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or many years, Lebanon did not occupy a central position in Türkiye’s regional policy. The fragility of the country’s political, social, and economic structure, its relative weakness compared to other actors in the Middle East, and its subjection to the influence of various powers were the primary obstacles preventing Ankara from developing a comprehensive strategy for Lebanon.

It would not have been a meaningful or reasonable choice for Türkiye to become involved before conditions conducive to the intense competition among various actors on Lebanese soil had emerged. Consequently, a situation prevailed in which a more basic-level approach, such as stable diplomatic relations between Ankara and Beirut, along with humanitarian aid, cultural events, and limited economic ties, was accepted as a given by both sides. However, the new status quo that emerged in the Middle East following Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, which began on October 7, 2023, paved the way for reshaping established relationship patterns and adopting a new understanding among regional countries.

The genocide in Gaza, the attacks carried out by the occupying state in line with its aggressive expansionist strategy, the state-building process led by Ahmed al-Sharaa that began with the end of the Bashar al-Assad era in Syria, the triggering of regional fault lines, and the emergence of a new reality due to the U.S./Israel-Iran War, all of these have paved the way for the restructuring of bilateral relations between Türkiye and Lebanon in a new tone. Before October 7, spheres of influence in Lebanon were largely defined.

The Assad regime’s influence, which, though weakened after 2006, persisted, and Iran’s decisive role in the country’s politics through Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia’s balancing role on the ground through Sunni political and economic elites, France’s efforts to preserve its traditional presence under the pretext of being the protector of the Maronite population, and the Zionist administration’s ambition, particularly to seize southern Lebanon, prevented the formulation of long-term strategies for the country. In Lebanon, a country with extreme fragility and an equally weak capacity to generate solutions, it was not easy for a new actor to enter the scene as a game-changer. The fundamental shift in the regional political equation and the transformation of the security landscape resulting from the events mentioned above presented an opportunity for a new beginning in Turkish-Lebanese relations.

The new reality in Lebanon after October 7

The shifting geopolitical environment around Lebanon after Al-Aqsa Flood not only disrupted the country’s traditional balances but also heightened society’s need for a new, trustworthy actor. In addition to the traumas of the 1975–90 civil war, the spillover of the Iran-Israel conflict into Lebanese territory had pushed societal fatigue to its peak. One main reason was weak state authority in Lebanon and Hezbollah’s transformation into a key determining actor because of the power it wielded. Furthermore, the profound disruption of Lebanon’s economic and social fabric following the civil war in Syria, along with the fact that pro-Assad and anti-Assad groups were waging a struggle through Lebanese territory, were among the factors preventing the Lebanese government from functioning effectively. However, the escalation of clashes between Hezbollah and the Zionist regime, followed by the occupying army’s series of operations that killed the majority of Hezbollah’s leading figures, signaled the emergence of a new reality on the ground.

The fact that the occupying army, which had withdrawn from Lebanese territory in 2000, began to regain control of certain areas within the country and asserted sovereignty over the region extending as far as the Litani River meant that Beirut would face numerous challenges in the new era. Perhaps the most significant development offering hope for Lebanese politics and the people during this period was the change taking place in Damascus. While the end of the Assad regime and Shara’s assumption of control with a new vision posed new security risks for Tel Aviv, for Beirut it highlighted the potential for a new strategic alliance to emerge in the region.

The spread of the aggressive strategy, carried out by the Zionist regime for political motives, into Syrian territory, and the occupying army’s intensification of its attacks and invasive actions aimed at disrupting Damascus’s stability, undermining its self-confidence, and increasing its vulnerability, were developments that also posed a threat to Türkiye’s national security. It was unthinkable for Ankara, which had paid a heavy price throughout the Syrian civil war, to accept that the Syrian people would be thrown into turmoil by the actions of the occupying state just as they were about to catch their breath. The strategic alliance between Türkiye and Syria also gave the Lebanese people hope.

Walid Canbolat’s visit to Türkiye in December 2024, as a prominent political figure and leader of the Druze community, was a significant indicator of Lebanese expectations. This visit, which took place immediately following the revolution in Syria, was nothing less than a message to Ankara to develop a new strategy regarding Lebanon. In a context where Hezbollah had lost a significant portion of its leadership, the Gulf states and the Western world were unable to assert themselves against Zionist aggression. Tel Aviv’s claim to sovereignty over Lebanon was expanding day by day; mentioning Türkiye in the context of its historical legacy aligned with the prevailing mood in the country. Following October 7, the overwhelming majority of every group in the country had come to expect Ankara to take a more visible role in Lebanon.

A Strategic relationship as a necessity

The profound changes in Syria and Türkiye’s ever-increasing influence in the Middle East are forcing the occupying state to intensify its pressure on Lebanon and to make the government dependent on it by compelling it to enter into various agreements. Caught between Hezbollah and Israel, Lebanese leaders are seeking a way out while simultaneously pursuing a balanced policy toward Tel Aviv in line with U.S. recommendations. Because the country’s political system has created deep ideological divisions among the ruling elites, conflicting political statements and strategies are a constant feature of Lebanese politics. In such an environment, the Zionist administration seeks to consolidate its influence in the region by developing a new relationship with Beirut through the Eastern Mediterranean, while also trying to minimize the likelihood of Beirut joining the Ankara-Damascus alliance in the new post-revolutionary situation in Syria. For this reason, Türkiye’s policy toward Lebanon must be conducted under the new conditions, with a strategic vision far more distinct and profound than in the past.

The separate visits to Türkiye in July by Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and President Joseph Aoun not only have the potential to open a new chapter in bilateral relations but also reveal the unique balances of Lebanese politics. During Salam’s meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, statements regarding Türkiye’s role in developing Lebanon’s infrastructure and the need to strengthen strategic relations in light of the new regional situation were particularly prominent. President Aoun, for his part, emphasized during his visit that the cooperation and coordination to be established with Türkiye constitute a strategic necessity rather than a temporary preference. In particular, conveying Ankara’s clear stance in the face of Israel’s dangerous initiatives in the Eastern Mediterranean and its efforts to involve Lebanon in this process via Southern Cyprus was highly significant for the course of the process.

Both visits and the topics discussed are highly significant in that they demonstrate the need to develop relations between the two sides after many years. Given the current fragilities, Türkiye is the only actor with which Lebanon can establish a strategic partnership in the region, and whose role Lebanese society can clearly accept. From Ankara’s perspective, shifting balances in the Palestinian arena, the transformation in Damascus, and the need to curb Tel Aviv’s aggression and expansionism require moving relations with Lebanon into a new phase. Although Ankara adopted a more limited policy toward Beirut to avoid becoming entangled in Lebanon’s power struggle in the past, the dynamics following October 7 have made it imperative to shift this approach and significantly strengthen ties with Lebanon within a strategic framework. In particular, sustaining the momentum gained after the revolution in Syria on December 8, 2024, and building relationships at various levels on the ground are crucial to a more stable region.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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n observation that the world is undergoing a profound transformation across the political, economic, technological, and security spectrum has become a cliché. Yet the scale and nature of the transformation underway today extend well beyond a conventional geopolitical realignment where merely existing power balances are redistributed. What is changing simultaneously is far more fundamental: the rules governing the international system, the centers of gravity, the meaning of security, patterns of economic interdependence, and even the nature of war and conflict itself.

States continue to compete through conventional military capabilities. However, technology, energy, trade, finance, intelligence, information, and strategic communication have increasingly become integral instruments of national power. At the same time, the contours of the emerging order will not be determined by great powers alone. Regional actors will also play a determinant role to shape this order through their political will, economic capacity, asymmetric capabilities, military strength, diplomatic networks, and ability to build partnerships.

For countries with a potential to be a regional power, therefore, the fundamental question is no longer simply how to withstand the consequences of global transformation. It is how to acquire sufficient capacity and strategic agency to influence its direction and help shape its outcomes. This is not merely a matter of strategic preference. It is an imperative.

Creating strategic space

Türkiye’s strategic orientation in recent years should be understood precisely against this backdrop. Rather than positioning itself as a state that merely adapts to changes determined elsewhere, Türkiye has increasingly sought to develop the capacity to influence the environment in which those changes unfold.

This orientation is visible across a broad spectrum of national policy—from foreign and security policy to defense-industrial development, energy security, diplomatic activism, and domestic political stability. Two developments are particularly illustrative of this strategic direction: the National Solidarity and Social Integration process pursued under the objective of a “Terror Free Türkiye,” and the Türkiye-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Joint Defense Agreement, referred to as the Mecca Agreement.

At home, Türkiye is seeking to eliminate the structural security challenges that have constrained its political, economic, and social potential. Abroad, it is simultaneously developing bilateral and multilateral partnerships designed to strengthen its position in a rapidly changing regional environment and to contribute to the formation of a more capable and resilient regional security architecture.

Developments across Türkiye’s immediate neighborhood have demonstrated that terrorism, irregular migration, energy security, border security, economic stability, and regional order can no longer be treated as separate policy issues. They constitute an interconnected security environment. Türkiye has therefore sought to create greater strategic space by employing the full spectrum of its national capabilities—from diplomacy and intelligence to military power and defense-industrial capacity. Its regional approach has gradually evolved from a conception of security centered primarily on protecting its borders toward one focused increasingly on shaping the security environment beyond them.

The critical point here is that strategic power is not driven from military capability alone. What matters is the ability to translate capabilities into political outcomes through the combination of power, political will, and diplomatic capacity. In Türkiye’s recent strategic approach, the interaction among these three elements has become increasingly visible.

A Türkiye free of terrorism

The objective of a “Terror Free Türkiye” can be understood as a natural extension of this broader strategic approach. The National Solidarity and Social Integration process should therefore not be viewed solely as a security policy designed to dismantle the PKK terrorist organization or eliminate an armed threat. Its strategic ambition is considerably broader. It seeks to strengthen social cohesion, reinforce the bonds of citizenship, and unleash Türkiye’s political, economic, and social potential from the long-term constraints imposed by terrorism and security-related instability.

The significance of the “Terror Free Türkiye” vision lies precisely in its ability to bring security and social integration within a single strategic framework. The Law on National Solidarity and the Strengthening of Social Cohesion, adopted by the General Assembly of the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye, should likewise be understood within this broader political and strategic context. It is not simply a legal instrument; it forms part of a wider effort to strengthen the foundations of national resilience.

In the contemporary understanding of national security, state power can no longer be measured solely by weapons systems, economic output, military personnel, or territorial capacity. Social resilience, political stability, institutional strength, and the existence of a shared sense of national purpose are equally important components of national power.

This is particularly significant in an era characterized by hybrid threats, disinformation, social polarization, proxy conflicts, and attempts to exploit societal divisions. Under such conditions, social cohesion is not merely a domestic policy objective. It is itself a component of national security. This creates a direct strategic link between domestic security and foreign policy.

The traditional distinction between internal and external security is increasingly blurred. Domestic stability and foreign policy are no longer separate spheres governed by entirely different dynamics. They form an interconnected strategic matrix in which developments in one domain directly affect the capacity available in the other.

For Türkiye, eliminating the terrorist threat and strengthening social cohesion at home, while simultaneously contributing to the shaping of regional security architectures abroad, are therefore interconnected components of a single strategic vision.

The resources, political attention, and strategic energy consumed by terrorism can instead be redirected toward economic development, technological advancement, social resilience, and foreign policy. In this sense, a “Türkiye Free of Terrorism” is not simply a domestic security objective; it is a foundation for greater strategic autonomy.

A state can exercise greater maneuverability in foreign policy only when it possesses a sustainable foundation of security, stability, and social cohesion at home.

From security consumer to security producer

This brings us to the second dimension of Türkiye’s emerging strategic posture: the transition from unilaterally producing security to building shared security capabilities.

The defense and security cooperation Türkiye has developed with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, alongside the domestic National Solidarity and Social Integration process, should be viewed within this broader framework. The three countries possess capabilities that are, in many respects, complementary. Türkiye contributes a sophisticated defense industry, extensive military experience, operational capabilities, technological know-how, and decades of NATO experience. Pakistan brings significant military capabilities, strategic geographic positioning, and established expertise in defense production and security affairs. Saudi Arabia contributes substantial economic and financial capacity, energy resources, and considerable strategic influence in the Gulf and wider Arab world. Taken together, these capabilities can form the foundations of a broader and more resilient regional security ecosystem.

The emerging model also has the potential to transcend the traditional concept of an alliance. The security challenges of the twenty-first century are increasingly multidimensional and interconnected. Terrorism, proxy warfare, missile and UAV threats, maritime security, energy security, cyberattacks, the protection of critical infrastructure, economic vulnerabilities, and emerging technological threats cannot be effectively addressed through military capabilities alone—or by any single state acting in isolation.

The regional security architecture of the future will therefore depend increasingly on multi-layered and complementary partnerships encompassing defense, intelligence, technology, energy, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, and economic resilience. Türkiye’s strategic opportunity in this environment is to position itself not merely as a country that consumes security, but as a country capable of producing and exporting security capabilities.

Türkiye’s growing defense-industrial capacity is central to this transformation. The defense industry is no longer simply a sector designed to meet the military requirements of the state. It has become an increasingly important instrument of foreign policy, technological development, diplomatic influence, economic power, and strategic autonomy.

A country’s ability to meet a substantial proportion of its defense requirements domestically reduces its vulnerability to external constraints during periods of crisis. At the same time, defense-industrial capacity changes the nature of its relationships with other countries. A state that can provide advanced defense technologies, establish joint production arrangements, transfer know-how, and develop long-term industrial partnerships possesses instruments of influence that extend well beyond conventional diplomacy.

Türkiye’s defense-industrial rise should therefore not be interpreted merely as a technological or economic achievement. From the perspective of regional security, it represents a strategic lever through which Türkiye can share capabilities with partners, develop joint production ecosystems, deepen institutional ties, and transform short-term security cooperation into durable strategic partnerships. This perspective also highlights the broader geopolitical significance of the Türkiye-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan axis.

Türkiye occupies a pivotal position connecting Europe, the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Pakistan is strategically positioned at the intersection of South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Saudi Arabia lies at the center of the Gulf and occupies a pivotal position within the Arab world.

The convergence of these three countries in the security domain therefore has implications extending well beyond their bilateral or trilateral relations. It has the potential to establish strategic connectivity between different geographic theaters.

The fact that the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement is open to the participation of other regional countries further strengthens this potential. Such an approach can enhance collective resilience while creating a framework through which regional actors themselves assume greater responsibility for their security environment. For this reason, the emerging cooperation should not be interpreted simply as a conventional defense arrangement among three states.

Viewed from a broader strategic perspective, it can potentially contribute to the emergence of a new belt of security and strategic cooperation linking Eurasia and the Middle East, as well as South Asia and the Gulf. When this external dimension is considered together with the objective of a “Terror Free Türkiye,” a striking strategic symmetry emerges between Türkiye’s domestic and foreign policy.

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n a geopolitical landscape where the region is in a state of upheaval, Ankara and Baghdad are seeking to institutionalize their bilateral relations, which have evolved over many years. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al-Zaidi, following his first foreign visit to the U.S. on July 14, visited Iran on July 23 and Türkiye on July 28. Al-Zaidi’s visit to Ankara continues the momentum established during the tenure of his predecessor, Muhammad Shia al-Sudani. Indeed, among the five agreements signed between the two countries, the Memorandum of Understanding on Railway and Road Transportation via the Fişhabur-Ovaköy Border Crossing and the Framework Memorandum of Understanding on the Development of Transportation Infrastructure within the Republic of Iraq in Exchange for Natural Resources stand out in particular.

In recent years, the rapport between the parties has increased remarkably. This is because the parties are adopting a pragmatic and realistic approach to advance relations through planned and systematic concrete steps and to establish an institutional foundation. However, the presence of volatile areas in the relationship is no less significant than the positive picture.

Relations are grounded in state-to-state ties

At a time when U.S. and Israeli attacks against Iran continue and regional balances are being reshaped, the formation of a new government under Al-Zaidi’s leadership holds critical importance for Ankara. Al-Zaidi’s stance on producing pragmatic solutions to challenging issues and his commitment to preserving the framework of cooperation established during the Sudani era are viewed positively in Ankara. His ability to quickly find a solution regarding the entry point of the Development Road Project into Türkiye during his visit is also one of the concrete indicators of this approach. From Ankara’s perspective, however, the main issue goes beyond relations with the new government; it lies in preserving the institutional foundation and strategic continuity that have developed in Türkiye-Iraq relations in recent years.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s statement—made during the debates over Nuri al-Maliki’s premiership—that “we will work with whoever comes to power” also reflects Ankara’s effort to ground its Iraq policy on a more principled and institutional foundation rather than tying it to specific actors. Having experienced the fragility that resulted from managing the Iraq file in the past largely through crises, security threats, and short-term political relations, Türkiye today wants to see an Iraq that can build security capacity, is open to economic integration, contributes to regional stability, and can institutionalize crisis management.

Economy: The most institutionalized issue

Ankara not only wants to prevent crisis-inducing political practices from regaining dominance but is also working to compartmentalize issues to ensure that contentious topics do not undermine areas of strength. The issue that stands out in this new approach is the economy.

Bilateral trade continues to hover around the $20 billion mark. Indeed, economic issues were the main focus during Al-Zaidi’s visit. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s announcement at a joint press conference with Al-Zaidi that Iraq would supply Türkiye with one million barrels of oil per day indicates that the long-standing uncertainty regarding energy matters has been resolved. In addition, the acquisition by the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) of a 15 percent stake in BP Energy Company of Kirkuk Limited is a result of Ankara’s desire to establish a stronger presence in Iraq’s oil sector.

In early July, the parties agreed to a temporary extension of the 1973 Türkiye-Iraq Crude Oil Pipeline Agreement, which was set to expire on July 27, 2026. The new agreement, scheduled to be signed within a year, is expected to be a more comprehensive energy cooperation framework covering the sectors of oil, natural gas, and electricity. Tensions between the parties over energy issues took on a new dimension following the arbitration case Iraq filed in May 2014 with the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The case was based on the allegation that Ankara had violated the 1973 agreement by allowing the export of KRG oil via the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline without Baghdad’s approval during the 2014–2018 period. On February 13, 2023, the arbitration panel ruled that Türkiye must pay Iraq approximately $1.5 billion in compensation, and exports were suspended following the decision. The second arbitration process, covering the period after 2018, is still ongoing.

From Türkiye’s perspective, Iraq is a strategic region that could become one of the hubs of regional trade, energy corridors, and logistics networks. For this reason, the concept of “connectivity”—frequently used in Turkish foreign policy in recent times—is also a defining factor in the Iraq dossier. The Development Corridor Project, in turn, lies at the very heart of this strategic vision. Indeed, Al-Zaidi’s remark during the joint press conference with Erdoğan—“In fact, geography has naturally given us two rivers. We want a third river as well. Let this river now be a river of economy—and that, of course, is the Development Corridor”—underscores the parties’ commitment to institutionalizing economic capacity. Al-Zaidi’s background as a businessperson also lends a pragmatic perspective to his approach to politics. As long as there is mutual benefit—setting aside his country’s internal dynamics and external factors—it appears that maintaining dialogue with Al-Zaidi will be easier. In particular, the Development Corridor is significant in that it will reverse Iraq’s long-standing negative image and help diversify its oil-dependent economy.

The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz following the U.S.-Iran War has elevated the project to an even more critical level. Nearly 80 percent of Iraq’s oil is transported via the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Hormuz is the only exit point. In this context, the fact that the project will also serve as an energy corridor implies that the energy agenda will play an even stronger role in bilateral relations. Of course, the KRG’s objections to the project have not yet been resolved. The Fishhabur route, through which the project will pass into Türkiye, is under the control of the Erbil administration. Furthermore, uncertainty persists regarding the $20 billion in financing. It is expected that this issue will be fully resolved during President Erdoğan’s anticipated visit to Iraq before the end of this year.

Security eases political tensions

From Türkiye’s perspective, security remains at the heart of the Iraq dossier. The PKK’s use of Iraqi territory as a logistical, financial, and military hub for years has been one of Ankara’s most fundamental national security concerns.

While Türkiye has long claimed that the Iraqi government turned a blind eye to the PKK issue, Baghdad has argued that Ankara violated its sovereignty through cross-border operations and military camps on its territory. Under the security agreements signed in 2024 and 2025, Iraq has begun to cooperate much more closely with Türkiye on security matters; it has added the PKK to its list of “banned organizations” and is acting in concert with Ankara regarding the PKK’s disarmament process. In particular, the approval of the framework law by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) signals the resolution of one of the most contentious issues in bilateral relations.

Ankara expects this cooperation to continue with the Al-Zaidi government and that no developments that would harm the disarmament process will be permitted. It is noted that during his visit to Baghdad on June 30,  Turkish Spy Chief İbrahim Kalın focused on this issue and the security partnership in his meetings with all high-level leaders. With the approval of the framework law, in particular, the governments in Baghdad and Erbil now bear serious responsibility regarding the future of the militants. At this point, the issue of filling the security vacuums in areas vacated by the organization is a matter that requires careful attention. Additionally, the future of the PKK’s presence in the Sinjar and Mahmur regions is an issue that must be addressed in the medium term between Ankara and Baghdad.

The sharing of the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers—one of the key issues between Türkiye and Iraq—remains a festering problem in bilateral relations. Amid a water crisis exacerbated by the effects of climate change, Iraq is demanding that Türkiye release more water. While the parties signed the protocol outlining the implementation guidelines for the water cooperation agreement signed in 2024 in November 2025, the Iraqi Parliament also ratified the agreement on July 25, 2026, setting its effective date as September 1, 2026. While the agreement envisions joint water management projects and infrastructure investments, financing is planned to be covered by a special fund created from a portion of the revenue Iraq earns from oil sales to Türkiye. Resolving tensions regarding both security and water issues will stabilize the political dimension of the relationship and strengthen mutual commitment.

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n July, Türkiye was the host in NATO’s family photo in Ankara. Leaders from across the alliance, from the United States and the United Kingdom to Germany and France, gathered at the Presidential Complex. As the summit reaffirmed the allies’ commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Ankara also became one of the key venues where NATO’s future security agenda was discussed.

Less than two months later, another family photo was taken, this time in Bishkek. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stood alongside Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and the leaders of Central Asia at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. Türkiye has been a dialogue partner of the SCO since 2012. On his way back from the summit, Erdoğan said that full membership could also be considered, while stressing that such a step would not mean breaking away from the West or any other institutional framework.

At first glance, the two photographs appear to tell very different stories. Look a little closer, however, and they reveal the same trajectory in Turkish foreign policy.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to measure Türkiye’s diplomatic weight simply by asking which alliance it belongs to. Ankara’s room for maneuver increasingly comes from its ability to engage with different centers of power at the same time. Türkiye remains a NATO ally while deepening its relations with the SCO.

This is therefore about something more than a shift of axis. Türkiye now operates across too many geopolitical spaces to be confined to a single one.

Being in the West does not mean closing the door to the East

The depth of Türkiye’s relationship with the West is already evident in the numbers.

Trade in goods between Türkiye and the European Union exceeded €217.6 billion in 2025, reaching a new record. Türkiye became the EU’s fifth-largest trading partner worldwide that year. European companies manufacture in Türkiye, Turkish industry is deeply embedded in European supply chains, and the Customs Union has formed the backbone of this economic relationship for almost three decades.

The security picture is even clearer. Türkiye has been a NATO member since 1952. Moreover, the summit held in Ankara once again demonstrated that its position within the alliance cannot be explained by military numbers alone. Many of the regions NATO must simultaneously consider, including the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, lie in Türkiye’s immediate neighborhood.

None of this, however, requires Ankara to limit its relations with the rest of the world.

This is precisely where the Shanghai Cooperation Organization becomes relevant for Türkiye. According to figures cited by Erdoğan in Bishkek, the geography represented by the SCO encompasses roughly 3.5 billion people and an economic volume of about $35 trillion. With China, India, Russia, and the Central Asian states sitting around the same table, it would hardly be economically or geopolitically rational for Türkiye to remain indifferent to such a platform.

For Ankara, the sensible approach is not to choose one space and abandon the other, but to use each relationship according to different national interests. Ankara’s room for maneuver comes precisely from this diversity.

Geography alone does not explain Türkiye’s importance

For years, Türkiye was commonly described as a “bridge country.” Today, that description is becoming insufficient. A bridge connects two sides, but it does not determine direction by itself. Turkish foreign policy in recent years has taken on a much more active character.

Türkiye has a role in Black Sea security. It is present in Europe’s energy and trade connections. It also lies at the center of transport routes stretching from the Caucasus into Central Asia. The Development Road project, planned through Iraq and towards the Gulf, could add another route linking Asian trade with Europe through Türkiye.

This is why the emphasis placed in Bishkek on aligning the Middle Corridor with China’s Belt and Road Initiative was hardly accidental.

The Middle Corridor stretches from China through Kazakhstan, across the Caspian Sea, into Azerbaijan and Georgia, before reaching Türkiye and then Europe. The World Bank has also estimated that, with the right investments, the route could substantially increase the volume of cargo transported along it. Türkiye is simultaneously working on projects designed to strengthen railway capacity across the Istanbul Strait and improve the corridor’s connection with Europe.

Türkiye’s geographical location therefore becomes strategically valuable only when it is combined with infrastructure, diplomacy, and economic capacity.

The same logic applies to energy. During Erdoğan’s meeting with Putin in Bishkek, new nuclear projects were discussed alongside the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant. Once its four reactors operate at full capacity, Akkuyu is expected to provide around 10 percent of Türkiye’s electricity needs. Ankara is therefore continuing its energy cooperation with Russia while remaining part of the European energy system and pursuing greater diversification of supply.

Trying to place all these relationships on a simple East-West scale makes little sense. Each file has its own calculation.

The ability to talk to different sides at the same time

Perhaps the clearest example of Türkiye’s diplomatic room for maneuver emerged during the Russia-Ukraine war.

As a NATO member, Ankara supported Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Yet it did not close its political channels with Moscow. The result was the Black Sea Grain Initiative, brokered by Türkiye and the United Nations in 2022, which enabled nearly 33 million tones of grain to leave Ukrainian ports for international markets while the war continued.

A similar mechanism is now back on the agenda.

On August 31, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said Türkiye had prepared a new plan for the safe passage of grain through the Black Sea and was in contact with both Russia and Ukraine. That development alone says a great deal about Türkiye’s diplomatic position.

Speaking to one side is easy. Having both sides in a war willing to take your call is far more valuable.

Türkiye’s diplomatic relevance does not come from agreeing with everyone. It comes from its ability to maintain dialogue with countries that disagree with one another. Nor is this multidirectional approach limited to the Black Sea.

In August, Türkiye signed the Mecca agreement with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The arrangement envisages political and military coordination as well as cooperation in air defense, unmanned systems, electronic warfare, and the defense industry. Ankara therefore remains part of NATO’s collective defense architecture while also helping build additional security networks in its wider neighborhood.

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or centuries, Somalia and China have been connected through the Indian Ocean. Long before the establishment of the modern Somali state, commercial and cultural exchanges linked the Somali coast with China through maritime networks. The modern diplomatic relations were established in 1960 and have survived some of Somalia’s most turbulent political periods.

Yet the significance of the relationship today is not simply that it has survived for decades. It is that the architecture of Chinese engagement with Somalia appears to be changing. China is increasingly visible not only in government offices and diplomatic exchanges, but also in Somali classrooms, universities, investment forums, youth networks and spaces of knowledge production. In September 2024, the two countries elevated their relationship to a strategic partnership.

This development should not be interpreted simply as another example of China expanding its footprint in Africa. What is more interesting is the changing instruments through which Chinese influence is being constructed in Somalia. For years, external engagement with Somalia has largely been understood through security assistance, humanitarian intervention, development programs and political diplomacy.

Türkiye has developed a particularly visible role across security, education, infrastructure and diplomacy, while Western and Gulf actors maintain their own political, economic and security relationships. China is now becoming more prominent within this increasingly competitive external environment, but its approach appears to rely on a somewhat different combination of instruments including economic statecraft, education, people-to-people exchanges, diplomatic networks and knowledge production.

150 Somali students win Chinese scholarships

Considering education, in August 2026, more than 150 Somali students received full Chinese government scholarships, one of the largest recent cohorts, with students entering fields including medicine and engineering. The Chinese Embassy’s scholarship reception was not presented merely as an educational event. Ambassador Wang Yu encouraged the students to develop a new perception of China, build new friendships and contribute to China-Africa and China-Somalia exchange. This scholarship initiative coincides with a parallel trend of self-funded Somali students choosing to study in China recently.

The wording is revealing. Scholarships are usually understood as development assistance or educational opportunity. But international relations shows us that education can also become an instrument of soft power and long-term socialization. A student who spends several years in another country does not return with a degree alone. They return with language skills, professional networks, personal experiences, perceptions of the host country and, sometimes, an entirely different understanding of how a state and society function. China has already begun building upon this accumulated human capital. Its embassy has previously brought together Somali alumni of Chinese universities, explicitly linking their educational experiences with future China-Somalia cooperation.

This does not mean that scholarship recipients automatically become instruments of Chinese influence. Such an interpretation would underestimate their agency. The more important point is that education creates social relationships that can survive individual projects and political administrations. A road connects two places, but an educational network can connect two societies for decades.

China and the youth in Somalia

The same logic is increasingly visible in China’s engagement with Somali youth. In August, a nine-member Somali youth (TikTokers) delegation travelled to China through a cultural-exchange program facilitated by the Chinese Embassy. Participants visited Chinese cities and institutions and subsequently documented their experiences for Somali audiences.

This is particularly significant because Somalia’s public sphere has changed. Foreign policy narratives are no longer communicated exclusively through embassies, official statements or traditional media. They increasingly travel through TikTok, YouTube, Instagram and other digital platforms. When Somali young TikTokers visit China and communicate their experiences to Somali audiences in their own language and cultural context, the relationship is no longer being narrated solely by Chinese diplomats. t is being re-mediated by Somali actors for Somali audiences.

That is an important distinction in understanding contemporary soft power. Influence does not necessarily become stronger because the source speaks louder. It can become stronger when local actors become the intermediaries through which an external country’s image and experience are interpreted. At the same time, Chinese institutions have increasingly used African and Somali youth engagement as part of the broader 2026 China-Africa Year of People-to-People Exchanges. Somalia’s Ambassador to China, Hodan Osman Abdi, has herself emphasized the role of young people and language learning in sustaining China-Africa relations.

But China’s emerging strategy goes beyond people-to-people diplomacy. It is also becoming increasingly economic. In August, the Somalia-China Business Networking Forum brought together government officials, Somali and Chinese businesses, investors and chambers of commerce in Mogadishu. The discussions covered infrastructure, manufacturing, fisheries, agriculture, energy, transport and logistics, while the Somali government presented investment opportunities linked to its National Transformation Plan.

Zero-tariff policy

Beijing is simultaneously presenting its expanded zero-tariff policy toward African countries as an opportunity for greater African exports and has explicitly discussed the policy with Somali officials. Somalia’s ambassador to China, Hodan Osman Abdi, has also publicly highlighted the importance of using these opportunities to deepen economic cooperation.

This matters because Somalia has historically been approached primarily as a recipient of humanitarian assistance, security support and development aid. A relationship increasingly organized around investment, exports and productive sectors could create a different form of engagement in which Somalia participates more actively in the economic relationship. China’s broader zero-tariff policy toward African countries also creates opportunities for Somali exports, an issue that Somalia’s ambassador to China has publicly emphasized.

But perhaps the most overlooked dimension is knowledge. In April, Yangzhou University discussed supporting the development of a Center for Somali Studies following engagement with Somali National University. The initiative points toward a growing Chinese academic interest in Somali language, society and affairs.

This may appear less consequential than investment or infrastructure, but it represents another form of power which is the epistemic power. Who studies Somalia matters. Who produces knowledge about Somali society matters. Who teaches Somali language matters. And who trains future specialists capable of interpreting Somalia matters.

For decades, much of the internationally influential knowledge about Somalia has been produced through Western universities, think tanks and international institutions. The emergence of Somali-focused academic engagement in China suggests that Beijing is gradually developing its own knowledge infrastructure through which it can understand Somali society and cultivate people capable of sustaining the relationship. China is therefore not simply increasing its presence in Somalia. It appears increasingly interested in developing the human, social and intellectual networks through which its presence can endure.

