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hen one thinks of the Middle East and Iraq, the first thing that springs to mind is often oil. However, developments in Iraq over recent weeks have once again demonstrated that oil is no longer merely an economic resource, but a strategic factor that determines state capacity, foreign policy and the regional balance of power.

Following the tensions between Iran and the West, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz provided short-term relief in global energy markets. However, for Iraq, this process did not merely signify a return to normal oil sales. The Baghdad administration has also brought back onto the agenda its long-delayed objectives of increasing production and securing a higher quota within OPEC.

Whilst this may appear at first glance to be merely a matter of energy policy, there is a larger story behind the issue. As is well known, oil is both the most vulnerable and the seemingly strongest aspect of the Iraqi economy. Oil revenues bear the main burden of the state budget. Many sectors, ranging from public sector wages to infrastructure investment, and from security expenditure to social payments, are dependent on this revenue. Consequently, every fluctuation in international markets comes to the attention not only of the economic bureaucracy but also of political decision-makers in Baghdad. Even a slight decline in oil revenue can place significant pressure on the state.

The messages conveyed by the Iraqi government in recent weeks are therefore noteworthy. On the one hand, new international investments are being discussed; on the other, it is stated that production capacity can be rapidly increased. The recent interest shown by major energy companies in oil fields suggests that Baghdad wishes to draw up a long-term growth plan. The recent increase in production in the southern oil fields also emerges as a development serving the effort to boost capacity.

Turkey-Iraq talks

However, the main issue in Iraq is not merely about producing oil. The real challenge facing Iraq is determining via which routes, with what political guarantees and within what economic framework it will deliver the oil it produces to the world market. From this perspective, the renewed intensive energy talks between Turkey and Iraq carry particular significance. The topics on the agenda between Ankara and Baghdad point to a broader framework than merely the technical operation and capacity expansion of the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline: oil, natural gas, electricity, energy supply security and the energy dimension of the Development Corridor.

The Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline, which has passed through Turkey for years, has become one of the most critical elements of this equation. The recent talks between Ankara and Baghdad, which have focused on energy cooperation, do not merely signify the renewal of a technical agreement. It appears that the two countries are seeking ways to establish a new energy architecture that will adapt to the changing regional geopolitical landscape. The duration of the agreement, the pipeline’s capacity, the transport of oil to the Mediterranean, and Iraq’s need to diversify its export routes are all being discussed at the same table.

The situation is equally significant not only from Iraq’s perspective but also from Turkey’s. Turkey has long aimed to be a country that manages energy corridors. One of the fundamental and most important pillars of this strategy is the secure delivery of Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean. For this reason, stable energy relations with Baghdad will also serve as a key tool in building political trust. An energy corridor stretching from southern Iraq to the north, and from there to Turkey and the Mediterranean, will form part of a broader picture encompassing regional trade, transport and security.

Iraq, meanwhile, has learnt the hard way in recent years the risks of relying on a single export route or a single regional balance of power. Crises in the Strait of Hormuz, the prospect of regional war and the occasional disruption of export routes in the north are prompting Baghdad to develop alternative routes. Iraq must now define its energy security not only in terms of production capacity but also through the diversity of its export routes. Consequently, the future of the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline has become a key indicator of Iraq’s capacity for economic sovereignty.

Anti-corruption operations

Amidst all this, another notable development has been the anti-corruption operations being carried out domestically. The operations in Baghdad, which have targeted high-ranking figures, send a significant message regarding the corruption networks that have long been the subject of discussion within state institutions. Of course, it cannot be expected that a few operations will eliminate decades-old institutional problems. However, the rule of law and transparency in public administration will be just as decisive as oil in shaping international investors’ view of Iraq.

Similarly, the US’s resumption of dollar transfers to Iraq should not be interpreted merely as a technical financial decision. This step demonstrates that economic ties between Washington and Baghdad have not been completely severed, but that issues of security, militias and financial oversight remain on the table. It has once again become clear that economic and security issues cannot be addressed in isolation from one another.

Viewed in the light of these developments, Iraq today stands at what is perhaps one of the most critical economic thresholds of the post-2003 era. Whilst the country is striving to attract major energy investments on the one hand, on the other it is seeking to strengthen public administration, strike a balance in its foreign relations and keep as far away as possible from regional crises. If successful, it could not only become a country that increases its oil production but also emerge as a new regional actor at the centre of energy, trade and transport corridors.

However, it is clear that oil revenues alone will not be sufficient for this to happen. Institutional reforms, legal predictability, investment security and sustainable relations with neighbours are just as important as new oil fields. The fundamental challenge facing Iraq is not actually extracting oil, but utilising oil revenues for the benefit of the state. To the extent that Baghdad succeeds in this, it may cease to be a conflict zone where regional crises persist.

From Turkey’s perspective, too, it would be insufficient to view developments solely through the prism of the oil trade. Iraq’s transformation into a stable, economically strengthening country open to regional integration will serve Ankara’s interests across many areas, from security to trade, and from logistics to energy. Consequently, in the coming months, we will be monitoring not only whether Iraq can produce more oil, but also whether it can channel this oil into political stability and economic development.

(Originally published by Middle East Africa website in Turkish)

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raqi security forces arrested several senior political figures, including members of parliament, in a series of overnight raids inside Baghdad’s heavily fortified Green Zone, marking one of the country’s most significant anti-corruption operations in recent years.

The arrests took place early Sunday after security forces sealed all entrances to the Green Zone, the high-security district that houses Iraq’s key government institutions, parliament and foreign embassies.

According to Iraq’s state-run Iraqi News Agency, the operation was launched following testimony provided by former Deputy Oil Minister Adnan al-Jumaili, who was arrested last month on corruption allegations. Authorities said the raids targeted individuals implicated in his statements and included lawmakers whose parliamentary immunity had been lifted.

A security agency report obtained by the Associated Press said seven people were detained, including five members of parliament. Officials did not immediately disclose the specific charges against those arrested or provide details about the alleged corruption scheme.

The identities of those detained have not been officially released, although the report said some of the arrested lawmakers belonged to the political bloc of former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani.

The large-scale operation unfolded in one of the most secure areas of the Iraqi capital, highlighting the sensitivity of the investigation and prompting heightened security measures throughout the district.

Investigation linked to former deputy minister

Authorities said the arrests stemmed from information provided by al-Jumaili, who was taken into custody last month as part of a broader corruption investigation.

His testimony reportedly implicated several senior political figures, leading prosecutors to seek the lifting of parliamentary immunity for lawmakers suspected of involvement.

Under Iraqi law, members of parliament generally enjoy immunity from prosecution while in office unless parliament votes to remove those protections.

Officials have not indicated whether additional arrests are expected or whether the investigation extends beyond those detained on Sunday.

The Green Zone lockdown temporarily restricted movement into one of Baghdad’s most heavily guarded areas while security forces carried out coordinated raids.

The operation underscores renewed efforts by Iraqi authorities to pursue corruption cases involving senior political figures, an issue that has long dominated public debate in the country.

Political implications

The arrests are expected to reverberate across Iraq’s fragmented political landscape, where corruption allegations often overlap with broader struggles for political influence.

Former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s political alliance secured the largest number of seats in Iraq’s parliamentary elections in November. However, despite that electoral success, al-Sudani did not return to office after political negotiations within the Coordination Framework reached an impasse.

The Coordination Framework, a coalition of Shiite political parties aligned with Iran, was unable to agree on its preferred candidate for prime minister.

Instead, Ali al-Zaidi, a businessman and political newcomer, emerged as a compromise choice and was appointed prime minister with backing from major political factions as well as support from the United States.

The detention of lawmakers linked to al-Sudani’s political bloc could further complicate relations among Iraq’s competing factions as the government seeks to maintain stability while pursuing anti-corruption reforms.

Corruption has remained one of Iraq’s most persistent challenges since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, with successive governments pledging reforms but facing widespread criticism over limited progress.

Transparency advocates have long argued that political patronage, weak institutions and competing party interests have hampered efforts to hold powerful officials accountable.

The latest arrests represent one of the highest-profile actions against serving political figures in recent months.

It remains unclear whether prosecutors will seek formal indictments against all those detained or whether further evidence will be presented in court.

Government officials have not commented on whether the investigation could expand to include additional politicians or public officials.

Analysts say the outcome of the case could influence public confidence in Iraq’s anti-corruption campaign, particularly if the investigation proceeds through the courts without political interference.

For now, authorities continue to investigate the allegations while security remains heightened around Baghdad’s Green Zone, reflecting the political significance of the operation and its potential consequences for Iraq’s governing establishment.

(Source: CNN)

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he political crisis in Iraq, which lasted for approximately six months, was partially resolved on May 14, when Ali Faleh Kazem Al-Zaidi’s government secured a partial vote of confidence in parliament. However, it would be an oversimplification to view the situation in Baghdad merely as a delayed government negotiation. For whilst politics in Iraq may appear to be functioning today, the balance that sustains the system is becoming increasingly fragile.

The presidential election process laid this bare. For months, a two-thirds majority could not be secured in parliament. The election of Nizar Amedi, the candidate of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), as president cleared the way for the government; however, the resulting picture points to a period in which new power distributions are becoming visible rather old balances continuing. Indeed, the fragmentation within the Shia political sphere, the intensifying rivalry between the KDP and the KYB, the emergence of more pragmatic networks among Sunni political actors, and the internal divisions within groups aligned with Iran all indicate that the political landscape in Baghdad has shifted.

Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to claim that the system has completely collapsed. Indeed, in the new framework, the presidency remains with the Kurds, the premiership with the Shias, and the speakership of parliament with the Sunnis. However, it is evident that the political balance underpinning this structure no longer reflects the old Iraq. In the current order, alliances are formed more flexibly, the political arena is becoming more fragmented, and actors are acting more pragmatically. Yet the state apparatus is failing to centralize to the same extent.

It is possible to interpret this emerging picture as a form of ‘asymmetric continuity’. In other words, the system continues, but the political algorithm that sustains it is changing. Indeed, as the sphere of representation expands, decision-making capacity becomes increasingly fragile. The manner in which the Zeydi government was formed also demonstrated this. Of the 23 ministers, only 14 were able to secure a vote of confidence in parliament. The confidence votes for some ministers were postponed, some candidates withdrew, and others were outright rejected. For Iraq, the issue is no longer merely forming a government; it is about establishing a state structure that functions, can make decisions, and possesses the capacity to exercise sovereignty over the country.

Foreign policy balance

It is precisely at this point that the US-Iran balance is once again becoming decisive. Historically, Iraqi politics has been interpreted through the narrow prism of ‘whether the US or Iran is “winning” Yet the recent process has revealed a different picture. Neither can Iran be pushed outside the system, nor can Washington establish a decisive sphere of influence on its own. In this sense, a more controlled model of competition appears to have emerged. The parties are not completely eliminating each other’s room for manoeuvre, but are attempting to establish strategic boundaries.

This situation felt particularly in the security sphere. The fact that certain figures close to Iran can hold positions in the government demonstrates that Tehran’s influence persists, whilst reservations regarding certain critical security posts highlight Washington’s sensitivity regarding Iraq’s security architecture. From the US perspective, the issue is not to eliminate Iranian influence entirely. Given the fragile structure in Iraq, such a move would risk making the system even more unstable. Consequently, within the new balance taking shape in Baghdad, a controlled competitive arena has emerged where the parties do not completely exclude one another but rather limit each other’s scope of action.

The Zeydi government’s program also reflects this very search for balance. The approach of “Stable State – Productive Economy – Balanced Partnerships” actually sets out the government’s orientation quite clearly. Upon close examination of the program, it becomes apparent that security, the economy and foreign policy are not treated as independent spheres, but as components of the same strategic framework. It is fair to say that the strengthening of state capacity, economic reforms, energy investments, the centralization of security decisions and a policy of balance in foreign affairs are all assessed within the same framework.

One of the notable points here is that the government program largely retains the roadmap established during the Sudani era. In particular, the Development Corridor Project, efforts towards integration in the energy sector, and the approach to regional connectivity are continuing. However, despite this strategic continuity in the government program, the political composition of the cabinet appears more fragile compared to the Sudani era. A structure is emerging that is more political, more fragmented and generates more bargaining. Consequently, the fundamental challenge facing Baghdad will be managing the tension between strategic continuity and political fragmentation.

The new equation in Iraq and Türkiye

The recent shift in Türkiye’s policy towards Iraq takes on its full significance precisely here. This is because Ankara no longer views the Iraqi theatre solely through a security-centric lens. The approach that had long been shaped by the PKK threat, border security and military operations is giving way to a broader strategic framework. Iraq’s political stability, economic capacity, regional connectivity and state institutionalization have become direct strategic issues for Türkiye.

Indeed, during the presidential election process and government negotiations, Ankara did not pursue a policy focused on ensuring the victory of a specific candidate or group. For Türkiye, the issue centered not so much on who would become prime minister, but rather on the question of how relations could be maintained within the new equation emerging in Iraq. The swift messages of support issued immediately following the formation of the Zeydi government were also a continuation of this approach.

It is possible to interpret the approach that has become more visible in recent times through the lens of ‘conjunctural rationalism’. Türkiye is upholding its fundamental strategic principles. Iraq’s territorial integrity, political unity, protection from conflict, and the preservation of regional stability remain unchanging priorities for Ankara. However, Türkiye is now implementing these principles through more flexible networks of relations and shifting on-the-ground balances. The controlled normalization developing with the KYB, the new political balance emerging in Kirkuk, and the thaw in relations between Ankara and Sulaymaniyah are all part of this transformation.

This strategic expansion is also evident in the security sphere. Türkiye’s ‘Türkiye Without Terrorism’ process has now moved beyond the traditional security approach confined to the border. This is because the issue is not merely the PKK’s military presence. The structure stretching from Qandil to Sinjar, and from Mahmur to the disputed territories, has also become part of Iraq’s sovereignty crisis.

Ankara’s broader strategic approach

For this reason, Ankara has recently been developing a broader strategic approach that, alongside military operations, seeks to build state capacity, institutional cooperation, economic integration and connectivity. Today, Türkiye does not view the security issues emerging in the Iraqi and Syrian theaters solely through the prism of the presence of armed groups. The real issue lies in the political, military and economic vacuums arising in areas where state capacity has eroded. For this reason, alongside moving security risks away from the border, Türkiye is seeking to establish a regional stability corridor that will contribute to filling these vacuums as much as possible.

The Development Corridor Project therefore holds a special place. It appears that Iraq, which has long served as a transit zone for conflicts, is for the first time turning towards an endeavor to establish itself as a regional hub through connectivity. Iraq’s status as a central country is regaining significance here. For Iraq is not merely a fragile geography; it is also one of the Middle East’s most critical transit zones.

