The killing of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis by a US UAV strike in Baghdad has changed the course of tensions between Iran and the US. The accumulation of recent aggressions in the Persian Gulf and in Iraq and Syria between two countries has paved the way for further escalation. But, no one was expecting the US to assassinate the Commander of the Quds Force of Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Deputy Leader of Iraqi People’s Protection Units (PMU-a.k.a. Hashd al Shabi), Shiite militia forces in Iraq.

Iran has built up its regional deterrence and de-stabilization capacity in two areas in addition to its conventional military capacity since 1979: (i) long-range missile technology and (ii) mobilization of influence over the Shiite militias in other countries. Both keep any existing or emerging threat away from Iranian territory. Apart from the missile technology, Iran’s mobilization and militarization of Shiites in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain and Afghanistan has been regarded as its most effective regional deterrence method. The Quds Force is the Iranian military apparatus to bridge potential Shiite militia capabilities with Iranian security and political agenda. The interactions between Iran and the Shiite militias were seen in Iran-Hezbollah solidarity in Lebanon, Iranian-Houthi solidarity in Yemen, Iran-Hasd al-Shabi solidarity in Iraq, Iran-Hazara/Afghan Shiite solidarity in Afghanistan, and Iran-Regime solidarity in Syria. Qassem Soleimani was the most influential figure in connecting the Shiite peoples in different countries through a militarized agenda.

Arab Spring, Emergence of Daesh and KRG Referendum: Opportunity for Iranian Expansionism

Qassem Soleimani acted as military advisor to Bashar al-Assad and as a field commander in fighting against the Syrian opposition forces during Syrian Civil War since 2011. Soleimani and his militia forces played an active role in seizure of Aleppo, Homs and southern Idlib. Qassem Soleimani and Shiite militias took credit for protecting Erbil and Baghdad and for capturing Mosul from Daesh (ISIS). Iran and the United States were fighting in the same ranks against Daesh in Iraq between 2014 and 2017. The cooperation between the US Air Force and Iranian backed ground forces resulted in the defeat of Daesh in Iraq. This was assumed as a de facto recognition of Iran’s expansion into Iraq. Qassem Soleimani also pushed Iranian expansionism into Yemen militarily by supporting Houthi rebels in Yemen against a Saudi Arabian intervention in 2015. This was during the time when the US and its allies were busy fighting against Daesh in Iraq and Syria, and the violence of the Syrian Civil War was at its peak. Soleimani was also an influential figure preventing the Kurdish Regional Government’s (KRG) claims to independence in northern Iraq. He is believed to have convinced the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) to stay neutral when Central Iraqi forces took control of Kirkuk in October 2017, and also warned Kurdish leaders before the Iraqi attack that: “Abadi has all the regional powers and the West is behind him and nothing will stop him from forcing you to return back to the mountains if he decides so.”

Race for Escalation

Although the US forces worked with Shiite militias in fighting against Daesh in Iraq, the Iranian general behind the militia’s power became the primary target after the common threat of Daesh was eliminated. The US feared that Iraq was slipping away from US influence into an Iranian orbit. Unlike US policy towards Iran during the Obama era, the Trump administration acted more aggressively by abandoning the Iran Nuclear Deal in 2018 and sanctioning Iran in 2019. US actions provoked Iran to act aggressively turning the course of mutual aggression into a race for escalation.

Iranian actions escalating the situation in Persian Gulf and beyond are as follows:

• 13 June 2019, two oil tankers were hit in the Oman Sea (possibly by Shiite militias)
• 20 June 2019, the Iranian Air Force shot down a US Global Hawk Drone
• 20 July 2019, Iran seized a British oil tanker
• 14 September 2019, ARAMCO oil facilities were hit in Saudi Arabia (by Shiite Houthis)
• 27 December 2019, the US military base in Kirkuk (K1) was hit by rocket attack (possibly by Shiite militias)
• 29 December 2019, Shiite demonstrators attempted to seize US Embassy in Baghdad.

US actions escalating the situation in the Gulf and beyond are as follows:

• 29 December 2019, US Air Force units carried out a series of airstrikes against the Iranian-backed Kataib Hezbollah militias (Brigades of the Party of God) positions in al-Qaim in Iraq.
• 2 January 2020, US UAVs conducted airstrikes against Qassem Soleimani convoy after leaving Baghdad Airport.
• January 2020, the US and Israeli Air Force conducted airstrikes against the IRGC and PMU positions near Abu Kamal on Iraqi-Syrian border.

The US has seized supremacy of escalation from Iran, and Iran is now expected to act in retaliation rather than with proactive measures. Iran has many asymmetric options to fatally complicate US escalation decisions. The US fears that Iran will avenge the killing of Qassem Soleimani through some clandestine or missile actions. The US alerted its embassies and military bases in Iraq, Bahrain, Pakistan, Lebanon, UAE, and Kuwait. The US already sent around 500 troops to Lebanon, 100 troops to Baghdad, 750 to Kuwait, and 3500 more are on their way to bases in the Middle East.

Losers, Winners and Opportunists

The US-Iran showdown will definitely cause further destabilization of Iraq and cause a larger rift between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds. This may result in permanent government problems in Iraq that may lead to a de-facto division of the country. In the absence of Sunni and Kurdish MPs, the Iraqi parliament voted on January 5, 2020, to authorize the Iraqi government to end the security agreement with the US and end the presence of foreign troops. In addition, Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr issued a statement on the same day demanding the closure of the US embassy; the immediate end to the security deal with the US, the closure of US bases in a humiliating way, the protection of Iraq be handed to the resistance militias, and the boycott of US products. Although many of these demands are not realistic to implement, the Shiite presence in Iraq would make aggressive position against the US likely. On the other hand, the Syrian Regime may be added to the losers due to the loss of an influential military advisor and field commander of the Syrian Civil War. Moreover, US and Israeli airstrikes against the Shiite militia positions are expected to gradually increase.

Turkey will possibly be influenced positively by the crisis between Iran and the US. The US military’s use of Turkish airspace for its re-supply mission in the Middle East suggests that while the US is actively confronting Iran, Trump won’t take any action against Turkey in terms of the latest congressional sanctions against Turkey’s role in Libya. If the U.S. is expelled from Iraq, the central Iraqi government will look to Turkey as a security and defense partner while the KRG will also look more to Turkey as security provider. In such scenarios, Turkey can deepen its military operations against the PKK and try to mediate between Iran and the U.S. This may also help Turkey-U.S. relation recover.

The KRG and Israel could be counted as the opportunists. In the midst of the Iraq-US tension, the KRG may attempt to gain more sympathy for its independence cause from the US. . If this happens, a stronger public opinion could be molded to argue that the Kurds are one of the few allies of the US in the region. The Kurdish MPs’ boycott of voting in the Iraqi Parliament is also illustrative of the KRG’s strategy for leaning towards US support. On the other hand, Israel is expected to join the US’s air campaigns against Iranian and Shiite militias’ positions in Syria and Iraq in order to confront and eliminate the Iranian influence there. Another possible scenario is that Israeli-U.S. solidarity may evolve into direct action against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

The consequences of American and Iranian escalations were expected to vary from further threats against Iran by the US -in case of Iranian retaliation of Soleimani- to the Iranian declaration ending its nuclear deal commitments. He latter has already happened. However, the consequences of the killing of Soleimani can pave the way for further conflict amongst the losers, winners and opportunists in the region with the involvement of other regional and global actors in Middle East. 

The U.S. Senate confirmed Trump’s nominee for U.S. ambassador to Turkey, David Satterfield. An esteemed career foreign service officer, Satterfield’s time with the foreign service goes back to the early 80s where he served in Jeddah, Tunis, Beirut, and Damascus. He then moved on to become the Director of the Executive Secretariat staff from 1990 to 1993 when he served on the National Security Council Staff as Director for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until 1996. After, he was appointed Director of the Department of State’s Office of Israel and Arab-Israeli affairs until 1998 when he was confirmed by the Senate as Ambassador to Lebanon.

Satterfield played a crucial role in the Middle East after the September 11 attacks and invasion of Iraq, acting as Deputy Assistant Secretary until 2004 and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs until May 2005. He subsequently took on the role of Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq in August of 2006 and then Director General of the Multinational Force and Observers. Since 2014, he has served as Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for Libya and in 2017, he was appointed as Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs.

Satterfield’s relationship with Ankara will extend beyond Turkey’s borders as he must consider the scope of the turmoil in the region.

Satterfield enters the arena as U.S. Ambassador to Turkey at a time when the bilateral relationship is not exactly at an all-time high. The U.S. is essentially harboring a Turkish fugitive, Fetullah Gulen, and working with the YPG who Turkey considers a terrorist threat while Turks have purchased an S400 missile system from Russia. Satterfield has his work cut out for him, but his resume proves that he might be the best shot at reconciling these deeply rooted tensions.

With Turkey as a rising regional power and a NATO ally, it is in the U.S. strategic interest to use diplomacy as a conduit for a better relationship. Satterfield made it clear in an April 15 telephone briefing. Maintaining security, fostering transparency and liberal values, and upholding rules-based institutions should be at the top of his agenda, and using his experience as a diplomat from the First and Second Gulf Wars has the potential to point relations in the right direction.

Satterfield is a seasoned veteran when it comes to foreign service. So, will he offer Turkey carrots or come down hard with sticks?

His relationship with Ankara will extend beyond Turkey’s borders as he must consider the scope of the turmoil in the region. Iran is planning to increase its uranium enrichment beyond the limits of the JCPOA, and the crisis in Syria continues unabated. The U.S. cannot afford more failed diplomatic efforts with its allies, especially in a region as fragile as the Middle East, but Satterfield’s experience serving the Clinton and W. Bush administrations shows a promising trajectory of U.S.-Turkey relations. He now has the ability to work alongside James Jeffrey, the Secretary’s Special Representative for Syria Engagement and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, who has expressed open mindedness and optimism vis-a-vis Turkey. The State Department duo is poised to actively engage with the Turks to find common ground and reconstruct the alliance. The U.S. needs level-headed, capable diplomats to conduct foreign affairs and foster good relationships, and Satterfield is as qualified as they come.

The only smudge on his record isn’t even a smudge at all. In 2005, two members of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) were indicted in U.S. courts for disclosing classified information to Israeli officials. Satterfield was mentioned as a “government official” in the indictment and served as a witness for the defense. The complicated case involving U.S. national security was eventually dropped by the Justice Department and Satterfield was dismissed unscathed. Even after this, he still preserved a good reputation on both sides of the aisle.

Satterfield is a seasoned veteran when it comes to foreign service. So, will he offer Turkey carrots or come down hard with sticks? The U.S. cannot expect to leverage its power everywhere. Turkey needs reassurance and the Americans need an olive branch. A better relationship will only come when they recognize the value of soft power and come to a consensus like allies should.

When the demonstrations in Syria started, the U.S. was fast on the very forefront, declaring its support to the demands for a democratic and free Syria. However, after 8 years of war, the U.S. has sidelined itself in the dispute between the Assad regime and the Syrian opposition, abandoning the later entirely. Nevertheless, the formulated U.S. ambitions in Syria bring up the need for the U.S. to re-engage with the Syrian opposition, namely the Syrian National Army. Otherwise, the U.S. goals for Syria will remain as meaningless words, likely to be redrafted by military measures of the regime axis.

According to U.S. Special Envoy James Jeffrey, the main goals of the U.S. in Syria are to ensure the defeat of Daesh, force Iran out of Syria and change the behavior of the Assad regime. While many in Washington think that they can enforce these terms by economic means – like sanctions as a stick and funds for reconstruction as a carrot – and staying inside Syria until U.S. terms are accepted, the regime axis does not seem impressed. The current carrot and stick strategy is based upon the assumption that the regime and Russia has a huge interest in re-building the formerly opposition-held areas it destroyed itself, and the miscalculation of the regime’s behavior. If economic sanctions would be enough to enforce terms on the regime, the regime would have accepted them when it was on the verge of collapse before the Russian intervention in 2015 and in 2013, when the regime almost lost control over all of Syria.

Many in Washington think that the U.S. can enforce its terms in Syria only by economic means – like sanctions as a stick and funds for reconstruction as a carrot.

In regards to Iran, I argued last week that the U.S. has limited options in Syria and has no real effective way of dealing with Iran in Syria. The last U.S. ambition in Syria is the enduring defeat of Daesh in which the U.S. has reportedly invested about $14.3 billion until June 30, 2017, but now the organization is re-grouping underground and conducting several attacks in Syria and Iraq. Some analysts like the ISW report suggests that Daesh has the capacity to capture an urban center. Focusing on Syria; there is a huge correlation between YPG-held areas and Daesh attacks.

Source: Tomasz Rolbieck

In order to be capable of achieving any goals in Syria, the U.S. needs to re-engage with the Syrian opposition. I am not suggesting that the U.S. change its horses, but that it should come back to its first horse again. The U.S. has mainly abandoned the opposition for two reasons: First, the fight against Daesh, in which the U.S. has regarded the Syrian branch of the PKK the most effective, and second, the ties between the Syrian opposition and extremists.

Regardless of the truth in these arguments, currently none of them apply. The first fight against Daesh is now in a new era in which popular support and acceptable governance will be the main effective tools to grab the extremists from their pool of recruitment and target their survivability. In regards to Iran, the Syrian opposition is a natural enemy of Iran and empowering them will ultimately help to force Iranians out of Syria. By supporting the Syrian opposition, the U.S. will have more room to ‘change the behavior’ of the regime in line with the UN-coordinated process.

The U.S. needs to re-engage with the Syrian opposition. I am not suggesting that the U.S. change its horses, but that it should come back to its first horse again.

In this matter, the Syrian National Army (SNA) provides the U.S. with a good opportunity. Composed of Arabs, Turkmens and Kurds, the SNA is the official armed structure of the Syrian Interim Government, which was formed by the Syrian opposition. The areas held by the SNA are totally separated from any extremist faction. Of the 28 factions in the SNA, 13 were previously supported by the U.S., 11 were established after U.S. support came to an end, and 22 fought against Daesh.

In recent days, the world has been on the verge of a potential war between Iran and the U.S. over the shooting down of an American drone by Iranian air-defense units. The Trump administration stopped the military response and considered the planned strike inappropriate for the downing of an unmanned air vehicle. The current escalation in the Basra Bay may have seemingly calmed down, but will the downing of the U.S. drone have real-life implications for Iran in Syria. Or more, what are the U.S. abilities and weaknesses in responding within the Syrian theatre?

Over the years, the U.S. sidelined itself in Syria by abandoning the Syrian opposition and solely focusing on the fight against Daesh. The U.S. made it a pre-condition not to fight against the Assad regime in order to obtain U.S. support, supplies and training to fight against Daesh. Most Free Syrian Army factions rejected to end their fight against the regime and were not co-opted by the U.S. As a result of this policy and other factors, the U.S. partnered with the Syrian branch of the PKK and formed the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), ergo not an enemy of Iran.

The SDF is not capable and is unwilling to confront Iran.

If the U.S. wants to take bold steps to undermine Iranian presence in Syria, its partners on the ground are an alliance of forces who did not come together to fight against Iran, and lack the motivation to do so. The SDF is not capable and is unwilling to confront Iran. Therefore, the U.S. seems limited in its ambitions to cut the Tehran-Damascus land route via Albu Kamal in southeast Syria. To go offensive on the ground against Iran seems unlikely. Only an over-extended air support might overdo the unwillingness of the SDF to cut the land route. However, this may open other fronts of weaknesses for the U.S. and risk the demobilization of some SDF units, including its biggest Arab component, the Shanadid Forces.

Another possibility for the U.S. to confront Iran in Syria might be through Israel. Israeli air forces have conducted several airstrikes against Iranian targets in Syria, but the extent of the Israeli air campaign is limited by Russia’s behavior to look the other way when Israeli air forces enter Syrian air space, and by the regime’s air-defense capabilities. Nevertheless, the Israelis might function as an important asset for the U.S. to strike Iranian positions in Syria as its own air force would need to challenge the Russian air-superiority in western Syria.

The U.S. could also use sanctions as a vehicle to undermine the Iranian role in Syria by targeting the Iranian regime and businessmen, and Iranian economical transactions as well as Iranian assets to gain money from Syria via business agreements. The U.S. can make life hard for Iran, but the effect of such actions would not be decisive.

In the U.S-Iran feud, the U.S. has limited options in Syria and has no real effective way of dealing with Iran in Syria.

As an exceptional way to limit Iran, the proposal made by the United Arab Emirates can come to mind as well. The UAE re-engaged with the Assad regime, arguing to limit Iran and Turkey by offering the regime an alternative. However, this option is the product of mindless politics. The regime will not abandon Iran, which saved the regime when everyone abandoned it, and especially not when all Iranian militias are in Syria. Lastly, the U.S. could target Iran by empowering the Syrian opposition, a natural enemy of Iran in Syria, but this would mean to re-evaluate U.S. policies in Syria again.

All in all, in the U.S-Iran feud, the U.S. has limited options in Syria and has no real effective way of dealing with Iran in Syria. This is because the U.S.’ policy on Syria is constructed in a way in which the fight against Iran was not and could not be a part of it. In order to challenge Iran in Syria, the U.S. needs to re-start its Syrian policy.

The year of 2019, and especially its first half, will go into the history of Turkey-U.S. relations as a critical turning point. At no point during the 70 years of bilateral relations, there existed such a strong opposition towards Turkey in Washington, as there is today. Within the first five months of the year, almost 10 bills and resolutions regarding Turkey were introduced in the U.S. Congress. Turkey’s plan to purchase the S-400 air defense systems has brought all groups in the U.S. opposing Turkey together, with Congress coming first. From the Armenian lobby to the Greek lobby, from the Jewish lobby to Neo-con think-tanks and the Central Command (CENTCOM), a wide range of actors are working to block progress in politics and diplomacy by using anti-Turkish propaganda. Statements made and the bills that are introduced show that the common point of all this propaganda is Ankara’s purchase of the S-400 systems.

Upon a brief examination of the latest developments in relations between Turkey and the U.S., a difference in discourse between Ankara and Washington on the subject of the S-400 can be clearly observed. Turkey defines the S-400 agreement as one that is complete and finalized. It must be noted that despite this, statements made by U.S. authorities portray the situation regarding the S-400 systems as one where Ankara can still be convinced. Within the last few weeks, reports citing anonymous sources emerged in the U.S. stating that Turkey was offered to indefinitely delay the purchase of the S-400s and that Ankara was evaluating this option. But these claims were dismissed by Turkish authorities.

At no point during the 70 years of bilateral relations, there existed such a strong opposition towards Turkey in Washington, as there is today.

A statement pushing the boundaries of diplomacy regarding the Istanbul elections was published by the U.S. Department of State. The expression in the statement that the U.S. “took note” of the decision to cancel the election is one that is hard to understand diplomatically. On the other hand, it has been expressed that regarding Syria, the meetings between the two countries are positively progressing. The 50% tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminum exports to the U.S. introduced during the Brunson crisis were also reduced to 25%. Beyond these topics, anti-Turkey propaganda and the pressure applied on the administration in regards to the S-400 issue continues.

Anti-Turkish sentiment in the U.S. Congress

On the subject of Turkey, most of the pressure applied on the administration comes from Congress. It’s no secret that whenever Trump closes his doors and starts engaging with Turkey, members of Congress come forward with statements, bills and resolutions opposing Turkey. It must be emphasized that this anti-Turkish sentiment in Congress causes great damage to bilateral relations. Attempting to keep Ankara on Washington’s side by applying pressure on the subject of defense while Turkey is trying to overcome national security matters is not an attitude that is possible to explain in strategic terms. Due to the fact that there is a “diffusion of power” in the global arena against the U.S., the administration is planning a national security strategy that prioritizes rivalry between great powers. In such a situation, the approach of applying pressure on an actor, especially one that has played a critical role during the Cold War era, should not be expected to serve the interests of the U.S. in any way.

Within the last three months, seven bills directly concerning Turkey were introduced to the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. All these bills had both Democrat and Republican representatives as their sponsors. This is important in illustrating the scale of anti-Turkish sentiment in the U.S. Congress. It is also worth mentioning that almost all of these bills referred to Turkey’s purchase of the S-400s. In other words, seven bills opposing Turkey were introduced to the U.S. Congress within a span of three months, of which all were supported by both Republican and Democrat representatives, and all of these bills included opposition to the purchase of S-400 air defense systems, whether relevant to the bill or not.

Anti-Turkey sentiment in the U.S. Congress is high. Within the last three months, seven bills directly concerning Turkey were introduced, all with the support of both Democrat and Republican representatives.

The first of these bills is the National Defense Authorization Act of 2019. This act is also known as the defense budgeting bill. While its general purpose is drawing the limits of Pentagon’s budget, it also contains many sections regarding foreign policy. Parts of this bill are dedicated to Turkey and request a report from the U.S. Department of State and Department of Defense regarding Ankara’s purchase of the S-400s. The National Defense Authorization Act of the previous year also requested a report on the same subject and this was presented to Congress in November. However, this time it was requested for the report to be updated and that until this report was submitted, the delivery of F-35s to Turkey to be stopped. Prior to this bill, the temporary spending bill that ended the temporary spending crisis between Trump and Congress and allowed the Federal Government to reopen also requested the U.S. Department of Defense, in consultation with the State Department, to submit a report regarding the status of the Turkish-American alliance and Turkey’s purchase of the S-400s. Until the report is submitted, or until November 1, 2019, the transfer of any F-35 aircraft or equipment to Turkey has thus been banned.

