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hilst the Middle East region has undergone significant change and transformation as a result of the attacks launched by Israel from 7 October 2023 onwards, the US-Israel–Iran war that began on 28 February 2026 has further fuelled this change, pushing it to a point of no return. For had these events not occurred, the ‘Mecca Joint Defence Agreement’, signed on 7 August 2026 between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, might not have been possible.

Developments necessitating “regional ownership”

Türkiye’s long-standing stance that the region’s problems should be resolved by the countries of the region themselves – a concept defined by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan as “regional ownership” – had not received sufficient support from the countries of the region. Whilst the reasons behind this may vary from country to country, ultimately external interventions aimed at resolving the region’s problems have failed to heal the wounds; on the contrary, they have either caused existing wounds to bleed anew or allowed them to simply harden into calluses without being resolved. Consequently, it has become apparent that interventions in the region—particularly from the West and, of course, the US—have failed to produce results and have not brought peace and stability to the region.

However, following the events that began on 7 October 2023, Israel’s adoption of a revisionist policy towards the region—believing that the conditions were favourable—and its subsequent attacks targeting not only Gaza and the West Bank but also Lebanon, Syria and Iran, have led to a shift in the preconceptions held by countries in the region towards Türkiye.

For whilst it is evident that almost all of the Western countries expected to resolve the region’s problems have taken sides in the war between Russia and Ukraine, providing Ukraine with billions of dollars in aid as well as both political and military support; whilst Israel’s razing of Gaza, massacred over 73,000 people and committed a massive genocide; deepened its annexation of the West Bank; gradually sought to alter the status of the Al-Aqsa Mosque; occupied southern Lebanon and attempted to provoke a civil war there; and, as if its decades-long occupation of the Golan Heights—which is Syrian territory —as if that were not enough—it unilaterally suspended the 1974 agreement following the revolution on 8 December 2024, occupied further Syrian territory, and sought to prevent Syria from achieving stability by manipulating the Druze and the SDG/PKK terrorist organisations.

The extent to which external actors remain indifferent to crises or conflicts in our region has once again been exposed in the war against Iran. For just as it is unjust and wrong for an actor such as the US to fall into Israel’s trap and attack Iran, it is equally wrong for other Western countries not to have taken the initiative to dissuade the US from this war, as was the case with Ukraine. Although these countries—the majority of which are also NATO members—were called upon by the US to deploy troops to open the blockaded Strait of Hormuz – although this was not in accordance with NATO regulations – they did not heed this call and, whilst not becoming directly involved in the war, they made their stance clear by expanding sanctions against Iran rather than exerting pressure on Israel to bring the war to an end.

During this war, Iran’s decision to attack Gulf states and other countries hosting US bases on their territory – rather than Israel and the US, which were directly attacking it – both because they were relatively easier targets and with the intention of indirectly exerting pressure on the US, has once again demonstrated the importance of regional ownership.

Israel’s revisionist policies and the perception of threats by regional countries

All these developments have made a mechanism such as the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement imperative, with the aim of thwarting the plans of a country like Israel—which, despite its small size, seeks to destabilize the region and derive benefit from the situation by leveraging its lobbying power in the US and Europe and relying on their support—and to establish a new status quo. Furthermore, whilst Israel recently proposed an alignment strategy—such as the “hexagon bloc”—which has yet to materialize on the ground, the formation of a counter-front by countries outside this bloc that perceive the current developments as a threat to their national interests must be regarded as inevitable.

Despite the security guarantees the US has provided to the Gulf states to date, the fact that these states have been exposed to Iranian attacks during the war against Iran has not only called into question the reliability of US guarantees in the Gulf, but has also inevitably led to a search for alternatives regarding the future of the region’s security architecture. It is therefore highly likely that the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement will address this necessity; in particular, should the US withdraw from the region following the war with Iran, it is conceivable that it might be open to entrusting the region’s security to three key and powerful allies: Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the fact that the US has not made any negative statements regarding the Mecca Agreement to date is interpreted in this light and reinforces the view that there is coordination between the signatory countries and the US.

Why is the agreement so important?

Among the key factors that make the agreement significant are the characteristics and capabilities of the signatory countries. Türkiye, for instance, is not only a NATO member but also a candidate country for the EU and has made significant strides in the defense industry in recent years. It is therefore an indispensable actor for both the Middle East and the European security architecture. Pakistan, meanwhile, is the only Muslim country to possess nuclear weapons and also has a substantial population. As for Saudi Arabia, it stands out as a key player not only due to its abundant energy resources but also because of its strategic location at the crossroads of global trade routes. Furthermore, as a leading figure in both the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League, and as the custodian of Islam’s holy sites, it is an actor held in high regard and whose word carries weight among both Arab and Muslim states.

The coming together of these three major powers to form a defense alliance would create a synergy whose effects are likely to extend beyond the region. Furthermore, should this agreement be successfully implemented, it would inevitably create a domino effect, making it likely that other countries in the region would join the agreement. Considering similar initiatives that have been attempted at various times but could never be brought to a conclusion due to both regional and circumstantial conditions, the most significant impact of this agreement, as of today, is that it stands as the sole development capable of curbing Israel’s aggressive, occupying and expansionist regional vision. Not only will the Abraham Accords no longer hold any appeal for countries in the region, but it is also understood that, should the US withdraw from the region following a war against Iran, the new security architecture of the region will be centered on the new pact established by this agreement.

What will the agreement provide for the signatory countries?

This agreement is of a defensive nature, aimed at protecting the signatories from attacks by other countries; in this way, it offers the signatory countries a security guarantee similar to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Türkiye’s current capabilities, Pakistan’s nuclear power and Saudi Arabia’s financial support not only demonstrate the agreement’s capacity and potential but also serve as a powerful deterrent to any actors seeking to attack one of the signatory states.

Consequently, in addition to Türkiye’s NATO membership, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement has now emerged as the sole agreement in the region offering an additional defense guarantee to regional countries, and it has been announced that the agreement remains open to new participants. Although it has been stated in the announcements that no specific country is being targeted, it is clear that a strong deterrent has been created for those with designs on the region – particularly Israel – or those claiming to shape its future.

Whilst there are no doubts regarding the agreement’s deterrent effect, as we do not yet possess detailed information on the nature of the agreement, it is not fully known how a response would be mounted in the event of an attack on any of the signatory states. Furthermore, given the geographical locations of the signatory states—particularly Pakistan’s relatively remote position—it is difficult to predict how such a response would be carried out. However, despite all these uncertainties, the implementation of such an arrangement in our region is of great importance.

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merican President Donald Trump has welcomed a new defense agreement between Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, describing the trilateral pact as an important step toward greater security cooperation in the Middle East.

“Very happy to see that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan have recently, and finally, signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement,” Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform.

He said the agreement showed that countries in the Middle East were “coming together” and would be better positioned to defend themselves. Trump described the pact as a “BIG, BOLD, IMPORTANT FIRST STEP.”

The agreement was signed in Mecca on August 7 amid escalating regional tensions and the ongoing U.S.-Iran war, which has expanded beyond the two countries and affected several states across the Middle East.

Three countries expand military cooperation

Under the agreement, Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia will establish strategic political and military mechanisms involving their defense and foreign ministers, as well as chiefs of staff or commanders of their armed forces.

Military cooperation is expected to develop gradually, beginning with command-post and field exercises. The three countries could later conduct joint exercises involving ground, naval and air forces, air defense systems and unmanned platforms.

The agreement also includes a commitment by the three countries to participate in efforts aimed at resolving the conflict between Iran and the United States.

The pact builds on an earlier Saudi-Pakistani mutual defense agreement signed in September, which stated that an attack against either country would be considered an attack against both.

Saudi Arabia has increasingly sought to diversify its defense partnerships as its critical infrastructure and energy facilities have come under attack amid the regional conflict.

Pact comes amid regional tensions

The agreement also reflects the broader security concerns facing the three countries. Saudi Arabia has been directly affected by attacks linked to the wider U.S.-Iran war, while Iran-backed Houthi forces have targeted regional shipping and other interests.

Türkiye, meanwhile, has faced growing tensions with Israel over the war in Gaza which resulted in broader regional conflicts, including fighting involving Iran and Lebanon.

Pakistan has increasingly positioned itself as a potential mediator in regional disputes while strengthening its security relationship with Saudi Arabia and expanding defense cooperation with Türkiye.

The three-way pact brings together three major Muslim-majority countries with significant military capabilities and strategic influence. Türkiye is a NATO member, Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, and Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s largest oil producers and a key U.S. partner in the Gulf.

Trump’s endorsement marks a notable reaction from Washington to the emerging security arrangement. His comments suggest that the United States views greater defense cooperation among regional powers as potentially complementary to broader efforts to strengthen security in the Middle East.

The agreement could also reshape regional security cooperation as countries seek greater capacity to protect their territory and infrastructure amid continuing instability and the widening consequences of the U.S.-Iran war.

(Source: Daily Sabah)

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he diplomatic initiatives that have been ongoing for some time between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have now materialized into a concrete security architecture with the Joint Defense Agreement signed today in Mecca. Although the agreement in question may appear to be a manifestation of the historical and religious ties between the three countries in foreign policy, it can in fact be regarded as part of a much broader regional transformation. This agreement, signed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif at the Safa Palace in Mecca, the holy city of the Muslim world, constitutes a full-fledged ‘collective defense’ pact, as it stipulates that an armed attack against any one of the three states shall be deemed an attack against all of them.

Furthermore, the fact that the agreement is based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which governs the right to self-defense, can be seen as a reflection of the initiative led by the three countries’ quest for legitimacy within the framework of international law. Consequently, the resulting joint defense mechanism aims to serve as a deterrent not only at the regional level but also in the eyes of global actors.

Outcome of regional developments

It is evident that the agreement goes beyond a merely symbolic initiative. In this regard, the normalization process between Turkey and Saudi Arabia since 2022 and the subsequent acceleration of strategic cooperation, followed by Saudi Arabia’s move to expedite its rapprochement with Pakistan in the security context, culminating in the signing of the Joint Strategic Defense Agreement in 2025, have been the key driving forces behind this process. President Erdoğan’s emphasis on defense industry cooperation during his visit to Saudi Arabia at the start of the year, along with signals of joint investment in the KAAN National Fighter Aircraft, also demonstrate that the signing in Mecca was the result of a process that had been under way for some time.

Beyond its strategic and symbolic significance, the Mecca Agreement is of critical importance given the context in which it emerged. The growing regional instability following the war launched by the US and Israel against Iran on 28 February has led all countries to seek alternatives. When compounded by Israel’s continued pursuit of aggressive and expansionist policies and Washington’s silence in the face of these developments, the confidence of many regional actors, particularly the Gulf states, in the traditional security architecture has been permanently shaken. Furthermore, the US’s failure to provide the expected security umbrella to the Gulf states, whose vulnerabilities were laid bare by Iran’s attacks, has eroded these actors’ trust in traditional security guarantors. Consequently, Washington’s inconsistency in providing protection to its allies during times of crisis has driven regional capitals to diversify their own security arrangements.

Signed against this backdrop, the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement can be seen as a concrete outcome of the quest to reduce dependence on external security guarantees and to build an intra-regional deterrence mechanism amongst regional actors. From Türkiye’s perspective, this step constitutes a key pillar of its long-stated vision for a regional security architecture. In line with the initiatives it has taken in recent years, Ankara has played a critical role in intensifying cooperation amongst regional actors. During this process, Türkiye has strengthened its cooperation with countries including the Gulf states, as well as Egypt and Pakistan, and has sought to implement partnerships across various sectors.

During this process, one of the areas on which Türkiye has placed particular emphasis has been partnerships in the defense industry. Viewed in this context, it should also be noted that, beyond its security dimension, the Mecca Agreement provides a framework for deepening cooperation in the defense industry. Saudi Arabia’s preference and policies in recent years to transition from the role of a customer to that of a co-producer in the procurement of defense industry products have led to concrete steps being taken in this context between Ankara and Riyadh. In this regard, Türkiye has demonstrated its commitment by signing agreements with Saudi Arabia on the joint production of unmanned aerial vehicles, radar technologies, anti-tank guided missiles and other defense industry products.

Defense projects between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia

Indeed, Türkiye has successfully concluded its negotiations with Saudi Arabia regarding the co-production of the Gökbey national helicopter project, and an agreement was signed in February 2026 between TUSAŞ and the Saudi Arabian Defense Industries Organization. It is expected that the Mecca Agreement will not only strengthen the joint security mechanism but also increase such collaborations in the defense industry sector. It can be argued that, in the coming period, this initiative will not only go beyond security cooperation but also pave the way for deepening economic ties between the three countries.

Although the Mecca Agreement was signed between the three countries, President Erdoğan stated in his announcement that this security initiative is open to the participation of all countries. At this stage, it can be said that countries such as Qatar and Egypt are likely to be among those adopting a positive stance towards this security architecture in the initial phase. Given that it adopts an inclusive approach rather than an exclusionary one, unlike certain alliances that have emerged in the region in the past, it can also be noted that this alliance is set to play a strategic role in the future of the regional security architecture.

On the other hand, it remains unclear what impact the differences in foreign policy priorities and the relative divergence in threat perceptions between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will have within the context of the agreement. Indeed, the fact that Turkey’s security priorities, centered on Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean, do not align with Saudi Arabia’s threat perception, which is largely centred on Iran, or with Pakistan’s security reflexes, which are focused on India, may be seen as a constraint. However, it can be argued that the impact of this divergence on the practical feasibility of the agreement will also be limited. Indeed, the fundamental dynamic behind the tripartite alliance is not so much divergent perceptions as shared, concrete threats. This situation forms the basis for the consolidation of power and a shared security vision along the Ankara-Riyadh-Islamabad axis.

The Joint Defense Agreement signed in Mecca stands out as an initiative that clearly sets out the signatory countries’ perspectives. This agreement, which can be seen as the tangible outcome of regional actors’ quest to build their own security amongst themselves, a quest directly influenced by the hardships caused by the interventions of external actors, serves as the nucleus of a far more comprehensive regional security architecture. At this juncture, it seems inevitable that Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which have so far acted within the framework of a shared vision, will move towards a much stronger alliance should they align their foreign policy orientations, harmonize their strategic objectives and integrate their security capabilities.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed on August 7, 2026, in Mecca between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, marks a significant transformation in the security equation between the Middle East and South Asia. At the heart of the agreement lies the principle that an armed attack directed against one of the parties shall be deemed to have been directed against all three states. This provision goes beyond traditional defense  cooperation to establish a new security mechanism based on the principle of collective deterrence.

The agreement’s primary significance in terms of international relations stems from the convergence of the signatory states’ diverse power elements within a single security framework. Turkey possesses NATO’s second-largest military force, advanced operational capabilities and a defence industry that has grown significantly in recent years. Pakistan is the only Muslim state to possess nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, stands out for its energy resources, financial capacity and influence in Gulf geopolitics. For this reason, the Mecca Agreement constitutes a strategic configuration of complementary capabilities formed by complementary strategic capabilities, rather than a traditional military alliance between three similar states.

The international context in which the agreement emerged is also significant. Rising military tensions in the Middle East, the security of energy transport routes, Iran-centred conflict dynamics and the tendency of regional states to diversify their security guarantees are reinforcing the search for a new regional security order. Within this framework, the Mecca Agreement can be interpreted as a demonstration of the will of regional states to support their security needs increasingly through mechanisms established amongst themselves, rather than through guarantees provided from outside.

The concept of strategic autonomy is particularly significant here. Since the end of the Cold War, one of the fundamental pillars of the Middle Eastern security system has been the US military presence and bilateral security relations. The Mecca Agreement does not directly abolish this system. It is also explicitly stated that the parties’ existing bilateral or multilateral obligations remain in force. However, the agreement demonstrates the will of regional actors to establish their own deterrence mechanisms alongside the Washington- centred security architecture. This situation can be interpreted as a transition from a dependence on a single security centre to a multi-layered security architecture.

The significance of the agreement for the participants

From Turkey’s perspective, the agreement also has a unique dimension. Turkey is a member of NATO. The Mecca Agreement, whilst enabling Ankara to maintain its NATO membership, also allows it to expand its institutionalised defense relations with regional powers outside NATO. Turkey is thus positioning itself strategically from which it can forge links between the Euro-Atlantic security system and the Middle East–South Asia security spheres. However, the relationship between the collective defense obligation under the Mecca Agreement and Article 5 of the NATO Treaty will require detailed legal and strategic scrutiny in the coming period, particularly in the event of simultaneous crises.

Pakistan’s participation in the agreement, meanwhile, shifts the deterrence debate to a different level. Pakistan’s nuclear capability enhances the agreement’s psychological and strategic weight. However, it cannot be concluded from current statements that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence has been extended to Turkey or Saudi Arabia. Saudi officials have also stated that the agreement is not linked to nuclear purposes or an arms race. Consequently, based on the current data, it does not appear appropriate to characterise the Mecca Agreement as a nuclear umbrella agreement.

From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the agreement represents a continuation of its policy of diversifying security partnerships. By linking its economic capacity with Turkey’s defense industry and Pakistan’s military capabilities, Riyadh may secure a greater degree of strategic manoeuvre. To the extent that this framework extends to areas such as defense industry investments, joint production, technology transfer, training, intelligence sharing and maritime security, it will acquire a lasting institutional character.

The principle of collective defense

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Agreement is the principle of ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’. This provision is reminiscent of NATO’s logic of collective defense. However, there is currently a significant institutional difference between the two organizations NATO is an institutional alliance with over seventy years’ history, underpinned by a military command structure, joint defense planning, force structure, standards and permanent political bodies. The implementation mechanisms of the Mecca Agreement, however, are not yet as transparent, based on the information made public.

For this reason, the true strength of the agreement will be measured not so much by its signing as by the extent to which it becomes institutionalized. Should a joint military committee be established, joint operational plans drawn up, regular exercises conducted, an intelligence-sharing mechanism put in place and defense industry projects undertaken jointly, the Mecca Agreement could evolve into a genuine collective defense system.

From Iran’s perspective, interpreting the agreement as a direct counter-alliance requires caution. The parties have specifically emphasized that the agreement does not target any particular state. Given Turkey’s shared border with Iran, its economic ties and regional diplomatic channels, the agreement’s potential to take on a sectarian dimension could entail significant strategic costs for Ankara. Consequently, the sustainability of the agreement will depend on maintaining a balance between the principle of collective defense and the policy of avoiding regional polarization.

Towards a new regional security architecture

From Israel’s perspective, the new framework presents a distinct area for strategic calculation. The convergence of Turkey’s NATO capabilities, Pakistan’s military strength and Saudi Arabia’s regional influence within a common security mechanism holds the potential to influence the balance of power in the Middle East. However, it is not possible to draw a definitive conclusion from current statements suggesting that the agreement constitutes an alliance formed against Israel.

A broader implication of the Mecca Agreement is the possibility of institutionalizing security cooperation within the Islamic world. Whilst the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is a broad political organization with 57 members, it lacks an effective collective defense mechanism. The tripartite structure emerging in Mecca could, if successful, form the core of a narrower yet highly operational security platform that could expand with the participation of other states.

At this point, the fact that the agreement is named ‘Mecca’ also carries symbolic significance. The signing of the agreement at the most important holy centre of the Islamic world lends it political and historical visibility beyond that of a purely military text. However, the agreement’s future legitimacy will be shaped not so much by its symbolic value as by its contribution to regional peace, its compliance with international law, and its capacity to prevent crises.

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ugust 7, 2026, marks a historic turning point at which the cards of Afro-Eurasian geopolitics and the global security architecture were reshuffled. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s working visit to Saudi Arabia brought together Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, who had arrived in Saudi Arabia the day before the visit, and General Asim Munir at the same table. The defense-focused trilateral ‘Mecca Agreement’, were signed following months of diplomatic maneuvering, and were announced at a time of rising military tensions in the region and US-Iran conflict threatening Gulf security.

Analyzing this critical development from the perspective of Islamabad is of vital importance for understanding Pakistan’s defense network, which stretches from Africa to the Gulf; its chronic and hybrid challenges in internal security; and its foundational role at the crossroads of Afro-Eurasia.

From nuclear power to regional security architecture: Pakistan’s role

As the only nuclear-armed state in the Muslim world, Pakistan constitutes the most deterrent and high-calibre military human capital component of this alliance. The bilateral defense pact signed with Saudi Arabia in 2025 was a consequence of Riyadh’s quest for military assurances, including nuclear deterrence, against potential security threats. However, Turkey’s inclusion in this equation as an official and institutional partner elevates Pakistan’s role as a bilateral ‘security provider’ to a much broader and more balanced framework.

From the perspective of the Islamabad administration, this agreement is not merely a single Gulf commitment, but the culmination of a multi-layered strategy stretching from the Horn of Africa to the Persian Gulf. Indeed, the Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation signed last week between Pakistan and Somalia, a year after it was approved by the Somali Cabinet, demonstrated Islamabad’s determination to play an active role in ensuring the security of navigation in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Furthermore, the Kuwaiti Parliament’s approval in late July of the long-awaited defense cooperation agreement with Pakistan, alongside the pursuit by actors such as Bahrain and Jordan of reciprocal defense agreements modelled on the Saudi model, has cemented Islamabad’s position as the region’s ‘security architect’. Consequently, the Turkey–Saudi Arabia–Pakistan triad forms the backbone not only of these three countries but also of a broader Afro-Eurasian security network.

Synergy of capital, technology and military manpower

Viewed from the perspective of Islamabad, the tripartite alliance is more than just a military pact; it is an industrial lever that brings together finance and high technology. For many years, Pakistan’s military diplomacy has provided Saudi Arabia with training, military personnel and security support, whilst in return it has relied on Gulf funding. However, when the high technology, unmanned systems and operational capabilities of the Turkish defense industry are added to this equation, Pakistan finds an opportunity to move beyond being a passive exporter of security and position itself at the center of a tripartite industrial synergy.

When Saudi Arabia’s financial strength, Turkey’s advanced defense technology and Pakistan’s regional military expertise and growing production infrastructure are combined, a domestic and independent defense bloc and an integrated ecosystem emerge at the very intersection of Afro-Eurasia. At a time when Pakistan is grappling with financial difficulties, this agreement enables it to secure direct Saudi investment whilst also modernizing its domestic defense industry through joint defense projects with Turkey, thereby opening up new market opportunities for both Turkish and Pakistani defense companies.

Internal security challenges and allegations of sabotage

Pakistan’s ambitious foreign policy on the global stage is being tested by chronic internal security challenges and regional hybrid threats. The Islamabad administration has long been grappling with violence perpetrated by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, whilst in the south-west it has been combating separatist actions by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) targeting economic infrastructure and Chinese projects.

However, the recent escalation of social tensions and protests in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (Azad Kashmir) has added a new dimension to the security equation. Strategic circles in Islamabad argue that the unrest erupting in Kashmir is not merely the result of local administrative or economic grievances; rather, they contend that it has been exacerbated by the instigations of external actors who are displeased with Pakistan’s key role in its independent balancing diplomacy with Iran and within the now-concrete Turkey-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Tripartite Alliance, which is now taking concrete form. This situation illustrates that, whilst Islamabad is fighting the actions of the TTP and the BLA on the one hand, it is also forced to contend with the hybrid front opened up via Kashmir by forces seeking to undermine the regional influence of the Tripartite Alliance.

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istory rarely announces itself. But occasionally, a single agreement tells us that something fundamental has changed.

The defense pact signed in Mecca between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye may be one of those moments.

Its most consequential provision is remarkably simple: an armed attack against one of the three countries will be considered an attack against all three.

For Pakistan, this represents something bigger than another defense agreement.

For decades, Pakistan’s military power, including its nuclear deterrent, was viewed overwhelmingly through the prism of South Asia, particularly its rivalry with India. Pakistan was already a formidable military power, but the strategic reach of that power was largely geographically contained.

That is beginning to change.

Pakistan’s security sxtends beyonf South Asia

Pakistan is now part of a collective-defense architecture stretching from South Asia through the Gulf to Türkiye.

And consider what these three countries bring together.

