asia. Consequently, an escalation along the Bab el-Mandeb corridor is the fastest route for the war to evolve from a regional issue into a global systemic crisis.

Turkiye and the geopolitics of chokepoints

The rise of the ‘age of chokepoints’ is also producing strategic consequences for Turkiye. Although Turkiye is not a direct party to the current war, it lies at the heart of one of the critical nodes of global circulation. The Straits of Istanbul and Dardanelles hold high strategic value not only for commercial transit along the Black Sea–Mediterranean route but also in terms of energy transport, regional security and crisis management. In an era where global competition is played out through these chokepoints, the importance of the Straits is likely to increase more than ever in the near future.

Consequently, this situation yields a two-fold outcome for Turkiye. Whilst strategic weight and diplomatic manoevring space expand on the one hand, the responsibility for risk management increases on the other. As seen in the Strait of Hormuz, in the current era, geography emerges both as an advantage and as a focal point for crisis management. For this reason, Turkiye’s priority must be to keep diplomatic channels open without allowing tensions to cross the threshold of regional escalation, and to contribute to efforts that prevent further constriction of global maritime traffic.

In this context, three policy priorities stand out. Firstly, supporting diplomatic pressure to prevent the war from spilling over to the Bab el-Mandeb–Red Sea corridor and strengthening international coordination to prevent an increase in maritime security risks. An escalation along this corridor would affect regional security and the broader economic landscape—including Turkiye’s own interests—particularly given the context of Turkiye’s investments in the Horn of Africa.

Secondly, given that the blockage in the Strait of Hormuz generates a risk premium that could persist even with partial flow, preventive policies must be implemented to limit the repercussions of fluctuations in energy and logistics markets on the Turkish economy. The pace of post-war normalization must be taken into account as much as the course of the war itself.

Thirdly, the geopolitics of global bottlenecks must be monitored more systematically at the institutional level, and Turkiye’s strategic preparedness capacity must be enhanced in the context of the Straits, ports, maritime security and critical supply lines. This situation stands out as a matter of defense and security, as well as a matter of economic, energy, logistics and crisis management capacity.

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he United Arab Emirates has announced it will leave OPEC effective May 1, in a move that could reshape global energy dynamics and weaken the oil producers’ group at a time of mounting geopolitical tensions in the Gulf.

The decision comes as an escalating conflict involving Iran disrupts energy flows through the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint that typically handles about a fifth of the world’s crude oil and liquefied natural gas shipments. Ongoing threats and attacks on vessels have significantly constrained exports, adding strain to global energy markets already facing volatility.

UAE Energy Minister Suhail Mohamed al-Mazrouei said the decision to exit the group followed a comprehensive review of the country’s long-term energy strategy. In remarks to Reuters, he described the move as a “policy decision” based on current and future production considerations, emphasizing that it was made independently and without consultation with other member states.

“This is a policy decision, taken after a careful look at current and future production policies,” Mazrouei said, adding that global energy demand is expected to rise, positioning the UAE to play a larger role in meeting supply needs.

The UAE, one of OPEC’s largest producers and among the few with significant spare capacity, has long been bound by the group’s production quotas designed to manage oil prices. Its departure will free Abu Dhabi to increase output once logistical constraints ease, potentially boosting its share of global markets.

Undermining OPEC’s ability to regulate supply

Analysts say the move could undermine OPEC’s ability to regulate supply and stabilize prices. According to data from the International Energy Agency, the broader OPEC+ alliance — which includes non-OPEC producers — saw its share of global oil output fall to 44% in March from about 48% in February. That figure is expected to decline further in the coming months as disruptions intensify and the UAE formally exits the group.

“This opens the door for the UAE to expand its production and capture greater market share,” said Monica Malik, chief economist at Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank. “It also raises questions about the future cohesion and influence of OPEC.”

The exit highlights a growing rift between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, OPEC’s de facto leader and the world’s largest oil exporter. Once close allies, the two Gulf powers have increasingly diverged on energy policy, regional strategy, and economic priorities.

Tensions have been fueled by competition over foreign investment, regional influence, and differing approaches to managing oil output. While Riyadh has often favored tighter supply controls to support prices, Abu Dhabi has signaled a willingness to expand production capacity and pursue a more flexible strategy.

The geopolitical backdrop has further complicated the situation. Gulf nations have faced a wave of missile and drone attacks since the United States and Israel launched military operations against Iran earlier this year. In response, regional leaders have held emergency consultations to coordinate security and economic responses.

Aligning with long-standing U.S. criticism of OPEC

The UAE, which normalized relations with Israel under the Abraham Accords, has also strengthened ties with Washington, positioning itself as a key regional partner. Its exit from OPEC may align with long-standing U.S. criticism of the group, particularly from President Donald Trump, who has accused the organization of artificially inflating oil prices.

Trump has repeatedly linked U.S. security commitments in the Gulf to oil pricing policies, arguing that producers benefit from American military protection while maintaining high prices. Analysts suggest the UAE’s move could be seen as a partial response to such pressure, while also advancing its own strategic interests.

Despite the announcement, immediate market reactions have been muted. Oil prices trimmed earlier gains following the news, with traders focusing more on supply disruptions in the Gulf than on structural shifts within OPEC. Mazrouei said he did not expect significant short-term impacts, citing ongoing export constraints through the Strait of Hormuz.

Still, longer-term implications could be substantial. With greater autonomy over production, the UAE may increase output rapidly once regional tensions ease, adding supply to global markets and potentially putting downward pressure on prices.

For OPEC, the departure represents a significant challenge to its cohesion and influence. As one of the group’s most capable producers steps away, questions are mounting about the sustainability of the alliance’s strategy — and about Saudi Arabia’s role as the central stabilizing force in global oil markets.

As the energy crisis deepens and geopolitical risks persist, the UAE’s decision marks a pivotal moment for the global oil industry, signaling a shift toward a more fragmented and competitive landscape.

(Source: Reuters)

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onald Trump has said the United States is likely to resume bombing Iran as a fragile ceasefire approaches its expiration, underscoring rising tensions despite ongoing diplomatic efforts.

Speaking on Tuesday, Trump indicated he did not intend to extend the 14-day truce, which is set to end on Wednesday. He framed renewed military action as part of a strategy to strengthen Washington’s position in negotiations, saying the US was prepared to act if talks failed to produce results.

“We’re ready to go. The military is raring to go,” he said, adding that he expected force would ultimately help secure a favorable agreement. However, he did not specify what such a deal would entail or how quickly it might be reached.

The remarks were accompanied by statements on Truth Social, where Trump accused Tehran of repeatedly violating the ceasefire. While such claims could serve as a basis for renewed strikes, they have not been independently verified.

Diplomatic channels remain open

At the same time, diplomatic channels remain open. A new round of talks is expected in Islamabad, where US Vice President JD Vance is set to meet Iranian parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. The discussions are seen as a last effort to extend the truce or reach a broader agreement before hostilities potentially resume.

Trump’s latest comments reflect a broader pattern of mixed messaging from the administration, alternating between warnings of escalation and suggestions that a deal may be within reach. Earlier in the week, he warned that “lots of bombs” could be used if negotiations collapsed, even as officials pointed to ongoing diplomatic engagement.

Senior figures in Washington have also adopted a hard line. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth recently said US forces were “locked and loaded,” signaling readiness to target Iran’s infrastructure, including its energy sector.

Firm Iranian opposition to coercive diplomacy

Iranian officials have responded with firm opposition to what they describe as coercive diplomacy. Ghalibaf said Tehran would not negotiate “under the shadow of threats,” while military leaders warned that any renewed US strikes would prompt an immediate and decisive response.

The standoff has already had wider implications, particularly for global energy markets. Fatih Birol, head of the International Energy Agency, warned that the crisis could have unprecedented consequences, especially when combined with ongoing disruptions linked to Russian gas supplies.

Analysts say the next phase of the conflict will likely hinge on the outcome of talks in Islamabad. A breakthrough could stabilize the situation, but failure to reach an agreement may lead to a rapid return to military confrontation.

With the ceasefire deadline fast approaching, both sides appear to be preparing for multiple scenarios—keeping diplomacy alive while signaling readiness for escalation.

(Source: The Guardian)

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ne of the most pronounced tensions in the current process of transformation within the international system stems from the ever-widening gap between the global responsibility claims of major powers and their actual behavior. Whilst these gaps may appear manageable at the level of rhetoric during ordinary times, they inevitably surface during crises, bringing the question of who is actually bearing the burden of the system back to the fore.

Underlying this analysis is the fact that the focus of this study lies not merely in China’s economic size or military capacity, but in its redefined great power identity over the past two decades. For whilst Beijing positions itself as an actor resolutely defending its ‘core interests’, it simultaneously claims to be a ‘responsible architect of the international order’. The tension between these two roles inevitably surfaces at times of deepening crisis, bringing the question of which order China truly belongs to back into the spotlight.

Indeed, with the launch of the joint US-Israeli air operation against Iran on 28 February, this question has taken the form of a concrete and challenging test for China. As the Middle East is dragged towards a new systemic breaking point, the crisis’s repercussions for energy security have been projected onto a global scale via the Strait of Hormuz, thereby exposing the fragilities of the global energy order once again through a regional conflict. Beijing, however, is not merely an external observer of this situation; it is portrayed as an actor compelled to confront the crisis as one of the parties directly affected.

The 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement

For China’s relationship with Iran is built upon a multi-layered structure of interdependence, ranging from oil purchases worth tens of billions of dollars and technology transfers to the 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement signed in 2021, and the parallel financial networks and shadow fleets that enable the circumvention of sanctions. The deeply intertwined nature of this structure leaves Beijing with neither the option of maintaining a complete distance nor the luxury of intervening openly on the ground during a crisis. Precisely for this reason, Beijing’s stance in the US/Israel-Iran conflict must be viewed not merely as a diplomatic reaction, but as a multi-layered strategic landscape that simultaneously tests China’s vision for the global order, the structural vulnerabilities arising from energy dependence, and its positioning reflexes within great power competition.

Spanning from the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz within the energy system to the asymmetrical depth of China-Iran relations, this landscape requires analysis along an axis extending from Beijing’s official statements to the ongoing practical facilitation measures on the ground. In this context, the Strait of Hormuz represents the pinnacle of the systemic tension China is currently experiencing. Following the launch of a coordinated air operation by the US and Israel against Iran, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps issued explicit warnings via VHF radio channels to all foreign vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

These warnings quickly escalated into a de facto closure, with tanker traffic declining by approximately 70 per cent and hundreds of vessels forced to anchor outside the strait. This situation threatened the energy corridors that supply 20 per cent of global oil supply, significant volumes of liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports, and a large portion of Asian economies, whilst leading to a rise in Brent crude oil prices. The head of the International Energy Agency described this situation as “the most severe global energy security crisis in history”, thereby concretely demonstrating how a regional war can transform into a structural global threat.

Comprehensive strategic partnership and energy

From China’s perspective, Beijing’s primary security concern in this process is of a directly economic nature and stems from the very structure of its energy supply. Seeking to maintain control over its own energy supply, China meets over 63 per cent of its oil requirements through maritime imports, with half of these imports passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Furthermore, China is the primary buyer of Iranian oil, as Beijing’s purchases account for approximately 90 per cent of Iran’s oil exports, generating tens of billions of dollars in annual revenue that funds the Iranian government’s budget and military activities. Given this structural dependency, the strait’s paralysis ceases to be merely a foreign policy issue for Beijing and becomes a direct matter of economic governance.

Indeed, prior to the crisis, China turned a blind eye to the accumulation of oil tankers from both Iran and Venezuela in its coastal waters; this floating reserve of approximately forty million barrels served as an emergency buffer against a potential prolonged closure of the Strait. The pre-stockpiling of strategic reserves clearly demonstrates that Beijing had anticipated such scenarios and treated energy security as a matter of strategic preparedness; however, the protracted duration of the crisis and the concurrent depletion of stocks are rendering this preparedness increasingly inadequate.

On the other hand, the 25-year ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement’ signed in 2021 confirms that the relationship between China and Iran cannot be explained solely by market dynamics or energy considerations. Encompassing economic, security and technological cooperation, this agreement serves as a testament to the evolution of the relationship between the two countries from limited cooperation over the decades to a broad strategic depth; and a significant portion of this partnership directly conflicts with US foreign policy and national security interests.

Behind Beijing’s positioning of Iran as such a central partner lies not only energy but also a geopolitical need for Tehran, which is viewed as a strategic asset that could be used to counterbalance US influence and reshape the US-led global order. However, despite its comprehensive nature, the partnership also harbors a deep asymmetry. Whilst Iran is heavily dependent on China for energy export revenues and diplomatic support, Beijing continues to pursue a cautious balancing act to avoid jeopardizing its relations with other Gulf partners such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Risk-free pragmatism

The practical manifestation of this balance is clearly evident in the form of China’s support for Iran. By enabling Iran to effectively circumvent global sanctions through trade and financial networks, technology transfers and dual-use trade, China takes care to keep this support strictly separate from any official defense commitments. Beijing, which is alleged to have facilitated access to dual-use technology—including oil transactions, covert tanker fleets, and Iran’s missile and unmanned aerial vehicle programs—through Chinese banks, front companies and intermediary firms, has refrained from making official commitments to Iran in the defense sector.

Although Tehran seeks a deeper strategic rapprochement, bilateral defense cooperation has remained limited in recent years, with both countries conducting their military coordination primarily through trilateral mechanisms with Russia and multilateral platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or BRICS. Reports that, following the outbreak of the crisis, two Iranian vessels in a Chinese port were allowed to be loaded with sodium perchlorate—a solid rocket propellant used in missiles—suggest that this balance of ‘official distance, practical facilitation’ persists. As of November 2025, there were 366 China- and Hong Kong-based entities on the SDN List due to sanctions programs related to Iran; when this figure is taken into account, it paints a picture that illustrates the depth and institutional reach of these networks.

When analyzed at the diplomatic level, it is evident that Beijing has adopted a carefully calibrated language in this crisis, as it has in many other global crises. At a press conference on 3 March, the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson emphasized that “energy security is of great importance to the world economy, and all parties bear the responsibility to ensure an uninterrupted energy supply” and called on all relevant parties to take action to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and China’s Permanent Representative to the UN have characterized the US and Israeli attacks as violations of international law, condemned the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and called for an immediate halt to military operations and the resumption of dialogue.

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n conflicts between states, the use of force is not the only factor shaping the course of a conflict. In fact, other strategic deterrent factors arise from the intersection of geography and politics, carrying significant weight in tipping the scales in favor of one side or the other. These factors include geographical location, time, planning mechanisms, decision-making processes, and implicit alliances. Non-military caveats mean that war is not merely a direct confrontation between military forces; rather, it is a challenge between political systems.

