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o see what effects the shift of the world’s centre of gravity from the Europe-Middle East axis towards the People’s Republic of China-South Asia axis has brought about, it is sufficient to note the visits to Beijing by US President Trump and, shortly afterwards, Russian President Putin within the space of a week, and to realize that Europe was not even mentioned during these visits. We can see how Europe’s equilibrium has been disrupted by developments in Beijing through the shifting stance of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen over the course of a month.

In a speech delivered on 20 April 2028 at the 80th anniversary event of the newspaper Die Zeit, she stated: “We must succeed in uniting the European continent as a whole so that it does not fall under Russian, Turkish or Chinese influence. We must think on a larger, geopolitical scale,” Von der Leyen stated. She must have quickly realized that the so-called power she represents does not belong in the league of superpowers, neither in terms of energy, defense nor technology, as she received the necessary lesson regarding the strategic importance of Turkey-EU relations during her telephone conversation with President Erdoğan on 19 May. In fact, this fundamental lesson was the result of a series of Turkey-centered developments throughout May.

The hard mathematics of geopolitics

Looking at the sequence of events, the visit to Turkey on 11 May by Queen Mathilde of Belgium, accompanied by a large delegation of businesspeople, can be considered the first link in this chain of developments. During the visit, Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prevot, responding to questions from TRT Haber, made the following remarks that explicitly targeted the President of the European Commission, serving as proof of how the EU’s perspective on Turkey has shifted: “Of course, the European Union needs Turkey. Turkey also needs Europe. In my view, it was illogical to use a phrase that places Turkey, China and Russia on the same level, on the same platform, as stated by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. You are a stabilizing force. For this reason, we must take Turkey’s strategic role in Europe’s future security architecture into account more than ever before.”

The developments necessitating a reorientation of von der Leyen’s course did not end there. On Monday 18 May, as part of Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Germany, the third meeting of the Turkey-Germany Strategic Dialogue Mechanism was held after a 12-year hiatus. The fear of Russia and US pressure must have put Berlin in such a state that German Foreign Minister Wadephul felt compelled to make the following remarks regarding this meeting: “After many years, we have re-engaged in strategic dialogue with Turkey. We wish to devote more time to this, as we want to examine the issues in greater depth. I am pleased that we have re-engaged on this path; we have reached a new level of quality in bilateral relations.”

For Wadephul’s quest for quality to achieve its aim, he must first begin with self-criticism. For instance, he could start by addressing the covert embargoes imposed on Turkey’s submarine manufacturing and the Akkuyu nuclear power plant. Or, if he were to explain how the investigation files regarding the NSU (National Socialist Underground) terrorist organization’s murder of eight Turks were deleted on 11 November 2011 – the very day the Federal Prosecutor’s Office took over the case – we might be able to move a little closer to the desired quality in Turkey-Germany relations. To understand Germany’s real concern, it is sufficient to look at the Welt newspaper’s report, also dated 18 May. Following the US’s suspension of Tomahawk missile deliveries to Germany, Berlin is seeking a solution in the Turkish defense industry.

What is interesting is that the Berlin-Paris duo, which has favored Greece since the 1970s under the banner of Hellenic romanticism, still cannot raise its voice against Athens, which is blocking Turkey’s participation in the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program. On the contrary, the overwhelming majority of member states are now aware that this 150-billion-euro program for joint defense procurement cannot achieve its objectives without Turkey, and have adopted the approach of bypassing the Greek obstacle by entering into independent agreements with Turkey. Indeed, reports have begun to emerge in the press suggesting that France is also making moves to join this initiative. However, it has been made clear to Paris, which is attempting, on the one hand, to stir up trouble in the Caucasus and, on the other, to upset the balance in the Eastern Mediterranean to Turkey’s detriment by aligning with the Greek Cypriot administration, that cooperation with Turkey in this area is impossible.

The Berlin-Paris axis: Coming to terms with Turkey

Although Turkey’s well-intentioned appeals have failed to yield results, the shifting geopolitical balances in the world are ultimately teaching the Berlin-Paris axis that it must come to terms with Turkey. The European Union, led by Germany, has now realized that it will be on the menu in any potential global power-sharing agreement between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. What they must now do is make up for the time and money they have squandered so generously since the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1992. Furthermore, they must admit that the energy they have expended on stalling Turkey has also been in vain.

The current state of the European Union was summarized by Germany’s former Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, on 4 May 2026 during a program he attended at the Harvard Kennedy School, part of Harvard University in the US. “The US and Germany have become a nation of lawyers. Other countries can build a national railway network in 20 years. Why can’t we build an urban rail line in 20 years?” As can be seen, Scholz, unlike von der Leyen, prefers to turn the spotlight on himself rather than targeting Turkey.

I do not believe Scholz chose this phrase, ‘a country of lawyers’, by chance. This phrase reminded me of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s 1993 book *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century*, in which he served as National Security Advisor to former US President Carter. In this work, Brzezinski warned the US administration, which was intoxicated by the victory of the First Cold War, that it needed to redirect its resources towards structural reforms as a matter of urgency. Had this warning been heeded, it is certain that we would not be seeing Donald Trump in the White House today.

In his book, Zbigniew presented a 20-point list of measures that needed to be implemented for the structural reforms the US required. The tenth item on this list concerns the issue of becoming a ‘nation of lawyers’, to which Scholz also refers. Brzezinski summarizes his complaint about this situation under the heading ‘The Presence of Parasites in the Legal System’ as follows: ‘One-third of the world’s lawyers work in the US. Legal fees paid in tort cases alone amount to three per cent of the US gross domestic product. This ratio is three times higher than in the countries with which the US competes. This high ratio has a deterrent effect on investors.”

Borrell’s garden has become a jungle

Instead of investing in technology and industry, or establishing a common defence and energy policy, the European Union, which offers those living within its borders a fantasy paradise, is now at a loss as to what to do in the face of developments centred on the People’s Republic of China. Yet on 13 October 2022, Josep Borrell, then the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, addressed students at the European Union Diplomatic Academy and brazenly likened the world beyond the European Union’s borders to a wild forest.

According to Borrell, the European Union represented a well-tended garden, that is, the best political harmony humanity could achieve. However, there was a danger that the forest might invade the garden, and according to Borrell, the European Union’s gardeners should go into the forest and engage with the rest of the world. Fortunately, thanks to the inflation driven by rising energy prices over the past four years, we now have the opportunity to observe a Europe that has turned into a jungle, where the far right is constantly gaining strength, from the island of stability that is Turkey.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he developments in North Africa have had a decisive impact on the current climate of instability in Mali. In this context, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged during the Algerian civil war in the 1990s and continues to operate in the Sahel. A group of Tuareg fighters received military training under Gaddafi’s ‘Islamic Legion’ project in Libya and came to northern Mali following NATO’s 2011 operation in Libya. These fighters established the Azavad Liberation Movement (MNLA) organisation and rebelled against the Malian state. These are the most fundamental examples of this claim.

The Tuaregs, constituting around 10 per cent of Mali’s population, organised under the MNLA and demanded an autonomous state. In order to repel state forces in the north, they formed alliances with various radical organisations, including AQIM, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar Dine. In March 2012, Amadou Toumani Touré, Mali’s president at the time, was overthrown in a coup by the army, who claimed that the government was unable to quell the rebellion.

The collapse of state institutions in the north enabled the MNLA to seize strategic centres such as Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. However, a dominant group within the MNLA that embraced a secular-nationalist ideology caused a deep split within the organisation. The MNLA subsequently withdrew from the alliance because its secular-nationalist ideology was incompatible with that of the other radical groups, and the MNLA entered into armed conflict with them. Following clashes that began in Gao, the radical groups eliminated the MNLA.

Initially pursuing a secular goal of independence, the insurgency turned into a terrorist threat dominated by jihadist Salafi ideology when radical groups advanced southwards to capture cities in central Mali. Amid increasing instability, the Malian government accepted Algeria’s comprehensive peace plan and signed a peace agreement with a coalition of independence movements in the Azawad region, including the MNLA. However, excluding radical groups from this coalition has allowed them to expand their influence and spread their control towards central Mali and neighbouring countries, such as Burkina Faso and Niger.

In 2017, the Sahel branch of AQIM, Ansar Dine, the Katiba Macina Front and al-Mourabitoun merged to form Jemaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Led by the Tuareg leader Iyad Ag Ghali, JNIM pledged allegiance to the al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and the Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada following its formation. Since 2017, the organisation has increased its activities in the Sahel region, centred in Mali.

JNIM’s new strategy: Economic warfare

In landlocked Mali, which has a population of around 25 million, terrorist and violent acts that have been ongoing for over a decade reached a critical threshold in 2025. In recent months, the country has faced an intensifying siege as JNIM has cut off vital supply routes to the capital, Bamako. Moving beyond classic guerrilla tactics, JNIM has begun to target transport convoys and logistical routes, exploiting the state’s economic vulnerabilities.

In September 2025, JNIM announced a ban on fuel imports into Mali from Senegal, Mauritania, the Ivory Coast and Guinea, effectively aiming to isolate Bamako from the outside world. This embargo has led to one of the most serious crises in Mali’s history. JNIM militants have targeted fuel tankers and transport companies in the Kayes-Nioro corridor in the west of the country, destroying hundreds of tankers and cutting off the main roads connecting Mali to Mauritania and Senegal. This has effectively besieged the capital, Bamako. As a result of this economic blockade, fuel supplies to Bamako came to a standstill.

Additionally, JNIM has targeted gold and lithium mines operated by foreign investors, kidnapping foreign engineers and demanding high ransoms in exchange. The fuel blockade is part of JNIM’s evolving operational strategy, which now encompasses economic warfare. Rather than seizing the capital Bamako directly, JNIM aims to weaken the government in the eyes of the people by tightening the circle around the regime using economic tools. As a result of these attacks, the country has experienced fuel shortages, price increases, power cuts, and supply chain disruptions. These issues are having a paralyzing effect on daily life, creating both psychological and political pressure on the regime.

The governance gaps within the Malian state, coupled with the socio-economic and cultural divisions in the north and centre, have played a decisive role in JNIM’s rapid rise. The central authority’s inability to respond to the demands of rural areas in particular, coupled with the economic and social neglect of the population, has facilitated the establishment of shadow governance structures by JNIM. These structures have fuelled JNIM’s growing support and influence by forging local agreements with different sub-communities in Mali. Mali’s political turmoil in recent years has also deepened the security vacuum. Military coups in August 2020 and May 2021 brought Colonel Assimi Goita to power. Although the Goita regime promised to address security issues in the north of the country, it has not yet achieved this.

The role of international actors and failed security models

Since 2012, security measures, military operations and regional and international cooperation have played an important role in countering ongoing terrorist and violent acts by radical groups in Mali. In 2013, Mali requested assistance from France to counter the terrorist threat spreading southwards. France responded with Operation Serval in 2013. This operation later evolved into Operation Barkhane, which is centred in Chad and targets radical groups in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. It involves 3,000 personnel. This operation helped the Malian forces to recapture key cities.

However, large areas of the countryside remained outside state control, enabling armed groups to proliferate. Not only did the presence of French forces on the ground fail to end terrorism, it also led to growing resentment among the local population. Anti-French sentiment, stemming from the colonial past, fuelled a series of military coups in the region, particularly in Mali. The Goita regime expelled French and UN troops from Mali, claiming that France was violating the country’s sovereignty.

Following France’s failed military missions in Mali and its subsequent withdrawal from the region, this has presented both an opportunity and a challenge for Russia. Since 2021, the Wagner Group, a private military company with links to the Kremlin, has been operating in Mali, supporting counter-terrorism operations and internal security missions. The recapture of the symbolically important city of Kidal was initially regarded as a triumph for the Mali-Russia alliance. However, in July 2024, around 80 Russian mercenaries and 50 Malian soldiers were killed in an ambush by Tuareg rebels and JNIM near the Algerian border.

These developments demonstrate that the Malian army is facing serious challenges on the ground, despite receiving external support. Furthermore, reports that Ukraine may have shared intelligence with Tuareg forces against the Wagner Group highlight the increasingly complex and internationalised nature of the conflict in Mali. Following the death of Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin in mid-2023, the Russian presence in Mali was reorganised as the ‘African Corps’. However, Russian forces have largely withdrawn to their bases and have not succeeded in stopping radical groups from advancing across the country.

The regional security environment has deteriorated further following the 2023 coup in Niger. This has led to fragmentation within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES): a military and political alliance between Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. The AES was formed on 16 September 2023 through the Liptako-Gourma Charter. It was designed as a response to the West’s withdrawal from the region and the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS against military regimes. The AES aims to establish an alternative security architecture that is independent of Western influence and asserts ‘regional strategic autonomy’.

Since 2012, the collapse of state authority in northern Mali and the rise of radical movements have created an environment of insecurity that threatens the entire country. The Russian mercenary model, introduced as a replacement for France’s failed counter-terrorism strategy, has resulted in greater instability and increased civilian casualties, with terrorism now reaching the capital. This situation demonstrates that security crises cannot be resolved solely by military means or by relying on external actors. In the short and medium term, the most serious threat to Mali is the erosion of the state’s legitimacy and the strengthening of JNIM as an alternative authority. Mali’s return to lasting stability will only be possible through local solutions centred on inclusive governance, socio-economic development and regional cooperation.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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rench President Emmanuel Macron on Thursday urged Chinese President Xi Jinping to step up cooperation on global stability, the Ukraine conflict, and rebalancing economic ties, as the French leader began a three-day state visit to China accompanied by a high-level business delegation.

Speaking at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Macron said the current global environment made dialogue between France and China “more vital than ever,” as Europe looks to China for support in ending the war in Ukraine while Beijing seeks diplomatic leverage amid mounting trade friction with Western economies.

“I propose a positive three-fold agenda for our relations – one of geopolitical stability, economic rebalancing, and environmental sustainability,” Macron said, stressing that cooperation between Paris and Beijing was “decisive” for global peace efforts.

The French president, on his fourth state visit to China, is accompanied by senior executives from major French companies including Airbus, BNP Paribas, Schneider Electric and Alstom. Paris hopes the visit will help secure commercial agreements and strengthen France’s economic position in the world’s second-largest economy.

China seeks relief from EU tensions

Beijing, meanwhile, is aiming to ease tensions with the European Union, which has recently confronted China over heavily subsidized electric vehicles and broader concerns about economic dependence.

China views France as a key European partner at a time when Beijing is navigating economic slowdowns and heightened trade pressure from the United States following multiple rounds of tariffs imposed by Washington.

During the talks, Xi said France and China should demonstrate “the independence and strategic vision of major powers,” reaffirming Beijing’s position that Paris should maintain its autonomy in its foreign and trade policies.

He also emphasized China’s continued support for peace efforts in both Ukraine and Gaza, though analysts say major shifts in China’s stance on Ukraine remain unlikely following recent assurances of continued cooperation with Russia.

Political constraints overshadow economic hopes

While Macron arrived with strong expectations for economic breakthroughs, political realities are likely to limit major outcomes.

Beijing is expected to delay approval of a long-anticipated 500-aircraft Airbus order, reportedly as part of its strategy to retain leverage in parallel trade discussions with the U.S. China is also unlikely to lift minimum pricing restrictions on French cognac imports—restrictions introduced after the EU moved to impose tariffs on Chinese EVs in 2024.

Prospects for easing Chinese duties on EU pork imports also remain limited, with Beijing using the issue to pressure Brussels into agreeing to minimum pricing for Chinese EVs entering Europe.

Following the talks, the two sides signed 12 cooperation agreements covering investment, nuclear energy cooperation, ageing populations, and panda conservation.

Economic challenges persist

France faces mounting pressure to rebalance its trade with China, which has widened steadily in recent years. China exports roughly $45 billion in goods to France annually, much of it low-value consumer items sold through online marketplaces such as Shein. In contrast, French exports to China are valued at about $35 billion, with cosmetics, aircraft parts and alcohol among the top categories.

Macron said both countries had a role to play in developing fairer global economic rules, adding that supply-chain stability and predictability were essential.

“Our two countries have a role to play in laying out, with other partners, the foundations for rebalanced economic governance,” he said.

In an unusual diplomatic gesture, Xi is scheduled to accompany Macron to Sichuan province on Friday, an honor rarely extended to visiting foreign leaders once they leave Beijing. The move is seen by observers as a signal that China places high value on its relationship with France, despite ongoing tensions with the broader European Union.

The visit comes as the EU prepares to unveil new policies aimed at reducing reliance on Chinese manufacturing and protecting key technologies—measures likely to shape the future of EU-China relations.

As France looks to bolster its global diplomatic influence and China seeks to stabilize its international partnerships, both sides emphasized the importance of maintaining channels of communication amid a turbulent geopolitical landscape.

(Source: Reuters)

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ntil President Macron, the shortest-lived government in French history occurred a century ago during the Third Republic and lasted three days. Two months later, World War I began. Three years after that, Alexandre Ribot formed a new government and became prime minister. However, this government also lasted only six to seven months.

Sébastien Lecornu, the third prime minister that President Macron appointed in a year, broke Ribot’s record and the century-long record for both tenure and reappointment. Lecornu spent 26 days appointing his ministers and, according to calculations by the newspaper Le Monde, remained in office for 836 minutes. Furthermore, the fiasco did not end there. The former prime minister was reappointed on Friday evening before the end of the week.

Macron breaks Mitterrand’s record

In a semi-presidential system, the prime minister’s role is largely ceremonial when the president and parliamentary majority belong to the same party. However, when they belong to different parties, the prime minister gains power, which usually results in crisis and chaos. Since the 2024 Early General Elections, though, neither of these scenarios has been the case. With no party holding an absolute majority, sharp ideological divisions, and large and small parties struggling to form alliances, finding a candidate for prime minister and governing within the country’s economic conditions is challenging.

Over the past year, Macron first appointed Michel Barnier, a former European Commission member and chief Brexit negotiator. Barnier is known for his skill in uniting opposites and for his success in negotiating with the UK without causing a rift in Europe. Even Marine Le Pen approved of this choice. Considering the early general election results were announced on July 7, Barnier was a good choice. Macron selected him after two months of deliberation, and he was widely credited by almost everyone. Macron then appointed François Bayrou, the leader of a small centrist Christian democratic party that has run a presidential candidate in every election, as mayor of Pau.

To give you an idea of how well-informed Bayrou is about the world and its countries, he said the following, which would be very understandable in Turkey: “Before the start of EU accession negotiations, let’s give Ankara 20 million euros in the French National Assembly so they give up their candidacy!” He failed to win a vote of confidence after the parliamentary majority rejected his €44 billion austerity budget, and he left, just like Barnier. As for Lecornu, his government faced backlash from not only the opposition but also the president’s own party. Gabriel Attal, the president of the Renaissance Party group and former prime minister whom Macron brought into the country’s history as the youngest prime minister, lashed out at Lecornu, given his characteristics and scandals.

Conversely, when Bruno Retailleau—leader of the Republicans (LR) and Lecornu’s appointee as Minister of the Interior—also reacted, it became clear that the government would not win a vote of confidence. Thus, Macron surpassed Mitterrand’s record. Mitterrand was the Socialist president who appointed the most prime ministers in the Fifth Republic. Mitterrand appointed seven prime ministers over two 14-year terms (the presidential term was seven years at the time; now it is five), whereas Macron surpassed this number in eight years.

Causes of the economic crisis in France

Of course, there are many causes and aspects to this political and economic crisis. Beginning with the most recent and technical issue, Macron aimed to push the 2026 budget through parliament without making concessions. The most controversial item in the budget is Macron’s plan to gradually raise the retirement age from 62 to 64 for individuals born in 1968 or later. This means that individuals who were planning to retire in five years will now have to work two years longer. According to Le Figaro newspaper, if this budget is not passed, “an additional 14 billion euros will be added to the budget each year.”

Many analysts claim that the country is on the brink of financial collapse. The budget deficit exceeds 5% of GDP and is growing, and public debt has reached 3.3 trillion euros (114% of GDP). In other words, France, a G7 and EU founding member, is far from meeting the Maastricht criteria and could not join the EU today, even if it wanted to. In fact, France, the second-largest economy in the EU and the eurozone, is now considered riskier than Greece or Italy. The British press has already begun writing about worst-case scenarios, albeit somewhat exaggerated ones. According to The Independent, “France’s situation not only harms its neighbors, but also encourages the Kremlin.”

Following Lecornu’s resignation, President Macron stated that he would not engage with representatives of the Unbowed Party (LFİ) and the National Rally Party (RN), which he described as “extremist,” and invited all parliamentary parties to the Élysée Palace for consultation. The LFİ, on the far left, is the strongest left-wing party and the second-largest party in the country in terms of votes. The RN, on the far right, is the largest party in the country. Macron himself is responsible for the rise of these two parties. Although the country had already taken a sharp turn toward its current situation, Macron had one more opportunity when he took office at the Élysée Palace in 2017 as the youngest president of the Fifth Republic. During his election campaign, he had stated, “Colonialism is part of France’s history. Colonialism is a crime against humanity.”

“France must apologize,” he said, defending liberal secularism, which means freedom of belief and worship for all, rather than “secularism,” which, in his words, targets Muslims. In response to France’s century-old rhetoric, “Leave your differences at the door and meet in the Republic,” he was talking about opening the door to meeting in the Republic despite differences. With his promises regarding the economy, Europe, and foreign policy, he was perceived as a “savior” and won 66 percent of the vote against Marine Le Pen. Conversely, France in 2017 was not embarrassed by the 17 percent vote for the far-right Jean-Marie Le Pen against Chirac in 2004. The country was becoming accustomed to the far right.

Cultural racism against Muslims was prevalent on the right and left, perpetuated by the media and influential intellectuals. Incidentally, although this is not the subject of the article, it should be emphasized from the outset that this hostility cannot be explained by ISIS terrorist attacks because it has a much more serious history. As for the economic and social environment, it was bleak and troubled. In a country with alarming macroeconomic data, there was a widespread belief that powerful figures in banks and financial centers had fleeced the masses since the 2008 crisis. Additionally, many complained about certain European Union practices.

Islamophobic and extremist attitudes

Contrary to the promises made during the presidential election campaign, France, which has the highest Muslim and Jewish populations in Europe, has quickly introduced legislation that has opened the door to the most Islamophobic rhetoric in continental Europe. The president introduced the concept of “separatism” for Muslims, citing their refusal to eat pork as an example. According to the Minister of the Interior, Christophe Castaner, “having a beard, breaking the fast in a group, praying regularly, and not kissing are signs of radicalism.” France has conducted surveys with questions such as, “Have you encountered requests for separate toilets for girls and boys or for taps in toilets?” (IFOP, 12/9/2021).

The Interior Minister, Gérald Darmanin, criticized Marine Le Pen for being “too soft on Muslims.” Horrific and vulgar cartoons were displayed in government buildings. Two 10- to 11-year-old students who refused to look at the cartoons in class were taken from their homes in the early morning hours with their families and subjected to investigation. After a French brand began selling a hooded tracksuit for women wearing headscarves in its North African online store, senior politicians attacked the brand, stating, “Such a thing cannot be permitted in our civilization,” and Macron’s party spokesperson, Aurore Bergé, called for a boycott.

According to Minister of State Schiappa, “This sporting product was clearly a promotion of political Islam—proof that religion controls everything.” A unique document was published showing the transfer of anti-Muslim sentiment to the state level during Macron’s first term. Imams would swear to abide by this text, and, in their view, so would Muslims. According to the document, Muslims were considered a separate and dangerous group in relation to the French constitution and laws. For example, they had to swear not to “discriminate against sick and disabled people”! Not to mention the number of mosques and associations that were closed, or the civil society organizations that fought against Islamophobia and were shut down!

On the other hand, Macron, who was quickly described as “the president of the rich, but the richest,” introduced the “Green Tax” initiative in his first term, which imposed an additional burden of over 20 percent on the French. For many people living on the outskirts of metropolitan areas who have no choice but to drive because public transportation is unavailable and who live on 700–800 euros, the green tax initiative meant an additional 100 euros in expenses. Shortly after, the government increased the tax deduction from salaries to 37%, while simultaneously granting tax breaks to large companies, abolishing the wealth tax, and implementing legal changes that made it easier to lay off workers.

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t the United Nations General Assembly, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that his country recognized Palestine as a state. This announcement raised questions about Paris’s policy toward the Gaza genocide. Is Macron pursuing a pro-Palestinian policy? Has France pursued a policy based on human rights and international law since the Gaza genocide began? How do Zionist lobbies, which are very influential throughout the Western world, affect France’s policy on Palestine? What are the main factors determining Paris’s recent policy on the Israeli issue? How do the policies of France and Germany, the two leading countries in the European Union, converge and diverge with regard to the genocide in Gaza?