Türkiye possesses NATO’s second-largest army and has transformed itself into a major defense producer, from drones and missiles to warships and advanced aerospace technology. US President Donald Trump himself recently described the Turkish military as “tremendous” and “powerful.”

Saudi Arabia brings enormous economic and energy influence and the political weight of one of the Arab and Islamic world’s most consequential states.

Pakistan brings one of the world’s largest militaries, considerable operational experience and, crucially, is the world’s only Muslim-majority nuclear-armed state.

The nuclear question is therefore unavoidable.

Nothing publicly released about the agreement says Pakistan has extended a nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia or Türkiye. It would be wrong to claim otherwise.

But deterrence is also about perception. Any state contemplating a major confrontation with one member must now factor in the possibility of Pakistani involvement. The presence of a nuclear-armed state within that collective-defense framework inevitably becomes part of the strategic calculation.

Also, it’s worth mentioning that for Türkiye and Pakistan, this is the culmination of something much older.

Ankara and Islamabad: A growing relationship

The relationship between Ankara and Islamabad has long gone beyond diplomacy. It is rooted in unusually strong political and public ties and has evolved into substantial military cooperation,  from training and joint exercises to defense-industrial collaboration and Turkish-built MILGEM warships for Pakistan.

The Mecca pact takes that relationship a significant step further: from close defense partners to countries formally bound by collective defense.

And its implications stretch beyond the three signatories.

India says it is closely following the agreement. Its “great friend” Israel will surely be watching closely too.

Just a day before the agreement was signed, Narendra Modi received a call from Benjamin Netanyahu. According to India’s Foreign Ministry, the two discussed developments in West Asia and reviewed progress in the India-Israel Special Strategic Partnership.

There is no evidence connecting that call to the Mecca pact, and India has explicitly rejected subsequent reports that it sought a defence agreement with Israel to counter it.

But the wider picture is difficult to ignore. From New Delhi to Tel Aviv, capitals will now be assessing what this new arrangement means for a strategic landscape already undergoing profound change.

Having ties to China and the US at the same time

Pakistan occupies an especially interesting position within it.

China remains Pakistan’s “all-weather” strategic partner. Yet Islamabad continues to engage Washington, while simultaneously playing an active mediating role between the United States and Iran.

Perhaps US Vice President JD Vance summed up Pakistan’s standing in Washington most simply when asked about Islamabad’s role in the latest diplomatic efforts: “Very good, we love Pakistan.”

That ability to maintain relationships across geopolitical divides is increasingly rare.

Pakistan can speak to Beijing and Washington, Riyadh and Tehran, and the wider Gulf — without being completely confined to any single geopolitical camp. And now it has added a collective-defense commitment with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye to that equation.

That puts Pakistan in a remarkably unusual strategic position.

The pact also reflects a wider transformation in the Middle East. For decades, regional security depended heavily on external powers. Years of war, uncertainty and shifting American priorities have increasingly encouraged regional states to look towards one another.

Is this agreement like NATO? Well, we still do not know how integrated military planning will become or how its obligations would work during an actual war.

But deterrence begins long before a shot is fired. It begins with the calculations an adversary makes before deciding whether to fire one.

Turkish military and technological power, Saudi economic weight and Pakistani conventional and nuclear strength are now connected through a formal mutual-defense commitment.

(A version of this article was first published in Turkish by Kriter)

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audi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan are set to sign a trilateral defense agreement on Friday, marking a significant expansion of security cooperation among three of the Muslim world’s most influential military powers as conflict with Iran reshapes the strategic landscape of the Middle East.

The agreement will be signed in the Saudi Red Sea city of Jeddah during a summit attended by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, is also expected to participate in the high-level meeting, underscoring the military significance of the pact.

Regional officials familiar with the negotiations said the agreement follows nearly a year of discussions aimed at strengthening defense coordination among the three countries amid mounting security challenges across the Gulf and surrounding waterways.

Although officials have confirmed that an agreement will be signed, none of the governments has publicly disclosed the precise scope of the pact or the commitments each country will undertake.

The trilateral accord comes at a time of heightened instability following the U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran earlier this year and Tehran’s subsequent retaliation against military installations, energy infrastructure and strategic targets across the Gulf. The conflict has exposed vulnerabilities in regional security arrangements while threatening one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies normally pass, has experienced repeated disruptions since hostilities escalated. Commercial shipping has slowed considerably as insurers raised premiums and shipping companies rerouted vessels due to fears of further attacks.

Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan have increasingly sought closer strategic coordination, reflecting concerns that existing regional security mechanisms may not adequately address evolving threats.

A Turkish official confirmed that the defense agreement would be signed but declined to provide further details.

Expanding strategic partnership

The agreement would bring together three countries with considerable military and geopolitical influence.

Türkiye possesses NATO’s second-largest military and has significantly expanded its domestic defense industry over the past decade, becoming a leading exporter of drones, armored vehicles and missile systems.

Saudi Arabia remains one of the world’s largest defense spenders and has accelerated efforts to modernize its armed forces while investing heavily in domestic military manufacturing as part of its Vision 2030 economic transformation program.

Pakistan, meanwhile, is the only Muslim-majority nation possessing nuclear weapons and maintains one of Asia’s largest standing armies. Islamabad has long maintained close defense ties with Riyadh, including military training, intelligence cooperation and joint exercises.

Security analysts say combining the capabilities of the three countries could create one of the region’s most significant military partnerships, although its effectiveness will ultimately depend on the operational mechanisms established under the agreement.

Building on existing cooperation

The new arrangement appears to build upon the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement signed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in September 2025.

According to Saudi officials who previously described the agreement, the bilateral pact treats an attack against either country as an attack against both and provides for cooperation using “all military means.”

Whether Türkiye will assume identical obligations under the expanded framework remains unclear.

Reuters reported earlier this year that negotiations were underway to broaden Saudi-Pakistani security cooperation to include Türkiye, reflecting Ankara’s growing role in regional diplomacy and defense affairs.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said in January that Ankara supported establishing broader regional security platforms capable of promoting stability through multilateral cooperation rather than relying exclusively on outside powers.

Friday’s signing appears to represent the first major institutional step toward realizing that vision.

Maritime security takes center stage

Regional media reports suggest maritime security will feature prominently in discussions during the Jeddah summit.

The three countries have already backed Saudi Arabia’s recently announced multinational maritime initiative aimed at protecting commercial shipping through the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

The initiative gained urgency after repeated attacks on commercial vessels and energy infrastructure during recent regional conflicts disrupted global trade routes.

The Houthis in Yemen have also intensified attacks against Saudi-linked shipping in the Red Sea, further complicating regional security calculations.

Meanwhile, tensions in the Strait of Hormuz have highlighted the vulnerability of energy exports from Gulf producers, particularly Saudi Arabia, whose economy remains heavily dependent on oil exports.

Analysts say closer military coordination could improve intelligence sharing, naval patrols and joint responses to emerging threats affecting maritime commerce.

Y

emen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement announced a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia on Monday, threatening to expand the regional conflict linked to the ongoing U.S.-Iran war and raising concerns over global energy supplies and international shipping.

The Houthis said the “maritime embargo” would take effect immediately, describing it as retaliation against what they called Saudi Arabia’s continued blockade of Yemen. The announcement broadens the conflict beyond the Gulf, bringing the strategically vital Bab el-Mandeb Strait into focus after shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has already been severely disrupted.

The Saudi-led coalition said it would respond “with force” to the Houthi announcement and confirmed that additional security measures had been implemented to protect commercial and military vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a critical route for Saudi oil exports.

The latest development raises the possibility of simultaneous disruptions at both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb, two of the world’s most important maritime energy corridors.

Analysts warn that a prolonged closure of Bab el-Mandeb could significantly reduce Saudi oil exports and further strain global energy markets already affected by the fighting in the Gulf.

Diplomacy continues despite escalation

The Houthi announcement came as diplomatic efforts to restore a ceasefire between Washington and Tehran appeared to continue.

A senior Iranian official told Reuters that mediators had presented Tehran with a proposal for a 10-day ceasefire aimed at preserving the interim agreement reached last month.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry confirmed that mediators had submitted proposals but did not disclose further details.

Separately, Pakistani officials said Iranian Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni had requested Islamabad to resume mediation efforts between the United States and Iran.

Despite renewed diplomatic contacts, military operations continued across the region.

U.S. Central Command launched another wave of strikes against targets in Iran, while President Donald Trump defended the attacks, saying they were carried out in response to recent Iranian attacks that killed American service members.

The Pentagon identified two U.S. soldiers killed in an Iranian strike on a U.S. base in Jordan last week and said unidentified remains believed to belong to a third missing soldier had been recovered. A fourth U.S. service member was killed separately in northern Iraq during the controlled detonation of unexploded ordnance from an Iranian drone.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it launched missile attacks against U.S. military facilities in Jordan, Kuwait and Syria, while Bahrain reported repeated air raid sirens and Kuwait said its air defense systems intercepted Iranian drones overnight.

Shipping and oil markets under pressure

The Houthis’ announcement briefly pushed oil prices higher before markets stabilized amid hopes that diplomatic negotiations could prevent a broader regional war.

Insurance premiums for vessels operating in the Red Sea increased as shipping companies assessed the heightened security risks.

Meanwhile, the IRGC said two oil tankers had exploded after attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz via what it described as an “unsafe” route, though Reuters was unable to independently verify the claim.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) also reported that a commercial vessel had been struck by an unidentified projectile off the coast of Oman.

The latest escalation underscores the widening geographic scope of the conflict, with military operations now stretching from Iran and the Gulf to Yemen, Jordan, Syria and Iraq.

While diplomatic initiatives remain underway, continued exchanges of military strikes and expanding maritime threats have raised fears that the conflict could further destabilize regional security and disrupt global energy and trade routes.

(Source: Reuters)

C

anadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has described Saudi Arabia and Türkiye as the two most influential countries in shaping potential solutions to the Middle East’s ongoing crises, emphasizing the importance of direct engagement with regional powers over public criticism.

Speaking to reporters during an official visit to Jeddah on Friday, Carney said that meaningful progress on regional conflicts would depend largely on the role played by Riyadh and Ankara.

“The two most influential countries regarding potential solutions in the Middle East are Saudi Arabia and Türkiye,” Carney said.

Carney stressed that Canada remains deeply committed to developments in the Middle East but argued that constructive dialogue is more effective than criticizing governments from afar.

He said engaging directly with regional leaders does not imply endorsement of all their policies.

“Lecturing countries from a distance is an ineffective strategy,” Carney said. “It may be satisfying, but it is ineffective. Engagement can be effective. That does not mean it will always be decisive, but it can produce results.”

Talks with Erdoğan

Addressing Canada’s relations with Türkiye, Carney said he discussed unresolved bilateral issues during his recent meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Ankara.

He noted that the direct dialogue had yielded positive outcomes that would not have been possible through diplomacy conducted from Ottawa.

Diversifying Canada’s partnerships

The Canadian prime minister also highlighted his government’s efforts to reduce Canada’s heavy reliance on the United States by expanding international partnerships.

“We are overly dependent on the United States. That has been demonstrated,” Carney said. “Every Canadian strongly recognizes this, and we are seeking diversification.”

His remarks reflect Ottawa’s broader strategy of strengthening diplomatic and economic ties with a wider range of global partners as Canada seeks a more diversified foreign policy and trade agenda.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

U

nited Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia reported new drone-related security incidents on Sunday, highlighting rising regional tensions as diplomatic efforts to end the war involving Iran remain deadlocked.

Emirati officials said a drone strike caused a fire at the Barakah Nuclear Power Plant, while Saudi Arabia announced it had intercepted three drones entering from Iraqi airspace.

The incidents came as U.S. President Donald Trump intensified pressure on Iran, warning that Tehran must move quickly toward a deal with Washington.

“For Iran, the Clock is Ticking,” Trump wrote on Truth Social. “They better get moving, FAST.”

UAE investigates strike near nuclear facility

According to Emirati authorities, the drone that penetrated air defenses struck an electrical generator outside the inner perimeter of the Barakah nuclear facility. Officials said there were no injuries and no release of radioactive material.

The UAE defense ministry stated that two additional drones were intercepted successfully after approaching from the country’s “western border,” though officials did not specify who launched them.

The UAE’s Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation later confirmed that the plant remained safe and fully secure.

The International Atomic Energy Agency said emergency diesel generators were supplying power to one reactor unit and called for “maximum military restraint” around nuclear sites.

Emirati officials condemned the attack as a dangerous escalation and warned the country reserved the right to respond against those responsible, whether directly or through proxy groups.

Saudi Arabia intercepts drones from Iraq

Saudi Arabia separately announced that its air defenses intercepted three drones entering from Iraqi territory.

Riyadh warned it would take all necessary operational measures to defend its sovereignty and national security.

Since the April ceasefire in the broader Iran conflict, several drones have reportedly been launched from Iraq toward Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

The incidents underscore how regional tensions continue despite the reduction in large-scale hostilities after the ceasefire took effect more than five weeks ago.

The United States is demanding that Iran dismantle its nuclear program and loosen its control over the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.

Iran, meanwhile, is seeking compensation for war-related damage, an end to the U.S. blockade of Iranian ports and a halt to fighting across multiple fronts, including clashes involving Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Reuters reported that Trump is expected to meet national security advisers this week to discuss possible military options if diplomacy continues to stall.

Iranian military spokesperson Abolfazl Shekarchi warned that any renewed U.S. military action would trigger “new, aggressive, and surprise scenarios.”

Iranian foreign ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baqaei accused the United States and Israel of destabilizing global energy markets through what he described as “unprovoked military aggression.”

Strait of Hormuz remains central to conflict

The continuing disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has contributed to major instability in global oil markets.

Iran has maintained restrictions on shipping traffic through the waterway since the conflict began following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran in February. In response, Washington imposed a blockade on Iranian ports and said it had redirected dozens of commercial vessels to enforce sanctions measures.

Iranian officials said Tehran is preparing a new mechanism to regulate shipping through designated routes in the strait, though details have not yet been released.

Despite ongoing tensions, some diplomatic efforts elsewhere in the region have continued. Israel and Lebanon agreed Friday to extend their ceasefire for another 45 days, although clashes along the border have not fully stopped.

The broader regional conflict has already caused thousands of deaths in Iran and Lebanon and continues to threaten international energy supplies and maritime security across the Gulf.

(Source: Reuters)

S

audi Arabia secretly launched a series of military strikes against Iran earlier this year in retaliation for attacks on Saudi territory, according to Western and Iranian officials cited by Reuters, revealing a previously undisclosed escalation in the Middle East war.

The strikes, reportedly carried out by the Saudi Air Force in late March, mark the first known direct Saudi military action on Iranian soil. Reuters said two Western officials and two Iranian officials confirmed the operations, though the exact targets inside Iran remain unclear.

The covert attacks came amid a rapidly expanding regional war triggered after U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Iran on February 28. Since then, Iran has launched missiles and drones at Gulf states, targeting military installations, airports, civilian infrastructure and energy facilities across the region.

According to Reuters, the Saudi strikes were followed by a sharp decline in Iranian attacks on the kingdom. A Reuters tally based on Saudi defense ministry statements showed more than 105 missile and drone attacks during the week of March 25-31, compared with just over 25 attacks during April 1-6.

Saudi Arabia shifts toward a more assertive posture

For years, Saudi Arabia relied heavily on the United States for regional protection, particularly against Iranian threats. However, the ongoing war has exposed vulnerabilities in the Gulf security system, with Iranian missiles and drones reportedly penetrating regional defenses.

The reported strikes suggest Riyadh is adopting a more assertive military posture in response to direct attacks on its territory.

While Saudi officials did not confirm the operations publicly, a senior Saudi foreign ministry official reiterated Riyadh’s support for de-escalation and regional stability. Iranian authorities also declined official comment.

Reuters reported that Saudi Arabia informed Iran through diplomatic channels about the strikes while simultaneously warning Tehran against further escalation. Intensive diplomacy followed, eventually producing an informal understanding between the two rivals to reduce hostilities.

Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group said the sequence reflected a “pragmatic recognition” by both sides that unchecked escalation could spiral into a much broader regional conflict.

Gulf states increasingly drawn into conflict

The report also highlights how Gulf Arab states have become more directly involved in the war than previously acknowledged publicly.

According to Reuters and earlier reporting by The Wall Street Journal, the United Arab Emirates also conducted military strikes against Iran during the conflict. Unlike Saudi Arabia, however, the UAE reportedly adopted a more hawkish approach and engaged less frequently in public diplomacy with Tehran.

Despite the covert military exchanges, Saudi Arabia maintained communication channels with Iran, including contacts through Tehran’s ambassador in Riyadh. Analysts say this dual-track strategy — combining military deterrence with diplomacy — reflects Riyadh’s effort to avoid a full-scale regional war while protecting its security interests.

The de-escalation efforts appeared to take effect shortly before Washington and Tehran agreed to a broader ceasefire on April 7.

Tensions remain despite ceasefire efforts

Although direct Iranian attacks on Saudi territory reportedly declined, regional tensions continued.

Western officials cited by Reuters assessed that later attacks targeting Saudi Arabia originated primarily from armed groups in Iraq rather than directly from Iran itself, suggesting Tehran may have scaled back overt military operations while allied militias continued limited attacks.

Saudi Arabia later summoned Iraq’s ambassador to protest projectiles launched from Iraqi territory.

The kingdom also considered retaliatory measures against both Iran and Iraq after another spike in missile and drone attacks on April 7-8, according to Reuters. During that period, Pakistan reportedly deployed fighter jets to reassure Saudi Arabia and urged regional restraint as diplomatic efforts intensified.

The conflict has tested the fragile détente established between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 under a China-brokered agreement that restored diplomatic relations after years of hostility and proxy conflicts across the Middle East.

Despite the ongoing tensions, Saudi Arabia has managed to avoid severe disruptions to oil exports, partly because Red Sea shipping routes remained operational throughout much of the conflict.

(Source: Reuters)

In recent years, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin have become strategically important regions, both regionally and globally. One of the main reasons for this is its location at the intersection of global energy and trade routes. This characteristic places the region at the centre of the struggle for influence among regional and global actors, while it simultaneously experiences a high level of political uncertainty and an unstable security environment due to instability and external interventions. While some of these actors exacerbate instability through destructive actions, others contribute to stability and development goals through constructive policies.

Türkiye, a pioneer in constructive policies towards the region, has recently intensified its stabilizing efforts and prioritized cooperation with other regional actors. In this context, Ankara appears to favor a foreign policy that prioritizes coordination over competition, particularly with Cairo and Riyadh, with regard to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. This approach suggests that Türkiye is attempting to utilize its cooperation-oriented bilateral relations to contribute to resolving crises in third countries.

While this strategy has the potential to evolve into an inclusive alliance among the involved parties, it also demonstrates the possibility of cooperation in specific areas and the potential for these partnerships to yield tangible results. Indeed, it reveals that, in a global political landscape where complete alignment of interests is challenging, it is possible to achieve common interests through the coordination of foreign policies. In this context, it can be said that Türkiye aims to significantly impact the political landscape of these countries by coordinating its policies more closely with Egypt regarding Somalia and with Saudi Arabia regarding Sudan. It should also be noted that the gradual normalization process with Cairo, and the strengthening of the alliance with Riyadh following the establishment of trust, played a significant role in reaching this point.

Coordinated engagement in Somalia

In this context, Somalia is one of the countries in which foreign policy partnerships are most commonly observed. The country has long struggled with issues such as state-building, establishing security, creating a national army, and achieving political unity and integrity. These difficulties have been exacerbated by the privileged relationships established by certain external actors with local factions, which have undermined the central authority. Somaliland and Puntland, two federated regions of Somalia, are treated as independent actors by regional and global powers, separate from Mogadishu. This is considered a serious threat to Somalia’s national sovereignty.

Therefore, for many years, Türkiye has been working closely with the Mogadishu government to take the necessary steps to protect Somalia’s national integrity and achieve stability. In this regard, Türkiye’s military training support, infrastructure investments and humanitarian aid activities have been of great importance in strengthening Somalia’s institutional capacity. Recognizing that Somalia’s stability is vital for security and political stability in the Horn of Africa, Ankara has maintained a clear stance against any threats directed at the Mogadishu government.

A similar approach can be seen in Egypt’s recent policy towards Somalia. Indeed, Egypt views policies such as Ethiopia’s disregard for Somalia’s national legitimacy and Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as threats to regional stability. In this context, Cairo has begun to pursue a foreign policy aligned with Ankara’s on Somalia. Egypt’s prioritisation of Somalia’s territorial integrity and stability in the context of Red Sea security provides a rational basis for Ankara and Cairo’s converging policies on Somalia.

This approach has undoubtedly been made possible by the recent steps taken by Egypt and Türkiye to align their foreign policies in various areas and enhance coordination. These steps have revealed areas in which they can cooperate on foreign policy, while also helping to identify threats that need to be combated. Consequently, cooperation in Somalia is one of the most tangible outcomes of the rapprochement between the two countries since 2021. This is evident in both countries’ statements regarding actions against Somalia’s sovereignty, their stance on strengthening its central institutions, and the steps taken against actors that could undermine Somalia’s stability.

In the coming period, it is inevitable that Türkiye and Egypt will take more decisive steps in line with their common interests, in response to political, diplomatic, economic and military initiatives that could destabilize Somalia. This increases the likelihood that diplomatic steps will be taken first to resolve crises and that military options will only be considered if diplomatic efforts fail. For all actors wishing to strengthen their relations with Somalia, it is critically important to adopt an approach that promotes unity, not division, among local elements within the country. Comprehensive policies on vital issues for Somalia, such as political stability, economic development, counter-terrorism and maritime security, will benefit all parties, especially Somalia.

The Sudan crisis and the balance of power in the Red Sea

A similar scenario can be said to apply to Sudan, which has been experiencing a civil war for the past three years. Türkiye has long been making intensive diplomatic efforts to prevent instability in Sudan from worsening, but has been relatively isolated in this regard. The direct or indirect intervention of certain regional actors in the Sudanese conflict has exacerbated the situation in the country, resulting in a serious humanitarian crisis. However, Türkiye’s consistent approach, particularly its engagement with key regional stakeholders, has recently begun to bear fruit.

Furthermore, the resolution of the political crisis with Saudi Arabia and the rapid rapprochement process that followed has impacted foreign policy in Sudan. In other words, the normalization of relations between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia has paved the way for bilateral coordination on the Sudan issue, making the Sudanese crisis one of Ankara and Riyadh’s shared foreign policy agendas.

Indeed, the political crisis and instability in Sudan could have consequences that affect not only the domestic balance, but also the entire Red Sea region. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, a maritime neighbor of Sudan, will undoubtedly be directly affected by these developments. The Riyadh administration has made previous attempts to resolve the crisis in Sudan, as it is increasingly concerned about the situation. These diplomatic initiatives and mediation efforts were primarily aimed at preventing the conflict from escalating into a regional proxy war. This scenario poses risks for Saudi Arabia, which lies just across the Red Sea. Similarly, Türkiye is concerned about the potential for the regional crisis to spread, and aims to prevent the deepening of humanitarian tragedies. It has therefore made efforts to protect Sudan’s territorial integrity.

Resolving conflicts rather than competing with each other

Therefore, recognizing their overlapping foreign policy priorities regarding Sudan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia have begun to demonstrate a willingness to combine their forces in resolving the conflict rather than competing with each other, leveraging their diverse instruments and the actors they interact with. While this approach has not yet caused those responsible for the destructive effects in Sudan to back down, the rebel actors in Sudan are being forced to retreat, particularly due to the deployment of military instruments. The joint stance of Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, as well as Egypt’s support for these initiatives, has been key in determining the outcome of this process.

In conclusion, the relationship that Türkiye has developed with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, prioritizing coordination over competition, has yielded positive results for all parties on a pragmatic, mutually beneficial basis, producing concrete policy outcomes. These dialogue-based relationships could usher in a new era of cooperation in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin, replacing competitive policies. This could weaken external factors that fuel instability and create a deterrent effect for those pursuing negative agendas.