As the great German military theorist Clausewitz stated, “War is the continuation of politics by other means.” In this context, Iran’s response to the joint U.S.-Israeli attack on February 28, 2026, is a prime example of a strategy that draws its strength from various factors, enabling it to withstand pressure. Additionally, Iranian decision-makers have a history of long-term resilience when dealing with adversaries, whether in times of peace or during disputes and conflicts. Tehran tends to employ a strategy of political and economic attrition against its opponents. Iran has responded to aggression with military action, targeting U.S. interests, Gulf Cooperation Council countries’ territory, and the Israeli heartland. This showcases the Iranian combat doctrine and conflict architecture, which focuses on strategies that confound adversaries and make prolonging the conflict costly and difficult. So, what has Iran done to withstand all this pressure?

The Iranian decision-making circle

Contrary to what some believe about Iran’s centralized decision-making process, Iran initially employs a strategic doctrine often referred to as “mosaic defense.” This doctrine involves distributing leadership roles to branches that can fight independently without central command and that have alternatives for every administrative position. Iran’s complex regime structure makes it impossible to cripple the regime by targeting the Supreme Leader or other prominent leaders, while maintaining communication networks between various commands and units. Second, since the revolution, Iran has proven that it is prepared for all scenarios, especially after the joint U.S.-Israeli attack in the twelve-day war in June 2025.

Iran has demonstrated its readiness for a prolonged war that does not necessitate a swift resolution. It can exhaust its adversaries and transform the war into a political and economic burden for the opposing side. Third, Iran has expanded the conflict regionally by launching simultaneous attacks on multiple fronts, including U.S. bases in the region, vital Arab Gulf facilities, and, crucially, threatening navigation by closing the Strait of Hormuz. The situation at the Strait has caused significant disruption to energy prices and the global economy, transforming the war into an international crisis.

Iran’s strategy of regionalizing the conflict stems from lessons learned from previous wars in the region, such as the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. These wars provided Iran with insight into U.S. military strategies and their pitfalls. Iran has also learned from Israel’s ground war with Hezbollah in 2006, not to mention its involvement in Syria, the October 2023 war between Hamas and Israel, and the confrontation between the Houthis in Yemen and the U.S. and Israel. Iran focuses on an asymmetric warfare strategy given its military weakness compared to its adversaries. Iran utilizes its missile and drone capabilities to launch flexible and simultaneous attacks, thereby weakening the ability of opposing air defenses to respond. Iran continues to utilize its regional allies, including the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq.

Despite the complex constitution of these factions and their varied affiliation with Iran, they remain key allies. These Iranian allies surrounding Israel have opened multiple fronts, granting Iran greater resilience and reinforcing the belief that survival is more important than dominance. Therefore, Iranian military doctrine demonstrates an ability to endure rather than achieve a decisive victory by complicating conflicts and exhausting adversaries without necessarily achieving outright triumph.

From the preceding, we can see that the balance of power primarily favors Iran and, to a lesser extent, Israel while failing to serve U.S. interests for two main reasons. First, Iran’s difficult terrain and natural barriers make a possible land invasion extremely complex. The Zagros Mountains in the south and west and the Alborz Mountains in the north form natural barriers with narrow, easily defensible passes that give defenders a tactical advantage. In the center, the Dasht-e Kavir and Dasht-e Lut deserts are massive, extreme desert areas with high summer temperatures and challenging terrain that can hinder supply lines and the movement of heavy machinery.

In the event of a land invasion, the terrain allows Iran to concentrate its defenses on chokepoints, which would make the mobility of land forces slow, costly, risky, and perhaps impossible. Second, while Iran and Israel share combat experience, which is emphasized by advocates of the realist school of thought regarding the use of military force to achieve objectives, Iran appears capable of enduring and prolonging a war. Iran has the manpower and a vast geographical area for maneuvering. It also has allies that can bolster its military position by disrupting calculations and controlling strategic waterways, such as the Strait of Bab al-Mandeb at the southeastern entrance to the Red Sea. Therefore, Iran has succeeded in freezing the conflict, preventing its adversaries from fulfilling their political agendas or achieving any strategic goals.

Iranian superiority or weaknesses of the adversaries?

Israel has combat experience and a vast military arsenal, but lacks strategic depth. It is accustomed to operating in a volatile environment and sensing threats from its surroundings. The domestic and regional challenges it faces have been exacerbated by global resentment since its aggression in the October 2023 war, internal opposition to its far-right policies, demographic imbalances, and increasing reverse migration. Despite suffering blows, Iran has broken Israeli hegemony and penetrated the “Iron Dome” defense system by targeting vital strategic areas such as command and control centers, air defense systems, power stations, energy facilities, and ports.

Attacks by Iran on Israel have led to a decline in economic activity and investment and have disrupted such sectors as tourism, aviation, and trade, which are pillars of the Israeli economy. Furthermore, Iran has depleted Israeli air defense capabilities to a certain extent and weakened its military readiness. The ability to target Israeli depth has proven costly for Israel, resulting in economic pressure, disruption to daily life, and pressure on the civilian population due to frequent warnings and the need to remain in shelters, thus diminishing the sense of security.

Israel is under increased international pressure to stop escalating the conflict, which has complicated its relations with some countries and eroded the stereotype of its absolute military superiority. The outcome of the confrontation has significantly undermined Israel’s ability to sustain the conflict, leading it to accept a ceasefire, perhaps at the behest of the United States. Notably, Iran’s air defense umbrella is the weakest link in its ability to confront Israel. This is attributed to the numerous sanctions that restrict Iran’s ability to acquire advanced air defense systems and its vast territory. The same applies to Iran’s naval capabilities, which remain vulnerable compared to those of its adversaries, who have more advanced platforms and superior electronic warfare capabilities.

During a relatively calm period, the United States suffered the most losses for several reasons. First, it lacked a sound strategic objective when launching the war and found itself embroiled in a poorly conceived conflict for itself and its allies in the Arab Gulf region. The U.S. campaign has not resulted in a clear victory. Meanwhile, the debate within the U.S. regarding the war’s legitimacy and feasibility has intensified. The war has created political division and public pressure, making it difficult to achieve decisive results. The prolonged state of attrition and the U.S. administration’s inability to manage important issues in Asia and Europe have also contributed to this difficulty. Not to mention, relations with traditional allies in Europe are strained, and relations with the GCC states are uncertain. American taxpayers are also aware of the repercussions of the war’s high operating costs, including the possible deployment of troops and equipment over vast areas and the resulting impact on energy prices and the disruption and rise in the price of goods.

Although the U.S. has not suffered losses on its own soil, Iran’s targeting of its interests and those of its allies in the region pushed the U.S. to accept a ceasefire and return to the negotiating table, despite the collapse of the Pakistani-led negotiations. Additionally, there has been strong opposition to the war within Washington’s decision-making circle, perhaps explaining the dismissal of some senior officers with extensive combat experience. As Iran realizes the limits of U.S.-Israeli power, it has set conditions for accepting a ceasefire and returning to negotiations. These conditions include linking the negotiations to the Lebanese issue and stipulating the level of U.S. representation during the direct talks in Islamabad. The U.S. vice president, J.D. Vance, will lead the American negotiating delegation.

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he United States has announced it will begin enforcing a sweeping naval blockade on Iranian ports, marking a sharp escalation in tensions with Iran after high-stakes negotiations failed to produce a breakthrough.

The decision follows weekend talks in Islamabad—the first direct meeting between U.S. and Iranian officials in more than a decade—which ended without agreement despite efforts to extend a fragile two-week ceasefire. The ceasefire had been aimed at halting six weeks of intense fighting across the Gulf region that has already left thousands dead and disrupted global energy flows.

According to United States Central Command, the blockade will take effect Monday at 10 a.m. ET and will target all maritime traffic entering or exiting Iranian ports along both the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Military officials emphasized that the operation would be applied “impartially” to vessels of all nations interacting with Iranian ports, though shipping transiting to non-Iranian destinations through the Strait of Hormuz would not be directly impeded.

U.S. President Donald Trump further escalated rhetoric, warning that American forces would intercept vessels in international waters if they had paid what he described as “illegal tolls” to Iran. He also vowed that any Iranian attack on U.S. forces or commercial shipping would be met with overwhelming force. Additionally, the U.S. Navy has begun operations to clear naval mines reportedly deployed by Iran in the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint through which roughly 20% of global oil supplies pass.

Markets react to rising tensions

Global markets responded swiftly to the announcement. Oil prices surged more than 7%, pushing benchmark crude above $100 per barrel, while the U.S. dollar strengthened and stock futures fell. Shipping activity in the Strait of Hormuz slowed significantly, with tanker operators rerouting or delaying voyages amid fears of confrontation.

Analysts warn that prolonged disruption in the Gulf could drive sustained inflation worldwide. The conflict has already strained supply chains and energy markets, and the blockade threatens to further destabilize global trade flows.

Iranian officials reacted sharply, accusing Washington of pursuing “maximalist” demands and undermining diplomatic progress. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps warned that any foreign military vessels approaching sensitive waters would be considered a violation of the ceasefire and would face a “decisive” response.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi criticized the U.S. for shifting its negotiating position at the last moment, saying Tehran had been close to agreeing on a framework memorandum before talks broke down. He described the U.S. approach as inconsistent and confrontational, adding that goodwill had not been reciprocated.

At the heart of the dispute are longstanding disagreements over Iran’s nuclear program and regional influence. U.S. officials said Tehran rejected demands to halt uranium enrichment, dismantle key nuclear facilities, and cease support for regional groups including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Iran also resisted calls to fully guarantee open access through the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian reiterated that Tehran remains open to a “balanced and fair agreement” but insisted that Washington must return to international legal frameworks to rebuild trust.

What’s next?

Despite the escalation, President Trump signaled mixed expectations about future diplomacy. While he initially expressed confidence that Iran would return to negotiations, he later stated that the U.S. could proceed without further talks if necessary.

The collapse of negotiations has raised concerns about a broader regional conflict. The Gulf remains heavily militarized, and any miscalculation in or around the Strait of Hormuz could trigger a wider confrontation involving multiple regional and global powers.

Experts caution that enforcing a comprehensive blockade against Iran could prove difficult to sustain over time without broader international support. The operation risks not only military escalation but also legal and diplomatic challenges, particularly if neutral shipping is affected.

Meanwhile, the economic consequences are already being felt. Rising fuel costs are expected to persist, with Trump acknowledging that high oil and gasoline prices could continue through upcoming U.S. midterm elections. Iranian officials have also highlighted the political impact, pointing to rising fuel prices in the United States as evidence of the blockade’s global repercussions.

As tensions mount, the prospects for a renewed diplomatic breakthrough remain uncertain. With both sides holding firm on key demands, the situation in the Gulf appears poised to remain volatile in the weeks ahead.

(Source: Reuters)

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ndian Prime Minister Modi had told Russian President Putin in the context of Ukraine, “This is not a time of war.” India had not condemned Russia either, but it must have realised it could not say the same to Trump. Many countries, likely including India, had assumed that the conflict between Iran, Israel and the US would come to a swift end. New Delhi was probably among those who thought this way and had hoped to weather the storm through silence. It now seems this approach has not been very effective.

As the Iran War escalates, we are witnessing how decision-makers in the US and Israel have miscalculated Iran’s resilience and resolve. At the same time, they have underestimated Tehran’s leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. As the world is shaken by the consequences of the Iran War, India is striving to maintain its neutrality whilst managing the risks and interests in the Middle East and beyond amidst the expanding conflict. India has a large diaspora in Arab states, as well as significant trade and investment ties.

Delhi, which keeps communication channels open with all parties, believes it is managing the situation well. Is that really the case? Iran’s refusal to compromise and its resolve in the face of constant missile attacks by the US and Israel offer lessons for the world, but they also hold a mirror up to India. Modi never shies away from saying that the world is watching India. It certainly is watching, but how?

India has also been severely affected by rising fuel prices, pressure on the rupee and strained diplomatic relations. According to Goldman Sachs, whilst approximately 14 per cent of its exports to Gulf countries pass through the Strait of Hormuz, remittances sent home by the roughly 10 million Indian workers employed in the Middle East account for 40 per cent of the annual total. For India, the Strait of Hormuz is a vital energy source through which approximately 90 per cent of its LPG imports and around 50 per cent of its crude oil imports pass.

On the one hand, Indians are forming long queues outside LPG distribution centres with empty LPG cylinders, while on the other hand, four of India’s Union states are preparing for elections in April (the repatriation of many Indians will significantly impact these and other Indian elections over the next 12 months), and meanwhile, New Delhi—balancing public silence with diplomatic flexibility—is conducting intensive consultations with all stakeholders.

Delhi’s stance

India’s top priority is to maintain access to all actors. The Iran War may have granted India a 30-day exemption advantage for Russian oil (though this is characterised by some Indian commentators as humiliation, and they are not entirely without a point – consider that your trade policy is shaped, or could be shaped, by another power in this situation, subject to US approval), but a far greater blow is being felt in its strategic relations across Asia, including the Gulf.

The Iran War began on 28 February, yet Modi was in Israel on 25–26 February. During his visit, which elevated bilateral relations to the level of a special strategic partnership, Modi—greeted as a brother by Netanyahu—stated in the Israeli parliament, the Knesset: “India stands firmly by Israel’s side, both now and in the future.” It remained a matter of speculation whether Modi was aware of the attack launched 1.5 days later. However, this visit and his subsequent prolonged silence on critical issues amounted to a loss of prestige for India and a strategic detriment to its long-term interests. Delhi did not condemn the US and Israeli attacks on Iran, but supported a draft resolution at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) condemning Iran’s attacks on various Gulf states.

In the Iran crisis, it appears that India’s efforts to remain in the background have pushed it into the sidelines. It is positioning itself through quiet rhetoric rather than action. It is expressing its concerns to Gulf leaders regarding Iranian attacks in the context of the safety of Indian workers, but at the same time, it seems to be opting to turn a blind eye to US and Israeli attacks.

New Delhi is driven by a desire to become a major power. It argues that it is entitled to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. It is on its way to becoming the world’s fourth-largest economy. At every opportunity, India states that recognizing its global role would also mean giving a voice to the Global South and the developing world, which are currently unrepresented on the UN Security Council. However, this is now highly open to question. A perception has emerged that India is not a neutral player in the conflict, but rather is aligning itself with the US-Israel camp, even if it does not explicitly state so.

The torpedo attack by an American submarine on the Iranian naval vessel IRIS Dena, which had been invited to participate in the MILAN exercise held in Visakhapatnam by New Delhi on 4 March, has made matters even more difficult for the Indian government. Not a single word was spoken to the US. The Indian Navy’s statement made no mention of the attack that sank the vessel or of any regret over the sailors’ deaths. Of course, the ship was outside Indian waters and India bore no legal or political responsibility. However, Delhi had previously gone to great lengths to prove and establish its role as the ‘clear security provider’ in the Indian Ocean region. Yet in this incident, the same Delhi went to great lengths to clarify that the Indian Ocean was not India’s ocean. This formalistic perspective on such a serious incident was, in a sense, an attempt to justify the American action and Delhi’s lack of responsibility.

