W

hilst the Middle East region has undergone significant change and transformation as a result of the attacks launched by Israel from 7 October 2023 onwards, the US-Israel–Iran war that began on 28 February 2026 has further fuelled this change, pushing it to a point of no return. For had these events not occurred, the ‘Mecca Joint Defence Agreement’, signed on 7 August 2026 between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, might not have been possible.

Developments necessitating “regional ownership”

Türkiye’s long-standing stance that the region’s problems should be resolved by the countries of the region themselves – a concept defined by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan as “regional ownership” – had not received sufficient support from the countries of the region. Whilst the reasons behind this may vary from country to country, ultimately external interventions aimed at resolving the region’s problems have failed to heal the wounds; on the contrary, they have either caused existing wounds to bleed anew or allowed them to simply harden into calluses without being resolved. Consequently, it has become apparent that interventions in the region—particularly from the West and, of course, the US—have failed to produce results and have not brought peace and stability to the region.

However, following the events that began on 7 October 2023, Israel’s adoption of a revisionist policy towards the region—believing that the conditions were favourable—and its subsequent attacks targeting not only Gaza and the West Bank but also Lebanon, Syria and Iran, have led to a shift in the preconceptions held by countries in the region towards Türkiye.

For whilst it is evident that almost all of the Western countries expected to resolve the region’s problems have taken sides in the war between Russia and Ukraine, providing Ukraine with billions of dollars in aid as well as both political and military support; whilst Israel’s razing of Gaza, massacred over 73,000 people and committed a massive genocide; deepened its annexation of the West Bank; gradually sought to alter the status of the Al-Aqsa Mosque; occupied southern Lebanon and attempted to provoke a civil war there; and, as if its decades-long occupation of the Golan Heights—which is Syrian territory —as if that were not enough—it unilaterally suspended the 1974 agreement following the revolution on 8 December 2024, occupied further Syrian territory, and sought to prevent Syria from achieving stability by manipulating the Druze and the SDG/PKK terrorist organisations.

The extent to which external actors remain indifferent to crises or conflicts in our region has once again been exposed in the war against Iran. For just as it is unjust and wrong for an actor such as the US to fall into Israel’s trap and attack Iran, it is equally wrong for other Western countries not to have taken the initiative to dissuade the US from this war, as was the case with Ukraine. Although these countries—the majority of which are also NATO members—were called upon by the US to deploy troops to open the blockaded Strait of Hormuz – although this was not in accordance with NATO regulations – they did not heed this call and, whilst not becoming directly involved in the war, they made their stance clear by expanding sanctions against Iran rather than exerting pressure on Israel to bring the war to an end.

During this war, Iran’s decision to attack Gulf states and other countries hosting US bases on their territory – rather than Israel and the US, which were directly attacking it – both because they were relatively easier targets and with the intention of indirectly exerting pressure on the US, has once again demonstrated the importance of regional ownership.

Israel’s revisionist policies and the perception of threats by regional countries

All these developments have made a mechanism such as the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement imperative, with the aim of thwarting the plans of a country like Israel—which, despite its small size, seeks to destabilize the region and derive benefit from the situation by leveraging its lobbying power in the US and Europe and relying on their support—and to establish a new status quo. Furthermore, whilst Israel recently proposed an alignment strategy—such as the “hexagon bloc”—which has yet to materialize on the ground, the formation of a counter-front by countries outside this bloc that perceive the current developments as a threat to their national interests must be regarded as inevitable.

Despite the security guarantees the US has provided to the Gulf states to date, the fact that these states have been exposed to Iranian attacks during the war against Iran has not only called into question the reliability of US guarantees in the Gulf, but has also inevitably led to a search for alternatives regarding the future of the region’s security architecture. It is therefore highly likely that the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement will address this necessity; in particular, should the US withdraw from the region following the war with Iran, it is conceivable that it might be open to entrusting the region’s security to three key and powerful allies: Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the fact that the US has not made any negative statements regarding the Mecca Agreement to date is interpreted in this light and reinforces the view that there is coordination between the signatory countries and the US.

Why is the agreement so important?

Among the key factors that make the agreement significant are the characteristics and capabilities of the signatory countries. Türkiye, for instance, is not only a NATO member but also a candidate country for the EU and has made significant strides in the defense industry in recent years. It is therefore an indispensable actor for both the Middle East and the European security architecture. Pakistan, meanwhile, is the only Muslim country to possess nuclear weapons and also has a substantial population. As for Saudi Arabia, it stands out as a key player not only due to its abundant energy resources but also because of its strategic location at the crossroads of global trade routes. Furthermore, as a leading figure in both the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Arab League, and as the custodian of Islam’s holy sites, it is an actor held in high regard and whose word carries weight among both Arab and Muslim states.

The coming together of these three major powers to form a defense alliance would create a synergy whose effects are likely to extend beyond the region. Furthermore, should this agreement be successfully implemented, it would inevitably create a domino effect, making it likely that other countries in the region would join the agreement. Considering similar initiatives that have been attempted at various times but could never be brought to a conclusion due to both regional and circumstantial conditions, the most significant impact of this agreement, as of today, is that it stands as the sole development capable of curbing Israel’s aggressive, occupying and expansionist regional vision. Not only will the Abraham Accords no longer hold any appeal for countries in the region, but it is also understood that, should the US withdraw from the region following a war against Iran, the new security architecture of the region will be centered on the new pact established by this agreement.

What will the agreement provide for the signatory countries?

This agreement is of a defensive nature, aimed at protecting the signatories from attacks by other countries; in this way, it offers the signatory countries a security guarantee similar to Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Türkiye’s current capabilities, Pakistan’s nuclear power and Saudi Arabia’s financial support not only demonstrate the agreement’s capacity and potential but also serve as a powerful deterrent to any actors seeking to attack one of the signatory states.

Consequently, in addition to Türkiye’s NATO membership, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement has now emerged as the sole agreement in the region offering an additional defense guarantee to regional countries, and it has been announced that the agreement remains open to new participants. Although it has been stated in the announcements that no specific country is being targeted, it is clear that a strong deterrent has been created for those with designs on the region – particularly Israel – or those claiming to shape its future.

Whilst there are no doubts regarding the agreement’s deterrent effect, as we do not yet possess detailed information on the nature of the agreement, it is not fully known how a response would be mounted in the event of an attack on any of the signatory states. Furthermore, given the geographical locations of the signatory states—particularly Pakistan’s relatively remote position—it is difficult to predict how such a response would be carried out. However, despite all these uncertainties, the implementation of such an arrangement in our region is of great importance.

T

he diplomatic initiatives that have been ongoing for some time between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have now materialized into a concrete security architecture with the Joint Defense Agreement signed today in Mecca. Although the agreement in question may appear to be a manifestation of the historical and religious ties between the three countries in foreign policy, it can in fact be regarded as part of a much broader regional transformation. This agreement, signed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif at the Safa Palace in Mecca, the holy city of the Muslim world, constitutes a full-fledged ‘collective defense’ pact, as it stipulates that an armed attack against any one of the three states shall be deemed an attack against all of them.

Furthermore, the fact that the agreement is based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which governs the right to self-defense, can be seen as a reflection of the initiative led by the three countries’ quest for legitimacy within the framework of international law. Consequently, the resulting joint defense mechanism aims to serve as a deterrent not only at the regional level but also in the eyes of global actors.

Outcome of regional developments

It is evident that the agreement goes beyond a merely symbolic initiative. In this regard, the normalization process between Turkey and Saudi Arabia since 2022 and the subsequent acceleration of strategic cooperation, followed by Saudi Arabia’s move to expedite its rapprochement with Pakistan in the security context, culminating in the signing of the Joint Strategic Defense Agreement in 2025, have been the key driving forces behind this process. President Erdoğan’s emphasis on defense industry cooperation during his visit to Saudi Arabia at the start of the year, along with signals of joint investment in the KAAN National Fighter Aircraft, also demonstrate that the signing in Mecca was the result of a process that had been under way for some time.

Beyond its strategic and symbolic significance, the Mecca Agreement is of critical importance given the context in which it emerged. The growing regional instability following the war launched by the US and Israel against Iran on 28 February has led all countries to seek alternatives. When compounded by Israel’s continued pursuit of aggressive and expansionist policies and Washington’s silence in the face of these developments, the confidence of many regional actors, particularly the Gulf states, in the traditional security architecture has been permanently shaken. Furthermore, the US’s failure to provide the expected security umbrella to the Gulf states, whose vulnerabilities were laid bare by Iran’s attacks, has eroded these actors’ trust in traditional security guarantors. Consequently, Washington’s inconsistency in providing protection to its allies during times of crisis has driven regional capitals to diversify their own security arrangements.

Signed against this backdrop, the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement can be seen as a concrete outcome of the quest to reduce dependence on external security guarantees and to build an intra-regional deterrence mechanism amongst regional actors. From Türkiye’s perspective, this step constitutes a key pillar of its long-stated vision for a regional security architecture. In line with the initiatives it has taken in recent years, Ankara has played a critical role in intensifying cooperation amongst regional actors. During this process, Türkiye has strengthened its cooperation with countries including the Gulf states, as well as Egypt and Pakistan, and has sought to implement partnerships across various sectors.

During this process, one of the areas on which Türkiye has placed particular emphasis has been partnerships in the defense industry. Viewed in this context, it should also be noted that, beyond its security dimension, the Mecca Agreement provides a framework for deepening cooperation in the defense industry. Saudi Arabia’s preference and policies in recent years to transition from the role of a customer to that of a co-producer in the procurement of defense industry products have led to concrete steps being taken in this context between Ankara and Riyadh. In this regard, Türkiye has demonstrated its commitment by signing agreements with Saudi Arabia on the joint production of unmanned aerial vehicles, radar technologies, anti-tank guided missiles and other defense industry products.

Defense projects between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia

Indeed, Türkiye has successfully concluded its negotiations with Saudi Arabia regarding the co-production of the Gökbey national helicopter project, and an agreement was signed in February 2026 between TUSAŞ and the Saudi Arabian Defense Industries Organization. It is expected that the Mecca Agreement will not only strengthen the joint security mechanism but also increase such collaborations in the defense industry sector. It can be argued that, in the coming period, this initiative will not only go beyond security cooperation but also pave the way for deepening economic ties between the three countries.

Although the Mecca Agreement was signed between the three countries, President Erdoğan stated in his announcement that this security initiative is open to the participation of all countries. At this stage, it can be said that countries such as Qatar and Egypt are likely to be among those adopting a positive stance towards this security architecture in the initial phase. Given that it adopts an inclusive approach rather than an exclusionary one, unlike certain alliances that have emerged in the region in the past, it can also be noted that this alliance is set to play a strategic role in the future of the regional security architecture.

On the other hand, it remains unclear what impact the differences in foreign policy priorities and the relative divergence in threat perceptions between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will have within the context of the agreement. Indeed, the fact that Turkey’s security priorities, centered on Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean, do not align with Saudi Arabia’s threat perception, which is largely centred on Iran, or with Pakistan’s security reflexes, which are focused on India, may be seen as a constraint. However, it can be argued that the impact of this divergence on the practical feasibility of the agreement will also be limited. Indeed, the fundamental dynamic behind the tripartite alliance is not so much divergent perceptions as shared, concrete threats. This situation forms the basis for the consolidation of power and a shared security vision along the Ankara-Riyadh-Islamabad axis.

The Joint Defense Agreement signed in Mecca stands out as an initiative that clearly sets out the signatory countries’ perspectives. This agreement, which can be seen as the tangible outcome of regional actors’ quest to build their own security amongst themselves, a quest directly influenced by the hardships caused by the interventions of external actors, serves as the nucleus of a far more comprehensive regional security architecture. At this juncture, it seems inevitable that Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which have so far acted within the framework of a shared vision, will move towards a much stronger alliance should they align their foreign policy orientations, harmonize their strategic objectives and integrate their security capabilities.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

T

he Ankara Summit clearly demonstrated which issues lie at the heart of NATO’s security agenda. The strong emphasis in the summit communiqué on collective defense, the transatlantic bond and Article 5 of the Washington Treaty once again underscored that the Alliance’s fundamental priority is deterrence and defense. Russia’s long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security, continued support for Ukraine, increased defense spending, the expansion of industrial production capacity and the development of new military capabilities formed the main framework of the Ankara Summit.

This picture is perfectly clear. Whilst the Russia-Ukraine War continues, it was to be expected that NATO would prioritize deterrence on its eastern flank. Indeed, the summit communiqué provides for the provision of 70 billion euros’ worth of military equipment, aid and training support to Ukraine by 2026, and for at least equivalent levels to be maintained in 2027. Similarly, the increase in defense investment by European allies and Canada, the announcement of new procurement worth over 50 billion dollars, and the emphasis on expanding defense industry production capacity demonstrate that NATO prioritizes the conversion of expenditure into tangible military capability, alongside its spending ratios.

360-degree security and the southern dimension of NATO in Africa

Another statement in the Ankara Summit Declaration indicates that this discussion must be addressed within a broader context. NATO states that it is continuing its 360-degree approach to deterrence and defense. This approach acknowledges that the Alliance’s security is not limited solely to its eastern flank, the Russian threat, or conventional military capabilities. Strategic competition, widespread instability, hybrid threats, terrorism, energy security, sea lanes, cyberspace, space, unmanned systems, artificial intelligence and critical infrastructure are all different components of the same security landscape.

It is precisely for this reason that NATO’s southern flank is one of the areas that requires more careful consideration following the Ankara Summit. However, Africa is not at the centre of this debate. NATO’s main agenda is, of course, not centered on Africa. Nor should it be expected to be. Nevertheless, Africa is a dimension that cannot be overlooked when seeking to understand the security architecture of the southern flank. The vast geography stretching from the southern Mediterranean to the Sahel, and from the Red Sea to the Horn of Africa, is one of the areas that tests what NATO’s 360-degree security approach means in practice.

At this point, it is necessary to make a conceptual distinction. NATO’s approach to Africa is not the same as the Africa policies of individual NATO member states. NATO is an organization comprising allies with different historical experiences, geopolitical priorities and bilateral relations. France, Italy, Turkey, the US, the UK and Spain do not all view Africa in the same way. Some allies focus more on North Africa, some on the Sahel, some on the Horn of Africa, whilst others prioritize maritime security and trade routes. Furthermore, the fact that many countries are members of both NATO and the European Union can, at times, lead to a blurring of priorities and instruments.

This diversity need not be a weakness. If managed correctly, it could foster a richer debate within NATO regarding its southern flank. After all, each ally possesses field experience, diplomatic networks, defense capabilities and development tools in different geographical regions. The real challenge lies in transforming this diversity into a shared understanding of security. Following the Ankara Summit, what NATO needs is not to produce a centralized, one-size-fits-all policy towards Africa, but rather to develop more realistic channels of cooperation with security institutions, regional organizations and relevant countries in Africa.