First, let us review the fundamental parameters that shape France’s policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Last July, French President Macron announced at the UN General Assembly that France would recognize the Palestinian state. U.S. President Donald Trump opposed this decision and disparaged Macron and France, stating that “his words carry no weight.” Indeed, it is difficult to argue that France, which is constantly losing economic and political power and being forced to abandon its former spheres of influence, particularly in Africa, is a significant player in Middle Eastern affairs.

Paris lags far behind Washington in terms of influence in the Middle East, especially when compared to the U.S.. However, France, a G7 member and one of Europe’s two nuclear powers, carries significant weight within the EU. Aware of this, Israel and the Zionist lobby harshly criticized Macron, fearing that France’s decision to recognize Palestine would prompt other European countries to follow suit. Indeed, other Western countries followed France’s lead in recognizing Palestine, tearing down another wall built by the global Zionist structure.

The influence of the Zionist lobby

France’s ability to influence Middle Eastern politics directly is limited, but it can greatly impact European politics. One factor shaping France’s policy on Gaza is the country’s increasing political instability due to the unstoppable rise of the far right, which has weakened Macron’s administration.

Elected president as the “liberal” candidate of a broad coalition formed in 2017 to curb the rise of the far right, Macron failed to resolve France’s chronic domestic and foreign policy problems, which led to the rise of the “far left” alongside the far right in the 2024 parliamentary elections and caused him to lose his parliamentary majority. With Macron weakened in this way, he has adopted a critical stance toward Israel, considering the mounting protests in France against the Gaza genocide. The decision to recognize Palestine is also a product of this critical approach.

Despite the growing criticism of Israel’s genocidal policies, France has refrained from imposing sanctions that would force Israel to back down. Compared to other EU countries, such as Spain and Ireland, France’s criticism of Israel is more cautious. This can be explained by the influence of Zionist lobbies on French politics. There is no doubt that France, home to the largest Jewish population in Europe, is strongly influenced by Zionist lobbies, both within its borders and in the United States.

Recalling how these lobbies use economic and political tools, media under their control, and other illegal methods against administrations unwilling to cooperate with Israel makes it clear why Paris refrains from taking steps that would upset Israel greatly. From this perspective, it is evident that the Macron administration in France, a country with the largest Muslim and Jewish diaspora populations in Europe, is pursuing a balanced policy, striving not to upset either diaspora too much.

Differences with Germany

In this respect, it should be noted that France differs from Germany, another important EU country. While Germany refuses to recognize the State of Palestine, France has decided to do so. While Germany opposes the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) arrest warrant for Netanyahu, and its chancellor, Friedrich Merz, has stated that Netanyahu would not be arrested if he visited Germany, France has supported the ICC’s decision. While Germany continues to send weapons to Israel until mid-2025, thereby becoming complicit in genocide, French President Macron called for an arms embargo on Israel on October 6, 2024.

While Germany continued to defend Israel’s civilian massacres in Gaza under the guise of “Israel’s right to defend itself,” France began to criticize these massacres. For example, at the EU summit held at the end of October, when the Israeli genocide began, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated that Germany was “in solidarity with Israel,” while French President Macron criticized Israeli policy, saying, “We believe that a comprehensive blockade, indiscriminate bombing, and more importantly, a large-scale ground operation are not appropriate ways to adequately protect the civilian population.”

At various times, Macron has called for Israel to stop bombing Gaza, refrain from killing civilians, not forcibly displace Gazans, not obstruct humanitarian aid, and secure a ceasefire. He has also described Israel’s human rights violations in Gaza as “shameful.”

Attitudes towards France

France’s critical stance toward Israel has seriously damaged relations between the Macron and Netanyahu administrations. It has also caused tension in France’s relations with countries that support Israel, notably the U.S. and Germany. For instance, U.S. Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee criticized Macron’s decision to recognize a Palestinian state, saying, “If France is so determined to see a Palestinian state, I have a suggestion: Take a piece of the Côte d’Azur and establish a Palestinian state there.”

Armin Laschet, a member of the ruling CDU party in Germany and chairman of the federal parliament’s foreign affairs committee, also expressed discomfort with Macron’s “unilateral” decision.

In response to France’s criticism of Israel’s aggression, the harshest statements came from Netanyahu’s administration. Netanyahu claimed that Macron’s criticism of Israel meant he was “supporting Hamas” and said that the French president’s policy meant he “chose to side with terrorism,” showing his intolerance of criticism of Israel’s policy of massacring Palestinians in Gaza. Tel Aviv’s intolerance of France’s critical stance was evident in November 2023 when French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot was beaten and arrested by Israeli security forces while visiting a church in Jerusalem during his visit to Israel.

Does France respect international law on Gaza?

Do the criticisms of France’s stance on Israel’s genocide in Gaza show that, as a member of the UN Security Council, France has pursued a policy respectful of international law and human rights? Has France done its part to prevent this genocide? The answer is clearly no. On October 16, 2023, France, alongside the United States and the United Kingdom, rejected the Security Council draft resolution proposed by Russia, which called for a ceasefire in Gaza. By doing so, they effectively voted in favor of allowing the massacres to continue. Subsequent votes in favor of ceasefire resolutions (except for October 25, 2023) do not mitigate Paris’ guilt but set it apart from the United States, which vetoed all ceasefire resolutions.

Another criticism of France’s policy on the Gaza genocide is the bans on demonstrations in support of Palestine and the police’s violent arrests of demonstrators during these demonstrations. Additionally, the French administration detained and deported Gassan Abu Sitta, a British surgeon of Palestinian origin and rector of the University of Glasgow, at the Paris airport in May 2024 when he arrived for a conference. Germany is claimed to be behind this decision. This is another example of France’s restrictions on activities in support of Palestine.

The greatest criticism of France’s policy regarding the Gaza genocide is that it has either turned a blind eye to or been complicit in the EU’s support of Israel’s long-standing aggression, despite France being a key leader of the EU. France’s greatest failure in not convincing Berlin to change this misguided policy is its failure to adopt effective sanctions against Israel under the EU umbrella for two years and its unconditional continuation of support for the Netanyahu administration, as the EU’s most important leadership partner. France was also very late in recognizing the Palestinian state and in taking action to prevent the Gaza genocide from taking place before the eyes of the world. It is still failing to take the necessary steps.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

F

rance’s outgoing Prime Minister Sebastien Lecornu began two days of emergency consultations on Tuesday in a last-ditch attempt to resolve the country’s escalating political crisis, just a day after tendering his resignation following the collapse of his government — the shortest-lived administration in modern French history.

President Emmanuel Macron tasked Lecornu with leading the talks amid mounting confusion, frustration, and criticism from across the political spectrum. The 39-year-old former defence minister, long seen as one of Macron’s closest allies, will meet party leaders and parliamentary heads in a bid to find a viable path forward for the deeply divided National Assembly.

The president has set a Wednesday evening deadline for Lecornu to report back, but even Macron’s supporters have privately expressed doubts about whether the discussions will yield any breakthrough.

“Like many French people, I do not understand the president’s decisions anymore,” said centrist lawmaker and former prime minister Gabriel Attal, voicing a sentiment echoed by many across the political class.

Resignation after record-short government

Lecornu’s resignation on Monday morning capped an extraordinary 24 hours in French politics. His cabinet, announced only the night before, was swiftly rejected by both allies and opponents, leaving Macron’s government adrift and underlining the paralysis that has gripped France since last year’s snap parliamentary elections.

The move left Macron without an effective prime minister — the third to step down since June 2024 — and reinforced perceptions of a president struggling to govern amid an unprecedented political stalemate.

Lecornu, standing on the steps of Hotel Matignon after submitting his resignation, said he would “continue to serve France as the president requests,” but did not elaborate on the scope of his new mandate.

Macron under pressure

The latest political turmoil represents the gravest challenge yet to Macron’s authority since the creation of the Fifth Republic in 1958. France’s semi-presidential system was designed to ensure stability through a strong presidency backed by a clear parliamentary majority. That system has now been upended.

Macron’s decision to dissolve parliament last year — after the far-right National Rally (RN) scored historic gains in European elections — produced a fractured National Assembly with no single party commanding a majority. The result has left Macron’s centrist Renaissance party reliant on fragile alliances and procedural maneuvers to pass legislation.

Since then, efforts to forge a governing coalition have repeatedly failed, and Macron’s opponents — from both the left and right — have seized on the chaos to accuse him of eroding France’s democratic institutions.

The president’s latest attempt to install Lecornu as prime minister was meant to restore order, but the swift rejection of his government instead deepened the perception of drift.

Uncertain mandate, limited options

What exactly Lecornu can achieve in two days of talks remains unclear. His schedule on Tuesday included meetings with Gerard Larcher, the conservative president of the Senate; Yael Braun-Pivet, head of the National Assembly; and representatives from Les Républicains (LR), the Socialists, the Greens, and the far-right National Rally.

But there is no clear consensus among parties about the way forward. The left-wing New Popular Front (NFP) coalition, which emerged as the largest bloc after the 2024 elections, has called on Macron to name a prime minister from its ranks — a demand the president has consistently resisted.

A leftist government would likely seek to roll back Macron’s flagship pension reform and alter tax and immigration policies, moves that would reverse much of his second-term agenda. Macron has so far refused to yield to that pressure, arguing that the NFP lacks the cohesion needed to govern effectively.

Opposition leaders have instead urged Macron to either dissolve parliament again or resign — both options the president has firmly ruled out. His term runs until 2027, and under the French Constitution, he cannot seek a third.

“France is stuck in a constitutional deadlock,” said political scientist Dominique Reynié of Sciences Po Paris. “The president refuses to compromise, the opposition refuses to cooperate, and the public has lost patience. The danger is paralysis — or populist revolt.”

Business leaders voice alarm

The crisis has rattled not only the political establishment but also the country’s economic stakeholders. The head of France’s leading employers’ federation, Medef, warned that prolonged uncertainty could further weaken investor confidence and damage growth.

“We are witnessing a political spectacle that saddens us,” said Patrick Martin, president of Medef, in an interview with Franceinfo radio. “This crisis adds to the concern that already existed within our ranks. We call for responsibility from all political players.”

The French economy has shown resilience in recent quarters but remains vulnerable to slowing European demand, high public debt, and labour unrest. Analysts warn that continued gridlock in Paris could derail key reforms and complicate the 2026 budget process.

An eroding presidency

Macron’s approval ratings have fallen sharply amid perceptions that he has become increasingly isolated and erratic in his decision-making. The president, who once promised to rejuvenate French politics with centrist pragmatism, now faces accusations of arrogance and detachment.

Lecornu, though still loyal, has also become a symbol of Macron’s narrowing circle of trusted allies. A former defense minister and widely regarded as competent and loyal, Lecornu was expected to steady the government. Instead, his 24-hour administration has become a political embarrassment.

For now, Macron’s immediate goal is to prevent the crisis from spiraling further. Lecornu’s talks are seen as a temporary measure to “buy time” before a new prime minister is appointed — possibly even Lecornu again, though that would likely trigger further backlash.

“Macron is trapped between his refusal to empower the left and his inability to govern alone,” said Reynié. “Every move risks deepening the divide rather than resolving it.”

The European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) is the latest step taken against the spiral of mistrust that emerged with the Russia-Ukraine war. The project was launched under the leadership of Germany, whose defense weaknesses have been on the agenda since the start of war in February 2022, drawing attention to its poor combat readiness and lack of basic military equipment.

Despite frequent warnings since the beginning of the war to increase ammunition production in European countries and to invest more in air and missile defense, European defense industry production has fallen further behind Russia. Meanwhile, as Russia shifted to a form of war economy, it significantly increased its production rate, further exacerbating insecurity in Europe.

Moreover, increased drone and missile strikes behind the front lines, intense attacks on critical infrastructure, and Russian missiles falling within NATO’s borders have put the need for air and missile defense in Europe back on the agenda. The ESSI is therefore expected not only to reduce vulnerability in this area, but also to encourage an overall increase in military spending on the continent and the development of a common understanding of defense.

The project aims to establish a layered air and missile defense network through the joint procurement and operation of the German Iris-T, American Patriot and Israeli Arrow-3 defense systems, thereby creating a cost-effective and interoperable network.

Why ISSI Is Needed for European Security?

Two fundamental challenges have played a driving role in the emergence of ESSI. The first is the fact that the development of missile and unmanned systems technology, as seen in recent conflicts and the war in Ukraine, could extend warfare behind the front lines.

The increasing use of large numbers of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which can be quickly and inexpensively produced and act as “missiles” with a saturation effect on air defense systems (neutralizing technologically superior enemy systems through numerical superiority), has reemphasized the importance of a multi-layered air and missile defense architecture.

Can ESSI Succeed?

The project is unlikely to succeed for a number of reasons. So far, the continent has failed to adopt a common position on security, defense and foreign policy. Although the project has been on the agenda for about a year and a half, no serious progress has been made except for the recruitment of new members due to the high cost of the systems to be procured. In addition, Germany and France have different approaches to war and common defense. All this inevitably puts the future of ESSI in a stalemate.

In the aftermath of the Ukraine war, France has become more emphatic about European strategic autonomy and the development of the European defense industrial ecosystem. However, it is noteworthy that the delays in the new generation aircraft and tank projects with Germany cannot be overcome.

French President Emmanuel Macron’s contradictory statements since the beginning of the war and his inability to find common ground with German Chancellor Scholz make it even more difficult to develop common policies, a situation that was recently repeated during the debate on the possible deployment of troops in Ukraine.

France’s refusal to participate in the ESSI, and even its frequent open criticism of the initiative, is one of the incompatibilities demonstrated by these differences. France considers the ESSI to be a project that will damage the Union’s defense industrial ecosystem, as it provides for the procurement of weapons systems from outside the EU.

It is worth recalling that France, along with Greece and Southern Cyprus, vetoed the delivery of urgently needed 155mm ammunition and unmanned systems to Ukraine from outside the EU.

We know that the ESSI is not a new concept, dating back to August 2022. The lack of a tangible outcome of the initiative, despite the long time that has passed and the rapid expansion of Russia’s capabilities, indicates that Europe has not overcome its traditional sluggishness when it comes to defense projects.

Despite the announcement of large defense budgets by many European countries, especially Germany, the extent to which these will be translated into reality and military modernization is a big question mark.

While the launch and success of an initiative like ESSI would be highly desirable for European security, the current picture suggests that it will not be easy to achieve. Even if successful, ESSI will only address a small part of Europe’s defense vulnerabilities, as most countries lack sufficient offensive capabilities to provide a deterrent.

While ESSI is an attractive idea, Europe must make a fundamental shift in its defense policy which is abandoning free riding under American security guarantees and developing its own defense. While France and the United Kingdom have the self-confidence that comes with having nuclear weapons, it will not be easy for other countries on the continent to undertake serious defense projects unless their dependence on the United States changes. This has also been the main criticism of Donald Trump, who is running for re-election in the US presidential elections.

Turkey, on the other hand, has signaled that it wants to maintain its participation in the European defense and security architecture by joining this initiative alongside Greece, just as it did with its NATO membership. Turkey does not currently have a procurement agenda for an external missile defense system. However, the goal is to increase the interoperability of Turkish systems with their European counterparts and, in the long term, to include Turkish defense industry products among the systems to be procured under the ESSI project although the latter goal is likely to face significant obstacles.

I

n a move to address rising tensions, Russia has formally requested a United Nations Security Council meeting to discuss French President Emmanuel Macron’s proposal to deploy NATO troops to Ukraine. Moscow expressed the need for further clarification on ideas that could potentially lead to the onset of a Third World War.

Dmitry Polyansky, Russia’s deputy Permanent Representative to the UN Security Council, emphasized the importance of understanding Macron’s offer during the meeting in New York. On February 27, Macron had confirmed his willingness to send troops to Ukraine, contingent on NATO consensus. He added that the decision to deploy ground forces had not been officially agreed upon but remained a possibility if Russia advanced towards Kyiv or Odesa.

Polyansky highlighted the necessity of addressing leaked conversations among German Air Force officers discussing the supply of Taurus missiles to Ukraine. Additionally, media reports suggesting the deployment of a network of spy bases by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) near the Russian border raised concerns.

Leaked discussions

“In connection with a conversation leaked to the media by high-ranking German military officials who talked about how to help Ukrainians destroy the Kerch Bridge in Crimea and strike deep into Russian territory, it would be interesting to hear a comment,” Polyansky stated.

Leaked discussions involving German Air Force officers regarding the potential supply of Taurus missiles to Ukraine led to criticism of the German government. The New York Times reported on February 27 that the CIA had trained and equipped Ukrainian intelligence officers over the past eight years in underground bunkers, including some near Ukraine’s forests.

Addressing the recent incident in Odesa, Polyansky clarified that the target was a workshop for assembling naval drones using parts delivered from the UK. He dismissed any suggestion of plans to remove Ukrainian President Zelenskyy through such actions.

A strike on Odesa

The Greek media reported an explosion in Odesa on Wednesday, just before a scheduled meeting between Ukrainian President Zelenskyy and Greek Prime Minister Kiriakos Mitsotakis. The Russian Defense Ministry confirmed a strike on Odesa, targeting a water drone warehouse.

As tensions escalate, the UN Security Council meeting is expected to provide a forum for discussions on the evolving situation in Ukraine and the potential ramifications of Macron’s troop deployment proposal. The international community will closely monitor diplomatic efforts to navigate through these delicate geopolitical challenges.

Source: Anadolu Agency

W

hen Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan asked Emmanuel Macron “Are you in a good mood?” during a casual conversation at the COP28 Climate Summit in Dubai, the French president replied, “I feel energetic.” He even ran to the podium as if to show how energetic he was. But everyone knows that Macron is not in a good mood.

While people of all religions and races from all over the world were demonstrating in the streets against Israel, the French president not only gave Tel Aviv his strong and unconditional support, but also came up with a brilliant solution that no one had thought of and proposed it during his visit to Israel: “The international coalition against Daesh can also fight against Hamas,” he proposed.

The French Foreign Ministry ignored the statement, a group of diplomats wrote a letter to the ministry marked confidential and reacted, the Élysée Palace issued a statement and tried to explain, but it was obvious that Macron thought of Daesh as soon as he saw the words Hamas, Jihad, and terrorism side by side!

The French president had thought that the whole world, including the Muslim countries, would side with Israel, which was committing massacres in Gaza, and fight as one against Hamas. Of course, this was beyond even Netanyahu’s imagination! In the post-truth era, the Israeli prime minister, who has been trying to manipulate the Western states that have been spreading “Islam equals terrorist” propaganda morning and night for decades, has been formulating “his war” with the same rhetoric since day one. But, as Netanyahu knows the world better than Macron, he stated, “This is Europe’s war. This is America’s war. If we don’t win now, you will be next.” And they came running—except for Spain.

Just a few months after his election in 2017, Macron was the first French president to declare that anti-Zionism is a form of anti-Semitism and described Netanyahu as a “friend.” Colonial France and colonial Israel once again appeared side by side in the same picture. Subsequently, since his first presidency, Macron has introduced the most Islamophobic legislation in Europe, leaving no breathing space for Muslims in a country occupied by cultural racist discourses.

After October 7, pro-Palestinian demonstrations, boycott campaigns against Israel, and anti-Israel protests were banned in Macron’s France, the country with the largest Muslim and Jewish populations in Europe. However, recruiting soldiers for Israel and raising money for the Israeli army in synagogues were not banned, and French-Israelis with dual passports who went to fight on the Israeli front were presented on television as “brave, courageous, and noble” people.

Macron has thus given Israel every opportunity to delegitimize its political enemies, directly or indirectly, to hide its occupation and massacres, and to present Israel to the French public as a “victim of radical Islamic fanaticism.” While members of the government and parliament engaged in all sorts of polemics with politicians from the radical left-wing La France Insoumise (LFI) party, which is the strongest opposition to Israel in the country, they did not react to Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Galant’s description of Gazans as “human animals,” nor to Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s religiously motivated horrific statement, which he made during a press conference on October 28, 2023. Netanyahu stated, “You must remember what Amalek has done to you, says our Holy Bible. I Samuel 15:3-4 ‘Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass’.”

On the French news channel LCI, David Pujadas’s comments in favor of the Israeli position that if Hamas is a terrorist organization, then all Gazans are terrorists, were not a problem. But when the Israeli army spokesman was interviewed on TV 5, the French state channel, after the spokesman’s statement that “Hamas kills civilians,” the journalist Mohamed Kaci said, “You also kill civilians. Then, are you acting like Hamas?” to which the army spokesman fiercely replied, “These words are an attack on the state of Israel.” The journalist thanked him, ending the broadcast. Then, all hell broke loose: First, the channel issued a written statement declaring that Kaci “did not act in accordance with the rules of journalism” and “the organization deeply regrets” it. A day later, Kaci was fired.

Being critical of Israel and expressing anger against Israel have become a marginal choice in France. Taking a stand against Israel and publicizing the tragedy in Gaza have been left to social media platforms and media websites that are against the dominance of the mainstream media.

Obviously, these policies and practices are not in favor or in the best interest of either French Muslims or French Jews living in France today. In fact, as early as 2020, Turkish President Erdoğan suggested that the French president might have lost his mind, saying, “What else can one call a head of state who does not recognize freedom of faith and freedom of belief and who treats millions of people of different faiths living in his own country in such a way?”

A month later, on November 10, 2023, Macron did a U-turn. In an interview with the BBC this time, he attacked Israel directly. “Baby-killer,” he called Israel, the country he had called on the world to fight for two weeks earlier. “Children, women, and the elderly are being bombed and killed. There is no explanation for this and it is unacceptable.” The same evening, he made another U-turn. He called Israeli President Herzog and said he “does not have the intention and will not accuse Israel of deliberately harming civilians in its operation against the Hamas terrorist organization.” He added, “I unconditionally support the state of Israel and your right to defend yourselves.”

In a statement, the Israeli presidency said that during this apparently long apology meeting, Herzog reminded Macron of the offer he made two weeks before to form a coalition against Hamas like the one against Daesh. All this is of little consequence, though. After all, the French president made this offer two weeks before, and a few hours later, in Ramallah, he had said that “the life of a Palestinian is worth the life of a Frenchman, who is worth the life of an Israeli”!

Macron then embarked on a new move ahead of COP28: he wanted to bring together the leaders of the countries in the region, from Egypt to Jordan to Qatar, and hold a roundtable. He, in fact, mobilized two of his ministers for this organization. However, the roundtable did not take place and not even a statement of unavailability was issued by any of the parties mentioned.

According to newspaper reports, Macron, who was due to visit Saudi Arabia after COP28, “canceled his visit at the last minute because he had planned to meet Mohammed bin Salman in Dubai anyway.” Le Monde reported, “Since the Crown Prince canceled his visit to Dubai at the last minute, he was not able to meet him either. This picture at COP28 gives an idea of how difficult it will be for France to engage in dialogue with Arab leaders in the post-October 7 climate.”

No wonder President Erdoğan, the only NATO leader to openly say that Israel is committing war crimes, asked Macron, “How are you feeling?” President Macron, though, wasn’t content with just saying “I’m in good spirits” in response; he added, “We can work together on humanitarian issues.” This brief conversation with Erdoğan that was the only message about Israel-Gaza in the tweets from COP28.

T

he Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry announced it has summoned envoys from the United States, Germany, and France over allegations of their countries’ involvement in the “illegal financing operations” of a local media outlet, Abzas Media. The ministry contends that these actions constitute a violation of Azerbaijani law and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

During the meetings, Azerbaijan expressed “serious objection” to the financial interactions between the Abzas Media news portal and organizations registered in the aforementioned countries, specifically naming the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), FreedomNow, and the New Democracy Fund. According to the Foreign Ministry, these entities have illicitly transferred financial resources to support the activities of Abzas Media.

The Azerbaijani statement emphasized that under national law, the financing of local media by foreign individuals, legal entities, or state institutions is prohibited. The ministry also accused the embassies of the U.S., Germany, and France of engaging in activities that interfere with the internal affairs of Azerbaijan.

National sovereignty and foreign engagement

Azerbaijan has made it clear that it condemns these alleged activities and reserves the right to respond with appropriate measures in line with its national legislation. This situation underscores the tension between national sovereignty and foreign engagement, particularly in the realm of media and information.

Abzas Media has spotlighted the tension between media freedom and a nation’s control over its financial affairs. The case of Abzas Media underscores a broader debate about the extent to which Western nations should be involved in promoting “free” press. Baku views the western funding of media outlets as a violation of their financial sovereignty and an unwelcome intrusion into their domestic affairs.

The response from the embassies involved in these allegations, and the subsequent steps by the Azerbaijani government, will be closely watched. These developments could have significant implications for diplomatic relations.

