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urkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Wednesday that a comprehensive investigation has been launched into the plane crash in Türkiye that killed Libya’s army chief and several members of his delegation.

Speaking at the Justice and Development (AK) Party’s extended provincial heads meeting in Ankara, Erdoğan said the incident “deeply saddened us” and extended condolences on behalf of Türkiye to the “brotherly Libyan people,” the Libyan armed forces and the government.

The Libyan Chief of the General Staff, General Mohamed Ali Al-Haddad, and four members of his delegation, as well as three crew members, died when a Falcon 50 business jet crashed shortly after taking off from Ankara.

Erdoğan said relevant Turkish ministries would provide further information as the investigation progresses.

Black boxes recovered as search and inspection continue

The aircraft was located about 2 kilometers south of Kesikkavak village in Ankara’s Haymana district. Search and rescue operations continued overnight despite heavy rain and dense fog, with efforts coordinated from a mobile command center established by Türkiye’s Disaster and Emergency Management Authority (AFAD).

Turkish Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya said the plane’s flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder were recovered early Wednesday, and the examination process has begun to determine the cause of the crash. He added that debris from the aircraft is spread across an area of approximately 3 square kilometers.

More than 400 personnel, supported by 103 ground vehicles and seven aircraft, are working at the site.

A Libyan military delegation arrived in Ankara on Wednesday to inspect the crash scene, while a separate 22-member delegation — including relatives of the victims and officials from Libya’s Defense and Interior ministries — also traveled to the Turkish capital.

Authorities said findings from the investigation will be shared with the public once the analysis is complete.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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hen assessed as a whole across four contexts, the Turkey-Italy-Libya Summit has signaled the first signs of a search for a new balance in the Mediterranean. In the geostrategic sphere, a framework linking the Eastern Mediterranean and Sub-Saharan Africa. In the economic sphere, a development vision supported by energy, integration and logistics routes. In the regional cooperation sphere, technical committees, multilateral formats and a process institutionalized with UN support, and finally, in the context of EU security, common solutions to irregular migration and human trafficking stand out.

The trilateral summit between Turkey, Italy and Libya, held in Istanbul in early August, was a critical meeting where long-term strategic lines for the Mediterranean basin and Africa were discussed. This summit also presents a framework that is coherent in terms of geostrategic, economic, regional cooperation and European security contexts. Each of these contexts exists and functions as interlinked rings. Therefore, it is a fact that this trilateral summit cannot be reduced to a single dimensional parameter.

From the Eastern Mediterranean to Sub-Saharan Africa

One of the most critical aspects of the tripartite summit is the new equation it presents in a geostrategic context. The Eastern Mediterranean has long been at the center of attention due to energy discoveries, disputes over maritime jurisdiction and regional competition. The maritime jurisdiction agreement signed by Turkey with Libya in 2019 invalidated the plans of Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) and suspended projects such as the EastMed pipeline. Today, the fact that Italy, a member of the EU and NATO, is sitting at the same table with Turkey and Libya confirms this agreement. Thus, a geopolitical reality has emerged in which Greece and the GCA are isolated, and the Ankara-Tripoli-Rome axis has been strengthened.

However, in this geostrategic picture, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and Turkey are dimensions that should not be overlooked. Israel’s rhetoric has recently increased, tending to portray Turkey as a “threat center”. As in the cases of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran, the reasons cited are the expansion of defense industry capacity, the construction of a nuclear energy reactor for peaceful purposes, and support for Palestine. In particular, allegations are being made that the nuclear power plant in Akkuyu is intended for a nuclear weapons program. Furthermore, Turkey’s UAV base in the TRNC, its signal intelligence facilities and its reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities are being presented by Israel as potential threats. These statements actually reveal that Israel has pursued a strategy of dividing the area into small pieces rather than engaging in a major conflict directly, thereby restricting the opponent’s room for maneuver through rhetoric and alliances.

To this end, Israel is increasing its efforts to build closer ties with the Republic of Cyprus and Greece. It is noteworthy that, despite Turkey not pursuing a policy of hostility towards any actor in its own region or within the global system, various actors share common ground with Israel through their opposition to Turkey. In this context, the Turkey-Italy-Libya cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean has the potential to act as a balancing factor against new alliance initiatives targeting Turkey, in addition to energy and migration issues and the Cyprus case.

Energy, Integration and Logistics Routes

The economic agenda became a natural complement to the geostrategic picture. At the summit, joint projects in the energy, oil and gas sectors, port investments, infrastructure projects and Libya’s connection to regional projects in the Mediterranean in terms of connectivity were at the forefront. Indeed, these issues serve as tools for economic cooperation and strategic integration. Turkey’s infrastructure and construction experience, combined with Italy’s energy investments through ENI, present a critical opportunity for cooperation in Libya’s reconstruction process.

In terms of logistics routes, the transformation of Libya’s ports into a new bridge to Europe and the interior of Africa is in line with the common interests of the three countries. Thus, it creates an effect that strengthens economic integration, security and geopolitical interests. At this point, the potential of economic development to mitigate the driving factors of migration will also enable energy and infrastructure projects to have a mitigating effect on irregular migration in the future. Therefore, it is considered that the economic agenda is directly linked to the migration and security agendas.

From technical level to multilateralism

On the other hand, the institutionalization of regional cooperation is the third link that completes the economic context. The establishment of technical level committees in a tripartite structure at the Summit enables the committees to begin working on concrete steps. The mechanisms formed by the committees aim to transform cooperation from abstract declarations of intent into action. In addition, the quadripartite format proposed by Libyan Prime Minister Dibeybe, which would include Qatar and involve ministers, demonstrates the intention to broaden the scope of cooperation. Qatar’s financial, humanitarian and logistical contributions are a factor that will increase the feasibility of the projects.

This situation signals that regional coordination will evolve beyond the Mediterranean coastal countries to include the Gulf countries. Furthermore, the political process to be conducted with UN facilitation and the support given to the elections reflect Turkey’s approach to enhancing the role of the UN in the international system. Indeed, in the face of increasing criticism of the UN and the questioning of its role in the international system, Turkey appears to be making a positive effort. Therefore, it can be said that Turkey aims to strengthen the legitimacy of the multilateral system, beyond bilateral and trilateral relations.

Common solutions to common challenges

As the fourth and final link, the migration issue has emerged as one of the most prominent topics of the Summit. Migration is a matter directly related to European Union (EU) security. Italy, as one of the most vulnerable countries on the EU’s southern border, considers limiting migration flows a vital priority.

Meanwhile, Turkey has long been implementing joint projects with Europe to combat irregular migration and human trafficking. Libya, as the main departure point for migration routes, is at the center of this triangle. The Summit was expected to discuss action plans to combat human trafficking networks, prevent irregular movements, and support Libya in managing migration pressures. The important point here is that migration is being addressed both as a security issue and as an economic and humanitarian matter. Italian Prime Minister Meloni’s desire to transfer the cooperation experience with Turkey, which she described as ‘excellent results,’ to Libya can be seen as a sign that the EU will also be indirectly involved in this process.

This context also serves as a reminder that Turkey is an integral part of EU security. Ankara’s role has the potential to counteract the influence of policies within the EU that prioritize the narrow interests of Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, migration can be seen not only as a crisis issue but also as a basis for establishing a new security architecture between Turkey and Europe.

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elations between Turkey and Egypt have been particularly strained in the aftermath of the 2013 military coup against then president Mohamed Morsi, with tensions manifesting themselves in multiple areas. Positioned on opposing sides, particularly on issues in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, the two countries have made efforts to counterbalance each other diplomatically, economically, and militarily in key conflict zones in the Middle East and Africa. Within this historical context, the 2021 normalization efforts mark a discernible shift toward a détente in this previously tense relationship.

The progression of diplomatic engagements, beginning at the level of deputy ministers and culminating in a significant institutionalized framework with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Egypt on February 14, indicates a pivotal moment of rapprochement. This newfound proximity paves the way for multifaceted opportunities for cooperation, with Libya standing out as a key area given the discord it has caused since 2014.

Key factors that elevate Libya’s importance in the foreign policy considerations of both nations include strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, migration routes, and energy resources. In this sense, the potential for joint efforts promises to produce tangible results in the country which has been characterized by political volatility and a precarious security landscape.

Encouraging the implementation of electoral processes

Libya’s elections, scheduled for December 2021, were postponed due to a number of constitutional and political challenges. This development, which facilitated the formation of the government led by Fathi Bashagha with the support of the eastern-based parliament and the backing of militia leader Khalifa Haftar, has exacerbated fragmentation and conflict in the country. Currently, the election issue remains in a state of ambiguity. Ongoing efforts by the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) under the leadership of Secretary General Abdoulaye Bathily, coupled with initiatives by Western actors and legislative discussions within Libya, have failed to achieve the desired resolution. At this juncture, the involvement of Turkey and Egypt could play a key role in reducing the prevailing division.

While maintaining substantial ties with the eastern segment, Egypt has also actively engaged in diplomatic relations with the Government of National Unity (GNU), which was formed in February 2021. In parallel, Turkey initiated a diplomatic outreach to eastern Libyan actors in the same year. Moreover, prior to his visit to Libya, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan announced Ankara’s intention to reopen its consulate in Benghazi in a joint media briefing with Malta’s Minister for Foreign and European Affairs and Trade Ian Borg, underscoring Turkey’s commitment to reestablishing its diplomatic presence in eastern Libya. This scenario accentuates the potential and capacity of both Turkey and Egypt to mitigate the competition between Libya’s eastern and western factions or, alternatively, to play a mediating role in the reconciliation process.

On the other hand, given their different priorities and agendas, Turkey and Egypt could serve as catalysts for the establishment of peace and stability in Libya. Turkey needs a certain level of stability to protect its national interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and to maintain its commercial ties with Libya. Conversely, the Abdel Fattah al-Sisi government prioritizes the foreign exchange earnings of Egyptian workers in Libya and the potential role Egypt could play in Libya’s reconstruction phase. The Libyan dossier is also sensitive for Egypt because of the extensive land borders it shares with Libya’s eastern region and is critically important for strengthening its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

It should be noted that Turkey and Egypt are key actors in western and eastern Libya, respectively. The most tangible cooperation that could materialize between the two countries, specifically regarding Libya, would be their commitment to overcoming the disputes of local actors and ensuring that elections are held in a fair and transparent environment. In such a scenario, instead of power-sharing models, both countries could increase their influence in local, regional, and international organizations to support the establishment of a people-based governance system, thereby reducing the influence and control of spoilers.

Steps and potential DDR initiatives

Since 2011, Libya has witnessed a rapid proliferation of armed factions, a phenomenon largely attributed to the power vacuum and the ensuing internal conflict. These groups, which vary in size, allegiance, and ideological orientation, have become entrenched in Libya’s sociopolitical landscape, posing complex challenges to the peacebuilding process. As a result, effective implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) in Libya requires a nuanced understanding of the local environment, the heterogeneity of these armed entities, and the intricate interplay of regional and international influences.

Several international organizations have demonstrated their commitment to the DDR process in Libya. In particular, the UNSMIL, led by Senegalese diplomat Abdoulaye Bathily, has been active in facilitating dialogue and providing technical assistance. The United States, the European Union, and countries such as Italy and Germany have made significant contributions through financial assistance and capacity-building initiatives. For these efforts to be truly effective, however, there must be a concerted effort to align them with Libya’s national goals and priorities.

When it comes to the Turkish-Egyptian model, it is safe to say that their consensus could produce more effective results and gain local support. Turkey’s and Egypt’s positive relations with the various factions in Libya could serve as a crucial bridge in the implementation of the DDR process. Turkey’s close ties with elements of the Libyan army and Egypt’s relationship with the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar could facilitate a basis for dialogue and reconciliation between these two factions. Particularly during the disarmament and demobilization phase, both countries have the potential to influence actors on the ground to increase efforts to disarm and disband military units.

The spectrum of DDR efforts currently underway in Libya demonstrates a range of methodologies. These initiatives range from basic disarmament and demobilization activities to more holistic programs that include psychosocial support, vocational training, and the facilitation of employment opportunities for ex-combatants. In the reintegration phase, Turkey and Egypt have the potential to promote social cohesion and create jobs in Libya through economic and social development projects.

For example, support for infrastructure and education projects as part of Libya’s reconstruction could facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life. Regarding the transition to a unified army in Libya, the sharing of military and security expertise by Turkey and Egypt is expected to contribute to the modernization and professionalization of Libya’s defense and security sectors. This is expected to strengthen central authority in Libya and help achieve security and stability throughout the country.

As two actors involved in the process since the beginning of the Libyan file, Turkey and Egypt have supported peace and stability in Libya according to their own priorities and agendas. The current rapprochement between the two countries, which is different from similar initiatives in the past, could lead to a more cautious approach and consensus on Libya. In this context, addressing the issue of elections and overcoming the security challenges posed by militias are priorities, while the establishment of a unified army and the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs remain crucial.

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ibya has not been on the international political agenda since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war as much as it was in the prewar period, yet recent major developments in the country have the capacity to influence both local Libyan and international actors involved in Libya. In fact, the protracted military and political developments in Libya have been triggered by the vacuum created by this relative decline in “international interest.”

With the end of the post of Stephanie Williams, the dominant leader of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) and, more generally, the political transition process has been left “unattended.” In this vacuum, the power struggle among Libyan actors escalated, military conflicts erupted occasionally, and the atmosphere of relative stability brought about by the political transition became extremely fragile.

With the disengagement of the UNSMIL, regional actors, especially Egypt, gained a lot of room for maneuver, and through their influence over certain Libyan actors, they were able to shape the political developments in the country and even attempted to redesign the political arena. These attempts naturally deepened the existing fault lines between Libyan actors and made conflicts inevitable.

When Aguila Saleh, the speaker of the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, announced that he withdrew his vote of confidence from the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU)—effectively acting on behalf of parliament—and when the Government of National Accord (GNA) appointed Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha as prime minister to form the the Government of National Stability; when Khaled al-Mishri, the head of the Tripoli-based Supreme State Council (SCC), initiated a series of negotiations to establish a legal basis for the elections—effectively taking over the political transition process—and when Mishri and Abdul Hamid al-Dbeibeh dismantled the GNA and attempted to form a new “unity government,” they all found Cairo as a strong supporter and benefactor.

Cairo’s activism in the western (Tripoli) region, taking advantage of the vacuum, was met with reactions and counter-mobilizations from Western regional actors, and periodic waves of instability in Libya. For a long time, Libya has been unable to achieve internal instability due to the influence of external actors. Important political and military developments in its periphery and on its borders seem destined to add fuel to the fire in a country struggling to gain internal unity, reach a political solution, and overcome its fragmented structure.

The Fezzan equation in the region

Although Fezzan, one of Libya’s three main geographical regions, has a much more modest role in influencing Libya’s destiny compared to the eastern (Barka) and western (Tripoli) regions, it constitutes a small African component of the country. Arab identity, as an extension of the Gaddafi regime, is, of course, a phenomenon that encompasses the whole of Libya, but this identity is somewhat more “diluted” in Fezzan compared to other regions. This is certainly due to Fezzan’s geographical, demographic, social, and cultural proximity and strong links with Libya’s African neighbors.

In the period after Gaddafi’s ouster, the borders, due to the disappearance of the state mechanism and the fragmented military and political structure, have become even more uncontrolled and porous. While completely controlling all of Libya’s borders is impossible both in terms of length and the difficulties inherent in desert regions, the southern border of Libya is the least controlled of all. The situation of Fezzan’s border with Chad and Niger has natural, humanitarian, man-made and criminal dimensions.

The social contact between the northern regions of Chad and Niger and Fezzan through tribal and kinship ties constitutes the natural and human aspect of uncontrolled borders. On the other hand, smuggling is the main economic activity in these border regions due to their largely desert nature and the sparseness of population density and settlements. In other words, in addition to natural social ties and interactions, economic and illicit activities and interactions are also very strong.

Libya’s African connection and its potential to be affected by Africa’s “problems” are not limited to the fact that it neighbors Chad and Niger via the Fezzan region. The positioning of Libya in the envisioning and geopolitical projections of the country by the external actors which have been involved in Libya also connects Libya to Africa. France, the most prominent of the European countries involved in Libya and so far the most decisive actor in the dynamics of the crisis, has strongly supported Haftar in many respects, and not only because it shares Haftar’s revolutionary and anti-“Islamist” ideological stance.

France’s goal of maintaining its presence and influence in the Sahel region, in general, and Operation Barkhane, in particular, has led to its interest and active intervention in Libya, which by virtue of its geographical and demographic elements is a natural part of this region, In fact, France’s perception of Turkey’s presence in Libya as having a potential impact beyond Libya, for example in North Africa in general or in the Sahel region, is behind France’s sharp anti-Turkey moves in its Libya policy.