Silence and choices

India, which has expended immense effort to establish itself as the “voice of the Global South”, now faces not only the challenge of safeguarding the image of Global South leadership it has sought to build, but also the handicap of protecting the strategic autonomy it has jeopardized in pursuit of a special relationship with the US and Israel. India’s stance appears to amount to nothing more than hoping the problems will resolve themselves. Just as Venezuelan President Maduro did during his ousting by the Americans in January 2026.

Some circles in India view Delhi’s silent response to the war as a cool-headed calculation aimed at safeguarding the interests of a rising power across multiple fronts. In their view, silence is a legitimate strategic tool when there is no bargaining power. This is theoretically defensible, but there is a difference between an ambiguous silence and principled restraint. Not only did it refrain from condemning the death of Iran’s religious leader, but it even avoided sending an official message of condolence.

The Ministry of External Affairs explicitly instructed all Indian ambassadors in world capitals not to sign any book of condolence opened by their Iranian counterparts without prior authorization from New Delhi. Ultimately, in the face of mounting domestic criticism, the Indian Foreign Minister visited the Iranian embassy to convey his condolences. However, the initial stance went beyond mere silence. This gives the impression that silence was used not as a strategic tool, but rather as a reflexive means to please the US and Israel.

Given its immense interests in the Gulf, Delhi’s choice to remain silent and defend this stance strategically may, in one sense, be a justified position. Yet, in another sense, it is incomplete. For India, Iran is not merely a trading partner. Nor is the issue solely about its energy imports via the Strait of Hormuz. For India, Iran represents a way to bypass the China-Pakistan axis. It is about bypassing Pakistani control in land access to Central Asia.

It is the cornerstone of the International North-South Transport Corridor and the gateway to the Chabahar port. India has invested at least 120 million dollars, diplomatic capital, infrastructure resources and long-term strategic planning into this framework over a period of more than twenty years. And for India, Iran represents a bond extending to cultural ties, as Foreign Minister Jaishankar has noted (for instance, even whilst the British were attempting to conquer the subcontinent, Persian remained at the heart of Indian court life).

The BRICS factor

Meanwhile, India currently holds the presidency of BRICS. BRICS is a multilateral coalition established with the aim of challenging American financial hegemony. Iran is a BRICS member and enjoys the support of China, Russia and South Africa. Consequently, Delhi finds itself at odds with other BRICS member states, particularly during the year it holds the group’s presidency. It is ironic to lead a multipolar coalition whilst sending mixed signals as if orbiting a unipolar power.

It is true that foreign policy requires caution. However, India has failed to apply this in this crisis. Taken as a whole, although it might be termed ‘strategic silence’, India’s omissions—which show a marked bias towards Israel and the US—are creating the perception that Delhi is on the side of the aggressors in this war. Those with a realistic perspective know that in international politics, words are worthless and actions are more effective than words.

However, one must not overlook the fact that, ultimately, the pressure of US sanctions has strained India’s relations with Iran. It has significantly reduced its oil imports and has almost entirely divested its stake in the Chabahar port. It may have concluded that it must position itself alongside the US, Israel and the Gulf states to maintain its dominance in this war. If so, it must have reached this conclusion at the cost of damaging its future credibility.

Using international diplomacy as a ploy to buy time and lull the Iranians into a false sense of security, the targeted assassination of a president who was not in hiding, false claims regarding the right to pre-emptive strikes, the torpedoing of a ship returning from a fleet inspection, Israel’s occupation of Lebanese and Syrian territory. Delhi has remained silent on all of these. Modi addressed the Knesset, received his medal, and departed with a series of defense-technology agreements. Just 36 hours after returning from Israel, Israeli-US missiles began bombing Iran.

Even without prior knowledge, speculation about a possible US-Israeli attack had been rife for weeks, and the timing inevitably drew attention. Could it be that India had agreed to align its foreign and security policies with American interests? The US Deputy Secretary of State said at the 2026 Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi: “India must understand that we will not make the same mistake with India that we made with China 20 years ago.” In other words, he is saying we will not allow India’s economic development to reach the point where it becomes a commercial rival. Were those who believed Delhi could become a major power by clinging to the coattails of a superpower mistaken?

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n a dramatic shift in Middle East politics, tensions between the United States and Iran have eased following the announcement of a two-week ceasefire, described by observers as a potential “last chance” to prevent a wider regional war.

The breakthrough came after Donald Trump confirmed that Washington had agreed to halt military operations against Iran for two weeks, citing a 10-point proposal from Tehran as a “workable basis for negotiations.” The announcement was made just hours before a deadline previously set by the U.S. administration.

The ceasefire, facilitated through mediation by Pakistan, includes an immediate halt to hostilities across multiple fronts, including Lebanon and other areas affected by the broader war. Pakistani officials have invited delegations from both sides to meet in Islamabad on Friday for continued negotiations, marking what could be the first face-to-face talks since the war began.

Trump stated that “significant progress” had been made toward a long-term agreement, adding that the temporary pause in military action would provide the necessary space to finalize a comprehensive deal.

Widespread international support

The agreement has been met with broad international approval, with countries across Asia and beyond urging both sides to use the opportunity to pursue lasting peace.

Indonesia called on all parties to respect sovereignty and prioritize diplomacy, as Australia welcomed the ceasefire as a step toward ending the war. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said his country is working with international partners to support diplomatic efforts and reopen the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz.

Similarly, Japan emphasized continued diplomatic engagement, particularly regarding the safe reopening of the strait, a critical global energy route. Malaysia also expressed support, with Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim calling for the Iranian proposal to evolve into a comprehensive peace agreement benefiting not only Iran but also Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.

UN and regional reactions

The United Nations welcomed the ceasefire, with Secretary-General António Guterres urging all parties to commit to international law and work toward a sustainable resolution. His spokesperson stressed the importance of adhering to the ceasefire terms as a pathway to comprehensive peace in the region.

Regional powers also reacted positively. Egypt described the move as a significant step toward de-escalation and stability, highlighting its importance for global security and international navigation. Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty reportedly discussed the development with U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff, expressing strong support for renewed diplomatic efforts.

Meanwhile, Iraq’s Foreign Ministry called for a “serious and sustained dialogue” between Washington and Tehran to address the root causes of their tensions and build mutual trust.

Next steps and uncertainties

According to U.S. officials cited by American media, the ceasefire is expected to take effect once Iran reopens the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for global oil shipments. Sources indicate that the upcoming talks in Pakistan could mark a turning point, as they would be the first direct negotiations between the two sides since the outbreak of war.

However, some uncertainty remains. Reports suggest discrepancies between the Persian and English versions of Iran’s ceasefire proposal, particularly regarding uranium enrichment—an issue likely to remain central in upcoming negotiations.

While the agreement has sparked optimism worldwide, analysts caution that the two-week ceasefire represents only a narrow window for diplomacy. Whether it leads to a lasting peace or merely a pause in hostilities will depend on the willingness of both sides to compromise on long-standing disputes.

For now, the deal offers a rare moment of hope in a region long marked by instability, with global leaders urging both Washington and Tehran to seize what may be their final opportunity to avoid a broader war.

(Source: News Agencies)

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ver the centuries, the Sultanate of Oman has navigated geopolitical shifts through a foreign policy characterized by calmness, deliberation, and positive neutrality. This approach stems from the profound understanding of current events held by its decision-makers, and is rooted in the country’s long history of adapting to its regional and global environment. It has strengthened Oman’s regional standing, ensured the stability of its political system and contributed to its continued existence as an independent state.

It has also given Oman a unique position in managing developments within the Arab Gulf region, with Muscat often playing the role of a conduit between conflicting parties without becoming embroiled in polarization or alliances. Oman’s role as a mediator or facilitator stems from the confidence that regional states and non-state actors have in its ability to resolve differences and find solutions to crises. Muscat is renowned for its constructive dialogue and diplomatic approach, avoiding confrontations that would otherwise harm the region.

This has led some political analysts to describe Oman as the ‘Switzerland of the Middle East’. However, the joint US-Israeli attack on Iran on 28 February 2026, following a round of indirect negotiations between the US and Iran, took Oman and other regional actors by surprise. His Excellency Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi, the Omani Foreign Minister, stated that an agreement was imminent following a round of negotiations held in Muscat and later in Geneva, he stated that progress was being made towards de-escalation in order to maintain the necessary calm in the region. This is vital as it is an important energy artery that cannot withstand military confrontation and its repercussions for long without seriously disrupting the global supply of oil and gas. This raises questions about Oman’s ability to fulfil its traditional role in the region, given its limited capacity to leverage its soft power, which is crucial for defusing tensions between conflicting parties.

In contrast to its previous calm and covert rhetoric, Muscat has openly voiced its opinion on the ongoing conflict, adopting a clear stance against joint US-Israeli aggression towards Iran. In an article published in The Economist, the Omani foreign minister emphasized that a war on Iran would be illegitimate and would not serve the interests of the region. It would also have serious repercussions for the security and economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, as well as for the global economy and energy markets more broadly. He urged Washington and its allies to de-escalate and resume diplomatic efforts.

A changing regional landscape

The Arab Gulf region has been unique for decades, with its own political, economic, cultural and religious characteristics. Long ago, it became an arena for competition between the great powers, starting with the arrival of the Portuguese in the late 15th century and continuing with the growing influence of the Dutch, British and French between the 17th and 19th centuries. The discovery of oil in the early 20th century further cemented the region’s prominence, even while the great powers were preoccupied with conflicts such as the First and Second World Wars. The discovery of oil coincided with the establishment of the Third Saudi State in 1932. This state is characterized by its vast geographical area, regional influence and prominent role in global energy markets. However, the region has not been immune to geopolitical changes that have disrupted its relative stability.

These include communist maneuvers in southern Oman (1965–1975), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), the Iranian Revolution (1979), the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990), the impact of the 9/11 attacks, followed by the US invasions of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), the subsequent Arab Spring (2011), the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen (2015) and the blockade of Qatar (2017). These events have cast a shadow over the political landscape of the Middle East and the relationship between the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. This raises questions about the future of the GCC, more than four decades after its foundation. This puts Oman’s foreign policy in relation to the region at stake and is exacerbated by the uncertainty surrounding the stance of the other GCC states.

Despite being relatively isolated from its regional surroundings since the dissolution of the Omani Empire in 1856, anyone familiar with Oman’s foreign policy towards the Arab Gulf region will realize that, since Sultan Qaboos came to power in 1970, Oman has been keen to achieve unity and consensus with its neighbors, focusing on collective action for human development rather than conflict. This approach has earned Oman the trust of various parties through its balanced policies, adherence to principles, maintenance of neutrality, avoidance of involvement in ill-conceived conflicts that could prove costly, and pursuit of diplomatic efforts in cooperation with regional partners, especially its ‘brothers’ in the GCC.

This independent and unique approach has continued under the leadership of His Majesty Sultan Haitham bin Tariq, who ascended to the throne on 11 January 2020. His Majesty affirmed that the Sultanate of Oman would continue its noble mission and play a positive role in the region. He emphasized the independence of Omani policy and its sovereign decision-making by stating that Oman would not be swayed by whims and desires and would not enter into blocs and alliances directed towards a specific party. This summarizes the balance and stability of Omani foreign policy over the past five decades.

His Majesty also affirmed Oman’s support for Arab and Muslim causes, foremost among them the Palestinian cause, within a balanced diplomatic framework that focuses on opportunities for peace. This framework affirms the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people to establish an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital, based on a two-state solution. It also completely rejects Israeli attacks that affect Palestinian lands and rights, as well as repeated violations of the sovereignty and security of other countries.

Oman’s approach to the crisis

While Muscat has achieved a certain level of political maturity and learned to adopt a moderate and non-confrontational approach to conflict, avoiding escalatory rhetoric and utilizing international channels to maintain calm, it has also demonstrated a firm desire to adhere to the principles of moderation and preserve regional balance and stability. However, recent events have challenged Muscat’s approach to the crisis, given the damage to Omani infrastructure caused by drone attacks on coastal investments, such as the ports of Sohar and Salalah and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in Duqm. While the physical damage was limited, the broader economic implications threaten the coastal investment strategy outlined in Oman’s Future Vision 2040, in which coastal investments are a crucial pillar of the economic diversification strategy.

Such attacks on Oman have revealed that traditional neutrality no longer guarantees security, and the breach of sovereignty sent an alarming signal to Muscat that a more explicit stance was necessary. Muscat condemned the attacks, some of which Tehran denied. Muscat then repeatedly criticized US-Israeli aggression against Iran, which brought chaos to the region. This was after the Omani Foreign Minister announced that the US and Iran were on the verge of reaching a genuine agreement on most of the complex issues causing hostility. The minister described the attacks as ‘illegal, shocking, but not surprising’ when military strikes were favored over a peace treaty that was within reach, and only hours after the most crucial round of talks. Furthermore, he described Iran’s immediate retaliation as ‘inevitable, albeit deeply regrettable’, as it led to unacceptable consequences and further escalation.

While other GCC capitals took a stronger position, refusing to support or participate in military operations, Muscat urged all sides to stop what it called ‘grave miscalculations’, calling for an immediate return to negotiations through engagement with other GCC states and other regional and international partners. Muscat emphasized its criticism of the war and called for an immediate ceasefire.

During the GCC foreign ministers’ meeting on 30 March, Muscat expressed its position to representatives from Russia and Jordan. At the same time, it continued its role as go-between through indirect talks with Washington and Tehran, stressing that the door for diplomacy remained open. Therefore, Oman is continuing its role as a stabilizing force, prioritizing diplomacy over all other means of resolving conflicts to ensure the stability of the Arab Gulf region and avoid military entanglement. This is in accordance with the fact that Oman’s security and economy are directly affected by the repercussions of the war.

Challenges to Muscat’s active role

One of the most significant challenges facing Muscat in its efforts to play an active role is reaching a consensus with the other GCC capitals on regional issues. These political differences have resulted in the absence of a collective GCC response mechanism to regional issues, whether political or military. Firstly, despite the GCC’s 45-year existence and the Peninsula Shield Force’s (PSF) 44-year history, this modest military force remains largely symbolic and lacks the capability to engage in a large-scale regional conflict due to its lack of air and naval elements. Secondly, Muscat is affected by regional polarization and a changing security landscape, which makes acting as an intermediary between the GCC states and Iran more difficult. Amid a polarized Arab Gulf environment, maintaining cordial ties can be difficult, reducing the chances of Muscat maintaining its neutrality. Therefore, Oman may be pressured into choosing sides, which would contradict its long-held political orientation.

Thirdly, the lack of robust leverage means that Oman’s regional role is being challenged by the emergence of new regional mediators, such as Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt. This reduces Oman’s unique diplomatic role, particularly given Muscat’s stance on the current crisis: it has explicitly condemned American and Israeli strikes on Iran, and warned against regional escalation and its repercussions for the region and the world. Fourthly, unlike other wealthier GCC states, Oman has financial constraints in the form of low financial reserves and high public debt. This reduces its ability to finance diplomatic initiatives and consequently reduces its regional footprint. Finally, Oman faces economic constraints, developmental challenges and an increasing unemployment rate, as well as a desperate need for economic diversification. This may reduce its ability to pursue an active foreign policy and instead divert its focus to domestic affairs.