The U.S. and France’s humanitarian and diplomatic backing for Armenia has been met with disapproval from Baku, with Azerbaijani officials claiming that such actions have “seriously damaged” the bilateral relationship. channel Kanal 13, on unrelated charges of unauthorized construction.

Giorgi Gogia, the associate Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch, strongly condemned the actions of the Azerbaijani authorities, describing them as part of a “longstanding pattern” of pursuing punitive criminal charges against critics.

Source: Anadolu Agency and Human Rights Watch.

A

zerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has leveled serious accusations against France, suggesting the European nation is actively destabilizing the South Caucasus. Speaking at the international conference on “Decolonization: Women’s Empowerment and Development,” on November 21, President Aliyev did not mince words, asserting that France’s support for separatist groups and military assistance to Armenia are actions that could provoke new conflicts in the region.

In his address, the Azerbaijani leader criticized France for its neocolonial approach, alleging that it has been instrumental in fueling separatist sentiments. He claimed that France’s policies are reminiscent of its colonial past and that instead of contributing to peace, it is preparing “the ground for the start of new wars in our region.”

President Aliyev accused France of leveraging its position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to advance biased and prejudiced policies. He also claimed that France is engaging in geopolitical machinations across various regions, attempting to manipulate Western organizations to exert pressure on other states.

The Nagorno-Karabakh region

The remarks come amid a backdrop of historical grievances and recent military clashes in the Nagorno-Karabakh region. The Azerbaijani leader’s comments reflect deep-seated tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which have been exacerbated by external involvement.

Aliyev’s allegations extend beyond regional politics, touching on France’s broader historical legacy. He suggested that instead of addressing its colonial past marked by “bloody crimes,” France continues to engage in what he termed “fictitious ethnic cleansing” narratives in other countries.

The President’s harsh rebuke indicates a sharp deterioration in relations between Azerbaijan and France. It also highlights the complexities of the South Caucasus, where historical disputes, international diplomacy, and the struggle for regional influence continue to pose significant challenges.

A victim of historical injustices perpetuated by colonial powers

The conference, attended by international delegates, provided a platform for President Aliyev to voice his concerns and position Azerbaijan as a victim of historical injustices perpetuated by colonial powers. The gathering focused on the role of women in development but was overshadowed by the strong political statements from the host country’s leader.

The French government has not yet responded to President Aliyev’s accusations, and it remains to be seen how this diplomatic spat will unfold. The European Union, of which France is a key member, has been keenly interested in the stability of the South Caucasus, a region fraught with territorial disputes and ethnic tensions.

As the chair of the upcoming 2026 ASEAN conference, the Philippines has expressed concerns about the conflict, highlighting the broader international implications of the ongoing tensions.

Source: Anadolu Agency

In a groundbreaking move, Germany, France, and Italy have reached an accord on the future regulatory approach to artificial intelligence (AI), as per a joint document reviewed by Reuters. This consensus is a pivotal moment that is likely to hasten the ongoing policy discussions at the European Union level regarding AI governance.

The joint paper delineates a framework emphasizing “mandatory self-regulation through codes of conduct” specific to foundational AI models. These models, which are critical to generating diverse AI outputs, will now be subject to a new regulatory regime that focuses on their application rather than on the technology per se.

Amidst active dialogue among the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the EU Council, this tri-nation agreement marks a significant stride towards a unified EU stance on AI. The document outlines the introduction of “model cards” — detailed descriptions provided by developers that clarify a machine learning model’s capabilities and limitations, rooted in the best practices of the AI development community.

An AI governance body

A novel feature of the proposed regulatory framework is the establishment of an AI governance body. Tasked with formulating guidelines and ensuring compliance with model card standards, this body will play a crucial role in overseeing the responsible deployment of AI technologies.

In a move supportive of innovation, the agreement initially recommends against the immediate imposition of sanctions. However, it does propose the eventual creation of a sanctions mechanism to address persistent violations of the established code of conduct.

Germany’s Economy Ministry, alongside the Ministry of Digital Affairs, has taken a leadership role in the discussions, advocating for regulatory measures that focus on AI’s application rather than the underlying technology itself. Digital Affairs Minister Volker Wissing lauded the agreement, stressing the importance of regulating AI applications to ensure Europe’s competitiveness in the global AI market.

Delicate balance needed

Economic Affairs State Secretary Franziska Brantner expressed the delicate balance needed between capitalizing on AI’s potential and curtailing its risks, especially in an area that is still navigating uncharted legal territory.

This trilateral consensus comes at a critical juncture as global governments increasingly prioritize AI, with Britain hosting its inaugural AI safety summit just last month. Germany is also set to host a digital summit in the city of Jena, which is expected to gather political, business, and academic thought leaders to further delve into AI and its broader implications.

The agreement will likely influence upcoming discussions when German and Italian officials meet in Berlin for talks later this week, with AI regulation undoubtedly a key agenda item. The collaborative stance of Germany, France, and Italy signifies a concerted effort to steer AI development in a direction that is innovative yet ethically sound and well-regulated.

Sources: Reuters and CNBC

T

he war that broke out in April between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia has killed and displaced thousands of Sudanese, in addition to massive destruction in buildings and infrastructure, with many fearing the whole country could descend into a full-scale civil war.

While some international powers and countries are choosing to remain neutral, France, with its long-term interest in Sudan and the region, should pick a side and push for the militia to be defeated and removed from the scene.

The RSF was formed in 2013 by restructuring the notorious Janjaweed militia with the goal of backing up the counterinsurgency operations in Darfur and South Kordofan. In 2017, the Sudanese parliament passed a law that organized and legitimized the militia’s activities. Several independent reports have exposed the militia’s countless crimes and atrocities, including destroying villages, killing protestors, sexual violations and rape, and unlawful detention, in addition to targeting hospitals and churches and ethnic cleansing during the ongoing war.

France’s role in Sudan

France’s role, hitherto, has been confined to successfully evacuating Western citizens from Sudan, providing humanitarian assistance to the Sudanese and refugees in the neighboring countries, and condemning the war violations in general.

In a preemptive step to any reversal in France’s stance, the RSF militia launched a campaign targeting French leaders and society. The militia sent a political advisor to France to conceal its crimes against civilians, and bribe journalists and TV producers to polish the militia’s leader image as a European ally and the savior of Sudan from Islamists. Moreover, the militia reportedly hired a French PR company to help in its campaign.

Four main practical and moral reasons, analyzed below, should prompt France out of neutrality and make it pick the side of defeating the RSF militia.

Why France should stop being neutral in Sudan

First, the militia’s expansion in neighboring African countries comes at the cost of France’s historical political interest. For instance, most recently, news reports have exposed the fact that before the war the militia was receiving military support supplied via the eastern borders of Chad. Meanwhile an RSF leader has boasted about his intervention to block a coup in the Central African Republic, and UN reports have reported that the RSF has funneled arms into the country.

Second, this expansion also means more influence for Russia and the Wagner group, which is now supplying the militia with surface-to-air missiles in exchange for smuggled Sudanese gold. France is alarmed by the growing cooperation between Wagner and the RSF militia and is monitoring it closely. France needs to think strategically and never give an opportunity to Putin’s future man in the region to succeed. The RSF leader, it should be noted, has visited Russia and has defended its invasion of Ukraine.

Third, the scale of violations committed by the RSF and the destruction it has caused show that the militia leadership does not have complete control over its forces. If the RSF emerges victorious, Sudan will become a fragile state. This chaotic status, among others, will impact the supply of gum Arabic—half of the country’s production of gum Arabic is imported by France.

The RSF and the future of Sudan

Fourth, the country could also become a shelter for many terrorist groups that France is fighting in the Sahel region. This situation will also exacerbate the immigration problem at the European borders. Dagalo, the head of Rapid Support Forces, who previously threatened to overflow Europe with the influx of immigrants, will use this as a pressuring card.

Undoubtedly, dismantling the RSF will prevent the militia from committing its next massacre in Darfur and put Sudan back on the democratic transition path towards a country with one, unified national army. This is a fair demand that the militia leader not only rejected, but he threatened to take the whole country down an unknown path if he were forced to do so. This step will be another diplomatic win for France, which convened the international conference to support Sudan and assisted it with a $1.5 billion bridging loan.

France can practically engage in countering the RSF militia in many ways, such as publicly advocating the agendas to dismantle it. Now, it should move from calling for respect of the UN arms embargo in Darfur to pressuring its allies, such as Chad and the UAE, to abstain from supporting the militia or facilitating the transportation of arms and missiles. France should also motivate European countries and organizations to stop collaborating with the militia on the immigration issue and hiring its companies to provide security services.

C

ould Brigitte Macron, the wife of President Macron, secretly be a Muslim? According to Gabriel Attal, Minister of National Education and Youth, it is possible.  If Madame Macron were a teenager who tried to enter school in the long white Louis Vuitton dress she wore to the White House reception in December 2022, would she be allowed in? Or, would she be allowed to enter school in the long black dress she wore on her husband’s visit to China?

Last week, a female student wearing a hip-length black jacket and trousers was refused entry on the grounds that her outfit was “too black.”  A female student named Nasima, wearing a cotton, cream-colored tunic and trousers, was also denied entry to her school. Both female students are Muslim. So is Madame Macron secretly Muslim?

Perhaps the answer would be clear if the two moderators on the TV channel BFM TV cross-examined her like they did Nasima: “So your dress is not a religious dress for you, is it? Then, why are you wearing this outfit that is a little bit draped? If it’s fashionable, where did this trend come from? Are you wearing this slightly flowy outfit to hide your curves? Is this outfit related to your religious beliefs? Are there any non-Muslims who dress like this, and if so, can they go inside? Do you wear a headscarf outside school?”

It, thus, transpires that if Madame Macron were a teenage schoolgirl, she would have managed to prove that she was not a Muslim at the very beginning of this interrogation and she could have entered the school without any problems, taking into account her attire on other occasions.

You may be thinking, “What an absurd and stupid fictional discourse!” But I am not the one who started it. What I am trying to do is to explain, in the laconic words of Le Figaro, “the ban on the abaya, the symbol of an education system that fails to transmit the richness of reason, the joy of freedom and the pride of a common heritage.” Otherwise, thank goodness, I am sufficiently intelligent and have common sense.

At the start of the new school year, Minister of National Education and Youth Gabriel Attal announced: “I have banned long dresses for Muslim girls in schools. If you wear pants or a skirt under a short dress or tunic, that is also forbidden.” However, the actual ban would have sounded something like this: “I have banned the wearing of abaya in schools. When you step into the classroom, you should not be able to tell at a glance which religion the students belong to.”

Just like the 2004 ban on the use of large crosses, kippahs, and headscarves in schools, Muslims are the subject of the ban and are facing open discrimination, racism, and persecution. Since students wearing crosses go to private Catholic schools, and Jewish students wearing kippahs from kindergarten onwards go to private Jewish schools, it is no secret that from the very beginning the 2004 ban targeted Muslim girls attending public schools.

Now, the French state is trying to control the body of Muslim girls from head to toe! Like his predecessors, Attal does not openly say “we are practicing cultural racism or Islamophobia,” but instead proclaims “secularism is the freedom to save oneself through education.” “These garments,” he contends, “are a religious expression that tests the resistance of the Republic in schools that are supposed to be the refuge of secularism!” According to the minister, 298 students wearing tunics and long flowing dresses were identified in the first week, more than half of them changed, 67 did not and were not allowed to enter the school. France has launched a mobilization to successfully implement the ban, and starting this year, 14,000 teaching staff will be trained by the end of 2024 and 300,000 by 2025.

President Macron also commented on the ban. “It is not our intention to label,” he began, in an assessment that, because he is the president of the Republic, naturally brought his formidable “French wisdom” to the fore. “We cannot pretend that the terrorist attack or the murder of Samuel Paty did not happen,” he said, emphasizing that the French people live with a minority in French society that “challenges the Republic and secularism” and “abuses religion,” sometimes with “very bad” consequences.

Jérôme Legavre, a deputy from the far-left La France Insoumise (LFI) said, “Are these girls suspects who want to behead their teacher? What is Macron looking for? Does he want to create worse conflicts?” He presumably doesn’t want to, but if one remembers that the gap between him and his far-right rival Marine Le Pen in the 2017 presidential elections narrowed from 32 points to 17 points in the 2022 elections, one gets an idea of where France is heading.

This is how Jews, whose Frenchness is not doubted today, were targeted 80 years ago, denounced by their French neighbors, until France eventually became an accomplice to the Holocaust. Thanks to strong legal protection against anti-Semitism after the Holocaust, no one today talks about the Jews observing a kosher diet, the floor-length skirts of Jewish women, the bonnets or turbans worn by some Jewish women, the robes of Jewish men, the beards that go halfway down their chests, their kippahs, or the academics asking people to help them turn on the light switch at the university on the Sabbath. No one calls it “bondage” when religious Jewish women walk behind their husbands and greet their husbands’ friends only from a distance.

Eighty years later, Muslims are demonized with the help of the media and intellectuals through the “Law of principles strengthening respect for the values of the Republic,” the “Charter of Imams,” and the invention of so-called French Islam. Islam is portrayed as a dangerous religion in need of mass surveillance and repression, and Muslims as an existential threat to the country’s “Civilization,” “Tradition,” and “Values.” Speaking on the occasion of this latest ban, Government Spokesperson Olivier Véran said that these disguises amount to “a political attack,” but also “an act of proselytizing,” and “an act of trying to convert people to Islam.”

According to the national education minister’s formula, it will not be possible to tell what religion a student is when they walk into class—only a few minutes later, perhaps, when asked for their name, “it will be obvious who is a Muslim!” In other words, the names of Muslim students could well be defined as “offenses” as well. Indeed, far-right leader Èric Zemmour has suggested that the names of Muslims should also be frenchized. Considering that Macron’s former interior minister Gérald Darmanin criticized Marine Le Pen for being “soft on Muslims,” why not?

S

ince 2020, a trend has emerged in African politics which has seen nearly a dozen military coups or attempts take place. While some have failed, most have succeeded. Those who staged the coups claim they are freeing their countries from Western influence, namely France and the United States. Other coup leaders have referred to domestic politics and the worsening economic situation in their countries as the factors behind their coups. Most notably, there is an increasing sign of solidarity among the military regimes being formed after these coups.

For instance, the Burkina Faso and Chad military regimes threated to send armies to Niger in case of foreign intervention. Below is a list of coups and coup attempts that have taken place since 2020 in Africa in chronological order.

Mali (August 2020)

This takeover involved a group of mutinous soldiers who took control of the government. The epicenter of the coup was the the Sundiata Keita military base in Kati, a town 15 km from the capital Bamako. During the coup, key government officials, including President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, were arrested, ultimately leading to Keïta’s resignation and the dissolution of the government.

The coup was triggered by widespread protests against Keïta’s government, which had been plagued by allegations of corruption, poor governance, and an inability to tackle the country’s security problems. The protests were ongoing since June 2020 and had gradually increased in size and fervor, paving the way for the eventual coup.

The consequences of the coup were far-reaching, unsettling Mali’s stability and exacerbating its ongoing security challenges. The Malian armed forces were severely weakened by the coup.

Chad (April 2021)

A cohort of military officers, led by Mahamat Idriss Déby, the scion of the late president Idriss Déby Itno, launched a military coup. This was triggered by the death of President Déby on  April 19, 2021 who was killed while fighting rebels in the northern region of the country. The rebel group, known as the “Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT),” had launched an offensive against the government in the weeks leading up to Déby’s death.

Following Déby’s death, the military formally announced the dissolution of the government and the suspension of the constitution. Subsequently, Mahamat Déby was appointed interim president and took over the leadership of a 15-member military council.

The reverberations of this coup have caused a state of upheaval in Chad, As Chad navigates an uncertain path forward, it faces several challenges that must be resolved to pave the way for the restoration of democratic governance.

Guinea (September 2021)

Guinea’s government takeover was orchestrated by a contingent of specialized forces led by Mamady Doumbouya who seized the presidential palace in the capital, Conakry. President Alpha Condé was arrested, released, and placed under house arrest. The coup was sparked by widespread dissatisfaction with Condé’s government, due to allegations of corruption, mismanagement, and human rights abuses. The coup was also fueled by Condé’s controversial decision to amend the constitution to allow him to seek a third term in office.

A transitional government was set up in October 2021, with Doumbouya assuming the role of interim president. This government promised to organize elections within 36 months, a timetable that was met with skepticism due to the prevailing uncertainties.

The aftermath of the coup has had a destabilizing effect on Guinea.

Sudan (October 2021)

General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), seized the country’s government during a period of transitional government. The coup was triggered by internal conflicts within this government, pitting military and civilian leaders against each other. The military faction expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of the transition to democracy and argued for a greater retention of power. The civilian leaders, on the other hand, wanted a rapid transition to civilian rule.

The coup was met with widespread protests in the capital, Khartoum, which were quickly put down. The coup leaders arrested several civilian leaders, including Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, and dissolved the existing transitional government. Looking ahead,

The Gambia (December 2021)

An attempted coup d’état was led by a contingent of soldiers who stormed the State House in the capital Banjul. Although President Adama Barrow escaped unharmed, he was subsequently placed under house arrest; however, the coup failed as Barrow effectively regained power with the support of the Gambian armed forces. The leaders responsible for the coup were arrested and charged with treason.

The motivations behind the coup were complex and stemmed from factors such as the country’s ongoing political instability and the vulnerability of its military structure. The Gambia has experienced several coups and attempted coups in recent years, exposing divisions and lack of discipline within the military ranks. The coup highlighted the country’s vulnerability to political instability. The Gambia, characterized by its compact size, has a history of political turbulence, and the coup attempt served as a stark reminder of the fragility of the country’s democratic systems.

These challenges include the need to address political instability, strengthen the military, and tackle corruption.

Burkina Faso (January 2022)

A group of insurgent soldiers, on January 23, 2022, stormed the capital, Ouagadougou. In February 2022, a transitional government was formed, with Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba assuming the role of interim president.

The aftermath of the coup has had a destabilizing effect on Burkina Faso, exacerbating the country’s existing security problems. As Burkina Faso moves forward, it faces a range of challenges that must be resolved to pave the way for democracy.

Guinea-Bissau (February 2022)

The coup attempt was staged by a contingent of rebel soldiers who stormed the government palace in the capital, Bissau. Although President Umaro Sissoco Embaló escaped unharmed, several government officials were arrested. Ultimately, the coup failed and Embaló managed to regain control of the government. The leaders behind the coup were subsequently arrested and charged with treason.

The coup attempt was fueled by several factors, including the country’s ongoing political instability and the fragility of the military apparatus. Guinea-Bissau has experienced several coups and attempted coups in recent times, revealing divisions and lack of discipline within the military ranks. The coup also highlighted the country’s vulnerability to drug trafficking. Guinea-Bissau is a key transit point for cocaine from South America to Europe, and drug trafficking is believed to have played a role in instigating the coup attempt.

Many of the nation’s difficulties need to be resolved in order to promote stability and democratic government. These challenges include the need to address the country’s political volatility, strengthen its armed forces, and combat the scourge of drug trafficking.

São Tomé and Príncipe (February 2022)

On February 24 and 25, 2022, an unsuccessful coup took place on the island nation of São Tomé and Príncipe. The coup was orchestrated by four individuals, including Delfim Neves, the incumbent president of the National Assembly, and a military officer previously linked to an earlier coup attempt. The coup leaders attempted to seize control of both the military barracks and the government headquarters in the capital, São Tomé. However, their efforts were met with fierce resistance from loyal troops and they were eventually defeated.

The coup leaders were subsequently arrested and charged with treason. The São Tomé and Príncipe government condemned the coup attempt and vowed to ensure that the perpetrators would face legal consequences. The coup attempt marked a setback for democracy in São Tomé and Príncipe, a country known for its long-standing political stability. The country has never experienced a successful coup, with the events of February 2022 marking the first coup attempt since 1995.

The episode also highlighted the complexities facing São Tomé and Príncipe, an African island nation with a fledgling democracy which faces challenges of poverty, unemployment, vulnerability to corruption, and the specter of political instability. São Tomé and Príncipe’s path remains uncertain, but the nation’s commitment to democracy and the rule of law remains firm. The government has expressed its determination to strengthen the security apparatus and root out corruption. The country is also actively seeking international support to address its economic difficulties.

W

est Africa is a region that has been plagued by coups since 2020. The most recent coup was in Niger on July 26, 2023. In 1900, Niger was a military zone administered by France. In 1946, it became a French overseas territory and since 1960, it has existed as a “fully independent” state in the international system. Since independence, Niger has suffered four coups d’état and three attempted coups d’état. This has led Niger to be described as one of the most unstable countries in the international system—a development highly related to its colonial legacy.

After the coup d’état in Niger, France, the United States, the West, in general, and, in particular, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union, condemned the coup and issued statements calling for the restoration of constitutional order and democratic conditions as soon as possible. Today, it is clear from the coups that the expectations of West African societies for democracy have not been met.

The serious problems in the security architecture of West African countries cause the security gaps that unfortunately lead to coups. It is difficult for a healthy democracy to function in countries where mutual trust and security cannot be fully guaranteed; in societies where people have lost their loved ones as a result of the practices of the governments and terrorist groups that rule the country, democracy is not a priority.

Niger is one of the ten poorest countries in the world and suffers from the persistence of insecurity due to a series of security problems such as economic problems, corruption, unequal distribution of income, terrorism, insurgency, conflicts and political instability, bad governance, and internal power struggles. All these stand out as the main factors behind the coup. Struggling with terrorism for many years, Niger is unable to guarantee security and France’s lack of success in providing security and stability had led to public outcry. On the other hand, the presence of Russia’s Wagner Group, which provides relative security, leads to the appearance of Russian flags in Niger and increased Russian influence in the region.

The coup in Niger

Unfortunately, coups in the Sahel now seem to be a regular occurrence. The Niger coup was preceded by coups in Mali in August 2020, Guinea in September 2021, Chad in April 2021, and Burkina Faso on January 24, 2022. Following the coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, French soldiers from these countries moved to Niger as part of Operations Barkhane and Sabre.

Together with the soldiers who entered Niger as part of these operations, it is estimated that there are 1,500 French soldiers in the country that have been deployed for counterterrorism training, intelligence, and air support.

Led by General Abdourahamane (Omar) Tchiani and the Nigerien presidential guard, a coup d’état took place on July 26, against Niger’s President Mohammed Bazoum, who had been democratically elected in 2021 with 55.6 percent of the vote. It remains unclear at this stage how the coup will end and what direction the process will take. The coup’s chances of success may also be linked to the intervention of external actors.

Looking at the reasons for the coup in Niger, which occupies a critical position in African politics and in West Africa, the aforementioned internal reasons come to the fore. In this context, while the number of putschist generals in the Sahel is increasing, the coup plotters are using anti-French discourses to legitimize their presence. This discourse is also being used by Russia, which is seeking to expand its presence in the region through Wagner and other means.

By using anti-French rhetoric, the coup generals in the Sahel are also trying to benefit from the global competition in international relations, legitimize their presence, and consolidate their position. At the same time, they are trying to create a balanced situation by forming alliances with other countries in the region that have also been taken over by coups.

Regional implications of the coup 

The Niger coup has implications and consequences both for the country and for actors with imperialist ambitions such as France, China, and Russia. In the process, the confidence in France’s influence in the region has weakened, while regional security risks have increased.

In the aftermath of the coup, the use of the rhetoric of military intervention by ECOWAS to restore the old order can be said to reflect its efforts to prevent instability in the region and ensure regional peace. At the same time, regional actors such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Algeria, have supported the new government in Niger. They issued a joint statement opposing the possible use of force by ECOWAS and stating that they would intervene militarily if necessary. This situation could lead to divisions among the countries in the region and ECOWAS’s ability to provide a coordinated response to such events may be reduced.

Nevertheless, if ECOWAS decides to intervene militarily, conflict in the region is inevitable. In addition, the presence of Nigeria, one of the most important countries in West Africa, Algeria, another important country in North Africa, and Chad, which is not a member of ECOWAS, as key actors in the regional equation will play a crucial role in determining the direction of regional tensions.

There are two alternative approaches that hold the potential to avoid conflict in Niger: the anti-coup military and civilian groups within Niger, and the efforts of Benin and Chad through mediating roles. It is believed that the anti-coup group within the Niger military will not use force against the coup plotters so as to avoid conflict; however, it is possible that a counter-coup could emerge, perhaps if the coup group is weakened. Nevertheless, the threatening messages by coup leaders in neighboring countries are setting in motion a process that is having a significant impact on tensions in Niger and the region.