Rather than regional actors clashing over their interests in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin, it would be more positive and realistic for them to manage these interests through shared foreign policies and coordinated crisis management. Examining the cases of Somalia and Sudan, it can be seen that such a strategic choice is feasible, but the involved parties must also demonstrate their willingness to do so. While it is acknowledged that local actors are the primary subjects of these processes, the abandonment of competitive policies by external powers involved in regional politics is also a key requirement for achieving lasting stability.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

F

ollowing the mass protests that erupted in many Arab countries after 2010, regional actors adopted significant policy changes and formed alliances with like-minded countries. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia were among the most prominent examples of such alliances. Posing as anti-revolutionary, these two countries coordinated their actions in many countries. This partnership included the air, land, and sea blockade of Qatar, another Gulf country. Saudi Arabia and the UAE also cooperated in Yemen. Their cooperation escalated to the point of military intervention.

Over time, both the political alliance formed on the basis of opposition to Qatar and the military cooperation established in Yemen have become increasingly damaging for both countries. One of the first signs of this was seen in the different approaches to normalising relations with Qatar following the crisis. While Saudi Arabia rapidly normalised relations with Qatar through the Al-Ula Summit in 2021, the United Arab Emirates, although involved in this process, did not exhibit the same willingness or warmth as Riyadh.

For Saudi Arabia, intra-Gulf reconciliation meant ensuring regional stability and reasserting its leadership claim; however, the UAE preferred a more distant, cautious approach to relations with Qatar. This divergence can be interpreted as an early sign that the two countries’ strategic priorities were beginning to diverge subtly.

By the end of 2025, this divergence had transcended mere competition over Yemen, revealing that serious problems between the parties could no longer be concealed. In December 2025, Saudi Arabia and the UAE confronted each other directly in Yemen, marking one of the most severe crises in recent years. The crisis escalated to the point of open accusations, ultimately reaching a new phase with the UAE’s announcement of its complete withdrawal from Yemen.

What happened?

In December 2025, events in Yemen exposed the long-suppressed strategic differences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Arab coalition, formed in 2015 under the banner of ‘restoring the legitimate Yemeni government’ and countering the Houthis, had evolved by 2025 into an increasingly covert power rivalry, having started out as a joint security intervention. Differences in goals, means, and priorities within the coalition became particularly pronounced from 2018 onwards, and December 2025 marked a turning point at which these differences were formalized.

Saudi Arabia’s airstrikes targeting Southern Transitional Council (STC) elements in Mukalla, Hadramut, and Mehri between 26 and 31 December 2025 concretised this rupture. By targeting forces that were effectively its partners, which had been trained and supported by the UAE, Riyadh created an unprecedented situation in the history of the coalition. Consequently, Yemen became a conflict zone where actors within the same alliance used force against each other.

Hadramut and Mehri have assumed a central role in this new phase. These two eastern provinces, which remained relatively uninvolved in direct conflict with the Houthis for a long time, have now become the main testing ground for intra-coalition rivalry. The STC’s expansion into these provinces, which consolidated its control over South Yemen by early December 2025, was perceived by Saudi Arabia as crossing a red line. In an article for The Conversation, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, an expert on the Gulf, noted that the timing of this move, which coincided with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit, reinforced Riyadh’s belief that Abu Dhabi was aware of and approved this step.

This crisis has once again confirmed that the divisions within the coalition are nothing new. The clashes in Aden in 2018, between UAE-backed Security Belt forces and Yemeni government troops, were the first serious test of the coalition’s unity. In 2019, Riyadh interpreted the UAE’s reduction of its military presence and continued influence through local armed groups as the Emirates’ abandonment of Saudi Arabia. Betül Doğan Akkaş of Ankara University explains this process in her article for Anadolu Agency as a ‘buck-passing’ approach.

According to this approach, while the UAE remained part of the coalition, it largely shifted the political and military costs of the Yemen intervention onto Saudi Arabia. The Riyadh Agreement, signed in the same year, and the Presidential Council, established in 2022, were arrangements that masked, but did not eliminate, this structural division. Competition shifting to the eastern provinces in 2023 and 2024 set the stage for a process that culminated in the coalition becoming effectively dysfunctional in December 2025.

Why is South Yemen important?

The competition over Hadramut and Mahra is driven by deep geostrategic considerations. According to the US-based MBN, Hadramut holds Yemen’s most significant oil and natural gas reserves. This makes it critically important for the country’s economy and energy security, given its long coastline on the Arabian Sea and its potential export ports. In contrast, Mahri is directly linked to Saudi Arabia’s efforts to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, thanks to its proximity to the Omani border, access to the open sea, and alternative energy and transport corridors. The UAE, however, views these areas as part of a broader network of ports and maritime trade extending from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa.

Therefore, the crisis in Yemen reflects a clash of strategic approaches between the two countries regarding the future of the regional order, rather than a temporary military dispute. Saudi Arabia considers Yemen strategically important to its national security and regional position within its 2030 Vision, whereas the UAE is pursuing a riskier path, involving collaboration with non-state actors and establishing influence through ports and security networks.

Gulf rivalry beyond Yemen?

According to Arab News, a news agency close to Saudi Arabia, tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have deepened, extending beyond Yemen to broader regional politics. The report, citing CNN, suggests that the crisis may have been caused by misinformation conveyed to Abu Dhabi, namely that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had requested sanctions against the UAE from President Donald Trump during his November visit to Washington.

Riyadh categorically denies this claim and believes that the misinformation has led to the mobilization of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council in Yemeni provinces near the Saudi border. Tensions escalated into open conflict on 30 December, when Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes targeting what it claims is a military deployment in Yemen linked to the UAE that was not coordinated with the coalition.

According to Arab News, the disagreement is not limited to Yemen, pointing to a deeper strategic divergence between the two countries. Saudi Arabia believes the UAE is collaborating with destabilizing actors in Yemen, Sudan, the Horn of Africa, and Syria, and it criticizes Abu Dhabi’s normalization process with Israel, which began in 2020. Although the UAE has withdrawn its troops from Yemen and emphasized its commitment to Saudi Arabia’s security, the situation reveals that the relationship between the two countries has shifted from one of tacit harmony to one of overt and structural competition.

N

ewly released documents from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) show that disgraced financier and convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein attempted to cultivate relationships with influential political and business figures across the Middle East.

The most immediate fallout in the region came with the resignation of Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem, chief executive and chair of Dubai-based ports operator DP World.

According to two sources familiar with the matter, the decision followed increased scrutiny after Bin Sulayem’s name appeared in the DOJ’s document release. DP World confirmed the leadership change but declined further comment. Bin Sulayem did not respond to requests for comment.

Dubai’s ruler also issued a decree appointing a new chairman for Dubai’s Ports, Customs and Free Zone Corporation, one of several roles previously held by Bin Sulayem.

Email exchanges and personal correspondence

Some of the correspondence reviewed by Reuters included personal email exchanges between Epstein and Bin Sulayem. In one 2007 email, Bin Sulayem described meeting a woman in New York with whom Epstein had helped arrange contact.

An undated photograph included in the files shows Epstein and Bin Sulayem cooking together in what appears to be a relaxed setting.

Being named in the files does not constitute evidence of criminal wrongdoing. However, following the disclosure, some of DP World’s international financial partners raised concerns.

The UK development finance agency British International Investment (BII) and Canadian pension fund La Caisse announced they would pause new investments in DP World pending clarification. After the resignation was announced, both institutions signaled their willingness to continue cooperation under new leadership.

Attempted political influence during Qatar blockade

The DOJ documents suggest Epstein also attempted to engage political figures during the 2017–2021 blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt.

In exchanges with Sheikh Jabor Yousuf Jassim Al Thani, a Qatari businessman and member of the ruling family, Epstein offered strategic advice during the diplomatic crisis. He reportedly criticized Qatar’s leadership at the time and suggested steps to improve relations with Washington.

Epstein urged Doha to consider strengthening ties with Israel to maintain favorable relations with then–U.S. President Donald Trump. Qatar ultimately maintained its policy course, and the regional blockade ended in 2021 when ties were restored.

Qatar’s current prime minister and foreign minister, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, has not publicly commented on Epstein’s characterizations in the documents.

The files also reveal that Epstein discussed the potential public listing of Saudi Aramco in multiple email exchanges.

In correspondence dating back to 2016 and 2017, Epstein warned that a public offering could expose Saudi Arabia to legal risks and asset seizures. He also floated alternative proposals, including selling a major stake to China rather than pursuing a traditional IPO.

Saudi Aramco declined to comment on the emails.

Outreach to Egypt’s Mubarak family

Epstein’s network appeared to extend to Egypt as well. Documents show that following the 2011 ouster of former President Hosni Mubarak, a request for assistance from a family member — reportedly connected to Gamal Mubarak — was passed on to Epstein.

The nature of the requested assistance remains unclear, and Reuters was unable to determine whether Epstein took any action.

The large cache of emails, text messages and related documents reinforces what investigators have previously alleged: that Epstein sought to leverage his wealth and global access to build relationships with powerful figures in politics, finance, academia and business worldwide — including across the Middle East.

Reuters reported it could not determine how successful Epstein was in influencing decision-makers in the region.

The latest revelations add to ongoing scrutiny surrounding Epstein’s international connections, years after his 2019 death while in federal custody in the United States.

(Source: Reuters)

I

n recent years, Turkey’s foreign policy has fundamentally focused on establishing a belt of stability and development stretching from Asia to Africa. In this context, Ankara has played a constructive role in regional crisis areas with the aim of achieving lasting stability. Thanks to Turkey’s positive approach, crises have been prevented from deepening in many areas, including Libya, Somalia, Syria and Sudan.

Ankara has not hesitated to cooperate with like-minded actors, bringing together all parties that can contribute positively to the processes and striving to implement solution-oriented, multilateral approaches. Rather than deepening divisions, Turkey’s position has been to bring regional actors together around common interests, resolving the problems encountered through the region’s own dynamics. In this context, Turkey has recently joined forces with countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan, adopting joint positions on regional policies and acting in a coordinated manner to resolve issues.

Alliance motivations of regional powers

The primary motivation behind Turkey’s proposed alliance structure, which would integrate the region’s leading countries, is to address mounting security concerns and ensure lasting stability. This would allow the Middle East and the Islamic world to tackle the issues they have faced increasingly in recent years, and could pave the way for a climate of peace. In recent years, the divergent agendas and policy preferences of the relevant parties have produced destructive rather than constructive results, leading to instability becoming the norm in crisis-stricken countries and across the region as a whole. This is evident in crisis regions such as Syria, Libya, Sudan and Yemen, where resolving crises has proven much more difficult during periods of discord and lack of cooperation among regional actors.

Another motivation behind this process of rapprochement among regional powers is anxiety caused by shifts in global power balances and the resulting uncertainty. The new approach to US policy in the Middle East, coupled with increasing signs of Washington’s diminishing presence in the region, has caused regional actors to adopt a more cautious approach to traditional security mechanisms. Consequently, countries in the region have increased their efforts to establish new security and cooperation mechanisms. While Turkey and Saudi Arabia’s recent initiatives towards this goal have resulted in concrete agreements being signed, the prospect of alliance structures emerging, comprising actors with shared priorities who intend to join, has strengthened.

Another factor encouraging the formation of regional alliances is the economic cooperation potential that has been stifled by an unstable political environment. Competitive foreign policies, regional leadership ambitions and mutual distrust among the region’s leading figures have hindered rapprochement and occasionally pushed these countries towards hostile policies. This situation creates a geo-economic context that conflicts with the goals of regional actors seeking to strengthen their economies or establish stronger, more resilient economic models through diversification. Cooperation initiatives between countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have the potential to foster closer interaction, both in terms of security and economically.

A political ecosystem established with the encouragement and leadership of regional powers would encourage the participation of other actors and pave the way for all parties to embrace the broader goal of achieving economic stability and development, particularly in the Middle East and the Islamic world. If embraced by the region’s leading actors, such an initiative will yield lasting benefits in terms of its potential outcomes and will help establish long-term stability. This is particularly true for the founding and participating countries of this alliance.

Turkey’s leadership in regional cooperation

Turkey currently supports such an initiative and, in this context, is intensifying its coordination with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in particular. Turkey has been active in many crisis areas in the region in recent years and has made intensive efforts to resolve crises and achieve lasting stability. However, Ankara prioritises cooperation with all relevant actors to achieve lasting solutions in regional crisis areas, and in this context it also needs allies. Acting together with the region’s leading powers will strengthen Turkey’s capacity to resolve crises. Increased cooperation with Egypt in Libya and Somalia, Saudi Arabia in Sudan and Qatar in Syria, for example, would strengthen coordination between these actors and enable them to play a more active role in post-stabilisation reconstruction processes in the relevant countries.

Another example of this can be seen in Gaza. Since 7 October 2023, Turkey has taken the strongest stance against the massacres carried out by Israel in Gaza and conducted intensive diplomacy with regional and global actors to stop Tel-Aviv. In particular, Turkey acted in concert with Egypt and Qatar to pressure the United States into forcing the Israeli government to agree to a ceasefire. On 9 October 2025, the Gaza Peace Plan — prepared under US leadership and agreed by Israel and Hamas — came into force, having been signed by Egypt, Turkey and Qatar. Intensive coordination between Ankara and Cairo during this process pressured both the US and Israel into accepting the ceasefire. In this respect, Ankara and Cairo’s joint action on Gaza can be seen as one of the most effective steps towards finding a solution.

Another concrete outcome of Turkey’s potential alliance with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and other leading regional countries could be the implementation of a joint defence system. Pakistan’s nuclear capacity, Saudi Arabia’s financial power and Turkey’s advanced defense technologies, if combined, could create a power centre that would redefine regional geopolitics. Supporting and expanding such a structure in future with the involvement of like-minded countries could provide the ‘ability to act together’ that has been lacking in the Islamic world for many years. This would be of critical importance in enabling faster and more effective steps to be taken in resolving crises, fighting external threats, coordinating foreign policies and acting jointly in development processes.

In a geopolitical landscape where global risks are increasing and regional unity is becoming more important, an alliance led by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey would, in principle, be open to actors adopting constructive regional policies and not susceptible to external destructive agendas. This bloc will adopt the fundamental approach of being an ‘inclusive cooperation platform to protect common interests’ rather than a rigid bloc.

In addition, this alliance will adopt a multinational and participatory philosophy, particularly when it comes to resolving crises centred on the Middle East, ending conflicts, and building a collective future. This approach aims to prioritise the welfare and security of the peoples of the region. The existence of such an alliance would play a pivotal role in re-establishing the Islamic world’s presence in global diplomacy, enabling countries that have struggled to form meaningful alliances for many years to become significant players in international politics.

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ecent contacts between Riyadh, Ankara and Islamabad regarding defense and security policy are the result of a long-term search for a joint defesce platform. According to Pakistani officials, a draft text has been prepared as part of this ten-month process of joint defense cooperation. It is clear, therefore, that the process is not a reaction to sudden developments. In fact, the process is not new, as evidenced by the consultative meetings held between the three countries in Riyadh in 2023. The issue demonstrates the three major power centers’ will to enter a period of more coordinated, joint and consultative defense partnerships as a result of long-term security assessments.

Islamabad and Ankara from Riyadh’s perspective

Each of the three countries has reasons to strengthen its defense partnership with the other two. From Riyadh’s perspective, defense and security cooperation with Islamabad does not represent a new era. This is because the two countries have enjoyed a long-standing strategic and tactical defense and security partnership for many years. For many years, Riyadh has benefited from Islamabad’s strategic assets, including its deep-rooted military tradition and human resources. At the same time, Riyadh considers Islamabad to be a reliable partner, not only for providing military personnel, but also for its contributions in the areas of training, consultancy and operational experience. The depth of the two countries’ military relations can be traced back to the Cold War era, the Gulf Wars, counter-terrorism operations and the strengthening of defense infrastructure.

However, military instability centered on Israel and Iran recently spiraled out of control, reaching its peak when Qatar was attacked by Iran in June 2025 and by Israel in September 2025. Perceptions that the US has not acted decisively enough on regional security issues have prompted Riyadh to strengthen ongoing military, defense and security cooperation, resulting in the signing of a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Consequently, recent geopolitical developments have made Riyadh’s cooperation with Islamabad more meaningful from a geopolitical perspective.

Recent official statements from Ankara indicating that it will strengthen its partnership with these two countries are not seen by Riyadh as a substitute for its structural security relations with other actors, but rather as a complementary factor in these processes. Since 2020–21, Ankara and Riyadh have elevated the climate of normalization in their bilateral relations through high-level visits, consolidating their cooperation to include strategic sectors such as the defense industry. The strengthening of Riyadh’s defense industry localization goals within this framework of cooperation, and the statements by the Saudi Arabian Military Industries General Authority (GAMI) that localization had reached 20 per cent by early 2025, demonstrate the benefits of strengthening relations between the two countries.

Fundamentally, therefore, Riyadh’s entry into the existing trilateral defense partnership involves primarily institutionalizing and strengthening its relations with Islamabad and Ankara.

The Geopolitical significance of the Tripartite platform for Riyadh

From Riyadh’s perspective, the talks held within the framework of the tripartite platform are based on several reasons. The fundamental reasons behind Riyadh’s desire to formalize the platform as an institution can be summarized as follows:

Firstly, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have been engaged in a long-standing, covert rivalry; Abu Dhabi does not accept Riyadh’s role as the most influential country in the Gulf. Within this framework, the two countries are engaged in geostrategic and geoeconomic competition as they essentially pursue the same goals through different means. As Arab Gulf monarchies, both countries have a strategy of diversifying their economic resources for the post-oil era. Their efforts to accelerate the transition to the post-oil era through their vision programs, as well as their policies of halting or expanding conflicts in the region according to their own interests, have brought this increasingly prominent competition to the fore.

Rather than adopting a reactive stance, therefore, Riyadh’s policy is to develop defence relations with other power centres in the region, preventing the possibility of isolation within the Gulf power balance without severing ties with Abu Dhabi. Riyadh is expanding its political, economic, and security ties with partners such as Ankara, Islamabad, Doha, and Cairo, seeking to give its foreign policy strategic depth beyond the Gulf and thereby narrow Abu Dhabi’s room for manoeuver. The talks held in late January 2026, which resulted in an agreement between Abu Dhabi and New Delhi to develop economic, political and military relations, confirm these parameters of intra-Gulf balances.

Riyadh’s pursuit of defense partnerships with Ankara and Islamabad is linked to efforts to bolster state capacity and bolster support for central governments in the Middle East. Since 7 October 2023, Israel’s destabilizing, unlawful and disproportionate political and military actions in the Middle East, combined with its previous actions, have given rise to the idea that a new military and political order will be established in the region. Indeed, following its occupation of southern Syria after 8 December 2024, Israel initiated activities in support of Druze communities in Deraa, Suwayda and Quneitra. It also established a political-military partnership with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, and officially recognized Somaliland, an autonomous region affiliated with Somalia.

These actions necessitated the formation of an opposition bloc to the divisions and structures that threaten regional stability and the integrity of the state. Therefore, Riyadh has positioned its foreign policy within this framework in response to these developments, seeking to institutionalize cooperation with constructive regional actors such as Ankara and Islamabad. By positioning itself against Israel’s vision for the region, Riyadh is able to demonstrate political deterrence and take a collective stance without engaging in direct warfare.

Institutionalization and expectations for the future

In this context, the tripartite platform expected to be established between Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia should not be interpreted as a new ‘military alliance’ for Riyadh, nor as a radical departure from existing partnerships. On the contrary, Riyadh’s actions may reflect a fundamental redefining of its security aspirations in light of changing regional and global geopolitical conditions and its surrounding environment. Eroding confidence in the US-centric security architecture, deepening intra-Gulf competition and the simultaneous pressure of multi-faceted and multi-layered crises such as those in Yemen, Sudan and Gaza are pushing Riyadh towards more flexible, multi-partner security frameworks.

In this context, the tripartite platform provides Riyadh with an opportunity to share military risks, expand political attention, and increase deterrence. Considering Turkey’s defense industry capacity and strategic experience, Pakistan’s military experience, and Saudi Arabia’s financial, economic, and political influence, the resulting picture shows greater deterrence and strategic influence for each actor in terms of their own balance of power. At the same time, this framework offers Riyadh the opportunity to offset, albeit to a limited extent, the erosion of its legitimacy on the Israeli–Palestinian issue, thereby strengthening its claim to regional leadership.

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he head of Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council (STC), an ally of the UAE, Aidarus Al-Zoubaidi, has fled southern Yemen under cover of darkness, according to a statement released Thursday by the Saudi-led Joint Forces Coalition.

Coalition spokesman Maj. Gen. Turki Al-Malki said Al-Zoubaidi and several associates “escaped in the dead of night” aboard a vessel that departed from the port of Aden heading toward Somaliland.

According to the statement, the group boarded the vessel BAMEDHAF after disabling its maritime identification systems. The ship later docked at the port of Berbera.

Al-Malki said Al-Zoubaidi contacted Maj. Gen. Awad Saeed bin Musleh Al-Hababi, commander of joint operations of the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces, to inform him of his arrival.

Following this communication, Al-Zoubaidi and his companions boarded an Ilyushin Il-76 aircraft, flight MZB-9102, which departed without declaring its destination.

The aircraft landed at Mogadishu International Airport at 3:15 p.m. local time (1215 GMT), remained on the ground for approximately one hour, and departed again at 4:17 p.m. (1317 GMT) toward the Arabian Gulf.

Identification systems disabled mid-flight

The coalition said the aircraft switched off its identification systems while flying over the Gulf of Oman, reactivating them shortly before landing at Al Reef military airport in Abu Dhabi at 8:47 p.m. (1747 GMT).

Maritime records indicate that the BAMEDHAF is registered under the flag of Saint Kitts and Nevis—the same flag used by the vessel GREENLAND, which previously transported military vehicles and weapons from Fujairah to the port of Mukalla, the statement said.

The disclosure comes amid heightened tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over southern Yemen. Riyadh has previously accused Abu Dhabi of encouraging STC forces to conduct military operations along Saudi Arabia’s southern border in Hadhramaut and Mahra provinces—an allegation denied by the UAE.

STC pushes for transitional phase

On Friday, Al-Zoubaidi announced a two-year “transitional phase” that would include dialogue with political actors in southern Yemen and a referendum on the future of the region.

The STC argues that successive Yemeni governments have politically and economically marginalized the south and has renewed calls for secession. Yemen’s internationally recognized government rejects these claims and maintains its commitment to the country’s unity.

The episode has deepened a growing rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the two most powerful members of the Gulf coalition backing Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Al-Zoubaidi had failed to appear in Riyadh for crisis talks on Wednesday amid escalating turmoil in southern Yemen, and Saudi claims that the UAE assisted his escape have raised the stakes in a crisis that erupted last month when STC forces swept through southern areas and reached the Saudi border, fracturing the coalition as it continues to battle Iran-backed Houthi forces.

(Source: Anadolu and Reuters)

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audi Arabia said on Tuesday that its national security was a “red line” and backed a demand for United Arab Emirates forces to leave Yemen within 24 hours, marking Riyadh’s strongest language yet toward its Gulf ally amid escalating tensions in the war-torn country.

The warning came hours after a Saudi-led coalition carried out an airstrike on the southern Yemeni port of Mukalla, targeting what it described as unauthorized foreign military support for UAE-backed southern separatist forces.

Yemen’s Saudi-backed presidential council head, Rashad al-Alimi, ordered Emirati forces to withdraw and announced the cancellation of a defense pact with the UAE, accusing Abu Dhabi of fueling internal conflict through its support for the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group seeking autonomy in southern Yemen.

“It has been definitively confirmed that the United Arab Emirates pressured and directed the STC to undermine state authority through military escalation,” Alimi said in a televised address, according to Yemen’s state news agency.

Saudi Arabia urged the UAE to comply with the withdrawal demand. The UAE’s foreign ministry did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Gulf stock markets fell following the flare-up, reflecting investor concern over rising tensions between the two longtime allies.

