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resident Donald Trump has sent a proposed civil nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia to Congress while maintaining that the deal will only take effect if the kingdom normalizes relations with Israel, a U.S. administration official told Reuters on Tuesday.

The agreement, reached in July, would allow American companies to export civilian nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia. It was formally transmitted to Congress on Monday, according to the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The Saudi embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Under U.S. law, Congress has 90 session days to review the pact. Unless lawmakers object, the agreement will go into force. If Congress were to reject it, Trump could veto that decision, which would require a two-thirds majority in both chambers to override.

“The president’s position has not changed that the agreement will only move forward if Saudi Arabia joins the Abraham Accords,” the U.S. official said, referring to the U.S.-brokered normalization agreements between Israel and several Arab and Muslim-majority nations reached in 2020 and 2021.

It was not immediately clear how sending the deal to Congress now advances the president’s objectives, given the normalization condition.

Recognition of Israel as a prerequisite for implementation

Days after agreeing to the nuclear pact in July, Trump set Saudi recognition of Israel as a prerequisite for implementation. Former President Joe Biden had also sought to link a nuclear agreement to normalization. Diplomats believed Riyadh was close to recognizing Israel in 2023, but the outbreak of Israel’s war in Gaza in October of that year dramatically altered the diplomatic landscape.

Saudi Arabia has demanded an irreversible path to a Palestinian state before recognizing Israel.

The 30-year nuclear deal calls for the construction of AP1000 reactors, a project worth tens of billions of dollars that would benefit Westinghouse, jointly owned by Canada-based Cameco and Brookfield Asset Management.

Two congressional sources said the deal was sent to congressional leaders and is expected to be referred to relevant committees on Wednesday.

‘Hardly Ideal’

Some Democratic lawmakers and nonproliferation advocates have criticized the agreement for not explicitly barring Saudi Arabia from enriching uranium or reprocessing nuclear waste — two potential pathways to developing a nuclear weapon. The United Arab Emirates accepted such restrictions, known as the “gold standard,” in its 2009 civil nuclear agreement with Washington.

The Trump administration says the deal includes nonproliferation measures required by law.

Henry Sokolski, head of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, said that by initiating the congressional review process, Trump has opened the possibility that lawmakers could approve the deal without the normalization and proliferation conditions attached.

“This is hardly ideal if you’re serious about no enrichment and recognition of Israel,” Sokolski said.

(Source: Reuters)

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he Strait of Hormuz has long been the lifeline for the energy production of the GCC states, enabling these oil-rich nations to export huge quantities of oil to consumers, particularly those in East Asian countries such as China, Japan, and South Korea. This allowed the GCC states to prosper, build their economies, foster population growth, and cultivate international relations, using energy as a tool of influence. However, the geopolitical shifts in the region, represented by the war between the United States and Iran in late February 2026, and the associated regional security dilemma, led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran on March 4, 2026.

This has cast a shadow over the economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which rely heavily on energy exports, and has also affected consumer economies, the industrial production cycle, supply chains, and global trade in general. Approximately 20% of global trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz daily, including roughly 16 million barrels of crude oil, representing more than 15% of global oil demand, estimated at 104 million barrels per day, according to 2025 figures.

In addition, about 10 billion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas (LNG) passes through the Strait, mostly from Qatar, which accounts for nearly 20% of global LNG trade. Therefore, a complete halt to shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz has severely disrupted energy exports and crippled the economies of the GCC countries, recovery from which is likely to take a considerable time. The disruption of energy exports through the Strait led to a supply gap estimated at around 10 million barrels per day.

Alternative options to bypass Hormuz

Countries with alternative export routes, such as the UAE’s Habshan-Fujairah crude oil pipeline, and Saudi Arabia’s 1,200 km. pipeline from Abqaiq in the Eastern Province to Yanbu on the Red Sea, were unable to fill the gap due to the limited capacity of these alternative routes. The limitation of the alternative oil export pipeline was compounded for Saudi Arabia when the Houthis closed the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb in July 2026, effectively choking off Saudi oil exports. Saudi Arabia alone exports between six and seven million barrels of crude oil per day, and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz reduced this production to less than half.

Overall, the pumping capacity of both alternative routes — the UAE’s Habshan-Fujairah pipeline and the Saudi pipeline from the Eastern Province to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea — remained capped at only 3.5–5.5 million barrels per day. The war with Iran and its major repercussions, such as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, posed a genuine threat, primarily to the GCC with their economies that are significantly reliant on revenues from the export of hydrocarbons. The dilemma also disclosed gaps in the GCC’s security arrangements and revealed a clear absence of long-term plans, to ensure the sustainability of energy exports without total dependence on passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

Despite the multiple official statements of condemnation and calls for the indispensability of allowing free navigation through the Strait, future considerations can be viewed through two main perspectives. First, the lack of cooperation on energy export strategies. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz severely impacted some GCC members, such as Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, due to the lack of alternative shipping routes. Second, the absence of a collective approach to security, particularly maritime security, within the GCC. This was manifested in the lack of a unified stance on the conflict, and the absence of a manifest collective security framework.

Collective energy export strategy

With regard to energy export strategies and economic security, the GCC countries need a joint strategy, to ensure the continuity of oil and gas exports during times of regional crisis that cause disruption to maritime shipping, such as when transit through the Strait of Hormuz becomes impossible. First, this requires the building of trust, as transboundary pipelines will traverse the territories of neighboring countries, with coastal states serving as the final export hub. If these final export hubs are to be the Omani ports on the Arab Sea, while avoiding the use of ports on the Sea of ​​Oman due to their proximity to Iran, this will pose a challenge for countries like Kuwait, as export routes will be long, and will pass through several GCC states’ territories.

Furthermore, a single export hub implies greater vulnerability, as it will represent a center of gravity for energy resources, making it susceptible to targeting or sabotage. Second, Saudi Arabia and the UAE may consider expanding their alternative pipeline capacity to accommodate their daily oil production. However, for the UAE, the alternative export terminal at the port of Fujairah on the Sea of ​​Oman remains vulnerable, due to its proximity to Iran. Likewise, for Saudi Arabia, the alternative oil pipeline in Yanbu on the Red Sea remains dependent on the status of the other maritime corridor, the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait.

Third, it is possible to invest in LNG and storage facilities in areas that do not require passage through any of the straits. This move could be linked to increasing storage capacity to accommodate mass LNG production, which would ensure the safe flow of LNG away from conflict zones, as it passes through the straits. However, the GCC states must reach a consensus on managing unified export hubs, and again, a common export hub would remain vulnerable to attacks and sabotage. Reaching a consensus on future security arrangements and energy export strategies is crucial for the GCC states, as divergent and unilateral approaches to security and energy issues have proven strategically costly.

Collective regional security approach is a must

When viewing the issue of their inability to secure energy exports, the GCC states appear to be constrained by divergent energy transportation strategies, each of which entails numerous challenges and risks. Therefore, the GCC states may need a comprehensive review of their security cooperation, to ensure a unified stance on regional crises and support mediation efforts, so as to reach solutions satisfactory to all members and regional actors alike.

The February 2026 outbreak of war serves as a wake-up call for GCC decision-makers to enhance coordination on security issues, ensuring the continuity of energy exports and regional security. Particular attention must be paid to maritime security through a collective approach, which is currently lacking. By ensuring a unified maritime security policy, the GCC states can strengthen their naval capabilities, guarantee the interoperability of systems, improve coastal patrols, and reduce defense spending through the concept of burden-sharing.

However, collective maritime security will only bear fruit by fostering a degree of coexistence with other actors, thus bringing relative calm to the region. This would allow the GCC states to address security issues in partnership with other regional actors, such as Iran, Iraq, and potentially Yemen, without foreign interference, and through joint investments, incentives, and shared interests, to build trust and counter geopolitical volatility.

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raqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zeidi’s visits to Washington, Tehran and Ankara in quick succession are significant in terms of demonstrating the new government’s approach to foreign policy. For Iraq, Washington and Tehran are two capitals closely linked to security, capital, historical influence and developments in Iraqi domestic politics. Ankara, on the other hand, represents the most concrete, stable and reliable economic route through which the country can access global markets. For this reason, al-Zaidi’s visit to Ankara immediately following his engagements in Washington and Tehran should not be viewed as a mere neighbourly visit. This visit demonstrates that Baghdad, which has placed economic development at the centre of its government program, views Türkiye not merely as a trading partner but as a strategic gateway in Iraq’s production, transport and energy equation.

The most significant aspect of the talks in Ankara is not the number of documents signed, but rather the needs of Iraq and Türkiye that they address. Five memoranda of understanding were signed between the two countries covering educational and academic cooperation, youth and sport, industrial property, rail and road transport via the Fishhabur–Ovaköy border crossing, and the development of transport infrastructure in Iraq in exchange for natural resources. Whilst the first three agreements broaden the social and institutional foundation of the relationship, the latter two are of direct strategic importance for Iraq’s economic future. This is because these agreements strengthen the necessary links to move the Development Corridor Project – which aims to connect the Grand Faw Port in Basra to the Turkish border via Iraq and from there to Europe – into the implementation phase.

The visit also demonstrates that the strong relations established between Iraq and Türkiye in recent years are being maintained by the new Iraqi government. During President Erdoğan’s visit to Baghdad in April 2024, 27 legal texts were signed, whilst 11 documents were signed at the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council meeting held in May 2025. The fact that Zaidi has included Ankara in the itinerary of his first foreign visit since taking office suggests that Türkiye has secured a permanent place in Iraq’s development plans.

Oil production but lack of control

Iraq has been producing oil for many years but has been unable to establish sufficient control over the routes by which this oil is transported. The fact that a very large proportion of oil revenues depends on exports via the southern ports and the Strait of Hormuz means that any military tension in the Gulf directly becomes a problem for the Iraqi budget. The closure of ports and disruption to tanker traffic affects not only oil companies but the entire state apparatus, from public sector wages to social spending. Road, rail and pipeline links via Türkiye therefore represent both a means of facilitating trade and a tool for economic security from Baghdad’s perspective.

This is where the true significance of the Development Corridor comes to the fore. If successful, the project—which is planned to link the Port of Faw to Türkiye via a network of approximately 1,200 kilometres of railways and motorways—will do more than simply transport containers from Basra to Türkiye. It will also create new industrial zones, logistics centres, energy networks and urban development areas along the route. Given Iraq’s young population and high unemployment rate, this transformation could provide an alternative to the limited employment opportunities currently available in the oil sector alone.

Türkiye plays a role in this equation that no other neighbour can easily fulfil. Iran is linked to Iraq through energy, trade and political networks, whilst the Gulf states can provide capital to Iraq. However, Türkiye is the only direct neighbour capable of connecting Iraq to the European market by road and rail, and to the Mediterranean via Ceyhan. Moreover, the economic foundation between the two countries will not be built from scratch. Trade volume between Türkiye and Iraq reached approximately 17 billion dollars in 2025, and Turkish companies have undertaken over 1,000 projects in Iraq with a total value of around 40 billion dollars. The setting of a medium-term trade target of 30 billion dollars during the Ankara talks demonstrates the will to roughly double the current level of trade.

Developments in the energy sector also demonstrated that the visit was not limited solely to the transport agenda. Although no long-term, comprehensive energy agreement was signed at the ceremony in Ankara, TPAO’s acquisition of a 15 per cent stake in the company managing BP’s operations in Kirkuk is a step that could transform Türkiye from merely being a buyer and transit country for Iraqi oil into a production partner.

A few days after the visit, Türkiye and Iraq signed a provisional agreement extending the use of the existing oil pipeline for another year, with a capacity of 750,000 barrels per day. This also showed that the talks in Ankara had begun to produce concrete results. Whilst time is being gained to prepare a broader energy agreement, Baghdad has secured the use of the only operational oil export pipeline. Given that the pipeline carries approximately 170,000 barrels per day, increasing the current capacity could be a significant step in Iraq’s efforts to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz.

The secret behind the fifth agreement!

The signing ceremony in Ankara also brought to light the main obstacle facing the Iraqi government. Whilst the signing of five agreements was expected, President Erdoğan’s realization that one agreement had not been signed, followed by Zaidi’s turn to Iraq’s Minister of Transport, Veheb al-Hasani, and the subsequent inclusion of the remaining documents in the signing process, were widely discussed in the media of both countries. Hasani later explained the incident as a technical and protocol-related disagreement. A spokesperson for the Iraqi Ministry of Transport, however, stated that there had been a prior dispute on the Iraqi side—involving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Oil—regarding the inclusion of the document in the visit’s program.

In contrast, some Iraqi and Turkish commentators alleged that the minister, who has a background in the Badr Organization, was attempting to slow down the Development Corridor agreement under Iranian influence. This claim could not be definitively confirmed, and the available information is insufficient to characterize the events as a definitive act of sabotage by Iran. However, the incident itself remains significant. Whether the problem stems from a lack of protocol, inter-institutional disagreement or political influence, it demonstrates that during the implementation of strategic decisions in Iraq, different ministries, parties and actors with external connections are not acting in unison. Viewed from this perspective, the success of the Zaidi government’s economic program will in fact depend not so much on how many agreements it signs abroad, but rather on the extent to which it can implement state decisions at home.

Economy in Ankara, missiles on the ground

The joint Saudi Arabian–US air strikes that took place immediately after the visit to Ankara once again demonstrated just how fragile the security environment is in which Zaidi’s development diplomacy is being conducted. US Central Command stated that the strikes targeted logistics and weapons sites belonging to groups it alleged were directed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. Reports citing Iraqi and Iranian sources stated that at least 20 members of the Hashd al-Shaabi were killed. Baghdad condemned the strikes as a violation of its sovereignty, and Zaidi cancelled his visit to Riyadh, which had been scheduled for July 30. Thus, within a matter of days, Iraq – which had been discussing transport corridors and economic integration in Ankara – has once again been drawn into the military arena of US-Iranian tensions.

This development does not diminish the importance of the Ankara visit; on the contrary, it enhances it. This is because the path for Iraq to extricate itself from regional military rivalry does not lie solely in maintaining balanced relations with Washington and Tehran. Iraq must raise the cost of the conflict by developing its economic ties, thereby forcing countries to step back from clashing on its territory. It would be difficult to claim that the intensive trade, energy and transport networks to be established with Türkiye will provide Baghdad with an absolute security guarantee. However, these links will make Iraq’s stability more valuable to Türkiye, Europe, the Gulf states and international companies. Economic interdependence alone will not prevent war, but it will help Iraq move away from being perceived solely as a country defined by militias, military bases and spheres of influence.

Looking at Zaidi’s initial foreign policy moves, he is seeking investment from Washington, political balance from Tehran and economic links from Ankara. Among these three capitals, Türkiye stands out for offering the most viable route to turn Iraq’s geography into an economic advantage. Multi-billion-dollar deals in Washington could provide capital and technology. Relations with Tehran cannot be entirely disregarded in terms of internal stability. However, Iraq’s ability to generate non-oil revenue, open up to Europe, create new employment opportunities and reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz depends to a large extent on the operationalisation of the routes extending northwards.

Ultimately, the visit to Ankara has done more than simply demonstrate Iraq’s growing rapprochement with Türkiye; it has also revealed the direction of the new government’s approach to development. The real issue is not the signing of the five documents. The real issue is whether the pipeline stretching from Ovaköy to Faw, the oil flowing from Kirkuk to Ceyhan, and the $30 billion trade target will make the Iraqi state stronger and more independent. If the Zaidi government can support these projects with institutional reform, transparency and state authority, relations with Türkiye could transform Iraq’s quest for balance in foreign policy into an economic strategy. Otherwise, the documents signed in Ankara will simply be added to the long list of agreements that Baghdad has accumulated over the years but has been unable to implement. .

(Originally published in Turkish by Middle East Africa)

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merican President Donald Trump’s approval rating has fallen to 33%, the lowest level of his current presidency, as growing concerns over the war with Iran and rising gasoline prices weigh on his standing with American voters, according to a Reuters/Ipsos poll released Monday.

The four-day survey found that 64% of Americans disapproved of Trump’s performance, compared with 33% who approved. His approval rating fell from 35% in an earlier poll this month and matched the lowest level recorded during his previous presidency, in December 2017.

Trump returned to the White House in 2025 with approval from just under half of Americans, but his standing has weakened as the conflict with Iran has continued. The war has disrupted a significant share of global oil trade and pushed gasoline prices higher, adding pressure on U.S. households.

Most Americans expect Iran war to continue

The poll showed widespread concern that U.S. involvement in the conflict will last much longer than Trump initially suggested.

About 80% of Americans said they believed U.S. involvement in Iran would continue for an extended period, including 87% of Democrats and 71% of Republicans. Only 16% expected the conflict to end within a few weeks.

Trump initially suggested that the war could be resolved within weeks, but Iran has continued resisting U.S. and Israeli military pressure. The conflict has also disrupted oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, contributing to higher energy prices.

Trump has defended the rising cost of gasoline as necessary to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. At a rally in New York on Friday, he told supporters that paying somewhat more for gasoline was worthwhile to prevent what he described as an evil country from obtaining nuclear weapons.

However, only about one in five Americans said the war was worth the cost. Among Republicans, only about half considered the conflict worthwhile.

The economic impact of the war could become a major issue ahead of the Nov. 3 congressional elections, with Republicans seeking to defend narrow majorities in the House while Democrats increasingly see an opportunity to gain control of the Senate.

Democrats gain ground on economy

The poll also showed Democrats gaining an advantage over Republicans on economic issues. About 38% of registered voters said Democrats would handle the economy better, compared with 35% who preferred Republicans.

That represents a significant shift from previous years and comes as voters express increasing concern about the cost of living and gasoline prices.

Democrats were also viewed as better equipped to manage the cost of living, while Republicans continued to hold a narrow advantage on immigration.

About 40% of voters said Republicans had the better approach to immigration, compared with 38% who favored Democrats. The two-point Republican advantage was the smallest recorded during Trump’s current presidency. Republicans had held a 26-point advantage on immigration in January 2025.

Although Trump’s administration has overseen a sharp decline in border crossings and expanded immigration enforcement, Republicans have faced political pressure over deadly confrontations and the growing number of people held in immigration detention, including children.

The Reuters/Ipsos poll was conducted online among 1,166 U.S. adults nationwide and had a margin of error of three percentage points in either direction.

The findings point to growing political challenges for Trump as voters confront the economic consequences of the Iran conflict and prepare to vote in the November midterm elections.

(Source: Reuters)

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hilst the Middle East region has undergone significant change and transformation as a result of the attacks launched by Israel from 7 October 2023 onwards, the US-Israel–Iran war that began on 28 February 2026 has further fuelled this change, pushing it to a point of no return. For had these events not occurred, the ‘Mecca Joint Defence Agreement’, signed on 7 August 2026 between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, might not have been possible.

Developments necessitating “regional ownership”

Türkiye’s long-standing stance that the region’s problems should be resolved by the countries of the region themselves – a concept defined by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan as “regional ownership” – had not received sufficient support from the countries of the region. Whilst the reasons behind this may vary from country to country, ultimately external interventions aimed at resolving the region’s problems have failed to heal the wounds; on the contrary, they have either caused existing wounds to bleed anew or allowed them to simply harden into calluses without being resolved. Consequently, it has become apparent that interventions in the region—particularly from the West and, of course, the US—have failed to produce results and have not brought peace and stability to the region.

However, following the events that began on 7 October 2023, Israel’s adoption of a revisionist policy towards the region—believing that the conditions were favourable—and its subsequent attacks targeting not only Gaza and the West Bank but also Lebanon, Syria and Iran, have led to a shift in the preconceptions held by countries in the region towards Türkiye.

For whilst it is evident that almost all of the Western countries expected to resolve the region’s problems have taken sides in the war between Russia and Ukraine, providing Ukraine with billions of dollars in aid as well as both political and military support; whilst Israel’s razing of Gaza, massacred over 73,000 people and committed a massive genocide; deepened its annexation of the West Bank; gradually sought to alter the status of the Al-Aqsa Mosque; occupied southern Lebanon and attempted to provoke a civil war there; and, as if its decades-long occupation of the Golan Heights—which is Syrian territory —as if that were not enough—it unilaterally suspended the 1974 agreement following the revolution on 8 December 2024, occupied further Syrian territory, and sought to prevent Syria from achieving stability by manipulating the Druze and the SDG/PKK terrorist organisations.

The extent to which external actors remain indifferent to crises or conflicts in our region has once again been exposed in the war against Iran. For just as it is unjust and wrong for an actor such as the US to fall into Israel’s trap and attack Iran, it is equally wrong for other Western countries not to have taken the initiative to dissuade the US from this war, as was the case with Ukraine. Although these countries—the majority of which are also NATO members—were called upon by the US to deploy troops to open the blockaded Strait of Hormuz – although this was not in accordance with NATO regulations – they did not heed this call and, whilst not becoming directly involved in the war, they made their stance clear by expanding sanctions against Iran rather than exerting pressure on Israel to bring the war to an end.

During this war, Iran’s decision to attack Gulf states and other countries hosting US bases on their territory – rather than Israel and the US, which were directly attacking it – both because they were relatively easier targets and with the intention of indirectly exerting pressure on the US, has once again demonstrated the importance of regional ownership.

Israel’s revisionist policies and the perception of threats by regional countries

All these developments have made a mechanism such as the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement imperative, with the aim of thwarting the plans of a country like Israel—which, despite its small size, seeks to destabilize the region and derive benefit from the situation by leveraging its lobbying power in the US and Europe and relying on their support—and to establish a new status quo. Furthermore, whilst Israel recently proposed an alignment strategy—such as the “hexagon bloc”—which has yet to materialize on the ground, the formation of a counter-front by countries outside this bloc that perceive the current developments as a threat to their national interests must be regarded as inevitable.

Despite the security guarantees the US has provided to the Gulf states to date, the fact that these states have been exposed to Iranian attacks during the war against Iran has not only called into question the reliability of US guarantees in the Gulf, but has also inevitably led to a search for alternatives regarding the future of the region’s security architecture. It is therefore highly likely that the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement will address this necessity; in particular, should the US withdraw from the region following the war with Iran, it is conceivable that it might be open to entrusting the region’s security to three key and powerful allies: Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the fact that the US has not made any negative statements regarding the Mecca Agreement to date is interpreted in this light and reinforces the view that there is coordination between the signatory countries and the US.

Why is the agreement so important?

Among the key factors that make the agreement significant are the characteristics and capabilities of the signatory countries. Türkiye, for instance, is not only a NATO member but also a candidate country for the EU and has made significant strides in the defense industry in recent years. It is therefore an indispensable actor for both the Middle East and the European security architecture. Pakistan, meanwhile, is the only Muslim country to possess nuclear weapons and also has a substantial population. As for Saudi Arabia, it stands out as a key player not only due to its abundant energy resources but also because of its strategic location at the crossroads of global trade routes. Furthermore, as a leading figure in both the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League, and as the custodian of Islam’s holy sites, it is an actor held in high regard and whose word carries weight among both Arab and Muslim states.

The coming together of these three major powers to form a defense alliance would create a synergy whose effects are likely to extend beyond the region. Furthermore, should this agreement be successfully implemented, it would inevitably create a domino effect, making it likely that other countries in the region would join the agreement. Considering similar initiatives that have been attempted at various times but could never be brought to a conclusion due to both regional and circumstantial conditions, the most significant impact of this agreement, as of today, is that it stands as the sole development capable of curbing Israel’s aggressive, occupying and expansionist regional vision. Not only will the Abraham Accords no longer hold any appeal for countries in the region, but it is also understood that, should the US withdraw from the region following a war against Iran, the new security architecture of the region will be centered on the new pact established by this agreement.

What will the agreement provide for the signatory countries?

This agreement is of a defensive nature, aimed at protecting the signatories from attacks by other countries; in this way, it offers the signatory countries a security guarantee similar to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Türkiye’s current capabilities, Pakistan’s nuclear power and Saudi Arabia’s financial support not only demonstrate the agreement’s capacity and potential but also serve as a powerful deterrent to any actors seeking to attack one of the signatory states.

Consequently, in addition to Türkiye’s NATO membership, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement has now emerged as the sole agreement in the region offering an additional defense guarantee to regional countries, and it has been announced that the agreement remains open to new participants. Although it has been stated in the announcements that no specific country is being targeted, it is clear that a strong deterrent has been created for those with designs on the region – particularly Israel – or those claiming to shape its future.

Whilst there are no doubts regarding the agreement’s deterrent effect, as we do not yet possess detailed information on the nature of the agreement, it is not fully known how a response would be mounted in the event of an attack on any of the signatory states. Furthermore, given the geographical locations of the signatory states—particularly Pakistan’s relatively remote position—it is difficult to predict how such a response would be carried out. However, despite all these uncertainties, the implementation of such an arrangement in our region is of great importance.

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he diplomatic initiatives that have been ongoing for some time between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have now materialized into a concrete security architecture with the Joint Defense Agreement signed today in Mecca. Although the agreement in question may appear to be a manifestation of the historical and religious ties between the three countries in foreign policy, it can in fact be regarded as part of a much broader regional transformation. This agreement, signed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif at the Safa Palace in Mecca, the holy city of the Muslim world, constitutes a full-fledged ‘collective defense’ pact, as it stipulates that an armed attack against any one of the three states shall be deemed an attack against all of them.

Furthermore, the fact that the agreement is based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which governs the right to self-defense, can be seen as a reflection of the initiative led by the three countries’ quest for legitimacy within the framework of international law. Consequently, the resulting joint defense mechanism aims to serve as a deterrent not only at the regional level but also in the eyes of global actors.

Outcome of regional developments

It is evident that the agreement goes beyond a merely symbolic initiative. In this regard, the normalization process between Turkey and Saudi Arabia since 2022 and the subsequent acceleration of strategic cooperation, followed by Saudi Arabia’s move to expedite its rapprochement with Pakistan in the security context, culminating in the signing of the Joint Strategic Defense Agreement in 2025, have been the key driving forces behind this process. President Erdoğan’s emphasis on defense industry cooperation during his visit to Saudi Arabia at the start of the year, along with signals of joint investment in the KAAN National Fighter Aircraft, also demonstrate that the signing in Mecca was the result of a process that had been under way for some time.

Beyond its strategic and symbolic significance, the Mecca Agreement is of critical importance given the context in which it emerged. The growing regional instability following the war launched by the US and Israel against Iran on 28 February has led all countries to seek alternatives. When compounded by Israel’s continued pursuit of aggressive and expansionist policies and Washington’s silence in the face of these developments, the confidence of many regional actors, particularly the Gulf states, in the traditional security architecture has been permanently shaken. Furthermore, the US’s failure to provide the expected security umbrella to the Gulf states, whose vulnerabilities were laid bare by Iran’s attacks, has eroded these actors’ trust in traditional security guarantors. Consequently, Washington’s inconsistency in providing protection to its allies during times of crisis has driven regional capitals to diversify their own security arrangements.

Signed against this backdrop, the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement can be seen as a concrete outcome of the quest to reduce dependence on external security guarantees and to build an intra-regional deterrence mechanism amongst regional actors. From Türkiye’s perspective, this step constitutes a key pillar of its long-stated vision for a regional security architecture. In line with the initiatives it has taken in recent years, Ankara has played a critical role in intensifying cooperation amongst regional actors. During this process, Türkiye has strengthened its cooperation with countries including the Gulf states, as well as Egypt and Pakistan, and has sought to implement partnerships across various sectors.