Global implications of the coup

After the coup in Niger, global competition is intense among actors such as France, the U.S., Russia, and China. France, in particular, has strong relations with West Africa; however, after the coups in Mali and Burkina Faso, it has paid more attention to Niger. The U.S., France, Germany, and Italy also have military bases in Niger. The most important of these military bases is Niger Air Base 201, a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) base, which stands out as an intelligence and surveillance center for the United States.

Niger shares a long border with Nigeria, which has significant energy reserves in the region, and instability in Niger can affect Nigeria’s security. Regional instability is undesirable given the U.S. relationship with Nigeria in the context of energy cooperation and U.S. interests in West Africa. Furthermore, the regional terrorist organization Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP) has the potential to strengthen its presence in the region by taking advantage of the possible conflict situation.

On the other hand, the energy resources in West Africa, where French companies such as Areva are active, are essential for France’s energy security. France depends on nuclear energy with nearly 70% of France’s energy needs being met by nuclear power stations. Niger, which has the seventh-largest uranium reserves in the world and the second-largest in Africa, is France’s third-largest uranium supplier. Niger supplies 19% of France’s uranium needs and exports the largest amount of uranium to France and Canada. At the same time, Niger supplies 25% of the European Union’s uranium needs.

Meanwhile, the China National Petroleum Corporation is building an oil pipeline project between Niger and Benin, most of which will pass through Niger, with a capacity of 90,000 barrels of oil per day. The coup in Niger and the stabilization of the country are therefore crucial to China’s economic interests in the region. In this context, it is also possible that China will take financial initiatives in relation to the coup. Given China’s cooperation with Russia on specific agendas, the global competition may continue in West Africa and these actors might evaluate the situation in the region as an opportunity for Russia to continue the war in Ukraine and squeeze the West in the energy sector.

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n July 28, General Abdourahmane Tchiani was appointed as the new head of state through a military coup in Niger, ousting President Mohamed Bazoum. General Tchiani and the supporting military forces cited the countries weak security situation and overall ineffective governance as motivations for their actions.

Some analysts speculate that internal power struggles, rather than security concerns, are the true driving forces behind General Tchiani’s actions. President Bazoum has made little commentary since Thursday, only writing “The hard-won gains will be safeguarded,” and “All Nigeriens who love democracy and freedom would want this,” on the social media platform X, previously called Twitter. His location is unknown although it is likely he is being held in the presidential palace.

Large swaths of Niger’s locals approve of the coup, agreeing with the claims of lack of security, specifically in the face of radical militants spreading across the Sahel region. Pro-coup locals hope that this change of power will provide increased protection from this threat. Other grievances from citizens include governmental corruption and difficult economic conditions. In addition, the coup represents the fruits of anti-French attitudes that are held by many in Niger due to France’s colonial history in the country.

Protests supporting General Tchiani, and against the former president’s pro-Western leanings, were seen in the capital, with protestors waving Niger’s and Russia’s flag. Chants in support of Russia’s Putin, Niger’s army and against France were heard during these protests. Pro-coup protestors also burned the French flag and threw stones at the French mission in the capital.

French president Emmanuel Macron responded by saying that their government “will not tolerate any attack on France or its interests.” Russia’s Wagner boss has publicly called the coup “good news” and has offered his fighter’s military power to aid the success of General Tchiani. Wagner is operational in bordering Mali and in other African nations including the Central African Republic.

The world reacts to the coup

Conversely, Niger’s locals have also organized anti-coup protests attended by hundreds across the nation. African and Western countries as well as local and global organizations maintain a backing for the president. The European Union warned of freezing financial support to Niger while the United States may withhold cooperation with Niger’s government. For anti-coup parties, democracy should prevail. In addition, Niger has been a strong ally of the West to combat insurgencies. Western powers are concerned with the possibility of this coup expanding Russian influence in the country.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECWAS) held a summit three days after the coup took place, agreeing that Bazoum should return to his position as president within a week time. If this does not happen, the Community has vowed to use “force” on top of already imposed sanctions on Niger. At the moment, it is unclear what force Niger may face from the ECOWAS.

Niger’s prime minister under President Bazoum has warned that sanctions will be “catastrophic” as Niger “is a country that will not be able to resist these kinds of sanctions.” Sanctions imposed by ECOWAS in other countries have generally been ineffective and have had negative impacts on civilian populations rather than the intended coup governments.

Additional results of this summit include the immediate shutting of Niger’s borders, banning of commercial flights, halted financial transactions, and frozen national assets and aid. U.S Secretary of State Anthony Blinken agreed with ECOWAS’ decisions and called for the immediate release of the president and that state functions be restored under the democratically elected government.

The United Nations said it would still deliver aid in Niger even though it had not had any contact with the military since the coup. U.S: “cease security and other cooperation with the government of Niger.”

General Tchiani’s military actions and supporting civilians represent well established anti-French sentiments and aspirations to create a new power structure while anti-coup individuals and forces seek to maintain the status quo in the region.

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n June 27, 17-year-old Nahel M of Algerian descent was killed in France for fleeing such a routine procedure. According to the testimony of the two motorcycle police officers who carried out the identity check, Nahel was shot in the heart in self-defense. In the video footage, described by the interior minister as “shocking” and confirmed by the French news agency AFP, one of the police officers can be seen pointing a gun at Nahel M while the other can be heard saying “You will be shot in the head.”

Nahel did not have a driver’s license and had been out with a friend in a borrowed car. Two weeks earlier, Alhoussein Camara, a 19-year-old French teenager of Guinean origin, was killed by police during an identity check on his way to work in the southwestern town of Angoulême. According to French media reports, he “had a regular job, a driver’s license, and his car was insured.” Since 2022, 13 people have been killed by police during routine identity checks in France.

After Nahel M’s death, a silent protest, attended by his mother, turned into a violent demonstration in a few hours and gripped the whole country. France witnessed a riot of this magnitude for the first time in 18 years. In 2005, in the Paris suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois, 15-year-old Bouna Traore and 17-year-old Zyed Benna were returning from a soccer match when they ran away from a police identity check, drove into a transformer, and burned to death.

In the last 50 years in France, children and teenagers, on foot, ridding a scooter or in a car, have tried to evade police checks and died: Youssef Khaïf (Mantes-la-Jolie, 1991), Malik Oussekine (Paris, 1986), Lahouari Ben Mohamed (Marseille, 1980), Mohamed Diab (Versailles, 1972). Following the killing of these young men, who were all of Arab or African origin, there were protests and outbreaks of violence.

Since the riots in the suburbs of Lyon in the 1980s, in the last 40 years, there have been no more than ten suburban riots in France; some local, some in big cities, and the largest in 2005. Both in the past and now, people in the suburbs have not been able to organize themselves like other social protest movements in the country, nor have they been able to turn their reactions into permanent political pressure.

Romain Gavras’s movie Athena, which was broadcast on Netflix last year, ended with the message that those who burn and destroy end up burning and destroying themselves and their relatives. Similarly, quoted on a front-page interview in the newspaper Liberation, a father who participated in the weeks-long events of 2005, said to his son, now involved in Nahel’s protests and violence: “I swear to you, this is not helping anything.”

Of course, it is not acceptable or excusable to disrupt public order, no matter how justified the cause. Yet, this is not a method of protest and rioting specific to the suburbs or to young people of Muslim origin or Black youth. This time, suburban youth have led a popular uprising; such uprisings  have taken place in the streets since the French Revolution in 1789, which laid the foundations of the Republic.

Suburban youth were not present in the spiral of violence of burning, destroying, and looting that accompanied the protests that began in November 2018, which lasted for months in response to the rise in energy prices. However, the current suburban youth uprising has been joined by the yellow vests, extreme leftists, and those angry with government policies. According to official data, more than 6,000 vehicles and 12,400 garbage bins were set on fire, 147 attacks on municipal buildings and libraries were recorded, and 3,700 people were detained, a third of them children.

There are millions of silent people like the mother in Gavras’s Athena, whose 13-year-old child is killed just like Nahel and who weeps in silent prayer with her neighbors with an imam at their head.  They too are worried about the youth rebellion, no matter what happens. If these people were to suddenly leave the country, France’s hospitals, the post office, the subway, and the train company RATP would collapse and the whole system would be paralyzed.

The movie mentions them for a few minutes, but it does not focus on them. Instead, it focuses on a small minority among these millions of people and their anger: Karim, who attacks the police station with a Molotov cocktail after the news that his brother was killed by the police and starts a rebellion with his friends; his older brother Abdel, who fought for the French army in Mali; and his older brother Moktar, a drug dealer.

Abdel, who initially tried to suppress Karim and the rebels, was accused of being a “harki,” a traitor, by his sister, and he confronted Karim. The only historical reference in the movie appears indirectly in this scene. During the Algerian National Liberation Front’s war against France on the road to independence in Algeria, Muslims who stayed loyal to the French army under the mistaken impression that they were caught between two fires were called “harki.”

As for the brother, Moktar, the drug dealer, it is no secret that in some neighborhoods in the suburbs it is not easy to manage the tensions between crime and law enforcement. In many suburbs there is drug trafficking, petty crime, and gangs. Many of the young people involved in these incidents have no ties to their homeland, do not recognize the authority of their parents, and even threaten to turn to the police if their parents pressure them, reminding them that they are in France.

They are a small minority, often trying to exist in a state of hatred and resentment. But the aggression and impunity of law enforcement in France is no secret. The trial of two police officers charged in the 2005 riots centered on a police radio statement that “if they enter a transformer, there is little chance of getting out alive.” Both were acquitted in 2015.

Moreover, a new law passed in 2017 authorizes the police to use weapons in five controversial circumstances in case of failure to obey a “stop” warning.  In addition, young people often evade identity checks because they are bored of being subjected to them and want to outsmart the police fueled by the anger they feel towards them.

What remains after the riots in the suburbs end is the image of the police with shields, batons, and tear gas canisters, on one side, and the youth throwing objects at them, burning cars, fireworks, and mortars. Whether reporting favorably or against the riots, they are always reported with the same headlines, analyzed the same way, and after the events are over, they are not talked about until the next one. Not only according to the far right, but also according to society at large, the suburban youth are the most likely group to be scapegoated for such incidents, and they are sidelined until the next incident.

In today’s world where reality and fiction are blurred, the movie Athena is being revisited on social media and in the French press, with some going as far as to claim that the movie is an inspiration for young people. In addition, the murderer in the movie is not a police officer, as initially believed, but a far-right militant wearing a police uniform.

Karim, who never believed he was a police officer and started the rebellion, eventually loses his life in the film, while the film labels Abdel, who has won the admiration of the French state and integrated into the system, a potential criminal: after Karim’s death, Abdel is driven by this pain to organize the continuation of the rebellion.

Even though President Macron introduced some of the most Islamophobic legislation in Europe during his first term and Muslims have become a minority in France that is routinely targeted and discriminated against, Macron has shown restraint on this occasion. During the 2005 events, Sarkozy, who was minister of the interior at the time, called the protesters a “rabble” and talked about purging them.

On the contrary, in his first statement after Nahel’s murder, Macron strongly condemned the incident, calling it “unforgivable.” As for his electoral rivals, on the far left, Jean-Luc Mélenchon refused to “call for calm”; far-right Eric Zemmour likened the suburban riots to the “prodromes of a civil war”; and, on the right, Les Republicains president Éric Ciotti called the rioters “barbarians.” Far-right theorists such as Renaud Camus have long labeled them “invaders” and their smear propaganda goes as far as arguing that “they will colonize us.”

An article in Le Monde stated, “Although many forget and don’t want to see it, what has led to the violence in recent days is indeed a sense of injustice that makes one weep.” The banner on the Paris ring road outside the Parc des Princes stadium simply reads, “God rest Nahel’s soul.”

From the War on Terror to the far-right conspiracies, Islamophobia manifests in various forms. In today’s world, systemic Islamophobia continues to cast a long and dark shadow over the lives of Muslims across continents. Rooted in historical and contemporary contexts, this pervasive form of discrimination and prejudice has significant implications for individuals, communities, and societies at large.

Systemic Islamophobia operates within power structures, institutions, and cultural biases, perpetuating inequality, marginalization, and the violation of human rights. Implicitly and explicitly, Islamophobia is reinforced by various layers of society, including governments around the world.

While its manifestations may differ from one region to another, systemic Islamophobia shares commonalities across countries and societies. It operates as a product of historical legacies, geopolitical dynamics, cultural narratives, and power imbalances. It thrives in contexts where Muslims are viewed as the “Other,” perpetuating stereotypes, prejudices, and negative portrayals that undermine their rights, dignity, and societal inclusion.

The impact of systemic Islamophobia is far-reaching. Muslim individuals and communities face challenges in various domains of life, as the titles included in this Bundle will show. They experience heightened surveillance, racial profiling, and discriminatory legislation, hindering the realization of fundamental human rights and the pursuit of justice and equality. Furthermore, the interconnetedness of discrimination makes the issue even more pressing for all.

Recognizing and understanding systemic Islamophobia is essential for dismantling its deeply entrenched structures. It requires comprehensive analysis, dialogue, and collective action which this collection hopes to envoke.

The Rise of Global Islamophobia in the War on Terror: Coloniality, Race, and Islam delves into the complex and far-reaching consequences of the ‘War on Terror’ on global perceptions of Muslims. The book examines the intersection between Islamophobia, and various social, economic, and political factors that have shaped its prevalence.

The authors convincingly argue that the ‘War on Terror’ has not only intensified anti-Muslim racism but has also provided a framework that perpetuates a global Islamophobic narrative. By framing Muslims a perpetual enemy, this conflict has fostered a climate of fear and suspicion, fueling the growth of nativist and populist movements worldwide.

One of the book’s strengths lies in its comprehensive analysis of the different forms and manifestations of Islamophobia. Through an examination of localized histories, conflicts, and contemporary geopolitical realities, the authors map out the intricate ways in which Islamophobia has taken shape across the global North and South. This approach adds depth to the understanding of the diverse factors contributing to the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment.

The book offers a nuanced and comprehensive analysis of the connections between interpersonal and institutional racism. While highlighting the deeply rooted nature of Islamophobia, the book also sheds light on the activism and resistance that have emerged to confront this issue. By featuring narratives of individuals and groups challenging Islamophobia, the authors provide hope and inspiration for those seeking to combat this pervasive form of discrimination.

Naved Bakali and Farid Hafez, The rise of global Islamophobia in the War on Terror: Coloniality, race, and Islam (Manchester University Press 2022) ISBN: 978-1-5261-6175-8, 264 pages

Islamophobia in France: The Construction of the “Muslim Problem” presents a groundbreaking examination of the multifaceted nature of Islamophobia in the country. Authored by Abdellali Hajjat and Marwan Mohammed, the book challenges the prevailing notion that Islamophobia arises solely from individual bias but rather that Islamophobia in France is deeply entrenched within existing structures of power and control.

The book sheds light on pivotal moments in French history that have contributed to the marginalization of Muslim communities. It highlights the 2004 ban on veils in schools, followed by the 2010 legislation that prohibited face-covering clothing in public spaces, primarily targeting women who wear burqas. President Emmanuel Macron’s public statements regarding the hijab’s compatibility with French ideals further illustrate the pervasive Islamophobia within the country. These cultural biases not only perpetuate discriminatory practices but also position the Muslim population as scapegoats for broader issues surrounding immigration in France.

Hajjat and Mohammed go beyond surface-level analysis to uncover the structural dimensions of Islamophobia in France. They argue that French elites strategically employ Islamophobia as a state technology to exert control and contest the presence of specific groups of postcolonial immigrants and their descendants. By exploring the data on Islamophobia and examining its functioning in contemporary French society, the authors paint a comprehensive portrait of the mechanisms through which Islamophobia operates.

Islamophobia in France is an English translation of Abdellali Hajjat and Marwan Mohammed’s Islamophobie: Comment les e´lites franc¸aises fabriquent le “proble`me musulman.” and an essential contribution to the field, providing a nuanced and insightful examination of the systemic nature of Islamophobia and its consequences on Muslim communities in France.

Abdellali Hajjat and Marwan Mohammed, Islamophobia in France: The Construction of the “Muslim Problem” (University of Georgia Press, 2023) ISBN-10 0820363251, 306 pages

In The New Crusades: Islamophobia and the Global War on Muslims Khaled A. Beydoun presents an essential examination of Islamophobia from a legal and ground-up perspective. Drawing on his intellectual prowess and moral imperative, Beydoun presents a compelling analysis of the network of anti-Muslim campaigns unfolding worldwide and offers a comprehensive analysis of how Islamophobia is utilized by both democratic and authoritarian regimes to persecute Muslim populations.

The New Crusades does not shy away from challenging the established narratives. It delves into the role of the War on Terror in fueling and intensifying anti-Muslim campaigns around the world. Beydoun skillfully illustrates how Islamophobia operates as a unifying thread, perpetuating state and social bigotry and igniting hate-mongering from both liberal and right-wing factions. Through trenchant analysis and firsthand accounts from Muslims on the ground, the author brings to light the various manifestations of Islamophobia in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and beyond.

The book’s global perspective sets it apart, as Beydoun incorporates on-site experiences, interviews, and a diverse range of contexts. This approach enhances the authority of the narrative and makes it accessible and engaging for scholars, students, and the general public.

The New Crusades unravels the distinct systems of demonization and oppression that have emerged across the post-9/11 geopolitical landscape. Whether it is the imposition of hijab bans in France, state-sponsored hate speech and violence in India, or the existence of concentration camps in China, Beydoun examines how Islamophobia operates as a global phenomenon, perpetuating discrimination on multiple fronts.

The book powerfully reveals the unsettling reality that Islamophobia remains one of the few acceptable forms of hate in the world today. By exposing this truth, Beydoun calls attention to the urgent need for collective action against Islamophobia and its far-reaching consequences. By weaving together social science, law, and captivating narratives, the author highlights the pervasive impact of Islamophobia on Muslims across the globe.

Khaled A. Beydoun, The New Crusades: Islamophobia and the Global War on Muslims (University of California Press, 2023) ISBN: 9780520356306, 390 pages

In Fear of a Muslim Planet: Global Islamophobia in the New World Order Arsalan Iftikhar, a renowned American Muslim human rights lawyer, offers a comprehensive exploration of global Islamophobia. The book refers to the chilling reminder of the Christchurch massacre, where a white supremacist perpetrated a horrific act of violence against Muslim worshippers in New Zealand. Iftikhar draws attention to the manifesto left by the attacker, titled “The Great Replacement,” which espoused the belief that Muslims posed a threat and sought to replace white people. This incident serves as a starting point for exploring the dangerous legacy of this theory and its influence on extremist acts.

Iftikhar goes on to emphasize that the victims of the “Great Replacement” theory extend beyond Muslims alone. The tragic attack on the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, which targeted Jewish congregants, exemplifies the broader impact of this ideology including the infamous actions of Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik.. The perpetrator’s anti-Semitic and Islamophobic motivations, fueled by anti-immigration sentiments, underline the interconnected nature of discrimination.

Throughout the book, Iftikhar critiques the presidency of Donald Trump, which he argues has contributed to the exacerbation of Islamophobia in America. He dissects Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric and policies, including his claim that “Islam hates us” and his call for a complete ban on Muslims entering the US. Iftikhar contends that Trump’s leadership has fueled the growth of Islamophobia.

The book goes beyond the United States and the Western world to shed light on global Islamophobia. Iftikhar highlights the genocidal levels of Islamophobia in countries like China and Myanmar, where Muslim communities face severe oppression. Additionally, he addresses the European focus on policing Muslim women’s hijab, exposing discriminatory policies that curtail religious freedom.

Arsalan Iftikhar, Fear of a Muslim Planet: Global Islamophobia in the New World Order (Skyhorse Publishing, 2021) ISBN-13 978-1510761872, 288 pages

The Suspect: Counterterrorism, Islam, and the Security State offers a captivating and deeply personal exploration of the impact that two decades of policing and counterterrorism have had on the state of mind of Muslims in Britain. Drawing from his own experiences, author Rizwaan Sabir takes readers on a compelling journey through British counterterrorism practices and the pervasive policing of Muslims.

Sabir’s narrative describes his wrongful arrest and detention on suspicion of terrorism. He recounts the distressing process of being unjustly made a target in the “war on terror.” With candor and vivid detail, he outlines the events leading up to his arrest, including being found in possession of the Al-Qaeda Training Manual, which he had downloaded for legitimate postgraduate research purposes. Sabir sheds light on the excruciating experience of being subjected to suspicion and surveillance solely based on his Muslim identity.

Throughout the book, Sabir recounts the harrowing aftermath of his arrest. He vividly describes the relentless monitoring and scrutiny he faced upon release from custody. This included frequent stop-and-search encounters, detentions at the border, surveillance by police and government departments, and an attempt by the UK military to recruit him into their psychological warfare unit. The author’s firsthand account provides a chilling insight into the intrusive and discriminatory practices endured by Muslims in the name of national security.

Sabir argues that the profound harm inflicted on individuals like him is not merely the result of government planning errors but rather a deliberate consequence of employing a counterinsurgency warfare approach to combat terrorism and police Muslim communities. Through his writing, Sabir advocates for and building networks of solidarity and support to challenge the injustices perpetuated by these policies and practices.

The Suspect serves as a powerful call to action, urging readers to recognize and resist the profound injustice faced by Muslims. By sharing his story, Sabir empowers readers to challenge the harmful narratives and practices that perpetuate the policing of Muslims.

Rizwaan Sabir, The Suspect: Counterterrorism, Islam, and the Security State (Pluto Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780745338484, 256 pages

T

he news of Nahel Merzouk’s murder by the police took me back to my primary school days in France. In the early 1990s, as a pupil in a public school in Forbach, Metz, I saw what it meant to be excluded and isolated.

That is why, for me, Nahel’s death was not the first death of a migrant in France, nor would it be the last. In 2005, for example, two young men met a fate similar to Nahel’s. Zyed Benna and Bouna Traoré were running from the police after a football match when they hit an electricity transformer in Paris and were electrocuted. There were riots afterwards. It happened again: Nahel Merzouk was killed by the police and riots followed immediately afterwards.

So, what is the basic problem? What is the root cause of the killing of people like Nahel and the events that follow?

The recruitment of labor from the colonial territories: Opening the door to migrants

In order to answer this question properly, it is necessary to look at the process of colonialism or more precisely to review the history of colonialism briefly. In this sense, colonialism,  which started in the 15th century, is the work of Western countries. The slave trade from Africa and the concept of the “attack on Africa” emerged in this context. Today, colonialism has changed its form.

Although it started a little later than Portuguese-Spanish and British colonialism, French colonialism was exceptionally  brutal. After the British Empire, the French colonial empire was the second largest in the world, reaching its peak and expansion between 1919 and 1939. The French colonial territory, including Algeria, amounted to between 8% and 10% of the world’s territory, and continued to exist until the 1960s.

The French treated the peoples of their colonies much more cruelly than other colonizers; those who were not killed, were treated as an underclass. As a result, the French colonies became very poor.  For example, the British colonies of New Zealand and Australia are now very wealthy states, while Algeria, which was subjected to French exploitation, is a poor and troubled country.

The history of French colonialism in Africa is a human tragedy. Starting with the colonization of Algeria in 1830, France began to establish a new colonialism in Africa. The aim was ruthless: to “civilize” African peoples through language and religion. For the French, as for all colonialists, this civilizing goal was, as Jules Ferry, the leading advocate of colonialism, openly declared, “The rights of the superior races over the inferior races.” By the beginning of the 20th century, French colonization gradually extended to most of North, West, and Central Africa, including Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Niger, Chad, and the Central African Republic.

Colonialism, especially French colonialism, gave way to “labor migrations” after World War II. From then onwards, it was a question of providing labor from the colonial territories struggling for independence for the reconstruction of Europe and France, in particular. It should be recalled that, although France withdrew from the countries it had colonized, it imposed two conditions on its withdrawal: first, French should be the official language of the country and the language of education, and second, public education should be compulsory.

By creating the “Community of French-Speaking Countries,” France prevented its former colonies from severing their ties with France. For example, French is the official language of 27 of the 54 countries in Africa. As a result, France had the power to easily carry out many “labor migrations” from its former colonies. Instead of the slaves of the past, especially in Algeria, now, there were the modern-day “workers.”

Slavery underwent a transformation process and took the form of a labor force, but both share a common goal: to exploit the world, and Africa in particular, for the welfare of the West or France in particular. For the continuity of the state’s welfare, migrant labor was brought into the system by extending colonial logic to this new era.

Positioning migrants: Assimilation, integration or segregation?

Despite the importance of migrants as a labor force in the eyes of France and Western countries, the positioning of migrants is somewhat complex. The complexity concerns whether to assimilate, integrate, or segregate migrants.