The first bill that directly concerned Turkey was introduced on March 28, 2019, by Republican Oklahoma Senator James Lankford, Democratic New Hampshire Senator Jeanne Shaheen, Republican North Carolina Senator Thamos Tillis and Democratic Maryland Senator Chris Van Hollen. The bill titled “Protecting NATO Skies Act” states that no F-35 aircraft should be transferred to Turkey until the U.S. government confirms that Turkey will not receive any S-400 air defense systems. The bill also states that no intellectual property and data regarding the maintenance of F-35s must be transferred to Turkey and that no storage facilities for these aircrafts should be established in the country.

The bill also emphasizes that Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 systems is within the scope of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and states that “such a purchase would endanger the integrity of the NATO alliance, would adversely affect ongoing operations of the United States Armed Forces, including coalition operations in which the United States Armed Forces participate, would result in a significant impact to defense cooperation between the United States and Turkey, and would significantly increase the risk of compromising United States defense systems and operational capabilities.” A similar bill was also introduced to the House of Representatives. Of course, it must be expressed that the points of whether these bills will be considered alone or appended to another bill, or whether they’ll undergo changes, are not clear but they are important in reflecting the opinions of Congress.

Other bills suggesting to call the events of 1915 a so-called “Armenian Genocide” were introduced to the Senate and House of Representatives in April. These bills are non-binding. But the fact that Rashida Tlaib, a Muslim U.S. representative who is of Palestinian origin, was among the sponsors of one of these bills presents a situation that must be carefully considered. Another bill introduced to the U.S. Senate was titled “Defending United States Citizens and Diplomatic Staff from Political Prosecutions Act.” This bill directly targeted Turkey and was aimed at Turkish citizens working at U.S. diplomatic missions who have been found to be in contact with the Gulenist Terror Group, also known as FETO. But in this bill as well in the section regarding the outlook of Congress towards Turkey, it was stated that an agreement between Turkey and Russia regarding the S-400s would negatively impact relations between Turkey and the U.S.

There is also another bill that deserves special attention due to the potential it carries of creating many serious strategic consequences if passed into law. This is the bill titled “Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act” introduced by Democratic representative Bob Menendez and Republican representative Marco Rubio, both of whom are members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In the section titled “Findings”, the bill emphasizes the importance of cooperation with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC), Israel and Greece, and states that it opposes behaviors and attitudes in the Mediterranean, Aegean and the Middle East (all but naming Turkey) that are one-sided, in violation of international law and against the principle of maintaining good relations with neighboring countries. It also draws attention to the statement made during the trilateral meeting held between Israel, GCASC and Greece on March 21 that any “ill-intentioned activities” would be defended against, and supports this sentiment. The same section also mentions that Turkey has purchased S-400 systems from Russia and could be subjected to CAATSA sanctions due to this.

The bill emphasizes that the U.S. must ensure energy supply security between its allies. In this section, which expresses that energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean will lead to the economic benefit of Europe, the importance of building the Southern Gas Corridor and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline in reducing Europe’s energy dependency on Russia is stressed. The bill suggests removing the arms embargo on the GCASC, the creation of a U.S. Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center to help energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean between Israel, GCASC, Greece and the U.S., providing Greece with 3 million dollars of foreign military financing assistance, and providing Greece with 2 million dollars and GCASC with 2 million dollars of funding for international military education and training support.

If the Menendez & Rubio bill on the Eastern Mediterranean passes, it will change the existing military status quo in the region.

There are two points that deserve extra attention in the Eastern Mediterranean bill: First, if the bill passes, the U.S. will have officially interfered on the matter of energy resources in the E. Mediterranean in favor of the interests of Israel, Greece and GCASC. Secondly, the U.S. will change the existing military status quo in the region by removing the arms embargo on the GCASC. The U.S. also enforced an arms embargo on Turkey following the Cyprus Peace Operation, but removed this without Ankara hanging its Cyprus policy. The arms embargo on GCASC was kept in place. Despite the fact that many bills put forward with pressure of the Greek lobby recommended the removal of the embargo, these attempts failed. The difference in this case is that alongside the subject of energy in the Eastern Mediterranean, this bill also mentions reducing Europe’s energy dependency on Russia and blocking the transfer of F-35 aircrafts to Turkey until it abandons its plans on the S-400s. This greatly increases the chances that Congress will pass this bill into law. Moreover, the fact that the main sponsors of the bill are Rubio and Menendez, two influential representatives from both sides of the aisle, shows the gravity of the situation.

It can be said that the Greek, Armenian, Jewish and all other anti-Turkish lobbies have found an opportunity to employ all their strategies against Turkey in Congress. There are almost no representatives with a favorable attitude towards Turkey, including Muslim representatives as well. The efforts of Congress to oppose Turkey today are severe enough to cause strategic cracks in relations between the two countries. And the subject of S-400s has been transformed from a technical matter to a political problem between Turkey and the U.S.

Turkey and F-35 

Turkey has repeated the same statements since the day it signed the S-400 agreement. Turkish authorities expressed that this was a finalized agreement and that Ankara urgently needed air defense systems. The administration also added that a joint technical study on the S-400 systems could be conducted with the U.S. in terms of assessing its risks. However, the discourse on the subject changed as the issue became more politicized in the U.S. The U.S. expected this issue to be resolved by Turkey accepting not to activate these systems. Concerns regarding the deployment and activation of these systems were being voiced, but with pressure from the Congress on the administration, the completion of Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 systems have become unacceptable. During budget meetings in Congress, both U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and acting U.S. Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan stated that in the case of Turkey completing the purchase of S-400 systems, the transfer of F-35s will not be allowed. The nuance in the discourse shows how political pressure has affected the administration.

In addition to this, the U.S. has prepared steps that will be taken against Turkey, meaning, the plan to exclude Ankara from the F-35 program. Shanahan confirmed that they met with partners of the F-35 program regarding Ankara’s exclusion from the program after Pentagon stopped the transfer concerning F-35s to Turkey and the manufacture of F-35 parts by Turkish firms. However, the details of this process are even more interesting. In the report presented by the Pentagon to Congress in November, possible complications that may occur in Ankara’s exclusion and legal and judicial concerns along with all precautions that will be taken regarding these concerns are evaluated and plans for all possible scenarios on this subject are clearly described.

An official from the Pentagon stated, “In a letter on July, Secretary Mattis voiced the complications that may occur if Turkey is excluded. And following this the Congress told us to go and take all precautions for the possible situation. And that is what we worked on.” Talks are being held with partnering countries on this subject and strangely enough, more than whether Turkey should be excluded or not, these meetings focus on who will take on the business and production parts that the Turkish defense industry handles, along with where and how this production can be done, meaning its feasibility in the event that Turkey is excluded. In other words, the only worry for partners regarding Turkey’s exclusion is how countries and shareholders remaining in the project will slice up the pie of work that will be created.

One of the most important aspects of the S-400 crisis that must be emphasized is that for the U.S., this subject is no longer a technical matter that can be overcome, but one that is very much a political matter. The perception created in the U.S. is on such a level that it’s being said in meetings of the U.S. National Security Council that Turkey has purchased the S-400 systems especially to operate outside of NATO and that it intends to use these systems against the alliance.

The U.S. expected the S-400 issue to be resolved by Turkey accepting not to activate these systems. 

In meetings concerning national security, it is being discussed that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan believes the U.S. and NATO countries supported FETO’s failed coup attempt and that in case there is another coup attempt and NATO supports this, S-400s could be used against the alliance. The biggest factor in the creation of this perception has been the propaganda from think tanks known for their support for FETO and other terror groups such as the PKK/YPG and names that are well-respected in the U.S. with no tolerance against Turkey. For example, Turkey’s expectation towards Trump bringing sanity back to the U.S.’ Turkey policy by handling the S-400 crisis together with President Erdogan is being attempted to be nullified.

Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), Eric Edelman, who is known for his close relations with FETO and FDD Vice President Jonathan Schanzer discussed this subject in an article published in the Wall Street Journal. Both stated that Trump must not show any tolerance towards Turkey. The article is carefully written and penned as if to constitute a briefing for Trump, and describes Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 systems as a “serious national security threat for the U.S.” The article is almost an attempt to block any moves Trump can make on the subject of the S-400s. At the same time, propaganda about removing U.S. nuclear weapons under the authority of NATO from Turkey is being brought into public discussion by similar organizations and media institutions. Thus, it seems very difficult for the U.S. administration to escape this torrent of manufactured perceptions and focus on the long-term strategic interests of the U.S. These manufactured perceptions also make it impossible for Turkey to express its anxieties regarding its national security and explain its commitment to multinational partnerships such as NATO.

What in the aftermath?

It is not in the interests of the U.S. to pressure Turkey through its national security. Turkey lies in a circle of fire. There’s Russia on one end of the circle and the U.S. on the other. In an environment where global politics is evolving towards such a multipolar order, U.S. pressuring Turkey as if it is the absolute hegemon will not yield any results. Let alone an ally that has thousands of years of state tradition, the U.S. can no longer exert authority on small states such as Venezuela, Cuba, or North Korea, or a state that has been under embargos for years, such as Iran. Russians have taken the Assad regime in Syria at the verge of death from the hands of the U.S. and has revived it. It is unknown why the U.S., seeing Russia and China in every corner in international politics, expects the pressure policy that it engages in at the risk of alienating an actor such as Turkey to yield results.

It is not in the interests of the U.S. to pressure Turkey through its national security. Turkey lies in a circle of fire. There’s Russia on one end of the circle and the U.S. on the other.

Turkey may have economic vulnerabilities and this pressure policy of the U.S. may have an effect on the economy to a certain point, but it will not lead to changes in Turkey’s national security strategy. This is because Turkey is not an actor that can easily be overcome in the region. Second, its national security strategy is based on the security balances and the threats in the region, and it will not negotiate on these points. Third, the acceleration of its national defense industry initiative is another goal that will be executed in parallel to its national security strategy. Turkey has long expressed that it no longer wishes to be exclusively a buyer of military equipment and that it is making investments and engaging in programs towards this goal. Thus, its national defense industry initiative is directly related to the security balances and threats in the region. Turning Turkey back from this point will interfere with the future prosperity of the country.

There is currently a diffusion of power in the global arena. There is no longer a singular hegemon, but regional hegemons. The U.S. is part of this hegemony in every region. It has updated its strategy for the “new cold war” that it has entered with China and Russia according to the principles of competition with great powers and in every region, even in space, is attempting to decrease the influence and presence of Russia and China. Losing Turkey in such an environment would lead to a great loss for the U.S. and Europe in the long run. Whether this policy of pressure will help solve problems between the U.S. and Turkey is still being discussed, but what is obvious is that it is leading to a level of distrust that has never been seen before between the two governments.

While Middle East politics has experienced one of the most chaotic periods in recent years, Israel stands out as the relatively comfortable actor during this process. This situation is clearly seen in Tel-Aviv’s policies toward various issues in the Middle East. The Israeli administration has managed to benefit from region-wide instability and confrontations between regional powers – Tel-Aviv even encouraged such rivalries. It can be argued that Israel has a more advantageous position than ever regarding issues such as Palestine, the Eastern Mediterranean, confronting the Iranian threat and relations with Gulf countries.  

There are a number of reasons behind this situation. First of all, the regional transformation that has been taking place since the start of the Arab revolutions of 2011 has created an uncertain political atmosphere in the region. Israel has considered this uncertainty as an opportunity to expand its sphere of influence. By utilizing various tools, Tel-Aviv achieved to turn the regional political atmosphere to its favour. In an environment where regional actors have been struggling to maintain their national interests and regime security, Israel follows a strategy to increase its influence without any concern that other regional actors have.

Due to regional instability after the Arab revolutions, Israel started to be considered as a stable and strong ally for some Arab leaders, particularly those of the Gulf Kingdoms. While Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain developed strong ties with Israel, Oman hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu. Apart from post-Arab revolutions instability in the Middle East, there are two other motivations for Gulf countries to develop alliances with Israel: the increasing threat perception of Iran and the rising influence of Turkey in the region.

By utilizing various tools, Israel has achieved to turn the uncertainty and regional transformation in the Middle East to its own favor. 

The 2013 military coup in Egypt and the emergence of a regime that does not pose a threat to Israel’s security can also be seen as an important factor that opened the way for Tel-Aviv to seek for much bigger ambitions in Middle East politics. For Israel, eliminating the possibility of a threat from Egypt is the most crucial element for Tel-Aviv’s foreign policy making process. Therefore, by securing its relations with Egypt, Israel was able to follow a more aggressive policy towards the region.

In addition to the above-mentioned reasons, the most important dynamic that allowed Israel to expand its influence in the Middle East is the election of Donald Trump to the presidency in the United States. Since Trump’s election in early 2017, Washington’s support for Israel has increased dramatically. The Trump administration fully supported Israel’s occupation policies and ignored many of Tel-Aviv’s steps in this regard. On many occasions, Trump emphasized that his government would defend the interests of Israel at any cost. Trump’s discourse was into put into practice through various policy choices.

In December 2017, Trump announced that the United States recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. While many U.S. presidents brought this issue onto their agenda, none of them made such a decision. Following this announcement by Trump, the U.S. administration moved its embassy in Israel from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem in May 2018. Finally, in March 2019, during the Israeli operations in Gaza, U.S. President Donald Trump made comments to support Tel-Aviv by saying that Israel was 100% right and could take all necessary measures to protect its citizens.

“Deal of the Century” envisages a solution that prioritizes Israel’s position on Palestine, delivers historic Palestinian territories to Israel and gives Palestinians statehood without sovereignty.

Another example of such support was on the disputed Golan Heights issue. On March 21, 2019, Donald Trump announced that the U.S. recognizes Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights. The Golan Heights, which is regarded as Syrian territory by international law, has been under illegal occupation of Israel for 52 years. With this decision, the United States aimed to support Tel-Aviv’s position on an international level and contribute to the efforts to solve the conflict in favour of Israel.

Finally, with Trump’s rise to power, Israel accelerated its efforts to institutionalize its occupation policies in Palestine. In this context, Trump’s son-in-law and his advisor, Jared Kushner, worked on a plan named as the so-called “Deal of the Century,” to resolve the conflict between Israel and Palestine. The plan, which is expected to be announced in the coming months, envisages a solution that prioritizes Israel’s position on Palestine, delivers historic Palestinian territories to Israel and gives Palestinians statehood without sovereignty. As the discussion continues on the Deal of the Century, Palestinians are determined to stick to their historical lands and claims.

As an indicator of new political alliances, the Deal of the Century is supported by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Despite the support of various regimes, the agreement will not receive support from the Arab people. Therefore, the signing of such an agreement and efforts to implement it will create further chaos in an already instable political environment in the region. Whether the agreement will be implemented or not, Israel’s influence in the Middle East will continue to increase given the instability in the region, rivalries among regional powers and the emergence of an alliance between Israel and three major Arab powers, namely Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Since 2010, Turkey’s deteriorating relations with the United States have peaked with three problematic areas. The first is the U.S. siding with the PKK affiliated PYD and its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG) throughout the Syrian crisis. Secondly, the U.S. refusal to extradite Fetullah Gulen, the so-called Muslim cleric who is behind the July 15, 2016, failed coup attempt in Turkey. Third is related to U.S. skepticism about Turkey’s loyalty to the West when Ankara decided to purchase S400s from Russia, allied with Iran and Qatar during the Qatar crisis and called the U.S. a “partner in bloodshed” over President Donald Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. In addition, Turkey’s efforts to unveil the Khashoggi murder in Istanbul damaged the Trump administration’s prestige and legitimacy when Trump openly refused to impose sanctions on those responsible for the murder of the Saudi journalist, viewing weapon sales as an important source of U.S. jobs and standing by the Saudi Crown Prince, Muhammed bin Salman (MbS).

U.S. and YPG Relations

If there is one single issue that has bedeviled Turkey-U.S. relations, it is the PKK issue. The strong belief  in Turkey that Washington covertly supported the PKK especially after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, peaked with the Trump administration’s supply of weapons to the YPG and consideration of the YPG as a legitimate and efficient fighter against the DAESH. Following Turkey’s Olive Branch operation (January 2018), the two sides agreed on a plan on the withdrawal of the YPG from Manbij in March 2018. However, the Trump administration became reluctant to cooperate with Turkey in the east of the Euphrates and the northern Syrian city of Manbij. Washington also had assured Ankara that there would be a definite withdrawal of YPG forces from the area after its capture from DAESH. These promises however, were not kept in a timely fashion and Turkey’s suggestion for the establishment of a safe zone in Syria to curb the refugee flow to Turkey fell on deaf ears.

If there is one single issue that has bedeviled relations between Turkey and the U.S., it is the PKK issue.

Interestingly, although Trump agreed on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria in January 2019 as DAESH was already defeated, only a few weeks later Trump threatened to “devastate” the Turkish economy if Ankara attacked Kurdish forces in Syria after U.S. forces left. This openly showed that the “strategic partnership” during Clinton’s period and “model partnership” during Obama’s period between Turkey and the United States took an entirely different shape. The current relationship between the two countries can be defined best as a “volatile partnership” as U.S. policies towards Turkey are quite unpredictable. Put it differently, the relationship that was structured in the Cold War at a time when Turkey had no choice but to claim its place in the West, now changed.

Today, Turkey sees itself as emerging from the shadow of the U.S. as an independent geopolitical actor that owes fealty to no one. President Erdogan views Turkey’s traditional ties with the West, including NATO, as unequal and at times unfavorable to Turkey’s interests. Therefore, Turkey under Erdogan, from the U.S. perspective, has been out of orbit. In this context, the July 15 coup attempt was perceived by a large percentage of Turks as an American attempt to topple President Erdogan.

FETO

Relations between Ankara and Washington have aggravated since the coup attempt, as the leader of FETO, Fetullah Gulen, has been a long term resident of Pennsylvania. Gulen has resided in the U.S. since 1999 and his fingerprints are explicit on all over the failed coup attempt. While the Turkish government’s passing of a state of emergency to conduct a purge in all government offices and business sector is still in progress, Turkey’s demand to extradite the mastermind of the failed coup remains unfulfilled.

As U.S. policies towards Turkey are quite unpredictable, the current engagement between the two can be defined at best as a volatile relationship.

The July 15, 2016, coup attempt led to Turkey’s upgrading relations with Russia and Iran as Turkey was estranged from its Gulf allies, and the United States who remained silent in the face of the coup whereas the Iranian and Russian leaderships publicly condemned the coup attempt within hours and supported Erdogan unreservedly.

In a nutshell, the two policies of Washington; the denial of repeated requests made by Ankara for the extradition of Gulen and the dispatch of trucks of arms to YPG three days after President Donald Trump promised that the United States would not supply any more weapons to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) pushed Turkey straight into Russia’s and Iran’s arms. Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia peaked with Turkey’s decision to buy S400s.  

Turkey’s S400 deal

Ankara’s intention to purchase an advanced air defense system, the S400, from Russia highlights diverging interests and perspectives between the two sides. According to Washington, Russian S400s are incompatible with NATO hardware equipment and deployment of such equipment risks the leaking of sensitive NATO military data to Russia as Turkey, at the same time, operates the F-35, the newest high-tech jet in the American military.

Although American officials including Scaparrotti (Commander of European Command) and Vice President Pence warned Ankara of “grave consequences” which could result in U.S. sanctions, Ankara openly declared that Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missile defense systems is a “done deal” and cannot be canceled. 

Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar underlined that Turkey fulfilled its financial commitments regarding the F-35 program and said that Turkey’s exclusion from the F-35 project would be “illegal and immoral.” In addition, according to Turkish officials, removing Turkey from the F-35 project would generate significant problems in the production of the jet fighter if the Turkish supply chain was disrupted. Here the issue is that the deal with Russia involves joint production and technology transfer to Turkey, whereas Washington has been reluctant to provide this.

Washington urges Turkey to purchase Patriots instead of the S400s, but Ankara has said that it would only be possible if the right terms were agreed upon.

Most importantly, the United States has rejected to sell Patriot systems and air defense systems to Turkey for different reasons since 1990s and wanted to prevent Turkey from purchasing these systems from China and Russia. While rejecting Turkey’s request of technology transfer or the ability to buy these technologies at a reasonable price due to being a NATO ally, NATO has transferred high military technology to non-NATO countries such as New Zealand and Sweden.

In 2011, Turkey asked for patriot systems against missiles thrown from Syria. The U.S. rejected. In a way Turkey was left defenseless by its allies against the Syrian army supported by Russia. Today, Washington urges Turkey to purchase Raytheon Co Patriot defense systems instead of the S400s, but Ankara has said that, even though it would like to make such a deal, it would only be possible if the right terms were agreed upon. Although the purchase of S400s does not lead to a firm strategic partnership between Turkey and Russia, it has caused damage to the reliability of the partnership between Turkey and the U.S.

The Qatar crisis and beyond

The Qatar crisis is noteworthy as it clarified that Turkey and the U.S. are on opposing camps in the Gulf and Middle East. With the Qatar crisis, which came soon after Trump’s visit to Riyadh, the 13-point ultimatum were given by Saudi Arabia to Qatar as the price for lifting the trade and diplomatic embargo of the country. One of the ultimatums urged Qatar to terminate the Turkish military presence in Qatar and end any joint military cooperation with Turkey inside Qatar. The most important of all, the blockade of Qatar led to an immense solidarity between the trio; Turkey, Qatar and Iran.

Ankara’s immediate response to the blockade on Qatar was to stand by Doha. Turkey sent military forces to Qatar to deter any invasion as a symbolic gesture, given the unlikelihood of an overt attack, but one which crystallized the sharp division between the two camps. On the one side were Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies (the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain) who are against Doha, and on the other side were Turkey, Iran and, to a lesser extent, Russia, which support Doha. Interestingly, while Trump voiced his support for Riyadh’s maneuver and implicitly accused Qatar of being a sponsor of terrorism, former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson called on the Saudi-led coalition to ease its blockade of Qatar, saying the cutoff was hindering the fight against DAESH and provoking food shortages. Washington’s confused policy toward the crisis soon ended with the signature of a $12 billion deal to sell Qatar dozens of F-15 jets as Qatar hosts the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East.