During this process, one of the areas on which Türkiye has placed particular emphasis has been partnerships in the defense industry. Viewed in this context, it should also be noted that, beyond its security dimension, the Mecca Agreement provides a framework for deepening cooperation in the defense industry. Saudi Arabia’s preference and policies in recent years to transition from the role of a customer to that of a co-producer in the procurement of defense industry products have led to concrete steps being taken in this context between Ankara and Riyadh. In this regard, Türkiye has demonstrated its commitment by signing agreements with Saudi Arabia on the joint production of unmanned aerial vehicles, radar technologies, anti-tank guided missiles and other defense industry products.

Defense projects between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia

Indeed, Türkiye has successfully concluded its negotiations with Saudi Arabia regarding the co-production of the Gökbey national helicopter project, and an agreement was signed in February 2026 between TUSAŞ and the Saudi Arabian Defense Industries Organization. It is expected that the Mecca Agreement will not only strengthen the joint security mechanism but also increase such collaborations in the defense industry sector. It can be argued that, in the coming period, this initiative will not only go beyond security cooperation but also pave the way for deepening economic ties between the three countries.

Although the Mecca Agreement was signed between the three countries, President Erdoğan stated in his announcement that this security initiative is open to the participation of all countries. At this stage, it can be said that countries such as Qatar and Egypt are likely to be among those adopting a positive stance towards this security architecture in the initial phase. Given that it adopts an inclusive approach rather than an exclusionary one, unlike certain alliances that have emerged in the region in the past, it can also be noted that this alliance is set to play a strategic role in the future of the regional security architecture.

On the other hand, it remains unclear what impact the differences in foreign policy priorities and the relative divergence in threat perceptions between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will have within the context of the agreement. Indeed, the fact that Turkey’s security priorities, centered on Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean, do not align with Saudi Arabia’s threat perception, which is largely centred on Iran, or with Pakistan’s security reflexes, which are focused on India, may be seen as a constraint. However, it can be argued that the impact of this divergence on the practical feasibility of the agreement will also be limited. Indeed, the fundamental dynamic behind the tripartite alliance is not so much divergent perceptions as shared, concrete threats. This situation forms the basis for the consolidation of power and a shared security vision along the Ankara-Riyadh-Islamabad axis.

The Joint Defense Agreement signed in Mecca stands out as an initiative that clearly sets out the signatory countries’ perspectives. This agreement, which can be seen as the tangible outcome of regional actors’ quest to build their own security amongst themselves, a quest directly influenced by the hardships caused by the interventions of external actors, serves as the nucleus of a far more comprehensive regional security architecture. At this juncture, it seems inevitable that Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which have so far acted within the framework of a shared vision, will move towards a much stronger alliance should they align their foreign policy orientations, harmonize their strategic objectives and integrate their security capabilities.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed on August 7, 2026, in Mecca between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, marks a significant transformation in the security equation between the Middle East and South Asia. At the heart of the agreement lies the principle that an armed attack directed against one of the parties shall be deemed to have been directed against all three states. This provision goes beyond traditional defense  cooperation to establish a new security mechanism based on the principle of collective deterrence.

The agreement’s primary significance in terms of international relations stems from the convergence of the signatory states’ diverse power elements within a single security framework. Turkey possesses NATO’s second-largest military force, advanced operational capabilities and a defence industry that has grown significantly in recent years. Pakistan is the only Muslim state to possess nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, stands out for its energy resources, financial capacity and influence in Gulf geopolitics. For this reason, the Mecca Agreement constitutes a strategic configuration of complementary capabilities formed by complementary strategic capabilities, rather than a traditional military alliance between three similar states.

The international context in which the agreement emerged is also significant. Rising military tensions in the Middle East, the security of energy transport routes, Iran-centred conflict dynamics and the tendency of regional states to diversify their security guarantees are reinforcing the search for a new regional security order. Within this framework, the Mecca Agreement can be interpreted as a demonstration of the will of regional states to support their security needs increasingly through mechanisms established amongst themselves, rather than through guarantees provided from outside.

The concept of strategic autonomy is particularly significant here. Since the end of the Cold War, one of the fundamental pillars of the Middle Eastern security system has been the US military presence and bilateral security relations. The Mecca Agreement does not directly abolish this system. It is also explicitly stated that the parties’ existing bilateral or multilateral obligations remain in force. However, the agreement demonstrates the will of regional actors to establish their own deterrence mechanisms alongside the Washington- centred security architecture. This situation can be interpreted as a transition from a dependence on a single security centre to a multi-layered security architecture.

The significance of the agreement for the participants

From Turkey’s perspective, the agreement also has a unique dimension. Turkey is a member of NATO. The Mecca Agreement, whilst enabling Ankara to maintain its NATO membership, also allows it to expand its institutionalised defense relations with regional powers outside NATO. Turkey is thus positioning itself strategically from which it can forge links between the Euro-Atlantic security system and the Middle East–South Asia security spheres. However, the relationship between the collective defense obligation under the Mecca Agreement and Article 5 of the NATO Treaty will require detailed legal and strategic scrutiny in the coming period, particularly in the event of simultaneous crises.

Pakistan’s participation in the agreement, meanwhile, shifts the deterrence debate to a different level. Pakistan’s nuclear capability enhances the agreement’s psychological and strategic weight. However, it cannot be concluded from current statements that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence has been extended to Turkey or Saudi Arabia. Saudi officials have also stated that the agreement is not linked to nuclear purposes or an arms race. Consequently, based on the current data, it does not appear appropriate to characterise the Mecca Agreement as a nuclear umbrella agreement.

From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the agreement represents a continuation of its policy of diversifying security partnerships. By linking its economic capacity with Turkey’s defense industry and Pakistan’s military capabilities, Riyadh may secure a greater degree of strategic manoeuvre. To the extent that this framework extends to areas such as defense industry investments, joint production, technology transfer, training, intelligence sharing and maritime security, it will acquire a lasting institutional character.

The principle of collective defense

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Agreement is the principle of ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’. This provision is reminiscent of NATO’s logic of collective defense. However, there is currently a significant institutional difference between the two organizations NATO is an institutional alliance with over seventy years’ history, underpinned by a military command structure, joint defense planning, force structure, standards and permanent political bodies. The implementation mechanisms of the Mecca Agreement, however, are not yet as transparent, based on the information made public.

For this reason, the true strength of the agreement will be measured not so much by its signing as by the extent to which it becomes institutionalized. Should a joint military committee be established, joint operational plans drawn up, regular exercises conducted, an intelligence-sharing mechanism put in place and defense industry projects undertaken jointly, the Mecca Agreement could evolve into a genuine collective defense system.

From Iran’s perspective, interpreting the agreement as a direct counter-alliance requires caution. The parties have specifically emphasized that the agreement does not target any particular state. Given Turkey’s shared border with Iran, its economic ties and regional diplomatic channels, the agreement’s potential to take on a sectarian dimension could entail significant strategic costs for Ankara. Consequently, the sustainability of the agreement will depend on maintaining a balance between the principle of collective defense and the policy of avoiding regional polarization.

Towards a new regional security architecture

From Israel’s perspective, the new framework presents a distinct area for strategic calculation. The convergence of Turkey’s NATO capabilities, Pakistan’s military strength and Saudi Arabia’s regional influence within a common security mechanism holds the potential to influence the balance of power in the Middle East. However, it is not possible to draw a definitive conclusion from current statements suggesting that the agreement constitutes an alliance formed against Israel.

A broader implication of the Mecca Agreement is the possibility of institutionalizing security cooperation within the Islamic world. Whilst the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is a broad political organization with 57 members, it lacks an effective collective defense mechanism. The tripartite structure emerging in Mecca could, if successful, form the core of a narrower yet highly operational security platform that could expand with the participation of other states.

At this point, the fact that the agreement is named ‘Mecca’ also carries symbolic significance. The signing of the agreement at the most important holy centre of the Islamic world lends it political and historical visibility beyond that of a purely military text. However, the agreement’s future legitimacy will be shaped not so much by its symbolic value as by its contribution to regional peace, its compliance with international law, and its capacity to prevent crises.

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ugust 7, 2026, marks a historic turning point at which the cards of Afro-Eurasian geopolitics and the global security architecture were reshuffled. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s working visit to Saudi Arabia brought together Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, who had arrived in Saudi Arabia the day before the visit, and General Asim Munir at the same table. The defense-focused trilateral ‘Mecca Agreement’, were signed following months of diplomatic maneuvering, and were announced at a time of rising military tensions in the region and US-Iran conflict threatening Gulf security.

Analyzing this critical development from the perspective of Islamabad is of vital importance for understanding Pakistan’s defense network, which stretches from Africa to the Gulf; its chronic and hybrid challenges in internal security; and its foundational role at the crossroads of Afro-Eurasia.

From nuclear power to regional security architecture: Pakistan’s role

As the only nuclear-armed state in the Muslim world, Pakistan constitutes the most deterrent and high-calibre military human capital component of this alliance. The bilateral defense pact signed with Saudi Arabia in 2025 was a consequence of Riyadh’s quest for military assurances, including nuclear deterrence, against potential security threats. However, Turkey’s inclusion in this equation as an official and institutional partner elevates Pakistan’s role as a bilateral ‘security provider’ to a much broader and more balanced framework.

From the perspective of the Islamabad administration, this agreement is not merely a single Gulf commitment, but the culmination of a multi-layered strategy stretching from the Horn of Africa to the Persian Gulf. Indeed, the Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation signed last week between Pakistan and Somalia, a year after it was approved by the Somali Cabinet, demonstrated Islamabad’s determination to play an active role in ensuring the security of navigation in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Furthermore, the Kuwaiti Parliament’s approval in late July of the long-awaited defense cooperation agreement with Pakistan, alongside the pursuit by actors such as Bahrain and Jordan of reciprocal defense agreements modelled on the Saudi model, has cemented Islamabad’s position as the region’s ‘security architect’. Consequently, the Turkey–Saudi Arabia–Pakistan triad forms the backbone not only of these three countries but also of a broader Afro-Eurasian security network.

Synergy of capital, technology and military manpower

Viewed from the perspective of Islamabad, the tripartite alliance is more than just a military pact; it is an industrial lever that brings together finance and high technology. For many years, Pakistan’s military diplomacy has provided Saudi Arabia with training, military personnel and security support, whilst in return it has relied on Gulf funding. However, when the high technology, unmanned systems and operational capabilities of the Turkish defense industry are added to this equation, Pakistan finds an opportunity to move beyond being a passive exporter of security and position itself at the center of a tripartite industrial synergy.

When Saudi Arabia’s financial strength, Turkey’s advanced defense technology and Pakistan’s regional military expertise and growing production infrastructure are combined, a domestic and independent defense bloc and an integrated ecosystem emerge at the very intersection of Afro-Eurasia. At a time when Pakistan is grappling with financial difficulties, this agreement enables it to secure direct Saudi investment whilst also modernizing its domestic defense industry through joint defense projects with Turkey, thereby opening up new market opportunities for both Turkish and Pakistani defense companies.

Internal security challenges and allegations of sabotage

Pakistan’s ambitious foreign policy on the global stage is being tested by chronic internal security challenges and regional hybrid threats. The Islamabad administration has long been grappling with violence perpetrated by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, whilst in the south-west it has been combating separatist actions by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) targeting economic infrastructure and Chinese projects.

However, the recent escalation of social tensions and protests in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (Azad Kashmir) has added a new dimension to the security equation. Strategic circles in Islamabad argue that the unrest erupting in Kashmir is not merely the result of local administrative or economic grievances; rather, they contend that it has been exacerbated by the instigations of external actors who are displeased with Pakistan’s key role in its independent balancing diplomacy with Iran and within the now-concrete Turkey-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Tripartite Alliance, which is now taking concrete form. This situation illustrates that, whilst Islamabad is fighting the actions of the TTP and the BLA on the one hand, it is also forced to contend with the hybrid front opened up via Kashmir by forces seeking to undermine the regional influence of the Tripartite Alliance.

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istory rarely announces itself. But occasionally, a single agreement tells us that something fundamental has changed.

The defense pact signed in Mecca between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye may be one of those moments.

Its most consequential provision is remarkably simple: an armed attack against one of the three countries will be considered an attack against all three.

For Pakistan, this represents something bigger than another defense agreement.

For decades, Pakistan’s military power, including its nuclear deterrent, was viewed overwhelmingly through the prism of South Asia, particularly its rivalry with India. Pakistan was already a formidable military power, but the strategic reach of that power was largely geographically contained.

That is beginning to change.

Pakistan’s security sxtends beyonf South Asia

Pakistan is now part of a collective-defense architecture stretching from South Asia through the Gulf to Türkiye.

And consider what these three countries bring together.

Türkiye possesses NATO’s second-largest army and has transformed itself into a major defense producer, from drones and missiles to warships and advanced aerospace technology. US President Donald Trump himself recently described the Turkish military as “tremendous” and “powerful.”

Saudi Arabia brings enormous economic and energy influence and the political weight of one of the Arab and Islamic world’s most consequential states.

Pakistan brings one of the world’s largest militaries, considerable operational experience and, crucially, is the world’s only Muslim-majority nuclear-armed state.

The nuclear question is therefore unavoidable.

Nothing publicly released about the agreement says Pakistan has extended a nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia or Türkiye. It would be wrong to claim otherwise.

But deterrence is also about perception. Any state contemplating a major confrontation with one member must now factor in the possibility of Pakistani involvement. The presence of a nuclear-armed state within that collective-defense framework inevitably becomes part of the strategic calculation.

Also, it’s worth mentioning that for Türkiye and Pakistan, this is the culmination of something much older.

Ankara and Islamabad: A growing relationship

The relationship between Ankara and Islamabad has long gone beyond diplomacy. It is rooted in unusually strong political and public ties and has evolved into substantial military cooperation,  from training and joint exercises to defense-industrial collaboration and Turkish-built MILGEM warships for Pakistan.

The Mecca pact takes that relationship a significant step further: from close defense partners to countries formally bound by collective defense.

And its implications stretch beyond the three signatories.

India says it is closely following the agreement. Its “great friend” Israel will surely be watching closely too.

Just a day before the agreement was signed, Narendra Modi received a call from Benjamin Netanyahu. According to India’s Foreign Ministry, the two discussed developments in West Asia and reviewed progress in the India-Israel Special Strategic Partnership.

There is no evidence connecting that call to the Mecca pact, and India has explicitly rejected subsequent reports that it sought a defence agreement with Israel to counter it.

But the wider picture is difficult to ignore. From New Delhi to Tel Aviv, capitals will now be assessing what this new arrangement means for a strategic landscape already undergoing profound change.

Having ties to China and the US at the same time

Pakistan occupies an especially interesting position within it.

China remains Pakistan’s “all-weather” strategic partner. Yet Islamabad continues to engage Washington, while simultaneously playing an active mediating role between the United States and Iran.

Perhaps US Vice President JD Vance summed up Pakistan’s standing in Washington most simply when asked about Islamabad’s role in the latest diplomatic efforts: “Very good, we love Pakistan.”

That ability to maintain relationships across geopolitical divides is increasingly rare.

Pakistan can speak to Beijing and Washington, Riyadh and Tehran, and the wider Gulf — without being completely confined to any single geopolitical camp. And now it has added a collective-defense commitment with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye to that equation.

That puts Pakistan in a remarkably unusual strategic position.

The pact also reflects a wider transformation in the Middle East. For decades, regional security depended heavily on external powers. Years of war, uncertainty and shifting American priorities have increasingly encouraged regional states to look towards one another.

Is this agreement like NATO? Well, we still do not know how integrated military planning will become or how its obligations would work during an actual war.

But deterrence begins long before a shot is fired. It begins with the calculations an adversary makes before deciding whether to fire one.

Turkish military and technological power, Saudi economic weight and Pakistani conventional and nuclear strength are now connected through a formal mutual-defense commitment.

(A version of this article was first published in Turkish by Kriter)

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audi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan are set to sign a trilateral defense agreement on Friday, marking a significant expansion of security cooperation among three of the Muslim world’s most influential military powers as conflict with Iran reshapes the strategic landscape of the Middle East.

The agreement will be signed in the Saudi Red Sea city of Jeddah during a summit attended by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, is also expected to participate in the high-level meeting, underscoring the military significance of the pact.

Regional officials familiar with the negotiations said the agreement follows nearly a year of discussions aimed at strengthening defense coordination among the three countries amid mounting security challenges across the Gulf and surrounding waterways.

Although officials have confirmed that an agreement will be signed, none of the governments has publicly disclosed the precise scope of the pact or the commitments each country will undertake.

The trilateral accord comes at a time of heightened instability following the U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran earlier this year and Tehran’s subsequent retaliation against military installations, energy infrastructure and strategic targets across the Gulf. The conflict has exposed vulnerabilities in regional security arrangements while threatening one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies normally pass, has experienced repeated disruptions since hostilities escalated. Commercial shipping has slowed considerably as insurers raised premiums and shipping companies rerouted vessels due to fears of further attacks.

Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan have increasingly sought closer strategic coordination, reflecting concerns that existing regional security mechanisms may not adequately address evolving threats.

A Turkish official confirmed that the defense agreement would be signed but declined to provide further details.

Expanding strategic partnership

The agreement would bring together three countries with considerable military and geopolitical influence.

Türkiye possesses NATO’s second-largest military and has significantly expanded its domestic defense industry over the past decade, becoming a leading exporter of drones, armored vehicles and missile systems.

Saudi Arabia remains one of the world’s largest defense spenders and has accelerated efforts to modernize its armed forces while investing heavily in domestic military manufacturing as part of its Vision 2030 economic transformation program.

Pakistan, meanwhile, is the only Muslim-majority nation possessing nuclear weapons and maintains one of Asia’s largest standing armies. Islamabad has long maintained close defense ties with Riyadh, including military training, intelligence cooperation and joint exercises.

Security analysts say combining the capabilities of the three countries could create one of the region’s most significant military partnerships, although its effectiveness will ultimately depend on the operational mechanisms established under the agreement.

Building on existing cooperation

The new arrangement appears to build upon the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement signed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in September 2025.

According to Saudi officials who previously described the agreement, the bilateral pact treats an attack against either country as an attack against both and provides for cooperation using “all military means.”

Whether Türkiye will assume identical obligations under the expanded framework remains unclear.

Reuters reported earlier this year that negotiations were underway to broaden Saudi-Pakistani security cooperation to include Türkiye, reflecting Ankara’s growing role in regional diplomacy and defense affairs.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said in January that Ankara supported establishing broader regional security platforms capable of promoting stability through multilateral cooperation rather than relying exclusively on outside powers.

Friday’s signing appears to represent the first major institutional step toward realizing that vision.

Maritime security takes center stage

Regional media reports suggest maritime security will feature prominently in discussions during the Jeddah summit.

The three countries have already backed Saudi Arabia’s recently announced multinational maritime initiative aimed at protecting commercial shipping through the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

The initiative gained urgency after repeated attacks on commercial vessels and energy infrastructure during recent regional conflicts disrupted global trade routes.

The Houthis in Yemen have also intensified attacks against Saudi-linked shipping in the Red Sea, further complicating regional security calculations.

Meanwhile, tensions in the Strait of Hormuz have highlighted the vulnerability of energy exports from Gulf producers, particularly Saudi Arabia, whose economy remains heavily dependent on oil exports.

Analysts say closer military coordination could improve intelligence sharing, naval patrols and joint responses to emerging threats affecting maritime commerce.

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ne of the most significant turning points in Turkish political life undoubtedly took place on the night of July 15, 2016. The coup attempt, which arose from a mutiny by a group within the military affiliated with the FETÖ organization, was thwarted thanks to the resolute stance demonstrated by the public and the strong political will displayed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This event not only directly influenced political processes but also served as a catalyst for a profound transformation in Turkish political culture. On the night of July 15, whilst the public’s silence in the face of the military largely came to an end, a clear tendency to embrace the political mechanism emerging from the manifestation of civilian will also became evident.

Following the failed coup attempt on July 15, social and political codes in Türkiye began to be restructured within a new paradigm. By opening the door to an understanding of the risks posed by—or that could be created by—movements characterized by external dependencies and a high degree of esotericism, July 15 brought about a historic turning point in terms of redefining the perception of security in Türkiye and reorganizing the relationship between the military and politics from the ground up.

The radical changes in these two areas have not only had a clear impact on domestic politics and the structuring of institutions, but have also been felt just as distinctly in Türkiye’s approach to international politics and its foreign policy practices. In this new reality, where the approach to countering external threats has shifted, Ankara’s strategic choices—particularly regarding the Middle East—exhibited a striking parallelism with both the region’s own conditions and the domestic transformation taking place within the country.

The strategy to contain Türkiye in the run-up to July 15

The foreign policy vision set out and the policies implemented following the 3 November 2002 elections, which brought the Justice and Development Party to power, enabled Türkiye to reposition itself in global politics and, in particular, to become a founding actor in the Middle East. In particular, the status quo that emerged as a result of the popular revolutions in the region during the 2011 Arab Spring bore the hallmarks of Ankara’s new global political vision. However, in the strategic transformations in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya, the significant electoral success of Islamist and conservative parties—which reflected broader societal trends rather than those of groups aligned with the West—completely altered the perspective of the US and other Western actors on the region.

Furthermore, with the open support provided by Russia and Iran to prop up Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, a serious attempt was made to put a brake on the Middle East’s drive towards independence. During this process, in which Ankara’s relations with the region were taken to a new level, the unease arising amongst global and regional actors evolved into a situation characterized by a succession of initiatives aimed at restricting Turkey’s room for maneuver. The sudden emergence in 2013 of events in Türkiye, Egypt and Bangladesh—which shared similar backgrounds, support bases and rhetoric—constituted steps taken to stem the new momentum within the Muslim world. Alongside the violent protests at Gezi Park in Türkiye, the Tamarod protests in Egypt and the Shahbag protests in Bangladesh were a reflection of a coordinated strategy.

Following the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt on July 3, 2013, through a coup, Ankara’s stance on this event led to the emergence of a new dynamic in the region. Alongside the deepening crisis in Syria, the efforts of certain regional actors to bring the popular revolutions to an end and restore the authoritarian status quo led to a narrowing of Türkiye’s foreign policy parameters, driven by both external and internal factors.

During this period, the terrorist organizations that emerged in northern Syria (ISIS and the YPG), alongside the PKK’s tendencies to undermine stability within the country, constituted attempts to erode the government in power before July 15 and, consequently, the legitimate and civilian political will. In particular, the deliberate efforts by members of FETÖ, who had infiltrated the security bureaucracy to a significant extent, to slow down decision-making and implementation processes and to prevent the government from exercising its proper authority through the dissemination of manipulative information, formed part of a plan to undermine Türkiye’s distinctive and independent character in global politics and reduce it to the status of an ineffective actor.

Against a backdrop of growing threats to Türkiye’s border security from Syria, the aircraft crisis with Russia has gone down in history as one of the profound challenges Ankara has faced. The tension that arose between Moscow and Ankara following the downing of a Russian SU-24 aircraft that had violated Turkish airspace caused serious difficulties for Türkiye, a country that was becoming increasingly isolated in the region and whose security concerns were being disregarded by the Western world.

However, under the leadership of President Erdoğan, and following the decision-making elite’s prudent management of the situation, the crisis between Ankara and Moscow was largely resolved, whilst at the same time Türkiye began to adopt a more resilient stance in the face of regional and global challenges. The fact that the collapse anticipated by FETÖ members and their external supporters did not materialize – due to Ankara’s protection of the country’s security and stability through alternative strategies and its continued resolute policy in the face of all threats – led to the attempt on the night of July 15 to overthrow the government by coup and eliminate Türkiye’s sovereignty.

Post-July 15 purge and Türkiye’s new Middle East policy

Following July 15—one of the longest nights in the history of the Republic—and the failure of FETÖ members’ attempts to eliminate the country’s political autonomy and restrict its capacity for action, Ankara began to pursue an action-oriented policy within a new paradigm. During this process, in which security and the perception of threat were formulated in a manner consistent with the reality on the ground, the security bureaucracy took steps—particularly through the purging of harmful elements within the military—within the framework of the hierarchical relationship that should exist between the government and the military.

On 24 August 2016, to send a message to the entire world and to demonstrate in concrete terms that it would combat all forms of terrorism without making any categorical distinctions, Ankara launched Operation Euphrates Shield in northern Syria, with the support of the Free Syrian Army. As part of this operation, which resulted in a crushing victory over ISIS elements, Ankara made a highly strategic move aimed at eliminating threats to its borders originating from Syrian territory and establishing a safe zone for Syrians in the north of the country.

By demonstrating a radical model of alignment between theory and practice through Operation Euphrates Shield, Türkiye not only altered the balance of power on the ground through its military activism but also assumed both an independent and a founding role in initiating a new process regarding Syria’s future. The fact that, for many years, US and European actors refrained from taking constructive and realistic steps to end the civil war in Syria and ensure the safe return of Syrians led Ankara, following July 15, to adopt a stance that engaged Russia more closely under a new framework.

The establishment of a Syria-focused dialogue framework involving Türkiye, Russia and Iran, and the Astana Talks, which represented an alternative initiative to resolve the crisis in the country, went down in the records as a concrete positive contribution of the July 15 events. Alongside its fight against Daesh, Türkiye—which is determined to prevent the PKK/YPG structure in Syria from undermining Syria’s territorial integrity in any way—carried out the Olive Branch and Peace Spring operations in line with its concept of strategic autonomy, despite reactions from the Western world, thereby consolidating its position as a game-changer in the region.

Having swiftly observed the outcomes of its post-July 15 purification efforts in Syria, Ankara adopted a more active strategy to escape the atmosphere of constriction and isolation that had emerged following the reversal of the post-Arab Spring process. During this period, the transformation of the domestic political system also facilitated Türkiye’s ability to pursue independent foreign policy practices.

The establishment of a new model, in which the executive branch has been strengthened and communication between institutions has been accelerated under the Presidential System of Government, played a decisive role in minimizing the negative effects of the July 15 coup attempt and in enhancing Ankara’s global standing. As a reflection of this, Türkiye demonstrated its influence in the region to all parties by openly supporting Doha against the blockade imposed by the Gulf Cooperation Council countries aimed at disciplining Qatar. Furthermore, following the purge within the country’s civil and security bureaucracy, the acceleration of developments in the defense industry and Türkiye’s transformation into a major security producer have enabled Ankara to reposition itself in global politics. This situation has undoubtedly led to a reassessment of ties with Ankara among regional actors and the reactivation of previously frozen relations.

Although the July 15 coup attempt appears to be an intervention in the political mechanism due to its direct targeting of President Erdoğan and his administration, it is clear that this failed attempt was actually the result of a will to eliminate Türkiye’s subjectivity in the global arena. Considering that a significant portion of classical or postmodern coups in Turkish political life have occurred as a result of Ankara establishing contact with alternative actors or presenting a new global political vision, it is evident that the FETÖ mechanism was activated to undermine the effects of President Erdoğan’s new perspective on the international stage and to transform Türkiye back into a secondary actor.