A security line stretching from migration to the Red Sea

The issue of migration is one of the most visible aspects of this. In European public discourse, Africa is often brought to the fore through debates on irregular migration. Locations such as Lampedusa, Ceuta and the Canary Islands highlight the link between stability in North Africa and Europe’s border management. However, viewing migration solely as a security threat is an incomplete approach. War, poverty, climate pressures, food insecurity and weaknesses in state capacity are among the root causes of human mobility. NATO’s recognition of climate change as a threat multiplier is also significant in this regard. Climate change may not, in and of itself, directly cause conflict. However, it can exacerbate resource scarcity, economic vulnerability, displacement and local tensions.

That said, the scale of migration originating from Africa should not be exaggerated. African migrants do not constitute the largest group of migrants accepted by NATO countries. A significant proportion of migration movements in Africa take place within the continent itself. Consequently, viewing Africa solely as the source of migration towards Europe is both analytically flawed and fails to establish a sound basis for partnership. A more appropriate approach is to develop sustainable mechanisms that strike a balance between shared responsibility, humanitarian protection, border management, development and the building of local capacity with countries along migration routes.

The second key issue that makes the African dimension of the Southern Flank significant is maritime security and trade routes. The call in the Ankara Summit Declaration for Iran to fully respect freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz demonstrates that NATO views maritime security not merely as a traditional military issue, but as a strategic matter linked to global trade and energy security. The same logic applies to the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb–Suez corridor. The Houthis’ attacks on commercial vessels have highlighted just how vulnerable this corridor is. The diversion of ships around the Cape of Good Hope has increased transit times, fuel costs, insurance expenses and the strain on global logistics.

For this reason, Red Sea security is not merely a matter for the countries in the region. Europe’s energy supply, production chains and commercial competitiveness also depend on this route remaining open and secure. The war in Sudan, the fight against terrorism in Somalia, inter-state tensions in the Horn of Africa and security vacuums in the Sahel are developments that indirectly but significantly affect NATO’s southern flank. The conclusion to be drawn from this is not that NATO should expand militarily into Africa. A more realistic need is to establish more regular cooperation with African countries and regional institutions in the areas of maritime security, early warning, intelligence sharing, border security, counter-terrorism capabilities and crisis prevention.

Partnership amidst competition and Turkey’s contribution

Great power competition is also a significant part of this picture. Russia’s efforts to deepen its security ties in areas such as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Sudan, and to develop a more institutionalized presence through mechanisms such as the post-Wagner African Corps, are trends being closely monitored by NATO. China’s influence in Africa, meanwhile, is advancing through ports, transport corridors, digital infrastructure, mining and investments in critical minerals. Resources such as cobalt, manganese, platinum group metals, lithium and graphite have become critical for the defense industry, the energy transition and advanced technology production.

Nevertheless, it would be an oversimplification to view Africa merely as a stage for competition between Russia, China, the US or Europe. African states are the actors who determine their own security preferences and development priorities. For NATO and its allies, the path to achieving a lasting impact lies in establishing partnerships with Africa based on respect for sovereignty, local ownership, technology sharing and mutual benefit. Relations with Africa’s security architecture must also be built upon this understanding. The African Union, regional economic communities, IGAD, ECOWAS and other regional structures are the pillars of joint security production.

Turkey’s experience offers a notable example in this debate. As a NATO ally, Turkey is one of the countries that has transformed its defense industry capacity into tangible military capability. The developing capabilities in areas such as unmanned aerial vehicles, electronic warfare, munitions, and land and sea platforms are directly linked to the discussions on industrial base and production depth emphasized at NATO’s Ankara Summit. However, Turkey’s role in Africa should not be interpreted solely through the prism of defense industry exports.

The training activities carried out in Somalia through TURKSOM represent an approach focused on capacity-building for local security institutions. Turkey’s integration of humanitarian aid, education, health, infrastructure and diplomacy with security support demonstrates that a more holistic approach to security is possible for the southern flank. The Ankara Declaration, signed between Ethiopia and Somalia, has also highlighted the importance of preventive diplomacy. Whilst mediation is not an alternative to military deterrence, it is a complementary element of the security architecture in terms of managing crises before they escalate into armed conflict.

S

yria and Russia have reached an agreement that will significantly reshape Moscow’s military presence along Syria’s Mediterranean coast, with Damascus set to take control of two strategically important facilities previously used as Russian military outposts.

Under the agreement announced by Syria’s Foreign Ministry, Syria will assume control of the Hmeimem air base near Latakia and the commercial berth at Tartus port as part of its civil administration. Military facilities at both locations will instead be transformed into joint training and qualification centers.

The ministry described the arrangement as a “reorganizing of the Russian presence” along Syria’s coast and said it represented the most significant development since negotiations began about a year and a half ago.

Russia’s military presence in Syria

Russia had been the most important political and military ally of former President Bashar Assad throughout Syria’s civil war. The Hmeimem air base and Tartus naval facility became central pillars of Russia’s military presence in the eastern Mediterranean, allowing Moscow to project air and naval power into the region.

The agreement comes after Assad was overthrown following a lightning insurgency. Russia did not intervene to prevent his removal but subsequently granted asylum to Assad and his family. Russian forces remaining in Syria have gradually withdrawn since the change of government.

Despite the reduction of Russia’s military role, Syria’s new leadership has sought to maintain relations with Moscow. Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa has visited Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow twice since taking power, with the future of the two Mediterranean facilities among the key issues discussed.

The latest agreement does not appear to end Russian-Syrian cooperation altogether. Instead, the conversion of the military facilities into joint training centers suggests that Damascus and Moscow intend to preserve some form of defense and institutional relationship while reducing Russia’s role as a military power stationed on Syrian territory.

Russia had not immediately issued a public comment on the agreement.

Syria’s new foreign policy

The development also reflects a broader transformation in Syria’s foreign policy following Assad’s fall. While Damascus has maintained ties with Moscow, it has simultaneously strengthened relations with Western governments and neighboring Arab states that had distanced themselves from Syria during Assad’s crackdown on opposition protests.

The United States has lifted most of its sanctions on Syria, while European countries have also begun rebuilding diplomatic relations with Damascus.

French President Emmanuel Macron visited Syria in July, during which he announced that France and Syria would appoint ambassadors for the first time in 14 years.

The shift has placed Syria at the center of a wider geopolitical realignment. For years, Russia’s military presence in Syria provided Moscow with a strategic foothold in the Mediterranean and helped sustain Assad’s government. The new arrangement indicates that this role is now being substantially reduced under Syria’s new leadership.

For Damascus, taking control of Hmeimem and the commercial facilities at Tartus represents an important assertion of sovereignty over strategic infrastructure. For Moscow, maintaining joint training facilities could preserve elements of its longstanding relationship with Syria even as its former military footprint is scaled back.

The agreement is likely to become an important marker of Syria’s transition from the Assad era, as the country seeks to balance its longstanding relationship with Russia against growing engagement with Türkiye Europe, the United States and Arab countries.

(Source: CNN)

T

he Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, signed on August 7, 2026, in Mecca between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, marks a significant transformation in the security equation between the Middle East and South Asia. At the heart of the agreement lies the principle that an armed attack directed against one of the parties shall be deemed to have been directed against all three states. This provision goes beyond traditional defense  cooperation to establish a new security mechanism based on the principle of collective deterrence.

The agreement’s primary significance in terms of international relations stems from the convergence of the signatory states’ diverse power elements within a single security framework. Turkey possesses NATO’s second-largest military force, advanced operational capabilities and a defence industry that has grown significantly in recent years. Pakistan is the only Muslim state to possess nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, stands out for its energy resources, financial capacity and influence in Gulf geopolitics. For this reason, the Mecca Agreement constitutes a strategic configuration of complementary capabilities formed by complementary strategic capabilities, rather than a traditional military alliance between three similar states.

The international context in which the agreement emerged is also significant. Rising military tensions in the Middle East, the security of energy transport routes, Iran-centred conflict dynamics and the tendency of regional states to diversify their security guarantees are reinforcing the search for a new regional security order. Within this framework, the Mecca Agreement can be interpreted as a demonstration of the will of regional states to support their security needs increasingly through mechanisms established amongst themselves, rather than through guarantees provided from outside.

The concept of strategic autonomy is particularly significant here. Since the end of the Cold War, one of the fundamental pillars of the Middle Eastern security system has been the US military presence and bilateral security relations. The Mecca Agreement does not directly abolish this system. It is also explicitly stated that the parties’ existing bilateral or multilateral obligations remain in force. However, the agreement demonstrates the will of regional actors to establish their own deterrence mechanisms alongside the Washington- centred security architecture. This situation can be interpreted as a transition from a dependence on a single security centre to a multi-layered security architecture.

The significance of the agreement for the participants

From Turkey’s perspective, the agreement also has a unique dimension. Turkey is a member of NATO. The Mecca Agreement, whilst enabling Ankara to maintain its NATO membership, also allows it to expand its institutionalised defense relations with regional powers outside NATO. Turkey is thus positioning itself strategically from which it can forge links between the Euro-Atlantic security system and the Middle East–South Asia security spheres. However, the relationship between the collective defense obligation under the Mecca Agreement and Article 5 of the NATO Treaty will require detailed legal and strategic scrutiny in the coming period, particularly in the event of simultaneous crises.

Pakistan’s participation in the agreement, meanwhile, shifts the deterrence debate to a different level. Pakistan’s nuclear capability enhances the agreement’s psychological and strategic weight. However, it cannot be concluded from current statements that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence has been extended to Turkey or Saudi Arabia. Saudi officials have also stated that the agreement is not linked to nuclear purposes or an arms race. Consequently, based on the current data, it does not appear appropriate to characterise the Mecca Agreement as a nuclear umbrella agreement.

From Saudi Arabia’s perspective, the agreement represents a continuation of its policy of diversifying security partnerships. By linking its economic capacity with Turkey’s defense industry and Pakistan’s military capabilities, Riyadh may secure a greater degree of strategic manoeuvre. To the extent that this framework extends to areas such as defense industry investments, joint production, technology transfer, training, intelligence sharing and maritime security, it will acquire a lasting institutional character.

The principle of collective defense

Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Agreement is the principle of ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’. This provision is reminiscent of NATO’s logic of collective defense. However, there is currently a significant institutional difference between the two organizations NATO is an institutional alliance with over seventy years’ history, underpinned by a military command structure, joint defense planning, force structure, standards and permanent political bodies. The implementation mechanisms of the Mecca Agreement, however, are not yet as transparent, based on the information made public.

For this reason, the true strength of the agreement will be measured not so much by its signing as by the extent to which it becomes institutionalized. Should a joint military committee be established, joint operational plans drawn up, regular exercises conducted, an intelligence-sharing mechanism put in place and defense industry projects undertaken jointly, the Mecca Agreement could evolve into a genuine collective defense system.

From Iran’s perspective, interpreting the agreement as a direct counter-alliance requires caution. The parties have specifically emphasized that the agreement does not target any particular state. Given Turkey’s shared border with Iran, its economic ties and regional diplomatic channels, the agreement’s potential to take on a sectarian dimension could entail significant strategic costs for Ankara. Consequently, the sustainability of the agreement will depend on maintaining a balance between the principle of collective defense and the policy of avoiding regional polarization.

Towards a new regional security architecture

From Israel’s perspective, the new framework presents a distinct area for strategic calculation. The convergence of Turkey’s NATO capabilities, Pakistan’s military strength and Saudi Arabia’s regional influence within a common security mechanism holds the potential to influence the balance of power in the Middle East. However, it is not possible to draw a definitive conclusion from current statements suggesting that the agreement constitutes an alliance formed against Israel.

A broader implication of the Mecca Agreement is the possibility of institutionalizing security cooperation within the Islamic world. Whilst the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is a broad political organization with 57 members, it lacks an effective collective defense mechanism. The tripartite structure emerging in Mecca could, if successful, form the core of a narrower yet highly operational security platform that could expand with the participation of other states.

At this point, the fact that the agreement is named ‘Mecca’ also carries symbolic significance. The signing of the agreement at the most important holy centre of the Islamic world lends it political and historical visibility beyond that of a purely military text. However, the agreement’s future legitimacy will be shaped not so much by its symbolic value as by its contribution to regional peace, its compliance with international law, and its capacity to prevent crises.

A

ugust 7, 2026, marks a historic turning point at which the cards of Afro-Eurasian geopolitics and the global security architecture were reshuffled. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s working visit to Saudi Arabia brought together Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, who had arrived in Saudi Arabia the day before the visit, and General Asim Munir at the same table. The defense-focused trilateral ‘Mecca Agreement’, were signed following months of diplomatic maneuvering, and were announced at a time of rising military tensions in the region and US-Iran conflict threatening Gulf security.

Analyzing this critical development from the perspective of Islamabad is of vital importance for understanding Pakistan’s defense network, which stretches from Africa to the Gulf; its chronic and hybrid challenges in internal security; and its foundational role at the crossroads of Afro-Eurasia.

From nuclear power to regional security architecture: Pakistan’s role

As the only nuclear-armed state in the Muslim world, Pakistan constitutes the most deterrent and high-calibre military human capital component of this alliance. The bilateral defense pact signed with Saudi Arabia in 2025 was a consequence of Riyadh’s quest for military assurances, including nuclear deterrence, against potential security threats. However, Turkey’s inclusion in this equation as an official and institutional partner elevates Pakistan’s role as a bilateral ‘security provider’ to a much broader and more balanced framework.

From the perspective of the Islamabad administration, this agreement is not merely a single Gulf commitment, but the culmination of a multi-layered strategy stretching from the Horn of Africa to the Persian Gulf. Indeed, the Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation signed last week between Pakistan and Somalia, a year after it was approved by the Somali Cabinet, demonstrated Islamabad’s determination to play an active role in ensuring the security of navigation in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Furthermore, the Kuwaiti Parliament’s approval in late July of the long-awaited defense cooperation agreement with Pakistan, alongside the pursuit by actors such as Bahrain and Jordan of reciprocal defense agreements modelled on the Saudi model, has cemented Islamabad’s position as the region’s ‘security architect’. Consequently, the Turkey–Saudi Arabia–Pakistan triad forms the backbone not only of these three countries but also of a broader Afro-Eurasian security network.

Synergy of capital, technology and military manpower

Viewed from the perspective of Islamabad, the tripartite alliance is more than just a military pact; it is an industrial lever that brings together finance and high technology. For many years, Pakistan’s military diplomacy has provided Saudi Arabia with training, military personnel and security support, whilst in return it has relied on Gulf funding. However, when the high technology, unmanned systems and operational capabilities of the Turkish defense industry are added to this equation, Pakistan finds an opportunity to move beyond being a passive exporter of security and position itself at the center of a tripartite industrial synergy.

When Saudi Arabia’s financial strength, Turkey’s advanced defense technology and Pakistan’s regional military expertise and growing production infrastructure are combined, a domestic and independent defense bloc and an integrated ecosystem emerge at the very intersection of Afro-Eurasia. At a time when Pakistan is grappling with financial difficulties, this agreement enables it to secure direct Saudi investment whilst also modernizing its domestic defense industry through joint defense projects with Turkey, thereby opening up new market opportunities for both Turkish and Pakistani defense companies.