Assimilation was to be easy in so far as people of migrant origin had to abandon their own culture and become “civilized.” This was already a central step in the colonial experience. If integration were to take place, the situation would be a little more difficult as people with a migrant background would have to be integrated into the existing culture while preserving their own culture.

This means accepting to be on the same level as people with a migrant background—in other words, a step against the colonial logic or the “superior race” mentality. There was also the possibility of segregating those with a migrant background, i.e., making them live in places that were separate and disconnected from society. After all, it was not appropriate for people of migrant origin to breathe the same air as people of the “superior race” and, therefore, migrants belonged in ghettos.

The ghettos, known as “suburbs,” became the address of migrants in France. What was the aim? To assimilate under the guise of integration; if that was not possible, then to exclude migrants, or to ghettoize by segregation.

The suburbs in France have many problems. Their main problem, however, is social isolation or social exclusion. Social exclusion is when a person or group, for one reason or another, is deprived of something; people of migrant origins living in the suburbs in France are deprived of many human rights simply because of their background. For example, the suburbs are areas where even ambulances refuse to go in case of emergency.

Those who live in the suburbs are known to develop their own methods to survive, which they retain even if they later move out of the suburbs. When they face injustice by the police and others, Paris is set on fire.

Being a victim of segregation or a reflection of the colonial spirit: The murder of Nahel Merzouk

The root cause of setting the city ablaze lies in the fact that people of migrant origin, who are not welcome to integrate and cannot assimilate as an extension of the colonial spirit, are segregated from society and subjected to social exclusion.

Τhe political, economic, and social rights that are automatically acquired through citizenship do not apply in practice to people with a migrant background, who are considered “incomplete (second-class) citizens.” Worse still, instead of having rights, having a migrant background is automatically tantamount to being a criminal, making people with a migrant background the usual suspects: in the case of theft, traffic offences, drug dealing, manslaughter, or similar crimes, having a migrant background is tantamount to being guilty without the need for any evidence.

It is precisely because of this humiliating and exclusionary treatment as “incomplete citizens” that in another French city, a young person demanding justice for Nahel stated, “Police violence happens every day, especially if you are Arab or Black.” It is partly because of this “incomplete citizen” status that people of migrant origin, and especially young people, distrust the police and have no faith in justice or law enforcement. As a result, the “resistance” or “escape” of young people, who are in a state of constant stress and, in the long run, resentment, often ends in death.

Nahel’s death is neither the first nor will it be the last. In the West, and especially in France, human rights do not apply to people of migrant origins who have gone from being slaves to migrant laborers.

F

rench President Emmanuel Macron recently completed a five-day trip to Africa, visiting Gabon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of the Congo, and Angola on March 1-5. Macron’s trip to Africa excluded several countries in the Sahel region, including Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, where there is significant tension with France.

Macron faced by criticism and protests

French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent trip to Africa aimed to deepen cultural connections and the exchange of ideas between France and African countries. He promised to end the “Françafrique” policy, which has long been criticized for enabling French political and economic influence in Africa.

His recent visit to Africa was met with criticism from numerous regional political analysts, who argued that his promises lacked new substance and were simply a repackaging of previous pledges. Many have expressed disappointment that Macron did not offer concrete plans or policy changes to address the complex issues facing the continent.

African political analyst Amir Nourdine Elbachir pointed out that Western nations are still discussing plans for Africa without involving Africans, suggesting that Macron’s new policy for Africa was prompted by threats to French interests in the continent.

Meanwhile, President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Félix Tshisekedi urged Macron to treat African nations as equal partners. Tshisekedi’s statement was made during a press conference with Macron held in Kinshasa on Saturday, March 4, 2023.

Tshisekedi called for France to change its “protectionist” attitude towards African countries, adding that France needs to see African countries as partners rather than in a paternal relationship.

The critiques suggest that while Macron’s new policies may be a step in the right direction, they may not go far enough in addressing the root issues of French interference and neocolonialism in Africa.

Despite Macron’s promises to end “Françafrique,” the French practice of maintaining economic and political influence over its former African colonies, Macron faced criticism and protests throughout his trip.

Lingering colonial legacy

France’s history of colonialism in Africa has left a legacy of resentment and distrust towards the West. Many African nations feel that their resources have been exploited and they have been left to deal with the aftermath of the colonial era leading to a deep and ongoing mistrust toward Western countries, and primarily Europe.

As competition for influence in Africa grows more intense, African nations are increasingly seeking partners who prioritize African interests and treat them as equal rather than viewing them as pawns in a neocolonial game.

Protests erupted during Macron’s visit to Gabon, where some demonstrators held placards stating “France get out.” The country’s opposition leader Jean Ping accused France of having a “neocolonial attitude” towards Gabon.

China and Russia on the rise

In recent years, China and Russia have expanded their presence in Africa, raising the concerns of European countries and the United States.

An interesting video circulated on social media showing some of the protestors who were chanting slogans against Emmanuel Macron’s planned visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo carrying Russian flags in their hands. The protest highlights the growing influence of Russia and China in Africa.

China’s economic policies in Africa focus on extracting natural resources, expanding the Chinese consumer market, and ensuring economic and political stability. Through President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative, China has expanded its economic cooperation with various African countries.

On the other hand, Russia’s approach to Africa involves business opportunities, arms sales in exchange for diplomatic support for Russia’s foreign policy preferences, political support for authoritarian leaders, and security cooperations. Russia’s relative popularity in the Global South has disappointed Western observers, and its attraction strategy has been fueled by the “memory diplomacy” approach whereby it highlights positive historical narratives such as its lack of involvement in the slave trade in Africa or colonialism in the region, and its role in supporting African countries during their struggle for independence.

In contrast, the European Union is trying to establish a broad political and economic relationship with African countries based on trade, investment, aid, and technical support, aiming to achieve better control over irregular migration.

The changing dynamics of Africa

African countries increasingly seek to assert their independence and pursue their own economic and political agenda.

The rise of China and Russia in Africa poses a challenge for the United States and EU countries by adding another layer to international African politics. They now have to re-adjust their approaches  to engage with African countries, taking into consideration their expectations and diplomatic needs.

The ongoing resentment towards the West in Africa highlights the need for a more equal and respectful relationship, one that both acknowledges the ongoing impact of Western colonialism and aims to help Africa address the root causes of poverty and instability.

W

ho was behind the release of thousands of confidential Moroccan documents, many of which are now being highlighted in the international press to support corruption charges against current and former MEPs at the center of Qatar Gate and Morocco Gate?

It is a mysterious case. In 2014, a “hacker” by the name of Chris Coleman published thousands of documents on Twitter and various social networks, many of them classified as “confidential” or “secret,” as well as a huge mass of correspondence, emails, and archives of all kinds exposing in great detail the way the DGED (General Directorate of Studies and Documentation, the Moroccan foreign intelligence agency) and the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked.

There was everything: reports on everything and everyone, studies, correspondence, requests for instructions, and above all the names of the DGED’s regular collaborators. Not the usual police snitches, but prominent members of society, Moroccans and foreigners, journalists, politicians, experts, senior officials, members of civil society, etc. Lists of gifts and generous sums of money paid to some politicians, closed this incredible inventory.

For example, the names of Pier Antonio Panzeri, the former Italian MEP, and his assistant Francesco Giorgi, both currently imprisoned in Brussels for the Qatar Gate and Morocco Gate affair, appeared in these documents without anyone taking notice.

Another example was Fight Impunity, the association created by Panzeri in Brussels, and which is now at the center of the scandal, which was exposed as the brainchild of the late Moroccan ambassador to the European Union, Menouar Alem, in a confidential report sent to the Moroccan foreign ministry in 2012.

At the time, namely 2014, a few people quickly accused “Chris Coleman” of being a forger and laughed at this “Marocleaks,” before retracting. The Moroccan state at no time questioned the authenticity of this immense documentation while certain media outlets accused neighboring Algeria of being behind this giant leak.

But who is this “Chris Coleman”? Who is behind this computer genius who managed to pump almost five gigabytes, and surely more, of data from the servers of the DGED and the Moroccan diplomacy to disperse them on the web? It is a question that has been asked a thousand times. Some have claimed that it was indeed a “hacker,” others have presented him as an ex-head of the DGED who broke with his management, and there are even those who have seen the hand of another Moroccan secret service to discredit the DGED, headed since 2005 by Mohamed Yassine Mansouri, a friend of King Mohamed VI. In short, a war of services.

There has always been a lot of imagination in the world of spies. In this case, however, the truth is simple if we carefully scrutinize the ups and downs of relations between Morocco and some countries considered “allies.”

The person who chose the name “Chris Coleman,” named after the former Welsh international footballer, is apparently a soccer fan, but he is not a hacker hiding somewhere in a dingy office surrounded by computer screens. And Algeria, which is hated by some Moroccans, is absolutely not involved in this affair, as some have tried to accredit.

The structure – a state one – behind “Chris Coleman” and which has exposed Moroccan counterespionage and diplomacy is probably the French DGSE (Direction générale de la Sécurité extérieure).

What follows is the result of several weeks of investigation and cross-checking that reveal that an underground and very unfriendly war has been going on for a decade, or perhaps more, between the French DGSE and the Moroccan DGED.

It all began on May 24, 2014, with an article that appeared on the Moroccan website le360. The article titled “Convocation of the French Ambassador: New Revelations” was written by Mohamed Chakir Alaoui, a former junior employee of the Agence France-Presse (AFP) office in Rabat.

Alaoui was not known in the Moroccan journalistic world, having never revealed any sensitive case. But on that day, he dropped a piece of information that would set the world on fire. “Agnès Féline,” he wrote, the “second secretary at the French embassy” is the “head of the antenna of the General Directorate of External Security (DGSE) in Morocco.”

This revelation startled the French embassy in Rabat and by extension the Parisian directorate of the DGSE. French diplomats and spies wondered how a journalist who was not an expert in the shadowy world of intelligence knew that Féline was indeed the “head of the DGSE antenna in Rabat.” At the same time, revealing Féline’s true function was tantamount to putting her in grave danger.

The French intelligence center quickly came to the conclusion that the information had been dictated to Alaoui by the Moroccan intelligence service, the only one to know Féline’s true status.

But why did the site le360 reveal the true function of a French spy? The Moroccan intelligence services were seeking revenge for a terrible humiliation suffered a few months earlier by the boss of the DST (Directorate General of Territorial Security). In February 2014, the French police sought to arrest the director general of the DST Abdellatif Hammouchi at the residence of the Moroccan ambassador to France in Neuilly-sur-Seine. A judge wanted to hear from the head of Moroccan spies after complaints of torture in Morocco filed by several French citizens, including former world kickboxing champion Zakaria Moumni.  Hammouchi had to leave France in a hurry, without passing through the Parisian airports. This was a great humiliation for the head of the Moroccan secret services.

O

n Friday, December 23, 2022, three people were killed and three others were injured in an armed attack on the Ahmet Kaya Cultural Center on Rue d’Enghien in the 10th arrondissement of Paris. The 69-year-old suspect was first arrested and then rushed to hospital. He was detained a day later. The suspect, named William M., is a retired mechanic with a long criminal record.

According to the statements by the authorities to the French press, the suspect was previously found guilty of an armed attack in the Seine-Saint-Denis region, a suburb of Paris, where heavily populated by Muslims. Later, his conviction was overturned on appeal. William M. was also found guilty of acts such as slashing with a knife and destroying immigrants’ tents in a racist attack against immigrants last year. However, the prosecutor’s office determined that the perpetrator was not motivated by extremist ideology, which is probably why he was released on bail earlier in December 2022.

According to the statement by French Prosecutor Laure Beccuau, the 69-year-old suspect “had a pathological hatred of foreigners, suffered depression, and had suicidal tendencies.” The suspect spent nearly a day in a psychiatric hospital before being brought back into police custody on Sunday evening, AFP reported. His father explained, “My son is mad!” When talking about the attack on television, the emphasis was placed on the suspect’s “madness” in capital letters with titles such as “The Suspect Is at the Psychiatric Unit.”

Did this discourse surprise anyone? Whenever there is a terrorist attack, today, if the perpetrator is European, he is portrayed as “mad,” but if he is Muslim, he is depicted as a “terrorist” who is mentally sound and in full command of his actions. As for the representation of the criminal act, the first is called an “attack” while the second is “terrorism.”

In Norway, for example, Anders Behring Breivik, who was on trial for the murder of 77 people, was also labeled “mad.” In his defense, he said that his actions were “a defense” against Islam, which he claimed was taking over Europe. He explained that this was not a crime, and that he was defending Norway against multiculturalism. Today, the language of politics adopts cultural racism instead of ethnicity-based racism. This is not limited to the far right, but permeates the center-right and center-left parties in Europe.

With French President Emmanuel Macron’s early practices, hostility towards Muslims in France gained legitimacy like nowhere else in Europe. It is enough to take a look at the documents prepared by the Macron government, namely “Reinforcing Republican Principles” and the “Imam Charter.”

The French state stigmatized Muslims as a separate entity based on cultural nationalism and even racism, and defined Islam as a threat to French identity. According to a report published in the French newspaper Libération, there have been 20 attacks, both major and minor, with racist motives in France since September 2022. These, of course, are only the ones recorded. If the suspect had not been involved in this latest attack, despite his criminal record, he would not have made the news.

In his statement, the suspect explained that he originally wanted to carry out an attack in Seine-Saint-Denis, north of Paris, an area with a dense immigrant population, but gave up on the grounds that there were few people around and the way he dressed made it difficult for him to hide his gun. Instead, he went to the Seine Denis neighborhood of Strasbourg, in the heart of Paris, where Kurdish, Turkish, and Arab immigrants have their shops. When he saw the “Ahmet” of the “Ahmet Kaya Kurdish Cultural Center” in the 10th district, he attacked!

According to the news published in the French press, the Ahmet Kaya Kurdish Cultural Center is a place under the control of people close to the PKK today. French police conducted a search there in February 2007 and arrested 13 people for allegedly financing terrorism in an “organized gang” in the Paris area. In 2014, the center was ordered to be closed down by the Supreme Court due to financing terrorist activities. At the time, the center remained open as a result of large demonstrations in support of appealing this decision. Some may know that the PKK collects racket from Kurdish shopkeepers in Paris, and if they do not, their security is imperiled. Since the 1990s, this is such a commonplace occurrence that it often occurs in front of customers.

William M. attacked with apparent anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant motivations, but in this post-truth age, which has been strengthened by social media since the 2000s, the PKK and its media organs as well as French politicians turned the narrative into an “anti-Kurdish” attack. The PKK, which is defined as a terrorist organization by Europe but protected by many European countries including France, was once again presented by French politicians and media as the representative of all Kurds. Sadly, no one emphasized the real anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant motive of the attack.

In his message, Macron said, “The Kurds of France were the target of a heinous attack in the heart of Paris. Our thoughts are with the victims, the people struggling for their lives, their families, and loved ones.” Antony Blinken, U.S. Secretary of State, tweeted “My thoughts are with the Kurdish community and the French on this sad day.” French politician Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who was a member of the National Assembly for the 4th constituency of Bouches-du-Rhône from 2017 to 2022 and who narrowly missed continuing on to the second round in French Presidential Election in 2022, said he “does not believe in coincidence when it comes to the assassination of Kurds in Paris.”

PKK media organs and organizations in Europe called on their sympathizers to protest in Place de la République immediately after the incident. Politicians participating in the protests marched and gave speeches, accompanied by PKK flags and Abdullah Öcalan’s posters. Some of the protesters, who had gathered from all over Europe, engaged in violence, forcing the police to intervene.

The statement by the police unions reacted to the violence by saying, “In the heart of Paris and Marseille, protesters burned cars, smashed stones and threw them here and there, and 53 police officers were injured on Christmas Day.” Indeed, the situation was summarized in Kurdish and French from the social media account of Sezai Temelli, a HDP MP in Turkey and former HDP Co-Chair, as follows: “Paris is on fire, let it burn!” Temelli wrote this comment, which he later deleted, as a reply to a social media post by journalist Clement Lanot, who wrote under a photo of a burning car, “There are very violent events taking place during the assembly of the Kurds. Burnt cars, bullets and tear gas.” It wasn’t just Paris – reality itself was turned upside down!

The anti-Muslim and xenophobic perpetrator openly attacked the “Ahmet” component of the Ahmet Kaya Kurdish Cultural Center. But even this attack, which caused the death of three people and the injury of three others and was apparently motivated by racist and anti-Muslim motives, was exploited and dismissed on the premise of the conflict between Turkey and the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK and France’s ally. Reality is turned upside down and hostility towards Muslims is turned into “enemy of Kurds.” Yet, for William M. and his like, it doesn’t matter whether the target is Kurdish, Turkish, or Arab, providing the target is Muslim.

C

arlos Martens Bilongo, a member of the French National Assembly, suggested the need for cooperation among European countries to rescue migrants in the Mediterranean. As a response, French MP Grégoire de Fournas insulted his colleague with racist words which caused immediate chaos in the assembly, prompting the suspension of the session.

Later, Grégoire de Fournas defended himself and asserted that he was referring to migrants rather than his colleague. He justified his words by saying, “There is a difference between saying he should go and they should go. He underlined the role of France in preventing illegal trafficking of migrants. Accordingly, migrants should go back to their home countries. As a result, I was not mentioning him in that content.”

Similar incidents

This incident brought back memories of another incident in which lawmaker Danièle Obono was represented in the magazine Valeurs actuelles with chains around her neck. The story was about slavery in the 18th century. “It humiliated my family and my ancestry,” Obono said.

In 2020, it was reported that French policemen used violence against dispossessed migrants forcing them to abandon their tents. A protestor shouted at police officers, “They are not animals, don’t act like they are!”

Racism, old and new

De Fournas did not offer any apology: he believes his words were misinterpreted and took no responsibility for the turmoil created by his racist remarks which ended the session.

President Macron did not accept De Fournas’s claim of misinterpretation, and stated that “he was overwhelmed by the words of the MP.” A couple of demonstrations against the racist comment took place in which Bilongo himself participated. Far-right party leader Marine Le Pen defended De Fournas by saying he was referring to migrants who were coming illegally to France. De Fournas explained that he received many messages from people on Twitter, who stand by him.

Grégoire de Fournas expelled from parliament

“Today, some people once again put my skin color at the center of a debate. I’m born in France and I am a French lawmaker and I didn’t think that today I will be insulted [like this] at the National Assembly,” Bilongo told reporters after the incident.

Mathilde Panot, leader of the far-left La France Insoumise group in the National Assembly, has demanded the expulsion of De Fournas, the toughest punishment for a French lawmaker.

De Fournas received a short-term expulsion order from the National Assembly. He argued that the punishment was too harsh and unfair; however, he added, “I accept this sanction because I am respectful to the institution I am working at.” De Fournas was expelled from the parliament for 15 days.

Growing nationalist tensions in France

 French nationality law provides for jus soli citizenship which refers to the right to obtain citizenship via birthplace. German citizenship, for example, is obtained jus sanguinis, which means gaining citizenship rights by blood, which is to say the nationality of one or both parents. The segregationist attitude of French politicians towards immigrants contradict the inclusive regulations of law regarding citizenship issues in the country.

Ethnic-based discrimination in France is becoming prominent. A society based on a liberal concept of citizenship is turning in favor of race- and ethnicity-based concepts of citizenship. Nowadays, a large number of people in France are more eager to live in a more homogenous society, alongside people consisting of the same ethnicity and color. The notion of citizenship is embracing an exclusionary tone and leading people to demand stricter restrictions on immigration.

T

here has been an uproar in France after French-Algerian author, Hamid Ait-Taleb, who holds two master’s degrees from the Sorbonne, changed his name to “Xavier Le Clerc” over the lack of job offers due to his North African-sounding name. Le Clerc made the statement during a radio interview on September 7, 2022.

In an interview with Radio France Inter, Le Clerc said soon after he changed his name, he got hundreds of calls offering him jobs, where in the past he never got called back after job applications.

Ait-Taleb is the author of the novel A Man without a Title, which speaks of his father’s journey into integration, identity, and poverty in France.

It is not clear whether Le Clerc’s father was with the Harkis, the Algerians who fought under French command during the country’s War of Independence in 1954-1962.

Upon arrival in France, Le Clerc’s father was employed in Normandy as a laborer by an agricultural company.

Surprising?

The statement made by Le Clerc came as a shock to some French, but France’s history of racism especially against Harkis is known to many and does not surprise people with migrant backgrounds in the country.

Le Clerc came out and spoke about the reason that pushed him to change his name after he was subjected to criticism including accusations against him of “betraying his roots and identity.”

Some 1.1 million people have watched the interview with Le Clerc with politicians and figures jumping on the bandwagon and noting that this comes as no surprise to them given the history of France and the rise of the far-right in the country.

Danièle Obono, member of the French National Assembly, tweeted that the case of Xavier Le Clerc is no exception, noting that discrimination in employment is known: an applicant of North African origin is 31.5% less likely to get a job than a white French applicant.

Farida Amrani, a Moroccan-origin member of the French National Assembly, noted that she was asked once in her electoral district how she became an MP while having a migrant background.

In France, a French Name?

According to a study, the gap between French with Maghribi origins and white French when it comes to employment is 15%.

In another study, the French American Foundation concluded that a French name gives universal access to all facets of French society.

France, due to its colonial history, hosts large migrant communities. Muslims make up 6.6% of the population of France or 8.8 million people—the largest Muslim population in a single European country.

As in the rest of Europe, racism in France is on the rise recently. In the most recent general elections an increasing number of French people voted for right-wing candidates whose discourse was mainly focused on their anti-migrant rhetoric.

Muslims find themselves in an increasingly hostile environment in France, which to date refuses to recognize its colonial past and integrate its Muslim population.

“For they have sown the wind, and they shall reap the whirlwind.” To make things worse, the storms that French President Emmanuel Macron will face are not of only one kind. Whatever had not happened before in the history of the Fifth Republic has taken place in the second round of the French presidential elections.

For the first time, a president could not win the absolute majority in the parliament just two months after being elected; for the first time, no political bloc could achieve the absolute majority in the parliament; and for the first time, a far-right political party became the main opposition party on its own with the highest number of deputies in its history. President Macron, who wanted a strong and clear support for his second five-year term, is now facing an outcome beyond even the worst scenarios.

Undoubtedly, Marine Le Pen was the elections’ most successful name. Le Pen, who could not get enough deputies in the past elections even to form a group in the parliament, increased her party’s number of deputies 11 times and won 89 seats. In the second round of elections, the ultra-leftist party leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon was the rival of President Emmanuel Macron, who, for two consecutive elections, had run against the far-right party leader Le Pen for the Élysée Palace.

This led some commentators to argue that the far right was weakening, but it actually was not. Comments that the second-largest political power in the country had shifted from the far right to the far left within two months, and that the voters in France were acting on a very unpredictable ground were also not true.

In the second round of the 2017 presidential elections, Le Pen was behind Macron by 32 points. In the 2022 elections, again in the second round, the difference dropped to 17 points. The difference between Macron’s and Le Pen’s votes was only 4.69 percent in the first round of the 2022 election. However, the parties on the left united and formed a single bloc despite the rivalry among them, whereas far-right parties could not. If Marine Le Pen had been able to convince Eric Zemmour, who preferred to run independently, and bring him under her party’s umbrella, she could have found herself abreast with Ensemble (the bloc supporting Macron) and NUPES (the bloc supporting Mélenchon) in the first round.

Notorious for his hostility towards Muslims and immigrants and some anti-Semitic rhetoric, Jewish far-right Eric Zemmour was the most talked about name in the presidential elections. Zemmour received 4.25 percent of the votes in the first round and split Le Pen’s vote. No one could predict that Zemmour could get such a high score, while it was considered almost certain that Le Pen would increase the number of deputies of her party, which was founded 50 years ago by her father, with 18.66  percent of votes in the first round. In fact, Marine Le Pen would run in 208 of 577 constituencies, 88 more than the last election held five years ago.

The NUPES alliance, led by the former Marxist Mélenchon, won 131 seats, less than expected and did not please the left. Hopes were indeed higher for the NUPES alliance for the second round. The alliance’s score in the first round was celebrated in the left press with headlines such as “The Left Is Coming Back.” The right press saw headlines along the lines “Will Communism Come to the Country This Summer?” aiming to frighten undecided voters. However, Mélenchon’s party, Unsubmissive France, which one day was portrayed in the media as the dreadful shark in Spielberg’s 1975 movie Jaws, another day was a monster, and yet another a bogeyman, eventually won 72 seats—in 2017, it had only 17.

Eight months before the 2017 presidential elections, Macron had resigned from his position as minister of economy in the socialist government, and first won the presidential elections and then 308 seats in the second round of elections with his party, whose motto was “Neither right nor left, both right and left.” Five years later, his La République En Marche ! (Republic Forward), which changed its name to Renaissance, received only 170 seats in the election.