Having overcome this organized threat against the country’s sovereignty and independence, Türkiye, having largely purged harmful elements from its ranks, has begun to develop more original strategies in the global arena. The most concrete manifestation of this is Türkiye’s founding and decisive role in the Middle East. Changing the status quo in the region and successfully balancing regional actors, Ankara has become one of the most effective actors in both Middle Eastern and global politics over the past decade.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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ermany’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) marked a turning point both in the shaping of the post-Second World War European security architecture and in Germany’s reintegration into the international system. Following its defeat in 1945 and the subsequent division between East and West Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) found itself on the front line of the Cold War.

Within this geopolitical reality, under the leadership of its first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, Germany saw ‘integration with the West’ (Westbindung) as the sole means of regaining the country’s sovereignty, securing its safety and forging lasting ties with the Western world. Germany’s membership of NATO, which took shape in line with Adenauer’s strategic vision and was formalized on 6 May 1955, represented not merely participation in a military alliance, but also a historic paradigm shift that reinforced Germany’s democratic identity and redefined the balance of power in continental Europe.

With its NATO membership, Germany began to re-establish a regular army and rearm. The fact that Germany was on the ‘hot front’ of the Cold War—a situation in which it could become the direct centre of hostilities in a potential conflict—is best understood through Chancellor Adenauer’s statement: ‘The sole aim of Germany’s rearmament is to contribute to the preservation of peace.’

Germany’s NATO objectives: Peace or the pursuit of economic interests?

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Cold War giving way to regional hot conflicts, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw Germany playing an active role within NATO. In addition to its participation in the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR) in the Balkans, Germany’s deployment of troops to the US-led operations in Afghanistan in 2001, at NATO’s request, is particularly noteworthy. Germany’s participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – established by a United Nations resolution and subsequently placed under NATO command – with a force that at times exceeded 5,000 troops, is regarded as the largest overseas military mission in modern German history.

In an interview given during a visit to German troops in Afghanistan in 2010, the then German President Horst Köhler stated that Germany’s overseas military mission should be viewed in a different light, remarking: “As a country of our size, as a country focused on foreign trade and therefore dependent on it, we must recognise that military intervention may also be necessary to protect our interests when required or in emergencies – for example, to secure free trade routes or to prevent regional instability – as such instability would undoubtedly have a negative impact on our opportunities in terms of trade, employment and income. ‘All of this must be discussed, and in my view, our situation is not all that bad…’ he had stated.

Horst Köhler’s remarks, made at a time when there had also been military casualties, raised questions about the constitutionality of Germany’s role in ISAF whilst also sparking intense domestic political debate; Horst Köhler subsequently resigned from the office of President.

Similar remarks were made by the then Federal Minister of Defence, Peter Struck, in December 2002, when the decision was taken to continue sending troops to Afghanistan. In a speech to the Federal Parliament, Struck said: “To clarify the matter, I had mentioned that our security is also defended in the Hindu Kush. ‘When we combat international terrorism alongside our allies and partners—using military means where necessary—in the very places where it originates, Germany becomes a safer place. Our security is further enhanced when the Bundeswehr successfully participates in the reconstruction process in the Balkans and Afghanistan, in accordance with democratic principles, thereby helping to establish the secure environment urgently required in these regions.”

These remarks, which are still the subject of debate today, signalled the dawn of a new era in German foreign policy at the time they were made. They marked the beginning of a new phase in which German foreign policy was no longer confined to defending its own borders, but also encompassed international preventive efforts. National interests were aligned with international interests, thereby justifying a military presence beyond Germany’s borders.

Despite all the past debates, although the number of troops is smaller, Germany still maintains a military presence at 17 locations with 2,000 troops as part of various NATO missions.

NATO or a European common defense system, or both?

Another initiative coinciding with this turning point in Germany’s foreign policy from a military perspective was the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP – Gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik), which was proposed at the European Union summit in Cologne in 1999 under Germany’s presidency and officially incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The CSDP, which was officially implemented in 2009, also led to the establishment of the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs through the provisions added to the Treaty of Lisbon. Just as in the NATO Treaty, the provision for a call for assistance and support, to be activated at the request of a member state, was also incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon, thereby giving the CSDP practical effect. The first to invoke this provision, by requesting assistance and support, was French President Hollande following the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015.

With 23 member states within NATO, the EU began setting strategic objectives through the CSDP to enable the EU to meet the expectations placed upon it as a security actor operating on a global scale. In 2020, under Germany’s Presidency, the ‘Strategic Compass’ was launched as the key document of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), setting out a clear direction and defining both the policy’s objectives and the necessary resources to achieve them. The first joint threat analysis by EU Member States was drawn up. The Strategic Compass also aims to foster even better cooperation in the field of security and defence and to enable the EU to respond more swiftly and effectively to crises through forward planning.

The EU Global Strategy, developed in 2016, stands out as a new and shared commitment regarding the security policies of Member States, whilst steps were also taken that same year to establish the EU Common Defence Fund under the CSDP.

Although the CSDP may at first glance appear to be an alternative to NATO, it is a structure without a standing army or an existing military chain of command. Since 2020, whilst the EU has undertaken various global missions under the CSDP, joint operations with NATO have also taken place.

Within the EU, a group of countries led by France argue that Europe must become an independent military and strategic actor, separate from the other side of the Atlantic. However, the former Warsaw Pact members that joined the Union through eastern enlargement—Poland, Romania, Hungary and the Baltic states—view NATO as an irreplaceable security umbrella for Eastern Europe. These states, which view Russia as a direct existential threat, currently regard the CSDP’s military deterrence as inadequate and position NATO—which hosts US nuclear and conventional capabilities—as the absolute preference for their own national defence. These countries advocate that the transatlantic bond must not be severed.

Furthermore, the rule within the EU requiring unanimous decision-making on CSDP matters hinders the EU’s ability to respond swiftly and effectively to crises. This situation impedes the CSDP’s operational capabilities.

Germany, meanwhile, is endeavouring to strengthen the CSDP whilst simultaneously seeking to bolster its role within NATO by increasing its defence budget. Ahead of the NATO summit, Germany – which had been criticised by the US President for not increasing its defence budget sufficiently and for failing to provide adequate support within NATO – has already countered Trump’s criticisms through Chancellor Merz, stating that defence spending has now reached 4 per cent of annual gross domestic product.

The debate over the relationship between NATO and the EU’s CSDP was also raised during Chancellor Merz’s meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during his visit to Ankara. President Erdoğan emphasised to Chancellor Merz that preserving the ‘Transatlantic Bond’ was crucial for strengthening NATO’s European pillar, and stressed that Turkey could support the European Union’s defence initiatives provided they complemented NATO. This situation demonstrates, on the one hand, that the CSDP is being closely monitored in Ankara and, on the other, that it has once again been emphasised that, from Turkey’s perspective, a common defence strategy against global threats must be defined within the framework of NATO. However, Merz’s statement that ‘a new European NATO is being established’ has failed to provide any indication as to what role the CSDP will play within NATO.

Turkey-Germany relations in the context of NATO

Relations between Turkey and Germany, which form NATO’s south-eastern flank, have followed a contentious course due to geopolitical shifts, diverging strategic priorities, Germany’s approach to Turkey’s cross-border operations, and the ‘clash of national interests’ between the two countries within the alliance. The fundamental strategic disagreement between Turkey and Germany stems from the asymmetrical nature of their threat perceptions. As a border state directly affected by instability in its immediate region (Syria, Iraq and the Mediterranean), Turkey prioritizes issues such as ‘counter-terrorism’ and ‘safeguarding territorial integrity’—not only its own but also that of its neighbors—whilst Germany has adopted a stance that disregards Turkey’s determination in the fight against terrorism.

During the Syrian civil war, following an increase in the ballistic missile threat against Turkey, Turkey requested an air defense system from NATO. In response to this request, Germany deployed the Patriot missile defense system to Kahramanmaraş; however, in 2015, despite the threat persisting, Germany withdrew the Patriot missile defence systems prematurely, citing Turkey’s counter-terrorism policies as justification. This situation, which led to a serious loss of trust in Germany and called into question NATO’s deterrent capability, persisted until recently.

Despite the friendly and warm remarks made by Merz in Ankara, Germany; its embrace of the PKK and FETÖ, the fact that these organizations still find a foothold in Germany, and the German state’s belief that by providing a platform for these terrorist organizations it could politically weaken Turkey, indicate that relations will not improve in the short term and that the alliance between the two countries within NATO will continue to be turbulent for some time to come.

Among the key issues included in the latest coalition agreement—that is, the government program—regarding Germany’s role within NATO are improvements to the federal armed forces’ contingents deployed as part of NATO’s defense efforts and an increase in military equipment. It has been stated that, due to its geographical location in Europe, Germany will be further strengthened as a central hub of NATO. Similarly, the government program views NATO as one of the cornerstones of the transatlantic partnership and emphasizes its indispensability for European security.

Among the objectives is the commitment to work towards establishing a European Defence Union with the aim of strengthening NATO’s European pillar. This objective is also in line with the argument that Germany must become more Europeanized in order for NATO to remain ‘Transatlantic’. In doing so, it also intends to pursue a trilateral cooperation protocol with France and the United Kingdom.

Whilst Germany is moving towards becoming a logistics hub within NATO, it will, at the same time, seek to bring together its EU member allies under a common budget and logistics framework by utilizing the CSDP mechanisms within the EU to strengthen NATO. In the long term, it will seek to secure its economic and political leadership on the European continent through its strength in the defense industry and its military power.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

I

ran is increasingly relying on economic disruption rather than direct military confrontation to pressure the United States into making concessions over the Strait of Hormuz, expanding threats to regional shipping routes and energy infrastructure as the conflict enters a prolonged phase.

According to Gulf officials, regional sources and analysts, Tehran believes that sustained pressure on global trade and energy markets will prove more effective than conventional military escalation in forcing Washington to reconsider its position.

Rather than seeking a decisive battlefield victory, Iran has adopted a strategy of calibrated escalation designed to steadily raise the economic and political costs of the conflict while avoiding an all-out regional war. The objective, analysts say, is to convince the United States and its allies that accommodating Iran’s demands over the Strait of Hormuz is less costly than continuing the current confrontation.

“Iran, from the beginning, has tried to out-escalate the United States by stretching out its escalation options so that it always has something new to bring every week — a new geography, a new type of weapon, a new type of target,” Michael Knights of the Washington Institute told Reuters.

He argued that Iran’s greatest leverage lies not in its ability to inflict military damage on the United States or Israel, but in its capacity to disrupt regional economies and global commerce.

“The bigger advantage they have is not that they can hurt America or Israel,” Knights said. “Their big advantage is that they can hurt the regional states and the global economy.”

Pressure beyond Hormuz

After demonstrating its ability to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz — a waterway that carried around one-fifth of global oil consumption before the conflict — Iran has signaled that its pressure campaign could extend well beyond the strategic chokepoint.

Threats directed at the Red Sea and Saudi energy infrastructure suggest Tehran is seeking to widen the geographical scope of the crisis, increasing the cost of protecting international shipping while testing Washington’s willingness to sustain a prolonged confrontation.

One Gulf source said commanders in Iran’s Revolutionary Guards believe recent developments have strengthened Tehran’s negotiating position.

“The Iranians believe that by widening the war and increasing the pressure, he will eventually give in,” the source said, referring to U.S. President Donald Trump. “Trump thinks he can hit the Iranians hard and bring them to the negotiating table, but they won’t bend.”

That assessment has shaped Tehran’s negotiating strategy, according to Iranian and regional sources.

Trump said on Monday that negotiations with Iran would take place after he canceled a planned military strike in hopes of securing an agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials, however, denied that talks with Washington were currently underway.

A senior Iranian source said Tehran’s leadership has concluded that previous attempts at flexibility only encouraged greater pressure from Washington, reinforcing the belief that meaningful negotiations can occur only after Iran establishes stronger leverage.

In Tehran’s view, the source said, Trump interprets concessions as weakness and responds only to sustained pressure.

Michael Singh, another senior fellow at the Washington Institute, said Iranian leaders appear convinced they still hold the initiative because the Trump administration remains uncertain about how far it is willing to escalate militarily.

“The Iranians are trying to press their advantage,” Singh said. “They’re interested in establishing sovereignty over the strait and exercising selective control over the waterway.”

Dispute over the Strait

At the heart of the standoff is the future administration of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors.

Regional sources say Oman has presented Tehran with a Gulf-backed proposal that would establish a mechanism for managing shipping through the strait, including voluntary user fees.

Iran, however, is reportedly seeking administrative authority over the waterway and the right to impose service charges on vessels passing through it.

Washington has rejected any arrangement that would allow Iran to exercise control over the strait, insisting it must remain an international waterway open to unrestricted commercial navigation.

Former U.S. diplomat Alan Eyre said Iran’s broader strategy is intended to deter further American military action while forcing Washington to lift its naval blockade and reconsider its negotiating position.

“They don’t want the U.S. to dictate the pace of events,” Eyre said.

War of endurance

Analysts say Iran’s campaign has already shifted the focus of regional and international efforts.

Rather than intensifying military pressure on Tehran, Gulf states and Western governments are increasingly concentrating on protecting commercial shipping and critical energy infrastructure.

The formation of a Saudi-led maritime coalition reflects that shift. According to Gulf sources, the initiative is primarily defensive, focusing on escorting commercial vessels, sharing intelligence and safeguarding vital sea lanes instead of confronting Iran directly.

Knights compared the effort to Europe’s Aspides naval mission in the Red Sea, which was established to protect merchant shipping rather than alter the regional military balance.

For Tehran, forcing rivals into an expensive defensive posture represents a strategic success despite its military disadvantages.

Unable to match U.S. military capabilities directly, Iran can still impose significant costs by compelling regional governments and foreign navies to devote increasing resources to securing global trade routes.

Each new threat, whether in the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait or elsewhere, increases the financial and military burden of keeping international commerce flowing.

Analysts describe the conflict as increasingly becoming a contest of endurance.

Iranian leaders appear to believe they can withstand economic pressure longer than the United States and its partners can tolerate repeated disruptions to global energy supplies and maritime trade.

The strategy also serves a diplomatic purpose.

By demonstrating an ability to expand the crisis whenever necessary, Tehran hopes to strengthen its bargaining position before any future negotiations.

“If there are going to be negotiations, they will define the terms,” said Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations. “Both sides are matching escalation with escalation.”

Despite intermittent diplomatic efforts, neither Washington nor Tehran has shown signs of backing down.

As both sides continue to test each other’s resolve through economic pressure, military deterrence and political signaling, analysts warn that a strategy intended to maximize leverage could still spiral into a wider conflict that neither side intends or is fully able to control.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he military operation launched by the US and Israel against Iran on February 28, 2026, which has now evolved into a fragile ceasefire, has reopened the debate on NATO’s institutional and geographical boundaries. The Trump administration’s stance, demanding that its European allies make their airspace and military bases available for use, as well as deploying active naval assets to the Strait of Hormuz, has triggered a structural tension within the Alliance.

Whilst Article 5 of the Treaty limits the obligation of collective defense to attacks on the territories of member states in Europe or North America, Article 6 further narrows this geographical scope by clarifying the definition of the ‘North Atlantic area’. Although the fact that the Washington–Tehran crisis unfolded entirely outside NATO’s formal area of responsibility provided a legal basis for the Alliance to refrain from taking the initiative as an actor, strategic considerations have been the decisive factor here. Although the Alliance claims to be a ‘global security actor’, its members prefer to define the organization as a regional defense pact, whilst avoiding turning their ‘out-of-area’ engagements into an institutional obligation.

Trump’s demands and Europe’s alliance dilemma

The most striking manifestation of the crisis at the operational level is the profound asymmetry between the expectations of the hegemonic power and the allies’ capacity to resist. Washington’s demands have gone beyond a classic burden-sharing debate to become a test of loyalty for the allies. The main objection raised from the European side in the face of this demanding stance is the political rejection that the process has been escalated without consultation with the allies and that ‘the war in question is not Europe’s war’. During this process, Spain adopted the toughest stance by closing its military bases and airspace to US use; Italy demanded strict prior coordination, whilst France and the UK raised various reservations regarding the allocation of bases.

However, despite these restrictive decisions, the European continent – led by Germany – effectively served as a vital logistical base for American military operations. As the crisis deepened and Iran began retaliatory strikes against Gulf states, France, Italy and the UK deployed their military forces to the region to fend off missile and drone attacks, thereby taking up active positions on secondary fronts. On the other hand, whilst the closure of the Strait of Hormuz dealt a severe blow to Europe’s economic interests, the capacity limitations of their own armed forces and their reluctance to be drawn into a conflict imposed by the US led European states to reject Trump’s demand to reopen the strait by military force. This collective refusal by Europe paved the way for Trump to accuse his allies of disloyalty and to threaten to withdraw the US from NATO.

This situation has left European decision-makers facing a classic ‘alliance dilemma’. Allies found themselves caught between, on the one hand, the fear of being drawn into a conflict in the Middle East (entrapment) in the name of US regional interests, and, on the other, the anxiety of being abandoned (abandonment) without the protection of the American security umbrella in the face of the Russian threat. This structural impasse has pushed Europe towards a strategy of ‘active inertia’, one that appeases the US politically whilst refraining from military engagement.

Legal basis for operations outside Article 5

Two historical precedents in which NATO was able to take action even in crises falling outside the scope of Article 5 provide an important comparison of how this structural limitation can be overcome. The Alliance’s military engagement in the Bosnian crisis (1992–1995), which it experienced during the post-Cold War period, was based on a process of deriving legitimacy directly through the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) phased authorisation mechanisms. Similarly, in Libya, the Alliance’s basis of legitimacy was derived not from its own founding articles but from the UN Security Council’s authorisation to protect civilians (Resolution 1973);

NATO became the institutional vehicle implementing this authorisation due to its command-and-control capabilities, yet the composition of participants remained variable, with members such as Germany remaining on the sidelines. The possibility of this scenario being repeated in the Iran crisis is structurally precluded: Russia and China’s veto powers on the Security Council block any Bosnia- or Libya-style authorisation from the outset. This has reinforced the conclusion that NATO has no capacity to take institutional action on the Iran issue, either within its own Articles 5 and 6 framework or through the UN; consequently, the only realistic option remaining is individual or coalition-based action centred on the US-Israel axis.

Furthermore, the Alliance’s structural fissures are manifesting themselves in various ways on the ground. The Alliance’s past operations against piracy in the Gulf of Aden or its missions to combat terrorism and smuggling in the Mediterranean demonstrate a modest yet functional capacity for action that underpins NATO’s claim to protect global trade routes. However, these historical examples are fundamentally at odds with the military and political nature of the threat in the Strait of Hormuz: Whilst operations in the Gulf of Aden or the Mediterranean are policing-style missions conducted against weak and non-state actors, patrolling under the NATO flag in the Strait of Hormuz amounts to engaging in a direct show of force with a sovereign state possessing advanced ballistic capabilities.

Indeed, this structural incompatibility came to the fore as recently as 2019, amidst the deepening US-Iran nuclear crisis and a situation where attacks on oil tankers were threatening global trade. At that time, rather than uniting under a common umbrella, NATO members established two separate naval forces, each operating independently and guided by opposing strategic rationales: the US-led IMSC (2019), focused solely on military deterrence, and the French-led EMASOH (2020), which aimed solely at diplomatic de-escalation without being drawn into the US–Iran conflict. The fact that this two-pronged structure, with its conflicting objectives, has been established outside NATO has clearly demonstrated that the Alliance lacks a shared perception of threat and the capacity for joint decision-making in ‘out-of-scope’ crisis regions.

Turkey as a NATO member

The evasive manoevres of European allies are transforming into a far more complex geographical and strategic equation centered on Turkey, which forms the Alliance’s south-eastern flank. Turkey’s long-standing border with Iran and its reflexes to preserve the regional balance of power, combined with a normative opposition to Israel’s military doctrine, are keeping Ankara away from kinetic conflict and forcing it into a conciliatory diplomacy.

Whilst this strategy of isolation is accepted by Washington, strategic infrastructure integrated into NATO, such as the Kürecik radar and Incirlik Air Base, which Turkey hosts on its own territory, creates structural pressure and the risk of ‘spatial entrapment’. To prevent these facilities from being instrumentalized by the US for unilateral operational intelligence or pre-emptive strikes, Ankara has blocked American manoevres by strictly limiting the rules of use within the Alliance’s formal defense framework. This stance demonstrates that geographical realities shape a security framework far more decisively than Alliance texts.

Ultimately, the ‘active inaction’ strategy developed by European states whilst caught in the ‘alliance dilemma’, alongside Turkey’s efforts to restrict the use of NATO infrastructure under its sovereignty to counter the risk of ‘spatial drift’, have clearly demonstrated that the allies will not unconditionally align themselves with a hegemonic power’s unilateral regional conflict. Although Donald Trump has sought to portray the Alliance as a weak and ‘ineffective’ institution in the eyes of the public, citing the allies’ rhetorical distancing and limited support as justification, the logistical and operational realities on the ground point to the exact opposite.

The difficulties the US has faced throughout the crisis against Iran, which possesses asymmetric capabilities, have clearly highlighted the limits of unilateral force projection, despite its military superiority. Ultimately, this crisis has paradoxically demonstrated the extent to which a hegemonic power needs the strategic depth and structural alliance architecture offered by its allies in order to consolidate its regional presence and project power.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

T

he 36th NATO Summit, held in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026, addressed critical agenda items not only concerning key themes such as the Russia-Ukraine War, defense spending or European security, but also within the context of NATO’s policies towards neighboring regions. In this context, the Summit can also be seen as a platform for redefining relations with the Middle East, North Africa and Gulf countries, which form the Alliance’s southern flank. NATO’s relations with the Gulf countries, which have been caught in a spiral of strategic uncertainty due to the US-Iran conflict, were specifically addressed at this Summit.

The summit held in Ankara demonstrates that the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), launched with the Gulf states at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, has regained strategic importance 22 years later. As will be recalled, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, marked the starting point of NATO’s institutional engagement with the Gulf states. However, over the span of 22 years, this initiative has failed to deliver the transformative impact that was anticipated. The potential of the Ankara Summit to revitalise this framework deserves to be assessed from both a symbolic and a strategic perspective.

The primary aim behind the establishment of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative was for NATO to contribute to the security architecture in the Middle East and the Gulf region in an inclusive and collaborative manner. In particular, the Gulf states’ reliance on external sources for security and their fragile structure were the underlying reasons for this initiative. However, in 2004, only four out of the six Gulf states joined the initiative, meaning full inclusivity could not be achieved. Nevertheless, NATO continued to invest in the initiative, hoping that other Gulf states might eventually join Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, which had already joined the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

At this stage, the fact that membership of this initiative remains limited to four countries, with Saudi Arabia and Oman continuing to remain outside it, can be regarded as both a symbolic shortcoming and a structural weakness. The fact that Saudi Arabia and Oman, two of the most critical countries when it comes to the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf and the security of the Strait of Hormuz, are not part of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative can be cited as the main reason why this initiative has remained a ‘limited-impact’ framework to date. Indeed, this situation also highlights the limitations that the Gulf states’ divergent security perceptions and foreign engagements may impose on cooperation with NATO. Consequently, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative’s failure to demonstrate the expected trajectory of development can be explained not only by fluctuations in NATO’s regional priorities but also by the divergent approaches of the Gulf states.

NATO-Gulf cooperation in the shadow of crisis

From the perspective of Gulf geopolitics, it can be argued that the key factor distinguishing the 2026 Ankara Summit from the 2004 Istanbul Summit was the context in which the meetings took place. The Istanbul Summit was held in the wake of the largest wave of expansion in NATO’s history and against a relatively optimistic global backdrop. The Ankara Summit, however, took place in an uncertain geopolitical environment in which a conflict between the US and Iran, which had started on February 28, was directly affecting the Gulf states and posing a serious threat to their security. This situation has distinctly set this year’s IIG session apart from the routine diplomatic contacts of previous years.

In this context, NATO foreign ministers and representatives from the Gulf states came together at a meeting held on the margins of the summit. At the meeting, a consensus was reached on strengthening cooperation in the face of the security challenges posed by the conflict in the Gulf region. This approach can be interpreted as a sign that the initiative may be evolving beyond a purely rhetorical framework of cooperation towards a crisis-management-centered function. A notable aspect here is the shift in the rhetoric of European allies. The fact that the stability of the Gulf is now framed not merely as a regional issue but as an integral part of European security and energy supply security can be interpreted as a shift in rhetoric that enhances the strategic significance of the IIG. This shift also points to the concretization, specifically in the context of the Gulf, of the ‘360-degree security’ approach that has long been debated within the Alliance.

On the other hand, from the perspective of representation, it is noteworthy that whilst the foreign ministers of NATO countries attended the meeting, only Kuwait, among the Gulf states, was represented at the level of foreign minister. The attendance of State Minister for Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdulaziz al-Khulaifi from Qatar, State Minister for Defense Mohammed bin Mubarak Fadil al-Mazrui from the UAE, and Director-General for Bilateral Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Abdullah al-Khalifa, from Bahrain, highlights that, despite strong diplomatic messages and rhetoric on cooperation, the Gulf states had limited expectations of the summit.

In terms of positive outcomes, however, it was observed that discussions took place at the summit regarding the possibility of taking some concrete steps between NATO and the Gulf states within the framework of the GCC. In this context, the agreement reached between Qatar and NATO on a partnership program to frame civil and military cooperation between the two sides, and the fact that the establishment process for a regional centre for peace support operations planned to be set up in Qatar is approaching its final stage, can be regarded as concrete steps in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative’s transition beyond being merely a consultative platform.

State Minister al-Khulaifi, who attended the summit on behalf of Qatar, emphasized in his statement that his country attaches great importance to the IIG and is ready to implement concrete outcomes. Kuwait, another country taking concrete steps in cooperation with NATO and hosting the GIG-NATO regional centre, launched the Kuwait-NATO Political and Security Dialogue Mechanism in January 2026. Sheikh Jarrah Jabir al-Ahmed al-Sabah, Kuwait’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, who attended the Ankara summit, also proposed in his statement that the GCC Ministerial Summit be held in Kuwait in 2027.

The future of NATO-Gulf cooperation

At this stage, it remains unclear whether NATO’s renewed engagement with the Gulf states is the result of a temporary momentum generated by current crises, or the outcome of a process aimed at implementing lasting structural measures. Given the Gulf states’ quest for security, having recognized the ineffectiveness of a security mechanism entirely dependent on the US during the Iran conflict, it is reasonable to suggest that they may wish to consider NATO as a new alternative security provider. Indeed, the Gulf states, which already maintain strong partnerships with NATO member states such as the US and Turkey, may also aim to formalize institutional cooperation with NATO.

Turkey’s role in this process, as the host of the Ankara Summit, is also noteworthy. Having hosted the 2004 Istanbul Summit during the enlargement process, Turkey has, by 2026, become a more central actor on the Alliance’s southern flank, owing both to its geographical location and its growing defense industry capacity. Efforts to position the reconstruction process in Syria as a bridge between NATO’s sphere of influence and Gulf capital can also be cited as one of the concrete manifestations of this central role. The progress Turkey has made in the defense industry sector and its transformation into a significant actor in terms of military deterrence have made Ankara an important security partner for the Gulf states.