Based on the foregoing and Oman’s traditional foreign policy approach, it is clear that Muscat has taken a firm stance by condemning both the American-Israeli and Iranian strikes. Calling on all parties to exercise restraint and avoid escalation, Muscat has also appealed to Iran to keep trade routes open and not to militarize the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, Oman recognizes that neutrality does not always guarantee security, as demonstrated by Iran’s targeting of some of its vital infrastructure. Therefore, Muscat now needs to achieve balance through two main strategies: Firstly, it should maintain its rapprochement with Tehran in order to advance diplomatic solutions, joining the initiative of regional actors such as Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt and Turkey to ensure the safety of maritime navigation routes and a regional environment conducive to foreign investment. This is vital to the future economic visions of all GCC states.

Secondly, Muscat should play a leading role in adopting a unified stance among the Gulf capitals regarding any foreign intervention that could lead to crises affecting the GCC states first. This can only be achieved by setting aside differing viewpoints and focusing on the collective benefits of regional stability. There must also be a firm conviction that prolonging the conflict will have serious repercussions for the GCC states themselves before it has regional and global effects. During a high-level briefing at the UN Security Council meeting on 2 April, GCC Secretary-General Jassim Al-Budaiwi stated that ‘The Gulf states do not favor war over peace, security and stability’, emphasizing that ‘dialogue and diplomacy remain the best way to address crises’ and that ‘continued escalation would undermine regional security and lead to serious repercussions for international peace and security’.

This could serve as a basis for a collective GCC perspective on regional politics and security that benefits not only Oman, but the entire region. While it does not necessitate a total transformation of Oman’s foreign policy or its decision-making autonomy, it does mean working in a more balanced manner with regional partners to ensure the security and stability of both the region and the country itself.

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ccording to the report, satellite imagery and Chinese government documents indicate that entire villages in Sichuan province were demolished and residents evicted beginning in 2021–2022 to make way for expanded nuclear facilities.

Local residents reportedly received minimal explanation for the land seizures, with officials citing “state secrecy.”

The construction includes large reinforced industrial structures, upgraded transportation links, and expanded facilities believed to be connected to nuclear weapons production and research.

The investigation highlights extensive development at sites identified as Site 906 and Site 931, part of a broader network of facilities linked to China’s nuclear program.

Among the most notable additions is a large dome-like structure described by experts as potentially designed for handling highly radioactive materials such as uranium and plutonium.

Analysts cited in the report say the scale and design of the facilities suggest a major modernization effort that could significantly increase China’s nuclear production capacity.

China’s growing arsenal and strategic shift

China is currently estimated to possess over 600 nuclear warheads, placing it behind the United States and Russia, but ahead of other nuclear powers such as France.

Defense analysts say China is the fastest-growing nuclear power globally, even as it maintains its official policy of “no first use.”

Beijing has repeatedly stated that its nuclear strategy is defensive in nature, with its Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejecting claims of weapons escalation and insisting China does not engage in nuclear threats against non-nuclear states.

The report comes at a time of increasing global uncertainty over nuclear arms control. The expiration of the New START Treaty between the United States and Russia has further weakened the international framework limiting strategic weapons.

Former U.S. President Donald Trump has previously called for a new arms control agreement that would also include China, though Beijing has shown little indication it is willing to join such negotiations.

Some analysts believe China’s expansion is linked to broader geopolitical tensions and a desire to strengthen deterrence, particularly in relation to Taiwan and rising military competition with the United States.

Concerns over a new arms race

Experts warn that the simultaneous modernization of nuclear forces by multiple major powers could lead to a more complex and unstable arms race than during the Cold War era.

Analysts also suggest that perceptions of China’s capabilities—whether accurate or exaggerated—could influence U.S. defense planning and potentially accelerate global nuclear proliferation.

Meanwhile, tensions in other regions, including conflicts involving Iran, are also seen by some experts as factors contributing to rising global nuclear insecurity.

(Source: CNN)

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s the war between the United States and Israel against Iran enters its second month with no clear path to de-escalation, China is increasingly positioning itself as a voice for peace. Yet analysts say Beijing’s actions suggest caution, raising doubts about whether it is ready to take on a central role as a mediator in one of the world’s most volatile geopolitical crises.

China’s diplomatic posture came into sharper focus this week following high-level talks in Beijing between Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. The two sides issued a joint statement calling for an “immediate ceasefire,” the swift launch of peace negotiations, and a long-term settlement backed by the United Nations.

The initiative, described by officials as a five-point proposal, also emphasized the protection of civilians, the security of critical shipping lanes, and respect for the sovereignty of all states involved. While the statement marked one of China’s most detailed responses to the ongoing war, it stopped short of outlining concrete mechanisms for achieving these goals.

Balancing diplomacy and risk

China’s approach reflects a broader strategic calculation. Under President Xi Jinping, Beijing has sought to expand its global diplomatic footprint and present itself as a stabilizing force in contrast to what it characterizes as Western interventionism. Calling for dialogue and restraint allows China to project influence without becoming entangled in the operational complexities of conflict resolution.

However, experts note that taking on a genuine peace broker role would require commitments Beijing has historically avoided. Acting as a guarantor of any agreement—ensuring compliance or responding to violations—could draw China into direct confrontation or force it to deploy military or monitoring capabilities abroad.

“China wants the credit of mediation without the burden of enforcement,” said one regional analyst, pointing to Beijing’s longstanding reluctance to engage in security alliances or military interventions beyond its immediate periphery.

Pakistan steps forward

While China has voiced support for diplomacy, Pakistan has emerged as a more active player in mediation efforts. Islamabad has offered to host talks between Washington and Tehran, leveraging its diplomatic ties with both sides. Pakistani officials have also reportedly explored the possibility of China acting as a guarantor in a future agreement, though no formal commitment has been made.

Behind the scenes, coordination appears to be ongoing. Reports indicate that Pakistani leadership has engaged with Chinese officials to discuss potential frameworks for de-escalation, including multilateral arrangements involving regional powers such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Türkiye.

Still, China has maintained a measured tone. In response to questions about a guarantor role, its foreign ministry reiterated that Beijing supports mediation efforts by “relevant parties” and is willing to play a “constructive role,” without specifying what that role would entail.

Lessons from past mediation

China’s diplomatic ambitions are not without precedent. In 2023, Beijing successfully brokered a normalization agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, a breakthrough widely seen as a milestone in its Middle East engagement. That deal demonstrated China’s ability to leverage its economic ties and political neutrality to facilitate dialogue.

However, analysts caution that the current war presents far greater challenges. Unlike the Saudi-Iran rapprochement, which involved two regional rivals seeking to reduce tensions, the present war involves active military confrontation and deep-seated hostility between Iran and the United States and Israel.

Moreover, trust between the parties remains minimal. Iranian officials have indicated openness to a ceasefire only under strict conditions, including guarantees against future attacks, while U.S. leadership faces its own domestic and strategic pressures.

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ensions in the Middle East escalated sharply after Iran warned it would target energy and water infrastructure across the Gulf if the United States attacks its power grid, following a deadline set by U.S. President Donald Trump.

Trump issued a 48-hour ultimatum demanding that Iran fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz, a vital global shipping route. He warned that failure to comply would result in U.S. strikes on Iranian power plants. The deadline is set for Monday evening.

Iranian officials responded with strong warnings, stating that any attack on their energy facilities would trigger retaliation against U.S. and allied infrastructure in the region. Military spokesperson Ebrahim Zolfaqari said energy systems, water desalination plants, and even information technology networks could be targeted.

The threat raises serious concerns for Gulf countries, which rely heavily on desalination to meet water needs. Nations such as Bahrain and Qatar depend almost entirely on desalinated water, while the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia also rely on it for a significant portion of their supply.

Iran’s parliament speaker, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, warned that regional infrastructure could face “irreversible destruction” if Iranian facilities are attacked.

Oil markets: Military escalation continues

The warning comes amid ongoing military exchanges. Israel launched a new wave of strikes targeting infrastructure in Tehran, while air raid sirens sounded across Tel Aviv and parts of the occupied West Bank due to incoming Iranian missiles.

Reports from Iran indicated civilian casualties following strikes in cities including Khorramabad and Urmia. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia said it intercepted ballistic missiles aimed at its capital, Riyadh.

The broader conflict, involving the United States and Israel against Iran and its allies, has already resulted in over 2,000 deaths since late February.

The crisis has severely disrupted global energy markets. The near-closure of the Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas passes — has triggered the worst oil shock since the 1970s.

Market analysts warn of growing instability. “A ticking time bomb of uncertainty” now hangs over global markets, with expectations of falling stock prices and rising fuel costs.

Iran has stated that while the strait remains open to some shipping, vessels linked to its “enemies” will be restricted. Some ships have reportedly managed to pass through under coordinated arrangements with Tehran.

The conflict is also expanding beyond Iran and Israel. Fighting involving the Iran-backed Hezbollah has intensified along Israel’s northern border, with continued rocket fire and Israeli military operations in southern Lebanon.

Israeli officials have indicated that the fighting could continue for weeks, raising fears of a prolonged regional war with global economic consequences.

(Source: Reuters)

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lobal oil markets are on edge as analysts warn that crude prices could surge to as high as $200 per barrel, driven by escalating war in the Middle East and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a vital artery for the world’s energy supply.

Less than three weeks after the United States and Israel launched strikes on Iran, benchmark crude prices have already climbed sharply. Brent crude briefly approached $120 per barrel earlier this month and has remained above $100 in recent days, reflecting mounting concerns over supply disruptions.

The central focus of market anxiety is the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil shipments pass under normal conditions. Since Iran declared the waterway closed and warned of attacks on vessels attempting to transit, maritime traffic has nearly halted, with only a limited number of ships reportedly securing safe passage.

Energy analysts say the duration of this disruption will be decisive. “Prices could rise substantially, even approaching $200, if flows through Hormuz remain blocked for a sustained period,” market observers note, pointing to a widening gap between global supply and demand.

Supply shock meets geopolitical risk

Recent attacks on energy infrastructure have intensified fears of a broader regional supply shock. Strikes targeting Iran’s South Pars gas field and subsequent retaliatory attacks on facilities in Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, have heightened volatility in energy markets.

Even coordinated efforts by major economies to release emergency oil reserves may not fully offset the disruption. Analysts estimate that, despite planned releases totaling hundreds of millions of barrels, the global market could still face a shortfall of up to 10 million barrels per day.

Such conditions have led some experts to describe $150 oil as increasingly likely, with $200 no longer considered out of the question. “The scale of supply at risk today is significant, and the market is already under strain,” industry analysts say.

A sustained surge in oil prices would carry far-reaching consequences for the global economy. According to estimates by the International Monetary Fund, every 10 percent increase in oil prices could push global inflation higher while slowing economic growth.

At $150 per barrel or more, economists warn of rising costs across key sectors, from transportation and manufacturing to agriculture and consumer goods. At $200, the impact could be even more pronounced, potentially triggering fuel shortages and increasing the risk of economic downturns in vulnerable economies.

Higher energy costs would also likely translate into increased prices for essential materials such as plastics and fertilizers, further amplifying inflationary pressures worldwide.

Doubts remain over extreme scenarios

Despite the growing concern, not all analysts believe oil will reach such extreme levels. Some point to the potential for increased production from major oil-producing countries, including the United States, Canada, and Brazil, as well as alternative transport routes that could partially bypass the Strait of Hormuz.

Others highlight the concept of “demand destruction,” where high prices lead consumers and businesses to reduce usage, ultimately easing pressure on the market.

“Historically, very high prices tend to correct themselves as consumption falls and supply increases,” analysts note, suggesting that while sharp spikes are possible, they may not be sustained.

For now, the trajectory of oil prices remains closely tied to developments in the Gulf. A swift reopening of the Strait of Hormuz could stabilize markets, while a prolonged closure or further escalation in hostilities could send prices sharply higher.

As governments and energy markets watch the situation unfold, one thing is clear: the risk of extreme volatility has returned, and with it, the possibility that oil could once again test historic highs.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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alls by Donald Trump for allied nations to send warships to escort vessels through the Strait of Hormuz have received a cautious and largely muted response, as tensions continue to escalate during the U.S.–Israel war on Iran and global oil markets remain on edge.

In a post on his Truth Social platform on Sunday, the U.S. president urged major energy-importing nations to join a naval effort to secure the strategic waterway.

“Hopefully China, France, Japan, South Korea, the U.K., and others, that are affected by this artificial constraint will send ships to the area so that the Hormuz Strait will no longer be a threat by a nation that has been totally decapitated,” Trump wrote.

The call comes as Iran’s military has effectively blocked the vital shipping route in retaliation for U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iranian territory.

The Strait of Hormuz, located between Iran and Oman, is one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints. Roughly one-fifth of global oil exports normally pass through the narrow waterway linking the Persian Gulf to international markets.

However, despite Washington’s appeal, there have been no immediate commitments from the countries Trump mentioned.

Diplomatic caution

Officials from several countries signaled a preference for diplomatic engagement rather than direct military involvement.

A spokesperson for China’s embassy in Washington, Liu Pengyu, said that “all parties have the responsibility to ensure stable and unimpeded energy supply,” adding that Beijing would “strengthen communication with relevant parties” in an effort to de-escalate the crisis.

Meanwhile, Chris Wright, the U.S. secretary of energy, told NBC that the administration had been in discussions with some of the countries mentioned by Trump and expressed hope that China could play a “constructive role” in restoring maritime traffic.

But analysts remain skeptical that Beijing would send naval forces to join a U.S.-led coalition.

Barbara Slavin, a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center, said China has little incentive to participate militarily.

“I don’t think China’s going to send warships to reopen the Strait of Hormuz,” Slavin told Al Jazeera. “But it doesn’t need to, because Iranian oil is flowing to China quite nicely.”

She added that Iran appears to be targeting shipments linked to the United States and its allies, rather than imposing a total blockade on global traffic.

Tanker disruptions and rising oil prices

The standoff has already had major implications for global shipping and energy markets.

According to data from the U.K. Maritime Trade Operations and the International Maritime Organization, at least 10 oil tankers have been hit, targeted, or reported attacks since Israel and the US started the war on February 28.

The disruptions have left around 1,000 tankers stranded, unable to pass through the strait.

Global crude prices have surged, hovering around $100 per barrel, raising concerns about wider economic repercussions.

Iran says the waterway remains open to most countries but has restricted passage for vessels linked to the United States and its allies.

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said several countries had approached Tehran seeking safe passage.

“We have been approached by a number of countries, and this is up to our military to decide,” Araghchi told CBS News.

India negotiates passage

Some countries have opted for direct negotiations with Tehran instead of joining a military escort mission.

India’s foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, said discussions with Iranian officials had already produced results.

Speaking to the Financial Times, Jaishankar said two Indian-flagged gas tankers were able to pass safely through the strait following diplomatic engagement.

“I am at the moment engaged in talking to them, and my talking has yielded some results,” he said. “Certainly, from India’s perspective, it is better that we reason and coordinate to get a solution.”