Likewise, for Russia, another of the most influential external actors involved in Libya, Libya functions as an important part of its more macro-level African designs. The Wagner mercenary army, which is the mediator of Russian influence and presence in many African countries, has also been Russia’s choice in Libya. The regions where the Wagner mercenary army, which is estimated to number around 2,000 today, is engaged, deployed, and operating on Libyan soil show that Russia attaches particular importance to the “Africa-facing” side of Libya and makes its operational investments there.

In short, Libya is inevitably becoming part of Africa, not only because of the strong land connection of its southern Fezzan region with Sahel countries like Chad and Niger, but also because of the policies pursued by influential external actors. The juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and now Niger are notable for their anti-French and pro-Russian rhetoric. If the series of coups in the Sahel turns into an active struggle for influence between France and Russia, the countries of the Sahel region will be destabilized.

With the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Wagner mercenary army’s head, Russia’s African network is entering a transition period. The importance of Libya within this African network was demonstrated when Russian Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov made his first visit to Libya on the day of Prigozhin’s death. Both the possible instability of the Sahel countries and Wagner’s active physical presence in the Fezzan region increase the risk of Libya being affected by the power struggle and instability of this region in the coming period.

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early 8% of the population of the Libyan city of Derna was killed or went missing after devastating floods hit the city on September 10, 2023, in the biggest natural disaster in the country’s modern history. A third of the city’s buildings were wiped out and swept away by the Mediterranean Sea, while hundreds of bodies are believed to be trapped in structures and buildings under water.

The disaster followed a warning issued last year by professor of civil engineering Abdelwanees Ashoor. “In the event of a major flood, the consequences will be catastrophic for the inhabitants of the valley and the city,” the Libyan academic wrote. Ashoor was not taken seriously by the authorities, resulting in one of the greatest flood tragedies in modern history in a country torn by conflict and war.

The floods have affected 200,000 Libyans, and the entire area of the old city of Derna was swallowed by water after the two dams surrounding the city exploded at 3:00 a.m. local time, giving people little time to flee. In fact, the local authorities had sent out a text message the day before warning people not to leave their homes because of the heavy rains caused by Storm Daniel, which hit the region from Greece.

Thousands dead and missing

Bad weather conditions made it impossible to use helicopters due to the strong winds at the time of the storm, in addition to the extremely difficult natural terrain of the area, which prevented the arrival of rescue equipment, teams, and vehicles.

Storm Daniel, which hit eastern Libya on September 10, killed at least 7,300 people and left around 11,000 homeless in a city with an estimated population of around 200,000. According to preliminary official figures, more than 36,000 people have been displaced.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said the death toll from the floods in Derna had risen to 11,300, while 10,100 people were still missing. The UN warned that an epidemic could break out in the city due to decomposing bodies and water pollution. Some 150 people have arrived to hospitals due to poison after drinking from the polluted water of Derna.

The UN confirmed that 170 people had died in floods elsewhere in eastern Libya, and that the number of displaced people in northeastern Libya had reached approximately 40,000.

Warning against drinking unclear water

At the same time, the UN envoy to Libya, Abdullah Batili, said he had seen the destruction and devastation in Derna and left with a heavy heart. He noted that the disaster was beyond Libya’s capacity and went beyond politics and border issues.

Georgette Gagnon, assistant secretary-general, resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator for Libya, confirmed that the UN is working with partners and local authorities to continue to deliver and coordinate much-needed humanitarian assistance to those in need.

The neglect of the city, which was previously a stronghold of armed groups opposed to Gaddafi and then Haftar’s forces, and the failure to maintain its dams and facilities and renovate its old buildings, in addition to the battles and wars it witnessed between 2015 and 2018, are among the factors that caused the death toll of Storm Daniel to rise dramatically.

Meanwhile, Libyans are still waiting for international aid to help them overcome one of the most tragic events in the country’s modern history. The city of Derna has experienced unprecedented destruction with residents being killed by both flooding and collapsed buildings. As time passes, the chances of finding survivors in Derna fades away.

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he elections in Turkey, the most important elections of 2023 worldwide, rolled on after the May 28 runoff, with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan getting 52.18 percent of the votes against his rival, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, and being re-elected.

On June 3, Erdoğan attended the swearing-in ceremony at the parliament and named the cabinet members right after the ceremony, the same evening. New faces have appeared in fifteen ministerial positions except for two ministries: the ministries of health and culture. The foreign, interior, defense, and finance ministries were among the most crucial cabinet posts with new incumbents. These four vital positions have been filled by well-known, experienced, and respected politicians and bureaucrats who have played critical roles in the country’s past two decades.

The replacement of the foreign minister, Mevlut Çavuşoğlu, with Dr. Hakan Fidan, who served as the head of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), and the assignment of Prof. Ibrahim Kalin, who served as a presidential spokesperson and advisor to Erdoğan, as the new head of Turkish intelligence have attracted the attention of not only regional powers but also international players due to the duo’s importance for the country and President Erdoğan.

Despite some analysts considering the new assignments as indicators of change, this is not the case. In the past three years, Turkey has adopted a normalization policy merged with its financial aims of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI).

The past three years’ diplomatic and economic attempts have aimed at the deliberate preparation of Turkey’s transforming foreign policy and economy. This transformation has brought about a series of hardships for the country resulting from the fall of the Turkish currency as Turkey seeks to be a regional financial hub. However, the Turkish government plans to make Turkey a “center country” as suggested by Wallerstein’s world systems theory which argues that the world economic system serves to benefit some countries and exploit others.

Turkey’s recent achievements in the defense industry (fighter jets, drones, missiles, etc.), technology, and its indigenous car (TOGG) are among the vital indicators of this intention. Rather than being exploited, Turkey wants to decrease the value of the Turkish lira, and stabilize and improve its relations with regional powers as part of its normalization efforts.

What is more, the country’s proactive role in several conflicts has brought it to the fore as a regional and international spot for resolving conflicts. Since this strategy requires a stabilized region and good diplomatic ties, Ankara, witnessing the decreasing hegemonic power of the U.S., started mending its ties with its neighbors, particularly the Gulf countries, which could impact a wide range of areas and regions, including the Maghreb.

Turkey and the Maghreb

What can be expected next in Turkey’s relations with the Maghreb countries in light of Turkey’s new cabinet?

First, it is vital to remember the fact that the newly assigned foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, has been behind the scene of Ankara’s normalization efforts with regional powers. Egypt is among the countries with which Turkey has sought normalization, and Ankara and Cairo have already announced the assignment of their ambassadors after several years of cold diplomatic ties. The normalization between Ankara and Cairo is important since it can help resolve Libya’s more than decade-long conflict, along with the disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s strengthening ties with Egypt would provide Ankara with an advantage against Greece, which signed an MoU with Cairo a year after Ankara signed one with Libya’s UN-backed government.

This can also provide an opportunity to find a solution for the Eastern Mediterranean gas and border rift. Regarding Libya, Turkey has been backing the UN-recognized government headed by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah while being in touch with several parties to the conflict. On the contrary, Egypt has been one of the closest allies of warlord Khalifa Haftar, the Tobruk-based parliament’s speaker and its PM-designate Fathi Bashagha. During Bashagha’s failed attempts to enter Tripoli, Turkey played a balancing role by stopping the clashes and mediating between the warring parties.

Following the visit of CIA Director William Burns to Libya in the middle of January in which he met with Dbeibah and Haftar, Fidan was quick to take action and meet Dbeibah, Menfi, Khalid al-Mishri, the Chairman of the High Council of State, and even Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

Hakan Fidan

Turkey’s foreign policy during Hakan Fidan’s tenure at the MIT was a conversion of his background activities into diplomatic steps, with Ankara’s grand strategy remaining the same: making Turkey a more independent, balanced, and proactive foreign approach, considering the decreasing hegemonic power of the U.S. in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have been seen to be happy with Erdoğan’s re-election as they were among the first countries to congratulate him on his election victory. Considering the upcoming visits and meetings between Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, Fidan could lead Ankara towards a solution of its long-standing issues.

With an operational intelligence service, proactive foreign policy efforts, and a qualified staff comprising among others the aforementioned ministers, Turkey only needs to eliminate its economic hardships. An improving Turkish economy would also help heal the wounds of the region and the world at large. As the U.S. is losing its hegemony across the region, Turkey, after recovering from an economic and diplomatic crisis, will seek to become a regional and global hub for trade, diplomacy, and politics as per its grand strategy.

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ohamed Auajjar, the chair of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya (FFM), led a three-year investigation by the UN Human Rights Council to investigate human rights abuses committed by all parties to the conflict in Libya since 2016.

The mission urged the Libyan authorities to cooperate more closely to uncover the truth behind the widespread crimes committed against both Libyans and migrants in the country.

According to the FFM, there are reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity have been committed. These crimes include arbitrary detention, murder, torture, rape, enslavement, sexual slavery, extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances.

The EU’s indirect support for human rights abuses in Libya

During the course of its investigation, the UN fact-finding mission visited Libya and urged local authorities to cooperate more extensively to establish the truth about these heinous and massive crimes.

The mission focused on identifying human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law in various Libyan cities.

FFM investigator Chaloka Beyani has stated that the European Union’s support for Libyan authorities has “aided and abetted rights breaches against migrants.”

Beyani clarified, “We’re not saying that the EU and its member states have committed these crimes. The point is that the support given has aided and abetted the commission of the crimes.”

The EU’s response to allegations

In response to these allegations, European Union Spokesman for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Peter Stano denied that the EU intends to “push and keep migrants in Libya.”

Stano emphasized that the EU “does not finance any Libyan entity and does not give material funds to partners in Libya.”

Despite the EU’s denial of involvement, the report highlights its indirect support in facilitating these human rights abuses. This raises concerns about the EU’s role in the ongoing crisis in Libya and the subsequent impact on human rights and international law.

Survivors speak out

The report found that the violations were carried out under the nominal or actual control of Libya’s Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration, the Libyan Coast Guard, and the Stability Support Apparatus.

According to the report, the FFM asserts that the “European Union and its Member States, directly or indirectly, provided monetary and technical support and equipment,” including boats to the Libyan Coast Guard and the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration for the interception and detention of migrants.

The report revealed alarming crimes against humanity in Libyan detention centers, where migrants faced torture, rape, enslavement, and starvation.

One victim who was held in Maya, Ayn Zarah, and Gharyan detention centers said, “Our concern is not dying in the water, but our concern is to go back to the prison where we will be oppressed and tortured by guards.”

The report disclosed numerous survivors and witnesses of rape cases, indicating that such crimes were widespread and routinely experienced in detention centers.

Pregnancies resulting from rapes in detention centers were frequently observed according to the report, and women often gave birth without access to professional medical assistance.

In this regard, victims often became aware of being sold or bought only when confronted with new circumstances and abuse. Enslavement, including sexual slavery, occurred in detention centers, and the mission found evidence of such crimes in Sabratha and Bani Walid.

The report documented cases of migrants forced to work in factories, construction,   and agriculture.

“In a case of enslavement and forced labor, a child from Mali was taken to a farm and forced to work with animals, only to be told he had been bought when he asked to leave.”

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nti-migrant racism in North Africa was thought to be a taboo, but in reality it never was. Racism against African migrants, coupled with unabashed anti-Black xenophobia, is alive and kicking in North Africa. Tunisian President Kais Saied’s recent comments on February 21 about sub-Saharan migrants surely shocked many people. Saied labelled migrants as “hordes” and a “demographic threat” to his country. Even more, Saied called for “the need to put a rapid end to this immigration,” which, to his view, has become a source of “violence, crime and unacceptable acts.”

For a country like Tunisia, a generator of migrants fleeing to find a better life in Europe, Saied’s speech may seem out of place and contradictory. Doesn’t the European far right, which applauded Saied’s speech, say the same about Muslim migrants?

President Saied’s invective is neither unprecedented nor isolated in the larger geographical area, the Maghreb. From Morocco to Libya, passing through Mauritania, Algeria and, of course, Tunisia, hateful allegations are not only the prerogative of what some people there call the “little people” to whom we could add the “uncultured” or the “intolerant.” In the upper echelons, at the highest level of the Maghreb states, the same ideas circulate.

For this discourse is not new. Since the Maghreb became the exit door for migrants from Africa to reach the fabled El Dorado, Europe, this immense territory has been transformed into a huge waiting room for tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of sub-Saharan migrants unable to reach the European coast. A waiting room that has turned into an open-air prison over time. Especially since, to curb this migration flow, the European Union outsourced its borders and entrusted their guarding to the Maghreb states by rewarding them financially, diplomatically, or both.

A migrant mass

The direct consequence of this strong policy of containment has been the creation of a migrant mass that has settled permanently in the Maghreb and lives on the fringes of society, waiting for a passage to Europe. It has also caused inevitable impoverishment and generated the phenomenon of criminalization that no one questions, especially not the local population in contact with migrants.

It is important to understand that as long as migrants were only crossing the territory, they were tolerated. It was only when they were prevented from doing so that their presence began to pose a problem and the old demon of racism resurfaced.

Over the past twenty years, many serious and sometimes bloody incidents have taken place against migrants in North Africa, without being properly reported by the press. Police raids followed by robberies and humiliations, assaults, lynching organized by neighborhood lords or angry citizens, and even rapes have targeted this vulnerable population.

Racism is as old as the world and knows no borders. The Maghrebi expressions for Black people, “âzzi” (black), “kahlouche” (negro), “âbid” (slave), or “oussif” (slave, servant), which have been heard with force recently, are not new and are not a relic of colonialism. As far back as the 14th century, Ibn Khaldun, a historian of Arab descent born in Tunis, wrote that “the only peoples who accept slavery are the negroes, because of their lower degree of humanity, their place being closer to that of the animal.”

Legacy of French colonization

These expressions are therefore the fruit of a mentality that predates the French colonization of Algeria and Mauritania, the French protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco, and the Italian occupation of Libya. What has changed is the violence of words and actions.

In 2012, the Moroccan weekly Maroc Hebdo devoted an entire dossier to the “Black Peril,” attacking without embellishment those who “live by begging, engage in drug trafficking and prostitution” and “pose a human and security problem for the country.” On Moroccan social media, there are regular calls for the expulsion of African migrants, the closure of borders, and the banning of mixed marriages in order to preserve an improbable “purity of the Moroccan race.”

On the other side of the border, in Algeria, a hashtag on Twitter resurfaces from time to time (in Arabic), #NotoAfricansinAlgeria, which immediately sets the world on fire by calling for the hunting down and deportation of migrants. Sometimes, the creators of these hateful messages deliberately confuse Black migrants with Black North African citizens. From the Atlantic Ocean to the Egyptian border, there is a Black Maghrebi population whose ancestors were slaves or settled in North Africa several centuries ago. They are certainly citizens, but they are still considered second-class ones.

A few years ago, in 2016, a Black model of Algerian nationality, Amina Hamouine, had to face an extraordinary campaign of hatred because she had the idea, or the “bad idea” as her detractors would say, of being photographed wearing a Kabyle dress—the Kabyle people are Berbers from the region of Kabylia. This was an unforgivable mistake for those who identify the Kabyle woman from the whiteness of her skin.

Too Black?

Recently, Khadidja Benhamou, an Algerian citizen from Adrar in the south of the country, was deemed “too Black” to wear the crown of Miss Algeria 2019—her skin color did not represent all Algerians, it seems.

But it is not only the “little people” who indulge in these feelings that sociologists and anthropologists call “systemic negrophobia.” Some Algerian leaders do as well. In 2017, five years before the Tunisian president’s remarks, senior officials of Algiers, which has a virulent anti-colonial past, were not kind to migrants either.

Ahmed Ouyahia, an Algerian politician who has been appointed prime minister ten times—an absolute record— and who at the time was head of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s cabinet as a minister of state, described African migrants on the private television station Ennahar TV as “[t]hese illegal foreigners bring[ing] crime, drugs and several other scourges.” At the time, Ouyahia was the secretary general of the National Democratic Rally (RND), one of the two crutches, along with the National Liberation Front (FLN), that support the government in Algeria.

His words were echoed and amplified a few days later by Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelkader Messahel, who identified the arrival of sub-Saharans in the country as a “threat to national security.”

But the ultimate horror was reached again in 2017 in Libya, when footage filmed by CNN journalists revealed to the world the unimaginable in the 21st century: an auction of migrants from Nigeria at a market near Tripoli.