Consequently, the Ankara Summit has had limited yet positive implications for the future from the perspective of the Gulf states. The interactions revealed by the Summit, particularly regarding the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, demonstrate that an initiative which had seen relatively limited progress over the past 22 years has been able to regain significance in the wake of the crisis. At this stage, the most significant question mark concerns whether this momentum will translate into a permanent institutional framework.

Whether the NATO–ICI dialogue will remain a temporary reaction to the geopolitical uncertainty created by the US–Iran conflict will become clear through the concrete steps the parties take in the future. Key factors in this regard will include whether key actors such as Saudi Arabia and Oman will join the initiative, and to what extent the emerging cooperation programm will be reflected in practice. Consequently, the most tangible dynamic in NATO’s future in the Gulf can be identified as the success of the transition from rhetorical solidarity to sustained institutional cooperation.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

O

nly one in three Americans support the U.S. war with Iran, while a large majority believe President Donald Trump has failed to clearly explain the conflict’s objectives, according to a new Reuters/Ipsos poll.

The nationwide survey, conducted from July 24 to 26 among 1,246 U.S. adults, found that support for the war has fallen to its lowest level since the conflict began five months ago. Only about one-third of respondents said they back the military campaign, while support has remained below 40% for five consecutive months.

Despite declining support for the war, Trump’s overall job approval rating rose three percentage points from the previous month to 37%, although it remains historically low for his presidency.

The poll found widespread uncertainty about the administration’s objectives in Iran.

Overall, 69% of respondents—including roughly 40% of Republicans—said Trump has not clearly explained why the United States is fighting in Iran.

Since the conflict began, Trump has cited multiple goals, including:

• Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
• Destroying Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities.
• Encouraging Iranians to overthrow their government.

The White House defended the administration’s approach. Spokesperson Olivia Wales said Trump would not base decisions on “fluid opinion polls” and reiterated that preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon remains the administration’s central objective.

Support lags far behind previous U.S. wars

Reuters noted that public backing for the Iran conflict is substantially lower than support recorded during the early stages of previous American military campaigns.

According to historical Gallup polling:

• Around 70% of Americans supported the Iraq War during its initial months in 2003.
• Approximately 90% backed military action in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks in 2001.

By contrast, Reuters/Ipsos polling has shown support for military action against Iran never rising above 40% since the conflict began on February 28.

The survey suggests the war may become a significant political challenge for Republicans before November’s congressional midterm elections.

Independent voters surveyed by Reuters/Ipsos favored Democratic congressional candidates over Republicans by 36% to 20%. Independents also gave Democrats higher marks on economic issues, reflecting concern over rising living costs linked to the conflict.

The war has contributed to higher energy prices, with average U.S. gasoline prices climbing above $4 per gallon compared with about $3 before hostilities began.

Republican strategist Alex Conant, who served in President George W. Bush’s administration, said the conflict is making it harder for Republicans to focus on economic issues that they had hoped would dominate the election campaign.

Voters question the purpose of the war

Several voters interviewed by Reuters expressed uncertainty about the reasons for the war.

Alex Womack, a retired Marine from Georgia who previously supported Trump, said he no longer understood the purpose of the conflict.

“It’s not clear why we started a war with them. I have no idea,” Womack said.

Another Georgia voter, Rhyan Anderson, who voted for Trump in 2024 after supporting former President Joe Biden in 2020, argued that the administration should focus more on domestic priorities than overseas conflicts.

“My biggest thing is just focus on the people who are actually in the country,” Anderson told Reuters.

According to Reuters, 18 U.S. service members have been killed since the conflict began, while thousands of people have died in Iran and in Lebanon, where fighting between Israeli forces and the Iran-backed Hezbollah has continued.

The combination of rising fuel prices, uncertainty over the war’s objectives and persistent public skepticism presents a growing political challenge for Trump as his administration seeks to sustain support for a conflict that has now entered its sixth month.

(Source: Reuters)

C

ommercial shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait dropped to its lowest level in months after Yemen’s Houthi movement launched attacks on Saudi oil installations along the Red Sea coast, raising fresh concerns over maritime security and global energy supplies.

Shipping data from Kpler showed that only 11 commodity vessels transited the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on Sunday, reflecting a sharp decline in traffic as ship operators reassessed risks following the latest escalation. The disruption comes as the Tehran-aligned Houthis seek to impose a blockade on Saudi exports, broadening the regional fallout from the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict.

The reduced vessel traffic has already pushed physical crude prices in the Middle East, Europe, and Africa to two-month highs, highlighting growing concerns over the stability of key global shipping routes.

Among the vessels that passed through the strait were seven oil tankers, including two very large crude carriers (VLCCs) bound for Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu port to load crude oil. Another tanker linked to Russia also entered the Red Sea.

Hong Kong-flagged New Explorer

Meanwhile, four tankers exited the Red Sea carrying crude destined for Asian markets. These included the Hong Kong-flagged New Explorer, transporting approximately 2 million barrels of Saudi and Emirati crude to Ningbo, China, another tanker carrying 1 million barrels of Russian crude for China, and a vessel delivering roughly 750,000 barrels of Saudi crude to Pakistan.

A second Hong Kong-flagged VLCC, New Pearl, carrying 2 million barrels of Saudi crude to Zhoushan, China, was also reported leaving the Red Sea, becoming the fourth Chinese supertanker to transit the route since the Houthis declared a naval blockade.

The Houthi military said it targeted facilities operated by Saudi state-owned oil giant Aramco in the Red Sea cities of Yanbu and Jizan on Saturday, further escalating tensions in the region.

Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz also remained subdued over the weekend despite a pause in direct U.S. and Iranian strikes. Fewer than 10 commodity vessels crossed the strategic waterway each day, according to Kpler data.

On Sunday, seven vessels transited Hormuz, including three Iranian-linked product tankers leaving the Gulf. The previous day, only three vessels passed through the strait with their tracking systems switched off, including a VLCC heading to Qatar, a liquefied petroleum gas tanker bound for the United Arab Emirates, and a tanker carrying Qatari naphtha to Japan.

The continued disruption across both the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz underscores mounting risks to global shipping and energy markets as regional tensions remain high.

I

ran transported Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders, military advisers, and missile- and drone-related equipment to Yemen earlier this month, according to four sources familiar with the matter, in a move that could strengthen the military capabilities of the Iran-aligned Houthi movement and increase threats to shipping in the Red Sea.

The sources, including two Iranian officials, Yemen’s information minister, and a regional security analyst, told Reuters that the personnel and equipment arrived aboard a Mahan Air flight that departed Tehran on July 13. The aircraft was reportedly bound for the Houthi-controlled capital, Sanaa, but diverted to the Red Sea port of Hodeidah after Sanaa International Airport came under attack by forces aligned with Yemen’s Saudi-backed government.

According to the two Iranian sources, between 10 and 21 IRGC personnel, including senior commanders, were aboard the flight. One source said the officers were deployed to support Houthi military operations and provide training on new missile systems. The source also alleged that Iran shipped gold on the aircraft to help finance Houthi activities.

Reuters could not independently verify the claims.

Iran denies allegations

Iran’s Foreign Ministry did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Tehran has consistently denied supplying the Houthis with missile capabilities or directing the group’s military operations.

Abdel Rahman al-Ahnomi, a Houthi media official who said he was on the flight, rejected the allegations, describing them as “lies and fabrications.” He said all passengers were civilians. The Houthis have repeatedly maintained that they develop their own weapons and are not acting as an Iranian proxy.

The reported deployment comes amid escalating regional tensions following renewed fighting involving Iran and the United States.

Three days after the reported flight, Reuters reported that Tehran had instructed the Houthis to prepare to close the Bab al-Mandab Strait if U.S. attacks targeted Iranian power infrastructure, raising concerns over global energy supplies and maritime security.

On Monday, the Houthis announced a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia, describing it as retaliation for the July 13 bombing of Sanaa airport, which they blamed on Saudi Arabia. The announcement effectively ended a four-year truce between Riyadh and the Houthis and heightened concerns over the security of one of the world’s busiest shipping routes.

The group later claimed responsibility for attacks on two Saudi oil tankers, further escalating tensions in the Red Sea.

Multiple confirmations

Yemen’s Information Minister Moammar al-Iryani confirmed to Reuters that IRGC personnel and military equipment had been transferred to Yemen, citing intelligence reports. He said their mission was to strengthen Houthi military capabilities and enable the group to threaten international maritime traffic through the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

Regional security analyst Mzahem Alsaloum also confirmed the arrival of the Iranian advisers, saying the cargo included components for short- and medium-range missiles and drones similar to systems previously used in attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Alsaloum further alleged that Iran had deployed military advisers to Yemen during last year’s conflict with Israel by routing them through Somalia, a claim Tehran has denied.

The reported transfer followed the resumption of direct flights between Tehran and Sanaa, which the Houthis say are intended to ease what they describe as a Saudi-imposed blockade on Yemen.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei said the July 13 flight was primarily intended to return a Houthi delegation that had traveled to Tehran to attend the funeral of Iran’s late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, along with Yemeni citizens who had received medical treatment in Iran.

According to the sources, the return flight also carried IRGC commanders and military advisers. Before landing in Sanaa, however, the aircraft diverted to Hodeidah after strikes targeted the airport.

The developments underscore growing concerns among regional governments and maritime security analysts that Yemen’s conflict could become increasingly intertwined with the broader confrontation between Iran and the United States, raising the risk of further disruption to international shipping through the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait.

(Source: Reuters)

F

ebruary 28, 2025 was one of the darkest days of the Ukraine-Russia War. Yet, for Ukraine, the catastrophe is unfolding not on the front lines but in Washington, right at the gates of the White House. In the early days of his second presidential term, Donald Trump opens proceedings by publicly mocking Ukrainian President Zelensky’s attire in front of the press, in a manner contrary to diplomatic protocol, before the President has even had a chance to enter the residence. Whilst Zelenskyy thought he would have to make do with this cold shower at the door, inside the White House he was subjected to a barrage of heavy criticism, this time joined by Vice-President James David Vance.

In a sense, those 10 minutes – during which all the aid the US had provided over the past three years was thrown in his face – must have felt like a decade, not only to the Ukrainian President but also to the European countries that had supported Ukraine. Donald Trump consistently maintained his line of accusing his predecessor, Joe Biden, over the Ukraine–Russia War right up until August 2025.

The Trump–Putin summit held on August 15, 2025, at Elmendorf–Richardson Air Force Base in Alaska had further reinforced the impression that all hope for Ukraine had been completely dashed. Furthermore, events at the White House just three days later, on August 18, 2025, reinforced the perception that the US had completely capitulated to Russia’s position on the war in Ukraine. That day, Trump lined up European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Finnish President Stubb, French President Macron, German Chancellor Merz, Italian Prime Minister Meloni, British Prime Minister Starmer, Ukrainian President Zelensky and NATO Secretary-General Rutte before him, and dictated his expectations regarding the course of the Ukraine–Russia War.

Furthermore, by catching this group off guard in front of the media, he forced them to speak on the validity of his own views. However, the evolving relations between the People’s Republic of China and Russia, the support Moscow provided to the Tehran regime during the Iran war, and Russia’s reluctance to sit down at the negotiating table have shifted the course of events.

A changing wind from Alaska to Ankara

On 8 July 2026, the image presented by the Trump–Zelensky duo when they faced the media at the NATO Summit in Ankara was very different from the unpleasant scenes witnessed a year and a half earlier. Beyond the positive messages conveyed, Trump had warmed relations to the point of joking with Zelensky about Ukraine’s drone and missile strikes on Moscow. When Trump asked, “Would you like to go to Moscow?”, Zelensky replied, “I don’t think so; there are far too many Ukrainian drones there.”

Clearly, the US President was also extremely pleased with Ukraine’s dominance, achieved through drones and guided missiles, extending as far as 2,000 kilometers into Russian airspace. Indeed, during the summit, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte remarked: “Some key targets deep inside Russia have been struck. ‘Over the past two months, Ukraine has been hitting targets more successfully’.” It is clear that Ukraine has not only made significant strides in the field of FPV drones and guided missiles.

There has also been an increase—the details of which we are not yet fully aware—in the quality and quantity of satellite-based electronic intelligence provided to Ukraine by NATO member states. The fact that around 100 naval vessels operating for the Russian ‘Ghost Fleet’ were struck by Ukrainian drone attacks in the Sea of Azov in the week following the NATO Summit is a matter that warrants attention in terms of the level these capabilities have reached. Looking back a little further, we can conclude that events took place which led Trump to lose hope that Russia and Putin would make peace with Ukraine in the final quarter of 2025.

The balance of power was redrawn in 2026

From the very first days of 2026, the nature and scale of Ukraine’s drone attacks saw a significant increase. Whilst all logistics routes supplying food and fuel to Crimea were paralyzed, almost all of the peninsula’s fuel depots and main electricity transmission stations were taken out of action by July. Petrochemical plants and refineries across Russia were struck 200 times in six months. This represents an 11-fold increase compared with the first six months of 2025. In May alone, 16 highly successful attacks were carried out against Russian refineries.

It has become commonplace for Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs to reach a range of 2,000 kilometers, or for FPV drones to strike targets more than 100 kilometers behind the front line. Having lost 40 per cent of its oil refining capacity, Russia has reached the point of banning diesel exports following its decision to ban the export of petrol and aviation fuel. Having been reduced to the point of having to import refined oil from India, Russia was unable to parade tanks and mobile missile launchers on Red Square during the traditional Second World War Victory Day commemorations on May 9.

As the military balance rapidly shifted against Russia, US President Trump’s behavior towards Ukrainian President Zelensky at the G7 Summit in Paris and the NATO Summit in Ankara, held between and June 15-17, signaled that even tougher times lay ahead for Moscow. At the summit, a commitment of 70 billion euros was made to provide Ukraine with military equipment, ammunition and training by 2026. Furthermore, following statements from some NATO member states that ‘we have nothing left to give to Ukraine’, the alliance decided to take an unprecedented step. Led by Canada, an initiative was launched to establish the ‘Defense, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB)’ with the participation of certain NATO member states.

The bank, scheduled to become operational in 2027, aims to provide low-cost financing of up to 100 billion pounds for defense projects. The members set to participate in this bank project include Turkey, Albania, Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania and Ukraine. It is clear that the Alliance does not wish to see a repeat of the chaos that ensued regarding support for the Kyiv administration from the outset of the war in Ukraine and intends to find an institutional solution to this.

The US has no further expectations of a Russia under Putin’s rule

Returning to the final communiqué of the NATO Summit in Ankara, it appears that the mobilization launched against the Russian threat directed at Ukraine – and even Poland and the Baltic states – will continue with an open-ended timeline. The communiqué, referencing the NATO Hague Summit Communiqué dated June 25, 2025, emphasised that Russia poses a long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. In other words, NATO members will channel more of their economic capacity into deterrence and defense against threats originating from Russia.

The emphasis on Russia as a “long-term threat” could be interpreted as the US having given up hope on the Putin administration. The visits to Moscow by US Special Envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff – which the Kremlin has been awaiting for nearly two months but which have yet to materialize – could also be seen as a manifestation of this “loss of hope”. Reports by the Russian TASS news agency in the first week of July stated that this visit, which Moscow was apparently eagerly awaiting, “could take place by the end of the summer, though a definite date has not yet been set”.

A report published in the British newspaper The Telegraph on July 10, 2026, however, indicates that the growing aversion towards Russia, particularly in Washington and other NATO capitals, is set to increase exponentially. According to the British newspaper’s report, the Dutch intelligence services, the AIVD (Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service) and the MIVD (Military Intelligence and Security Service), have discovered that doorbell cameras at hundreds of homes along the routes leading from NATO bases in the Netherlands to airports and seaports have been hacked. So, who would want access to the footage from hundreds of doorbell cameras?

According to the Dutch intelligence services, the culprits are cybercriminals backed by Moscow. Their aim is to determine the contents and quantities of arms shipments to Ukraine. According to The Telegraph, this Russian operation is not limited to the Netherlands. Across Europe, thousands of doorbell cameras are under the control of Russian intelligence. In other words, the Ukraine-Russia War has reverted to the ‘factory settings’ established at the outset by the US-UK duo. The objective is no longer limited to simply expelling Russia from Crimea and the Donbas region, which it has annexed. The ultimate goal has been updated to create the conditions necessary to topple Putin’s regime in Moscow.

(This article was originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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emen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement announced a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia on Monday, threatening to expand the regional conflict linked to the ongoing U.S.-Iran war and raising concerns over global energy supplies and international shipping.

The Houthis said the “maritime embargo” would take effect immediately, describing it as retaliation against what they called Saudi Arabia’s continued blockade of Yemen. The announcement broadens the conflict beyond the Gulf, bringing the strategically vital Bab el-Mandeb Strait into focus after shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has already been severely disrupted.

The Saudi-led coalition said it would respond “with force” to the Houthi announcement and confirmed that additional security measures had been implemented to protect commercial and military vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a critical route for Saudi oil exports.

The latest development raises the possibility of simultaneous disruptions at both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb, two of the world’s most important maritime energy corridors.

Analysts warn that a prolonged closure of Bab el-Mandeb could significantly reduce Saudi oil exports and further strain global energy markets already affected by the fighting in the Gulf.

Diplomacy continues despite escalation

The Houthi announcement came as diplomatic efforts to restore a ceasefire between Washington and Tehran appeared to continue.

A senior Iranian official told Reuters that mediators had presented Tehran with a proposal for a 10-day ceasefire aimed at preserving the interim agreement reached last month.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry confirmed that mediators had submitted proposals but did not disclose further details.

Separately, Pakistani officials said Iranian Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni had requested Islamabad to resume mediation efforts between the United States and Iran.

Despite renewed diplomatic contacts, military operations continued across the region.

U.S. Central Command launched another wave of strikes against targets in Iran, while President Donald Trump defended the attacks, saying they were carried out in response to recent Iranian attacks that killed American service members.

The Pentagon identified two U.S. soldiers killed in an Iranian strike on a U.S. base in Jordan last week and said unidentified remains believed to belong to a third missing soldier had been recovered. A fourth U.S. service member was killed separately in northern Iraq during the controlled detonation of unexploded ordnance from an Iranian drone.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it launched missile attacks against U.S. military facilities in Jordan, Kuwait and Syria, while Bahrain reported repeated air raid sirens and Kuwait said its air defense systems intercepted Iranian drones overnight.

Shipping and oil markets under pressure

The Houthis’ announcement briefly pushed oil prices higher before markets stabilized amid hopes that diplomatic negotiations could prevent a broader regional war.

Insurance premiums for vessels operating in the Red Sea increased as shipping companies assessed the heightened security risks.

Meanwhile, the IRGC said two oil tankers had exploded after attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz via what it described as an “unsafe” route, though Reuters was unable to independently verify the claim.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) also reported that a commercial vessel had been struck by an unidentified projectile off the coast of Oman.

The latest escalation underscores the widening geographic scope of the conflict, with military operations now stretching from Iran and the Gulf to Yemen, Jordan, Syria and Iraq.

While diplomatic initiatives remain underway, continued exchanges of military strikes and expanding maritime threats have raised fears that the conflict could further destabilize regional security and disrupt global energy and trade routes.

(Source: Reuters)

U

.S. President Donald Trump on Thursday declassified a series of documents that he said revealed Chinese interference in U.S. elections, renewing his long-standing focus on election security despite previous intelligence assessments concluding that Beijing did not alter the outcome of the 2020 presidential election.

In a 25-minute televised address from the White House, Trump claimed the documents exposed “shocking vulnerabilities” in the U.S. electoral system and alleged that China had obtained personal information from approximately 220 million American voter records.

The president also accused members of the U.S. intelligence community of suppressing information about China’s activities and urged Congress to pass stricter election laws, including voter identification requirements, proof of citizenship for voter registration and limits on mail-in voting.

The address comes ahead of November’s midterm elections, as Republicans seek to defend narrow majorities in Congress amid political headwinds linked to the Iran conflict and rising energy prices.

However, Trump’s claims appeared to conflict with findings by the U.S. intelligence community. A declassified intelligence assessment issued in 2021 concluded that no foreign government attempted to alter any technical aspect of the 2020 presidential election, including voter registration systems, ballots, vote tabulation or certified results.

CIA thinks otherwise

The assessment, conducted under then-Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe—now serving as CIA director under Trump—found that while China had collected publicly available information on American voters and political trends for years, it did not attempt to interfere directly in the election outcome.

According to Reuters, two people familiar with the matter said the voter data cited by Trump consisted largely of publicly available voter files that political campaigns and consultants routinely purchase and could not be manipulated to alter election results.

Some White House officials reportedly expressed concern before the speech that releasing the documents could create a misleading impression about the nature of China’s activities.

Trump nevertheless argued that the newly declassified material demonstrated significant weaknesses in U.S. election security and reiterated claims that large numbers of non-citizens were registered to vote, although he did not provide evidence that those registrations resulted in illegal ballots being cast.

Rare voter fraud

Election experts and previous studies have consistently found that voter fraud and non-citizen voting in U.S. elections are rare.

Democratic Senator Mark Warner, vice chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, rejected Trump’s assertions, saying the U.S. intelligence community had unanimously concluded that China “did not even try to change a single vote” in the 2020 election.

The president also renewed his call for lawmakers to approve the SAVE America Act, legislation that would require photo identification to vote, proof of U.S. citizenship for voter registration and tighter restrictions on mail-in ballots. The measure has passed the Republican-controlled House of Representatives but remains stalled in the Senate amid Democratic opposition.

Despite Trump’s assertions about election vulnerabilities, the declassified documents released Thursday did not provide evidence that votes in the 2020 election were altered or manipulated, according to Reuters.

(Source: Reuters)

U

.S. Vice President JD Vance has accused members of the Israeli government of attempting to influence American public opinion against U.S. diplomatic efforts to end the war with Iran, describing the campaign as an effort to prolong the conflict.

In an interview with podcaster Joe Rogan released on Wednesday, Vance defended last month’s U.S.-Iran interim peace agreement and alleged that Israeli officials sought to derail negotiations through a coordinated influence campaign.

“I know beyond a shadow of a doubt that there have been people within the Israeli government who are trying to shift us away from that policy because they want to continue the military campaign,” Vance said.

The vice president cited a recent Time magazine report alleging that a former Trump campaign manager had been hired on behalf of Israel to oversee a digital campaign aimed at shaping American public opinion regarding Israel and the Iran conflict.

“There’s a literal foreign influence campaign being funded to tank the very deal that I was pursuing,” Vance said, adding that a “well-funded” effort had sought to undermine negotiations.

He also claimed that he had personally faced intense criticism because of his diplomatic outreach.

“People are attacking me viciously for quite literally trying to accomplish the negotiation objective that the president set for the country,” Vance said.

The issue becomes problematic

While acknowledging that allies and adversaries routinely attempt to influence U.S. policy, Vance said the issue becomes problematic when such campaigns shape American political decision-making.

“It doesn’t bother me that Israel tries to do this,” he said. “What does bother me is when those operations, those influence campaigns, actually affect American political judgement.”

Asked whether the United States would have entered the latest conflict with Iran without Israeli influence, Vance replied: “Yes, yes I do.”

He nevertheless reiterated President Donald Trump’s long-standing position that Iran should not acquire nuclear weapons.

“I think the president, separate from any influence from Israel, believes very strongly—and I agree with this—that Iran should not have a nuclear weapon,” Vance said.

The remarks highlight growing public differences between Washington and Israel over U.S. policy toward Iran, particularly following the collapse of last month’s interim peace agreement amid renewed military exchanges.

Former Israeli diplomat Alon Pinkas described Vance’s comments as unprecedented, saying no sitting U.S. vice president had previously accused Israel of actively working to undermine American foreign policy through an influence campaign.

Separately, Vance also addressed the controversy surrounding the late convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein, alleging that Epstein had unspecified high-level connections to both U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

T

he United States has reimposed a naval blockade on Iranian ports and launched another wave of military strikes targeting Iran’s southern coast, intensifying hostilities and further eroding an interim peace agreement reached last month.

The U.S. military said the renewed blockade of vessels traveling to and from Iranian ports and coastal areas took effect at 20:00 GMT on Tuesday, as Washington sought to restrict maritime activity linked to Tehran amid escalating tensions in the Strait of Hormuz.

The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) also confirmed a fresh round of strikes targeting Iranian military infrastructure, saying the attacks were intended to degrade capabilities used to threaten commercial shipping in the strategic waterway.

Iranian media reported explosions in or near the southern cities of Sirik and Bandar Abbas following the announcement, while earlier reports said U.S. strikes had also targeted Abadan, home to the Middle East’s oldest oil refinery, as well as Mahshahr, Qeshm Island and Kish Island.

The latest operations follow a series of U.S. strikes launched a day earlier against targets including Bushehr and Bandar Abbas, marking another escalation in a conflict that resumed despite a memorandum of understanding signed in June aimed at halting hostilities.

Iran retaliates across the Gulf

Iran responded by launching attacks against U.S.-linked targets across the Gulf region, including strikes on Kuwait, Bahrain and Jordan, while also targeting two commercial vessels in Omani waters within the Strait of Hormuz, according to regional officials.

The United Arab Emirates said one crew member was killed in the attacks on the ships.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) acknowledged striking the two supertankers, saying they had ignored repeated warnings while navigating what it described as an unauthorized route through the strait.

The IRGC accused the United States of encouraging vessels to violate Iranian directives and warned that continued cooperation with what it called the “aggressor enemy” would prolong disruption to shipping and increase the risk of a global energy crisis.

Bahrain said its air defenses intercepted an Iranian aerial attack, while Kuwait’s armed forces reported engaging hostile aerial targets. Jordan also said Iranian projectiles targeted military facilities on its territory.

International concern grows

Regional mediators Qatar and Oman urged restraint as the fighting intensified.

Qatar condemned attacks on commercial shipping, while Oman called on all parties to respect international law governing navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

The International Maritime Agency expressed concern over the latest incidents, saying two seafarers had been killed and warning that the continuing cycle of military escalation threatened global maritime security.

Speaking at the White House, President Donald Trump blamed Iran for reigniting the conflict.

“They shot first, and that was a big mistake because we have been knocking the hell out of them,” Trump said, defending the renewed military campaign.

Trump also announced he was abandoning a previously proposed 20% fee on vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz, saying it would instead be replaced by expanded trade and investment agreements with Gulf allies.

“I have decided to replace the 20% United States Reimbursement Fee with trade and investment deals that the various Gulf states will be making into the United States,” he said.

Tehran says agreement no longer binding

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi accused Washington of violating the interim agreement and destroying the framework established to reduce tensions.

According to Iranian state media, Gharibabadi said Tehran no longer considers itself bound by the memorandum of understanding, including provisions related to navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

He rejected suggestions that renewed military pressure would force Iran back to negotiations, arguing that Washington had forfeited the diplomatic framework through its actions.