Mukalla strike and separatist advance

The Saudi-led coalition said the airstrike on Mukalla port caused no casualties or collateral damage. Two sources told Reuters the strike targeted a dock where cargo from two vessels had been unloaded.

Coalition officials said the ships arrived over the weekend from the UAE port of Fujairah without authorization, disabled their tracking systems, and unloaded weapons and combat vehicles intended to support the STC.

Yemeni state television aired footage showing black smoke rising from the port and burned vehicles in the area.

The STC, backed by the UAE, has recently made significant advances in southern Yemen, breaking years of military stalemate and seizing control of large areas, including parts of the strategic Hadramout province, which borders Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia had warned the STC against further military moves in Hadramout and demanded a withdrawal, a call the group rejected.

Deepening rift among allies

The UAE was part of the Saudi-led coalition fighting Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement from 2015. Although Abu Dhabi began reducing its troop presence in 2019, it has continued to wield influence through local allied forces, including the STC.

The recent STC offensive has brought Saudi Arabia and the UAE closer to direct confrontation, exposing fractures within the coalition that once fought the Houthis together.

In response to the escalation, Alimi imposed a 72-hour no-fly zone and a sea and land blockade on ports and crossings, with limited exemptions authorized by the coalition.

The STC’s leadership in Hadramout rejected the withdrawal demand, calling the Mukalla strike “a blatant attack on Hadramout and its people,” and described the UAE as an ally that should not be abandoned.

Yemen’s internationally recognized government accused the STC of staging an armed rebellion and serving Houthi interests, while praising Saudi Arabia for acting to prevent eastern Yemen from descending into chaos.

The Houthis continue to control northern Yemen, including the capital Sanaa, while the conflict remains fragmented among rival factions despite years of international efforts to end the war.

(Source: Reuters and Aljazeera)

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he Gulf region is one of the areas with which Türkiye has had the most intense foreign policy interactions in recent years. Since 2020, this rapprochement has intensified, and Türkiye’s partnerships with the region’s leading foreign policy actors have grown. Notably, its long-standing close relations with Qatar have evolved into a strategic partnership. Meanwhile, relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which were once defined by competition, have transformed into cooperative engagements.

Meanwhile, Ankara has also maintained contact with other countries in the region, including Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain. These interactions have brought potential cooperation opportunities in various sectors, including the defense industry, trade, energy, and manufacturing, to the forefront. In line with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s approach of establishing direct contact with Gulf countries, reciprocal visits have increased.

From October 21 to 23, 2025, President Erdoğan undertook a Gulf tour covering three countries. Accompanied by numerous ministers, bureaucrats, and journalists, he visited Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman. There, he engaged in activities aimed at strengthening Türkiye’s relations with Gulf countries, particularly in areas such as the defense industry and energy. The signing of 24 cooperation and partnership agreements during the visit suggests that the relationship is evolving into a stronger partnership.

What makes Qatar, Oman and Kuwait different?

There are certain points that distinguish Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman—the three countries visited by President Erdoğan on his recent tour of the Gulf region—from other Gulf countries. First, these three countries differ from others in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain, particularly in terms of their foreign policy approaches and orientations. Notably, Qatar’s relations with Türkiye, its North African policies, and its moderate stance on the Muslim Brotherhood distinguish it from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Conversely, unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Oman and Kuwait tend to adopt a neutral and conciliatory stance in their foreign relations.

Another aspect that sets Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman apart from other Gulf countries is how they handle the Palestinian issue. Notably, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain normalized relations with Israel by signing the Abraham Accords in 2020. Recently, there has been discussion about the possibility of Saudi Arabia taking a similar step. In contrast, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman have opposed Israel’s occupation policies in Palestine on many regional and international platforms.

These countries also use their diplomatic influence on the global stage to advocate for Palestinian rights. For example, Qatar has hosted Hamas members for many years and uses the Aljazeera channel to create international public pressure against Israel. Since October 7, Oman has strongly criticized Israel’s massacres in Gaza in official statements. This reaction is also evident at the societal level. In Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait, Friday sermons, television broadcasts, and civil society organizations have condemned Israel while expressing solidarity with Gaza and the Palestinians.

Qatar and Oman: Diverting from Saudi Arabia and the UAE

On the other hand, one could argue that Qatar and Oman have diverged from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain in their policies toward Iran. In fact, Qatar is closely aligned with Tehran due to its cooperation with Iran in the Persian Gulf and their similar policies on other regional issues. During the 2017 blockade, Iran and Türkiye provided Qatar with significant support, particularly by supplying food products.

Oman, on the other hand, is said to have the strongest historical and cultural ties to Iran of any country in the Gulf region. Recently, these two countries conducted military exercises involving land and naval forces. In contrast, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Manama have adopted policies closer to those of the U.S. and Israel regarding Iran. Thus, they differ from Doha and Muscat in this respect.

Finally, it is known that all three countries closely cooperate with the United Kingdom in the defense industry. In this context, Türkiye has been planning to purchase Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets for some time. Due to growing regional risks and security concerns, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman have added 22, 15, and 12 Eurofighter jets, respectively, to their air forces in recent years.

Despite their security partnerships with the U.S. and the U.K., these countries have been striving to develop their own capabilities. According to reports, Qatar ordered 36 Eurofighters, Kuwait ordered 28, and Oman ordered 12. Considering that Türkiye has put the purchase of used Eurofighters on its agenda, President Erdogan’s choice of these three countries for his Gulf visit becomes more meaningful. Indeed, statements made after the visit indicated that the purchase of Eurofighter jets was specifically negotiated with Oman and Qatar.

From cooperation to strategic partnership

President Erdoğan’s Gulf tour from October 21 to 23 is significant because it elevates Türkiye’s relations with regional countries beyond traditional cooperation into strategic partnerships. Considering the nature of relations and partnerships in recent years, this has already been achieved with Qatar. Türkiye provided critical support to Qatar when it became the target of a political blockade initiated by its neighbors on June 5, 2017. As a result, relations between the two countries strengthened. Following the blockade, Türkiye established a military base in Qatar, becoming one of the Doha administration’s most reliable global partners.

Over the following years, Türkiye and Qatar continued to strengthen their relationship, particularly with regard to regional policies. They pursued common policies in regions such as the Horn of Africa and North Africa. Most recently, during Israel’s attacks on Gaza, Ankara and Doha pursued overlapping policies, calling for Tel Aviv and the Benjamin Netanyahu government to be held accountable under international law. Disturbed by Qatar’s stance, Israel bombed the offices of Aljazeera and the Qatar Red Crescent in Gaza.

Then, in September, Israel directly targeted Doha, the capital of Qatar, carrying out an attack against Hamas members there. Despite Israel’s aggression, Turkey continued to support Qatar. After the attack, President Erdoğan attended the Doha summit and expressed his support for Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. As part of his Gulf tour, Erdoğan also made his second visit to Qatar within two months.

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t a cost of $500 billion, the city of NEOM lies at the heart of Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman’s (MbS) initiative to modernize and reform Saudi Arabia. The project, which covers an area of 26,000 square kilometers, is being developed in Tabuk, in northwestern Saudi Arabia, and will extend to the borders of Jordan and Egypt. According to some, NEOM will become Saudi Arabia’s “Dubai” and capture the appeal that regional rivals have gained from their cities. At the core of the project is The Line, a 170-kilometer-long, car-free, vertical-axis city designed to have zero carbon emissions. Sub-projects such as the Trojena ski resort, the Oxagon industrial city, and the Sindalah island complex will also contribute to NEOM’s multi-layered architecture. However, it is evident that NEOM has become as much of a problem as it is a project.

Recent developments concerning the NEOM project that have come to public attention indicate that the project is evolving into more than just a technical construction process; it is also at the center of economic and political pressures. Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) commissioning international consulting firms to conduct feasibility studies on The Line project reveals that the administration has its doubts about the project’s feasibility. Reports that the NEOM administration plans to lay off more than a thousand employees and relocate some of them to Riyadh during the same period suggest an administrative restructuring is underway.

Although NEOM was initially conceived as an economic development initiative, it was marketed as a symbol of Saudi Arabia’s modernization aspirations due to its central role in the 2030 Vision. However, recent developments centered on NEOM and other mega-giga projects show that this vision has not been realized at the same pace on the ground. The project is subject to a process shaped by technical limitations, financial pressures, and geopolitical tensions. Consequently, contrary to the grand narrative at its inception, NEOM’s current situation has become a multidimensional picture of fragility.

NEOM’s internal vulnerabilities

The loss of momentum in NEOM’s ongoing construction process is due to structural problems inherent to the project itself. Building a city of this scale in a desert climate like Saudi Arabia’s requires capabilities, technologies, and financing that go beyond traditional engineering practices. High temperatures, intense dust erosion, water scarcity, and topographical challenges have made adhering to the projected timeline difficult. In this context, the length of the 170-kilometer Line project and its planned population capacity, as initially announced, show a significant mismatch with the progress achieved on the ground. Building infrastructure networks suitable for desert conditions, integrating power lines, and managing water resources sustainably have posed serious technical challenges that have not yet been fully resolved.

The financial aspect of NEOM’s vulnerabilities exacerbates the situation. The Public Investment Fund’s (PIF) announcement of an estimated $8 billion loss by the end of 2024 suggests that financing sources are limited. A lack of coordination at the management level, frequent changes in leadership positions, and slow decision-making processes are weakening the project institutionally. Progress continues partially in some sub-regions, such as Sindalah, but there are significant deviations from the planned schedule. As this table shows, NEOM’s most fundamental problems stem from internal fragilities rather than external geopolitical pressures.

The pressure of geopolitical tensions

The main tensions shaping Saudi Arabia’s neighborhood today include the Houthi crisis in Yemen, attacks on ships and tankers in the Red Sea, the conflict in Gaza prior to the ceasefire, rising regional tensions, ongoing competition with Iran, and oil price volatility. Since October 2023, the Houthis’ attacks on ships and tankers linked to Israel in the Red Sea have prompted Saudi Arabia to decide to build an alternative land trade corridor to reduce its dependence on the Red Sea route. However, this preference for a circumventing route could disadvantage NEOM’s logistics strategy in terms of time and cost.

Due to its reliance on the Red Sea coast and imported materials, NEOM is experiencing longer shipping routes, higher insurance costs, and delayed deliveries of materials and equipment due to Houthi attacks. This has been observed to slow down the pace of construction. To reduce its dependence on the Red Sea, Riyadh is attempting to establish a land trade corridor, which could impose additional time and production cost burdens on the project and the Saudi budget.

The ongoing conflict in Gaza and growing security concerns are heightening caution among foreign investors, who are adopting a wait-and-see approach that could disrupt project financing. Recent developments, such as a strategic review of the Line project and a new Trojena project tender, indicate that plans are being revised against this backdrop. Therefore, internal technical and financial constraints remain decisive for NEOM, while geopolitical tensions form the external framework that narrows these constraints.

Concrete manifestations of the slowdown

Recent developments reveal that internal fragilities in NEOM are exacerbated by regional geopolitical pressures. The Line, the project’s symbolic core, has officially been placed under strategic review. This indicates that timetables, phases, and targets may be redefined. Similarly, the cancellation and reopening of the main tender processes for the Trojena ski resort suggest that technical and financial calculations have fallen behind initial plans. Another factor contributing to the international visibility of this situation is the assessment by Moody’s. The international credit rating agency has described the progress of Saudi Arabia’s megaprojects as “uneven,” a finding closely monitored by investment circles.

During the same period, attacks carried out by the Houthis in the Red Sea have extended maritime shipping routes, increased insurance premiums for companies, and made delivery times unpredictable. The resulting slowdown in the flow of materials and equipment critical to NEOM’s construction process has directly affected the pace of construction. Additionally, information disclosed to the public about the project’s internal expenditure items has raised questions about resource prioritization. These developments demonstrate that NEOM’s slowdown is not due to one factor, but rather, a combination of internal technical and financial constraints and geopolitical pressures that create a mutually reinforcing cycle. The overall picture shows that the project is progressing in a complex arena, constrained by economic and geopolitical conditions.

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audi Arabia is in advanced discussions with the Trump administration to secure a new defense agreement that could see Washington extend formal security guarantees to the kingdom, similar to the U.S.-Qatar pact signed last month, according to officials familiar with the matter.

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is expected to visit the White House next month, marking his first trip to the United States since 2018. The visit is anticipated to culminate in the signing of a deal that would deepen military and intelligence cooperation between the two longtime partners.

Sources close to the negotiations said Riyadh hopes the accord will be “robust” and reflect the kingdom’s growing role in regional security, while reinforcing Washington’s long-standing commitment to Gulf stability.

A senior Trump administration official confirmed that “there are discussions about signing something when the crown prince comes, but the details are in flux.” Both the White House and the State Department declined to elaborate, although a spokesperson emphasized that U.S. defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia remains “a strong bedrock of our regional strategy.”

The move comes just weeks after President Donald Trump signed an executive order guaranteeing Washington’s protection of Qatar following a missile strike on Doha by Israel that targeted Hamas’s political leadership. The attack rattled Gulf states and reignited concerns about regional instability.

Under the U.S.-Qatar pact, any assault on the Gulf emirate is to be treated as a threat to America’s peace and security, a commitment that Saudi Arabia now hopes to replicate. The proposed Saudi deal is expected to encompass joint defense planning, intelligence sharing, and enhanced cooperation in missile and air defense.

A Long-sought security guarantee

Saudi Arabia has pursued a formal defense agreement with Washington for years, viewing it as a key pillar of its security doctrine and a foundation for Crown Prince Mohammed’s sweeping Vision 2030 development agenda.

The kingdom previously sought a comprehensive defense treaty with the Biden administration that was linked to plans for normalizing relations with Israel. However, those negotiations collapsed after Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel and the subsequent war in Gaza.

Prince Mohammed has since reiterated that normalization with Israel would only be possible if a Palestinian state were established — a stance at odds with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s firm rejection of Palestinian statehood.

The Saudi leader, who has accused Israel of committing genocide in Gaza, has sought to refocus his country’s diplomacy on achieving greater strategic autonomy, balancing ties with the United States, China, and other powers.

Security concerns

Riyadh’s renewed push for a U.S. defense pact follows a period of heightened regional tension. In recent months, the Middle East has seen missile strikes, proxy conflicts, and shifting alliances.

The Israeli strike on Hamas officials in Doha and the 12-day Israel-Iran war in June — during which Tehran fired missiles at the U.S. military base in Qatar in retaliation for Trump’s bombing of Iranian nuclear sites — have intensified Gulf nations’ concerns over Washington’s reliability.

Saudi Arabia last month signed a “strategic mutual defense” pact with Pakistan, a nuclear-armed ally, in what analysts describe as a signal to both Washington and Tel Aviv that Riyadh is prepared to diversify its security partnerships if necessary.

“There’s an understanding that there’s no real alternative to the U.S. security architecture in the region,” said Firas Maksad, managing director for the Middle East and North Africa at Eurasia Group. “But there are ways Saudi Arabia can plug holes and strengthen its deterrence profile.”

Maksad added that Prince Mohammed’s trillion-dollar economic transformation plans depend heavily on regional stability. “Enhancing security cooperation with the U.S. is absolutely paramount to sustaining investor confidence,” he said.

A complicated relationship

While the Trump administration appears receptive to a new pact, obstacles remain. Hussein Ibish, a senior scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, noted that Trump’s continued insistence on Saudi-Israeli normalization could complicate negotiations.

“That doesn’t mean we can’t get past it — because all Trump has to do is decide it’s a good idea,” Ibish said. “But we’re not there yet.”

Prince Mohammed, who forged close personal ties with Trump and his son-in-law Jared Kushner during Trump’s first term, is seen as eager to rebuild that rapport. His upcoming visit will be his first to Washington since the 2018 fallout over the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, an episode that strained U.S.-Saudi relations for years.

Saudi Arabia remains one of the largest purchasers of U.S. weapons. During Trump’s previous tenure, the White House announced a $142 billion arms package for the kingdom, which included missile defense systems, air force modernization, and naval upgrades — a deal the administration described as “the largest defense agreement in history.”

However, Riyadh has grown increasingly wary of Washington’s shifting priorities, particularly after the U.S. failed to respond to a 2019 missile and drone attack — blamed on Iran — that temporarily shut down half of Saudi Arabia’s oil production.

A turning point for the region’s balance of power

Analysts say a formal U.S.-Saudi defense pact could mark a turning point for the region’s balance of power, particularly amid the continuing conflict in Gaza and uncertainty over Iran’s future role.

“The region is in flux, and the Gulf monarchies are recalibrating their strategies,” said Maksad. “For Saudi Arabia, this is about ensuring it remains at the center of any future security framework.”

If finalized, the deal would reaffirm Washington’s role as the region’s primary security guarantor — but also underscore Riyadh’s growing leverage as it navigates a rapidly changing geopolitical landscape.

(Source: The Financial Times)

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he defense agreement recently concluded between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is more than a conventional arrangement between two allies. It is a harbinger of a shifting order, signaling how Middle Eastern power is being reconstituted in ways that diminish U.S. centrality while elevating Gulf-driven legitimacy and multipolar alignments. Crystallized against the backdrop of global turbulence, this pact reflects how security, economics, and credibility are being rethreaded into a new fabric of regional architecture.

The Pakistan–Saudi defense agreement carries deep implications. For Saudi Arabia, it adds a new layer of strategic depth. For decades, Pakistan has quietly underwritten Riyadh’s security, particularly through military training and personnel support. By formalizing this cooperation, Saudi Arabia diversifies away from exclusive reliance on Washington at a time when American commitments look increasingly uncertain. For Pakistan, the pact enhances prestige and cements its role as a core partner in shaping Islamic and regional security.

But the broader significance lies in its network effect: once Saudi Arabia anchors itself in such an arrangement, the gravitational pull will inevitably extend across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman cannot afford to remain outside an emerging defense framework that binds Pakistan and Saudi Arabia together. What begins bilaterally is likely to evolve into a GCC-wide lattice of security arrangements, forming the skeleton of a new Middle Eastern order.

Strategy of recalibration

Crucially, Saudi Arabia has positioned this defense pact at the apex of the global power center. It is not framed as a narrow bilateral contract but as part of Riyadh’s sovereign strategy of recalibration: balancing U.S. ties while embedding its security in multipolar circuits that stretch from Islamabad to Beijing and Moscow. This is both hedging and projection, securing the Kingdom against volatility while ensuring that Saudi leadership defines the grammar of regional security. Pakistan, in turn, is elevated from peripheral partner to central architect in this evolving equation.

This realignment intersects directly with the unresolved Palestinian question. For decades, Palestine was treated as a frozen conflict, endlessly deferred while U.S. power guaranteed the regional status quo. That status quo is now unraveling. Recent moves by Western capitals, including recognitions of Palestinian statehood by European governments, are not simply moral awakenings, but signs of the old structure crumbling.

Yet while Europe shows visible adjustment, Washington remains the primary bastion of Israel’s narrative power. Recognition and peace are now treated not merely as ethical gestures, but as instruments of realignment in the global balance of power. In this context, Saudi Arabia’s insistence that normalization with Israel must pass through Palestinian recognition is not mere symbolism; it is a geopolitical condition backed by sovereign wealth, strategic independence, and Chinese leverage.

Israel at a crossroads

This places Israel at a crossroads. For decades, it thrived as Washington’s forward outpost, the spearhead of U.S. regional dominance, and the beneficiary of unconditional American support. That model is now fraying. To endure in the emerging landscape, Israel must pivot from reliance on unilateral American security guarantees to anchoring itself within a regionally mediated framework of validity. It must adapt to the logic of what might be called Abraham Accords 2.0: a framework where normalization is inseparable from Palestinian recognition and GCC mediation.

This carries profound political implications inside Israel itself. The maximalist politics embodied by Benjamin Netanyahu, deeply tied to a vanishing unipolar moment, no longer fit the realities of a multipolar Middle East. The future will belong to Israeli leaders capable of embedding their state into regional designs of cooperation, rather than clinging to unilateral hegemony.

What is manifesting is not state collapse, but the rise of a new formation: autonomous regional finance, security, and trade frameworks. Here, the Gulf states are already gaining disproportionate influence, economically, diplomatically, in energy, tech, and investment. The real divide ahead is less Israel vs. Iran and more dependency vs. independence; global alignment vs. regional resilience; old patronage vs. new investment.

A new Israel?

Within this emerging regional architecture will appear a new Israel, likely post-Netanyahu, integrated into the system rather than dominating it. That transition is already unfolding, not only in the U.S. political arena but within its power structure itself, where competing narratives are contesting Israel’s future place in a Gulf-centered order. In such a system, Israel is no longer the pivot, but one actor among many in a Gulf-dominated framework. And this is precisely why Israel’s strike in Qatar was less about Hamas itself than about disrupting the very system now taking shape.

In this reconfiguration, the U.S. role is instructive not by its dominance but by its erosion. Washington remains powerful, but its monopoly on dictating the terms of Middle Eastern politics is gone. It cannot unilaterally impose solutions in Palestine, nor can it guarantee Israel’s regional acceptance. Instead, the United States is becoming one actor among many, still influential, but increasingly compelled to negotiate with the gravitational fields generated by Riyadh, Beijing, Moscow, and now Islamabad. The very fact that Western recognition of Palestine is accelerating without U.S. orchestration underscores this diffusion of power.

Here, the rise of BRICS is decisive. The alignment of Russia, China, and Iran, anchored in coordinated policy, military cooperation, and alternative financial systems, has forged a new axis of resilience. No longer isolated, Iran is now embedded in a hardened geopolitical circuit: shielded by eastern powers and engaging pragmatically with Gulf actors. What was once styled the “axis of resistance” has matured into an axis of integration. This is not the region’s disintegration, but its reassembly, and therein lies its durability.

Thus, the Pakistan–Saudi pact should not be seen in isolation. It is part of a larger tectonic movement: the erosion of U.S.-centric hegemony, the recalibration of Israel’s place within regional politics, and the repositioning of Palestine from a deferred issue to a litmus test of standing. What begins with a defense pact in Riyadh and Islamabad reverberates through Doha, Abu Dhabi, and beyond, ultimately converging on the question of Jerusalem.

The contours of the emerging landscape are clear. It is multipolar, Gulf-centered, and legitimacy-driven. It binds security to sovereignty, finance to diplomacy, and recognition to survival. In this edifice, neither the United States nor Israel can dictate terms unilaterally. Instead, the power to define regional order now flows increasingly from the Gulf and the Pakistan–Saudi Defense Agreement is one of the clearest signals yet that a new Middle East is being born.

I

n recent years, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has embarked on a new identity-building process. This transformation, with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at its center, is not limited to the social dimension and is directly related to domestic/foreign policy and the economy. This multidimensional process of searching for a new identity and the changes that are taking place encompass reforms in the country’s political, economic, and social spheres, and aim to move Saudi society in a more open, dynamic, and contemporary direction.

The foundation of this identity-building process is the “Vision 2030” announced by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in 2016. This vision focuses on transforming the traditional profile of Saudi Arabia, a rentier state that derives its wealth and revenues from natural resources such as oil, into a modern one. “Vision 2030” aims to reduce the kingdom’s dependence on oil, diversify economic inputs with non-oil resources, build new cities and promote tourism, and modernize social life in ways that challenge the kingdom’s dominant religious and cultural codes.

Economic dimension

Saudi Arabia has undergone significant changes in the economic sphere, and these changes are innovative and directly related to efforts to reshape the country’s identity. The efforts take place within the framework of the comprehensive reform program called “Vision 2030.” This vision is a far-reaching goal that focuses on objectives such as diversifying the Saudi economy, strengthening the private sector, ensuring sustainability, and implementing social change and transformation.

One of the most notable steps taken in the context of economic transformation is the Kingdom’s efforts to reduce its dependence on oil and diversify the economy. Saudi Arabia aims to create a strong and sustainable economy outside the energy sector. In order to achieve this goal, efforts are being made to strengthen the country’s economic base through measures such as investing in renewable energy projects and encouraging the private sector. For example, the Kingdom has increased its investment in green energy projects, particularly solar and wind power. Similarly, having decided to reduce oil production, Saudi Arabia has increased its investment in natural gas. Many natural gas fields have been developed, including Hasbah-Arabiyah conventional gas field, and Karan, and new gas production facilities have been built, such as al-Fadili and Abu Hadriyah.