Anti-racism laws

To counter this unfortunate litany of racist acts, Tunisia passed a law in 2018 penalizing racism and established January 23 as the “National Day for the Abolition of Slavery.” However, the 2018 law, historical, innovative, and the first of its kind in the Arab world, was annihilated by the verbal outrage of President Saied on February 21, 2023, when he evoked a “criminal plan prepared at the beginning of this century to change the demographic composition of Tunisia” and whose objective was to transform the country into an “African-only country” and to remove its “Arab Muslim” identity.

Of course, one can try to nuance this reality by recalling, for example, the decision of the Moroccan authorities to launch campaigns to issue resident permits, such as in 2014, which initially resulted in the regularization of 25,000 undocumented migrants. It can also be argued that, like Tunisia, Algeria adopted a law criminalizing racial discrimination in 2020. But these gestures of goodwill have little impact if they are not followed by campaigns to educate the local population on the need to accept the “other.” Campaigns that television stations refused to broadcast, as was the case in Morocco.

All crises, whether economic or security-based, produce exasperation that ends up finding a scapegoat, and African migrants have become the ideal candidates. They pay for the economic crisis and the criminal behavior of a minority in their own community.

As a scapegoat, they also pay the price for some of the services rendered by the Maghreb states to Europeans: to showcase its status as a paid gendarme of the European Commission, Morocco got carried away by its destructive zeal on June 24, 2022, when it violently curtailed an attempt by several hundred migrants, mostly Sudanese, citizens of a “brotherly Arab” country, to force their way into Ceuta, a Spanish enclave on Moroccan territory.

EU responsibility

The result—24 dead according to the Moroccan authorities, 37 according to a local association, not counting the missing—has not only tarnished Morocco’s image in Africa but also revealed another problem that is worth studying. In which state in the world, except for the former East Germany and the now defunct Berlin Wall and migrants escaping war to Greece and Italy, are dozens of people killed to prevent them from leaving a country that is not theirs to seek refuge elsewhere?

A tragedy that ended with a congratulatory gesture worthy of the former East Germany, as the president of the Spanish government, Pedro Sánchez, praised the brutal intervention of the Moroccan police force.

Finally, the European Union’s migration policy, which consists of preventing human beings from moving freely, by force if necessary, has helped this local outbreak of racism and intolerance, and dynamited several principles, some of them religious, that were thought to be immutable.

Pan-Africanism, the egalitarian and anti-slavery utopia propagated in most of the post-independence Maghreb countries, especially Algeria, has come to an end. The myth introduced by these countries of an integrating Islam that makes no distinction between a white and a Black person has been shattered. Despite many migrants adhering to Islam, they are treated as strangers to the Ummah.

On February 6, 2023, Turkey experienced one of the most catastrophic earthquakes in its history. Syria has also deeply suffered from the earthquake. In the aftermath of the tragic events, huge efforts, supported by domestic and international rescuers, continued to save those trapped under the rubble. One of the interesting aspects of the early days of the earthquake was the increasing diplomatic traffic centred around Turkey.

Within a few days following the earthquake disaster, the Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani was the first head of state to visit Turkey. At the same time, due to the earthquake, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov, Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias, Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen, UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed, and U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken visited Turkey and earthquake-stricken areas, and held talks with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu.

Within this framework, diplomatic activities carried out during disaster period witnessed another significant development on February 27. Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sameh Shoukry visited Turkey, marking the highest-level visit between the two countries in almost a decade. Shoukry’s visit signalled a concrete step in the long-awaited normalization in Turkey-Egypt relations.

In the statement made after the meeting of the two foreign ministers, Çavuşoğlu emphasized the importance of Egypt’s visit at a time when Turkey is experiencing difficult moments, a fact underlining that Egypt and Turkey mutually need each other.

A will to reconcile?

At the same time, he drew attention to the will of the two countries to take their relations to higher levels as shared by the presidents of Turkey and Egypt. Çavuşoğlu stated that the visit of the Egyptian foreign minister might also lead to a meeting of the two presidents in the near future.

The reactions of Turkey and Egypt towards regional politics after the Arab popular movements caused the two countries to experience tense political relations. It was a period in which the power struggle in the Eastern Mediterranean, the course of the war in Libya, and policies towards the Muslim Brotherhood formed the main points of tension in the relations between the two countries.

However, the Gulf region-oriented normalization that started in the Middle East in late 2020, rapidly spilled over across the region and, to a certain extent, brought about the normalization of Turkey-Egypt relations. There are three, if not more, dynamics that pushed Ankara and Cairo to speed up the normalization.

The first is that both countries seem to have the political will to restore bilateral relations. Both Turkey and Egypt are aware of the importance of the other in terms of regional security, economic opportunities, and sociocultural issues. Turkey and Egypt, with a total population of almost 200 million, are among the regional powers of the Middle East and would be able to form one of the largest partnerships in the region with their vast resources and potential.

This is one of the greatest reasons why both countries maintain commercial and economic relations to a certain extent even during periods when political relations were tense.

“Share” in regional normalization

The second point is that both countries want to ensure their “share” in regional normalization and have the desire to keep diplomacy alive in times of disaster. Along with the climate of normalization in the region, Turkey, which has normalized relations with countries with which it has long-term problematic relations such as Greece, Armenia, France, and Israel, has tried to resolve the tension areas with Egypt through diplomacy and continuous dialogue.

Following Egypt’s economic crisis and the situation after the food and energy crisis caused by the Russia-Ukraine war, the country has adopted a strategy of re-establishing strong partnerships with its partners in the region.

The third point is that both countries have a huge market and potential for the other. In this sense, in case of enhanced normalization, Turkish companies in Egypt are going to be able to increase their business, and this process will have a positive impact on the Egyptian economy. Also, as Çavuşoğlu stated, it may be possible for Egyptian and Turkish companies to share their experiences and render the benefits of these relations more permanent. Therefore, at this stage, a normalization carried forward could herald extremely positive developments for both Turkish and Egyptian people.

The future of Turkish-Egyptian relations

In conclusion, there are obviously many reasons to be optimistic about the future of Turkish-Egyptian relations. It may be only a matter of time that the leaders of Turkey and Egypt meet in one of the two capitals. Their main aims will be to restore the already damaged relations and to eliminate differences in regional policies. Much of the discussion will probably be focusing, among other bilateral issues, the issues of the Eastern Mediterranean, Libya, and Africa.

Finally, both countries do not have the luxury of scaling down their roles and ambitions as assumed leaders in regional politics. For decades, Egypt has enjoyed a leading position in the Middle Eastern political and social arena with its huge capabilities diplomatically, militarily, and culturally. Meanwhile Turkey has been the most successful example of a well-functioning and prosperous democratic Muslim-majority nation.

Turkey has also recently transformed itself into a military power that has allowed Ankara to play a role in regional politics by being involved in regional and global crisis areas in a game-changing capability. Therefore, both Turkey and Egypt see each other’s potential, and have concluded that cooperation would be more beneficial than confrontation.

The Libyan capital Tripoli was shaken by a wave of clashes between rival armed groups during the early hours of May 17. The clashes were instigated by the sneaking into Tripoli of Fathi Bashagha, who was designated as the prime minister by the Tobruk-based parliament, the House of Representatives (HoR), in February this year on the grounds that the incumbent Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli had expired its mandate since elections did not occur on December 24, 2021.

The fact that a “designated prime minister” had to sneak into the capital of the country is itself telling enough. Bashagha had to keep his entry into Tripoli, in the middle of the night, highly secret. He revealed his arrival on social media, bragging about his ultimate “successful entry,” as this was his third attempt to enter Tripoli. The previous two unsuccessful attempts were both foiled by the tenacity of the armed groups who either remained loyal to the incumbent prime minister Abdel Hamid Dbeibah or were unconvinced by Bashagha’s claim to be prime minister.

In his first attempted entry into Tripoli, Bashagha was expelled after a heated “negotiation” between armed groups barely avoiding an armed conflict. His eventual entry on May 17 resulted in anti-Bashagha forces attacking the Nawasi Brigade, which had escorted Bashagha into Tripoli and hosted him in its headquarters. Eventually, it had to give in to the heavy pressure from the anti-Bashagha forces and handed him over to a neutral military force to escort him out of the city on the same day.

Bashagha’s attempts to enter Tripoli and the subsequent clashes among armed groups are symptoms of a wider political and regional power struggle. Formalities aside, Bashagha’s claim to premiership became possible only after his coalition with the HoR and more importantly, its speaker Aguila Saleh. The Saleh-Bashagha coalition aims at dismantling the Dbeibah-led GNU and replacing it with the Bashagha-led Government of National Stability (GNS), which would be heavily under the influence of the “kingmaker” of the coalition—Khalifa Haftar.

The Regional and International Aspect of the Saleh-Bashagha Coalition

Although the initiative started as Saleh and Bashagha’s pursuing their personal interests, the coalition was not built in a vacuum. The Saleh-Bashagha coalition lobbied in certain capitals for their alliance, and made their move once they received the green lights and blessing of those same capitals. Although the coalition promised to be useful to many, each capital committed to it to varying degrees.

While some capitals endorsed the coalition openly, others demonstrated their support more indirectly. Paris and other European capitals as well as Riyadh were among the lower-profile supporters of the Saleh-Bashagha coalition. However, Cairo and Moscow were much more straightforward in their endorsement.

While Dbeibah did not hide Turkey’s special place among Tripoli’s friends, he did not leave Egypt out, either. On the contrary, Dbeibah granted more contracts to Cairo than he did to Ankara to placate the former and ensure its neutrality vis-à-vis Tripoli. As a matter of fact, Ankara was not bothered by losing some Tripoli stakes to Cairo as it thought that they would work as the proverbial carrot for the latter. Nevertheless, Cairo chose to proceed with a zero-sum mentality: winning was not good enough for Cairo, it wanted to make sure that Ankara was not winning as well.

An agreement over Dbeibah would mean a rapprochement slightly more favorable to Ankara than Cairo. Cairo, on the other hand, wanted to keep the rapprochement with Ankara on its own terms. Thus, Cairo came up with a rival premiership proposal with purportedly “pro-Turkey” Bashagha, which would also supposedly appease Ankara. However, this was the greatest smokescreen in the whole parallel government scheme: Cairo consented to the Saleh-Bashagha coalition only after making sure that Bashagha was transformed into something else—the junior partner of the greater coalition of Haftar and Saleh.

Bashagha’s role was envisioned as nothing more than being a subordinate to the Haftar-Saleh duo. His function was supposed to be to extend the influence over Tripoli of both Haftar and Saleh, and their external backers, none more so than Cairo. Therefore, Cairo saw in the Saleh-Bashagha coalition the prospect of undermining Ankara’s prevalence in Tripoli and duly supported it.

The idea of negotiating with Ankara after diluting its position of strength in Tripoli through a change of government appeared much more attractive than engaging in a win-win setting with Ankara. Unless Cairo comes to terms with Ankara’s presence and influence in Tripoli, Libya will not be a theatre of convergence between the two countries.

The Spanish-American philosopher George Santayana once said, “Only the dead have seen the end of war.”

Considering the current situation in Libya, this would be among the best ways to describe the country’s current circumstances vis-à-vis the hope-filled attempts to have free and fair elections which were planned more than a year ago.

Libyans hoped to end their more than a decade-long war when the UN-sponsored Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) elected Abdul Hamid Dbeibah to lead a new transition government in the country and lead Libyans to the polls on December 24.

Following candidacies of controversial figures like Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and warlord Khalifa Haftar, and the lack of a constitutional basis to hold free and fair elections in the country within the agreed timeline, the process literally became a born-dead one.

Although the UN-sponsored LPDF made it clear that the mandate of Dbeibah’s government was valid until June 2022, the pro-Haftar, eastern-based parliament House of Representatives (HoR) argued that the UN-backed Government of National Unity’s (GNU) mandate had expired.

The HoR and pro-Haftar figures’ opposition was followed by an attempt by the HoR to install a new rival government to challenge that of Dbeibah. Former UN-backed government, Government of National Unity’s Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha, after a series of negotiations with the HoR, was designated as the new PM of the transitional government, which was rejected by the GNU and the country’s west regions.

During this process, Bashagha tried to enter the capital, Tripoli, to assume power. His military convoy failed to do so, with Dbeibah saying he would hand over his power only to an elected government.

Dbeibah, on the other hand, announced his country’s plans to have elections while the UN was trying to bring different sides to the table to negotiate the constitutional basis for having elections amid the growing specter of military confrontation between the two sides.

Although the HoR initially refused to choose members for the joint committee, the rivals met on Tuesday, April 19, in the Egyptian capital Cairo, to discuss constitutional arrangements for new elections.

Aguila Saleh, the HoR’s speaker, Khalifa Haftar, and Fathi Bashagha are fully aware that the priority of the international community is not “legitimacy” but self-interest, a fact that can even be observed in their pragmatic statements.

The international community doesn’t want to abandon the pro-Haftar side to Russia; however, they also don’t want their so-called “pro-democracy” stance to be damaged in the eyes of the world by yielding up Dbeibah.

At this point, two strategies step forth. First, international actors will try their best to bring Dbeibah and Bashagha to the table to find a new and peaceful diplomatic final exit to have elections under their sponsorship. Second, they will recognize Bashagha’s legitimacy and offer a new political dialogue forum with a reshuffled Libyan team while not abandoning their rhetorical and democratic discourse.

The second option seems more feasible after considering what happened in 2019, as the U.S. played ostrich when Khalifa Haftar launched an offensive against the UN-backed government. Washington suspended the U.S.-citizen warlord’s trials about war crimes in Libya ahead of the December 24 elections.

As it is known, accessing the Mediterranean has been a consistent and significant goal of Russian foreign policy, which seeks to challenge NATO’s naval supremacy and the U.S. presence throughout the Eastern Mediterranean.

With its military existence in Syria, Moscow found a door to knock on: it sent infamous Wagner mercenaries in support of Haftar and built another passage for itself between Sirte and Jufra, critical spots in Libya neighboring the Eastern Mediterranean. Despite this, we have not seen Washington taking a solid stance against the warlord.

When Haftar’s military operation against the UN-backed government failed, thanks to Turkish forces’ support to the internationally recognized government, the U.S. was quick to broker a new political dialogue while hoping to force through elections.

As a new war and an oil embargo are at the international community’s elbow, the UN, the U.S., the UK, and others seek absolute legitimacy by any means. In their eyes, any sacrifice is worth protecting their interests, including sacrificing the democracy that Libya has been dreaming of after decades-long turmoil.

The death toll has increased to 25 as Tunisian officials found five new bodies of migrants who lost their lives off the Tunisian coasts on their way to Europe. The bodies were found on March 18 and 19, 2022.

The total number of migrant deaths involved in the incident is unknown as there is no information on the number of people who were in the capsized boat, while the search for survivors continues by the Tunisian authorities.

The bodies of dead migrants washed up on Nabeul Beach, to the northeast of the country.

“Migration remains relatively muted in Tunisia, despite its increased popularity as a transit country and the growing number of people drowning off its coasts,” Michela Pugliese, a migration and asylum researcher at Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, told Politics Today.

Many refugees choose Libya and Tunisia as points of departure for Europe. According to the International Organization of Migration (IOM), at least 348 migrants and asylum seekers have died or gone missing in 2021, joining over 23,000 others who have lost their lives since 2014.

The busiest and deadliest migration route to Europe

Many migrants use the Central Mediterranean route to reach Italy. In 2020, according to the UNHCR, 34,154 people arrived in Italy. Reports show that over 88,000 migrants arrived in Europe via the Mediterranean in 2021.

According to the IOM, 348 people have died or gone missing by the end of February 2022.

Thousands of North African and Middle Eastern refugees and asylum seekers try crossing the Mediterranean every year as a result of poverty and conflict in their home countries.

According to the European Council’s data published in February 2022, Bangladeshis and Egyptians use the Central Mediterranean route from North Africa via Tunisia to reach Italy (Europe).

The asylum researcher told Politics Today that “half of the EU member states consider Tunisia a ‘safe country of origin,’ meaning that when Tunisian nationals reach Europe, they tend to be quickly repatriated and their asylum claims impatiently rejected. What Europe mainly does for migrants leaving Tunisia is provide support to the authorities to increase their capacity to prevent migrants’ departures.”

“In reality, through forced returns, border externalizations, and bilateral agreements, Europe is committed to containing migration and systematically denying the right to seek asylum for people coming from Africa, while safeguarding the rights of Ukrainian refugees,” Pugliese concluded.

Vladimir Putin has crossed a line which seemed impassable for many. By launching a full-scale attack on Ukraine to revise the post-Cold War order, he has resurrected old fears in Europe and far beyond.

Are those who cannot come to terms with the past doomed to repeat its mistakes?