Analysts warned that the latest exchanges indicate the conflict is evolving into a prolonged confrontation rather than returning to full-scale war, raising concerns over regional stability and the security of one of the world’s most important energy transit routes.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

I

ran launched a new wave of missile and drone attacks against U.S.-linked military installations across the Gulf on Sunday, targeting sites in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan and Oman after the United States carried out another round of strikes on Iranian military infrastructure.

The latest exchange marks a significant escalation in the conflict, with both sides intensifying military operations despite previous diplomatic efforts to contain hostilities.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it had entered the fifth phase of its retaliatory campaign, claiming missile and drone strikes against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain and radar installations in Oman.

The IRGC said it targeted military infrastructure in Juffair, Bahrain, as well as long-range aerial surveillance and vessel-detection radar systems in Oman, claiming the radar facilities were destroyed.

It warned that continued U.S. military operations in the Strait of Hormuz would further disrupt global energy markets.

“The only way to open the Strait of Hormuz to vessel traffic is to end the interventions of the aggressive U.S. military in this strait and respect the sovereignty of countries over their own coastal waters,” the IRGC said.

Earlier, Iranian forces claimed they struck a U.S. missile base in Kuwait, saying two HIMARS launchers and missile storage facilities were destroyed.

Iran also said it targeted military sites in Jordan, including Prince Hassan Air Base, although Jordan said its air defenses intercepted four missiles that entered its airspace.

US expands strikes across southern Iran

The latest Iranian attacks followed a new wave of U.S. air and naval strikes against dozens of military targets across southern Iran.

According to the U.S. military, the operation targeted air defense systems, coastal radar installations, missile and drone facilities, naval assets and other military infrastructure.

Iranian media reported explosions in Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, Sirik and Jask along the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz, as well as several locations in Khuzestan province.

Authorities also reported that at least one civilian was killed and four others injured after a U.S. strike hit an agricultural water pumping station near Mahshahr.

Following Iran’s retaliation, several Gulf countries activated emergency measures.

Bahrain’s Interior Ministry urged residents to seek shelter and avoid open areas as air defense systems responded to incoming threats.

Kuwait’s military announced that its air defenses had engaged “hostile aerial targets,” while authorities advised residents not to panic if they heard explosions resulting from interception operations.

Jordan confirmed intercepting four missiles launched from Iranian territory before they reached their intended targets.

Strait of Hormuz tensions fuel oil market concerns

The renewed fighting has heightened fears over the security of the Strait of Hormuz, a maritime corridor through which roughly one-fifth of global oil shipments normally pass.

Brent crude prices climbed above $79 per barrel as traders reacted to the increased risk of prolonged disruption to global energy supplies.

Analysts warned that depleted global oil inventories leave markets more vulnerable to sustained conflict than during previous crises.

While both Washington and Tehran continue to exchange military strikes, experts suggest neither side is likely to seek a prolonged war due to the potentially severe economic consequences, particularly for global energy markets and regional stability.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

C

anadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has described Saudi Arabia and Türkiye as the two most influential countries in shaping potential solutions to the Middle East’s ongoing crises, emphasizing the importance of direct engagement with regional powers over public criticism.

Speaking to reporters during an official visit to Jeddah on Friday, Carney said that meaningful progress on regional conflicts would depend largely on the role played by Riyadh and Ankara.

“The two most influential countries regarding potential solutions in the Middle East are Saudi Arabia and Türkiye,” Carney said.

Carney stressed that Canada remains deeply committed to developments in the Middle East but argued that constructive dialogue is more effective than criticizing governments from afar.

He said engaging directly with regional leaders does not imply endorsement of all their policies.

“Lecturing countries from a distance is an ineffective strategy,” Carney said. “It may be satisfying, but it is ineffective. Engagement can be effective. That does not mean it will always be decisive, but it can produce results.”

Talks with Erdoğan

Addressing Canada’s relations with Türkiye, Carney said he discussed unresolved bilateral issues during his recent meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Ankara.

He noted that the direct dialogue had yielded positive outcomes that would not have been possible through diplomacy conducted from Ottawa.

Diversifying Canada’s partnerships

The Canadian prime minister also highlighted his government’s efforts to reduce Canada’s heavy reliance on the United States by expanding international partnerships.

“We are overly dependent on the United States. That has been demonstrated,” Carney said. “Every Canadian strongly recognizes this, and we are seeking diversification.”

His remarks reflect Ottawa’s broader strategy of strengthening diplomatic and economic ties with a wider range of global partners as Canada seeks a more diversified foreign policy and trade agenda.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

T

urkish tennis player Zeynep Sönmez has attracted international attention both for her historic performances at Wimbledon and for a symbolic display of solidarity with Palestinians after tournament officials barred her from wearing a pro-Palestinian badge.

The 24-year-old became one of the tournament’s most talked-about players after using a watermelon-shaped vibration dampener on her racket — a symbol widely associated with Palestinian identity and solidarity because it shares the colors of the Palestinian flag.

Sönmez said Wimbledon officials prohibited her from wearing a pro-Palestinian brooch during the tournament, prompting her to adopt the watermelon symbol instead.

“I used to wear a brooch, but tournaments no longer allow me to wear it,” Sönmez told Türkiye’s Anadolu Agency.

She questioned what she described as inconsistent standards governing political expression in tennis, noting that players have been permitted to display Ukrainian symbols while similar expressions of solidarity with Palestinians were not allowed.

“I argued that the Ukrainian flag is allowed, but the Palestinian one is not,” she said. “They told me they would not permit it.”

Unable to wear the badge on her clothing, Sönmez attached the watermelon-shaped dampener to her racket, explaining that tournament officials could not object to her choice of equipment.

Her gesture received widespread praise in Türkiye.

Turkish Youth and Sports Minister Osman Aşkın Bak commended Sönmez’s stance, describing it as an example of sport promoting universal human values. Ömer Çelik, spokesperson for Türkiye’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), also praised her expression of solidarity with Palestinians.

Sönmez thanked supporters, saying the encouragement she received from Türkiye made her feel she was “never alone” on court.

From ball girl to national trailblazer

Born in Istanbul on April 30, 2002, with family roots in the Black Sea town of Arhavi, Sönmez began dreaming of a professional tennis career while working as a ball girl at a Women’s Tennis Association tournament in Istanbul.

Watching fellow Turkish player Çağla Büyükakçay win a WTA title inspired her ambition to reach the sport’s highest level.

Coached by Issam Jellali and Mehmet Bayraktar, Sönmez transformed her game following a difficult Wimbledon qualifying defeat several years ago, adopting a more aggressive playing style while building on her speed and athleticism.

She has also earned recognition for her sportsmanship, including a widely praised fair-play moment during a tournament in Monastir, where she and opponent Eva Lys corrected line calls in each other’s favor.

Sönmez has enjoyed the strongest period of her career over the past two seasons.

She captured her first WTA 250 singles title in Mérida, Mexico, in 2024 before continuing her rise through the rankings.

Her performances elevated her to a career-high world ranking of No. 51, making her the highest-ranked Turkish woman in WTA history, surpassing Çağla Büyükakçay’s previous national record.

Sönmez also became the first Turkish player—male or female—in the Open Era to reach the third round at Wimbledon in 2025.

She matched that achievement at the 2026 Australian Open, defeating Anna Bondár and upsetting 11th seed Ekaterina Alexandrova before exiting in the third round.

Earlier this season, she earned the first top-10 victory of her career by defeating Italy’s Jasmine Paolini at the Porsche Tennis Grand Prix in Stuttgart.

Wimbledon campaign ends

Sönmez’s 2026 Wimbledon singles run concluded in the second round with a 7-5, 6-3 loss to American Claire Liu.

Despite the defeat, her performances on court and her symbolic show of support for Palestinians made her one of the tournament’s most prominent figures, drawing international attention both for her sporting achievements and her advocacy.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

T

he United States and Iran exchanged another round of military strikes on Thursday, sharply escalating tensions in the Gulf and raising fresh concerns over the stability of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global energy corridor.

The latest escalation came after U.S. forces launched a second wave of attacks against Iranian military infrastructure overnight, with Washington saying the operation was intended to safeguard freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz following Iranian attacks on commercial shipping.

Iran responded hours later by launching missile and drone strikes against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, marking another direct exchange between the two countries despite previous diplomatic efforts to halt the conflict.

The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said its latest operation struck approximately 90 military targets across Iran, including air defense systems, coastal surveillance installations, missile and drone storage sites, naval assets and military logistics infrastructure along Iran’s southern coastline.

The strikes followed an earlier round of attacks this week in which U.S. forces targeted more than 80 Iranian military sites.

Speaking to reporters while returning from the NATO summit in Türkiye, U.S. President Donald Trump defended the operation, describing it as retaliation for Iran’s attacks on commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

“We just hit them very hard,” Trump said. “Every time they hit us, we’re going to hit them 20.”

Earlier, Trump declared that the interim agreement intended to halt fighting between Washington and Tehran was effectively “over.”

Iran retaliates against US bases

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced that it had carried out strikes against U.S. military positions in Bahrain and Kuwait in response to the American attacks.

The Guards warned that further retaliation would follow if the United States launched additional strikes against Iranian territory.

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf said the Strait of Hormuz would operate only under what he described as “Iranian arrangements,” adding that U.S. “bullying and breaking its commitments no longer come without a cost.”

Iranian state media reported that three people were killed and several others injured in U.S. strikes near Ahvaz in southwestern Iran.

Multiple locations along Iran’s southern coast were reportedly hit, including Bandar Abbas, home to Iran’s largest commercial port and major naval facilities belonging to both the Iranian Navy and the Revolutionary Guards.

Additional strikes were reported in Konarak, Chabahar and Iranshahr, where a firefighter was killed during an attack on the city’s airport. Iranian media also reported damage to a railway bridge near Aqqala in northern Iran.

Oil prices climb

Global oil prices rose as markets reacted to renewed fighting and concerns that continued hostilities could threaten shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies normally pass.

Brent crude futures rose more than 1% to nearly $79 per barrel, while U.S. West Texas Intermediate crude also gained more than 1%.

The latest exchange follows a familiar pattern seen during previous rounds of fighting, with Iranian attacks on commercial shipping followed by U.S. military retaliation and subsequent Iranian strikes on American military facilities in the Gulf.

Despite the escalating military exchanges, analysts say both sides may still be seeking to strengthen their negotiating positions while avoiding a broader regional war, although the collapse of the interim agreement has significantly reduced prospects for an immediate diplomatic breakthrough.

(Source: Reuters)

F

ollowing approximately 100 days of tension, Iran and the US announced on Sunday 14 June that they had reached an agreement on a memorandum of understanding. On 17 June, the text of the 14-point memorandum of understanding was signed by US President Donald Trump and Iranian President Mesud Pezeşkiyan. Thus, an agreement has been reached that will launch a 60-day negotiation process between the two countries. The final outcome will be determined by the agreement reached at the conclusion of these 60 days of negotiations. From this perspective, it is fair to say that the current memorandum of understanding serves as a sort of ‘goodwill document’ to initiate the negotiation process between the two countries. This document also serves as a guide regarding the issues to be addressed during the negotiation process. In this context, it is worth examining in detail the matters covered by the Memorandum of Understanding.

Matters covered by the memorandum of understanding

The provisions set out in the 14-article Memorandum of Understanding are broadly divided into two categories. Some of these are provisions that come into force upon the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, whilst others are provisions expected to come into force subject to the outcome of the 60-day negotiations.

Accordingly, Articles 1, 4, 5, 10 and 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding cover the matters that come into force upon its signing. Article 1 stipulates that the US, Iran and their allies must immediately and permanently cease hostilities on all fronts where tensions persist, particularly in Lebanon. This article also emphasises that the parties shall henceforth refrain from initiating war or military operations against one another, shall not issue threats, and that Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity shall be guaranteed. Consequently, the implementation of this article extends not only to the US and Iran but also to Israel and Hezbollah. Indeed, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi stated in a statement that one party to the agreement consists of the US and Israel, whilst the other comprises Iran and Hezbollah. From this perspective, any potential conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is of critical importance. Given Israel’s statements that it will not withdraw from the territories it occupies in Lebanon, it is clear that this provision is also one of the factors rendering the agreement fragile.

Another important issue—the keeping of the Strait of Hormuz open and the regulation of transit—is addressed in Articles 4 and 5 of the Memorandum of Understanding. Accordingly, the US will lift its naval blockade against Iran within 30 days, commencing immediately after the signing of the agreement. In return, Iran will ensure that traffic through the Strait of Hormuz returns to pre-war levels within 30 days. It has been stated that Iran will not charge fees to ships transiting through the Strait of Hormuz for a period of 60 days. Once the 60-day period has ended, it is envisaged that Iran will reach an agreement with Gulf states, primarily Oman, regarding transit arrangements. It has also been stated that the US will withdraw its troops from the vicinity of Iran. According to statements by US officials, this does not imply that the US will withdraw from its bases in the region; rather, it refers to the restoration of the US military presence to its pre-war status.

Iran’s frozen assets

Another issue expected to be implemented following the signing of the memorandum of understanding concerns Iran’s frozen assets and restrictions on its oil sales. Under Articles 10 and 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding, the US Department of the Treasury will issue the necessary authorizations regarding Iran’s oil sales and related insurance, transport and banking transactions, which will remain in force until sanctions are lifted. In addition, Iran’s frozen assets will be released. The details regarding the implementation of these articles will be determined during the negotiation process.

In addition to the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding that come into force upon signature, there are also provisions that will come into force with the final agreement, which is expected to be signed following 60 days of negotiations. These provisions cover more fundamental issues than those that come into force upon the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding and require detailed technical information.

The sanctions imposed on Iran in connection with its nuclear program also constitute one of the provisions contained in the Memorandum of Understanding. The sanctions are addressed in Articles 6 and 7 of the Memorandum of Understanding. Accordingly, all sanctions imposed on Iran – primarily those enacted through United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and those unilaterally imposed by the US – will be lifted. In addition, the US will plan an investment program worth at least 300 billion dollars, with the assistance of its regional allies, to support Iran’s economic development. The program will operate entirely under US supervision. It is stated that this program has been established by the US as an alternative to Iran’s claim for war reparations. [OO1] The implementation of the program is contingent upon a final agreement following the negotiations. The issue of sanctions, meanwhile, constitutes one of the first matters to be addressed upon the commencement of negotiations.

An examination of the articles of the Memorandum of Understanding reveals that, alongside operational provisions, there are also articles containing general provisions. For example, Article 2 of the Memorandum emphasizes that Iran and the US shall respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and shall not interfere in each other’s internal affairs.

Finally, Articles 12, 13 and 14 regulate the operation of the Memorandum of Understanding. According to these articles, a mechanism will be established to monitor the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding. Once the provisions set out in Articles 1, 4, 5, 10 and 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding have entered into force, the two parties will commence 60 days of negotiations. The final agreement reached following the 60-day negotiations will also be confirmed by a UN Security Council resolution.

Risks and opportunities

One of the most significant aspects envisaged by the Memorandum of Understanding concerns Lebanon. Accordingly, it provides for an immediate cessation of hostilities in Lebanon and guarantees of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, Israel has stated that it will not withdraw from the territories it occupies in Lebanon; not content with this, it has also launched attacks on Lebanese territory following the announcement that an agreement had been reached between Iran and the US. Similarly, the memorandum of understanding signed between Iran and the US has drawn predominantly negative reactions from within Israeli domestic politics.

Channel 14, based in Israel and a staunch supporter of Netanyahu, has levelled harsh criticism at Trump over the signed memorandum of understanding. This situation has prompted a reaction from US Vice-President JD Vance. Consequently, it is evident that the memorandum of understanding is highly fragile, given that Israel – one of its indirect parties – has adopted such an adversarial stance. However, as can be inferred from the reactions of Trump and his deputy Vance, the US administration appears determined to secure a final agreement. Yet, only time will tell whether this US determination will be sufficient to rein in Israel.

Another risk factor is the potential for new regulations governing transit through the Strait of Hormuz. According to the provision in the memorandum of understanding, Iran will temporarily allow transit through the Strait of Hormuz without charging any fees. However, once the 60-day period has expired, a new arrangement will be put in place in consultation with other Gulf states, primarily Oman. Indeed, Iran has previously held discussions with Oman on this matter. Iran maintains that transit through the Strait of Hormuz should be under the control of both Oman and Iran. In this regard, it proposes that a specific fee be charged in return for the service provided. Furthermore, Iran has raised the issue of distinguishing between military and civilian transit. Iran’s refusal to back down from these demands, coupled with the other side’s refusal to accept them, poses a risk to the negotiation process.

Although the signed memorandum of understanding contains elements of risk, it represents the highest-level interaction between the two countries since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. For the first time since then, the presidents of the two countries have signed a document aimed at securing peace. This not only signals the beginning of a new era but also demonstrates that 47 years of hostility have borne no fruit. The most concrete example of this is the tensions and conflicts that have arisen between the two sides over the past year. For this reason, the memorandum of understanding signed is more likely to evolve into a lasting agreement than previous ones.

Unlike other negotiations, the current talks are taking place against a backdrop where other options – primarily war – have already been tried alongside diplomacy. Given that war, as the most radical option, has proved fruitless, it is clear that the two sides have no alternative to diplomacy. Consequently, it is highly likely that the new process that has been initiated will result in peace. However, given that the negotiations leading to the KOEP lasted 18 months, it is clear that a 60-day period is not sufficient for a comprehensive agreement. It is therefore reasonable to assume that this period will be extended and that a longer-term process is on the cards.

(Originally published in Turkish by SETA Foundation)

I

raqi security forces arrested several senior political figures, including members of parliament, in a series of overnight raids inside Baghdad’s heavily fortified Green Zone, marking one of the country’s most significant anti-corruption operations in recent years.

The arrests took place early Sunday after security forces sealed all entrances to the Green Zone, the high-security district that houses Iraq’s key government institutions, parliament and foreign embassies.

According to Iraq’s state-run Iraqi News Agency, the operation was launched following testimony provided by former Deputy Oil Minister Adnan al-Jumaili, who was arrested last month on corruption allegations. Authorities said the raids targeted individuals implicated in his statements and included lawmakers whose parliamentary immunity had been lifted.

A security agency report obtained by the Associated Press said seven people were detained, including five members of parliament. Officials did not immediately disclose the specific charges against those arrested or provide details about the alleged corruption scheme.

The identities of those detained have not been officially released, although the report said some of the arrested lawmakers belonged to the political bloc of former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani.

The large-scale operation unfolded in one of the most secure areas of the Iraqi capital, highlighting the sensitivity of the investigation and prompting heightened security measures throughout the district.

Investigation linked to former deputy minister

Authorities said the arrests stemmed from information provided by al-Jumaili, who was taken into custody last month as part of a broader corruption investigation.

His testimony reportedly implicated several senior political figures, leading prosecutors to seek the lifting of parliamentary immunity for lawmakers suspected of involvement.

Under Iraqi law, members of parliament generally enjoy immunity from prosecution while in office unless parliament votes to remove those protections.

Officials have not indicated whether additional arrests are expected or whether the investigation extends beyond those detained on Sunday.

The Green Zone lockdown temporarily restricted movement into one of Baghdad’s most heavily guarded areas while security forces carried out coordinated raids.

The operation underscores renewed efforts by Iraqi authorities to pursue corruption cases involving senior political figures, an issue that has long dominated public debate in the country.

Political implications

The arrests are expected to reverberate across Iraq’s fragmented political landscape, where corruption allegations often overlap with broader struggles for political influence.

Former Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s political alliance secured the largest number of seats in Iraq’s parliamentary elections in November. However, despite that electoral success, al-Sudani did not return to office after political negotiations within the Coordination Framework reached an impasse.

The Coordination Framework, a coalition of Shiite political parties aligned with Iran, was unable to agree on its preferred candidate for prime minister.

Instead, Ali al-Zaidi, a businessman and political newcomer, emerged as a compromise choice and was appointed prime minister with backing from major political factions as well as support from the United States.

The detention of lawmakers linked to al-Sudani’s political bloc could further complicate relations among Iraq’s competing factions as the government seeks to maintain stability while pursuing anti-corruption reforms.

Corruption has remained one of Iraq’s most persistent challenges since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, with successive governments pledging reforms but facing widespread criticism over limited progress.

Transparency advocates have long argued that political patronage, weak institutions and competing party interests have hampered efforts to hold powerful officials accountable.

The latest arrests represent one of the highest-profile actions against serving political figures in recent months.

It remains unclear whether prosecutors will seek formal indictments against all those detained or whether further evidence will be presented in court.

Government officials have not commented on whether the investigation could expand to include additional politicians or public officials.

Analysts say the outcome of the case could influence public confidence in Iraq’s anti-corruption campaign, particularly if the investigation proceeds through the courts without political interference.

For now, authorities continue to investigate the allegations while security remains heightened around Baghdad’s Green Zone, reflecting the political significance of the operation and its potential consequences for Iraq’s governing establishment.

(Source: CNN)

G

ulf Arab states are reassessing their long-standing security relationship with the United States following Washington’s emerging agreement with Iran, amid concerns that the proposed deal could reshape the regional balance of power and leave key security issues unresolved.

The framework agreement between the United States and Iran, announced after months of conflict and negotiations, has been welcomed across the Gulf as a step away from a wider regional war. However, analysts and diplomats say many governments in the region remain deeply uneasy about its long-term implications, particularly regarding Iran’s military capabilities and growing regional influence.

The agreement seeks to end hostilities between Washington and Tehran, reopen the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping and establish a process for broader negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions relief and economic reconstruction. While Gulf capitals support efforts to prevent another devastating conflict, many officials are questioning whether the arrangement adequately addresses their security concerns.

Trust in US erodes

For decades, Gulf monarchies have relied heavily on the United States as their principal security guarantor. American military bases, naval deployments and defence partnerships have formed the backbone of regional deterrence against external threats, particularly from Iran.

Yet confidence in those guarantees has gradually weakened over the past several years.

Regional observers point to a series of developments that have fuelled doubts, including the limited U.S. response to attacks on Saudi oil facilities in 2019 and Washington’s broader shift toward reducing its military footprint in the Middle East.

Those concerns have resurfaced following the latest U.S.-Iran agreement, which many Gulf officials view as another indication that Washington is increasingly prioritising diplomacy and strategic disengagement over long-term military commitments in the region.

The agreement also introduces new arrangements affecting navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors. Under the framework, Iran is expected to play a role in future discussions on managing commercial shipping alongside Oman and other regional stakeholders.

Possible Iranian influence on maritime security

For Gulf countries whose economies depend heavily on energy exports passing through the waterway, the prospect of expanded Iranian influence over maritime security has generated considerable debate.

Analysts argue that while reopening shipping lanes would benefit global energy markets, Gulf governments remain cautious about any arrangement that could strengthen Tehran’s leverage over regional trade.

The deal also leaves several contentious issues unresolved.

Although negotiations on Iran’s nuclear activities are expected to continue during a 60-day transition period, the current framework does not directly address Tehran’s ballistic missile programme or its relationships with armed groups across the Middle East.

Many Gulf governments have long regarded those issues as posing a more immediate security challenge than Iran’s nuclear ambitions alone.

During a regional tour following the announcement of the agreement, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio sought to reassure Gulf allies that Washington would continue consulting closely with them throughout negotiations and would not pursue policies that undermine their security.

Rubio emphasised that future discussions concerning Iran’s missile program would be coordinated with regional partners and reaffirmed America’s commitment to longstanding alliances in the Gulf.

Despite those assurances, regional analysts say trust has been weakened by years of uncertainty surrounding U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Diversifying military partnerships

Several experts argue that Gulf states increasingly believe they must prepare for a future in which they shoulder greater responsibility for their own defense.

As a result, some governments have accelerated efforts to diversify their military partnerships and defence procurement beyond traditional suppliers.

Turkey has emerged as one potential alternative source of military equipment and defense cooperation, reflecting a broader strategy of reducing dependence on any single security partner.

At the same time, Gulf countries continue to strengthen economic ties with the United States. Major investment commitments announced in recent years demonstrate that while questions persist over security arrangements, economic cooperation remains a central pillar of bilateral relations.

The proposed agreement with Iran also includes plans for a multibillion-dollar reconstruction and investment fund intended to support Iran’s economic recovery after the conflict.

Although Washington has indicated that Gulf participation would be important, several regional governments have said they have not yet committed funding and are awaiting further details before making any decisions.

For many Gulf leaders, preventing another regional war remains the immediate priority.

The recent conflict exposed the vulnerability of Gulf states to missile and drone attacks and highlighted the economic consequences of disruptions to energy exports and international shipping.

A

t least 32 people have been confirmed dead and around 700 injured after two powerful earthquakes struck Venezuela, causing widespread destruction in the capital Caracas and other parts of the country, according to authorities.

The twin quakes, measuring 7.2 and 7.5 in magnitude, hit less than a minute apart about 160 kilometers west of Caracas, triggering building collapses, damaging infrastructure and prompting fears that the final death toll could rise significantly as rescue efforts continue.

Emergency crews raced through the night to search for survivors trapped beneath the rubble of collapsed buildings. Images from Caracas showed rescue workers combing through debris while families gathered anxiously near disaster sites awaiting news of missing relatives.

Interim President Delcy Rodríguez said at least 32 people had been killed and hundreds injured, though officials cautioned that casualty figures remained preliminary.

Rescue efforts intensify

Search-and-rescue teams have been deployed across affected areas, with authorities focusing on collapsed residential buildings and heavily damaged neighborhoods.

Eyewitnesses described scenes of panic and devastation. One survivor in Caracas said residents struggled to escape amid dust clouds and falling debris.

“The scene was like a horror movie,” the survivor told Reuters, describing how people climbed over rubble to reach safety.

Several aftershocks have been recorded since the initial earthquakes, complicating rescue operations and raising concerns about further structural collapses.

Thousands of deaths feared

While official casualty figures remain relatively low so far, the U.S. Geological Survey’s Prompt Assessment of Global Earthquakes for Response (PAGER) system has warned that the eventual toll could be much higher.

According to updated USGS modeling, there is a 39% probability that fatalities could range between 1,000 and 10,000 people, and a 37% chance the death toll could reach between 10,000 and 100,000 if the most severely affected areas suffered extensive structural failures.

The agency also estimates economic losses equivalent to between 1% and 4% of Venezuela’s gross domestic product.

The United States announced it has activated a disaster assistance team and emergency task force to coordinate humanitarian support.

According to the U.S. State Department, Washington plans to send search-and-rescue specialists, medical supplies and humanitarian aid in cooperation with Venezuela’s interim government.

U.S. President Donald Trump said the earthquakes may have caused a “devastating number of deaths” and pledged American support for relief efforts.

Oil sector appears largely unaffected

Despite concerns about Venezuela’s energy infrastructure, authorities reported no immediate damage to major oil facilities.

Officials in Maracaibo, near the country’s main oil-producing region around Lake Maracaibo, said there were no reports of injuries or significant damage affecting petroleum operations.

Energy companies operating in Venezuela have begun assessing facilities, although industry sources warned that prolonged power outages could disrupt crude production in the coming days.

The disaster comes at a sensitive moment for Venezuela, which is undergoing a political transition following the removal of former President Nicolás Maduro earlier this year.

The country continues to face severe economic difficulties, with widespread poverty, fragile infrastructure and ongoing efforts to rebuild institutions after years of political turmoil.