Another step in the economic context of Saudi Arabia’s search for a new identity is to invest in modern, non-traditional areas. By investing in sports teams, electric cars, tourism, films, and TV series through the $600 billion Public Investment Fund, Saudi Arabia is attempting to transform an economic system based solely on oil revenues. In addition, initiatives are being taken to increase foreign investment, focus more on Asian and African markets, and allow Saudi citizens to spend their money within the Kingdom. For example, the construction of new, modern cities such as NEOM and the Line is designed to encourage Saudi tourists to spend in Saudi Arabia and to make the Kingdom attractive to foreign tourists.

Similarly, by hosting world-famous international sporting events, attracting famous footballers to Saudi teams, and increasing investment in the entertainment sector, the aim is to keep spending within the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia’s new moves in the economy are directly related to the Kingdom’s search for a new identity, and are evident in the sweeping changes being made under “Vision 2030.” While these changes are in line with the country’s goals of economic diversification, social change, and becoming a more effective actor in the international arena, they also have significant implications for Saudi Arabia’s future role.

Social dimension

Saudi Arabia’s search and construction of a new identity have an impact on the social sphere as well. The influence of religious authority and the ulama in social life is limited. For example, since 2016, the powers of the morality police in Saudi Arabia, charged with shaping social life according to Islam, have been curtailed and some reform steps have been taken in the religious field. In the new identity of the 4th modern Saudi Arabia built by Crown Prince bin Salman, the role of religion is quite limited: instead of the Saudi Arabia that for years was identified with Wahhabism and Salafism, the administration is promoting a more modern, Western-integrated understanding of religion that emphasizes tolerance.

Accordingly, the aim has been to increase religious freedom in the country while promoting a more tolerant interpretation of Islam. Efforts are being made to promote a more open-minded understanding of religion among the country’s young population. This social change is clearly evident in the steps taken towards women’s rights; thus, for instance, the unwritten custom that prevented women from driving has been abolished and women have become more active in many sports, particularly cricket. At the same time, women have been given the opportunity and encouraged to take part in activities that are products of modern life, such as attending football matches, and going to the cinema and theatre.

Reforms such as the ones discussed above alongside giving women greater opportunities in business have led to significant changes in Saudi society and identity. Such steps were the Kingdom’s way of ensuring greater participation of women in social and economic life. The search for a new identity in Saudi Arabia is also manifesting itself in the direction of gender equality and encouraging the participation of the young population in the workforce. The reforms introduced to increase women’s participation in the workforce and to bring about changes in social norms are making a significant contribution to the country’s social transformation. Educational reforms aimed at maximizing the potential of the young population are also playing an important role in building Saudi Arabia’s new identity.

Political dimension

In the political sphere, Saudi Arabia has embarked on a new identity-building process in its regional and international relations with the search for autonomy in foreign policy and the processes of rapprochement with actors outside the traditional alliance structures being the most prominent developments. Problems in relations with Western actors such as the United States, Britain, and France have prompted Saudi Arabia to reshape its foreign policy identity. The Riyadh government has deepened its cooperation with non-Western alliance structures without severing relations with Western actors. For example, in 2024, Saudi Arabia officially became a member of the BRICS organization, which includes actors challenging Western hegemony such as China and Russia.

Second, Saudi Arabia, which has pursued an aggressive foreign policy since the Arab revolutions, has focused its foreign policy moves more on dialogue and cooperation since 2020. The embargo on Qatar, known as the “Gulf crisis,” was lifted in 2021, and relations with Turkey, Iran, and Syria were normalized. The Kingdom’s policy towards Yemen, where a war has been raging since 2015, has also changed radically. Having launched a negotiation process with the Houthis, Saudi Arabia aims to contribute to reducing the conflict and ensuring regional stability through the Presidential Council it established in 2022.

Foreign policy therefore plays an important role in the political context of Saudi Arabia’s new identity construction. The country is attempting to adopt a more constructive and conciliatory foreign policy in order to eliminate the criticism it has faced from Western actors. However, the Saudi process of identity construction has also been subject to criticism. Allegations of human rights violations in Yemen between 2015 and 2022, restrictions on freedoms such as the Ritz-Carlton hotel and the Khashoggi example, and harsh reactions to dissidents who criticize the kingdom, have put Saudi Arabia under scrutiny as it searches for its new identity.

The Kingdom’s oppressive modernization process and the search for a new identity have been interpreted as the construction of Saudi Arabian nationalism. Saudi Arabia’s search for a new identity has given rise to a new type of Saudi nationalism that has strengthened the power of the al-Saud family and the Crown Prince. Meanwhile, the process of Saudi Arabia’s new identity construction is bringing about significant economic, social, and political changes in the country, and attracting national and international attention. Overall, the process is seen as an important phase that will determine the country’s future role and leadership approach.

I

n an unexpected move, Saudi Arabia announced on January 30 that it has abandoned its plan to increase maximum sustainable oil production capacity from 12 to 13 million barrels per day (bpd) by 2027. The surprising decision, coming amid fluctuating global oil prices, has left analysts speculating on the kingdom’s motives and potential repercussions.

The Financial Times described the move as “a major policy reversal,” Reuters labeled it a “U-turn,” and the MEES energy newsletter referred to it as “a bombshell announcement.” The decision, reportedly at least six months in the making, seems to be a response to changing dynamics in the global economy, particularly a slowdown in China.

Unnamed industry sources suggested that the decision was top-down, indicating that Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MbS), the de facto leader of Saudi Arabia, played a key role in the move. The cutback reflects a reassessment of medium-term demand growth, aligning with a cautious outlook on the world economy.

Constant investment in existing oil fields

The revision means the kingdom will redirect its focus from expanding production capacity to maintaining current levels through constant investment in existing oil fields. While billions of dollars will still be allocated for this purpose, the total expenditure is expected to be significantly lower.

The decision has implications for the kingdom’s ambitious economic transformation plan, Vision 2030, spearheaded by MbS. This vision heavily relies on oil revenues and foreign investments. The slower-than-expected foreign investment in Saudi projects, including the ambitious NEOM city, raises concerns about the economic transformation’s pace.

For the week ending February 2, global oil prices experienced a 5 percent decline, with Brent crude, the main internationally traded benchmark, dipping slightly over $77 per barrel. While short-term price movements don’t necessarily indicate long-term trends, the drop signals potential financial challenges for Saudi Arabia.

The days of $100 prices are over

The Financial Times’ Lex column declared on January 31 that “Oil: The Days of $100 Prices Are Over.” It emphasized the enduring role of oil in our lives but highlighted a plateau in its value to consumers. The column pointed to the changing dynamics in China, forecasting a significant shift toward electric cars, with half of all new car sales expected to be electric by 2025.

Low oil prices, while beneficial for U.S. domestic interests, pose challenges for Gulf allies like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These countries, crucial for regional stability, may find it difficult to balance their budgets, impacting their diplomatic support in addressing key regional issues, including Gaza and tensions with Iran.

As Saudi Arabia navigates this strategic shift, the long-term implications for the kingdom’s economic diversification and global oil dynamics remain uncertain.

Source: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

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ussia’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) reveal a multifaceted and increasingly strategic nature as recently witnessed by the visits of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Discussions on issues such as the Russia-Ukraine war, Israeli attacks on Gaza, and OPEC+ point to a deepening engagement beyond traditional energy cooperation.

President Putin visited the UAE and Saudi Arabia on December 6. The visits were notable as they were among the rare visits made by the Russian president after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for him. As a result of the arrest warrant, for example, Putin did not attend the recent BRICS summit in South Africa or the G20 summit in India.

While Putin’s visit to the Gulf is critical in many respects, it is also fundamentally related to the structure of Russia-Gulf relations after the Russia-Ukraine war that began in February 2022. The visits to the UAE and Saudi Arabia focused on the Russia-Ukraine war, Israel’s attacks on Gaza, OPEC+ energy issues, and the Yemen issue.

Analysis of conjunctional developments on the Russia-Gulf line

With the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war, the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, showed a neutral foreign policy tendency. In essence, the Gulf countries’ refusal to participate in the sanctions against Russia imposed by Western countries—led by the United States—was similar to the foreign policy trends before the Russia-Ukraine war.

The Gulf states were already having problems in their relations with the U.S. because of its rhetoric and actions about withdrawing from the region; however, after the Taliban took power in Afghanistan, relations entered a crisis of confidence. In addition, the U.S., which has problems with Saudi Arabia over, among others, the Biden-Muhammad bin Salman tension and oil production policy, has also experienced tensions in its relations with the UAE over issues such as Russia-UAE relations and the UAE’s relations with the Assad government in Syria.

In fact, the Gulf countries, which have intensified their search for both regional and international partnerships, did not participate in the sanctions against Russia imposed by Western countries. At the same time, within the framework of this search for partnership, normalization processes with Israel, Iran, and Turkey have been carried out since 2020, albeit at different levels. The depth of the Gulf states’ positions on the Russia-Ukraine war, in fact, can be attributed to signs of a multipolar world order prevailing among them.

The Gulf views Russia as an alternative power in a multipolar world order and a critical actor in terms of energy policy, strategic partnerships, and regional security concerns. The decline in global demand for oil and natural gas derivatives from 2019 onwards, in the context of pandemic measures and the transition to renewable energy projects, was the point at which Russia and the Gulf countries sought a common solution. At a time when the discourse on reducing the use of fossil fuels was one of the most important dimensions of the fight against global climate change, the loss of global oil and gas supplies made Russia and the Gulf countries strategic energy actors once again.

The sanctions imposed by Western countries on Russia’s oil and gas exports as of February 2022 enabled Russia and the Gulf countries to effectively use the OPEC+ platform in global international relations. Despite serious criticism and sometimes veiled threats from the U.S., since 2019, the largest producers, Russia and Saudi Arabia, have taken decisions to reduce oil production within OPEC+ several times, and price stability in the oil market has been achieved.

At the same time, Russian oligarchs are protecting their financial resources mainly in Middle Eastern countries and, in particular, in places like the Emirate of Dubai, and  do not want to lose them due to the pursuit of sanctions by Western regimes. According to 2022 data, Russian citizens came first in the purchase of houses in Dubai, leaving behind British and Indian citizens—a sign that explains Russia’s strategic relations with the Gulf countries.

Background of the strategic security and defense partnerships

Russia’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates date back beyond recent years, when signs of a multipolar world order were seen, and the Russia-Ukraine war. It should be remembered that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been developing military, defense, and security cooperation with Russia since the 2010s. Saudi Arabia’s purchase of the S-400 air defense system, Kornet-EM anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) systems, and other specific military equipment from Russia was on the agenda. The two countries also signed a military cooperation agreement in August 2021. At the time, the move by Saudi Arabia was interpreted as a strategy to build relationships with influential international actors and achieve relative autonomy through partnerships, rather than relying solely on the United States in security and defense policy.

Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE has long been engaged in military, defense, and security partnership cooperation with Russia. So much so that Russia is known to be negotiating with the UAE and India on the joint production of the fifth-generation SU-57 fighter jet. At the same time, defense and security cooperation between Russia and the UAE has manifested itself in Russia’s interventions in Syria and Libya since 2015, while the UAE has sought to harmonize its strategy and power with Russia’s strategy in both regions. In addition, the two countries seem to be pursuing a joint strategy in South Yemen. Also, between 2009 and 2013, Russia supplied the UAE with Pantsir-S air defense systems, which were subsequently reformed.

For many years, Russian companies have been able to present their current products at international exhibitions held in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the UAE. Such platforms can be used to broker contracts for the supply of military equipment. All in all, it should be noted that the UAE’s defense/security partnership with Russia is a strategic diversification choice rather than a conjunctional necessity.

I

n a significant development, Saudi Arabia has expressed its interest in normalizing ties with Israel following the recent genocide in the Gaza Strip. Prince Khalid bin Bandar, the Kingdom’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, revealed that a normalization deal was “close” before the October 7 Hamas attack, emphasizing that any agreement must lead to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

The ambassador, speaking to BBC Radio 4’s “Today” program, stated that Saudi Arabia still believes in normalization with Israel but not at the expense of the Palestinian people. The announcement comes ahead of the resumption of talks to form the next government after the November 2023 election.

Prince Khalid explained that the potential deal was paused after the October 7 incident but reiterated the Kingdom’s commitment to normalization with Israel. He dismissed claims that the Hamas attack was intended to spoil Arab normalization efforts with Israel, emphasizing that the roots of the conflict date back almost a century.

A Palestinian state

“We can’t live with Israel without a Palestinian state. We were close to normalization; therefore, close to a Palestinian state. One doesn’t come without the other,” Prince Khalid stated during the interview. He highlighted that Palestinian interests are the top priority in Saudi negotiations with Israel, emphasizing that it’s not just a Saudi-Israeli peace plan but a Palestinian-Israeli peace plan.

Regarding the role of Hamas in a future Palestinian state, the ambassador acknowledged the complexity and the need for careful consideration. Drawing a parallel with the situation in Ireland, he suggested that change is possible with optimism and hope, emphasizing the importance of compromise for a lasting solution.

However, Prince Khalid expressed concerns about Israel’s government, describing it as having an “extreme, absolutist perspective” and failing to work towards achieving compromise. He criticized statements made by Israeli officials, suggesting that similar remarks in other countries would lead to condemnation and, in sensible governments, officials would be asked to leave.

An immediate ceasefire

As part of Saudi Arabia’s immediate plans to end the violence in Gaza, Prince Khalid voiced strong support for an immediate ceasefire. He acknowledged the lack of a perfect, immediate solution and emphasized the need for international involvement in discussions with Palestinians, the international community, and Israel.

The risk of “radicalization” among Gazan civilians was identified as a long-term issue by Prince Khalid. He condemned the “unprecedented level of violence” from “both sides” and called for increased global efforts to address the conflict.

The ambassador urged the UK and other countries to moderate their positions on the conflict, highlighting what he termed as a “blind spot” toward Israel. He emphasized the importance of nuance and perception for lasting peace in the region.

The announcement follows recent discussions between U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Al-Ula. Blinken acknowledged the clear interest in pursuing normalization but stressed the need for an end to the Gaza conflict and a practical pathway to a Palestinian state. The developments mark a potentially significant shift in the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East.

Sources: Anadolu Agency and Arab News

I

n a surprising turn of events, Germany has announced its decision not to oppose the sale of Eurofighter jets to Saudi Arabia. This unexpected move comes as a notable departure from Germany’s previous stance on arms sales to the Middle Eastern nation. Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock conveyed this decision after a meeting with Israeli President Isaac Herzog and Foreign Minister Israel Katz in Jerusalem.

Historically, Germany has been reluctant to endorse arms sales to Saudi Arabia due to concerns about human rights violations and regional stability. However, the latest statement by Baerbock suggests a shift in perspective, highlighting Saudi Arabia’s contribution to Israel’s security.

Baerbock emphasized that Saudi Arabia plays a crucial role in enhancing Israel’s security by intercepting missiles launched by Yemen’s Houthi rebels. The Foreign Minister acknowledged Riyadh’s efforts to counter the threat posed by the Houthis and stated that Germany would not stand against the idea of Britain providing more Eurofighters to Saudi Arabia.

The decision underscores the intricate geopolitical dynamics of the region and how nations collaborate in response to shared security concerns. Baerbock noted, “Saudi Arabia is a key contributor to Israel’s security and is helping to stem the risk of a regional conflagration.”

Rationale Behind the Decision

The shift in Germany’s stance appears to be rooted in the recognition of Saudi Arabia’s strategic role in maintaining regional stability. Baerbock’s statement suggests that the German government sees Saudi Arabia as a valuable partner in addressing common security challenges, and this perception has influenced its decision on Eurofighter sales.

The Eurofighter is a joint project involving the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and Spain. As Germany’s approval is required for sales of these fighter jets, the decision not to oppose the sale to Saudi Arabia reflects a coordinated effort among the participating nations.

Houthi rebels have been a source of regional instability, targeting vessels in the Southern Red Sea and threatening Israel-bound ships. In response to these attacks, the United States recently announced the creation of a multinational mission named Operation Prosperity Guardian to counter Houthi aggression.

A significant shift in German foreign policy

The geopolitical landscape in the Middle East has been further complicated by the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas. The Israeli onslaught on Gaza has resulted in a humanitarian crisis, with significant international concern about potential war crimes or genocide. This complex situation adds layers of intricacy to diplomatic relations in the region.

Germany’s decision not to oppose Eurofighter sales to Saudi Arabia marks a significant shift in its foreign policy approach to arms deals in the Middle East. The acknowledgment of Saudi Arabia’s role in enhancing regional security and countering common threats demonstrates the evolving nature of diplomatic relationships in a dynamic geopolitical environment. The implications of this decision will likely reverberate across international relations, prompting further analysis of the evolving alliances in the Middle East.

Source: Anadolu Agency

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n September 10, 2023, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) announced the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with India to establish a new economic corridor linking India, the Middle East, and Europe.

The Saudi crown prince announced the project on X, formerly Twitter, a day after it was announced by Saudi Arabia and the United States.

Bin Salman announced that, “As a culmination of what has been worked on during the last period, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United States of America, the Republic of India, the United Arab Emirates, and the Republic of France, The Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy and the European Union signed a memorandum of understanding regarding the project to establish a new economic corridor linking India, the Middle East and Europe.”

He added that the memorandum “crystallizes the foundations upon which it was built to achieve the Kingdom’s common interests, enhance economic interdependence with its partners from other countries, and reflect positively on the global economy in general.”

On September 9, the Saudi crown prince said, “The economic corridor will contribute to developing and rehabilitating the infrastructure that includes railways and ports and will help increase the exchange of goods and services.”

He continued, “The project will enhance economic integration and contribute to providing new and quality job opportunities in order to achieve long-term gains along the new cross-border corridors.”

The statement concluded that the MoU “requires continuing the pace of efforts that have been made, and immediately starting to develop the necessary mechanisms for their implementation, according to the time frame that was agreed upon based on what was stated in the memorandum.”

Economic cooperation: Beyond India and Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia and India signed more than 50 agreements during the G20 Summit, in the fields of information technology, communications, entrepreneurship, chemicals, energy, and advanced industries, according to the Saudi Ministry of Investment.

In his speech during the Saudi-India Investment Forum held in New Delhi, Saudi Investment Minister Khalid Al-Falih revealed that the Saudi Public Investment Fund, which manages assets exceeding $750 billion, is considering opening a branch in New Delhi. This indicates the sovereign fund’s interest in investing in Indian companies that have recently seen expansion and development.

The U.S. involvement in inking the agreement that will eventually link India to Europe through the Middle East suggests that Washington aims to mitigate the growing influence of China through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

In addition to India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, Cyprus, Greece, and the rest of the European Union, the economic corridor will include shipping and rail routes.

Besides speeding up trade between India and the EU by 40%, the project aims to normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia. When launched, the project is likely to impact the Suez Canal negatively; approximately 12% of global trade and 30% of global container traffic currently pass through the Suez Canal.

Turkey, Egypt, and the India-Europe economic corridor

The economic corridor connecting India with Europe will also negatively impact another trade corridor that was supposed to be established between Iraq and Turkey, connecting the Gulf with Europe through Ankara, known as the Development Road Project. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan commented on establishing the economic corridor between India and Europe by saying, “We say that there is no corridor without Turkey.”

Speaking to journalists accompanying him to the G20 summit in India, Erdoğan added, “Turkey is an important production and trade base. The most convenient line for traffic from East to West must pass through Turkey.”

Erdoğan noted that many countries in the region, such as Qatar and the UAE, are in favor of Turkey’s proposed project, expressing hope that the Development Road Project will proceed as planned.

Some 2.7 million Indian workers work in Saudi Arabia and send billions of dollars in hard currency back home annually. The Saudi involvement in the economic corridor project reflects the growing economic ties bet3ween India and the Kingdom, which recently has been engaging in diversifying its economic resources to move away from oil dependency.

*Written by the staff of Politics Today

A

fter a seven-year diplomatic rupture between Iran and Saudi Arabia, negotiations between the foreign ministers of the two countries were held in Beijing in March 2023 to cease hostilities and restore bilateral relations.

In 2016, Saudi Arabia severed ties with Iran after an assault on the Saudi embassy in Tehran by Iranian protesters following the execution of Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr. Bilateral relations between the two regional powers have further deteriorated due to proxy wars and missile strikes ever since. In 2021-2022, a series of Iraq- and Oman-brokered informal negotiations took place between Saudi Arabia and Iran aimed at the re-establishment of diplomatic relations.

Extending Iraq and Oman’s mediation between 2021 and 2022, President Xi Jinping offered China’s mediation to resolve the conflict between the two sides.

As a consequence of the China-brokered Saudi-Iranian deal in March 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to reopen diplomatic missions and lift restrictions on direct flights in two months’ time. Hajj flights between Iran and Saudi Arabia started to run from 21 cities presently and negotiations to expand the network of direct flights beyond the hajj season are underway.

The foreign ministers of the two countries jointly stated that “technical teams will continue coordination to examine ways of expanding cooperation, including the resumption of flights and bilateral visits by official and private sector delegations, and facilitate the issuance of visas to citizens of the two countries.”

Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian wrote on Twitter that the negotiations with his Saudi counterpart were generally “positive” and that “emphasis on stability, stable security and development of the region” were among the issues on the agenda.

Additionally, Iran and Saudi Arabia decided to revive the Security Cooperation Agreement (2001) and the Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement (1998). Iran signed these agreements with Saudi Arabia during the era of former reformist president Mohammad Khatami.

China’s mediation offer for the Palestine-Israel conflict

After brokering the Saudi-Iranian deal, China intensified its mediation diplomacy to increase its political capital in the Middle East. Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang offered to mediate peace talks between Israel and Palestine in phone calls to Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen and Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyad al-Maliki in April 2023.

China stepped in amid the expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the rise of the far right in Israel. However, the internal divisions between Palestinian factions undermine the prospect of a deal at present.

China’s renewed mediation offer, consisting of a three-point proposal, was made by President Xi as Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas arrived in Beijing on June 14 for a four-day visit.

At the start of their meeting, Xi told Abbas that “we are good friends and partners” and “we have always firmly supported the just cause of the Palestinian people to restore their legitimate national rights.”

A lasting solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict

Xi went on to say that a lasting solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict lies in the establishment of an “independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital,” referring to the UN Security Council Resolution 242.

As a result of the Xi-Abbas talks, China and the Palestinian Authority (PA) established a strategic partnership. Xi said the strategic partnership with the PA was an “important milestone in the history of bilateral relations.”

Abbas noted that his government “looks forward to strengthening cooperation” and “securing investment” under the strategic partnership with China.

On July 27, 2023, China extended an invitation to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for an official state visit. The invitation coincided with China’s intermediary diplomacy in the Middle East and rising tensions between the Biden administration and Netanyahu’s government. Netanyahu did not comment on whether and at what point in time the trip to China will take place. Hence, Israel’s stance on China’s renewed mediation offer has yet to become clear.

Is China replacing the United States in the Middle East?

Experts on the Middle East have told Reuters that China mediating between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and Israel and Palestine might stabilize the war-torn region.

According to Aaron David Miller, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former Middle East policy advisor for the State Department, Chinese engagement in the Saudi Arabia-Iran rapprochement and the  Israeli-Palestine are in conflict with the U.S. influence in the region, which is quickly diminishing. In line with this perception, a Middle Eastern official told Politico that the U.S. is viewed as leaving the Middle East and China is stepping in.

However, the extent to which China’s mediation diplomacy will continue as a mediating actor in the Middle East, and how the U.S. will respond to the geopolitical challenge posed by China, remains an open question.