Many argue that Russia has always sought to satisfy its needs through conflict and by attacking others. Therefore, we should not be surprised by their full-scale military operations in a sovereign country.

Putin’s plan to restore the imperial power of Russia was evident as early as 2008 when he attacked Georgia.

This is because the irrationality here is only apparent. Putin has most likely prepared the country for such a development by hoarding huge currency reserves and making arrangements with China for the sale of its raw materials. His calculation probably includes the annexation of some of the Ukrainian territories in the east and south, and possibly leaving Ukraine bleeding without resources and unable to lift itself up from the misery.

He aims to recreate the status quo that existed before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fact that he is achieving this by seemingly irrational methods that generate gigantic costs for Russia itself is another matter.

Putin’s iron grip

In the hours up to the invasion, Putin recognized the independence of the self-proclaimed People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk – everything in an usurpatory attempt to redraw the map according to his own liking and to undermine the international order. These areas, governed by pro-Russian separatists, have been steadily moving closer to Moscow for a long time, and the world has sat back and watched.

Putin did not even refrain from questioning Ukraine’s existence, asserting that “Ukraine never had a tradition of genuine statehood,” and that the nation now known as Ukraine was carved out of Russia by Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin.

Putin is showing that he is prepared to go to great lengths to turn back the clock and re-subjugate Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact-era territories to Russia. For the time being, he is active in Belarus and Ukraine.

Putin’s motivations are serious, as he demonstrated back in 2005 when he stated that the “collapse of the USSR was not only the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century but also a real drama for Russians.”

Resetting world order

The boundaries of Putin’s fantasies can be reconstructed – albeit with some difficulty. Some experts believe that for him the pinnacle of the development of Russian statehood was Stalin’s centralized empire, where all decisions were taken by Moscow, but appearances in the form of the national flags of the republics were retained. Putin, however, seems to want to be surrounded by vassal states like Belarus.

For many years, Belarus leader Alexander Lukashenko has systematically delayed taking any binding decisions regarding a federation with Russia. The federal state therefore has remained a theory for nearly two decades.

For many years, Belarus leader Alexander Lukashenko has systematically delayed taking any binding decisions regarding a federation with Russia.

The situation changed in 2020 when mass street protests spilled across Belarus after the rigged presidential elections. Minsk became isolated by the West and suffered under sanctions, offering the perfect opportunity for Russia to become a guarantor of the stability of Lukashenko’s grip on power.

Apart from that, Kazakhstan, Armenia, and other post-Soviet states are highly likely to complete Putin’s wish list.

A new old power base

The prospect of challenging the “American world order” must be very tempting for a former KGB officer brought up in hatred and distrust of the U.S. Is Putin sensical with this? His black-and-white vision of the world explains not only his obsession with empire but also his fears over Russia’s declining population. For on almost every occasion, Putin has repeated that there should be more inhabitants in Russia. But, where to find the right number of people in a country with rising mortality and chronic poverty?

There is one way out – at least for Putin: empire building.

Russia is not very tempting economically (the exception being the corporations draining its natural resources), and its economic integration initiatives for former Soviet states are coming apart at the seams. But Putin has many tanks that can be deployed abroad, and as Lenin taught, “War is the continuation of politics only by other means.”

In sum, an empire can be built for a variety of reasons. Some believe that Russia is doomed to expand, otherwise, it will be torn apart by an explosion from within. The accumulated social discontent, which cannot be discharged due to poor governance, must be directed towards external conquests.

In the ultimatum presented to NATO in December last year, Putin demanded the withdrawal of the alliance’s troops and the related infrastructure behind the Oder River that separates Poland from Germany. This would immediately create a “grey security zone” from the borders of Russia to the western border of Poland. This means that with a forward-looking and aggressive Russia, Putin would create his own “sphere of influence.”

“Russia’s border doesn’t end anywhere,” as Putin once jokingly said. There’s only a horizon in Russia.

Since the last months of 2021, the UAE’s diplomatic moves in foreign policy have been attracting the attention of Gulf scholars and observers. In an interview, Dr. Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, the UAE’s minister of industry and advanced technology, noted that the recent diplomatic moves by the UAE are critical to the country’s new foreign policy. “The art of partnership is part of our DNA, and it has been key to our success over the years,” said Al Jaber. Signals of change and using diplomacy instead of military power from Hormuz to the Suez constitute a sharp rupture for UAE foreign policy.

Following the withdrawal of its military presence from Yemen in mid-2019, the UAE regional security policy entered a de-escalation mode. Political conflicts with neighbors started being replaced with an economic interests-driven foreign policy. The Gulf states’ regional loneliness, partly due to the Biden administration’s hesitancy to take an active role in regional affairs, forced the UAE and other GCC states to fend for themselves within the shifting regional security dynamics and alliances.

While the Al-Ula reconciliation ended the groupings of the GCC states, the post-reconciliation process sparked a diplomacy rivalry among the GCC actors which strived to present themselves as the region’s important stabilizers and peacemakers.

The rhetorical shift in UAE foreign policy can be best understood by looking into the “10 Principles” announced in the “Projects of the 50” campaign in 2021. The projects publicized the strategic roadmap planning for the UAE’s economic, political, and social development. Among the “10 Principles,” “good neighborliness” stands as one of the UAE’s essential principles for stable political, economic, and social relations with its neighbors.

While openness, tolerance, and peace were mentioned as the state’s core values, the UAE calls for peace, harmony, negotiation, and dialogue to resolve all conflicts by envisioning bilateral relations based on a non-security or non-military perspective. This new narrative will help the Emirates to overcome its thorny relations with Turkey.

The Saudi-Emirati tension

Following the UAE’s military withdrawal from Yemen, the UAE-Saudi relations entered a period of standoff where distrust rose. After the 2017 Qatar diplomatic crisis, the UAE had adopted a common security understanding with Saudi Arabia that endured until the withdrawal of the Emirates from Yemen in mid-2019. Although the UAE was also militarily disengaged from several bases like Eritrea or Somaliland, its departure from Yemen made Saudi Arabia the foremost responsible for Yemen’s humanitarian crisis internationally.

The new pragmatism of the UAE foreign policy resulted from the Emirati decision-makers’ abandonment of a proactive foreign policy and military interventions in Syria, Yemen, and Libya. Although the UAE did not experience demonstrations such as those in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, the potential for the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, through the Al-Islah movement that was founded in 1974, was perceived as a threat to the existing state structure and the royal families of the seven emirates of the UAE. This fear caused the demonization and the labeling of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group working against the stability of the Gulf monarchies.

The close rhetoric between Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood for almost ten years, pushed Emirati decision-makers to adopt adverse policies towards Turkey in various regional crises.

The close rhetoric between Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood for almost ten years, pushed Emirati decision-makers to adopt adverse policies towards Turkey in various regional crises like the Syrian Civil War and the Eastern Mediterranean until the visit of Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MBZ), the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and de facto ruler of the Emirates, to Turkey in November 2021.

Before visiting Turkey, Sheikh Mohammed and other UAE decision-makers made diplomatic visits to Jordan, Egypt, and Syria as part of the claimed Emirati diplomatic activism in the region. However, the visit to Turkey attracted more regional and international attention due to the lousy record of bilateral relations since 2011 and accusations over the UAE’s financial support to the foiled coup d’état attempt in Turkey in 2016.

Despite tense political relations, Turkey’s trade ties with the UAE have continued to improve, and UAE exports to Turkey rose to 110 percent while total trade increased by 21 percent from 2019 to 2020. The satisfaction on both sides following the Erdoğan-MBZ meeting and the agreements focusing on the strategic investments to generate steady and safe revenues in the long term, including the logistics, health, and energy sectors, demonstrated both states’ preference to overlook their political divergences for the sake of economic advantages.

As a result, regional cooperation, dialogue, and negotiation themes initiated new diplomacy rhetoric between Turkey and the UAE. Similarly, one might emphasize the change of Turkish foreign policy rhetoric towards the Gulf, such as referring to the six Gulf states as Turkey’s friends – not only “brotherly Qatar” anymore.

UAE exports to Turkey rose to 110 percent while total trade increased by 21 percent from 2019 to 2020.

Throughout the 2017 Qatar crisis, Turkey adopted a security-oriented approach and claimed to provide a security umbrella to the whole Gulf. Turkey adopted this controversial rhetoric to calm the anxieties of Saudi Arabia and the UAE after establishing a Turkish military base in Qatar. Still, it made Turkey’s relations with the prementioned Gulf states even tenser. Now, one can observe a change in the rhetoric of almost every Gulf state towards establishing non-military bilateral ties. This does not harm Turkey’s relations with Qatar, but allows Turkey to include itself in the Gulf regional security architecture through cooperation, trade, and peaceful means.

In contrast to Saudi Arabia, the UAE has been more willing to establish relations regional actors like Iran or Israel. The UAE’s maneuver capacity can be related to the abandonment of religious themes in its foreign policy rhetoric. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has historically adopted a “distinctive” status for itself in the Arab world.

While Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar have always cultivated significant relations with Iran, Saudi and Emirati decision-makers have viewed Iranian regional activities and proxy wars as working against the domestic security of regional states such as Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, or Iraq. Interestingly, Iran’s imports from the UAE reached $5.39 billion in the period of March-August 2021, illustrating the high volume of trade relations between the two even in times of crisis.

However, since April 2021, behind-the-scenes meetings between Iranian and Saudi officials were revealed, which jump-started efforts to normalize  diplomatic ties with Iran. The endeavors of the Gulf states came in the form of re-establishing diplomatic relations with Iran without waiting for the Biden administration’s steps to renew the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal, which would bring Iran a vainglorious opponent to the diplomacy table.

Similar to the Saudi side, at the Baghdad Summit held in August 2021, the UAE’s Vice President and Ruler of Dubai Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum met Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian to discuss the possibilities of a “neighborhood policy and diplomacy.”

The year 2021 has witnessed an escalated tension in the Middle Eastern and European security complexes. Early this year, Saudi Arabia and Greece strengthened their bilateral cooperation. Simultaneously, France encouraged Greece to increase its armament while blaming its European partners for turning a deaf ear to the threats the European Union is facing.

France, Saudi Arabia, and Greece seem to have twofold gains from this cooperation. They could both better materialize their energy cooperation and target Turkey’s gas explorations as well as challenge Turkey’s maritime superiority in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean.

Since early 2021, Turkey is voicing its concern over the Saudi F-15s to be based in the Souda air force base in Crete. The first quarter of the year signaled a potential escalation regarding the military drills to be conducted in the Aegean Sea. Turkey’s chief objection was to the Saudi F-15s that would be piloted by Greek lieutenants during military drills.

In February 2021, the Philia Forum brought Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain together to integrate into the pre-established Greek-Egypt-Cyprus cooperation. The main actor behind this initiative was Saudi Arabia. France conducted the White Shark 21 maritime drills, which symbolized the new hawkish stance against the Turkish energy pivot in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Military drills jointly conducted by France, Greece, Israel, Cyprus, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in the heart of the Aegean Sea are obviously a significant development. The dynamic of this alliance is issue-specific and narrow-scoped; however, it has a potential to attain short-term goals.

In the last three years, one of Turkey’s most important advantages has been its natural gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In the last three years, one of Turkey’s most important advantages has been its natural gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean, which created political complications with states such as Greece, Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, and France as well as with institutions including NATO and the European Union. The current balance of power created room for maneuver for Turkey which is now being constrained by rival energy-seekers such as France, Italy, Greece, and Israel.

Nevertheless, this alliance has been forged to preserve the status quo, and an stalemate might be an actual gain for the guarantor states such as France. There are two interrelated motives behind the French foreign policy: defense exports and international prestige. France is a leading actor in defense exports and tries to be an alternative to the United States.

Greece and Israel try to increase their political influence to protect or obtain bargains from the European search for more reliable energy sources.

In the last three years, France has been the second-largest defense exporter to Saudi Arabia after the U.S. For the last 5 to 10 years, only the UK has been able to compete with France. Besides, Greece and Israel try to increase their political influence to protect or obtain bargains from the European search for more reliable energy sources. There are a lot of pull factors of entering such a dynamic such as increased resolve to engage in conflict, better military resources, and the higher chance of deterrence, etc.

Such circumstances create a potential conflict on the Turkish maritime borders in the Eastern Mediterranean. It seems like the age-old Turco-Greek debate on the naval border is going to evolve into a bitter rivalry over the control of the Eastern Mediterranean energy flow. Certain stakeholders such as energy providers like Egypt, Algeria, and Israel will set the tone for which side will have the wind at its back.

Turkey can become a trendsetter by discovering natural gas reserves. It might also play a transmitter role with a plan that bypasses Cyprus and Greece, and transfers the Eastern Mediterranean gas directly to the EU. In this context, the problem for the gas alliance builders in the Eastern Mediterranean seems to be Turkey’s potential to be simultaneously a trendsetter and a transmitter.

Turkey’s potential to attain this power is perceived as a threat by its rivals. From an international relations perspective, such conflicts are quite natural; the most formidable alliance will once again force the other to succumb to its demands.

Time flies when it comes to the rapidly developing sequence of events in Libya. As of early 2021, there was an atmosphere that was regarded as promising for the first stage of elections in the country.

Fast-forward to December 24, and Libyan politics is debating how to have legitimate elections in order not to allow yet another tyranny in the war-torn country.

Representatives of around 30 countries arrived in Paris in November to discuss the recent political situation in Libya. Political actors such as the UK, Germany, Turkey, and Italy emphasized the need for a consensus on election law while France and Egypt are obsessed with having an election as soon as possible.

Due to the election laws unilaterally issued by the Aguila Saleh-led House of Representatives, Khalifa Haftar could now run for Libya’s presidency. The laws issued by Saleh have not been voted and passed in the parliament. Moreover, dual citizens, war criminals, and people who hold military posts are not permitted to run for the Libyan presidency, and Haftar faces several impediments to running for the elections.

Everybody, including France and Egypt, knows the warlord cannot even get 10 percent of the votes if elections are held freely in Libya.

Furthermore, it seems, Haftar’s ambitions are such that he is even ready to destroy his long-term supporters, showing no mercy. According to rumors, Saleh’s wish to run for Libya’s presidency was refused by Haftar and Egypt recently.

Haftar threatened people in east Libya against supporting Saleh as a candidate to run for the presidency.

When Saleh insisted, Haftar threatened people in east Libya against supporting him as candidates are obliged to collect 5,000 signatures to run for the presidency. Sending a message to Saleh’s potential supporters, Haftar stated that anyone who signs Saleh’s candidacy will be jailed. Despite all this, in a surprising move, Saleh announced his candidacy.

The overwhelming majority of Libyan people and politicians first want to have a solid foundation for an electoral system – a constitutional law that will be reached through consensus. That’s why the laws announced by the House of Representatives are considered flawed.

Yes, Libya needs elections to erase the traces of the civil war and chaos, and to heal its wounds, but not by unilaterally imposing “laws” which favor a warlord rather than a civil authority.

It is not only the High Council of State that demands a delay in order to reach a mutually accepted consensus on electoral laws, but also the Government of National Unity officials and political figures in the west along with the members of Tobruk-based House of Representatives.

France is among the countries which have been supporting Haftar at all costs, and the conferences organized in Paris, in general, have been a tool in its attempt to remain a key actor.

Nonetheless, even some of the Western participants of the most recent Paris Conference on Libya in November emphasized the need for change in election law.

Elections per se cannot enable Libya to rebuild its war-torn soul, but free, fair, and legitimate elections based on equitable laws can. And delaying elections to have a free and fair election is much better than having a flawed one.

Libya has been waiting for stability for more than a decade – the missed time can be tolerated, but the destruction of the efforts that have been made in this time cannot.

Mohammed bin Zayed, the crown prince of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), visited Turkey and was received by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on November 24. Diplomatic sources state that this meeting could have been held long before, but was delayed. The visit by the crown prince, the latest being ten years ago, tells a lot. Have foreign policy priorities changed in the UAE? Why have the two leaders waited 10 years to meet again?

Heralding a new era in bilateral relations indicates that geo-economic interests outweigh geopolitical ones at the moment. Both sides are being pragmatic; however, the competition in the region will not suddenly come to an end. At the same time, the visit signaled that the rivalry is manageable through taking bilateral steps based first on economic cooperation.

Accepting Ankara

The latest diplomatic move by the UAE shows that Abu Dhabi has acknowledged Turkey’s power and potential, and is coming to terms with the Turkish foreign policy perspective in MENA. Since the early days of this year, there is a pattern in the Middle East pushing regional powers to seek mutual engagements, and even though they continue to diverge on different issues, they seem to have found mutual grounds of understanding.