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urkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit, covering Tripoli and Benghazi between August 11 and 12, has been one of the most visible indicators of the shift in Türkiye’s Libya policy that has become apparent in recent years. Immediately prior to the visit, a 4.5-million-litre petrol tank at the Zawiya Refinery, 50 kilometres west of Tripoli, was set alight by a drone attack, prompting the National Oil Corporation to declare a state of emergency at the highest level. Foreign Minister Fidan’s reference to an approach that “makes no distinction between western, eastern and southern Libya” is the clearest expression of Ankara’s new approach, which, whilst defending Libya’s territorial integrity, does not limit its engagement on the ground to a single political and geographical center.

Exercises unite the army but not politics

One of the notable changes in the Libya dossier in 2026 was Washington’s return as a more visible actor. Indeed, the initiative led by Massad Boulos, US President Donald Trump’s adviser on Arab and African affairs, materialized in Sirte on July 14. Khalid Haftar, son of Khalifa Haftar and Chief of Staff of the Libyan National Army (LNA), and Selahaddin Nemrush, Chief of Staff of the Government of National Unity (GNU), met under the supervision of the United Nations (UN) Support Mission and issued a declaration on a ‘single national army’. They also agreed to organize joint exercises to tackle smuggling and migration along the Chad-Niger border.

Details that have emerged suggest that a power-sharing formula is being discussed, under which Abdulhamid Dbeibeh would remain as Prime Minister and a senior executive position would be opened up for the Hafter faction. Furthermore, plans to encourage the return of American energy companies to Libya and to carry out joint military activities under the leadership of AFRICOM indicate that Washington is seeking to advance the political, economic and security dimensions of its Libya policy simultaneously. The adoption in April 2026 of the first unified budget since 2013 has been one of the most tangible outcomes of this process to date.

Washington approaches Libya’s political crisis partly with a cost-benefit analysis. The Central Bank cannot finance two parallel governments indefinitely; therefore, scarcity forces the parties to unite. This is an approach that treats the economy as the driving force, whilst regarding legitimacy as a technical detail to be resolved later. The unification of military institutions under a single structure, the conduct of joint exercises and even reaching agreement on a joint budget are genuine achievements. However, none of this address the question of which political authority the armed groups will be subject to. Indeed, the outright rejection of the plan by the armed groups in Misrata, the militia clashes in Tripoli and the objections rising from the south demonstrate that the architecture on paper has yet to find its counterpart on the ground.

Ankara’s own terms

Another weakness of the Boulos initiative lies in the tension between timing and legitimacy. The 36-month transition timetable and the stated election date of February 17 position the ballot box as a promise rather than a concrete objective. The fact that the unified budget signed in April has still not been implemented shows that the agreement on paper has had only limited impact on the ground. Political steps taken without establishing an implementation mechanism do not, on their own, alter the balance of power on the ground. Furthermore, power-sharing carries the risk of fueling corruption and further reinforcing existing power networks by easing current constraints on public spending. In short, the formula of political compromise in exchange for oil revenue is sufficient to keep the two capitals at the negotiating table in the short term. However, as the size of the rent to be shared increases, so does the disruptive capacity of armed actors left out of the process. The events in Zawiya can also be interpreted within this framework.

Türkiye is positioning itself within this plan on its own terms. Ankara’s advantage lies in maintaining its strong military and political presence in western Libya whilst progressively deepening its relations with actors in the east. Foreign Minister Fidan’s meetings in Tripoli with Dibeybe, Menfi and Takala, as well as Acting Defence Minister Zubi, Interior Minister Trabelsi, Chief of the General Staff Nemrush and Head of Military Intelligence Mahmud Hamza; and in Benghazi with Marshal Hafter, Saddam Hafter and Agile Salih, demonstrates that Türkiye is analyzing the situation in Libya at the level of its security apparatus.

Moreover, some of the figures on this list, including Agile Salih, are known to be actors who maintain a distance from the American initiative. Consequently, Ankara’s network of contacts encompasses actors who approach the American initiative to varying degrees. Ankara’s military and political access emerges as a key factor in making the US plan feasible on the ground. This position allows it to continue its engagement with Ankara through American initiative, whilst enabling it to defend its own priorities more forcefully at the negotiating table.

Sons and nephews: The consolidation of loyalty and a fragile arena

The most critical dynamic observed in Libya today is the advancement of succession engineering rather than institutionalization. In the east, Saddam Hafter’s military and political clout, Khalid Hafter’s position within the General Staff, and Bilkasım Hafter’s management of the reconstruction budget through the Development and Reconstruction Fund; whilst in the west, Ibrahim Dibeybe’s central role in the dossier as the Prime Minister’s national security adviser, represent the two ends of the same spectrum. In both camps, power is consolidated through families and networks of loyalty rather than through institutions. In this context, Ankara has established relations with actors likely to influence the future of Libyan politics.

The fact that political and military balances in Libya are never static makes this approach rational from a foreign policy perspective. Washington’s return to the negotiating table is also reshaping the calculations. The key capability stemming from Ankara’s decade-long experience lies not in alliances formed with specific actors, but in the flexibility to recalibrate its position as actors change. Conversely, when Türkiye’s core interests are at stake, the same flexibility cannot apply. The inclusion of the Turkish Armed Forces’ Libya Task Force Command in Tripoli in the visit program serves as a deliberate reminder of the deterrent power underpinning diplomacy.

Vulnerability, however, is concentrated in the west. The Zawiya refinery has for years been a nexus of fuel subsidies, smuggling and rivalry between armed groups. The increasing isolation of Mohammed Bahrun—a key regional actor who once aligned closely with the Dbeibeh faction—is turning Zawiya into one of the new flashpoints of tension between the government and local armed groups. Regardless of who carried out the attack, the current situation indicates that one of the key dimensions of the struggle in western Libya centers on the distribution of rents and resources. Foreign Minister Fidan’s inclusion of Omar Mukhtar’s memorial tomb in his Benghazi itinerary can be interpreted as a symbolic message showing that Türkiye’s engagement in the east is not limited solely to existing political and military actors. Ankara is establishing a foundation in the east that is grounded not only in military and political relations but also in Libya’s historical memory.

The Cairo circle: The Mecca Pact, maritime jurisdiction zones and the equation extending to the Red Sea

The framework that gives Fidan’s visit to Libya its true significance, however, is regional. The joint defense agreement signed in Mecca on August 7 by President Erdoğan, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif established a collective security architecture that treats an attack on one party as an attack on all parties, whilst remaining open to the participation of other regional countries. This move, which brings together Türkiye’s military weight within NATO, Saudi Arabia’s financial capacity and Pakistan’s security capabilities within the same framework, has made the divisions between the various partnership networks already taking shape in the region more apparent.

The addition of India’s growing interest to the cooperation between Greece, the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus and Israel indicate the emergence of overlapping partnerships that balance Türkiye’s regional influence, rather than a single opposing bloc. The competitive arena for this axis could extend from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea and East Africa.

At this juncture, the Türkiye–Libya agreement on maritime zones, signed in 2019, is becoming one of the key elements in the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean, in addition to its legal status. The political sustainability of the agreement depends not only on the continuity of the government in Tripoli but also on Benghazi’s stance towards this text. For this reason, the relationship maintained with the Haftar family is also significant in terms of safeguarding Türkiye’s legal rights and gains regarding maritime zones in the Eastern Mediterranean. The relations Ankara has developed with Benghazi present an important opportunity for the maritime zones agreement to gain acceptance in eastern Libya as well.

Egypt might join the Mecca Agreement

Cairo was the missing link in this equation. Foreign Minister Fidan’s visit to Egypt following his trip to Libya completes this missing link. The topics to be discussed outline the strategy for the region. Alongside Gaza, Syria, Libya, Sudan and the Eastern Mediterranean, the details of this strategy include hydrocarbon and electricity grid integration, the defense industry, and the trade volume, which is targeted to increase from 8 billion dollars to 15 billion dollars. Foreign Minister Fidan’s indication that Egypt might join the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, however, elevates this visit beyond a mere technical consultation. The fact that Türkiye and Egypt are now able to speak with one voice on Libya could weaken one of the key elements of the rival patronage equation that has long fueled the east-west divide in Libya.

It is no coincidence that the Sudan dossier is also being discussed at the same table. Egypt is the key country in the corridor linking the Eastern Mediterranean to the Red Sea and East Africa. The quest for stability in Libya and the containment of the conflict in Sudan are two ends of the same geopolitical axis. The defense framework signed in Mecca on August 7, the meetings in Tripoli and Benghazi held between August 11 and 12, the reception of Mahmoud Abbas in Ankara on August 12, and the visit to Cairo on August 13 all constitute an intense diplomatic flurry crammed into a single week. It would be an oversimplification to view this sequence of events as entirely unrelated developments.

Turkish foreign policy today views the Eastern Mediterranean, North Africa and the Red Sea basin as an increasingly interconnected security zone. Ankara’s emphasis on a ‘single Libya’ is, in fact, the diplomatic expression of its view that the Eastern Mediterranean constitutes a holistic, rather than fragmented, strategic equation. Within this equation, Libya serves as a strategic terrain where it is critical not only to secure gains but also to safeguard them over the long term.

(Originally published in Turkish by SETA Foundation)

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cross the African capital cities like Addis Ababa, Mogadishu, Bamako, Abuja and Niamey or Rabat, a strategic recalibration has been underway for some years now, one that rarely announces itself in strategic policies communiques but is nonetheless visible in procurement contracts, bilateral training agreements, and the silhouettes overhead in contested airspace. Where the vocabulary of Turkish engagement with Africa once belonged almost entirely to the register of humanitarian development and religious solidarity, it has, in the span of a single decade, acquired a second and increasingly dominant grammar, that of the arms deal, the joint operations center, and the strategic partnership memorandum.

To understand how Ankara has repositioned itself as an indispensable actor in African security affairs is to understand something broader about the fracturing of the postwar arms export order, wherein middle powers unbound by the conditionalities that have long governed Western defense relationships are discovering that hardware, sold cheaply at affordable prices and without diplomatic or political instruction attached, can purchase influence that decades of soft power initiatives struggled to secure. In one decade Türkiye has become a major strategic and military partner of many African countries.

For much of the past two decades, Türkiye’s presence on the African continent was narrated and framed through the lens of humanitarianism: hospitals built by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), Türkiye burslari scholarships (YTB) extended to students from Mogadishu to Ouagadougou, mosques and Yunus Emre cultural centers that carried Ankara’s new vision and humanitarian diplomacy into capital cities where Western embassies had long since retreated. This perception of Türkiye as a primarily humanitarian actor, has not disappeared, but it no longer sits at the center of the relationship of the African continent and Türkiye.

What has displaced this perception of Türkiye is a harder currency altogether, one measured in drone airframes rather than aid packages. The Bayraktar TB2 and its heavier sibling, the Akıncı, have become the most visible symbols of a Turkish foreign policy that increasingly treats military defense exports as a vehicle for coorperation and alliance-building, and the African continent, more than any other region outside Turkey’s immediate neighborhood, has become the proving ground for this new military and security approach to diplomatic engagements.

Turkish defense exports are visible across Africa

The growing need for Turkish military cooperation and bilateral relations on security, is not difficult to trace. A Bayraktar TB2, priced at somewhere between two and five million dollars (the price range depends on the included equipment and systems), costs a fraction of comparable American or European drone platforms, and it arrives without the geopolitical interest conditionalities, congressional reviews, or parliamentary scrutiny that typically accompany Western arms transfers.

For African governments confronting insurgencies, militias, rebel groups and security issues with strained budgets, that combination of affordability and political convenience and non-interference is decisive. Baykar, the company behind the TB2 and Akıncı lines, now counts more than a dozen African states among its clients, a list that spans North Africa, the Horn, and the Sahel and that continues to grow with each passing procurement cycle.

What emerges from this pattern, then, is not simply a commercial success story for Baykar or a diplomatic or strategic coup for Ankara against the West, but a demonstration of how thoroughly the terms of security assistance on the continent have been rewritten in the absence of a single hegemonic supplier. The African governments turning to Turkish drone platforms are not merely choosing a cheaper alternative to American or European systems; they are opting into a relationship structured by a fundamentally different logic, one in which the seller neither interfere with internal politics nor conditions delivery on governance benchmarks, and in which the transaction itself becomes an instrument of legitimation for regimes that might otherwise struggle to access military capability at all.

Whether this arrangement proves durable, or whether it merely defers the reckoning between weak states and the insurgencies that flourish in their ungoverned peripheries, is a question that drone sales alone cannot answer, and one that Ankara’s own diplomatic ambitions on the continent will eventually have to confront.

Somalia as proving ground

If the African continent as a whole has become the proving ground for Ankara’s drone-centered approach to security diplomacy, Somalia has functioned as something closer to a strategic and diplomatic laboratory, the site where each successive increment of Turkish military involvement has first been tested before being exported elsewhere on the continent – and of course Libya is another case. What began in 2011, in the wake of a devastating famine, as an ostensibly humanitarian intervention had by the following decade acquired a military architecture nested inside it, one that has continued to deepen rather than plateau.

The clearest evidence of this trajectory arrived in January 2026, when Türkiye moved beyond its established drone operations to forward-deploy F-16 fighter jets to Mogadishu’s Aden Adde International Airport, flown not by Somali pilots but by Turkish personnel stationed there for what officials described, tellingly, as Ankara’s own security and strategic interests.

Where the Bayraktar and Akıncı platforms had allowed Turkey to shape Somalia’s counterterrorism campaign at a comfortable remove, the arrival of manned combat aircraft signaled a willingness to send Ankara’s own forces directly into the kinetic dimension of that campaign, collapsing the distinction between arms supplier and co-combatant that had, until then, given Turkish involvement in Somalia a degree of plausible deniability.

Somalia remains the clearest illustration of what this military and security partnership looks like when it matures past a single arms sale into something closer to institutional entanglement. Türkiye’s military training facility in Mogadishu, opened in 2017 and reportedly the largest such overseas base Ankara operates, has run alongside a steadily deepening supply relationship, one that culminated in Somalia’s acquisition of the Akıncı, a far more capable long-endurance strike platform than the TB2, as the al-Shabaab terror group intensified its campaign against Somali government forces. Turkish trainers, Turkish drone equipment, and Turkish-managed port and airport contracts in Mogadishu now sit alongside one another and it has become a model many African countries expect of relations with Türkiye.

Moreover, Ankara has leaned on this accumulated leverage diplomatically as well, positioning itself as mediator in the dispute that erupted after Ethiopia’s January 2024 memorandum with Somaliland, a deal that would have granted Addis Ababa naval access to the Red Sea in exchange for recognizing Somaliland’s independence. Turkey’s ability to broker a subsequent diplomatic arrangement between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa owed much to the credibility it had already banked as many African countries’ principal security partner and assistance in military capacity buildings across the continent.

What the Somali case shows, then, is the logical endpoint toward which drone diplomacy tends when a partnership is allowed to mature unrestrained by the kind of parliamentary or congressional friction that constrains Western security assistance: not merely the sale of platforms but the gradual absorption of the client state’s security architecture into the “patron’s” own operational command, such that Mogadishu’s airspace, its port, its officer training pipeline, and now its combat air component all answer, in some meaningful sense, to Ankara.

This is a different order of strategic entanglement than the transactional drone sales occurring elsewhere in the Sahel, where governments purchase platforms and operate them with whatever sovereignty their capacity allows; in Somalia, the jets themselves remain Turkish, flown by Turkish crews, protecting what Turkish officials have openly termed Turkish interests, which raises the uncomfortable possibility that the mediating role Ankara has claimed between Mogadishu and its neighbors rests less on disinterested diplomatic credibility than on the leverage that comes from having, in practice if not in name, assumed responsibility for a portion of Somalia’s own war.

Ankara’s widening client list

Beyond the Horn, the pattern repeats with variations across the African continent. Niger, still absorbing the fallout from the 2023 coup and the departure of French forces, received its first Turkish drones between 2021 and 2022 and signed a further financial cooperation agreement in mid-2025 to expand its fleet and bring in additional Turkish trainers to Niamey. Nigeria, whose Bayraktar purchases have expanded considerably since 2024, now flies TB2s and Hürkuş light attack aircraft against Boko Haram insurgents in its north, while Nigerian and Togolese forces jointly use Turkish drones to patrol the porous frontier they share with Burkina Faso and Niger.

Mali’s forces have credited Turkish-supplied platforms with battlefield gains, including the 2023 recapture of Kidal from separatist fighters, even as one of its Akıncı drones was shot down near the Algerian border in 2025, a reminder that these platforms are neither invulnerable nor immune from geographical terrain and climatic conditions. Ethiopia’s use of Bayraktar drones against Tigrayan rebel forces, meanwhile, has been widely credited with tipping a war that had, for two years, resisted decisive military resolution, a fact that has not gone unnoticed by neighboring governments weighing their own procurement decisions.

Furthermore, Morocco’s request to host a Baykar production and maintenance facility, announced in late 2024, signals that Ankara intends to make its African footprint not just a matter of exports but of manufacturing presence, allowing faster delivery to clients across the continent while embedding Turkish industrial interests more permanently within African defense infrastructure. Kenya’s arrival on Baykar’s client list in late 2024, following the completion of operator training earlier that year, extends this network into East Africa proper, suggesting that what began as a series of bilateral arrangements is congealing into something closer to a continental military and security architecture, one in which Ankara increasingly functions as the default supplier for governments unwilling or unable to meet Western procurement standards and high prices.

Taken together, these cases suggest that Türkiye’s expansion has ceased to depend on any single crisis or client and has instead settled into something resembling a strategic infrastructure, a supply chain distributed widely enough across the continent that setbacks in one theater, a downed Akıncı here, a stalled procurement there, register as friction rather than failure.

What Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Ethiopia, Morocco, and Kenya share is not a common conflict but a common calculation, that Turkish platforms arrive faster, cost less, and demand less political interest or string accounting than the alternatives, and it is this calculation, replicated across regimes with otherwise little in common, that is quietly converting a decade of bilateral drone sales into the architecture of a continental security order authored in Ankara.

What drones cannot solve

Having traced the arc from humanitarian aid to drones, from bilateral arms sales to something approaching a continental security architecture, it becomes necessary to ask what this expansion has actually purchased for the African states that have embraced it, and whether the question that matters most has been quietly displaced by the one that is easiest to answer. It is simpler, after all, to count drones delivered, bases opened, and insurgent strongholds recaptured as in the case of Mali than to ask whether any of it addresses why those strongholds existed in the first place.

None of this, however, answers the harder question that ought to sit beneath any accounting of Turkey’s African security and military diplomacy: whether a continent whose conflicts, violence and insecurities are so often rooted in weak governance, contested land and resource claims, and unresolved questions of political legitimacy can be stabilized through an instrument that, by design, addresses only the symptom of armed violence rather than its causes.

Drones can degrade a militia or an insurgency’s capacity to strike, but they cannot adjudicate a land dispute, cannot build a functioning judiciary, and cannot resolve the grievances that produce recruits for al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, or the Sahel’s jihadist networks in the first place.

Yet, Türkiye’s growing security engagement with Africa should not be understood solely through the lens of military hardware and defense exports. Turkish drones and broader military partnerships are undoubtedly reshaping Africa’s security landscape by providing governments with affordable, effective, and politically accessible tools to confront immediate security threats.

However, the long-term significance of Ankara’s role on the continent will depend on its ability to move beyond the battlefield and translate security partnerships into broader diplomatic influence. Türkiye has already demonstrated its capacity to mediate complex disputes, from the Somalia–Ethiopia tensions to other regional crises where traditional actors have struggled to produce meaningful outcomes. As Ankara’s political, economic, and security ties with African states deepen, it has an opportunity to position itself not only as a defence partner but also as a trusted mediator and peace-building actor. Türkiye, as professor E. Eyrice-Tepeciklioğlu has observed, has become “Africa’s mediator.”

The future of Africa-Türkiye relations may therefore lie not only in controlling contested skies, but also in helping to resolve the conflicts that continue to shape Africa’s political order on the ground.

The honest strategic accounting, then, is a divided one: Türkiye has demonstrated a genuine capacity to alter the tactical balance in Africa’s conflicts, and an emerging, still unproven capacity to convert that battlefield leverage into the kind of political mediation that might actually address what produces those conflicts, but the two capacities are not the same achievement, and conflating them risks mistaking the suppression of violence for its resolution.

Ankara’s own rhetoric increasingly gestures toward the latter ambition, and its interventions in the Somalia-Ethiopia dispute suggest the mediating role is not merely aspirational, yet a continent’s worth of governance failures, land disputes, and legitimacy crises.

Whether Türkiye chooses, and is permitted, to become something more than Africa’s most efficient arms dealer will determine whether drone diplomacy is remembered as a transitional phase in the continent’s security history or as its settled condition.

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urkish Presidential Communications Director Burhanettin Duran said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s threats and accusations against Türkiye and Syria reflect Israel’s growing international isolation and domestic political concerns.

Speaking to Anadolu Agency, Duran described Netanyahu’s recent remarks as an attempt to create imaginary threats and enemies and distract international attention from Israel’s policies in Gaza, Syria and Lebanon.

“Netanyahu’s threats and lies against Türkiye and Syria are a new reflection of the Israeli prime minister’s growing international isolation, political fears and delusions,” Duran said.

He argued that international criticism of Israel’s policies has increased, including among the United States, Britain and other countries. Duran said Netanyahu was using hostility toward Türkiye as a political tool amid domestic pressures and competition with more radical elements within Israel’s political system.

Türkiye says Israel is fueling regional instability

Duran accused Netanyahu’s government of pursuing an increasingly aggressive regional policy, including military operations in Gaza, Syria and Lebanon, as well as allowing attacks by Israeli settlers in the occupied West Bank.

He said Israel’s attempt to blame Türkiye following its strikes in Syria demonstrated what he described as an effort to shift responsibility for its own actions.

“The problem is not that people do not understand Israeli policies,” Duran said. “It is that more and more people understand and reject these policies.”

He said Türkiye did not pose a threat to Israel but opposed policies that undermine regional security and stability.

According to Duran, Ankara would continue supporting countries pursuing peaceful policies in the region, particularly Syria, while seeking to prevent further escalation.

He said Türkiye had sufficient experience and strength to respond to threats while maintaining a cautious and measured approach.

Duran calls for two-state solution

Duran also pointed to criticism of Netanyahu within Israel, saying opposition politicians had described his anti-Türkiye rhetoric as irresponsible and extreme and warned that it was creating concern among the Israeli public.

He argued that Israel was losing international support and said tensions with Türkiye had produced no meaningful benefit for Israel.

Duran emphasized Türkiye’s position as a NATO member with significant military and diplomatic capabilities, saying Ankara would continue to prioritize regional peace and stability.

He urged Israel to abandon what he described as destabilizing policies and instead work toward a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

“The most rational course for the Israeli government would be to work toward a two-state solution that would completely resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to stop taking further destabilizing steps in the region,” Duran said.

He also criticized Israeli policies concerning the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem and plans for new settlements in the occupied West Bank.

Duran said Türkiye would not allow Netanyahu’s policies to undermine regional peace or threaten the security of Türkiye and its allies.

“Türkiye’s prudent and peaceful foreign policy will thwart the bloody games of figures like Netanyahu who are willing to set the region on fire to secure their own political futures,” he said.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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srael is facing growing international criticism after its warplanes struck an abandoned military airfield in northwestern Syria, with regional governments and international organizations warning that continued attacks threaten Syria’s sovereignty and regional stability.

The Israeli strikes targeted the disused Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase in Idlib province. Syrian officials said Israeli aircraft carried out eight separate strikes, damaging the runway and hitting a derelict structure inside a hangar. No casualties were immediately reported.

The Syrian Foreign Ministry condemned the operation as a violation of the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, saying Israeli attacks on Syrian territory have continued since December 8, 2024.

Damascus said it has pursued a policy of restraint in an effort to strengthen domestic stability and prevent a wider regional escalation.

Regional governments condemn Israeli strikes

Türkiye strongly condemned the Israeli operation and called for greater international pressure to end what it described as Israel’s continuing aggression against Syria.

“We call on the international community to display a more decisive stance to ensure an end to Israel’s aggression against Syria,” the Turkish Foreign Ministry said, urging accountability for actions it said disregarded international law.

Jordan described the strikes as an “unjustified hostile attack” and said they violated international law and Syrian sovereignty. Egypt similarly warned that repeated Israeli violations of Syrian territory and airspace could trigger a dangerous escalation and undermine wider regional peace efforts.

The Gulf Cooperation Council also condemned the strikes. Saudi Arabia denounced the attack in the strongest terms and rejected the targeting of the Abu al-Duhur facility, while Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait warned that continued military action against Syria threatened regional security.

GCC Secretary-General Jasem Mohamed al-Budaiwi called for stronger international action to protect Syrian territory and uphold regional stability.

U.N. and U.S. express concern

The Arab League also criticized the Israeli strikes, with Secretary-General Nabil Fahmy accusing Israel of using provocative military action to intensify regional tensions.

Pakistan expressed solidarity with Syria and described the strikes as a violation of international law that threatened regional stability. Islamabad called on the international community to ensure accountability.

At the United Nations, spokesperson Stephane Dujarric said the strikes represented another “alarming violation” of Syria’s territorial integrity and airspace.

“These airstrikes must stop, and we are opposed to them,” Dujarric told reporters.

The United States also expressed concern. Tom Barrack, the U.S. ambassador to Ankara and special envoy for Syria and Iraq, said Washington remained committed to diplomatic efforts and talks between regional parties.

Barrack said Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government had not adopted an aggressive posture toward Israel and had instead repeatedly favored de-escalation.

The latest strikes come as Syria seeks to consolidate its new political order and strengthen relations with regional and international partners. The growing criticism of Israeli military operations, meanwhile, reflects broader concerns that continued attacks could undermine efforts to stabilize Syria and prevent another escalation across the Middle East.

(Source: Daily Sabah)

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hilst the Middle East region has undergone significant change and transformation as a result of the attacks launched by Israel from 7 October 2023 onwards, the US-Israel–Iran war that began on 28 February 2026 has further fuelled this change, pushing it to a point of no return. For had these events not occurred, the ‘Mecca Joint Defence Agreement’, signed on 7 August 2026 between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, might not have been possible.

Developments necessitating “regional ownership”

Türkiye’s long-standing stance that the region’s problems should be resolved by the countries of the region themselves – a concept defined by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan as “regional ownership” – had not received sufficient support from the countries of the region. Whilst the reasons behind this may vary from country to country, ultimately external interventions aimed at resolving the region’s problems have failed to heal the wounds; on the contrary, they have either caused existing wounds to bleed anew or allowed them to simply harden into calluses without being resolved. Consequently, it has become apparent that interventions in the region—particularly from the West and, of course, the US—have failed to produce results and have not brought peace and stability to the region.

However, following the events that began on 7 October 2023, Israel’s adoption of a revisionist policy towards the region—believing that the conditions were favourable—and its subsequent attacks targeting not only Gaza and the West Bank but also Lebanon, Syria and Iran, have led to a shift in the preconceptions held by countries in the region towards Türkiye.

For whilst it is evident that almost all of the Western countries expected to resolve the region’s problems have taken sides in the war between Russia and Ukraine, providing Ukraine with billions of dollars in aid as well as both political and military support; whilst Israel’s razing of Gaza, massacred over 73,000 people and committed a massive genocide; deepened its annexation of the West Bank; gradually sought to alter the status of the Al-Aqsa Mosque; occupied southern Lebanon and attempted to provoke a civil war there; and, as if its decades-long occupation of the Golan Heights—which is Syrian territory —as if that were not enough—it unilaterally suspended the 1974 agreement following the revolution on 8 December 2024, occupied further Syrian territory, and sought to prevent Syria from achieving stability by manipulating the Druze and the SDG/PKK terrorist organisations.

The extent to which external actors remain indifferent to crises or conflicts in our region has once again been exposed in the war against Iran. For just as it is unjust and wrong for an actor such as the US to fall into Israel’s trap and attack Iran, it is equally wrong for other Western countries not to have taken the initiative to dissuade the US from this war, as was the case with Ukraine. Although these countries—the majority of which are also NATO members—were called upon by the US to deploy troops to open the blockaded Strait of Hormuz – although this was not in accordance with NATO regulations – they did not heed this call and, whilst not becoming directly involved in the war, they made their stance clear by expanding sanctions against Iran rather than exerting pressure on Israel to bring the war to an end.

During this war, Iran’s decision to attack Gulf states and other countries hosting US bases on their territory – rather than Israel and the US, which were directly attacking it – both because they were relatively easier targets and with the intention of indirectly exerting pressure on the US, has once again demonstrated the importance of regional ownership.

Israel’s revisionist policies and the perception of threats by regional countries

All these developments have made a mechanism such as the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement imperative, with the aim of thwarting the plans of a country like Israel—which, despite its small size, seeks to destabilize the region and derive benefit from the situation by leveraging its lobbying power in the US and Europe and relying on their support—and to establish a new status quo. Furthermore, whilst Israel recently proposed an alignment strategy—such as the “hexagon bloc”—which has yet to materialize on the ground, the formation of a counter-front by countries outside this bloc that perceive the current developments as a threat to their national interests must be regarded as inevitable.

Despite the security guarantees the US has provided to the Gulf states to date, the fact that these states have been exposed to Iranian attacks during the war against Iran has not only called into question the reliability of US guarantees in the Gulf, but has also inevitably led to a search for alternatives regarding the future of the region’s security architecture. It is therefore highly likely that the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement will address this necessity; in particular, should the US withdraw from the region following the war with Iran, it is conceivable that it might be open to entrusting the region’s security to three key and powerful allies: Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the fact that the US has not made any negative statements regarding the Mecca Agreement to date is interpreted in this light and reinforces the view that there is coordination between the signatory countries and the US.

Why is the agreement so important?

Among the key factors that make the agreement significant are the characteristics and capabilities of the signatory countries. Türkiye, for instance, is not only a NATO member but also a candidate country for the EU and has made significant strides in the defense industry in recent years. It is therefore an indispensable actor for both the Middle East and the European security architecture. Pakistan, meanwhile, is the only Muslim country to possess nuclear weapons and also has a substantial population. As for Saudi Arabia, it stands out as a key player not only due to its abundant energy resources but also because of its strategic location at the crossroads of global trade routes. Furthermore, as a leading figure in both the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League, and as the custodian of Islam’s holy sites, it is an actor held in high regard and whose word carries weight among both Arab and Muslim states.

The coming together of these three major powers to form a defense alliance would create a synergy whose effects are likely to extend beyond the region. Furthermore, should this agreement be successfully implemented, it would inevitably create a domino effect, making it likely that other countries in the region would join the agreement. Considering similar initiatives that have been attempted at various times but could never be brought to a conclusion due to both regional and circumstantial conditions, the most significant impact of this agreement, as of today, is that it stands as the sole development capable of curbing Israel’s aggressive, occupying and expansionist regional vision. Not only will the Abraham Accords no longer hold any appeal for countries in the region, but it is also understood that, should the US withdraw from the region following a war against Iran, the new security architecture of the region will be centered on the new pact established by this agreement.

What will the agreement provide for the signatory countries?

This agreement is of a defensive nature, aimed at protecting the signatories from attacks by other countries; in this way, it offers the signatory countries a security guarantee similar to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Türkiye’s current capabilities, Pakistan’s nuclear power and Saudi Arabia’s financial support not only demonstrate the agreement’s capacity and potential but also serve as a powerful deterrent to any actors seeking to attack one of the signatory states.

Consequently, in addition to Türkiye’s NATO membership, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement has now emerged as the sole agreement in the region offering an additional defense guarantee to regional countries, and it has been announced that the agreement remains open to new participants. Although it has been stated in the announcements that no specific country is being targeted, it is clear that a strong deterrent has been created for those with designs on the region – particularly Israel – or those claiming to shape its future.

Whilst there are no doubts regarding the agreement’s deterrent effect, as we do not yet possess detailed information on the nature of the agreement, it is not fully known how a response would be mounted in the event of an attack on any of the signatory states. Furthermore, given the geographical locations of the signatory states—particularly Pakistan’s relatively remote position—it is difficult to predict how such a response would be carried out. However, despite all these uncertainties, the implementation of such an arrangement in our region is of great importance.

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merican President Donald Trump has welcomed a new defense agreement between Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, describing the trilateral pact as an important step toward greater security cooperation in the Middle East.

“Very happy to see that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan have recently, and finally, signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement,” Trump wrote on his Truth Social platform.