Internal security challenges and allegations of sabotage

Pakistan’s ambitious foreign policy on the global stage is being tested by chronic internal security challenges and regional hybrid threats. The Islamabad administration has long been grappling with violence perpetrated by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, whilst in the south-west it has been combating separatist actions by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) targeting economic infrastructure and Chinese projects.

However, the recent escalation of social tensions and protests in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (Azad Kashmir) has added a new dimension to the security equation. Strategic circles in Islamabad argue that the unrest erupting in Kashmir is not merely the result of local administrative or economic grievances; rather, they contend that it has been exacerbated by the instigations of external actors who are displeased with Pakistan’s key role in its independent balancing diplomacy with Iran and within the now-concrete Turkey-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Tripartite Alliance, which is now taking concrete form. This situation illustrates that, whilst Islamabad is fighting the actions of the TTP and the BLA on the one hand, it is also forced to contend with the hybrid front opened up via Kashmir by forces seeking to undermine the regional influence of the Tripartite Alliance.

H

istory rarely announces itself. But occasionally, a single agreement tells us that something fundamental has changed.

The defense pact signed in Mecca between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye may be one of those moments.

Its most consequential provision is remarkably simple: an armed attack against one of the three countries will be considered an attack against all three.

For Pakistan, this represents something bigger than another defense agreement.

For decades, Pakistan’s military power, including its nuclear deterrent, was viewed overwhelmingly through the prism of South Asia, particularly its rivalry with India. Pakistan was already a formidable military power, but the strategic reach of that power was largely geographically contained.

That is beginning to change.

Pakistan’s security sxtends beyonf South Asia

Pakistan is now part of a collective-defense architecture stretching from South Asia through the Gulf to Türkiye.

And consider what these three countries bring together.

Türkiye possesses NATO’s second-largest army and has transformed itself into a major defense producer, from drones and missiles to warships and advanced aerospace technology. US President Donald Trump himself recently described the Turkish military as “tremendous” and “powerful.”

Saudi Arabia brings enormous economic and energy influence and the political weight of one of the Arab and Islamic world’s most consequential states.

Pakistan brings one of the world’s largest militaries, considerable operational experience and, crucially, is the world’s only Muslim-majority nuclear-armed state.

The nuclear question is therefore unavoidable.

Nothing publicly released about the agreement says Pakistan has extended a nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia or Türkiye. It would be wrong to claim otherwise.

But deterrence is also about perception. Any state contemplating a major confrontation with one member must now factor in the possibility of Pakistani involvement. The presence of a nuclear-armed state within that collective-defense framework inevitably becomes part of the strategic calculation.

Also, it’s worth mentioning that for Türkiye and Pakistan, this is the culmination of something much older.

Ankara and Islamabad: A growing relationship

The relationship between Ankara and Islamabad has long gone beyond diplomacy. It is rooted in unusually strong political and public ties and has evolved into substantial military cooperation,  from training and joint exercises to defense-industrial collaboration and Turkish-built MILGEM warships for Pakistan.

The Mecca pact takes that relationship a significant step further: from close defense partners to countries formally bound by collective defense.

And its implications stretch beyond the three signatories.

India says it is closely following the agreement. Its “great friend” Israel will surely be watching closely too.

Just a day before the agreement was signed, Narendra Modi received a call from Benjamin Netanyahu. According to India’s Foreign Ministry, the two discussed developments in West Asia and reviewed progress in the India-Israel Special Strategic Partnership.

There is no evidence connecting that call to the Mecca pact, and India has explicitly rejected subsequent reports that it sought a defence agreement with Israel to counter it.

But the wider picture is difficult to ignore. From New Delhi to Tel Aviv, capitals will now be assessing what this new arrangement means for a strategic landscape already undergoing profound change.

Having ties to China and the US at the same time

Pakistan occupies an especially interesting position within it.

China remains Pakistan’s “all-weather” strategic partner. Yet Islamabad continues to engage Washington, while simultaneously playing an active mediating role between the United States and Iran.

Perhaps US Vice President JD Vance summed up Pakistan’s standing in Washington most simply when asked about Islamabad’s role in the latest diplomatic efforts: “Very good, we love Pakistan.”

That ability to maintain relationships across geopolitical divides is increasingly rare.

Pakistan can speak to Beijing and Washington, Riyadh and Tehran, and the wider Gulf — without being completely confined to any single geopolitical camp. And now it has added a collective-defense commitment with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye to that equation.

That puts Pakistan in a remarkably unusual strategic position.

The pact also reflects a wider transformation in the Middle East. For decades, regional security depended heavily on external powers. Years of war, uncertainty and shifting American priorities have increasingly encouraged regional states to look towards one another.

Is this agreement like NATO? Well, we still do not know how integrated military planning will become or how its obligations would work during an actual war.

But deterrence begins long before a shot is fired. It begins with the calculations an adversary makes before deciding whether to fire one.

Turkish military and technological power, Saudi economic weight and Pakistani conventional and nuclear strength are now connected through a formal mutual-defense commitment.

(A version of this article was first published in Turkish by Kriter)

T

he Russia-Ukraine War continues to be the primary catalyst for the process of change and adaptation that NATO is currently undergoing. Russia’s loss of its status as a partner within the Western security architecture following the attack it launched in February 2022, and its subsequent classification as a ‘threat’, has shaped the political and geopolitical dimension of the issue, whilst the military and technological aspects of the war’s conduct have also presented challenges to the Alliance’s defense and deterrence capabilities. Measures relating to this process featured as key issues on the agenda of the Ankara Summit and in the Summit Declaration.

Political-geopolitical dimension

It comes as no surprise that the Ankara Summit Declaration defines Russia as a long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security and stability, as the prevailing view amongst the vast majority of allies is that Russia’s objectives are not limited to Ukraine. This view underpins the rapid increase in defense spending across the Alliance, the removal of barriers to defence industry production, and the strong continuation of military and non-military support for Ukraine.

Since February 2022, NATO’s top priority has been to strengthen the Alliance’s capabilities, whilst the second has been to ensure the sustainability of Ukraine’s combat capabilities. To date, 99 per cent of the military aid provided to Ukraine has come from NATO allies. We can see that this resolve has been maintained at the Ankara Summit, as evidenced by the scale of the support package announced. Whilst the allies have pledged 70 billion euros’ worth of military aid to Ukraine for 2026, this figure has also been set as the baseline for the following year.

What is particularly noteworthy here is that this aid will be funded largely by the European Union (EU). With the Ukraine Support Facility adopted in April 2026, the EU had decided to provide Ukraine with 30 billion euros in financial aid and 60 billion euros in military aid for the period 2026–2027. It should be recalled that in March 2025, all US military aid to Ukraine was cut off, and the flow of American weapons to Ukraine could only be maintained through the intervention of European countries.

On the other hand, the statement in the Ankara Summit Declaration that Ukraine is contributing to transatlantic security by fighting against Russia is significant, as it indicates that the allies recognize Ukraine as a major military power. Speaking at the Defence Industry Forum held on the sidelines of the summit, Ukrainian President Zelensky emphasized that his country is no longer an actor seeking security but one that produces it, and that Ukraine has become an ‘extraordinary source of defense capability’ for Europe. Whilst there is some truth in Zelensky’s remarks, linking this to NATO membership does not seem realistic at this stage, as the war is ongoing and, even if a lasting peace were to be achieved, the US administration’s unequivocally negative stance on the matter is well known.

Military and industrial dimension

The Russia-Ukraine War has highlighted the critical importance of defense industry production and innovation in the theatre of war. With the intensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), artillery munitions and various missile systems, the war has turned into an industrial race in design and production. The rapid, innovative and high-volume production of these systems has had a direct impact on the combatants’ success on the ground. This can be seen in the changing nature of UAV warfare. Today, on the battlefield, UAV systems are being used not merely to target isolated tactical elements, but to shape the battlefield itself.

New-generation UAV systems have played a major role in the war taking on a distinctly positional character from late 2023 onwards and in manoevristic operations coming to a virtual standstill. The ‘kill zones’—areas 10–15 kilometers deep where artillery fire and electronic warfare have intensified alongside the use of UAV systems—have transformed the war into a series of battles taking place in isolated areas. Efforts by the opposing sides to gain the upper hand, whether through kamikaze attacks using UAVs or by deploying them to drop explosives from above, are concentrated in these zones.

The race for innovation, which is characterized by constant dynamism on the Russia-Ukraine warfront, is also taking place in the field of unmanned maritime and land vehicles. For example, whilst it has been observed over the past year that Ukraine has begun to utilize unmanned maritime systems (UMS) much more intensively and effectively, we are now seeing new-generation amphibious operation trials aimed at deploying unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) – transported by UMS – to critical areas. Ukraine’s recent operation on the Kinburn Peninsula has been described as the first unmanned amphibious operation in history.

Ukraine’s increasing military power

Looking at the current course of the war, it is clear that Ukraine has, over the past few months, acquired an increasing ability to strike targets within Russia. Ukraine is specifically targeting bridges, motorways, railways and fuel tankers with the aim of disrupting Russia’s logistical capabilities. The reason for this is to thwart Russia’s ability to launch a new offensive during the spring and summer months. Similarly, these attacks aim to isolate the Donbas region from occupied Crimea through the selection of specific geographical targets (thereby blocking the use of the corridor between them). Judging by the results of Ukraine’s attacks and the pace of Russian advances, it appears that this objective has so far been achieved with considerable success.

The impact of these systems on the war extends beyond the battlefield. As a result of drone and missile attacks by both sides, the agricultural sectors of both Ukraine and Russia have suffered serious damage. Long-range missile and UAV attacks are disrupting the production of grain, wheat and sunflower oil, either directly or indirectly, whilst the targeting of Russian ships carrying wheat in the Sea of Azov by UAV systems is also producing negative consequences for the global market.

Similarly, it must be noted that unmanned systems are also having an impact on the sociological dimension of the war. For example, it is well known that UAV systems flying at low altitude and then diving create great fear amongst the civilian population. Last week, a spokesperson for the Ukrainian Air Force highlighted this situation, emphasizing that Russia’s jet-powered Shahed UAVs were flying at high speed at low altitude and that Russia’s aim was to force the residents of Kyiv to flee the city. In this regard, the prospect of unmanned systems becoming part of systematic intimidation and terror-inducing operations targeting the civilian population in the medium to long term represents a critical risk.

NATO’s comprehensive budget

All these factors have led NATO to establish a comprehensive budget and adopt reform processes in the fields of unmanned systems and their countermeasures (counter-UAS). Whilst it was announced at the Ankara Summit that the Alliance would undertake defense procurement worth 50 billion dollars, the ‘Drone Edge’ initiative, worth 40 billion dollars, was also launched to support anti-UAV systems. By the end of 2027, the allies have committed to increasing the number of UAV operators fivefold. Consequently, unmanned systems – which are shaping modern warfare – constitute a significant part of NATO’s military capability requirements, an issue that has largely been brought to the fore through discussions on budget increases.

Similarly, new steps are being taken to remove obstacles to defense industry cooperation – an area Turkey has long advocated for, but whose importance within the Alliance has only become apparent in recent years, and which can be understood in the context of production shortcomings. Initiatives announced at the Ankara Summit, such as ‘NATO Front Door for Industry’ and ‘NATO Engine’, aim to achieve greater integration of defense industries on a transatlantic scale.

Until now, the focus within NATO has been on military interoperability; however, modern warfare has highlighted the necessity of industrial interoperability to meet defense industry requirements. Indeed, the interoperability issues observed with Western-manufactured 155-millimeter artillery ammunition in the Ukrainian theatre had already demonstrated the inevitable need for close coordination between military operations and defense production.

Consequently, the Russia-Ukraine War remains NATO’s top priority. Despite transatlantic divisions and pro-Russian allegations leveled at Donald Trump, the fact that Russia continues to be defined as a long-term threat in the Ankara Summit Declaration is noteworthy in this regard. Similarly, the continuation of strong support for Ukraine also points to the same conclusion. In this sense, whilst the dynamics of transatlantic relations will determine the political dimension of the transformation taking place within NATO, the Russia–Ukraine War and the war’s innovation dynamics will continue to shape the process of change and adaptation in the Alliance’s military capabilities.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

S

audi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan are set to sign a trilateral defense agreement on Friday, marking a significant expansion of security cooperation among three of the Muslim world’s most influential military powers as conflict with Iran reshapes the strategic landscape of the Middle East.

The agreement will be signed in the Saudi Red Sea city of Jeddah during a summit attended by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, is also expected to participate in the high-level meeting, underscoring the military significance of the pact.

Regional officials familiar with the negotiations said the agreement follows nearly a year of discussions aimed at strengthening defense coordination among the three countries amid mounting security challenges across the Gulf and surrounding waterways.

Although officials have confirmed that an agreement will be signed, none of the governments has publicly disclosed the precise scope of the pact or the commitments each country will undertake.

The trilateral accord comes at a time of heightened instability following the U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran earlier this year and Tehran’s subsequent retaliation against military installations, energy infrastructure and strategic targets across the Gulf. The conflict has exposed vulnerabilities in regional security arrangements while threatening one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies normally pass, has experienced repeated disruptions since hostilities escalated. Commercial shipping has slowed considerably as insurers raised premiums and shipping companies rerouted vessels due to fears of further attacks.

Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan have increasingly sought closer strategic coordination, reflecting concerns that existing regional security mechanisms may not adequately address evolving threats.

A Turkish official confirmed that the defense agreement would be signed but declined to provide further details.

Expanding strategic partnership

The agreement would bring together three countries with considerable military and geopolitical influence.

Türkiye possesses NATO’s second-largest military and has significantly expanded its domestic defense industry over the past decade, becoming a leading exporter of drones, armored vehicles and missile systems.

Saudi Arabia remains one of the world’s largest defense spenders and has accelerated efforts to modernize its armed forces while investing heavily in domestic military manufacturing as part of its Vision 2030 economic transformation program.

Pakistan, meanwhile, is the only Muslim-majority nation possessing nuclear weapons and maintains one of Asia’s largest standing armies. Islamabad has long maintained close defense ties with Riyadh, including military training, intelligence cooperation and joint exercises.

Security analysts say combining the capabilities of the three countries could create one of the region’s most significant military partnerships, although its effectiveness will ultimately depend on the operational mechanisms established under the agreement.

Building on existing cooperation

The new arrangement appears to build upon the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement signed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in September 2025.

According to Saudi officials who previously described the agreement, the bilateral pact treats an attack against either country as an attack against both and provides for cooperation using “all military means.”

Whether Türkiye will assume identical obligations under the expanded framework remains unclear.

Reuters reported earlier this year that negotiations were underway to broaden Saudi-Pakistani security cooperation to include Türkiye, reflecting Ankara’s growing role in regional diplomacy and defense affairs.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said in January that Ankara supported establishing broader regional security platforms capable of promoting stability through multilateral cooperation rather than relying exclusively on outside powers.

Friday’s signing appears to represent the first major institutional step toward realizing that vision.

Maritime security takes center stage

Regional media reports suggest maritime security will feature prominently in discussions during the Jeddah summit.