H

ave you ever experienced power cuts lasting more than five hours in the middle of a scorching heatwave? This is what Egyptians have been experiencing for the past two weeks and will continue to do so for the next month, according to Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly. The public, which has endured a heatwave of 40°C or more as well as power cuts, has expressed its growing discontent on various platforms in the hope that government officials will hear their voices.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian government continues to promote and invest in urban megaprojects such as the New Administrative Capital, the Cairo Monorail, and Capital Med. Madbouly recently claimed that these projects are being pursued for the necessary development of the Egyptian economy and were it not for them, the country would have collapsed some time ago.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia has been promoting its latest megacity project in the province of Tabuk known as “The Line.” If you have ever imagined living inside a mirror, The Line promises to make your fantasy come true. It is a 170-kilometer-long linear smart city stretching from west to east, and aims to be the world’s first city powered by renewable energy.

The Line

In his latest effort to promote this project, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) has teamed up with the Discovery Channel and produced a documentary titled “The Line: Saudi Arabia’s City of the Future in Neom.”

In the documentary, MBS dismissed critics of his vision, claiming that his futuristic urban megaproject, which is being constructed in an “untouched” area, will go a long way towards meeting the environmental sustainability needs of the population by 2030. He stated, “They say that a lot of the projects that are done in Saudi Arabia cannot be done, that they’re too ambitious. They can keep saying that and we can keep proving them wrong.”

Is it true that they are building The Line in an “untouched” area? According to Courtney Freer, a research fellow at the Middle East Center at the London School of Economics and Political Science, it is not. The Saudi security forces killed Abdul-Rahman Al-Howeiti of the Howeitat tribe in 2020 because he refused to leave his home, which was on the megaproject’s site.

In the same year, his tribe sent an urgent request to the UN for protection against their allegations of the government’s forced displacement. Furthermore, a report in the Wall Street Journal estimated that 20,000 people would be evicted from the area to make way for the city.

Utopian vision: Supporters of the urban megaprojects

With the current global environmental crisis, many seem to agree on the need to develop sustainable urban projects as a solution to the crisis. In addition, MENA’s largest cities are suffering from housing problems due to rapidly growing populations. So, it seems only fair that governments would come up with urban projects that can solve both problems.

Taking The Line as an example, Tarek Qaddumi, an executive director from Neom’s urban project, told the magazine Dezeen that the city will combat the negative effects of urban sprawl. Since the city is vertically layered, the structure will limit the expansion of urban areas. The city will also offer technological progress and sustainability as a way of life.

On the business side, many businesspeople believe that these urban projects will boost the economy and attract good investments. Take Mohamed Khaled, a commercial real estate consultant, as an example: he told Egypt Today that the New Capital will be the perfect place for those who want to invest their money in good locations, as it will offer great business opportunities.

The investment of the Talaat Mustafa Group, one of the biggest construction companies in Egypt, is evidence to this end. Reports have indicated that they have invested in the foundations for the “Noor City” project within the New Capital. Similarly, Rawan Ahmed, a Saudi entrepreneur, told the National that it is very exciting to have innovations such as The Line be featured in the kingdom.

In terms of smart sustainability, housing, and business, many believe that MENA’s urban megaprojects offer innovation for a better future.

Dystopian vision: Critics of the urban megaprojects

Many critics from different fields have criticized MENA urban megaprojects as dystopian because of the authoritarian nature of regional political structures, the cost of these projects, and the delusional goals set for them. Starting with the authoritarian nature, experts such as Robert Draper, a correspondent for GQ, claim that the urban megaprojects have clearly proven that governments do not involve their citizens in the decision-making process.

Returning to the Egyptian case, Michele Dunne, a nonresident scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, claimed that the New Capital’s emptiness proves that President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s vision doesn’t include most Egyptian citizens: ordinary citizens are not allowed there on the grounds that it is a “military compound.”

Similarly, the Saudi government hasn’t consulted its citizens on whether they would agree to evacuate their homes for the megaproject nor has it offered them adequate compensation. While MBS claims that The Line is being constructed in an “untouched” area to provide housing for the population, the reality tells a different story.

Local population and cost

According to a New York Times report, MBS has never mentioned the tribal community that is forced to leave the project’s site or the consequences they face for not complying. On October 2, 2022, the kingdom’s special courts handed down the death sentence to three members of the Howeitat tribe who protested against the forced eviction of their homes in 2020.

Experts such as Philip Oldfield, head of school at the School of Built Environment, University of New South Wales (UNSW), have also criticized the cost of these plans. Despite governments’ claims that these projects are being implemented to save the region from the ongoing climate and overpopulation crises, Oldfield has warned that the projects are costly for all the wrong reasons. A project like The Line could destroy the biodiversity of the Saudi desert. Would the migrating birds understand what a mirror is?

Furthermore, according to Oldfield, the financial and environmental costs of building the project will overwhelm any promised environmental benefits. He told Dezeen that the project will require a huge amount of steel, glass, and concrete – all of which are not considered low-carbon materials. His findings could also be applied to the Egyptian case.

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hina’s traditional reluctance to get involved in international crises and conflicts, particularly beyond its regional sphere of influence, has now become obsolete as the rising power increasingly seeks to become a global player rivaling the United States. Conflict management and crisis diplomacy are now integral to China’s diplomatic involvement in the Middle East. China and its Middle Eastern partners are building a strategic multipolarity that would serve their national interests better than the current U.S.-led order giving rise to a new strategic multipolar order.

The Middle Eastern middle powers view China’s growing involvement in the region as steps towards a multipolar order, which would help them counterbalance the U.S. influence. In March 2021, Iran and China signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement entailing economic, military, and cybersecurity cooperation. Both states seek to undermine U.S. dominance in the Middle East: Iran needs China for tackling U.S.-led sanctions aimed at crippling its economy, while China imports cheap oil and gas from Iran.

A similar mutually beneficial relationship also exists between Saudi Arabia and China. The two countries are building a strategic partnership through a series of trade and investment deals. Chinese companies are set to build factories in Saudi Arabia and the kingdom is already China’s biggest supplier of crude oil. In June 2023, Saudi Minister of Investment Khalid Al-Falih told CNBC that he believes a multipolar world has emerged and that cooperation between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Arab world, and China will be a significant part of the new order.

Is China replacing the U.S.?

The U.S. has been a key player in the Middle East since the end of World War II, while the regional order was mostly dominated by the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. brokered peace between Egypt and Israel; has formed alliances with Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt and since the mid-1970s with Egypt; and used to be allies with Iran until the Islamic Revolution in 1979.

By the end of the Cold War, the U.S. appeared even more forceful (or hegemonic); however, more recently, it has lessened its involvement in the region as it seeks to shift its focus to Asia-Pacific. China, on the other hand, aims to militarily counter the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region and has increased its diplomatic and economic engagement with the Middle East.

China has achieved some notable success in peacemaking in the Middle East. Chinese officials have successfully mediated between Saudi Arabia and Iran for normalization of the relations between the two states. China’s trade relations with both have been substantially progressing and it has also offered to mediate in the Israel-Palestine conflict, which used to be an exclusive domain of American diplomacy. In fact, China has established strategic partnerships across the Middle East, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Jordan, Qatar, Iraq, Oman, Kuwait, Israel, and Palestine.

No other country, not even the U.S., has such a long list of partners in the region. Although the level of engagement with China substantially varies from one country to another, the length of the list is indicative of China’s ambitions. Given such developments, many Middle East analysts pose the same question: Is China going to replace the U.S. as the main external actor in the region?

Analysts agree that China is yet to establish itself as a global military power while the U.S. still enjoys certain advantages such as its long-established alliances and military bases across the Middle East. Some point out that China and the U.S. share the same crucial regional interests: access to energy resources and freedom of navigation. As the Chinese and American interests are compatible, the emerging multipolar order in the region is not necessarily detrimental for U.S. interests.

Would multipolarity prove stable in the Middle East?

A multipolar order, according to some IR scholars, would prove stable among competitors who have equal distribution of power. In the case of the emerging multipolarity in the Middle East, power appears dispersed but not equally distributed. The region’s key actors, Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, have varying levels of economic and military capacities. Shifts in power balance may also complicate the regional order. For instance, Iran becoming a nuclear power would not be welcomed by the other regional actors, and would likely result in an unstable multipolarity.

The emerging multipolarity may not prove stable in the middle or long term, but it currently serves the interests of the Middle Eastern middle powers and China well. It also poses no threat to the vital U.S. interests. The Middle East actors cannot aspire to regional dominance given their current capabilities, but through their partnerships with China they can create a strategic multipolarity which serves their national interests. If in the future the actors perceive their interests differently based on the acquisition of more capabilities, the multipolarity might be undermined.

The Chinese-brokered Saudi-Iran diplomatic normalization deal is a case in point. The deal has a limited scope because neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran desires full-fledged collaboration in regional affairs. The Iranians and Saudis instead seek stronger ties with China which would help them strengthen their standing vis-à-vis the U.S. In other words, the Chinese quest for multipolarity in the Middle East corresponds to the strategic multipolarity sought by Middle Eastern middle powers.

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ccording to the Qatar-based Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, discussions have taken place regarding the establishment of a joint naval force involving Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman. The primary objective of this coalition is to ensure the safety of navigation in the strategically significant Persian Gulf. China has actively participated in mediating the talks between Tehran, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi. On June 3, following this news, Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, Commander of the Iranian Navy, stated that several regional countries, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, will form a new naval coalition in the northern parts of the Indian Ocean.

During a television program, the Iranian Navy Commander stated that almost all littoral countries in the northern parts of the Indian Ocean are willing to support Iran and collaborate collectively to ensure security. He went on to say that while Iran and Oman have conducted numerous joint naval exercises in the past, other countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, Pakistan, and India are also keen on engaging in joint naval cooperation. Irani claimed that the “unjust” presence of foreign powers in the region would soon come to an end, and that the countries of the region would take responsibility for safeguarding it. Irani did not provide specific details about this development, and there have been no statements from the countries allegedly involved in the formation of this alliance.

On June 6, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin announced that Beijing is in favor of the concept of a joint naval force consisting of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other regional countries. During a press conference, Wenbin stated that the preservation of peace and stability in the Middle East’s Persian Gulf region is crucial for the prosperity of the countries and people in the area, and plays a vital role in global peace, the advancement of global economic growth, and ensuring a sustainable energy supply. Wenbin highlighted China’s commitment to playing a positive and constructive role in promoting peace and stability in the region.

Response to Middle East NATO?

According to Iran’s state broadcaster, Press TV, the proposal to establish a regional naval alliance is seen as a response to U.S. and Israeli suggestions made last year to create a Middle East NATO. Commander Tim Hawkins, the spokesman for the U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces, criticized Iran’s claim of forming a maritime security alliance, stating that Iran is the primary cause of regional instability and cannot claim to protect the waters it threatens. Hawkins mentioned that Iran has attacked or seized 15 international-flagged merchant ships in the past two years, and stated that the U.S. is reinforcing defenses around the Strait of Hormuz with its partners.

In contrast, the UAE government announced its withdrawal from the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) on May 31, expressing disappointment with the U.S. military’s perceived lack of response to Iran’s seizure of commercial tankers in April and May. Although UAE officials denied that their withdrawal from the CMF was a direct result of U.S. inaction against Iran’s maritime activities, a phone call on June 2 between UAE National Security Advisor Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan and his American counterpart Jake Sullivan suggests uncertainty and tension regarding the course of action in the absence of U.S. security guarantees.

Abu Dhabi’s disappointment with the perceived weaker U.S. commitments has led to a shift in the UAE’s foreign policy, emphasizing diplomacy and partnerships with China and Russia to address regional threats from Iran. This approach may reflect both the recognition of declining U.S. influence in a multipolar geopolitical environment and a strategy to secure stronger American commitments.

GCC Challenges

The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) member states have faced challenges in establishing effective joint military structures and agreeing on a common vision regarding threats and challenges. Factors contributing to this include a lack of appropriate strategic culture and military power, significant divisions and rivalries within the GCC, concerns about Saudi Arabia’s dominance, and the presence of private interests.

Despite making joint declarations, the GCC states are not a unified entity, and a joint military operation in the event of a conflict would likely have a limited value. Decision-makers within the GCC primarily focus on the quantity and technological advancement of their military equipment, rather than their ability to use it effectively. As a result, the security of these countries is seen as fragile. The issue of the GCC states’ actual combat value, effectiveness, and ability to cooperate in warfare remains unresolved.

Despite significant military expenditures, the GCC states have heavily relied on Western countries for military protection and security. However, the perception of the United States as an unreliable security guarantor has led the Gulf states to seek closer ties with major powers like China and Russia. They have also increased diplomatic efforts to counter the perceived threat from Iran. Consequently, the possibility of security cooperation between Iran and the Gulf states is not entirely out of question. Nour News, a news website close to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, suggested on Tuesday that Iran’s nuclear technology could even be potentially transferred to Saudi Arabia under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accordance with international law.

Given that the countries involved have not denied the plan to establish a joint naval force, it can be inferred that discussions on this matter have taken place. However, it is important to note that the focus might be more on joint action or planning rather than forming a formal naval alliance. The Iranian Navy Commander’s statement regarding previous joint naval exercises by Iran and Oman, as well as the interest shown by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, and other countries in naval cooperation with Iran, could indicate Iran’s plans for joint exercises in the Gulf or Sea of Oman, similar to their annual exercises with China and Russia in the Indian Ocean.

Change in the course of relations

While the joint Iranian-Arab naval exercises will not be more than messaging, they will be an indication that Iran and the Gulf countries are making efforts to change the course of their relations. Although the details of this project have yet to be disclosed, it nonetheless is indicative of an important geopolitical shift that is taking place in the Middle East.

Both Riyadh and Tehran are looking for new options to manage regional equations, and Washington is no longer seen by the Gulf states as a security guarantor and a regional problem-solver. This includes China’s economic partnership plans in the region. Moreover, Washington’s pledge to build an alliance of democracies against autocracies in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine has also irritated some Gulf Arab countries.

The timing of an incident involving alleged “harassment” in the Strait of Hormuz amidst these ongoing developments is significant. On June 5, the U.S. Navy announced that its sailors, along with the UK Navy, had come to the aid of a ship reportedly harassed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the strategically important Strait of Hormuz.

In response to these allegations, on Monday, June 5, IRGC Navy Commander Abbas Gholamshahi stated that a distress call had been made by a Marshall Islands-flagged ship through the international channel, and Iranian forces had responded accordingly. Gholamshahi emphasized that certain hostile media outlets in violation of media ethics were attempting to spread misinformation, incite unrest, and legitimize the “illegitimate and unjustified presence of non-regional countries in the Persian Gulf.”

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he Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have decided to resume their diplomatic relations after a seven-year hiatus. The negotiations were initiated by Chinese President Xi Jinping and took place in Beijing on March 6-10, with State Minister Musaid bin Mohammed al-Aiban and Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani representing Saudi Arabia and Iran, respectively.

As a result of the talks, both nations have agreed to reopen their embassies within two months and revive their Security Cooperation Agreement (2001) and the Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement (1998). These agreements were originally signed with Saudi Arabia during Mohammad Khatami’s reformist presidency in Iran.

The diplomatic rupture between the two nations stemmed from Saudi Arabia’s execution of Shiite religious leader Ayatollah Sheikh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr in early 2016, which provoked a mixed reaction on the streets of Iran and led to the arson of the Saudi Embassy in Tehran.

Consequently, diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed, and their strained relations were further aggravated by proxy wars in the region for five years. However, negotiations between the two have been underway for the past two years with Iraq and Oman as intermediary countries – the role of which was acknowledged by both Iran and Saudi Arabia, which thanked them in the agreement text.

Reasons behind normalization

The agreement signed on March 10 has distinct motivations for all three parties involved. Iran’s objective is to expand its network of partners in response to the international isolation caused by the U.S. sanctions. Since assuming office, President Ebrahim Raisi has emphasized his country’s commitment to cultivating positive relationships with neighboring countries and looking towards the East rather than the West. Therefore, the decision to reestablish diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia is significant in mitigating Iran’s losses resulting from sanctions and diplomatic isolation.

Saudi Arabia opted for normalization as a means of avoiding potential risks such as the loss of U.S. support and pressure from Iran, particularly after the election of President Joe Biden. This agreement also carries significant implications for Saudi Arabia. The government in Riyadh, which has frequently operated under the security umbrella of the United States, is signaling to the Biden administration that it has other options. This message could also be interpreted by the U.S. as a warning that it risks losing its partners in the region to Iran and China if it fails to provide adequate support.

China’s global vision prioritizes the stability of the Middle East due to the region’s abundant oil and natural gas resources and investment potential. The presence of conflicts and instability in the Middle East poses a significant obstacle to China’s economic opening policy. Therefore, it seeks to establish favorable relations with both Tehran and Riyadh, recognizing that the tension between the two countries indirectly affects it. The recent visit by Xi Jinping to Saudi Arabia highlighted the challenges China faces in this regard. The bilateral talks between Beijing and Riyadh, and the statements following the China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit, had an adverse impact on China’s relations with Iran.

Despite diplomatic efforts and Iranian President Raisi’s visit to Beijing, had the situation at the time persisted without any substantial improvement in Tehran-Riyadh relations it would have posed challenges for China. What is more, the ongoing tension restricted China’s opportunities for cooperation with both countries.

The decision by Iran and Saudi Arabia to hold negotiations in China was a significant political message aimed at the United States. Iran has long opposed the U.S. and has urged other countries to create an alternative system to the one in which the U.S. is the dominant power. Saudi Arabia, a long-time ally of the U.S. that has relied on its security protection, has partially heeded Iran’s call. Although it may not be seeking to build an anti-U.S. system, Saudi Arabia’s decision to negotiate with Iran in China sends a clear message to the U.S. that it cannot take its alliances for granted.

Consequences for regional and global politics

The agreement reached between Saudi Arabia and Iran is likely to have a positive impact on the region’s conflicts and instability. The revival of the security agreement of 2001 is particularly significant, as it signals a commitment by both parties to avoid interventions that could undermine each other’s security. This, in turn, suggests that the era of “proxy wars” between Saudi Arabia and Iran, particularly in competitive regions, such as Yemen, may be coming to a close.

The strained relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia had contributed to Iran’s diplomatic isolation, as Saudi Arabia had been actively funding influential media outlets, such as the Washington, D.C.-based news television channel “Iran International” to portray Iran negatively to the international community. Thus, the recent détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia is expected to alleviate some of the international pressure on Iran. This development is particularly significant for the country given the challenges it has been facing due to the recent internal protests and subsequent crackdowns.

China’s mediation in the Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement is a significant source of diplomatic success and prestige for the country. It indicates that China’s desire to fill the gap left by the U.S. in the region is becoming more concrete. The agreement is a manifestation of China’s aspiration to exert influence not only in the economic sphere but in the realm of politics and diplomacy. Undoubtedly, the successful diplomatic efforts of both Muslim countries will have a practical impact on reducing the pressure felt by China regarding the Uyghur issue, thereby serving as another advantage for China in this process.

It is expected that the Washington administration will react to this process soon, as despite the U.S. initial positive diplomatic and discursive stance, the recent development has produced three distinct undesirable outcomes for it.

First, its claim to be the global hegemon and its political authority has been seriously undermined in the Middle East. Second, China, its biggest rival, is expanding its influence in the Middle East as an economic power, and now as a political and diplomatic one as well. Finally, there is a high likelihood that Israel will be adversely affected by this process. It is known that Israel, which is the most important partner of the U.S. in the Middle East, has benefited for years from the opportunities created by the internal conflicts and weaknesses in the region.

Although the process is fragile and prone to disintegration, China has declared its aspiration to become the hegemon in the Middle East, a title the U.S. has long claimed for itself. We will see how the U.S. will respond to this challenge in the coming days. No doubt, this answer will serve as an effective dynamic in the global superpower struggle.

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multipolar regional order is in the making in the Middle East, the preponderance of the U.S. is waning and rising powers, primarily China and Russia, are deepening their involvement in the region. For the U.S., the Middle East has been losing its significance and the Asia Pacific region is considered economically and militarily more vital. The stable supply of oil from the Middle East is no more a top U.S. concern as the booming shale oil production in North America helps towards energy independence.

The badly ended invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq showed the limits of the U.S. power and influence in the region, which makes American policymakers less willing to play a major role in Middle Eastern affairs. The most recent escalation of violence between Israel and Palestinians in Jenin was met with mere calls for calm by the U.S. and President Biden so far has been quite unwilling to reinitiate the Middle East peace process. As the U.S. interest in the region diminishes, the rising powers of China and Russia are increasingly more interested in strengthening their ties with the Middle East.

The longstanding U.S. allies in the Middle East, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Turkey, are forming new intra and extra regional alliances. The Abraham Accords (2020) largely ended Israel’s isolation in the region, on an official level, as it established diplomatic relations with the UAE and Bahrain. In 2020, Morocco also recognized Israel and Sudan declared such an intention, which has not materialized yet. After four years of rupture, diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey were restored in December 2022. Even Saudi Arabia’s relations with Israel are on the mend, though a normalization between the two is still not in the offing. In short, Israel is no more isolated officially and hence less dependent on the U.S. for its security.

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE are all establishing stronger ties with China and Russia. Egypt and China have fast growing economic and military ties, and Egypt is one of the major focus countries of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The two countries call their relationship a “strategic partnership.” Saudi Arabia is strengthening its strategic ties with China. Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Riyadh in December 2022 and the two sides agreed that “they firmly support each other’s core interests” and would strengthen their partnership on energy and defense. President Jinping also met with representatives of other oil-producing Gulf states and the Arab League countries in the same visit, and called for the use of Chinese yuan, instead of U.S. dollars, in oil and gas transactions as he promised that China would continue its large volume oil imports from the region.

The increasing trade with the region is not simply driven by oil, there is also strong demand for the Chinese goods in the Middle East. Most strikingly, U.S.-banned Huawei technologies, such as its 5G equipment, are welcomed in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The U.S. refusal to sell certain advanced technology weapons to a number of Middle East countries, along with Russia’s focus on its war in Ukraine, have led China to become “the secondary arms supplier of choice for many Middle East countries” in 2022.

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are already partners of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s dialogue. Russia is also making inroads in the region beyond its already entrenched regional alliances, e.g., with Syria. The Saudi-Russia cooperation is particularly strong in OPEC+, where both countries seek to cut oil supplies to prevent a drop in oil prices. Saudi Arabia’s oil alliance with Russia is a serious concern for the U.S., and American policymakers argue that this alliance benefits Russia for continuing its invasion of Ukraine. Egypt and Turkey also have close ties with Russia.

Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made S400 air defense system and the ongoing construction of the first Turkish nuclear power plant by a Russian state-owned company are notable examples of the strengthening Turkish-Russian relationship. In July 2022, Egypt and Russia signed a deal for Egypt’s first nuclear power plant to the chagrin of the West, which has placed economic sanctions on Russia due to the war in Ukraine. Both Egypt and Turkey have maintained neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war and chose not to implement any economic sanctions against Russia. That’s also the case with all other major U.S. allies in the Middle East: neither UAE nor Israel or Saudi Arabia has taken sides in the war.

China maintains a close relationship with Iran, the main U.S. rival in the region. The trade between Iran and China provides Iran with the badly needed cash for its economic survival in the face of U.S.-led sanctions imposed on Tehran for its nuclear program. Although Iran is worried over China’s growing cooperation with Saudi Arabia, China has thus far managed to develop its ties with the two rival countries. The U.S. is particularly worried about China’s increasing cheap oil imports from Iran.

China weakens U.S. influence in the Middle East and Iran sustains its economy through trade with China. There is no reason for China and Iran to abandon such mutually beneficial trade. The relationship between Iran and Russia is also deepening as Iran supplies Russia with drones and other military equipment in its war against Ukraine, and Russia remains a key Iranian ally in countering the U.S.-led sanctions.

Regional powers in the Middle East seem to have already benefited from the lessening of U.S. interest in the region. The growing ties with China and Russia enable regional actors in the Middle East to withstand U.S. influence. However, this does not entail a breakup of their relations with the U.S. Egypt, Israel, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are not going to part ways with the U.S. They are rather more likely to hold on to the middle ground, being neither fully committed allies nor rivals to the U.S. If that path is to be continued by regional actors, we may well be witnessing the emergence of a multipolar order in the Middle East, one that is not dominated by any external or regional player.