Virtually every regional crisis in recent years has demonstrated this once again. The US-Iran tensions, the fragility arising after the Gaza war, and the new equation emerging following Israel’s attacks on Iran have all directly affected Iraq. This is because Iraq continues to be one of the areas where regional power struggles intersect. For this reason, any political vacuum that emerges in Baghdad can quickly transform into an arena of regional competition.

However, this very central geographical position also affords Iraq a significant strategic advantage. In terms of energy routes, trade corridors, transport networks and regional connectivity, Iraq’s geopolitical position makes it one of the Middle East’s most critical hubs. Consequently, whether the country reverts to a fragile fault line beset by conflict and proxy struggles, or emerges as a hub for regional integration, holds the potential to produce outcomes that will shape not only Iraq’s but the entire region’s future.

Precisely for this reason, it would be a mistake to interpret the strategic rapprochement that has emerged between Türkiye and Iraq in recent times as merely a routine bilateral process. The new ground being established here is evolving into one of the key battlegrounds in the struggle between security-centered fragmentation and connectivity-centered integration in the Middle East. However, the sustainability of this process does not depend solely on the strategic will demonstrated by Ankara. Baghdad also needs to manage the balance between political flexibility and state capacity. Therefore, the direction Iraq takes in the coming period will directly affect not only the country’s domestic political future but also the direction along which the regional order will be shaped.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he five-month political deadlock in Iraq, which had persisted since the November 2025 elections, ended on 27 April 2026 with the announcement of a surprise candidate. The country’s largest parliamentary bloc, the Shiite Coordination Framework, nominated 41-year-old businessman Ali al-Zeydi as its candidate for prime minister, and Iraqi President Nizar Amedi officially tasked Zeydi with forming the new government. Zeydi, a figure with no political background who is seen as a ‘technocratic consensus figure’, has reignited both internal balances and the dynamics along the Washington–Tehran axis. The young prime ministerial candidate is expected to present his cabinet to parliament within 30 days.

The quota system in the shadow of crises

In Iraq, the process of forming a government has traditionally been fraught with difficulties due to the ethnic-sectarian quota system known as ‘Muhasasa’, which has been in place since the US invasion of 2003. Under this system, the presidency is allocated to the Kurds, the speakership of parliament to the Sunnis and the premiership to the Shia Arabs, despite this not being enshrined in the constitution. However, this power-sharing arrangement, particularly when combined with competition between factions within the Shia bloc and the interventions of external actors, can lead to governance vacuums lasting several months.

A similar scenario emerged during the latest crisis following the November 2025 elections. Rivalry between former prime minister Nuri al-Maliki and incumbent prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani brought the process to a standstill. This deadlock was only resolved when both figures withdrew their candidacies in the national interest and reached a consensus on Ali al-Zeydi, a non-political figure. Zeydi’s candidacy was approved by the majority of leaders within the Coordination Framework, thereby becoming the will of parliament’s largest bloc.

Portrait of a young businessman: who is Ali al-Zeydi?

Born in Baghdad in 1986, Ali al-Zeydi is the youngest prime ministerial candidate in Iraqi history. He studied law and finance and completed a master’s degree in banking and finance. Notably, he has never previously held any political office or served in government.

Prior to entering politics, he was a wealthy businessman at the helm of major conglomerates such as the Al-Owais Group and National Holding, spanning 15 sectors including agriculture, property, energy, logistics, education, and healthcare. Furthermore, his management of major contracts supplying food to the Iraqi army, as well as his educational investments, including Al-Shaab University, demonstrate the extent of his economic influence. However, Zeydi’s profile is not without controversy. The South Islamic Bank, of which he is chairman of the board, was subjected to sanctions in 2024 at the request of the US Treasury Department due to suspicions of money laundering and dollar smuggling. The bank was also barred from conducting dollar transactions. Some analysts have criticised this situation as an attempt to normalise and sweep under the carpet the ongoing major corruption investigations in Iraq.

Zeydi’s candidacy is seen as an attempt to maintain balance between Nuri al-Maliki and Muhammad Shia al-Sudani within the Coordination Framework. Zeydi is known to have close ties with the incumbent Prime Minister, Sudani, and his cousin, Ziya al-Zeydi, is a parliamentarian from Sudani’s coalition. This raises the question of whether Zeydi is an extension of the current system.

Nevertheless, Zeydi’s name has also been well received by other key political figures. In addition to the leaders of the Kurdish KDP and KYB parties, the Sunni Azm, Siyada and Taqaddum alliances have also congratulated Zeydi and issued messages of support. Shortly after his appointment, Zeydi met with Sunni leaders and promised to establish a government that would represent all Iraqis.

The Approach of the US, Iran and other powers

One of the key figures involved in the process was US President Donald Trump. As is well known, Trump firmly vetoed Nuri al-Maliki, the Shiite bloc’s first choice and a figure known for his close ties to Iran, threatening to cut off all support for Iraq should Maliki become prime minister. This pressure from Washington forced the Coordination Framework to back down, prompting it to reconsider its options for prime ministerial candidates.

However, Trump openly supported Zeydi’s candidacy, posting a message on Truth Social reading “Congratulations, Ali!” and inviting him to Washington once he had formed the government. This apparent green light from the US appears to be conditional on Zeydi forming a government that maintains a ‘distance from Iran’. Meanwhile, the Tehran administration initially remained silent, but Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi later congratulated Zeydi, stating that they supported Iraq’s stability. Political circles are also discussing whether Zeydi’s appointment might be the result of a “mysterious” agreement between Washington and Tehran regarding Iraq, as has been the case in all prime ministerial selection processes since 2003, or whether it is a temporary step back by Iran to avoid sanctions.

One of the key figures involved in the process was US President Donald Trump. As is well known, Trump firmly vetoed Nuri al-Maliki, the Shiite bloc’s first choice and a figure known for his close ties to Iran, threatening to cut off all support for Iraq should Maliki become prime minister. This pressure from Washington forced the Coordination Framework to back down, prompting it to reconsider its options for prime ministerial candidates.

Ali al-Zeydi’s appointment to form a government has received widespread support, both within and beyond the US and Iran. In its congratulatory message, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasised the deep historical ties between the two countries and expressed a desire to develop strategic institutional cooperation further in the coming period. During a telephone conversation, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari congratulated Zeydi and they discussed the development of bilateral relations and Pakistan’s role in reducing regional tensions. Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Abu Ghait welcomed the appointment, expressing hope that the new government would fulfill the Iraqi people’s aspirations for security and prosperity.

Leaders of many Arab countries, including Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan and Lebanon, also telephoned al-Zeydi to offer their personal congratulations. The European Union (EU) Delegation to Iraq and British Ambassador to Baghdad, Irfan Siddiq, stated that they viewed the appointment positively and emphasized that they would continue to support Iraq’s reform, peace and development process.

The challenging process ahead for Zeydi

Securing a vote of confidence from an absolute majority of the 329-seat parliament within the 30-day legal timeframe is Ali al-Zeydi’s greatest test on the path to becoming Prime Minister. Should Zeydi succeed in forming a government, the economic crisis will be the first of many challenges he will face. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the disruption of oil exports due to tensions between the US, Israel and Iran have already severely impacted Iraq’s struggling economy.

Corruption and security issues constitute another major crisis awaiting Zeydi. Combating deep-rooted corruption and addressing the future of Shia militia groups (Hashd al-Shaabi), which operate outside the army’s full control, are among the most sensitive issues facing the new government. Political stability is another area where it remains to be seen whether Zeydi will be able to succeed, given that Iraq has been unable to achieve it for years. After all, it is unclear how influential figures such as Muqtada al-Sadr will react to this process.

Some predict that, should Zeydi fail to form a government, the Coordination Framework could propose new candidates to buy time, while others suggest that the country could be drawn into a cycle of early elections. Ultimately, it will become clear in the coming weeks whether this ‘rejuvenation’ operation in Baghdad constitutes genuine reform or merely a tactical manoever, depending on the nature of the cabinet to be formed.

This article was originally published by Middle East Africa in Turkish.

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he process, which began on 28 February with US and Israeli attacks on Iran and rapidly escalated with Iran’s direct retaliations, is no longer merely a conflict between two sides but has transformed into a war dynamic that has spread across the region. From the very first days of the war, Iraq has been the sole country where the direct and indirect attacks of both the US/Israel axis and Iran have intersected; the country has effectively become the second front of this war. Furthermore, whilst Iraq has become one of the parties that is involved in the war, it also lies at the centre of a multi-layered crisis spiral where military, political and strategic dimensions feed into one another.

It would not be inaccurate to say that the impact of the US/Israel–Iran war on Iraq goes beyond a classic example of a ‘neighboring country being affected’. The emerging picture shows that Iraq has become not only country bearing the consequences of the war but also a terrain where the war is being waged directly. In this sense, it would be appropriate to analyze the dynamics unfolding in Iraq today through the lens of a three-layered reality.

Consequently, in this process, Iraq has transformed into a ‘secondary front’ militarily; strategically, Iran and the US/Israel have begun to wear each other down through its territory; and politically, the Iraqi state has once again demonstrated that it faces sovereignty issues within its own borders. Indeed, from the very first days of the war, the targeting of US bases, diplomatic missions and energy infrastructure, coupled with the rapid development of a high-intensity attack capability by Iran-backed militia networks, has transformed Iraq from a passive spectator into an active theatre of conflict.

Indeed, the decisions taken at the meeting of the Iraqi National Security Council on 24 March, following the attack on the Popular Mobilization Forces headquarters in Anbar on the night of 23 March—in which more than 15 PMF members lost their lives—are noteworthy. In a statement issued after the Iraqi National Security Council meeting, whilst it was emphasized that the state is the sole authority on decisions regarding war and peace, it was also announced that a decision had been taken to respond to attacks against Iraqi security forces—particularly the PMF—within the framework of the “right to legitimate self-defense and retaliation”.

Iraq no longer outside the conflcit

Whilst this decision does not technically constitute a declaration of open war against any state, it demonstrates that Iraq has effectively abandoned its position of remaining outside the conflict. This is because, for the first time on this scale and with this clarity, the state has defined its authority to provide a collective and institutional response to attacks against its own security apparatus. More importantly, rather than interpreting this decision merely as a defensive reflex, it can also be assessed as a step that redefines Iraq’s position within the conflict. Whilst this decision challenges the monopolisation of decisions regarding war and peace by non-state actors, it simultaneously positions the state itself as one of the parties to this conflict.

Although the decisions taken by the Iraqi National Security Council—which include the simultaneous protest against US and Iranian representatives and the expression of preparations to appeal to the United Nations—may indicate that Iraq is attempting to pursue a policy of balance, the reality on the ground is increasingly eroding this balance. In this context, the decision in question reveals that Iraq is positioned not as a ‘declared party’ to the war, but as an actor that has become involved both de facto and institutionally.

Consequently, Iraq has moved beyond being merely a geographical area where conflict is waged, becoming a country directly involved in the dynamics of this war through its own security institutions, political decision-making mechanisms and military reflexes. This marks a new threshold for Iraq; the country’s capacity for neutrality has been replaced by controlled participation and compulsory engagement.

How are the attacks in Iraq taking shape?

Today, the military manifestation of the Israel/US–Iran conflict in Iraq is, in fact, creating a hybrid arena where two distinct models of warfare intersect. The fact that the majority of attacks are carried out using drones and rockets, supplemented by a limited number of ballistic missiles and precision air strikes, indicates that the parties are pursuing a strategy focused on low-cost, sustained pressure that wears down the opposing side’s defence systems, rather than conventional frontline warfare. The war in Iraq is being waged, on the one hand, by actors possessing high-intensity conventional warfare capabilities and, on the other, through proxy networks carrying out low-cost, flexible and deniable attacks.

Within this framework, the Iranian axis seeks to establish territorial pressure through quantity—that is, via intense and dispersed attacks—whilst the US/Israeli axis strives to achieve qualitative superiority through more selective and lethal targets. The methods employed by structures affiliated with or aligned to Iran are aimed at saturating air defence systems, straining reaction times, and creating a constant state of alert to reduce the operational tempo of the opposing side. In contrast, the US-Israel axis’s approach aims to disrupt the integrity of the network by targeting command-and-control nodes, logistics centres and critical infrastructure through intelligence-based targeting.

However, this asymmetric balance creates a persistent climate of insecurity across Iraqi territory rather than producing a definitive outcome on the ground. This is because one side’s dispersed and regenerative attack capacity cannot be entirely neutralised by the other side’s high-precision but limited interventions.

At this juncture, the decisive factor is increasingly the ‘shadow militias’ and proxy structures. As these structures provide both operational flexibility and political deniability, they ensure the conflict’s continuity whilst keeping its costs under control. In this context, the military picture emerging on the Iraqi battlefield can be interpreted as a war of attrition rather than a decisive war. Rather than gaining ground, the parties are focusing on eroding the opponent’s capabilities, testing their deterrence, and exerting long-term pressure. This renders the conflict unpredictable, fragmented and chronic. Indeed, even if tensions between Israel/the US and Iran were to ease in the coming period, or even if the war were to end, it would not be wrong to expect the conflict dynamics in Iraq to persist. Furthermore, this conflict dynamic will not be confined solely to the military sphere; as seen in the country’s political system following 2003, it could drag Iraq into a multi-layered system of competition.

Iraq’s strategic depth

Indeed, on the strategic level, Iraq serves as a ‘proxy depth’ for Iran and a ‘containment corridor’ for the US and Israel. Through its militia networks in Iraq, Iran is able to exert pressure on the US without opening a direct and costly front, thereby keeping the conflict away from its own territory whilst actively utilizing its regional influence. This model provides Iran with both operational flexibility and escalation control.

This situation removes Iraq from being a buffer zone in the classical sense, transforming it into a flexible and permeable arena of conflict where both sides impose costs on one another. In other words, no actor can fully control Iraq, yet all actors utilize Iraq for their own strategic calculations. This state of ‘uncontrolled use’ enhances Iraq’s geopolitical value whilst simultaneously deepening its fragility.

The most severe consequence of this military and strategic pressure is manifesting in the political sphere. The Iraqi state is compelled to both maintain its security relationship with the US and react to the targeting of militia structures that form part of its own security architecture. This situation pushes Baghdad into a contradictory position, making it both dependent on Washington yet in tension with it. This contradiction goes beyond a diplomatic dilemma for Iraq; it directly becomes a matter of state capacity and sovereignty. This is because if Iraq remains silent regarding the targeting of The Popular Mobilization Forces elements—which it defines as part of its own security structure—it weakens its internal legitimacy; if it responds, however, it increases the risk of direct tension with the US. Consequently, Baghdad is becoming increasingly trapped in a ‘policy of forced balance’ with a narrowing scope for manoevre.

This predicament has become more apparent in recent decisions taken by the Iraqi National Security Council. More importantly, the manner in which these decisions are implemented has the potential to affect directly Iraq’s internal political balances. The question of which actors will exercise the right to self-defense, to what extent, and under what coordination, could redefine the balance of power between the central state and militia structures. If this process cannot be managed under central command, the scope of action for non-state actors may expand, and this could further deepen Iraq’s already contentious ‘multi-headed security structure’.