The three countries have already backed Saudi Arabia’s recently announced multinational maritime initiative aimed at protecting commercial shipping through the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

The initiative gained urgency after repeated attacks on commercial vessels and energy infrastructure during recent regional conflicts disrupted global trade routes.

The Houthis in Yemen have also intensified attacks against Saudi-linked shipping in the Red Sea, further complicating regional security calculations.

Meanwhile, tensions in the Strait of Hormuz have highlighted the vulnerability of energy exports from Gulf producers, particularly Saudi Arabia, whose economy remains heavily dependent on oil exports.

Analysts say closer military coordination could improve intelligence sharing, naval patrols and joint responses to emerging threats affecting maritime commerce.

O

ne of the most significant turning points in Turkish political life undoubtedly took place on the night of July 15, 2016. The coup attempt, which arose from a mutiny by a group within the military affiliated with the FETÖ organization, was thwarted thanks to the resolute stance demonstrated by the public and the strong political will displayed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This event not only directly influenced political processes but also served as a catalyst for a profound transformation in Turkish political culture. On the night of July 15, whilst the public’s silence in the face of the military largely came to an end, a clear tendency to embrace the political mechanism emerging from the manifestation of civilian will also became evident.

Following the failed coup attempt on July 15, social and political codes in Türkiye began to be restructured within a new paradigm. By opening the door to an understanding of the risks posed by—or that could be created by—movements characterized by external dependencies and a high degree of esotericism, July 15 brought about a historic turning point in terms of redefining the perception of security in Türkiye and reorganizing the relationship between the military and politics from the ground up.

The radical changes in these two areas have not only had a clear impact on domestic politics and the structuring of institutions, but have also been felt just as distinctly in Türkiye’s approach to international politics and its foreign policy practices. In this new reality, where the approach to countering external threats has shifted, Ankara’s strategic choices—particularly regarding the Middle East—exhibited a striking parallelism with both the region’s own conditions and the domestic transformation taking place within the country.

The strategy to contain Türkiye in the run-up to July 15

The foreign policy vision set out and the policies implemented following the 3 November 2002 elections, which brought the Justice and Development Party to power, enabled Türkiye to reposition itself in global politics and, in particular, to become a founding actor in the Middle East. In particular, the status quo that emerged as a result of the popular revolutions in the region during the 2011 Arab Spring bore the hallmarks of Ankara’s new global political vision. However, in the strategic transformations in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya, the significant electoral success of Islamist and conservative parties—which reflected broader societal trends rather than those of groups aligned with the West—completely altered the perspective of the US and other Western actors on the region.

Furthermore, with the open support provided by Russia and Iran to prop up Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, a serious attempt was made to put a brake on the Middle East’s drive towards independence. During this process, in which Ankara’s relations with the region were taken to a new level, the unease arising amongst global and regional actors evolved into a situation characterized by a succession of initiatives aimed at restricting Turkey’s room for maneuver. The sudden emergence in 2013 of events in Türkiye, Egypt and Bangladesh—which shared similar backgrounds, support bases and rhetoric—constituted steps taken to stem the new momentum within the Muslim world. Alongside the violent protests at Gezi Park in Türkiye, the Tamarod protests in Egypt and the Shahbag protests in Bangladesh were a reflection of a coordinated strategy.

Following the overthrow of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt on July 3, 2013, through a coup, Ankara’s stance on this event led to the emergence of a new dynamic in the region. Alongside the deepening crisis in Syria, the efforts of certain regional actors to bring the popular revolutions to an end and restore the authoritarian status quo led to a narrowing of Türkiye’s foreign policy parameters, driven by both external and internal factors.

During this period, the terrorist organizations that emerged in northern Syria (ISIS and the YPG), alongside the PKK’s tendencies to undermine stability within the country, constituted attempts to erode the government in power before July 15 and, consequently, the legitimate and civilian political will. In particular, the deliberate efforts by members of FETÖ, who had infiltrated the security bureaucracy to a significant extent, to slow down decision-making and implementation processes and to prevent the government from exercising its proper authority through the dissemination of manipulative information, formed part of a plan to undermine Türkiye’s distinctive and independent character in global politics and reduce it to the status of an ineffective actor.

Against a backdrop of growing threats to Türkiye’s border security from Syria, the aircraft crisis with Russia has gone down in history as one of the profound challenges Ankara has faced. The tension that arose between Moscow and Ankara following the downing of a Russian SU-24 aircraft that had violated Turkish airspace caused serious difficulties for Türkiye, a country that was becoming increasingly isolated in the region and whose security concerns were being disregarded by the Western world.

However, under the leadership of President Erdoğan, and following the decision-making elite’s prudent management of the situation, the crisis between Ankara and Moscow was largely resolved, whilst at the same time Türkiye began to adopt a more resilient stance in the face of regional and global challenges. The fact that the collapse anticipated by FETÖ members and their external supporters did not materialize – due to Ankara’s protection of the country’s security and stability through alternative strategies and its continued resolute policy in the face of all threats – led to the attempt on the night of July 15 to overthrow the government by coup and eliminate Türkiye’s sovereignty.

Post-July 15 purge and Türkiye’s new Middle East policy

Following July 15—one of the longest nights in the history of the Republic—and the failure of FETÖ members’ attempts to eliminate the country’s political autonomy and restrict its capacity for action, Ankara began to pursue an action-oriented policy within a new paradigm. During this process, in which security and the perception of threat were formulated in a manner consistent with the reality on the ground, the security bureaucracy took steps—particularly through the purging of harmful elements within the military—within the framework of the hierarchical relationship that should exist between the government and the military.

On 24 August 2016, to send a message to the entire world and to demonstrate in concrete terms that it would combat all forms of terrorism without making any categorical distinctions, Ankara launched Operation Euphrates Shield in northern Syria, with the support of the Free Syrian Army. As part of this operation, which resulted in a crushing victory over ISIS elements, Ankara made a highly strategic move aimed at eliminating threats to its borders originating from Syrian territory and establishing a safe zone for Syrians in the north of the country.

By demonstrating a radical model of alignment between theory and practice through Operation Euphrates Shield, Türkiye not only altered the balance of power on the ground through its military activism but also assumed both an independent and a founding role in initiating a new process regarding Syria’s future. The fact that, for many years, US and European actors refrained from taking constructive and realistic steps to end the civil war in Syria and ensure the safe return of Syrians led Ankara, following July 15, to adopt a stance that engaged Russia more closely under a new framework.

The establishment of a Syria-focused dialogue framework involving Türkiye, Russia and Iran, and the Astana Talks, which represented an alternative initiative to resolve the crisis in the country, went down in the records as a concrete positive contribution of the July 15 events. Alongside its fight against Daesh, Türkiye—which is determined to prevent the PKK/YPG structure in Syria from undermining Syria’s territorial integrity in any way—carried out the Olive Branch and Peace Spring operations in line with its concept of strategic autonomy, despite reactions from the Western world, thereby consolidating its position as a game-changer in the region.

Having swiftly observed the outcomes of its post-July 15 purification efforts in Syria, Ankara adopted a more active strategy to escape the atmosphere of constriction and isolation that had emerged following the reversal of the post-Arab Spring process. During this period, the transformation of the domestic political system also facilitated Türkiye’s ability to pursue independent foreign policy practices.

The establishment of a new model, in which the executive branch has been strengthened and communication between institutions has been accelerated under the Presidential System of Government, played a decisive role in minimizing the negative effects of the July 15 coup attempt and in enhancing Ankara’s global standing. As a reflection of this, Türkiye demonstrated its influence in the region to all parties by openly supporting Doha against the blockade imposed by the Gulf Cooperation Council countries aimed at disciplining Qatar. Furthermore, following the purge within the country’s civil and security bureaucracy, the acceleration of developments in the defense industry and Türkiye’s transformation into a major security producer have enabled Ankara to reposition itself in global politics. This situation has undoubtedly led to a reassessment of ties with Ankara among regional actors and the reactivation of previously frozen relations.

Although the July 15 coup attempt appears to be an intervention in the political mechanism due to its direct targeting of President Erdoğan and his administration, it is clear that this failed attempt was actually the result of a will to eliminate Türkiye’s subjectivity in the global arena. Considering that a significant portion of classical or postmodern coups in Turkish political life have occurred as a result of Ankara establishing contact with alternative actors or presenting a new global political vision, it is evident that the FETÖ mechanism was activated to undermine the effects of President Erdoğan’s new perspective on the international stage and to transform Türkiye back into a secondary actor.

Having overcome this organized threat against the country’s sovereignty and independence, Türkiye, having largely purged harmful elements from its ranks, has begun to develop more original strategies in the global arena. The most concrete manifestation of this is Türkiye’s founding and decisive role in the Middle East. Changing the status quo in the region and successfully balancing regional actors, Ankara has become one of the most effective actors in both Middle Eastern and global politics over the past decade.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

G

ermany’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) marked a turning point both in the shaping of the post-Second World War European security architecture and in Germany’s reintegration into the international system. Following its defeat in 1945 and the subsequent division between East and West Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) found itself on the front line of the Cold War.

Within this geopolitical reality, under the leadership of its first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, Germany saw ‘integration with the West’ (Westbindung) as the sole means of regaining the country’s sovereignty, securing its safety and forging lasting ties with the Western world. Germany’s membership of NATO, which took shape in line with Adenauer’s strategic vision and was formalized on 6 May 1955, represented not merely participation in a military alliance, but also a historic paradigm shift that reinforced Germany’s democratic identity and redefined the balance of power in continental Europe.

With its NATO membership, Germany began to re-establish a regular army and rearm. The fact that Germany was on the ‘hot front’ of the Cold War—a situation in which it could become the direct centre of hostilities in a potential conflict—is best understood through Chancellor Adenauer’s statement: ‘The sole aim of Germany’s rearmament is to contribute to the preservation of peace.’

Germany’s NATO objectives: Peace or the pursuit of economic interests?

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Cold War giving way to regional hot conflicts, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw Germany playing an active role within NATO. In addition to its participation in the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR) in the Balkans, Germany’s deployment of troops to the US-led operations in Afghanistan in 2001, at NATO’s request, is particularly noteworthy. Germany’s participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – established by a United Nations resolution and subsequently placed under NATO command – with a force that at times exceeded 5,000 troops, is regarded as the largest overseas military mission in modern German history.

In an interview given during a visit to German troops in Afghanistan in 2010, the then German President Horst Köhler stated that Germany’s overseas military mission should be viewed in a different light, remarking: “As a country of our size, as a country focused on foreign trade and therefore dependent on it, we must recognise that military intervention may also be necessary to protect our interests when required or in emergencies – for example, to secure free trade routes or to prevent regional instability – as such instability would undoubtedly have a negative impact on our opportunities in terms of trade, employment and income. ‘All of this must be discussed, and in my view, our situation is not all that bad…’ he had stated.

Horst Köhler’s remarks, made at a time when there had also been military casualties, raised questions about the constitutionality of Germany’s role in ISAF whilst also sparking intense domestic political debate; Horst Köhler subsequently resigned from the office of President.

Similar remarks were made by the then Federal Minister of Defence, Peter Struck, in December 2002, when the decision was taken to continue sending troops to Afghanistan. In a speech to the Federal Parliament, Struck said: “To clarify the matter, I had mentioned that our security is also defended in the Hindu Kush. ‘When we combat international terrorism alongside our allies and partners—using military means where necessary—in the very places where it originates, Germany becomes a safer place. Our security is further enhanced when the Bundeswehr successfully participates in the reconstruction process in the Balkans and Afghanistan, in accordance with democratic principles, thereby helping to establish the secure environment urgently required in these regions.”

These remarks, which are still the subject of debate today, signalled the dawn of a new era in German foreign policy at the time they were made. They marked the beginning of a new phase in which German foreign policy was no longer confined to defending its own borders, but also encompassed international preventive efforts. National interests were aligned with international interests, thereby justifying a military presence beyond Germany’s borders.

Despite all the past debates, although the number of troops is smaller, Germany still maintains a military presence at 17 locations with 2,000 troops as part of various NATO missions.

NATO or a European common defense system, or both?

Another initiative coinciding with this turning point in Germany’s foreign policy from a military perspective was the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP – Gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik), which was proposed at the European Union summit in Cologne in 1999 under Germany’s presidency and officially incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The CSDP, which was officially implemented in 2009, also led to the establishment of the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs through the provisions added to the Treaty of Lisbon. Just as in the NATO Treaty, the provision for a call for assistance and support, to be activated at the request of a member state, was also incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon, thereby giving the CSDP practical effect. The first to invoke this provision, by requesting assistance and support, was French President Hollande following the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015.

With 23 member states within NATO, the EU began setting strategic objectives through the CSDP to enable the EU to meet the expectations placed upon it as a security actor operating on a global scale. In 2020, under Germany’s Presidency, the ‘Strategic Compass’ was launched as the key document of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), setting out a clear direction and defining both the policy’s objectives and the necessary resources to achieve them. The first joint threat analysis by EU Member States was drawn up. The Strategic Compass also aims to foster even better cooperation in the field of security and defence and to enable the EU to respond more swiftly and effectively to crises through forward planning.

The EU Global Strategy, developed in 2016, stands out as a new and shared commitment regarding the security policies of Member States, whilst steps were also taken that same year to establish the EU Common Defence Fund under the CSDP.

Although the CSDP may at first glance appear to be an alternative to NATO, it is a structure without a standing army or an existing military chain of command. Since 2020, whilst the EU has undertaken various global missions under the CSDP, joint operations with NATO have also taken place.

Within the EU, a group of countries led by France argue that Europe must become an independent military and strategic actor, separate from the other side of the Atlantic. However, the former Warsaw Pact members that joined the Union through eastern enlargement—Poland, Romania, Hungary and the Baltic states—view NATO as an irreplaceable security umbrella for Eastern Europe. These states, which view Russia as a direct existential threat, currently regard the CSDP’s military deterrence as inadequate and position NATO—which hosts US nuclear and conventional capabilities—as the absolute preference for their own national defence. These countries advocate that the transatlantic bond must not be severed.

Furthermore, the rule within the EU requiring unanimous decision-making on CSDP matters hinders the EU’s ability to respond swiftly and effectively to crises. This situation impedes the CSDP’s operational capabilities.

Germany, meanwhile, is endeavouring to strengthen the CSDP whilst simultaneously seeking to bolster its role within NATO by increasing its defence budget. Ahead of the NATO summit, Germany – which had been criticised by the US President for not increasing its defence budget sufficiently and for failing to provide adequate support within NATO – has already countered Trump’s criticisms through Chancellor Merz, stating that defence spending has now reached 4 per cent of annual gross domestic product.

The debate over the relationship between NATO and the EU’s CSDP was also raised during Chancellor Merz’s meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during his visit to Ankara. President Erdoğan emphasised to Chancellor Merz that preserving the ‘Transatlantic Bond’ was crucial for strengthening NATO’s European pillar, and stressed that Turkey could support the European Union’s defence initiatives provided they complemented NATO. This situation demonstrates, on the one hand, that the CSDP is being closely monitored in Ankara and, on the other, that it has once again been emphasised that, from Turkey’s perspective, a common defence strategy against global threats must be defined within the framework of NATO. However, Merz’s statement that ‘a new European NATO is being established’ has failed to provide any indication as to what role the CSDP will play within NATO.