The Qatar crisis and the following tectonic changes in Saudi Arabia under MbS’s de facto administration is noteworthy with respect to understanding the newly emerging distribution of power in the region. This has been an ongoing process since the fall of Morsi and the empowerment of Sisi in Egypt as a proxy of Israel and the United States. In this framework, it can be said that Turkey under President Erdogan has been in the opposing camp despite its institutional links with the West such as NATO membership, EU membership candidacy, its efforts to support NATO in Afghanistan and so on.

Unfortunately, the strategic U.S.-Turkey partnership is a thing of the past.

When looked at closely, Erdogan’s attitude towards Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the recognition of the Golan Heights as Israeli territory, the Turkish President has been extremely critical more than that of any other Arab country leader. Turkey’s unveiling of the Khashoggi murder is a response to the allegations that Turkey is sponsoring radical Islamist ideology. Former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s accusation of Turkey supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and former chief strategist Steve Bannon’s statement in an interview with the Saudi-owned Asharq Al-Awsat that Turkey is “more dangerous than Iran” pushed Turkey to unveil the Khashoggi murder. Thus, Ankara demonstrated to the world how the U.S. under Trump turned a blind eye to a brutal murder as it did not suit their economic and strategic interests to act otherwise. This, at the same time, was a diplomatic success for Turkey as the murder proved the current Saudi administration under the control of MbS as much more threatening and illegitimate than the Muslim Brotherhood, which only demands reform from the long lasting monarchs in the region.

In a nutshell, almost thirty years after the Cold War, the United States and Turkey often find themselves on different sides of a variety of important issues. Many of the problems in U.S.-Turkey relations are structural. Had Erdogan never come to power, there would still be a strain between the two countries due to the transformations in global politics. At a time when the U.S. sees the limited and transactional relationship with Turkey as serving U.S. interests, Turkey is trying to prevent bilateral relations from reaching a new low. The issue is to what extent Ankara and Washington will be able to formulate a new approach to the current problematic relations. Unfortunately, the strategic U.S.-Turkey partnership is a thing of the past.

The two decisions of the U.S. administration – recognizing the Golan Heights as Israeli territory and the decision to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem – indicate that the Netanyahu and Trump administrations are forcing the limits of a regional war in the Middle East, which would have devastating consequences for all across the globe.

Although the mainstream media interpreted these decisions as an election ‘gift’ from Trump to Netanyahu, the decisions seem to go beyond a simple support for the latter’s re-election. Speaking to The New Turkey, Associate Editor of The Electronic Intifada Asa Winstanley argued that these two internationally illegal decisions of Trump were not just direct gifts to Netanyahu, but in the first place, a favor to his close friend and the main financial backer of his campaign, Sheldon Adelson, a billionaire casino owner in the U.S.

Trump wanted to make not only Netanyahu happy but also Sheldon Adelson, a billionaire casino owner in the U.S., Trump’s close friend and the main financial backer of his campaign.

Winstanley describes Adelson as one of the main funders of the Israeli lobby in the U.S. and an individual who is on the far-right of that lobby. He has close relations with Trump and therefore the President is making Adelson happy as a way of paying off his generous donations to Trump’s presidential campaigns.

Speaking to The New Turkey, Haydar Oruc, researcher at Sakarya University Middle East Institute, argues that considering the previous decisions made by Trump in support of the State of Israel since the beginning of his presidency, the Golan Heights and Jerusalem decisions should not come as a surprise.

As one of the important promises of his presidency, Trump has been talking about solving the Palestine-Israel conflict with the ‘deal of the century,’ conducted by his son-in-law and chief-advisor Jared Kushner. Trump has appointed David Freeman, a right-wing Jewish American outside of the Foreign Office, and a supporter of the Israeli settlements, as the Ambassador to Israel.

For years, the U.S. administration has approved and conducted practices proposed by the Israel administration and has further isolated the Palestinians in the international community. Cutting the UNRWA fund for Palestine, closing the Palestinian authority office in Washington, forcing Arab regimes in the region to cooperate with Israel, putting pressure on the International Criminal Court in order to prevent Israel from trial, and rejecting decisions against Israel at the UN Security Council are just some examples of U.S. behavior before recognizing the Golan Heights as Israeli territory.

Haydar Oruc recalls the remarks of Israeli politicians during the opening ceremony of the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem, who described Trump as the Persian Emperor Cyrus and blessed him for bringing Jews to the promised lands after 2000 years. Both some Jewish and Evangelical figures described these events and the presidency of Trump as ‘miracles’ promised in their holly book. Oruc added that although it is difficult to believe, what is happening at the moment is merely attempts of some fanciful Jewish-Evangelical Zionists in parallel with their beliefs.

The strong support that the Israeli government provides for Trump is not coincidental when one considers the actions of previous administrations in Washington. During the last period of the Obama administration, an anti-Saudi approach had been followed. First, the nuclear agreement was signed with Iran and then a U.S. court decided to freeze Saudi accounts in the U.S. due to possible connections with the 9/11 attacks. When the U.S. administration under Obama made moves to pave the way for Iran, there were rumors of U.S. pressure on a regime change in Saudi Arabia.

This approach not only troubled Saudi Arabia but the pro-Iran approach also caused distress within the Israeli administration. Thus, Trump’s presidential campaign received rigorous funds from individuals in Israel and the Gulf – which is why he made official visits to these two regions after he got elected as U.S. President.

Haydar Oruc recalls the ‘glowing orb’ incident at the opening ceremony of the Global Center for Combating Extremist Ideology during Trump’s first foreign visit as the President of the U.S. in Saudi Arabia. A couple of days after the picture with Trump, Saudi King and Sisi around the orb, the Gulf Crisis kicked off, and the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Bahrain began implementing isolationist policies against Qatar. This regional Arab bloc in the south that has been crystalized since the beginning of the crisis has not merely been established only against Qatar. The south Arab bloc consolidated by the U.S. and Israel is against another bloc on the north, which consists of Iran, Qatar, and Turkey.

Zionists have been using the motto ‘maximum land, minimum Arabs’ since the establishment of the State of Israel.

Can these developments and the fateful alliance between the current U.S. evangelical administration and Zionist Israel lead to a regional war? Asa Winstanley believes that a regional war is unlikely to occur in the future, however, adds that one can never count out the possibility. According to him, Zionists have been using the motto ‘maximum land, minimum Arabs’ since the establishment of the State of Israel. Therefore, the annexation of the Golan Heights, declaring Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the future plan of annexing the West Bank should be seen as other examples of this strategy.

Haydar Oruc claims that in order to comment on a possible regional war it is first necessary to analyze whether or not global powers would directly get involved in such a war. Otherwise, it is not realistic to expect Israel – despite being a nuclear power – together with the south bloc of Arab regimes to counteract Iran. And if you add Turkey next to Iran, the task becomes almost impossible. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2010, the civil wars that erupted in Syria, Yemen, and Libya, together with the tensions in Iraq, Lebanon, Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, and Palestine, are all signs of an on-going covert war in the region.

Independent from this turmoil in the region, it is unlikely for the south-bloc Arab regimes and Israel alone to attack Iran or any other target directly. Instead of a military offense, embargoes supported by the U.S., political pressure, and attempts of regime change through popular uprisings in target countries seem like more convenient tactics to utilize. However, Haydar Oruc adds that in the case of the involvement of global powers in the process, it is more likely to see conflicts in the region whether or not you call it regional war in the traditional sense.

The scrupulousness of Israeli and American political actors is the source of the ongoing illegalities and any possible armed conflict in the region.

Asa Winstanley describes the ultimate goal of Israel as maximum land with minimum Arab population. He adds that they are pursuing this goal step-by-step in the West Bank, first targeting the less populated areas. This has been the strategy of Israel since 1948. However, Winstanley highlights that there is a current rise of extremists in Israel, who will play a future role in the government. According to him, Zionists are becoming more extreme and some extremists even suggest the demolition of the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound and building a Jewish synagogue in the same location.

Haydar Oruc underlines that unfortunately there are many indications of an ‘Armageddon’ projection of Christian and Jewish Zionists. Analysis on symbolic dates, locations and people, indicate the existence of such a utopian intention. Even though it may sound irrational, he says, it is important to accept the situation and develop policies accordingly.

There are not many signs to be optimistic about things turning around if immediate actions are not taken by both regional and international actors. The scrupulousness of Israeli and American political actors is the source of the ongoing illegalities and any possible armed conflict in the region, since they have direct power to influence decision makers both in Israel and the U.S.

The debate on the U.S. withdrawal from Syria suffers from a couple of frequently repeated arguments that do not reflect the realities of the conflict, especially in northern Syria. Some argue that the U.S. should not abandon their allies on the ground and leave them to their fate, which would amount to a “betrayal of the Kurds.” This line of thinking makes a couple of flawed assumptions starting with equating the PKK’s Syrian affiliate the YPG with Syrian Kurds in general. The reality is that the YPG does not represent even the majority of the Kurds in Syria, nor are they reliable partners as they have been promoted. Since the beginning of the conflict, they refused to fight the Assad regime, maintained connections with Russia, and prolonged the anti-Daesh fight as much as possible to ensure the U.S. remained in Syria as their protectors.

The U.S. military has openly promoted the “accomplishments” of the Syrian Democratic Forces, a rebranding of the YPG, despite the fact that U.S. intelligence community as well as high-level officials have repeatedly admitted on the record that the YPG is the “Syrian militia” of the PKK. The U.S. military officials, especially those at CENTCOM, have expressed displeasure about Turkey as they have perceived Turkish efforts in northern Syria as hindering their anti-Daesh mission despite the fact that Turkey has been part of the anti-Daesh coalition from the beginning. Turkey’s reservations and repeated warnings against allying with the YPG seem to have been received by the U.S. military more as an annoyance than legitimate national security concerns of a NATO ally.

Some argue that the U.S. should not abandon their allies on the ground and leave them to their fate, which would amount to a “betrayal of the Kurds.” This line of thinking makes a couple of flawed assumptions starting with equating the PKK’s Syrian affiliate the YPG with Syrian Kurds in general.

The disconnect between the U.S. and Turkey on the YPG issue has widened and deepened in recent years. As both the Obama and Trump administrations adopted a policy of “by, with, and through” local partners to fight Daesh, Turkish concerns have been ignored until very recently. President Trump’s withdrawal decision created an opening for repairing the long-simmering tensions between the two countries contingent on a rethinking of the U.S. partnership with the YPG. In the early days of the decision, I commented that the withdrawal might not translate to an immediate halt to the U.S. support for the YPG. Today, all indications are that the U.S. policy planners are trying to convince Turkey to forego any potential military operations against the YPG once the U.S. leaves. However, Turkey’s refusal to commit to not fighting the Syrian branch of the PKK should surprise no one. While the “betrayal of the Kurds” argument might have some currency among at least some policymakers, reassuring a NATO ally should take priority.

Turkey has not only supported the U.S. withdrawal decision but also offered ways to make it an orderly and successful process by leaving no room for a political vacuum. Turkey’s insistence on establishing a safe zone along the border with Syria in the north aims to achieve two main goals, which would ensure its national security and allow for stability in the region. First, the YPG would no longer control the border, which would reassure Turkish security concerns about arms transfers into Turkey and the PKK control in the region. Second, significant numbers of refugees would be settled in northern Syria to relieve Turkey of some of the political burden of hosting more than 3.6 million refugees. From the American perspective, however, the safe zone appears to be a demarcation zone where Turkey and the YPG would be separated from each other so that the U.S. forces would not leave the YPG at the “mercy” of Turkey. Just as the two NATO allies’ approaches to the YPG has diverged, their conceptions of the function of the potential safe zone are not aligned. Once again, their basic disagreement about the YPG spells potential for disaster in bilateral relations.

By establishing a safe zone along the border with Syria in the north, Turkey aims to achieve two main goals: First, the YPG would no longer control the border, which would reassure Turkish security concerns about arms transfers into Turkey and the PKK control in the region. Second, significant numbers of refugees would be settled in northern Syria to relieve Turkey of some of the political burden of hosting more than 3.6 million refugees. 

It is time for a truly honest and in-depth strategic conversation between the two allies about the U.S. relationship with the YPG. Characterizing it as a tactical and temporary alliance will not suffice as the withdrawal discussions show that the U.S. feels it owes the YPG as if it is actually a strategic partner for the long haul. Turkey needs reassurance that this is not the case and the reassurance cannot be in words only. The U.S. policy planners need to make it clear to Turkey that they are not looking for ways to protect the YPG as part of their withdrawal plan.

The U.S. withdrawal symbolizes a new phase for local and regional actors in Syria. Particularly for Ankara, the U.S.’ “slow and coordinated” pull out strategy, which involves 2,000 troops in North East Syria, is a game changer; it was an unexpected move that no one saw it coming two weeks ago in Ankara. However, President Erdogan had a very strong expectation that President Trump would take responsibility to reshape Turkish-American relations before it would be too late. He never gave up on maintaining his communication with President Trump.

The mobilization of Turkish troops and the declaration of high military readiness in the region following Erdogan’s Ankara speech was a direct message not for the YPG but for the U.S. government to change its policy towards the YPG. More importantly, Turkey’s unexpected yet comprehensive air strike against PKK positions in Northern Iraq was a strong sign that Turkey would extend same military campaigns against YPG positions in Syria. In this regard, it was the last chance for the Turkish-American relations to reevaluate the escalation on the YPG issue. Otherwise, Turkey would have been militarily involved in the North East Syria where the U.S. has been operating alongside YPG forces. During the phone call on December 14, as it is claimed, President Erdogan strongly stressed Turkey’s position on military action, and it was followed by Trump’s decision.

At this stage, the operational and strategic dynamics, as well as the new geopolitical calculations among the actors involved in the Syrian conflict should be reconsidered. The post-American Syria revealed the dynamics, especially for Turkey. Hence, President Erdogan should reevaluate his overall strategy on Syria. Turkey’s priority, as president Erdogan repeatedly expresses, is to eliminate the YPG threat for Turkey’s imminent national and regional security concerns.

The cooperation between the U.S. and the YPG, and the U.S. operational military presence in NE Syria were some of the important dynamics that restricted Turkey’s freedom of military action against the YPG. Trump’s withdrawal means that Turkey gained freedom of military action in eastern Syria, yet the development brings a challenging road-map for Turkey to achieve its strategic priorities. If Turkey delivers its priorities on the ground and redesigns the current balance of power, the Syrian conflict is likely to be reshaped soon.

Following the cleaning of the Manbij pocket from the YPG forces, Turkey will reach its initial goal to take full control alongside its border in the western part of the Euphrates River. This might bring Turkey freedom of military action not only to reshape the overall region including Idlib but also to accommodate refugees.

The challenges that Turkey has to reconsider are multidimensional. First and foremost, what type of military move, in an operational manner, that Turkey will adopt following the U.S. withdrawal is significant. It seems that Turkey’s first military mission is to establish a full-scale military control in the Manbij pocket where Turkey and the U.S. had already agreed, yet the YPG maintains its presence there. The intense military mobilization of Turkey and Turkey-trained National Army near the Turkish border and inside Jarablus demonstrate that Ankara will take military action in Manbij.

Even though the regime tends to mobilize its militias towards the Manbij pocket to retake the city from the YPG, Turkey certainly perceives Manbij as a military threshold to maintain its military deterrence. At this stage, deterrence for Turkey is the use of threats to dissuade the Syrian regime from initiating an undesirable act in the region. Following the cleaning of the Manbij pocket from the YPG forces, Turkey will reach its initial goal to take full control alongside its border in the western part of the Euphrates River. This might bring Turkey freedom of military action not only to reshape the overall region including Idlib but also to accommodate refugees. Up until now, 300,000 returned to their homes in the western part of the River.

Following the takeover of Manbij, Turkey’s second military move against the YPG is expected to be alongside the border. This military operation will have a different character as the YPG would probably want to defend Ayn Al Arab (also known as Kobane), Rasul Ayn, and Tel Abyad against Turkey’s military action. The YPG’s search for a new ally at this stage is one of the significant steps that can influence Turkey’s potential military action, yet it seems that no credible actor at this stage can prevent Ankara from taking military action in these regions.

The strategy that Turkey might adopt following the liberation of Manbij has two broad aims. While the first aim for Turkey is to disassemble the YPG’s territorial continuity alongside the Turkish-Syrian border, the second one is to provide a safe haven for the refugee community who were forcefully displaced by the YPG. If this will is the case, Turkey is set to accomplish its original aim to establish a secure zone alongside its Syrian border. This also means that fighting against Daesh is a secondary mission that should be carried out following the establishment of a safe zone for Turkey’s military presence.

Trump’s decision brought many opportunities to repair especially the U.S.’s wrong strategy of working with a terrorist organization to fight against another terrorist organization, but at the same time brought Syria into a new rivalry between the regional countries.

This probably brings the third dimension for Turkey’s post-American roadmap in Syria. Fighting against Daesh at this stage is a complicated issue from a military perspective in which Turkey has the capacity, yet the geographical distance where Daesh militants operate makes Turkey’s military engagement riskier. While Turkey was calculating a limited military operation against the YPG in its borderline, now Turkey has to reconsider its military strategy.

This requires a comprehensive counter-insurgency strategy for Turkey to clean the area from YPG and Daesh, hold the liberated territories to sustain military presence and finally to build the post-conflict places. More importantly, Turkey’s potential far-reaching military operation towards the southern flank of Syria might also bring the Syrian regime, Russia and Iran into the geopolitical rivalry in the region, which is a situation Turkey would not want to get into. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that “Syrian government should assume control of areas vacated by the U.S.” This means that Russia does not tend to accommodate with Turkey’s own roadmap for the post-American withdrawal. Therefore, cooperation with Russia and the U.S. is the most significant part of Turkey’s strategy in NE Syria.

The game changer development for Turkey would be a potential and quick dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces. If the non-YPG forces (mainly the Arab forces) inside the SDF decide to detach themselves from SDF, then Turkey’s strategy has to take the Syrian regime’s move towards the eastern part of the Euphrates into account

The game changer development for Turkey would be a potential and quick dissolution of the Syrian Democratic Forces. If the non-YPG forces (mainly the Arab forces) inside the SDF decide to detach themselves from SDF, then Turkey’s strategy has to take the Syrian regime’s move towards the eastern part of the Euphrates into account, which poses another trouble, not just for Turkey but also for the U.S.  

The Syrian crisis is fundamentally localizing geopolitics, in which each actor has strategically different priorities regarding every single terrorist formation in Syria. Trump’s decision brought many opportunities to repair especially the U.S.’s wrong strategy of working with a terrorist organization to fight against another terrorist organization, but at the same time brought Syria into a new rivalry between the regional countries. Undoubtedly, Turkey needs a comprehensive strategy for its Syrian road-map following the American withdrawal.

Although the Turkish administration is still very cautious, Trump’s decision to withdraw troops from Syria has been echoed for the government in Ankara and for Turkish foreign policy on an international level.

There is more than one perspective on the U.S. decision to withdraw troops from Syria – a decision that was taken by President Trump on Wednesday. The reaction from the region and the U.S. reflects the two sides of the equilibrium. While Russia, Iran, and Turkey are happy about the decision, European countries such as the UK, France, Greece, and Israel are having a hard time digesting the decision. As stated by Ibrahim Kalin, spokesman for the Turkish President, Turkey is still cautious about the decision.

On Wednesday, Trump tweeted, “We have defeated ISIS in Syria, my only reason for being there during the Trump Presidency.” According to Trump himself, the decision was not a surprising one. Commenting in Twitter again on Thursday, he tweeted, “Getting out of Syria was no surprise. I’ve been campaigning on it for years, and six months ago, when I very publicly wanted to do it, I agreed to stay longer. Russia, Iran, Syria & others are the local enemy of ISIS. We were doing there work. Time to come home & rebuild. #MAGA.”

Not everyone in the U.S. administration supports Trump’s decision either. Some republicans strongly oppose the decision and criticized Trump for strengthening the hands of Russia and Iran, who are defending the Assad regime. According to some U.S. officials that spoke to Reuters on confidentiality, U.S. commanders in Syria are worried about a ‘quick’ withdrawal.

Just a day after Trump announced his decision, Turkish President Erdogan and Iranian President Rouhani came together in Istanbul with the invitation of Erdogan and emphasized that both countries will work closer together in order to end the war in Syria and to start building a political process.

Although the meeting between the two leaders had been arranged earlier, the ‘move’ was considered meaningful and was supported by Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Both leaders decided not to make any comments on Trump’s decision.

During their press conference in Ankara, Erdogan found it sufficient to comment “There are many steps that Turkey and Iran can take together to stop the fighting in the region and to establish peace,” while Rouhani said “Syria’s territorial integrity must be respected by all sides. Both countries are in the same opinion regarding this.”

Both the approval of possible patriot sales to Turkey and the U.S. withdrawal from Syria will have a direct effect on the foreign policy of Ankara in the short and long term. Hence, these two events have been observed as a triumph for Erdogan.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi

The relationship between the U.S. and Southeast Asian Association of Nations (ASEAN) is crucially interconnected within mutual interests. However, the Trump administration has failed to meet the expected sustainable and consultable ASEAN policies.

The U.S. government’s majorly contributive move towards supporting ASEAN perspectives is based on two distinct policies, which involve security and economic policies as observed in territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the formation of the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) during the Obama era. Hence, the Trump administration has contradicted the U.S.’s existing role for being inconsistent by encouraging irrelevant narratives due to certain fundamental principles.

On the other hand, how ASEAN member states perceive the above-mentioned approach gives some insights about the current relationship. For instance, known as a robust character and strong statesman, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, the prime minister of Malaysia, stated that “there is a need for the U.S. President Donald Trump to be consistent, including over policy matters on Asia.”