As rescue operations continue and damage assessments expand, authorities fear the human and economic cost of the disaster could become one of the most severe natural catastrophes to strike Venezuela in decades.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he political crisis in Iraq, which lasted for approximately six months, was partially resolved on May 14, when Ali Faleh Kazem Al-Zaidi’s government secured a partial vote of confidence in parliament. However, it would be an oversimplification to view the situation in Baghdad merely as a delayed government negotiation. For whilst politics in Iraq may appear to be functioning today, the balance that sustains the system is becoming increasingly fragile.

The presidential election process laid this bare. For months, a two-thirds majority could not be secured in parliament. The election of Nizar Amedi, the candidate of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), as president cleared the way for the government; however, the resulting picture points to a period in which new power distributions are becoming visible rather old balances continuing. Indeed, the fragmentation within the Shia political sphere, the intensifying rivalry between the KDP and the KYB, the emergence of more pragmatic networks among Sunni political actors, and the internal divisions within groups aligned with Iran all indicate that the political landscape in Baghdad has shifted.

Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to claim that the system has completely collapsed. Indeed, in the new framework, the presidency remains with the Kurds, the premiership with the Shias, and the speakership of parliament with the Sunnis. However, it is evident that the political balance underpinning this structure no longer reflects the old Iraq. In the current order, alliances are formed more flexibly, the political arena is becoming more fragmented, and actors are acting more pragmatically. Yet the state apparatus is failing to centralize to the same extent.

It is possible to interpret this emerging picture as a form of ‘asymmetric continuity’. In other words, the system continues, but the political algorithm that sustains it is changing. Indeed, as the sphere of representation expands, decision-making capacity becomes increasingly fragile. The manner in which the Zeydi government was formed also demonstrated this. Of the 23 ministers, only 14 were able to secure a vote of confidence in parliament. The confidence votes for some ministers were postponed, some candidates withdrew, and others were outright rejected. For Iraq, the issue is no longer merely forming a government; it is about establishing a state structure that functions, can make decisions, and possesses the capacity to exercise sovereignty over the country.

Foreign policy balance

It is precisely at this point that the US-Iran balance is once again becoming decisive. Historically, Iraqi politics has been interpreted through the narrow prism of ‘whether the US or Iran is “winning” Yet the recent process has revealed a different picture. Neither can Iran be pushed outside the system, nor can Washington establish a decisive sphere of influence on its own. In this sense, a more controlled model of competition appears to have emerged. The parties are not completely eliminating each other’s room for manoeuvre, but are attempting to establish strategic boundaries.

This situation felt particularly in the security sphere. The fact that certain figures close to Iran can hold positions in the government demonstrates that Tehran’s influence persists, whilst reservations regarding certain critical security posts highlight Washington’s sensitivity regarding Iraq’s security architecture. From the US perspective, the issue is not to eliminate Iranian influence entirely. Given the fragile structure in Iraq, such a move would risk making the system even more unstable. Consequently, within the new balance taking shape in Baghdad, a controlled competitive arena has emerged where the parties do not completely exclude one another but rather limit each other’s scope of action.

The Zeydi government’s program also reflects this very search for balance. The approach of “Stable State – Productive Economy – Balanced Partnerships” actually sets out the government’s orientation quite clearly. Upon close examination of the program, it becomes apparent that security, the economy and foreign policy are not treated as independent spheres, but as components of the same strategic framework. It is fair to say that the strengthening of state capacity, economic reforms, energy investments, the centralization of security decisions and a policy of balance in foreign affairs are all assessed within the same framework.

One of the notable points here is that the government program largely retains the roadmap established during the Sudani era. In particular, the Development Corridor Project, efforts towards integration in the energy sector, and the approach to regional connectivity are continuing. However, despite this strategic continuity in the government program, the political composition of the cabinet appears more fragile compared to the Sudani era. A structure is emerging that is more political, more fragmented and generates more bargaining. Consequently, the fundamental challenge facing Baghdad will be managing the tension between strategic continuity and political fragmentation.

The new equation in Iraq and Türkiye

The recent shift in Türkiye’s policy towards Iraq takes on its full significance precisely here. This is because Ankara no longer views the Iraqi theatre solely through a security-centric lens. The approach that had long been shaped by the PKK threat, border security and military operations is giving way to a broader strategic framework. Iraq’s political stability, economic capacity, regional connectivity and state institutionalization have become direct strategic issues for Türkiye.

Indeed, during the presidential election process and government negotiations, Ankara did not pursue a policy focused on ensuring the victory of a specific candidate or group. For Türkiye, the issue centered not so much on who would become prime minister, but rather on the question of how relations could be maintained within the new equation emerging in Iraq. The swift messages of support issued immediately following the formation of the Zeydi government were also a continuation of this approach.

It is possible to interpret the approach that has become more visible in recent times through the lens of ‘conjunctural rationalism’. Türkiye is upholding its fundamental strategic principles. Iraq’s territorial integrity, political unity, protection from conflict, and the preservation of regional stability remain unchanging priorities for Ankara. However, Türkiye is now implementing these principles through more flexible networks of relations and shifting on-the-ground balances. The controlled normalization developing with the KYB, the new political balance emerging in Kirkuk, and the thaw in relations between Ankara and Sulaymaniyah are all part of this transformation.

This strategic expansion is also evident in the security sphere. Türkiye’s ‘Türkiye Without Terrorism’ process has now moved beyond the traditional security approach confined to the border. This is because the issue is not merely the PKK’s military presence. The structure stretching from Qandil to Sinjar, and from Mahmur to the disputed territories, has also become part of Iraq’s sovereignty crisis.

Ankara’s broader strategic approach

For this reason, Ankara has recently been developing a broader strategic approach that, alongside military operations, seeks to build state capacity, institutional cooperation, economic integration and connectivity. Today, Türkiye does not view the security issues emerging in the Iraqi and Syrian theaters solely through the prism of the presence of armed groups. The real issue lies in the political, military and economic vacuums arising in areas where state capacity has eroded. For this reason, alongside moving security risks away from the border, Türkiye is seeking to establish a regional stability corridor that will contribute to filling these vacuums as much as possible.

The Development Corridor Project therefore holds a special place. It appears that Iraq, which has long served as a transit zone for conflicts, is for the first time turning towards an endeavor to establish itself as a regional hub through connectivity. Iraq’s status as a central country is regaining significance here. For Iraq is not merely a fragile geography; it is also one of the Middle East’s most critical transit zones.

Virtually every regional crisis in recent years has demonstrated this once again. The US-Iran tensions, the fragility arising after the Gaza war, and the new equation emerging following Israel’s attacks on Iran have all directly affected Iraq. This is because Iraq continues to be one of the areas where regional power struggles intersect. For this reason, any political vacuum that emerges in Baghdad can quickly transform into an arena of regional competition.

However, this very central geographical position also affords Iraq a significant strategic advantage. In terms of energy routes, trade corridors, transport networks and regional connectivity, Iraq’s geopolitical position makes it one of the Middle East’s most critical hubs. Consequently, whether the country reverts to a fragile fault line beset by conflict and proxy struggles, or emerges as a hub for regional integration, holds the potential to produce outcomes that will shape not only Iraq’s but the entire region’s future.

Precisely for this reason, it would be a mistake to interpret the strategic rapprochement that has emerged between Türkiye and Iraq in recent times as merely a routine bilateral process. The new ground being established here is evolving into one of the key battlegrounds in the struggle between security-centered fragmentation and connectivity-centered integration in the Middle East. However, the sustainability of this process does not depend solely on the strategic will demonstrated by Ankara. Baghdad also needs to manage the balance between political flexibility and state capacity. Therefore, the direction Iraq takes in the coming period will directly affect not only the country’s domestic political future but also the direction along which the regional order will be shaped.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

C

onservative candidate Abelardo De La Espriella has secured a narrow victory in Colombia’s presidential runoff election, defeating leftist Senator Ivan Cepeda in a closely contested race that signals a significant political shift in one of Latin America’s largest economies.

According to preliminary results released by Colombia’s national registrar on Sunday, De La Espriella won 49.66 percent of the vote, while Cepeda received 48.70 percent, leaving a margin of approximately 250,000 votes with nearly all ballots counted.

The result marks a major setback for the political movement of outgoing President Gustavo Petro, Colombia’s first left-wing president, whose reform agenda and security policies became central issues during the election campaign.

De La Espriella, a lawyer and political newcomer, campaigned on promises to crack down on crime, revive economic growth, reduce government spending and strengthen Colombia’s oil and gas sector.

Speaking to supporters in the coastal city of Barranquilla after the results were announced, he pledged to govern for all Colombians regardless of political affiliation.

“I will govern for all Colombians, for those who voted for me and for those who chose the other candidate,” De La Espriella told cheering supporters.

His campaign centered on criticism of Petro’s administration, which he accused of failing to contain armed groups, drug trafficking and insecurity in several regions of the country. He vowed to end negotiations with rebel and criminal organizations while expanding investment in the energy sector and reducing the size of the state by as much as 40 percent.

Despite advocating major economic reforms, De La Espriella has also promised to maintain some of Petro’s most popular social measures, including a 23 percent increase in the minimum wage and assistance programs for vulnerable communities.

The president-elect also received a congratulatory call from Donald Trump, who had publicly endorsed his candidacy during the campaign. The endorsement attracted attention both inside Colombia and internationally, highlighting growing ties between conservative political movements across the Americas.

Cepeda refuses to concede immediately

Although the preliminary count favored De La Espriella, Cepeda stopped short of immediately conceding defeat.

Addressing supporters in Bogotá, the veteran leftist politician said his campaign would await the completion of Colombia’s official verification process, which involves a ballot-by-ballot review supervised by judges and notaries.

Cepeda said his campaign was contesting results from roughly 33,000 ballot boxes out of more than 122,000 nationwide.

“We are open to dialogue; we are willing to reach agreements as long as they are respectful, genuine, and reflected in political actions that benefit the nation,” he told supporters.

While acknowledging the narrow margin, Cepeda emphasized that his supporters remain a powerful political force that must be represented in future national decisions.

The close result reflects a deeply polarized electorate divided between demands for stronger security measures and support for the social and environmental reforms introduced under Petro’s government.

De La Espriella will take office facing significant political and economic challenges.

Despite winning the presidency, he is expected to encounter resistance in Congress, where Cepeda’s coalition, the Historic Pact, remains one of the largest political blocs. No party controls a majority, meaning the incoming president will likely need to negotiate extensively to pass legislation.

Analysts say this reality may force De La Espriella to moderate some of his more ambitious proposals, particularly plans to dramatically reduce government spending and reshape state institutions.

The new administration must also address mounting public debt and sluggish economic growth while balancing demands for increased security spending.

Questions have additionally been raised about De La Espriella’s business record. During the campaign, Colombian media reported that several of his companies had been dissolved or faced financial difficulties, though his legal practice remained profitable. The president-elect rejected suggestions that these issues undermine his economic credentials.

Security concerns dominated the election

Security emerged as one of the defining issues of the campaign.

Many Colombians remain concerned about growing violence linked to drug trafficking organizations, dissident guerrilla factions and criminal networks operating in remote regions.

Supporters of De La Espriella argued that a tougher approach is necessary to restore public order and combat extortion, kidnappings and narcotics trafficking.

However, critics fear his confrontational rhetoric could undermine ongoing peace initiatives and potentially reignite broader conflict in a country that has endured more than six decades of violence involving left-wing insurgents, right-wing paramilitary groups and criminal organizations.

At Cepeda’s election-night gathering, several supporters voiced concerns that Colombia could move away from reconciliation efforts pursued in recent years.

Colombia’s election adds to a broader trend across Latin America, where several countries have recently elected conservative leaders.

Voters in countries including Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Bolivia and Ecuador have shifted toward right-leaning governments amid concerns about inflation, crime and economic performance.

More than 26.3 million Colombians participated in the runoff vote, representing a strong turnout among the country’s 41.4 million eligible voters. More than 427,000 voters submitted blank ballots, often viewed as a form of protest against both candidates.

While the final certified results are still pending, De La Espriella’s victory appears set to usher in a new political era for Colombia, one focused on security, economic liberalization and closer relations with conservative governments across the region.

(Source: Reuters)

U

krainian drones struck a major oil refinery in southeast Moscow for the second time in three days on Thursday, triggering a massive fire, disrupting transportation across the Russian capital, and underscoring Kyiv’s growing ability to carry the war deep inside Russian territory.

The attack targeted one of Moscow’s key fuel-processing facilities, located just 16 kilometers (10 miles) from the Kremlin and within the city’s ring road, making it one of the most symbolically significant strikes on Russian infrastructure since the war began more than four years ago.

Video footage shared on social media showed thick black smoke billowing into the sky above the refinery after a powerful explosion. Witnesses reported that the blast was so intense that the giant metal lid of an oil storage tank was hurled into the air.

The strike appeared to evade Russian air defenses and ignited a blaze that emergency crews battled for hours.

War reaches the heart of Russia

The attack forms part of a broader Ukrainian campaign targeting Russia’s energy sector, which Kyiv argues provides crucial revenue for Moscow’s military operations in Ukraine.

But beyond the economic impact, the strike carried substantial symbolic significance.

By successfully targeting infrastructure inside the Russian capital, Ukraine appears intent on demonstrating to ordinary Russians that the consequences of the war are no longer confined to distant battlefields.

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister, Andrii Sybiha, used social media to directly address residents of Moscow following the attack.

“One of the most popular questions asked by Muscovites this morning is ‘What is going on?'” Sybiha wrote. “Your country started a war of aggression against ours. For years, it has been killing our people.”

The comments reflected Kyiv’s effort to frame the attacks as a response to Russia’s invasion rather than an escalation of the conflict.

Disruption across Moscow

The strike caused widespread disruption throughout the Russian capital, home to more than 13 million people.

Authorities temporarily suspended flights at all Moscow airports as security services assessed the threat posed by additional drones.

Operations were halted at Sheremetyevo Airport, Russia’s busiest air hub, and parts of the airport were evacuated as a precaution.

Traffic was also disrupted along major roads surrounding the refinery, creating significant delays for commuters.

Residents in online forums complained that no air raid sirens or emergency alerts were issued before the attack.

Some suburban residents reported finding oily residue on vehicles and windows after rainfall passed through areas affected by smoke from the refinery fire.

The incident highlighted the growing vulnerability of Russia’s largest city to long-range Ukrainian drone operations.

While Moscow has experienced occasional drone attacks since 2023, including an incident involving the Kremlin itself, such strikes have generally had limited impact on daily life.

Thursday’s attack represented one of the most disruptive incidents the capital has experienced since the conflict began.

Economic impact growing

The latest refinery strike also points to the increasing economic consequences of Ukraine’s campaign against Russia’s energy infrastructure.

Russia remains one of the world’s largest oil producers and a major exporter of crude oil and refined fuel products.

Repeated attacks on refineries, storage facilities, and transportation networks have begun affecting domestic fuel supplies.

Industry sources told Reuters that Russia is expected to import fuel by sea this month, an unusual step for a country that is normally a major fuel exporter.

Reports of gasoline shortages have emerged in several regions in recent weeks.

Although Moscow city authorities insisted that fuel supplies in and around the capital remain stable, Russia’s federal anti-monopoly service has launched an inquiry after one major retailer reportedly increased gasoline prices by nearly 19 percent within a week.

Energy analysts say sustained attacks on refining capacity could place additional pressure on domestic fuel markets while increasing operational costs for Russia’s economy.

I

ndia’s 2026 state elections did not produce a simple story of victory and defeat. They revealed a country moving in two directions at once. From above, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) looks stronger, more confident and more geographically expanded. From below, Indian politics looks restless, younger and increasingly impatient with old forms of authority. The same political season that gave the BJP a historic breakthrough in West Bengal also gave India the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), a satirical youth movement that has turned insult, unemployment and examination scandals into a new language of protest.

This contradiction is the real meaning of the elections. India is not only becoming more BJP-dominated. It is also becoming more politically uneven. The ruling party is expanding into regions once considered resistant to its ideological project, while regional parties, opposition alliances and younger voters search for new vehicles of expression. The result is an India that looks more consolidated on the electoral map, but less settled in society.

BJP expansion from above

The most symbolic result came from West Bengal. According to the Election Commission of India, the BJP won 207 seats in the 294-member assembly, while the All India Trinamool Congress, widely known as Trinamool Congress (TMC), fell to 80. The result ended Mamata Banerjee’s long dominance and broke one of the last major regional exceptions to BJP power. For decades, Bengal’s politics drew strength from leftist memory, regional pride, linguistic culture and a self-image of secular resistance. That image was always more complicated than its defenders admitted.

West Bengal was central to the opposition’s imagination because it showed that a regional leader could resist the BJP and speak against New Delhi from a position of strength. That model now looks broken. The BJP’s victory gives the party a psychological advantage ahead of the 2029 general election. It also weakens the opposition’s claim that regional strongholds can contain the BJP’s national expansion.

Yet the election was not a simple BJP wave. Tamil Nadu told a different story. The Election Commission’s results showed actor-politician Vijay’s Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) as the single largest party with 108 seats in the 234-member assembly, ahead of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK). Tamil Nadu shows that voter fatigue can disrupt established regional parties without automatically benefiting the BJP. Vijay’s rise suggests that younger voters may move beyond older Dravidian formations without accepting the BJP as the only alternative.

Assam, Kerala and Puducherry added further nuance. Assam confirmed the BJP’s strength in the northeast, with the party winning 82 seats in a 126-member assembly. Kerala produced a Congress-led result rather than a BJP breakthrough, while Puducherry showed that alliance management still matters in smaller political spaces. Taken together, these results put pressure on the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA), the opposition bloc formed to challenge the BJP nationally. Its problem is not only ideological, it is organizational and psychological.

The BJP, by contrast, has regained momentum after the limits exposed in the 2024 general election, when it remained the largest party but lost its single-party majority in the Lok Sabha. West Bengal gives it a new eastern frontier. Assam confirms its northeastern hold. Even where it did not dominate, as in Tamil Nadu, the weakening of older opposition parties may serve its long-term interests.

Cockroach anger from below

The rise of the Cockroach Janta Party is the clearest sign. The movement began after Chief Justice of India Surya Kant reportedly compared some unemployed youth and fake-degree holders to “cockroaches” and “parasites.” He later said sections of the media had misquoted his oral observations. But the phrase had already escaped the courtroom. Abhijeet Dipke, a U.S.-educated Indian activist, turned the insult into satire. The cockroach became a symbol of humiliation, survival and stubborn resistance.

The movement is funny, but it is not trivial. Its slogans are playful, but its anger is real. Young Indians are protesting because education has become uncertain, examinations have become scandal-prone, jobs are scarce and official responses often sound dismissive. Reuters reported that the CJP’s first street protest in New Delhi on June 6, 2026, focused on youth unemployment and examination-related grievances, including demands for Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan’s resignation over repeated paper leaks and grading errors.

This matters because exams are not a small question in India. For millions of families, they are the promised bridge between poverty and dignity. When that bridge begins to look broken, satire becomes serious. The CJP says what many young Indians feel but cannot easily organize around: they are over-tested, under-employed, mocked by power and expected to remain grateful.

The CJP may not become a conventional political party. It may fade, split or be absorbed by larger forces. But even if the organization disappears, the mood behind it will remain. India has a young population with rising aspirations and shrinking patience. That generation is asking whether nationalism, development slogans and electoral victories can answer the practical anxieties of jobs, exams and dignity.

Why this matters beyond India

This is where the 2026 elections and the Cockroach movement meet. The elections show the strength of political power. The movement shows the weakness of social consent. A party can win states and still face a generation that feels unheard. A government can expand geographically and still struggle to answer the desperation of students, job seekers and young graduates.

The consequences will not remain only domestic. In West Bengal, the BJP’s rise may harden politics around migration, citizenship, border security and Bangladesh. For Dhaka, Kathmandu, Colombo and other regional capitals, India’s internal political shifts matter because New Delhi’s domestic debates often shape regional behavior. If identity politics becomes stronger in Bengal, border communities and minorities may feel the pressure before foreign ministries do.

India after the 2026 state elections is therefore neither fully triumphant nor fully unstable. It is powerful, but tense. The BJP has expanded its map, but the opposition is not the only source of challenge. The challenge is also social, generational and emotional. It comes from young people who may not yet have a full program, but who have found a symbol in the cockroach: despised, difficult to eliminate and strangely capable of surviving.

For the BJP, the lesson is clear. Electoral expansion can create authority, but it cannot replace accountability. For the opposition, the lesson is equally sharp. Anti-BJP politics cannot rely only on old regional faces and emergency alliances. It must speak to the anxieties of the young, the unemployed, the exam-weary and the socially humiliated.

The 2026 elections changed India’s political map. The Cockroach Janta Party revealed something deeper: maps do not show pressure building under the surface. India today is governed from above with confidence, but questioned from below with increasing impatience. That tension may shape the road to 2029 more than any single state result.

T

he United States and Iran have released the text of a 14-point memorandum of understanding that lays the foundation for ending months of conflict, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, easing economic restrictions on Tehran, and launching negotiations toward a comprehensive peace agreement.

The document, formally titled the “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran,” was read to reporters by a senior U.S. official on Wednesday and is expected to serve as the basis for intensive negotiations over the next 60 days.

While the memorandum establishes an immediate ceasefire and outlines broad commitments by both sides, many of the most difficult issues—including Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions relief, and regional security arrangements—remain subject to future negotiations.

Immediate end to war

The first provision commits both countries and their allies to the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon. Both sides pledged not to initiate future military action against one another and agreed to respect Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Under the second point, Washington and Tehran agreed to respect each other’s sovereignty and refrain from interference in internal affairs.

The third provision establishes a negotiation period of up to 60 days, which may be extended by mutual agreement, to finalize a broader peace settlement.

The fourth and fifth points focus on restoring maritime commerce through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy shipping routes.

The United States agreed to begin lifting its naval blockade immediately and to remove all restrictions within 30 days. Washington also committed to withdrawing military forces from Iran’s vicinity within 30 days after a final agreement is reached.

Iran, for its part, pledged to facilitate safe passage for commercial vessels through the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Tehran also agreed to remove mines and military obstacles and restore normal shipping operations over the next month.

The agreement further calls for consultations between Iran, Oman, and other Gulf states regarding future administration and maritime services in the strategic waterway.

Massive reconstruction package

One of the most significant elements of the agreement is contained in point six.

The United States committed to working with regional partners to develop a reconstruction and economic development package worth at least $300 billion for Iran.

The mechanism for implementing the fund will be finalized during negotiations, while Washington pledged to provide the necessary licenses, waivers, and permissions required for financial transactions.

Point seven outlines a U.S. commitment to terminate all sanctions imposed on Iran, including United Nations-related restrictions, nuclear-related measures, and both primary and secondary U.S. sanctions.

The timing and sequencing of sanctions removal remain subject to negotiation during the upcoming talks.

Both sides described sanctions relief as one of the most important issues to be addressed during the next phase of diplomacy.

Nuclear program left for future talks

The eighth provision addresses Iran’s nuclear activities but postpones major decisions until a final agreement.

Iran reaffirmed that it would not seek or develop nuclear weapons.

The two countries agreed that the future of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium would be determined through a mutually agreed mechanism. At a minimum, any solution would involve down-blending enriched material under supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Future discussions will also address uranium enrichment levels and Iran’s civilian nuclear requirements.

Under point nine, both countries agreed to maintain the status quo while negotiations continue.

Iran will not expand its current nuclear activities, while the United States pledged not to impose additional sanctions or deploy new military forces to the region.

Point ten requires the U.S. Treasury Department to issue waivers immediately permitting Iranian oil exports, petroleum product sales, banking transactions, shipping, insurance, and related services.

Point eleven concerns Iranian assets frozen abroad.

The United States agreed to make those assets available for use and to work with Iran on procedures governing their release. Washington also committed to issuing the necessary licenses and authorizations to facilitate access to those funds.

A

proposed $300 billion private investment fund aimed at revitalizing Iran’s economy has emerged as a central component of the framework agreement reached between the United States and Iran to end months of conflict, according to a source with direct knowledge of the negotiations.

The fund, which would be known as the Reconstruction and Development Fund, is designed to encourage both sides to finalize a comprehensive peace agreement by offering a powerful economic incentive for post-war recovery and long-term investment.

According to the source, more than half of the proposed funding—over $150 billion—has already been pledged by companies and financial institutions across multiple regions, including North America, Asia, the Gulf, Africa, and South America.

The initiative remains contingent on the successful completion of a final agreement between Washington and Tehran. Negotiators are expected to spend the next 60 days working on unresolved issues, including Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions relief, and regional security arrangements.

Economic dimension of peace deal

The investment proposal represents one of the most ambitious economic initiatives linked to a Middle Eastern peace agreement in recent decades.

Unlike traditional reconstruction packages financed by governments or international organizations, the proposed fund would be entirely privately financed.

The source familiar with the negotiations said no government money, grants, or direct public financing would be involved.

Instead, private companies and financial institutions have committed investment capital intended for projects in key sectors of Iran’s economy, including energy, transportation, logistics, manufacturing, and industrial development.

The fund is separate from ongoing discussions regarding the release of Iranian assets frozen abroad and the lifting of U.S. sanctions.

Negotiators have reportedly established distinct tracks for those issues, with separate timelines and objectives.

“This is not compensation, reparations, or a government aid package,” the source said. “It is an investment vehicle intended to unlock economic opportunities once a final settlement is achieved.”

From compensation demand to investment plan

The idea reportedly emerged after Iran initially sought substantial compensation for damage caused during the conflict.

A senior Iranian source told Reuters that Tehran had requested approximately $400 billion in compensation from the United States for wartime losses.

Washington rejected that proposal, leading negotiators to explore alternative mechanisms capable of supporting economic recovery while remaining politically acceptable to all parties.

The resulting concept focuses on investment rather than compensation.

Under the proposed structure, regional countries and international investors would contribute through various mechanisms, including financing projects directly, establishing credit facilities, guaranteeing loans, and supporting reconstruction efforts at damaged industrial and infrastructure sites.

Projects under consideration reportedly include repairs and modernization of refineries, airports, transportation networks, industrial facilities, and major manufacturing centers damaged during the conflict.

Among the sites expected to benefit is the Mobarakeh Steel complex, one of Iran’s largest industrial enterprises.

Untapped economic potential

Supporters of the initiative argue that Iran presents significant long-term opportunities for investors if geopolitical risks and sanctions barriers can be reduced.

Despite decades of economic isolation, Iran remains one of the largest economies in the Middle East.

The country possesses the world’s second-largest proven natural gas reserves and the fourth-largest oil reserves, making it a major potential energy producer.

In addition, Iran has a population exceeding 92 million people, a relatively educated workforce, extensive industrial infrastructure, and significant potential in sectors ranging from petrochemicals and mining to tourism and agriculture.

However, successive rounds of international sanctions and political tensions have largely excluded Iran from global capital markets for more than four decades.

As a result, foreign direct investment has remained limited despite the country’s economic potential.

Analysts say that if sanctions are eased and political stability improves, Iran could attract substantial foreign investment in the coming years.

While the investment initiative has generated considerable attention, its implementation depends entirely on the success of broader negotiations.