Turkey-Germany relations in the context of NATO

Relations between Turkey and Germany, which form NATO’s south-eastern flank, have followed a contentious course due to geopolitical shifts, diverging strategic priorities, Germany’s approach to Turkey’s cross-border operations, and the ‘clash of national interests’ between the two countries within the alliance. The fundamental strategic disagreement between Turkey and Germany stems from the asymmetrical nature of their threat perceptions. As a border state directly affected by instability in its immediate region (Syria, Iraq and the Mediterranean), Turkey prioritizes issues such as ‘counter-terrorism’ and ‘safeguarding territorial integrity’—not only its own but also that of its neighbors—whilst Germany has adopted a stance that disregards Turkey’s determination in the fight against terrorism.

During the Syrian civil war, following an increase in the ballistic missile threat against Turkey, Turkey requested an air defense system from NATO. In response to this request, Germany deployed the Patriot missile defense system to Kahramanmaraş; however, in 2015, despite the threat persisting, Germany withdrew the Patriot missile defence systems prematurely, citing Turkey’s counter-terrorism policies as justification. This situation, which led to a serious loss of trust in Germany and called into question NATO’s deterrent capability, persisted until recently.

Despite the friendly and warm remarks made by Merz in Ankara, Germany; its embrace of the PKK and FETÖ, the fact that these organizations still find a foothold in Germany, and the German state’s belief that by providing a platform for these terrorist organizations it could politically weaken Turkey, indicate that relations will not improve in the short term and that the alliance between the two countries within NATO will continue to be turbulent for some time to come.

Among the key issues included in the latest coalition agreement—that is, the government program—regarding Germany’s role within NATO are improvements to the federal armed forces’ contingents deployed as part of NATO’s defense efforts and an increase in military equipment. It has been stated that, due to its geographical location in Europe, Germany will be further strengthened as a central hub of NATO. Similarly, the government program views NATO as one of the cornerstones of the transatlantic partnership and emphasizes its indispensability for European security.

Among the objectives is the commitment to work towards establishing a European Defence Union with the aim of strengthening NATO’s European pillar. This objective is also in line with the argument that Germany must become more Europeanized in order for NATO to remain ‘Transatlantic’. In doing so, it also intends to pursue a trilateral cooperation protocol with France and the United Kingdom.

Whilst Germany is moving towards becoming a logistics hub within NATO, it will, at the same time, seek to bring together its EU member allies under a common budget and logistics framework by utilizing the CSDP mechanisms within the EU to strengthen NATO. In the long term, it will seek to secure its economic and political leadership on the European continent through its strength in the defense industry and its military power.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

T

he 36th NATO Summit, held in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026, addressed critical agenda items not only concerning key themes such as the Russia-Ukraine War, defense spending or European security, but also within the context of NATO’s policies towards neighboring regions. In this context, the Summit can also be seen as a platform for redefining relations with the Middle East, North Africa and Gulf countries, which form the Alliance’s southern flank. NATO’s relations with the Gulf countries, which have been caught in a spiral of strategic uncertainty due to the US-Iran conflict, were specifically addressed at this Summit.

The summit held in Ankara demonstrates that the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), launched with the Gulf states at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, has regained strategic importance 22 years later. As will be recalled, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, marked the starting point of NATO’s institutional engagement with the Gulf states. However, over the span of 22 years, this initiative has failed to deliver the transformative impact that was anticipated. The potential of the Ankara Summit to revitalise this framework deserves to be assessed from both a symbolic and a strategic perspective.

The primary aim behind the establishment of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative was for NATO to contribute to the security architecture in the Middle East and the Gulf region in an inclusive and collaborative manner. In particular, the Gulf states’ reliance on external sources for security and their fragile structure were the underlying reasons for this initiative. However, in 2004, only four out of the six Gulf states joined the initiative, meaning full inclusivity could not be achieved. Nevertheless, NATO continued to invest in the initiative, hoping that other Gulf states might eventually join Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, which had already joined the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

At this stage, the fact that membership of this initiative remains limited to four countries, with Saudi Arabia and Oman continuing to remain outside it, can be regarded as both a symbolic shortcoming and a structural weakness. The fact that Saudi Arabia and Oman, two of the most critical countries when it comes to the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf and the security of the Strait of Hormuz, are not part of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative can be cited as the main reason why this initiative has remained a ‘limited-impact’ framework to date. Indeed, this situation also highlights the limitations that the Gulf states’ divergent security perceptions and foreign engagements may impose on cooperation with NATO. Consequently, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative’s failure to demonstrate the expected trajectory of development can be explained not only by fluctuations in NATO’s regional priorities but also by the divergent approaches of the Gulf states.

NATO-Gulf cooperation in the shadow of crisis

From the perspective of Gulf geopolitics, it can be argued that the key factor distinguishing the 2026 Ankara Summit from the 2004 Istanbul Summit was the context in which the meetings took place. The Istanbul Summit was held in the wake of the largest wave of expansion in NATO’s history and against a relatively optimistic global backdrop. The Ankara Summit, however, took place in an uncertain geopolitical environment in which a conflict between the US and Iran, which had started on February 28, was directly affecting the Gulf states and posing a serious threat to their security. This situation has distinctly set this year’s IIG session apart from the routine diplomatic contacts of previous years.

In this context, NATO foreign ministers and representatives from the Gulf states came together at a meeting held on the margins of the summit. At the meeting, a consensus was reached on strengthening cooperation in the face of the security challenges posed by the conflict in the Gulf region. This approach can be interpreted as a sign that the initiative may be evolving beyond a purely rhetorical framework of cooperation towards a crisis-management-centered function. A notable aspect here is the shift in the rhetoric of European allies. The fact that the stability of the Gulf is now framed not merely as a regional issue but as an integral part of European security and energy supply security can be interpreted as a shift in rhetoric that enhances the strategic significance of the IIG. This shift also points to the concretization, specifically in the context of the Gulf, of the ‘360-degree security’ approach that has long been debated within the Alliance.

On the other hand, from the perspective of representation, it is noteworthy that whilst the foreign ministers of NATO countries attended the meeting, only Kuwait, among the Gulf states, was represented at the level of foreign minister. The attendance of State Minister for Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdulaziz al-Khulaifi from Qatar, State Minister for Defense Mohammed bin Mubarak Fadil al-Mazrui from the UAE, and Director-General for Bilateral Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Abdullah al-Khalifa, from Bahrain, highlights that, despite strong diplomatic messages and rhetoric on cooperation, the Gulf states had limited expectations of the summit.

In terms of positive outcomes, however, it was observed that discussions took place at the summit regarding the possibility of taking some concrete steps between NATO and the Gulf states within the framework of the GCC. In this context, the agreement reached between Qatar and NATO on a partnership program to frame civil and military cooperation between the two sides, and the fact that the establishment process for a regional centre for peace support operations planned to be set up in Qatar is approaching its final stage, can be regarded as concrete steps in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative’s transition beyond being merely a consultative platform.

State Minister al-Khulaifi, who attended the summit on behalf of Qatar, emphasized in his statement that his country attaches great importance to the IIG and is ready to implement concrete outcomes. Kuwait, another country taking concrete steps in cooperation with NATO and hosting the GIG-NATO regional centre, launched the Kuwait-NATO Political and Security Dialogue Mechanism in January 2026. Sheikh Jarrah Jabir al-Ahmed al-Sabah, Kuwait’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, who attended the Ankara summit, also proposed in his statement that the GCC Ministerial Summit be held in Kuwait in 2027.

The future of NATO-Gulf cooperation

At this stage, it remains unclear whether NATO’s renewed engagement with the Gulf states is the result of a temporary momentum generated by current crises, or the outcome of a process aimed at implementing lasting structural measures. Given the Gulf states’ quest for security, having recognized the ineffectiveness of a security mechanism entirely dependent on the US during the Iran conflict, it is reasonable to suggest that they may wish to consider NATO as a new alternative security provider. Indeed, the Gulf states, which already maintain strong partnerships with NATO member states such as the US and Turkey, may also aim to formalize institutional cooperation with NATO.

Turkey’s role in this process, as the host of the Ankara Summit, is also noteworthy. Having hosted the 2004 Istanbul Summit during the enlargement process, Turkey has, by 2026, become a more central actor on the Alliance’s southern flank, owing both to its geographical location and its growing defense industry capacity. Efforts to position the reconstruction process in Syria as a bridge between NATO’s sphere of influence and Gulf capital can also be cited as one of the concrete manifestations of this central role. The progress Turkey has made in the defense industry sector and its transformation into a significant actor in terms of military deterrence have made Ankara an important security partner for the Gulf states.

Consequently, the Ankara Summit has had limited yet positive implications for the future from the perspective of the Gulf states. The interactions revealed by the Summit, particularly regarding the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, demonstrate that an initiative which had seen relatively limited progress over the past 22 years has been able to regain significance in the wake of the crisis. At this stage, the most significant question mark concerns whether this momentum will translate into a permanent institutional framework.

Whether the NATO–ICI dialogue will remain a temporary reaction to the geopolitical uncertainty created by the US–Iran conflict will become clear through the concrete steps the parties take in the future. Key factors in this regard will include whether key actors such as Saudi Arabia and Oman will join the initiative, and to what extent the emerging cooperation programm will be reflected in practice. Consequently, the most tangible dynamic in NATO’s future in the Gulf can be identified as the success of the transition from rhetorical solidarity to sustained institutional cooperation.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

I

ran is expected to receive the first shipment of hundreds of Chinese-made shoulder-fired air defense missile systems within weeks under a deal valued at between $60 million and $70 million, according to three sources familiar with the agreement cited by Reuters.

If completed, the purchase would represent one of Tehran’s largest known efforts to rebuild its short-range air defenses since months of fighting with the United States and Israel exposed weaknesses in its ability to protect military facilities and strategic infrastructure.

The contract reportedly covers between 300 and 400 man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), including the Chinese-made QW-12 and FN-16 missile systems.

According to Reuters, the agreement was signed through Zhongqing Baoshang International Investment, which the sources said acted as an intermediary between Iran and the Chinese supplier.

The total value of the contract is estimated at $60–70 million, although the sources cautioned that delivery schedules, quantities and implementation details could still change.

Iran’s foreign ministry did not immediately comment on the report.

China’s foreign ministry denied the claims, stating:

“The relevant reports are completely groundless. China has consistently played a role in promoting peace and ending the conflict.”

The parent company, Zhong Qing Bao Shang Group, also did not immediately respond to Reuters’ request for comment.

Air defense overhaul after months of war

Reuters said Iran is seeking to strengthen its defenses after U.S. and Israeli strikes targeted facilities connected to its missile, drone and air defense programs during the recent conflict.

Military analysts note that portable air defense systems are particularly valuable because they can be quickly deployed by small teams and relocated frequently, making them less vulnerable than fixed air defense batteries.

The reported purchase would significantly expand Iran’s inventory of short-range air defense weapons designed to engage Low-flying aircraft, helicopters, and drones.

The QW-12 and FN-16 are infrared-guided missile systems intended to protect military bases, energy infrastructure and other sensitive locations against aerial threats.

Defense experts cited by Reuters consider the QW-12 less advanced than newer Chinese systems such as the QW-18 and QW-19 but say it remains capable of providing an effective layer of short-range protection.

According to the sources, initial shipments were expected to leave Urumqi in western China before transiting through Pakistan into Iran.

The sources did not specify whether the transfers would occur by air or overland.

Pakistan firmly denied any involvement.

The military’s media wing, the Inter-Services Public Relations, called reports linking Pakistan to the transfer of Chinese air defense systems “absolutely concocted and false.”

Reuters also reported that Iran has explored overland transportation routes for Chinese military equipment and dual-use components to reduce the risk of disruption.

Growing military ties with China

The reported procurement comes amid expanding defense cooperation between China and Iran despite years of international sanctions on Tehran.

European and Middle Eastern security sources told Reuters they were aware of discussions involving possible Iranian purchases of several QW-series MANPADS, including the QW-12, QW-18 and QW-19 variants.

Reuters previously reported that Iran was also negotiating with China to acquire anti-ship cruise missiles, although it could not determine whether that agreement was finalized.

If the current deal proceeds, it would underscore Iran’s continued reliance on a combination of domestic weapons production and foreign suppliers as it rebuilds military capabilities following months of conflict.

(Source: Reuters)

W

hat do white supremacist Silicon Valley tech bros and terrorist mass shooters of mosques, synagogues, and migrant centers have in common?

They all subscribe to a death cult that dreams of a utopic world where there is racial and cultural hierarchy, and all non-white migrants are deported from Western countries and imperialism, hard power and exploitation to reign again in the global order.

The world is facing a new form of terrorism threat and fascism: it is called Accelerationism. Accelerationists disdain non-white migrants, Muslims, ethnic minorities, radicals and politicians that advocate for diversity, integrating migrants, decolonial justice, and the reparation for slavery and colonialism.

Death cults

On May 19, 2026, two teenagers attacked a San Diego Mosque, killing three people and livestreamed their shooting. A 75-page manifesto written by the shooters espoused Islamophobia, antisemitism, anti-Black racism, Hispanophobia, accelerationism and misogyny was later found online. This was not an isolated incident. On March 15, 2019, a gunman walked into the Al Noor Mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand, and murdered 51 Muslims while livestreaming the massacre on Facebook. He left behind a manifesto soaked in the language of accelerationism and had similarities with the San Diego shooters’ manifesto.  Accelerationism espouses the idea that Western/White civilization must be pushed to a violent breaking point so that white and “pure” ethnostates can rise from the ashes and reclaim their glorious past.

The terrorism in Christchurch and accelerationism have a long history. It echoed Anders Breivik’s 2011 massacre in Norway, where 77 people, most of them teenagers, were murdered in the name of protecting Europe from cultural Marxism and Muslim migration. It echoed the Pittsburgh synagogue shooting, the El Paso Walmart attack targeting Hispanic shoppers, the Buffalo supermarket massacre aimed at Black Americans.

Accelerationist terrorism is carried out in the name of ideological and cultural warfare, carried out by mostly young white men who believe that accelerating racial, cultural and religious conflict would hasten a white supremacist revolution, response and reaction.

AI and the far-right

The question the world has been too slow to ask is this: who is building the intellectual, ideological and political infrastructure that makes this violence justifiable?

Look no further than Silicon Valley.

Elon Musk, today the world’s richest man, owner of X (formerly Twitter), and now the single most powerful unelected figure in the United States, has spent recent years amplifying white nationalist accounts, and platforming “great replacement” conspiracy theories, and signal-boosting neo-Nazi rhetoric to hundreds of millions of followers across the world. His very public embrace of far-right European parties, his attacks on Muslim communities, his obsessive promotion of white demographic anxiety, are not the eccentricities of a distracted Trillionaire. When Musk performed a Nazi salute at a post-inauguration rally and the world shrugged, it confirmed what many had long suspected: white supremacy has found its most powerful champion not in the backrooms of a skinhead bar but in the boardrooms of the most valuable companies on earth.