Among the member states, countries such as Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia have comparatively felt disaffected more than other by countries by the changing characteristics and uncertainties of U.S. policy. This is quite understandable when considering the divisions between member states and their relationships with the U.S. and China.

Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, the prime minister of Malaysia, stated that “there is a need for the U.S. President Donald Trump to be consistent, including over policy matters on Asia.”

During the Obama era, the U.S. was leading its relationship with ASEAN in a determined policy known as a ‘pivot to Asia.’ This policy aimed at re-structuring security and economic policies by supporting each other, while preferring mainly the advancement of economic relationships. Obama himself engaged significantly with member states with his official state visits, and he also attended ASEAN summits as well.

In contrast to Obama, Trump’s ASEAN policy is surrounded on narratives of his ‘America first’ agenda and protectionism as a mainstream policy. In fact, no surprise should come out of this contradiction considering his administration had delivered initial signals on how he would construct, in essential, trade-based relations with ASEAN before his presidential victory in 2016.

There is no doubt that, at least in certain terms, Trump’s policy of U.S.-economy victimization is labeled as a deconstruction process flapped out of a well-established relationship during the Obama era. Indeed, Trump called for punishment to be applied to certain countries including some member states of ASEAN, which are responsible for contributing to the trade deficit that put the U.S. at a disadvantage.

In this regard, Trump’s absence on the 33rd ASEAN Summit held in Singapore on 11-15 November meant an isolation from exchanging ASEAN interest where leaders of major regional and global powers such as Japan, South Korea, Russia, Australia, New Zealand, India, and China took part.

In contrast to Obama, Trump’s ASEAN policy is surrounded on narratives of his ‘America first’ agenda and protectionism as a mainstream policy.

Although U.S. Vice-President Mike Pence represented the U.S. government, his discourse and statements during the meetings with various leaders were far from rebuilding a constructive relationship with ASEAN.

Pence re-iterated the importance of U.S. security policy of the Asia-Pacific region, while stressing that “empire and aggression have no place in the Indo-Pacific.” With this obviously Pence was referring to China and North Korea and security issues related to the South China Sea and North Korea nuclear issue, which are still considered as potential threats to the interest of the U.S. and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region.

As is known, the U.S. has a special approbation to the free access of the sea ways, which connects regional allies bound to energy sources in the Middle East and global commercial activities connecting the Indian Ocean and the Pacific region.

As seen in the above-mentioned statement of Pence, the U.S. has deprived from a multiple approach in its engagement with ASEAN. And no doubt that Pence clearly did not cater the expectations of ASEAN in the context of improvement of the economic relationship, which in fact was considered extremely essential during the current global economic recession.

Due to these uncertainties, ASEAN leaders do not have any predictable hope of boosting the relationship with the U.S., in particular, pertaining to engagement and improvement in trade and investment opportunities the region offers.

Though the U.S. administration merely focuses on security issues, it is too difficult to gain the upper hand in competition with China without cementing economic relationships and gaining engagement with and popular support of ASEAN people.

ASEAN has already acquired the position of being a strong global economic power house in terms of sustainable economic development, direct foreign investment, and increasing trade by applying liberal economic policies.

In addition, ASEAN has been re-structuring economic connectivity among the member states and strategic partners on the basis of bilateral treaties for further advancement since the establishment of ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) commencing from the end of 2015.

It is quite clear that the U.S. under Trump’s presidency does not have any significant tendency for a combination of multiple policies with ASEAN, even after the mid-term elections, which resulted in the Democratic upper-hand in Congress. The upcoming few years of Trump’s administration will be tested as to whether it will re-evaluate its relationship with ASEAN or not.

On November 20, U.S. President Donald Trump released a statement regarding the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. In this statement, Trump defended the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) amid increasing evidences of his direct involvement in the murder. To an extent, it was so obvious that Senator Bob Corker commented on it by saying he never thought he’d “see the day a White House would moonlight as a public relations firm for the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia.”

Moreover, Trump carried some of the Saudi official claims against Khashoggi. “Representatives of Saudi Arabia say that Jamal Khashoggi was an enemy of the state and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood,” the U.S. President said. Adding “but my decision is in no way based on that.” Trump tried to cast doubt on the Crown Prince’s role in Khashoggi’s murder by saying “maybe he did –know- and maybe he didn’t!”

In order to justify his position, the U.S. President diluted his blunt defense of MbS by referring to the vast economic and strategic interests tying his country to Saudi Arabia. However, as usual, Trump stuffed his statement with inaccurate information and false facts about Saudi Arabia to support his stance. Here are four myths he presented in his statement.

Trump has gone so far in protecting Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman that Senator Bob Corker stated he never thought he’d “see the day a White House would moonlight as a public relations firm for the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia.”

Myth No. 1:

“The Kingdom agreed to spend and invest $450 billion in the United States. This is a record amount of money…..Of the $450 billion, $110 billion will be spent on the purchase of military equipment.”

This is probably Trump’s favorite myth on Saudi Arabia. The U.S. President keeps repeating it every time when the wisdom of his policies towards Saudi Arabia is questioned. Despite previously referring to it many times, no one knows where the number $450 billion has emerged from. It was not officially mentioned neither during Trump’s visit to the Kingdom in May 2017, nor during MbS’s visit to the U.S. in March 2018.

There were previous mentions for opportunities worth $400 billion, but those were only verbal promises over a long period of time. These promises are not expected to be materialized anytime soon if at all. In fact, according to official numbers cited by the U.S. State Department in October 2018, out of the $110 billion Trump always boost in military purchases, Saudis only spent $14.5 billion on defense contracts with US since Trump took office.

Assuming that they will continue on this rate, which is almost impossible, Saudis need at least one and half decade to fulfill their $110 billion promise to Trump. In line with this, Former CIA officer Bruce Riedel, a researcher at the Brookings Institution in Washington, said the $110 billion was fake news then and it’s still fake news today.

President Trump keeps quoting a $450 billion Saudi investment in the U.S. when there’s no such thing. Why does he always use the same figure when lying? 

Myth No. 2:

“It will create hundreds of thousands of jobs, tremendous economic development, and much additional wealth for the United States.” 

No, the promised numbers are not going to create hundreds of thousands of jobs in the U.S. even if we assumed that they will be materialized anytime soon, which is impossible anyway. Last October, Trump claimed the – “non-existing”- $450 billion deals with Saudi Arabia will generate over a million jobs in the U.S.! He also boosted that the $110 billion military package will generate hundreds of thousands of jobs.

Last month, Reuters published a report which refutes this claim thoroughly. The report concludes that the “500,000 jobs Trump keeps bringing up is at least three to five times higher than what one could expect from the Saudi deal, given the estimates from the companies themselves, plus the most generous use of the indirect multiplier.”

Moreover, another report published by the Center for International Policy, a Washington think tank, says Saudi arms sales account for fewer than 20,000 U.S. jobs a year—less than one-twentieth of the employment boost Trump has claimed.

Myth No. 3:

“If we foolishly cancel these –defense- contracts, Russia and China would be the enormous beneficiaries – and very happy to acquire all of this newfound business. It would be a wonderful gift to them directly from the United States!”

No, this isn’t true either. When it comes to its military strength, advanced weapons, and weapon systems, Riyadh heavily dependent on Washington. The vast majority of the Saudi military hardware comes from the U.S., the rest comes from EU and a tiny fraction from China and maybe from Russia.

In this sense, even if we hypothetically assume that Saudis will drop all their military deals with the U.S., China and Russia can’t be an alternative especially when it comes to the most advanced weapons. Ignoring this fact again, depending on Russia and China means that Saudis will have to transform their military in order to be able to acquire and employ military hardware from these countries. 

Such a process is time consuming and probably beyond even the Kingdom’s financial capacity, it will take more than a decade of time at least, and will cost them a fortune. Even if they managed to do so, which I highly doubt, the results will not be impressive at all. Saudis will be weaker, their military strength will be reduced, and they will be much more vulnerable without a global guarantor for their security. In other words, you can sanction them and they will still come to you because they have no other options. 

If the U.S. cancel their defense contracts with Saudi Arabia this will not benefit Russia and China. It’ll just reduce the Kingdom’s military capacity. 

Myth No. 4:

“Saudi Arabia is a great ally in our very important fight against Iran.”

The Iranian regime is not invincible, however making use of others’ mistakes and employing their wrong policies to its benefit have been one of its best features during the last decades. In this sense, if there is one reason why Iran is regionally expanding and increasing its influence, it is because of the Saudi incompetence and Riyadh’s conflicting and chaotic polices to counter Iran. Such Saudi policies increased notably since the rise of Muhammad bin Salam to power in the Kingdom.

In order to effectively counter Iran in the region, you need to achieve a few basic things: Cutting it off from the regional public support which usually boosts its stance; depriving its regional role from the needed legitimacy by standing for everything the public represents such as the Palestinian issue, Syria etc., and finally countering its economic and military activities by making sure that collective regional efforts are contributing to this aim.

However, while stressing the need to counter Iran, MbS undermined every single aspect of any useful regional strategy to fight against Tehran. Working with the advice of his mentor, the de facto ruler of UAE, Crown Prince Mohammad bin Zayed (MBZ), MbS prioritized an absurd war with the so called political Islam, imposed a blockade on Qatar, antagonized Turkey, initiated political and diplomatic crisis with traditional allies such as the Lebanese Prime Minister, King of Jordan, the Palestinian President, the Yemeni President. His reckless, dangerous policies further destabilized the region and boosted Iran’s regional position in an unprecedented way.

Moreover, by creating a deep rift in the GCC bloc, Arab bloc, and between some Arab countries and Turkey, the Saudi Crown Prince made any regional collective efforts to counter Iran almost impossible and provided Tehran with precious cards not only to unlock its regional isolation but also to be in a better position to utilize the regional contradictions to its benefit.

There is no strategic value in such a partner in the fight against Iran. On contrary, the Crown Prince used the issue as an excuse to consolidate his powers internally and externally. Taking all this into consideration, Saudi Arabia under MbS became nothing but a heavy burden on the U.S. and the allies especially in the fight against Iran.

The U.S.-Turkey relationship is going through interesting times, as both allies are willing to work through their differences despite serious disagreements over a host of issues. Turkey has been pressing the U.S. as well as the international community to take a firmer stand against those responsible for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

When asked about the extradition of Gulen to Turkey, Trump denied getting involved in the legal process but stated that the U.S. is looking for “whatever we can do for Turkey.”

The Turkish position puts President Trump in an awkward position, as he appears inclined to accept that the Crown Prince Mohammad bin Selman was not responsible. Trump also pledged that the relationship with Saudi Arabia would not be affected by the Khashoggi affair. Despite this disagreement, President Trump made some positive statements about President Erdogan and Turkey, citing the release of Pastor Andrew Brunson last month. Most recently, when asked about the extradition of Gulen to Turkey, Trump denied getting involved in the legal process but stated that the U.S. is looking for “whatever we can do for Turkey.”

There is also the U.S. support for the YPG that continues to be a sticking point. However, both the American and Turkish leaderships express willingness to work through these differences largely because the two NATO allies have a lot more to gain by working together than at cross purposes. 

For some analysts, the Khashoggi case has been a useful tool for Turkey to play politics in a geostrategic power struggle.

For some analysts, the Khashoggi case has been a useful tool for Turkey to play politics in a geostrategic power struggle. It is important to note that the Saudi failure to provide an explanation for what happened to Khashoggi lasted weeks. Every explanation the Saudis provided was quickly falsified by facts and Turkey insisted on accountability as well as national sovereignty. For all intents and purposes, the Saudi behavior forced Turkey to leak facts and made it all too easy to pursue a “drip drip strategy,” if there was ever such a conscious strategy in the first place.

The U.S. media’s pressure on the Trump administration to take a clear stance was indirectly owed to Turkey’s unwillingness to let this murder be covered up. Turkey made a careful distinction between King Salman and the rest of the Saudi leadership, creating at least some wiggle room without abandoning full accountability for Khashoggi’s murder. President Trump may have preferred that the issue goes away somehow but his administration continued to engage Turkey on the matter. This dynamic of persistent engagement despite deep differences is interesting and might provide a blueprint at least for the next two years.

Both on the issue of Gulen’s extradition and the U.S. support for the YPG, there seems to be a similar dynamic at play. Turkey has requested Gulen’s extradition and pushed hard for it politically but understands the political constraints on the Trump administration. This does not mean Turkey will contend itself with the status quo and give up on the extradition request. Turkey will continue to bring up the issue and pressure the U.S. side to act against the Gulen network all the while engaging instead of confronting the administration. With regard to the YPG issue, Turkey again insists that the U.S. should stop supporting the organization because of its links to the PKK. Yet, it continues to engage the new U.S. team on the Syria policy without accepting any kind of normalization of the YPG.

Time will tell if this is all we can hope for but continuous engagement through crises may be the solution for the time being.

All the minefields in the U.S.-Turkey relationship need careful analysis and comprehensive policy coordination and there is a long way to go before that happens. Nevertheless, it is important to underline that the two sides are both willing to listen to each other’s positions and engage in a meaningful way. It is not clear if this dynamic will be sustainable in the medium and long terms but it should be considered a start in any case.

Time will tell if this is all we can hope for but continuous engagement through crises may be the solution for the time being. However, we should not lose sight that a comprehensive strategic dialogue would produce more concrete and sustainable results in the long run.   

Last week during the WWI commemoration ceremonies, U.S. President Donald Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron had a quarrel over how to sustain European security. President Trump has been pressing very heavily on European leaders to increase their share in NATO, forcing them to follow the U.S. sanctions leveled against Iran and Russia, threatening to enforce additional tariffs on European products, mainly those pertain to the automobile industry. Germany and France, the two pillars of the emerging European super-state, have grown uneasy about unilateralism and the peremptory attitude of Trump’s foreign policy. However, they have showed no sign of aversion.

This has changed with Macron’s recent call for building up a European army to protect Europe in the face of growing Russian, Chinese and also the U.S. threat. This implied a new security framework for Europe outside of NATO. Macron’s call for an independent security framework was hastily backed by Germany. This snap has, of course, drawn Trump’s fury that he did not miss the opportunity to ridicule France by expressing that the U.S. saved France from Germany’s hand in WWI. Trump was obviously implying that if the U.S. gave up its role of European balancer, history would repeat itself. That is, Germany might invade the neighboring countries and establish its hegemony over the whole of Europe once again. Besides, he reiterated that the U.S. did not have an intention to renounce its role of European balancer or dissolve NATO but the U.S. needed the European countries to take more responsibility for maintaining security of the Western world.

U.S. President Trump didn’t miss the opportunity to ridicule France after Macron’s call for an independent security framework within the EU and said that the U.S. saved France from Germany’s hand in WWI.

Does this fray over European security between the U.S. and the European central powers demonstrate another challenge against the existing unipolar international order? And does it amount to a return of Europe to great power politics?

Indeed, Europe lost its central place in international politics with the rise of the U.S. as a regional hegemon in its region during the 19th century. Before the rise of the U.S., international politics was exclusively determined by equal relations among European states in the European continent and their colonial or rather hierarchical relations with the rest of the world. The rise of the U.S. at the end of the 19th century put an end to this dual order and shifted the gravity of international politics towards North America.

Does the fray over European security between the U.S. and the EU demonstrate a return of Europe to great power politics?

In the new format, international politics was determined by the U.S.’s perpetual attempts to prevent an emergence of another regional hegemon in other regions by following a strategy of offshore balancing. This strategy mainly comprises taking the side of the lesser power(s) in a region and thus to forestall integration of a region under a hegemon. This was clearly observed in WWI and WWII. In the former the U.S. attempted to prevent German hegemony in Europe whereas in the latter it sought to preclude German hegemony in Europe and Japanese hegemony in East Asia. The U.S. succeeded in both of those systemic wars.

However, the U.S.’s success backfired. It led to a power vacuum in Eurasia and gave way to the rise of another regional hegemon, the USSR. The Cold War witnessed an international system with two hegemons with their own spheres of influence. Europe was split between the U.S. and the USSR and became a dominated region. The end of the Cold War has not changed the status of Europe so much. But it has furthered European unification, which had started in the mid-1950s with the American support.

European leaders see Trump’s unilateral and domineering foreign policy as an opportunity to upgrade Europe’s status in international politics to a higher level.

Now we are at another stage in European integration and its return to international politics as a great power. No power in international politics desires to leave its national security to the hands of another state unless it has no other choice. Thus, French President Macron’s call for a European army and Germany’s backing cannot be thought as a bluff against the U.S. Nor can it be understood from a scapegoat approach, that states tend to start or escalate conflicts in outside their borders to sustain unity within the country. It seems that European leaders see Trump’s unilateral and domineering foreign policy as an opportunity to upgrade Europe’s status in international politics to a higher level. It is completely a different matter that whether they can achieve that goal or not, the intention is clear – Europe is on its way to smash another brick in existing unipolar international order, alongside Chinese and Russian challenges to the U.S.

Last week, the Washington administration authorized up to $12 million of rewards for information leading to the identification or location of three senior members of the PKK terror group. Accordingly, Washington approved up to $5 million for information on Murat Karayilan, $4 million for Cemil Bayik and $3 million for Duran Kalkan. The U.S. listed the PKK as a terrorist organization 21 years ago, and handed the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan over to Turkey in 1999.

The three senior members of the PKK are now sought as part of the U.S. Department of State’s Reward for Justice program. To quote the program’s exact words, the “goal is to bring international terrorists to justice and prevent acts of international terrorism against U.S. persons or property.”  It is stated that while the law governing the program is aimed at terrorism directed against Americans, the U.S. also shares information with other nations whose citizens are at risk.

The program describes the three PKK members as follows: “Karayılan, Bayık and Kalkan are senior leaders of the PKK. The Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), also known as Kongra-Gel is a regionally active terrorist organization and a U.S. designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).” It goes on to list some of the deadly attacks of the PKK over the past three years that killed 1200 people: “The PKK has targeted Turkish government officials, police and security forces and indiscriminately injured and killed civilians. In 2015 and 2016, the PKK expanded attacks across Turkey, metropolitan centers, and tourist destinations on Turkey’s Aegean and Mediterranean coast. In August 2016, the group claimed a car bomb attack against Sirnak police headquarters, killing 11 and wounding more than 70. In June 2017, the PKK attacked a military convoy in southeastern Turkey, killing over 20 soldiers. Since 2015, the group has been responsible for the deaths of over 1,200 Turkish security officials and civilians.”

Since the program primarily targets the terrorists posing a direct threat to the U.S., the reward announcement for the three PKK militants is justified as follows: “In 1993 the PKK kidnapped 19 Western tourists including an American and in 1995 two Americans were injured in a PKK bombing.” The methods the PKK uses are also explicated: “PKK uses its network and criminal activities across Europe to obtain weapons and materials. The PKK has used suicide bombers, vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), and other indiscriminate terror tactics. The PKK also recruits and indoctrinates youths, sometimes by abduction, and employs them as militants.”

It is no secret that the life expectancy of someone in the PKK is no longer than 7 or 8 years after joining the terrorist organization.

However, the criminal careers of these three PKK operatives and the PKK’s relations with the U.S., Russia, and various European countries are no secret, as it is already known that these countries overtly or covertly provide support to the PKK. The PKK’s relations in the Middle East and the fact that it forcibly recruits children in its guerrilla forces beginning from 12-years-old are also known. The terror group gives a “commander” title to 15-year-olds and makes them organize suicide attacks. It is also no secret that the life expectancy of someone in the PKK is around 7-8 years after entering the organization. Plus, the PKK engages in drug and arms trafficking and might be responsible for the murder of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, which has remained unsolved up to now.

Forcibly recruiting children in its guerrilla forces beginning from 12-years-old and giving a “commander” title to 15-year-olds as well as pushing them commit suicide attacks are among well know practices of the PKK.

Who murdered Olof Palme, the Swedish Prime Minister?

When the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was tried following his extradition to Turkey by the U.S. in 1999, he confessed all these to a great extent during his plea. For instance, upon the chief judge’s question whether the article that urged killing Olof Palme published in the PKK’s media outlets affected his murder, Ocalan answered: “No. Huseyin Yıldırım is the one writing these articles. He is responsible for the foreign affairs of the organization. In his article, he threatens Olof Palme and says that he will see what would happen to him. I have received information that Palme was killed by PKK Rejini, which generally operates in Europe.”

Moreover, when Ocalan was asked about the PKK’s involvement in drug or arms trafficking, he said: “Arms trafficking was a vital need for our organization. I directed and approved it. But I am against drug trafficking, I urged [the militants] to racketeer those engaging in this. […] But despite my objections, some incidents happened out of my control. It is very hard for me to control every segment of the organization.”

The PKK does not deny its suicide attacks, mass murders, and involvement in arms and drug trafficking. They try to justify their criminal activities on the pretext that they are all done as part of their fight for freedom, democracy, humanity etc. Yet, reminiscent of the times when the U.S. extradited the PKK leader, the reward offered for the three senior PKK members seems to have caused a great surprise and indignation within the organization. However, they objected to only one item in the list of the PKK’s criminal activities. An article in the PKK’s newspaper “Yeni Özgür Politika,” which is published in Germany and circulates across Europe, reads: “Some 25 or 30 years ago, several tourists were kidnapped in violent conditions of warfare. But were they taken hostages; was any ransom asked for; or were they subjected to any kind of ill treatment?” I suppose this means to ask how come the U.S. gave up on backing the PKK.