He said the agreement showed that countries in the Middle East were “coming together” and would be better positioned to defend themselves. Trump described the pact as a “BIG, BOLD, IMPORTANT FIRST STEP.”

The agreement was signed in Mecca on August 7 amid escalating regional tensions and the ongoing U.S.-Iran war, which has expanded beyond the two countries and affected several states across the Middle East.

Three countries expand military cooperation

Under the agreement, Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia will establish strategic political and military mechanisms involving their defense and foreign ministers, as well as chiefs of staff or commanders of their armed forces.

Military cooperation is expected to develop gradually, beginning with command-post and field exercises. The three countries could later conduct joint exercises involving ground, naval and air forces, air defense systems and unmanned platforms.

The agreement also includes a commitment by the three countries to participate in efforts aimed at resolving the conflict between Iran and the United States.

The pact builds on an earlier Saudi-Pakistani mutual defense agreement signed in September, which stated that an attack against either country would be considered an attack against both.

Saudi Arabia has increasingly sought to diversify its defense partnerships as its critical infrastructure and energy facilities have come under attack amid the regional conflict.

Pact comes amid regional tensions

The agreement also reflects the broader security concerns facing the three countries. Saudi Arabia has been directly affected by attacks linked to the wider U.S.-Iran war, while Iran-backed Houthi forces have targeted regional shipping and other interests.

Türkiye, meanwhile, has faced growing tensions with Israel over the war in Gaza which resulted in broader regional conflicts, including fighting involving Iran and Lebanon.

Pakistan has increasingly positioned itself as a potential mediator in regional disputes while strengthening its security relationship with Saudi Arabia and expanding defense cooperation with Türkiye.

The three-way pact brings together three major Muslim-majority countries with significant military capabilities and strategic influence. Türkiye is a NATO member, Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, and Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s largest oil producers and a key U.S. partner in the Gulf.

Trump’s endorsement marks a notable reaction from Washington to the emerging security arrangement. His comments suggest that the United States views greater defense cooperation among regional powers as potentially complementary to broader efforts to strengthen security in the Middle East.

The agreement could also reshape regional security cooperation as countries seek greater capacity to protect their territory and infrastructure amid continuing instability and the widening consequences of the U.S.-Iran war.

(Source: Daily Sabah)

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he diplomatic initiatives that have been ongoing for some time between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have now materialized into a concrete security architecture with the Joint Defense Agreement signed today in Mecca. Although the agreement in question may appear to be a manifestation of the historical and religious ties between the three countries in foreign policy, it can in fact be regarded as part of a much broader regional transformation. This agreement, signed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif at the Safa Palace in Mecca, the holy city of the Muslim world, constitutes a full-fledged ‘collective defense’ pact, as it stipulates that an armed attack against any one of the three states shall be deemed an attack against all of them.

Furthermore, the fact that the agreement is based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which governs the right to self-defense, can be seen as a reflection of the initiative led by the three countries’ quest for legitimacy within the framework of international law. Consequently, the resulting joint defense mechanism aims to serve as a deterrent not only at the regional level but also in the eyes of global actors.

Outcome of regional developments

It is evident that the agreement goes beyond a merely symbolic initiative. In this regard, the normalization process between Turkey and Saudi Arabia since 2022 and the subsequent acceleration of strategic cooperation, followed by Saudi Arabia’s move to expedite its rapprochement with Pakistan in the security context, culminating in the signing of the Joint Strategic Defense Agreement in 2025, have been the key driving forces behind this process. President Erdoğan’s emphasis on defense industry cooperation during his visit to Saudi Arabia at the start of the year, along with signals of joint investment in the KAAN National Fighter Aircraft, also demonstrate that the signing in Mecca was the result of a process that had been under way for some time.

Beyond its strategic and symbolic significance, the Mecca Agreement is of critical importance given the context in which it emerged. The growing regional instability following the war launched by the US and Israel against Iran on 28 February has led all countries to seek alternatives. When compounded by Israel’s continued pursuit of aggressive and expansionist policies and Washington’s silence in the face of these developments, the confidence of many regional actors, particularly the Gulf states, in the traditional security architecture has been permanently shaken. Furthermore, the US’s failure to provide the expected security umbrella to the Gulf states, whose vulnerabilities were laid bare by Iran’s attacks, has eroded these actors’ trust in traditional security guarantors. Consequently, Washington’s inconsistency in providing protection to its allies during times of crisis has driven regional capitals to diversify their own security arrangements.

Signed against this backdrop, the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement can be seen as a concrete outcome of the quest to reduce dependence on external security guarantees and to build an intra-regional deterrence mechanism amongst regional actors. From Türkiye’s perspective, this step constitutes a key pillar of its long-stated vision for a regional security architecture. In line with the initiatives it has taken in recent years, Ankara has played a critical role in intensifying cooperation amongst regional actors. During this process, Türkiye has strengthened its cooperation with countries including the Gulf states, as well as Egypt and Pakistan, and has sought to implement partnerships across various sectors.

During this process, one of the areas on which Türkiye has placed particular emphasis has been partnerships in the defense industry. Viewed in this context, it should also be noted that, beyond its security dimension, the Mecca Agreement provides a framework for deepening cooperation in the defense industry. Saudi Arabia’s preference and policies in recent years to transition from the role of a customer to that of a co-producer in the procurement of defense industry products have led to concrete steps being taken in this context between Ankara and Riyadh. In this regard, Türkiye has demonstrated its commitment by signing agreements with Saudi Arabia on the joint production of unmanned aerial vehicles, radar technologies, anti-tank guided missiles and other defense industry products.

Defense projects between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia

Indeed, Türkiye has successfully concluded its negotiations with Saudi Arabia regarding the co-production of the Gökbey national helicopter project, and an agreement was signed in February 2026 between TUSAŞ and the Saudi Arabian Defense Industries Organization. It is expected that the Mecca Agreement will not only strengthen the joint security mechanism but also increase such collaborations in the defense industry sector. It can be argued that, in the coming period, this initiative will not only go beyond security cooperation but also pave the way for deepening economic ties between the three countries.

Although the Mecca Agreement was signed between the three countries, President Erdoğan stated in his announcement that this security initiative is open to the participation of all countries. At this stage, it can be said that countries such as Qatar and Egypt are likely to be among those adopting a positive stance towards this security architecture in the initial phase. Given that it adopts an inclusive approach rather than an exclusionary one, unlike certain alliances that have emerged in the region in the past, it can also be noted that this alliance is set to play a strategic role in the future of the regional security architecture.

On the other hand, it remains unclear what impact the differences in foreign policy priorities and the relative divergence in threat perceptions between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will have within the context of the agreement. Indeed, the fact that Turkey’s security priorities, centered on Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean, do not align with Saudi Arabia’s threat perception, which is largely centred on Iran, or with Pakistan’s security reflexes, which are focused on India, may be seen as a constraint. However, it can be argued that the impact of this divergence on the practical feasibility of the agreement will also be limited. Indeed, the fundamental dynamic behind the tripartite alliance is not so much divergent perceptions as shared, concrete threats. This situation forms the basis for the consolidation of power and a shared security vision along the Ankara-Riyadh-Islamabad axis.

The Joint Defense Agreement signed in Mecca stands out as an initiative that clearly sets out the signatory countries’ perspectives. This agreement, which can be seen as the tangible outcome of regional actors’ quest to build their own security amongst themselves, a quest directly influenced by the hardships caused by the interventions of external actors, serves as the nucleus of a far more comprehensive regional security architecture. At this juncture, it seems inevitable that Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which have so far acted within the framework of a shared vision, will move towards a much stronger alliance should they align their foreign policy orientations, harmonize their strategic objectives and integrate their security capabilities.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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urkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Wednesday that Türkiye  would continue to strongly defend the Palestinian cause, as he met Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in Ankara for talks on Gaza, the West Bank and efforts to establish an independent Palestinian state.

Speaking at a joint news conference after the meeting, Erdoğan said Türkiye  was working with the Palestinians to advance the Palestinian cause on the basis of a two-state solution. He accused the Israeli government of continuing what he described as unlawful actions in the West Bank and Jerusalem, including settlement expansion, demolitions and forced displacement.

According to United Nations figures cited by Erdoğan, about 3,800 Palestinians had been displaced in 2026 as a result of settler violence, demolitions and evictions, while nearly 100 Palestinians had been killed.

“Palestinian statehood is being undermined,” Erdoğan said, adding that the international community could not ignore what was happening. He said Palestinian support was a shared responsibility, particularly for the Muslim world.

Erdoğan calls for Palestinian state

Erdoğan said he and Abbas discussed developments in the occupied Palestinian territories as well as bilateral relations. He also welcomed the decision to hold Palestinian legislative and presidential elections, saying they could contribute to reconciliation and strengthen Palestinian unity.

The Turkish president said Ankara opposed attempts to alter the status quo at Muslim and Christian holy sites, particularly the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound in Jerusalem and the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron.

He accused the Israeli government of seeking to benefit from instability and new conflicts while pushing the Palestinian issue out of international attention.

“Whatever they do, they will not succeed,” Erdoğan said, adding that Türkiye  would continue supporting the Palestinian cause “on every platform.”

He reiterated Türkiye ‘s support for the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital and with territorial continuity.

On Gaza, Erdoğan said Israel’s government continued to take what he described as an uncompromising and aggressive approach despite international efforts and Palestinian calls for peace.

He called for conditions to be established quickly for reconstruction in Gaza and for ensuring security for its population.

Abbas thanks Türkiye for support

Abbas thanked Erdoğan and Türkiye  for their support for Palestinian rights and for providing humanitarian assistance to Gaza, hosting Palestinian students and treating patients and wounded people.

He said the two leaders had held productive discussions on regional developments and bilateral relations and agreed to strengthen dialogue between Türkiye  and Palestine.

Abbas also welcomed the recent joint defense agreement between Türkiye , Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, describing it as potentially important for regional stability and security and for protecting the interests of Muslim countries.

He said a just peace could only be achieved by ending the occupation and establishing an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, in accordance with international law and the Arab Peace Initiative.

Abbas said a ceasefire agreement in Gaza had been reached through efforts by Türkiye , Egypt, Qatar and the United States, but warned that humanitarian aid had yet to enter Gaza at the level needed. He also called for reconstruction and the return of legitimate Palestinian authority to Gaza.

“Gaza is an integral part of the State of Palestine,” Abbas said, emphasizing that there could be no Palestinian state without Gaza.

He also said the Palestinian Authority faced serious financial difficulties, claiming Israel was withholding about $6.5 billion in Palestinian funds, affecting the government’s ability to pay salaries and cover expenses in Gaza.

Settler violence in the West Bank and Jerusalem

Abbas said he and Erdoğan also discussed escalating tensions and settler violence in the West Bank and Jerusalem. He accused Israeli settlers of acting under the protection of Israeli forces and said attacks had targeted Muslim and Christian holy sites alike.

“We are standing firm on our land and are opposed to displacement,” Abbas said.

He stressed the importance of Palestinian unity and said the Palestine Liberation Organization remained committed to a unified political program and national institutions.

Abbas also said Palestinians were preparing for legislative and presidential elections scheduled for November 28, describing them as an important step toward strengthening the Palestinian political system.

The Palestinian president ended by thanking Erdoğan for Türkiye ‘s support and expressing hope that Palestinians would achieve independence and freedom while peace and stability returned to the region.

Both leaders also expressed condolences following the crash of a Turkish F-16 fighter jet during a training flight in Yalova.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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he Ankara Summit clearly demonstrated which issues lie at the heart of NATO’s security agenda. The strong emphasis in the summit communiqué on collective defense, the transatlantic bond and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty once again underscored that the Alliance’s fundamental priority is deterrence and defense. Russia’s long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security, continued support for Ukraine, increased defense spending, the expansion of industrial production capacity and the development of new military capabilities formed the main framework of the Ankara Summit.

This picture is perfectly clear. Whilst the Russia-Ukraine War continues, it was to be expected that NATO would prioritize deterrence on its eastern flank. Indeed, the summit communiqué provides for the provision of 70 billion euros’ worth of military equipment, aid and training support to Ukraine by 2026, and for at least equivalent levels to be maintained in 2027. Similarly, the increase in defense investment by European allies and Canada, the announcement of new procurement worth over 50 billion dollars, and the emphasis on expanding defense industry production capacity demonstrate that NATO prioritizes the conversion of expenditure into tangible military capability, alongside its spending ratios.

360-degree security and the southern dimension of NATO in Africa

Another statement in the Ankara Summit Declaration indicates that this discussion must be addressed within a broader context. NATO states that it is continuing its 360-degree approach to deterrence and defense. This approach acknowledges that the Alliance’s security is not limited solely to its eastern flank, the Russian threat, or conventional military capabilities. Strategic competition, widespread instability, hybrid threats, terrorism, energy security, sea lanes, cyberspace, space, unmanned systems, artificial intelligence and critical infrastructure are all different components of the same security landscape.

It is precisely for this reason that NATO’s southern flank is one of the areas that requires more careful consideration following the Ankara Summit. However, Africa is not at the centre of this debate. NATO’s main agenda is, of course, not centered on Africa. Nor should it be expected to be. Nevertheless, Africa is a dimension that cannot be overlooked when seeking to understand the security architecture of the southern flank. The vast geography stretching from the southern Mediterranean to the Sahel, and from the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa, is one of the areas that tests what NATO’s 360-degree security approach means in practice.

At this point, it is necessary to make a conceptual distinction. NATO’s approach to Africa is not the same as the Africa policies of individual NATO member states. NATO is an organization comprising allies with different historical experiences, geopolitical priorities and bilateral relations. France, Italy, Turkey, the US, the UK and Spain do not all view Africa in the same way. Some allies focus more on North Africa, some on the Sahel, some on the Horn of Africa, whilst others prioritize maritime security and trade routes. Furthermore, the fact that many countries are members of both NATO and the European Union can, at times, lead to a blurring of priorities and instruments.

This diversity need not be a weakness. If managed correctly, it could foster a richer debate within NATO regarding its southern flank. After all, each ally possesses field experience, diplomatic networks, defense capabilities and development tools in different geographical regions. The real challenge lies in transforming this diversity into a shared understanding of security. Following the Ankara Summit, what NATO needs is not to produce a centralized, one-size-fits-all policy towards Africa, but rather to develop more realistic channels of cooperation with security institutions, regional organizations and relevant countries in Africa.

A security line stretching from migration to the Red Sea

The issue of migration is one of the most visible aspects of this. In European public discourse, Africa is often brought to the fore through debates on irregular migration. Locations such as Lampedusa, Ceuta and the Canary Islands highlight the link between stability in North Africa and Europe’s border management. However, viewing migration solely as a security threat is an incomplete approach. War, poverty, climate pressures, food insecurity and weaknesses in state capacity are among the root causes of human mobility. NATO’s recognition of climate change as a threat multiplier is also significant in this regard. Climate change may not, in and of itself, directly cause conflict. However, it can exacerbate resource scarcity, economic vulnerability, displacement and local tensions.

That said, the scale of migration originating from Africa should not be exaggerated. African migrants do not constitute the largest group of migrants accepted by NATO countries. A significant proportion of migration movements in Africa take place within the continent itself. Consequently, viewing Africa solely as the source of migration towards Europe is both analytically flawed and fails to establish a sound basis for partnership. A more appropriate approach is to develop sustainable mechanisms that strike a balance between shared responsibility, humanitarian protection, border management, development and the building of local capacity with countries along migration routes.

The second key issue that makes the African dimension of the Southern Flank significant is maritime security and trade routes. The call in the Ankara Summit Declaration for Iran to fully respect freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates that NATO views maritime security not merely as a traditional military issue, but as a strategic matter linked to global trade and energy security. The same logic applies to the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb–Suez corridor. The Houthis’ attacks on commercial vessels have highlighted just how vulnerable this corridor is. The diversion of ships around the Cape of Good Hope has increased transit times, fuel costs, insurance expenses and the strain on global logistics.

For this reason, Red Sea security is not merely a matter for the countries in the region. Europe’s energy supply, production chains and commercial competitiveness also depend on this route remaining open and secure. The war in Sudan, the fight against terrorism in Somalia, inter-state tensions in the Horn of Africa and security vacuums in the Sahel are developments that indirectly but significantly affect NATO’s southern flank. The conclusion to be drawn from this is not that NATO should expand militarily into Africa. A more realistic need is to establish more regular cooperation with African countries and regional institutions in the areas of maritime security, early warning, intelligence sharing, border security, counter-terrorism capabilities and crisis prevention.

Partnership amidst competition and Turkey’s contribution

Great power competition is also a significant part of this picture. Russia’s efforts to deepen its security ties in areas such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Sudan, and to develop a more institutionalized presence through mechanisms such as the post-Wagner African Corps, are trends being closely monitored by NATO. China’s influence in Africa, meanwhile, is advancing through ports, transport corridors, digital infrastructure, mining and investments in critical minerals. Resources such as cobalt, manganese, platinum group metals, lithium and graphite have become critical for the defense industry, the energy transition and advanced technology production.

Nevertheless, it would be an oversimplification to view Africa merely as a stage for competition between Russia, China, the US or Europe. African states are the actors who determine their own security preferences and development priorities. For NATO and its allies, the path to achieving a lasting impact lies in establishing partnerships with Africa based on respect for sovereignty, local ownership, technology sharing and mutual benefit. Relations with Africa’s security architecture must also be built upon this understanding. The African Union, regional economic communities, IGAD, ECOWAS and other regional structures are the pillars of joint security production.

Turkey’s experience offers a notable example in this debate. As a NATO ally, Turkey is one of the countries that has transformed its defense industry capacity into tangible military capability. The developing capabilities in areas such as unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic warfare, munitions, and land and sea platforms are directly linked to the discussions on industrial base and production depth emphasized at NATO’s Ankara Summit. However, Turkey’s role in Africa should not be interpreted solely through the prism of defense industry exports.

The training activities carried out in Somalia through TURKSOM represent an approach focused on capacity-building for local security institutions. Turkey’s integration of humanitarian aid, education, health, infrastructure and diplomacy with security support demonstrates that a more holistic approach to security is possible for the southern flank. The Ankara Declaration, signed between Ethiopia and Somalia, has also highlighted the importance of preventive diplomacy. Whilst mediation is not an alternative to military deterrence, it is a complementary element of the security architecture in terms of managing crises before they escalate into armed conflict.

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he Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed on August 7, 2026, in Mecca between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, marks a significant transformation in the security equation between the Middle East and South Asia. At the heart of the agreement lies the principle that an armed attack directed against one of the parties shall be deemed to have been directed against all three states. This provision goes beyond traditional defense  cooperation to establish a new security mechanism based on the principle of collective deterrence.

The agreement’s primary significance in terms of international relations stems from the convergence of the signatory states’ diverse power elements within a single security framework. Turkey possesses NATO’s second-largest military force, advanced operational capabilities and a defence industry that has grown significantly in recent years. Pakistan is the only Muslim state to possess nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, stands out for its energy resources, financial capacity and influence in Gulf geopolitics. For this reason, the Mecca Agreement constitutes a strategic configuration of complementary capabilities formed by complementary strategic capabilities, rather than a traditional military alliance between three similar states.

The international context in which the agreement emerged is also significant. Rising military tensions in the Middle East, the security of energy transport routes, Iran-centred conflict dynamics and the tendency of regional states to diversify their security guarantees are reinforcing the search for a new regional security order. Within this framework, the Mecca Agreement can be interpreted as a demonstration of the will of regional states to support their security needs increasingly through mechanisms established amongst themselves, rather than through guarantees provided from outside.

The concept of strategic autonomy is particularly significant here. Since the end of the Cold War, one of the fundamental pillars of the Middle Eastern security system has been the US military presence and bilateral security relations. The Mecca Agreement does not directly abolish this system. It is also explicitly stated that the parties’ existing bilateral or multilateral obligations remain in force. However, the agreement demonstrates the will of regional actors to establish their own deterrence mechanisms alongside the Washington- centred security architecture. This situation can be interpreted as a transition from a dependence on a single security centre to a multi-layered security architecture.

The significance of the agreement for the participants

From Turkey’s perspective, the agreement also has a unique dimension. Turkey is a member of NATO. The Mecca Agreement, whilst enabling Ankara to maintain its NATO membership, also allows it to expand its institutionalised defense relations with regional powers outside NATO. Turkey is thus positioning itself strategically from which it can forge links between the Euro-Atlantic security system and the Middle East–South Asia security spheres. However, the relationship between the collective defense obligation under the Mecca Agreement and Article 5 of the NATO Treaty will require detailed legal and strategic scrutiny in the coming period, particularly in the event of simultaneous crises.

Pakistan’s participation in the agreement, meanwhile, shifts the deterrence debate to a different level. Pakistan’s nuclear capability enhances the agreement’s psychological and strategic weight. However, it cannot be concluded from current statements that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence has been extended to Turkey or Saudi Arabia. Saudi officials have also stated that the agreement is not linked to nuclear purposes or an arms race. Consequently, based on the current data, it does not appear appropriate to characterise the Mecca Agreement as a nuclear umbrella agreement.

From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the agreement represents a continuation of its policy of diversifying security partnerships. By linking its economic capacity with Turkey’s defense industry and Pakistan’s military capabilities, Riyadh may secure a greater degree of strategic manoeuvre. To the extent that this framework extends to areas such as defense industry investments, joint production, technology transfer, training, intelligence sharing and maritime security, it will acquire a lasting institutional character.

The principle of collective defense

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Agreement is the principle of ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’. This provision is reminiscent of NATO’s logic of collective defense. However, there is currently a significant institutional difference between the two organizations NATO is an institutional alliance with over seventy years’ history, underpinned by a military command structure, joint defense planning, force structure, standards and permanent political bodies. The implementation mechanisms of the Mecca Agreement, however, are not yet as transparent, based on the information made public.

For this reason, the true strength of the agreement will be measured not so much by its signing as by the extent to which it becomes institutionalized. Should a joint military committee be established, joint operational plans drawn up, regular exercises conducted, an intelligence-sharing mechanism put in place and defense industry projects undertaken jointly, the Mecca Agreement could evolve into a genuine collective defense system.

From Iran’s perspective, interpreting the agreement as a direct counter-alliance requires caution. The parties have specifically emphasized that the agreement does not target any particular state. Given Turkey’s shared border with Iran, its economic ties and regional diplomatic channels, the agreement’s potential to take on a sectarian dimension could entail significant strategic costs for Ankara. Consequently, the sustainability of the agreement will depend on maintaining a balance between the principle of collective defense and the policy of avoiding regional polarization.

Towards a new regional security architecture

From Israel’s perspective, the new framework presents a distinct area for strategic calculation. The convergence of Turkey’s NATO capabilities, Pakistan’s military strength and Saudi Arabia’s regional influence within a common security mechanism holds the potential to influence the balance of power in the Middle East. However, it is not possible to draw a definitive conclusion from current statements suggesting that the agreement constitutes an alliance formed against Israel.

A broader implication of the Mecca Agreement is the possibility of institutionalizing security cooperation within the Islamic world. Whilst the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is a broad political organization with 57 members, it lacks an effective collective defense mechanism. The tripartite structure emerging in Mecca could, if successful, form the core of a narrower yet highly operational security platform that could expand with the participation of other states.

At this point, the fact that the agreement is named ‘Mecca’ also carries symbolic significance. The signing of the agreement at the most important holy centre of the Islamic world lends it political and historical visibility beyond that of a purely military text. However, the agreement’s future legitimacy will be shaped not so much by its symbolic value as by its contribution to regional peace, its compliance with international law, and its capacity to prevent crises.

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he geopolitical upheavals experienced in the international security environment in recent years are fundamentally altering the position of defense spending within economic policy. Increasing strategic competition on a global scale – particularly deepening security risks in the Middle East, such as the Russia-Ukraine War and the US/Israel-Iran War– alongside energy supply security, supply chain continuity and the global race for critical technologies, is leading to a reshaping of defense spending. In particular, NATO’s decision to raise member states’ defense spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the long term signals the start of a new era, not only in security policies but also in global industrial production and technology investment. This has sparked a debate as to whether defense spending could become the new engine of economic growth.

For many years, defense spending has been assessed within the framework of the opportunity cost approach. This approach argues that public resources allocated to defense have a restrictive effect—albeit to a relative degree—on economic growth, as they are diverted from productive sectors such as education, healthcare or infrastructure investment. However, the technological transformation and changes in the security architecture over the past twenty years have necessitated a reassessment of this approach. Today, defense expenditure is viewed not merely as current expenditure-focused public spending aimed at building military capability, but as multifaceted investments that support high-tech production, research and development (R&D) activities, and export capacity.

How do defense expenditures affect economic equilibrium?

The economic effects of defense expenditures are now analyzed not only from the perspective of fiscal policy but also from the perspectives of industrial policy and technological transformation. The economic impact of defense expenditures is realized through a multi-stage transmission mechanism. In the first stage, public expenditure stimulates demand, thereby increasing aggregate demand, expanding production volumes, raising capacity utilization rates and supporting industrial production. Due to their high capital intensity, defense projects generate increased production across numerous sub-sectors, notably machinery manufacturing, electronics, metallurgy, composite materials, software and communications technologies. Thus, defense expenditure creates a powerful multiplier mechanism that mobilizes a broad supply chain.

In the second stage, R&D investments come into play. Defense projects involve significant R&D expenditure due to their high-technology nature. Technologies developed within the defense industry are transferred to other sectors over time, thereby creating long-term positive effects on productivity.

The third stage is the external balance channel. Owing to its high technology intensity, the defense industry is one of the sectors with the highest export value per kilogram. The export of defense products contributes to the current account balance and, at the same time, enables countries to move up the global technology value chain. For this reason, the defense industry is today recognized as one of the strategic determinants of high-value-added exports.

However, the effectiveness of this transfer mechanism depends largely on domestic production capacity. In countries that procure defense systems largely through imports, increasing defense budgets lead to significant outflows of foreign exchange, whereas in economies with domestic production capacity, the same expenditure is channeled back into the economy in the form of increased production, employment, technology development and exports. Consequently, the economic return on defense expenditure is linked not so much to the size of the budget as to the extent to which expenditure can be channeled into the domestic industry.

In this new global context, Türkiye’s production capacity constitutes a notable advantage. As a result of the localization policies implemented over the past twenty years, dependence on foreign sources in the defense industry has been significantly reduced. Within the defense industry, capabilities in design, system integration and high-technology production have been markedly enhanced. Consequently, defense expenditure has evolved from a structure heavily reliant on imports to a production model that generates domestic added value.

What is the contribution of Turkish defense industry companies to the economy?

One of the most significant indicators of this transformation is Türkiye’s rise in global defense exports. Over the past twenty years, Türkiye’s share of global defense exports has grown steadily and, as a result, Türkiye has become one of the key suppliers in the global defense market. This rise in export performance demonstrates that the defense industry has transformed into a strategic production ecosystem that competes in international markets, exports technology and generates foreign exchange.

Institutional transformation is equally noteworthy. Whilst in 2009 ASELSAN was the sole company representing Türkiye amongst the world’s top 100 defense industry firms, in recent years TUSAŞ, ROKETSAN, ASFAT and MKE have joined ASELSAN on the same list. The fact that companies such as STM, HAVELSAN, FNSS and BMC have entered the global top 100 defense industry companies in different years demonstrates that Türkiye’s defense industry has evolved from a single-company-centered structure into a multi-stakeholder, deepened and technologically diversified industrial ecosystem.

This rise in international company rankings is directly reflected in Türkiye’s industrial performance. An analysis of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry’s ISO 500 survey reveals that defense industry companies are steadily strengthening their positions among Türkiye’s largest industrial organizations in terms of sales from production. It is particularly noteworthy that, as of 2025, TUSAŞ has become Türkiye’s seventh-largest industrial organization, while ASELSAN has become the ninth-largest. Export performance at the company level also confirms this transformation. While ASELSAN’s export revenues have reached an all-time high in recent years, TUSAŞ has risen to the status of a key manufacturer within global aerospace and defense supply chains, with export volumes hovering at the billion-dollar level. This picture demonstrates that the Turkish defense industry has gained international competitiveness not only in platform production but also in areas such as electronic systems, avionics solutions, software, engineering services and systems integration.

How will defense expenditure take shape in the coming period?

In this regard, NATO’s plan to accelerate defense investments over the next decade is of considerable importance for Türkiye. This does not merely signify a larger export market for Türkiye. It also holds the potential to strengthen Türkiye’s strategic position within the supply chains of NATO countries, thanks to its production infrastructure with high local content, advanced engineering capabilities and defense companies capable of competing on a global scale. The growing demand from Alliance countries for defense industry products is creating long-term investment and export opportunities for the Turkish defense industry.

In conclusion, the global defense economy has entered a new phase of structural transformation. Defense expenditure is regarded not merely as public spending to meet security needs, but as strategic investments that support technology development, high-value-added production and export capacity. In the coming period, competition between countries will be shaped not so much by the size of defense budgets, but by the capacity of industrial ecosystems to convert these budgets into production, technology and exports.

The defense industry infrastructure that Türkiye has established over the past 20 years, and in particular its clusters, will provide a significant competitive advantage during this new period of expansion in global defense spending. For this reason, the defense industry will continue to be one of the key pillars of both national security and Türkiye’s development strategy, which is based on sustainable growth, high-tech production and exports.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

A

ugust 7, 2026, marks a historic turning point at which the cards of Afro-Eurasian geopolitics and the global security architecture were reshuffled. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s working visit to Saudi Arabia brought together Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, who had arrived in Saudi Arabia the day before the visit, and General Asim Munir at the same table. The defense-focused trilateral ‘Mecca Agreement’, were signed following months of diplomatic maneuvering, and were announced at a time of rising military tensions in the region and US-Iran conflict threatening Gulf security.

Analyzing this critical development from the perspective of Islamabad is of vital importance for understanding Pakistan’s defense network, which stretches from Africa to the Gulf; its chronic and hybrid challenges in internal security; and its foundational role at the crossroads of Afro-Eurasia.

From nuclear power to regional security architecture: Pakistan’s role

As the only nuclear-armed state in the Muslim world, Pakistan constitutes the most deterrent and high-calibre military human capital component of this alliance. The bilateral defense pact signed with Saudi Arabia in 2025 was a consequence of Riyadh’s quest for military assurances, including nuclear deterrence, against potential security threats. However, Turkey’s inclusion in this equation as an official and institutional partner elevates Pakistan’s role as a bilateral ‘security provider’ to a much broader and more balanced framework.

From the perspective of the Islamabad administration, this agreement is not merely a single Gulf commitment, but the culmination of a multi-layered strategy stretching from the Horn of Africa to the Persian Gulf. Indeed, the Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation signed last week between Pakistan and Somalia, a year after it was approved by the Somali Cabinet, demonstrated Islamabad’s determination to play an active role in ensuring the security of navigation in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Furthermore, the Kuwaiti Parliament’s approval in late July of the long-awaited defense cooperation agreement with Pakistan, alongside the pursuit by actors such as Bahrain and Jordan of reciprocal defense agreements modelled on the Saudi model, has cemented Islamabad’s position as the region’s ‘security architect’. Consequently, the Turkey–Saudi Arabia–Pakistan triad forms the backbone not only of these three countries but also of a broader Afro-Eurasian security network.

Synergy of capital, technology and military manpower

Viewed from the perspective of Islamabad, the tripartite alliance is more than just a military pact; it is an industrial lever that brings together finance and high technology. For many years, Pakistan’s military diplomacy has provided Saudi Arabia with training, military personnel and security support, whilst in return it has relied on Gulf funding. However, when the high technology, unmanned systems and operational capabilities of the Turkish defense industry are added to this equation, Pakistan finds an opportunity to move beyond being a passive exporter of security and position itself at the center of a tripartite industrial synergy.

When Saudi Arabia’s financial strength, Turkey’s advanced defense technology and Pakistan’s regional military expertise and growing production infrastructure are combined, a domestic and independent defense bloc and an integrated ecosystem emerge at the very intersection of Afro-Eurasia. At a time when Pakistan is grappling with financial difficulties, this agreement enables it to secure direct Saudi investment whilst also modernizing its domestic defense industry through joint defense projects with Turkey, thereby opening up new market opportunities for both Turkish and Pakistani defense companies.

Internal security challenges and allegations of sabotage

Pakistan’s ambitious foreign policy on the global stage is being tested by chronic internal security challenges and regional hybrid threats. The Islamabad administration has long been grappling with violence perpetrated by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, whilst in the south-west it has been combating separatist actions by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) targeting economic infrastructure and Chinese projects.