Marc Andreessen, the venture capitalist and co-founder of Netscape, published his “Techno-Optimist Manifesto” in 2023, declaring that there is no problem “that cannot be solved with more technology” and that the “techno-capital machine” exists to serve humanity. What he did not say is whose humanity he had in mind. The effective accelerationist movement (e/acc) that Andreessen and his Silicon Valley peers champion is accelerationism with a smile: the same ruthless logic of letting destructive forces run unchecked, dressed up in the language of progress, technology and innovation. The merger of white nationalist politics and Silicon Valley capital is no longer a fringe concern. It is the ideology of most Far Right and white supremacist political movements.

Underneath all of it runs a single obsession: replacement. The “great replacement” theory, the paranoid anxiety that white Western populations are being deliberately displaced by non-white migrants, has migrated from the fever swamps of the internet into mainstream conservative politics across Europe, America, and Australia. Replacement paranoia is the connective tissue between the Christchurch shooter and the French Far Right, between the neo-Nazi accelerationist and the Arktos circle and the recently exposed Dialog list of Peter Thiel. This is an ideological project: a far-right internationalism that stretches from Budapest to Buenos Aires, from Washington to Warsaw, and united by the shared paranoid conviction that the non-white world and its peoples are an existential threat to Western civilization.

Techno-fascism

And now this far right international has acquired its most powerful tool yet: Artificial Intelligence.

The global AI economy is being built on a foundation that replicates, with algorithmic precision, the colonial extraction of previous centuries. The data that trains the large language models powering Silicon Valley’s fortunes is harvested from populations across the Global South, often without consent, without compensation, and without benefit. The content moderation labour that makes these platforms usable is outsourced to workers in Kenya, the Philippines, India and Pakistan, paid poverty wages to absorb the worst of humanity’s digital violence so that Western users need not see it.

Moreover, the rare earth minerals that power the hardware are extracted from the Congo, from Bolivia, from Indonesia, by workforces whose conditions would be unthinkable in any country whose citizens Musk and Andreessen consider fully human.

This is the new colonialism, not the colonialism of the gunboat and the governor-general, but of the server farm and the terms of service agreement. The Global South is being incorporated into the AI economy not as a beneficiary but as raw material: its people as cheap labour, its data as free resource, its governments as compliant hosts, and most consequentially the Silicon Valley tech bros dream of a hierarchical world where the Global South is exploited and enslaved.

The accelerationists and the tech bros, in both their violent and techno-utopian forms, agree on one thing: some lives are the fuel, not the destination.

In their hyper-technological and advanced futuristic utopian world, where Musk, Jeff Bezos, Peter Thiel and other billionaires will go for vacation to Mars, there is no place for Muslims, Africans and peoples of the Global South.

Violent death cults have always worn different suits and hoodies in different eras. Today they wear a hoodie or suit and call themselves disruption innovationists, Techno-Utopianists or efficiency strategists.

The mosques of Christchurch and the sweatshops of Nairobi are not separate stories. They are the same story, told in different registers of the same accelerationist logic: that some people exist to be exploited so that others may prosper and build a civilization that reaches Mars and beyond while the Global South is robbed of its wealth, labour and minds and rendered perpetually poor and miserable.

We should not look away.

All forms and manifestations of hatred, dehumanization and exploitation ought to be challenged and resisted – even when it’s clothed in the language of technological advancement or saving a particular civilization, culture or race.

O

nly one in three Americans support the U.S. war with Iran, while a large majority believe President Donald Trump has failed to clearly explain the conflict’s objectives, according to a new Reuters/Ipsos poll.

The nationwide survey, conducted from July 24 to 26 among 1,246 U.S. adults, found that support for the war has fallen to its lowest level since the conflict began five months ago. Only about one-third of respondents said they back the military campaign, while support has remained below 40% for five consecutive months.

Despite declining support for the war, Trump’s overall job approval rating rose three percentage points from the previous month to 37%, although it remains historically low for his presidency.

The poll found widespread uncertainty about the administration’s objectives in Iran.

Overall, 69% of respondents—including roughly 40% of Republicans—said Trump has not clearly explained why the United States is fighting in Iran.

Since the conflict began, Trump has cited multiple goals, including:

• Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
• Destroying Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities.
• Encouraging Iranians to overthrow their government.

The White House defended the administration’s approach. Spokesperson Olivia Wales said Trump would not base decisions on “fluid opinion polls” and reiterated that preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon remains the administration’s central objective.

Support lags far behind previous U.S. wars

Reuters noted that public backing for the Iran conflict is substantially lower than support recorded during the early stages of previous American military campaigns.

According to historical Gallup polling:

• Around 70% of Americans supported the Iraq War during its initial months in 2003.
• Approximately 90% backed military action in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks in 2001.

By contrast, Reuters/Ipsos polling has shown support for military action against Iran never rising above 40% since the conflict began on February 28.

The survey suggests the war may become a significant political challenge for Republicans before November’s congressional midterm elections.

Independent voters surveyed by Reuters/Ipsos favored Democratic congressional candidates over Republicans by 36% to 20%. Independents also gave Democrats higher marks on economic issues, reflecting concern over rising living costs linked to the conflict.

The war has contributed to higher energy prices, with average U.S. gasoline prices climbing above $4 per gallon compared with about $3 before hostilities began.

Republican strategist Alex Conant, who served in President George W. Bush’s administration, said the conflict is making it harder for Republicans to focus on economic issues that they had hoped would dominate the election campaign.

Voters question the purpose of the war

Several voters interviewed by Reuters expressed uncertainty about the reasons for the war.

Alex Womack, a retired Marine from Georgia who previously supported Trump, said he no longer understood the purpose of the conflict.

“It’s not clear why we started a war with them. I have no idea,” Womack said.

Another Georgia voter, Rhyan Anderson, who voted for Trump in 2024 after supporting former President Joe Biden in 2020, argued that the administration should focus more on domestic priorities than overseas conflicts.

“My biggest thing is just focus on the people who are actually in the country,” Anderson told Reuters.

According to Reuters, 18 U.S. service members have been killed since the conflict began, while thousands of people have died in Iran and in Lebanon, where fighting between Israeli forces and the Iran-backed Hezbollah has continued.

The combination of rising fuel prices, uncertainty over the war’s objectives and persistent public skepticism presents a growing political challenge for Trump as his administration seeks to sustain support for a conflict that has now entered its sixth month.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he 80-year-old global order established after the Second World War is unravelling. The security architecture of the Atlantic system, the economic and political framework of the Bretton Woods institutions, the liberal assumption that free trade would reduce conflicts by increasing interdependence, and global supply chains reliant on cheap energy and low-cost production no longer meet the needs of the new era. The world is transitioning, increasingly and more forcefully, to a new global competitive order that we define as ‘Second Mercantilism’.

In this new order, trade is no longer merely trade. A semiconductor factory, a container port, a data centre, a rare-earth elements mine, an LNG terminal, a satellite network, a submarine cable, a shipyard or an ammunition factory have all simultaneously become elements of economic, technological, geopolitical and military power. States are no longer competing solely for market share; they are vying for control over production capacity, critical technology, energy security, logistics routes, strategic minerals, data flows and supply chains.

Consequently, the old distinction between the global economy and the global security system has vanished. The economy is being securitised, security is being industrialised, technology is becoming geopolitical, and trade is increasingly and explicitly transforming into a tool of the struggle for national power. It is precisely in the midst of this major shift that NATO’s future lies.

In the 20th century, there was an ideological, military and nuclear balance between two major blocs. Today, however, competition is far more fragmented, far more technological and far more economic in nature. Russia represents an immediate and direct military challenge; China, long-term industrial, technological and systemic competition; regional powers, missile systems, unmanned systems and proxy wars; whilst non-state actors represent asymmetric threats.

Cyberspace, space, undersea infrastructure, energy networks, critical minerals, artificial intelligence and supply chains are becoming new arenas of competition. In such a world, it is impossible for NATO to continue on its current path based on the classic military alliance logic of 1949.

5 per cent: much more than just a budget target

The commitment by NATO members to raise their defense and security-related expenditure to 5 per cent of their GDP represents one of the most significant economic and political transformations in the Alliance’s history. However, it would be a grave mistake to interpret this decision merely as ‘spending more money’. For money, on its own, does not create deterrence.

You can increase your budget, but if you cannot produce sufficient ammunition, you cannot fight. You may possess the most advanced platforms, but if your critical components are reliant on a single external supplier, you cannot establish a sustainable defense capability. You can develop excellent air defense systems, but if your stockpile of interceptor missiles is depleted within a few weeks of intense fighting, your strategic resilience remains merely theoretical. You may possess very expensive fighter aircraft, but if their maintenance, engine, electronics, software and ammunition supply chains are fragile, you cannot manage the economics of a protracted war.

The Russia-Ukraine War, the crises in the Red Sea, the conflicts in the Middle East and the revolution brought about by unmanned systems on the battlefield have all demonstrated the same truth to us: the decisive factor in modern warfare is not merely technological superiority; it is the ability to scale up technology, produce ammunition continuously, rapidly replace losses and adapt industrial capacity to the pace of the war.

For this reason, NATO’s 5 per cent target must be a production doctrine, not merely an accounting decision. In this new era, NATO’s fundamental question should not be ‘How much are the Allies spending?’, but rather ‘How much can the Alliance produce, how quickly can it replenish its stocks, how long can it sustain operations, and how rapidly can it ramp up production in the event of war?’ It is precisely at this point that NATO must transition from a traditional alliance to a comprehensive defense economy.

NATO’s new requirement: A total defense economy

The concept of a total defense economy does not mean transforming the entire economy into a military economy. The issue is to restructure the boundaries between defense and the economy in line with the demands of the new era.

NATO can no longer consider military planning and industrial planning in isolation from one another. Defence ministries, economic and industrial ministries, energy policies and critical infrastructure investments cannot operate in separate spheres. This is because, in modern warfare, the distance between the front line and the production line has been eliminated.

For this reason, the Alliance’s new economic model must be built on five fundamental pillars:

Firstly, long-term and predictable joint demand must be established. If defense companies are to be asked to increase their capacity, they must be given a 10–15-year order outlook, not just a three-year one. Factories grow not on the basis of political statements, but on guarantees of sustainable demand.

Secondly, joint procurement mechanisms must be strengthened. The dozens of different standards for the same munitions, disjointed national tenders for the same requirement, duplicate investments amongst allies, and political protectionism that hinders economies of scale must be reduced.

Thirdly, redundancy must be established in critical production chains. In the new NATO economy, no strategic product should be dependent on a single factory, a single country or a single company. Alternative production centers must be established for engines, explosives, guidance systems, semiconductors, optical and radar components, batteries, critical minerals and software infrastructure.

Fourthly, a transition to a joint stockpiling system must be made. Ammunition, fuel, critical spare parts, air defense interceptors and strategic raw materials must be planned not solely on the basis of national stockpiling logic, but in terms of the Alliance’s overall resilience.

Fifthly, production-conversion capacity must be established in the event of war. Plans must be drawn up today to identify which elements of civilian industry – from automotive to electronics, from chemicals to metallurgy, and from software to logistics – can support defense production in the event of a crisis.

The view that this new architecture must evolve towards a ‘NATO Defence Economic Area’ has gained significant traction. This area should encompass common standards, long-term orders, mutual investments, cross-border production clusters, coordination on critical raw materials, the integration of SMEs into the system, joint testing and certification processes, and the reduction of political barriers to defense trade within the Alliance.

This is because, in the era of Second Mercantilism, the defense industry is not merely a sector in which companies operate. It is one of the main pillars of national power, technological sovereignty and alliance resilience.

The alliance cannot afford ‘internal strife’

However, NATO faces more than just Russia, China or other global challenges. One of the most significant issues the Alliance must overcome is strategic fragmentation within its own ranks.

NATO must shake off the image of a ‘row among boatmen’ – a situation where allies sometimes view one another as rivals, where bilateral political disputes hold collective security hostage, where defense industry restrictions are directed at alliance members, and where short-term domestic political calculations take precedence over long-term strategic objectives.

To put it more plainly, NATO cannot prepare for a new Cold War whilst engaged in an internal ‘brawl’. Weakening an ally’s defense capabilities on political grounds undermines the alliance’s overall deterrence. Disrupting an ally’s supply chain reduces the capacity NATO will require in a crisis. Imposing restrictions on parts, engines, ammunition or technology for an ally’s strategic platforms, whilst subsequently expecting that same ally to contribute more to the Alliance’s defense, is unsustainable.

Moreover, as the world moves towards far greater systemic competition, NATO’s squandering of its energy on internal disputes creates strategic space for its real rivals.

The Alliance cannot resolve every political issue between its members. Such an expectation is unrealistic. However, it must not allow bilateral disputes to paralyze its collective defence capabilities. Defence industry cooperation must be spared from becoming the first casualty of short-term political tensions. In this regard, the example of Türkiye is highly instructive.

O

ne of the greatest aspirations of a journalist with an interest in international relations is to cover events held in various parts of the world where global issues are debated (such as the NATO Summit, the UN General Assembly, the G20, etc.). In a professional climate where conventional media is losing its importance on the international stage day by day, and whilst the financial clout of the media is eroding and investment in certain sectors is being cut back, the likelihood of a journalist attending such summits is also declining day by day.

In the current climate, the hosting of an organization such as NATO in Turkey presented a significant opportunity for our colleagues in Turkey. Although journalists and television professionals, myself included, had only limited opportunities to engage with leaders due to the nature of the event, we did manage to soak up the atmosphere of the summit.

Turkey is the only NATO member state with a Muslim majority. The 2026 summit was set to have a distinct character for this reason alone. However, factors such as the ongoing tension between Iran and the US (which had been reignited just hours before US President Trump landed in Ankara when he ordered a new strike), the continuing disagreement between the US and its European allies, and the deadlock in the Russia-Ukraine war all served to make the summit even more significant.

Details of the Trump–Erdoğan meeting

The meeting that fuelled the intrigue at the NATO Summit was the encounter between President Erdoğan and US President Trump. Once the rumours circulating days beforehand – that ‘Trump would not attend the summit due to his anger towards NATO members’ – were dispelled, our focus shifted to the nature of the bilateral meeting. The last time a US President had made an official visit to Turkey was in 2009.

Following the visit by then US President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961) in 1959, the chain of visits continued with George H. W. Bush (1991), Bill Clinton (1999), George W. Bush (2004) and Obama (2009), had been interrupted during Trump’s first term and had not even been on the agenda during Joe Biden’s term (2020–2024). Whilst Trump’s visit marked a turning point in this sense, current issues (the F-35 procurement process, CAATSA, etc.) were also raising the stakes.

Despite the scrutiny that began days in advance, logistical and protocol details were kept strictly confidential right up to the last moment. Contrary to expectations, Trump’s aircraft landed at the newly opened Ankara Airport (and the fact that he returned from Esenboğa on an older model aircraft also raised questions. However, technical reasons related to security were cited as the justification). President Erdoğan welcomed Trump at the airport with a gesture reserved for a select few guests.