The framework agreement announced earlier this week established a 60-day period during which U.S. and Iranian negotiators will seek to reach a comprehensive settlement.

One of the most difficult issues remains Iran’s nuclear program.

According to U.S. Vice President JD Vance, access to the reconstruction fund would depend on Iran meeting strict conditions, including dismantling key elements of its nuclear program, eliminating stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, and accepting extensive international inspections.

Iran has consistently maintained that its nuclear activities are intended for peaceful purposes and has rejected accusations that it seeks nuclear weapons.

The issue remains one of the most contentious points in negotiations.

D

evelopments in Mali over recent months indicate that the security crisis in the Sahel region has entered a new phase. In particular, the “tactical cooperation” that has emerged between the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin – JNIM) and the Azawad Liberation Front (Front de Libération de l’Azawad – FLA), which represents the Tuareg separatist faction, has exerted serious military pressure on the Bamako administration.

The recapture of Kidal in April 2026, the targeting of the areas around Bamako and Kati, and the assassination of Defence Minister Sadio Camara have demonstrated that Assimi Goita’s administration is facing one of the most severe security crises of recent years. However, the emerging picture suggests, contrary to initial appearances, not the regime’s imminent collapse in the short term, but rather the deepening of a protracted war of attrition between state authority and armed groups in Mali.

The fundamental issue in Mali today is not so much the military capacity of the armed groups, but whether this capacity can be transformed into a sustainable political order. Indeed, whilst the recent coordination between JNIM and the FLA has yielded significant results in terms of wearing down the regime, it has failed to articulate a shared political vision capable of jointly governing Mali. Consequently, whilst this alliance may be able to put pressure on the Goita administration in the short term, it remains far from producing a comprehensive alternative capable of establishing a new model of governance across the country.

Recent background

Developments in Mali over the past two years have brought this structural problem into sharper focus. Whilst clashes between the FLA—which reorganised in the north by the end of 2024—and the Malian army intensified, JNIM also expanded its influence, particularly in central and western Mali. Attacks carried out along the Dioura, Boulikessi and Timbuktu line throughout 2025 have highlighted the Malian army’s capacity issues. Meanwhile, JNIM’s systematic attacks on fuel convoys along the Senegal-Mali border during the same period have demonstrated that the group effectively employs not only military but also economic pressure tactics. The fuel crisis, power cuts and transport problems in the capital, Bamako, have laid bare the erosion of the state’s capacity to provide basic services.

In response, the Goita administration has further restricted the political sphere in parallel with the security crisis. The closure of political parties, the suppression of opposition figures and the postponement of the electoral process on the grounds of ‘pacifying the country’ have reinforced the trend towards the institutionalisation of military rule in Mali. The Goita administration has transformed the security crisis into a tool of legitimacy not only in military but also in political terms. In particular, anti-French rhetoric and an emphasis on sovereignty play a significant role in the Goita regime’s ability to generate social support.

In fact, this is precisely the fundamental reason why the Goita regime remains in power today. It survives not because the regime is strong, but because its rivals have failed to present a common state project. The armed opposition in Mali, whilst appearing militarily effective, is politically fragmented. At the heart of this fragmentation lie the structural differences between JNIM and the FLA. JNIM is an al-Qaeda-linked organisation that ‘exploits Islam’, and this radical group claims that its long-term objective is to establish a Sharia-based order in Mali. The organisation is attempting to establish alternative governance mechanisms, particularly in rural areas.

It is filling the state vacuum through methods such as tax collection, setting up checkpoints, mediating local disputes and operating Sharia courts. Consequently, JNIM has become a hybrid actor seeking to establish influence not only in the military sphere but also in the social and economic spheres, deriving legitimacy from these domains. The relationships it has developed with Fulani communities, particularly those spreading across the Sahel region, have given the organisation significant social depth in central Mali.

Ethno-regional motivation?

In contrast, the FLA’s primary motivation is not ideological but ethno-regional. The Tuareg separatist movements have for many years been advocating for autonomy or independence centered on Azavad in northern Mali. Consequently, the FLA’s priority is not to Islamize the Malian state, but to establish a Tuareg-dominated political sphere in the north. This explains why the relationship between JNIM and the FLA is limited and fragile. Both actors seek to weaken the Bamako administration; however, they have quite different political projects regarding ‘how Mali should be governed’.

This difference becomes particularly apparent in discussions regarding the ‘post-victory order’. Whilst JNIM aims to establish ideological hegemony across the whole of Mali, the FLA appears to be seeking regional dominance in the north. In other words, whilst one seeks ideological transformation of the unitary state, the other advocates a political model based on the fragmentation of the state. Consequently, whilst joint military operations may be possible, a joint governance model appears a highly unlikely prospect.

Moreover, the difference between these two structures is not merely ideological. Their spheres of legitimacy also differ. The FLA’s social support is largely confined to the Tuareg region in the north and lacks a strong political counterpart in southern regions such as Bamako, Sikasso or Kayes. JNIM, on the other hand, is able to operate across a wider geographical area, particularly in regions where state violence is intense, presenting itself as an ‘alternative security provider’.

However, even this does not grant the organization a sustainable governance capacity across the country. Indeed, as seen in the case of Mali, armed groups in the Sahel, whilst possessing the military capacity to erode state authority, are unable to produce a sustainable and inclusive governance model capable of replacing it. JNIM’s economic blockade and rural control capacity may exert pressure on Bamako, but it lacks the administrative and economic infrastructure to replace modern state mechanisms. The same applies to the FLA. There is a significant difference between establishing control over symbolic areas such as Kidal and governing a country with a population of over 20 million, which is ethnically fragmented and economically oriented towards the south. Consequently, the current situation in Mali represents the ‘spread of multiple spheres of authority’ rather than the ‘construction of an alternative state’.

External support commitments

The Goita administration’s external support commitments are also bolstering the regime’s resilience. The security vacuum created following France’s withdrawal and the conclusion of MINUSMA has been attempted to be filled by Russian-backed security structures. The transition from Wagner to the Africa Corps demonstrates that Russian influence is taking on a new form. Although Russian support has not fully ensured security in Mali, it constitutes a significant security buffer preventing the regime’s sudden collapse. Furthermore, the Sahel States Alliance (Alliance des États du Sahel – AES) axis, developed by Mali alongside Burkina Faso and Niger, provides the regime with a regional sphere of solidarity.

Consequently, the most likely scenario in Mali in the coming period is the deepening of a fragmented security order rather than the country falling entirely under the control of a single party. A prolonged war of attrition, in which the FLA increases its influence in the north and JNIM in the central regions, whilst the Bamako-based military core maintains its presence, appears a more realistic prospect. In this process, internal power struggles within the regime and new military alignments may also come to the fore.

However, current data suggests that whilst JNIM and the FLA do not possess the capacity or a shared vision to jointly govern the whole of Mali, JNIM is strengthening its position within the FLA and pursuing a medium- to long-term strategy. Consequently, the crisis unfolding in Mali today is not merely a security issue. It is also a crisis of state capacity, representation, centre-periphery relations and legitimacy. One of the factors fueling JNIM’s growth is the inadequacy of state capacity and exclusionary security policies. The factor fueling the FLA’s resistance, however, is the chronic issue of autonomy and representation in the north. Yet the common ground between these two structures is merely their opposition to the current regime. Indeed, this alliance is insufficient to produce a sustainable political vision and also fuels the underlying rivalry between these groups.

Consequently, the picture emerging in Mali today reflects a ‘crisis of mutual governance’ rather than a regime change. The Goita administration is unable to establish effective sovereignty across the entire country, yet its rivals are also unable to offer a comprehensive political order capable of replacing it. Therefore, however remarkable the recent “military successes” of the JNIM and Tuareg groups may be, it is quite difficult for these successes to translate into a sustainable state model. In Mali, the determining factor in the short term will not be the decisive victory of one side, but rather how this long-term balance of attrition between the state and armed groups will shape the nerve centers inside and outside Bamako.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

T

he United States launched a series of strikes against Iranian military targets on Tuesday after President Donald Trump accused Tehran of shooting down a U.S. Apache attack helicopter near the Strait of Hormuz, a dramatic escalation that threatens fragile peace efforts and raises fears of renewed conflict across the Middle East.

The strikes targeted Iranian air defense systems, surveillance radars, and ground control facilities near the strategic waterway, according to the U.S. military, which described the operation as a “proportional response” to recent attacks on American forces and commercial shipping in the region.

The military action marks one of the most significant direct confrontations between Washington and Tehran since a tenuous ceasefire took effect in April, amid ongoing negotiations aimed at ending months of regional warfare.

“I believe the response should be very strong, very powerful, and that’s what this one is,” Trump told ABC News shortly after the operation began.

According to U.S. Central Command, the strikes started at approximately 2100 GMT and concluded several hours later. The military said the targets were selected to degrade Iran’s ability to monitor and challenge military and commercial traffic moving through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy transit routes.

Helicopter incident triggers retaliation

The latest escalation followed the downing of a U.S. Army Apache helicopter during a patrol mission near Oman’s coast early Tuesday.

A U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the aircraft was struck by a one-way Iranian attack drone. The helicopter subsequently went down in waters near Oman, prompting a rescue operation involving a U.S. Navy surface drone.

The two crew members aboard the helicopter were recovered after approximately two hours and were reported to be in stable condition.

Trump sought to downplay the incident during an interview with The Wall Street Journal, saying the crash “wasn’t a big deal” and emphasizing that the pilots survived unharmed.

“The pilot is fine,” Trump said.

Nevertheless, the administration moved quickly to authorize military action, arguing that failure to respond could encourage further attacks on U.S. personnel and regional shipping.

Iranian officials denied responsibility for any offensive military operations in the Strait of Hormuz during the previous 24 hours. State media cited military sources who rejected allegations that Iranian forces had targeted the American helicopter.

Iranian sites hit

Iranian media reported explosions on Qeshm Island and in the port city of Sirik, both located near the Strait of Hormuz. Residents also reported hearing blasts in Bandar Abbas and near Jask, close to the entrance of the strategic waterway.

The attacks appeared aimed at military infrastructure associated with Iran’s coastal defense network.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi condemned the U.S. operation and warned that Tehran would respond to any attack.

“Iran will leave no attack or threat unanswered,” Araqchi wrote on social media.

In an earlier statement, he warned that foreign military forces operating in the region risk becoming involved in accidents or crossfire, adding that the best way to reduce risks would be for outside powers to withdraw from the area.

The latest exchange has further strained already fragile diplomatic efforts aimed at reaching a comprehensive agreement between Washington and Tehran.

Trump has repeatedly insisted that a peace deal remains within reach and has argued that negotiations are progressing despite frequent military incidents. However, analysts warn that direct military clashes could undermine trust and complicate efforts to secure a lasting settlement.

Iran retaliates across the Gulf

Shortly after the U.S. strikes, Iranian media reported retaliatory attacks against American military assets in the Gulf.

According to reports citing Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya military command, some U.S. bases in the region were targeted in response to the American operation.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps also claimed responsibility for a drone attack against the U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, warning that additional attacks could follow if hostilities continued.

Bahraini authorities activated warning sirens and urged residents to seek shelter. A media adviser to Bahrain’s king later said the country’s air defenses had successfully intercepted incoming threats.

The Pentagon did not immediately comment on the Iranian claims, and independent verification of battlefield reports remained difficult.

The exchange has heightened concerns that the conflict could spread further across the Gulf, drawing in regional states that host U.S. military facilities.

I

srael and Iran exchanged direct military strikes on Monday for the first time since a ceasefire was declared in April, raising fresh concerns about a wider regional conflict and threatening diplomatic efforts led by the United States to end months of hostilities.

The renewed confrontation began after Israel launched strikes on military targets in western and central Iran, prompting Tehran to respond with missile attacks targeting Israeli military facilities. The exchanges mark the most serious escalation between the two regional rivals since the ceasefire halted direct hostilities earlier this year.

The latest violence comes despite efforts by U.S. President Donald Trump to preserve ongoing negotiations with Tehran and prevent a collapse of the fragile truce that has largely held since April.

Israeli military officials said air force jets struck military installations in Iran during overnight operations. Iranian authorities reported explosions in several cities, including Tehran, Tabriz, and Isfahan, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) accused Israel of carrying out attacks using air-launched ballistic missiles.

Hours later, the IRGC announced retaliatory strikes against Israel’s Nevatim and Tel Nof air bases. Iranian state media described the attacks as a warning and said Iran was prepared for broader military operations if Israeli attacks continued.

“The armed forces are ready for any scenario,” the IRGC said in a statement carried by Iranian media, warning that future responses could be more extensive.

Israeli authorities confirmed that missiles had been launched from Iran and said air defense systems were activated to intercept incoming threats. No immediate reports of casualties or significant damage were released.

Energy infrastructure hit

The escalation took a significant turn when Israeli strikes reportedly hit facilities within Iran’s energy sector.

Iranian officials said the Karun petrochemical plant near the southwestern city of Bandar-e-Mahshahr sustained damage during the attacks. Shortly afterward, the Israeli military confirmed that it had targeted several sites within the Mahshahr petrochemical complex.

Iranian state media reported that authorities had begun evacuating the Mahshahr Special Petrochemical Economic Zone, a major industrial hub located near the Persian Gulf.

The strikes marked the first reported attack on Iranian energy infrastructure since the ceasefire was announced in April, raising fears that the conflict could increasingly target economically strategic facilities.

Energy analysts warned that attacks on petrochemical installations could have broader implications for global energy markets if hostilities continue to expand.

Financial markets reacted quickly to the renewed fighting.

Brent crude futures rose more than $3 per barrel, climbing above $96, while U.S. crude futures also posted gains of more than 3 percent. The increases erased losses recorded late last week when hopes for diplomatic progress between Washington and Tehran had boosted investor confidence.

Oil prices have remained highly sensitive to developments in the Middle East, particularly since the wider conflict involving Iran, Israel, and Iran-backed groups intensified earlier this year.

Traders fear that any prolonged disruption to energy infrastructure or shipping routes could threaten supplies from one of the world’s most important oil-producing regions.

Trump pushes for diplomacy

The renewed violence unfolded despite reports that Trump personally urged Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to avoid further military escalation.

According to U.S. officials cited by American media, Trump told Netanyahu during a phone conversation that additional attacks could jeopardize ongoing efforts to secure a broader agreement with Iran.

“We are close to doing something good in terms of a deal,” Trump reportedly told the Israeli leader.

Speaking to the Financial Times before the latest strikes, Trump downplayed concerns that renewed military action would derail negotiations.

“It is not going to have any impact on the deal,” Trump said. “I call the shots. I call all the shots. He doesn’t call the shots.”

The comments reflected growing tensions between Washington and the Israeli government over how to manage the conflict. Reports indicate that Trump has repeatedly pressed Israel to limit military operations in Lebanon and elsewhere to create space for diplomacy.

Last week, the U.S. president publicly expressed frustration with Netanyahu’s approach to the conflict, signaling rare daylight between Washington and its closest regional ally.

The latest exchange comes after Israel launched strikes near Beirut on Sunday, targeting positions linked to Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Lebanese armed group.

Those attacks represented Israel’s first military action in the Beirut area since Washington proposed a truce plan for Lebanon last week.

Iran has repeatedly stated that any long-term peace arrangement with the United States would depend on a sustained ceasefire not only between Israel and Iran but also in Lebanon, where fighting involving Hezbollah has continued intermittently.

Before Sunday’s missile exchange, Iran had not directly attacked Israel since the ceasefire took effect in April, although Hezbollah and other groups aligned with Tehran have continued occasional attacks against Israeli targets.

The situation became even more complicated when Israel’s military reported a missile launch from Yemen toward Israeli territory. While details remained limited, the launch highlighted the involvement of multiple regional actors in the broader conflict.

What is the path forward?

Diplomatic observers warn that the latest confrontation could undermine efforts to achieve a comprehensive agreement aimed at ending months of regional warfare.

While both Israel and Iran have framed their actions as responses to previous attacks, the direct exchange of strikes suggests that the ceasefire remains fragile and vulnerable to collapse.

The targeting of military facilities, energy infrastructure, and strategic installations has increased concerns that future attacks could become more damaging and difficult to contain.

For now, both governments appear determined to demonstrate military resolve while avoiding a full-scale war. However, with missiles flying across borders, energy markets reacting sharply, and diplomatic negotiations hanging in the balance, the latest escalation has underscored how quickly tensions in the Middle East can reignite despite international efforts to secure peace.

As Washington continues to push for a negotiated settlement, the coming days may prove critical in determining whether the region returns to a path of diplomacy or slides back toward a broader conflict involving multiple fronts and regional powers.

(Source: Reuters)

I

srael and Lebanon have agreed to implement a ceasefire aimed at ending months of hostilities, the Trump administration announced on Wednesday, raising hopes that a broader agreement to end the U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran could be within reach.

The agreement, reached following negotiations in Washington, requires a complete cessation of hostilities by the Iran-backed Hezbollah and the withdrawal of its fighters from southern Lebanon’s Litani region, according to a joint statement issued by the United States Department of State.

The development comes despite continued violence across the region and mounting tensions involving Iran, Gulf states, and U.S. forces.

A previous ceasefire announced last month failed to halt fighting, with clashes continuing after Israel launched operations in Lebanon in March against Hezbollah, which had opened a front against Israel in support of Tehran.

The latest agreement is viewed as a key component of wider diplomatic efforts to end the regional conflict that erupted following U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran earlier this year.

Gulf attacks and Strait of Hormuz tensions continue

Even as diplomatic efforts advanced, regional tensions remained high.

Kuwaiti authorities said Iranian missile and drone attacks damaged facilities at Kuwait International Airport, killing one person and injuring more than 60 others. Airport operations were temporarily suspended before flights resumed later in the day following emergency safety measures.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps denied targeting the airport directly, claiming the damage was caused by failed U.S. interceptor missiles. The U.S. military rejected that account, saying Iranian drones deliberately targeted the airport.

At the same time, the United States Central Command reported carrying out defensive strikes against missile launch sites and naval assets in southern Iran. U.S. forces also struck targets on Qeshm Island near the strategically important Strait of Hormuz after what officials described as attempted Iranian attacks.

The Strait of Hormuz, a critical route for global oil and gas shipments, remains largely closed more than three months after the conflict began. Oil prices rose nearly 2% on concerns about continuing disruptions to energy supplies.

Negotiations with Iran remain fragile

The ceasefire announcement comes amid ongoing efforts to secure a broader agreement between Washington and Tehran.

Iran has linked progress in negotiations to an end to fighting in Lebanon and is seeking access to frozen oil revenues, sanctions relief, an end to restrictions on its ports, and guarantees regarding future access to the Strait of Hormuz.

Abbas Araqchi said negotiations with the United States had not been suspended but acknowledged that no significant progress had been made in recent days.

Meanwhile, President Donald Trump expressed optimism that developments could occur soon.

“If it happens, it could happen over the weekend,” Trump told reporters at the White House, without providing further details.

Trump also indicated that negotiators were attempting to separate discussions about reopening the Strait of Hormuz from the conflict in Lebanon.

Despite the ceasefire announcement, violence continued on Wednesday. Lebanese security sources reported Israeli drone strikes that killed at least six people in southern Lebanon and targeted areas near Beirut. Israel said it had intercepted a hostile aircraft believed to have been launched by Hezbollah.

Araqchi warned that Iran would respond decisively if Israel expanded military operations against Beirut.

The conflict has killed thousands of people, primarily in Iran and Lebanon, while disrupting global trade and energy markets. Although the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire has raised hopes for a wider diplomatic breakthrough, ongoing military incidents underscore the fragility of the situation and the challenges facing negotiators seeking a broader regional settlement.

(Source: Reuters)

U

.S. President Donald Trump has endorsed Colombian presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriellaahead of this month’s runoff election, injecting an international dimension into a closely contested race that could shape future relations between Colombia and the United States.

In a social media post on Tuesday, Trump said the outcome of the election would be critical for Colombia’s future and its ties with Washington.

“The results of this election are very important to the future of Colombia and its relationship to the United States,” Trump wrote.

De la Espriella, a right-wing lawyer who has never held elected office, will face leftist senator Ivan Cepeda in a runoff after neither candidate secured an outright majority in the first round of voting.

According to official results, de la Espriella won nearly 44% of the vote, while Cepeda received just under 41%, setting up a highly competitive second-round contest later this month.

Security and crime dominate campaign

De la Espriella has built his campaign around promises to crack down on criminal organizations and armed groups that continue to operate across parts of Colombia.

His proposals include the construction of 10 large prisons and a tougher security strategy aimed at combating drug trafficking and organized crime.

The candidate’s rhetoric and law-and-order agenda have drawn comparisons to Nayib Bukele, whose aggressive anti-gang policies have earned both praise and criticism across Latin America.

In a video shared on social media following Trump’s endorsement, de la Espriella emphasized the importance of cooperation with Washington in addressing Colombia’s long-standing security challenges.

“The United States plays a crucial role in combating crime and narco-terrorism and in finally freeing Colombia from so much pain and violence,” he said.

The candidate also highlighted what he described as shared values with Trump, including support for democracy, freedom, and the rule of law.

Petro criticizes US intervention

Trump’s endorsement quickly drew criticism from Colombian President Gustavo Petro, whose relationship with the U.S. leader has often been strained.

Petro, Colombia’s first left-wing president, responded on social media Tuesday night, criticizing Trump’s public support for de la Espriella. While details of Petro’s comments were not immediately available, the intervention is likely to intensify debate over foreign influence in the election campaign.

The runoff will be closely watched across the region as voters choose between two sharply contrasting political visions.

De la Espriella has campaigned on a platform centered on security, stronger ties with the United States, and conservative policies. Cepeda, a veteran human rights advocate and longtime senator, has emphasized social reforms and continuity with parts of Petro’s political agenda.

The election outcome could have significant implications for Colombia’s domestic policies, its approach to security and drug trafficking, and its relationship with Washington, one of Bogotá’s most important international partners.

With polls indicating a tight race, both candidates are expected to intensify campaigning in the coming weeks as they seek to win over undecided voters before the decisive runoff vote.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he war between the United States, Israel, and Iran has profoundly affected the Middle East and, by extension, the entire world. Following the ceasefire declared at the end of the 40th day, the war entered a negotiation phase. Prior to the first round of talks in Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital, the parties clearly articulated their expectations of one another. The United States’ demands regarding the agreement included the following:

– The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which had been closed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

– The complete suspension of all nuclear enrichment activities for 15 years

– The handover of 460 kilograms of uranium enriched to over 60 percent

– The closure or strict control of key nuclear facilities (Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow)

– The suspension of long-range missile capabilities

– The cessation of support for groups under its control in neighboring countries

However, Iran sought full sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, including control of transit fees, international recognition of its right to enrich uranium, a five-year moratorium on uranium enrichment, dilution of uranium enriched to 60 percent instead of handing it over, $270 billion in compensation for damage to critical infrastructure, release of $120 billion in frozen Iranian assets, inclusion of China and Russia in the process as guarantors of the new agreement, and complete lifting of sanctions.

U.S. demands from Iran

The war between the United States, Israel, and Iran has profoundly affected the Middle East and, by extension, the entire world. Following the ceasefire declared at the end of the 40th day, the war entered a negotiation phase. Prior to the first round of talks in Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital, the parties clearly articulated their expectations of one another. The United States’ demands regarding the agreement included the following:

– The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, which had been closed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

– The complete suspension of all nuclear enrichment activities for 15 years

– The handover of 460 kilograms of uranium enriched to over 60 percent

– The closure or strict control of key nuclear facilities (Natanz, Isfahan, and Fordow)

– The suspension of long-range missile capabilities

– The cessation of support for groups under its control in neighboring countries

Following the talks, US Vice President JD Vance stated that the Iranian delegation appeared more reasonable and flexible than in the past. Yet, he criticized the Iranian side for not acting in a manner willing to reach an agreement or focused on a solution. In response, Foreign Minister Iraqchi, one of the lead Iranian delegation representatives, stated that the US side was greedy and had made unacceptable demands. These statements highlighted that the parties had failed to reach an agreement and that the expected outcome of the talks had not been achieved.

Iran’s losses and survivors

Upon examining the negotiation process in question, it is evident that there is a prevailing consensus among U.S. officials, with no apparent divergence of opinion or division. Although many Americans have criticized the initiation of the war and the management of the process, which has even caused unease within the US military, securing as many concessions as possible from Iran at the negotiating table is clearly seen as a historic opportunity that no one would turn down. However, the situation was far different for Iran, which suffered heavy destruction and losses throughout the war. The most devastating loss was the assassination of Ali Khamenei, the leader who held absolute authority in the country for 37 years.

While serving as Iran’s supreme leader, Khamenei held a position of authority and influence that allowed him to make final decisions on everything from minor issues to long-term strategic planning and policymaking processes. This was thanks to his unifying power over all state institutions and the absolute obedience he commanded. Although he was perceived as open to consultation, he insisted on critical decisions regarding the nuclear and missile programs and policies toward Syria and Iraq. This stance often prevented dissenting voices from emerging across all levels of the administration. The removal of such a powerful and influential leader was bound to create a distinct leadership vacuum in the country. Indeed, events have unfolded in this direction, and it is now clear that this vacuum has led to serious consequences within the administration and on the ground.

Thanks to its multi-layered political and military system, which has been intertwined with religious and ideological beliefs for decades, Iran was able to avert a serious crisis that could have triggered its collapse. The expected collapse did not materialize. However, there are signs of a deadlock in the decision-making process regarding the ongoing ceasefire and negotiations, as well as power struggles and divisions.

The Khatam Al Anbiya Headquarters

One of the clearest examples of this is the statement by the Khatam Al Anbiya Headquarters, one of the IRGC’s most important centers, that “passages will remain closed as long as the enemy’s hostile attacks continue,” following Iraqchi’s announcement after the first round of talks that limited and authorized passages through the Strait of Hormuz would be permitted. Headlines in Keyhan, a hardline conservative newspaper formerly close to Ali Khamenei, have targeted Muhammad Bakir Galibaf, a member of the negotiation team, and the negotiation efforts. Similar broadcasts by Iranian State Television have criticized Galibaf and the negotiations with the US.

It should be noted that Galibaf is one of the regime’s iconic figures. A former high-ranking commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), he wields significant influence and power in both the military and politics. Although he is associated with conservative figures, Galibaf’s stance and policies can adapt to the conditions of the time. During the war, he survived an environment in which key figures such as Ali Khamenei, Larijani, and Shamkhani were eliminated. By conducting negotiations with a moderate approach, he established a presence on the international stage. His desire and efforts to rise in politics, despite having run for president twice and having a military background, may have also played a role in this process.

Trump’s remarks from the outset that “there are alternative leadership options within the regime” and his statement at the end of the war that “we are in contact with reasonable figures” drew attention to Galibaf. Opposition media in the diaspora claimed that Galibaf was one of these “reasonable figures” from the beginning and even before the war began. Therefore, he was deliberately spared from being targeted.

While it is difficult to assert that these claims are part of a long-term, premeditated plan, Galibaf’s ambition for the top spot is well known throughout his political career. Notably, unlike many other IRGC commanders, he has adopted a more moderate stance following the destruction wrought by the war and the successive removal of high-ranking figures. One could argue that this approach is based on the desire to keep the regime afloat through controlled normalization with the U.S. and secure the top of the power pyramid by outmaneuvering rivals in the emerging new balance of power.”