However, the recent escalation of social tensions and protests in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (Azad Kashmir) has added a new dimension to the security equation. Strategic circles in Islamabad argue that the unrest erupting in Kashmir is not merely the result of local administrative or economic grievances; rather, they contend that it has been exacerbated by the instigations of external actors who are displeased with Pakistan’s key role in its independent balancing diplomacy with Iran and within the now-concrete Turkey-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Tripartite Alliance, which is now taking concrete form. This situation illustrates that, whilst Islamabad is fighting the actions of the TTP and the BLA on the one hand, it is also forced to contend with the hybrid front opened up via Kashmir by forces seeking to undermine the regional influence of the Tripartite Alliance.

H

istory rarely announces itself. But occasionally, a single agreement tells us that something fundamental has changed.

The defense pact signed in Mecca between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye may be one of those moments.

Its most consequential provision is remarkably simple: an armed attack against one of the three countries will be considered an attack against all three.

For Pakistan, this represents something bigger than another defense agreement.

For decades, Pakistan’s military power, including its nuclear deterrent, was viewed overwhelmingly through the prism of South Asia, particularly its rivalry with India. Pakistan was already a formidable military power, but the strategic reach of that power was largely geographically contained.

That is beginning to change.

Pakistan’s security sxtends beyonf South Asia

Pakistan is now part of a collective-defense architecture stretching from South Asia through the Gulf to Türkiye.

And consider what these three countries bring together.

Türkiye possesses NATO’s second-largest army and has transformed itself into a major defense producer, from drones and missiles to warships and advanced aerospace technology. US President Donald Trump himself recently described the Turkish military as “tremendous” and “powerful.”

Saudi Arabia brings enormous economic and energy influence and the political weight of one of the Arab and Islamic world’s most consequential states.

Pakistan brings one of the world’s largest militaries, considerable operational experience and, crucially, is the world’s only Muslim-majority nuclear-armed state.

The nuclear question is therefore unavoidable.

Nothing publicly released about the agreement says Pakistan has extended a nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia or Türkiye. It would be wrong to claim otherwise.

But deterrence is also about perception. Any state contemplating a major confrontation with one member must now factor in the possibility of Pakistani involvement. The presence of a nuclear-armed state within that collective-defense framework inevitably becomes part of the strategic calculation.

Also, it’s worth mentioning that for Türkiye and Pakistan, this is the culmination of something much older.

Ankara and Islamabad: A growing relationship

The relationship between Ankara and Islamabad has long gone beyond diplomacy. It is rooted in unusually strong political and public ties and has evolved into substantial military cooperation,  from training and joint exercises to defense-industrial collaboration and Turkish-built MILGEM warships for Pakistan.

The Mecca pact takes that relationship a significant step further: from close defense partners to countries formally bound by collective defense.

And its implications stretch beyond the three signatories.

India says it is closely following the agreement. Its “great friend” Israel will surely be watching closely too.

Just a day before the agreement was signed, Narendra Modi received a call from Benjamin Netanyahu. According to India’s Foreign Ministry, the two discussed developments in West Asia and reviewed progress in the India-Israel Special Strategic Partnership.

There is no evidence connecting that call to the Mecca pact, and India has explicitly rejected subsequent reports that it sought a defence agreement with Israel to counter it.

But the wider picture is difficult to ignore. From New Delhi to Tel Aviv, capitals will now be assessing what this new arrangement means for a strategic landscape already undergoing profound change.

Having ties to China and the US at the same time

Pakistan occupies an especially interesting position within it.

China remains Pakistan’s “all-weather” strategic partner. Yet Islamabad continues to engage Washington, while simultaneously playing an active mediating role between the United States and Iran.

Perhaps US Vice President JD Vance summed up Pakistan’s standing in Washington most simply when asked about Islamabad’s role in the latest diplomatic efforts: “Very good, we love Pakistan.”

That ability to maintain relationships across geopolitical divides is increasingly rare.

Pakistan can speak to Beijing and Washington, Riyadh and Tehran, and the wider Gulf — without being completely confined to any single geopolitical camp. And now it has added a collective-defense commitment with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye to that equation.

That puts Pakistan in a remarkably unusual strategic position.

The pact also reflects a wider transformation in the Middle East. For decades, regional security depended heavily on external powers. Years of war, uncertainty and shifting American priorities have increasingly encouraged regional states to look towards one another.

Is this agreement like NATO? Well, we still do not know how integrated military planning will become or how its obligations would work during an actual war.

But deterrence begins long before a shot is fired. It begins with the calculations an adversary makes before deciding whether to fire one.

Turkish military and technological power, Saudi economic weight and Pakistani conventional and nuclear strength are now connected through a formal mutual-defense commitment.

(A version of this article was first published in Turkish by Kriter)

T

he Russia-Ukraine War continues to be the primary catalyst for the process of change and adaptation that NATO is currently undergoing. Russia’s loss of its status as a partner within the Western security architecture following the attack it launched in February 2022, and its subsequent classification as a ‘threat’, has shaped the political and geopolitical dimension of the issue, whilst the military and technological aspects of the war’s conduct have also presented challenges to the Alliance’s defense and deterrence capabilities. Measures relating to this process featured as key issues on the agenda of the Ankara Summit and in the Summit Declaration.

Political-geopolitical dimension

It comes as no surprise that the Ankara Summit Declaration defines Russia as a long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security and stability, as the prevailing view amongst the vast majority of allies is that Russia’s objectives are not limited to Ukraine. This view underpins the rapid increase in defense spending across the Alliance, the removal of barriers to defence industry production, and the strong continuation of military and non-military support for Ukraine.

Since February 2022, NATO’s top priority has been to strengthen the Alliance’s capabilities, whilst the second has been to ensure the sustainability of Ukraine’s combat capabilities. To date, 99 per cent of the military aid provided to Ukraine has come from NATO allies. We can see that this resolve has been maintained at the Ankara Summit, as evidenced by the scale of the support package announced. Whilst the allies have pledged 70 billion euros’ worth of military aid to Ukraine for 2026, this figure has also been set as the baseline for the following year.

What is particularly noteworthy here is that this aid will be funded largely by the European Union (EU). With the Ukraine Support Facility adopted in April 2026, the EU had decided to provide Ukraine with 30 billion euros in financial aid and 60 billion euros in military aid for the period 2026–2027. It should be recalled that in March 2025, all US military aid to Ukraine was cut off, and the flow of American weapons to Ukraine could only be maintained through the intervention of European countries.

On the other hand, the statement in the Ankara Summit Declaration that Ukraine is contributing to transatlantic security by fighting against Russia is significant, as it indicates that the allies recognize Ukraine as a major military power. Speaking at the Defence Industry Forum held on the sidelines of the summit, Ukrainian President Zelensky emphasized that his country is no longer an actor seeking security but one that produces it, and that Ukraine has become an ‘extraordinary source of defense capability’ for Europe. Whilst there is some truth in Zelensky’s remarks, linking this to NATO membership does not seem realistic at this stage, as the war is ongoing and, even if a lasting peace were to be achieved, the US administration’s unequivocally negative stance on the matter is well known.

Military and industrial dimension

The Russia-Ukraine War has highlighted the critical importance of defense industry production and innovation in the theatre of war. With the intensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), artillery munitions and various missile systems, the war has turned into an industrial race in design and production. The rapid, innovative and high-volume production of these systems has had a direct impact on the combatants’ success on the ground. This can be seen in the changing nature of UAV warfare. Today, on the battlefield, UAV systems are being used not merely to target isolated tactical elements, but to shape the battlefield itself.

New-generation UAV systems have played a major role in the war taking on a distinctly positional character from late 2023 onwards and in manoevristic operations coming to a virtual standstill. The ‘kill zones’—areas 10–15 kilometers deep where artillery fire and electronic warfare have intensified alongside the use of UAV systems—have transformed the war into a series of battles taking place in isolated areas. Efforts by the opposing sides to gain the upper hand, whether through kamikaze attacks using UAVs or by deploying them to drop explosives from above, are concentrated in these zones.

The race for innovation, which is characterized by constant dynamism on the Russia-Ukraine warfront, is also taking place in the field of unmanned maritime and land vehicles. For example, whilst it has been observed over the past year that Ukraine has begun to utilize unmanned maritime systems (UMS) much more intensively and effectively, we are now seeing new-generation amphibious operation trials aimed at deploying unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) – transported by UMS – to critical areas. Ukraine’s recent operation on the Kinburn Peninsula has been described as the first unmanned amphibious operation in history.

Ukraine’s increasing military power

Looking at the current course of the war, it is clear that Ukraine has, over the past few months, acquired an increasing ability to strike targets within Russia. Ukraine is specifically targeting bridges, motorways, railways and fuel tankers with the aim of disrupting Russia’s logistical capabilities. The reason for this is to thwart Russia’s ability to launch a new offensive during the spring and summer months. Similarly, these attacks aim to isolate the Donbas region from occupied Crimea through the selection of specific geographical targets (thereby blocking the use of the corridor between them). Judging by the results of Ukraine’s attacks and the pace of Russian advances, it appears that this objective has so far been achieved with considerable success.

The impact of these systems on the war extends beyond the battlefield. As a result of drone and missile attacks by both sides, the agricultural sectors of both Ukraine and Russia have suffered serious damage. Long-range missile and UAV attacks are disrupting the production of grain, wheat and sunflower oil, either directly or indirectly, whilst the targeting of Russian ships carrying wheat in the Sea of Azov by UAV systems is also producing negative consequences for the global market.

Similarly, it must be noted that unmanned systems are also having an impact on the sociological dimension of the war. For example, it is well known that UAV systems flying at low altitude and then diving create great fear amongst the civilian population. Last week, a spokesperson for the Ukrainian Air Force highlighted this situation, emphasizing that Russia’s jet-powered Shahed UAVs were flying at high speed at low altitude and that Russia’s aim was to force the residents of Kyiv to flee the city. In this regard, the prospect of unmanned systems becoming part of systematic intimidation and terror-inducing operations targeting the civilian population in the medium to long term represents a critical risk.

NATO’s comprehensive budget

All these factors have led NATO to establish a comprehensive budget and adopt reform processes in the fields of unmanned systems and their countermeasures (counter-UAS). Whilst it was announced at the Ankara Summit that the Alliance would undertake defense procurement worth 50 billion dollars, the ‘Drone Edge’ initiative, worth 40 billion dollars, was also launched to support anti-UAV systems. By the end of 2027, the allies have committed to increasing the number of UAV operators fivefold. Consequently, unmanned systems – which are shaping modern warfare – constitute a significant part of NATO’s military capability requirements, an issue that has largely been brought to the fore through discussions on budget increases.

Similarly, new steps are being taken to remove obstacles to defense industry cooperation – an area Turkey has long advocated for, but whose importance within the Alliance has only become apparent in recent years, and which can be understood in the context of production shortcomings. Initiatives announced at the Ankara Summit, such as ‘NATO Front Door for Industry’ and ‘NATO Engine’, aim to achieve greater integration of defense industries on a transatlantic scale.

Until now, the focus within NATO has been on military interoperability; however, modern warfare has highlighted the necessity of industrial interoperability to meet defense industry requirements. Indeed, the interoperability issues observed with Western-manufactured 155-millimeter artillery ammunition in the Ukrainian theatre had already demonstrated the inevitable need for close coordination between military operations and defense production.

Consequently, the Russia-Ukraine War remains NATO’s top priority. Despite transatlantic divisions and pro-Russian allegations leveled at Donald Trump, the fact that Russia continues to be defined as a long-term threat in the Ankara Summit Declaration is noteworthy in this regard. Similarly, the continuation of strong support for Ukraine also points to the same conclusion. In this sense, whilst the dynamics of transatlantic relations will determine the political dimension of the transformation taking place within NATO, the Russia–Ukraine War and the war’s innovation dynamics will continue to shape the process of change and adaptation in the Alliance’s military capabilities.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

S

audi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan are set to sign a trilateral defense agreement on Friday, marking a significant expansion of security cooperation among three of the Muslim world’s most influential military powers as conflict with Iran reshapes the strategic landscape of the Middle East.

The agreement will be signed in the Saudi Red Sea city of Jeddah during a summit attended by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, is also expected to participate in the high-level meeting, underscoring the military significance of the pact.

Regional officials familiar with the negotiations said the agreement follows nearly a year of discussions aimed at strengthening defense coordination among the three countries amid mounting security challenges across the Gulf and surrounding waterways.

Although officials have confirmed that an agreement will be signed, none of the governments has publicly disclosed the precise scope of the pact or the commitments each country will undertake.

The trilateral accord comes at a time of heightened instability following the U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran earlier this year and Tehran’s subsequent retaliation against military installations, energy infrastructure and strategic targets across the Gulf. The conflict has exposed vulnerabilities in regional security arrangements while threatening one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies normally pass, has experienced repeated disruptions since hostilities escalated. Commercial shipping has slowed considerably as insurers raised premiums and shipping companies rerouted vessels due to fears of further attacks.

Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan have increasingly sought closer strategic coordination, reflecting concerns that existing regional security mechanisms may not adequately address evolving threats.

A Turkish official confirmed that the defense agreement would be signed but declined to provide further details.

Expanding strategic partnership

The agreement would bring together three countries with considerable military and geopolitical influence.

Türkiye possesses NATO’s second-largest military and has significantly expanded its domestic defense industry over the past decade, becoming a leading exporter of drones, armored vehicles and missile systems.

Saudi Arabia remains one of the world’s largest defense spenders and has accelerated efforts to modernize its armed forces while investing heavily in domestic military manufacturing as part of its Vision 2030 economic transformation program.

Pakistan, meanwhile, is the only Muslim-majority nation possessing nuclear weapons and maintains one of Asia’s largest standing armies. Islamabad has long maintained close defense ties with Riyadh, including military training, intelligence cooperation and joint exercises.

Security analysts say combining the capabilities of the three countries could create one of the region’s most significant military partnerships, although its effectiveness will ultimately depend on the operational mechanisms established under the agreement.

Building on existing cooperation

The new arrangement appears to build upon the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement signed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in September 2025.

According to Saudi officials who previously described the agreement, the bilateral pact treats an attack against either country as an attack against both and provides for cooperation using “all military means.”

Whether Türkiye will assume identical obligations under the expanded framework remains unclear.

Reuters reported earlier this year that negotiations were underway to broaden Saudi-Pakistani security cooperation to include Türkiye, reflecting Ankara’s growing role in regional diplomacy and defense affairs.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said in January that Ankara supported establishing broader regional security platforms capable of promoting stability through multilateral cooperation rather than relying exclusively on outside powers.

Friday’s signing appears to represent the first major institutional step toward realizing that vision.

Maritime security takes center stage

Regional media reports suggest maritime security will feature prominently in discussions during the Jeddah summit.

The three countries have already backed Saudi Arabia’s recently announced multinational maritime initiative aimed at protecting commercial shipping through the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

The initiative gained urgency after repeated attacks on commercial vessels and energy infrastructure during recent regional conflicts disrupted global trade routes.

The Houthis in Yemen have also intensified attacks against Saudi-linked shipping in the Red Sea, further complicating regional security calculations.

Meanwhile, tensions in the Strait of Hormuz have highlighted the vulnerability of energy exports from Gulf producers, particularly Saudi Arabia, whose economy remains heavily dependent on oil exports.

Analysts say closer military coordination could improve intelligence sharing, naval patrols and joint responses to emerging threats affecting maritime commerce.

T

he 36th NATO Summit, held in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026, saw US President Trump state that he had attended the summit solely out of respect for President Erdoğan; the ‘NATO 3.0’ agenda was realized; and, contrary to some experts’ expectations, there was no rift within the alliance. Türkiye’s excellent hosting, which continues to make the country the talk of the town, the efforts by the Israeli delegation throughout the summit to shift the agenda and overshadow the summit were equally striking.

The main factor driving Israel to make such desperate moves was Trump’s pre-summit remarks, in which he suggested that Türkiye might be supplied with F-110 jet engines and the fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets—which had been withheld since 2019—and that the CAATSA sanctions, in place since 2020, might be lifted. On the other hand, Türkiye’s hosting of the summit during such a critical period, President Erdoğan’s meetings on the sidelines of the summit with over 40 heads of state and government on the sidelines of the summit, and, of course, the organization of a defense industry exhibition showcasing Türkiye’s national and domestically produced defence industry products – a first in NATO history – have driven Israel to distraction.

The most significant reason driving Israel to such a state of exasperation and pushing it to make irrational moves is the sense of insecurity that has arisen both within Israel and in the American public sphere due to the stalemate in the war against Iran and the fact that, contrary to promises, an absolute victory has not yet been achieved. Conversely, the fact that Türkiye is viewed as one of the factors hindering Israel’s success due to its role in the war against Iran, coupled with the fact that relations between Türkiye and the US have come to take precedence over those between Israel and the US, is seen as a cause setting off alarm bells and leading Israel to pull out all the stops simultaneously.

It would therefore be useful to highlight the ‘Israel factor’ in Turkish-American relations by examining the rivalry between Türkiye and Israel, mediated through the US and Trump, and the methods Israel employed to persuade the Trump administration to withdraw its support for Türkiye.

Israel’s divergent stance as Turkish-US relations improve

Despite the improvement in Turkish-US relations during Trump’s first term—following the strained relations of Obama’s second term, which is regarded as a crisis period—full normalization could not be achieved due to the dominance of the Zionist lobby over Trump. Indeed, despite all claims of an improvement in bilateral relations, the Pastor Brunson crisis, the Halkbank crisis, threats of economic attacks and the imposition of CAATSA sanctions on Türkiye following its exclusion from the F-35 program all took place during the Trump era. Following the Biden era, which was marked by very frosty Turkish-American relations, Trump’s second presidential term was of paramount importance for both Türkiye and Israel, and both countries had high expectations of Trump from their respective perspectives.

However, Trump had not forgotten what he had gone through after losing the 2020 election; whilst he projected a warm image to the public, it was said that behind the scenes he had distanced himself from Netanyahu, viewing the latter’s relationship with Biden as a betrayal. At the same time, he did not hesitate to publicly express his affection and respect for President Erdoğan, thereby drawing a clear distinction between Erdoğan and Netanyahu. We saw the repercussions of this distinction clearly when, due to developments in Syria, Netanyahu complained to Trump at the White House about Türkiye and President Erdoğan. Indeed, Trump’s response to Netanyahu – “you must be reasonable too” – caused great disappointment on the Israeli side, whilst in Türkiye it was interpreted as Trump taking Türkiye’s side.

Similarly, whilst Trump supported Israel’s attacks on Gaza on the one hand, he did not remain indifferent to the prospect of reaching a ceasefire in Gaza through Türkiyey’s mediation on the other. Similarly, regarding developments in Syria, he has aligned himself closely with Türkiye’s position; despite all of Israel’s objections, he recognised Ahmed Shara as a legitimate interlocutor and provided the necessary support to ensure Syria’s territorial integrity.

The speeches and pledges made by Trump during his Middle East tour in May and at the meeting he held in New York in September with the heads of state and government of Muslim countries, on the occasion of the opening of the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly, are also significant in that they demonstrate that the US occupies a different position from Israel regarding the region’s future. This is because the ceasefire process in Gaza began after this date.

The Iran card

Realizing it could not influence Trump through Gaza and Syria, Israel attempted to win him over by playing the Iran card; however, it was once again disappointed when, in June 2025, despite Trump ordering strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities during the 12-Day War, he refrained from intervening in the conflict. However, by any means necessary, Israel managed to drag the US into war with Iran on 28 February, hoping that this would enable it to achieve the regime change in Iran it had long dreamt of and thereby reorganise the region as it saw fit. Yet Israel’s plans failed, and the Iranian people reacted strongly against the assassination of their religious leader, standing firmly behind their government.

The deadlock in the war with Iran has, on the one hand, led the US to reassess its approach to the region, whilst on the other, it has prompted a re-evaluation of its alliance with Israel. It was during this period that Türkiye stepped in once again; together with Qatar and Pakistan, it opened the door to negotiations, making it possible to secure a ceasefire between the US and Iran. Israel, however, found itself isolated as the sole country wishing for the war to continue; whilst continuing its attacks on the Lebanese front, it began doing everything in its power to undermine the ceasefire between the US and Iran.

Israel’s stance has been criticised on numerous occasions by both Trump and Vice-President JD Vance. The events unfolding in the region are particularly telling in demonstrating just how hollow Israel’s long-standing rhetoric about ‘actors posing a threat to it in the region’ really is. For far from certain actors in the region posing a threat to Israel, it has become undeniable that Israel itself constitutes a threat to the entire region and is the sole actor destabilising the region.

This situation has also put a strain on the so-called unshakeable alliance between Israel and the US. For Israel, particularly due to the aggressive and intransigent policies it has pursued under Netanyahu’s leadership, has become an unbearable burden for the US. Given this, it has become inevitable for the Trump administration to opt to work alongside a strong, conciliatory actor such as Türkiye, which prioritises regional stability. However, this situation has thoroughly infuriated Israel. Believing itself to be—and to remain—the US’s sole ally in the region, Israel has jeopardised both its own future and the region’s stability by resorting to endless intrigues aimed at discrediting, and even weakening, the US’s other regional ally, Türkiye.

Israel’s attempts to overshadow the NATO Summit

Türkiye is the country that has shown the strongest reaction to Israel’s attacks on Gaza and the crimes of genocide it has committed there. Whilst, on the one hand, it has given concrete expression to its response by imposing certain sanctions on Israel in accordance with its own domestic law, on the other hand, it is monitoring proceedings before both the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice, and is fighting to ensure that Israel is brought to justice and receives the necessary punishment for the genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity it has committed. In addition to this, Türkiye’s position regarding developments in Syria and its role in the Iran War have led Israel to target Türkiye, giving rise to the narrative that ‘after Iran, the new target is Türkiye’.

At a time when Israel was attempting to position Türkiye as the ‘new Iran’, and just before the critical NATO summit, Trump’s announcement to Türkiye that F-110 jet engines and F-35 fighter jets would be supplied, and that CAATSA sanctions would be lifted, naturally caused the Israeli administration to panic. As a result, Netanyahu—who had been unable to reach Trump in the run-up to the summit—appeared on US media outlets during the summit, stating: “Türkiye is not a good ally; Israel is the US’s true ally, the sale of F-35s to Türkiye would jeopardize Israel’s security and that of other US allies in the region (by which he meant Greece and the Greek Cypriots), and the CAATSA sanctions imposed on Türkiye must never be lifted”, in an attempt to influence American public opinion and, thereby, exert pressure on Trump to back down.

Whilst the whole world was discussing just how wonderfully Türkiye had hosted the summit, noting that, thanks to President Erdoğan, differences of opinion within NATO had not spilled over into the summit, and that, ultimately, a consensus had emerged in the final communiqué regarding the strengthening of NATO—and whilst praise for Türkiye was at its peak— it has been observed that certain journalists—who are clearly funded by Israel and Jewish capital—have been questioning Türkiye’s role within NATO, criticizing the security measures taken for the summit, and, worse still, raising issues that have absolutely no connection to the summit and relate entirely to processes governed by Türkiye’s domestic law, thereby asking questions and writing articles aimed at creating the perception that there is no democracy or fair trial in Türkiye.

At the conclusion of the summit, the fact that Israel was found to be behind the so-called intelligence suggesting a possible attack on the new Air Force One aircraft—a gift from Qatar which Trump used on his visit to Ankara—was viewed as an attempt by Israel to cast a shadow over the summit. Furthermore, by doing so, they sought to spread the perception that Türkiye is unsafe, whilst also sabotaging the process by presenting a pretext to derail the negotiations between the US and Iran. It must not be forgotten that, in the world, the sole country capable of carrying out such attacks is Israel rather than Iran, and history is replete with examples of this.

O

ne of the most significant turning points in Turkish political life undoubtedly took place on the night of July 15, 2016. The coup attempt, which arose from a mutiny by a group within the military affiliated with the FETÖ organization, was thwarted thanks to the resolute stance demonstrated by the public and the strong political will displayed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This event not only directly influenced political processes but also served as a catalyst for a profound transformation in Turkish political culture. On the night of July 15, whilst the public’s silence in the face of the military largely came to an end, a clear tendency to embrace the political mechanism emerging from the manifestation of civilian will also became evident.

Following the failed coup attempt on July 15, social and political codes in Türkiye began to be restructured within a new paradigm. By opening the door to an understanding of the risks posed by—or that could be created by—movements characterized by external dependencies and a high degree of esotericism, July 15 brought about a historic turning point in terms of redefining the perception of security in Türkiye and reorganizing the relationship between the military and politics from the ground up.

The radical changes in these two areas have not only had a clear impact on domestic politics and the structuring of institutions, but have also been felt just as distinctly in Türkiye’s approach to international politics and its foreign policy practices. In this new reality, where the approach to countering external threats has shifted, Ankara’s strategic choices—particularly regarding the Middle East—exhibited a striking parallelism with both the region’s own conditions and the domestic transformation taking place within the country.

The strategy to contain Türkiye in the run-up to July 15

The foreign policy vision set out and the policies implemented following the 3 November 2002 elections, which brought the Justice and Development Party to power, enabled Türkiye to reposition itself in global politics and, in particular, to become a founding actor in the Middle East. In particular, the status quo that emerged as a result of the popular revolutions in the region during the 2011 Arab Spring bore the hallmarks of Ankara’s new global political vision. However, in the strategic transformations in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya, the significant electoral success of Islamist and conservative parties—which reflected broader societal trends rather than those of groups aligned with the West—completely altered the perspective of the US and other Western actors on the region.

Furthermore, with the open support provided by Russia and Iran to prop up Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, a serious attempt was made to put a brake on the Middle East’s drive towards independence. During this process, in which Ankara’s relations with the region were taken to a new level, the unease arising amongst global and regional actors evolved into a situation characterized by a succession of initiatives aimed at restricting Turkey’s room for maneuver. The sudden emergence in 2013 of events in Türkiye, Egypt and Bangladesh—which shared similar backgrounds, support bases and rhetoric—constituted steps taken to stem the new momentum within the Muslim world. Alongside the violent protests at Gezi Park in Türkiye, the Tamarod protests in Egypt and the Shahbag protests in Bangladesh were a reflection of a coordinated strategy.

Following the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt on July 3, 2013, through a coup, Ankara’s stance on this event led to the emergence of a new dynamic in the region. Alongside the deepening crisis in Syria, the efforts of certain regional actors to bring the popular revolutions to an end and restore the authoritarian status quo led to a narrowing of Türkiye’s foreign policy parameters, driven by both external and internal factors.

During this period, the terrorist organizations that emerged in northern Syria (ISIS and the YPG), alongside the PKK’s tendencies to undermine stability within the country, constituted attempts to erode the government in power before July 15 and, consequently, the legitimate and civilian political will. In particular, the deliberate efforts by members of FETÖ, who had infiltrated the security bureaucracy to a significant extent, to slow down decision-making and implementation processes and to prevent the government from exercising its proper authority through the dissemination of manipulative information, formed part of a plan to undermine Türkiye’s distinctive and independent character in global politics and reduce it to the status of an ineffective actor.

Against a backdrop of growing threats to Türkiye’s border security from Syria, the aircraft crisis with Russia has gone down in history as one of the profound challenges Ankara has faced. The tension that arose between Moscow and Ankara following the downing of a Russian SU-24 aircraft that had violated Turkish airspace caused serious difficulties for Türkiye, a country that was becoming increasingly isolated in the region and whose security concerns were being disregarded by the Western world.

However, under the leadership of President Erdoğan, and following the decision-making elite’s prudent management of the situation, the crisis between Ankara and Moscow was largely resolved, whilst at the same time Türkiye began to adopt a more resilient stance in the face of regional and global challenges. The fact that the collapse anticipated by FETÖ members and their external supporters did not materialize – due to Ankara’s protection of the country’s security and stability through alternative strategies and its continued resolute policy in the face of all threats – led to the attempt on the night of July 15 to overthrow the government by coup and eliminate Türkiye’s sovereignty.

Post-July 15 purge and Türkiye’s new Middle East policy

Following July 15—one of the longest nights in the history of the Republic—and the failure of FETÖ members’ attempts to eliminate the country’s political autonomy and restrict its capacity for action, Ankara began to pursue an action-oriented policy within a new paradigm. During this process, in which security and the perception of threat were formulated in a manner consistent with the reality on the ground, the security bureaucracy took steps—particularly through the purging of harmful elements within the military—within the framework of the hierarchical relationship that should exist between the government and the military.

On 24 August 2016, to send a message to the entire world and to demonstrate in concrete terms that it would combat all forms of terrorism without making any categorical distinctions, Ankara launched Operation Euphrates Shield in northern Syria, with the support of the Free Syrian Army. As part of this operation, which resulted in a crushing victory over ISIS elements, Ankara made a highly strategic move aimed at eliminating threats to its borders originating from Syrian territory and establishing a safe zone for Syrians in the north of the country.

By demonstrating a radical model of alignment between theory and practice through Operation Euphrates Shield, Türkiye not only altered the balance of power on the ground through its military activism but also assumed both an independent and a founding role in initiating a new process regarding Syria’s future. The fact that, for many years, US and European actors refrained from taking constructive and realistic steps to end the civil war in Syria and ensure the safe return of Syrians led Ankara, following July 15, to adopt a stance that engaged Russia more closely under a new framework.

The establishment of a Syria-focused dialogue framework involving Türkiye, Russia and Iran, and the Astana Talks, which represented an alternative initiative to resolve the crisis in the country, went down in the records as a concrete positive contribution of the July 15 events. Alongside its fight against Daesh, Türkiye—which is determined to prevent the PKK/YPG structure in Syria from undermining Syria’s territorial integrity in any way—carried out the Olive Branch and Peace Spring operations in line with its concept of strategic autonomy, despite reactions from the Western world, thereby consolidating its position as a game-changer in the region.

Having swiftly observed the outcomes of its post-July 15 purification efforts in Syria, Ankara adopted a more active strategy to escape the atmosphere of constriction and isolation that had emerged following the reversal of the post-Arab Spring process. During this period, the transformation of the domestic political system also facilitated Türkiye’s ability to pursue independent foreign policy practices.

The establishment of a new model, in which the executive branch has been strengthened and communication between institutions has been accelerated under the Presidential System of Government, played a decisive role in minimizing the negative effects of the July 15 coup attempt and in enhancing Ankara’s global standing. As a reflection of this, Türkiye demonstrated its influence in the region to all parties by openly supporting Doha against the blockade imposed by the Gulf Cooperation Council countries aimed at disciplining Qatar. Furthermore, following the purge within the country’s civil and security bureaucracy, the acceleration of developments in the defense industry and Türkiye’s transformation into a major security producer have enabled Ankara to reposition itself in global politics. This situation has undoubtedly led to a reassessment of ties with Ankara among regional actors and the reactivation of previously frozen relations.

Although the July 15 coup attempt appears to be an intervention in the political mechanism due to its direct targeting of President Erdoğan and his administration, it is clear that this failed attempt was actually the result of a will to eliminate Türkiye’s subjectivity in the global arena. Considering that a significant portion of classical or postmodern coups in Turkish political life have occurred as a result of Ankara establishing contact with alternative actors or presenting a new global political vision, it is evident that the FETÖ mechanism was activated to undermine the effects of President Erdoğan’s new perspective on the international stage and to transform Türkiye back into a secondary actor.

Having overcome this organized threat against the country’s sovereignty and independence, Türkiye, having largely purged harmful elements from its ranks, has begun to develop more original strategies in the global arena. The most concrete manifestation of this is Türkiye’s founding and decisive role in the Middle East. Changing the status quo in the region and successfully balancing regional actors, Ankara has become one of the most effective actors in both Middle Eastern and global politics over the past decade.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

G

ermany’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) marked a turning point both in the shaping of the post-Second World War European security architecture and in Germany’s reintegration into the international system. Following its defeat in 1945 and the subsequent division between East and West Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) found itself on the front line of the Cold War.

Within this geopolitical reality, under the leadership of its first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, Germany saw ‘integration with the West’ (Westbindung) as the sole means of regaining the country’s sovereignty, securing its safety and forging lasting ties with the Western world. Germany’s membership of NATO, which took shape in line with Adenauer’s strategic vision and was formalized on 6 May 1955, represented not merely participation in a military alliance, but also a historic paradigm shift that reinforced Germany’s democratic identity and redefined the balance of power in continental Europe.