Conversely, should central authority bring this process under control, the position of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) within the state could become even more institutionalized. Both scenarios carry the potential to create new fault lines in Iraqi politics. For this reason, the current situation should be assessed not merely as a classic foreign policy crisis, but as a structural breaking point simultaneously transforming Iraq’s state structure, security architecture and political balances.

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n a stern message directed at the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani’s son, Bafal Talabani, in northwestern Iraq, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan issued a warning to the Suleymaniyah-based faction, urging them to sever ties with the PKK terrorists.

Speaking during a live broadcast on Monday March 18, Fidan emphasized the importance of correcting the alleged mistake and restoring friendship between Turkey and the PUK in Suleymaniyah. He stressed Ankara’s expectation for the PUK to refrain from supporting the PKK, emphasizing Turkey’s commitment to eliminating the terrorist organization.

“We do not want to become enemies with our allies as we eliminate the PKK,” Fidan stated, expressing Ankara’s hope for the PUK to distance itself from the terrorist group. He criticized the local administration in Suleymaniyah for allegedly supporting both PKK and YPG terrorists and providing logistical support to them.

Enduring friendship

Turkish officials have previously criticized the PUK for allowing Suleymaniyah to serve as a refuge for PKK terrorists.

Highlighting the enduring friendship between Turkey and the people of Sulaymaniyah, Fidan underscored the seriousness of the threat posed by the PUK leadership’s cooperation with the PKK, describing it as a national security issue for Turkey.

During his visit to Iraq last week, accompanied by Turkish intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalın and Deputy Interior Minister Münir Karaloğlu, Fidan reiterated Turkey’s commitment to combating terrorism. His visit coincided with news that Iraq’s National Security Council had officially designated the PKK as an outlawed group.

In its more than 40-year terror campaign against Turkey, the PKK has been responsible for the deaths of over 40,000 people, including women, children, and infants. The PKK is listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union.

Source: Daily Sabah

I

n a significant development, the United States and Iraq are poised to initiate discussions regarding the conclusion of the U.S.-led international military coalition in Iraq. The focus will shift towards establishing bilateral relations between the two nations. This marks a crucial step forward, previously hindered by the conflict in Gaza.

The United States conveyed its intention through a letter presented by U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Alina Romanowski, to Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein on January 25, 2024. Importantly, the U.S. dropped preconditions, including the cessation of attacks by Iran-backed Iraqi militant groups, signaling a readiness to engage in constructive dialogue.

The Iraqi foreign ministry acknowledged the receipt of an “important” letter, emphasizing that Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani would carefully study its contents. While the specifics of the letter were not disclosed, it is clear that the proposed talks are expected to unfold over several months, with the outcome uncertain and no immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops anticipated.

2,500 US troops in Iraq

As of now, the United States maintains 2,500 troops in Iraq, actively supporting local forces to prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State, which had captured substantial territories in Iraq and Syria in 2014 before facing defeat. Additionally, troops from various European nations participate in the U.S.-led coalition dedicated to counterterrorism efforts.

The mission’s presence in Iraq has faced mounting pressure, especially against the backdrop of escalating tensions witnessed due to the Gaza genocide. The exchange of attacks between militias and U.S. forces, orchestrated by Iran-backed factions, has strained the delicate alliance between Iraq, Tehran, and Washington.

U.S. troops stationed in Iraq and Syria have experienced approximately 150 attacks by militants based in Iraq, prompting retaliatory strikes by the U.S., including the latest on Tuesday. The surge in violence prompted Iraqi Prime Minister al-Sudani to advocate for the swift departure of U.S.-led coalition forces through negotiations, a process initiated last year but interrupted by the Gaza genocide.

Talks with Iraq

Washington’s reluctance to negotiate a potential withdrawal while under persistent attack has shifted due to the realization that the attacks are unlikely to cease. There is a growing acknowledgment that maintaining the status quo would only lead to continuous escalation.

A U.S. official stated, “The U.S. and Iraq are close to agreement on starting the Higher Military Commission dialogue that was announced back in August.” This commission is expected to facilitate a joint assessment of the Iraqi security forces’ capacity to combat the Islamic State and shape the nature of the bilateral security relationship. The official emphasized that the timing of the talks is unrelated to recent attacks and that the U.S. will retain the right to self-defense throughout the negotiation process.

The attacks have been orchestrated by influential Iraqi militias with close ties to Iran, some of which lack formal representation in the Iraqi parliament but wield considerable influence in decision-making. The initiation of talks is seen as an attempt to alleviate political pressure on Prime Minister al-Sudani’s government and potentially reduce attacks on U.S. forces.

Source: Reuters

The just war doctrine debate goes back to the Middle Ages, when philosophers and theologians linked to the Roman Catholic Church, such as Augustine of Hippo in his encyclopedia on the city of God against the pagans (De civitate Dei contra paganos), commonly referred to as The City of God and Thomas Aquinas in his theological compendium Summa Theologica (Summary of Theology), provided theological justifications for waging wars. These wars were seen as a necessary evil by the Church to bring about better outcomes and justice, and to help those who the Church saw as worthy.

The reason the Church had to justify going to war was that as a pacifist institution being involved in wars was against its founding principles. Thus, the Church and its theologians introduced new concepts such as the theology of liberation, which was understood as the liberation of an oppressed people, justifying war as a last resort to achieve justice.

The theology of liberation manifested itself in the form of crusades—wars in the Middle East to save Jerusalem and Eastern Christians from what the Roman Catholic Church at the time saw as “oppression” by Muslims. For the Catholic Church, their crusades were “just,” but for people in the Levant, including large sectors of Christians, they were simply unjust.

It is important to note that when the crusaders arrived in the Levant, certain Christian groups fought alongside Muslims to repel the invading forces. Also, when the same Catholic Church revived the theology of liberation in the1960s in Latin America, in an attempt to explain the role, the Church should play in public life and politics, it was faced by a strong opposition by theologians linked to centers of power and government. Subsequently, when Pope John Paul II visited Nicaragua in 1983, he called for the removal of five priests from their jobs over their liberation theology advocacy.

The doctrine of just war

Michael Walzer, an American philosopher and the leading figure of the just war theory, outlines his approach in his well-known book Just and Unjust Wars, published in 1977, and still widely read today. Walzer speaks of two stages of war: jus ad bellum, the conditions leading to war, and jus in bello, the rules governing conduct during war. The first stage of just war requires meeting specific conditions before going to war, namely a just cause, a right intention, a legitimate authority, proportionality, and making war a last resort.

Still challenging, defining a just cause is subjective, and it could differ from one person and one actor to another (state or non-state). For the crusaders, waging a war was a just cause to “save” Christians. For the people of the Levant, including some Christians, these wars were unjust, and the crusaders had to be fought off.

We have seen how a spark can lead to a world war when the assassination of Austria’s Archduke Franz Ferdinand led to the outbreak of World War I. Of course, there were underlining reasons such as nationalism and expansionism, but nonetheless individual acts were also important to the buildup to war.

There are instances, especially in the context of anti-colonization struggles such as the National Liberation Front (FLN) of Algeria, where all attempts at dialogue for the withdrawal of the French failed. This lack of will to end colonial rule peacefully has left the colonized people with no other option but to take up arms against their oppressors.

The concept of a war as a last resort is a matter of interpretation as state actors—in the above case, colonial authorities—can always claim the absence of a partner for reaching an agreement to prevent a war. A prime example of this is Israel which puts forth the “absence” of a Palestinian partner as its excuse for not engaging in the process to achieve a sustainable and long-term peace.

Proportional and indiscriminate war

Despite the principles of jus in bello, in almost all wars, whether waged by state or non-state actors, civilians have always, directly and indirectly, fallen victims of attacks carried out by parties that claim to be fighting a just war.

In many instances, the response of colonial authorities to the colonized people was so brutal that it left scars on civilians for years to come such as France’s response to the May 1945 protests, where nearly 45,000 Algerians and 86 European settlers/soldiers were killed.

Israel’s use of force against Palestinians is another example of this colonial violence where in all confrontations to this day, the number of Palestinian victims has always been unproportionally higher. In fact, in many instances, even a comparison is impossible. Equally important, attacks against military targets located in civilian areas have also been documented in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan, where the harm is undoubtably and disproportionately higher than the benefits.

The third way: justice as an end

It appears clear that the just war doctrine is not perfect and there is an urgent need for a third way debate that moves beyond the confines of a just war, on the one hand, and terrorism, on the other. This is true because the theory of a just war, despite including state and non-state actors, is still widely a state-centric theory. At the same time, many non-state actors seem on the defensive and don’t have the privilege of choosing their own designation. Both theories of just war and terrorism are western-centric, in as much as the agency of the colonized people is trivialized.

The third way theory should seek justice as an end, based on two important principles: people’s right to self-determination, and stressing the agency of non-state and state actors alike, by setting the rules of conduct during armed conflicts. The framework governing this theory of justice should be international law rather than national interests, history, or political calculations. This way, the theory becomes less subjective and not open to interpretation, power and interest relations.

Seeking justice should be the driving force of oppressed people. A balanced approach to peace and war is the only way to achieve justice. Non-state actors, with all their agency, are also responsible for making sure that injustice does not take place while seeking justice. For this reason, non-state actors must abide by the rules of conduct in wars in line with their right to self-determination, as defined by international law.

Iran-backed proxies are involved in almost every major crisis in the Middle East. Recently, the Houthis, or Ansar Allah, of Yemen launched another missile attack on Abu Dhabi, called on foreign companies and investors to leave the UAE, and vowed to make the country unsafe. Also, the Fatah Alliance and other Iran-backed parties affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) rejected Iraq’s recent parliamentary election held in October 2021 and tried to further destabilize the already chaotic Iraqi politics.

Moreover, elements within the PMF such as Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq with strong ties to Iran, have been trying to hinder Turkey’s fight against PKK terror in northern Iraq as they present it as “a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty,” a point which was also made by Iraj Masjedi, Iran’s ambassador in Baghdad last year in February.

Most recently, Kata’ib Hezbollah issued a statement which threatened Turkey and demanded the withdrawal of its forces “before it’s too late.” To these Iranian proxies, the presence of Iran’s militias in Syria must also be added. In short, alongside the Hezbollah of Lebanon, Iran’s proxy par excellence, Iran-backed Shiite militant groups are active all across the Middle East.

Why does Iran need proxies?

Iran is undoubtedly a major Middle Eastern power with its geostrategic position, abundant natural resources, and significant human capital. Nevertheless, Iran’s conventional military capacity has, for decades, either fallen behind its political aspirations or remained untested with the notable exception of the tragic and devastating defensive war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1980-1988.

In the twentieth century, the country was not involved in any substantial and direct military conflict against any major enemy. For that, Iranian elites’ masterful political maneuvers and their use of the international balance of power to their advantage deserves a huge credit, but that’s a different story.

The country stayed neutral during the two World Wars, “solved” the oil nationalization crisis in the early 1950s without facing military aggression – unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt which was jointly attacked by Israel, the United Kingdom, and France upon President Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 – and even got away with the Iran hostage crisis at the end of 1979 without an open military confrontation.

While doing this, Iran envisioned itself as the true leader of all the Shiites in the region and beyond. These proxies consolidated Iran’s defensive capabilities but gradually turned into a security risk for the region. Furthermore, although Iran’s short-term expectations from these proxies were mostly military, there was a strong political dimension from the beginning. In essence, Iran was reproducing, in different countries, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps which were established by Ayatollah Khomeini following the revolution and in time turned into a military, economic, political, and even social power.

How do Iran’s proxies function?

From its inception, the Islamic Republic of Iran emerged as an interventionist regime that interposed in the affairs of regional states through the rhetoric and practice of exporting the revolution. This was clearly reflected in Article 154 of Iran’s constitution which declared Iran’s support for the “just struggles of the mustada‘fun [the oppressed] against the mustakbirun [the oppressor] in every corner of the globe,” while “scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations.”

As it turned out, Iran cared little about the non-intervention principle of the United Nations. The hostility between the Islamic Republic, the U.S., and Israel, along with the unfavorable attitude of certain Arab regimes in the region, with the notable exception of Hafez Assad’s Syria, towards the Islamic Republic’s policies certainly added to Iran’s desire to look for non-state allies to consolidate its security in the region. Nevertheless, paradoxically these proxies caused, for all intents and purposes, Iran’s further isolation in the region.

Although the “axis of resistance,” Iran’s preferred term for the large network of proxies under its control, is anti-American, anti-Zionist, and counter-hegemonic in rhetoric, it is characterized, in fact, by two main features: Iran’s proxies grew in weak and war-torn states, and they targeted Iran’s regional enemies – not only Israel – along with the U.S. as the first and foremost global hegemonic power. Yet, the real risk for Iran’s proxies has always been their political influence rather than their military capability.

Iran’s proxies after Qasem Soleimani

Iran’s Middle East proxies have for a long time been predominantly associated with Qasem Soleimani, the former commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. There is no question that Soleimani played an immensely decisive role in coordinating Iran’s network of Middle East proxies especially after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

But, although his assassination by the U.S. in January 2020 came as a shock for Iran, his weight in in laying out Iran’s Middle East foreign policies was already put under increasing question by those such as Javad Zarif, Iran’s former minister of foreign affairs, who sought to reintegrate Iran in the international community.

In the changing landscape of today’s Middle East and Iran’s normalization attempts with its Gulf neighbors, Iran’s proxies can no longer effectively function like they did in the past as sheer militant groups. Yet their political influence in their respective countries also poses challenges to the region.

Their sectarian approaches, reliance on arms, and their close ties with Iran further complicate the possibility of their integration into national politics. In a nutshell, at best, Iranian proxies can hope to replicate the Lebanese Hezbollah, which itself suffers from these defects and acts like a state within a state.

As nuclear negotiations continue in Vienna to find a common ground between Iran and the U.S., Iran’s proxies once again became a critical issue. It goes without saying that the U.S. regards these proxies as a security risk for itself and its Middle Eastern allies, but they are primarily a regional problem.

Thus, although reaching a renewed nuclear deal which would effectively limit Iran’s nuclear capacity and undermine the security risks of its proxies must be a shared priority for the region, there needs to be a regional initiative to secure stability in the greater area.

Turkey’s attempts to normalize relations and repair broken ties with a number of states in the region can be a good starting point to deescalate tensions in the Middle East. Also, the lifting of illegal sanctions on Iran can encourage it to take part constructively in the region’s normalization process.

In order to realize this, Iran must respect the principle of “scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations” as stipulated in its constitution.

In January 2020, a military strike by the United States assassinated Qasem Soleimani, the former commander of the elite Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, then deputy head of an Iraqi paramilitary organization known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMU).