The last season of the much-acclaimed House of Cards features the story of the first woman American president Claire Underwood (Hale). The storyline is quite a bit of a commentary on the current debates in U.S. politics, women’s participation in politics, relations with Russia, impeachment of a president or even a Supreme Court judge among others. In the first two years of Trump’s presidency, many controversies have dominated the political debate but the president has not been seriously threatened despite much political ruckus. With Democrats in the House majority now, more political turmoil awaits the U.S. public as a number of investigations may be conducted in the coming months. Not to mention the Mueller probe that may have fatal consequences for President Trump. The midterms created a split in Congress, which promises major political showdowns between the President and House Democrats. As further infighting appears to be on the horizon, Trump may turn to foreign policy to project an image of strength despite his domestically inclined America first agenda.

Democrats will have to play their “cards” carefully as they will not want to be seen as “obstructionists” who are only interested in going after President Trump personally instead of serving the interests of the American people. The Democratic Party leadership has signaled that they want irrefutable evidence out of the Mueller probe and broad Republican support before considering impeachment. No matter what comes out of the Mueller probe, however, it will come down to a political decision and a judgment call by Democrats. Given the high likelihood that President Trump will continue to enjoy strong support by Republicans, Democrats dead set on impeachment will probably be disappointed. However, this does not mean that the administration will not face serious pressure from Congress in all fronts, both in terms of congressional investigations and public policy.

Trump’s removal of the Attorney General Jeff Sessions and his replacement of Matthew Whitaker instead of Rod Rosenstein is instructive as the president wants the Mueller investigation to be neutralized, denying ammunition to the House Democrats. Democrats have been threatening to investigate Sessions’ replacement with Whitaker but it is not clear if they can prevent him from overseeing the Mueller probe in a way aligned with his public statements against the investigation. Clearly, this investigation has the potential to determine the relationship between the president and the House Democrats in the next two years. In all likelihood, the drawn-out process will make legislation extremely difficult, if not impossible. In that case, Trump may simply turn to foreign policy to win points in the eyes of the American public heading to the 2020 presidential election.

One obvious place will be the Middle East, particularly Iran. The administration already pulled out of the JCPOA and snapped back sanctions, issuing 6-month waivers to 8 countries including Turkey. Squeezing Iran and bringing them to the table on the administration’s terms seems to be the ultimate goal here, as is clear from the Secretary of State Pompeo’s article in Foreign Affairs. Iran will likely wait to see the results of the 2020 elections before committing to negotiations despite the harsh sanctions. In that case, Trump may try to exert more pressure on Iran with additional sanctions, perhaps refusing to extend further waivers to countries trading with Iran. Pushing against pro-Iranian forces in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen is another strategy the administration could pursue but so far Trump has not devised a comprehensive regional strategy against Iran. House Democrats have promised to investigate Trump’s relationship with the Saudis as well, which may limit his ability to increase pressure against Iran in the Persian Gulf.

Another foreign policy issue candidate to display strength and whip up domestic support would be North Korea. However, President Trump’s rhetoric on this one reached such heights in the past that a repeat of it would come dangerously close to war. Both Iran and North Korea issues carry the risk of escalation and miscalculations but Trump’s deeply anti-war agenda was part of how he won the presidency in the first place. If he comes too close to or engages in yet another war, he will lose domestic support even from his constituency. So far, President Trump has been able to shape or at least change the public debate whenever he wanted to a large extent. As he might seek to bolster his image abroad, the alliances and institutions he has attacked so far may not be there to help him. In that case, the unilateral action may be his only choice. The U.S. presidents have leaned on foreign policy issues when they felt trapped at home but that can have costly consequences at home as well.

President Trump has enjoyed Republican support in both houses of Congress until now, succeeding in cutting taxes, deregulation and Supreme Court appointments among others. In the next two years, he will be faced with a House intent on preventing his agenda and investigating his administration. As major legislation will be close to impossible to pass through Congress, he may choose to play his foreign policy card in the lead up to 2020. It is not clear if it will be enough, however, and he will have to play his hand just as well as the House Democrats.

The Americans are nervous that the UN will accuse them of human rights violations in Yemen and so should take a stand against the Saudis there. They can start with ending the Saudi travel ban on journalists.

Did Trump really tweet about the ‘cover up’ of the Khashoggi murder in such a manner, that it appeared he derided the amateurism of those carrying out the ghastly killing? It’s almost as though he is saying if the Saudis had paid him a decent wedge, that his own people could have done the job much more professionally.

Far fetched? Perhaps. But the horror story of despot getting into power in the White House and giving his Gulf Arab oil sheikh friends in the Middle East the green light to flex their muscles and behave badly – really badly – is not. It’s a reality which we are all living with as America is forced to re-examine its relations with Saudi Arabia whose benighted 33 year old Crown Prince has shown the world a glimpse of the brutality which is carried out habitually to anyone who dares to think. Just to think. Mohammad bin Salman cannot take any kind of comment or even humble advice from even those in his own court and is running Saudi Arabia along fierce, autocratic lines, which is expected of him, from his peers.

We shouldn’t be so shocked about Khashoggi who was only one of many who were renditioned and it is only down to the sensational amateurism of MbS’s henchmen – and the current Turkish investigation – that we know all the gory details.

But it isn’t so much the murder itself, but more the abysmal, half-cocked effort to cover it up which has spurned a broader morality check from Western governments, with Germany taking the initiative to block its own arms sales to the Gulf Arab kingdom. The wholesale impunity afforded to the Saudi Prince, via Trump’s absurdly inexperienced wannabe something son-in-law Jared Kushner, has resulted in the derailment to attention, to Saudi Arabia’s nefarious techniques in governing; or rather preserving the existence of its elite, the Saudi royal family, which the British enshrined during the first world war as they created a cluster of clients states in the Middle East whose very existence was based on their savagery, lack of trust of one another and reverence to the colonial model.

Seven Pillars

Indeed, T E Laurence, a polemic loner and somewhat awkward British serving officer said of the Saudis and their neighbors “The Arabs are even less stable than the Turks. If properly handled they would remain in a state of political mosaic, a tissue of small jealous principalities incapable of cohesion.”

The House of Saud was favored by the British for this reason and, not withstanding its savagery and reputation to never take prisoners as it swept across the (then) fractured country, its firebrand leader united a vast country, what is known as Saudi Arabia today. But there came a price. Wahhibism – a uniquely crafted interpretation of Islam not entirely unlike what Daesh practices against its non-believers – was also seen as a strong point, much later, after the second world war, where it was seen as a shining counterweight to the rapid expansion of communism. But the price the British paid then was savagery. And it’s the price that Trump is now paying with the Khashoggi attempted rendition and many like his.

Does the young prince believe he is more modern than his ancestors as he at least gives his enemies a chance to repent and to return to the kingdom? Khashoggi was a traitor. He had lived a rich and prosperous life as a devoted surf of his Saud rulers. He gained their trust and respect. They shared all their secrets with him over thirty years until the day he decided that he wanted to not only leave their propinquity, but to also use that privileged inside information against them to gain their respect and attention – but in so doing, possibly destroy them.

When President Erdogan of Turkey referred in his own parliament to the “Political killing” of Khashoggi, no western journalists picked this up, but his own parliamentarians knew what he meant. Khashoggi was a Muslim Brotherhood supporter – an organisation which the Saudis hate more than even Iran – and he was hoping to set up a TV channel in Turkey, a country which is aiming to take for itself more hegemony in the region, directly out of Saudi Arabia’s hands. The murder was not only a message to Saudi dissidents, but also to Turkey’s leader: don’t think you can ever get away with a stunt like that. 

Yemen rules

Yet the murdering and rendition itself is nothing new. MbS had been doing this for well over a year, detaining and murdering anyone who he feared might dare to comment on his ideas, let alone present himself as a threat to his tumultuous leadership. But it took the Khashoggi affair to gain the attention and imagination of the world’s media. It was like he did this to one of ours.

Although the West, neither today nor historically, cares not about such atrocities as long as they are kept from the weary eyes of its media or politicians who fear that this ugly proximity to Arab brutality might affect them getting re-elected in the age of Twitter. And the media in the U.S. (and U.K. also) is more guilty for one small, but important detail which Trump’s own support base should care about.

If Western media, and in particular the left leaning Washington Post isn’t guilty for sending its Saudi columnist to his death when they agreed to his articles being published in Arabic, they are certainly guilty for allowing Trump to let the Saudis get away with what they are doing in Yemen – a war and subsequent famine which befits no superlatives in the English language in its biblical level of cruelty and rancorous savagery.

Saudi US-made jets pound these poor people who, skeletons who resort to eating leaves, have no energy to run when they see the jets coming. World records are made everyday with infant mortalities as parents leave their frail babies in the hospital and don’t turn around as people starve – not due to lack of food but money to buy it.

With up to 100,000 dead so far and a contingent of Congress members eager to show Saudi Arabia it has to adapt to Washington rules, there has never been a better time to push for the end of the war in Yemen – which is largely a by product of America over selling the Iran threat to insecure Saudis who are addicted to US arms sales. Saudi Arabia loses 50bn dollars a year in Yemen.

The repugnant reality of the relationship between Washington and the Saudis is that it is western jobs and morally bankrupt politicians who are procuring the justification to sell arms to the Saudis. And the media is part of that collusion.

The Khashoggi murder and all its wretched detail has garnered a momentum of consciousness and probing, probably for all the wrong reasons. But how can we live with ourselves if we are to turn a blind eye to thousands dying in Yemen, who are certainly less worthy of their fate than a merely one journalist with grandiose ideas about his career?

Wrangle with Saudis

Most western editors who have the power to cover Yemen chose not to, as they know that if the U.S. business being done with the Saudis is seen in all its glory with its southern neighbor, it’s not going to score them any points with White House and State department mandarins and, in this era of high lay offs in the newsroom, might even cost them their jobs. But there’s another reason which is far more shameful and leaves us all with blood on our hands.

The Saudis for quite some time now impose a travel ban on western journalists wishing to work in the north of Yemen, where the real story of humanitarian calamity can be captured. Saudi Arabia does not issue journalists with special visas to enter the country. It is this rule, which western media largely complies with – and respects – which should be now at the heart of politicians zealous consciousness as they wrangle with the Saudi question.

How can the Trump administration accept such an arrangement when Yemen is a sovereign state and not a protectorate of Riyadh? When will journalists who sit in each day at Washington press conferences put their hands up and ask the ex Fox moronic press mannequins, the simple question “why does President Trump allow such a rule which prevents us from traveling to Yemen to report there?” The British may have created the house of Saud and planted the seeds for their present day savagery, but it will have to be American journalists who will stand up and stop Trump keeping such traditions alive.

John Cusack, the American actor, may be right about Trump being mentally ill. It’s not important. What is important is that Trump acts now to pull this ruling Saudi family out of the middle ages and convince them that the historical ‘no prisoners’ rule of their ancestors is no longer conducive with the modern world and that the West no longer considers them an asset when they continue to divide the middle east along outdated British imperial lines. Trump needs to show the Saudi Crown Prince the errors of his ways before it’s too late. And Yemen would be a good start for him, MbS and the American media to redeem themselves.

East Africa has witnessed an unprecedented geopolitical shake-up since Abiy Ahmed ascended to power as Ethiopia’s first ethnically Oromo premier earlier this year. His foreign policies were so swift and drastic that it caught his doubters and supporters alike off-guard. However, the region observers and political analysts struggled to decipher the substantiality of his foreign policies vis-à-vis the current ethnic-based internal decadence Ethiopia is going through.

Since Abiy Ahmed came to power, Ethiopia and Eritrea have normalized relations – the two countries were technically at war since 1998. Eritrea and Djibouti also smoothed ties between themselves after Ethiopia and other gulf states played a critical placatory role. Then for the first time in history, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia signed a tripartite security agreement of which the details and specifics are unknown to the public even now. Unforeseen seismic changes were altering the region’s geopolitical landscape. Yet all this was occurring as Ethiopia was undergoing neutrotic ethnic violence where more than 2 million people were displaced and rendered homeless.

A keen observer in the region’s geopolitical shifts and vicissitude would not reconcile Abiy’s foreign policy ambitions to Ethiopia’s internal ethnic psychosis. There is a lingering question: Where is Abiy Ahmed’s foreign policy pace and hubris sprouting from while domestic issues glare at him?

The Horn of Africa: the new Sino-American geopolitical playground

A geopolitical policy shift was evident in the U.S. 2018 National Defense Strategy outline: In a speech he made earlier this year, Defense Secretary James Mattis posited that it will be “great power competition, and not terrorism the primary focus of national security.” This change in U.S. foreign and defense policy can be interpreted as the U.S. administration accepting that it needs to engage with other great powers geographically, and leverage its political alliances in Africa to its advantage. This includes engaging with China and Turkey in the context of Africa. Coincidentally, earlier this year, General Thomas Waldhauser, AFRICOM Commander, informed Congress of the geopolitical risk the U.S. faced in the Horn of Africa. Both Turkey and China have military installations in Somalia and Djibouti respectively. This was understood as a threat to U.S. global interests and in particular U.S. interests in the strategic Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

The U.S. is wary of the growing Chinese and Turkish soft power influence in Africa. Chinese investments and Turkish humanitarian efforts in the region have surpassed the U.S. in the last decade. African states had on their disposal alternative foreign policy interlocutors and hence new forms of cooperation were possible and forged to their advantages. The U.S. fell out of favor in the age of Donald Trump’s America-first policy. The U.S. had to engage with African nations on a geopolitical level ground; the notions of security and anti-terrorism were hallowed and unsustainable in the face of a multi-polar world system.

It is in this approach that the fast-changing geopolitical landscape of East Africa can be understood and comprehended. Ethiopia has been central to the U.S. fight against terrorism in East Africa – the Ethiopian army invaded Somalia to dismantle the Al-Qaeda affiliated Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006 with the backing of the U.S. Today they are part and parcel of AMISOM efforts to fight Al-Shabaab. Abiy Ahmed, a former member of the Ethiopian army and the founder of its Cyber-security intelligence department was elected by the ruling Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Revolutionary Front (EPDRF) to spear-head the country out of the three-year long protests and ethnic violence that engulfed the most populous nation in East Africa. To his credit, the new Prime Minister was cathartic to Ethiopia’s dire conditions, but his foreign policy forays captured global news head-lines.

Containing Turkish and Chinese influences in the Horn of Africa

Shortly after the unprecedented rapprochement with Eritrea, on 24 July this year, Ethiopia’s Abiy Ahmed alongside Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea were in the United Arab Emirates for a tripartite summit. They were received majestically. On 20 September this year, Afwerki was again in the UAE for diplomatic talks. Saudi Arabia and Gulf nations, with the exception of Qatar, were already wary of Turkish and Chinese diplomatic forays into the Horn of Africa: Somalia, a regional ally of Turkey just closed the Emirati embassy in Mogadishu and Djibouti– where China established its first military base– terminated all contracts of the UAE state-owned DP world contracts over operational disputes in the Port of Doraleh. The summit was recognized as a Saudi and UAE (inevitably and ultimately the U.S.) efforts to salvage their geopolitical influence in the face of a growing Turkish and Chinese influence in the region. In their visit, the UAE Crown Prince conferred both leaders with the UAE’s highest award. Shortly after the summit was concluded, Eritrea information minister tweeted that the summit fostered “a broader and robust regional cooperation and coordination.”

Rashid Abdi, the International Crisis Group’s Horn of Africa Director emphasized the role of the U.S. in the tripartite summit and lifting of Eritrea’s sanctions. To counter Turkish and Chinese influence in the horn, a new ally in the name of Eritrea has to be saved first from the doldrums of international sanctions. It is in this consciousness that Abiy Ahmed prioritized normalization of relations with Eritrea. Eritrea was going the way of Iran, Syria, and Cuba and to save-guard U.S. regional interests and security, engaging the tiny nation was inevitable and necessary. Mehari Taddele Maru, a scholar of peace and security observed that the U.S. modus operandi in the Horn of Africa changed drastically: Eritrea has to be “fetched” from diplomatic isolation hence his notion of “Eritrea in, Djibouti out” of the U.S. strategic approach to the Horn of Africa. Somalia – a Turkish sphere of influence – and Djibouti – a Chinese sphere of influence – would be countered and checked with Ethiopia and diplomatically reinvigorated and exorcised Eritrea.

The U.S. is totally in support of the new axis of political alliance that has emerged at the ruins of the Qatari blockade: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, Bahrain, and Jordan. This comes at the expense of Turkish and Qatari interest in the larger Muslim world and strategic Horn of Africa. A shift is already apparent in U.S. geopolitical strategy: strengthening regional allies geopolitically; propping-up new allies (in this case Eritrea) and other partners in the face of a growing global multi-polar new order. The geopolitical and foreign policy changes in the Horn of Africa ought to be seen in the underlying dynamics of U.S. foreign policy and its perceived threats from other spheres of influences. Abiy Ahmed’s foreign policy reforms and the peace breeze sweeping the Horn of Africa is commendable and long-waited but the deafening geopolitical changes’ raison d’etre definitely lie elsewhere: the U.S. Secretary of State.

On 2 October 2018, Jamal Khashoggi, a journalist and critic of the policies of the current Saudi monarchy, was killed in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. His status as columnist with the Washington Post in the U.S., the international response to the nature of his death, and the uncertainty surrounding what happened has created a wave of international press coverage and concern.

President Trump’s response to the incident has been tempered by Saudi oil exports accounting for 13 percent of global crude production and the Kingdom is still perceived to be able to help control oil prices in OPEC as a swing producer. This will be particularly important as the U.S. imposes new sanctions on Iranian oil exports after 5 November 2018. President Trump also claims that more than $110 billion in arms sales are at stake.

Whilst agreeing with Saudi Arabia’s ‘rogue killers’ theory, President Trump sent Secretary of State, Michael Pompeo, to meet with the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, Mohammad bin Salman. He then sent a different message, calling the conflicting Saudi version of events surrounding the murder ‘the worst cover up ever‘. In a televised address on 23 October, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan went a step further, saying the murder was premeditated and that he holds intelligence on what happened. The Saudi prosecutor has since agreed that the murder was premeditated.

Germany has quickly haltered arms exports to the Kingdom while urging other EU states to do the same. Quite late in the process, President Trump sent CIA Director, Gina Haspel, to Turkey to assist in the investigation and Secretary of the Treasury, Steven Mnuchin, travelled to six countries in theMiddle East, including Saudi Arabia, visiting the Terrorist Financing Targeting Centre and having meetings in preparation for Iran sanctions. Although he did not participate in the Future Investment Initiative (FII) which has been boycotted by various business and political leaders (including from France, Australia and the Netherlands), he did meet with Mohammad bin Salman who stressed the importance of the U.S.-Saudi strategic partnership.

The initial Saudi response has been to absolve members of the royal family over the incident by firing 5 top officials and arrested 18 other Saudis. In the economic sphere, the Saudi oil minister, Khalid al-Falih, has said that global oil demand will be met no matter what. The international oil price has already dropped from $85 to $76 since the murder. The move has calmed fears amid a global sell-off caused by this incident, along with budget issues for the Italian government and Brexit. It is also helping President Trump in the lead up to the mid-term elections by its knock on effect in gas pump prices, but oil policy could change and stability will be key up to the elections in on 6 November.

In a state department news conference on 23 October, Secretary of State Pompeo announced that the Trump administration would be revoking the US visas of 21 Saudi suspects implicated in the incident. He also talked about the possibility of targeted sanctions on those responsible for Khashoggi’s death. This was after a bipartisan group of senators sent a letter to President Trump in early October which triggered an investigation through the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. The Act was originally intended to punish Russian officials responsible for the death of Russian tax accountant Sergei Magnitsky in a Moscow prison in 2009, specifically preventing implicated officials from travelling to the US or using the US banking system.

Like the Russian case but in contrast to U.S. sanctions against Iran led by the White House under Executive Order, President Trump has given the U.S. Congress responsibility for longer term responses related to the Khashoggi case. Much depends on the congressional testimony of Gina Haspel once she returns to the U.S. and on Turkish officials or further media revelations concerning the circumstances surrounding the death of Jamal Khashoggi. There does appear to be congressional appetite for sanctions on arms sales to Saudi Arabia if there is sufficient evidence to suggest Saudi officials were involved in the murder, but this is yet to be determined.

President Trump’s assertion that U.S. arms deals to Saudi Arabia are worth $110 billion has been cited as being incorrect given that the deals have not all been signed or paid for. Therefore they cannot equate to up to 600,000 jobs at risk and Congress is probably aware of this.

If further measures are implemented against Saudi Arabia, no matter what the Saudi threats would be in response, whether concerning oil production or moves to purchase more weapons from US adversaries such as Russia and China, the Kingdom will remain tied to the U.S. and its security umbrella against Iran. In turn, the Saudis can also be relatively confident that the U.S. needs Riyadh’s compliance to help maximise pressure on Iran, so its response is likely to be relatively low key.

Still, economic fallout from this incident could yet be felt in the Kingdom, the region and in global markets if a set of more robust sanctions are imposed. Saudi Vision 2030, including the diversification away from oil, remain priorities and part of Mohammad bin Salman’s portfolio, along with defence. Continued state intervention in the economy, including the arbitrary detention of hundreds of princes and businessmen at the Ritz-Carlton hotel in Riyadh in November 2017 and capital flight remain real issues in the diversification process. Saudi Arabia is heavily invested in states and markets across the region and internationally through aid, trade and investments. The Public Investment Fund alone (on whose board Mohammad bin Salman sits) has $557 billion of investments, with many in western markets. But it is conceivable that deals such as the $20 billion deal with Blackstone Group Infrastructure Fund could be arranged to maximise privacy and continued investment under almost any conditions. The issue of providing jobs to millions of youth in Saudi Arabia will also be of paramount importance going forward and favours greater economic engagement in the Saudi economy, under the right conditions, not less.