With its NATO membership, Germany began to re-establish a regular army and rearm. The fact that Germany was on the ‘hot front’ of the Cold War—a situation in which it could become the direct centre of hostilities in a potential conflict—is best understood through Chancellor Adenauer’s statement: ‘The sole aim of Germany’s rearmament is to contribute to the preservation of peace.’

Germany’s NATO objectives: Peace or the pursuit of economic interests?

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Cold War giving way to regional hot conflicts, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw Germany playing an active role within NATO. In addition to its participation in the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR) in the Balkans, Germany’s deployment of troops to the US-led operations in Afghanistan in 2001, at NATO’s request, is particularly noteworthy. Germany’s participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – established by a United Nations resolution and subsequently placed under NATO command – with a force that at times exceeded 5,000 troops, is regarded as the largest overseas military mission in modern German history.

In an interview given during a visit to German troops in Afghanistan in 2010, the then German President Horst Köhler stated that Germany’s overseas military mission should be viewed in a different light, remarking: “As a country of our size, as a country focused on foreign trade and therefore dependent on it, we must recognise that military intervention may also be necessary to protect our interests when required or in emergencies – for example, to secure free trade routes or to prevent regional instability – as such instability would undoubtedly have a negative impact on our opportunities in terms of trade, employment and income. ‘All of this must be discussed, and in my view, our situation is not all that bad…’ he had stated.

Horst Köhler’s remarks, made at a time when there had also been military casualties, raised questions about the constitutionality of Germany’s role in ISAF whilst also sparking intense domestic political debate; Horst Köhler subsequently resigned from the office of President.

Similar remarks were made by the then Federal Minister of Defence, Peter Struck, in December 2002, when the decision was taken to continue sending troops to Afghanistan. In a speech to the Federal Parliament, Struck said: “To clarify the matter, I had mentioned that our security is also defended in the Hindu Kush. ‘When we combat international terrorism alongside our allies and partners—using military means where necessary—in the very places where it originates, Germany becomes a safer place. Our security is further enhanced when the Bundeswehr successfully participates in the reconstruction process in the Balkans and Afghanistan, in accordance with democratic principles, thereby helping to establish the secure environment urgently required in these regions.”

These remarks, which are still the subject of debate today, signalled the dawn of a new era in German foreign policy at the time they were made. They marked the beginning of a new phase in which German foreign policy was no longer confined to defending its own borders, but also encompassed international preventive efforts. National interests were aligned with international interests, thereby justifying a military presence beyond Germany’s borders.

Despite all the past debates, although the number of troops is smaller, Germany still maintains a military presence at 17 locations with 2,000 troops as part of various NATO missions.

NATO or a European common defense system, or both?

Another initiative coinciding with this turning point in Germany’s foreign policy from a military perspective was the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP – Gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik), which was proposed at the European Union summit in Cologne in 1999 under Germany’s presidency and officially incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The CSDP, which was officially implemented in 2009, also led to the establishment of the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs through the provisions added to the Treaty of Lisbon. Just as in the NATO Treaty, the provision for a call for assistance and support, to be activated at the request of a member state, was also incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon, thereby giving the CSDP practical effect. The first to invoke this provision, by requesting assistance and support, was French President Hollande following the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015.

With 23 member states within NATO, the EU began setting strategic objectives through the CSDP to enable the EU to meet the expectations placed upon it as a security actor operating on a global scale. In 2020, under Germany’s Presidency, the ‘Strategic Compass’ was launched as the key document of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), setting out a clear direction and defining both the policy’s objectives and the necessary resources to achieve them. The first joint threat analysis by EU Member States was drawn up. The Strategic Compass also aims to foster even better cooperation in the field of security and defence and to enable the EU to respond more swiftly and effectively to crises through forward planning.

The EU Global Strategy, developed in 2016, stands out as a new and shared commitment regarding the security policies of Member States, whilst steps were also taken that same year to establish the EU Common Defence Fund under the CSDP.

Although the CSDP may at first glance appear to be an alternative to NATO, it is a structure without a standing army or an existing military chain of command. Since 2020, whilst the EU has undertaken various global missions under the CSDP, joint operations with NATO have also taken place.

Within the EU, a group of countries led by France argue that Europe must become an independent military and strategic actor, separate from the other side of the Atlantic. However, the former Warsaw Pact members that joined the Union through eastern enlargement—Poland, Romania, Hungary and the Baltic states—view NATO as an irreplaceable security umbrella for Eastern Europe. These states, which view Russia as a direct existential threat, currently regard the CSDP’s military deterrence as inadequate and position NATO—which hosts US nuclear and conventional capabilities—as the absolute preference for their own national defence. These countries advocate that the transatlantic bond must not be severed.

Furthermore, the rule within the EU requiring unanimous decision-making on CSDP matters hinders the EU’s ability to respond swiftly and effectively to crises. This situation impedes the CSDP’s operational capabilities.

Germany, meanwhile, is endeavouring to strengthen the CSDP whilst simultaneously seeking to bolster its role within NATO by increasing its defence budget. Ahead of the NATO summit, Germany – which had been criticised by the US President for not increasing its defence budget sufficiently and for failing to provide adequate support within NATO – has already countered Trump’s criticisms through Chancellor Merz, stating that defence spending has now reached 4 per cent of annual gross domestic product.

The debate over the relationship between NATO and the EU’s CSDP was also raised during Chancellor Merz’s meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during his visit to Ankara. President Erdoğan emphasised to Chancellor Merz that preserving the ‘Transatlantic Bond’ was crucial for strengthening NATO’s European pillar, and stressed that Turkey could support the European Union’s defence initiatives provided they complemented NATO. This situation demonstrates, on the one hand, that the CSDP is being closely monitored in Ankara and, on the other, that it has once again been emphasised that, from Turkey’s perspective, a common defence strategy against global threats must be defined within the framework of NATO. However, Merz’s statement that ‘a new European NATO is being established’ has failed to provide any indication as to what role the CSDP will play within NATO.

Turkey-Germany relations in the context of NATO

Relations between Turkey and Germany, which form NATO’s south-eastern flank, have followed a contentious course due to geopolitical shifts, diverging strategic priorities, Germany’s approach to Turkey’s cross-border operations, and the ‘clash of national interests’ between the two countries within the alliance. The fundamental strategic disagreement between Turkey and Germany stems from the asymmetrical nature of their threat perceptions. As a border state directly affected by instability in its immediate region (Syria, Iraq and the Mediterranean), Turkey prioritizes issues such as ‘counter-terrorism’ and ‘safeguarding territorial integrity’—not only its own but also that of its neighbors—whilst Germany has adopted a stance that disregards Turkey’s determination in the fight against terrorism.

During the Syrian civil war, following an increase in the ballistic missile threat against Turkey, Turkey requested an air defense system from NATO. In response to this request, Germany deployed the Patriot missile defense system to Kahramanmaraş; however, in 2015, despite the threat persisting, Germany withdrew the Patriot missile defence systems prematurely, citing Turkey’s counter-terrorism policies as justification. This situation, which led to a serious loss of trust in Germany and called into question NATO’s deterrent capability, persisted until recently.

Despite the friendly and warm remarks made by Merz in Ankara, Germany; its embrace of the PKK and FETÖ, the fact that these organizations still find a foothold in Germany, and the German state’s belief that by providing a platform for these terrorist organizations it could politically weaken Turkey, indicate that relations will not improve in the short term and that the alliance between the two countries within NATO will continue to be turbulent for some time to come.

Among the key issues included in the latest coalition agreement—that is, the government program—regarding Germany’s role within NATO are improvements to the federal armed forces’ contingents deployed as part of NATO’s defense efforts and an increase in military equipment. It has been stated that, due to its geographical location in Europe, Germany will be further strengthened as a central hub of NATO. Similarly, the government program views NATO as one of the cornerstones of the transatlantic partnership and emphasizes its indispensability for European security.

Among the objectives is the commitment to work towards establishing a European Defence Union with the aim of strengthening NATO’s European pillar. This objective is also in line with the argument that Germany must become more Europeanized in order for NATO to remain ‘Transatlantic’. In doing so, it also intends to pursue a trilateral cooperation protocol with France and the United Kingdom.

Whilst Germany is moving towards becoming a logistics hub within NATO, it will, at the same time, seek to bring together its EU member allies under a common budget and logistics framework by utilizing the CSDP mechanisms within the EU to strengthen NATO. In the long term, it will seek to secure its economic and political leadership on the European continent through its strength in the defense industry and its military power.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

T

he military operation launched by the US and Israel against Iran on February 28, 2026, which has now evolved into a fragile ceasefire, has reopened the debate on NATO’s institutional and geographical boundaries. The Trump administration’s stance, demanding that its European allies make their airspace and military bases available for use, as well as deploying active naval assets to the Strait of Hormuz, has triggered a structural tension within the Alliance.

Whilst Article 5 of the Treaty limits the obligation of collective defense to attacks on the territories of member states in Europe or North America, Article 6 further narrows this geographical scope by clarifying the definition of the ‘North Atlantic area’. Although the fact that the Washington–Tehran crisis unfolded entirely outside NATO’s formal area of responsibility provided a legal basis for the Alliance to refrain from taking the initiative as an actor, strategic considerations have been the decisive factor here. Although the Alliance claims to be a ‘global security actor’, its members prefer to define the organization as a regional defense pact, whilst avoiding turning their ‘out-of-area’ engagements into an institutional obligation.

Trump’s demands and Europe’s alliance dilemma

The most striking manifestation of the crisis at the operational level is the profound asymmetry between the expectations of the hegemonic power and the allies’ capacity to resist. Washington’s demands have gone beyond a classic burden-sharing debate to become a test of loyalty for the allies. The main objection raised from the European side in the face of this demanding stance is the political rejection that the process has been escalated without consultation with the allies and that ‘the war in question is not Europe’s war’. During this process, Spain adopted the toughest stance by closing its military bases and airspace to US use; Italy demanded strict prior coordination, whilst France and the UK raised various reservations regarding the allocation of bases.

However, despite these restrictive decisions, the European continent – led by Germany – effectively served as a vital logistical base for American military operations. As the crisis deepened and Iran began retaliatory strikes against Gulf states, France, Italy and the UK deployed their military forces to the region to fend off missile and drone attacks, thereby taking up active positions on secondary fronts. On the other hand, whilst the closure of the Strait of Hormuz dealt a severe blow to Europe’s economic interests, the capacity limitations of their own armed forces and their reluctance to be drawn into a conflict imposed by the US led European states to reject Trump’s demand to reopen the strait by military force. This collective refusal by Europe paved the way for Trump to accuse his allies of disloyalty and to threaten to withdraw the US from NATO.

This situation has left European decision-makers facing a classic ‘alliance dilemma’. Allies found themselves caught between, on the one hand, the fear of being drawn into a conflict in the Middle East (entrapment) in the name of US regional interests, and, on the other, the anxiety of being abandoned (abandonment) without the protection of the American security umbrella in the face of the Russian threat. This structural impasse has pushed Europe towards a strategy of ‘active inertia’, one that appeases the US politically whilst refraining from military engagement.

Legal basis for operations outside Article 5

Two historical precedents in which NATO was able to take action even in crises falling outside the scope of Article 5 provide an important comparison of how this structural limitation can be overcome. The Alliance’s military engagement in the Bosnian crisis (1992–1995), which it experienced during the post-Cold War period, was based on a process of deriving legitimacy directly through the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) phased authorisation mechanisms. Similarly, in Libya, the Alliance’s basis of legitimacy was derived not from its own founding articles but from the UN Security Council’s authorisation to protect civilians (Resolution 1973);

NATO became the institutional vehicle implementing this authorisation due to its command-and-control capabilities, yet the composition of participants remained variable, with members such as Germany remaining on the sidelines. The possibility of this scenario being repeated in the Iran crisis is structurally precluded: Russia and China’s veto powers on the Security Council block any Bosnia- or Libya-style authorisation from the outset. This has reinforced the conclusion that NATO has no capacity to take institutional action on the Iran issue, either within its own Articles 5 and 6 framework or through the UN; consequently, the only realistic option remaining is individual or coalition-based action centred on the US-Israel axis.

Furthermore, the Alliance’s structural fissures are manifesting themselves in various ways on the ground. The Alliance’s past operations against piracy in the Gulf of Aden or its missions to combat terrorism and smuggling in the Mediterranean demonstrate a modest yet functional capacity for action that underpins NATO’s claim to protect global trade routes. However, these historical examples are fundamentally at odds with the military and political nature of the threat in the Strait of Hormuz: Whilst operations in the Gulf of Aden or the Mediterranean are policing-style missions conducted against weak and non-state actors, patrolling under the NATO flag in the Strait of Hormuz amounts to engaging in a direct show of force with a sovereign state possessing advanced ballistic capabilities.

Indeed, this structural incompatibility came to the fore as recently as 2019, amidst the deepening US-Iran nuclear crisis and a situation where attacks on oil tankers were threatening global trade. At that time, rather than uniting under a common umbrella, NATO members established two separate naval forces, each operating independently and guided by opposing strategic rationales: the US-led IMSC (2019), focused solely on military deterrence, and the French-led EMASOH (2020), which aimed solely at diplomatic de-escalation without being drawn into the US–Iran conflict. The fact that this two-pronged structure, with its conflicting objectives, has been established outside NATO has clearly demonstrated that the Alliance lacks a shared perception of threat and the capacity for joint decision-making in ‘out-of-scope’ crisis regions.

Turkey as a NATO member

The evasive manoevres of European allies are transforming into a far more complex geographical and strategic equation centered on Turkey, which forms the Alliance’s south-eastern flank. Turkey’s long-standing border with Iran and its reflexes to preserve the regional balance of power, combined with a normative opposition to Israel’s military doctrine, are keeping Ankara away from kinetic conflict and forcing it into a conciliatory diplomacy.

Whilst this strategy of isolation is accepted by Washington, strategic infrastructure integrated into NATO, such as the Kürecik radar and Incirlik Air Base, which Turkey hosts on its own territory, creates structural pressure and the risk of ‘spatial entrapment’. To prevent these facilities from being instrumentalized by the US for unilateral operational intelligence or pre-emptive strikes, Ankara has blocked American manoevres by strictly limiting the rules of use within the Alliance’s formal defense framework. This stance demonstrates that geographical realities shape a security framework far more decisively than Alliance texts.

Ultimately, the ‘active inaction’ strategy developed by European states whilst caught in the ‘alliance dilemma’, alongside Turkey’s efforts to restrict the use of NATO infrastructure under its sovereignty to counter the risk of ‘spatial drift’, have clearly demonstrated that the allies will not unconditionally align themselves with a hegemonic power’s unilateral regional conflict. Although Donald Trump has sought to portray the Alliance as a weak and ‘ineffective’ institution in the eyes of the public, citing the allies’ rhetorical distancing and limited support as justification, the logistical and operational realities on the ground point to the exact opposite.

The difficulties the US has faced throughout the crisis against Iran, which possesses asymmetric capabilities, have clearly highlighted the limits of unilateral force projection, despite its military superiority. Ultimately, this crisis has paradoxically demonstrated the extent to which a hegemonic power needs the strategic depth and structural alliance architecture offered by its allies in order to consolidate its regional presence and project power.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

T

he 36th NATO Summit, held in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026, addressed critical agenda items not only concerning key themes such as the Russia-Ukraine War, defense spending or European security, but also within the context of NATO’s policies towards neighboring regions. In this context, the Summit can also be seen as a platform for redefining relations with the Middle East, North Africa and Gulf countries, which form the Alliance’s southern flank. NATO’s relations with the Gulf countries, which have been caught in a spiral of strategic uncertainty due to the US-Iran conflict, were specifically addressed at this Summit.

The summit held in Ankara demonstrates that the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), launched with the Gulf states at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, has regained strategic importance 22 years later. As will be recalled, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, marked the starting point of NATO’s institutional engagement with the Gulf states. However, over the span of 22 years, this initiative has failed to deliver the transformative impact that was anticipated. The potential of the Ankara Summit to revitalise this framework deserves to be assessed from both a symbolic and a strategic perspective.

The primary aim behind the establishment of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative was for NATO to contribute to the security architecture in the Middle East and the Gulf region in an inclusive and collaborative manner. In particular, the Gulf states’ reliance on external sources for security and their fragile structure were the underlying reasons for this initiative. However, in 2004, only four out of the six Gulf states joined the initiative, meaning full inclusivity could not be achieved. Nevertheless, NATO continued to invest in the initiative, hoping that other Gulf states might eventually join Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, which had already joined the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

At this stage, the fact that membership of this initiative remains limited to four countries, with Saudi Arabia and Oman continuing to remain outside it, can be regarded as both a symbolic shortcoming and a structural weakness. The fact that Saudi Arabia and Oman, two of the most critical countries when it comes to the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf and the security of the Strait of Hormuz, are not part of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative can be cited as the main reason why this initiative has remained a ‘limited-impact’ framework to date. Indeed, this situation also highlights the limitations that the Gulf states’ divergent security perceptions and foreign engagements may impose on cooperation with NATO. Consequently, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative’s failure to demonstrate the expected trajectory of development can be explained not only by fluctuations in NATO’s regional priorities but also by the divergent approaches of the Gulf states.

NATO-Gulf cooperation in the shadow of crisis

From the perspective of Gulf geopolitics, it can be argued that the key factor distinguishing the 2026 Ankara Summit from the 2004 Istanbul Summit was the context in which the meetings took place. The Istanbul Summit was held in the wake of the largest wave of expansion in NATO’s history and against a relatively optimistic global backdrop. The Ankara Summit, however, took place in an uncertain geopolitical environment in which a conflict between the US and Iran, which had started on February 28, was directly affecting the Gulf states and posing a serious threat to their security. This situation has distinctly set this year’s IIG session apart from the routine diplomatic contacts of previous years.

In this context, NATO foreign ministers and representatives from the Gulf states came together at a meeting held on the margins of the summit. At the meeting, a consensus was reached on strengthening cooperation in the face of the security challenges posed by the conflict in the Gulf region. This approach can be interpreted as a sign that the initiative may be evolving beyond a purely rhetorical framework of cooperation towards a crisis-management-centered function. A notable aspect here is the shift in the rhetoric of European allies. The fact that the stability of the Gulf is now framed not merely as a regional issue but as an integral part of European security and energy supply security can be interpreted as a shift in rhetoric that enhances the strategic significance of the IIG. This shift also points to the concretization, specifically in the context of the Gulf, of the ‘360-degree security’ approach that has long been debated within the Alliance.

On the other hand, from the perspective of representation, it is noteworthy that whilst the foreign ministers of NATO countries attended the meeting, only Kuwait, among the Gulf states, was represented at the level of foreign minister. The attendance of State Minister for Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdulaziz al-Khulaifi from Qatar, State Minister for Defense Mohammed bin Mubarak Fadil al-Mazrui from the UAE, and Director-General for Bilateral Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Abdullah al-Khalifa, from Bahrain, highlights that, despite strong diplomatic messages and rhetoric on cooperation, the Gulf states had limited expectations of the summit.

In terms of positive outcomes, however, it was observed that discussions took place at the summit regarding the possibility of taking some concrete steps between NATO and the Gulf states within the framework of the GCC. In this context, the agreement reached between Qatar and NATO on a partnership program to frame civil and military cooperation between the two sides, and the fact that the establishment process for a regional centre for peace support operations planned to be set up in Qatar is approaching its final stage, can be regarded as concrete steps in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative’s transition beyond being merely a consultative platform.

State Minister al-Khulaifi, who attended the summit on behalf of Qatar, emphasized in his statement that his country attaches great importance to the IIG and is ready to implement concrete outcomes. Kuwait, another country taking concrete steps in cooperation with NATO and hosting the GIG-NATO regional centre, launched the Kuwait-NATO Political and Security Dialogue Mechanism in January 2026. Sheikh Jarrah Jabir al-Ahmed al-Sabah, Kuwait’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, who attended the Ankara summit, also proposed in his statement that the GCC Ministerial Summit be held in Kuwait in 2027.

The future of NATO-Gulf cooperation

At this stage, it remains unclear whether NATO’s renewed engagement with the Gulf states is the result of a temporary momentum generated by current crises, or the outcome of a process aimed at implementing lasting structural measures. Given the Gulf states’ quest for security, having recognized the ineffectiveness of a security mechanism entirely dependent on the US during the Iran conflict, it is reasonable to suggest that they may wish to consider NATO as a new alternative security provider. Indeed, the Gulf states, which already maintain strong partnerships with NATO member states such as the US and Turkey, may also aim to formalize institutional cooperation with NATO.

Turkey’s role in this process, as the host of the Ankara Summit, is also noteworthy. Having hosted the 2004 Istanbul Summit during the enlargement process, Turkey has, by 2026, become a more central actor on the Alliance’s southern flank, owing both to its geographical location and its growing defense industry capacity. Efforts to position the reconstruction process in Syria as a bridge between NATO’s sphere of influence and Gulf capital can also be cited as one of the concrete manifestations of this central role. The progress Turkey has made in the defense industry sector and its transformation into a significant actor in terms of military deterrence have made Ankara an important security partner for the Gulf states.

Consequently, the Ankara Summit has had limited yet positive implications for the future from the perspective of the Gulf states. The interactions revealed by the Summit, particularly regarding the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, demonstrate that an initiative which had seen relatively limited progress over the past 22 years has been able to regain significance in the wake of the crisis. At this stage, the most significant question mark concerns whether this momentum will translate into a permanent institutional framework.

Whether the NATO–ICI dialogue will remain a temporary reaction to the geopolitical uncertainty created by the US–Iran conflict will become clear through the concrete steps the parties take in the future. Key factors in this regard will include whether key actors such as Saudi Arabia and Oman will join the initiative, and to what extent the emerging cooperation programm will be reflected in practice. Consequently, the most tangible dynamic in NATO’s future in the Gulf can be identified as the success of the transition from rhetorical solidarity to sustained institutional cooperation.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he fact that security dynamics in the international system have taken on a nature that transcends regional boundaries necessitates that NATO summits be interpreted from a broader perspective. For this reason, assessing NATO summits solely from the perspective of European security has become increasingly inadequate in recent years. Although the Russia–Ukraine War continues to dominate the Alliance’s agenda, the summits also provide a significant body of data in terms of illustrating how the relationship between Euro-Atlantic security and strategic developments in the Indo-Pacific is being redefined.

In particular, China’s rise, the deepening of the US-China great power rivalry on a global scale, growing awareness of the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and supply chains, and issues such as advanced technologies and maritime security are key areas that inevitably extend NATO’s security agenda beyond Europe. Consequently, the NATO summits held in recent years have conveyed strategic messages that concern not only Europe’s security architecture but also the future of the Indo-Pacific and, by extension, the global system.

The Indo-Pacific agenda in the capital of NATO’s closest ally in Asia

Viewed from this perspective, the Ankara Summit harbors a turning point that warrants careful analysis from an Indo-Pacific perspective. For the first time in NATO’s history, the Alliance’s Indo-Pacific agenda was brought to the table in the capital of NATO’s closest ally to Asia; moreover, it has laid the foundations for a new strategy regarding the region within NATO. At this very point, when the process is examined from a chronological perspective, a critical paradox emerges between the institutional visibility provided by the summits and NATO’s actual engagement with the Indo-Pacific.

Looking at the course of events, the foundations of the transatlantic approach within NATO were laid not, as is often stated, at the 2022 Madrid Summit, but in fact at the 2008 Bucharest Summit. With the Bucharest Summit, the impact of security developments outside Europe on the Alliance became more apparent, whilst global partnerships became an integral part of NATO’s long-term strategic vision. This approach was taken to a new level at the Madrid Summit, where China was defined for the first time as a ‘systemic challenge’ in the NATO Strategic Concept; whilst the leaders of the Indo-Pacific Quartet (IP4), comprising Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, were invited to a NATO summit for the first time.

Alongside this highly significant development, the approach that European-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security cannot be assessed in isolation from one another has gained institutional visibility not only at the rhetorical level but also in summit diplomacy. The 2023 Vilnius Summit holds particular significance as it represents the first stage in the attempt to institutionalize this initiative. Although the initiative to establish a NATO liaison office in Japan had the potential to become the Alliance’s first institutional presence in Asia and to demonstrate that NATO was supporting the US strategy of containing China, it could not be implemented due to objections led by France and supported by Germany.

At the 2024 Washington Summit, however, against the backdrop of US-China tensions and the emphasis on the ‘China Threat’, the rhetoric towards China hardened further, and Beijing was labelled as an actor providing indirect support to Russia by acting as a ‘decisive factor’ in the war in Ukraine. However, this hardening of rhetoric in Washington has not been reflected to the same extent in institutional expansion; and, partly due to the EU’s call for ‘strategic autonomy’, even the issue of the liaison office in Tokyo has not been brought back onto the agenda.

From visible strategies to covert operational warfare

The fundamental shift in NATO’s Indo-Pacific strategy became apparent at the summits in The Hague and Ankara. Declarations from previous summits, which contained detailed assessments of China and the Indo-Pacific, have been replaced by shorter texts focused on strengthening Europe’s defense capabilities. In this regard, issues such as increasing defense spending, developing the defense industry’s production capacity, burden-sharing and collective deterrence, issues centered on alliance-internal development, have gained a more pronounced priority compared to previous summits.

At the same time, it is a well-known fact that the participation of IP4 countries at leadership level has gradually declined during this period, and that, for the most part, the leaders of these countries sent their defense or foreign ministers to the summits up until the Ankara Summit. Similarly, the process that began with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s decision not to attend the summit in 2024 has been mirrored by other countries in subsequent years; by the time of the Ankara Summit, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung stood out as the only IP4 head of state to attend the two-day summit.

Although this pattern, stretching from 2008 to the present day, might at first glance be interpreted as indicating a decline in NATO’s interest in the Indo-Pacific, it is important to recognize the existence of a different trend during the same period. Whilst institutional visibility has relatively diminished, functional cooperation between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners has shifted towards more concrete areas. At the IP4 meetings held in Ankara, alongside common security issues such as the war in Ukraine, China, North Korea and Iran, defense industry, critical technologies, cyber security, strategic communication and industrial cooperation were brought to the fore. Similarly, Japan’s initiative to join NATO’s Defense Innovation Accelerator (DIANA) program demonstrates that technology-based cooperation with non-allied countries is being taken to a new level.

The signing of a memorandum of understanding between the US, Japan and South Korea during the summit, aimed at the deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs) in third countries, also demonstrates that security cooperation is not limited to the military sphere; it has expanded to encompass areas such as energy technologies, critical infrastructure and strategic production capacity. Consequently, the chronological progression and the developments that have stood out at the last two summits indicate a shift in the nature of engagement rather than a retreat in NATO’s Indo-Pacific policy. The political symbols, leaders’ photographs and initiatives to establish a NATO liaison office in Tokyo that characterized the Madrid and Vilnius periods are giving way to a partnership model that is increasingly less visible but more functional.

In other words, NATO’s relations with the Indo-Pacific are now deepening largely through defense industry, technological innovation, critical infrastructure, supply chains, cyber resilience and joint production capacity. The relative decline in institutional visibility does not imply a weakening of functional integration; on the contrary, the two processes are moving in opposite directions.

The China dilemma

Of course, attributing this transformation solely to Washington’s shifting strategic priorities and the challenges within NATO would result in a flawed analysis. Undoubtedly, the US has, particularly in recent times, been demanding that its European allies assume greater defense responsibilities and views the strengthening of Europe’s defense capabilities as one of the prerequisites for redirecting its strategic focus and resources more effectively towards the Indo-Pacific. However, this is not the sole factor explaining the transformation in NATO’s Indo-Pacific policy. Differing threat perceptions within the Alliance and the nature of economic relations with China also significantly shape this process.

The fact that 23 of NATO’s 32 members are also members of the European Union necessitates striking a delicate balance between the security narrative regarding China and economic interests. For many European countries, whilst China is an actor with whom strategic competition is becoming increasingly pronounced, it remains a partner that is difficult to do without in terms of trade, investment, critical technologies and supply chains.

Consequently, whilst shared security concerns regarding China are reflected in NATO documents, it appears difficult to speak of full consensus amongst allies regarding the extent to which this rhetoric will be translated into institutional and operational policies. At the Vilnius Summit, the blocking of the initiative to establish a NATO liaison office in Japan, led by France, can be regarded as one of the most concrete examples of this divergence.

Similarly, the diplomatic contacts that Western leaders have recently maintained with Beijing also indicate that a more pragmatic approach has been adopted, one in which competition and engagement are pursued simultaneously. The messages conveyed by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney during his visit to Beijing regarding the transformation of the global order, alongside US President Donald Trump’s pursuit of direct diplomatic contact with China and the messages he delivered during his visit to Beijing, demonstrate that competition in the security sphere does not imply a complete severing of economic and diplomatic ties.

This situation also partly explains the shift in tone observed in NATO’s rhetoric towards China. Consequently, the fact that China featured to a more limited extent at the Ankara Summit compared to previous years can be interpreted not as a weakening of the perception of threat, but rather as a reflection of the strategic balance being sought within NATO between security priorities and economic interdependence. It is precisely for this reason that the Ankara Summit represents a turning point, not signifying that NATO is distancing itself from the Indo-Pacific, but rather that it is redefining its engagement with the region by adapting to the strategic and economic realities brought about by the changing international system.

In the coming period, the key factor determining the direction of this transformation will be not so much the communiqués to be issued, but rather the concrete collaborations to be developed between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners in critical defense sectors. For this reason, the Ankara Summit appears worthy of being remembered not as a summit at which NATO distanced itself from the Indo-Pacific, but as a threshold at which the Alliance reformatted its strategic engagement with the region in line with new geopolitical realities.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he Republic of Turkey hosted a NATO Summit once again after a gap of twenty-two years. Whilst the Ukraine–Russia War has triggered a shift in the perception of threats in Europe, the emergence of new security risks stemming from a potential US/Israel–Iran conflict has further heightened the importance of the Summit. Statements made by heads of state and government prior to the Summit indicated that it would be the most significant gathering in recent years in terms of ‘outcomes and decisions taken’.

In this context, the fact that NATO’s future vision was shaped in Ankara, given that NATO is itself a security organization, holds particular significance. Turkey’s central position within NATO, as well as its capabilities in the defense and aerospace sectors, are drawing attention in the context of the Alliance’s future. When the final communiqué is considered, it is evident that NATO is transitioning to a new security architecture referred to as the ‘3.0 era’.

Whilst Ankara hosted the 36th NATO Summit of Heads of State and Government, defense spending and the defense industry were at the heart of the strategic decisions taken by the Alliance in Ankara. Ensuring that Alliance partners adhere to the stated commitment regarding the targeted defense spending limits was a priority. In parallel, the development of defense and security cooperation and relations came to the fore. Discussions held throughout the Summit centered on the role of the capabilities achieved by the Turkish defense industry in the Alliance’s future, and how and to what extent these capabilities could be utilized.

In addition to the statements made, the Defence Industry Forum held as part of the Summit addressed potential areas for Alliance partners to work together and build a sustainable ecosystem. Hosted by the President of the Turkish Defence Industry, Prof. Dr Haluk Görgün, and organized at TUSAŞ as part of the NATO Summit Defence Industry Forum (NSDIF), a reception was held where the capabilities of the Turkish defense industry were demonstrated to participating delegations through both flight displays and an exhibition in the static display area.

Burden-sharing among allies

As part of the Summit, the defense industry forum (NSDIF) – which marked a number of firsts – was held at the ATO Congresium. As announced by NATO, bilateral and multilateral military, security and cooperation agreements were signed for the first time under the NSDIF’26 framework. The agreements, estimated to have a total value exceeding 50 billion dollars, were primarily structured around the following key areas: defense investments and the Alliance partners’ ‘5 per cent’ commitment, capacity enhancement through multinational cooperation, the development of defense industry partnerships, and the improvement of processes from serial production to sustainment. Within the framework of NSDIF’26, emphasis was placed on the importance of developing high-tech and innovation-focused solutions tailored to the evolving battlefield.

NATO’s long-standing target of 2 per cent defense spending was accepted by Alliance partners as a radical increase to “5 per cent” in response to the growing and evolving threat perception. Recently, assessments have been carried out regarding the independent and collective activities undertaken to achieve this objective. Whilst the aim is to significantly increase burden-sharing within the Alliance, the objective is to enter a new era in which allies outside the US (Europe and Canada) directly assume their own security responsibilities. Whilst the concept of “strategic autonomy” is being defined within the Alliance, the initial objective is to establish the financial infrastructure.