European leaders have also shown reluctance to join any military coalition.

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer discussed the situation with Trump and emphasized the need to restore global shipping, but London has not announced plans to deploy additional naval forces.

Germany’s foreign minister Johann Wadephul was more openly skeptical about participating.

“Will we soon be an active part of this conflict? No,” Wadephul told ARD television.

France has previously floated the idea of an international escort mission but indicated that such a plan could only move forward once fighting subsides.

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n the morning of February 28, the U.S. and Israel launched a comprehensive military offensive against Iran, seemingly in response to Omani Foreign Minister Badr bin Hamed al-Busaidi’s statement that ‘peace is immediately possible’ following his meeting with U.S. Vice President JD Vance. The attacks were conducted as part of a clear decapitation strategy, targeting Iran’s political and military command structure. Numerous high-ranking political and military figures were reportedly killed, including Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.

Tehran quickly retaliated with ballistic missile and drone strikes. The initial stages of the conflict revealed that the Iranian military and political response was more resilient than the U.S. and Israel had anticipated, strongly signaling that the conflict could evolve from a swift and decisive operation into a longer, multifaceted war.

U.S./Israeli sources have stated that 2,000 targets were struck within the first five days of the war. U.S. President Donald Trump and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth appear confident about the military victory, presenting a picture of total success. The attacks are being carried out in close coordination between the two countries, with a clear division of labor: U.S. forces are focusing on military facilities, while Israel is targeting political and military leadership positions.

It seems that the U.S. is trying to cripple the country’s infrastructure, while Israel is trying to cripple its leadership and command structures. However, U.S./Israeli attacks have also hit civilian sites such as schools and hospitals, resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties.

Iran’s response

This time, the Tehran regime was caught in the conflict in a relatively better-prepared position. Iranian decision-makers had not tied all their strategic investments to the diplomatic process, and were aware that they could be targeted even during negotiations. Therefore, the element of surprise in the attack was limited. Despite heavy losses in the command structure, Iran quickly demonstrated an organized capacity for retaliation. Tehran targeted Israeli and U.S. military bases in the Gulf, diplomatic facilities, areas where U.S. troops were accommodated, and some regional airports with missile and drone salvos.

Simultaneously, Iran attempted to increase the effectiveness of its own missile operations by launching attacks aimed at destroying radar and early warning systems. Tehran’s decision to close the Strait of Hormuz was also a strategic move aimed at creating shockwaves in the international economic system by putting pressure on the global energy supply. These actions directly affect the region’s security architecture and demonstrate that, this time, Iran entered the conflict not merely as a reactor, but as a more prepared actor aiming to produce strategic results.

However, the intensity of Iran’s retaliatory attacks decreased significantly in the days that followed the initial onslaught. This may have been due to operational reasons, such as the rapid depletion of missile stockpiles or the destruction of launch sites. Alternatively, Tehran may have preferred to use its missile inventory more cautiously and strategically in order to prolong the war and engage in long-term conflict. There are significant uncertainties surrounding Iran’s actual missile capabilities, and the Tehran administration consciously exploits these uncertainties as a deterrent and an element of wartime deception.

Conversely, the targeting of U.S. military personnel in the Gulf has created a new security dynamic that pits the region’s monarchies directly against Iran. While this development is not expected to produce a direct military result in the short term, it could lead the Gulf countries, which have long had a fragmented approach to Iran policy, to adopt a more coordinated stance over time.

The risk of regionalization of war

The first regional reaction against the U.S. and Israel came from Tehran’s allies. While some elements of the Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon have become partially involved in the conflict, it seems likely that these actors, as well as the Ansarullah movement in Yemen, will increase their operational tempo in the coming days. If the war drags on, the role of these regional armed networks is expected to become increasingly decisive.

As the conflict evolves from a classic interstate battle into a war of attrition, the influence and visibility of these non-state armed groups will also grow. However, it is highly likely that the war will affect not only regional military dynamics, but also the internal political balances of Lebanon and Iraq. In particular, discussions regarding the disarmament of Hezbollah and the position of Shia actors in Iraqi politics may change in line with the war’s progress.

Conversely, attacks on the U.S. military presence in the Gulf could pave the way for more direct military responses against Iran in the Gulf if the conflict drags on, even if they don’t produce a direct response in the short term. Furthermore, security concerns arising from missile and drone attacks targeting neighboring countries are also noteworthy, despite Iran officially denying responsibility. Incidents such as these, particularly those targeting Türkiye and Azerbaijan, are considered to be developments that expand the geographical risk area of the war, indicating that the number of similar incidents may increase as the conflict continues.

The fate of the Iran war

The justification for the war against Iran by President Donald Trump and his team is becoming an increasingly debated topic in American public opinion. The conflicting objectives and reasons for involvement of government officials are obscuring Washington’s strategic aim in this conflict. At the heart of the debate lies a fundamental question: Does the U.S. want to change the Iranian regime, transform Iran’s regional and military behavior, or is Washington primarily involved in the war to serve Israel’s security priorities? The lack of a clear and consistent strategic framework undermines the legitimacy and sustainability of the war in domestic politics.

In contrast, the justification for the war on the Iranian side is based on a much clearer and stronger narrative. The loss of high-ranking political and military figures, including the Supreme Leader, during the attacks has caused Iranian society to view the conflict not merely as a security crisis, but also as a struggle to defend the nation and religion. This is a significant factor that strengthens Iran’s motivation for war. Furthermore, Iran has developed significant resilience and experience of conflict through years of regional wars, proxy conflicts and sanctions. Wars of attrition, in particular, are not alien to Iranian strategic culture. Therefore, if the conflict continues, Washington is likely to face progressively higher military, economic and political costs.

While U.S. military losses appear to be limited at this stage, the possibility of large-scale casualties cannot be ignored if the conflict escalates. In particular, a ground operation could dramatically increase losses and potentially cause a significant rift in American domestic politics. Such a scenario could also lead to a return to the trauma of the Vietnam War, which was a long and costly military engagement that left deep scars on the national psyche. In other words, strategic miscalculations eventually come home to roost.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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enior leaders in Iraq and Northern Kurish region have reaffirmed that their territories will not be used as platforms for conflict against Iran, emphasizing neutrality and regional stability amid escalating tensions following large-scale military strikes by the United States and Israel.

Nechirvan Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), said the autonomous Kurdish region would not participate in ongoing regional conflicts and would instead continue supporting diplomatic efforts to de-escalate tensions.

According to a statement from the KRG presidency, Barzani made the remarks during a phone conversation with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

The two officials discussed bilateral relations and regional developments, stressing the importance of maintaining peace and stability.

Barzani stated that the KRG “will not be part of the conflicts” and will remain “a factor of peace,” supporting diplomatic initiatives aimed at easing tensions and protecting civilians from the threat of war.

Both sides also highlighted the need to maintain strict border security to prevent destabilizing activities or attempts by third parties to escalate tensions.

Barzani further expressed condolences to Iran over casualties caused by the recent military strikes and reiterated the KRG’s commitment to maintaining friendly relations with Tehran.

Baghdad rejects use of Iraqi territory against Iran

Meanwhile, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani said Iraq would not allow its territory to be used to threaten Iran.

During a separate phone call with Araghchi, al-Sudani condemned the U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran and described them as violations of international principles and norms.

According to a statement from Iran’s Foreign Ministry, the Iraqi leader also expressed condolences over the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who was reportedly killed in the strikes along with several senior Iranian military officials.

Al-Sudani stressed that Iraq “will under no circumstances allow any threat to the Islamic Republic to originate from Iraqi borders.”

Araghchi thanked the Iraqi government, religious authorities and the Iraqi public for their support and solidarity with Iran.

Rising regional tensions

The diplomatic exchanges come as the United States and Israel continue a large-scale military campaign against Iran that began last weekend. Iranian authorities say the strikes have killed at least 926 people, including senior political and military leaders.

In response, Iran has launched drone and missile attacks targeting Israel and Gulf countries hosting U.S. military bases, raising fears of a broader regional war.

Araghchi warned during the conversations that the military actions have heightened insecurity across the Middle East and could have global consequences if the conflict continues to escalate.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

T

he European populist right is distancing itself from its origins as it searches for its identity. In a sense, Europe is abandoning itself. Faced with mounting migratory pressure, Europeans are attempting to create a divide between themselves and the newcomers. Yet the Enlightenment established civilized relations between individuals, not societies. The European value system claimed universality.

The phenomenon that legitimized colonialism in continental Europe was this claim of universality. In response, European thought sought ways to live in a multicultural, post-secular society. However, the popular response of European peoples manifested itself in the abandonment of this claim. They will need more time to realize that abandoning the claim to universality also means abandoning the hierarchy of civilizations.

Recognizing the decline

The European value system, based on the Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment, claimed universality and established a hierarchy among civilizations, while also creating a world system. Although not everyone believed in the system, it was important to be seen as part of it and to participate in its rituals, since the system operated in a Eurocentric manner. For around sixty years, dozens of institutions formed around the United Nations were revered as churches, determining the rituals of the new world order. These institutions collaborated with complementary elements of American capitalism, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO.

First, Europe abandoned the claims of its own value system. Then, the rest of the world lost faith in these values. Finally, the organizations that regulated the capitalist market lost their meaning. Furthermore, it has only recently become apparent that these developments signify a collapse rather than a transition. Those who argue that it is a transition claim that the world system is now dominated by five major powers, and that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council have lost their significance. They expect another country to join the US, China, the EU and Russia as the fifth member. Those who speak of the collapse of the system argue that the world is bigger than five.

Europe was not as accustomed to living with different cultures as it claimed to be. The Catholic and Protestant worlds of Europe had always demonstrated their quest for homogeneity through historical massacres. When the Enlightenment replaced religion, this quest for homogeneity became secularized within the context of nationalism. The Holocaust emerged as the catastrophe of modernity’s divisive quest for homogeneity.

After the Second World War, the economy took precedence over politics and the global market necessitated the legitimization of multicultural societies. However, the balance of the world system was disrupted by Turkey’s application for EU membership, the political crisis that began with Islamophobic attacks and the 2008 economic crisis. The influx of refugees, which peaked in 2015, and the shock of the pandemic after 2019 further intensified these crises. The Gaza massacre marked the point at which universal values were exhausted. By the beginning of the 21st century, Europe had lost its economic, political and human credibility.

Europe benefiting

The United States and Russia are the only remaining powers in a depleted Europe. The United States is anxious to protect its economic interests, while Russia is striving to preserve its political presence. Both powers seek to control the continent’s remaining countries, as if to demonstrate that they are not part of Europe. Each power engages with Europe’s populist right and supports nationalist and separatist political movements for different reasons. What they have in common is that neither wants a strong EU.

A fragmented Europe, akin to the Middle Ages, would retain its economic production and market power, but lose its political significance. Unable to produce even a common foreign policy, let alone the planned common army, Europe is doomed to remain an economic community without political will. The protectionist and passive stance of European nationalists coincides with the interests of non-European powers. This is why the populist right in Europe is simultaneously supported by both the US and Russia.

The US, keen to exert influence over the court ruling on Le Pen, is using Greenland as a pretext to crush Europe’s political power. By frightening markets with customs duties, the US is taking advantage of European peoples’ inability to protect their welfare. Meanwhile, Russia was aware that Europe could not fight back when it attacked Ukraine, which is under EU protection both politically and economically. Driven by a desire to preserve welfare without military engagement, Europe is facing significant challenges in both the economic and security spheres. With its market under threat from the US and its security architecture under threat from Russia, it seems unlikely that Europe will be able to preserve its political unity. The likelihood of Europe becoming more fragmented is quite high. Concerned about preserving their own identities, European populations are also being drawn towards federalism and ‘direct democracy’.

The main issue for those who support the European populist right is freedom of expression. However, what is actually meant by freedom of expression, as reflected in the names of Dutch and Austrian European populist right parties, is the ability to espouse views that do not align with democratic values. As provocations and rhetoric designed to attract media attention are increasingly framed in terms of freedom of expression, the fight against disinformation is becoming increasingly important in European countries. Legal regulations legitimized through disinformation originating particularly from Russia are also affecting the European populist right.

Independence

Another facet of freedom is independence. Russia views the European populist right as representing the people against the elites. Therefore, it supports the independence of European peoples in their opposition to their own elites. In European populist literature, politics against the elites is politics against the ‘established parties’. Europe’s established system also tries to prevent populists from participating in decision-making processes by drawing political boundaries.

In every European country, from Austria and the Netherlands to Italy and Hungary and the Czech Republic, politics now revolves around those in favor of and those opposed to integration with the EU. However, from the perspective of the European populist right, the sides in the political struggle are not pro-EU and anti-EU, but real people and Europeanized elites. It is hardly surprising that US populists also claim to support the ‘real people’. In this context, Musk’s speech of support at the AfD congress could be seen as an attempt to free the ‘real people’ from elite domination.

Another favorite topic of the populist right is ‘direct democracy’. The Swiss model of direct Democracy and confederalism are presented as a formula to save the EU’s political existence, but they actually conceal a Europe that has lost its political unity and declined in power. Paradoxically, therefore, the proponents of plebiscitary democracy, supported by both the US and Russia, are the European peoples themselves, who are concerned about preserving their identities. Those who advocate federal ideas based on the romantic notion that a unified political structure will emerge from a world of satisfied social interests also belong to the European populist right.

Another argument of the European populist right is that they alone can internalize the system of democratic values. This tendency makes the European populist right defensive and passive. The exclusionary tendencies of European peoples now stem not from a claim to greatness, but from a claim to authenticity. However, this claim to authenticity is increasingly diminishing amid new divisions. For example, this tendency towards division is evident among Germans, Bavarians and Munich residents. In the French populist right, the shift from Jean-Marie Le Pen’s view of French superiority to Marine Le Pen’s view of protecting ‘Frenchness’ represents an intellectual contraction. Such tendencies towards contraction and isolation are naturally supported by both the US and Russia.

I

n its early years, the World Economic Forum was born from a well-intentioned vision, serious intellectual effort and a quest for technical governance. When Klaus Schwab launched the Forum nearly sixty years ago, his primary aim was to strengthen the institutional capacity of Western industry and establish a healthy dialogue between corporate executives and decision-makers.

However, from the second half of the 1990s onwards, the rapid financialization of capitalism, coupled with the growing influence of new types of sponsors and global capital actors on the Forum, began to fundamentally alter the spirit of Davos. The dominance of financial capitalism and the increasingly theatrical nature of the event have eroded its intellectual weight.

It is now debatable whether the World Economic Forum should continue to be held in Davos. Davos’s reputation has suffered serious erosion over time.

The golden age: The centre of neoliberal globalization (1990-2008)

The early 1990s marked a historical turning point for both the international system and Davos’s institutional identity. The unipolar world order that emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union reinforced the global perception that liberal democracy and the free market were ‘without alternative’. This period was symbolized by Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis and marked the ideological triumph of neoliberal globalization.