On the other hand, China’s growing influence in the Middle East is a fact that does not necessarily mean replacing the U.S. The Chinese are keen on improving their economic and trade ties with the Middle East, but there is no evidence of any plans for military presence in the region. The U.S. still remains the major power in the Middle East, though its influence is in decline. The regional actors in the Middle East are likely to exploit the U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia rivalries at the global and regional levels to strengthen their positions. A multipolar order in the Middle East is definitely not the guaranteed outcome of shifting alliances and growing ties between regional and rising powers, but it appears as the most likely option.

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ince the dawn of 21^st century, the world has been witnessing a shift in the global power balance, with the rise of new economic and political powers. One of the most notable examples of this shift is the emergence of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) as a major powerful inter-regional bloc on the world stage. This group of countries, which represents some of the fastest-growing economies in the world, has been working together to promote a multipolar world order and to challenge the dominance of traditional Western powers.

Argentina and Saudi Arabia may soon join the BRICS group, which would strengthen the multipolar world order bloc, according to recent media rumours. Saudi Arabia has expressed interest in joining the BRICS nations, according to South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, who was in the Kingdom at the time. If this were to occur, the inclusion of these two nations would benefit the group and the entire world, politically and economically.

Saudi Arabia is an important regional and global player in world politics, and henceforth, its addition to BRICS will provide a significant economic and political influence to the group. For instance, Saudi Arabia’s membership will provide a valuable partner in the region to this group and would help promote stability in the Middle East. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is also a major player in the global petrochemical industry, with a production capacity of more than 70 million tons/year. Saudi Arabia’s admission to BRICS would provide its members with a reliable partner in the energy sector and would help promote stability in the global oil market.

On the contrary, Argentina’s membership would bring valuable economic benefits to the group and would help promote trade and investment between BRICS and Latin America. According to IMF and World Bank records, the Argentina’s GDP is $406.2 billion, which makes it the 23rd largest economy in the world.

In addition, Argentina has a strong manufacturing sector, predominantly in the aerospace and automotive industries. Argentina’s membership in BRICS would grant the other members entry into these industries and help stimulate cooperation in the field of manufacturing.

Despite both Argentina and Saudi Arabia facing economic challenges in the past few years,  joining BRICS could provide them with new opportunities to access new markets, and to boost development and economic growth.

For instance, in the case of Saudi Arabia, joining the BRICS group would provide it with new opportunities for investment and trade, which would help to diversify its economy and reduce its dependence on oil exports. Saudi Arabia’s addition to BRICS is particularly quintessential from the standpoint of the ongoing shift towards renewable energy sources, which is likely to lead to a decline in demand for oil in the coming years. As a matter of fact, Saudi Arabia’s inclusion in BRICS would give it access to new technologies and expertise, which would be crucial for its efforts to diversify its economy and create new jobs.

Similarly, in the wake of the ongoing economic crisis in Argentina, joining BRICS would provide it with new opportunities for trade and investment, which would help to stimulate its economy and create new jobs. The ongoing economic crisis in Argentina, which has been characterized by high inflation, a large fiscal deficit, and a large trade deficit, makes the BRICS group a new opportunity for the country. Joining BRICS would provide Argentina with access to new technologies and expertise, which would be crucial for its efforts to modernize its economy and create new jobs.

From the geopolitical and geo-economic standpoint, the BRICS countries have been working to establish a more unbiassed and impartial world order for years, and the inclusion of Saudi Arabia and Argentina in the group would further strengthen these efforts. The BRICS group as an economic bloc have been working on diverse proposals to promote this multipolar world order. For instance, the creation of the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, which is designed to provide alternative sources of finance for developing countries, is a key BRICS initiative. The inclusion of Saudi Arabia and Argentina in the group would further strengthen these initiatives and provide more resources and support to these efforts.

Likewise, from the strategic standpoint, the inclusion of Saudi Arabia and Argentina in BRICS would promote regional stability and cooperation at the global stage. Saudi Arabia and Argentina are key regional players and their membership would bring valuable regional expertise and provide a valuable partner to the BRICS countries in these regions.

To conclude, the possible inclusion of Saudi Arabia and Argentina to the BRICS would bring significant economic, political, and social benefits. The addition of two regional powers to BRICS would further advance the influence of this bloc in particular regions. Their inclusion would strengthen the multipolar world order, provide new opportunities for growth and development, disseminate regional stability and cooperation, and strengthen cultural and educational exchanges.

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The controversial decision by the OPEC Plus group to slash oil production by two million barrels per day amid the painful global energy crisis and the United States’ attempts to dissuade it have sparked heated reactions and repercussions for Saudi Arabia and the United States. Saudi Arabia is routinely accused of weaponizing oil in its foreign policy; this time it is said to be doing so in order to influence Biden’s midterm elections and consolidate Putin’s gamble in Ukraine.

In this context, Saudi Arabia appears to be behaving like Russia, using oil to gain leverage over the West and back Russia, which is losing ground on all fronts. As per Western estimates, if Europe abandons its reliance on Russian gas to prevent a similar future scenario, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC would replace it in covering future energy resource shortfalls. Yet, with the disappointing OPEC Plus decision, this hope began dissipating.

Although the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement justified the consensual decision and tried to dispel doubts about its politicization, Washington’s reactions ranged from warning to hinting at a reassessment of relations with Riyadh. According to National Security Council Strategic Communications Coordinator John Kirby, President Joe Biden is considering reevaluating the U.S.-Saudi partnership, and the president himself said in an interview with CNN that this would have consequences.

Consequences?

Exactly what these consequences might be is not clear, but most likely they might take the form of a halt in arms sales to Saudi Arabia, notably the 300 MIM-104E Patriot missile system to counter ballistic and long-range cruise missiles. Senator Chris Murphy tweeted on what the U.S. should do in response to the OPEC issue in the short term, including shifting the scheduled AMRAAM air-to-air missile deal from Saudi Arabia to Ukraine and removing the remaining Patriot anti-missile batteries. Furthermore, following the Saudi-led OPEC Plus decision, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez urged an immediate freeze of cooperation with Saudi Arabia.

For Washington, this action is a political cross-cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Russia in an economic guise. Reducing the oil cartels contributes to the recovery of Moscow’s dilapidated economy after its war in Ukraine, and unseating President Biden and the Democrats in the November midterm elections. For Saudi Arabia, Washington’s escalation is just an ideal reflection of Democrats’ and President Biden’s stances on Saudi Arabia, as well as the accumulation of past files such as the Jamal Khashoggi case, human rights, and the Yemen war.

The Saudis’ stalemate with Democrats is mainly due to myopic perceptions of local and regional dynamics of the latter from President Obama’s tenure during the Arab Spring to President Biden, who once labeled Saudi Arabia as a pariah state. Since the outset of his election campaign, President Biden has appeared to be at odds with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman over the Khashoggi case and the Yemen war. Yet, despite Mohammed bin Salman’s bold steps toward social and cultural modernization of Saudi Arabia following decades of scathing Western criticism of the kingdom as a breeding site for extremism, this does not seem to satisfy Washington.

A blow to regional normalization

Beyond that, the decision came as a blow to endeavors to continue normalizing regional relations, which included restoring U.S.-Saudi relations following President Biden’s July visit to the region and Riyadh. Also, the visit sought to discuss energy issues in light of the Ukrainian war and put forward the idea of building a regional alliance that includes Israel to confront Iran. All of this represented two successive disappointments for Biden: the first being when he returned from Riyadh empty-handed and failed to pressure and persuade Saudis to postpone the OPEC Plus decision until the end of the midterm elections in November.

Indeed, the eight-decade U.S.-Saudi partnership based on the oil-for-security equation has become questionable: the United States’ pivot away from the Middle East and its growing shale oil output reduce the value of relations with Riyadh, while Saudi Arabia’s view of waning American hegemony and the rising powers of China and Russia calls for the evaluation and diversity of its allies.

The politicization of oil and security has become a popular cliché in explaining the trajectories of the U.S.-Saudi relationship. In two historical instances, Saudi Arabia exploited oil to settle scores in international affairs. On October 17, 1973, Saudi Arabia joined the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) in imposing an oil embargo on all countries that supported Israel in the 1973 war against Egypt and Syria. The second instance occurred when Saudi Arabia raised oil output during the Gulf crisis to topple Iraq’s economy.

In contrast, by backing the OPEC Plus decision, Saudi Arabia appears to be hedging its bets to minimize the risks of allying with the West against Russia while maximizing economic gains. Nevertheless, this strategy is vulnerable to negative consequences and may worsen in the future. By seeking autonomy in foreign policy decision-making, the Saudis’ attitude and rhetoric in this matter suggest that to some extent it was acceptable to them for the U.S. to intervene in their domestic affairs under the pretext of human rights but this is not the case for meddling in economic and foreign policy decisions.

With the OPEC Plus decision, Saudi Arabia’s hedging lies in two assumptions. Economically, reducing crude oil production would enrich the Saudi budget needed to finance Vision 2030 projects and compensate for the financial deficit that the military campaign in Yemen has drained over the past seven years. Politically, Saudi Arabia wants to signal two messages. First, it wants to seize the opportunity to stand with Russia in the face of international isolation in order to yield an iconic position in their future relationship, to win Russia over to its side within the premise of diversification of alliances, and to entice it to veer away from Iran.

At the same time, just a few days following the OPEC Plus decision, Saudi Arabia pledged to provide $400 million in humanitarian aid to Ukraine, not to mention the will to mediate between Moscow and Kyiv. Second, Saudi Arabia wants to send a moral message to its Western allies about the double standard of dealing with threats faced by allies by standing firm in backing Ukraine against Russia while the West has been hesitant to do the same for Saudi Arabia in its fight against Iran in Yemen and elsewhere.

T

he Russian invasion of Ukraine not only led to a war between the two countries, but also brought about a discursive and value-laden struggle between western and eastern countries. The most recent developments indicate that the East-West axis in international relations entail costs on both sides. Political, military, and economic changes in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans immensely affect the choices of regional actors’ foreign policies who have to choose between the policy options set before them by Russia, China, or the Western powers with the U.S. taking the lead among the latter.

Meanwhile, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey act in accordance with the realities of contemporary multipolar global politics. Turkey, for example, as a regional player successfully maintains political, military, and economic ties with multiple states, which occasionally have conflicting interests, and avoids a unilateral alignment in its foreign policy. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, two prominent powers in the Middle East, try to pursue their national interests almost independently of the great powers’ political, military, and economic agendas.

These three nations, which have lately undergone a degree of political normalization, may now be progressing towards the next level of cooperation within one of the most important groupings of emerging economies, namely BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). In this regard, BRICS as one of the organizations of non-Western actors in the international political and economic system points to the weight of these actors in the international economic system.

Turkey’s mediator role

With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Turkey took on a significant role on issues such as ceasefire talks between Russia and Ukraine, and the resolution of global/transboundary crises, combining historical diplomatic experience with the relevance of its geographical location. As an international actor in cooperation with international organizations and as part of its own foreign policy, Turkey maintained talks with both Russia and Ukraine. Turkish authorities brought the warring parties together in Turkey, and established the Grain Corridor Deal together with Russia, Ukraine, and the UN to tackle the regional and global food crisis.

It is worth highlighting that Turkey is both a NATO member and maintains ties with Russia, and could thus keep communication and diplomatic channels open. As the most trustable third party, Turkey garners the appreciation of both Russia and Ukraine, while after the Grain Corridor Deal, Turkish-Russian nuclear cooperation continues to develop as witnessed by the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant.

Saudi Arabia and Egypt are two regional powers that tread cautiously in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as well as other regional and international challenges. Egypt, for instance, while preserving ties with the United States, cooperates with Russia on nuclear issues.

Egypt condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine at the UN General Assembly but did not entirely oppose Russia and tries to sustain a balanced policy. On the one hand, Egypt historically needs the West’s political backing, especially in terms of political legitimacy and foreign aid, but, on the other, the high number of Ukrainian tourists visiting Egypt and the substantial amount of grain imported from Russia required it to pursue a more balanced approach toward the conflict.

The balanced approach of Saudi Arabia

Although today’s international relations have a multipolar structure, the Russian invasion of Ukraine again triggered and revealed an East-West struggle. At this point, similar to Turkey and Egypt, Saudi Arabia follows a neutral and balanced approach in this regard. Saudi Arabia, like other Gulf states, pursues a balanced policy not only in opposing Russia’s invasion but also with regards to the East-West axis. Saudi Arabia is improving its military and diplomatic ties with China and Russia, has been in talks with Russia for the procurement of Russian military hardware, and has signed a defense cooperation agreement with Russia. The kingdom is also cooperating with China on ballistic missile development on Saudi soil.

At the Jeddah Security and Development Summit 2022, attended by U.S. President Joe Biden who met with the leaders of the GCC states and Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq, the U.S. administration did not succeed in building a front against Russia, Iran, and China—the basic motivation behind Biden’s visit. This idea was politely overridden by several states that have close and interdependent political, military, and economic ties with Russia and China.

Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt want to strengthen their ties with BRICS members, and this interest is not one-sided. According to Purnima Anand, a representative of the BRICS International Forum, these three states may join the BRICS countries soon.

What would the BRICS group bring to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt?

The three countries becoming members of the BRICS group would immediately be a vital turning point for them, the BRICS member-states, and the organization itself. Particularly in the Chinese media, it is claimed that the three countries’ participation would strengthen the organization’s discourse on global governance and a fairer international political and economic system. In addition, the GDP of Saudi Arabia and Turkey, each more than $800 billion, and Egypt’s GDP, which also exceeds $400 billion, would mean that BRICS would grow by almost $2 trillion, and its international economic potential and role would be tremendously augmented.

Along these lines, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s attendance of the 2018 BRICS meeting in South Africa’s capital had furthered discussion over the country’s membership—a discussion that occasionally pops up on the Turkish foreign policy agenda. The economic forum, which is comprised of five states with a combined GDP of $21–22 trillion and roughly half of the world’s population, is undeniably significant.

The relations that Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt can develop with various economic organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) would help these states sustain their balance-oriented foreign policies within the framework of the East-West axis, and would also serve as a healthy bridge between the region and the West.

U.S. President Joe Biden announced that U.S. peacekeepers would withdraw from the Red Sea islands of Tiran and Sanafir by the end of the year during his visit to Saudi Arabia on June 16.

The announcement came after quietly negotiated deals between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Israel approved the outline of a deal ceding control of the strategic islands from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, while Saudi Arabia opened its airspace to Israeli flights.

Formerly, Saudi Arabia had only allowed Israeli airplanes flying from Tel Aviv to the UAE and Bahrain through its airspace. The kingdom’s new decision allows unlimited use of its airspace by Israeli airlines to fly to and from the country.

For months, the Biden administration sought to formalize security and economic deals between the two countries to possibly pave the way for the normalization of their relations. Biden hailed the kingdom’s decision, saying that it could aid in moving toward Israel’s further integration into the region.

Strategic importance of the islands

The Tiran and Sanafir Islands, which were ceded from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, are currently uninhabited, yet they hold key strategic value. In line with the terms of the 1978 Camp David Accords, Egypt was not allowed to station troops on the islands and only peacekeepers—now to be replaced by cameras—are present. The islands were kept demilitarized to maintain peace in the region.

According to the treaty, Israel needs to ratify the islands’ territorial status. With the deal, Israeli officials, including the Israeli prime minister’s office, and the foreign and defense ministries, gave the green light for the Tiran and Sanafir Islands to be taken over by Saudi Arabia.

The two islands are located at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba where Tiran controls all shipping to Eilat harbor, Israel’s only access to the Red Sea. The islands remain vital to Israeli trade with Southeast Asia, while Saudi Arabia seeks to utilize the islands for tourism and economic development.

Why did Egypt cede Tiran and Sanafir Islands to Saudi Arabia?

Egypt decided to cede Tiran and Sanafir Islands to Saudi Arabia in April 2016. Saudi Arabia had made sovereignty claims over Sanafir and Tiran twice: first in 1957 and then in 1968, pledging free maritime passage. In 1990, Hosni Mubarak relinquished control of the islands to Saudi Arabia when he issued a presidential decree sent to the UN that set Egypt’s maritime baselines in the Red and Mediterranean Seas.

In 2010, Saudi Arabia posted its maritime baseline to the UN and made another sovereignty claim. When Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi decided to cede the islands to Saudi Arabia, the decision was met with nationalist backlash and protests.

Some accused Sisi of selling out the islands in exchange for an estimated $25 billion pledged in aid and investments from Saudi Arabia at the time. The Egyptian government argued the islands were originally leased to Egypt from Saudi Arabia in the 1950s.

In 2018, Egypt’s Supreme Court approved the deal by nullifying the contradictory rulings of two lower courts opposing ceding control of the islands, and therefore, a final decision was reached by the Egyptian side. With Israeli agreement, the islands’ sovereignty will be transferred to Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia has put forth that normalization with Israel would not be possible unless the Palestinian issue is resolved. Following the Abraham Accords of 2020 and the series of normalization deals between Israel and the Arab states of the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco, this work-around agreement brokered by the U.S. may signal an advance in Saudi-Israeli relations. Will Biden set the “crown jewel” of the Arab-Israeli relations?

If the war in Ukraine reveals a single globally valid truth, it is the fact that today states operate under a very different political and security order than a decade ago.

The most striking example of this new international structure manifests itself in how Saudi and Emirati national interests dictated and enabled these Gulf monarchies to respond to the Russian attacks in Ukraine more cautiously and openly refusing an automatic alignment with the United States.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has brought the broadened range of political, economic, and strategic partnerships of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with Russia and China to the fore, and renewed a scholarly focus on the two Gulf states’ pivot to the East.

Gulf pivot to Asia: The shift is real

It is hardly surprising that economic cooperation has been the linchpin of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) pivot to China, and to a much lesser extend to Russia, given the interdependent structures of their economies.

Over the last years, the economic relations of the GCC states with Russia and China are blooming at an unprecedented pace. In 2020, China replaced the European Union as the GCC’s top trading partner, as the bilateral trade volume reached $161.4 billion.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are China’s most important economic partners in the Gulf region. According to Saudi custom data, Saudi Arabia was China’s top supplier of crude oil and held 17 percent of the Chinese market. In 2021, China was Saudi Arabia’s main trade partner, both in terms of exports (17.3 percent) and imports (20.7 percent).

Similarly, China is the top trade partner of the UAE as the bilateral trade volume exceeded $49 billion in the first nine months of 2021, showing a 38.1 percent increase compared to the same period in 2020. Furthermore, the UAE is a key destination for re-exports of Chinese goods into the Middle East and Africa.

On January 10, in an unprecedented move, foreign ministers from Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman, and the secretary general of the GCC paid a visit to China to deepen bilateral partnerships. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with Gulf GCC Secretary General Nayef Falah Mubarak Al-Hajraf during the visit.

Both sides agreed that conditions are ripe for the establishment of a China-GCC strategic partnership and both sides will speed up the process so as to push bilateral relations to a new level,” the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a statement. The visit is expected to give impetus to China-GCC Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations, which were launched in 2004. Although absent from the visit, the UAE expressed its support for the FTA and reiterated Abu Dhabi’s willingness to deepen cooperation with China.

The UAE and China already agreed to upgrade their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership, the highest form of diplomatic relationship, during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the UAE in 2018.

Beijing was also the venue for Qatar’s Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani’s meeting with Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in February 2022, for the first time since the end of the Gulf rift in 2021.

Military cooperation between the GCC, China, and Russia

The militarization and digitalization of Saudi-Emirati relations with China and Russia show the widened scope of the Gulf pivot to Asia beyond bilateral trade. China has long been absent in the direct security engagements in the Gulf. Yet, the recent reports signal a change in Beijing’s position. Based on a U.S. intelligence report, in 2021, the Wall Street Journal claimed that China was secretly building a military facility near a port in Abu Dhabi. The fate and the details of the Chinese facility remain unknown; yet, it is clear that China started to engage with the Gulf states through military diplomacy, including niche arm sales and joint military exercises.

The recent pledge to increase military cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia falls into these efforts. Chinese arms sales to Saudi Arabia rose from $35 million to $170 million between 2015 and 2020, and to the UAE from $45 million to $121 million over the same period.

On the Russian side, increasing arms transfers from Moscow to the Gulf, particularly to the UAE, is well documented. Russia and the UAE signed a declaration of strategic partnership in 2018 and engaged in joint investments in the military industrial sectors. Saudi acquisition of Russian S-400 air defense systems was reportedly on Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s agenda on his 2021 visit.

Digital infrastructure and cybersecurity cooperation is another sign of the Gulf pivot to Asia, particularly to China. The UAE Telecommunication Company signed a deal with Chinese Huawei to provide 5G services to the Emirates in 2019. More recently, in February 2021, Huawei and Emirati partners leveraged 5G multi-access edge computing to live broadcast the UAE President’s Cup, an annual cycling event.

In March 2022, the UAE Cybersecurity Council inked a deal with Huawei to launch a jointly established independent think-tank on cybersecurity. More recently, Saudi Arabia has announced that Riyadh is becoming a regional hub for Chinese Alibaba Cloud operations, as the company pledged up to $500 million in investments in Saudi Arabia over the next five years.

Testing the limits of hedging

The UAE’s decision to suspend a billion-dollar deal of U.S.-made F-35 fighter jets in December 2021 over Washington’s attempts to bloc technology transfer from China to the Emirates, which shows the extended limits of hedging strategies of the small Gulf monarchies.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is another striking example of changing U.S.-Gulf relations as Gulf states refused to pump oil into the market, and have kept cordial relations with Russia’s Putin with which they deepened bilateral cooperation in many areas.

Washington’s relations with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have recently become strained over a number of issues and the two Gulf monarchies’ deepened cooperation with Russia and China has been one of them. “Washington is dealing with a far more assertive, confident generation of Gulf leaders who have been hedging their relationships to be more independent of the U.S.,” notes a recent article in the Financial Times, underlining the Gulf states’ closer relations with Moscow and Beijing.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) visit to Turkey on June 22, 2022, consolidated a new paradigm in the Gulf. This comes along with a shift from a militarized and securitized rhetoric to a diplomatic reconstruction process based on economy-oriented policies. In the joint statement, Saudi and Turkish officials underlined their determination to political, economic, military, energy, technology, and security cooperation based on “historical brotherhood” to consolidate regional peace. Hence, the reciprocal visit has apparently ended the break in Saudi-Turkish dialogue upon the mutual needs of both sides to reconcile by negotiating the possibility of damaged bilateral relations.

Saudi decision-makers and media portrayed the crown prince’s visit as the last leg of his regional tour to Egypt and Jordan, and, thus, not a special visit to Turkey per se. Like Egypt and Jordan, MBS’s visit is significant for the Turkish economy, struggling since late 2021 with currency devaluation against the U.S. dollar. One expectation from the visit was to bolster investment, especially in the defense sector, which might also be reinforced by tightening social and cultural ties.

Since the beginning of this year, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have been trying to manage a diplomatic meeting at the highest level. Although Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had announced a potential appointment with King Salman bin Abdulaziz in February 2022, the meeting was canceled. Later, in May 2022, Erdoğan visited the kingdom. During that time, Erdoğan mentioned King Salman’s “promise” to visit; according to some, thus drawing attention  to the Saudis’ hesitancy in terms of timing and content to pay a diplomatic visit to Turkey. Despite the mutually positive atmosphere, until MBS visited Turkey on June 22, Saudis preferred to carry on with talks behind the scenes and extend the negotiation process for normalization.

On his visit to the Saudi Kingdom, President Erdoğan had emphasized the opening of a “new era” in bilateral relations and strengthening ties in several fields. However, Saudi newspapers preferred to ignore Erdoğan’s earlier visit to Saudi Arabia, highlighting MBS’s visit to Turkey as the mark of the beginning of this “new era” of cooperation. Likewise, following Erdoğan’s visit to the Saudi Kingdom, officials of both sides made no joint statement. Despite the absence of the latter, the closure of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mekameleen TV station in Turkey signaled, at least, one of the priorities set by the Saudis.