The aim is for Alliance partners to increase their defense spending to 5 per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP), which represents a significant economic volume, whilst also developing production capabilities beyond mere procurement. However, the fact that multinational projects implemented, particularly in Europe, have failed to deliver the desired results, due both to their lengthy timelines and their structural nature, has opened the door to alternative approaches: the “Trusted Partner”. Although Turkey has been a NATO member for a quarter of a century, the fact that its capabilities in the defense industry have not been ‘effectively’ utilized within the Alliance has been a subject of debate, particularly over the last 10 years. Turkey, an Alliance member that has also been subject to both covert and overt embargoes, is now being highlighted as a central actor in NATO’s new era.

Mass production capacity and centralized production

The Ukraine–Russia War has highlighted the inadequacy of stockpiles and inventories amongst the world’s armed forces in the face of protracted conflict. Furthermore, a similar scenario has manifested itself in various forms within the US-Israel-Iran triangle. In the face of the reality of the ‘war of attrition’, which has been redefined in the present day, it is imperative that allies ensure their stocks of ammunition and military equipment are sustainable. The signing of supply agreements at the summit, totalling over 50 billion dollars, aims to transform the defence industry from a purely commercial sector into a direct deterrent. In this context, particular attention was drawn to items with high consumption rates, such as artillery ammunition, aircraft bombs and air defence missiles. In this regard, the allies’ efforts – for example, Canada’s increase in artillery ammunition production capacity and Turkey’s allocation of additional funding for the ‘Iron Dome’ air defence systems – were the first examples to be highlighted.

Attention was drawn to the negative effects of projects implemented in a multinational framework in European countries, both on the execution of the projects and on production capacity and capabilities. In assessments aimed at improving this situation, ‘project management’ and ‘autonomous/centralised’ approaches emerged as key priorities. The aim is for key actors in projects to be carried out on a multinational basis, as well as allied nations acting as subcontractors, to implement more effective process management. In this way, both the production capabilities and key areas such as sustainment and logistics of projects carried out on a multinational basis are being improved. Furthermore, Turkey’s long-standing vision of “lifting covert and overt embargoes between allies” aligns directly with this topic addressed at the Summit.

NATO is demonstrating increasing sensitivity regarding the management of interoperability amongst allies. Multinational collaborations are being implemented whilst taking into account the operational needs of the allies. The decision taken at the Ankara Summit to strengthen the transport aircraft fleet, in addition to the NATO-led tanker aircraft fleet, underscored this commitment. The fleet to be established with A400M transport aircraft will be operated to meet the operational needs of the allies. In addition to the transport fleet, in which the Turkish defence industry also holds a share, Turkey will take a leading role in establishing a space-based communications and early warning system through the IMECE project.

The allocation of an additional $24 billion budget for the Iron Dome is significant not only for Turkey but also for the Alliance’s air and missile defence capabilities. Roketsan’s demonstration of its missile systems in the field of precision-guided systems also attracted attention. Turkey’s capabilities in mass production and high technology are being utilised more actively than ever before to meet diverse requirements. In particular, Turkey has gained increasing importance in recent times with solutions such as cyber security and encrypted communications. As emphasised at the Summit, NATO aims to structure its capabilities not only around assets such as ships and aircraft, but also through integrative elements such as cyberspace, communications and intelligence.

Conclusion: An increasing role and key messages

As part of the NATO Defence Industry Forum, the capabilities of the Turkish defense industry were demonstrated to participating delegations at a reception held at TUSAŞ, through both flight displays and an exhibition in the static display area. The delegations were greeted by the modern instruments of the battlefield on display: the Altay tank, ARMA armored vehicles, MKE’s TOLGA air defense solution, ROKETSAN’s ballistic missiles, and Baykar and TUSAŞ’s manned and unmanned aerial platforms. In addition to all this, demonstrations were held to showcase the current state of the aviation sector: the GÖKBEY general-purpose helicopter, the T129 ATAK attack helicopter, the HÜRKUŞ basic trainer aircraft, the HÜRJET advanced jet trainer, the ANKA III strategic bomber, the ANKA-S, the Bayraktar AKINCI UAV and the Bayraktar TB3 unmanned aerial vehicle, all of which demonstrated their capabilities through flight displays.

The capabilities of the Turkish defense industry were demonstrated to delegates not merely through a ‘catalogue’, but directly at the production facilities and via live flight demonstrations. The presence of both executives and project engineers from the relevant companies on site enabled the evaluation of both the products and potential partnerships. In short, the reception provided a unique platform for increasing defense and aerospace exports and establishing new partnerships.

Turkey’s production of systems that are fully compliant with NATO standards (STANAG) and have proven themselves on the battlefield supports strategic interoperability within the Alliance. This, in turn, enables Turkey to export significant quantities of defense systems to its Alliance partners. According to 2025 figures, 56 per cent of Turkey’s exports, totaling 10.56 billion dollars, were made directly to the European Union, NATO member states and the United States. These figures are, in themselves, a testament to the quality and reliability of Turkish defence industry products, which meet Western standards. Furthermore, there is a growing interest in products that have proven themselves on the battlefield.

This reinforces the desire to implement ‘joint projects’, as seen during Belgium’s recent high-level visit to Turkey. The Belgian firm developing the turret proposed to Turkish land vehicle manufacturers: “Let’s integrate our turret into your armoured vehicle and sell them together.” In every discussion regarding Turkey, the door to cooperation is being opened with the message: “You have high-quality products, and we want to benefit from working with you.” Meanwhile, Spain’s supply of the HÜRJET fighter aircraft, Portugal’s warships, Italy’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and Poland’s electronic warfare systems are strengthening Turkey’s central position within the Alliance in this field.

In short, the Ankara Summit is more than just a platform for delivering political messages; it represents a critical turning point where the obstacles to defense industry cooperation among allies will be discussed. It was clearly emphasized at this summit that any form of export restriction or covert embargo imposed by allies against one another under the NATO umbrella ultimately weakens the Alliance’s own collective deterrence. It is abundantly clear that Turkey’s high-tech production capacity is not a competitive factor to be excluded or restricted amongst allies. Turkey’s position should be viewed as that of a ‘regional production hub’ which will optimize the Alliance’s overall capabilities whilst also reducing logistical costs.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he 80-year-old global order established after the Second World War is unravelling. The security architecture of the Atlantic system, the economic and political framework of the Bretton Woods institutions, the liberal assumption that free trade would reduce conflicts by increasing interdependence, and global supply chains reliant on cheap energy and low-cost production no longer meet the needs of the new era. The world is transitioning, increasingly and more forcefully, to a new global competitive order that we define as ‘Second Mercantilism’.

In this new order, trade is no longer merely trade. A semiconductor factory, a container port, a data centre, a rare-earth elements mine, an LNG terminal, a satellite network, a submarine cable, a shipyard or an ammunition factory have all simultaneously become elements of economic, technological, geopolitical and military power. States are no longer competing solely for market share; they are vying for control over production capacity, critical technology, energy security, logistics routes, strategic minerals, data flows and supply chains.

Consequently, the old distinction between the global economy and the global security system has vanished. The economy is being securitised, security is being industrialised, technology is becoming geopolitical, and trade is increasingly and explicitly transforming into a tool of the struggle for national power. It is precisely in the midst of this major shift that NATO’s future lies.

In the 20th century, there was an ideological, military and nuclear balance between two major blocs. Today, however, competition is far more fragmented, far more technological and far more economic in nature. Russia represents an immediate and direct military challenge; China, long-term industrial, technological and systemic competition; regional powers, missile systems, unmanned systems and proxy wars; whilst non-state actors represent asymmetric threats.

Cyberspace, space, undersea infrastructure, energy networks, critical minerals, artificial intelligence and supply chains are becoming new arenas of competition. In such a world, it is impossible for NATO to continue on its current path based on the classic military alliance logic of 1949.

5 per cent: much more than just a budget target

The commitment by NATO members to raise their defense and security-related expenditure to 5 per cent of their GDP represents one of the most significant economic and political transformations in the Alliance’s history. However, it would be a grave mistake to interpret this decision merely as ‘spending more money’. For money, on its own, does not create deterrence.

You can increase your budget, but if you cannot produce sufficient ammunition, you cannot fight. You may possess the most advanced platforms, but if your critical components are reliant on a single external supplier, you cannot establish a sustainable defense capability. You can develop excellent air defense systems, but if your stockpile of interceptor missiles is depleted within a few weeks of intense fighting, your strategic resilience remains merely theoretical. You may possess very expensive fighter aircraft, but if their maintenance, engine, electronics, software and ammunition supply chains are fragile, you cannot manage the economics of a protracted war.

The Russia-Ukraine War, the crises in the Red Sea, the conflicts in the Middle East and the revolution brought about by unmanned systems on the battlefield have all demonstrated the same truth to us: the decisive factor in modern warfare is not merely technological superiority; it is the ability to scale up technology, produce ammunition continuously, rapidly replace losses and adapt industrial capacity to the pace of the war.

For this reason, NATO’s 5 per cent target must be a production doctrine, not merely an accounting decision. In this new era, NATO’s fundamental question should not be ‘How much are the Allies spending?’, but rather ‘How much can the Alliance produce, how quickly can it replenish its stocks, how long can it sustain operations, and how rapidly can it ramp up production in the event of war?’ It is precisely at this point that NATO must transition from a traditional alliance to a comprehensive defense economy.

NATO’s new requirement: A total defense economy

The concept of a total defense economy does not mean transforming the entire economy into a military economy. The issue is to restructure the boundaries between defense and the economy in line with the demands of the new era.

NATO can no longer consider military planning and industrial planning in isolation from one another. Defence ministries, economic and industrial ministries, energy policies and critical infrastructure investments cannot operate in separate spheres. This is because, in modern warfare, the distance between the front line and the production line has been eliminated.

For this reason, the Alliance’s new economic model must be built on five fundamental pillars:

Firstly, long-term and predictable joint demand must be established. If defense companies are to be asked to increase their capacity, they must be given a 10–15-year order outlook, not just a three-year one. Factories grow not on the basis of political statements, but on guarantees of sustainable demand.

Secondly, joint procurement mechanisms must be strengthened. The dozens of different standards for the same munitions, disjointed national tenders for the same requirement, duplicate investments amongst allies, and political protectionism that hinders economies of scale must be reduced.

Thirdly, redundancy must be established in critical production chains. In the new NATO economy, no strategic product should be dependent on a single factory, a single country or a single company. Alternative production centers must be established for engines, explosives, guidance systems, semiconductors, optical and radar components, batteries, critical minerals and software infrastructure.

Fourthly, a transition to a joint stockpiling system must be made. Ammunition, fuel, critical spare parts, air defense interceptors and strategic raw materials must be planned not solely on the basis of national stockpiling logic, but in terms of the Alliance’s overall resilience.

Fifthly, production-conversion capacity must be established in the event of war. Plans must be drawn up today to identify which elements of civilian industry – from automotive to electronics, from chemicals to metallurgy, and from software to logistics – can support defense production in the event of a crisis.

The view that this new architecture must evolve towards a ‘NATO Defence Economic Area’ has gained significant traction. This area should encompass common standards, long-term orders, mutual investments, cross-border production clusters, coordination on critical raw materials, the integration of SMEs into the system, joint testing and certification processes, and the reduction of political barriers to defense trade within the Alliance.

This is because, in the era of Second Mercantilism, the defense industry is not merely a sector in which companies operate. It is one of the main pillars of national power, technological sovereignty and alliance resilience.

The alliance cannot afford ‘internal strife’

However, NATO faces more than just Russia, China or other global challenges. One of the most significant issues the Alliance must overcome is strategic fragmentation within its own ranks.

NATO must shake off the image of a ‘row among boatmen’ – a situation where allies sometimes view one another as rivals, where bilateral political disputes hold collective security hostage, where defense industry restrictions are directed at alliance members, and where short-term domestic political calculations take precedence over long-term strategic objectives.

To put it more plainly, NATO cannot prepare for a new Cold War whilst engaged in an internal ‘brawl’. Weakening an ally’s defense capabilities on political grounds undermines the alliance’s overall deterrence. Disrupting an ally’s supply chain reduces the capacity NATO will require in a crisis. Imposing restrictions on parts, engines, ammunition or technology for an ally’s strategic platforms, whilst subsequently expecting that same ally to contribute more to the Alliance’s defense, is unsustainable.

Moreover, as the world moves towards far greater systemic competition, NATO’s squandering of its energy on internal disputes creates strategic space for its real rivals.

The Alliance cannot resolve every political issue between its members. Such an expectation is unrealistic. However, it must not allow bilateral disputes to paralyze its collective defence capabilities. Defence industry cooperation must be spared from becoming the first casualty of short-term political tensions. In this regard, the example of Türkiye is highly instructive.

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ne of the greatest aspirations of a journalist with an interest in international relations is to cover events held in various parts of the world where global issues are debated (such as the NATO Summit, the UN General Assembly, the G20, etc.). In a professional climate where conventional media is losing its importance on the international stage day by day, and whilst the financial clout of the media is eroding and investment in certain sectors is being cut back, the likelihood of a journalist attending such summits is also declining day by day.

In the current climate, the hosting of an organization such as NATO in Turkey presented a significant opportunity for our colleagues in Turkey. Although journalists and television professionals, myself included, had only limited opportunities to engage with leaders due to the nature of the event, we did manage to soak up the atmosphere of the summit.

Turkey is the only NATO member state with a Muslim majority. The 2026 summit was set to have a distinct character for this reason alone. However, factors such as the ongoing tension between Iran and the US (which had been reignited just hours before US President Trump landed in Ankara when he ordered a new strike), the continuing disagreement between the US and its European allies, and the deadlock in the Russia-Ukraine war all served to make the summit even more significant.

Details of the Trump–Erdoğan meeting

The meeting that fuelled the intrigue at the NATO Summit was the encounter between President Erdoğan and US President Trump. Once the rumours circulating days beforehand – that ‘Trump would not attend the summit due to his anger towards NATO members’ – were dispelled, our focus shifted to the nature of the bilateral meeting. The last time a US President had made an official visit to Turkey was in 2009.

Following the visit by then US President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961) in 1959, the chain of visits continued with George H. W. Bush (1991), Bill Clinton (1999), George W. Bush (2004) and Obama (2009), had been interrupted during Trump’s first term and had not even been on the agenda during Joe Biden’s term (2020–2024). Whilst Trump’s visit marked a turning point in this sense, current issues (the F-35 procurement process, CAATSA, etc.) were also raising the stakes.

Despite the scrutiny that began days in advance, logistical and protocol details were kept strictly confidential right up to the last moment. Contrary to expectations, Trump’s aircraft landed at the newly opened Ankara Airport (and the fact that he returned from Esenboğa on an older model aircraft also raised questions. However, technical reasons related to security were cited as the justification). President Erdoğan welcomed Trump at the airport with a gesture reserved for a select few guests.

Upon arriving at the welcoming ceremony at the Presidential Complex, we noticed a different arrangement in the preparations. The ranks of the mehteran band, which usually performs at routine receptions, had been reinforced, and additional units of Janissary soldiers had been deployed. The two leaders’ delegations were also positioned on a platform that differed from the norm. The leaders’ senior advisers (foreign ministers, defense ministers, ambassadors) held their initial discussions on this platform. The flypast by the Turkish Stars, comprising six F-5s, which was part of the welcoming ceremony, was precise and went off without a hitch.

The most exciting moment of the entire process was the joint press conference. The format we are accustomed to in a standard leaders’ meeting is press conferences held in the main hall following discussions between the leaders and their delegations. On this occasion, however, it was announced that only a limited number of journalists would be allowed into President Erdoğan’s office. We were therefore swiftly directed towards the room.

The organizers informed us that journalists wishing to ask questions would need to be ‘quick off the mark’, as the format of the press conference would be modelled on the ‘Oval Office Rules’. I recalled the format we’d seen on TV screens. In those press conferences, held in a small room with Trump and the visiting leader flanked by their aides, it was the loudest who won and secured the floor. Once the floor was opened for questions, although American journalists took the lead with the first questions, my Turkish colleagues and I also managed to ask our questions by adopting a forceful and boisterous approach to secure the floor.

US President Trump gave the floor to ask my question, which touched on the Iran-US tensions. Throughout the meeting, Trump delivered positive messages, particularly regarding CAATSA restrictions and the F-35s. It is also worth noting that, unlike the bilateral meetings held in the Oval Office – which were characterised by Trump’s impulsive responses – there were no remarks from the Trump-Erdoğan talks in Washington or Ankara that would cause any friction.

The factors driving the relationship between the two leaders beyond the usual bounds to a positive momentum are seen as their ability to strike the right balance in their dialogue, the fact that their communication predates the presidency, and the continued flow of contact following Erdoğan’s message to Trump even after he lost the 2020 election. Another important factor is that Trump has framed the Erdoğan–Biden tension as a positive reference point. The animosity towards Biden, which he mentions in almost every speech, also lends extra credibility to those who have had difficulties with him. Ironically, in Trump’s political analysis, the Evangelical vote—which solidified following the release of Pastor Brunson—has also made a positive contribution to the new course of Turkey–US relations.

What happened at the summit?

Opportunities to engage with leaders at the NATO Summit are very limited. One such opportunity is the ‘doorstep’ – the area where leaders give impromptu interviews on the morning of the summit. Not every leader makes an appearance here. It generally provides an opportunity for leaders of small and medium-sized countries, who are often out of the spotlight, to make their voices heard. Danish Leader Frederiksen, commenting on Trump’s continued interest in Greenland, emphasized their stance by stating, “We will defend every inch of our land; this is why we are in NATO.” UK Prime Minister Starmer, who is due to step down upon his return, was cautious; he did not answer any questions and was not particularly talkative. Although French President Macron’s name was on the list, he was busy completing his now-traditional run at the time.

Even the order of arrival at the venue for the leaders’ summit has become a form of image management. Leaders from countries such as the US and France arrive last. Following the smooth participation of all 32 leaders in the much-anticipated session of the summit, attention turned to what was being discussed inside. The information received pointed to a positive atmosphere. It was noted that US President Trump listened to all the leaders who spoke. It was reported that Trump, who remained until the end of the session, did not address any contentious issues (such as the tensions with Spain, the Greenland issue, or tensions with European countries).

It was stated that Spanish Prime Minister Sánchez, in a constructive speech, emphasized that his country’s contribution to NATO should be measured not by mathematical figures but by the rate of achievement of strategic objectives. The extent to which Sánchez’s speech, which emphasized resolve, managed to cool Trump’s fixation on figures will become clear through future rhetoric and policies. It was noted that the US delegation heard the approach they had sought from all their allies during the leaders’ session.

Following the session, the summit effectively concluded with the leaders’ bilateral meetings and the press conferences they held. The most eagerly anticipated of these meetings was undoubtedly Trump’s. Before the US leader took to the podium following NATO Secretary-General Rutte—who had used the hall before him—there was not a single empty seat in the hall, nor even a suitable place to stand. The hall was completely cleared before the US President took to the stage; journalists were only allowed back in after security checks. Among the dozens of journalists vying for the chance to ask a question, the lucky ones were generally our American colleagues sitting in the front row, who had opted for colorful attire.

Trump’s summit marathon, during which he answered questions in a positive and conciliatory manner, concluded on a positive note despite the harsh messages that occasionally resurfaced in some of his press statements. President Erdoğan also held his final press conference as the host. Having followed all these proceedings, having observed that, unlike their foreign counterparts, Turkish journalists tend to include lengthy comments in their questions and drag out the subject before getting to the point, I feel it is worth emphasizing that there is a clear structural problem in this regard. As Turkish journalists, we do not know how to ask questions properly.

A farewell without the usual ‘See you next year’

The NATO Summit concluded without any major hitches. The international media community was highly satisfied with the facilities provided. The complimentary buffet service exceeded expectations, and the goody bags and kits presented to journalists were shared in vlogs. However, the development that particularly surprised the foreign leaders occurred right at the end. The gift of a revolver (firearm) engraved with their names, presented to them by Turkey, took the majority of the foreign leaders by surprise. Some were unable to take the gift home with them due to legal restrictions in their own countries, whilst others announced they would donate it to a museum.

Nevertheless, the message behind the gift hit home. The fact that the gift at a summit where tough issues were discussed was in keeping with realistic geopolitical conditions served as a powerful metaphor and message. It is also worth noting that the specially produced pen, manufactured using domestic resources, was well received.

As summits of this kind draw to a close, attention turns to the next one, and the scheduled date is marked. This time, however, there is a degree of uncertainty, as the likelihood that the summit will not be held next year has increased. In fact, there is no explicit rule stipulating that the summit must be held annually; a proposal that has recently come to the fore suggests extending the summit cycle to every two years.

It is expected that this process will be clarified by the end of this year; what is certain is that the next stop will be Albania. Although it seems impossible to predict the course regional developments will take by that date, it appears unlikely that the opportunities and agenda offered by Turkey will be presented within the framework of that summit.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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en years have passed since the coup attempt of July 15, 2016. From the very first day, the state launched a comprehensive campaign against the damage caused by FETÖ, the perpetrator of the coup attempt, within the system. With the support of society, a restoration of the state’s institutional structure was undertaken; this did not stop at merely erasing the traces of FETÖ, but also involved intensive efforts to thoroughly eliminate the effects of the tutelage mechanisms within the system. Of course, this is not a process that has been fully completed. It is clear that, just as FETÖ, which infiltrated the system over many years, may still have a small number of dormant cells within it, so too do the external links it established from the very beginning continue to exist.

Consequently, we must remain vigilant regarding the potential for FETÖ, and, naturally, similar organisations, to cause harm to the system, even if they cannot go as far as staging a coup. However, another matter of at least equal importance is to recognise what else was actually prevented on the night of July 15, 2016, when the coup attempt was thwarted. Under the leadership of President Erdoğan, the Turkish nation stood up to the coup plotters on July 15, thereby saving not only democracy but also the country’s independence and future.

This is because developments that emerged particularly prior to the coup attempt – and which have continued to accelerate over the past decade – indicate that politics has taken on a new dimension globally. Thanks to President Erdoğan’s leadership and the public’s confidence in him, Turkey is putting up a strong fight during this challenging period. The loss of ground in foreign policy faced by many states in recent years, particularly France, has not affected Turkey. On the contrary, Turkey has expanded its sphere of influence by utilizing both soft and hard power elements simultaneously.

The world from 2016 to the present

Over the past decade, numerous studies have been conducted analyzing the causes and consequences of the 15 July coup attempt, covering topics ranging from FETÖ’s infiltration of the state from the 1970s onwards to the point where it gained sufficient power to attempt a coup. At this juncture, it is worth focusing on the developments that have taken place in the world and in Turkey over the ten-year period following the coup attempt. Indeed, the past decade has witnessed one of the most rapid periods of transformation in human history. First and foremost, the course of global politics has shifted. Donald Trump, who emerged victorious from the US Presidential Election in November 2016, effectively ushered in a new style of leadership.

The Covid-19 pandemic that emerged in 2020 led to a reassessment of states’ capacities and crisis-management capabilities. In a sense, the importance of being able to make swift decisions to cope with extraordinary circumstances was once again highlighted. Particularly in the early stages of the pandemic, international organizations proved ineffective, mechanisms for inter-state cooperation collapsed, and borders were closed on both sides. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the prospect of a redrawing of the map in Northern Europe emerged. Indeed, Sweden and Finland, fearing that they might be next after Ukraine, hastily applied for NATO membership. During this period, in which the functions of international organizations were called into question, NATO remained an exception to the rule.

Indeed, not only did NATO’s membership increase, but expectations of its members also rose. Meanwhile, the ongoing Syrian Civil War came to an end at the end of 2024 with the overthrow of the Assad regime. Israel launched a genocide as part of its policy of depopulating Gaza. The terrorist state of Israel also carried out attacks against Iran and Lebanon, and in particular carried out assassinations targeting numerous figures within the Iranian state administration. This brief summary alone may suffice to illustrate the chaotic picture the world has faced over the past decade.

It is possible to say that the current process actually signals a paradigm shift in a sense. In fact, for almost the past twenty years, a security-oriented perspective, in which the reflexes of the nation-state have strengthened, has prevailed worldwide. States have prioritized their own national interests rather than adopting a universal perspective that emphasizes international cooperation mechanisms. To such an extent that the European Union (EU), which had already been losing ground following the UK’s departure in 2016, saw its influence further weakened due to its inability to present a united front in the face of global developments.

In particular, there was no unified voice among EU member states on defense and security policies. The voices of international organizations outside NATO were scarcely heard. Indeed, the very existence and functions of these organizations, including the United Nations, were called into question. Even if their existence were to continue, calls for significant structural changes were frequently voiced.

The longest decade in Turkish politics

Undoubtedly, the coup attempt orchestrated by FETÖ had significant repercussions on Turkish politics. One of the coup’s consequences, albeit not a direct one, was the adoption of a new system of government. With the constitutional amendments approved by a referendum in 2017, the country transitioned to a presidential system of government, thereby putting an end to the dual leadership in the executive branch. In the 2018 elections, President Erdoğan was elected as the first president under the new system.

In addition, far-reaching changes took place, particularly within the security and judicial bureaucracies. Whilst the country’s defense and security capabilities were strengthened on the one hand, they were also purged of FETÖ elements and genuinely nationalized on the other. Following the events of July 15, Turkey carried out the Euphrates Shield operation in 2016, the Olive Branch operation in 2017, the Peace Spring operation in 2019 and the Spring Shield operation in 2020 to prevent any security vulnerabilities. This prevented the formation of a ‘terror corridor’ along the line stretching from the Syrian border to the Mediterranean. During the same period, support was provided to Azerbaijan to regain its territories in Karabakh. In the Eastern Mediterranean, attempts by the Greek Cypriot Administration and Greece to expand their maritime zones were thwarted.

A clear stand was taken against Israel’s genocide and massacres targeting Palestinians. During this period, Turkey also faced a series of other challenges at home. It is fair to say that the most significant of these was the earthquake centered on Kahramanmaraş on the night of February 6, 2023, the effects of which were felt intensely across 11 provinces. In the earthquake, which claimed the lives of over 50,000 people, hundreds of thousands of homes were rendered uninhabitable. It is clear that this situation has also had a negative impact on the economy. This event, occurring just as the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic were beginning to be overcome, increased the pressure on economic management.

Turkey was directly or indirectly affected by almost all of these challenging processes. In contrast, Turkey emerged successfully from these trials, unlike many other states. Firstly, it was ensured that domestic developments did not lead to any weakness in state capacity. Although the security forces were most adversely affected by the coup attempt, both the Armed Forces and the law enforcement agencies continued their work without losing their capacity. The positions of the expelled FETÖ members were filled within a short time. Cross-border operations and domestic operations demonstrated that the security forces were able to carry out their duties without any weaknesses emerging. During the same period, Turkey also made significant strides, particularly in the security and defense sectors. Reducing dependence on foreign sources in the defense sector is one of the most important means of the country achieving true independence.

Historically, whenever Turkey’s national interests clashed with those of Western countries, it faced severe sanctions and embargoes from the opposing side. The most striking example of this was when, following the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, numerous countries simultaneously imposed embargoes on Turkey. From that point onwards, Turkey endeavored to establish its own national defense industry with the limited resources available at the time. These efforts intensified significantly during the Özal era, which began in 1983. However, subsequently, particularly amidst the chaotic environment of the 1990s, this process experienced various setbacks due to the impact of successive economic and political crises.

The real breakthrough, however, began with the AK Party’s rise to power and has gained significant momentum, particularly over the last decade. President Erdoğan, recognizing the shifting global balance of power and correctly interpreting the trends in new technology, launched a major initiative in the defense industry. Defence companies have increased their exports to various parts of the world. The progress made in this area is closely linked not only to the companies’ growing capacity to adapt to new technologies but also to their ability to identify new markets.

Given their status as critical sectors, simply producing high-quality equipment in the defence and security fields is not sufficient in itself. The country’s political power serves as the most important means of selling to other states. Turkey’s sphere of influence, which has grown thanks to the efforts of President Erdoğan, has also ensured that production in these sectors generates economic revenue through exports. Consequently, over the past decade, Turkey has become one of the world’s leading defense industry suppliers.

A strong Turkey under Erdoğan’s leadership

Meanwhile, President Erdoğan has steadily increased his influence in non-Western societies. Moreover, it is not only within the Islamic world but also amongst oppressed nations in various parts of the world, particularly in Africa and South America, that Erdoğan has been viewed almost as their natural leader. The interesting aspect is that the Western world has also accepted this role of Erdoğan’s. As exemplified by US President Trump’s favor towards him, as seen once again at the most recent NATO summit, Erdoğan has been recognized as the spokesperson for a vast region. It can be said that this process has begun to transform Turkey from a regional actor into a global power. The ‘Turkey Century’ vision is, in fact, a clear expression of this endeavor. In the coming period, it will be possible to see the positive results of the steps taken in terms of both soft and hard power more clearly.

It is also important to emphasize that these steps have not been limited to the fields of foreign policy and security. For example, Turkey demonstrated its ability to heal the wounds caused by an earthquake that deeply affected 11 cities, leaving some of them almost in ruins, within a short period of time. Hundreds of thousands of homes were built in the earthquake-stricken areas; in effect, new towns were established. Moreover, this process was carried out without disrupting ongoing public investment projects in other parts of the country. Just as in the political sphere, strong leadership was a key factor here. It is worth noting in passing that this process also demonstrated the benefits of the Presidential System of Government. The country continued to grow in a stable and determined manner without descending into the chaotic climate characterized by the coalitions that existed prior to the AK Party’s time in power.

It is clear that, had the 15 July coup attempt been successful, Turkey’s capacity to deal with problems, whether arising from external sources or from within the country itself, would have been extremely limited. In particular, it is easy to foresee that an independent foreign policy aligned with the country’s interests could not have been pursued. Indeed, the primary objective of the coup attempt was to reduce Turkey to a weakened state, with no room for manoeuver outside the Western world, and particularly the US, and where the expression of national will was suppressed. In contrast, the response of the people, under the leadership of President Erdoğan, ensured that these plans were turned on their head. The fact that the country weathered a coup attempt characterized by disproportionate use of violence, in which 253 people lost their lives, thousands were injured, and bombs rained down on cities, has boosted the nation’s self-confidence and enhanced the country’s standing in the international community.

At the same time, the importance of strong and resolute leadership has been demonstrated once again. President Erdoğan not only ensured the coup attempt failed by directing the nation onto the streets on the night of 15 July, but also strengthened the country’s power through the steps he took afterwards. It is clear that these developments are instructive in many respects. What is particularly striking is that Erdoğan’s resolute stance and determined attitude have strengthened Turkey’s position amongst nations. Of course, state administration and politics are closely linked to institutionalization and the full fulflilment of duties by professional teams. However, to be fair, it is important to emphasize the following point in particular: both the resistance witnessed on the night of July 15 and Turkey’s rapidly rising global standing in the aftermath are, to a large extent, the result of President Erdoğan’s leadership skills.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he stability of political regimes is assessed through the nature of the relationship between the normative power of the constitutional order and the depth of social legitimacy. The mere existence of a constitution, the meticulous construction of the institutional architecture, or the explicit definition of the principle of the separation of powers in legal texts does not, in itself, guarantee the security of the regime. The true resilience of regimes is revealed in the attitudes of social actors towards the source of legitimacy during times of crisis. In this context, coups are not merely power struggles targeting the institutional continuity of the state; they are attempts to forcibly answer the question of who will exercise sovereignty.

In political science literature, a coup is defined as an attempt by an organized group within the state apparatus to seize executive power through the use of force or the threat of force, by suspending constitutional and legal procedures. In this context, coups signify not merely a transfer of power, but the detachment of political legitimacy from its institutional foundation and its subsequent reconstruction through power relations. Studies on coups indicate that such interventions are more likely to occur in regimes characterized by a low level of institutionalization, where the capacity for consensus among civilian political actors is weak and power centers within the state are fragmented. In systems where political institutions are not sufficiently entrenched, power struggles may turn to the direct use of force rather than relying on electoral, parliamentary or legal mechanisms.

Discussions on military tutelage reveal that when the military goes beyond its role as an institution ensuring security against external threats to assume a supervisory and directive role over the political sphere, it weakens democratic processes. When the military positions itself as the ultimate guardian of the regime or the arbiter of its ideological boundaries, it limits the decision-making capacity of elected civilian authorities and erodes democratic accountability. In such a structure, the military begins to be perceived as a legitimate actor capable of intervening in politics. This situation becomes one of the fundamental structural obstacles to democratic consolidation.