Along this line, the UAE’s view of Turkey has shifted too. For the UAE, challenging or intensifying the competition against Turkey is not a priority anymore. Moreover, the UAE has given up being part of the polarization in regional politics. Since the start of 2021, the UAE has been de-escalating tensions with regional actors including Syria and Iran.

There are many reasons why the UAE is normalizing its relations with Turkey. The election of Joe Biden and his approach towards the Middle East have contributed to accelerating this rapprochement. Biden has been criticizing the UAE’s adventurous foreign policy and he is unlikely to support Abu Dhabi’s destabilizing position in the region. Donald Trump was chiefly responsible for packing fights, conflicts, and tensions into the Middle East.

Another reason behind the UAE’s changing view of Turkey is that Abu Dhabi has long feared Turkish foreign policy’s translation into hard power.

On the other hand, the Biden era has brought uncertainty to those whose foreign policies rely on U.S. support –as for example, the Gulf monarchies. Therefore, without U.S. backing, sustaining the rivalry with Turkey would not be easy, and the UAE seems to have grasped this quickly.

Another reason behind the UAE’s changing view of Turkey is that Abu Dhabi has long feared Turkish foreign policy’s translation into hard power. The UAE policymakers thought that by putting pressure on Turkey, Ankara could give up seeking its national interests in the region. Since 2016, however, every foreign policy move by Turkey has hit the target.

Mohammed Dahlan, who is in Turkey most-wanted list, had his movement reportedly restricted by the UAE and that he may be asked to leave to another country. The same scenario is uttered for Sedat Peker, an eccentric Turkish mafia boss. Another salient piece of evidence would be the lessening of anti-Turkey propaganda in UAE-backed media. In fact, the UAE-backed media covered the visit positively.

Prioritizing the economy

Turkey and the UAE agreed on economic cooperation, which was the most important item on Mohammed bin Zayed’s agenda. Given COVID-19’s shattering spillover effects on economies, the two countries agreed on boosting the trade volume to at least $15 billion. The UAE’s economic pragmatism prioritizes increasing its investments abroad to diversify the non-oil trade volume. We should also keep in mind that the Emirati officials want to turn the country into a trade hub in competition with Saudi Arabia, the UAE’s strong and traditional ally.

Turkey and the UAE agreed on economic cooperation, which was the most important item on Mohammed bin Zayed’s agenda.

Therefore, the UAE wants to open a trade route with Turkey, involving a corridor passing through Iran, and to enhance its chance to become the region’s economic leader. This new trade corridor has encouraged regional actors to intensify cooperation rather than competition.

In this sense, the UAE decided to invest more in Turkey and normalize its relations with Ankara. On the first of November, Iran announced that the first shipment along this route, connecting the UAE and Turkey, was transported. With this new corridor, shipments which took 20 days by sea on the Sharjah-Mersin route via the Suez Canal will now take six to eight days, passing through Iran.

The new transportation route saves time and reduces costs. This is a good example of how the UAE has started prioritizing economic gains over political differences in its relations with Turkey. The UAE is looking for ways to increase its investments in Turkey, and there are several fields that Abu Dhabi is interested in, such as business, energy, transportation, and delivery services. Direct foreign investments are a mutual target for both countries. The UAE was searching for new countries to invest in order to diversify its economic activities, while Turkey regards direct foreign investment as a remedy to heal economic stagnation.

The investment fund Mubadala/Exchange, Abu Dhabi’s sovereign wealth fund, invested $7.5 billion in Getir, a delivery service company in Turkey, between March and July 2021. In August, Syed Basar Shueb, CEO of Abu Dhabi’s holding International Holding Co. (IHC), announced that the company is seeking investment opportunities in Turkey in the healthcare sector. Tahnun bin Zayed, the UAE’s national security advisor, who met Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on August 18, 2021, is IHC’s president.

Ankara plans to send its Wealth Fund and Investment Support and Promotion Agency officials to Abu Dhabi to discuss possible investment opportunities with Emirati officials. The United Arab Emirates invited Alparslan Bayraktar, Turkey’s deputy minister of energy and natural resources, to speak at the Gastech conference at the Dubai World Trade Center on September 13.

In September, Turkey’s e-commerce giant Trendyol raised its value to $16.5 billion by investing $1.5 billion  in Trendyol from several high-profile investors, including Abu Dhabi’s state fund ADQ. The UAE is expected to invest $500 million in the Turkish MNG cargo company.

Geopolitical Mindset

The UAE’s latest diplomatic moves towards Turkey reveal that there is a consensus to cooperate economically despite political differences. The UAE aims to leverage Turkey’s power to balance its regional competitors such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar with which Abu Dhabi has political disagreements. On the other hand, despite several positive and constructive signs of improvement of UAE-Turkey ties, Abu Dhabi has not entirely given up its anti-Turkey position. Economic cooperation may help to ease the tension, but the potential for political crises is still there.

The rivalry between the UAE and Turkey continues in many subregional fields such as Eurasia, Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Libya. The diplomatic rapprochement between Ankara and Abu Dhabi is a policy recalibration and can be seen as an effort to manage the rivalry. Even though it is still hard to predict how a possible normalization would proceed, it can be expected that economic relations will further strengthen, and geopolitical rivalry will lessen but continue under a new framework.

Morocco and Turkey have the potential to establish a promising political and economic cooperation, based on mutual respect and national interests. In addition to the shared cultural and religious ties, both are important geopolitical actors of the MENA region, the Mediterranean, and the Islamic world at large.

Over the past two decades, Morocco and Turkey have intensified their diplomatic relations and trade volume, sharing experience in many sectors such as migration, military cooperation, security affairs as well as the textile and construction sectors.

Turkey regards Morocco as an important partner given the dynamism of Morocco’s economy and the kingdom’s geographical location as a gateway to Africa. But there is also a competitive aspect to this relationship.

From 2011 onward, the Turkish-Moroccan relations indicate a state of reluctance to establish strong relations. Invited by the chief of the government in 2013, then Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Morocco, seeking a strategic partnership, but he was not received by King Mohammed VI. Moreover, Erdoğan was boycotted by the General Confederation of Moroccan Enterprises.

While the coalition government’s leading political party, the Party for Justice and Development in Morocco, had a strong cooperation with Turkey’s JDP (Justice and Development Party or AKP), the monarchy refused to have strong relations with Turkey. However, in December 2014, King Mohammed VI and his family were received by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at his home. It was a friendly and unofficial meeting.

In the summer of 2016, two years later, Morocco condemned the coup attempt against Turkish President Erdoğan and met the Turkish government’s demands to crack down on FETO (Fetullah Terrorist Organization) institutions in Morocco. As a response, in 2017, Morocco closed seven FETO schools and arrested many of those who are affiliated with the group.

Unbalanced Free Trade Agreements

The Turkey-Morocco free trade agreement (FTA) signed on April 7, 2004, in Ankara, and entered into force at the beginning of 2006, provides a significant impetus to bilateral cooperation.

In 2018, the trade volume between Turkey and Morocco increased to around $2.7 billion, which is a positive indicator of the agreements made earlier. Despite the gradual increase, Morocco requested a review of some clauses of the FTA after its local industries and businesses suffered a loss, and the trade balance with Turkey experienced a deficit following the entry into force of the accord in 2006.

This imbalance is due to the similarity of certain sectors in both countries, such as textiles, leather, construction, public works, and distribution networks. In parallel, the Turkish investments in the Kingdom of Morocco were not materialized as expected. The volume of Turkish investments in Morocco does not exceed 1% due to the lack of the promotion of direct Turkish investment in the country, notably through joint-venture operations. However, to increase Turkish investment, Ankara should invest in new sectors such as the pharmaceutical industry, banking services, or insurance, in addition to the establishment of joint investment platforms.

In October 2020, up to 90% additional customs taxation was imposed on Turkish products for a period of five years. These additional taxes cover a total of 1,200 different products in different categories, led by the industry, food, and textile sectors.

The changes and additional taxation were implemented after a controversial 18 months. The Moroccan government thinks that the 2004 free trade agreement with Turkey has a negative impact on Morocco’s trade deficit. For Morocco, enhancing the free trade agreement to overcome impediments for equitable sharing of benefits is critical for sustainable cooperation and is necessary for a win-win perspective.

A Strategic Partnership to What Extent?

While Morocco and Turkey’s bilateral relations are based on common interests on security, migration, development, and territorial integrity, the former Saudi-Turkish confrontation affected regional stability and led to further geopolitical polarization in the Maghreb region. The long-standing rivalry between the two important powers of North Africa, Morocco and Algeria, has always been the determining factor in the steps of international and regional powers toward the region. Maintaining economic and political relations with both countries is an important factor in Turkey’s insistence on a neutral policy toward the region’s two important countries.

One of the most sensitive and important issues is the Sahara crisis. Here, Algeria is providing both financial and political support to the Polisario militias, and Turkey’s relationship with Algeria and its lack of clarity on this issue has led to tense relations between it and Morocco.

In December 2019, the state-owned Turkish television channel TRT World aired an interview with Sahrawi separatist Aminatou Haidar. Haidar’s critical discourse towards the Moroccan state triggered a wave of criticism by Moroccan media. The broadcast was considered blackmail after a call for a readjustment of a free trade deal with Turkey by the Moroccan government.

In economic terms, the visit of Algerian Foreign Minister Sabri Bukadoum to Turkey on September 1, 2020, and his commitment to offering important opportunities to Turkish investor companies, is an indicator of the rivalry between Morocco and Algeria in the Maghreb region and the African continent.

In March 2010, at the last Arab summit held in Libya, then secretary-general of the Arab League Amr Moussa proposed to expand the Arab League to include Turkey. Moussa called on Turkey to be part of the Arab regional system in a strategic dialogue as a friendly neighboring major power with strong historical, cultural, and economic ties to the region. However, Moussa’s “Arab neighboring policy” was postponed to the next summit and was never realized after the region was shocked by the wave of Arab uprisings that started a few months later.

In the pre-Arab uprisings era, Turkey was enjoying the golden days in its relations with regional countries, in particular the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). On the Turkish side, economic considerations and the enhancement of its position in the Middle East were the driving force, while on the GCC states, the adverse impact of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which strengthened the Shiite position in the country, and the rising Iranian influence in the region had an important impact on their consideration of Turkey as a potential partner.

Despite their domestic differences, Turkey and the GCC states agreed on the fact that without mutual cooperation, it would be quite difficult for the two sides to maintain the balance of power in the region in such a way as to favor their own interests. Thus, domestic factors did not play a large role in shaping the foreign policy decisions of Turkey and the GCC states when the nature of the regional developments, such as in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, were more related to the balance of power in the Middle East. For the sake of their regional interests, Turkey and the GCC states did not allow their domestic differences to come to the surface and adversely affect their cooperation.

However, the harmony that Turkey and the GCC enjoyed ended fairly soon with the Arab uprisings, especially after Egypt’s military takeover in 2013. The regional security perceptions of two opposing alliances – one that supported the popular movements, spearheaded by Turkey and Qatar, and another that opposed them championed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Egypt – diverged significantly over regional crises, creating an “ideological proxy war” which preponderated over their mutual concerns.

In recent months, this picture has begun to change as several signs of a rapprochement between these actors have emerged. The era of military-based hard power politics that had led to subsequent crises between these actors seems to have closed and a fresh start is on the horizon.

Breaking the ice, but gradually

Following the recent visit of UAE National Security Adviser Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed al-Nayhan to Ankara, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held a rare phone call with UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ). That was followed by a call between their foreign ministers. It was reported that Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani, a good friend of both Erdoğan and MBZ, helped facilitate the rapprochement between Turkey and the UAE – two countries that confronted on almost all regional issues concerning Libya, Egypt, the Horn of Africa, Yemen, and the Eastern Mediterranean throughout the past decade.

Triggering factors for rapprochement 

Due to external factors, both international and regional, and domestic factors related to economy and security, countries within these opposing blocs have equally started to recalibrate their positions and reset their relations, which had previously been predicated on confrontation. The main theme of this new era is realpolitik as actors seem determined to put ideology aside and focus on the economy for solid gains to end a period of intense regional rivalry.

International: The new U.S. administration under Joe Biden is determined to prioritize Asia, to deal with its own domestic issues, and to push for diplomacy in the Middle East, unlike the preceding Trump administration. This change in the global context came at a time when the U.S. is re-evaluating its military footprint in the region, which has been a triggering factor in pushing Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia towards a de-escalation era.

Biden’s tenure not only led these countries to question the U.S. security commitment but also raised the importance of relying on regional cooperation just like in the pre-2011 era. Ultimately, the recent reconciliation climate aligns with the Biden administration’s policies in the region.

Regional: The signing of the Al-Ula declaration that officially ended the Gulf dispute created further incentives for Ankara to break the ice with Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. As such, Turkey’s attempts to normalize relations with Egypt paved the way to the rapprochement with the other Gulf countries as well. Turkey and Qatar started a dialogue with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, while in order not to remain on the sidelines of this regional era of rapprochement the UAE also rolled up its sleeves.

Another regional factor that triggered these developments was the growing relations between Egypt, Israel, Greece, and the Greek Cypriot administrations in the Eastern Mediterranean at the expense of Turkish interests. For Turkey, cooperation with Egypt on the issues related to Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean is vital, while the same applies to Cairo as well.

Domestic: Domestic considerations play a significant role in shaping a country’s foreign policy. In the domestic context, Turkey’s precarious economic situation and the UAE’s need to make investments in accordance with its “Vision 2030” have been a driving force in the Turkey-UAE rapprochement. Erdoğan underlined that trade was the main focus of talks with Tahnoun, saying that “serious Emirati investments” lay on the horizon. Cultivating economic ties not only benefits the two sides, but could also prove beneficial to both countries’ political and security interests.

To conclude, the Middle East has proven this several times: yesterday’s enemy could be tomorrow’s ally. Changing geopolitics and realities in the region have pushed countries to put aside ideological differences for the sake of national interests and stability in the region.

Now that the Turkey-Qatar and the UAE-Egypt-Saudi Arabia blocs seem to perceive this rapprochement as an opportunity to maintain their regional influence, it is unlikely that they will allow minor internal political calculations to hamper this rapprochement process.

Time will show whether regional countries will be able to build confidence similar to the pre-2011 era, when interest-driven pragmatism outweighed ideologically-driven foreign policy.

Let me be clear from the beginning: what happened in Tunisia on July 25, 2021 is a coup against the constitution. There is no doubt about it and no argument.

As for the decision of the coup, it was not taken in haste on the Sunday before last nor was it a reaction to the widespread protests taking place that day. There is no doubt that Kais Saied has been planning this coup from at least the beginning of this year, which means that he had already consulted with the army leadership and secured the necessary support before taking these drastic measures.

There is no direct material evidence that there is any foreign involvement in Saied’s decision to embark on this coup. However, there is an important question to be asked: Kais Saied is over sixty years of age, a university lecturer, and was able to win the presidential elections. Is it reasonable to believe that he would suspend the parliament and move to monopolize all of the state’s power in his hands without having coordinated in advance with foreign powers such as the French president to secure international support, and then with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to secure the necessary financial support to cement his coup?

Moreover, there is much to be gleaned from the international response to the coup. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s first public words on the coup were, “I had a good call with President Kais Saied.”

These words indicate that the U.S. administration will not seriously obstruct Saied’s plans to change the political course in Tunisia. The Americans are not interested much in competing with France for influence in Tunisia, and have far more important issues such as Afghanistan, Iraq, China, Russia, and COVID-19.

The social and economic situation in Tunisia has deteriorated significantly since 2011.

Yet it cannot be denied that there is significant popular support for Saied’s decisions. The social and economic situation in Tunisia has deteriorated significantly since 2011. Over the course of the past two years, the newly elected parliament, and the two governments which were bestowed with its vote of confidence, have resoundingly failed to improve the lives of ordinary citizens – just as the previous governments before it. The situation has been compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic that has ripped through the country with devastating impact.

President Kais Saied’s coup against the constitution has, of course, significant effects at home, as well as in Tunisia’s regional surroundings, particularly with regards to neighboring Libya. Among the countries that supported Saied’s measures immediately after they were announced, are two countries that have great interests in Libya, which outweigh their interests in Tunisia – namely, Egypt and the UAE.

President Kais Saied’s coup against the constitution has significant effects at home as well as in Libya.

The leaders of both countries fully understand that Tunisia is a lifeline for the Tripoli government, and that if a regime closer to them is established in Tunis, and they have a tangible influence on it, it will be possible to tighten the noose around the Tripoli government in coordination with their ally Haftar who is ever-present in the east.