The assassination increased not only the escalation between the U.S. and Iran-linked Shiite militias, but it also enabled the Iraqi parliament to request then Iraqi prime minister Adel Abdul Mahdi to end foreign military presence in Iraq. Correspondingly, Shiite militias carried out a total of nearly 100 attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities and bases hosting  U.S.-led coalition troops in Iraq, compelling the U.S. to reconsider its combat mission in Iraq.

At first, the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic facilities and bases forced the U.S. to downsize its military mission in Iraq. Accordingly, the U.S. withdrew approximately half of its 5,000 forces from Iraq in 2020. The majority of the remaining forces serve as advisers to Iraq’s military. The U.S.-led coalition handed over eight bases to the Iraqi military last year and pulled international troops back to larger garrisons such as Camp Taji, Erbil, and Ain al-Asad airbases.

Meanwhile, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi has been facing pressure from Iraqi Shia factions in the country and militias allied with Iran to implement the Iraqi parliament’s nonbinding decision to end foreign military presence in Iraq. Al-Kadhimi has strived to reduce coalition combat forces, and instead to increase NATO’s role in Iraq, where in 2018 he invited some 500 NATO personnel to raise Iraqi military and security competencies during Iraq’s strategic dialogue with the U.S.

The U.S. withdrawal of combat missions from Iraq will not stop drone and rocket attacks by the Shiite militias on U.S. diplomatic facilities and bases hosting the U.S.-led coalition troops in Iraq.

On the one hand, the strategic dialogue meetings have resulted in reducing the U.S.-led combat mission against DAESH in Iraq, the majority of whom are American soldiers, by 60 percent. On the other hand, NATO agreed to expand its military consultation mission in Iraq to roughly 4,000 troops.

Moreover, Josep Borrell, high representative of the European Union for foreign affairs and security policy and vice-president of the European Commission, announced that NATO is planning to establish a second base for training missions in Erbil. Thus, the U.S. has shared the responsibility to respond to attacks from Iran-linked Shiite militias with its allies in NATO.

While there always seem to be efforts to rehabilitate Iran’s image at both a regional and international level, usually attempting to make Tehran appear to be the victim rather than the victimizer, few would be naïve enough to deny the fact that Iranian ambitions can actively be classified as being imperial in nature.

However, Tehran’s clergy-cum-politicians have played the game of empires in an intelligent and subtle manner, preferring to control vassal states by proxy rather than directly imposing their rule directly. In this way, Iran can claim to simply be “providing assistance” to the people of the region that it is now actively terrorizing.

Through a strategy of clever and careful outsourcing of war to ideologically loyal militants across the Middle East, Iran has managed to carve for itself a sphere of influence that threatens peace and security in the region and beyond.

War on the cheap

As previously stated, Iran does not use direct, conventional means of control and military power projection as it knows it can be a costly endeavor, both in blood and treasure.

The last time Iran was involved in a conventional conflict was against Iraq between 1980 and 1988. In almost eight full years of grinding war, Iran was left militarily and economically broken, politically isolated, and the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, famously stated that signing a ceasefire with Iraq was like drinking from a poisoned chalice.

The Iranians learnt the lesson of the war well – no amount of Shia Islamist rhetoric was able to lead the Iranian military and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to victory. After the butcher’s bill of the Iran-Iraq War, the Shia revolutionaries changed tack and began a new strategy of harboring Shia Islamist groups loyal to them, waiting for the right opportunity to install them in positions of power.

Perhaps the most famous of these groups was actually incubated during the war with Iraq and is now Iran’s leading proxy in the region. Lebanon’s Hezbollah militia, now led by Hassan Nasrallah, was created, financed, and trained by the IRGC in 1985, ostensibly to resist the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. In cooperation with their Syrian ally in the Assad regime, Iran dispatched hundreds of IRGC operatives to train Lebanese Shia irregulars in guerrilla warfare.

To this end, the PMF have executed Iran’s bidding with bloody enthusiasm. Not only are they implicated in war crimes and crimes against humanity during their campaigns against Daesh between 2014 and 2017 against innocent Sunni Arabs, but they have also recently targeted largely Shia Arab pro-democracy activists, killing at least 600 since 2019, and are actively involved in fighting in neighboring Syria where they have supported Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

But Iran’s proxies are not only active in the traditional “Shia Crescent” stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean Sea, but they also have a presence on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The Yemeni Houthi militias, while not as intricately linked to Iran as Hezbollah in Lebanon or the PMF in Iraq, are in the modern day inextricably linked to Tehran’s regional ambitions.

The Yemeni Shia group not only uses similar propaganda by calling for death to America, Israel, and publicly cursing all Jews in what can only be described as anti-Semitic hatred, but has received extensive Iranian financial and military support. This has included the provision of drone technology that the Houthis have used to harass Saudi Arabia and attack its strategically vital energy sector.

The modern Iranian empire is ruled by proxy

These groups are not simply allies, but they are direct proxies of Tehran and an extension of the Iranian leadership’s strategic ambitions.

In the Houthi case, Yemen has been used as a quagmire to bleed Saudi and its allies in an unwinnable war, while simultaneously controlling the capital city and commanding a dangerous position over vital naval shipping routes. In the Iraqi and Lebanese cases, Iranian rule by proxy is so obvious and is seen as existentially vital to Iran’s strategic ambition to dominate the Middle East, far more so than their presence in Yemen.

It is no wonder, then, that senior Iranian officials occasionally allow the mask to slip and openly gloat about their new empire and how they control four Arab capitals: Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Sanaa. They have also made their ambitions of a wider Shia revolutionary uprising clear, and half a decade ago announced the formation of a “Shia Liberation Army”.

Without a regional and international cooperative framework to contain Iran’s ambitions and to roll back its gains in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon especially, with Yemen of secondary importance, then Tehran will only consolidate its control over these territories that are largely populated by Sunni Arabs. This will be a recipe for disaster as majorities rarely accept being ruled minorities, and therefore there is a significant risk of the outbreak of a regional sectarian war, the results of which will be devastating and must be avoided at all costs.

The Erbil Conference that took place on September 24, 2021, and hosted more than 300 Iraqi delegates from all across Iraq, including tribal and religious leaders, called for the normalization of ties between Baghdad and Tel Aviv following the examples of Bahrain, Morocco, the UAE, and Sudan in 2020. However, reactions against the conference varied as did the reasons and motives behind it.

Initially, attendees’ addresses were mostly shaped around how normalization with Israel would be critical for the future of Iraq and how such a course is inescapable. For example, Sahar Karim al-Ta’i, a senior official in Iraq’s Ministry of Culture, indicated that Israel is a powerful country with strong relations with the U.S. and the rest of the world, and that Iraq cannot ignore this. “No force, local or foreign, has the right to prevent this call,” she added. Moreover, Sheikh Rissan al-Halbousi, an attendee from Anbar Province, stated that normalization with Israel is a necessity.

The conference was held in Erbil, a location that is politically symbolic. In 2017, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) conducted a referendum that asked for the independence of the KRG of Iraq. Although the results of the referendum could not be implemented and caused military clashes between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi army, Israel was one of a few countries that supported an independent Kurdistan. “Israel supports the legitimate efforts of the Kurdish people to achieve their own state,” said then Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu. As a result, the Kurds in Iraq have a better relationship historically with Israel than the Iraqi central government.

On the other hand, the relationship between Iraq and Israel is not strong due, among other reasons, to the influence of Iran, Israel’s archrival, in the country. The conference caused a domestic storm in Iraq, drawing the attention of regional actors as well. While Israel welcomed the conference, the Iran-supported Lebanese group

Hezbollah condemned it, calling it “a failed attempt to promote the culture of dialogue with the Israeli enemy.” Meanwhile, Iraq’s central government called the conference illegal and the spokesperson of the KRG stated that “the conference does not reflect their opinions and does not reflect the views and policies of the KRG.”

Even though only time will tell whether the conference will be successful or not, there are two motives that lie behind holding it. In the aftermath of the Abraham Accords, Israeli authorities wanted to show that it is possible to normalize ties between the Arab world and Israel without solving the Palestinian issue. However, the public opinion on Israel in the Arab world is unlikely to change as long as Israel continues to occupy Palestinian lands and to treat Palestinians in an oppressive and inhumane manner.

Eighteen years after the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Iraqi Shiites are divided on the relationship between political power, ethnicity, and religious legitimation. However, one thing that is clear is that the greater majority of high-ranking Shiite religious scholars in Iraq support democracy. Peyman Eshaghi of Politics Today interviewed Dr. Ali Taher Elmemmud, associate professor of sociology at the University of Baghdad, on his book titled The Embers of Governance: Iraqi Shiites and Nation-State Building Challenges in the Post-2003 Era, Beirut, Darelrafidayn, 2017 [in Arabic].

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Q. What is the inspiration and motivation behind this book? What is the inspiration and motivation behind this book?

This book was my doctoral dissertation. It took two years to write, and a passionate defense that lasted six and a half hours was held for it. This was because it was the only dissertation defended in the Faculty of Humanities and the Department of Sociology of Baghdad University on Shiism and state-building in Iraq. After that, of course, it took a year to turn the dissertation into a book.

Of course, I removed some theoretical aspects from the book, and it became more suitable for non-academic readers and researchers. To write the dissertation, I conducted field research for more than a year. I succeeded in conducting interviews with twenty notable personalities. It was very challenging to meet Iraqi high-ranking Shiite clerics, known as “Sources of Emulation,” and top political figures due to Iraq’s situation and the sensitivities surrounding the issue. Among them are Al-Sayyid Ali Al-Sistani, Sayyid Muhammad Saeed Al-Hakim, Muhammad Is’haq al-Fayadh, and Bashir Al-Najafi.

Talking to intellectuals was much easier, but as I said, interviewing leading religious figures in Iraq was more difficult. For example, I spent six months trying to interview a Shiite high-ranking religious scholar known as “Marja” (literally Source of Emulation) in Najaf.

Q. How did you conduct research for this book?

While examining the state-building by Shiites in Iraq after 2003, I tried to study the fundamental theories of state-nation building. But I soon realized that many of the approaches cited about Iraq do not reflect the realities of the country. Perhaps this is because most of the researchers who have worked in this field have been non-Iraqis or have not done fieldwork. It must be borne in mind that Iraq is a country with an ancient history and deep-rooted culture. Therefore, it is challenging to bring together all the affairs of Iraq and understand the country in terms of the relationship that the government has had with its people.

For example, Francis Fukuyama has written about state-building in Iraq, and British author Liora Lukitz has written another book on state-building in Iraq. In this book, Lukitz applies Anthony Smith’s theory of national identity to the case of Iraq. However, when we scrutinize the issue, we find that neither of the two writers has been able to consider and understand Iraq’s realities. These two “Western ways” of thinking could not comprehend the local complexities.

Since 2003, Iraqi Shiite Islamists have ruled with the same secular tools and way of thinking. Thus, it must be said that this is a new phenomenon in the course of Shiite political thought. In practice, no Shiite Islamist has tried to pass Islamic law in parliament since 2003. Personal status laws were never transformed into the “Islamic” ones. The budget law, one of the clauses of which imposes a tax on alcoholic beverages, which practically guarantees their free sale in Iraq, has never been criticized by a parliament whose majority is Shiite Islamists. They never tried to establish an Islamic institution called the government. Such things show that their Islamism enjoys a civil approach.

Although this approach is not Islamist in the conventional sense, it is not necessarily secular in the anti-religious sense. Instead, it respects religion without allowing religion to rule directly. Iraqi Shiite Islamists are in favor of a civil society, and Islamism for these Islamists is a belief in Islam and a personal commitment to it. In other words, Islamism is defined by performing a series of private acts of worship, observing sincerity and trustworthiness, and the like. Islamists have no purpose other than themselves and individual issues, and do not intend to lead society towards Islam.

Most of the Iraqi Shiites are following Ayatollah Sistani. However, they are not the only ones. Some Shiites are also openly secular in three types: first, liberal seculars represented by people like Ahmad Chalabi, who passed away a few years ago. Second, the national seculars who are represented in the political arena by politicians such as Ayad Allawi. The third group is the Communist seculars, represented by the Iraqi Communist Party.

Islamist Shiites are also made up of several groups. Most of them follow Ayatollah Sistani. The second group, which is smaller than the first group, is Muqtada al-Sadr. Religiously, they were following Sayyid Muhammad-Sadiq al-Sadr, Muqtada al-Sadr’s father, who was assassinated by state forces in 1999, and now they follow Muqtada al-Sadr. Muqtada is a nationalist figure who has never called for the formation of an Islamic-Shiite state since 2003. He has promoted religious, denominational, and cultural pluralism in Iraq, especially in recent years.

The third group of Shiite Islamists is loyal to the theory of velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist). They follow Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran, who resides outside Iraq in the Iranian capital of Tehran. These people are mainly affiliated with Iraqi militia groups. They have never dared to say that they want an Islamic or Shiite state since the fall of Saddam, but their approach is vividly focused on the Shiite identity and creating a Shiite ummah. In their view, the Shiite ummah ranges from the Hazaras of Afghanistan to Hezbollah in Lebanon. According to them, the leadership of this Shiite nation will be in Tehran.

The last group of Iraqi Shiites is supporters of Ayatollah Sayyid Sadiq al-Shirazi. They are much fewer in number than others. They are more focused on ritual issues, and they do not have a specific political program.

Iraqi Premier al-Kadhimi and his mentor Iraqi President Barham Saleh are making a futile attempt against all odds at home to carve a new leadership role for the country by availing themselves of the chaotic internal conditions and the strained and fragile post-Arab Spring Middle East order.

A conference was held in Baghdad on August 28, 2021, which the two Iraqi leaders were originally hoping would be a summit. However, the list of attendees shows that it turned out to be a one-day ministerial-level conference.

Al-Kadhimi co-sponsored the conference in Baghdad with French President Emmanuel Macron to discuss the war in Yemen, Lebanon’s collapse, the regional water crisis, and the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement. The Iraqi and the Arab media paid special attention to the conference, raising the expectations.

The statement of the London-based Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper read, “The Saudi and Iranian presence, through their foreign ministers, Faisal bin Farhan and Hussein Amir Abdullahian, also indicated an increasing desire on both sides to find lines to meet.”

Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein indicated that the Saudi-Iranian meetings are continuing and that they began in Baghdad with a meeting that took place between the ruler of Dubai and the Iranian foreign minister. Iraqi officials viewed the meetings between the emir of Qatar, Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, and Bin Rashid of Dubai as a major breakthrough.

Nevertheless, the rapprochement between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors had commenced before the Baghdad conference. The Saudi-Iranian dialogue was launched in April this year as the U.S. and Iran held negotiations on reviving the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran (JCPOA) – a development which alarmed the Saudis. The latter are afraid of a possible deal at their expense.

Tehran’s sensitive relationship with Baghdad and the issue of not using Iraq as a launching pad to launch attacks on neighboring countries were not addressed.