Regionally, Saudi Arabia is a lynchpin of President Trump’s Middle East policy which seeks to contain Iran and support Israel, Jordan and Egypt. In return, the Trump administration has continued to support the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen and remained inarticulate over Saudi and Emirati attempts to isolate Qatar. Should the U.S. and U.K. follow Germany’s lead by suspending arms sales to the Kingdom it would send a strong signal and potentially give Riyadh an incentive to bring its intervention in Yemen to a negotiated end. This could change the overall dynamic of U.S.-Saudi relations in the Middle East and put the bilateral relationship under further pressure. For example, Saudi Arabia was against the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, blamed the U.S. for the loss of its ally President Mubarak in Egypt and turmoil there in 2012 – 2013, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that threatened a U.S.–Iran rapprochement. However, such a move might boost U.S. standing in the Middle East more broadly, especially after President Obama’s ‘red lines’ were exceeded by the Syrian government’s repeated use of chemical weapons. The question is whether the Trump administration has the political will to entertain a new approach to the Middle East and develop its capacity in doing so.

President Trump has been clear that human rights and democracy promotion do not form part of his foreign policy agenda. He instead relies on personal relationships, reassurances and ‘alternative facts.’ This policy would need to be revisited if Congress supports the return of the U.S. to favour more of a values based foreign policy.

World War I had begun following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, but the geopolitical reason behind the war traces back to the power competition among the European states in the late 19th-century. Even though Ferdinand’s assassination was a crystallization of the already-broken strategic balance within European politics, it unearthed the influence of geopolitics on international politics: The intensified geopolitical antagonism in the Balkans that took place back in the day constitutes a great example in that regard.

One hundred years later, this time in the Middle East, another example reveals the mentality behind geopolitics. The disappearance of the journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, at the hands of Trump’s close ally, in the Saudi consulate general in Istanbul, displays the very nature of the violent geopolitics of the contemporary Middle East. The incident does not only expose the strategic rationality behind the brutal operation led by the MbS coalition but also underlines the competitive nature of regional geopolitics.

Competing narratives on the murder of Khashoggi

There have been two broad categories of competing narratives since Khashoggi’s first disappearance in the Saudi consulate. The first one revolves around the idea of fundamental human rights and freedom, for which killing a dissident journalist at the hand of a rogue apparatus of the Saudi regime constitutes the case. Contrary to the moral logic, the second narrative points out the reality of the geopolitics of the Middle East in general, and the geopolitics of Saudi Arabia in particular.

The latter is gradually becoming the main narrative and shaping our perception of the murder of Khashoggi. These two narratives enable us to understand the already-worsening political landscape in the Middle East. It is crucial to keep in mind that the region has a unique anarchical trajectory, and the ongoing legitimacy crisis of the existing international order shapes the very future of this region via geopolitics. Also, needless to say, the U.S. is an active influencer of the geopolitics in the Middle East.

The U.S. narrative regarding the disappearance of Khashoggi depicts the Trump administration’s complicated relationship with the Middle East. It is widely accepted that the U.S. is a liberal democracy, in which the rule of law, the freedom of speech and free market economy are at the center. This perception might be partly true within the borders of the U.S., but it does not play into reality abroad. The U.S. had never been a real proponent of ideal liberal democracy in shaping its foreign policy priorities abroad, especially in the Middle East. More importantly, the existing U.S. strategy in the Middle East constitutes the most troubling strategic obstacle preventing the achievement of a stable order in the region.

In other words, the U.S. itself is undermining the potential of establishing a stable region in the Middle East. The intention here is not to argue that without the U.S., the Middle East region would overcome its issues overnight. The U.S.’s Middle East grand strategy is only achievable through rogue actors that have no perception of universal values. From the PKK to Saudi Arabia and from Israel to the UAE and Egypt, the U.S. can only deliver its strategic objectives through rouge entities or regimes, who are also incapable of delivering their own grand strategies without the support of the U.S. in the region. It is no secret that, in every single incident, the Trump administration stands by the rogue regime or entity at stake.

The Khashoggi murder is no exception for the U.S.

Regarding the disappearance of Jamal Khashoggi, however, the U.S. embraced two different narratives simultaneously. The mainstream media, particularly the Washington Post, where Jamal Khashoggi contributed as a columnist, disseminated the intelligence information shared by anonymous Turkish intelligence sources and pushed the Trump administration to take some responsibility to clarify whether his most popular ally, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, also known as MbS, has any responsibility behind the disappearance of Khashoggi.

While the media and some of high profile Republicans and Democrats frame the Khashoggi case within the context of American universal values, the Trump administration determined its strategy in line with its arms deal with Saudi Arabia, the containment strategy of Iran, the fragile balance of power in the Gulf region, and the U.S.-Israel master plan on Palestine. However, Turkey’s cautious approach gradually pushed Saudi Arabia to accept its responsibility, and the Trump administration had to change its ways of framing the issue.

Here, the problem for the Trump administration is not the action of the Crown Prince against a dissident journalist, but it is the intelligence information shared by Turkey.

At this stage, if Trump decides to retreat MbS because of his brutality, which is unlikely to happen, it will not be a decision of American liberal principles, but a decision motivated by the increasing unpredictability of MbS’s actions in the Middle East.

Turkey and the Khashoggi murder

When it comes to Turkey, besides the moral aspect of the Khashoggi murder, the mentality of geopolitics is also a determining factor not only in understanding the nature of Khashoggi’s death but also in determining Ankara’s foreign policy agenda. From the geopolitical angle, Turkey did not initially want to disrupt its relationship with the Saudi state but desired to influence Saudi’s anti-Turkey position in the region. During the first stage of the disappearance of Khashoggi, Ankara decided to provide details about Khashoggi’s killing at the Saudi consulate to shape the perception of international media to test the waters. This stage was crucial for Ankara to locate the Khashoggi murder as an international issue rather than formulating it as a Turkish-Saudi problem.

More importantly, Ankara pushed the Trump administration to take a leading role in addressing the issue to confront Saudi Arabia. The central rationality behind Ankara’s behavior was to create an international moral awareness to put pressure on Saudi Arabia and push the Saudi authorities to accept the crime that they committed. It was clear for Turkey that Saudi Arabia would not accept its responsibility if Turkey had not gradually shared the intelligence information with the international media.

In the second stage, Ankara started to intensify its intelligence sharing to ultimately show that Saudi Arabia had the responsibility in organizing every single stage of the Khashoggi operation. Following the 17 days of intelligence sharing by Turkey, Saudi Arabia had to confirm that something went wrong during the interrogation of Khashoggi in the consulate. During this stage, Saudi Arabia quickly became an international flashlight as international actors began to change their attitudes against MbS.

In the third stage, President Erdogan himself began to lead the process by sharing his perception with the international audience. On Tuesday, President Erdogan gave a very detailed timeline explaining that the Saudi team planned the brutal killing of Khashoggi. In his speech, Erdogan did not directly accuse the Saudi leadership but highlighted that a Saudi probe, which has resulted in the arrest of 18 people so far, has not yet reached the high-level representatives in the Kingdom’s inner circle.

It is clear that Ankara has a moral duty to clarify what happened in the consulate as well as various geopolitical concerns. Within this context, underlying the role of MbS in Saudi politics carries a critical role in explaining the geopolitical dimension of Khashoggi’s murder. For Turkey, there is profound geopolitical disagreement between Ankara and Riyadh regarding regional affairs.

While Saudi Arabia’s support of the U.S. strategy towards the PYD/YPG in Syria is an essential one for Turkey, MbS’s role in the Palestinian case demonstrates another issue, in which Saudis seem to be an integral part of a long-term U.S.-Israel strategy to redesign the region. Qatar is also a critical disagreement point in Turkish-Saudi relations. From Libya to Yemen, Turkey and Saudi Arabia compete with each other.

President Erdogan intentionally highlighted in his speech the difference between the King of Saudi, Selman and politically responsible name behind the murder by saying that the killing was premeditated. At this stage, Turkey is trying to carry out its position one step forward to weaken the legitimacy of MbS internationally and to deter Saudi Arabia’s anti-Turkish geopolitical ambitions in the Middle East. The intelligence knowledge that Turkey has can also shift the U.S. position against MbS.

Khashoggi’s murder revealed the complex nature of geopolitics in the region, but how it is going to influence the future of the region remains a big question mark.

Following his election to the U.S. presidency in late 2016, Donald Trump produced two political strategies towards the Middle East. The first one is the plan dubbed as the “deal of the century,” which aims to solve the Palestine-Israel conflict. Although this has not been made public, Trump has slowly been trying to implement this plan. The second is the Middle East Strategic Alliance initiative that has recently dominated the U.S. agenda towards the region.

In this context, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo held a meeting on September 28, 2018, with the participation of six countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the foreign ministers of Egypt and Jordan. After the meeting, it was stated that the U.S. administration would provide full support to the establishment of a Middle East Strategic Alliance consisting of GCC +2 countries in order to combat armed organizations in the Middle East, to bring peace in Syria and Yemen, and to stop the harmful activities of Iran. In the following period, the U.S. media reported that Trump had planned to hold a Washington Summit with the leaders of the GCC +2 countries on 12-13 October. However, this never happened.

The Jamal Khashoggi incident, which took place on October 2, determined the agenda of Middle East politics. A Saudi citizen and a columnist for the Washington Post, Khashoggi disappeared after he entered the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. This incident created a global reaction against the Saudi regime, which is believed to be behind what happened to Jamal. More, a serious campaign against Saudi Arabia began from many spheres in the U.S. and the cooperation between the Trump administration and Riyadh has been heavily criticized. These developments made a negative impact on Trump’s Middle East Strategic Alliance initiative, which already suffers from different structural problems.

The first of these problems is the crisis between Qatar and other Gulf neighbors, namely, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. In June 2017, these countries started a political and economic embargo against Qatar, which further deepened the crisis between countries in the region. The main reason for the rapid deterioration of the crisis is the harsh steps taken by Mohammad bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and Mohammad bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces. These policies increased the mistrust among the members of the GCC, and countries such as Oman and Kuwait have initially preferred to stay out of this anti-Qatar campaign. Both countries even criticized the Saudi and Emirati initiatives against Qatar. Therefore, it can be said that the unresolved Gulf crisis is the main obstacle for Washington’s Middle East Strategic Alliance initiative.

Another disagreement among the members of the GCC is the different attitudes taken in regards to Iran. While Saudi Arabia has been the champion of demonizing Iran, countries like Qatar and Oman have not pursued hostile policies. In fact, Oman has maintained good relations with Iran for many years and has signed numerous deals with the Tehran administration, especially in the field of energy. During the past few years, Oman has not criticized Iranian involvement in the civil war in Yemen and this attitude of Muscat has further angered the regime in Riyadh.

Another dispute among the Gulf Cooperation Council members has been taking place between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The disagreements between the two countries have increased in recent years. The first of these disputes is the status of the Khafji oil field, which the two countries jointly used for many years. However, due to the number of disagreements between the two, Saudi Arabia suspended its oil production, forcing Kuwait to do the same. Since then, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have failed to reach a consensus on the solution of this problem.

The second dispute surrounds the embargo on Qatar. Kuwait’s mediation efforts during the embargo on Doha were not accepted by Riyadh or Abu Dhabi. It is noted that Riyadh in particular failed to take a step for the solution of these problems. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s failure to address these issues, which were planned to be discussed during his visit on October 1, 2018, indicates that the Saudi administration has followed an uncertain policy in relations with Kuwait.

Another issue that hinders Trump’s Middle East Strategic Alliance initiative is Egypt’s reluctant attitude. Initial signs of Cairo’s reluctance in joining Saudi Arabia’s efforts to counter Iran was seen during Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen. The Egyptian army did not provide full-scale support to the operation, leading to a temporary crisis between Riyadh and Cairo. Egypt has also followed a different path from Saudi Arabia in Syria. The Sisi regime had multiple meetings with Bashar Assad and further engaged in military and intelligence cooperation with Damascus. Additionally, Sisi’s close relations with Russia is another sign of Egypt’s reluctance to join a U.S.-led campaign as Cairo aims to follow a balanced policy between Russia and the U.S.

One of the most important obstacles in establishing an Arab alliance against Iran is the possible discomfort of the Shiite population living in these states. The Shiites living in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait, would be alienated from such an alliance and from the U.S. policy to encourage a sectarian divide.

Future of the Middle East Strategic Alliance Project initiated by U.S. President Donald Trump is vague and doubtful. The future of the Trump administration in U.S. politics, the process of political transformation in the region and the deepening of the political divisions between the Gulf countries can be stated as the most important obstacles of this project.

We have been living in a unipolar world since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. has been the sole major power. However, the structure of the international system has been evolving away from unipolarity due to the disproportional growth rates among states. Accordingly, there are states that speedily head to gain the status of major power. China in particular has increased its military and economic capacity in a short span of time, which is expected to reach the level of development that facilitates it to challenge the primacy of the U.S. So, a bipolar world is rising.

Besides, recently, new regional powers have emerged. Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey, are among those powers. The rise of regional powers, though it does not complicate things much at the global level, puts pressure on the U.S., which, as the only major power, engages in the politics of regions such as the Middle East as an off-shore balancer. Losing the control of a region may undoubtedly have political repercussions on the international level. That may give way to penetration of another extra-regional power or worse lead to the emergence of a regional hegemon, which may happen to rise as a global power in the long run.

Russia’s enhancement of its influence and Turkey’s tendency to act autonomously in the Middle East can be cited in this context. The relative decline of U.S. power in the Middle East has prompted Russia to fill the power vacuum and has urged Turkey to start the process of uplifting its status from a balancer to a hegemon in the region.

Current U.S. foreign policy faces the problem of accommodating China and regional powers like Turkey. So far under the Trump presidency, the U.S. has countered this problem by developing a unilateralist and isolationist foreign policy. This foreign policy basically seeks to contain and overturn the power shift that is now taking place. The Trump administration has taken policies that range from trade war to military tour de force for that purpose. This has been accompanied by the securitization of China and regional power like Turkey in the media.

Nevertheless, especially owing to the domestic political necessities like the upcoming elections for the Senate, the Trump administration has started to take contrary decisions towards these countries. The release of Pastor Andrew Brunson last week, who had been in prison for about two years in Turkey on accusations of aiding the PKK, was reciprocated by signaling to lift some of the economic sanctions that had been imposed on Turkey earlier this year.

Here we should note that Trump seems to plan to use the release of Brunson in his election campaign in order to mobilize the Evangelical and conservative voters to go to the polls and vote for the Republicans for the Senate. Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, has recently expressed that some sanctions could be lifted. This marks that the period of tension, which was grown by mutual retaliatory political moves, seems to enter into a period of relative normalcy.

However, this should not increase the hopes for bilateral relations. As noted above, relations between Turkey and the U.S. will not be normalized unless the U.S. agrees to accommodate Turkey by admitting its new international status, which is an autonomous regional power. Indeed, in the past, relations between the two countries have witnessed several low points, including the Cyprus crisis in the 1970s. Yet, the reason behind these kinds of tensions was not structural. Turkey was merely expecting for its sovereign rights to be expected. It did not seek to change its status and position in international politics.

Today, Turkey seeks to adjust the international order according to recent changes in its domestic politics and the distribution of power in the region. Turkey does not want to keep playing its traditional role of the “outsider” balancer in its vicinity by following the U.S. leadership and national interests. Instead, it desires to establish itself as an autonomous powerhouse in the region. The U.S. has so far responded to Turkey’s new foreign policy attitude by supporting the terrorist organizations such as the PKK and FETO (led by U.S.-based criminal cult leader Fetullah Gulen), which strives to curb the country’s potentials and capabilities.

In response to this attitude, Turkey has continuously given the message that it will not take a step back. For instance, last week President Erdogan signaled a new wave of military operations in the south of the country and stated that Turkey was adamant to cleanse the east of the Euphrates River from all terrorist (PKK) elements. This, no doubt, will be a new test on how “healthy” the relations between Turkey and the U.S. are.

The disagreement over the control and status of the Syrian town of Manbij has been a symbol of the strategic differences between the U.S. and Turkey’s Syria policies for a while now. Turkey’s successful military operation in Afrin led to the announcement of a roadmap over Manbij, which relatively calmed down U.S.-Turkey tensions. However, the U.S. continued to support the PKK-affiliated YPG forces in a stated mission to deny a return to Daesh in northern Syria.

With Daesh no longer holding territory, this mission did not appear to provide convincing rationale for a prolonged American presence on the ground. More recently, the U.S. ended its ambiguity by announcing an open-ended presence in Syria declaring a mission to limit Iranian influence in Syria as part of a broader strategy to confront Iran in the region.

With this critical shift in strategy, the U.S. commitment to northern Syria seems to be set in motion for the long term. One of the first concrete outcomes of this change appears to be the administration’s stern warnings against a regime operation against Idlib, which would have caused yet another humanitarian catastrophe.

Turkey sent reinforcements to its observation posts in and around Idlib to prevent the regime from an easy takeover while lobbying Russia to prevent such an operation. The U.S. rhetoric against the looming operation may have helped Turkey’s case, convincing Russia to hold off at least for a period of time in return for the Turkish promise to push terror groups out of Idlib.

Another consequence of the U.S. policy change seems to be the announcement that the PYD would no longer negotiate with the Assad regime. This step seems to be aimed at softening the Turkish argument that the U.S. should not trust the PYD, which would work with the Assad regime, Iran or Russia depending on its needs. This argument still holds true despite the PYD’s obvious tactic to appease its American supporters, who are clearly concerned about the degree to which the regime is supported by Iranians.

The PYD has played a critical role in the PKK’s regional ambitions by opening the door for legitimacy in the international arena despite Turkey’s warnings. Turkey has been able to limit the PYD’s forays into the western side of the Euphrates but the area it continues to control remains a major concern for Turkey.

The U.S. policymakers in charge of the Syria policy would like to see Turkey enlisted on their side in their push back against Iran in the region and they must see an interest in alleviating at least some of the Turkish concerns. This kind of willingness to work with Turkey and the most recent announcement of joint Turkish-American patrols around Manbij can help rebuild confidence between the two NATO allies.

Nevertheless, we should be clear-eyed about the reality on the ground of the U.S. support for the PYD, which is considered by Turkey as a direct security threat. This will continue to be the Achilles’ heel in the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relationship. The PKK understands this and will seek to exploit it for its interests.

Turkey feels more confident after its Afrin operation, the Manbij agreement with the U.S., and the successful diplomatic effort to prevent the Assad regime from launching a major military assault against Idlib, supported at least rhetorically by Washington. These are strong signs for a renewed dynamic that takes into consideration Turkey’s interests and concerns. But once again, American support for the YPG continues to be the underlying fundamental strategic divergence between the two allies, with significant potential to undermine any positive momentum.

There has been a lot of debate about the current U.S. unwillingness to lead the liberal international order it created after World War II. The Obama administration already displayed signs of war weariness, which often translated into no action in conflicts like Syria. On issues that he cared about the most, the Iran nuclear issue and climate change, President Obama worked hard to build international consensus through multilateral institutions in the international system. However, the U.S. was already hesitant to provide leadership on a whole host of issues, particularly in matters of war and peace.

Having run on the theme of “America First,” the Trump administration has transformed this hesitation to what many would call hostility against internationalism and the global institutions themselves. From NATO to NAFTA, military and economic multilateral institutions and agreements have been targeted by President Trump. Traditional allies have been threatened with tariffs and economic pressure unless they agree to deals that would no longer “take advantage” of the U.S. It would be misleading to label this attitude isolationism per se. The Trump administration has been insisting that these international institutions and agreements be made to serve U.S. interests even if it is at the expense of international liberal order.

Just as we saw in the case of the Obama administration’s reluctance to lead, we are now witnessing the Trump administration’s resentment against the international system and that the U.S. is reconsidering its global role. Clearly, both administrations provided no comprehensive answers to the leadership question and both of their approaches have been subject to heavy contestation from both the left and the right domestically. Furthermore, more often than not, the Trump administration’s admonishment of the international system has subsided with rather superficial adjustments (NATO members’ promise to increase their national defense budget to 2%) or renegotiated trade deals (U.S.-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement instead of NAFTA). The lesson here is that neither the Obama nor Trump administration has addressed the global leadership question in a comprehensive manner.

The message to the world has been that the U.S. has been rethinking its global role in a rather confused and haphazard manner. At times, the somewhat ideological assertion of national sovereignty seems to take priority whereas, at other times, satisfying some domestic constituency seems to suffice. The response of both the allies (the EU and others) as well as potential rivals (China) have been an interesting one. Nobody seems willing to sit and wait for the U.S. to “come to its senses.”

Allies are thinking of ways to live without the U.S. leadership, recognizing that they may even have to confront the U.S. along the way. The rebuff President Trump received from the UN Security Council a special session on Iran, which was instructive in this sense. Potential competitors like China, on the other hand, are working hard to minimize the economic impact of the impending trade wars by strengthening their regional relationships. In many ways, the world is not waiting for the U.S.

Turkey, as a traditional ally, has had to adjust to the regional realities with minimal or no serious U.S. leadership on a variety of issues including the Syrian crisis. In order to protect its national security and economic interests in the region by minimizing the detrimental impact of the Syrian conflict, Turkey has worked with Russia and Iran on the diplomatic and strategic fronts, the EU on the humanitarian front, and the U.S. on the political front.

The days of alignment with a clearly identified bloc of nations are long gone. Creating a strategy based on the realities on the ground and one that accommodates some of the priorities of the regional powers has become a routine part of policymaking. The most recent rapprochement with Germany can be given as an example of an effort to “bring Europe in” in the absence of robust U.S. leadership.

In the years ahead, if it decides to return, U.S. global leadership will find itself in an environment that has fundamentally changed. The emergence of regional cooperation mechanisms and mini-alliances based on a variety of issues will create realities that will not be easy to replace.

Providing a global framework for action will be ever more difficult since many countries, both allies and rivals, will have pivoted away on a whole host of strategic and economic issues. The U.S. will continue to enjoy great capacity to shape world events, alliances and institutions for the foreseeable future but it will find it increasingly challenging to lead given the legacy of these intervening years with minimal serious U.S. role.