Institutional veto capacity

Analyses of democratic fragility emphasize that the institutional veto capacity of anti-regime or extra-systemic actors is decisive during periods of crisis. Situations such as economic crises, social polarization, governance failures or loss of legitimacy can increase the fragility of the political system, creating a fertile ground for anti-democratic interventions. During periods when coordination among the state’s key institutions breaks down and social consensus weakens, coups emerge as the result of a broader regime crisis. For this reason, modern literature explains coups not so much in terms of the will of individual actors, but rather through institutional weaknesses, power balances and fragilities within the regime’s structure.

When Turkish political history is examined through these theoretical frameworks, it becomes apparent that the tension between democratic representation and authoritarian power centers is a persistent feature. From the time of Ottoman modernization onwards, the positioning of the military and bureaucratic elites as the state’s founding and protective actors has led to political legitimacy being constructed in a state-centered manner rather than from a social base. During the Republican era, this structure gained institutional continuity; following the transition to a multi-party system, however, a structural conflict emerged between political legitimacy derived from elections and the tradition of tutelary intervention.

Given this historical background, the coup attempt that took place on the night of July 15, 2016, cannot be regarded as an isolated security incident. This event marks a critical threshold in Turkey’s tradition of intervention, which spans nearly two centuries, and constitutes a historic turning point in the societal defense of democratic legitimacy. The uniqueness of the event is evident in the scale of the attempt, the level of violence involved, and the nature of the societal reaction it provoked.

Pre-Republican political structure

To understand the sociological roots of coups in Turkey, one must examine the pre-Republican political structure. During the classical period of the Ottoman Empire, whilst central authority appeared strong, power relations were shaped by the balance between the palace bureaucracy, the military elite and regional power centres. With the process of modernisation, the centralisation of military reforms within state transformation significantly increased the political weight of the army.

The deposition of Sultan Abdülaziz in 1876 is one of the clearest indications of the Ottoman state elite’s capacity to intervene in the transfer of power. The power structure established by the Committee of Union and Progress after 1908, meanwhile, deepened the institutional intertwining of military-political relations. Consequently, the mindset that the military elite possessed the right to determine the direction of the state became deeply entrenched.

The central role of the military in the founding of the Republic not only failed to bring this historical legacy to an end but also provided it with a new basis of legitimacy. The military background of the founding generation fostered the notion that the military bore a special responsibility for the regime’s survival. In subsequent periods, this understanding formed the institutional basis for the tutelary mindset that argued democratic politics must be kept within certain limits.

Prime Minister Adnan Menderes

The transfer of power in Turkey following the 1950 elections represented a historic advance in terms of democratic representation. However, this transition did not eliminate tutelary reflexes. The coup of 27 May 1960 is the clearest illustration of this reality.

May 27 signifies the overthrow by armed force of an elected, democratic and legitimate government – that is, the will of the people as expressed. The execution of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and two of his ministers following the intervention constituted a punishment directed against the will of the people. This event represents a deep fracture in the collective memory of Turkish democracy. One of the coup’s most significant consequences was the normalization of military intervention as a legitimate political tool. An event as horrific and repugnant as the coup itself is the fact that this tragedy was declared a public holiday and celebrated for years…

The constitutional order established after 1961 granted military and bureaucratic institutions the power of veto over the system. Thus, a hybrid structure emerged—democratic in appearance, but fundamentally encircled by mechanisms of tutelage.

The March 12, 1971, memorandum demonstrated that the political arena could be forcibly restructured without directly seizing power. The fact that Parliament remained open does not imply that the intervention was of a civilian nature, as political decision-making processes were shaped under military pressure.

The coup of September 12, 1980, on the other hand, radically transformed Turkey’s social and institutional fabric. Parliament was closed, political parties were dissolved, and fundamental rights and freedoms were suspended. This period marked a phase in which state violence intensified on an institutional scale. Detentions, torture, bans and a climate of severe repression produced deep traumas in the collective memory.

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urkish defense technology company HAVELSAN has advanced four of its domestically developed software solutions into NATO’s certification process after successfully completing interoperability tests during the alliance’s Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exploration, Experimentation, Examination Exercise (CWIX) in Poland.

According to information released on Saturday, HAVELSAN’s DOOB-HQ, KAPI, Embedded NONC2 ATA DLP and LYNX systems passed the Assurance Verification and Validation (AV&V) tests required for NATO certification.

The successful evaluations confirmed the systems’ compliance with NATO’s Federated Mission Networking (FMN) standards, enabling them to operate seamlessly alongside allied command-and-control networks during multinational military operations.

The CWIX exercise serves as NATO’s primary platform for testing interoperability among member and partner nations’ command-and-control systems. Certification under the FMN Spiral 4 framework is considered a key prerequisite for participation in NATO missions scheduled between 2025 and 2027.

Expanding HAVELSAN’s NATO portfolio

The addition of four new capabilities further expands HAVELSAN’s portfolio of NATO-compatible technologies in command and control, secure data sharing, system integration and tactical communications.

HAVELSAN has participated in the annual CWIX exercise since 2012, steadily increasing the number of certified systems. Previous certifications include DOOB and KAŞİF in 2019, ADVENT CMS and ADVENT MARTI in 2023, KARTAL and NONC2 ATA DLP in 2024, and six additional products in 2025, including DOOB-HQ, DOOB-TACTICAL, OCTOPUS and TDLYM.

This year’s CWIX exercise, held from June 6 to 26 in Poland, brought together more than 3,000 personnel, 780 systems and representatives from 46 countries, including NATO allies and European Union members.

HAVELSAN participated with 43 personnel and 16 systems spanning multiple operational domains, including command and control, maritime operations, cyber defense, communications, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense, modeling and simulation, and tactical data links.

New operational focus areas

The company also debuted several capabilities in new operational focus areas, including LYNX and Embedded NONC2 ATA DLP in the Air domain, ADVENT TALAY/REI in the Geospatial, Meteorological and Oceanographic (GEOMETOC) domain, KAPI in Federated Mission Networking, ICS SENTINEL in Cyber, and FIVE in Modeling and Simulation.

HAVELSAN General Manager Mehmet Akif Nacar said the successful certification process demonstrates that Türkiye’s domestically developed defense software meets NATO’s highest interoperability standards.

“The inclusion of four new capabilities in NATO’s certification process is concrete evidence that our national software solutions have gained international recognition and meet the highest interoperability standards,” Nacar said.

He added that HAVELSAN plans to build on its expanded participation in joint operations, cyber defense and modeling and simulation by introducing artificial intelligence-supported command-and-control capabilities in future NATO exercises.

Nacar said the company remains committed to developing technologies that meet the operational requirements of the Turkish Armed Forces while delivering internationally competitive defense solutions.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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hen one thinks of the Middle East and Iraq, the first thing that springs to mind is often oil. However, developments in Iraq over recent weeks have once again demonstrated that oil is no longer merely an economic resource, but a strategic factor that determines state capacity, foreign policy and the regional balance of power.

Following the tensions between Iran and the West, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz provided short-term relief in global energy markets. However, for Iraq, this process did not merely signify a return to normal oil sales. The Baghdad administration has also brought back onto the agenda its long-delayed objectives of increasing production and securing a higher quota within OPEC.

Whilst this may appear at first glance to be merely a matter of energy policy, there is a larger story behind the issue. As is well known, oil is both the most vulnerable and the seemingly strongest aspect of the Iraqi economy. Oil revenues bear the main burden of the state budget. Many sectors, ranging from public sector wages to infrastructure investment, and from security expenditure to social payments, are dependent on this revenue. Consequently, every fluctuation in international markets comes to the attention not only of the economic bureaucracy but also of political decision-makers in Baghdad. Even a slight decline in oil revenue can place significant pressure on the state.

The messages conveyed by the Iraqi government in recent weeks are therefore noteworthy. On the one hand, new international investments are being discussed; on the other, it is stated that production capacity can be rapidly increased. The recent interest shown by major energy companies in oil fields suggests that Baghdad wishes to draw up a long-term growth plan. The recent increase in production in the southern oil fields also emerges as a development serving the effort to boost capacity.

Turkey-Iraq talks

However, the main issue in Iraq is not merely about producing oil. The real challenge facing Iraq is determining via which routes, with what political guarantees and within what economic framework it will deliver the oil it produces to the world market. From this perspective, the renewed intensive energy talks between Turkey and Iraq carry particular significance. The topics on the agenda between Ankara and Baghdad point to a broader framework than merely the technical operation and capacity expansion of the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline: oil, natural gas, electricity, energy supply security and the energy dimension of the Development Corridor.

The Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline, which has passed through Turkey for years, has become one of the most critical elements of this equation. The recent talks between Ankara and Baghdad, which have focused on energy cooperation, do not merely signify the renewal of a technical agreement. It appears that the two countries are seeking ways to establish a new energy architecture that will adapt to the changing regional geopolitical landscape. The duration of the agreement, the pipeline’s capacity, the transport of oil to the Mediterranean, and Iraq’s need to diversify its export routes are all being discussed at the same table.

The situation is equally significant not only from Iraq’s perspective but also from Turkey’s. Turkey has long aimed to be a country that manages energy corridors. One of the fundamental and most important pillars of this strategy is the secure delivery of Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean. For this reason, stable energy relations with Baghdad will also serve as a key tool in building political trust. An energy corridor stretching from southern Iraq to the north, and from there to Turkey and the Mediterranean, will form part of a broader picture encompassing regional trade, transport and security.

Iraq, meanwhile, has learnt the hard way in recent years the risks of relying on a single export route or a single regional balance of power. Crises in the Strait of Hormuz, the prospect of regional war and the occasional disruption of export routes in the north are prompting Baghdad to develop alternative routes. Iraq must now define its energy security not only in terms of production capacity but also through the diversity of its export routes. Consequently, the future of the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline has become a key indicator of Iraq’s capacity for economic sovereignty.

Anti-corruption operations

Amidst all this, another notable development has been the anti-corruption operations being carried out domestically. The operations in Baghdad, which have targeted high-ranking figures, send a significant message regarding the corruption networks that have long been the subject of discussion within state institutions. Of course, it cannot be expected that a few operations will eliminate decades-old institutional problems. However, the rule of law and transparency in public administration will be just as decisive as oil in shaping international investors’ view of Iraq.

Similarly, the US’s resumption of dollar transfers to Iraq should not be interpreted merely as a technical financial decision. This step demonstrates that economic ties between Washington and Baghdad have not been completely severed, but that issues of security, militias and financial oversight remain on the table. It has once again become clear that economic and security issues cannot be addressed in isolation from one another.

Viewed in the light of these developments, Iraq today stands at what is perhaps one of the most critical economic thresholds of the post-2003 era. Whilst the country is striving to attract major energy investments on the one hand, on the other it is seeking to strengthen public administration, strike a balance in its foreign relations and keep as far away as possible from regional crises. If successful, it could not only become a country that increases its oil production but also emerge as a new regional actor at the centre of energy, trade and transport corridors.

However, it is clear that oil revenues alone will not be sufficient for this to happen. Institutional reforms, legal predictability, investment security and sustainable relations with neighbours are just as important as new oil fields. The fundamental challenge facing Iraq is not actually extracting oil, but utilising oil revenues for the benefit of the state. To the extent that Baghdad succeeds in this, it may cease to be a conflict zone where regional crises persist.

From Turkey’s perspective, too, it would be insufficient to view developments solely through the prism of the oil trade. Iraq’s transformation into a stable, economically strengthening country open to regional integration will serve Ankara’s interests across many areas, from security to trade, and from logistics to energy. Consequently, in the coming months, we will be monitoring not only whether Iraq can produce more oil, but also whether it can channel this oil into political stability and economic development.

(Originally published by Middle East Africa website in Turkish)

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urkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan warned on Thursday against the expansion of the Russia-Ukraine war into the Black Sea, saying attacks on civilian maritime infrastructure threaten regional stability and should not be tolerated.

Speaking alongside Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha after talks in Kyiv, Fidan said Türkiye remains committed to preventing the conflict from spreading into the strategically important waterway.

“We do not want the war to spread to the Black Sea,” Fidan said, stressing that peace and security in the region must be preserved.

He condemned attacks targeting civilian maritime assets, saying ports, oil tankers and fishing vessels should not become military targets.

“Targeting ports, tankers and fishing boats and putting civilians’ lives at risk is not something that can be justified,” Fidan said, urging all parties to act with restraint and responsibility.

Fidan said Türkiye continues to explore new strategic approaches with the warring parties and international mediators to break the deadlock in the conflict.

Call for negotiations

He reaffirmed Ankara’s support for continuing negotiations under the Istanbul format, arguing that direct talks between Russian and Ukrainian officials had produced valuable transparency and dialogue.

“I believe it would be very beneficial for the Türkiye negotiations, particularly the Istanbul talks, to continue,” Fidan said, adding that ongoing hostilities should not prevent diplomatic engagement.

The Turkish foreign minister noted that while U.S. negotiators later became involved in efforts to achieve a broader settlement, the conflict continues with an increasing risk of escalation.

Addressing potential post-war security arrangements, Fidan said security guarantees for Ukraine would likely include land, air and naval components.

He revealed that Türkiye has agreed to lead the maritime component of those guarantees in coordination with allied countries.

“Türkiye has accepted to lead the maritime component, and we have a common understanding with our allies on this issue,” he said, adding that planning work is already being carried out by the naval forces of participating allied nations.

Ukraine is ready for a ceasefire

For his part, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha reiterated Kyiv’s readiness for a ceasefire and voiced support for Türkiye as the venue for future high-level peace negotiations.

“We believe that negotiations, especially a possible meeting between President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and President Vladimir Putin, could take place in Türkiye,” Sybiha said.

He added that only a summit between the two leaders could inject new momentum into the peace process.

“As Ukraine, we are ready for a ceasefire,” Sybiha said.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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ürkiye’s Communications Director Burhanettin Duran on Wednesday described the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016, as a “historic turning point” that safeguarded the country’s future and reinforced its democratic path, marking the 10th anniversary of Democracy and National Unity Day.

In a message shared on the Turkish social media platform NSosyal under the hashtag #VictoryIsOurs, Duran said the public’s resistance against the coup attempt remains one of the defining moments in Türkiye’s modern history.

“Under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, this epic written through the courage, wisdom and unwavering resistance of our noble nation proclaimed to the world that the national will cannot be held captive by any force,” Duran said.

He emphasized that the determination displayed by the Turkish people on July 15 not only thwarted the coup attempt but also demonstrated internationally that no force could override the will of the nation.

Tribute and responsibility

Duran said commemorating the events of July 15 serves both as a tribute to those who lost their lives and those who were wounded while resisting the coup, as well as a responsibility to preserve the memory of the events for future generations.

“Strong states stand not only because of the resources they possess, but because of nations that protect their history, values and national memory,” he said.

Marking the 10th anniversary of Democracy and National Unity Day, Duran paid tribute to those who were killed during the failed coup attempt and expressed gratitude to veterans who participated in resisting it.

“I remember with mercy and gratitude our noble martyrs who sacrificed their lives for the homeland, and extend my appreciation to our heroic veterans,” he said.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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anadian Prime Minister Mark Carney has described Saudi Arabia and Türkiye as the two most influential countries in shaping potential solutions to the Middle East’s ongoing crises, emphasizing the importance of direct engagement with regional powers over public criticism.

Speaking to reporters during an official visit to Jeddah on Friday, Carney said that meaningful progress on regional conflicts would depend largely on the role played by Riyadh and Ankara.

“The two most influential countries regarding potential solutions in the Middle East are Saudi Arabia and Türkiye,” Carney said.

Carney stressed that Canada remains deeply committed to developments in the Middle East but argued that constructive dialogue is more effective than criticizing governments from afar.

He said engaging directly with regional leaders does not imply endorsement of all their policies.

“Lecturing countries from a distance is an ineffective strategy,” Carney said. “It may be satisfying, but it is ineffective. Engagement can be effective. That does not mean it will always be decisive, but it can produce results.”

Talks with Erdoğan

Addressing Canada’s relations with Türkiye, Carney said he discussed unresolved bilateral issues during his recent meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Ankara.

He noted that the direct dialogue had yielded positive outcomes that would not have been possible through diplomacy conducted from Ottawa.

Diversifying Canada’s partnerships

The Canadian prime minister also highlighted his government’s efforts to reduce Canada’s heavy reliance on the United States by expanding international partnerships.

“We are overly dependent on the United States. That has been demonstrated,” Carney said. “Every Canadian strongly recognizes this, and we are seeking diversification.”

His remarks reflect Ottawa’s broader strategy of strengthening diplomatic and economic ties with a wider range of global partners as Canada seeks a more diversified foreign policy and trade agenda.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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resident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said NATO must evolve into an alliance that strengthens its members rather than creating dependency, as Türkiye concluded its hosting of the 36th NATO Summit with calls for greater burden-sharing, stronger defense industrial cooperation and renewed diplomatic efforts to address global conflicts.

Speaking at a press conference following the two-day summit at the Presidential Complex in Ankara on Wednesday, Erdoğan said the meeting marked a significant step toward building a stronger alliance at a time when Euro-Atlantic security faces unprecedented challenges.

“NATO should be an alliance of allies that strengthen one another, not one of countries dependent on each other,” Erdoğan said, arguing that genuine deterrence depends not only on defense spending but also on technological superiority, industrial capacity and sustainable military production.

The summit, the first NATO leaders’ meeting ever held in Ankara and Türkiye’s second time hosting the alliance after more than two decades, brought together heads of state and government from all member countries.

Erdoğan said allied leaders agreed on the need for European members to assume greater responsibility for collective defense while maintaining fair burden-sharing within the alliance.

“We have laid the foundations for a stronger NATO in which European allies undertake greater responsibility and military capabilities are reinforced through equitable burden-sharing,” he said.

Türkiye highlights military contributions

The Turkish president stressed that Türkiye has become one of NATO’s leading military contributors after decades of confronting regional conflicts and terrorism largely on its own.

He noted that Türkiye commands NATO’s second-largest land army and has safeguarded the alliance’s southeastern flank for decades while making substantial contributions to NATO missions, operations and common funding.

Erdoğan announced that Turkish F-16 fighter jets will deploy to Estonia beginning in August as part of NATO’s Air Policing mission.

He also said Türkiye will continue commanding the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) until September 2026 and will assume command of the NATO Response Force during 2028-2029.

“Türkiye has always fulfilled its responsibilities within the alliance, taking risks and paying the price when necessary,” Erdoğan said.

Defense industry emphasized

A central theme of Erdoğan’s remarks was Türkiye’s growing defense industry, one of the country’s key strategic advantages.

He said Türkiye now manufactures its own fighter aircraft, tanks, warships and air defense systems while ranking among the world’s leading producers of unmanned aerial and naval vehicles.

“True deterrence comes from three dimensions: advanced technology, sufficient scale and sustainable production,” Erdoğan said.

He welcomed the adoption of the “Ankara Strategy” during the NATO Defense Industry Forum, saying it would strengthen cooperation between NATO and defense manufacturers.

Erdoğan also renewed calls for the removal of remaining restrictions on defense trade among allies and argued that European Union defense initiatives should complement NATO rather than duplicate its efforts.

He warned that excluding non-EU allies such as Türkiye from European defense projects would limit their effectiveness.

Ukraine, Middle East discussed

The summit also addressed ongoing security crises, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and instability across the Middle East.

Erdoğan reiterated Türkiye’s offer to facilitate renewed peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.

“The war has become a machine of destruction that claims tens of thousands of casualties every month,” he said. “There are no losers in a just peace.”

Turning to the Middle East, Erdoğan welcomed the Islamabad Agreement, which Türkiye has supported, while expressing concern over continued violence in Lebanon and Gaza.

He said attacks in Lebanon have displaced civilians and destroyed cities, while the humanitarian crisis in Gaza continues.

“There is no room in our region for new tensions or new conflicts,” Erdoğan said. “Humanity needs peace, stability and security.”

I

n the current climate, where the global energy architecture is undergoing structural upheavals and supply chains are being reconfigured, Turkey is rising far beyond the role of a mere ‘transit country’ or ‘bridge’ to become a ‘hub’ that shapes the rules of Eurasian energy geopolitics. The energy partnerships established with Azerbaijan form the most solid foundation and strategic complement to this vision, which Ankara has built with a long-term strategic vision. The infrastructure initiatives, whose foundations were laid with the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and which have reached an intercontinental dimension through the Southern Gas Corridor, confirm that Turkey is the sole strategic gateway opening up the Caspian Basin’s resources to global markets. This equation, in which Turkey plays a central role, not only constitutes one of the greatest supporters of regional stability but also acts as an asymmetric power element that counterbalances external interventions.

Turkey’s geopolitical leverage in Europe’s energy security

The radical disruptions in Europe’s energy supply chains, triggered by the Russia-Ukraine War, have elevated Turkey’s indispensable role in global energy security to an existential level. In this crisis environment, the security of Europe’s energy supply has become directly dependent on Turkey’s diplomatic and infrastructural capabilities. The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which forms the backbone of the Southern Gas Corridor, and its European extension, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), position Turkey as the system’s primary controller and distributor in the delivery of Caspian gas to the West. The planned phased increase in TANAP’s capacity to over 30 billion cubic metres and the integration of new fields in the Caspian Sea into the system mean that Europe’s energy strategy will run directly through Ankara. Through these projects, Turkey is not only contributing to the energy security of the European continent but is also gaining a very powerful geopolitical lever.

The Hormuz crisis and Ankara-centered stability for neighboring countries

Turkey’s pipeline diplomacy, which has demonstrated the country’s capabilities and maturity in energy geopolitics, is also the only rational way out for regions such as the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, where border disputes and political deadlocks are rife. In particular, the crises that have erupted recently around the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea clearly demonstrate the structural fragility caused by excessive reliance on maritime chokepoints in global energy trade. These routes, through which approximately one-fifth of global oil supplies and a significant portion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade pass, are extremely vulnerable to asymmetric attacks by non-state actors and the risks of regional conflict.

This situation, which constantly generates a geopolitical risk premium in global markets, makes secure land-based alternatives for the transport of Middle Eastern hydrocarbons to the West an existential necessity. It is precisely at this point that the seamless pipeline infrastructure established by Turkey with Azerbaijan offers a tried-and-tested, ready-made integration model for Gulf resources as well. In response to the high-cost and high-risk nature of maritime routes, Turkey is building a reliable land-based bridgehead connecting the Gulf directly to Europe through projects such as the Development Corridor, which runs via Iraq. Ankara’s vision could enable Middle Eastern resources to be channelled to global markets via Turkey’s secure transmission network, bypassing fragile chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz.

A similar situation applies to the Eastern Mediterranean. It has become clear that all alternative routes—such as EastMed, which have sought to bypass and exclude Turkey from the commercialization and delivery of the region’s hydrocarbon resources to Western markets—have failed from technical, political and financial perspectives. The flexibility of Turkey’s onshore infrastructure is positioning Ankara as one of the key decision-makers and a distribution hub for the integration of resources from the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean into global markets, following on from Caspian resources.

Turkey as a ‘green energy hub’ beyond fossil fuels

In the wake of wars and supply crises, Turkey has emerged as the most reliable hub to which global players are turning in their search for dependable suppliers. However, the future of this geopolitical capacity built by Ankara is not limited to conventional hydrocarbon resources or existing natural gas pipelines. In this new order, where the energy transition is gathering momentum, Turkey is also systematically implementing its strategy to transform itself into a regional clean energy hub in line with carbon-neutral targets.

The renewable energy potential of the Caspian region – comprising not only the Caspian Sea’s 157 gigawatt technical wind energy potential but also the ‘green energy’ capacity of the Karabakh and Eastern Zangezur regions – can only be integrated into global markets via Turkey’s national grid and transmission infrastructure. Plans to transport the renewable energy to be generated – in the form of electricity and green hydrogen – to Europe via the Nakhchivan corridor and Turkey could completely change the rules of the game. Adapting existing natural gas infrastructure—particularly TANAP—to facilitate hydrogen transport in the future will transform Turkey from a traditional natural gas trading hub into one of the key players shaping the clean energy markets of the future.

The shift from physical transportation to setting commercial rules

All these physical infrastructure and green transition projects lay the groundwork for Turkey’s strategy to evolve beyond its ultimate vision in energy geopolitics—that of being a ‘bridge country’—and become a price-setting hub. Ankara is crowning the physical network it has established through pipelines and electricity grids with the aim of creating an international trading centre where energy prices are set. In this regard, the natural gas trading centre being established in Thrace and initiatives to deepen national energy markets are transforming Turkey from merely a transit route for energy flows into a financial magnet where regional market conditions are shaped. The fact that critical suppliers such as Azerbaijan are adding volume and depth to this trading hub not only strengthens Ankara’s hand in global markets but also compels neighbouring countries to integrate into the market architecture established by Turkey in energy trade.

Within the context of Turkey’s national energy strategy, the relations it has developed with Azerbaijan go beyond a conventional trade agreement to constitute the construction of a geo-economic integration centred on Ankara. Turkey, which has served as a shield against Europe’s crises and assumed a rule-setting role in the balance of power in the Eastern Mediterranean under the traditional concept of energy security, is also striving to utilise its vast infrastructure advantage in integrating with the renewable energy revolution. As the energy architecture of the future is redesigned in line with the goals of a ‘carbon-neutral economy’, Turkey, with its autonomy, strategic vision and strong alliances, will continue to be one of the indispensable centres of gravity in the global energy order for decades to come.

(Originally published in Turkish by SETA Foundation)

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ürkiye has called on NATO allies to convert rising defense spending into concrete military capabilities, warning that higher budgets alone will not guarantee deterrence as the alliance confronts an increasingly complex security environment.

Speaking at the NATO Allies in Ankara event on Tuesday, National Defense Minister Yasar Guler said NATO’s credibility would ultimately depend on whether member states could translate political commitments into operational military strength, resilient defense industries and integrated security capabilities.

The event, organized in cooperation with Türkiye’s Communications Directorate, the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) and the Munich Security Conference, comes ahead of the NATO leaders’ summit in Ankara, where alliance members are expected to discuss defense investment, industrial cooperation and regional security challenges.

“Increasing defense spending is important, yet spending money alone does not produce deterrence,” Guler said.

He stressed that NATO must focus on building ready military forces, expanding ammunition stockpiles, strengthening logistics, improving integrated air and missile defense systems, enhancing command-and-control structures and increasing defense industrial production.

According to Guler, the alliance has entered a new strategic phase requiring both credible collective defense and the ability to respond rapidly to crises across multiple regions.

He said NATO’s role has evolved significantly since World War II, moving from collective defense during the Cold War toward crisis management and counterterrorism operations after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today’s security environment, however, requires the alliance to maintain strong conventional deterrence while remaining prepared for emerging threats.

A stronger and more balanced NATO

The minister reiterated Türkiye’s support for a stronger and more balanced NATO in which European allies assume greater responsibility for their own defense while maintaining the transatlantic partnership and the United States’ security commitment as the foundation of the alliance.

However, he argued that burden-sharing should not be measured solely by defense budgets.

Instead, contributions should also reflect operational risks, geographical responsibilities, military readiness, participation in alliance missions, industrial production capacity and the ability to respond effectively during crises.

Guler highlighted Türkiye’s longstanding role within NATO, saying Ankara maintained one of the alliance’s largest and most capable armed forces while many European countries significantly reduced troop numbers, military stockpiles and defense manufacturing after the Cold War.

“Türkiye has never been merely a geographical frontline country,” he said.

“It has consistently assumed risks, carried responsibility in the field and contributed to deterrence when necessary.”

Türkiye, which joined NATO in 1952, currently fields the alliance’s second-largest army and possesses highly trained forces with extensive operational experience, joint operational capability and high readiness levels, he added.

The minister noted that Turkish forces continue contributing to NATO missions, exercises and deterrence operations across a wide geographic area stretching from the Baltic region to the Black Sea while also participating in maritime security, crisis management and military training activities.

Defense industry and regional security priorities

Guler also emphasized Türkiye’s expanding defense industry, describing it as an increasingly important contributor to NATO’s overall military capabilities.

He said the country has developed advanced technologies across multiple sectors, including unmanned systems, air defense, electronic warfare, precision-guided ammunition, naval platforms, aviation and command-and-control systems.

Over the next three years, Ankara plans to prioritize investments in air and ballistic missile defense, long-range strike capabilities and unmanned military systems to meet both national defense requirements and NATO capability targets.

These capabilities, he argued, should be viewed not only as national assets but also as resources capable of helping reduce NATO’s wider capability and production gaps if fully integrated into alliance planning.

Guler called for greater defense industrial cooperation among allies, arguing that joint production and technology sharing would strengthen NATO more effectively than restrictive policies.

“Türkiye favors cooperation over rivalry, joint production over exclusion and capability-based cooperation over restrictions in the defense industry,” he said.

Addressing European security, Guler welcomed initiatives aimed at strengthening Europe’s defense capacity but stressed that such efforts must reinforce rather than duplicate NATO’s existing structures.

“NATO-EU cooperation must be inclusive, integrating and mutually reinforcing,” he said.

Reinforcing unity

Looking ahead to the NATO summit in Ankara, Guler described the gathering as a critical opportunity for allies to reinforce unity and address key issues including defense investment, industrial production, support for Ukraine and the alliance’s future deterrence posture.

He said the summit should send a clear message that NATO’s collective defense commitment under Article 5 remains unwavering but must be supported by credible military power.

The minister also emphasized the importance of maintaining NATO’s 360-degree approach to security, arguing that the alliance must remain equally attentive to threats along both its eastern and southern flanks as well as challenges beyond the Euro-Atlantic region.

He identified the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf, Syria, Iraq, the Eastern Mediterranean, North Africa, the Sahel, the Black Sea and the Caucasus as interconnected parts of the same strategic environment requiring coordinated allied attention.

Guler said modern security extends beyond conventional military assets such as tanks, aircraft and warships, encompassing secure digital infrastructure, resilient supply chains, protected critical infrastructure, societal resilience and the ability to respond faster than potential adversaries.

He concluded by reaffirming Türkiye’s commitment to NATO, saying Ankara would continue contributing to the alliance’s deterrence and defense posture while supporting its adaptation to evolving global security challenges.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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resident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said the upcoming NATO Leaders’ Summit in Ankara will serve as the strongest platform for sharing experience among allies, while urging greater solidarity within the alliance to address growing regional and global security challenges.

Speaking at the NATO Parliamentary Summit in Istanbul on Monday, Erdoğan said the alliance faces a historic turning point as wars, terrorism, irregular migration and geopolitical instability reshape the Euro-Atlantic security environment.

“It is my belief that the Ankara Summit will be the strongest platform for sharing experience,” Erdoğan said, referring to the NATO Heads of State and Government Summit scheduled to take place in the Turkish capital on July 7-8.

Addressing parliamentary representatives from NATO member states, Erdoğan said the Istanbul meeting carried added significance ahead of the leaders’ summit and thanked participants for contributing to cooperation among allied legislatures.

Global security environment changing rapidly

Erdoğan said traditional assumptions about international security were no longer sufficient to explain today’s rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape.

“Europe-Atlantic security is passing through a historic turning point,” he said, pointing to conflicts, regional crises, terrorism and irregular migration along NATO’s eastern and southeastern borders.

He argued that growing instability had replaced predictability in international affairs and warned that existing international institutions had suffered a loss of credibility in the face of recent conflicts.

Referring to developments in Gaza and Lebanon, Erdoğan said recent massacres had left deep scars on humanity’s conscience while undermining confidence in international organizations.

“In this environment, preserving NATO’s deterrence and strengthening solidarity among allies has become even more critical,” he said.

The Turkish president stressed that Türkiye remains one of NATO’s leading contributors, citing its strategic location, military capabilities and more than seven decades of participation in the alliance.

Sharing borders stretching more than 1,800 kilometers with conflict regions, Türkiye continues to play an active role in NATO missions and peacekeeping operations while sharing its experience in crisis management with allies, he added.

Erdoğan said international interest in the Ankara summit extends well beyond NATO member states.

“Our fundamental expectation from the summit is to achieve outcomes that strengthen the spirit of alliance while respecting the national security sensitivities of all allies,” he said.

Defense cooperation and regional diplomacy

Erdoğan also called for a fairer sharing of defense responsibilities within NATO and urged the removal of barriers affecting defense industry cooperation among allies.