Al-Kadhimi and Macron are trying to seize the opportunity presented to them to assert leadership and enhance their dwindling power base at home as elections are approaching. It appears that President Joe Biden’s strategic shift in foreign policy orientation from the Middle East to Asia, his stated policy of making human rights the priority of his foreign policy abroad, and the recent debacle in Afghanistan have alarmed Arab regional leaders, Saudis, and the United Arab Emirates and convinced them to chart a new foreign policy in the region and regard Washington as unreliable.

Iran has its own reason to be receptive of regional dialogue as well. Being hard-pressed by the U.S.-led economic embargo initiated by the earlier U.S. administrations, and intensified by the Donald Trump administration to maximum pressure, and which the Biden administration so far has done nothing tangible to alleviate, Iran was not in a position to refuse negotiation. What is more, the hardline President Raisi stated during his inauguration speech that there will be serious openings internally and externally to better the conditions in the country.

Finally, being hard-pressed by COVID19, and the shadow war which is continuing with Israelis, Iran had no choice but to act on pragmatic considerations and accept peaceful engagements with its regional foes. However, this does not stop Iran from pursuing its war against the U.S. and its regional allies through regional proxies.

The Baghdad government’s initiative to hold a regional conference also had an Iranian blessing.

Thus, the Baghdad government’s initiative to hold a regional conference also had an Iranian blessing: it is an attempt to find a loophole in the siege wall and isolation imposed by the United States and its allies on Iran.

U.S. officials are fully aware of Iran’s foreign policy objectives but still seem to be committed to the success of the Vienna Talks. For this reason, Biden has empowered Macron, who aspires to a new leadership role abroad to stop his declining popularity at home, to be the channel for conveying messages to Iran. Due to Macron’s occasionally voiced opposition to Trump’s unilateralism, Iran seems to have accepted Macron’s mediating role.

President Saleh of Iraq, following the footsteps of his group leader Jalal Talabani, a former Iraqi president who tried to play a mediating role between Iranian and western leaders, especially the U.S., seems to have convinced al-Kadhimi to initiate this conference.

Saleh has recently been engaged in intensive shuttle diplomacy in Iraq with various influential groups, especially the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and regional countries, while he also met President Reisi to ensure his second term as president of Iraq. The holding of the regional conference was an attempt to enhance his chance to be re-elected for a second term.

Although al-Kadhimi has made numerous statements to the effect that in the future he will not stand for any post, his recent political statements and the numerous measures he has taken recently indicate that he is hopeful that he will continue in his post most probably in an alliance which will be composed by the opponents of Iran’s dominant influence in Iraq: the Sadr followers of Sairun, the Nasr bloc, and the Kurdish groups. The success of this conference could enhance his role regionally and internally.

According to Bayat, Islamic political movements experience certain phases. The first phase is the experimentation, in which the movement gains power. Then, they face the paradoxes of being in power in addition to failure to realize their promises. In the end, the appeal, energy, symbols, and sources of legitimacy of political Islamism evaporate.

Bayat believes that this procedure does not lead to an anti-Islamic approach. However, the supporters of political Islamism tend to resecularize it which negatively affects their political career and their ability to hold on to power and remain as the winner their political career and simultaneously give up their religious ends and ambitions.

In recent years, scholars have tried to apply the post-Islamism theory to different cases, specifically the contexts where political Islam has been active in the past decades. Yadullah Shahibzadeh is among those who have followed political Islam in Iran. In his book Islamism and Post-Islamism in Iran: An Intellectual History, he explains the crisis of political leadership in post-1979 revolution Iran.

By detecting “Islamist totalism” in Iranian politics, he follows the career of Islamists in power. He discusses the challenges they faced with democracy, and the challenges with Islamist and non-Islamist reformists in their effort to guarantee democracy in Iran. Shedding light on Iranian political and intellectual history after the 1979 revolution, Shahibzadeh focuses on Iranian Muslim intellectuals and their understanding of politics and democracy in reference to their religious background and religiosity.

He argues that by providing a large amount of epistemological, ethical, and political insights to society, Iranian Muslim intellectuals have contributed to the transformation of Iranian Islamism into post-Islamism. Therefore, the past, solid Islamic ideology in terms of its avid eagerness to preserve political power and dominance has been enormously weakened and delegitimized.

Although the discussions on post-Islamism were more concerned with Iran, Egypt, and Turkey, after the downfall of the Baathist regime, Iraq also entered the current scholarship on post-Islamism. In Patriotic Ayatollahs: Nationalism in Post-Saddam Iraq, Caroleen Sayej has followed the attitudes of Islamist parties and activists in post-2003 Iraq and has provided a deep analysis of senior Iraqi clerics in the Iraqi political sphere.

Sayej focuses on Shiite clerics’ pronouncements and fatwas on political issues, and narrates their ideas and ideals on contested issues such as democracy. In Patriotic Ayatollahs, she narrates the most important Shiite religious scholars and their followers’ positions. For her, they have selected a progressive and secular approach in post-2003 Iraq. The case becomes more critical as most Shiite politicians and political leaders lived in Iran for years and were influenced by the theory of the “Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist” which is currently prevalent in Iran.

In other words, the Iranian experience has pushed the Iraqi Shiite religious scholars toward a post-Islamist inclination in Iraqi politics. Sayej’s main contributions to the issues of post-Islamism in this work are, first, her reference to the role of high-ranking religious leaders in insisting on the necessity of democracy and its legitimacy over any Islamic theocracy; and second, the vital role that nationalism plays in the political thinking and behavior of an Arab Muslim nation in the Middle East amidst sectarian temptations and tendencies.

In other words, the importance of Sayej’s work lies in the fact that she illustrates a path in which a transnational Shiite movement has been replaced by a local endeavor to guarantee a democratic system and to reinterpret Islamism in a way that deals with personal and communal piety and not with structural-political issues.

Are Knudsen and Basem Ezbidi have edited several articles and published them in a volume called Popular Protest in the New Middle East: Islamism and Post-Islamist Politics. The editors have considered a group of political uprisings in different parts of the Middle East, known generally as the “Arab Spring,” whose immediate outcome was overthrowing decades-long political regimes and substituting them with unstable states.

More than any other place, in post-Mubarak Egypt and post-Ben Ali Tunisia, Islamist political movements have gained power: the Freedom and Justice Party and the Ennahda Movement, respectively. In addition to a foreword by Asef Bayat, the authors have provided insightful analyses of Islamist and post-Islamist trends in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Turkey.

Popular Protest in the New Middle East deliberately moves away from the generalizations and abstractions of post-Islamism attributed to the Muslim world as a whole. The book, an essential read for all those interested in the subject, has applied the concept of post-Islamism and its related notions to different cases in Middle Eastern countries and dealt with the concept in relation to Muslim political activists’ experiences in the past decades in their countries and dealt with the concept in relation to Muslim political activists’ experiences in the past decades in their countries.

Last but not least in this grouping is a selection of articles edited by Mohammed Abu Rumman and published under the title Post-Islamism: A New Phase or Ideological Delusions? It discusses the main problems of post-Islamism as a term and concept. To put it concisely, the authors believe that although post-Islamism is controversial, they have decided to use it “in the absence of a more fitting label.”

Drawing on the experience of the Arab Revolutions, the authors ascertain that the revolutionaries failed to achieve certain of the classical goals of political Islam such as the Islamic state due to ideological delusions and sociological realities. The authors refer to the transformations of Islamists’ experiences in countries such as Iran, Iraq, Indonesia, and Jordan, and try to read the changes in different countries of the Middle East.

Published in 2018 and appearing later than the other works on post-Islamism, Post-Islamism: A New Phase or Ideological Delusions? draws on a range of theories and past discussions of the term. In each article, authors have used, challenged, and developed the theory of post-Islamism, based on its rich literature, and have contributed to this discussion by direct reference to different Muslim countries.

The Italian director Gianfranco Rosi’s film Notturno (2020) is a compelling meditation on life in and around the borders of Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. The film offers a critique of foreign, colonial and extremist meddling within the region in terms of constructed borders and disaffected citizenry while presenting a visual style that consists of slow-moving landscape and a story-telling approach that leans on oblique characters that display withdrawn emotion. At times the film seems to be a deliberate anachronism to the images of conflict from the region that viewers have become accustomed to.

Observational Documentary

Notturno is an interesting work both because of its subject matter and its formal approach. It partially presents itself in the tradition of Poetic Documentaries such as G. Reggio’s Koyaanisqatsi (1982) which both translates as ‘Life out of Balance’ and evokes both the beauty and absurdity of humans and the planet.

The difference with Rosi’s film is that he introduces and follows a number of subjects or characters and touches upon harsher and even brutal elements of life in the region of Iraq and Syria while consistently maintaining a kind of distance.

Rosi spent three years living in the border areas of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and there is an obvious ‘verite’ feeling to some of the scenes- he reportedly accumulated 90 hours of footage which both lends a veracity to the project while also making the complete edit feel too long at times and lacking a clear structure.

Some of the most disturbing scenes in the film are also the ones that fit the least in terms of the formal structure and tone; a series of interviews between therapists and children who recount the horrors of life in Syria or under Daesh. The children recount graphic accounts of beheadings and depict ISIS (Daesh) leader Al-Baghdadi alongside his followers in drawings with particular emphasis given to Yazidi victims.

The film opens with a series of marching soldiers passing under a majestic sky and this theme of unobtrusively allowing events to unfold comprises much of Notturno; we see everything from a drum beater of Ramadan wandering the streets to wake people from their slumber and rise for the pre-dawn meal to the sounds of gunfire to a boy cleaning his gun on guard duty to wider imagery of an American convoy of jeeps and SUV tanks and a refugee camp.

In almost all of these cases throughout the film the director gives little clue as to where this is taking place and has deliberately re-blurred borders and asked the audience to either hypothesize on location or get swept up in the idea of a conflict so complex and multi-faceted that it becomes meaningless to know where exactly on the map you are.

Oblique dramatics include a series of audio messages with a distraught mother whose daughter is being held ransom by ISIS which eventually dwindle to nothing but remembrances of the missing young woman as well as the absurd sight of a single car ferry transporting its load near a destroyed bombed-out bridge.

One sequence that does give more clues involves a group of women YPG militants holding guns and later retreating to their barracks, taking off their shoes. They cook and watch training videos on a tablet with the red, white and green flag visible on their soldiers. This and the American flag are the only ones noticeable over the course of the film.

Another episode early in the film includes a wailing mother who revisits the eerily empty prison (which is in Erbil, Iraq) where the son died- the scene proves both distant and uncomfortable to the viewer.

A later scene offers a birds-eye view of another prison yard (again the location is unclear) where orange-clad male prisoners have their limited exercise walk; little to no context is given and this scene proves disturbing because it plays out in real time and later cuts to close-up shots of them with hands cuffed behind their backs.

There is both a banality and silence to the scene as the viewer tries to reconcile media representations and earlier references in the film (ISIS/Daesh) with the state-sponsored retribution that is unfolding.

Theatre of the Absurd

This most compelling part of Notturno is the casting, direction and performance of a play on the history of Iraq called ‘Homeland’ that takes place in a psychiatric ward; the viewer is first greeted by images of wailing patients and then witness the director (a doctor) choose six patients to act in his play.

A video montage is projected in the background that provides glimpse of archival context that has been missing throughout the film- Assad, Saddam, burning oil fields, American invasion… from Monarchy to Republic to Daesh. The doctor-director gives the patient-actors scripts to memorize and the viewer witnesses both this strange approach to rehabilitation and a fiercely dedicated troupe of misfit performers express their collective outrage at the loss of their country.

One of the actors shouts ‘no to America… no to Iran’ as another video montage throws a blitz of imagery that reveals colonial roots to Iraqi civil war alongside a ‘Palestine is Lost’ mantra; Notturno seems about to end with an Arabic song of lament and the close-up of the actors but instead the film turns back to imagery of the everyday (one of the earlier characters, Ali and his silent work assisting bird hunters).

Mercenaries have been a part of war since humans first started to coordinate and live amongst each other in societies. In the classical era, Xenophon of Athens recounted how his mercenary force, “The Ten Thousand”, helped Achaemenid prince Cyrus the Younger in his failed attempt to usurp the Persian throne from his brother Artaxerxes II. This extended through to the famous mercenary armies of the Renaissance period, famously criticized by writer and philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli for being a threat to their employers.

However, and despite numerous national laws forbidding mercenary activity in the militarily advanced Western world, mercenaries have continued to flourish and thrive in the battlefields and cities of Iraq and Afghanistan – the two countries who suffered the most from the American imperial footprint in the 21^st century.

With the United States now openly stating that it intends to disengage from both countries, it is likely that, rather than reduce the number of mercenaries deployed, it will instead increasingly rely on its army of private military contractors to secure its interests.

The case of Iraq

As one of the world’s most fossil fuel-rich nations, Iraq has been blessed (and cursed) with bountiful natural resources. This has obviously attracted the avarice and attention of massive international energy companies who wish to exploit Iraq’s oil stocks and also its burgeoning natural gas fields.

ExxonMobil, one of the world’s largest oil and gas companies headquartered in Texas, operates two subsidiaries in Iraq, one of which deals with the Northern Iraq Region and one of which specializes in contracts relating to the richer oil fields in the Iraqi south. ExxonMobil is currently the lead contractor at the West Qurnah oilfield in cooperation with China’s PetroChina.

ExxonMobil’s operations have been targeted several times by pro-Iran Shia jihadist groups who were seeking to make the U.S. presence in Iraq as inhospitable as possible in order to give Tehran the diplomatic leverage it needed against Washington elsewhere. The American oil giant had to evacuate its employees on several occasions, including after rocket attacks struck their compound near Basra in 2019.

This will have the effect of emboldening mercenary companies as they know they can acquire billions in contracts while operating in a murky world devoid of accountability in a corporate war environment where violence equals profit.

The Iraqi experience is largely replicated in the Afghan theatre, with mercenary companies running logistics to various American and NATO bases.

The case of Afghanistan

The Iraqi experience is largely replicated in the Afghan theatre, with mercenary companies running logistics to various American and NATO bases, providing highway security for supply routes, guarding embassies and government installations, and even providing training to the Afghan police.

However, a series of scandals involving contractors using deadly force and engaging in corruption and black market smuggling operations caused enough of an uproar to force then-President Hamid Karzai to ban several mercenary companies, including Blackwater.

However, and commensurate with Karzai’s status as a president of an occupied country, international pressure forced the Afghan government to backtrack and they decided to allow mercenaries to simply rebrand themselves not as private security but as “risk management” companies. This was after NATO countries doubted the Afghan Public Protection Force’s capabilities of providing security in the country they were apparently sovereign over.