The steep devaluation of the Turkish Lira against the U.S. dollar in August 2018 has mostly been attributed not to economic, but political reasons by many around the world – although most Western media outlets have tended to argue otherwise in a rather biased way as I discussed in my last column.

It should be noted that the abuse of the global reserve currency, the U.S. dollar, as a “financial weapon” against the countries that the U.S. is not happy with in political terms will have significant adverse consequences for the U.S. itself.

In today’s world, the U.S. dollar has certainly been in a rather dominant position as the reserve currency of the world. However, the U.S. economy is not that dominant at all in the world economy. First, although the share of the U.S. in the global trade is around 16 percent (14 percent of global exports and 18 percent of global imports), half of the total global trade is conducted via the U.S. dollar. Second, oil, gold and other commodities are overwhelmingly, if not totally, denominated in the U.S. dollar in global trade. Third, the U.S. dollar reserves comprise of around two-thirds (62.48 percent) of foreign-exchange reserves in central bank coffers around the world. Fourth, more than 80 percent of global foreign currency exchanges have been carried out with the U.S. dollar in either buy-side or sell-side.

The U.S. dollar had not been that strong in the past and certainly will not be in that position forever. The U.S. dollar has reached its current dominant position with the construction of the global economic/financial system by the U.S. itself during and in the wake of World War II. In this system, which is also called Bretton Woods, the U.S. dollar had been indexed to gold and other currencies had been tied to the U.S. dollar. However, in 1971 amid growing strains on the U.S. dollar, U.S. President Nixon severed the tie between the U.S. dollar and gold. This was the beginning of the end for the Bretton Woods system, which has gradually been replaced by neoliberalism in the 1970s and 1980s around the world. The U.S. dollar has managed to keep its title as the world’s reserve currency in this transition, due to the fact that the U.S. was the world’s biggest economy and hegemonic power and the U.S. dollar was firmly established in the global financial/economic order.

No one can deny that the U.S. dollar, as the world’s reserve currency, contributes greatly to the U.S. economy. On the other hand, however, other countries also benefit from a steady economic/financial system “to an extent,” in which the U.S. dollar has a central place. But, the reputation of this structure has been tarnished by the myriad financial crises occurred since the introduction of neoliberalism and, of course, the global financial crisis of 2008-09. Lastly, using the U.S. dollar as a weapon against other countries in an effort to promote the political interests of the U.S. itself has become the final blow to the U.S. dollar. The U.S. dollar was meant to be the stabilizer of the world trade and economy, not the destabilizer.

Using the U.S. dollar with political motivations against Turkey will certainly damage the Turkish economy to an extent in the short run. However, the U.S. itself, will be the biggest loser of this financial warfare in the medium/long run. Because the U.S. dollar benefits other countries by providing a stable financial environment, in which financial transactions could be conducted without serious fluctuations in value. Moreover, the U.S. dollar serves the world as the global unit of account, or the yardstick, with which all sorts of assets can be compared in value easily globally. However, make no mistake: the U.S. is by far the biggest winner of this system. Yet, it is the U.S. itself marring it.

Although the U.S. is still the hegemonic power of the world, it is an apparent fact that its power has been waning in relative terms. The share of the U.S. economy in the world was 25 percent in 1950. It is just around 17 percent now. Moreover, in terms of purchasing power parity, China has surpassed the U.S. as the world’s biggest economy in 2011. The same thing will happen in terms of market exchange rates in the medium term. This means that the power of the U.S. dollar is destined to abate significantly. And it will possibly cease to be the reserve currency of the world in the medium/long term with dire consequences for the U.S., resulting in several reserve currencies. Using the U.S. dollar as a political weapon would only precipitate this fate.

On 10 September, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo confirmed that Washington has released $1.2 billion military aid to Egypt. The aid package includes $1 billion for the budget of fiscal year 2018 and $195 million, which was originally allocated for the previous fiscal year. The U.S. administration had decided to suspend the transfer of the $195 million due to the human rights records of the Sisi regime in Egypt. However, increasing cooperation between the two countries led Washington to eventually release this aid.

It was surprising for many that the U.S. government’s decision came a day after an Egyptian court sentenced 75 people to death, including a senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood Mohamed Beltagy, the Deputy Head of the Freedom and Justice Party Essam al-Erian, Salafi preacher Safwat Hegazy, former youth minister Osama Yassin and al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya leader Tarek al-Zumer. The court also sentenced the Muslim Brotherhood’s supreme leader, Mohammed Badie, to life in prison and the son of former President Mohammad Morsi, Osama Morsi, to 10 years in prison. A total of 739 people were charged after their supposed responsibility during the dispersal of Rabaa Square protests. Many international human rights organizations and civil society groups criticize the Sisi regime for its unjust treatment of the civilian opposition.

The U.S. government however, falls short of criticizing the Egyptian regime on its human rights record and continues to provide military assistance. This was reflected in the recent statement released by the State Department, in which the Trump administration emphasized that, “Cairo is a vital partner in the regional politics of Washington and that cooperation between the two countries in security will continue.”

There are three main dynamics for Egypt’s strategic role in the U.S. foreign policy regarding the Middle East. The first reason is ultimately the security of Israel. Traditionally, the most important element in ensuring Israel’s security – which is the main determinant of U.S. policy in the Middle East – is the existence of a government in Egypt that is loyal to the U.S. A government in Cairo that does not cause problems for Israel has always been a key factor for Washington and Tel-Aviv. This was the case during the periods of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak.

The second dynamic is forcing the Egyptian regime to follow a foreign policy pattern, which is in line with the priorities of the U.S. The U.S. has aimed to control Egypt’s regional and international policy via various instruments such as financial aid, military assistance, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic support.

Finally, as one of the most influential Muslim countries, Egypt is of great importance for the U.S. in regards to its political agenda in the Middle East. By keeping Egypt under control, Washington aims to strengthen its hand in confronting other regional actors such as Russia, Iran, and to some extent, Turkey. In this regard, the U.S. is thus able to prevent Egypt from forming a close relationship with these actors, which would otherwise form a coalition against Washington.

U.S. policy towards Egypt has been in line with these dynamics in the past years, particularly since 2011. Washington did not support the presidency of Mohammad Morsi – an individual that had been elected in the first free and democratic elections the country held in decades. The main reason for Washington’s attitude was Morsi’s affiliation with the moderate Islamic civil society organization, the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, the U.S. was quick to support the military coup of July 3, 2013, which toppled the Morsi government. U.S. support for the post-coup Sisi regime was evident in many regards. This became much clearer after the election of Donald Trump in January 2017. During the Trump era, relations between the two countries transformed into a strategic alliance.

Despite the fact that thousands of civilians oppose the military coup in Egypt, the U.S. administration continues to support the Sisi regime. Washington also ignores the Sisi regime’s violations of human rights, pressure on civil society, and the repression on the freedom of expression. There is no doubt that the U.S. clearly ignores democratic values and is continuing its support for a repressive regime. This attitude of the U.S. only encourages other repressive regimes in the region and prevents the emergence of democratic political structures throughout the Middle East. For this reason, it should be underlined that the U.S. administration’s statements of democratization in the Middle East do not reflect reality. Rather, Washington is currently the largest obstacle for democratic governments in the region.

Turkey has been the most vocal critic of the seemingly impending military assault against Idlib by the Assad regime. Turkey has serious concerns about the strategic and humanitarian consequences of a potential operation. An Assad-Iran ground operation supported by Russian airpower (though limited it may be) can unleash yet another humanitarian catastrophe, producing hundreds of thousands of IDPs and refugees. A regime takeover would signal the end of the opposition as we know it. However, Turkey’s adamant stance combined with its recent military reinforcements to the 12 observation posts might bear fruit and deter the regime, at least for the time being. Given the strong rhetoric used by the U.S. against the Assad regime especially with regard to its potential chemical weapons use, Russia might not be so eager to deploy its air support to the regime any time soon.

The most recent Tehran summit that brought the main sponsors of the Astana process, Turkey, Russia and Iran, demonstrated the level of deep disagreements between these powers. While Ankara has pushed for better relations with Moscow recently, the summit showed that Turkey would stand its ground when it comes to defending its interests in Syria, including the support for the moderate opposition. Turkey has not contended itself with warnings about a possible disaster in Idlib but has taken measures to deter the Assad regime from engineering a fait accompli. Clearly, a regime assault on Idlib goes against the basic logic of the Astana process and it can seriously derail any attempt at a political solution.

The Assad regime and its supporters have shown time and again that they have little interest in a truly political process to end the conflict in Syria. The regime has been trying to “win” through a systematic effort to take over most of the country by implementing strategic ceasefires and military operations both sequentially and simultaneously depending on the region. While there has been the talk of a political process, there has been little tangible progress on that front. Turkey’s military presence on the ground and its continued support to the opposition appear to be the only true obstacles before the regime to accomplish its goals. Turkey, on the other, is trying hard to ensure that when and if the Geneva process happens, it comes to the table with a strong hand and a viable opposition to speak of.

The most recent reports indicate that there has been a quiet policy shift in U.S. policy. Having justified its military operations in the north of Syria on the Daesh threat, the U.S. political and military leaders have not been making a strong case for continued operations in Syria, albeit until recently. The recent shift seems to entail a more open-ended commitment despite President Trump’s earlier comments about leaving Syria soon. Now, the Syria policy appears to be insistent on the departure of Iranian forces from the country as well as a stronger, albeit rhetorical, posture against the Assad regime’s potential Idlib operation. It is difficult to say the U.S. and Turkey see eye-to-eye on Idlib but there are clearly strong overlaps.

A realignment could re-emerge between the U.S. and Turkey’s policies on Idlib, which could give the Assad regime and especially Russia a pause. Despite the diplomatic benefits the U.S. position may provide, Turkey has skin in the game in a way its NATO ally does not. With the recent U.S. appointment of James Jeffrey, the new representative for engagement on Syria, there are signs that Washington might listen to and understand Ankara better, especially on its Syria policy. However, there is every indication that the U.S.’s continued support for the YPG, the Syrian extension of the PKK, will continue. In fact, much of the new Syria policy might depend on this relationship. If that continues to be the case, the U.S.-Turkey agreement on Idlib may not grow into broader cooperation on Syria.

A key component of the new U.S. policy on Syria will be the focus on reducing Iranian influence in the region, hoping to enlist Turkey’s support. However, with the impending sanctions on Iranian energy sectors, it is safe to bet that the U.S. and Turkey will have serious disagreements on Iran. Turkey vehemently disagrees with Iran on Syria but it is reliant on Iran for its oil and natural gas needs. If the U.S. is interested in enlisting Turkish support against Iran’s regional influence, it will need to engage Turkey in a meaningful way beyond the somewhat limited agreement on Idlib.

Following the election of Donald Trump as President, the United States has adopted a new political strategy towards the Middle East. The most important component of this policy was the establishment of an Arab alliance, which would have two major aims: Following pro-U.S. policies in the region and fighting against threats that could harm Israel’s security. In order to establish such an alliance, the U.S. focused on three countries – namely, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In this context, Trump made his first oversees visit to Saudi Arabia and then hosted Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi at the White House. Trump also met with the de facto leader of the UAE, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Zayed, at the White House on May 15, 2017.

This initiative became the main pillar of the U.S. administration’s new strategy for the region. Within this framework, the leaders of these countries have begun to act with the U.S. administration in all regional and global issues. Increasing pressure on the Muslim Brotherhood and policies towards Iran can be noted as examples of the issues that the Washington administration, Cairo, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi governments have co-opted.

The successful existence of this alliance is vital for Washington for several reasons. First, such an alliance is a crucial instrument in order to secure Israel from regional threats. The Trump-led U.S. administration’s approach to Israel is different from previous governments. Not only does Trump make his pro-Israel stance extremely visible, he also employs figures that are staunch supporters of Israel. In December 2017, Trump revealed his decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel – a decision that was always avoided by previous U.S. presidents.

Confronting Iran is also an important factor for establishing such an alliance. The U.S. aims to unify regional actors in their policies towards Iran. For this reason, Washington has been supporting Saudi Arabia’s and the United Arab Emirates’ fight in Yemen against Iranian-backed Houthis. A similar situation can also be observed in the case of Syria. The Trump administration’s hostile stance against Iran is no secret and this attitude was emphasized in Washington’s decision to impose new sanctions on Tehran.

A third reason why the U.S. administration wants to establish such a regional coalition is the issue of security and natural resources. As one of the leading countries in the world in terms of oil reserves, Saudi Arabia is also the main defence industry importer of the U.S. Riyadh is also one of the largest foreign investors, which has billions of investments in the U.S. Therefore, Washington indirectly benefits from the wealth of Saudi Arabia – which is generated from the country’s natural resources. Having a close relationship with countries that have large energy resources gives the U.S. an advantage in competition with global actors.

The creation of a pro-U.S. alliance in the Middle East is of great importance for Washington’s rivalry with global actors such as Russia and China. It can be argued that one of the main motivations behind the U.S. strategy in the Middle East is to prevent the rising influence of Moscow and Beijing in the region. Therefore, it is important for the U.S. to contain Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in order to ensure they do not fall under the influence of other international actors.

The U.S. administration also aims to prevent a possible regional alliance between these countries and Turkey – one of the main challengers of Washington’s policies in the Middle East. The U.S. and Turkey have been increasingly distancing themselves from each other, and their regional strategies have been in strong competition. As a result, the policies of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE have been in parallel with those of the U.S.

In order to impose its new strategy in the Middle East, the Trump administration wants to keep the most important countries in the region under its control. The recent political moves of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE reflect the fact that they are fully committed to a strong alliance with Washington. Most recently, while Muslim countries across the world condemned the decision, these countries showed minimal response to Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

Although it may seem that Washington’s strategy of building a pro-U.S. regional coalition is at work, there are obstacles for its success. While social and political actors defy this initiative and continue to display their discomfort with U.S. influence in the region, there is rising popular dissatisfaction with authoritarian regimes such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Therefore, it is still unknown as to whether this U.S. strategy of forming an Arab alliance in the region will produce a functioning outcome.

Judaism has a holy day named Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement), which is spent with ceremonies of redemption for the sins of the Israelites. During the early periods of Judaism, high priest Aaron would perform religious ceremonies for the atonement of the community and made people pray on this holy day. Then, he drew lots from a lottery box over two goats. One was selected to sacrifice for the sins of the people, while he leaned his hands on the second goat and confessed the sins of the entire people of Israel, thus making it the scapegoat. After that, the scapegoat was taken out of the sanctuary and cast into the desert. According to the Jewish faith, the sins were cleansed as the scapegoat lurked out of sight.

Today, the word scapegoat is used in almost every language, including Turkish, to define one that bears the blame for others. In that sense, the U.S. President Donald Trump has become a global scapegoat. Since his inauguration, his discharge is constantly on the agenda in U.S. domestic politics, while the international community is fed up with him. The most criticized thing about him is his “crude and obnoxious” tone. But as a matter of fact, he perfectly represents U.S. policies, especially U.S. foreign policy, with this very tone. That is why many international audience supported Trump against Hillary Clinton during the presidential race. It was obvious that Clinton would sugarcoat U.S. foreign policy’s atrocious practices and their consequences much better than Trump since Trump accentuates the vulgar side of U.S. policies.

To illustrate, let me remind the reader of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which led to a series of conflicts in the region. The U.S. Senator from Arizona, John McCain, who recently passed away and was eulogized by the U.S. press and even by his rivals, was noted as one of the leading hawkish names paving the way for the invasion of Iraq. Shortly before his death, McCain wrote in his memoir that the invasion “can’t be judged as anything other than a mistake, a very serious one, and I have to accept my share of the blame for it.” But no matter whether he regretted it, more than 600.000 Iraqi civilians were killed in Iraq over the past decade while the U.S. troops suffered 4.500 losses. Plus, millions of Iraqis were displaced and lost their homes.

A former deputy from the Republican People’s Party (CHP) likened the Gulenist Terror Group (FETO) to a barnacle, saying that a barnacle cannot survive unless it feeds on a whale’s skin and how FETO flourished in Turkey. So, it can be said that Israel is a barnacle living on the U.S. ever since it was founded. The U.S. is also content with supporting the country’s tyranny. Innumerable examples portraying this relation can be given but let me remind you of the latest one. The law that recognizes Jerusalem as Israel’s capital city passed in 1995 in the U.S. Congress. Although all U.S. presidents in office as of that date kept the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv by using their authority in foreign politics, this law has been in force since then. Trump only exercised it, making the U.S.’ Israel policy even more obvious, and urged moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem.

Another example can be given from Turkey. FETO of course did not appear during Trump’s term in office, as the terror group has been revealed to have almost 40 years of past. When FETO attempted to stage a military coup in Turkey on July 15, 2016, Barack Obama was in the White House. Both Obama and his successor Trump issued statements siding with Turkey on the subject, but this cannot change what happened. FETO leader Fetullah Gulen, who moved to Pennsylvania in 1999, with the help of former CIA vice-chair Graham Fuller, is still living there without facing any restriction since then.

European leaders, especially German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron, criticize Trump for being compliant with authoritarian regimes and having problems with Washington’s allies. But endless examples can be listed showing that France, Germany, and the U.S. have not only complied with authoritarian regimes and even dictatorships, but have also laid the groundworks for these regimes in most cases. The second new situation for Germany and France is Washington’s relations with its allies since Trump’s inauguration. But Trump does not represent the entire U.S. on this matter. As the German Foreign Minister put it, the U.S. is bigger than the White House and Trump cannot change that no matter how much he tweets.

Nevertheless, the rest of the world can hardly contend that Trump is not suitable for the U.S. Presidency.

There is a lot going on in the international arena with respect to the power struggle both in terms of domestic and international politics. While on the one hand Trump is dealing with the legacy of John McCain – who passed away last week – on the other hand, his dealing with the growing risk of impeachment as the country is preparing for midterm elections for the entire House and one third of the Senate. The U.K. is still troubled with the post-Brexit referendum shock and is divided between the “done is done” camp and the “we can still go back” camp.

May is too stubborn and Corbyn is too commie for their respective critics, while Boris Johnson is not the savior for the blurry future for most citizens. Continental Europe is still troubled with the much-feared increasing immigration wave and the rising far right. Given these circumstances, China and Russia are expanding their spheres of influence, as the West is too troubled with its own domestic affairs and inner disagreements. The Western camp, if there is still one, needs to be led and given a direction, but that sign will obviously not come from Trump’s twits.

All these leading (or used-to-be-leading) countries of the West also lack the motivation and means to bring order to the Middle East. Such an agenda is not on the table for Russia or China either. Given this reluctance, there seems to be no easy solution for the blood spilling in Yemen and Syria amongst others. While global powers are too busy, and hence, too reluctant, to deal with problems in the Middle East, regional powers come forward and try to fill in this vacuum.

While Russia is digging deeper roots in Syria, the U.S. is doing little more than nothing to counterbalance it. However, there are others who are trying harder to assume the job of counterbalancing – namely, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Kids bully, fight, and cause problems if they are not restrained or incentivized by their parents. All this mess in the Middle East is mostly the result of this fight between regional powers in the absence of greater ones. Regional powers from Iran to Israel and Saudi Arabia have bigger sponsors in the global scale and a sustainable regional order will require a deal between such global powers as well. Although it seems that Iran is the winner in reaching out to a whole new range of locations from Iraq to Yemen, this is also problematic as Iran’s expansion attracts Saudi and Israeli reactions – who target Iran’s proxies, or sometimes Iranian troops directly. Further, Iran also seems to be overstretched, which causes financial problems and public outrage domestically.

As a regional power, where does Turkey stand in all this mess? Turkey seems to have two concerns. Its first and most immediate concern is twofold: Turkey does two things to deal with its primary concern of eliminating PKK terrorism; (a) hit the PKK wherever you can and clean the areas under its control, and (b) if you cannot hit the PKK due to U.S. sponsorship – as in Eastern Syria – contain the PKK geographically and do not let it consolidate its power in the contained area.

Turkey’s second concern is bigger in scope. Turkey wants stable and friendly countries in the neighborhood. This second concern is politically motivated (i.e., to create trustable partners in the region), defensive (i.e., to prevent and preempt destabilizing developments before it reaches its own borders), and sort of humanitarian (i.e., to end the humanitarian crises in the region). For these reasons, Turkey supports some excluded or repressed groups in the region. These groups include Turkmens in Iraq and Syria, Sunni Arabs in Syria, the social forces following the legacy of the Brotherhood (Ikhvan) in Egypt, and Palestinians in the occupied territories of Palestine.

Turkey’s means to support these groups against the host states range from direct military action, as in the case of Syria, to diplomatic pressure, as in the case of Israel and Egypt. Turkey also uses military force in Iraq, but not to change the structure of the Iraqi state and stop some kind of repression, but for the mere goal of defending itself against PKK terror attacks from within Iraq. In the midst of such global and regional trends, Turkey’s job is not easy and its possible routes will be the focus of this column in the upcoming weeks.

On August 6, 2018, U.S. President Donald Trump signed a new Executive Order named “New Iran E.O.” in order to re-impose sanctions. On the day the U.S. announced its withdrawal from the JCPOA, the U.S. Department of the Treasury determined two different ‘wind-down’ periods to indicate that the sanctions will gradually enter into force. Offering only one piece of the sanctions, the Executive Order aims to target companies that do business in different sectors that are central for Iranian business, such as the automotive sector. The other portion of the sanctions will come into effect on November 4, 2018 – the end of the 180-day wind-down period.

It is fair to state that the Trump administration is desirous of punishing the Iranian regime. However, the administration’s tough stance is, in fact, twofold. By framing a ‘zero’ policy, the U.S. administration not only intends to strain the financial capacity of the Iranian government, but also demands other countries to reduce their exports from Iran to zero. At this point, it is significant to differentiate sanctions as primary and secondary, of which the latter will indirectly and potentially treat U.S. allies as suspects of violating the sanctions.