Macron could not reach the numbers of five years ago, even with the votes of a total of seven parties, large and small, united behind the bloc and entering the election together. The Ensemble, the alliance of political parties supporting Macron, won 245 seats and thus remained 44 seats short of an absolute majority.

Along with Macron’s unsatisfactory performance in the last five years, there were other reasons, of course, behind the election results such as the COVID19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the economic and social consequences of the war. However, the economic policies of President Macron and his government, which further widened the gap between the rich and those with a low income, and his Islamophobic rhetoric and legal regulations targeting Muslims that were actually unprecedented in Europe affected both election results.

Thus, while the far-right politics moved to a legitimate ground, Le Pen and the like, on the one hand, and those who took a hostile position against such policies, on the other, like the far-leftist Mélenchon, gained strength just for this reason by winning the votes of 70 percent of Muslims.

In the 2017 elections, the traditional right and left parties had weakened to a great extent against Macron’s brand-new party and were finally buried in the 2022 presidential elections. The socialist party, which had 30 seats in 2017, was able to get 26 seats, while the Republicans, which had 112 seats, could only get 61 deputies. The Union of Democrats and Independents (UDI), another right-wing party that entered the election with the Republicans, had 18 deputies last time, but could only get three this time. It deserves mentioning also that for the first time in its history, Paris will not have either a socialist or a republican deputy.

Another important result in the second round of elections was the indifference of the French people to the elections: a new record was set with 53.77 percent abstention and 7.67 percent protest votes. According to the detailed analyses of the election results by poll companies, although all parties were affected by this situation, the left was affected the most. It seems that indifference to the left bloc and sometimes the fact that there was no left bloc candidate in some electoral districts despite the risk of the far-right candidate being elected in the second round and no votes for the bloc supporting Macron all contributed to this new record.

Before his visit to Romania and Moldova, President Macron spoke recently in Orly and asked for an absolute majority in order not to add “French disorder to the world’s disorder.” There was no absolute majority in the elections, and even the Republicans, judging by the statements of their officials, do not want to cohabitate the same political space as Macron. As Élisabeth Borne, prime minister of France, said, the country is indeed in an “unprecedented state”!

According to the social and solidarity economic plan of the 2024 Olympics, the International Olympic Committee, and partner organizations are working to ensure that young people and those struggling to find work can find employment in jobs created by Paris 2024 Summer Games. However, what is the human cost of this sporting event? Recently, some alarming facts have come to life which show the dark side of this athletic extravaganza.

A dozen unlawful migrant employees were involved in the construction of the Athletes Village in the Parisian suburb of St. Denis. The recent discovery of such undocumented workers toiling at Olympic construction sites reveals the unscrupulous subcontracting network at the heart of delivering the Paris 2024 Olympics. This may just be the tip of the iceberg.

The uncovering of mostly minority ethnic undocumented labour has led to only 100 checks being carried out by authorities despite thousands being employed constructing the many venues that will be used to host the Games. Why they are reluctant to investigate the full extent of the problem remains a mystery, though one may guess as to the reason.

These undocumented workers will likely be employed on poor terms and conditions and not receive the pay and benefits that lawful employee should expect to receive in France. The discovery of the abuses of migrant labourers comes as France brands its Olympics as the ‘Games for social inclusion of refugees and asylum seekers.’ Furthermore, the French Government supports the Olympic Refuge Foundation ahead of Paris 2024.

These high-minded aspirations appear to be little more than a blatant attempt to mask the truth about French society and sport. Ground-breaking research shows that even amateur French football, along with that of other European countries, discriminates against ethnic minority immigrants.

Sports built on French double standards

Robert Oulds, Executive Director of ImpACT International, told Politics Today that “It would be ironic, if it were not so tragic, that France’s showpiece tournament aims to raise awareness as to the plight of refugees whilst exploiting those very same migrants. The French Olympic authorities are taking the hypocrisy of virtue signalling to new extremes. President Macron’s showpiece tournament may hide the trouble that France has found itself in for a few weeks, but the dishonour of exploiting labour in service of building their stadia will stain his reputation.”

“Having experienced life in France, where workers’ rights are so neglected, it is no surprise that so many migrants and refugees are choosing to cross the English Channel in search of a better life in Britain. Their hopes may, however, be dashed.”

Ultimately Oulds finds that “The bogus claim repeatedly made by Remainers that staying in the EU was the only way to protect workers’ rights was ridiculous.”

“British standards and protections exceed those set by the European Union. Working people in Britain know that aim of Brexit is about the opportunity to get a well-paying job. Indeed, Remainers’ like Lord Rose campaigned for a low-wage economy. Far from some employment Nirvana countries like France just want to continue exploiting the vulnerable while pretending that they care about migrants,” concludes Oulds.

How are the games affecting the property market?

Making matters worse, the 86,000 acre Olympic and Paralympic village is being built in St. Denis to provide athletes with a place to live and is set to be used as a residential neighborhood that is expected to provide an estimated 5,000 homes once the games end. As part of the “Grand Paris Hub” project to renovate the St. Denis suburb, a new train station, better transport links, new housing and increased public facilities will be created.

Apart from the Olympic village, the hub plans to build a high-class complex building used as office space, two forty story hotels, shopping and restaurant facilities and a grand exhibition centre. In essence, such a grand project looks extremely attractive to foreign investors and those who can afford to enjoy such luxuries.

However, the reality does not look quite exciting for those less fortunate and will hit those families who are unable to afford to live in St. Denis after the Games due to the rise in property prices that the development will cause. It is estimated that there could be an increase of 10% to 15% in property prices in the surrounding areas with a potential for apartments to increase by up to 25% around the new transport facilities created in the St. Denis suburb. Thus, with property prices already skyrocketing in Paris’s suburb towns, residents will be left scrambling to afford basic living conditions.

The northern region of Paris already suffered from years of neglect, unregulated infrastructure, and a less well-off population than that of central Paris. Therefore, this expected spike in property prices will only make matters worse by increasing the division and gap between Paris’ wealthy and poor residents. A rise in poverty levels should be expected at the cost of lavish mega sporting events.

Neighbourhood relocation

When assessing the Paris Olympic bid evaluation, the Institute for Human Rights and Business accessed that the French were indeed committed to making use of existing infrastructure meaning that there would not be a substantial risk of displacement of populations to create new game venues. Additionally, according to the IOC, the Paris Olympics will already feature 95 per cent of the existing and temporary venues in the city.

However, what can be seen since Paris won the bidding process to hold the Olympic Games, is quite the opposite of the above-mentioned statement, instead, the creation of the Olympic Village in the Northern suburb has led to the forced eviction and relocation of thousands. The human cost of a mega sporting event of such large magnitude comes as no surprise of course, however, the lack of response from the IOC and its member committees is quite shocking to say the least.

Apart from the forced relocation of residents in the St. Denis suburb, schools and local businesses have been coerced into shutting down to make space for the building process. Unsurprisingly, the IOC has not done anything to stop the destruction of over 20 businesses, 3 schools, hotels, one student accommodation complex, and housing for migrant workers.

Although residents and workers have been offered temporary housing relocation offers, local protests have been underway since the Olympic village project was announced. Alongside this, a rise in unemployment will come because of business closures and relocations, exacerbating the divisions between the rich and the poor.

One representative for the migrant workers’ hostels complained about the temporary housing relocation claiming that the location was far from transportation links, little or no access to restaurants, grocery stores, cafes, or a disable friendly environment. Students are left to find more expensive housing closer to the capital whilst business owners are concerned over damage to profit earnings.

It should go without saying that if a host country has a minimal amount of pre-allocated land for the building of the iconic Olympic Village they simply should not be considered or allowed to enter the bidding process. This means that countries who wish to host future Olympic Games should show evidence of allotted space that is available to be used for the creation of new venues. This will provide assurance that the human cost of building such grand stadiums and racetracks will be mitigated and decreased, ensuring as little harm as possible happens to those communities.

In France, a founding member of the European Union, the far-right party has advanced to the threshold of the Élysée Palace, and its voice is now being heard not only at home, but around the world. Marine Le Pen has never been so close to winning the presidential election. What if she crosses the threshold?

Since the night of April 10, French politicians, academics, intellectuals, journalists, and especially President Emmanuel Macron, have been repeating both verbally and in writing: “This is a historical responsibility, it is time to unite against the extreme right!” In the Fifth Republic, when this call was first made 20 years ago, in 2002, Jean Marie Le Pen eliminated the socialist candidate Lionel Jospin, but President Jacques Chirac won the election with 82.21 percent in the second round.

In 2017, when Emmanuel Macron won 24.1 percent and Marine Le Pen 21.30 percent of the votes in the first round, the call was repeated: “This is a historical responsibility, unite your votes against the extreme right!” Although the difference was not as clear as last time, Macron came in at 66.10 percent and Marine Le Pen at 33.90 percent. Here it is, five years later, in the first round, Emmanuel Macron got 27.84 percent, Marine Le Pen got 23.15 percent, and the other two far-right candidates Eric Zemmour got 7.07 percent and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan 2.28 percent.

The far right thus received a total of 32.50 percent of the votes in the first round. This time, according to various polls that see Macron ahead, the gap between the two candidates is closing and is only between 2 and 7 points.

In the last elections, the country’s traditional left and right parties had weakened in favor of Macron’s “neither right nor left, both right and left” party; this time, they were buried. Anne Hidalgo, the candidate of the socialists and the mayor of Paris, received 1.75 percent of the votes. Valérie Pécresse, the candidate of the center-right party of the Gaullist tradition, Les Républicains, is crying foul because her 4.78 percent will not allow her to receive state aid, and has launched a campaign to cover election costs.

Parties that receive less than 5 percent of the votes in France are not eligible for state aid. While that is the scenery, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the leader of the ultra-leftist La France Insoumise party, who is a presidential candidate for the third time, scored unpredictably high, receiving 21.95 percent of the votes. In other words, he almost scored high enough to qualify to run against Macron for the second round, the difference with Le Pen being only 1.2 percent.

Why did the far right and the far left get stronger?

So, what happened to make the far right and far left so strong in France? Why is everyone, especially Macron, screaming that “Republican values” are under threat? Why are the leaders of the Rassemblement national (National Rally) party (Le Pen), the Reconquête (Reconquest) (Zemmour), and Debout la France (Dupont-Aignan) called far-right? Who are their enemies, what makes the far right a far right?

The economic measures of Macron’s rival, Marine Le Pen, are similar to those of the far-left and even centrist parties. She wanted to take France out of the military wing of NATO, but De Gaulle also did so in 1966. She does not say, “France should leave the European Union,” but she makes promises that will inevitably create a de facto departure from the EU. “I will recognize the supremacy of constitutional law over European law by holding a referendum,” she says.

While Macron said in his 70-minute speech on “Fighting Separatism” that “in some schools, some students want meals in the canteens based on their religious beliefs” (i.e., they do not eat pork), according to Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin, this was communitarianism and unacceptable. In October 2019, Macron’s former interior minister, Christophe Castaner, described having a beard or celebrating Ramadan as “conspicuous” and a sign of radicalism. These and similar absurd statements were well received by France’s elite, whose apparently influential majority is extremely Islamophobic, and became the cover story of weekly magazines.

The Imam Charter, for example, a unique state-level text on anti-Muslim hostility, was the official declaration that Muslims were a separate and dangerous entity under the French Constitution and laws, even in their very existence. Judging by the ideas and actions that the imams, and thus Muslims, were supposed to commit to never think or act, they were a community prone to committing all kinds of evils, including “discrimination against the sick and disabled.”

Indeed, Macron’s government this year even shut down the Collective Against Islamophobia in France, one of the leading anti-discrimination organizations documenting hate crimes against Muslims. Between 2018 and 2022, France rummaged nearly 25,000 mosques, schools, associations, and workplaces, and shut down 718 bodies, including more than 20 mosques. The state demonizes Muslims with its Imam Charter, Anti-separatism Law, its so-called French Islam with its fabrications and rhetoric, and portrays Islam as a dangerous religion that needs mass surveillance and oppression. Muslim French are presented as an existential threat to France’s “civilization,” “tradition,” and “values.”

With a president and government that patented Islamophobia for themselves, naturally, Marine Le Pen had to go from door to door in the election campaign in order not to get euchred out of her voters. What’s more, Zemmour emerged as another candidate in the elections. “Sow the wind and reap the whirlwind,” say the Turks.

In his brief 10-minute speech after the election results were announced, Macron hastily began embracing Muslims. In his refutation, he said excitedly and surreptitiously, “I do not want a France that prevents Muslims or Jews from eating as their religion dictates. No, we will not.” For the first time, Macron mentioned Muslims and Jews in the same sentence, but because of the strict laws and sanctions against anti-Semitism, no one cares about the kosher of the Jews. He could not stop himself and went on to give a message to Muslims before the second round on April 24: “Madame Le Pen says she will ban the headscarf. Then, she will not be president of all French people.”

Before that, however, Macron had said, “The headscarf contradicts our country’s civilizational understanding of the relationship between men and women, and therefore makes us feel insecure.” Each of his ministers made numerous statements on the same subject. Marlène Schiappa, Minister Delegate in charge of Citizenship attached to the Ministry of Interior stated, “The headscarf is a political act,” and Minister of National Education Jean-Michel Blanquer said, “The headscarf is undesirable in our society.”

The Minister of the Interior Darmanin, who opposes Le Pen today, said, “In no democratic country in the world, is there a ban on religious symbols and signs in public spaces,” the women wearing headscarf were taken hostages in accordance with traditions that are not compatible with the Republic.

While hostility to Muslims brought votes from the far right, respect for Muslims also brought votes from the far left to Jean-Luc Mélenchon. French Muslims, who had to choose between deliberate abstention and voting, gave their votes to the far-left candidate Mélenchon by 70 percent, according to polls. Many French Muslims posted the following message verbatim on their social media platforms: “I never look at the world ideologically from the same angle, but Mélenchon does not discriminate, does not point fingers, does not label us and even condemns Islamophobia.”

The legitimization of Islamophobia, which resurged in France after the colonial period, especially since the 2000s, has played a very important role in the growth of the far right. Today, it is no longer just a threat to Muslims, but it indirectly threatens the rule of law, the European Union, and even the country’s strategic choices and alliances.

In the first round of France’s presidential election on April 10, incumbent Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen came out on top, securing their places in the second round of voting, which will be held on April 24.

Macron’s result was the best first-round performance for an incumbent president since 1988. He gained more votes than in the 2017 first round. There is no doubt that his warnings of the need to hold voters back from the far right and his role in the Ukraine-Russia war both played a big part in his success.

However, Le Pen also scored higher than in 2017, especially in the last few weeks of her campaign when, instead of putting Muslims on the agenda, she focused on the high costs of living and inflation, something that concerns most voters.

Now, with all the votes counted, Macron has over 27% and Le Pen has less than 23.1%. Far-left leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon came third, with close to 22% of the votes.

Although this year’s election did not exceed the 2002 record levels of abstentions, which stood at 28%, the percentage of voters who abstained this time remained high at 26% which corresponds to 12.8 million from around 49 million eligible voters. This time the abstention rate was higher than in the first round five years ago.

The abstention among the younger population was higher this year than in the previous elections. According to Ipsos-Sopra Steria estimates, the age group with most abstentions was voters between 25 and 34 (46%).

Yasser Louati, a French political analyst, believes that voters abstain from voting mainly because they don’t have faith in politicians.

“We have millions of people living under the poverty line, COVID19 killed more than 150,000 people. We have institutions that are being discredited, people don’t believe in institutions, politicians are not trusted, journalists are not trusted,” he told Politics Today.

“Instead of addressing these questions and how we can make our institutions more legitimate, how we can address poverty, we have debates over Muslims. Such as, do Muslims belong here? Are Muslims like us?” he noted.

Amal Benkerroum, a Muslim woman entrepreneur, who is thinking of leaving France, told us, “I don’t know if I will vote on Sunday. I don’t know who to vote for.” She added, “If Le Pen becomes the next president of France, I am going to leave France because that means the community that we are living in doesn’t want us and we are not welcome.”

With the second runoff only a week away, France is faced with two choices. However, most young people feel that neither Macron nor Le Pen can represent them. Four days after the first round, several hundred students took to the streets chanting “Neither Macron nor Le Pen!” Most of them voted for the hard-left leader Mélenchon, and they complain about not having a suitable candidate in the second round who represents them.

According to Ifop pollsters, Macron is expected to receive 51% of the votes and Le Pen 49% on April 24. However, abstentions may increase in the second round mostly due to the fact that the 2022 French election has been driven by fear rather than hope. Although Macron is calling on people to vote for him in order to block the far right, the gap is very narrow and it is the first time in French history that the far right is so close to winning.

Who would have thought that French President Emmanuel Macron and the Muslim minority living under pressure in France especially during his term, would breathe a sigh of relief at the same time, for the same reason, albeit for a temporary period! The war launched by Russian President Vladimir Putin on February 24, 2022, on the grounds of the “demilitarizing and de-Nazification of Ukraine,” turned the political climate in France upside down.

With the biggest conventional war that Europe has seen since World War II, Russians took the place of the Muslim minority in France, who were spoken of with hostility from morning to night and subjected to legal regulations one after another. Muslims, who were the target of far-right candidates in the first round of the presidential elections, could thus partially breathe because people are now more afraid of the Russians.

On the other hand, compared to the other candidates, President Macron, whose popularity had started decreasing as far back as directly after he was elected, turned into a dignified statesman who tried to manage the crisis in his capacity as the EU term president. Naturally, he was relieved.

After three years in which the most discriminatory laws of the Fifth Republic were enacted and anti-Islam and anti-Muslim hostility turned into a state policy, “immigrants, Islam, and Muslims” were at the forefront of the propaganda during the election campaigns.

The most media-savy and strongest candidates of the election campaign, hang on to 75-year-old former socialist militant Renaud Camus, who has turned into one of the most influential figures of the far right, and his conspiracy theory called “Le Grand Remplacement” (The Great Replacement) which claims that Arabs and Muslims will seize control of France.

This infamous theory had also influenced Brenton Tarrant, who attacked two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand in 2019, causing 51 deaths and 49 injuries. While the far-right Marine Le Pen has long expressed her admiration for Camus, Éric Zemmour, a far-right candidate who called for banning Arabic names, and giving employers the right not to employ Arabs/African,  has turned Camus’s theory into the central idea of ​​his media show and political propaganda.

Aside from the discussion of whether the left would be a remedy in the face of this storm, where the extreme right ideas sailed into the stern, Liberation Newspaper asks: where was the left? At the beginning of the election campaign, the newspaper asked, “Well, who will protect Muslims, women, Jews, officials, intellectuals, and other targets from this hate speech?” and argued that the left should come out with an inevitable historical mission.

However, there was no reply to this article. Could Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s coming third with 22% of the total votes be an answer? The left in France has not been able to straighten its back since the socialist François Hollande, who ruled the country between 2012 and 2017.

The Socialist Party candidate, 62-year-old Anne Hidalgo, who was elected mayor of Paris in 2014, could not exceed 2% at the polls. It is not new for the French left to lose some of the working class to the far right, and to leave others in despair and make them abstain from the elections. To some, this is a lost ideological war. In fact, no leader candidate from the left could emerge with a political agenda to meet this need at a time when social democracy is most needed because of the COVID19 crisis.

Nevertheless, not on the left but on the extreme left wing, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the leader of La France insoumise (France Unbowed), was the surprise of the first round in his third run as a presidential candidate. With his promises to increase the minimum wage, to bring back a tax that was lifted for the rich, and to be positive towards the Muslim minority, he got 22% of the total votes.

Far-right ideas were seriously moving along, but Russia’s invasion of Ukraine directly affected the dynamics in French politics. As Russia claimed that its purpose was to destroy the neo-Nazis in Ukraine, far-right and right-wing candidates in France that engage in anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim propaganda were suddenly cornered. Le Pen, Zemmour, and even Mélenchon had to make people forget about their long-held admiration for Vladimir Putin and their various relations with him in person. Each tried to condemn Putin and Russia in their own way.

There was another important development revealed by the war: the immigrant was in disguise! He was no longer Arab and Muslim, but European. The commentator on the French television channel BFM put it thus, “They were not Syrians fleeing the bombings of the Syrian regime, but Europeans, with cars like ours, who simply set out to save their lives.” “Immigrants,” which was one of the most talked about topics for all candidates, including President Macron, in the election campaign, thus turned into a sensitive issue that have forced candidates to use a careful language.

Far-right candidate Zemmour said, “I would prefer the Ukrainians to be in Poland. Also, when the war is over, they can return home more easily: it is not good to destabilize France, which is drowning in immigration.” And after saying this he suddenly became “heartless”! His far-right rival Le Pen must have sensed the changing tide and and said that “Ukrainian acceptance is very natural.”

And President Macron, whose support went down right after he took his seat in the Elysée Palace, who had to struggle with the consequences of the Yellow Vest protests all over the country, who had to deal with the weaknesses in the health and industry sectors caused by the COVID19 pandemic, announced his candidacy for the elections on March 3, just five days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

His tactic was to watch the opposition candidates from the stage and turn the first round of elections into the opposition’s primary election. Although this situation was criticized as a “democratic deficit,” he was redressed as a candidate who sought a solution to the Ukraine crisis before the Russian invasion, who tried to persuade Putin, and gave the image that he strove for peace. Thus, he assumed the most reasonable role as both the French president and the president of the EU Council.

Macron broke away with his closest rival Le Pen, passed her by 4.7 points, and got 27.8% in the first round. Macron’s claim was to fill the seat of European leadership left vacant by Merkel and to foster France’s role in finding solutions to the problems of the European Union. Although this was opportunism and was criticized as such, until the war, the French elections were publicly discussed with headlines such as “Will Europe win the elections?” The Russia-Ukraine War changed the country’s priorities.

Macron’s famous opinion that “progress in the common defense capacity is of critical importance to ensure the sovereignty of the European Union,” which he frequently emphasized, now gained a special meaning during the war. Macron defines himself as “a defender of democracy against populism” and the only candidate who could find answers to questions such as: What red line will be drawn against the dictator who tries to seize European order? What weapons will be used to resist since there is no one ready to die for Ukraine in the European Union? What should be done for France to gain its sovereignty industrially, strategically, and militarily?

Political commentators in France put it all down to the lack of alternatives. Now the question is whether there can be a surprise in the second round.

France will choose its new president in April of this year. Current president Emmanuel Macron has not yet announced his candidacy, but he is expected to announce it officially soon. There are around 40 candidates who will run for the election.

The presidency is the strongest organ of the country’s two-headed executive branch. Thus, the French presidential election attracts a global interest as French presidents determine the country’s foreign policy and domestic politics.

While far-right politicians in France have been already mobilized, Macron, who was elected in 2017 with great expectations, wants to be re-elected. No prediction for a future election is easy, and neither is predicting whether Macron will be elected again. To this end, we need to have a brief look at Macron’s four-year term in office.

Macron’s failed tests

Emmanuel Macron faced many challenges in domestic politics after he was elected in 2017. The yellow vests protests and the COVID-19 pandemic were the most important tests. In November 2018, civil protests broke out against the rising fuel prices and living costs. The police response was violent and used disproportionate force against civilians participating in the protests, leading to severe criticism of the Macron administration.

The Macron government did not prevent the excessive violence by the security forces, but on the contrary, made legal arrangements for the use of violence. The General Security Law emerged as a reaction to the protests and was approved in France’s National Assembly, empowering security forces and justifying the use of excessive force to defend and protect themselves.

Macron failed another test in the fight against the COVID19 pandemic. His administration couldn’t efficiently overcome the socio-economic problems that emerged due to the pandemic, reducing confidence in Macron’s leadership. As a result, La République En Marche! (LREM) founded by Macron suffered a great defeat in the municipal and regional elections that took place in 2020 and 2021, respectively. LREM fell short of expectations and lost big cities such as Lyon, Marseille, and Paris to the Greens and Socialists, respectively.

Islamophobic aspects of the candidates

The Islamophobic views of prominent candidates such as Macron, Le Pen, and Zemmour in the lead-up to the election point to a serious threat to Muslims in the country. In fact, the marginalization and securitization of Muslims in France since the September 11 terrorist attacks reveal that the French governments follow an institutionally Islamophobic stance.

The Islamophobic views of prominent candidates such as Macron, Le Pen, and Zemmour in the lead-up to the election point to a serious threat to Muslims in France.

More recently, Macron’s government has closed down 17 mosques with vague claims of violating security laws or not meeting the required safety standards, and has surveyed nearly 90 mosques. Moreover, the government pressured the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) to sign a charter of “Republican values” as a part of its so-called French Islam project.