With the Taliban currently ascendant and the U.S.-installed Afghan government facing an existential threat, it is highly doubtful that the United States will entirely cut their losses and withdraw from Afghanistan. China has recently made a number of overtures by formally hosting Taliban officials and this will raise concerns in Washington as they already face off against Beijing in other strategic theaters around the globe.

It is therefore likely that the U.S. will want to secure the Afghan government by allowing international mercenary companies to continue to operate as “advisers” who will provide training. This may have the effect of allowing the Afghan government to maintain control over Kabul and other major population centers, effectively controlling islets surrounded by a sea of Taliban control in rural Afghanistan. Naturally, Kabul will pay through the nose for the pleasure of hosting mercenaries to ensure their survival.

Across Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, the U.S. Department of Defense has confirmed that, as at the fourth fiscal quarter of 2020, it had engaged the services of 27,388 contractors in these three theaters. Considering there are around 2,500 troops in Afghanistan, 2,500 in Iraq, and around 900 or so in Syria, one begins to appreciate the sheer scale of the “contractor” economy and how reliant the U.S. and its allies are on it.

While the approximately 30,000 contractors will obviously not all be combat oriented (about 10-20 percent are in combat roles while the rest offer support functions), a significant proportion of them will be armed and will be protected under U.S. federal laws that allows them to use “deadly force against enemy armed forces only in self-defense”.

This means that, with the U.S. drawing down uniformed personnel, this already extant addiction to hiring soldiers of fortune is not going to reduce, but in fact the U.S. will become ever more dependent on them to remain relevant in theaters of war they have been forced to abandon.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi arrived in Baghdad on June 27, 2021 and was received by Iraqi President Barham Salih. This visit marks the first official visit by an Egyptian head of state to Iraq since the Gulf War in 1990. It marks the fourth in a series of trilateral summits between Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq as part of their growing regional collaboration.

The summit included King Abdullah II of Jordan, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi and Egypt’s president al-Sisi. The summit was held in Baghdad within the framework of a tripartite cooperation initiative, which started in Cairo in March 2019.

The Egyptian, Jordanian, and Iraqi leaders met in Baghdad for the latest summit to discuss political and economic cooperation, investments, and other developments in the Middle East. A joint statement was released at the end of the meeting.

The statement highlighted possible ways of cooperation in the fields of energy, trade, and security. The talks also covered regional issues including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Syria crisis, and the war in Yemen. The leaders called for restoring stability in Libya and Yemen.

Al-Sisi emphasized Egypt’s respect and support for Iraq’s territorial unity. He shared Egypt’s intention to cooperate with Iraq within the framework of economic integration and strategic cooperation. Al-Sisi stated Egypt’s desire to increase communication between cultural, educational, and religious institutions in both countries.

Similarly, Iraqi President Barham Salih tweeted, “Our deep-rooted historical relations would be a starting point for a promising future for our peoples and the youths. It is a powerful message amid formidable challenges in the region. Iraq’s recovery will pave the way for a regional integrated system, based on contending extremism, respecting sovereignty, and economic partnerships.”

Along the same lines, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi  stated, “We are keen on continuing this effort and developing relations to build joint ventures serving everyone. We try to crystalize a mechanism for tripartite cooperation, and dedicate our efforts and capabilities to keep this level of cooperation.”

Egyptian presidential spokesperson Bassam Rady stated, “The new round of talks builds on what has been achieved during the previous three summits, evaluates developments in various cooperation fields, and follows up on projects being implemented as part of efforts aiming to support and deepen historical ties between the three countries. We are trying to crystalize political consultation over means to counter challenges facing the Arab world and the Middle East.”

Previous trilateral summits between Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq

The latest round is the fourth summit held between the three countries. The first summit was held in Cairo in March 2019 and a joint statement highlighted major areas for cooperation following the summit. The three countries’ rulers acknowledged the importance of their strategic and economic cooperation.

The second summit took place in New York in September 2019, during which the three leaders stressed their full support for the Palestinian cause, which is a rallying point for the Muslim world, and that it was Palestinians’ right to enjoy legitimate rights including an independent state with East Jerusalem as its capital. This was in line with the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 and international agreements.

Talks among the three leaders urged regional powers to face and oppose any state or entity funding or supporting terrorism in the region. Full support was declared for Iraqi efforts to rebuild the state and help displaced people after their towns were captured by the ISIS (Daesh) terrorist group.

In 2020, a one-day summit in Amman covered trade, investments, and economic cooperation, along with other regional developments. The summit was seen as an attempt to build a regional alliance to neutralize Iranian influence in Iraq, especially after accusations of Iranian intervention in Iraqi internal affairs.

The third summit discussed joint security issues and food security in the region. King Abdullah II stressed the importance of the meeting, considering the exceptional circumstances faced by both the region and the world. He pointed especially to food security, claiming that it would be one of biggest challenges in 2021 and that it would require uniting efforts to find common solutions.

Iraq has often been likened to a mafia state and a kleptocracy. It has the semblance of democracy through fairly regular elections, and the trappings of a judiciary and security forces serving the interests of the nation by “fighting terrorism” and “ensuring justice is served”, as Iraqi politicians often like to pontificate in an attempt to polish their credentials as public servants.

In reality, however, Iraq has become the playground for Iran-sponsored Shia jihadist groups and militias who control every kind of industry imaginable, from a Shia clergy-backed illicit sex trade that sells girls as young as 9-years-old, to a drug trafficking cartel that controls Iraq’s porous borders with Iran and smuggles copious amounts of narcotics.

Regular Iraqis who have had their lives upended by the incessant criminality and who have had their hopes for a bright future dashed by these gangs and terrorist organizations know that Iran’s insidious influence is responsible. Although they have come out in protest several times, such open dissent is often extremely deadly, with activists facing assassination and worse.

A recent spate of political assassinations

This month alone, several well-known activists and political dissidents have been killed, with the state either complicit in the slayings or else powerless to prevent these powerful militias from murdering the Iraqi citizens it is supposed to protect.

In the first week of May, Ihab al-Wazni, a leader of the protest movements in Karbala, was gunned down outside his home. Surveillance footage showed several masked men on motorcycles close in on Wazni before strafing him in a hail of gunfire, killing him on the scene.

The militants had finally killed the prolific activist, himself a Shia Arab, after attempting to do so in December 2019 just after the most recent protest movement first began in earnest. Wazni narrowly escaped an attempt on his life which tragically led to the death of his friend and co-organiser Fahem al-Tai. Wazni was dropping Tai off at his home, also in Karbala, when again masked gunmen opened fire leading to Wazni barely escaping death while Tai was not so fortunate and was killed outside his home.

The assassination of Wazni was followed 24 hours later with the attempted murder of journalist Ahmad Hassan who was shot in the head as he arrived home in Diwaniyah. Hassan has undergone brain surgery and remains in critical condition at a Baghdad hospital with his family fearing further retaliation against him and them due to his criticism of the authorities and militia violence against unarmed demonstrators.

Over the weekend, a candidate in the upcoming elections was also assassinated, again by suspected Iran-backed militants. Hashem al-Mashhadani, a Sunni candidate in Baghdad for the Azm Coalition led by businessman Khamis al-Khanjar, was killed last Saturday less than five months before elections are due to take place. Khanjar described the assassination as “a dangerous message” designed to undermine the democratic process by putting candidates in fear of their lives.

These assassinations and murders have led Al-Beit Al-Watani, or the National House bloc, a political group which emerged out of the protest movement, to boycott the elections set to take place in October this year. The party has demanded that the killers responsible be brought to justice before the electoral process can be taken seriously. Obviously, this is not a controversial position for them to adopt, particularly considering the last election in 2018 attracted an embarrassing 44.5 percent turnout, placing enormous doubts on the credibility of Iraq’s democratic process.

Shia jihadism undermines democracy

It is no secret that Karbala, Diwaniyah, Baghdad, and all major Iraqi cities are crawling with pro-Iran Shia militants. While the protest movements in Iraq were primarily Sunni-led until the rise of the Daesh terror group in 2014 (itself a consequence of sectarian Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s violent suppression of protests), since Daesh’s defeat and the recapture of Mosul in 2017, most demonstrations have been led by the Shia.

The authorities in Baghdad blamed all of Iraq’s economic, security, and political woes on Sunni terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaeda, but after they declared victory in 2017, the common Iraqi Shia began to lose patience with the government for its total lack of services, corruption, and its subservience to Tehran’s interests and diktats. This ultimately led to a number of crises, including the total poisoning of Basra’s water supply due to systemic negligence, continued electricity shortages despite Iraq’s massive energy wealth, and rampant corruption that has drained Iraq of at least $150 billion since 2003, destroyed the economy, and the people’s hopes for a brighter future.

Realizing that the problems faced by the country could not solely be attributed to terrorist organisations, and having finally felt fed up of the government blaming everyone but the corrupt politicians who serve the national interests of Iran rather than Iraq, the Shia Arabs took to the streets in heretofore unheard of mass demonstrations in the Shia-dominant south.

These protesters knew who to blame. Aside from torching the offices of several Shia Islamist parties, the demonstrators have repeatedly set fire to diplomatic buildings including consulates belonging to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Anti-Iran sentiment is at the highest it has been likely since the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, a war in which many Shia Iraqis gave their lives to prevent Iraq from being occupied by Iranian forces after Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, ordered an invasion of their country in 1982.

What this demonstrates is that there is now a new kind of Iraqi nationalism forming, and it is a nationalism that is largely based on opposition to corruption engendered by malignant Iranian interference. By trampling over human rights, the rule of law, and the rights of Iraqi citizens to live with dignity and economic opportunity, Iran and its Shia proxies have inadvertently created perhaps their worst enemy yet. Rather than that enemy being a terrorist organization, it is instead the Iraqi people themselves and, as such, it is only a matter of time before they topple the corrupt state that has made their lives a living misery since 2003.

On April 18, news of Iran-Saudi Arabia talks to re-establish relations was reported in the media. Aside from the veracity of the news, recently there have been bilateral signs of softening. Both countries have their reasons that drive them to the negotiation table.

The Saudi-Iranian relations, although improved for a short period in the 1990s, cooled off with the geopolitical shift in the Middle East following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The rise of pro-Iranian politicians in “new” Iraq increased Iran’s role in the country’s turbulent politics, an influence that gradually expanded with the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011.

However, the Arab Spring has put Iran and Saudi Arabia in a paradoxical situation. While considering the protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, and Libya as a phenomenon inspired by its Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran regarded the mass protests in Syria and Iraq as a conspiracy initiated by its enemies: the Zionists, the West, and their regional allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia tried to seize the opportunity and, in an obvious contradiction, perceived the Syrian revolution as the people’s democratic right while considered the protests and events in Yemen, Bahrain, and Lebanon a result of Iranian intervention. Thus, the fierce proxy war between the two sides became inevitable.

It is clear that the hostile policies between Iran and Saudi Arabia are due to their pragmatic thinking. The two countries have always tried to prevent each other from acquiring more power by giving money and weapons to their governmental and non-governmental allies. The war in Syria caused the two to enter into a fierce proxy war; however, as the war entered an erosive stage, military spending on both sides increased sharply.

Iran tried to keep the Saudis busy by expanding the scope of the conflict to other areas like Yemen.

Iran tried to keep the Saudis busy by expanding the scope of the conflict to other areas like Yemen. There were even large-scale demonstrations and clashes in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, which Saudi officials perceived as a result of foreign intervention, implicitly accusing Iran. Eventually, the Saudi influence in the Syrian war gradually declined after 2015 as they became heavily involved in the war in Yemen against the Houthi group, which maintains close ties with Iran.

The continuation of hostilities between Iran and Saudi Arabia has led to unpleasant results. The humanitarian crisis in Yemen has tarnished Saudi Arabia’s prestige. After six years of intense conflict in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has faced severe international pressure in addition to not being able to achieve its desired results.

The heavy cost of the war in Yemen and the increase in military spending, along with falling oil prices and the COVID19 pandemic, have led to a downturn in the Saudi economy and a budget deficit. Additionally, the competition with Iran has caused the latter to make its influence in the Middle East persistent by forming proxy groups, while the main goal of Saudi Arabia was to eliminate Iran’s influence.

Although Iranians have gained a lot of experience in fighting regional rivals, the overall consequences haven’t been favorable for the country. Iran sees the wars in the region as a conspiracy to curb its influence in the Middle East, and as a result, believes that groups such as Daesh (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra were formed by Saudi Arabia and its regional and international allies. Therefore, Iran has to defeat its enemies in erosive battles outside its borders.

However, the outcome of the bloody wars has shown that this policy isn’t sustainable for either country. Increasing Iranian influence has led neighboring Arab countries to seek refuge in Iran’s number one enemy, Israel. In addition, Saudi Arabia, due to its influence in the Arab world, has been able to seriously disrupt Iran’s relations with other Arab countries.

For example, after the attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran in 2016, Saudi Arabia encouraged Arab countries to close down their embassies in Tehran. Coinciding with the former U.S. President Donald Trump taking office in the United States, international pressure and sanctions on Iran increased to a high level and Saudi Arabia encouraged the United States and other Western countries to intensify pressure on the country.

The possibility of the formalization of Saudi Arabia’s relations with Israel poses a double threat to Iran.

Nevertheless, an even worse scenario materialized when Saudi Arabia’s close allies normalized their relations with Israel in 2020. The possibility of the formalization of Saudi Arabia’s relations with Israel poses a double threat to Iran. Since the UAE and Bahrain have already normalized their relations with Israel, it is possible that Israel will enter the region’s security mechanisms as a protector of these states.

Further efforts were made to re-establish relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia following an attack on a Saudi Aramco facility in September 2019. Even before this attack, the Iranian foreign minister had signaled that a “non-aggression pact” with Saudi Arabia and its allies was offered. The attack on Aramco showed the ability of Iran’s allies to reach the depths of Saudi territories.

However, after the attack, which put the two countries at risk of direct confrontation, Iran softened its approach towards Saudi Arabia. It is even said that General Soleimani, who was assassinated in Baghdad by the U.S. military, was carrying a message to Saudi officials during his visit to Iraq.

Saudi Arabia seems to have softened its stance as a result of the Houthis in Yemen targeting of its infrastructures almost daily. The purpose of these tactical attacks, which seem to have been somewhat successful, is to force Saudi Arabia to stop attacks on Yemen and to negotiate with Iran. Along with this, the pressure by the Biden administration on Saudi Arabia has made Saudi officials more flexible with Iran.

Today, with the resumption of Iran’s talks with the P5+1 group, there is a possibility that with the return of Iran and the U.S. to the nuclear deal, Iran will offer more support to the Houthis, who have been in control of Yemen’s northern governorates since 2014. Accordingly, the Houthis, in practice, have become an effective force vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, and Iran can use them to pressure the Saudis.

Houthi missile and drone attacks have repeatedly closed Saudi Arabia’s airports, terminals, and other vital infrastructure. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to claim that Yemen’s Houthis have become the second most powerful quasi-governmental force in the region after Lebanon’s Hezbollah, both of which are close to Iran. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia does not have such a leverage.