Davos thus became the most visible showcase of the Western-centric global order in this new atmosphere. The principles of the Washington Consensus — privatization, deregulation, free trade and fiscal discipline — were discussed at Davos and virtually transformed into global norms. The invisible coordination mechanism formed between the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Economic Forum created intellectual and political legitimacy for reform packages that imposed the neoliberal market economy on developing countries.

Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Davos was a platform on which state leaders, central bank governors, financial institution executives, and CEOs of multinational companies effectively shaped global economic policies. Representatives of ‘Third Way’ politics, such as Clinton and Blair, met with global finance and technology figures, such as Soros, Gates and Greenspan, on the same ground. They constantly promoted the idea that market capitalism and neoliberal democracy were compatible and sustainable.

From the early 2000s onwards, the first wave of digitalization played a significant role in the transformation of Davos. The rise of the internet economy saw Silicon Valley–based technology companies join the ranks of the global elite, with Google, Microsoft and Amazon becoming the new stars of the forum. The pioneers of digital capitalism began to represent not only technological innovations at Davos, but also new power relations.

However, this ‘golden age’ turned into a period in which the fragilities of the neoliberal system deepened, in stark contrast to the name given to the era. Excessive financial market liberalization, deteriorating income distribution, weakening real production and uncontrolled speculative capital growth made the global economy increasingly fragile. Sadly, Davos participants largely ignored these risks, and consequently the period from 1990 to 2008 represents both the most brilliant and the most problematic phase in Davos’ history.

Cracks in the neoliberal wing: The 2008 crisis and the erosion of legitimacy (2008-2016)

The global financial crisis of 2008 has gone down in history as the most severe structural test of the neoliberal globalisation model. The collapse that began in the US mortgage market quickly spread to the global banking system, and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers revealed just how fragile the financial system had become. This crisis was not just an economic collapse; it also signified the intellectual bankruptcy of the market-centred order that had been staunchly defended at the World Economic Forum’s Davos Summit for years.

Following the crisis, Western governments were forced to implement extraordinary interventions that contradicted the free market rhetoric of previous years. Trillions of dollars of public funds were used to bail out banks that were ‘too big to fail’; losses were socialised while profits remained in the private sector. This situation undermined the justice and legitimacy of market capitalism profoundly.

For Davos, this period marked the beginning of a serious loss of credibility. Many of the forum’s leading figures had supported policies advocating financial liberalisation and downplaying risks, which led to the crisis. Despite this, there was no real process of self-criticism by these same actors at Davos in the post-crisis period; responsibility was attributed to ‘wrong practices’ rather than the system’s structural problems.

The Occupy Wall Street movement and similar protests that emerged in this environment were among the first major indicators of a mass reaction against the global elite order represented by Davos. The slogan ‘the 99% against the 1%’ symbolised the collapse of the neoliberal system’s social legitimacy. Davos was now perceived as both an economic forum and a symbol of global inequality.

By the mid-2010s, the Davos Summit had become a ‘post-crisis platform’, attempting to mitigate the effects of the crisis rather than determining the direction of the global economy. Consequently, the period between 2008 and 2016 can be viewed as a transitional phase leading to the ‘inevitable end’ of Davos. The confidence of the neoliberal golden age gave way to uncertainty, with ideological certainty making way for defensive rhetoric. The erosion of legitimacy deepened during these years.

The Trump Earthquake, Brexit and the Dissolution of the Atlantic (2016-2022)

2016 was a turning point for the global liberal order represented by Davos. The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union and Donald Trump’s election as US president revealed the collapse of the political and economic consensus that had been established in the Western world for decades. These developments were not just a matter of domestic policy preferences, but also reflected accumulated social reactions against globalization in politics.

Trump’s ‘America First’ doctrine conflicted directly with Davos’s fundamental values, such as free trade, multilateralism, and institutional cooperation. The US pursued policies that rendered the World Trade Organization ineffective, initiated trade wars with its allies and demonstrated a tendency to withdraw unilaterally from international agreements. In this process, Washington became the biggest challenger to the liberal order it had defended for many years. In his second term, Trump has taken his policies and strategies even further.

Brexit showed that the idea of the irreversibility of European integration was a misconception. The British referendum clearly exposed structural problems in the economic and political architecture of the European Union, and the discourse of national sovereignty regained strength.

During this period, NATO’s role has also been subject to serious scrutiny. Meanwhile, China’s economic and technological growth has further complicated the global balance of power.

Against this backdrop of geopolitical fragmentation, the World Economic Forum in Davos has sought to defend globalization and preserve the existing order. However, Davos’s greatest weakness during this period was its tendency to view rising nationalism and sovereignty demands as a ‘temporary deviation’. The socio-economic causes of populist movements were not analyzed in depth; it was assumed that the process could be managed through cosmetic reforms to the system.

By 2020, Davos had regressed from determining the direction of the global system to defending an order that was seemingly disintegrating. Political fragmentation along the Atlantic axis has also greatly eroded the forum’s historical role. Therefore, the period from 2016 to 2022 can be defined as a phase of ‘inability to adapt’ for Davos.

T

he United States’ military intervention in Venezuela on 3 January 2026 marked a significant turning point in the international system. The capture and transfer of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife to the United States as part of this operation constitutes a serious violation of international law and is a concrete manifestation of Trump’s ‘America First’ policy. Trump justified the intervention by claiming that Venezuela was a major player in international drug trafficking. However, his real aim was to gain control of the country’s oil resources, which he declared to be under temporary U.S. control.

The overt and covert reactions of European Union (EU) leaders to this operation are contributing to the erosion of international norms. This development reveals an approach that disregards the territorial integrity of sovereign states, raising concerns that similar scenarios could be repeated in other regions. The military operation in Venezuela adds a new dimension to Trump’s long-standing interest in Greenland.

A direct military attack by the US on Greenland is unlikely due to Denmark’s NATO membership. However, the US is likely to pose a real threat to Greenland by employing diplomatic, economic and hybrid pressure tactics. The intervention in Venezuela can be described as a precursor to neo-imperialism focused on oil and other resources, justified on security grounds. Given Greenland’s strategic location and mineral wealth, there is a high risk that this operation could trigger a similar or different one.

EU leaders’ passive stance towards the Venezuela operation, which disregards international law, highlights the possibility of a similar response in the Greenland scenario: diplomatic outcry without sanctions. In Greenland specifically, the NATO dimension is highly likely to cause a deep crisis in the already fragile transatlantic relationship. This study examines Greenland’s status, Trump’s statements and actions, how the European Union might react, and the future of transatlantic relations.

The status and geopolitical position of Greenland

Greenland is an autonomous part of the Kingdom of Denmark and, under the 2009 Selvstyre Act, has extensive administrative autonomy. With a population of around 56,000 people, mostly of Inuit origin, the island has full authority over matters such as education, health, natural resources and internal affairs. However, foreign policy, defense and monetary policy remain the responsibility of Copenhagen. Greenland is recognized as a people with the right to self-determination under the UN Charter, and independence is a legally recognized option.

While the majority of Greenland’s population wants independence from Denmark, they are also opposed to the idea of joining the United States. In a joint statement, Greenlandic Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen and Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen emphasised that the principle that ‘Greenland belongs to the Greenlanders’ forms the basis of sovereignty. The island possesses extraordinary wealth in rare earth elements, uranium and various other strategic mineral resources, which constitute a significant portion of the world’s reserves. These resources play a critical role in ensuring the continuity and strategic security of global supply chains.

Geopolitically, Greenland is a key strategic point in the Arctic region. The emergence of new sea routes as a result of glacial melting, triggered by climate change, has significantly intensified Russian and Chinese military and commercial activities in the area. The Trump administration perceives this development as an unacceptable threat within the framework of the US 2025 National Security Strategy. Unlike Venezuela, Greenland is protected by NATO and European Union defense mechanisms (Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty) via its association with Denmark. Theoretically, any military operation or annexation attempt would trigger collective defense obligations. However, while this status partially protects Greenland from conventional interventions similar to those in Venezuela, it leaves it vulnerable to hybrid warfare methods.

The Trump administration’s statements and measures regarding Greenland

Located on the island under the 1951 U.S.-Denmark defense agreement, the U.S. Thule Air Base plays a strategic role in Arctic security. Trump’s interest in Greenland dates back to his first term in office, when he proposed buying the island in 2019, and intensified during his second term. This interest was not just rhetorical, but supported by concrete diplomatic initiatives and high-level visits. Notably, in March 2025, Vice President JD Vance visited the air base and accused Denmark of failing to invest adequately in the Greenlandic people and their security. He criticized the Copenhagen administration, stating: ‘Our message to Denmark is very simple: you have not done a good job for the Greenlandic people. You have not invested enough in them, and you have not invested enough in the security infrastructure of this magnificent continent.’

Although he criticized Copenhagen’s administration, he claimed that the US would adopt a respectful approach, emphasizing the Greenlanders’ right to self-determination. Although the visit was short, lasting only a few hours, and largely confined to the military base, it was perceived as provocative in Denmark and Greenland, and not welcomed by the local administration. Vance’s visit is seen as an early manifestation of Trump’s Greenland policy, and similar initiatives accompanied by senior officials such as National Security Advisor Mike Waltz have increased US pressure on the island.

At a press conference in Palm Beach in December 2025, Trump stated, “We need Greenland for national security, not for minerals. We should have it.’ He thus designated Greenland as a national security target and appointed Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry as special envoy to oversee the process of bringing Greenland under US control. Landry explicitly stated the goal of ‘making Greenland part of the US’ on X, drawing significant backlash in Denmark. Although Trump emphasized security over minerals, analysts have noted that mineral resources, particularly rare earth elements, were the primary motivation.

Trump’s characterization of Greenland as a ‘great real estate deal’ and his appointment of a special envoy have increased diplomatic pressure, while Landry’s implication that he will ‘lead the charge’ in negotiations suggests a transactional approach. Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen has described this appointment as completely unacceptable and warned the US ambassador in Copenhagen. Following the intervention in Venezuela, speculation about a similar military operation in Greenland has increased. However, due to the NATO factor, this appears unlikely. Instead, economic sanctions, influencing local elites or covert operations are more likely. Indeed, Trump’s personality makes him unpredictable and challenges international norms.

European Union reactions

In response to Trump’s statements on Greenland, the European Union (EU) showed diplomatic solidarity with Denmark and Greenland, but avoided taking harsh measures. EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen emphasized territorial integrity, stating: ‘We stand in full solidarity with the people of Denmark and Greenland,’ while Antonio Costa noted that Arctic security was a ‘priority issue’. French President Emmanuel Macron also expressed support for the sovereignty of Denmark and Greenland. As with the EU’s limited ‘concern’ statements following the intervention in Venezuela, diplomatic warnings rather than explicit condemnation are at the forefront in Greenland.

This stance stems from transatlantic dependence: trade, energy and the NATO partnership prevent the implementation of harsh measures. If the US were to intervene in Greenland, objections and diplomatic isolation via the UN are expected, while military or economic sanctions are unlikely. The EU supports Denmark’s investments in Arctic defense, which amount to billions of dollars, thereby strengthening the Union’s strategic autonomy. However, divisions within the Union, such as the close ties between some EU countries, like Hungary, and Trump, could weaken the response. The submissive stance adopted by EU leaders on the Venezuela issue could also emerge in the Greenland scenario, ultimately plunging transatlantic relations into a deep crisis and eroding international law.

S

ince the beginning of the 20th century, the United States has intervened numerous times in Latin American countries, which it considers its “backyard,” to protect its own interests, often using arguments of “democracy” and “the fight against communism” to legitimize these interventions. Within this historical context, the US operation on the night of January 3, 2026, in Venezuela, capturing and abducting President Nicolas Maduro, has once again brought to the forefront criticisms that Washington can disregard international norms for the sake of its hegemonic interests.

Indeed, Trump’s rhetoric about governing Venezuela until a safe transition is ensured, and the clear messages from US oil companies regarding the resumption of production in Venezuela, demonstrate that geo-economic objectives were decisive in this intervention. Therefore, the Maduro operation can be read not as a new behavior in the long practice of US intervention in Latin America, but rather as a more visible manifestation of the same intervention logic.

Disregard for International Legitimacy

U.S. interventions in Latin America have often targeted democratically elected governments. In Guatemala, the 1954 elected president Arbenz was targeted for land reform, and a CIA-backed coup led to a long civil war. One of the most striking examples of U.S. interventions in Latin America is the debate surrounding Washington’s role in the 1973 coup that overthrew Chilean President Salvador Allende by General Augusto Pinochet. Three years later, following the 1976 coup in Argentina, it has been argued that the U.S. adopted a stance of accepting and supporting regime change. The U.S.’s direct military intervention in Panama in 1989 to overthrow Manuel Noriega demonstrated Washington’s ability to employ hard power when necessary.

These examples in Latin America indicate that the U.S. has long held an approach to intervention that prioritizes its security and geo-economic interests. Washington, citing various reasons, primarily the fight against communism, has instigated government changes in many countries while channeling military and economic resources to authoritarian regimes aligned with US interests.

The kidnapping of Maduro has made it even more apparent that the “Rules-Based International Order” rhetoric, which the Washington administration has consistently promoted, especially since the end of the Cold War, is in practice selectively applied. Indeed, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s statement in Davos—” We knew that international law was applied with different rigor depending on the identity of the accused and the victim. This construct was useful because it offered certain benefits of American hegemony. So we put the sign on display “—clearly confirms this. Within this framework, the US move regarding Venezuela also emerges as one of the factors weakening the legitimacy of liberal hegemony.

U.S. Energy Management Plan

Looking at the historical role of energy, while the United Kingdom built its industrial power on coal in the 19th century, the US consolidated its global power through oil in the 20th century. Therefore, in US interventions concerning energy, the main issue has often been who controls the oil, where it is sold, who controls the revenue, and how prices are determined. The US organization and support of the 1953 coup in Iran after Mossadegh nationalized oil is a classic example demonstrating Washington’s ability to directly intervene in the internal politics of countries when energy interests are at stake.

In 1980, the Carter Doctrine considered the flow of oil in the Persian Gulf a vital US interest and declared that any means, including military force, could be used against any attempt to threaten this flow. Indeed, the Gulf Crisis of 1990 demonstrated how this logic worked in practice; the possibility of oil supply disruption and price shocks became one of the main justifications legitimizing US-led military intervention. This historical context demonstrates that the US has been able to resort to a variety of tools, including hard power, when it comes to oil flow.

In this context, while the capture and extradition of Maduro to the US is being justified by the rhetoric of “fighting drugs-narcoterrorism,” it also demonstrates the continuation of the US’s energy-geopolitical reflexes in the background. Indeed, Trump stated that they had taken the oil found on the Venezuelan tankers seized by the US, that it would be processed in US refineries, and that 30-50 million barrels of oil would be shared. Furthermore, Trump’s statement that the US would decide which major oil companies would enter Venezuela clearly shows that the intervention was not solely for security reasons, but also aimed at establishing de facto control over oil flow and revenue.