With elections drawing near, the French government is looking for ways to appeal to far-right voters. For instance, on February 5, 2022, they officially introduced the Forum of Islam in France (FORIF) that took over from the CFCM. What’s controversial about this forum is that all its members will be handpicked by the government, evidently undermining the political representation of Muslims in the country.

As part of their far-right ideology Marine Le Pen and Eric Zemmour are quite notorious for holding both Islamophobic and anti-Semitic stances. Both oppose the presence of Islam and Muslims in France. More extreme than Le Pen, Zemmour calls for the assimilation of Muslims and demands that French Muslims renounce their faith.

Muslims in France are struggling to decide which candidate to vote for in the election. Whatever the outcome of the election is, difficult days lie ahead for French Muslims, which comprise around 10 percent of the population. The worst-case scenario is a far-right candidate coming to power. Then Muslims would face innumerable difficulties including facing more violent acts in the coming years.

How might the election results affect relations with Turkey?

It seems that two political/ideological factions stand out in the French presidential elections. The first is the relatively moderate line represented by Macron, and the other is the far-right line represented by Le Pen and Zemmour. If Macron is re-elected, as seems probable at the moment, the current tense atmosphere in Turkish-French relations may continue. More specifically the tensions in Libya, Syria, and the Eastern Mediterranean, where the concerned parties are in direct confrontation, are likely to remain.

The second scenario would be catastrophic. If the far right comes to power in France, then, there would be a paradigm shift in France’s relations with Turkey. Turkish-French relations cannot remain healthy under a Turkophobic and Islamophobic government. In such a scenario, ideological motives would dominate the relationship and the bilateral relations may come to a breaking point. Therefore, Macron’s victory in the presidential election seems the more preferable option for Turkey.

What did France’s President think he was doing by visiting Putin in Moscow? On the anniversary of the EU adopting the Maastricht Treaty – heavily backed by France – a lot has changed in the world. But Macron hasn’t changed his own vision of France and is still living in the 90s where the Republic had more clout on the world’s stage and Russia was just rebuilding itself after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The long table stunt was pure genius by Putin, who knows a good media opportunity when it walks in the room. The ruse, to make Macron look pathetic, servile and very much a servant at the master’s table paid off as Macron was blindsided by the media arrangements, too obsessed with his moment in the global media spotlight.

Compared to other world leaders who visited Putin – Merkel, Trump and just recently Erdogan – Macron was certainly treated with a certain contempt, which reflects exactly how the  Russian leader regards the EU project and Macron himself. Lightweights.

Macron paid a heavy price consequently to agree to the long table photo shoot which served as an example of how out of touch he is and how desperate he is to promote himself as a world leader, weeks ahead of the Presidential elections in France which will probably reinstall him as the country’s premier.

He believes in a European pillar within NATO and that France should lead such a farcical vanguard, which is really what the visit to Putin was about. He undermined NATO entirely and even went as far as to support Russia’s presence in Eastern Ukraine all in exchange for the meeting itself which he really believed would make him shine at home with the voters and embolden his banal ideas of an EU army, led by France which supposedly would deter Putin.

The Russian leader’s threats are very real and Macron’s visit and the hilarious memes which followed gave Putin even more kudos.

All nonsense and wildly deluded. In reality what we saw by the move was that it merely enshrined Putin even more and affirmed him as a powerful leader of a mighty super power which, unlike the West, does not have a reputation of talking big but then retreating when someone calls its bluff. Putin is not Obama. The Russian leader’s threats are very real and Macron’s visit and the hilarious memes which followed gave Putin even more kudos and placed Russia where it has wanted to be but failed for twenty years – in a superior position where the West is actually listening to its security concerns. Macron just walked straight into a media trap and gave Putin exactly what he wanted: a snapshot of the West on its knees with cavernous, weak, ambitious leaders begging for sympathy.

Macron is part of a political elite which since Maastricht has treated Russia with contempt. In particular, the EU’s role in pushing Kiev to mull NATO membership was foolish and has led to the present crisis. The photo itself of the long table will be logged in the annals of history as the key moment where Russia no longer takes the EU and the West seriously as the tipping point now is in Russia’s favor.

Putin will be delighted by how the meeting went. Macron really got nothing accept mockery on the internet, while the EU and NATO had to just look on as puerile spectators while he made everyone look like second rate players.

Aside from the memes on the internet which just made Macron look stupid, there are some important messages there which Putin’s media people manipulated. The main message is that Russia has the advantage however the Ukraine debacle turns out. It is the lion, surrounded by mice.

The winner takes it all. And Putin is winning even more now after Macron gave him this latest media coup.

Macron’s embarrassing charade merely supported this. A French president who has delusional views about his own status in the world organizing himself a personal visit to see the Russian president doesn’t make France look like the super power that it would like to project of itself, more like a corrupt, minor EU member state which allows its president to manipulate its own media, led by a man who clearly doesn’t have any respect for the fourth estate.

France today is struggling to come to terms with its new demise and Macron’s visit just underlined this as he walked away a loser. The winner takes it all. And Putin is winning even more now after Macron gave him this latest media coup.

Another message from Putin is that he is neither scared nor bothered by the threat of sanctions from the West, which is really what the whole row is about. Sanctions alone will be difficult on Putin and in particular his close circle of tycoons who have huge investments in London. But as Biden has proved, secondary sanctions imposed on a handful of countries which buy oil from Iran, are very hard these days to implement and Putin has made it clear that, if necessary, he will trade sanctions for an invasion of some sort, if the West doesn’t engineer a way of Ukraine talking down NATO membership.

Of course, if Putin sent his own troops into those regions, Macron may well be delighted as this would give even more gravitas to his idea of an EU army. The problem of course is that the French leader doesn’t want to send French troops to a war zone with Russia, as he has proved by speeding up his own withdrawal of troops in Mali, once the presence of Russian mercenaries just recently emerged. But it will be that iconic picture of the long table which will haunt Macron as the Russian media machine will be the victor. As Churchill once said, history is written by winners. And that snapshop of the long table makes it quite clear who the winners and losers are.

Greece ordered a total of 18 Rafale combat aircraft from France in 2021. The country received the first six Dassault Rafale combat aircraft on January 19, 2022.  The Rafale is planned to replace the older models of the Mirage 2000 aircraft, also produced by France.

The year 2021 saw many developments regarding combat aircraft in the form of announcements of selection and procurement signatures. The Rafale by France and the F-35 by the United States were the two most prominent aircraft in the headlines throughout the year. The technical-military selection criteria and the political impact thereof are subject to debate. The evaluation of modern combat aircraft, similar to other sophisticated platforms such as air defense systems, requires a multi-disciplinary approach incorporating military, technological, and political assessments. The competition between the Rafale and the F-35 is emblematic of such a challenge.

The F-35 Lightning II

The F-35 Lightning II is the product of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program to develop a next-generation combat aircraft for the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps as well as the program’s partner nations and major U.S. allies. Developed by Lockheed Martin, the F-35 has three variants: the conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) version F-35A; the short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) version F-35B; and carrier variant (CV) F-35C. All variants share the same basic design and mission systems whereas critical subsystems and performance parameters differ based on specific design requirements.

The development and manufacture of the F-35 are undertaken by the United States and seven partner nations, namely the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Italy, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Turkey was also a partner in the program, but was removed by the United States in 2020 due to Ankara’s purchase of S-400 air defense systems from the Russian Federation.

According to the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation in 2021, the F-35 program costs a total of $1.7 trillion across its lifecycle.

The F-35A is a fifth-generation combat aircraft which incorporates next-generation flight and combat capabilities such as very low observability (VLO) against radars and other sensors, advanced electronic warfare, electronic intelligence and communication capabilities, various types of electromagnetic and electro-optical sensors, and a wide range of precision guided air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons. The F-35 was designed around the concept of interoperability, as a tactical combat platform able to seamlessly exchange data with various air, sea, land, and space assets of allied nations during complex multinational operations.

The JSF is the world’s most expensive and complicated weapon development project to date. Along with the project’s political aspect, JSF has resulted in controversy and criticism mainly because of its sizable budget and schedule overruns. According to an estimate by the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation in 2021, the F-35 program is expected to cost a total of $1.7 trillion across its lifecycle.

The Rafale has a maximum takeoff weight of 24.5 tons and can carry 9.5 tons of external fuel and armament. For strategic strike missions, the Rafale’s main weapon is the SCALP air-launched cruise missile and the ASMP standoff nuclear missile that is used for nuclear strike. The latest version of the Rafale is designated as “F3R.” This variant comes with improved avionics systems and the introduction of the RBE2-AA new-generation active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, replacing the legacy RBE2 radar. A follow-on variant, the F4 is under development and all French air and naval forces Rafales will be upgraded to this standard.

F-35 partner orders and exports

More than 700 F-35s have been delivered to the United States, partner nations, and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customers as of late 2021. So far, the U.S. has ordered 1,763 F-35As, 353 F-35Bs, and 353 F-35Cs. Partner nations, namely the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Australia, Denmark, and Norway, have confirmed orders for 353 F-35A/Bs. Canada, a Level III partner, has so far not ordered any F-35s.

In addition to the United States and seven program partners, so far, the F-35 has been selected or ordered by eight nations. South Korea ordered 40 F-35As in 2014, with a follow-on acquisition of 20 F-35As and 20 F-35Bs announced in August 2020. Two other major U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific region, namely Japan and Australia, have ordered F-35s. Japan signed an agreement for an initial batch of 42 F-35As and in 2018 declared plans for the procurement of 63 F-35As and 42 F-35Bs.

Two states, namely Israel and Singapore, are procuring the F-35 as Security Cooperative Participants (SCP) under agreements signed in 2003. In 2006, the Israeli Air Force officially announced its long-term plan to purchase more than 100 F-35As. The contract for the first 19 aircraft was signed in 2010, followed by an order for 14 more in 2015. A batch of 17 aircraft was ordered in 2016, and the first F-35A was delivered in December 2016. As of January 2022, the Israeli Air Force has 30 F-35As in service. The U.S. approved the sale of four F-35Bs to Singapore with an option for eight more in January 2020.

In September 2019, the U.S. approved the sale of F-35As to Poland with a cost of $6.5 billion. Another agreement for 32 jets was signed in January 2020. In the following year, another NATO ally, Belgium, selected the F-35A to replace its aging F-16A/B fleet. A contract for 34 F-35As was signed in April 2020.

The F-35A won two major competitions in 2021. First, Switzerland announced its selection of the aircraft in June 2021. The F-35A competed against the Dassault Rafale and the Swedish Saab Gripen E/F. The Swiss Air Force will receive 36 F-35As. The other feat was in Finland. After a much-publicized competition against the Dassault Rafale, the Eurofighter Typhoon, and the Saab Gripen, the F-35A was declared the winner in December 2021. Finland will purchase 64 F-35As along with a large package of precision-guided munitions.

The F-35 is currently on the agenda of several countries. One of the most controversial cases is the United Arab Emirates. A letter of request (LoR) for 50 F-35As and a large package worth $23 billion including MQ-9 Reaper armed drones was sent to Washington in September 2020. The request was approved on the last day of Donald Trump’s presidency and temporarily paused for review by his successor Joe Biden. The process was reportedly given a go-ahead by the Biden administration, but the UAE said it will withdraw the request in December 2021 because of a disagreement over operational limitations and logistics.

Greece is planning to induct the F-35 as well. Athens sent an LoR for 24 aircraft in November 2020. Other prospective customers include Spain, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Thailand.

France’s sales thrust for the Rafale

After entering service with the French air forces and navy, the Rafale was marketed to many countries, but did not achieve an export success until the mid-2010s mainly due to high acquisition costs. In February 2015, Egypt ordered 24 Rafales under a €5.2 billion agreement with France. The agreement also covered the purchase of a FREMM class frigate and various types of missiles. A follow-on order for 30 jets was made in 2021, bringing the total number of Egyptian Rafales to 54.

France was shocked when Jean Marie Le Pen, who was the leader of the far-right party and never invited to be on any television channel in France, went into the second round against Jacques Chirac with 16.86% of votes in the 2002 presidential elections. Expectedly, Chirac was elected president with 82.21% in the second round; meanwhile Le Pen could only increase his vote to 17.79%.

But, according to the newspaper headlines, this was a shameful event and a great disaster for France! This was because Le Pen, who was prosecuted for inciting xenophobia and for his statement that gas chambers were “a mere detail” in the history of World War II, achieved a great success considering he could only win 0.74% of votes in 1974 when he first ran.

That’s all water under the bridge now. Over the last 20 years, far-right ideas have flourished and bloomed. They have even ceased to be “far-right ideas” as they have become pretty common. An ambiguous xenophobia against Africans, Arabs, and sometimes people coming from countries in the European Union was replaced by an overt hatred of Islam and hostility towards Muslims. This new xenophobia moved to the center of politics and gained serious ground in both left-wing and right-wing politics.

French Minister of Higher Education Frédérique Vidal, who gave an interview to CNews channel after Blanquer, said, “Islamo-leftism causes social collapse and I think universities as a part of the society are not free of its grip.” Not only that, Vidal also called on the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) to conduct a study on the “Islamo-Gauchisme [French term of Islamo-leftism] effect and its impact on studies on the decolonization process” in universities.

There are many examples of the so-called valorous breakthroughs in the name of Islamophobia that started in the 2000s. An influential figure in left-wing politics, feminist intellectual and philosopher Élizabeth Badinter, in an interview to the newspaper Le Monde during socialist President Hollande’s incumbency stated, “Don’t be afraid of being accused of being Islamophobic; I’m not afraid, no one should be afraid.” She had also secured the support of Prime Minister Manuel Valls at the time.

Before that, one of the founders of the highly circulated right-wing magazine Le Point, Claude Imbert said in slightly more timid words, “To be honest, I’m a bit Islamophobic,” while Françoise Laborde, a former Radical Party of the Left senator who later joined Macron’s party, said, “Frankly, I like being called Islamophobic.” These are only a taste of what’s going on.

With his talent as a writer, Zemmour expresses in a vulgar but impactful way what others could only whisper or insinuate. He is a republican after all, albeit being “radical” or “overzealous” for some. In France, the definitions of secularism, republicanism, and “Civilization” – whether used together or separately – are extraordinarily useful euphemisms for anti-Islamic sentiment and hostility towards Muslims. When it comes to Muslims, Zemmour’s far-right ideological position of “Civilization and the Republic,” Marine Le Pen’s emphasis on “Secularism,” and a socialist or a right-wing politician’s discourse of “Republicanism, Secularism” or “Civilization” are not different at all.

As a matter of fact, Macron’s “Anti-Separatism Bill” was renamed “Principles Strengthening Respect for the Laws of the Republic” after receiving backlash across the world for being Islamophobic; however, it retained its content. In other words, the state does not openly say “give up your Islamic identity” like Zemmour, but does its best to make Muslims live their faith in their inner world and make their physical attachment to their religion invisible.

The French public is subject to constant manipulation; the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP), one of the leading research institutions in France, for instance, published a survey last month based on students’ responses to the question “Have you observed any behavioral patterns at school that show signs of religious belonging?” Zemmour, then, justified his thesis through this survey.

Horrendous cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed being projected on government buildings or Muslim children being forced to look at these cartoons as a part of their education, and two 10- or 11-year-old students who refused to look at these cartoons being taken from their homes with their families and being subjected to investigation is not dissimilar to what Zemmour promises.

Eric Zemmour announced and propagated this discourse and his racist comments by writing for mainstream media outlets like Le Quotidien de Paris and Le Figaro, along with appearing on prime-time shows on channels such as RTL and France 2. Although he faced trial and was convicted twice, it is not possible to claim that he has faced a hostile response to his person. In the last 20 years, he has become a celebrity in political and economic circles. For two years, he was working at CNews, the news channel controlled by the Catholic businessman Vincent Bolloré, who previously supported Macron.

Eric Zemmour announced and propagated this discourse and his racist comments by writing for mainstream media outlets like Le Quotidien de Paris and Le Figaro, along with appearing on prime-time shows on channels such as RTL and France 2.

Despite all this, there is something about Zemmour that renders him unique. Born in 1958 to an Algerian Jewish family, at his first official political rally on December 5, 2021 he boasted of his minority background, describing himself as a “little Berber Jew from the other side of the Mediterranean.” Zemmour, who was educated at a private Jewish school located in a Parisian suburb, says he practices his faith but does not consider himself Orthodox. However, this is not what makes him unique – he is accused of turning historical events on their head, while some describe him as an “anti-Semitic Jew.”

Indeed, Zemmour claimed that “Dreyfus may not be innocent,” [referring to the political scandal riddled with anti-Semitism known as “Dreyfus affair”] and Philippe Petain, who was president during the Nazi occupation between 1940 and 1944, was actually watching over the French Jews! Shocking at first glance, Zemmour’s connection to anti-Semitic history seems to be his far-right ideology, and the anti-Semitic vein at the base of the far-right may have tactically compelled him to make such comments. Indeed, 93-year-old former far-right party leader Le Pen also declared that he supports Zemmour instead of his daughter. “The only difference between Éric and me is that he is a Jew. It’s hard to call him a Nazi or a fascist. It gives him more freedom,” Le Pen said.

On the other hand, there may be another element to explain his shocking historical “revisionism.” In France, there is a publication called Causeur, which was first established as a website by the Sephardic Jewish journalist and writer Élisabeth Lévy. Causeur has been publishing as a monthly magazine for several years now and is deemed a right-wing and far right-wing publication. Alain Finkielkraut, another one of the magazine’s founders, is one of the country’s most influential and prominent philosophers and of Jewish origin, who is known for being “just like Lévy, but more of an Islamophobe.”

Lévy, in the article titled “Salomon, Will You Vote for Zemmour?” states that Zemmour is the talk after synagogue services. She relays that while part of the congregation says, “aren’t you be ashamed to support him, so you’re going to vote for a Petainist,” others say “Zemmour is our savior.” Due to France’s foreign policy discourse or despite the protection offered by legislation against anti-Semitism, the rise of Islamophobia causes tensions between Arab and Jewish children in the suburbs, especially in Paris. Lévy extracts that while many institutions and organizations of the Jewish community condemn Zemmour for his views and allegations, Jewish families residing in the suburbs see him as a “savior” or even as the “last exit before exile.”

According to polls, with 14-17% of the vote, Zemmour is unlikely to become president. However, in a country where far-right parties and ideas are indisputably on the rise, he will retain a significant voter base and will continue to inflame the debates along with consolidating the anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim rhetoric.

On December 3 and 4, 2021, French President Emmanuel Macron traveled to the Gulf for a short visit to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. This is likely to be his last foreign trip outside of Europe, as France has entered election season. The presidential election will take place on April 10 and 24, 2022, and

Macron is preparing to run for re-election.

Macron’s trip highlights the importance of the Gulf countries on at least two levels. First, at a time of the United States’ disengagement from the region, France is trying to occupy its place economically, militarily, and politically.

Second, at a time when the issue of Islam and Muslims is at the center of the presidential campaign, Macron wants to seek support for the French position against “radicalism,” and especially so after the adoption of the “Law against Separatism,” renamed the “Law Reinforcing the Principles of the Republic,” which came into force in August 2021 and which has caused much misunderstanding in the Muslim world (and elsewhere) as it appears to be (and is in fact) a law against Islam and Muslims.

The most successful stopover was in Abu Dhabi, where President Macron has a close personal relationship with the Emirates’ strongman, Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ). The signing of a record contract for the sale of 80 Rafale aircraft was accompanied by the sale of twelve Eurocopter EC725 Caracal helicopters, and the singing of various economic partnership agreements. “This is the biggest military contract with a French component in our history – worth some 17 billion euros,”  Macron said.

For Macron, this is proof of the close ties between Paris and Abu Dhabi. “I think that the Emirates and the Crown Prince saw that France was a solid partner in the fight against terrorism (…), that is to say that we kept our commitments in the region and that we were attached to its balance.” For it is not only a question of arms sales, but of a community of views and coordination between Abu Dhabi and Paris in the “war against terrorism” (notably in Libya), and in the fight against “political Islam,” as shown by the presence on the trip of Laurent Nuñez, the national coordinator of intelligence and the fight against terrorism. MBZ’s support for French laws against “separatism” is particularly appreciated.

We should notice that the French president said nothing about the authoritarian nature of the Abu Dhabi regime, which imprisons and tortures its opponents, about its involvement in the deadly war in Yemen, or about its use of Pegasus spy software. Yet, a few days later, a report by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) highlighted the dark side of the regime and Paris’s complicity in it.

The last and most controversial stop of Macron’s trip to the Gulf, in France at least, was his visit to Saudi Arabia. For the first time since the horrific murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018, a major head of state of the Western world agreed to meet Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), the Saudi crown prince, widely considered the mastermind of this crime.

Relations between MBS and Macron had not been rosy since the French president “rescued” Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in 2018, when he was reportedly kidnapped in Saudi Arabia by MBS and forced to announce his resignation from Riyadh.

Relations between MBS and Macron had not been rosy since the French president “rescued” Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in 2018.

While the aim of the meeting was also to give a boost to bilateral relations – and to take advantage of the rift between Washington and Riyadh, with President Joe Biden refusing any contact with MBS – one of the objectives was a new mediation with Lebanon, which the Saudis are subjecting to a trade embargo that is aggravating the economic crisis in the country. The result was modest: a conversation between Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati and MBS on Macron’s phone. Nothing more came of the visit – no return of ambassadors and no lifting of the embargo.

During the trip, the question of the nuclear agreement with Iran was not at the center of the discussions. Macron made only one declaration asking the Gulf states and Israel to be associated, a non-starter for Iran and even for the U.S. It is also noteworthy that the question of Palestine was not addressed, as France has supported the Abraham Accords and largely abandoned its traditional position on a solution to the Palestinian question.

There are three obvious conclusions to Macron’s visit to the Gulf. First, the trip was notable for the absence of any reference by France to human rights in the region. It is true that since the reception of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in France in December 2020 and his decoration as “Grand Officier de la Légion d’honneur,” President Macron has not seemed to attach much importance to democracy in the Middle East.

Secondly, Macron’s visit made clear the importance of the “Islam” dimension in French foreign policy, a ball and chain that is all heavier since Paris is the only major Western capital to show such an obsession with Islam and Muslims. Finally, Macron’s visit shows that France can still be an actor in the Gulf and the Middle East, and can defend its interests there; however, its weight is limited, especially in the regional conflicts (Iran, Syria, Palestine, Yemen), not only when compared with the United States, but also with regional powers such as Turkey, Iran, or Russia.

The year 2021 has witnessed an escalated tension in the Middle Eastern and European security complexes. Early this year, Saudi Arabia and Greece strengthened their bilateral cooperation. Simultaneously, France encouraged Greece to increase its armament while blaming its European partners for turning a deaf ear to the threats the European Union is facing.

France, Saudi Arabia, and Greece seem to have twofold gains from this cooperation. They could both better materialize their energy cooperation and target Turkey’s gas explorations as well as challenge Turkey’s maritime superiority in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean.

Since early 2021, Turkey is voicing its concern over the Saudi F-15s to be based in the Souda air force base in Crete. The first quarter of the year signaled a potential escalation regarding the military drills to be conducted in the Aegean Sea. Turkey’s chief objection was to the Saudi F-15s that would be piloted by Greek lieutenants during military drills.

In February 2021, the Philia Forum brought Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain together to integrate into the pre-established Greek-Egypt-Cyprus cooperation. The main actor behind this initiative was Saudi Arabia. France conducted the White Shark 21 maritime drills, which symbolized the new hawkish stance against the Turkish energy pivot in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Military drills jointly conducted by France, Greece, Israel, Cyprus, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in the heart of the Aegean Sea are obviously a significant development. The dynamic of this alliance is issue-specific and narrow-scoped; however, it has a potential to attain short-term goals.

In the last three years, one of Turkey’s most important advantages has been its natural gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In the last three years, one of Turkey’s most important advantages has been its natural gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean, which created political complications with states such as Greece, Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, and France as well as with institutions including NATO and the European Union. The current balance of power created room for maneuver for Turkey which is now being constrained by rival energy-seekers such as France, Italy, Greece, and Israel.

Nevertheless, this alliance has been forged to preserve the status quo, and an stalemate might be an actual gain for the guarantor states such as France. There are two interrelated motives behind the French foreign policy: defense exports and international prestige. France is a leading actor in defense exports and tries to be an alternative to the United States.

Greece and Israel try to increase their political influence to protect or obtain bargains from the European search for more reliable energy sources.

In the last three years, France has been the second-largest defense exporter to Saudi Arabia after the U.S. For the last 5 to 10 years, only the UK has been able to compete with France. Besides, Greece and Israel try to increase their political influence to protect or obtain bargains from the European search for more reliable energy sources. There are a lot of pull factors of entering such a dynamic such as increased resolve to engage in conflict, better military resources, and the higher chance of deterrence, etc.