Greater Arab integration has long been a dream of the Arab people. Wherever one travels in the Middle East, the romantic idea of Arab unity and brotherhood pervades conversations, and it is not uncommon to hear Arabs speaking positively about the idea of forging closer bonds with their fellow Arabs in other countries.

Therefore, when news emerges of summits being held and planned by two historically important Arab powers such as Iraq and Egypt, there are always murmurs of “what could be?” should these summits bear fruit.

However, considering recent Arab history, the chances of anything fruitful emerging from these talks to establish greater Arab interdependency should be taken with a fistful of salt.

The Egypt-Jordan-Iraq land bridge

Alongside Jordan acting as a nexus between the two, the leaders of the three countries have hatched preliminary agreements to create land corridors between Iraq and Egypt, allowing for cross-border trade, investments, and the transfer of manpower and energy between the three nations.

The idea is that, for $130 dollars per ticket. Egyptian passengers could board a ferry at Nuweiba, cross over to Jordan’s Aqaba, and then use the Jordanian road network to access Iraq and even Syria when the security situation permits. This would facilitate a two-way exchange of goods, expertise, labour, and energy, providing a tripartite economic partnership that benefits all.

Iraq currently cannot support its own energy needs, despite its rich oil wealth and natural gas deposits.

By utilizing Egypt’s vast human resources to enhance the labour force in Iraq in particular, and by exploiting Iraq’s substantial fossil fuel reserves to provide energy to its energy starved neighbors, it appears like a win-win for all involved. In fact, an agreement between Egypt and Iraq at the end of last year has already paved the way for Egyptian contractors to redevelop dilapidated and bombed out Iraqi cities in exchange for oil.

But this plan is poor from the outset. Iraq currently cannot support its own energy needs, despite its rich oil wealth and natural gas deposits. Indeed, Baghdad currently imports most of its energy needs from neighboring Iran, which has a disproportionate level of influence over Iraqi affairs and has infiltrated most of its political, economic, and security institutions leaving Iraq as a rump state servicing the needs of Tehran rather than the Iraqi people.

A history of failure

If it flounders, the imperiled tripartite agreement will not be the first to fail in the Arab world. Arab unity and cooperation has been tried many times throughout the modern Middle East since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, the first attempt at uniting the Arab world was the Arab Revolt that was supported by the British Empire in a successful attempt to undermine the Ottomans and divide their lands.

However, rather than live up to their end of the bargain by allowing their client Sharif Hussein bin Ali to become king of the Arabs, the British divided up Arab lands between themselves and the French, beginning decades of brutal and exploitative colonial rule.

In the post-colonial era, nominally independent yet weak and incompetent Arab rulers again made a cosmetic attempt at uniting their forces in 1948, this time in a military alliance to defeat the nascent Israeli state and expel the Jewish occupation of Palestinian Arab lands. That campaign ended in monumental failure, as did the wars of 1967 and 1973.

But before the wars of the 1960s and the 1970s, the secular nationalist Arab rulers of Egypt and Syria attempted a political union under the leadership of Egyptian independence icon Gamal Abdel Nasser. The United Arab Republic, as it was known, brought together Egypt and Syria in a political union in 1958 that had the potential to be as effective as the united territories of the same lands under Sultan Salahuddin al-Ayoubi who, in 1187, reconquered Jerusalem from the Crusaders.

However, Nasser’s undeniable charisma could not plug the shortfalls caused by his incompetence, poor planning, and institutionally poor governance. Eventually, the Syrian military forced themselves into the equation and restored the pre-UAR Syrian republic, re-establishing their independence in 1961. This paved the way for the Syrian coups of 1963, 1966, and 1971 that established Hafez al-Assad as the sole dictator of a Ba’athist regime. We all know the results of those events, as Hafez’s son, Bashar, is currently in the process of butchering his own people.

This long history of failure by greedy, weak, and self-interested Arab rulers places into doubt any enterprise that they engage in or appear to be making moves towards agreeing. After all, the Saudi-Egypt Causeway that has been in development since the mid-2000s has yet to see the light of day, in large part because Israel has opposed it.

The stark reality is that any plan that may appear to benefit the Arab people will either be scuppered by Arab leaders or else will be vetoed by more powerful interlocutors such as Israel or the United States.

It is therefore highly doubtful that these states, who suffer from so much internal instability as aptly demonstrated by an attempted coup in Jordan earlier this month, will be able to make anything substantial work.

Pope Francis’s recent trip to Iraq is considered of historical importance both for its strong symbolic message and its political and diplomatic impact on regional developments. During his trip, which lasted three days (March 5-8), the highest authority of the Catholic Church visited the main cities and key places of Christianity in Iraq and held important meetings.

It is certainly not the first time that a pope expresses his will to visit Iraq, the land of the prophet Abraham and a country that has been tormented by many wars. Indeed, back in 1999, Pope John Paul II had to give up the idea for safety reasons. Pope Francis announced his arrival in Iraq on his so-called pastoral journey in a video-message by saying, “I come as a penitent pilgrim to implore forgiveness and reconciliation from the Lord after years of war and terrorism; to ask God for the consolation of hearts and the healing of wounds.”

The final goal of the trip was to bring comfort to Iraqis and especially to the Christians among them who have suffered from harsh persecution and destruction at the hands of Daesh (ISIS). In the spirit of solidarity and goodwill, Pope Francis declared, “From you, millennia ago, Abraham began his journey. Today, it is up to us to continue it, with the same spirit, along the paths of peace together!” The same words were taken up by the highest Iraqi institutional leaders. Both the President of the Republic Barham Salih and Prime Minister al-Kadhimi expressed their confidence that the visit is a message of peace for Iraqis of all religions and that it will help consolidate domestic and regional stability.

The supreme pontiff aimed to reaffirm the Christian presence as an important element of both the country’s and the region’s population. Hence, his first stopover in Baghdad was the Syriac Catholic Cathedral of Our Lady of Salvation, where a meeting with the exponents of the Christian community took place. Throughout recent history, Christian groups in Iraq have suffered and been forced to flee – especially after the fall of S H, following the U.S. invasion in 2003. From that moment, a spiral of violence and ethnic conflict began.

It is estimated that during Saddam’s regime, more than one million Christians lived in Iraq while nowadays they are around 300,000.

The massive destruction and hate campaign launched by Daesh has contributed to the further tearing apart of an already bleeding country. In recent years, many Iraqis have been forced to leave their homes and Christians, in particular, have been badly affected by the wartime conditions. It is estimated that during Saddam’s regime, more than one million Christians lived in Iraq while nowadays they are around 300,000. Currently, Iraqi law declares that “each Iraqi has the right to freely exercise his religion.” Islam, however, is “the state religion and the most important source for legislation” according to Article 2 of the Constitution of Iraq.

The pope’s visit to the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in Najaf is considered the turning point of the visit to Iraq. Pope Francis is the first supreme pontiff and state representative to meet with Ayatollah Sistani. This is both a religious and political event. From the perspective of interreligious dialogue, their private conversation aimed at reaffirming the equality of all ethnic and religious components of Iraq and the region.

On the other hand, to achieve peace, the ayatollah has shown a preference to dialogue with the pope: the former signed a tacit pact of collaboration, which sounds like a subtle accusation against Tehran. “I hope that religious and spiritual leaders will urge interested parties, and especially the great powers, to give priority to reason and wisdom by renouncing the language of war.… [they] should not put their own interests first at the expense of the rights of peoples to live in freedom and with dignity,” the note reads.

The pope’s journey continued to Mosul and to Qaraqosh, the largest Christian-populated city of Iraq, whose biggest sanctuary was burned and desecrated by Daesh in the summer of 2014, forcing thousands of people to flee. However, the exodus of Christians from these lands is in continuity with the past – Christians were also forced to flee following the U.S.-led military operations “Desert Storm” in 1990 and “Iraqi Freedom” in 2003.

The last stopover for Pope Francis was Erbil, the capital of the autonomous Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), where he celebrated a public mass in the Franso Hariri Stadium. Afterwards, he welcomed the father of Alan Kurdi, the child who became a symbol of the tragedy endured by refugees as he was found dead on Turkish shores after their boat to Europe capsized.

The pope also visited a refugee camp that hosts displaced people who have fled Daesh. In the short period of three days, Pope Francis highlighted some of the deepest fractures and cleavages of our times in gestures symbolizing the flourishing of life over destruction and terrorism.

Pope Francis tried to bring hope and a spirit of unity to a region of the world where leaders do not go and where their efforts have proven unsuccessful. However, in this relaxed and festive atmosphere, there was margin for manipulation and an unfortunate attempt took place that aimed to create further problems and divisions.

Security experts admit that we are living in a new era of terrorism and that the terrorist organization Daesh (ISIS) is its most outstanding example. Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East organized a panel entitled “The Future of ISIS” to discuss Daesh’s legacy including its detainees and returnees, and strategies against a potential resurgence of the group in Iraq and Syria. The experts that participated in the panel discussed their views on the future of the terror group.

When Daesh jihadists declared the foundation of a so-called Islamic State in 2014, a battle between the Salafist-jihadi group and Al-Qaeda members broke out. According to Mohammed Abu Rumman, a Jordanian scholar and former Minister of Culture and Youth, the fight between the two extended all across the world, starting from Iraq and Syria and later crossing over to Yemen, Afghanistan, and North Africa. This included various Salafist jihadists some of whom affiliated themselves with Daesh while others felt closer to Al-Qaeda. According to Abu Rumman, even though both organizations have lost some of their influence, the fight and competition between them remains and is likely to continue in the future.

Daesh tried to build a strategy and ideology in Iraq, Syria, and other regions by branding itself a representative of Sunni communities. On the contrary, Al-Qaeda is more concerned with its struggle against globalization and its relationship with the United States, its “distant enemy.” According to Abu Rumman, the future of Daesh can’t be discussed without understanding the situations in Iraq, Syria, and Al-Qaeda together.

No Chance of an Insurgency in Iraq and Syria

According to Mara Revkin, a fellow at Georgetown Law’s Center on National Security and the Law, as a terrorist organization Daesh has few chances of staging a successful insurgency in Syria and Iraq. In order to survive, terrorist organizations must secure a political ground and economic resources for sustainable financing. Revkin explained that Daesh has neither political nor economic support.

The loss of its “caliphate” in Syria and Iraq was interpreted as a huge blow to the organization.

The loss of its “caliphate” in Syria and Iraq was interpreted as a huge blow to the organization. The group forfeited its technological bases and the territories it controlled, which were perceived as key areas for its continued presence. At the moment, this transnational terrorist group has been hindered from spreading violence and the changing dynamics have deprived the group of political and economic backing. Thus, the organization’s propaganda capacity has been doomed to fail.

Its limited activities, its internet and social media strategies, and losing its “caliphate,” turned the group into an underground organization and shifted its future plans. Abu Rumman noted that losses on the ground translate into a reduced presence on social media platforms, which are terrorist groups’ prime recruiting ground. A great contribution to this development was the declaration by the two social media giants, Twitter and Facebook, that they would not tolerate discourses encouraging violence on their platforms.

The Future of Daesh

The future of Daesh, in light of its ideology and presence in Syria and Iraq, is uncertain. Daesh lost all its strength including the local population’s support. Borzou Daragahi, a journalist and senior non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council, argued during the seminar that their recruitment attempts constantly fail as the group has lost its legitimacy in the eyes of the local population, which stays away from the group.

In the future, it is less likely that Daesh will reorganize itself and establish strongholds in Syria and Iraq as it did in the past. The international community’s united fight against the terror group has effectively rendered a potential upsurge by Daesh impossible. This global effort is an exemplary case of  a global collaboration against a terrorist group.

Daesh (ISIS) violence has returned to Iraq and has started yet again to threaten the country’s stability. A couple of suicide bombings in central Baghdad on January 21, 2021, in which dozens of civilians were killed and wounded, made this clear.

The suicide bombings took place in the crowded Tayaran Square, a popular marketplace. The first suicide bomber pretended to feel ill and when people gathered around him, he blew himself up. After the first explosion, people gathered again to help the victims and then a second suicide bomber blew himself up, killing more people mercilessly.

The initial scenes bore the fingerprints of the terror group Daesh: It sends suicide bombers to blow themselves up amid innocent people. It is a shameful tactic they do not shy away from.

Baghdad has witnessed intense security deployment since December 2020 with al-Kazemi’s government trying to show its security might. Yet military checkpoints couldn’t prevent security breaches, some of which were aggressive and had major political and security repercussions for the country.

Daesh wanted to send several messages by this attack in a critical location and at an important moment. One message was to their supporters to let them know that the “Islamic State” still exists and is alive and kicking. Another message was meant for Daesh’s enemies to notify them that Daesh still poses a major security threat and is capable of targeting vital areas.

The announcement of the defeat of the “Islamic State” and the elimination of its political project by the end of 2017 wasn’t enough. There is a certain confusion surrounding the understanding of the project of the “Caliphate” and there is an underestimation of the strength of the organization, which makes Daesh capable of quickly adapting to field developments. Daesh enjoys a great deal of flexibility which allows it to shift its approach, and it has a decentralized leadership which allows the group to carry out various attacks in many areas in Iraq and Syria.

Daesh Moves Its Terror to the City

The suicide attacks against civilians show that Daesh has moved to another stage in which it uses its military tactics in a strategic way and based on the notion of “terror in cities.” This means carrying out two suicide attacks in the same place to inflict the highest number of casualties, or sending car bombs, or both. This approach is considered a key part of Daesh’s strategy to create sectarian tension and provoke reprisals between Shiites and Sunnis. The recent bombings confirm that Daesh may be preparing a lot of surprises in the near future.

Daesh’s return to the Iraqi scene was not surprising. The local causes and conditions that led to its emergence are still present, and are conducive to its return. Moreover, these reasons multiplied due to the continuation of political chaos and the complex regional conflict.

One can accept that security weaknesses can occur in any country in the world, including countries with effective security services. However, the repetition of the same security breaches in Iraq over and over again costs the country enormous human and material losses.

Suicide bombings didn’t recommence in Iraq purely due to the lack of efficiency in the security and military apparatuses, but rather there is a set of political reasons behind this development and as a result, the Iraqi security institutions were unable to perform their tasks efficiently.

Iraqi political parties made use of suicide bombings in an attempt to obtain popular support or used suicide bombings against political opponents, whether in a local or regional context.

Political conflicts make decision-makers lose their ability to implement proper measures due to the lack of a clear vision and external influence on the political decision-making process. For instance, the dialogue between Iraq and the U.S. was meant to bring good results, but the rejection of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq led to a clash of the U.S. and Iraqi policies.

The political parties made use of suicide bombings in an attempt to obtain popular support or used suicide bombings against political opponents, whether in a local or regional context.