Furthermore, the US’s oil-centric energy system is facing significant competitive pressure today due to the rapid spread of renewable energy technologies. In particular, China’s production share exceeding 80% in the solar energy supply chain and its role in accounting for more than three-quarters of global battery sales provides it not only with technological superiority but also the opportunity to establish an alternative energy-economy network to the US-centric system by exporting panels, batteries, and electric vehicles to many parts of the world. Indeed, one of the most critical fronts of the global competition with China is the critical minerals and supply chains dependent on these minerals, which are essential for renewable energy technologies and digitalization.

Venezuela possesses rich resources of critical minerals vital to the technology industry, including coltan, known as blue gold. For the US, which seeks to break China’s monopoly in battery and high-tech production, controlling Venezuelan resources also means cutting off Beijing’s access to these strategic raw materials. Therefore, the January 3rd operation should also be considered a concrete manifestation in Latin America of the US strategy to contain China through its supply chains.

Controlling the oil industry

Finally, the pursuit of control over the oil industry in Venezuela, the country with the world’s largest proven oil reserves, can be interpreted not only as a response to today’s supply needs but also as a goal to “buy time.” Assessments indicating that the pace of transition to renewable energy and investment appetite can weaken during periods of low fossil fuel prices suggest that the strategy of increasing oil supply and suppressing prices could have a “slowing down the transition” effect. Indeed, Trump’s mention of aiming to lower prices by releasing more Venezuelan oil onto the market shows that this approach can also be interpreted as an intention to “make the transition more controlled.”

Furthermore, the goal of lowering oil prices coincides with the aim of reducing inflationary pressure in the US by lowering energy costs and mitigating economic discontent in domestic politics. Washington’s past calls for OPEC to increase energy production and Trump’s pressure on OPEC to increase energy supply at different times support this idea. In this respect, the Venezuela move can also be read as a complementary part of the strategy of increasing oil supply to lower prices.

From an environmental and climate perspective, moves to lower oil prices have the potential to counteract the goals of accelerating the renewable energy transition and reducing emissions. Given the Trump administration’s approach of prioritizing fossil fuel production over the climate agenda, the oil strategy implemented through Venezuela can be seen as a step that supports and strengthens this trend.

In conclusion, the events in Venezuela exemplify the hegemonic politics of the United States, which complements its energy and precious metal resources with military force in order to maintain its global leadership. Washington’s move sends a clear message, primarily to rising powers such as China, that Latin America is within the US sphere of influence and that the regional geo-economic order will be shaped in accordance with Washington’s priorities.

The crisis of the international order is no longer an abstract concept. It is evident in headlines that would have seemed inconceivable a decade ago: US operations in Venezuela, threats to take Greenland by force, and the deepening strategic divide between Washington and its European allies. While the liberal order championed by Washington is not collapsing overnight, it is clearly hardening into a more transactional, unilateral and openly strategic approach.

The Trump administration justifies these moves in terms of national security. This framing is not entirely incorrect, but it is incomplete. The deeper question is not whether these actions are about security. Rather, it is about why they are happening now and how they are converging across seemingly unrelated theatres, from the Arctic to Latin America to Eastern Europe.
The answer lies in the accelerating AI race.

Analysed in isolation, issues such as Greenland, Venezuela, rare earth diplomacy and energy realignment appear as traditional realpolitik: resource grabs, power projection and coercive diplomacy. However, when considered collectively, they reveal a coherent long-term strategy centred on one objective: securing the material and energy resources necessary to win the AI competition against China.

This is not about territory. It is about infrastructure.

AI as a grand strategy

Since returning to office, Trump has treated AI not as a sectoral priority, but as a systemic one. AI is now at the core of US national strategy, shaping defence modernisation, industrial policy, export controls, energy planning and strategic finance. Critical mineral supply chains have been formally recognised as national security imperatives in Trump’s National Security Strategy. Executive orders have sought to expand domestic extraction and rebuild rare earth processing capacity in the United States. Public–private partnerships with American mining and materials firms reflect a broader attempt to restore industrial capabilities that had long migrated abroad.

However, what makes this moment distinct is the unprecedented alignment between the federal government and major technology firms. Silicon Valley is no longer operating at arm’s length from Washington. AI developers, semiconductor manufacturers, hyperscale cloud providers and energy-intensive data centre operators are becoming increasingly involved in strategic planning discussions. Contracts, export controls, infrastructure financing and industrial policy are being designed in consultation with the firms that are driving AI development. The boundary between national and corporate strategy has become unusually thin.

Taken together, these measures signal something larger than economic policy. They reveal an acknowledgement of a structural constraint: the US cannot fully decouple from China under current technological conditions. The conversation about decoupling began during Trump’s first term, but time has exposed its limitations. Semiconductor fabrication, rare earth refining, advanced battery production and energy systems remain deeply interwoven across borders.

This creates a strategic paradox. Although decoupling is presented as a security necessity, the extent of interdependence means that abrupt separation would be destabilizing. Both Washington and Beijing understand this. Each is now engaged in a quiet race to reduce vulnerability before a systemic rupture occurs. The objective is not immediate disengagement, but preparation.

Strategic autonomy in semiconductors, rare earth processing and energy generation will determine who can withstand a future rupture. The state that secures control over these foundational inputs first will possess disproportionate leverage in the AI competition.

Export bans on advanced chip designs, restrictions on critical mineral flows and the rapid expansion of industrial alliances are not isolated measures when viewed through this lens. They are components of a larger repositioning exercise. Resource diplomacy has become more assertive because the AI race has shifted from software to infrastructure.

Greenland: REE and the Arctic chessboard

Trump openly threatened to annex Greenland, claiming it was a matter of national security rather than minerals. The rhetoric was blunt. Yet, after months of diplomatic friction, discussions evolved to include frameworks that explicitly incorporated rare earth elements alongside defence cooperation. This shift reveals a deeper truth: Today, Greenland’s geostrategic value lies less in its immediate military positioning and more in its long-term role in critical supply chains.

The island hosts some of the world’s largest undeveloped rare earth deposits, including the Kvanefjeld and Tanbreez sites, which are both rich in heavy rare earth elements that are essential for advanced magnets, precision weapons, semiconductors and AI hardware. As early as 2019, Washington signed a memorandum of understanding with Greenland focused on cooperation in critical minerals, long before the latest escalation. This suggests that access to resources has long been part of the calculation.

China has also recognised Greenland’s importance. Through its Polar Silk Road strategy, Beijing has pursued infrastructure projects and secured stakes in rare earth ventures linked to Greenland. Even where projects have stalled, China’s dominance in rare earth processing gives it leverage over any future extraction.

Meanwhile, the Arctic itself is undergoing transformation. Melting ice is opening up new shipping routes and altering the military landscape across the North Atlantic. Greenland is located at the intersection of emerging trade routes and missile trajectories, making it a strategically important location in a warming world.

In the evolving geopolitical landscape of AI and advanced manufacturing, rare earths are not peripheral; they are fundamental. The modern infrastructure of AI — semiconductors, permanent magnets, high-end sensors and quantum materials — depends on minerals that are currently dominated by China’s processing capacity. Greenland offers an alternative source of supply in this high-stakes contest.

Therefore, Trump’s interest in Greenland is not a quixotic land grab. It reflects a broader shift: security policy is now infrastructure policy. The question is not whether Greenland matters, but why it matters now, and how access to minerals and supply-chain leverage are reshaping the meaning of national security in the 21(st) century.

Venezuela: Energy, minerals, and strategic leverage

At first glance, Venezuela appears to be a classic oil story. It has the world’s largest proven oil reserves. However, this is not just about fossil fuels in the traditional sense of energy security. AI is changing the energy equation dramatically.

Electricity demand in the United States is rising rapidly, partly due to explosive growth in data centers built to power AI and cloud computing. In 2023, U.S. data centers consumed around 4.4% of total electricity, and this figure is expected to increase significantly as AI workloads grow. In states where data centers are concentrated, electricity prices are rising faster than the national average, with power bills increasing by 13% in Virginia, 16% in Illinois and 12% in Ohio in the past year alone. Utilities are extending generation capacity and upgrading transmission networks to meet this concentrated demand, highlighting that electricity is now a strategic fuel rather than a commodity.

Venezuelan oil and gas could help to offset U.S. energy demand by supplementing crude oil supplies, thereby alleviating stress on the grid and refineries. However, Venezuela’s strategic significance extends well beyond hydrocarbons. Much of the country sits on the ancient Guayana Shield, which is home to substantial deposits of nickel, copper, bauxite, coltan, gold, and other critical minerals that are essential for advanced electronics, defense technologies, renewable energy sources, and AI hardware. In 2016, Caracas established the extensive Orinoco Mining Arc as a state-controlled area for mineral extraction, formally placing these resources under centralized management.

In practice, however, mining there has become a mix of state oversight, informal operations, and widespread illegal extraction. A significant proportion of minerals, particularly coltan and other strategic materials, are smuggled into Colombia and then on to global markets, with much ultimately ending up in China’s processing networks. Even though official rare earth output remains underdeveloped, Venezuela’s broader mineral ecosystem reinforces Beijing’s leverage in global supply chains. At the same time, it should be noted that China has been Venezuela’s largest buyer of crude oil for years.

From this perspective, it could be argued that control or influence over Venezuelan resources and minerals would offer the U.S. several strategic advantages. Firstly, it would allow Washington to act strategically on its own energy needs rather than leaving them vulnerable to global disruptions. Secondly, it would reduce China’s access to discounted Venezuelan crude, thus limiting Beijing’s ability to diversify. Thirdly, it would strengthen U.S. leverage through sanctions and market positioning.

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he United States has agreed to cut tariffs on Indian goods to 18% from as high as 50% in exchange for India halting purchases of Russian oil and lowering trade barriers, US President Donald Trump announced on Monday.

Trump said the agreement followed a call with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and would see India replace Russian oil with purchases from the United States and potentially Venezuela.

A White House official told Reuters the US would remove a punitive 25% duty imposed over India’s Russian oil imports, which had been added to a separate 25% “reciprocal” tariff.

Markets rally

US-listed shares of major Indian firms rose sharply after the announcement. Infosys gained 4.3%, Wipro rose 6.8%, HDFC Bank climbed 4.4%, and the iShares MSCI India ETF jumped 3%.

The deal also boosted broader US market sentiment, particularly among technology and semiconductor stocks.

Trump said India would “BUY AMERICAN at a much higher level,” including more than $500 billion in US energy purchases, as well as technology, agricultural, and other products. He added that India would move to reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers on US goods to zero.

However, few details were provided on implementation timelines, enforcement mechanisms, or the scope of India’s commitments. As of Monday afternoon, no presidential proclamation or Federal Register notice had been issued to formalize the changes.

India’s commerce and foreign ministries did not immediately comment, and Russia’s embassy in Washington also declined to respond.

Mixed reaction in the U..S

Economists said the deal brings India closer to tariff levels faced by other major Asian exporters.

“This puts India broadly in line with its Asian peers on tariff rates,” said Madhavi Arora of Emkay Global, adding that it would ease pressure on Indian exports and the rupee after months of investor outflows triggered by higher U.S. tariffs.

US business groups reacted cautiously. The US Chamber of Commerce called the announcement a positive step toward a broader trade agreement.

But a coalition of more than 800 small businesses, operating under the name “We Pay the Tariffs,” warned the deal still represents a sharp increase in costs for US importers, noting tariffs on Indian goods were around 2% to 3% in 2024.

Modi welcomed the announcement, thanking Trump for lowering tariffs on Indian products.

“Delighted that Made in India products will now have a reduced tariff of 18%,” Modi wrote on X, calling the move beneficial for India’s 1.4 billion people.

India’s Trade Minister Piyush Goyal said the deal would deepen economic ties and help India access US technology.

Oil geopolitics

India, the world’s third-largest oil importer, relies on imports for about 90% of its needs. Cheaper Russian crude has been central to its energy strategy since the war in Ukraine, though purchases have begun to decline in recent months.

Analysts said U.S. and Venezuelan oil could partly replace Russian supplies, reshaping energy flows as Washington pushes trade partners to distance themselves from Moscow.

The agreement comes amid a broader push by the Trump administration to finalize trade frameworks with key partners ahead of a US Supreme Court ruling on the legality of Trump’s “reciprocal” tariffs.

(Source: Reuters)

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reenland’s prime minister said the semi-autonomous Arctic territory would choose to remain part of the Kingdom of Denmark over any closer alignment with the United States, as senior Danish and Greenlandic officials prepared for talks in Washington amid renewed U.S. interest in the island.

Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen said Greenland faced a “geopolitical crisis” but stood firmly with Denmark, dismissing suggestions that the territory could become part of the United States.

“If we have to choose between the U.S. and Denmark here and now, then we choose Denmark,” Nielsen told reporters in Copenhagen, appearing alongside Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen. “Greenland does not want to be owned by the United States, and Greenland will not be governed from Washington.”

Greenlandic and Danish foreign ministers are due to meet U.S. Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Washington on Wednesday, after President Donald Trump revived his long-standing interest in acquiring Greenland, first raised during his initial term in 2019. Trump has cited the island’s strategic location and mineral resources as vital to U.S. national security, and his administration has discussed options ranging from closer security arrangements to economic incentives.

Public opinion wary of U.S. control

In Greenland’s capital Nuuk, residents voiced support for remaining within Denmark and under NATO’s security umbrella, with some calling for a pause in discussions about rapid independence.

“I can’t imagine living as an American,” said Charlotte Heilmann, a pensioner in Nuuk. “We are part of Denmark and NATO. I don’t understand why he keeps saying he wants to take our country.”

Others said U.S. pressure had fostered greater unity at home. “Last year some people talked about fast independence,” said Casper Frank Moller, a tour operator. “Now there’s more agreement that we need to stand together against possible annexation.”

Greenland has steadily expanded self-rule since 1979, but cabinet minister Naaja Nathanielsen said there was no urgency to accelerate independence. “For others this may be a piece of land, but for us it’s home,” she said, adding that Greenlanders see themselves as allies of the United States, not Americans.

Denmark seeks diplomacy

Danish Foreign Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen said Copenhagen and Nuuk had requested the Washington meeting to address tensions through dialogue. “Our aim is to move the discussion into a meeting room where we can look each other in the eye,” he said.

Frederiksen acknowledged the challenge of pushing back against Washington while maintaining close alliance ties. “It is hard to stand up to the U.S., our most important ally,” she said. “But the hardest part may still be ahead of us.”

Denmark has faced growing pressure to strengthen Arctic defenses as geopolitical competition in the region intensifies. Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen is scheduled to meet NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte next week, with multinational NATO exercises in Greenland planned by 2026.

Both Denmark and Greenland have repeatedly rejected any proposal to sell or cede the territory, insisting that Greenland’s future can only be decided by its people.

(Source: Reuters and Anadolu Agency)

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ussia on Thursday condemned the United States’ seizure of a Russian-flagged oil tanker in the North Atlantic, calling the move a “gross violation” of international maritime law and warning it could further escalate tensions between Moscow and Washington.