As the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood is removed from the table, so the concerns of Saudi decision-makers are eased, and diplomatic channels can be reopened. In fact, Turkish foreign policy-makers have always tended to avoid irreparably jeopardizing bilateral relations and have always adopted a respectful rhetoric for the rulers of Saudi Arabia. Not long after MBS’s visit, Erdoğan announced the Saudi intention to buy battle-proven Bayraktar drones, involved in successful combat in Libya, Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Ukraine, from Turkey. Behind the Saudis’ colder attitude regarding making a joint statement with Turkey was an effort to play hardball and embolden their position in the normalization process.

The post-al-Ula regional security narratives of the Saudis have revolved around adjusting the shortcomings of personalized politics and in repairing Saudi Arabia’s bilateral relations. The Saudi assertive rhetoric against Turkey was mainly the consequence of the Khashoggi affair in 2018 and the following campaign targeting MBS’s persona both in Turkey and on the international stage. The transfer of the Khashoggi trial to the Saudi authorities in April 2022 calmed the tension, alleviating the damage. It became clear that Turkish decision-makers were more willing to accelerate the rapprochement with the Kingdom.

Leaving a military- and security-based foreign policy and adopting active diplomacy is likely to help Saudi Arabia balance its security reliance on the United States as an external guarantor and hail the Kingdom as a initiator of a new security architecture. Saudi decision-makers understood that normalizing relations with Turkey and Israel is vital for Saudi foreign policy.

Turkey’s isolation, on the other hand, in the energy rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean through Saudi Arabia’s siding with Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel attested to Turkey’s need to deal with Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia all at the same time. Having the Saudis near, taking some normalization steps with Egypt, and establishing dialogue with Israel would likely help Turkey reach an accommodating status quo for its regional security needs, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean.

While Turkey and Israel moved to restore ties at a high level after 15 years with Israeli President Isaac Herzog visit to Turkey in March 2022, the coming days are likely to bring the initiation of an official dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which in turn will likely have favorable implications for Turkish foreign policy.

The meeting between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on April 28 at al-Salam Palace in Jeddah marks a sea change in the two countries’ relations which had reached a nadir after several events in the past.

In the last two decades, Middle East politics experienced ups and downs in Turkish-Saudi relations, one of the most complex in the region. For some time, both sides have been working to fix the broken ties. In particular, last month saw an acceleration of diplomatic efforts which eventually bore its fruit with the April visit.

Significant encounters between Saudi and Turkish officials in March 2022 signaled an easing of tensions in political, economic, and security relations. First, foreign ministers Prince Faisal bin Farhan and Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu met during the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) meeting in Islamabad. Then, Turkish President of Religious Affairs Ali Erbaş and Saudi Minister of Hajj and Umrah Tawfiq Al-Rabiah met in Jeddah.

Later, Saudi Chief of General Staff Fayyad bin Hamed Al-Ruwaili visited the Turkish pavilion at the Doha International Maritime Defence Exhibition and Conference (DIMDEX) in Doha. After these developments, in a televised interview, Çavuşoğlu said that “concrete steps” were on the way to mend ties with Saudi Arabia. The decision of a Turkish court to transfer the Jamal Khashoggi case to Saudi Arabia after Riyadh’s request was a step in the direction of normalization.

Besides these bilateral efforts, what were the driving forces behind the idea of restoration of relations? The short answer is that Turkey and Saudi Arabia face concurrent challenges in their domestic and foreign policies, and therefore, both consider the rapprochement as pragmatic and realist. The longer answer is that this rapprochement is driven by several internal, regional, and international dynamics.

Turkey needs to regain its friends in the region. In domestic politics, the country is facing an economic crisis and heading towards a critical presidential election scheduled for next year. Saudi Arabia, which also faces the economic consequences of COVID19, aims to invest in accordance with its “Vision 2030.”

What Riyadh expects from Turkey on a regional level

Major issues that led to the tension between the two countries are not present anymore or have been partially resolved regarding the regional and international dynamics, be it the Cairo-Ankara rift, the Muslim Brotherhood issue, or the Gulf crisis. However, there are still some minefields. To avoid these, the rapprochement is expected to start with trade and business followed by a political cooperation based on the assessment of the progress achieved.

Riyadh might consider the political rapprochement with Ankara as an important step toward a broader anti-Iran bloc. Also, it might consider Ankara’s backing of its military campaign in Yemen in light of the latest Houthi escalation. Turkey has harshly condemned the Houthi attacks on the Gulf countries and has stressed that it attaches as much importance to the Gulf’s stability and security as it does to its own. Turkey can provide security guarantees to both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi through its effective drones.

Foreign policy in Saudi Arabia and Turkey is mostly driven by personalities, not institutions. Leaders play highly important roles in shaping and directing policies, and they prefer not to speak in public extensively about what goals they seek and how they intend to pursue them. Therefore, the success of the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Turkey will be based primarily on what concrete steps the two countries take in the following days both on the bilateral and regional level.

The Gulf reconciliation at the Al-Ula Summit suddenly changed the regional atmosphere and the rhetoric of war among Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari decision-makers. The themes of building trust and confidence over broader regional security moved out of the Gulf context, given the new trend of Gulf diplomacy that favors economic interest over political conflict. The emerging Gulf portrait requires Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar to polish their international image as the region’s natural stabilizers and peaceful actors.

Although the Al-Ula Summit put an official end to the Gulf crisis, it threw a veil over political divergences for an unpredictable period of time, at which point it may lead to the redefinition of the Gulf states’ security interests. In fact, there is an intolerant ambiance in the post-Al-Ula era. Peace appears on the surface; however, beneath it lies the spirit of competition and aggression via the indirect foreign policies of Qatari and Emirati decision-makers who hide behind the foreign policy rhetoric of peace and stability for the eyes of the international community and, particularly, the United States.

Both Qatar and the UAE use their financial and media powers to challenge each other’s narratives as the central stabilizer establishing regional order. While other regional powers like Turkey, Israel, and Iran expect to benefit from the new Gulf diplomacy and its economic offers, the overall security perceptions of political actors in the Gulf and the Middle East continue to be unstable.

The central question here is to what extent Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE can tolerate each other’s regional aspirations in negotiating the process of regional order? As the Gulf states don’t have a joint foreign policy and a common defense agenda, establishing bilateral military relations with Gulf and non-Gulf actors independently seems inevitable.

It has been over a year now since Qatar and the UAE agreed on restoring bilateral ties and ending adverse statements against each other. However, the institutional rhetoric of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) on foreign policy and bilateral relations do not change rapidly as illustrated in a speech by Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, the foreign minister of Qatar, who stated, “It could take some time to move past this difficult period.”

Official delegations of Qatar and the UAE held a meeting in Doha in early February 2022, and stated their commitment to creating joint mechanisms and procedures for implementing the Al-Ula Declaration. Afterwards, the photograph of Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani and Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan shaking hands during the opening of the Olympic Games Beijing 2022 demonstrated the intention of the parties to portray a positive diplomatic ambiance at the highest level.

Before the Al-Ula declaration, Qatar and the Emirates continuously utilized their financial power through media and lobbying abroad to put pressure on each other. Recently, Qatar objected to the Abraham Accords signed between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain, by criticizing the UAE’s efforts to initiate a diplomatic move without negotiating a solution to the Palestinian cause.

After the Al-Ula declaration, one might mention the continuity of the indirect competition over the Hollywood movie The Misfits that portrays Qatar as “Jazeeristan,” a terrorist state and a global financier of terrorism.

The movie, co-produced by the UAE, Paramount Pictures, and Highland Film Group, mentions actual Qatari institutions such as Al-Emadi Hospital, the Lekhwiya police force, and Al Jazeera supporting the state’s “terrorist” activities. Another incident of behind-the-scenes competition can be seen in the UAE’s attempts to encourage journalists in Africa to campaign against Qatar’s hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup.

In another case, the UAE’s ambassador to Israel, Mohamed Al Khaja, accused Al Jazeera of continuously manipulating the narrative of the Palestinian cause and shifting the credibility of the events from the truth.

Likewise, Qatari newspapers published the visit of Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, the foreign minister of the UAE, the first Emirati official to visit Damascus since 2011, to discuss “new horizons” by referring to the Syrian civil war as a brutal and multifaceted war that has killed innocent civilians.

One can also come across news in Qatari media criticizing the UAE’s labor sponsorship system as problematic given that thousands of migrant children lack schooling and access to healthcare because they are not issued birth certificates by the authorities as a result of being born to unmarried or single parents and not paying medical bills.

The marring of the UAE’s international image during its military involvement in the Yemeni civil war decreased the chances of the Biden administration perceiving the UAE as the primary peacebuilder in the Gulf. The Biden administration’s recent selection of Qatar as a major non-NATO ally to cooperate in security and investment sectors demonstrated that the U.S. foreign policymaking would not tolerate aggressive foreign policies against the region’s instability and neighbors.

The Biden administration’s intolerance of aggressive foreign policies and military activities benefited Qatar’s previous regional narratives during the blockade period.

As the issue of Muslim Brotherhood is no longer on the table in intra-Gulf discussions or a factor in the Gulf states’ relations with other countries, ideological war narratives  are now replaced with a competition over the display of state capacity to promote peace-building and regional stability.

The process favors Qatar for now, but all this is tied to the U.S. administration’s foreign policy. Upon realizing that, the UAE recently established a new foreign policy built upon the theme of “good neighborliness” so as not to return to the hostile competitive environment and to avoid recalling its notorious military aggression in Yemen.

The UAE’s diplomatic move to reconcile and improve ties with Turkey through highest level visits and positive statements about the visit of Israel President Isaac Herzog to the country in January 2022  indicate the UAE’s determination to diversify regional allies peacefully and independently of its Gulf neighbors. In this new era of narrative wars built upon peace rhetoric, Qatar as a major non-NATO ally of the United States, appears to be the UAE’s primary competitor.

In a televised interview on the Iranian Al-Alam news channel on February 8, secretary general of the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, revealed that they wished the ex-Lebanese prime minister, Saad Hariri, reconsider his bombshell decision of “suspending” his political career, announced on January 24.

Nasrallah called the decision “unfortunate,” given that Hariri was their “candidate for the premiership,” highlighting that the political landscape remains extremely opaque in a post-Hariri era and that channels of cooperation and communication with the Future Movement, Hariri’s political party, shall remain open.

Ironically, Hezbollah never named Hariri for the premiership in the custom parliamentary consultations often held by the president of the republic before a PM is designated based on a majority of votes. However, Hezbollah’s position on Hariri’s departure says a lot about the role Hariri played to the militant group’s advantage especially since 2016, despite Hezbollah basking in unrivalled power during that period.

Hariri’s exit does not necessarily imply that observers, politicians, and researchers have written him off completely; however, his decision should not be taken lightly either, in terms of the seismic shift the country is undergoing by moving completely into the “Iranian influence archipelago.”

In late January, Saad Hariri arrived in Beirut following months of speculation in the wake of yet another solitary retreat – this time in the Emirati capital, Abu Dhabi – that came into effect mid-July last year. Hariri, a PM-designate at the time, stepped down after failing to form a government for over eight months. In Beirut, Hariri met with his aides, party members, MPs from his bloc, and other sectarian leaders or figures, and proceeded to announce the unthinkable: suspending his involvement in political activities and not running in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

In third-world countries (although I have reservations regarding the term), politicians and leaders do not simply step down: they either abdicate to their heirs or die while still in office. If they ever step down, it is often a form of a relegitimization process following serious blunders. Exhibit A is Egypt’s leader Gamal Abdel Nasser’s shenanigan in 1967 following his country’s catastrophic defeat by Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967.

Hariri is no Nasser

But Hariri is no Nasser and he might not even aspire to be one, and, Hariri was not met with waves of people flocking the streets asking him to rescind his decision as Nasser experienced back then. Hariri enjoyed a few flagship “selfies” with a handful of supporters near his Beiruti mansion and a couple of hours of chants in his name. The feeble reaction from Saad’s supporters, the ones he represents, is symptomatic of current times in Lebanon where sectarian leaders, previously holding gods-like statuses, are dealt major blows to their popularity, to a varying extent.

The Sunni community today stands at a three-way crossroad with different options to mitigate the current situation. As Saad fades into the horizon, until further notice, Sunnis can either succumb to further marginalization and disenfranchisement without devising a plan to attempt to fill Hariri’s shoes, or the main Sunni figures in the country can move towards creating a consortium that manages the transition into a post-Hariri era through cooperation, or lastly, compete amongst each other over the leadership of the sect causing further communal depression and the complete erosion of the sect’s leverage within the country’s power-sharing arrangement.

Unfortunately, Lebanon isn’t shifting into a secular state any time soon, nor will its sectarian system be altered at the moment, despite the hopeful dreams of the Lebanese youth that took to the streets during the October 2019 uprising.

It appears that the Lebanese Sunni leaders understand that now is not the time for petty politics amongst them, especially during an extremely sensitive phase where Iran sits and negotiates with the United States in Vienna not only regarding its nuclear program but also its influence in the region, and while the world is starting to show signs of reconsideration of policies towards the Syrian regime, despite its track record of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

As such, a common understanding seems to be brewing for the option of a concerted effort to rally the community and block the way in face of lackluster disbursement of Sunni votes. The cornerstone of such an effort will be the mufti who already adopted a proactive approach to the situation, in addition to the club of ex-prime ministers who, alongside Mikati, can throw their weight around.

However, this does not ensure that Hariri’s shoes will be filled. After all, and despite his blunders, he remains the Sunni community’s most popular leader and no other figure enjoys the potential Saad once represented – not even the sitting billionaire PM, Najib Mikati, who has yet to come out of his localized constituency in northern Lebanon towards the country as a whole.

With the Sunni community divided, Hezbollah can now rule much easier

The recent dynamics will pave the way towards a schism between the Sunni figures of the cities and those of the peripheries, who are not aligned in politics and allegiances. In fact, peripheral figures have a bigger chance for representation today, especially since they’ve maintained good relations with the Syrian regime in Damascus and with the tides shifting in their favor.

This schism will serve as a conduit for both Hezbollah and Bashar al-Assad to exercise influence over the Sunni role within the power-sharing arrangement, allowing them to break any form of unity sect leaders might work to establish. It’ll be easier for Hezbollah to rule in the wake of a divided Sunni community.

Hezbollah has lost an ally in Saad Hariri, a pro-Western PM with access to all capitals of the world who acted as a buffer between the international community and the Iran-aligned militant group and also as a whipping boy for most of the shortcomings under the pretext that “Hezbollah doesn’t rule.” Now, the group is gearing for a wider share of the pie in Lebanon as the reconfiguration of spheres of influence is underway in the region.

Hariri is obviously jumping ship, a sinking one with more holes than the current 6.5 million population can fill even if they all chipped in.

Hariri’s decision stacks up against a series of mistakes he has committed over a 17-year period, yet the decision might eventually pay off during these trying times – as in now. Saad is obviously jumping ship, a sinking one with more holes than the current 6.5 million population can fill even if they all chipped in. The economy is in shatters, the country’s relations with the outside world are collapsing, and the predominant Hezbollah-Free Patriotic Movement alliance has no competency or potential to lead the country out of the abyss.

More so, in order to secure a deal with the International Monetary Fund and other global donors, the time will come where even more difficult austerity measures will be required with harsh reforms that often come at a popularity expense. Hariri being out of the picture means he won’t be associated with those measures and will spare himself further decline in popularity.

For decades, the geopolitical and geo-sectarian rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has played out across the Middle East in various destabilizing ways. Since the Houthi rebels usurped control of Sana‘a in 2014, Yemen has been an important flashpoint in this competition for regional influence with Riyadh and Yemeni forces loyal to the UN-recognized Yemeni government waging war against the Iranian-backed insurgents for nearly seven years. The conflict(s) in Yemen still rages on. In recent days, the Government of Yemen “liberated” energy-rich Shabwah while the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed al-Amaliqa Brigades has been advancing into Marib. Meanwhile, Houthi missiles attacks keep on targeting their enemies, most recently including the UAE, at least according to the rebel group’s claims.

A major question that analysts have been asking since Saudi-Iranian talks began in Baghdad in April 2021 is, what could such dialogue mean for Yemen? It seems safe to conclude that although these talks have not led to major strategic or necessarily tangible changes in Yemen, there have been some tactical changes that could be grounds for some cautious optimism.

An important development in late 2021 was the death of Hassan Erlou who served as Iran’s ambassador to the Houthis. His passing called into question the relationship between the Houthis and their backers in Tehran, and how that could change the face of the war in Yemen. Erlou, who was smuggled into Yemen in 2020, was likely evacuated on an Iraqi plane from Yemen to Iraq, before flying home to Iran where he died from COVID19 on December 18, 2021.

“Erlou was obviously, from the evidence that we have, someone who was quite closely tied into the [Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)] and the Quds force,” explained Dr. Andreas Krieg, a senior lecturer at the School of Security Studies at King’s College London, Royal College of Defense Studies, in an interview with Politics Today. “He was on the U.S. Treasury watch list. Having someone like him leaving [Yemen] without being actually arrested and then flying over Saudi territory was quite a concession from the side of the Saudis. This was only possible because of Iraqi mediation.”

Yet there were many conflicting reports about Erlou and his situation in Yemen just before leaving the country. The Saudis and Iranians told different stories about what had happened as well as the significance of and reasons for his exit from Yemen. “According to the Saudis, Erlou’s return to Tehran reflected tensions between the Houthis and Iran, but there has been little evidence of a breach in the relationship between Sanaa and Tehran,” according to Dr. Annelle Sheline, a Research Fellow for the Middle East at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Some reports even claimed that the Houthis were pushing for Erlou’s exit due to rising domestic pressure to distance themselves from Tehran.

Nonetheless, as Dr. Krieg explained, beyond all the facades and information warfare, there is a renewed willingness to talk between Riyadh and Tehran. In fact, last month when the Organization of Islamic Cooperation gathered in Pakistan to address the situation in post-U.S, Afghanistan, diplomats from the Saudi Kingdom and the Islamic Republic met.

This meeting between Saudi and Iranian officials in Islamabad “suggests that there is a willingness and also permission from the superiors to actually have these talks continue and that’s the most important thing,” according to Dr. Krieg. Additionally, in late 2021 the Saudi government granted Iranian diplomats visas at the OIC—a development suggesting that Riyadh and Tehran could possibly restore diplomatic relations this year.

Last month, the Saudi-led coalition released video footage and photographs that purportedly confirmed that the Houthis are receiving support from Hezbollah and the IRGC. The videos purportedly show a Hezbollah leader giving Houthi leader Abdullah Yahya Al-Hakim instructions, Hezbollah trainers teaching Houthis to operate drones, boxes of drone parts with the Hezbollah logo, and satellite footage showing how the IRGC has assisted the Houthis in transforming the Sanaa International Airport into a drone and missile launching pad.

“The Saudis want the Iranians to stop their surrogate operations across the region, whether it may be in Yemen or Iraq,” argued Dr. Krieg. “The problem with that is that the Iranians are saying there are no surrogate operations, and that these are local operations which we have no control over, which is obviously a lie. But it’s obviously this kind of surrogate game is one that’s based on dissociation and plausible deniability. Hence, why it’s very difficult to come to any conclusion because the Iranians will say in the first place ‘we have no forces on the ground, so we have no control over what’s going on’. It’s true to an extent. The control that the Iranians have over surrogate operations is limited. That’s something that the Saudis understand, and it always provides the Iranians with a degree of plausible deniability and disassociation to tell others that they’re actually not involved. That makes it difficult to come up with a solution that is sustainable.”

These recent developments leave us questioning how Erlou’s replacement will affect the situation in Yemen. Earlier this month, Iranian officials appointed Abdul Reza Shahlai as Erlou’s replacement without giving him an official diplomatic title, which some believe may be a sign of positive relations between Tehran and Riyadh. According to Gregory Johnsen, a nonresident fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution: “If the narrative of a split between the Houthis and Iran is true, then it is notable that Shahlai will not be given a diplomatic title, and by selecting an official already in Yemen, Iran honored the Houthi commitment to Saudi Arabia not to bring in a ‘new diplomat’.” However, his appointment could also simply be a means of convenience. Shahlai has been in Yemen for several years, meaning that they would not have to go through the effort to smuggle a new diplomat into the country and he is already a seasoned military commander with experience in Yemen.

In the final analysis, Saudi Arabia will continue to see Iran as a threat in the long term, no matter the direction that dialogue between the two countries takes in 2022. Iranian influence in Yemen will continue terrifying the Saudis. Nonetheless, one can assume that thanks to Iraqi mediation the likelihood of a repeat of the Saudi Aramco attacks of September 2019 has decreased.

Within the context of the Iranians wanting to improve their relationship with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in order to create a new architecture in the sub-region, we might see Tehran begin to show more sensitivity toward Saudi security as it directly pertains to the Gulf. But beyond the Gulf, it is tough to imagine talks in Iraq between Riyadh and Tehran leading to the Islamic Republic winding down its surrogate or “proxy” operations throughout the greater Middle East.

On December 3 and 4, 2021, French President Emmanuel Macron traveled to the Gulf for a short visit to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. This is likely to be his last foreign trip outside of Europe, as France has entered election season. The presidential election will take place on April 10 and 24, 2022, and

Macron is preparing to run for re-election.

Macron’s trip highlights the importance of the Gulf countries on at least two levels. First, at a time of the United States’ disengagement from the region, France is trying to occupy its place economically, militarily, and politically.

Second, at a time when the issue of Islam and Muslims is at the center of the presidential campaign, Macron wants to seek support for the French position against “radicalism,” and especially so after the adoption of the “Law against Separatism,” renamed the “Law Reinforcing the Principles of the Republic,” which came into force in August 2021 and which has caused much misunderstanding in the Muslim world (and elsewhere) as it appears to be (and is in fact) a law against Islam and Muslims.

The most successful stopover was in Abu Dhabi, where President Macron has a close personal relationship with the Emirates’ strongman, Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ). The signing of a record contract for the sale of 80 Rafale aircraft was accompanied by the sale of twelve Eurocopter EC725 Caracal helicopters, and the singing of various economic partnership agreements. “This is the biggest military contract with a French component in our history – worth some 17 billion euros,”  Macron said.

For Macron, this is proof of the close ties between Paris and Abu Dhabi. “I think that the Emirates and the Crown Prince saw that France was a solid partner in the fight against terrorism (…), that is to say that we kept our commitments in the region and that we were attached to its balance.” For it is not only a question of arms sales, but of a community of views and coordination between Abu Dhabi and Paris in the “war against terrorism” (notably in Libya), and in the fight against “political Islam,” as shown by the presence on the trip of Laurent Nuñez, the national coordinator of intelligence and the fight against terrorism. MBZ’s support for French laws against “separatism” is particularly appreciated.

We should notice that the French president said nothing about the authoritarian nature of the Abu Dhabi regime, which imprisons and tortures its opponents, about its involvement in the deadly war in Yemen, or about its use of Pegasus spy software. Yet, a few days later, a report by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) highlighted the dark side of the regime and Paris’s complicity in it.

The last and most controversial stop of Macron’s trip to the Gulf, in France at least, was his visit to Saudi Arabia. For the first time since the horrific murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018, a major head of state of the Western world agreed to meet Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), the Saudi crown prince, widely considered the mastermind of this crime.

Relations between MBS and Macron had not been rosy since the French president “rescued” Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in 2018, when he was reportedly kidnapped in Saudi Arabia by MBS and forced to announce his resignation from Riyadh.

Relations between MBS and Macron had not been rosy since the French president “rescued” Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in 2018.

While the aim of the meeting was also to give a boost to bilateral relations – and to take advantage of the rift between Washington and Riyadh, with President Joe Biden refusing any contact with MBS – one of the objectives was a new mediation with Lebanon, which the Saudis are subjecting to a trade embargo that is aggravating the economic crisis in the country. The result was modest: a conversation between Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati and MBS on Macron’s phone. Nothing more came of the visit – no return of ambassadors and no lifting of the embargo.