As Daesh claimed responsibility for the recent suicide bombings, pro-Iran politicians rushed to make statements that both suicide bombers were Saudi nationals. Meanwhile, certain media circulated allegations that the suicide bombers were from the city of Mosul, which was also incorrect.

In fact, the politicization of the terrorist attacks and sectarian polarization serve the very goal that Daesh seeks.

When it comes to the role of the Iraqi government in combating suicide bombings, we see that political leaders are not serious enough to employ a comprehensive security strategy in confronting this type of terror attacks. This is due to a structural defect and a dysfunction within the Iraqi security services.

There is a lack of centralization in the decision-making when it comes to security issues arising from the conflict between government security agencies and irregular forces operating outside the state control. There is also a lack of intelligence sharing which weakens the ability of preempting threats.

Despite all the above, the Iraqi government’s intelligence services detected the plan of the twin suicide bombings in central Baghdad two months before it took place. However, those in charge of security did not take the information seriously.

The spokesperson for the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Iraq, Major General Yahya Rasool, stated that “the suicide bombers detonated themselves while being pursued by the security forces.” This is another piece of evidence that testifies to the lack of security that enabled the suicide bombers to reach deep into Baghdad without being stopped.

The most important question is how this impacts the political scene in Iraq. Suicide bombings came after the government’s announcement of postponing the parliamentary elections to October 10, 2021, to give the authorities more time to register voters and new parties.

The beginning of the relations between China and the KRG, the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, dates back to the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Despite this relatively short history, Beijing has significantly strengthened its economic and diplomatic presence in the region. Only in the past six months, Beijing has signed a number of multibillion-dollar agreements with authorities in Erbil.

Among them are the $210 million contract for the construction of a cement plant based in Erbil, a $5 billion project for a giant housing development and an urban tourist attraction in the city (both announced in October 2020), and a $5 billion agreement for the construction of a massive Chinese commercial center (signed in January 2021). All this, without mentioning the enormous help China provided to Erbil during the COVID-19 pandemic by supplying hospitals and the public with masks, sanitizers, and necessary equipment.

Furthermore, China is increasing its diplomatic presence in northern Iraq. Earlier, in 2014, by opening its consulate general, Beijing showed clear support to the KRG and established a solid diplomatic presence in the region. During the opening ceremony, China’s Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Ming said, “The opening of our consulate general in Erbil expresses our strong support for the political process in Iraq. It is a sign of our strong desire to further deepen and strengthen our bilateral ties with Iraq and the Kurdistan Region in various fields.” This move turned a new page in developing diplomatic relations between Beijing and Erbil.

Considering it was the time when Daesh (ISIS) was at the peak of its strength in Iraq, Beijing’s move meant China had a number of strategically important plans in Iraqi Kurdistan. Despite the aggressive and devastating interventions by Daesh in Iraqi lands, the KRG was able in a surprisingly short period of time to protect and free its territories, such as Mosul and Kirkuk, from terrorists – to a great extent as a result of having its own military forces. For many, northern Iraq was a safe area that could be defended using its own forces, independently from Iraq’s central administration.

At the same time, the KRG took control of the oil-rich province of Kirkuk and connected its oil reserves to the pipeline linking the region to Turkey. This opened a lucrative opportunity for the Kurdish government to raise its oil production to up to 450,000 barrels a day and created the ground for new Chinese investment projects in the region.

China’s non-ordinary approach to enhancing economic and diplomatic ties with the KRG during politically unstable times in war-torn Iraq is explained by Beijing’s ambitions to secure and expand its Belt and Road Initiative far beyond Iraq and the KRG. Following its non-interference policy and soft military presence in the Middle East, China is becoming an influential player in the region. Through its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO), China uses soft power to intervene in the international affairs of other countries, and especially Arab and African countries.

China has also been a frequent facilitator in negotiations between the Taliban and Afghan authorities. China pursues a mediation role in the Syria conflict too and aims to become a key investor in Syrian infrastructure, energy, and other industries as part of international efforts to rebuild the country.

Today, China’s strategy in Iraqi Kurdistan follows an ambitious geopolitical goal: to scale up Big Asia’s vector.

Today, China’s strategy in Iraqi Kurdistan follows an ambitious geopolitical goal: to scale up Big Asia’s vector. This refers not only to a geographical frame but also to the emergence of a new counterbalancing power against the West, Russia, and Turkey that will be led by China and Iran.

Having pursued a pro-Western policy for decades, the government of Iraqi Kurdistan is turning its geopolitical and economic compass to the East. It’s enough to recall the speech of Chancellor Masoud Barzani in 2018 to verify this claim. During the meeting with the Chinese ambassador to Iraq, Chen Weiqing, Barzani expressed his hopes that China would play “a greater role” in bringing stability to the Middle East – a role that China appears to have realized.

China, a poor country only a few decades ago, has now become a superpower with a new approach. China’s influence in the Middle East, and particularly in Iraq and the KRG, goes far beyond the economic and geopolitical dominance. Within a couple of years, China has introduced its culture and language to the region. Books about China and its leaders are being translated into the Kurdish language, while tourist spots, hotels, and even some schools in Erbil have started to provide information to visitors in Chinese, apart from English and Arabic. The famous Salahaddin University-Erbil has opened a center for the Chinese language.

However, there are several risks of letting Beijing dominate northern Iraq. One is that economic relations between the KRG and China are still one-sided. In order to avoid the trade deficit and the potential inflation crisis, the KRG has to balance the imports and exports between the region and Beijing – preferably by finding other sources of exports apart from oil.

The second risk is the internal tensions between the KRG and Iraq. Should the Chinese political approach and ideology prevail in the region, it will seize the freedoms enjoyed in Erbil with its semi-autonomous status from Baghdad, as China has always supported a centralized governance model.

Finally, the Chinese Model could impact the KRG’s economic and diplomatic ties with the U.S., Russia, and Turkey, all of whom are still very important geopolitical partners in the region. This may lead to the isolation of the KRG and Baghdad from the global economy, and to becoming cut off militarily and in terms of goods supplies.

It may also exclude KRG from international diplomatic initiatives such as the U.S.-funded media outlets aimed to promote the Kurdish language, culture, and policies (e.g. Radio Nawa) and lead to the political enhancing of ties with Russia as seen by the visit of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) delegation to Moscow to enhance Russian-Kurdish cooperation in Syria.

Yet, this scenario is – at least – for the moment unlikely as the KRG has the ability to use its soft power and to establish diplomatic ties with nations which oppose each other in the international arena.

Throughout February, the Saudi Arabian-owned and UAE-based Al Arabiya channel aired two interviews with Raghad Saddam Hussein. For those who think her name sounds familiar, that is because she is the daughter of the late and deposed Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein, who ruled Iraq from 1979 until an illegal US-led invasion toppled him and his Ba’athist regime in 2003, allegedly on a mission to bring democracy to Iraq and to disarm its weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

Of course, both democracy in Iraq and any functioning WMD programme turned out to be not only illusory, but an outright lie. Iraq’s governance is now at the mercy of a number of corrupt political elites, many of whom owe their allegiances and careers to neighbouring Iran’s support.

So why are these politicians so afraid of what a dead dictator’s daughter might have to say?

Whereas it would previously take several dollars to equal a single dinar, in the modern day it now takes thousands of dinars to make a single dollar, with current prices currently at $1,458 to the dinar. The Iraqi economy is in appalling shape, with a bloated public sector, very little foreign investment, and a corrupt system that awards large contracts to ethically compromised businessmen who have ties to politicians who enjoy substantial kickbacks.

Raghad’s appearance on a regional pan-Arab broadcaster has caused a massive debate in Iraq.

After being almost totally eradicated, illiteracy has made a resurgent comeback with almost 10 percent of the country over the age of 15 unable to read and write, with gender inequality surging and causing female illiteracy to be almost double that of their male counterparts, according to UNESCO. Meanwhile, Iraqis who are literate, have achieved academically, and who are trying to teach the future generations of their nation are commonly targeted for assassination, leading to a brain drain.

Raghad’s appearance on a regional pan-Arab broadcaster has caused a massive debate in Iraq, with some feeling nostalgic for the days when, despite living under a brutal dictator, Iraqis still had equal access to education, physical security to go about their business, and public services that, while not ideal under a sanctions regime, still blows almost anything the modern Iraqi government offers today out of the water.

Rather than respond with reforms, the Iraqi authorities deployed their security forces, killing more than 600 civilians. They were aided by Shia jihadist militias, all loyal to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and who protect and support Tehran’s agenda of control over Iraq.

Protests against the failed political system that seemingly only serves the interests of the US and Iran have been taking place for more than a decade in Iraq.

Protests against the failed political system that seemingly only serves the interests of the US and Iran have been taking place for more than a decade, with repeated Sunni-led demonstrations meeting heavy crackdowns and deadly violence. The last such attempt was savagely ended by sectarian Shia Islamist Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a well-known Iranian stooge, who ordered the army into the protest camps in 2013 and opened the door to armed violence which ultimately led to Daesh’s conquest of a third of the country.

While previous Shia-led governments could easily smear Sunni protesters as being sympathisers of either the Ba’athists, Al-Qaeda, or even Daesh, and could use that as a cover to violently suppress them, it has proven much more difficult to do that to the Shia demonstrators who, by and large, were the electoral heartland for most of those in power over close to two decades. It is for that reason that protests continue, with the authorities recently killing four demonstrators in the Shia majority city of Nasiriyah late last month.

In a country such as this, where the political elite are viewed across the ethno-sectarian divide as serving no one’s interests but themselves, is it any wonder that the mere voice of Saddam’s daughter elicits such spasmodic fear?

Despite Saddam’s many well-documented cruelties, the situation in Iraq is so bad that the halls of power in Baghdad still fear the phantom of Saddam that continues to stalk his old palatial complexes, now inhabited by those who sold Iraq out to serve their own interests and having achieved nothing for Iraqis in almost two decades.

It is for that reason that Raghad’s interview, her apportioning blame on Iran’s presence for much of Iraq’s woes, and her open consideration of perhaps a political role in Iraq’s future has so many of Baghdad’s elites agitated and laying awake at night.

It has been almost two decades since the United States led a coalition of Western powers to invade and occupy Iraq, on the promise to the world of ending former dictator Saddam Hussein’s purported Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) program, and the pledge to the Iraqi people that only they would be the masters of their own fates.

In the ensuing years, Iraq has not emerged as a bastion of democracy in an almost uniformly undemocratic Arab world as was initially promised, but instead it has become a warning to others about the destructive potential of divisive politics, sectarianism, and allowing the politics of revenge to gain pre-eminence over the national interest.

Like many modern nation-states, Iraq’s population is composed of a pastiche of different peoples, cultures, and religions. This is as a natural result of centuries, even millennia, of population migrations, wars and conquests, and, increasingly in the modern day, globalization.

While this can in many ways be a blessing for a nation, it can also create some stark divides that are exploited by unscrupulous politicians and external powers who seek to sow discord and strife within a country to ensure that it is always under the boot.

It is unsurprising that a country as rich in resources, geostrategic importance, and as diverse as Iraq, which is ethnically, culturally, and religiously varied, would be the target for the divisive and bloody politics of sectarianism.

Iran’s self-proclaimed “Islamic Revolution” that began in 1979 was forcibly confined within Iran’s own borders and the dream of a Shia Islamic state fizzled away in the face of the Iraqi armed forces.

Iraq’s present political elite are largely those who heeded the call of the former administration of George W. Bush in 2002 and attended the London Hilton to form an official “Iraqi opposition” to support the invasion of their own country by a foreign interloper. These people were not only backed by the United States, but also by Iran, which may strike many as interesting considering the history of enmity between the two powers.

However, if there was one thing Washington and Tehran could agree on, it was that they needed a broken, weak, and shattered Iraq that was incapable of defending itself or pursuing its own interests. It was not simply the case that Saddam had to go, but the very concept of a sovereign Iraq had to be dismantled and destroyed, never to rise and stand on its own feet again.

In Iran’s case, this is simply because Iraq had, and after eight long years of war, forced the Islamic Republic’s founding father, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, to sign an embarrassing ceasefire in 1988. Iran’s self-proclaimed “Islamic Revolution” that began in 1979 was forcibly confined within Iran’s own borders and the dream of a Shia Islamic state fizzled away in the face of the Iraqi armed forces.

Iraq was thus seen as the bulwark against any Iranian plan to export their revolution and further destabilize a region that was still suffering from the effects of rampant misplaced nationalism born of European colonization in the aftermath of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War.

Although the stated objective of the United States and its allies was to disarm Iraq, ensure Saddam Hussein could never develop WMDs, and as a punitive mission to stop Saddam’s support for terrorist organizations including Al-Qaeda, the perpetrators of the 9/11 terror attacks, the reality was far different.

In reality, and as became blindingly clear, all of the reasons for invading Iraq turned out to be false and based on lies. In Britain, this scandal became known as former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s “Dodgy Dossier”, a file packed to the gills with lies, mistruths, and red herrings designed to mislead the British public. Not only was Iraq effectively contained since the Gulf War concluded in 1991, but it had no WMDs and certainly did not support Al-Qaeda.

Even worse, it has engendered brutal sectarian violence and produced such politicians as former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who has gained infamy as one of Iraq’s most sectarian Shia Islamist politicians and ruled the country between 2006 and 2014.

According to international rights monitor Amnesty International, Maliki frequently abused counterterrorism laws to target Sunnis, imprisoned and tortured many, and his administration used rape and sexual violence against female relatives of inmates as a way of forcing false confessions leading to their executions. Alongside his open support for violent, unofficial Shia armed groups and death squads, Maliki’s actions directly led to the rise of the ISIS (DAESH) terror group in 2014.

However, even after ISIS’s defeat in 2017 and Maliki’s departure from the most powerful office in the land, there appear to be no signs of the Shia and pro-Iran dominated government’s let up against the Sunni population.

Sunni cities are still a mess of rubble and destruction that have not been rebuilt since ISIS was defeated, and the closure of refugee camps for internally displaced people have forced children to live amongst bombs and corpses.

Further, and just last month, the United Nations expressed concern over how Sunni prisoners faced “imminent executions” on the basis of hasty convictions on terror charges in trials marred by irregularities and no access to fair hearings.

There can be no doubt that the primary purpose of such executions, discrimination, and disenfranchisement is to ensure that Iraq’s Sunni population can never again be an organized political force. A succession of Shia Islamist prime ministers has consistently backed policies that seek to keep the Sunnis down, blaming an entire segment of the population for the actions of Saddam.

However, as Maliki’s foolish policymaking proved, the politics of revenge does nothing to alleviate any threat to the nation-state but in fact exacerbates it and could easily lead to a resurgence of violent groups such as ISIS coming to the fore again.

Such an outcome will prove that the Iraqi elite has learned nothing since 2003 and certainly not since ISIS was defeated in 2017, and they will only have themselves to blame when they radicalize yet another generation of the downtrodden against them.