Upon arriving at the welcoming ceremony at the Presidential Complex, we noticed a different arrangement in the preparations. The ranks of the mehteran band, which usually performs at routine receptions, had been reinforced, and additional units of Janissary soldiers had been deployed. The two leaders’ delegations were also positioned on a platform that differed from the norm. The leaders’ senior advisers (foreign ministers, defense ministers, ambassadors) held their initial discussions on this platform. The flypast by the Turkish Stars, comprising six F-5s, which was part of the welcoming ceremony, was precise and went off without a hitch.

The most exciting moment of the entire process was the joint press conference. The format we are accustomed to in a standard leaders’ meeting is press conferences held in the main hall following discussions between the leaders and their delegations. On this occasion, however, it was announced that only a limited number of journalists would be allowed into President Erdoğan’s office. We were therefore swiftly directed towards the room.

The organizers informed us that journalists wishing to ask questions would need to be ‘quick off the mark’, as the format of the press conference would be modelled on the ‘Oval Office Rules’. I recalled the format we’d seen on TV screens. In those press conferences, held in a small room with Trump and the visiting leader flanked by their aides, it was the loudest who won and secured the floor. Once the floor was opened for questions, although American journalists took the lead with the first questions, my Turkish colleagues and I also managed to ask our questions by adopting a forceful and boisterous approach to secure the floor.

US President Trump gave the floor to ask my question, which touched on the Iran-US tensions. Throughout the meeting, Trump delivered positive messages, particularly regarding CAATSA restrictions and the F-35s. It is also worth noting that, unlike the bilateral meetings held in the Oval Office – which were characterised by Trump’s impulsive responses – there were no remarks from the Trump-Erdoğan talks in Washington or Ankara that would cause any friction.

The factors driving the relationship between the two leaders beyond the usual bounds to a positive momentum are seen as their ability to strike the right balance in their dialogue, the fact that their communication predates the presidency, and the continued flow of contact following Erdoğan’s message to Trump even after he lost the 2020 election. Another important factor is that Trump has framed the Erdoğan–Biden tension as a positive reference point. The animosity towards Biden, which he mentions in almost every speech, also lends extra credibility to those who have had difficulties with him. Ironically, in Trump’s political analysis, the Evangelical vote—which solidified following the release of Pastor Brunson—has also made a positive contribution to the new course of Turkey–US relations.

What happened at the summit?

Opportunities to engage with leaders at the NATO Summit are very limited. One such opportunity is the ‘doorstep’ – the area where leaders give impromptu interviews on the morning of the summit. Not every leader makes an appearance here. It generally provides an opportunity for leaders of small and medium-sized countries, who are often out of the spotlight, to make their voices heard. Danish Leader Frederiksen, commenting on Trump’s continued interest in Greenland, emphasized their stance by stating, “We will defend every inch of our land; this is why we are in NATO.” UK Prime Minister Starmer, who is due to step down upon his return, was cautious; he did not answer any questions and was not particularly talkative. Although French President Macron’s name was on the list, he was busy completing his now-traditional run at the time.

Even the order of arrival at the venue for the leaders’ summit has become a form of image management. Leaders from countries such as the US and France arrive last. Following the smooth participation of all 32 leaders in the much-anticipated session of the summit, attention turned to what was being discussed inside. The information received pointed to a positive atmosphere. It was noted that US President Trump listened to all the leaders who spoke. It was reported that Trump, who remained until the end of the session, did not address any contentious issues (such as the tensions with Spain, the Greenland issue, or tensions with European countries).

It was stated that Spanish Prime Minister Sánchez, in a constructive speech, emphasized that his country’s contribution to NATO should be measured not by mathematical figures but by the rate of achievement of strategic objectives. The extent to which Sánchez’s speech, which emphasized resolve, managed to cool Trump’s fixation on figures will become clear through future rhetoric and policies. It was noted that the US delegation heard the approach they had sought from all their allies during the leaders’ session.

Following the session, the summit effectively concluded with the leaders’ bilateral meetings and the press conferences they held. The most eagerly anticipated of these meetings was undoubtedly Trump’s. Before the US leader took to the podium following NATO Secretary-General Rutte—who had used the hall before him—there was not a single empty seat in the hall, nor even a suitable place to stand. The hall was completely cleared before the US President took to the stage; journalists were only allowed back in after security checks. Among the dozens of journalists vying for the chance to ask a question, the lucky ones were generally our American colleagues sitting in the front row, who had opted for colorful attire.

Trump’s summit marathon, during which he answered questions in a positive and conciliatory manner, concluded on a positive note despite the harsh messages that occasionally resurfaced in some of his press statements. President Erdoğan also held his final press conference as the host. Having followed all these proceedings, having observed that, unlike their foreign counterparts, Turkish journalists tend to include lengthy comments in their questions and drag out the subject before getting to the point, I feel it is worth emphasizing that there is a clear structural problem in this regard. As Turkish journalists, we do not know how to ask questions properly.

A farewell without the usual ‘See you next year’

The NATO Summit concluded without any major hitches. The international media community was highly satisfied with the facilities provided. The complimentary buffet service exceeded expectations, and the goody bags and kits presented to journalists were shared in vlogs. However, the development that particularly surprised the foreign leaders occurred right at the end. The gift of a revolver (firearm) engraved with their names, presented to them by Turkey, took the majority of the foreign leaders by surprise. Some were unable to take the gift home with them due to legal restrictions in their own countries, whilst others announced they would donate it to a museum.

Nevertheless, the message behind the gift hit home. The fact that the gift at a summit where tough issues were discussed was in keeping with realistic geopolitical conditions served as a powerful metaphor and message. It is also worth noting that the specially produced pen, manufactured using domestic resources, was well received.

As summits of this kind draw to a close, attention turns to the next one, and the scheduled date is marked. This time, however, there is a degree of uncertainty, as the likelihood that the summit will not be held next year has increased. In fact, there is no explicit rule stipulating that the summit must be held annually; a proposal that has recently come to the fore suggests extending the summit cycle to every two years.

It is expected that this process will be clarified by the end of this year; what is certain is that the next stop will be Albania. Although it seems impossible to predict the course regional developments will take by that date, it appears unlikely that the opportunities and agenda offered by Turkey will be presented within the framework of that summit.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

I

ran transported Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders, military advisers, and missile- and drone-related equipment to Yemen earlier this month, according to four sources familiar with the matter, in a move that could strengthen the military capabilities of the Iran-aligned Houthi movement and increase threats to shipping in the Red Sea.

The sources, including two Iranian officials, Yemen’s information minister, and a regional security analyst, told Reuters that the personnel and equipment arrived aboard a Mahan Air flight that departed Tehran on July 13. The aircraft was reportedly bound for the Houthi-controlled capital, Sanaa, but diverted to the Red Sea port of Hodeidah after Sanaa International Airport came under attack by forces aligned with Yemen’s Saudi-backed government.

According to the two Iranian sources, between 10 and 21 IRGC personnel, including senior commanders, were aboard the flight. One source said the officers were deployed to support Houthi military operations and provide training on new missile systems. The source also alleged that Iran shipped gold on the aircraft to help finance Houthi activities.

Reuters could not independently verify the claims.

Iran denies allegations

Iran’s Foreign Ministry did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Tehran has consistently denied supplying the Houthis with missile capabilities or directing the group’s military operations.

Abdel Rahman al-Ahnomi, a Houthi media official who said he was on the flight, rejected the allegations, describing them as “lies and fabrications.” He said all passengers were civilians. The Houthis have repeatedly maintained that they develop their own weapons and are not acting as an Iranian proxy.

The reported deployment comes amid escalating regional tensions following renewed fighting involving Iran and the United States.

Three days after the reported flight, Reuters reported that Tehran had instructed the Houthis to prepare to close the Bab al-Mandab Strait if U.S. attacks targeted Iranian power infrastructure, raising concerns over global energy supplies and maritime security.

On Monday, the Houthis announced a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia, describing it as retaliation for the July 13 bombing of Sanaa airport, which they blamed on Saudi Arabia. The announcement effectively ended a four-year truce between Riyadh and the Houthis and heightened concerns over the security of one of the world’s busiest shipping routes.

The group later claimed responsibility for attacks on two Saudi oil tankers, further escalating tensions in the Red Sea.

Multiple confirmations

Yemen’s Information Minister Moammar al-Iryani confirmed to Reuters that IRGC personnel and military equipment had been transferred to Yemen, citing intelligence reports. He said their mission was to strengthen Houthi military capabilities and enable the group to threaten international maritime traffic through the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

Regional security analyst Mzahem Alsaloum also confirmed the arrival of the Iranian advisers, saying the cargo included components for short- and medium-range missiles and drones similar to systems previously used in attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Alsaloum further alleged that Iran had deployed military advisers to Yemen during last year’s conflict with Israel by routing them through Somalia, a claim Tehran has denied.

The reported transfer followed the resumption of direct flights between Tehran and Sanaa, which the Houthis say are intended to ease what they describe as a Saudi-imposed blockade on Yemen.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei said the July 13 flight was primarily intended to return a Houthi delegation that had traveled to Tehran to attend the funeral of Iran’s late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, along with Yemeni citizens who had received medical treatment in Iran.

According to the sources, the return flight also carried IRGC commanders and military advisers. Before landing in Sanaa, however, the aircraft diverted to Hodeidah after strikes targeted the airport.

The developments underscore growing concerns among regional governments and maritime security analysts that Yemen’s conflict could become increasingly intertwined with the broader confrontation between Iran and the United States, raising the risk of further disruption to international shipping through the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait.

(Source: Reuters)

T

en years have passed since the coup attempt of July 15, 2016. From the very first day, the state launched a comprehensive campaign against the damage caused by FETÖ, the perpetrator of the coup attempt, within the system. With the support of society, a restoration of the state’s institutional structure was undertaken; this did not stop at merely erasing the traces of FETÖ, but also involved intensive efforts to thoroughly eliminate the effects of the tutelage mechanisms within the system. Of course, this is not a process that has been fully completed. It is clear that, just as FETÖ, which infiltrated the system over many years, may still have a small number of dormant cells within it, so too do the external links it established from the very beginning continue to exist.

Consequently, we must remain vigilant regarding the potential for FETÖ, and, naturally, similar organisations, to cause harm to the system, even if they cannot go as far as staging a coup. However, another matter of at least equal importance is to recognise what else was actually prevented on the night of July 15, 2016, when the coup attempt was thwarted. Under the leadership of President Erdoğan, the Turkish nation stood up to the coup plotters on July 15, thereby saving not only democracy but also the country’s independence and future.

This is because developments that emerged particularly prior to the coup attempt – and which have continued to accelerate over the past decade – indicate that politics has taken on a new dimension globally. Thanks to President Erdoğan’s leadership and the public’s confidence in him, Turkey is putting up a strong fight during this challenging period. The loss of ground in foreign policy faced by many states in recent years, particularly France, has not affected Turkey. On the contrary, Turkey has expanded its sphere of influence by utilizing both soft and hard power elements simultaneously.

The world from 2016 to the present

Over the past decade, numerous studies have been conducted analyzing the causes and consequences of the 15 July coup attempt, covering topics ranging from FETÖ’s infiltration of the state from the 1970s onwards to the point where it gained sufficient power to attempt a coup. At this juncture, it is worth focusing on the developments that have taken place in the world and in Turkey over the ten-year period following the coup attempt. Indeed, the past decade has witnessed one of the most rapid periods of transformation in human history. First and foremost, the course of global politics has shifted. Donald Trump, who emerged victorious from the US Presidential Election in November 2016, effectively ushered in a new style of leadership.

The Covid-19 pandemic that emerged in 2020 led to a reassessment of states’ capacities and crisis-management capabilities. In a sense, the importance of being able to make swift decisions to cope with extraordinary circumstances was once again highlighted. Particularly in the early stages of the pandemic, international organizations proved ineffective, mechanisms for inter-state cooperation collapsed, and borders were closed on both sides. With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the prospect of a redrawing of the map in Northern Europe emerged. Indeed, Sweden and Finland, fearing that they might be next after Ukraine, hastily applied for NATO membership. During this period, in which the functions of international organizations were called into question, NATO remained an exception to the rule.

Indeed, not only did NATO’s membership increase, but expectations of its members also rose. Meanwhile, the ongoing Syrian Civil War came to an end at the end of 2024 with the overthrow of the Assad regime. Israel launched a genocide as part of its policy of depopulating Gaza. The terrorist state of Israel also carried out attacks against Iran and Lebanon, and in particular carried out assassinations targeting numerous figures within the Iranian state administration. This brief summary alone may suffice to illustrate the chaotic picture the world has faced over the past decade.

It is possible to say that the current process actually signals a paradigm shift in a sense. In fact, for almost the past twenty years, a security-oriented perspective, in which the reflexes of the nation-state have strengthened, has prevailed worldwide. States have prioritized their own national interests rather than adopting a universal perspective that emphasizes international cooperation mechanisms. To such an extent that the European Union (EU), which had already been losing ground following the UK’s departure in 2016, saw its influence further weakened due to its inability to present a united front in the face of global developments.

In particular, there was no unified voice among EU member states on defense and security policies. The voices of international organizations outside NATO were scarcely heard. Indeed, the very existence and functions of these organizations, including the United Nations, were called into question. Even if their existence were to continue, calls for significant structural changes were frequently voiced.

The longest decade in Turkish politics

Undoubtedly, the coup attempt orchestrated by FETÖ had significant repercussions on Turkish politics. One of the coup’s consequences, albeit not a direct one, was the adoption of a new system of government. With the constitutional amendments approved by a referendum in 2017, the country transitioned to a presidential system of government, thereby putting an end to the dual leadership in the executive branch. In the 2018 elections, President Erdoğan was elected as the first president under the new system.

In addition, far-reaching changes took place, particularly within the security and judicial bureaucracies. Whilst the country’s defense and security capabilities were strengthened on the one hand, they were also purged of FETÖ elements and genuinely nationalized on the other. Following the events of July 15, Turkey carried out the Euphrates Shield operation in 2016, the Olive Branch operation in 2017, the Peace Spring operation in 2019 and the Spring Shield operation in 2020 to prevent any security vulnerabilities. This prevented the formation of a ‘terror corridor’ along the line stretching from the Syrian border to the Mediterranean. During the same period, support was provided to Azerbaijan to regain its territories in Karabakh. In the Eastern Mediterranean, attempts by the Greek Cypriot Administration and Greece to expand their maritime zones were thwarted.

A clear stand was taken against Israel’s genocide and massacres targeting Palestinians. During this period, Turkey also faced a series of other challenges at home. It is fair to say that the most significant of these was the earthquake centered on Kahramanmaraş on the night of February 6, 2023, the effects of which were felt intensely across 11 provinces. In the earthquake, which claimed the lives of over 50,000 people, hundreds of thousands of homes were rendered uninhabitable. It is clear that this situation has also had a negative impact on the economy. This event, occurring just as the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic were beginning to be overcome, increased the pressure on economic management.