In a statement, Russia’s Foreign Ministry said the tanker Marinera — formerly known as M/V Bella 1 — was seized by U.S. forces while “innocently passing through international waters” en route to a Russian port. The vessel had received temporary permission to fly the Russian flag on Dec. 24, the ministry said.

Moscow described the action as an “illegal military operation,” stressing that U.S. authorities had been repeatedly informed of the ship’s Russian registry and civilian status.

“International maritime law clearly provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state over vessels on the high seas,” the ministry said, adding that Russia neither consented to the boarding nor accepted Washington’s justification for the seizure.

Tanker was not “stateless or operating under a false flag”

The statement rejected U.S. claims that the tanker was stateless or operating under a false flag, calling such assertions unfounded. It also dismissed Washington’s reliance on U.S. sanctions legislation as lacking any legal basis under international law.

“Under these circumstances, the boarding and seizure of a peaceful vessel by U.S. military personnel, as well as the detention of its crew, can only be interpreted as a gross violation of freedom of navigation,” the ministry said.

Moscow further criticized suggestions by U.S. officials that the operation was part of a broader effort to control Venezuela’s oil exports, describing such remarks as “cynical” and reflective of “neocolonialist pretensions.”

The Foreign Ministry warned that the incident risked fueling “acute international crises,” including in Russian-American relations, and could heighten military and political tensions in the Euro-Atlantic region.

“We call on Washington to immediately cease its illegal actions against the Marinera and other vessels engaged in legitimate activities on the high seas,” the statement said.

“Shadow fleet”

U.S. forces announced on Wednesday that they had seized the tanker for alleged violations of U.S. sanctions. White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt said the vessel was considered part of Venezuela’s so-called “shadow fleet” and was transporting oil subject to U.S. restrictions.

Leavitt said the tanker was deemed stateless after sailing under a false flag and was seized under a judicial order. She added that the crew could face prosecution under U.S. federal law and be brought to the United States if necessary.

There was no immediate comment from the tanker’s operators.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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n December 26, 2025, Israel became the first United Nations member to officially recognize Somaliland’s independence, significantly transforming the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa. This move marked a crucial shift in how global powers vie for influence over the Red Sea, one of the world’s most disputed maritime routes. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu framed the decision within the framework of the Abraham Accords, linking this recognition to a broader network of Israeli-Gulf Arab cooperation aimed at containing Iran and promoting regional cohesion.

However, this action is perceived as the projection of Israel’s tumultuous Middle Eastern policies onto the Horn of Africa, a region already plagued by ongoing conflicts. It also signifies a potentially misguided reassessment of power dynamics in an area where critical maritime chokepoints, terrorist movements, and shifts in strategic alliances intersect. The repercussions will echo well beyond the agreements of individual states.

Israel’s move was a clear violation of international norms, prompting a swift and categorical international response. The African Union, Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt, Türkiye, Somalia, Djibouti, and the UN Security Council issued coordinated statements rejecting the move.

The African Union’s chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, explicitly invoked the 1964 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Border Inalienability Principle, a cornerstone of continental stability, warning that the recognition “sets a dangerous precedent with far-reaching implications for peace and stability across the continent.” However, this overwhelming diplomatic consensus obscures the fact that this move will accelerate instability and conflict in a region already teetering on the brink of catastrophic fragmentation.

To understand why Israel moved at this precise moment, we must examine two overlapping calculations: First, maritime security and the strategic importance of the Red Sea. Second, the role of the UAE as an architect of fragmentation in the Horn of Africa.

The Red Sea as a strategic pivot

The Red Sea is no longer just a shipping lane. It has become a critical arena where the balance of power between the traditional, Western-led maritime order and emerging threats to global trade is being contested. For example, since November 2023, the Houthis in Yemen have attacked over 190 commercial vessels, forcing hundreds of ships to reroute around South Africa. This has increased transit times by up to 50 percent and imposed costs of an estimated $180 million per month in protection fees paid to shipping agents, according to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

The Houthis’ main justification for these actions was to demand an end to the genocide in Gaza. However, analysts contest this claim in the context of a possible Israeli move into Somalia, as there are reports suggesting that Israel plans to evacuate Palestinians to Somaliland in exchange for recognition. When discussing the strategic importance of the Red Sea, it is important to mention the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This 70-mile-long chokepoint, which separates Africa from Arabia, processes approximately one-third of global maritime commerce, including critical energy and container shipments.

Therefore, Somaliland renders the northern region of Somalia strategically indispensable to any actor seeking to project power over this maritime domain. Somaliland’s coastline along the Gulf of Aden positions it as a natural complement to Israeli objectives in three critical ways. First, it could serve as a naval logistics hub, offering berthing capacity for Israeli vessels seeking a continuous presence in the Red Sea. Second, it could counterbalance Houthi control of Yemen’s coastline. Third, it could provide a tangible foothold in the evolving geopolitical architecture of the Abraham Accords, as well as in the developments of world powers in the Horn of Africa.

According to a 2025 Institute for National Security Studies memo, Israel explicitly frames the Red Sea as “a distinct strategic arena where geopolitical and economic maneuvering, rather than security alone, is a fundamental component of Israel’s national security strategy.”(P. 16) Recognizing Somaliland operationalizes this doctrine, positioning Israel as a legitimate power broker in East African maritime governance. Previously, this posture was unavailable without some form of diplomatic entrée into the region.

The UAE’s involvement

Conducting this analysis without including the UAE’s involvement in this critical issue will be less imperative. Understanding Somaliland’s recognition requires examining the UAE’s footprint in the Horn of Africa over the past fifteen years. Since 2010, Abu Dhabi has systematically pursued a strategy that could be called “port-based imperialism”: establishing commercial and military footholds in strategically important harbors to project power while maintaining commercial legitimacy.

The UAE’s relationship with Somaliland exemplifies this doctrine perfectly. In 2016, DP World, a Dubai-based port operator majority-owned by the Abu Dhabi government, invested $442 million to develop the Port of Berbera. This secured a 30-year concession with an automatic 10-year renewal, effectively ensuring Emirati control over one of the Red Sea’s most critical deep-water facilities for the next four decades. Initially, the UAE sought to establish a military base in Berbera. However, facing international pressure and clear objection from the Somali government, the UAE recalibrated in 2019, presenting the arrangement as purely commercial. This is a textbook example of how great power competition in the 21st century operates through obfuscation rather than direct colonialism.

The strategic importance of this arrangement lies in its deniability. By linking Somaliland’s economic viability to Emirati port investments, the UAE established a structural dependency that grants influence without exercising formal political control. For example, when Ethiopia sought recognition of Somaliland in exchange for maritime access to Berbera in early 2024, it was not negotiating with an independent state with an autonomous foreign policy. Rather, it was responding to incentive structures designed by an external power that manipulates regional actors toward fragmentation.

A security paradox

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is more than just a cause for concern about the country’s and the wider region’s future stability. It will undoubtedly create a security paradox that transforms recognition into an operational advantage for transnational terrorist movements.

Recognition of Somaliland coincides with a critical security development. Documented evidence shows that Al-Shabaab and Yemen’s Houthis are coordinating more closely. In February 2025, United Nations investigators reported that, in 2024, the two groups had progressed from communication to physical meetings and materiel transfers. The Houthis provided al-Shabaab with weaponized drones, ballistic missiles, and specialized training. This collaboration could intensify if Israel’s intention to transfer Palestinians to Somaliland is discussed.

The collaboration between these organizations generates multiplied threat cascades across the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Al-Shabaab’s extensive network of smugglers, fighters, and sympathizers provides the Houthis with expanded logistics corridors for transporting weapons from the Indian Ocean to the Gulf of Aden. In return, al-Shabaab gains access to precision weaponry and drone capabilities, exponentially increasing its ability to strike fixed military targets and high-value civilian infrastructure.

The implications for maritime security are catastrophic. Currently, the Houthis extract an estimated $180 million per month from shipping companies that pay protection fees. This figure would increase substantially if al-Shabaab successfully integrated maritime piracy into a coordinated regional attack strategy. Fundamentally, the geographic distribution of threats—the Houthis controlling Yemen’s western coastline, al-Shabaab controlling Somalia’s central territory, and Puntland in northern Somalia hosting ISIS members—creates a zone of contested sovereignty where traditional maritime law enforcement becomes impossible.

Somaliland’s separation from Somalia, formalized by Israeli recognition, undermines the already fragile unified maritime response to this threat. Somaliland operating as an effective client state of the UAE—with its port under Emirati concession and its foreign policy oriented toward maximizing external investment rather than regional security—becomes another vector through which external powers pursue influence while ignoring the security implications of this multiplication.

Security and political implications for the Horn of Africa

The preceding analysis reveals the facts and strategic rationale behind Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. The critical question for analysts is: What will happen next, and why does this specific move pose an exceptional danger to regional stability?

Scenario 1: The Somaliland legitimization trap

Israeli and Emirati strategy seems to be based on the idea that recognizing Somaliland’s statehood will increase their regional influence and presence. This logic is fundamentally flawed. The Horn of Africa region requires stability through the establishment of moderate, democratic, and cooperative governments. Otherwise, Israel’s move will be fallacious. Recognizing Somaliland without simultaneously resolving Somalia’s political fragmentation creates a perverse incentive structure. Resources that would otherwise strengthen Somalia’s central capacity are instead invested in Somaliland’s infrastructure, widening the development gap between north and south.

More critically, recognizing Somaliland solidifies Ethiopia’s strategic calculations regarding maritime access. Ethiopia has been negotiating with Somalia and Somaliland regarding port access and trade corridors. The formalization of Somaliland’s independence will likely accelerate Ethiopia’s strategic alignment with Somaliland. This could include formal recognition and military cooperation arrangements, which would further isolate Somalia’s federal government and create more conflict and competing power centers within the region.

Scenario 2: Al-Shabaab’s opportunistic expansion

Al-Shabaab has begun to analyze and discuss the Somaliland recognition narrative as a recruitment and legitimacy tool. Through encrypted channels and propaganda platforms, the group’s messaging emphasizes that foreign powers are deliberately fragmenting Somali territory to prevent unified resistance against terrorism and maintain conditions of state weakness that enable exploitation.

This narrative has substantial credibility in recruitment contexts. Young men in areas contested by Al-Shabaab observe that their government is fractured and that external powers are carving up their nation’s territory. They see that the only cohesive institutional force that can offer them structure, purpose, and material incentives is the insurgency itself.

Scenario 3: Maritime Instability as the New Normal

If Somaliland achieves de facto independence and aligns strategically with Israel and the UAE, the Red Sea will be divided into multiple competing maritime jurisdictions: Houthi-controlled Yemen, politically unstable Somalia with competing authorities, UAE-aligned Somaliland, and an expanding Israeli naval presence. Managing maritime security in such an environment would become exponentially more complex.

Houthi attacks on commercial ships already pose challenges to global trade routes and create shipping delays that affect global supply chains. These attacks would likely intensify if the Houthis perceive an Israeli military presence in Somaliland as a direct escalation. Alternatively, operational coordination between the Houthis and al-Shabaab could extend maritime threats southward from the Bab el-Mandeb Strait toward other maritime states in the region, such as Kenya and Djibouti, creating what military strategists call “distributed threat zones,” where conventional maritime security approaches are inadequate.

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sraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced Wednesday that Israel has approved a $35 billion natural gas export agreement with Egypt, calling it the largest gas deal in the country’s history.

Valued at 112 billion shekels, the agreement will see 130 billion cubic meters of natural gas exported from Israel’s offshore Leviathan field to Egypt through 2040. Deliveries will be carried out by U.S. energy giant Chevron, which operates the field alongside Israel’s NewMed Energy Partnership and Ratio Oil Exploration.

Netanyahu said in a televised statement that the deal would strengthen Israel’s position as a regional energy power and contribute to stability in the Middle East. He added that the agreement ensures gas will also be sold domestically at favorable prices for Israeli consumers. About half of the proceeds are expected to go to Israel’s state treasury.

Egyptian authorities have not issued an official confirmation of the agreement.

Deal follows months of political tension

Reports of the agreement had circulated for months amid diplomatic strains between Israel and Egypt. Israeli media previously reported that Netanyahu had delayed approval of the deal amid Israeli allegations—denied by Cairo—that Egypt violated the 1979 peace treaty by increasing military deployments in the Sinai Peninsula.

The agreement expands an existing gas export arrangement signed in 2019. Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen, who had earlier opposed the deal’s terms, stood alongside Netanyahu during the announcement and said he now supports the final agreement.

Egypt has played a key mediating role during the war in Gaza and the U.S.-brokered ceasefire reached in October, while also criticizing Israel’s military offensive that has caused widespread destruction in the enclave.

Israel discovered significant natural gas reserves in the Mediterranean Sea in the early 2000s and began exporting gas nearly a decade ago, first to Jordan and later to Egypt. The latest agreement further deepens energy cooperation between the two countries despite ongoing political tensions in the region.

(Source: Anadolu Agency and the Associated Press)

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resident Donald Trump announced Wednesday that the United States has seized an oil tanker off the coast of Venezuela, a dramatic escalation in the administration’s pressure campaign against President Nicolás Maduro’s government.

“We’ve just seized a tanker on the coast of Venezuela,” Trump told reporters at the White House, calling it “the largest one ever seized” and adding only, “It was seized for a very good reason.” Asked what would happen to the crude on board, Trump replied: “Well, we keep it, I guess.”

A U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the tanker seizure was carried out by the U.S. Coast Guard with support from the Navy. Coast Guard personnel fast-roped onto the ship from helicopters launched off the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford, currently deployed to the Caribbean in a major U.S. show of force.

A video posted by Attorney General Pam Bondi showed armed Coast Guard members boarding the tanker and clearing its superstructure.

Bondi wrote that the vessel “has been sanctioned for multiple years” due to involvement in an illicit network shipping oil for foreign terrorist organizations.

The seized ship, identified as the Skipper, departed Venezuela on December 2 with about 2 million barrels of heavy crude, according to documents from state-run oil company PDVSA. Roughly half the cargo reportedly belonged to a Cuban state-run importer. The tanker previously sailed as M/T Adisa, sanctioned in 2022 for allegedly moving oil on behalf of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah.

Venezuela condemns ‘international piracy’

Venezuela’s government called the U.S. action “a blatant theft” and an act of “international piracy,” accusing Washington of using military force to seize Venezuelan resources.

“The true reasons for the prolonged aggression against Venezuela have finally been revealed,” the government said. “It has always been about our natural resources.”

Maduro, speaking at a rally in Caracas, did not refer directly to the tanker but warned supporters that Venezuela was “prepared to break the teeth of the North American empire if necessary.”

The tanker seizure comes amid the largest U.S. military presence in the Caribbean in decades and follows a string of deadly U.S. strikes on alleged drug-smuggling boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific. The campaign has killed at least 87 people in 22 strikes since early September, prompting bipartisan concern in Congress.

Earlier this week, a pair of U.S. fighter jets flew over the Gulf of Venezuela, the closest to Venezuelan airspace that American warplanes have come in recent years. Trump has repeatedly hinted that “land attacks” are coming soon but has provided no further details.