“If we want to confront today’s challenges successfully, we must ensure balanced burden-sharing while removing obstacles to defense industry trade,” he said.

He noted that Türkiye continues to increase defense spending in line with commitments adopted at the recent NATO summit in The Hague and remains among the alliance’s five largest contributors to NATO missions and operations.

Despite these contributions, Erdoğan argued that Türkiye’s role in European security is sometimes overlooked.

He called for Ankara’s inclusion in European Union defense and security initiatives, saying Türkiye’s defense capabilities should not be excluded because of narrow political considerations.

“We must establish a security and defense network stretching from Texas to Ankara without reservations or conditions,” he said.

The president said the Ankara summit would place particular emphasis on defense industry cooperation through a NATO Defense Industry Forum, where Türkiye plans to showcase its latest defense technologies and discuss measures to deepen industrial collaboration among allies.

Participants would also review key regional and international developments, including the situations in Ukraine, Iran, the Gulf region and Palestine, he said.

Erdoğan reaffirmed Türkiye’s commitment to supporting efforts aimed at turning the ceasefire between the United States and Iran into a lasting settlement, saying Ankara would continue working alongside Pakistan, Qatar and other friendly countries.

Turning to Palestine, Erdoğan said lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved without ending the Israeli occupation and establishing an independent Palestinian state.

“An independent, sovereign and territorially contiguous Palestinian state within the 1967 borders must be established,” he said.

He also warned against actions that could undermine regional stability, particularly attacks targeting Lebanon, and urged NATO parliamentarians to support efforts aimed at preventing further escalation.

Erdoğan reiterated Türkiye’s readiness to continue mediating efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine war through dialogue, saying Ankara remains one of the few allies trusted by both sides.

“As a country that can speak with both parties and has initiated successful diplomatic processes, we will continue to contribute actively to peace efforts,” he said.

The event concluded with a family photograph hosted by Turkish Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş as part of the NATO Parliamentary Summit in Istanbul.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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ecent legislative amendments have brought about changes to the structure of the National Security Council in Turkey, which has played a decisive role in domestic politics throughout the history of the Republic. With the establishment of the Directorates of Internal Security Research and Assessment, External Security Research and Assessment, and Defense Planning Coordination, the expanding nature of security in the global arena has been taken into account. Furthermore, such an expansion should also be viewed as a consequence of Turkey’s changing foreign policy and geopolitical perceptions.

President Erdoğan delivered a speech highlighting key points at the opening of the National Security Conferences, a series planned to articulate Turkey’s approach to security. Alongside an emphasis on historical state tradition, the speech drew attention to the harmonious coordination between Turkey’s institutions in the face of the region’s ongoing and seemingly endless ‘ring of fire’, whilst also heralding the National Security Council’s return to its core remit. In light of the reforms implemented and this announcement, it is worth asking whether there has been a shift in Turkey’s security culture alongside its evolving foreign policy approach.

The relationship between foreign policy and security culture

Security culture is a concept frequently used in the study of International Relations (IR). In this context, it is defined as the totality of norms that shape how a state or society perceives security, defines threats and formulates responses to the security challenges it faces. Security culture, centered on the perception of threats, helps us understand what a state regards as a threat, or which policies it views as such, and, in parallel, the values by which it defines itself and the historical memory through which it does so. At the same time, the behavioral framework that develops through these elements forms a state’s established code of conduct in the international arena.

Consequently, the perception of security becomes a concept directly linked to foreign policy as a natural outcome of these definitions and perceptions. For when a state’s strategic mindset and self-definition change as a product of an internal process, foreign policy is naturally updated, which in turn implies a shift in the reference points of the security narrative. Just as a definition of interests, resulting from a protectionist mindset and a narrow geopolitical narrative, reflects a limited context, such a narrative also leads to the perception of security threats being viewed from a considerably broader perspective.

What is Turkey’s security culture?

The most fundamental element shaping Turkey’s security culture has been the identity redefined alongside the establishment of the state. With the acceptance of a Western identity as the cornerstone of the state, foreign policy was entirely shaped by a Western geopolitical narrative, and security culture was naturally shaped by the perception of areas outside the West as sources of threat. Paradoxically, despite waging war against the West, Turkey has constructed its security culture on a plane identical to that of the West, defined its perception of threat as originating from outside the West, and sought to meet its security needs through Western organizations or alliances.

Historical experiences inherited from the Ottoman Empire led to the new state being security-focused; the new Republic, through discourses on national sovereignty, territorial integrity and the unity of the state, necessitated a strong state structure. This, in turn, led to Turkey’s security culture becoming state-centered, and institutions have largely defined their roles as significant power factors in domestic politics by relying on this discourse.

The Middle East and the Caucasus represented the core regions perceived as threats by this security culture; the attempt to demonize Islam, the Kurdish issue and the identities defined through these factors were framed as problems for Turkey. As a result of the geopolitical narrative reflecting a narrow hinterland, distant regions did not even fall within the scope of this security culture. Consequently, Turkey’s security culture has reflected a framework synonymous with the West and its interests; adherence to the NATO concept, both during and after the Cold War, has been Ankara’s foremost priority.

The shift in the security paradigm

Since 2002, the changes in Turkish foreign policy have naturally led to a shift in the security paradigm, as they also signified a significant transformation of identity. Firstly, the norms guiding foreign policy have diverged, and Turkey has begun to perceive its historical ties not as a threat but as a source of strength. A foreign policy approach has begun to prevail in which Turkey defines itself through an identity that, without disregarding Western values, places greater emphasis on its own identity elements, an identity that, in the simplest terms, can be expressed by the concept of our ‘heartland’. In parallel with this shift in self-definition, the definitions of interests and threats have changed, and the geopolitical perspective has expanded from a framework confined to the West to encompass a much broader geography stretching as far as Africa, Asia and the Americas.

So, what has changed in Turkey’s security culture? First and foremost, Turkey has become a country that understands very clearly that it must ensure its own security. In particular, the situation into which European states have fallen following the war in Ukraine continues to be discussed as an example illustrating just how accurately Ankara has assessed the situation. In this respect, from its very inception, Turkey has moved away from relying on international coalitions and policies dictated by them, and has begun to define its own security framework. In the words of Erdoğan, Turkey has shattered the glass ceiling over it and has transformed into an actor capable of redefining concepts at a regional level, writing its own narrative and shaping its own future. This situation has been interpreted as a reflection of self-confidence; by enhancing its own capabilities, Turkey has been able to devise solutions through its own policies whenever it perceives a threat to its security.

Regions where the traditional security culture held a perception of security threats have largely come to be viewed as areas for cooperation; security has been perceived not merely as a need secured by closing oneself off within borders, but rather as synonymous with taking proactive action. Security has been linked to the deepening of relations and increased mutual interdependence; where security vulnerabilities have arisen as a result of this approach, necessary measures have been taken to expand security boundaries. In this context, cross-border operations have constituted one of the most significant indicators of the shift in Turkey’s security paradigm. Consequently, security boundaries have been expanded, and Turkey has risen to the status of a state capable of implementing its own policies, demonstrating that security can also be ensured through new points established beyond its borders. Furthermore, it is a fact that, in line with Turkey’s evolving and expanding geopolitical understanding, the country now maintains military bases in many countries.

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he official visit to Türkiye by Niger’s President Abdourahamane Tchiani, at the invitation of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, marks a new strategic milestone in relations between Ankara and Niamey. The fact that Tchiani was accompanied during his visit by a large delegation, including the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, energy, mining, the economy, agriculture and trade, demonstrates that relations between the two countries are progressing on the basis of multi-dimensional cooperation spanning from security to energy, and from trade to institutional capacity-building. For this reason, the visit should be assessed not merely as a routine diplomatic engagement between the two countries, but within the context of shifting power balances in the Sahel and Niger’s quest to diversify its external partnerships.

According to a statement from the Communications Directorate of Türkiye, following the meetings between President Erdoğan and Tchiani at the Presidential Complex in Ankara, three agreements and a joint declaration were signed between Türkiye and Niger in the fields of education, health, trade and diplomacy. Within this framework, a protocol regarding the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation in higher education for the period 2026–2030, a joint declaration on the establishment of the Economic and Trade Partnership Commission (JETCO), a protocol on the joint operation and handover of the Niger-Türkiye Friendship Hospital, and a memorandum of understanding between the Diplomacy Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye and the National Institute for Diplomatic and Strategic Studies of the Republic of Niger.

To interpret the cooperation that has developed between Türkiye and Niger in recent years solely as a result of current security and economic needs would be an oversimplification. Relations between the two countries are based on a multidimensional cooperation where historical heritage, the pursuit of mutual trust and a shared strategic vision for the future intersect. The ties between the two countries stretch back to the cultural, political and strategic influence of the Ottoman Empire in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Niger, during the 16th century. The relationships based on mutual trust that the Ottoman Empire established with local communities in the region, such as the Tebu and Tuareg peoples, who came under its administration, have left a historical legacy that continues to foster a positive perception of Türkiye in Niger.

Türkiye’s Africa policy

This historical legacy of the Ottomans gained further significance following Ankara’s institutionalization of its Africa policy through the ‘Action Plan for Opening Up to Africa’, launched by Türkiye in 1998. This process of opening up paved the way for diplomatic contacts with Niger to gain momentum from the 2000s onwards. The mutual opening of embassies by Türkiye and Niger in 2012, and the official visit to Niger by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in his capacity as Prime Minister in 2013, marked the beginning of a new era in bilateral relations.

Since then, Türkiye’s relations with Niger, which it regards as a strategic partner in Africa, have moved beyond diplomatic contacts to take on a more concrete character in areas such as energy, defense, trade, education and cultural cooperation. Ankara is strengthening the historical and cultural ties between the two countries through the Programme Coordination Office (PKO) of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and the schools run by the Türkiye Maarif Foundation. In the health sector, one of the most significant steps,  the Niger-Türkiye Friendship Hospital, was opened in October 2019. Through these measures, Türkiye aims to establish a long-term, multi-dimensional partnership with Niger, rather than pursuing a policy focused solely on economic interests.

Following the coup in Niger in 2023, Türkiye did not sever its diplomatic ties and continued its strategic investments whilst maintaining its interest in Niger. On 17 July 2024, a high-level delegation, including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Minister of National Defence Yaşar Güler and Minister of Energy Alparslan Bayraktar, visited Niamey. During the visit, significant agreements were signed in the fields of security, energy and trade, whilst decisions on cooperation in the fields of education and health were also taken. Furthermore, the signing of a declaration of intent for cooperation in the oil and natural gas sector during these talks, and the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation in the mining sector in October 2024, demonstrate that relations between the two countries have now extended to the energy and mining sectors as well.

The fight against terrorism

Other key issue that came to the fore between the two countries in recent years is cooperation in the fight against terrorism and in the field of security. Niger is one of the countries most affected by the rise in terrorist incidents in the Sahel in recent years. The country is exposed to terrorist activities by the Al-Qaeda-linked JNIM and the ISIS-linked ISSP, particularly in its western border regions via the Liptako-Gourma security zone, and by ISWAP and Boko Haram elements in the south-east via the Lake Chad Basin. In this context, where Niger has terminated its military cooperation with Western partners, notably France and the US, Türkiye is emerging as a reliable strategic partner thanks to its growing defense industry capacity, experience in counter-terrorism, security cooperation and active diplomatic initiatives.

These factors are strengthening the strategic dimension of relations between the two countries and ensuring that Türkiye is viewed as an important partner by Niger. In this context, Niger, which cooperates with Türkiye in the fields of defense and security, is importing various defence industry products from Türkiye to enhance its capacity in the fight against terrorism. Furthermore, the On-Site Training Support Protocol signed in April 2026 demonstrates that security cooperation between the two countries is not limited to the supply of defence industry products, but also encompasses military training support and intelligence. It is evident that, through these collaborations, Niger aims to achieve its objective of conducting more effective and successful counter-terrorism operations.

One of the key pillars of the developing relations between the two countries is the strengthening of economic ties and trade. Following the military intervention in Niger in 2023, the country has gone through a difficult period due to sanctions imposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the suspension of financial support and security cooperation by Western partners. During this difficult period, Niger’s Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance, Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine, visited Türkiye to strengthen economic and political ties. Within this framework, Türkiye has continued to develop its economic relations with Niger.

Investments in the energy, mining, construction and trade sectors have not only enhanced Türkiye’s economic presence in Niger but have also contributed to Niger’s efforts to diversify its development and external partnerships. Indeed, the fact that the volume of trade between Türkiye and Niger is projected to rise from approximately 38.9 million dollars in 2012 to 273 million dollars by 2025 is one of the concrete indicators of this economic rapprochement. In the same year, Türkiye’s exports to Niger amounted to 214 million dollars, whilst imports from Niger stood at 59 million dollars. Furthermore, the signing of the joint declaration on the establishment of JETCO during Tchiani’s visit to Ankara can be regarded as a significant step towards conducting economic cooperation on a more structured and institutionalized basis.

In conclusion, these developments demonstrate that the multi-dimensional cooperation between Türkiye and Niger, which has gained momentum since 2020, has moved beyond diplomatic rhetoric and has begun to produce tangible results through trade, institutional agreements and sectoral partnerships.

(Originally published in Turkish by the Middle East Africa website)

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he political crisis in Iraq, which lasted for approximately six months, was partially resolved on May 14, when Ali Faleh Kazem Al-Zaidi’s government secured a partial vote of confidence in parliament. However, it would be an oversimplification to view the situation in Baghdad merely as a delayed government negotiation. For whilst politics in Iraq may appear to be functioning today, the balance that sustains the system is becoming increasingly fragile.

The presidential election process laid this bare. For months, a two-thirds majority could not be secured in parliament. The election of Nizar Amedi, the candidate of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), as president cleared the way for the government; however, the resulting picture points to a period in which new power distributions are becoming visible rather old balances continuing. Indeed, the fragmentation within the Shia political sphere, the intensifying rivalry between the KDP and the KYB, the emergence of more pragmatic networks among Sunni political actors, and the internal divisions within groups aligned with Iran all indicate that the political landscape in Baghdad has shifted.

Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to claim that the system has completely collapsed. Indeed, in the new framework, the presidency remains with the Kurds, the premiership with the Shias, and the speakership of parliament with the Sunnis. However, it is evident that the political balance underpinning this structure no longer reflects the old Iraq. In the current order, alliances are formed more flexibly, the political arena is becoming more fragmented, and actors are acting more pragmatically. Yet the state apparatus is failing to centralize to the same extent.

It is possible to interpret this emerging picture as a form of ‘asymmetric continuity’. In other words, the system continues, but the political algorithm that sustains it is changing. Indeed, as the sphere of representation expands, decision-making capacity becomes increasingly fragile. The manner in which the Zeydi government was formed also demonstrated this. Of the 23 ministers, only 14 were able to secure a vote of confidence in parliament. The confidence votes for some ministers were postponed, some candidates withdrew, and others were outright rejected. For Iraq, the issue is no longer merely forming a government; it is about establishing a state structure that functions, can make decisions, and possesses the capacity to exercise sovereignty over the country.

Foreign policy balance

It is precisely at this point that the US-Iran balance is once again becoming decisive. Historically, Iraqi politics has been interpreted through the narrow prism of ‘whether the US or Iran is “winning” Yet the recent process has revealed a different picture. Neither can Iran be pushed outside the system, nor can Washington establish a decisive sphere of influence on its own. In this sense, a more controlled model of competition appears to have emerged. The parties are not completely eliminating each other’s room for manoeuvre, but are attempting to establish strategic boundaries.

This situation felt particularly in the security sphere. The fact that certain figures close to Iran can hold positions in the government demonstrates that Tehran’s influence persists, whilst reservations regarding certain critical security posts highlight Washington’s sensitivity regarding Iraq’s security architecture. From the US perspective, the issue is not to eliminate Iranian influence entirely. Given the fragile structure in Iraq, such a move would risk making the system even more unstable. Consequently, within the new balance taking shape in Baghdad, a controlled competitive arena has emerged where the parties do not completely exclude one another but rather limit each other’s scope of action.

The Zeydi government’s program also reflects this very search for balance. The approach of “Stable State – Productive Economy – Balanced Partnerships” actually sets out the government’s orientation quite clearly. Upon close examination of the program, it becomes apparent that security, the economy and foreign policy are not treated as independent spheres, but as components of the same strategic framework. It is fair to say that the strengthening of state capacity, economic reforms, energy investments, the centralization of security decisions and a policy of balance in foreign affairs are all assessed within the same framework.

One of the notable points here is that the government program largely retains the roadmap established during the Sudani era. In particular, the Development Corridor Project, efforts towards integration in the energy sector, and the approach to regional connectivity are continuing. However, despite this strategic continuity in the government program, the political composition of the cabinet appears more fragile compared to the Sudani era. A structure is emerging that is more political, more fragmented and generates more bargaining. Consequently, the fundamental challenge facing Baghdad will be managing the tension between strategic continuity and political fragmentation.

The new equation in Iraq and Türkiye

The recent shift in Türkiye’s policy towards Iraq takes on its full significance precisely here. This is because Ankara no longer views the Iraqi theatre solely through a security-centric lens. The approach that had long been shaped by the PKK threat, border security and military operations is giving way to a broader strategic framework. Iraq’s political stability, economic capacity, regional connectivity and state institutionalization have become direct strategic issues for Türkiye.

Indeed, during the presidential election process and government negotiations, Ankara did not pursue a policy focused on ensuring the victory of a specific candidate or group. For Türkiye, the issue centered not so much on who would become prime minister, but rather on the question of how relations could be maintained within the new equation emerging in Iraq. The swift messages of support issued immediately following the formation of the Zeydi government were also a continuation of this approach.

It is possible to interpret the approach that has become more visible in recent times through the lens of ‘conjunctural rationalism’. Türkiye is upholding its fundamental strategic principles. Iraq’s territorial integrity, political unity, protection from conflict, and the preservation of regional stability remain unchanging priorities for Ankara. However, Türkiye is now implementing these principles through more flexible networks of relations and shifting on-the-ground balances. The controlled normalization developing with the KYB, the new political balance emerging in Kirkuk, and the thaw in relations between Ankara and Sulaymaniyah are all part of this transformation.

This strategic expansion is also evident in the security sphere. Türkiye’s ‘Türkiye Without Terrorism’ process has now moved beyond the traditional security approach confined to the border. This is because the issue is not merely the PKK’s military presence. The structure stretching from Qandil to Sinjar, and from Mahmur to the disputed territories, has also become part of Iraq’s sovereignty crisis.

Ankara’s broader strategic approach

For this reason, Ankara has recently been developing a broader strategic approach that, alongside military operations, seeks to build state capacity, institutional cooperation, economic integration and connectivity. Today, Türkiye does not view the security issues emerging in the Iraqi and Syrian theaters solely through the prism of the presence of armed groups. The real issue lies in the political, military and economic vacuums arising in areas where state capacity has eroded. For this reason, alongside moving security risks away from the border, Türkiye is seeking to establish a regional stability corridor that will contribute to filling these vacuums as much as possible.

The Development Corridor Project therefore holds a special place. It appears that Iraq, which has long served as a transit zone for conflicts, is for the first time turning towards an endeavor to establish itself as a regional hub through connectivity. Iraq’s status as a central country is regaining significance here. For Iraq is not merely a fragile geography; it is also one of the Middle East’s most critical transit zones.

Virtually every regional crisis in recent years has demonstrated this once again. The US-Iran tensions, the fragility arising after the Gaza war, and the new equation emerging following Israel’s attacks on Iran have all directly affected Iraq. This is because Iraq continues to be one of the areas where regional power struggles intersect. For this reason, any political vacuum that emerges in Baghdad can quickly transform into an arena of regional competition.

However, this very central geographical position also affords Iraq a significant strategic advantage. In terms of energy routes, trade corridors, transport networks and regional connectivity, Iraq’s geopolitical position makes it one of the Middle East’s most critical hubs. Consequently, whether the country reverts to a fragile fault line beset by conflict and proxy struggles, or emerges as a hub for regional integration, holds the potential to produce outcomes that will shape not only Iraq’s but the entire region’s future.

Precisely for this reason, it would be a mistake to interpret the strategic rapprochement that has emerged between Türkiye and Iraq in recent times as merely a routine bilateral process. The new ground being established here is evolving into one of the key battlegrounds in the struggle between security-centered fragmentation and connectivity-centered integration in the Middle East. However, the sustainability of this process does not depend solely on the strategic will demonstrated by Ankara. Baghdad also needs to manage the balance between political flexibility and state capacity. Therefore, the direction Iraq takes in the coming period will directly affect not only the country’s domestic political future but also the direction along which the regional order will be shaped.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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n recent years, the Eastern Mediterranean has become one of the most sensitive arenas of regional competition shaped around energy resources. The main reason for this sensitivity is that regional resources are viewed not merely as economic assets, but also as strategic instruments in terms of sovereignty, security, and power politics. Indeed, the intensifying competition in the Eastern Mediterranean has further deepened the existing political and military tensions in the region. One of the most striking examples of this tension today is Israel’s attempt to render ineffective the maritime border understanding reached between Lebanon and Israel in October 2022 under US mediation through unilateral and coercive moves.

The process leading to the agreement was the outcome of a long-standing maritime jurisdiction dispute. The area between Lebanon’s Line 29 claim and the border approach imposed by Israel in its own favour had gone far beyond a technical issue of maritime delimitation because of its high hydrocarbon potential. Under the understanding reached, the maritime boundary was drawn on the basis of Line 23. Thus, while Israel secured its sovereign rights over the Karish field, which was ready for natural gas production, Lebanon was given the opportunity to continue exploration activities in Block 9, which includes the Qana field. However, the Beirut administration, under a severe economic crisis, not only had to step back from its Line 29 claim, but was also forced to accept the concession of granting Tel Aviv a share of the possible revenues from the part of the Qana field extending into the Israeli side.

Nevertheless, Lebanon has not yet been able to obtain the short-term economic gains it expected from this understanding. The identification of commercially viable reserves in the Qana field and the transition to actual production are, by their nature, processes that will take time. Moreover, political instability, institutional weaknesses, and uncertainty in the investment environment make Beirut’s energy planning even more fragile. The current conjuncture, in turn, feeds Israel’s effort to transform Lebanon’s political and economic vulnerabilities into an asymmetric advantage in its own favor. Tel Aviv’s approach should therefore be read as part of a broader strategy aimed at eroding Lebanon’s rights over the Qana field and establishing a new hegemonic sphere in favour of Israel within the Eastern Mediterranean energy equation.

The historical continuity of geopolitical conflict

Essentially, although the tension surrounding Lebanese gas in the Eastern Mediterranean may at first appear to be a current maritime jurisdiction dispute between two states, it is part of a broader struggle for power shaped by the control of energy resources.  Throughout the twentieth century, oil in the Middle East, and following the dissolution of the Soviet Union,, energy resources in the Caspian Basin, were among the main factors fuelling sovereignty disputes, external interventions, and struggles for regional influence. From this perspective, the dispute over Lebanese gas can also be read as the contemporary reflection in the Eastern Mediterranean of the historical role of energy resources in generating geopolitical rivalry and power competition.

However, it is not sufficient to explain Israel’s position only through the general conflictual logic of energy geopolitics. The main point that deserves attention here is that Tel Aviv has brought an agreement signed through international mediation back into question in such a short period of time and has sought to create the ground for its unilateral termination. The regional conflicts that have intensified since October 2023, the silence of Western states in the face of Israel’s genocidpole in Gaza, and Tel Aviv’s strategy of leaving Beirut helpless on the ground through military pressure directly extended into the Lebanese arena have turned Israel into a maximalist and revisionist actor that recklessly violates the limits of the international legal order.

Indeed, Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen’s statement in March 2026 describing the 2022 Maritime Border Agreement as a “document of surrender” for Israel and bringing the option of cancellation onto the agenda shows that Tel Aviv is trying to exploit the regional chaos it has deepened in order to reopen Lebanon’s maritime jurisdiction areas to discussion. In other words, Israel’s move targeting Lebanon’s maritime jurisdiction areas and natural gas fields points directly to a development that can be described as an “energy grab”.

The west’s double standards and Europe’s energy supply security

The United States, which was the main architect and mediator of the maritime border understanding in 2022, has not shown any significant reaction to the Israeli Energy Minister’s statements aimed at cancelling the agreement. On the one hand, the Washington administration explains Tel Aviv’s military operations in the region through the discourse of “self-defense”; on the other hand, it does not raise a strong objection to the de facto reopening of maritime borders to discussion or to Israel’s moves that put pressure on Lebanon’s sovereign rights.

Europe’s stance is not very different from that of the United States. Brussels’ position is shaped not by the protection of international law, sovereign rights, or Lebanon’s legitimate claims, but rather by the potential value of Eastern Mediterranean gas for European energy supply security. For the European Union, which significantly reduced its dependence on Russian gas after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022, Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon reserves have become one of the important alternatives due to their geographical proximity and potential for supply diversification.

In this new geopolitical environment, the Tel Aviv administration seeks to realize its objective of becoming the dominant actor in the control of energy resources and transport routes in the Eastern Mediterranean by pursuing a more aggressive strategy. Despite this, the silence of Western actors in the face of Israel’s moves to narrow Lebanon’s maritime jurisdiction areas and establish de facto superiority over energy resources reveals the existence of a clear double standard. While the Western world strongly emphasizes territorial integrity and international law when Ukraine is at stake, its reluctance to defend the same principles against Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean reveals a clear double standard.

Lebanon’s economic future and investment risk

For Lebanon, which is grappling with political instability, economic challenges and infrastructure collapse, the potential revenues from the Qana field are viewed not merely as an economic gain, but as a significant opportunity for the state’s recovery and the strengthening of its institutional capacity. However, for a country such as Lebanon, marked by limited economic resources, a fragmented political system and vulnerability to external interference, any uncertainty surrounding energy projects carries serious consequences. In this regard, Israel’s attempt to revive the maritime border dispute has the potential to undermine not only the future of a specific gas field, but also the broader investment climate in Lebanon’s energy sector.

This is because offshore natural gas projects are high-cost, long-term investments that are highly sensitive to political stability. An increase in legal and political uncertainty in such projects may heighten investors’ risk perception, thereby further weakening Lebanon’s position in the regional energy equation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the statements about unilateral cancellation and the threatening rhetoric issued by Tel Aviv clearly show that the issue in the Eastern Mediterranean is not merely a technical border dispute. The picture before us is Israel’s attempt, relying on its military superiority and the silence of Western actors, to erode Lebanon’s right to exercise control over its legitimate energy resources and to establish de facto superiority on the ground. In other words, this process should be read not as a diplomatic disagreement, but as a systematic state-led “energy grab.”

Tel Aviv’s approach once again reveals that Israel is far from being a predictable actor committed to its obligations under international law. International law, diplomatic agreements and border arrangements can easily be eroded in the face of Israel’s Zionist expansionist reflexes. For this reason, Israel’s stance once again confirms the existence of a deep and structural trust problem regarding the sustainability of long-term agreements with Tel Aviv.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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oday’s international system heralds a new historical era marked by major upheavals and multi-layered power struggles. In this age, where global balances are being shaken, the Western-centred order is being called into question, and energy wars, proxy conflicts and economic competition are intensifying, states can only survive not merely through their military might, but through their diplomatic flexibility, historical depth and strategic acumen.

It is precisely in such a period that the decision to hold the NATO Summit in Turkey is not merely a routine organizational choice, but signifies the reaffirmation of Turkey’s weight within the global system on an international scale.

To assess this development merely as a technical preference within the diplomatic calendar would, of course, be an oversimplification. For the positioning of Turkey as a central nation by NATO—the world’s most powerful military-political alliance—during such a critical period is a clear consequence of the strategic influence Ankara has built up in recent years.

Undoubtedly, Turkey has become a state closely monitored by global power centres not merely due to its geographical advantages, but also because of its crisis-resolution capacity, multifaceted diplomatic approach and independent political reflexes.

Diplomatic paradigm and the ancient Turkish state mindset

The paradigm developed by Turkey under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in foreign policy has largely transcended the classic ‘peripheral state’ mentality. For many years, Turkey was viewed merely as an outpost of the Western security architecture; today, it has transformed into a power centre capable of devising its own strategy, negotiating with global actors when necessary, and making independent moves when required. We cannot explain this transformation solely through the technical tools of modern politics; rather, behind this success lies the ancient Turkish state experience and the accumulated heritage of civilization.

In Turkish political thought, the state has been viewed not merely as an administrative mechanism, but as the bearer of the historical order. Indeed, Yusuf Has Hacib, in the Kutadgu Bilig, speaks of four fundamental elements that sustain the state: justice, reason, happiness and contentment. In other words, according to him, the greatness of a ruler is measured not merely by the strength of his army, but by his ability to interpret the changing conditions of the world. Today, the delicate balance Turkey has established between East and West is precisely a contemporary manifestation of this historical philosophy of the state. For Ankara is no longer a passive but a decisive actor.

There is a Turkey that is working to prevent the spread of war in the Black Sea, capable of establishing grain corridor diplomacy, and able to maintain contact with both Moscow and Kyiv simultaneously. There is a Turkey that shapes normalization processes in the Middle East, develops diplomatic influence in Africa, deepens integration with the Turkic world, and plays a central role in the European security architecture. The hosting of the NATO Summit in Turkey is, in fact, a natural consequence of this multi-layered influence.

One of the most striking aspects of President Erdoğan’s foreign policy is his transformation of Turkey from a country that merely reacts defensively into a state capable of making strategic moves. Self-confidence has been a defining element of this approach. Turkey has emerged not merely as a country exposed to the consequences of global decisions, but as an actor influencing the very process by which those decisions are shaped. Undoubtedly, this situation also represents a significant shift in mindset within modern Turkish foreign policy.

At the core of this changing mindset lies the historical continuity referred to as the ‘Turkish state mind’. The Turkish state tradition has always been noted for its ability to maintain balance even during chaotic periods. Nizam al-Mulk, the Grand Vizier of the Great Seljuk Empire, states in his Siyasetname (policy) that the survival of the state can be safeguarded not only through force, but also through reason, diplomacy and stability. In his view, a statesman must be able to employ both hard power and wisdom simultaneously. The multi-dimensional diplomacy pursued by today’s Turkey is a reflection of this historical legacy.

The Antalya Diplomacy Forum and the new narrative being forged

Indeed, in recent years Turkey has built up significant capacity not only in the military sphere but also in the diplomatic arena. One of the most significant examples of this is undoubtedly the Antalya Diplomacy Forum. Despite its relatively short history, the forum has become one of the key meeting places in global politics. The fact that leaders from vastly different political traditions—from Africa to Europe, and from Asia to Latin America—can come together on the same platform demonstrates the new sphere of influence Turkey has established in global diplomacy.

The success of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum cannot be explained by organizational ability alone. The real issue is Turkey’s development of a new diplomatic discourse and paradigm. Whilst most Western-centric diplomatic platforms are now unable to adequately address global crises, a more inclusive and multi-polar approach is attracting attention in Antalya.

Here, Turkey is not merely the host but also the bearer of a new international discourse. The Antalya Diplomacy Forum has, in effect, become an intellectual showcase of the Turkish state’s vast capacity.

This is because the forum demonstrates Turkey’s claim to be not merely a military or economic power, but also an intellectual centre. Bringing together different actors in world politics around the same table is not merely a logistical achievement, but a capacity to generate trust. Diplomacy, after all, is not just the management of states, but also the management of trust.

This situation gains even greater significance when viewed from a civilizational perspective. Al-Farabi states that, in his conception of a virtuous state, the ruler’s fundamental duty is to establish social order based on justice and wisdom. According to him, politics is not brute force, but the art of guiding society through higher reason. The active diplomacy Turkey has pursued in recent years is, in every sense, an example of this very mindset.

This is one of the key aspects of the language President Erdoğan has established in international politics. He is striving to reposition Turkey not merely through economic or military parameters, but alongside its historical identity. The relations developed with the Turkic world, the outreach to Africa, diplomatic activities in the Islamic world, and the balanced relations maintained with the West are all components of this broad vision.

The hosting of the NATO Summit in Turkey is therefore not merely a security-focused development. This choice also demonstrates that Turkey is once again recognized as a central power within the international system. For the world of politics now realizes that it is impossible to achieve a balance without Turkey. From energy routes to migration crises, and from Black Sea security to the equations of the Middle East, Ankara now plays a decisive role in numerous issues.