Such circumstances create a potential conflict on the Turkish maritime borders in the Eastern Mediterranean. It seems like the age-old Turco-Greek debate on the naval border is going to evolve into a bitter rivalry over the control of the Eastern Mediterranean energy flow. Certain stakeholders such as energy providers like Egypt, Algeria, and Israel will set the tone for which side will have the wind at its back.

Turkey can become a trendsetter by discovering natural gas reserves. It might also play a transmitter role with a plan that bypasses Cyprus and Greece, and transfers the Eastern Mediterranean gas directly to the EU. In this context, the problem for the gas alliance builders in the Eastern Mediterranean seems to be Turkey’s potential to be simultaneously a trendsetter and a transmitter.

Turkey’s potential to attain this power is perceived as a threat by its rivals. From an international relations perspective, such conflicts are quite natural; the most formidable alliance will once again force the other to succumb to its demands.

Emmanuel Macron’s statement on French colonial history and memory in Algeria and his sharp criticism of the Algerian regime sparked a political crisis between the two countries, which are linked with more than 130 years of colonial history. Macron’s statement is not new to the French political elite, which since Algeria’s independence in 1962 has been playing the colonial history card on every occasion for internal political consumption in France. Given the size of the Algerian community in France, Algeria has always occupied a significant place in the sociopolitical agenda.

More than four million Algerians are living in France and more than one million French Algerians are eligible to vote in French elections. During his visit to Algeria in 2007 on the eve of French elections, former French president Nicolas Sarkozy was the first French head of state to utter words of recognition and apology for the French colonial crimes.

However, later, he explicitly withdrew his statement during a presidential visit in December of the same year. What is new in President Macron’s statement is the criticism of the ruling elite in Algeria, his direct targeting of it, and the reference to the military structure of the regime despite the good relations that link these elites with France both publicly and behind the scenes.

This is the reason why Algerian authorities reacted strongly to Macron, especially when he referred to the slackness of the Algerian regime vis-à-vis the popular movement (the Hirak Movement) that erupted on February 22, 2019. Moreover, Macron questioned the existence before French colonialism of an Algerian nation in the first place. In a clear echo of the French orientalists of the nineteenth century, he ignored Algeria’s long history and its emergence as a state, the state of Numidia, a thousand years before the French state existed.

In fact, the French cultural and scientific machine worked hard to justify Algeria’s occupation and dissolving its political structure following its colonization in 1834, claiming it as French soil and its inhabitants as French Muslims. From then onward, France employed the Catholic Church’s religious machinery under the pretext of “civilizing” Algerians by educating them.

Behind Macron’s statement lies that fact that French presidential elections are approaching and according to opinion polls, far-right candidates such as Marine Le Pen, the head of the National Rally, and Éric Zemmour, independent far-right candidate of Algerian origin, have better chances in the elections.

Stora presented his report in January 2021 to Macron, including practical recommendations to bridge the gap between the two countries politically and culturally. Macron also handed over the skulls of 24 nineteenth-century leaders of the Algerian resistance against French colonialism – out of the 500 skulls France keeps – after 170 years of displaying them at the Musée de l’Homme (Museum of Mankind) in Paris. This was a first in the history of French-Algerian relations, and it occurred on the occasion of the 58th anniversary of Algeria’s independence in July 2020.

These steps by Macron were meant to show many Algerians that he is serious about facing the crimes committed during the French colonial rule. Macron’s recent statement, however, brought the matter back to square one and escalated the Algerian position, which insists on a full apology for the crimes of colonialism in the period from 1832 to 1962. The Algerian government demands three conditions to bridge the gap: (1) giving the archival documents presently kept in France back to Algeria; (2) opening the French nuclear explosions file in southern Algeria; and (3) paying compensation and the full recovery of the skulls of the Algerian resistance fighters held in Paris.

France views the bilateral relations through a colonialist memory and logic, which goes up and down in accordance with the strength of the Algerian regime. When the Algerian regime was strong in the 1970s, French politicians and intellectuals were reluctant to rise any serious issues against Algeria in reference to colonial memory. France sought to maintain a solid and calm relationship with Algeria in an effort to preserve its economic interests as stipulated in the Évian Accords of 1962 that granted independence to Algeria.

France, in fact, signed an accord with Algeria in 1968, with which it granted exceptional privileges to Algerians living in France. However, the weakness of the Algerian regime, starting with the military coup in 1992, left the door open for France to blackmail Algerians, who were in dire need of French support at international forums. France launched a campaign to nullify the 1968 accord of its content and made a unilateral amendment to it in 1994 with Decree No. 1103/94. France made another amendment in 2001, which reduced the privileges Algerians enjoy in France, restricting the freedom of movement of Algerians between France and Algeria.

France also started to discuss thorny issues between the two countries, such as the rights of the Pieds-Noirs, the French settlers in Algeria, who left Algeria after independence, and the right of return to their homeland of Algerian Harka, the Algerians who fought with France in the 1954-1962 war and who fled with the French army in 1962, including granting them a full pardon. France has practiced all forms of pressure on the Algerian ruling elite to reverse the policy of Arabization pursued by Algeria since 1972, which aimed at achieving cultural independence from France and strengthening the Algerian identity based on three main pillars: Islam, Arabism, and Amazigh identity.

It is strange that France succeeded, through its Francophone lobbies, in infiltrating the Algerian administration, in blocking the Arabization law of 1991 and the law of 1997, and in stopping all attempts to strengthen the role of the English language in the Algerian educational system. France also obstructed all efforts to pass a law criminalizing the colonial legacy of France by the Algerian parliament. The first draft was put up for discussion in 2009. But, with France’s strong influence on Algerian domestic decision-making, the Algerian regime failed to decolonize the colonial memory, which both the regime and the Algerian people consider one of the central issues in rearranging bilateral relations with France.

The successive French policies of obstructing the presence of Algerian Harkis, who fought alongside France during Algeria’s War of Independence, on French soil escalates during electoral campaigns, and has strengthened and consolidated the official and popular Algerian position. Perhaps the best evidence is Law No. 2005-158, which glorifies colonialism and was passed by the French General Assembly in February 2005 during the time of President Jacques Chirac.

Chirac considers the colonization of Algeria and the rest of African peoples as a matter of French pride.

Chirac considers the colonization of Algeria and the rest of African peoples as a matter of French pride. The fourth article of the law includes a paragraph stipulating that school programs should praise the positive role played by the French presence abroad, especially in North Africa. As expected, this law caused a deep rift in Algerian-French relations.

Even though Macron’s recent statement was a strategic move for the upcoming presidential elections in order to win the support of the French far right and to break the popularity of the National Rally, it reflects a deep French conviction not to retreat from the French position on the issue of colonial memory in Algeria.

For Algerians, the best option is a full recognition of French colonialism and its brutality. However, the only way to change the French position and secure a full apology is closely linked to the establishment of a strong and coherent government in Algeria. Macron’s positive statements and promises made before September 2021 and his retreat reflect a state of confusion among the French political elites that began since Nicholas Sarkozy came to power in 2007, and became even worse after Emmanuel Macron became the president in 2017 – a development that shook the French political system.

On October 5, Jean-Marc Sauvé, the head of the independent commission charged by the Catholic Church itself to investigate sex crimes in its ranks, publicly and solemnly released the massive 2,500 page report, whose conclusions he shared in a two-hour, surgically and factually devastating live presentation in front of the press, politicians, associations of victims, and Catholic officials.

The result of a three-year investigation by a panel of 22 experts in all relevant fields (law, theology, psychiatry, social sciences, anthropology, history of religions, etc.), based on Church, court, and police archives as well as interviews with victims and witnesses, the Sauvé Report is being hailed by all, without a single exception, as a model to be emulated by other nations and institutions worldwide seeking to investigate sex crimes. In its scope, conclusions, and methodological sophistication both quantitative and qualitative, it is simply unprecedented and has no equivalent anywhere in the world.

It is an understatement to say that ever since its public release, that the report, akin to a fragmentation bomb or cataclysm, has been sending shockwaves across not just the Catholic institution but the whole nation and to a much lesser extent other countries. Although everybody knew the Catholic Church had always been a hotbed of pedophilia and that was an open secret—after all, among other goals Jean Calvin’s reform movement back in the 16th century already intended to react against the massive debauchery he could observe in the Church from top to bottom—and despite widespread common awareness, the Sauvé Report stunned and shocked by the extent and gravity of what it is describing.

Main Findings

A mere few facts and numbers may give an idea:

• Between 1950 and 2020, a 70-year period, less than a lifetime, 216,000 children, 80% of whom young boys, have been raped, often repeatedly over a long period of time (several months or years) by about 3,000 predator priests or bishops (3% of the total), and a few nuns. Some of those priests raped hundreds of children.
• If one adds those who were abused by laymen working for and in the Catholic Church (catechists, monitors of youth camps, etc.), the figure rises to 330,000 victims.
• All along, the Catholic hierarchy from the peers of the criminals all the way to bishops, cardinals, and popes, including Pope Francis, knew the identity and crimes of most of the serial rapists. Yet, not only they did nothing to stop them, but they actively, systematically, and methodically denied and covered up the crimes; sheltered and protected the serial rapists from public exposure and criminal prosecution; and consistently refused to pay any attention to the victims, whose abuse they denied and whom they refused to listen to—as was still the case a mere few years ago.
• In some cases, for decades, highly organized and effective actual networks of pedophiliac priests shared among themselves and with others both the children and the pornographic material (images, etc.) produced during those sessions on church grounds.
• As Alain Cordier and other commission members declared, “I want to emphasize the fact that it is NOT a problem of the past but a problem of the present. Because the problem continues today.”

A second instant achievement of the report has been to completely pulverize all the denial, spin, hypocritical lines of defense, and attempts at minimizing the nature and extent of the crimes the Catholic Church had been able to use to oppose such accusations until October 5, 2021. At least they are no longer trying, as shown by the pope’s reaction when he lamented, “Dignity to our Lord! Shame, shame, shame on all of us!” while the other Church officials, shamed and rendered speechless, could only admit everything and hypocritically feign surprise, and then ask for “forgiveness.”

At least the French Church is no longer trying to hide or minimize any of this as it was still doing yesterday, and it has now fully accepted the conclusions of this horrifying report. Historically, this in itself is colossal progress.

To take the full measure of this, one needs to keep in mind four other facts:

1) The figures above would be terrible for a country the size of a continent like the United States with a population of 330 million. But we are here talking about a small country with a population of 67 million, the size of the state of Texas, a country where one can drive from east to west and north to south in half a day or less.

2) Those numbers include only minors, but sex crimes against legal adults above 18 years old whether nuns or practitioners are also widespread and would need to be added to the already horrible picture.

3) The comparison between the French situation and similar investigations conducted in other countries like Germany, Ireland, the United States, or Australia suggests France may actually be at the bottom of the list. One will remember that the famous 2002 Boston Globe investigation, popularized by the star-studded 2015 blockbuster Spotlight, uncovered nearly 100 pedophiliac priests and thousands of victims in a mere few dioceses of that one U.S. city and that in the years that followed, similar or worse patterns were discovered all across the country in hundreds of cities.

4)  Those numbers, whether French or American, are the “low and minimal estimates” as the Sauvé commission members have always been careful to specify in their many public interventions.

Institutionalizing Rape and Pedophilia

A few quotes by Jean-Marc Sauvé himself will illuminate the systemic nature of the crime, which can no longer be reduced to a mere few rotten apples or a matter of individuals, even thousands of them, in an otherwise healthy institution.

Until the 2000s, the Catholic Church showed a complete and cruel indifference to the victims.

Sex abuse in the Catholic Church has been a massive and systemic phenomenon, covered by a veil of silence.

Catholic authorities covered up the abuse over decades, in a systemic manner.

The cover-up has permitted mass crimes for decades.

The French findings are furthermore fully corroborated by previous findings from other countries, suggesting without a doubt that the exact same has been happening everywhere where the Catholic Church operates:

For the first time, we can all begin to understand the systematic cover-up by Church leaders that followed. The abuse scarred every diocese. The cover-up was sophisticated. The Church protected the institution at all costs […] The cover-ups by the Church served a key purpose—the longer they covered up abuses, the less chance that law enforcement could prosecute predator priests because the statute of limitations would run out. “As a consequence of the cover-up, almost every instance of abuse we found is too old to be prosecuted,” the grand jury found.

To sum up, four main lessons clearly emerge from this picture. First, the Catholic Church has been and, as Alain Cordier made clear, remains a massive breeding ground of organized mass pedophilia and a true safe haven for its thousands of sex predators. Second, pretty much everybody knew everything all along including bishops, cardinals, and popes, who were aware of the identities of the priests and children, when and where this was happening, yet not only did they do nothing but they actively covered it up, guaranteeing, in full knowledge, that this activity would go on—and one should remember here how Pope Francis himself, who now claims shock and surprise in utmost hypocrisy much to the victims’ anger, in 2018, was still defending predator priests while calling their victims liars, publicly accusing them of “slander and calumny.”

Three, besides the family (for obvious reasons such as that is where children spend most of their time, relatives have easy and permanent access, etc.), the Catholic Church has been (and most likely remains) quite simply the institution where the most pedophiliac crimes occur, well ahead of schools, sports clubs, youth camps, etc. In that domain it simply has no match. Four, and this needs to be stated without euphemism: what is described here is a gigantic collective crime—what the Catholic Church has done was to institutionalize mass pedophilia, make it part of its culture, of its DNA, and entrench then preserve and protect it like no other institution besides the family ever did, possibly in human history.

Chad contributed 1,200 troops to the G5 Sahel forces since 2017, until recently when its authorities announced the recall of 600 troops from the regional front, half of its contingent, “in order to redeploy them to better adapt to terrorist organization.” This decision came after France also announced in June that its operations in the Sahel to combat the militants, also known as Operation Barkhane, will be reduced from 5,100 soldiers to 2,500-3,000 by early next year.

The reasons behind Chad’s decision are not far to seek. The country is battling domestic instability after the offensive launched by the Chadian rebel group Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT), on 11 April 2021 – the same day as the country’s presidential election – in the northern Chad led to the death of the incumbent President, Idriss Déby who seized power in 1990 in a coup that overthrew President Hissene Habré, for whom he had served as head of the army.

Although the killing of President Déby on the battlefield was shocking because he was poised to win the election and thus extent his 30-year rule. But his presence on the battlefield was not unusual, as he was known to have led many battles against rebel attacks during his rule; in 2006, 2008 and 2019, his forces (with the support of the French army) successfully defended themselves against rebel attacks. These moves also helped President Déby’s image as a powerful leader. He surged in popularity among young Africans in April 2020 after he led a counterattack against the Boko Haram that had just killed about 100 Chadian soldiers in Lake Chad.

The political situation took another turn in Chad when the presidency announced a day after the death of the President, that Idriss Déby’s son, General Mahamat Idriss Déby will take over as the president in place of his father. This move was termed an “institutional coup” and was rejected by opposition leaders and rebels who called for the return to civilian rule.

In August, the Transitional Military Council which initially refused to dialogue with the rebels and claimed victory over them in May, invited the rebels to participate in national dialogue. Yet, threats and challenges from the armed opposition groups remain, which give an insight to why some of the 600 soldiers that were withdrawn by Chad from the G5 Sahel force are those with heavy weapons.

Also, the withdrawal of these soldiers could deepen the security crisis in the African Sahel and affect the counterterrorism efforts. Sahel is highly competitive at the international level and a strategic location for its countries. The region stretches from the Atlantic Ocean eastward through northern Senegal, southern Mauritania, the great bend of the Niger River in Mali, Burkina Faso, southern Niger, northeastern Nigeria, south-central Chad and into Sudan.

The major concern in the Sahel region is that, despite the combined efforts from the G5 Sahel force, attacks have escalated, and violent activities have spread rapidly due to the alliances between terrorist groups to expand their presence in the border region between Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.

Chad’s military is the most effective Sahelian force engaging in regional counterterrorism operations and withdrawing the soldiers from the tri-border area of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger would relieve the terrorist groups of pressure in the region.

Burkina Faso and Niger have witnessed an upsurge in recent attacks. The insurgency in Burkina Faso started in 2016, and the attack on 4-5 June 2021 was considered the deadliest since the crisis began. The local authorities reported that gunmen killed at least 132 civilians when they attacked the town of “Solhan” in the Sahel region of northern Burkina Faso. Meanwhile, Niger also witnessed similar attacks this year, in which at least 137 civilians were killed.

Also, in northeastern Nigeria and Lake Chad, the killing of Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau created a new dimension; ISWAP took control of most of what remained of Boko Haram, with the surviving members of Shekau being incorporated into ISWAP. There are also reports of cooperation between criminal gangs and terrorist groups to spread to new areas in the northwestern Nigeria.

Chad is the largest troop contributor to the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali, known as MINUSMA, with over 1,400 Chadian soldiers stationed there in as of July 2021. Recent reports also showed that Chadian MINUSMA soldiers have been active against JNIM. On April 2, for example, a major JNIM attack on a MINUSMA outpost in northern Mali was repelled. Thus, the withdrawal of the Chadian forces could increase the workload of the UN mission in northern Mali, and benefit Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM).

Finally, while Chad is looking inward so as to secure its stability which the international community sees as vital due to its role in the counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel, it would be better to accompanied it with a political solution through finding common areas between the military and the oppositions.

Although, looking inward and withdrawing soldiers from the G5 Sahel force could weaken the regional efforts to curb the spread of terrorist groups into other neighboring countries. It could also cede terrain to any of the deadly groups in Sahel and bring their deadly incursions closer to the Chadian borders and terrains, except if other countries in the G5 Sahel, such as Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Niger all increase their efforts.

After nearly three decades of rule and a ceaseless subordination to the interests of France, the killing of Chadian President Idriss Déby comes as a bombshell at a time when France is struggling to obtain the support of its European partners in its endless war in the Sahel, costing thousands of lives and nearly a billion euros per year.

In early April, at the Forward Operating Base (FOB) of Ménaka in Mali, in the heat and dust, the French and the Czech inaugurated the headquarters of the Takuba Task Force comprised of European special forces. It is the first of its kind. “It’s a laboratory for European defense,” said Florence Parly, the French minister of the armed forces.

In addition to the Czech contingent, Estonians, Swedes, and Italians are already participating in Takuba, bringing the total number of soldiers to 600, of which nearly half are French. The partners are very discreet about their special forces and do not divulge the precise figures of their soldiers there.

The Sahel, from the Atlantic coast to Sudan, is experiencing the worst escalation of violence in the last decade. The Sahel includes the five states of the G5 Sahel, a regional security group that includes Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, and Chad. In 2013, François Hollande sent French armed forces to the Sahel countries with the motive of fighting terrorism.

Groups such as Boko Haram and Daesh (ISIS) are active in these countries. However, for eight years now, the record is not glorious. In 2020, nearly 2,400 civilians were killed in clashes in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), an NGO working in the region. Two million people have been forced to leave their homes.

Internationalization of the war and French influence

“No jihadists. It doesn’t stop,” complains a schoolteacher chosen as spokesman for his fluent French in a village about 20 kilometers from Gao, in northern Mali. “The French, the Estonians, the Dutch, the Germans… come here every week. They ask what we need. But they never do anything,” he says to the Estonian soldiers  watching the village’s surrounding area.

Since March 2018, about fifty infantrymen from the prestigious Estonian Scouts Battalion have been deployed under a tricolored French command. They protect the huge base of Gao and intervene in a perimeter of about twenty kilometers. Several of them were injured in July 2019 during a suicide attack. Yet, Tallinn, which is an unwavering ally of Paris, has promised to double its detachment in the Sahel: in December, the parliament gave its approval to send a total of 175 men.

For General Riho Terras, a member of the European Parliament (European People’s Party, EPP) who commanded the first forces deployed by Estonia to Africa in 2018, it is also a matter of Estonia gaining value in the eyes of its most powerful Western partners. “We show our commitment to the Alliance,” Terras explains. “We did it with the Americans in Iraq and with the British in Afghanistan. For Estonia, participating in a French operation or a NATO operation is the same thing,” he states.

The fifty soldiers present in Gao do not fundamentally change the balance of forces on the ground. But they allow the French command to redeploy some of its own troops for combat missions. For their part, the British have provided three Chinook helicopters since 2018 and the Danes two Merlins in 2019. The French army, on its part, does not have such heavy machines. The latter can move cargo or soldiers in large numbers closer to the fighting.

When examining the details of the arrangements, each country has imposed its own restrictions, which reduce the room for maneuver for the French command. London, for example, refused to allow its heavy helicopters to take part directly in the fighting. Its airmen had to avoid putting their men and equipment at risk. When there was a risk of an exchange of fire, the Danes took over. They were allowed to approach the front line, but only during the day.

The crash of one of their aircraft in Afghanistan in 2014 has shown that the crews have not sufficiently mastered nighttime maneuvers. So, the French have to juggle these constraints. At night, they fly the British. Near combat zones, they fly the Danes. If it is night and a collision is possible, they have to manage on their own.

The gradual establishment of a new special forces detachment such as the Tabuka Task Force,  changes the situation somewhat. Now, European soldiers integrated into the tricolored ranks will go with them to the front line. Launched by France at the Pau Summit in January 2020, this initiative aims to strengthen and coordinate international military action in the Sahel. Senior French officers from Operation Barkhane will organize the operations.

The concept, which initially aroused some skepticism, has finally won over Estonia, Sweden, the Czech Republic and, recently, Greece. It is said that officers of the French special forces managed to convince their counterparts that the Sahel would provide them with a particularly rich training ground. They then convinced their supervisory authorities. Details of the number of troops have yet to be specified.

Undermining accusations of imperialism

Even for countries which prefer to invest in development rather than in hunting terrorists, being in the line of fire is essential to maintaining a high level of technical competence and learning inter-allied and multinational work. It also helps to harden the troops. It was in this spirit that Denmark sent heavy-lift helicopters, first to Afghanistan in 2014 and then to the Sahel.

They left Africa at the end of 2020, in preparation for possible deployment to Iraq. These short one-year mandates allow them to accumulate experience without getting involved in the search for political and strategic solutions.

Usually, the French military is reluctant to consider multinational operations that are too restrictive. In 2013, they did not hide their pride in having led Operation Serval almost single-handedly. But the conflict continues with no real prospect of victory or exit.

In 2019, Emmanuel Macron assigned a commission of historians to research France’s role in the mass killing of Tutsis in Rwanda. The commission submitted its report to the French president on March 26, 2021. It concludes that the French government has “heavy and damning responsibilities” in the event, but dismisses the claim it was complicit in the genocide.

The mass killing or genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda began on April 7, 1994. Within three months, from April to July 1994, between from 800,000 to 1,000,000 Tutsis were killed at the hands of Hutu extremists, who were in charge of the government. The commission describes the Rwandan policy of the French government, which was led by then president François Mitterrand as a way to make Rwanda “a kind of laboratory.”

The Mitterrand government offered Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana “a guarantee of military protection in exchange for a program of democratization, respect for human rights and negotiations with the Rwandan Patriotic Front.” In this spirit, Mitterrand delivered a speech at the French African Summit of 1990, in which he depicted France as Africa’s most generous supporter. For the commission, there is no doubt that the “French authorities have shown continuous blindness in their support for a racist, corrupt and violent regime conceived as a laboratory.”

The report by the commission, which was chaired by Vincent Duclert, argues that France’s responsibility lies in the ideological blindness of Mitterrand and his advisors that was then imposed on the rest of the state apparatus, and that it is a revelation of colonial stereotypes and a purely ethnic reading that irrigated France’s African policy.

After its independence in 1962, following Belgian colonization, Rwanda developed a close relationship with France. Mitterrand and Habyarimana, who came to power in Rwanda in 1973, were on good terms. The Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR) were established thanks to French support.

The commission’s archival research reveals that the Rwandan file with the request for arms was intentionally diverted away from the ministries and administrations that are involved in the usual decision-making process. The papers were signed by General Jean-Pierre Huchon, then deputy chief of staff to Admiral Jacques Lanxade, and by then general Christian Quesnot.

The influence of military staff was felt over the rest of the administration, and even at the Élysée Palace, where Bruno Delaye replaced Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, the advisor on African affairs since 1986 and son of then president Mitterrand. It is the syndrome of smoking in a closed room where everyone present, even those who do not actually smoke, carry the smell.

According to an Élysée source, France’s responsibility “translates into an inability to think about the genocide that was taking place.” The commission report concludes that France bears political, institutional, intellectual, moral, and cognitive responsibility for the genocide that took place in Rwanda.