Two years ago, Khalifa Haftar was about to enter Tripoli victorious, after he had besieged it with the support of Egypt and the UAE. But, Turkish support and an open border with Tunisia, where the Ennahda movement has enjoyed an advanced political position, saved Tripoli and its rulers from defeat.

But now that Ennahda has been removed from power with the coup of Saied, Egypt and the UAE may hope that what they failed to accomplish in 2019 can now be achieved in coordination with a friendly regime in Tunisia, and with more support for their ambitious Libyan ally, General Hafter.

Of course, the governments of Egypt and the UAE also have a strong alliance with France, with whom they share mutual interests and cooperation on regional issues, and in particular Libya: oil for France; the employment of Egyptian workers and the granting of construction contracts to Egyptian companies for the el-Sisi regime; and uprooting the Muslim Brotherhood movement and ending its presence in Libya for the UAE (which Egypt and France also want to see).

It is very clear, then, that the Tunisian coup has a strong relationship with the Libyan issue. This naturally leads us to consider Algeria, Tunisia’s most important neighbor, and how it will react to the Tunisian coup and its repercussions in the region.

There are no official Algerian statements that can be relied on to know the actual mood among Algerian policymakers. However, there was a call between the Tunisian and Algerian presidents on July 26 and a visit by the Algerian foreign minister to Tunisia the next day, during which he met with Saied.

Algerian comments on social media and press leaks indicate that Algeria will not accept the control of Tunisian foreign policy by Egypt and the UAE – a control that would seek to facilitate Haftar’s bid to gain control of all of Libya’s regions. Algeria views Haftar as an opponent, and he, in turn, reciprocates this stance. Algeria also sees the UAE as an antagonist in the region. Abu Dhabi has established a consulate in the disputed Western Sahara, much to the chagrin of Algiers. Coupled with the normalization of ties with Israel, the intention of the UAE to flex against Algeria by drawing on international support in favor of Morocco is clear.

On this basis, Algeria may put pressure on Saied not to dissolve parliament and not to overextend the period afforded to him to wield emergency powers in order to preserve the position of the Ennahda movement in the Tunisian political scene, and thereby to ensure there is a check on the governments of Egypt and the UAE that prevents them from exercising influence on the foreign policy of Tunisia.

Recently, there have been a number of high-profile meetings between the leadership of Libya’s Government of National Unity [GNU] and that of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Besides hosting discussions and affirming their support for the political transition and further cooperation on security, several economic deals have been announced.

Libya and Algeria agreed to resume flights, reopen land borders and launch maritime lines and on the measures to boost trade and investment. Following a visit at the end of May by Tunisia’s Prime Minister, Libya and Tunisia concurred on facilitating border crossings. Morocco just hosted another round of intra-Libyan talks.

While to some, this may seem like a new tangent for Libya’s complicated foreign policy, it is actually a logical and healthy continuation of previous initiatives. Proximity, shared culture, interdependence and shared threats give the countries of the Maghreb common interests. Despite some different circumstances and the intense rivalry between Algeria and Morocco, all three countries have tried to appear neutral and offer constructive diplomatic assistance while attempting to limit any contagion to their own fragile situations.

Historical Context

Besides geography, the countries of the Maghreb share a lot of culture and history. In more recent times, the late Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi attempted coups against the leaders of both Morocco and Tunisia as part of his numerous, failed attempts at a larger union. There has also been discord between other members, notably Algeria and Morocco, who have longstanding differences, especially over the fate of the Western Sahara.

Despite all this, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia established the Arab Maghreb Union in 1989 to promote cooperation and economic integration. However, the issues that divided them proved too difficult to overcome and the organization quickly became dormant. Initially the poorest country in the region, the discovery of oil in the 1950s made Libya the richest nation and therefore an important economic motor for the whole Maghreb. Despite this new wealth, Qaddafi’s quixotic governance meant that Libyans often depended on their neighbors for goods and services.

Plenty to Deal with at Home

Besides good intentions, these three western neighbors may also have had domestic considerations for not getting involved militarily in the Libyan conflict. Without a source of considerable outside financing, it would have been very costly to start an unnecessary foreign adventure and these countries had plenty of drama to deal with. Having overthrown the authoritarian rule of President Zine el-Abidine Ben, Tunisia was going through many growing pains with its more open politics.

There was intense competition between Islamist and more secular parties. A truth commission appointed to investigate human rights violations of previous regimes accused President Beji Caid Essebsi of committing crimes while serving in the government of Ben Ali’s predecessor, Habib Bourguiba. Essebsi died while in office in 2019. The process to replace him was somewhat ambiguous and a formal constitutional court had yet to be established.

Algeria had gone through its own civil war from 1991-2002 and had remained under emergency law until 2011. During the period of the Libyan crisis, long-time President Bouteflika had serious health problems and there were numerous protests demanding more freedom and political change. Following massive street protests, Bouteflika resigned in 2019.

Morocco has continued to deal with its conflict in Western Sahara with the Polisario Front, which rejects its 1975 annexation of the territory.  Following the Arab Spring, Morocco engaged in its own reform program. While avoiding the intense disturbances of many of its neighbors, some tensions have remained.

Common Security Worries

Besides the issues that they have sometimes foisted on each other, the Maghreb countries share many other concerns like radical cross-border groups and pressure by the European Union to stem the flow of migrants. People also flow within the region. After the fall of Qaddafi, an estimated 200-400,000 Libyans decamped to Tunisia [out of a population of around 11 million].

Several thousand Tunisians fought for jihadist groups in the Middle East or Libya between 2011 and 2016. Besides being the closest major theatre of operations, Libya also served as a launching pad for attacks like that of Daesh attack on the border town of Ben Guerdane, allegedly motivated by an air attack on its training base.

Tunisia reinforced its patrols and built a sand barrier covering 168 of the 468 kilometres of its porous border with Libya. An estimated 600 Tunisian extremist jihadis are reckoned to remain in Libya, primarily in the south. Others continue to fight in other countries, including the nearby Sahel region. Though reduced, the threat has not disappeared but the security restrictions are a heavy burden on the economy, particularly for pastoralists and other border communities.

Like Tunisia, Algeria shares a border with Libya and has been worried about infiltration by  Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM] like the attack on gas facilities at Ain Amenas and a possible return of radicalized Tuaregs who had served in Qaddafi’s paramilitary “Islamic Legion” such as happened in Mali. The Government reinforced its border with Libya by deploying an additional 30-40,000 troops but like Tunisia, it also has to worry about security restrictions disturbing border livelihoods.

Morocco does not share a border with Libya, but some recruitment of fighters to go to Libya is alleged to have taken place there.

Also… The Sahel

While Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are concerned by issues in Libya, it is worth remembering that the southern part of Algeria is in the Sahel region and Morocco is close by, if not formally part of it. Several countries of the Sahel are experiencing serious problems of violent Jihadi attacks, inter-ethnic conflict and coups besides chronic issues of extreme poverty and climate change.

Even though they not among the most affected, the Maghreb nations must be watchful of threats and spillover coming from the Sahel as well. Morocco has started to take a keen interest in developments and has started to play a role in the G5 Sahel force.

Mercenaries are back. No one knows how many billions of dollars slosh around this illicit market. All we know is that business is booming because when you need something absolutely, positively done in war, you call the private sector. Missions once conducted by special operations forces or the CIA are now outsourced — I know because I did them.

Mercenaries are deadlier than most people realize, a grave oversight. In 2018, a group of U.S. Army Rangers, Delta Force, Green Berets and Marines — America’s most elite troops — were pinned down in Syria. Attacking them were 500 mercenaries, hired by Russia. They were not the cartoonish rabble depicted by Hollywood movies. This was the Wagner Group, a high-end mercenary outfit with artillery, armored personnel carriers, and tanks.

The American commandos radioed for help. Warplanes arrived in waves, including Reaper drones, Apache helicopters, F-22 fighter jets, F-15 strike fighters, B-52 bombers, and AC-130 gunships. Scores of airstrikes pummeled the mercenaries, but they did not waver.

Four hours later, the mercenaries finally retreated. No Americans were killed, and the U.S. military touted this as a big win. But it wasn’t. It took America’s best troops and advanced aircraft four hours to push back 500 mercenaries. What happens when they have to face 1000? 5000? More? Even an undefeated military can lose.

Mercenaries are the second oldest profession, and their return is no surprise. Since 2015, mercenaries have flourished in Yemen, Libya, Nigeria, Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Mozambique, Central African Republic, and Venezuela. There are even cyber-mercenaries called “hack back” companies.

The UAE hired mercenaries to kill Houthis during the War in Yemen. Some of these were allegedly U.S. military although most came from Latin America.

There are many reasons why mercenaries are returning now. In fact, they have been gradually reappearing over the past three decades, but always in the shadows and that’s by design. Rich clients with a small or no military can swipe a check and wage war. The UAE hired mercenaries to kill Houthis during the War in Yemen. Some of these were allegedly U.S. military although most came from Latin America. After six failed years of fighting Boko Haram, Nigeria hired mercenaries to push the terrorist group out of their country, which they did in a few weeks. Libya is a mercenaries-on-mercenary war. Perhaps someday ExxonMobil will have its own army, too.

But why do states with big militaries use mercenaries? Because warfare is changing — it’s getting sneakier. We live in an information age, and weapons that provide plausible deniability, like mercenaries, are more important than raw firepower. In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine, not by blitzkrieg but through deception. They covertly deployed Spetsnaz special forces, mercenaries like the Wagner Group, Little Green Men, and fake pro-Russia militias. Dense propaganda, troll factories, and other active measures further concealed the truth, until it was too late. While the West stood befuddled about what was going on, the Crimea was a fait d’accompli.

Moscow created the fog of war, and moved through it for victory. Mercenaries ooze plausible deniability. If they are caught, the client can disavow them. Not so for army soldiers. Plus, Russian citizens (like U.S. ones) hate seeing their dead soldiers coming home in body bags, but do not care about dead contractors. Owing to this, Putin can engage in risky military operations with minimal domestic political consequence. For the first time since the Cold War, Russia has launched expeditionary operations in the Middle East and Africa. The weapon of choice? Mercenaries, like the Wagner Group.

Private warfare is a growing trend with alarming implications, yet few in the West seem to care. Perhaps they assume international law will take care of the problem, but this is magical thinking. Who will go into Libya and arrest all those mercenaries? The UN? NATO? Nobody. Worse, mercenary can shoot law enforcement dead. The market for force literally resists regulation.

Privatizing war changes warfare in profound ways modern generals do not comprehend.

A world awash in mercenaries means more war and suffering. History teaches us that unemployed mercenaries become bandits and racketeers, preying on people and sometimes taking over whole kingdoms, as happened to Milan in the 15^th century. Soldiers of fortune can start and elongate war for profit, and avoid outbreaks of peace. This is one reason why the Thirty Years War (1618-48) in Europe took so long, as mercenaries fought for all sides in great numbers. By the time it ended, Germany lost a greater percentage of its population than in WWII.

Privatizing war changes warfare in profound ways modern generals do not comprehend. If conflict is commoditized, then military and marketplace strategies apply to war. It’s like General Patton goes to the souk. You can win wars by outbidding your enemy for mercenary services, bribing your enemy’s mercenaries to defect, or not paying your mercenaries when the war is over. However, it’s a dangerous game because your enemies and mercenaries can do the same to you, and there is no reliable way to enforce contracts.

Treachery is the watchword of private warfare. The 14^th century Florentine, Niccolò Machiavelli, was ripped off by his own mercenaries in 1500 and 1506, during a war with Pisa, causing Florence to lose to its diminutive neighbor. A few years later, he writes in his book The Prince, that mercenaries are: “disunited, ambitious, without discipline, unfaithful; gallant among friends, vile among enemies; no fear of God, no faith with men.”

Private force will also change world order. Offering the means of war to anyone who can afford it will transform warfare and the future of war. If money can buy firepower, then large corporations and the super-rich will become a new kind of superpower. This will rewrite the rules of global order. Who, how and why people fight will change, and there will be wars without states, accelerating global chaos.

This trend will grow, fueled by a free market for force that generates war but cannot regulate it. Today’s militaries have forgotten how to fight private wars, leaving us all exposed. We must increase our strategic IQs to deal with this problem before it becomes a crisis.

There is good news. Mercenaries are as old as war, yet the world did not devolve into anarchy, as is often portrayed by critics of private force. In fact, they can even do good, if hired to do so. If the industry were properly vetted and transparent, they could support UN peacekeeping operations, stop impending genocides, rescue civilian populations from human predators, hunt crime lords, and launch humanitarian operations quickly to save lives — something the international community cannot do. Mercenaries are like fire: they can burn down the house or power a steam engine. It’s a question of how we use them, so let’s use them for good.

The Kremlin’s successful “comeback” in the Middle East is explained by the fact that Moscow has become accustomed to appearing on the political scene only during crises, when conventional players seek a quick but often emotional resolution. Another obvious reason is the logic of the Russian authorities which have traditionally exploited different upheavals to gain greater political leverage inside the country.

In general, the Syrian war has enabled the Kremlin to make a quiet “comeback” in the Middle East. From the outset, Moscow managed to raise its contacts with key regional and extra-regional stakeholders to an unprecedented level, thus achieving a dialogue on an equal footing that had been sought by the Kremlin since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Yet, many observers wonder whether Russia will be able to use these gains efficiently in the long term. This crucial question is still open-ended as the answer depends on the capabilities and consistent steps of the power vertical.

No arms sale windfall following the weapons tests in Syria

Experts in Moscow enjoy discussing how the war in Syria became a promotion campaign for Russia’s weaponry. The real-world evidence for this hypothesis, however, is somewhat scant. Despite Moscow testing a wide spectrum of weaponry and military hardware in Syria, this has not translated into an uptick of its military exports to the Middle East and Northern Africa, a region which occupies a special place for Russia to expand its military-technical cooperation with countries around the globe.

Taking into account that arms negotiations usually take two years to conclude, it was rather amusing to read various hot takes on the upsurge in Russia’s weapons sales only six months after the start of Moscow’s intervention in Syria.

Russia’s military exports demonstrated steady growth prior to 2013 but have been plateauing ever since. According to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s public statements, the volume of Russia’s military sales amounted to $15 billion in 2014, $14.5 billion in 2015, $15.3 billion in 2016, $15.3 billion in 2017, $16 billion in 2018, $13 billion in 2019 (the Defense Department puts the figure for this year at $15.2 billion), and around $13 billion in 2020.

In 2015-2020, Egypt, Algeria, and Iraq were the main importers of Russia’s weapons. All three countries began striking their bundle agreements (or negotiating over particular classes of weapons) with Russia before its intervention in the Syrian civil war.

The values of contracts might be subject to manipulation, so looking at the actual physical volume of deliveries could give us a more accurate picture. In 2015-2020, Egypt, Algeria, and Iraq were the main importers of Russia’s weapons. All three countries began striking their bundle agreements (or negotiating over particular classes of weapons) with Russia before its intervention in the Syrian civil war.

The exception to this rule includes some of the agreements between Russia and Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. Those deals became media highlights due to the specifics of those countries’ relations with the U.S. But neither the sums of the contracts nor their assortment points at any sort of arms sale windfall.

However, it would be a misconception to interpret such steps as Moscow’s desire to become a mediator or that it is interested in building a balanced architecture of regional security – it just seeks to present itself as a mentor.

Strategically speaking, Russia has pursued a “clinger” policy in recent years. Moscow has been trying importunately to interact with everyone in order to impose a “dialogue on an equal footing” on Washington, its principal rival.

The Kremlin seeks to bolster its position by playing the contradictions card and making the most of the lack of concordance among traditional allies; by gaining a firmer foothold in the countries at the apex of the crisis – Syria, Lebanon, Iraq; or by mediating the overdue policy to diversify political ties.

Such tactics tend to be typical of non-state actors which do not have the means to secure themselves. The Kremlin has them in plentiful supply, both nuclear and non-nuclear ones. However, insufficient economic resources prevent Russians from winning unswerving loyalty – even that of their strategic allies, not to mention tactical ones.

Recipe for “success”

In the official propaganda, the emphasis is on exceptional strength which is devoid of significant economic power and which stems from the Soviet paradigm. The latter has defined the agenda promoted by the Kremlin and reinforced the familiar bugaboo of the external enemy against the image of upright state leadership.

Therefore, Putin, a politician who became a historic figure with the annexation of Crimea, could not simply put up with the sanctions imposed after 2014 or see Russia being compared to a besieged fortress. Although the image of the external enemy is indispensable to Russian officials’ speeches, it contradicts, first of all, the existing Western centrism of the Russian elite.