When U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton said that the administration intends to “say no waivers” in order to go beyond “where the sanctions were in 2015,” the administration apparently set the bar relatively higher than previous international sanctions. However, this zero policy can bring certain paradoxical consequences. If this policy will be a genuinely zero policy in the sense that the goal of the U.S. administration is to give irreparable economic harm to the regime, it needs to avoid using waivers to specific countries. Otherwise, the financial structure of the regime will be able to take a breath through the payments made by these countries that are awarded these waivers. In this first scenario, the collapse of the government, if very much desired by the administration, hardly appears in the short term. Therefore, the tough stance on the Iranian administration becomes questionable.

While the zero policy might appear as the only option for Trump, who is keen on bringing the Iranian government empty-handed to the negotiation table, the legal, political, and economic aspects of this policy are troublesome. Especially, in the global trade of crude oil, experts argue that the zero policy can force a significant amount of oil out of the market, leading to a drastic price change because of the high global demand for oil. In order to seek for a plausible way to minimize market disruptions to augment production, President Trump has approached  other allies such as Saudi Arabia. It remains difficult to assess to what extent juggling the production capacities of partners remains an effective plan. On the other hand, President Trump bemoaned the so-called “OPEC Monopoly” for raising oil prices. This implies that he can easily find a way to remove his guilt for the long-term high market price of oil.

When viewed from the legal and political angles of the policy, the picture is the same. The Department of Treasury, working with the Department of State and Department of Energy, will be the ‘guardian’ of the implementation of the sanction law. Transactions in U.S. dollars would suffice for the Department of the Treasury to claim extraterritorial jurisdiction to fine the individuals or entities having business ties with different Iranian sectors, such as energy and automotive sectors. It’s not a big hurdle for the Department of Treasury to impose fines or add individuals to the list of Specifically Designated Nations (SDN) based on evidence collected by intelligence or other means.

The more difficult challenge is related to the political outcomes of the decision to impose sanctions against countries. For instance, many major oil exporters from Iran are EU countries, Turkey, India, China, South Korea, and Japan. Unless they change their oil trade routes, they can be caught by secondary sanctions. The potential effect of the sanctions can be far-reaching, reaching U.S. allies, great powers, or developing countries. Furthermore, Iran’s geopolitical position, integrating the Middle East and Central Asia, will complicate the attempts made by neighboring countries such as Turkey to cut trade with Iran. This might obstruct the implementation of the zero policy if these neighboring countries prioritize their own economic and commercial interests in trading with Iran, rather than following the Trump administration’s demand to cutting all imports of Iranian oil.

The new Executive Order leaves many questions unanswered. The prime one is whether the U.S. would issue waivers from the sanctions if requested by its allies, which are unwilling to jeopardize or deteriorate their bilateral relationships with the U.S. Brian Hook, a senior State Department official, told reporters that the administration would consider waivers based on “case-by-case.” While this revives the hopes for many countries, it also brings to question the intended harsh effect on the Iranian regime.

The paradoxical situation is unlikely to be clarified in the future due to the fact that, just like the process in 2015, the current process is not clear. Unlike the current procedure, during the 2015 process, P5+1 countries sat at a table with Iran and the sanctions that were to be lifted were predictable. Nevertheless, receiving a waiver will be contingent on the negotiations to be held between the U.S. and its allies such as Turkey. For this reason, it would be beneficial for the two countries to solve existing problems rapidly and expediently in order to condense all of their focus on the future of sanctions that will come into full effect as of November 4.

The Middle East has been going through a transformation period that was triggered with the Arab uprisings, which began in Tunisia in December 2010. This process is an opportunity to re-shape the political and social structure in the region. While this regional transformation has led to societies question the existence of autocratic governments, which have been in power for many years, it also forced international actors to recognize their relationships with regional governments. As a result of these transformative events, the region has witnessed regime changes in many countries and continuing civil wars in others.

The wave of regional transformation came under attack with the intervention of actors who support the status quo in the Middle East. The main aim of these actors was to prevent any regime changes as well as an establishment of a new regional order. One of the most visible interventions of these actors took place in Bahrain, where peaceful demonstrations were violently dispersed by the Saudi Arabian security forces. Another example was experienced in Egypt, where counter-revolutionary actors initiated a military coup and prevented the country from turning into a democracy. In Libya, Syria, and Yemen, popular protests were faced with tough responses from the regimes, or were led to a proxy war with other regional actors such as the U.S., Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

In the light of all these developments, a number of analysts claimed that the process of Arab revolutions were all failed attempts. Although these claims have some truth attached to them, they fall short of reasonable accounts. It should be remembered that political and social transformations can still take place after long periods. More, since the region has, for centuries, been a battlefield for international actors, such a substantial transformation would require the extensive efforts of regional actors. However, there are four main reasons why we should be hopeful about the future of regional transformations.

First of all, despite all the discouraging events and developments, there is still a strong will among the populations of the regional countries for the continuation of the revolutionary processes. Despite the fact that political leaders aimed to protect their privileged positions, the calls for regime changes have been continuing. The general public and political oppositions in these countries demand the toppling of repressive regimes and the formation of democratic political structures.

Secondly, despite a region-wide alliance that aims to prevent the revolutions in the Middle East, there are various countries and political actors that have strongly revealed their support for regional transformation. Among these countries, Turkey and Qatar have relentlessly been supporting the people of the region, who seek for democratic regimes in their countries. In addition to this, as one of the strongest social and political actors in the region, the Muslim Brotherhood movement also supports the democratization efforts in the region.

Thirdly, it is important to question the success of counter-revolutionary actors who consider regional transformation as a threat to their own regimes. These actors have failed in their campaigns to prevent revolutionary uprisings so far. This can be observed in the cases of Syria, Yemen, and Libya. Additionally, their newly established alliances have proven to be fragile. Last year’s regional blockade on Qatar, which was imposed by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt, has not produced the desired outcomes – causing further anxiety among these actors.

Finally, global actors have different policies and approaches regarding the transformation process in the Middle East. For instance, European countries do not embrace U.S. policies towards the Gulf region, Iran, and the Palestine issue. These different approaches prove the fact that there is a strong division among Western countries in their policies towards the Middle East. In addition to this, the regional policies of other international actors such as Russia and China are also significantly different from that of the U.S. and Europe. Therefore, there exists a strong competition among international actors in their policies towards the Middle East.

It may be misleading to state that the wave of regional transformation, which began in 2010, has come to an end despite the downward course of events in recent years. Many factors, both regional and international, have the potential to reactivate the wave of transformation in the Middle East.

It seems that the dispute over a detained U.S. pastor between Turkey and the U.S. has triggered new dynamics in Turkey’s relations with leading EU states, above all with Germany. As Burhanettin Duran recently addressed, “The Trump administration’s policy of economic selfishness … encourages the world’s leading economies to work more closely together. The U.S. decision to weaponize the dollar and customs compels them to form a common line of defense in international trade. … At the end of the day, the Russian, Chinese, German or French support for Turkey in the face of U.S. sanctions wasn’t just about the potential problems that they would face if the Turkish economy suffers a crisis.”

By looking at the last week, it wouldn’t be wrong to say that reactions from German officials were in compliance with these statements. For instance, members of Germany’s coalition government made some positive comments regarding Turkey-Germany relations in order to stress the country’s stance with regard to Trump’s irrational sanctioning steps against Turkey. In addition, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel had a telephone call in which both leaders discussed the current developments as well as regional issues, such as the situation in Syria. While the Turkish and German leaders pledged their determination to strengthen relations between the two states, some details regarding President Erdogan’s planned visit to Berlin in September were also addressed.

Even before the phone call, Chancellor Merkel clearly stated that “Nobody has an interest in an economic destabilization in Turkey” while adding that “Germany would like to see an economically prosperous Turkey. This is in our interest.” It has also to be mentioned that Germany’s Economy Minister Peter Altmaier (CDU), who is one of the closest politicians to Chancellor Merkel, was one of the first European officials opposing Trump’s tariff policy on Turkey. Altmaier explained, “This trade war slows down and destroys economic growth and produces new uncertainties.” While Altmaier also emphasized that Germany is willing to keep good economic relations with Turkey he stated, “Turkey stands for security and reliability in Europe. We are working together well with Ankara in terms of migration.”

A similar positive step came from the junior coalition partner, the Social Democrats. Besides Foreign Minister Heiko Maas (SPD), the party’s chairperson Andrea Nahles stated in an interview on Sunday that Germany could help Turkey should it become necessary. According to Nahles, despite the possibility whether her predictions became true or not, “A situation could arise in which Germany must help Turkey, regardless of the political discrepancies with President Erdogan.” While she also stressed that it is in everyone’s interest that Turkey remains economically stable and that currency turbulence is curtailed, it is also crucial for her to keep up dialogue on all levels with Turkey, which is a member of NATO and part of Europe.

In addition, some publicly funded German media outlets, which are generally and unfortunately known for their biased broadcasting in the case of Turkey, published some news, in which a rather neutral –or even pro-Turkey– media language and stance has been observed — this was surprising but was also an understandable step due to the current political conjuncture. However, many German media outlets, commentators and columnists, on the other hand, still preferred nearly similar arguments, stating that the Turkish economy is in a very bad situation and accusing the country’s President. In most of these articles, a known language regarding Turkey has been preferred. Without going into detail, one might just mention, that those pieces generally include one-side criticisms while disregarding the U.S.’ role and the contextual impacts.

Nevertheless, it seems obvious that despite certain opposition politicians and known media representatives’ biased perspectives, the German government’s recent steps can be elaborated as rational ones in order to achieve some –in particular economic– objectives. This, with no doubt, aims an improvement of relations between Turkey and Germany – on both sides. Thus, under these circumstances it is also no surprise that, for instance, the German government’s Commissioner for Tourism and Parliamentary State Secretary, recently promoted travel to Turkey by stating that “there is no reason not to go on holiday” to Turkey.

It’s obvious that Germany’s federal government does not have any interest in supporting the U.S. President’s sanctions against Turkey. Even though Germany’s recent positive position regarding Turkey is based rather on economic interests and short-term goals, which are also based on President Trump’s personal and similar negative attitudes against Germany, relations between Turkey and German might mutually benefit from this current situation. Above all, in regard to the Turkish President’s planned visit on 28/29 September to Germany, some additional steps in order to intensify the mutual confidence might be advantageous for both countries – also in fields other than economics.

Many dynamics of political disagreements between Turkey and the U.S. over bilateral and regional issues have reached a crossroad that might lead to long-term strategic implications for both states. The nature of conflict is extraordinarily complex and the preceding discussion represents only a surface-level picture.

The U.S. administration has imposed sanctions against Turkish ministers and Turkey, has (and continues to) arm the PYD/YPG, which is known as the Syrian offshoot of the PKK – an armed terrorist organization that has been responsible for the deaths of thousands of Turkish citizens since 1984 and which is recognized as a terrorist organization by the United States in the fight against Daesh in Syria and Iraq – and more, the U.S. is currently hosting a so-called religious cleric who was the mastermind behind the July 15 military coup attempt that was orchestrated by Gulenist putschists.

At the center of the current crisis, the U.S. is requesting for the evangelist Pastor, Andrew Brunson, to be released from house arrest in Turkey and is trying to prevent Ankara from obtaining a Russian-made air defense missile system, which is scheduled to be delivered to Turkey by the end of 2019. More importantly, the U.S.’s new strategy in the wider Middle East region towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the status of Al-Quds and the Iranian nuclear deal is not comprised of Turkey.

Against these policies, Turkey seeks to recalibrate its foreign and security policies by alternating its geopolitical portfolio not only on economic terms but also through its foreign and security policies. Recently, President Erdogan called for alternative foreign and economic policies for Turkey. In his article published by the New York Times, following the sanctions crisis, Erdogan underlined that “before it is too late, Washington must give us the misguided notion that our relationship can be asymmetrical and come to terms with the fact that Turkey has alternatives. Failure to reverse this trend of unilateralism and disrespect will require us to start looking for new friends and allies.”

Since 2002, the AK Party governments and President Erdogan have followed a multidimensional foreign and security policy by redefining Turkey’s regional and international role in order to reconstruct Turkey’s power status from a middle-range regional power to a big power, which could relatively be noted as a more assertive reformulation of Turkey’s role in the international system. Since then, Turkish foreign policy has been under fundamental transformation not only because of the changes in foreign policy mentality but also due to the regional and geopolitical turmoil emanating mainly from the Arab uprising.

In the post-Arab spring regional and geopolitical landscape, Turkey had to adjust its foreign policy strategy and reformulate its military strategy, especially in Syria and Iraq. In the early stages, the Arab spring was observed as an opportunity to recalibrate Turkey’s power in the region. However, following the diversification of the Syrian war and other regional developments, Turkey was barred from getting a new power status on the regional level.

The Middle East crisis articulated around the Arab revolutions and counter-revolutions were also perceived as an opportunity to reformulate Turkish strategy towards the Syrian crisis and security threats across the region. Throughout all the stages of the Arab uprising, the U.S. has been the main country that caused a strategic shift in Turkey’s preferences. Due to ambiguity in U.S. strategy, Turkey had to change its policy in regards to Syria, Libya, Yemen, Egypt, and Iraq.

The existing crisis between Turkey and the U.S. is a consequence of the Arab uprising and the U.S.’s strategic choices towards Syria, Iraq and other countries. However, this time Turkey perceives the bilateral crisis as a real opportunity to reformulate its geopolitical portfolio. Ankara believes that the U.S. is still a strategic partner in nature but the unpredictable nature of the new American administration and “institutional chaos” in the U.S. foreign and security decision-making processes drive Turkey to seek new alternatives. The perception here is much more important than the realities of strategic relations between Turkey and the U.S. More importantly, the Turkish government believes that if they want to reach strategic flexibility in international and regional politics, Turkey’s geopolitical portfolio should be reformulated.

The question is how Turkey will reformulate its new geopolitical game, and this can be understood by examining Turkey’s response to U.S. policies that have been encountered against the Turkish will. There are three broad dimensions for Turkish strategy. The first one is Turkey’s bilateral strategic engagements with alternative power centers. Russia is the most crucial power that Turkey can utilize in order to balance U.S. pressure in the short term. Russia is not an economic giant for Turkey, but in terms of the strategic implications over Turkey-U.S. relations, Russia might become an external balancer for Ankara against the U.S. There is already increasing rapprochement between Turkey and Russia over various issues. However, the nature of the conflict in Syria and historical geopolitical codes in Turkey-Russia relations need to be carefully taken into consideration by Ankara.

China is another alternative power for Turkey, especially when considering the need to deepen and diversify the Turkish economy. Turkey’s political and economic engagements with the rising power also constitute important alternatives for the geopolitical portfolio of Ankara in the near future. There has also been increasing foreign policy initiatives taken by Ankara to extend its diplomatic and economic relations with Latin American, African and Asian countries.

The second and probably the most important point here is Turkey-EU relations which have been under fundamental pressure for almost more than five years. Historically, Europe has always played a vital role in Ottoman diplomacy. Following the dissolution of the Empire, one way or another, European powers maintained a way to influence Turkish diplomacy and facilitated Turkey’s balance of power game against Soviet Russia. This time, Turkey can use European powers as an opportunity to readjust its geopolitical game vis-à-vis the U.S. There are two important aspects of Turkey-EU relations following the Turkey-U.S. crisis. Turkey, firstly, can use this opportunity to repair its institutional relations on the EU level. Secondly, Turkey can effectively join the European side in balancing the U.S. in the trade war and can especially contribute to European powers in reshaping NATO’s strategic mission while Trump holds a different view of NATO.

Last but not least, Turkey’s third option to alternate its geopolitical portfolio is the Middle East. The Middle East region is geopolitically important for Turkey in regards to protecting its national security, deepening its economic lifeline, and recalibrating Turkey’s international actor role by consolidating its military tools in the region. It seems that Iran is perceived as an important strategic partner by Ankara in the region but there are some limits as well potential risks for Turkey. The Gulf countries except the UAE seems a real economic life-line for Turkey. As the Qatar case shows, the more security investment in the region provides more space of maneuver for Turkey, especially on an economic level.

Within this context, therefore, it seems that the crisis in relations between Turkey and the U.S. is pushing Turkey to rethink its current foreign policy strategy and gives Ankara an opportunity to readjust its geopolitical portfolio.

As the relations between Turkey and the U.S. have turned tense, the economic cost of the tension is increasing for Turkey with the USD skyrocketing vis-a-vis the Turkish Lira. The outcome is heavy for the Turkish economy but it is not what Turkey deserved when bilateral relations are examined retrospectively.

The Turkey-U.S. alliance had better days over the past seven decades. While it’s not in its best mood today, it’s not in its worst either. Turkey served as a significant pillar of the containment strategy of the USSR during the Cold War era. The logic was simple. Turkey would not be part of the Soviet sphere of influence. It would allow the American intelligence to operate freely from Turkey to monitor the Soviets. It would host NATO military bases. It would be okay for the nuclear-tipped Jupiter rockets to be deployed in its own soils to deter the Soviets. It would also be okay if the U.S. uninstalls its military equipment on a whim. It would be ready to absorb a possible offense from the Soviets so that the “West” would save some time for its defense, and so on. This way, Turkey was a key part of the Western defense strategy against the USSR. This way, the Black Sea has never been a Soviet lake, the Soviets could not rule the Eastern Mediterranean, and they could not have direct access to the Middle East. In return for this great strategic favor, Turkey would get NATO’s word for its collective defense against any possible Soviet aggression and, further, would receive economic aid and cheap credit from the West.

Nevertheless, this seemingly plausible anti-Soviet alliance was tested multiple times. The opium crisis and Turkey’s military intervention against the Greece-backed junta in Cyprus let to the most memorable crisis between the allies. While the U.S. placed an arms embargo on Turkey from 1975 to 1978, Turkey responded by closing the military bases that were hosting American troops in the country. The crisis did not last long though. As Turkey changed its opium policy in a way to satisfy the American demands, the U.S. ended the embargo and did not push Turkey too hard on the Cyprus matter. Yet, it costed Turkey to diverge from the American orientation with its shrinking economy in the late 1970s. After all, it was and is still costly to annoy a superpower. Annoying the global sheriff led the Turkish economy in the late 1970s to something very much reminiscent of today.

The U.S. will fail to leave a smooth legacy in the Middle East without the support of Turkey. Thus, there’s still time to transform relations from a lose-lose to a win-win situation.

The Turkey-U.S. alliance did not die as did the enemy, that is the Soviets, died in 1991. By the time it became clear that the old enemy was collapsing, the U.S. had already found new enemies. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1990 was about to be the first rogue state of the new world order. As a loyal American ally, Turkey provided assistance to the U.S. for its first Gulf War against Saddam. It was an easy military win but not a final victory with a persistent legacy. It was not the end but a whole new start for Turkey.

With its role in the war, Turkey seemed happy to show its utility as an ally in the post-Cold War era but what it did not know was Iraq would never be a stable neighbor again for the next 17 years until now. The power vacuum in its neighbor was filled by the PKK and Turkey has witnessed years of terror attacks originating from Iraq. For that reason, Turkish policymakers did not welcome the idea of a second Gulf War across its borders in 2003.

The Turkish parliament denied the U.S. permission to use the base in Turkey to store its military equipment before the invasion of Iraq in 2003. This was the most significant turning point and the heaviest crisis between the allies after the opium crisis of the 1970s. The alliance has become a pseudo-alliance since then. The Syrian War was and still is proof of the fact that Turkey is not being treated as a genuine ally by the U.S. Turkey’s refugee problem due to the Syrian Civil War has been disregarded by the U.S. as it rejected Turkey’s calls for joint action. Further, Turkey was left alone when it got really close to a war with Russia after it downed a Russian jet in 2015. By the time Turkey found a formula to get out of the tight corner it got stuck to in the course of the Syrian War, the U.S. had already started to cook a new alliance with Turkey’s long-time adversary, the PKK (its Syrian branch PYD to be precise).

As long as the U.S. does not change its policies regarding the PYD and FETO, Turkey will see its alliance with the U.S. as no more than a pseudo-alliance no matter how much it hurts the Turkish economy.

Further, the U.S. is also hosting the FETO (Fethullahist Terror Organization) network on American soil. FETO is the organization that carried out the coup attempt of June 15, 2016. These two issues are direct threats to Turkey’s very basic national security and far more significant than the following crises whether it be last year’s visa crisis or today’s Brunson crisis. It seems like as long as the U.S. does not change its policies regarding the PYD and FETO, Turkey will see its alliance with the U.S. as no more than a pseudo-alliance no matter how much it hurts the Turkish economy. This may not sound as a big problem for a superpower like the U.S. Nevertheless, it should also see that it can win wars in Iraq or Syria but cannot leave a smooth legacy without Turkey.

The bilateral relations can still change course from a lose-lose scenario to a win-win one. Perhaps American policymakers no longer need Turkey to contain Russian expansion for now, but it will not help the U.S. to alienate Turkey and push it to the revisionist camp of the American hegemony. I still think the U.S. is not blind to lose Turkey altogether and will flex its muscles in its dealing with Turkey. If it does not, Turkey has its own instruments. It cannot hurt the USD by threats on Twitter, but Turkey is a growing country in its capabilities, population, and significance on the world scale.

As the financial pressure increases over Turkey, it will search for an exit, which may lead to an increasing financial linkage to China, which I believe will not please American interests. As Turkey will try to overcome the current financial risks with domestic structural reforms and a quest for new international economic partners, it is still not too late to resurrect the pseudo-alliance. Some easier solutions on the Brunson or Halkbank matters based on mutual respect can spill over toward something better and bigger.