T

he late Nelson Mandela said, “work to support courage where there is fear, foster agreement where there is conflict, and inspire hope where there is despair”. This may well apply to Pakistan’s position during a critical period of the escalating conflict between the United States and Iran. Many parties were unable to, or perhaps remained either reluctant or hesitant to get involved amidst waves of retaliatory strikes, a political and media discourse that had reached a new peak since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, and a division in stances regarding the ongoing conflict.

However, one thing there was absolute agreement on the necessity of reaching a détente that would lead to the opening of the Strait of Hormuz to international navigation, thus restoring global economic activity, and ensuring the continued export of energy supply to consumers, including Pakistan, which considers the stability of the Strait and the region crucial to its economy and maritime security. The Pakistani initiative came at a pivotal moment, acting as a decisive factor in achieving a ceasefire, in an attempt to reach a consensus between both parties to end the conflict and quash its repercussions.

The initiative raised numerous questions about Islamabad’s role, which some might interpret as exploiting a political vacuum that other parties were unable to fill, adding to Pakistan’s regional influence, especially in view of the escalating tensions. There are also ongoing concerns about the continuation of the crisis, and its repercussions at the regional and international levels, as well as its economic and security implications for Pakistan itself. There is a conviction that an early effort at mediation allows more room for negotiation, and that the longer the initiative is delayed, the less willing the conflicting parties will be to accept a compromise. Therefore, Pakistan’s involvement at this juncture is commendable, even if it is limited, as it occurred during a period of transition, not after the situation had already stabilized.

Pakistan’s initiative to find a solution to the crisis between the United States and Iran may be viewed through the lens of political, economic, and geographical factors. The country has good relations with both sides, and is utilizing other channels of communication, such as with Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Türkiye, to advance its mediation efforts. It is worth noting that regional stability, and internal stability in Iran itself is important to Pakistan, which shares a long border of 900 km with its western neighbor. Islamabad fears the spillover of any political turmoil in Iran that may have sectarian and security repercussions for Pakistan, not to mention other repercussions on the energy markets, and on regional and global trade. Thus, Islamabad saw an opportunity to draw attention to itself as an important regional player and a diplomatic power capable of playing a prominent role during crises, which enhances its political standing and its international relations. Despite all this, the Pakistani initiative has raised many questions and perhaps drawn skepticism about Pakistan’s intentions and its role at this particular time.

Pakistan and the parties to the conflict

The relationship between Pakistan and the Western powers, particularly the United States, has always been complex and volatile. It can be described as a pragmatic partnership rather than an alliance based on mutual trust. This relationship has witnessed periods of intense rapprochement but also periods of sharp tension, depending on the changing circumstances and strategic interests of each party. During the Cold War, the relationship was very close, allowing Pakistan to join US-backed alliances such as the Baghdad Pact and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), in exchange for military and financial aid. This cooperation reached its peak during the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when Pakistan played a prominent role in supporting the ‘Mujahideen’, while receiving direct assistance from the United States. However, this harmony did not last long.

After the end of the Cold War in 1991, the relationship cooled off, especially with the emergence of Pakistan’s nuclear program, which led the United States to impose sanctions. The attacks of September 11, however, revived Pakistan’s ties with the United States, through the logistical and intelligence support provided by Islamabad to Washington, despite lingering suspicions about Pakistan’s duplicity in its dealings with the West. Its unstable surroundings worried western analysts, and in recent years the United States’ suspicions of Pakistan’s intentions have increased, especially following Islamabad’s growing rapprochement with Beijing through a series of economic projects and defense partnerships, particularly in military manufacturing and technology transfer. Consequently, the relationship between the two sides is determined by regional and international power balances, without any guarantee of a lasting political and strategic convergence.

Conversely, since its separation from India in 1947, Islamabad has maintained a relatively good relationship with Tehran, recognizing its direct proximity to its western neighbor, and understanding that any regional conflict in which Iran is directly involved will immediately affect Pakistan. This would have several repercussions, including disruptions to the transport of natural resources such as oil and gas, the potential for refugee flows, and the possibility of an escalation in sectarian tensions within Pakistan, given that approximately 20% of the population is Shia, who could potentially ignite an internal crisis. Therefore, in any escalation between Iran and the United States, such as the one that occurred following the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force in 2020, Islamabad has been quick to intervene diplomatically, emphasizing the need to respect the sovereignty of states and renounce the use of force.

Pakistan has also stressed that it will not allow its territory to be used in any conflict against any neighboring country, especially since Islamabad intends to maintain good relations with Tehran, Washington, Riyadh, and other regional actors. Meanwhile, tensions occasionally surface between Iran and its Gulf neighbors, albeit with some noticeable variations. Consequently, Islamabad knows it will have to maintain the delicate balance that grants it a regional role, and presents itself to the world as an influential state capable of resolving conflicts, thus giving it greater diplomatic weight.

Current regional events have cast a shadow over the political and economic landscape, given the difficulty of reaching a formula for consensus between the United States and Iran. This has prompted Islamabad to intervene and adopt a mediation initiative, hosting direct negotiations at the highest level. This step has been described by many as the result of precise political and security calculations that take into consideration the repercussions of escalation in the region and its impact on Iran’s neighbors, and on the region as a whole.

The Pakistani initiative did not come about as a reaction at a particularly sensitive moment, but rather as a direct protection of its internal security and its economy, which cannot withstand the devastating effects of being drawn into regional conflicts, which in itself seems a justifiable reason for such action. However, the timing of Islamabad’s entry as a mediator has raised many questions, at a time when countries such as Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Egypt were themselves seeking to bridge the divide and reduce tension. Therefore, what was it that prompted Islamabad this time to adopt the mediation role that Oman has played between the United States and Iran for many decades?

A regional role or an opportunistic approach?

There may be several interpretations of Pakistan’s decision to take a mediation role at this critical juncture, involving two parties whose relationship has been marked by open hostility since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Some believe that Islamabad’s move stems from a desire to ensure regional stability, which is essential for the smooth flow of maritime traffic, the uninterrupted flow of energy resources to consumers, and the avoidance of internal tensions in Iran. This is to say nothing of the potential influx of refugees and border tensions, as well as the economic shocks associated with disruption to energy prices, trade, shipping, and insurance. Therefore, according to this argument, Islamabad has adopted a mediating stance to prevent escalation and seek diplomatic solutions to the crisis, given that a protracted conflict threatens both regional and internal Pakistani security. Thus, the mediation role reflects a desire to prevent the expansion of the regional war, an attempt to de-escalate tensions between competing powers, and a commitment to maintaining a strategic balance between all parties to the conflict, without siding with any of them. The initiative embodies Pakistani political traditions of keeping channels of communication open with all competing powers.

On the contrary, some believe Pakistan’s move is driven by opportunistic motives. Perhaps, Islamabad saw an opportunity to regain its diminishing standing and bolster its international presence, at a time when it is grappling with economic difficulties and political instability. Others view this as less credible, arguing that it is seeking to improve its image abroad, particularly in the United States, and strengthen its ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Such a move would grant it diplomatic prestige and the ability to present itself as an indispensable regional power.

This comes within the framework of repositioning itself after years of relative isolation and attempting to balance its relationships with regional actors like Iran and Saudi Arabia, especially given the Joint Defense Agreement (JDA) with Riyadh, which places Islamabad in a precarious position, particularly in the event of a potential clash between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, it seeks to maintain balanced relations with other regional and international players such as Türkiye and the United States, a position which could lead to economic gain, broader security cooperation, defense-industry partnerships, and debt relief. With the disruption to energy supplies, Islamabad has been forced to implement austerity measures, shortening school days and working hours to conserve energy.

Ensuring a de-escalation of the regional situation would in fact bring significant benefits to Pakistan. These include guaranteeing access to Iranian oil at affordable prices once sanctions are lifted, and the completion of the long-awaited Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline. By avoiding further escalation, Islamabad would also secure a safe trade corridor to Central Asia via Iran, as evidenced by the shipment of the first batch of Pakistani frozen meat to Uzbekistan in April 2026. This is particularly important given that trade routes through Torkham and Chaman, key strategic border crossings and vital trade arteries from Afghanistan to Central Asia, remain closed due to ongoing strained relations between Islamabad and Kabul. Furthermore, internal stability in Iran would prevent Indian attempts to infiltrate Pakistan’s Baluchistan via the Chabahar project, thus thwarting any encirclement efforts by New Delhi. These benefits would also prevent India from attempting to extend its influence through Iran into Pakistani Baluchistan.

According to an extreme view, still others believe that Islamabad may be complicit in a conspiracy against Tehran, given the actions of the United States, Pakistan’s historical ally, and Iran, its ideological antithesis and the primary rival of Saudi Arabia, a key Pakistani ally in the region. Maintaining complete neutrality in these circumstances would therefore be extremely difficult. This view is supported by the mobilization of forces and the stringent sentiment that the United States continued to express while negotiations were underway.

US and Pakistani forces in Saudi Arabia

This included the entry of two American destroyers into Saudi waters in the Arabian Gulf and the arrival of Pakistani forces at King Abdulaziz Air Base in the Eastern Province, accompanied by fighter jets and various weapons. Some interpreted this as an activation of the JDA between the two countries, an agreement considered a strategic buffer for Saudi Arabia and an additional layer of deterrence. It is worth noting that there were also reports that Pakistan simultaneously hosted some Iranian aircraft at Nur Khan Air Base, to protect them from any American military strikes. These included RC-130 intelligence and reconnaissance aircraft and C-130 transport aircraft. Conflicting views call for a deep reassessment of Pakistan’s actual role in the negotiations, which means that Islamabad’s initiative appeared to be not so much altruistic as a geostrategic maneuver to achieve substantial gains under the guise of ensuring the region’s security.

There remains the factor of China, which strongly supports the negotiating track adopted by Pakistan, preferring a diplomatic solution to escalation. China supports Iran, not only because the latter is a key partner in trade and energy, but also because it is a reliable strategic ally in any future confrontation with the United States. Beijing does not want any disruption to shipping lanes, and at the same time seeks a balanced relationship with Washington, as was evident during US President Donald Trump’s visit to China on May 13, 2026. Therefore, it prefers to play a supporting role in negotiations rather than leading them. Reports indicate that Beijing pressured Tehran to accept de-escalation and enter negotiations, exploiting Iran’s need to export its oil to the Chinese market.

In short, Islamabad’s hosting of negotiations between two parties that are extremely important to its national security involves several possible motives, including that this is at the request of the United States, which is trying to end the crisis with the least number of losses and concurrently to save face. It may also be driven by other parties such as Saudi Arabia, which is keen on the security of the region at a time when it is accelerating towards achieving its economic ambitions that require a degree of regional stability.

Despite the regional competition with Iran, Riyadh sees the stability and prosperity of its northern neighbor as a greater opportunity for rapprochement, at a time when its relationship with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is shrouded in much ambiguity. Thus, the outcomes of Pakistan’s role and what the conflict will lead to is likely to indicate much of what the region will face, which also means that the true implications behind the role that Pakistan is playing may become clear later, for Pakistan itself, for the two parties to the conflict, and for the entire region.

I

n the context of the effects of the war launched by the U.S. and Israel against Iran on February 28 on the Gulf region, the saying “Geography is destiny” is a particularly apt description. The Gulf states, which were not direct parties to the war, have been affected almost as negatively as the warring parties by this process. From the war’s very first days, the Gulf states, known as the “oasis of prosperity” in the Middle East, began to emerge as the biggest losers of this process, following Iran’s retaliations. While not all have been affected equally, the myth of the “Gulf’s inviolability” has ended, opening the door to a bleak future for the region’s monarchies.

In this context, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which could be considered the actors closest to the US politically, have borne the brunt of the blow. Their cautious statements in the early days of the war gave the impression that they were avoiding taking sides. However, the use of US military bases on their territory during the conflict was viewed by Iran as an unacceptable pretext.

They attempted to maintain security ties with Washington while keeping tensions with Tehran under control, but the rapidly rising tension and chaos soon made it impossible for these countries to avoid becoming targets. Bahrain and Kuwait, which pursue low-intensity foreign policies, were similarly affected. In both countries, critical infrastructure, including US military bases, ports, and water treatment facilities, was targeted by Iran at various times.

Position towards Iran

The differing reactions of the Gulf countries during the war resulted in varying impacts of the conflict. From this perspective, Oman and Qatar’s positions during the war set them apart from other Gulf states. Although Qatar sustained heavy damage and expelled Iranian diplomats, the Doha administration’s decision to maintain dialogue with Tehran was notable. Oman, on the other hand, stood apart from all other Gulf states. It became one of the few Gulf countries not targeted by ballistic missiles from Tehran and emerged as one of the most important mediators between Iran and the US.

Throughout this process, both countries adopted a measured approach. However, Oman engaged in intensive mediation efforts to prevent the outbreak of war in the pre-conflict period. It can be argued that the common ground underpinning these countries’ approaches lies in their distanced stance toward the U.S. and Israel, coupled with a relatively closer position regarding their relations with Iran.

A common factor among the Gulf states, which have been affected by the war to varying degrees, is growing security concerns. The deployment of air defense systems in the Gulf following drone and missile attacks on critical infrastructure, particularly energy facilities, marked a turning point in terms of defense for the Gulf states. Iran’s unexpectedly aggressive stance, coupled with the Gulf states’ realization that they were facing this aggression alone, constituted a significant turning point.

The Gulf states were disappointed by the failure of the security architecture, which had been based on the assumption that the US would protect them, to withstand this severe test. This disappointment has driven the Gulf states to develop alternative security mechanisms. Consequently, while the Gulf states realized during this war that the U.S. would not directly protect them, they also recognized the need to form alliances with other actors to ensure their security and prepare for a potential Iranian threat after the war. It has become evident that countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar are trying to strengthen security cooperation by working with important regional actors, including Türkiye, Pakistan, and Egypt.

Economic impact

The economy is another area where the concrete effects of the war have been particularly felt in the region. The Gulf region, one of the most important hubs for the global energy supply, found itself in the midst of the conflict. The initial impact was felt in the form of rising oil prices. While some shipments were diverted to alternative routes due to the war, this has increased costs and extended delivery times.

Although rising oil prices above $100 per barrel might appear favorable for the Gulf states, which are exporters, the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for hydrocarbon products reaching global markets, remained at the center of military activity. Coupled with rising insurance costs and the complete halt of transit, the Gulf states were deprived of one of their main sources of income.

In this context, Oman is the only country that stands apart from the other Gulf states. Due to its geographical location, Oman is not dependent on the Strait of Hormuz. Consequently, its oil revenues have risen in line with the increase in prices during this period. Oman continued to export oil, particularly to Asian countries, from its LNG facility in Kalhat, even during the war. Shipments also continued from Mina al Fahal, the country’s most important oil export hub. Omani crude oil traded at $120 per barrel when global oil prices were at $100. This played a critical role in the country’s economy.

Beyond hydrocarbon trade, the economic impacts of the war on Gulf countries have also been highly destructive. In the United Arab Emirates, a key tourism hub in the region, tourist activities came to a complete standstill. Hundreds of hotels in Dubai were left entirely empty within a short period, and thousands of future bookings were canceled. Following the damage to the region’s “safe haven” image, there was a capital outflow amounting to billions of dollars, particularly from Dubai, a recognized global financial center. While the Abu Dhabi and Dubai stock exchanges suffered significant losses, the property market declined by up to 30 percent.

Another sector severely affected by the war is the aviation industry. Major Gulf airports, such as those in Dubai, Doha, and Abu Dhabi, which serve as key hubs for global air transport, became completely non-operational in the early days of the war. They were subsequently forced to operate at minimum capacity. As a result, tens of thousands of foreign workers, who form the backbone of the Gulf labor market, have left the region, negatively impacting consumption and the labor market. Due to these factors, many Gulf countries, including the UAE, are expected to experience severe economic contraction by 2026.

Social impact and expectations of peace

On the other hand, the war has undoubtedly impacted societies in the Gulf. While the effects were limited to daily life and the food supply chain during the war, the erosion of the region’s sense of security has had a traumatic effect on Gulf societies accustomed to nothing but prosperity and development for decades. Consequently, some Gulf citizens have reportedly temporarily relocated with their families to safe havens such as London, Zurich, Singapore, and Istanbul. Uncertainty has also rapidly increased for the millions of foreign workers who play a key role in daily life and the labor market across the Gulf states. The fact that some of the migrant workforce, particularly in the energy and construction sectors, is considering returning to their home countries risks disrupting the already fragile labor market balance. Meanwhile, rising energy and logistics costs are reflected in daily living expenses, and price increases have been observed in food and essential consumer goods.

Although the effects of the war are gradually subsiding following a temporary ceasefire, the Gulf states are prioritizing lasting peace. The Gulf states’ key priorities in the post-war period include the cessation of cross-border threats, particularly from Iran; the guarantee of regime security; and the permanent removal of barriers to energy exports. The Gulf states also expect Iran to struggle for regional influence through proxy forces and to limit Tehran’s nuclear capabilities. Finally, establishing a new security architecture and implementing defense mechanisms to ensure regional security are of critical importance to the Gulf states.

Conversely, one could argue that the collapse of the Iranian regime or the country’s descent into deep instability in the post-war era would also pose a risk to the Gulf states. A resulting power vacuum could lead to uncontrollable consequences that go beyond the current threats. The emergence of a more radical Iranian regime would also pose risks to the Gulf states. A Tehran administration capable of holding the Gulf regimes accountable for events during the war could threaten the Gulf states for decades to come. From this perspective, the Gulf states would prefer Iran to remain an actor whose capacity to generate security concerns is limited and with whom limited dialogue can be maintained rather than being perceived as a threat. Consequently, the Gulf states greatly value entering the post-war period in an environment free of threats from Iran.

The war initiated on February 28 by the U.S. and Israel targeting Iran has had its most intense regional impact on the Gulf states at this stage. The Persian Gulf’s role as the logistical hub and economic heart of the war is the primary reason for this. Consequently, although a temporary ceasefire has been established, the Gulf states now face a vortex of uncertainty within their own borders, as this war has transformed from a crisis unfolding elsewhere. This serves as a reminder that crises seemingly far removed from the Gulf states are much closer than they appear. As the most vulnerable actors in the climate of uncertainty created by the war, the Gulf states are calling for an immediate end to the conflict while attempting to prepare for the new political, military, and economic order set to emerge.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

E

xchanges between US President Donald Trump and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz are becoming increasingly heated. Merz was initially one of the European leaders with whom Trump got on best. While leaders of major European nations, such as France and Spain, found themselves embroiled in disputes with Trump following his inauguration for a second term in early 2025, Merz’s first meeting with Trump at the White House in June 2025 ended without incident. Trump’s warm welcome and words of praise were also well received in the German media.

Merz’s praise for Trump, his avoidance of raising issues between the two countries, and his assertion that the US was an indispensable partner for Germany all played a key role in ensuring the meeting’s positive outcome. Furthermore, Merz brought a copy of his German grandfather’s birth certificate as a gift and did his utmost to win over the American president.

Despite Trump’s threats regarding Greenland and the economic toll of his tariffs on European industry, the positive start to the Trump-Merz relationship proved resilient for a long duration. This was because Merz was one of the European leaders who was most vocal in advocating a cautious and conciliatory approach in response to Trump’s aggressive policies. Unlike France, Spain and the UK, Germany continued to unconditionally support Israel’s actions in the Middle East during Merz’s tenure. While the aforementioned countries recognized the State of Palestine in response to Israel’s actions, Germany’s refusal to recognize Palestine also contributed to Trump’s satisfaction with Merz.

Finally, Merz’s statements supporting the war initiated by the U.S. and Israel against Iran—which was in violation of international law—had also greatly pleased Trump. The German Chancellor, who supported Israel during last year’s 12-Day War by stating, ‘This is the dirty work Israel is doing for all of us,’ entered into a heated dispute with Iranian leaders by demanding regime change prior to the Israel/U.S. offensive that began on February 28 of this year, earning the appreciation of the Trump-Netanyahu duo.

Regarding the US and Israel’s stance on attacking Iran with the aim of changing its regime, Merz argued that this was in accordance with international law. Shortly after the war began, the German chancellor visited Trump at the White House. While he expressed his support for the US and Israel, he remained silent in the face of Trump’s harsh criticism of the Spanish and British prime ministers, who had announced during the meeting that they would not allow their countries’ bases to be used for the war. Clearly, Merz’s stance also pleased the American president.

Angering Trump

It was clear that the German chancellor would anger Trump by changing his stance on Iran and making critical statements as events took a turn for the worse, given that he had pursued an Iran policy aligned with the US and Israel. The deterioration in the relationship between Trump and Merz became apparent when the US and Israel realized that effecting a regime change in Iran would be more difficult than they had anticipated. They had not even managed to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, which had been closed by Tehran. Merz’s rejection of Trump’s request for assistance against Iran in reopening the Strait of Hormuz infuriated the American president.

Merz’s rejection of this request, accompanied by the question, ‘Did they ask us when they started the war?’, led to an intense response from Trump, given that the German chancellor had previously adopted a stance in his pre-war statements along the lines of ‘Yes, the regime in Iran must change’ and ‘Go on, do our dirty work for us’. Now that the process was not going as planned and the global cost of the war was rising daily, Merz’s reluctance to offer support was causing Trump distress.

It should be noted that both parties believed they were justified in their actions. Merz feels vindicated in his stance, arguing: ‘Our support was purely rhetorical; you entered this war confidently without the need to consult us, so do not ask us to join now. We are already occupied with a war against Russia in Ukraine, and our military strength is insufficient. Trump, on the other hand, believed he was in the right, reasoning, ‘You said the regime in Iran must change. You said our attack was in accordance with international law, so why aren’t you supporting us?’

Damaging a relationship

These differences in position and perspective appear to have damaged the relationship between the two leaders, as well as US–German relations, to an extent that will be difficult to repair. The German chancellor’s remarks in a speech on 27 April further enraged Trump. In the speech, she stated that ‘the US would not be able to end the war against Iran in the short term because the Iranians are stronger than anticipated and the Americans lack a truly persuasive negotiating strategy’, and that ‘the entire American nation has been humiliated by the Iranian regime’. Trump, who has threatened to withdraw American troops from Germany, said that ‘it is hardly surprising that Germany is in such a dire state, both economically and in other respects, under the leadership of Merz, who has no idea what he is talking about’.

Unable to contain his anger, Trump took his criticism of the German chancellor a step further, accusing Merz of being ‘completely ineffective’ in the war in Ukraine thus far and stating that ‘instead of meddling in other matters, he should be trying to put his “ruined country” back in order’. Trump’s remarks that the German chancellor should devote more time to ending the war between Russia and Ukraine, followed by his instruction to the defense minister to withdraw 5,000 troops from Germany, may prevent Merz from further escalating this dispute. This is because, while US interest in and support for Ukraine has diminished significantly under Trump, an escalation of tensions between Washington and Berlin could leave Germany and other European countries in an even more difficult position with regard to Russia.

The failure of the US and Israel to achieve their objectives in the unjust war they launched against Iran, coupled with Iranian resistance, is causing a rift among even Trump’s most loyal supporters. The US could face serious problems with its allies and Israel if the Strait of Hormuz were to close for an extended period.

(This article was originally published in Turkish by the Middle East Africa website)

F

ollowing Viktor Orbán’s defeat, the elections held in Hungary attracted considerable attention in Turkey. Various predictions were made based on election assessments and comparative analyses. Analyses comparing the election winner, Péter Magyar, with Orbán, in particular, interpreted the election results through classic dichotomies, such as democracy versus authoritarianism, liberal democracy versus populism, and the right versus the far right.

However, regrettably, many of these analyses relied on these clichéd distinctions and interpretations. Furthermore, the post-liberal rise in Hungarian and international politics was analyzed from a liberal perspective, resulting in erroneous interpretations. Initial assessments such as the return of liberal democracy, the retreat of authoritarianism, and the defeat of the far right and populism demonstrate an inability to understand the true nature of the sociopolitical transformation occurring in Hungary and around the world.

The true significance of the Hungarian election results

The clearest conclusion to be drawn from the election results is that there is a significant crisis of legitimacy and trust within the political landscape, rather than an ideological shift. Orbán was defeated by another post-liberal figure who uses similar language, draws on the same social base, and shares a similar perception of the crisis. In other words, contrary to what is often assumed, the new prime minister, Magyar, is not so much a liberal democrat as he is another figure who largely represents the post-liberal current due to the rhetoric he employs and the ideological position he occupies. From this perspective, the Hungarian elections should not be viewed as a regime change or political transformation but rather as a renewal and cleansing of actors within post-liberalism itself.

More precisely, Orbán’s defeat and the winner’s profile do not, contrary to many interpretations, signify that the social demands he represented and championed have disappeared. On the contrary, the election results indicate that post-liberal tendencies persist, but the current government has lost its ability to represent these demands.

The most significant indicator of this is that the dynamics underpinning the post-liberal quest remain firmly in place. The inequalities brought about by neoliberalism, the uncertainties arising from technological transformation, and the perceived cultural disintegration caused by liberal democracy continue to generate a strong need for security and meaning across broad sections of society. People still expect a political stance that delivers public services and defends their own values.

For this reason, the election results should be interpreted as a rearticulation of the social demands represented by post-liberalism, despite the fact that these demands are being discredited with labels such as populism, authoritarianism, and far-right extremism. When Orbán’s political platform could no longer meet these expectations, the electorate did not abandon that platform. Instead, they chose a new leader whom they believed could represent it more effectively. Thus, the transformation witnessed in the Hungarian elections is more indicative of a crisis of representation being resolved than an ideological rupture. Society did not change its demands; it simply updated its choice of who would represent them.

Why did Orbán lose?

The real breaking point that led to Orbán losing his 16-year reign was not the depletion of his ideological framework. As the standard-bearer of the post-liberal movement, Orbán began contradicting his own claims. Over time, he formed a new power bloc to replace the “corrupt elites” he had criticized. This network, centered on the distribution of state resources, became the focal point of accusations of corruption and nepotism.

In foreign policy, however, his decision to replace the “corrupt EU,” which he claimed was victimizing the Hungarian people through liberal democratic impositions, opposing moral values, and neoliberal economic policies, with Putin’s Russia and Trump’s U.S. began to backfire. The hegemonic rhetoric of foreign policy suffered as a result of the increasing visibility and influence of Russia and the U.S. Indeed, anti-elitist rhetoric has lost credibility and is now perceived as merely anti-EU.

Furthermore, the deterioration in economic performance has accelerated this crisis of legitimacy. Financial pressures arising from high inflation, interventionist policies, and tensions with the EU have undermined the government’s claims of “stability” and a “protective state.” Consequently, the disconnect between rhetoric and material reality has become more apparent. Orbán, the champion of the post-liberal movement he defines as “illiberal democracy,” was unable to maintain the moral and political framework he had established. This has led to the collapse of his credibility, reliability, consistency, and moral superiority claims. All of this has driven centrist voters, who were already opposed to Orbán and predominantly reside in major cities, as well as peripheral voters, where Orbán traditionally enjoys a high concentration of support, to seek an alternative.