Moreover, pretending to see a threat and moralizing are not tantamount to rule-setting on the world stage. After the Russian “comeback” in the Middle East, where it had to deal with numerous non-state and quasi-state actors, Moscow was forced to resort to parallel diplomacy given the inability of official departments to solve the foreign policy tasks assigned to them in an effective manner.

Hence, we have seen the involvement of the Chechen think tank (Kadyrov’s Muslim team) in the negotiations, the deployment of Prigozhin’s mercenaries to fulfill military tasks, and the engagement of military intelligence to get rid of undesirables. Naturally, special forces should coordinate such activities rather than the Foreign Ministry.

Formally, the Russian Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministries work very close and in tandem. Nevertheless, it has been clear since 2017 that security officials, and military and intelligence agencies, sidelined diplomats in the Syrian and later in the Libyan cases. Still, the key players were only too glad to let Moscow call the shots in Syria as Russia would have to shoulder the burden of the crisis settlement and the responsibility for the survival of Assad’s ossified regime.

In recent weeks, Tripoli has seen a steady stream of visits by European officials after the Government of National Unity (GNU) won the confidence of the Libyan parliament to lead the country to elections in late December of this year.

At a time when the new Libyan government is rejoicing in a diplomatic watershed – illustrated by the intense schedule of visits to Tripoli by foreign dignitaries – the need for EU members to boost relations with Libya is already emerging as one of the most acute foreign policy challenges. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ visit to the Libyan capital on April 6, demonstrated the difficulty of this task.

“Let those who tried to question our relations in the past stay back,” said Mitsotakis during his meeting with his Libyan counterpart, Abdel Hamid Dbeibah, who was appointed in February to head the new Government of National Unity bringing together representatives from the west and east of the country for the first time since 2014.

In 2019, Faiz al-Sarraj’s Government of National Accord (GNA), backed by Turkey, had driven General Haftar’s forces out of western Libya. To further the cooperation and in exchange for vital support for the GNA, al-Sarraj signed two memoranda of understanding, “The Security and Military Cooperation” and “Restriction of Marine Jurisdictions,”  with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Istanbul on November 28, 2019.

Mitsotakis asked Tripoli “to cancel the illegal documents presented as agreements between states when they have no legal value.” But days after his short visit, Erdoğan and Dbeibah reaffirmed their commitment to the “Restriction of Marine Jurisdictions” agreement.

This angered some of their neighbors in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as some EU members who were willing “to circumvent the agreement if it cannot be cancelled” as a European diplomat told Le Monde. Erdoğan and Dbeibah also signed numerous agreements following one-on-one and inter-delegation talks.

Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio said that Italy and the United States have “a common concern about the presence of foreign forces, both Russian and Turkish, in Libya,” meaning that there is a perception of “stronger” cooperation between the two countries on this matter.

Europe has recently shown interest in the upcoming elections in Libya.

During a meeting in Washington on Monday with his U.S. counterpart Antony Blinken, the two officials discussed the importance of the “full implementation of the ceasefire in Libya and the holding of elections [scheduled for December 24] on time.”

Europe has recently shown interest in the upcoming elections in Libya. Last month, the Libyan High National Electoral Commission held a meeting attended by foreign ministers from Italy, Germany, and France. The commission said the ministers “continued to support the commission in carrying out the elections scheduled for December 24 of this year.”

On Tuesday, French Ambassador to Libya, Béatrice Le Fraper du Hellen, signed an agreement with Gerardo Noto, the resident representative of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Libya, by which

France pledged to contribute one million euros to support the UNDP project “Promoting Elections for the Libyan People,” bringing the total funds contributed by France to the said project to 1,850,000 euros. This is particularly interesting after France backed General Haftar with military support during his 2019 attempt to take over Tripoli.

In many ways, Libya presents unparalleled benefits to EU members and the ongoing EU diplomatic efforts are proof of Europe’s interest in the political upturn in this neighboring country after a decade of chaos.

To understand how deep political differences between Turkey and Egypt are at the moment, one need not look further than the different reactions to the “four-finger salute” or Rabia sign in both countries. In Egypt, this gesture is treated as a political symbol of the Muslim Brotherhood and the opposition to the current Egyptian government.

In Turkey, it brings to mind then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s gesture in 2013 to express his opposition to the military coup in Egypt and his support to the democratically elected late President Mohamed Morsi.

The hand salute became a symbol of the breaking down of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Turkey in 2013, after Egyptian President Morsi was ousted by a military coup. Since then, cold diplomatic showdowns left their place to bilateral hostility and resulted in the two countries expelling each other’s ambassadors.

Politically, President Erdoğan made use of many platforms to criticize the undemocratic government in Egypt while the Egyptian government issued several statements targeting the Turkish government. Egypt also criticized Turkey for hosting members of the Muslim Brotherhood who fled Egypt due to political persecution.

Conflicts and Rivalry

Turkey and Egypt became rivals in the region following the 2013 diplomatic standoff. When the Libyan civil war broke out, Egypt supported the Libyan National Army led by Khalifa Haftar, while Turkey backed the UN-recognized Government of National Accord in Tripoli. In the ongoing Eastern Mediterranean conflict over natural gas and maritime borders, Egypt supported Greek Cyprus against Turkey.

Egypt is considered a regional power in the Middle East and the Arab world, while Turkey is regarded as a role model for Muslim democracy in the region.

When Egypt discovered natural gas fields in the Mediterranean, it chose to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot administration. This cooperation would enhance, it was thought, the Egyptian economy, but it adversely affected Egypt’s already deteriorating relations with Turkey.

Egypt is considered a regional power in the Middle East and the Arab world, while Turkey is regarded as a role model for Muslim democracy in the region. Turkey’s increased involvement in the Middle East has had wider implications for the country. According to a report by the UNHCR in October 2020, since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Turkey has hosted approximately 3.6 million Syrian refugees.

The Egyptian government did not confirm this statement. An unnamed Egyptian official commented that “there is no such thing as resuming diplomatic contacts.” The official said that Egypt and Turkey have diplomatic ties already at the level of chargé d’affaires.

Egypt criticized Turkey and backed Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is widely believed to be behind the brutal murder of Khashoggi.

During the same speech, Çavuşoğlu emphasized Turkey’s interest in mending relations with the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, both of which are major supporters of the Sisi regime. It seems that the hostile approach by the UAE towards Turkey results from Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood – many of its supporters and leaders are based in Turkey, where they broadcast and issue statements, a move that has always angered Egypt.

When Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was murdered by Saudi operatives in Saudi Arabia’s consulate in Istanbul in 2018, Turkey revealed the facts behind the crime to the international public. Egypt criticized Turkey and backed Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is widely believed to be behind the brutal murder.

Egypt has always been a loyal ally of Saudi Arabia. In 2015, Egypt supported the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen against the Houthi rebels and boycotted Qatar in 2017 in response to the request by the Saudi-UAE political axis. Saudi Arabia has been a main actor in the Egyptian political and economic scene. Through its economic aid packages to Egypt following the military coup in 2013, Egypt’s foreign policy has come under strong Saudi influence.

The UAE supported Egypt in its war against the Muslim Brotherhood, which the Emirati and Egyptian governments view through the same lens of an alleged threat posed by political Islam. The fact that Turkey hosts anti-coup members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who fled political purge and persecution in Egypt, strains the relations between the two countries.

Win-Win Rapprochement

In a relatively softer tone, President Erdoğan has stated that relations with Egypt will be strengthened if diplomatic efforts result in positive outcomes. He stated, “Friendship between the Egyptian and Turkish peoples will not be the same as relations between the Egyptian and Greek peoples.”

Turkey is well aware of Egypt’s political importance in the Middle East. If Turkey and Egypt leave their ideological differences aside, focus on prospects of growth, and reach a reconciliation initially on their economic interests and for the stability in the region, other steps will follow suit. Turkey and Egypt can find common grounds on the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya. If the two countries normalize their relations, Turkey could be a potential importer of Egyptian natural gas through the Mediterranean.

Turkey and Egypt share the historical, centuries-long legacy of the Ottoman Empire. Whether or not they follow their mutual interests, only time can tell. Diplomatic relations between the two can’t be mended with a quick fix and ultimately actions will speak louder than words.

Egypt and Turkey broke their diplomatic relations in 2013, after a military coup ousted the late Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi. Both countries expelled each other’s ambassadors and since then, their relations have gradually worsened. President Erdoğan criticized Abdel Fattah el-Sisi for violating the emergent democracy and massacring Egyptians while Sisi criticized Erdoğan for safeguarding Muslim Brotherhood members who fled to Turkey.

Since 2013, anti-coup media channels based in Turkey such as Mekameleen TV and EL Sharq TV have been tough critics of the Sisi regime in Egypt. Aired from Istanbul, Egyptian authorities have associated these media outlets with the Muslim Brotherhood political movement and have labelled them “terrorist.” As a result, Turkey is presented in Egyptian national media platforms as an enemy state.

During a recent interview with Anadolu Agency, Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlut Çavuşoğlu, announced that some steps have been taken to resume diplomatic relations with Egypt and that neither country set preconditions to proceed. In response, Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sameh Shoukry commented by saying, “Words alone are not enough. They must be accompanied with actions. If we witness a change in Turkey’s policy, approach, and goals that are aligned with Egyptian policies, we might consider it a ground to normal relations.”

National Egyptian newspapers covered the efforts of rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey. “Turkey has approached Egypt since it is willing to remark its maritime borders. Ankara needs Cairo more than Cairo needs Ankara. Therefore, it has been ‘flirting’ with Egypt lately,” claimed Mohammed Hamed, director at the East Mediterranean Gas Forum.

Mustafa Bakri, an Egyptian journalist, explained the Turkish actions by saying, “Turkey must prove its goodwill to Egypt through practical actions. It must hand over any parties that Egypt declared to be legally involved in terrorism or violence.”

In an interview with UAE-based Sky News Arabia, Osama Abdel Aziz, an expert on Turkish affairs, said that Erdoğan surprisingly changed his strategy. Abdel Aziz stated, “Turkey has first to maintain its diplomatic relations with Egypt. It must give up on its interference in internal affairs of Arab states, specially in Libya and Iraq.”

Certain social media users in Egypt believe that Turkey focuses on its own interests but considered Turkey’s willingness to normalize relations with Egypt as a Turkish government’s recognition of the Sisi regime.

This news received a mixed reception by the public, and divided media platforms. Several public figures and media outlets claimed it was a victory for the Sisi regime against Turkey and against the Muslim Brotherhood, and that these channels would soon be completely closed down. Others argued that Egyptian media tend to exaggerate news to glorify Sisi’s regime and that this was fake news.

Egyptian State Minister of Media & Information Osama Heikal stated that “ensuring opposition channels in Istanbul follow the principles of media ethics is a good sign from the Turkish side.” Heikal went on to say that such a step would create an atmosphere conducive to discussing several issues that were subject to dispute between the two countries.

On the whole, it seems that Egyptian and Arab media outlets chose to focus on the issue of the Turkey-based Egyptian opposition channels rather than on the regional political and economic implications of a possible diplomatic reconciliation between the two countries.

Experts discussed the possibility of a peaceful transition in Libya at an online panel organized by SETA Brussels entitled “Libya’s Political Transition Process,” on February 23, 2021. Libya’s political transition process, the role of external powers, and possible future scenarios for the country were among the topics discussed.

Claudia Gazzini, an analyst at the International Crisis Group in Libya, outlined the efforts by the United Nations to create an interim government by uniting the two governments in Tripoli and Tobruk, boost dialogue, and end the ongoing civil war. Based on the current political events taking place in Libya, Gazzini was optimistic about progress in the country. She noted that “running transparent elections where candidates freely competed and accepted election results was an unprecedented step” and something new on the Libyan political scene.

During the panel, Gazzini emphasized the need to have trust in the cabinet and the House of Representatives. Rich in resources such as oil, all Libyans would benefit from a single unified authority in control of the state in the form of an elected government. Gazzini emphasized how revenues from hydrocarbon production and oil exports can be used productively by the government, once formed.

Francois Burgat, emeritus director of research at the French Center for Scientific Research and a senior research fellow, political scientist, and expert on Arab affairs, shed light on the role of external actors in Libya, especially the United Arab Emirates, and the geopolitical importance of Libya after the Arab Spring.

Sharing the optimistic view by Gazzini, Burgat focused on the UAE’s role in creating militias to fight “political Islam” as part of its years-long strategy. “The Emirates buy support and create militias to fight an enemy, whom they call ‘political Islam,’” said Burgat.

Tarek Megerisi touched on the internal dynamics of the political transition process in Libya. A heavily divided country, torn between warring governments and competing groups, does not give a positive impression for the future. Internal conflicts need to be settled for a country to progress, he stressed and continued, in Libya, reality makes it clear that having a dynamic field with several external actors leads to a relative pessimism regarding the transition.

There is a need for Libyans to organize themselves, select a representative party, and have free elections.

Murat Aslan noted that the scene in Libya is rapidly changing and evolving. The problem does not lie in forming a government, but rather in maintaining stability. This means that there is a need for Libyans to organize themselves, select a representative party, and have free elections. “Some challenges are posed by internal and external groups that might be expelled from the dialogue, which requires cautious steps while addressing the various interests of the different parties,” Aslan concluded.

When asked about the political dialogue in Libya, Gazzini reflected on the lack of common understanding among Libyans of the political process. The fact that there are representatives appointed by an external body, namely the UN, alongside the State Council and other 13 representatives, leaves Libyans without a clear road map for the coming elections. This suggests a better reconciliation of efforts to guide the country through its transition period. Certain external parties, such as Turkey and Europe, could be a great support to Libya in ensuring the proper launch of its economy.

In Burgat’s opinion, the UAE seems to be fighting its opponents rather than acting as a regional leader in the place of Egypt. “Political Islam” is a term coined  to signify “the enemy of democracy” by leaders such as Egypt’s president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi or the UAE’s Mohammed bin Zayed. They both use the term repeatedly in their speeches and come together to fight a single opponent – the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood by and large is seen as the representative of “political Islam.”

The Libyan situation has seen the involvement of different actors such as the EU, Turkey, France, Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. France might need to revise its strategy in the Middle East, especially under Emmanuel Macron, considering the tolerating of caricatures that mock Prophet Mohammed and cause offense to Muslims, and Macron decorating Sisi with the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor in 2020, despite all the allegations made against the Sisi regime and its violations of human rights.

Maybe it is time for Libyans to handle their issues internally with the help of friendly countries and bodies. In fact, it is in the country’s best interest to handle its problems on its own, without external interventions. The existence of various actors and military groups in the country might adversely affect the transition process. Do Libyans lack trust in officials appointed by external institutions such as the United Nations? The truth is that they do not trust the intentions of countries such as France which supports Haftar and Sisi – the latter being the former U.S. President Donald Trump’s “favorite dictator.” Only time will tell.

Libya recently saw the conclusion of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), a peace process under the United Nations’s (UN) auspices. Its primary outcomes were an election date, set for December 24, 2021, and a new executive authority. The composition of the latter was a widely unexpected climax. In a process outwardly reverse-engineered to facilitate one result, the winning list of four candidates did not include the projected heavyweights.

Indeed, the combination of the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) Speaker Aguila Saleh proved to be too toxic in list-form. The former had alienated some Tripoli armed groups and built rapports with adverse factions, while the latter damaged his political brand by legitimizing eastern ex-General Khalifa Haftar’s military adventures.

The winning list was not actively endorsed by LPDF delegates; it was more a case of voting against the other option, or, alternatively, “voting as veto.” Correspondingly, it was less ideology than opportunism that united the new executive authority. This can be both a boon and a bane – the former as it offers novel openings for pragmatism because this quadruplet has less baggage, and the latter as the lack of concinnity and the reliance on kickback-giving may prove to be unsustainable.

The designated Prime Minister (PM) and head of the Government of National Unity (GNU), Abdelhamid Dabaiba, is a wealthy and transactional businessman with handy experience in the construction sector. He has been angling for this position for some time, and was also part of the 2017 Misratan delegation to Moscow. His unscrupulous nature comes with drawbacks, however, as corruption allegations – he has links to his cousin Ali Dabaiba, a moneyed Gaddafi-era procurement official – and vote-buying accusations have bogged him down.

The new Presidential Council (PC) consists of three members, one for Libya’s historical three provinces. The member for Cyrenaica, and President-designate of the PC, Mohammed al-Mnefi, is from Tobruk. He markedly neither supported nor denounced Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli, and therefore how far his influence reaches in eastern Libya is still unclear.

A member of late Libyan hero Omar al-Mukhtar’s tribe, he was previously Tripoli’s ambassador to Greece, though he was expelled after the GNA’s maritime agreement with Turkey (Athens has ironically announced it intends to reopen its Libyan embassy).

Al-Mnefi recently met with Haftar in Benghazi; with accountability calls disregarded in modern-day Libya, this is a critical time for al-Mnefi to establish whether he will be the politician to demonstrate the east is not monolithic or if he will fall victim to recurrent missteps. His ambitious priorities in this 10-month preparatory period are military and institution unification, as well as national reconciliation.

The member for Tripolitania, Abdullah al-Lafi, is from Zawiya and a moderate HoR parliamentarian, while the member for Fezzan, Mossa al-Koni, is a Tuareg born in Ghadames; he was part of the HoR then the GNA’s PC before resigning in January 2017.

Considering the Saleh-Bashagha duo’s possible qualms with the executive authority’s on-paper transience had they won – candidates pledged not to run for December’s elections if selected – this result may be more propitious in the long-run. This is the silver lining; as they are permitted to run, this may make them more vested in seeing them happen.

Dabaiba’s likely balanced cabinet, which he has stated will include carrots for key constituencies and placate individuals like Bashagha, also needs the HoR’s approval. Yet, in an astute move by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (USMIL) that suggests some past lessons are being learned, if the HoR fails to grant confidence (as Saleh recently threatened and given his post-Libyan Political Agreement actions), the responsibility will be transferred to LPDF delegates.

This crystalizes the rubber stamp nature of the HoR, which has planned a preliminary session— though its circumvention might provide a pretext for prospective spoilers such as Saleh and Abdullah Thinni, PM of the east-based Interim Government. While it would also be a polarizing issue at the LPDF (given February 5’s disapproval voting dynamics and the winning ticket still only earning 53 per cent), the prospects for pragmatism increase.

Having its eggs firmly in the Haftar basket, the UAE remains to be seen whether this new status quo will prove to be satisfactory.

As ever, the response of international sponsors will be vital. Although the expected carousel of lip-service did transpire, there can be a sharp dichotomy between what is said and done vis-à-vis Libya, as the last decade has exhibited. Indeed, how Egypt responds to seeing its preferred candidate Saleh lose will be consequential.

Whereas it would have liked to retain the HoR as an excuse to safeguard its perceived interests, UNSMIL’s foresight means that option is no longer directly on the table – though the precarious constitutional process it is hosting remains available. Conversely, backing December elections in good faith could be seen as risky in Cairo as it may stand to lose considerably if they are held fairly.

Another relevant actor is the UAE and how it chooses to respond. Having its eggs firmly in the Haftar basket, it remains to be seen whether this new status quo will prove to be satisfactory. Haftar has incidentally been elevated again at the expense of Saleh, who may lose his HoR speakership to a parliamentarian with Fezzan origins. Nevertheless, strong doubts persist as to whether Haftar’s powerbroker status is merited or merely imposed by his foreign backers.

For Turkey, it will be mostly content by this outcome; it has good relations with PM-designate Dabaiba, a Misratan who gave his first interview to a Turkish outlet and called it an “ally, friend, and a brotherly state.”

For Russia, its primary interests are preserving its influence in Libya, ideally with a military installation in Sirte, Jufra, or both. Given it implausibly insists on Private Military Company Wagner’s independence from Moscow, it is expected to keep working both sides. If regular Libyans are on board is another matter – protests recently resumed in Houn, a town beside Jufra Airbase, demanding the departure of mercenaries. 

Moving forward, Libya now has a new executive authority. If the GNU is endorsed, it replaces the GNA, a government that likely could have been sufficient had it received more material support from the international community. In any case, facilitating elections in December remains the priority.

Many scholars and pundits of the MENA region are wondering why the Islamists did not take over during the massive protests known as the “Arab Spring.” This question is relevant to the extent that political Islam for many decades has been a popular movement that has threatened regimes marked by a deficit of legitimacy.

To address this issue, we need to bear in mind that the ideological references of Islamism pertain to a sort of utopia which prevented the movement from being politically efficient. Many Islamists became aware of this ideological handicap, seeking another path in order to play a role in the state institutions.

What is Islamism?

Islamism can be defined as a resistance to the inescapable secularization, or at least, an attempt to bargain the place of religion in the public sphere. Facing the social and cultural transformations of past colonization and current globalization, religious consciousness is worried about the future of Islam.

Hence the demand for the implementation of Islamic law, sharia. But this demand is not limited to the judiciary; it encompasses a worldview that dictates how the state and society should be.

In this regard, Islamism is a utopia expressing the desire for a perfect society and a fair state. The utopia is about building a social world where selfishness does not exist. For instance, in the Islamist literature of the 1980s in Algeria, including the weekly publication Al Munqid, the issue of underdevelopment was explained by mismanagement and bad economic policy.

The idea is that despite the fact that God created enough wealth, poverty is widespread and it is the result of the rulers’ corruption and selfishness. To reach this utopian goal, the state needs to be run by righteous people who fear God and who are not prone to corruption. Islamists are in search of the ideal government and the ideal leaders in a society marked by fairness.

The excessive violence in Egypt and Algeria led to a split of the movement: a mainstream approach to take over the state peacefully through the electoral process, and a minority trend supporting Al-Qaida and Daesh. It is worth noting that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt accepted to create a party (Justice and Liberty Party), meaning that by implication they saw themselves as a political party among others, while in the past they claimed to be the party of all the Egyptians.

Islamism evolved towards what is called “post-Islamism,” inspired by the Turkish experience as embodied by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

By foregoing violence to take over the state and by accepting other parties as legitimate competitors, Islamism evolved towards what is called “post-Islamism,” inspired by the Turkish experience as embodied by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Islamists took part in elections, and in some countries, they won. They won in Tunisia in 2011, and in Egypt and Morocco in 2012 following the nationwide protests.

The internet factor

The internet factor, as a societal phenomenon, reduced the influence of the Islamist discourse among young people. Multiple debates in many virtual forums gave the opportunity to oppose the Islamist views on society, women, culture, etc. There was a sort of deconsecration of the Islamist discourse with the idea that the verses of the Koran could have many different interpretations. This deconsecration was made possible by the free speech that was encouraged by anonymity on social media.

Some young people went as far as to claim to be atheists, and others questioned Muslim theology. At the university, professors and students engaged in debates questioning the religious authority of thinkers such as Al Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah.

There is a climate never seen before where people are demanding a reform of the theology inherited from the past. Students have started to read Mohamed Shahrour, Mohamed Taha, Mohammed Arkoun, among others.

Undermined by its ideological and political contradictions, Islamism failed to emerge as the dominant force to take over the state following the Arab Spring. The Islamists do not see themselves any more as the party of the nation; they have accepted to be one party among others.

In Tunisia, they backed down on issues of women and freedom of consciousness. In Morocco, they aligned with the king who kept the army and the foreign affairs under his control, despite having gained more seats in the National Assembly than any other party.

In Egypt and Algeria, certain Islamists are seeking the blessing of the military to take part in the state institutions. In Iraq, Sunni Islamism has been weakened by the excesses of violence perpetrated by Daesh. It leaves a space to Shiite groups to be more active, whether they align themselves with Tehran or not.

On October 23, a ceasefire was signed following the successful campaign by Libya’s internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) to roll back General Khalifa Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli with Turkish military help. All units are supposed to return to their camps and all foreign forces [including training crews] to leave within three months.

Registration was to begin immediately with a view to integration or demobilization. Land and air crossings are supposed to be opened and media escalation and hate speech to halt. A joint security room will form a monitoring force. The 5+5 Joint Military Committee (JMC) will develop a mechanism with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to monitor the implementation.

Signs of hope in Libya

Some real progress has been made. Despite an attack by Haftar forces on Ubari November 28, the ceasefire has generally held and exchanges of detainees have continued. Flights between Benghazi, Tripoli, Sebha, Ghat and Ubari have resumed. Oil production, almost stopped after Haftar closed most sites in January, is now back to pre-blockade levels of 1.2 million barrels per day.

While the 5+5 JMC continues to meet, political and economic negotiations are also happening. On December 7, the Central Bank of Libya held its first unified board meeting since 2014 to discuss exchange rates. UNSMIL has facilitated virtual and in-person sessions of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum [LPDF] on reforming the executive authority. Defying pro-Haftar Speaker Aguila Saleh, 127 out of 200 members of the House of Representatives met in Ghadames and agreed to choose a new speaker at their next session scheduled for December 21.

Saleh held a rival “official” session in Benghazi but less than 20 members showed up. His removal would be a blow to Haftar and his foreign backers: the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Egypt and France. Saleh has been the effective civilian face of the eastern government despite Haftar’s attempted dismissal of all civilian authorities on April 27.

All of this is largely positive. So, has the civil war come to an end? Though we hope progress will continue, we are only at the beginning of the beginning. Recent history shows how difficult the road ahead will be.

Elections in Libya can be a step forward

According to the LPDF plan, presidential and parliamentary elections should be held December 24, 2021. This would be an important step, if they take place and are reasonably free and fair. However, as we saw before, elections are not a panacea. The results must be broadly accepted. Then comes the infinitely harder and more important challenges of making laws and governing. Between now and then other major obstacles remain.

The two sides have not begun to withdraw their combatants. Addressing the LPDF on December 2, UNSMIL acting chief Stephanie Williams noted that 20,000 foreign forces still on Libyan soil besides continued hate speech and human rights abuses.

While Turkish troops remain, Haftar’s foreign allies will not want to leave if the UAE and Saudi Arabia continue to pay the bills.

Haftar began his April 2019 offensive just days before a UN supported peace conference was to start, so the GNA is unlikely to want to give up its protector. Turkey has already indicated its forces will stay as long as the internationally recognized government wants them to.

While Turkish troops remain, Haftar’s foreign allies will not want to leave if the UAE and Saudi Arabia continue to pay the bills. One option would be a reasonably robust international peacekeeping mission to monitor the ceasefire and help separate the parties.

In 2012, most combatant troops were revolutionary fighters with little formal training. With barely any regular junior officers and troops, revolutionaries did most of the work on the ground with minimal supervision.

Qaddafi left hollowed-out security institutions. Most of the officers were colonels and most of the enlisted personnel were sergeant majors – generally near retirement age. Authorities constantly squabbled among themselves. In 2012, most combatant troops were revolutionary fighters with little formal training. The old guard and the revolutionaries did not trust each other much. With barely any regular junior officers and troops, revolutionaries did most of the work on the ground with minimal supervision.

Inevitably, many became used to their entitlements and reluctant to reform. While able to come together to combat existential threats like the so-called “Islamic State” [IS or Daesh] or Haftar’s advance on Tripoli, they tend to fight amongst themselves and against the Government when not under imminent danger.

There needs to be a comprehensive plan, accepted by most, if not all, with effective coordination. Transitional mechanisms will be needed for the different formations to come under an overarching structure with a generous, unified benefits structure for pay and retirement to avoid jealousy. This is essentially what South Africa did at the end of Apartheid.

Though that country still has issues, it has avoided falling back into civil war. A professional training mission should support this transition, focusing not just on basic training but also on effective democratic governance of the security sector. Ideally, this would be an international mission with a NATO backbone since it has the infrastructure. If it is composed of only a few countries, Libyans may not trust it. Fortunately, there are some plans created in 2012-2013 that lay out a vision of what Libyan security forces could look like, so the work does not need to start from scratch.

New player or new attitude in Libya?

A major factor will be the incoming American administration. Under President Obama, the U.S. did not get engaged much until IS arrived. President Trump was even more nonchalant, particularly given his indulgence to Middle Eastern autocracies, until Russia’s Wagner Group mercenaries started showing up.

President-elect Biden has declared that he will be less permissive. A recent report by the Defense Department’s Inspector General invoking UAE funding of these fighters is a factor in bipartisan Congressional opposition to arms sales to the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. As they fight back with their impressive public relations arsenals, we will have to wait a few more months to see whether real change will come.

Disclaimer: The opinions above are those of Mr. Reid alone and do not purport to represent the United Nations.

In the past few months Luigi Di Maio, the youngest Italian Foreign Minister since Galeazzo Ciano, who served from 1936 until 1943 in the nefarious government of his father-in-law, Benito Mussolini, has been involved in rebuilding the international supply chain and reopening borders to free circulation after the country was hit hard by COVID-19. However, Di Maio’s second priority has been to protect Italy’s interests in Libya in the new scenario that emerged after Turkish intervention in favor of the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA).

Italian Foreign Policy on Libya

Irregular migration, energy and security are the three main Italian interests in Libya. Despite the diversification policies since the early 1970s, Libya still plays a relevant role in Italy’s energy policy because of the amount of oil imported, the exceptional quality of Libyan crude oil, and the Greenstream subsea gas pipeline laid by the Italian energy giant, ENI (State Hydrocarbons Authority), and opened in 2004. Moreover, for Rome, Libyan gas is probably the only reliable alternative to Russian natural gas.

As in all European countries, the issue of immigration is at the top of the political debate in Italy too. Most of the irregular migrants entering the country come from the shores of Libya. The issue has created enormous tensions domestically – just remember that the Catholic Church has pressed for a policy of open borders, but the Italian right is basing much of their populist discourse on stopping migration by all means. Irregular migration has also created significant tension at the EU level, which is refusing the modification of the Dublin Regulation.

Future perspectives

Thus, Di Maio’s priority is to provide stability in the country, to provide security, the flow of oil and natural gas, and the containment of irregular immigration. For Rome, the ideal option is to reach a political compromise between the different parts and maintain the unity of the country. However, in the present situation, where different regional and global actors have sided with opposing groups, it appears a remote option.

Turkish intervention in favor of the GNA has even reduced the chances for an Italian role and has created a situation that (from Rome’s viewpoint) resembles the first phases of the unending Syrian crisis. Consequently, Italy is now faced with a difficult choice of taking a leading role opposing Ankara or cooperating with it.

Di Maio initially attempted to reduce the GNA’s dependency on Ankara with a more active and independent role. Nevertheless, this would mean a radical shift in Italian foreign policy and unprecedented deployment of its military as well as economic resources. This is unlikely because of three constraining elements. Firstly, foreign policy choices must enjoy domestic support. The Italian media, however, continue to follow the Libyan crisis sporadically and without interest. Italian public opinion also deplores the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy, as an “enemy” is not regarded as an implacable foe that needs to be confronted with military power and, instead, can be more effectively engaged using diplomacy.

Secondly, Italian defense policy, as stated by the White Book of the Italian Ministry of Defense, is concentrated on the Euro-Atlantic geopolitical area and on the Euro-Mediterranean geopolitical area. The Euro-Atlantic security is guaranteed by NATO, EU, “common values” and strong economic and cultural ties. The Euro-Mediterranean area, however, is characterized by anarchy and suffers political and economic instability and intra-state competition. Yet, despite its relevance, it is very unlikely that the Italian Armed Forces can intervene in the Euro-Mediterranean area outside the U.S.-led mission scenario –  something that the Trump administration is not considering.

Consequently, Italy has pointed to a UN-sponsored solution to the crisis and to the reinforcement of Mission Irini, the EU military operation to enforce the arms embargo to Libya. Both efforts appear difficult in materializing when key members of the EU and permanent members of the Security Council either backed Haftar (Russia and France), who aims to destroy the GNA militarily or are uninterested in the crisis (U.S., U.K., and China).

Italy has relatively small economic resources to invest in Libya or to apply pressure. Because of the huge public debt and the poor performance of its economy, the country cannot afford big investments abroad. Private investments are also unlikely. Major companies like FIAT or UniCredit, which have been important actors of Italian foreign policy in Libya and the East Mediterranean, are now focused on the American or internal market. The only relevant economic player is ENI, which has been active in Libya since 1959 and has lobbied the Italian government extensively.

Exactly because of these three restrictions, to not lose a role in North Africa, Italy should look into a compromise with Turkey, which deployed enormous resources in Libya. However, this compromise may need brave decisions: Turkey’s image with the Italian public is particularly poor, and the Rome-Ankara alliance may damage relations with France, Greece, and Egypt. With the first two countries, there is a high level of interconnection that will not be damaged by an eventual competition in Libya. Moreover, Paris has been frequently in conflict with Rome on the issue of migration and proved highly destabilizing in Libya. Italian policymakers define Egypt as an “inescapable partner” in the Middle East. This view has been maintained even after Giulio Regeni’s brutal killing in February 2016, presumably by members of the Egyptian security apparatus, and the fact that none have been brought to justice.

At the moment Italy appears to be in a cul de sac in Libya with a young Foreign Minister who will not be able to change Italian foreign policy because he lacks strong political support; his party is in turmoil and he recently lost its leadership. Everybody hopes, though, that he will not share the young Foreign Minister Ciano’s fate, who watched powerless the decline of Italy’s power in the Mediterranean.