Turkey was directly or indirectly affected by almost all of these challenging processes. In contrast, Turkey emerged successfully from these trials, unlike many other states. Firstly, it was ensured that domestic developments did not lead to any weakness in state capacity. Although the security forces were most adversely affected by the coup attempt, both the Armed Forces and the law enforcement agencies continued their work without losing their capacity. The positions of the expelled FETÖ members were filled within a short time. Cross-border operations and domestic operations demonstrated that the security forces were able to carry out their duties without any weaknesses emerging. During the same period, Turkey also made significant strides, particularly in the security and defense sectors. Reducing dependence on foreign sources in the defense sector is one of the most important means of the country achieving true independence.

Historically, whenever Turkey’s national interests clashed with those of Western countries, it faced severe sanctions and embargoes from the opposing side. The most striking example of this was when, following the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, numerous countries simultaneously imposed embargoes on Turkey. From that point onwards, Turkey endeavored to establish its own national defense industry with the limited resources available at the time. These efforts intensified significantly during the Özal era, which began in 1983. However, subsequently, particularly amidst the chaotic environment of the 1990s, this process experienced various setbacks due to the impact of successive economic and political crises.

The real breakthrough, however, began with the AK Party’s rise to power and has gained significant momentum, particularly over the last decade. President Erdoğan, recognizing the shifting global balance of power and correctly interpreting the trends in new technology, launched a major initiative in the defense industry. Defence companies have increased their exports to various parts of the world. The progress made in this area is closely linked not only to the companies’ growing capacity to adapt to new technologies but also to their ability to identify new markets.

Given their status as critical sectors, simply producing high-quality equipment in the defence and security fields is not sufficient in itself. The country’s political power serves as the most important means of selling to other states. Turkey’s sphere of influence, which has grown thanks to the efforts of President Erdoğan, has also ensured that production in these sectors generates economic revenue through exports. Consequently, over the past decade, Turkey has become one of the world’s leading defense industry suppliers.

A strong Turkey under Erdoğan’s leadership

Meanwhile, President Erdoğan has steadily increased his influence in non-Western societies. Moreover, it is not only within the Islamic world but also amongst oppressed nations in various parts of the world, particularly in Africa and South America, that Erdoğan has been viewed almost as their natural leader. The interesting aspect is that the Western world has also accepted this role of Erdoğan’s. As exemplified by US President Trump’s favor towards him, as seen once again at the most recent NATO summit, Erdoğan has been recognized as the spokesperson for a vast region. It can be said that this process has begun to transform Turkey from a regional actor into a global power. The ‘Turkey Century’ vision is, in fact, a clear expression of this endeavor. In the coming period, it will be possible to see the positive results of the steps taken in terms of both soft and hard power more clearly.

It is also important to emphasize that these steps have not been limited to the fields of foreign policy and security. For example, Turkey demonstrated its ability to heal the wounds caused by an earthquake that deeply affected 11 cities, leaving some of them almost in ruins, within a short period of time. Hundreds of thousands of homes were built in the earthquake-stricken areas; in effect, new towns were established. Moreover, this process was carried out without disrupting ongoing public investment projects in other parts of the country. Just as in the political sphere, strong leadership was a key factor here. It is worth noting in passing that this process also demonstrated the benefits of the Presidential System of Government. The country continued to grow in a stable and determined manner without descending into the chaotic climate characterized by the coalitions that existed prior to the AK Party’s time in power.

It is clear that, had the 15 July coup attempt been successful, Turkey’s capacity to deal with problems, whether arising from external sources or from within the country itself, would have been extremely limited. In particular, it is easy to foresee that an independent foreign policy aligned with the country’s interests could not have been pursued. Indeed, the primary objective of the coup attempt was to reduce Turkey to a weakened state, with no room for manoeuver outside the Western world, and particularly the US, and where the expression of national will was suppressed. In contrast, the response of the people, under the leadership of President Erdoğan, ensured that these plans were turned on their head. The fact that the country weathered a coup attempt characterized by disproportionate use of violence, in which 253 people lost their lives, thousands were injured, and bombs rained down on cities, has boosted the nation’s self-confidence and enhanced the country’s standing in the international community.

At the same time, the importance of strong and resolute leadership has been demonstrated once again. President Erdoğan not only ensured the coup attempt failed by directing the nation onto the streets on the night of 15 July, but also strengthened the country’s power through the steps he took afterwards. It is clear that these developments are instructive in many respects. What is particularly striking is that Erdoğan’s resolute stance and determined attitude have strengthened Turkey’s position amongst nations. Of course, state administration and politics are closely linked to institutionalization and the full fulflilment of duties by professional teams. However, to be fair, it is important to emphasize the following point in particular: both the resistance witnessed on the night of July 15 and Turkey’s rapidly rising global standing in the aftermath are, to a large extent, the result of President Erdoğan’s leadership skills.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

T

he stability of political regimes is assessed through the nature of the relationship between the normative power of the constitutional order and the depth of social legitimacy. The mere existence of a constitution, the meticulous construction of the institutional architecture, or the explicit definition of the principle of the separation of powers in legal texts does not, in itself, guarantee the security of the regime. The true resilience of regimes is revealed in the attitudes of social actors towards the source of legitimacy during times of crisis. In this context, coups are not merely power struggles targeting the institutional continuity of the state; they are attempts to forcibly answer the question of who will exercise sovereignty.

In political science literature, a coup is defined as an attempt by an organized group within the state apparatus to seize executive power through the use of force or the threat of force, by suspending constitutional and legal procedures. In this context, coups signify not merely a transfer of power, but the detachment of political legitimacy from its institutional foundation and its subsequent reconstruction through power relations. Studies on coups indicate that such interventions are more likely to occur in regimes characterized by a low level of institutionalization, where the capacity for consensus among civilian political actors is weak and power centers within the state are fragmented. In systems where political institutions are not sufficiently entrenched, power struggles may turn to the direct use of force rather than relying on electoral, parliamentary or legal mechanisms.

Discussions on military tutelage reveal that when the military goes beyond its role as an institution ensuring security against external threats to assume a supervisory and directive role over the political sphere, it weakens democratic processes. When the military positions itself as the ultimate guardian of the regime or the arbiter of its ideological boundaries, it limits the decision-making capacity of elected civilian authorities and erodes democratic accountability. In such a structure, the military begins to be perceived as a legitimate actor capable of intervening in politics. This situation becomes one of the fundamental structural obstacles to democratic consolidation.

Institutional veto capacity

Analyses of democratic fragility emphasize that the institutional veto capacity of anti-regime or extra-systemic actors is decisive during periods of crisis. Situations such as economic crises, social polarization, governance failures or loss of legitimacy can increase the fragility of the political system, creating a fertile ground for anti-democratic interventions. During periods when coordination among the state’s key institutions breaks down and social consensus weakens, coups emerge as the result of a broader regime crisis. For this reason, modern literature explains coups not so much in terms of the will of individual actors, but rather through institutional weaknesses, power balances and fragilities within the regime’s structure.

When Turkish political history is examined through these theoretical frameworks, it becomes apparent that the tension between democratic representation and authoritarian power centers is a persistent feature. From the time of Ottoman modernization onwards, the positioning of the military and bureaucratic elites as the state’s founding and protective actors has led to political legitimacy being constructed in a state-centered manner rather than from a social base. During the Republican era, this structure gained institutional continuity; following the transition to a multi-party system, however, a structural conflict emerged between political legitimacy derived from elections and the tradition of tutelary intervention.

Given this historical background, the coup attempt that took place on the night of July 15, 2016, cannot be regarded as an isolated security incident. This event marks a critical threshold in Turkey’s tradition of intervention, which spans nearly two centuries, and constitutes a historic turning point in the societal defense of democratic legitimacy. The uniqueness of the event is evident in the scale of the attempt, the level of violence involved, and the nature of the societal reaction it provoked.

Pre-Republican political structure

To understand the sociological roots of coups in Turkey, one must examine the pre-Republican political structure. During the classical period of the Ottoman Empire, whilst central authority appeared strong, power relations were shaped by the balance between the palace bureaucracy, the military elite and regional power centres. With the process of modernisation, the centralisation of military reforms within state transformation significantly increased the political weight of the army.

The deposition of Sultan Abdülaziz in 1876 is one of the clearest indications of the Ottoman state elite’s capacity to intervene in the transfer of power. The power structure established by the Committee of Union and Progress after 1908, meanwhile, deepened the institutional intertwining of military-political relations. Consequently, the mindset that the military elite possessed the right to determine the direction of the state became deeply entrenched.

The central role of the military in the founding of the Republic not only failed to bring this historical legacy to an end but also provided it with a new basis of legitimacy. The military background of the founding generation fostered the notion that the military bore a special responsibility for the regime’s survival. In subsequent periods, this understanding formed the institutional basis for the tutelary mindset that argued democratic politics must be kept within certain limits.

Prime Minister Adnan Menderes

The transfer of power in Turkey following the 1950 elections represented a historic advance in terms of democratic representation. However, this transition did not eliminate tutelary reflexes. The coup of 27 May 1960 is the clearest illustration of this reality.

May 27 signifies the overthrow by armed force of an elected, democratic and legitimate government – that is, the will of the people as expressed. The execution of Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and two of his ministers following the intervention constituted a punishment directed against the will of the people. This event represents a deep fracture in the collective memory of Turkish democracy. One of the coup’s most significant consequences was the normalization of military intervention as a legitimate political tool. An event as horrific and repugnant as the coup itself is the fact that this tragedy was declared a public holiday and celebrated for years…

The constitutional order established after 1961 granted military and bureaucratic institutions the power of veto over the system. Thus, a hybrid structure emerged—democratic in appearance, but fundamentally encircled by mechanisms of tutelage.

The March 12, 1971, memorandum demonstrated that the political arena could be forcibly restructured without directly seizing power. The fact that Parliament remained open does not imply that the intervention was of a civilian nature, as political decision-making processes were shaped under military pressure.

The coup of September 12, 1980, on the other hand, radically transformed Turkey’s social and institutional fabric. Parliament was closed, political parties were dissolved, and fundamental rights and freedoms were suspended. This period marked a phase in which state violence intensified on an institutional scale. Detentions, torture, bans and a climate of severe repression produced deep traumas in the collective memory.

F

ebruary 28, 2025 was one of the darkest days of the Ukraine-Russia War. Yet, for Ukraine, the catastrophe is unfolding not on the front lines but in Washington, right at the gates of the White House. In the early days of his second presidential term, Donald Trump opens proceedings by publicly mocking Ukrainian President Zelensky’s attire in front of the press, in a manner contrary to diplomatic protocol, before the President has even had a chance to enter the residence. Whilst Zelenskyy thought he would have to make do with this cold shower at the door, inside the White House he was subjected to a barrage of heavy criticism, this time joined by Vice-President James David Vance.

In a sense, those 10 minutes – during which all the aid the US had provided over the past three years was thrown in his face – must have felt like a decade, not only to the Ukrainian President but also to the European countries that had supported Ukraine. Donald Trump consistently maintained his line of accusing his predecessor, Joe Biden, over the Ukraine–Russia War right up until August 2025.

The Trump–Putin summit held on August 15, 2025, at Elmendorf–Richardson Air Force Base in Alaska had further reinforced the impression that all hope for Ukraine had been completely dashed. Furthermore, events at the White House just three days later, on August 18, 2025, reinforced the perception that the US had completely capitulated to Russia’s position on the war in Ukraine. That day, Trump lined up European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Finnish President Stubb, French President Macron, German Chancellor Merz, Italian Prime Minister Meloni, British Prime Minister Starmer, Ukrainian President Zelensky and NATO Secretary-General Rutte before him, and dictated his expectations regarding the course of the Ukraine–Russia War.

Furthermore, by catching this group off guard in front of the media, he forced them to speak on the validity of his own views. However, the evolving relations between the People’s Republic of China and Russia, the support Moscow provided to the Tehran regime during the Iran war, and Russia’s reluctance to sit down at the negotiating table have shifted the course of events.

A changing wind from Alaska to Ankara

On 8 July 2026, the image presented by the Trump–Zelensky duo when they faced the media at the NATO Summit in Ankara was very different from the unpleasant scenes witnessed a year and a half earlier. Beyond the positive messages conveyed, Trump had warmed relations to the point of joking with Zelensky about Ukraine’s drone and missile strikes on Moscow. When Trump asked, “Would you like to go to Moscow?”, Zelensky replied, “I don’t think so; there are far too many Ukrainian drones there.”

Clearly, the US President was also extremely pleased with Ukraine’s dominance, achieved through drones and guided missiles, extending as far as 2,000 kilometers into Russian airspace. Indeed, during the summit, NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte remarked: “Some key targets deep inside Russia have been struck. ‘Over the past two months, Ukraine has been hitting targets more successfully’.” It is clear that Ukraine has not only made significant strides in the field of FPV drones and guided missiles.

There has also been an increase—the details of which we are not yet fully aware—in the quality and quantity of satellite-based electronic intelligence provided to Ukraine by NATO member states. The fact that around 100 naval vessels operating for the Russian ‘Ghost Fleet’ were struck by Ukrainian drone attacks in the Sea of Azov in the week following the NATO Summit is a matter that warrants attention in terms of the level these capabilities have reached. Looking back a little further, we can conclude that events took place which led Trump to lose hope that Russia and Putin would make peace with Ukraine in the final quarter of 2025.

The balance of power was redrawn in 2026

From the very first days of 2026, the nature and scale of Ukraine’s drone attacks saw a significant increase. Whilst all logistics routes supplying food and fuel to Crimea were paralyzed, almost all of the peninsula’s fuel depots and main electricity transmission stations were taken out of action by July. Petrochemical plants and refineries across Russia were struck 200 times in six months. This represents an 11-fold increase compared with the first six months of 2025. In May alone, 16 highly successful attacks were carried out against Russian refineries.

It has become commonplace for Ukrainian kamikaze UAVs to reach a range of 2,000 kilometers, or for FPV drones to strike targets more than 100 kilometers behind the front line. Having lost 40 per cent of its oil refining capacity, Russia has reached the point of banning diesel exports following its decision to ban the export of petrol and aviation fuel. Having been reduced to the point of having to import refined oil from India, Russia was unable to parade tanks and mobile missile launchers on Red Square during the traditional Second World War Victory Day commemorations on May 9.

As the military balance rapidly shifted against Russia, US President Trump’s behavior towards Ukrainian President Zelensky at the G7 Summit in Paris and the NATO Summit in Ankara, held between and June 15-17, signaled that even tougher times lay ahead for Moscow. At the summit, a commitment of 70 billion euros was made to provide Ukraine with military equipment, ammunition and training by 2026. Furthermore, following statements from some NATO member states that ‘we have nothing left to give to Ukraine’, the alliance decided to take an unprecedented step. Led by Canada, an initiative was launched to establish the ‘Defense, Security and Resilience Bank (DSRB)’ with the participation of certain NATO member states.

The bank, scheduled to become operational in 2027, aims to provide low-cost financing of up to 100 billion pounds for defense projects. The members set to participate in this bank project include Turkey, Albania, Belgium, Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania and Ukraine. It is clear that the Alliance does not wish to see a repeat of the chaos that ensued regarding support for the Kyiv administration from the outset of the war in Ukraine and intends to find an institutional solution to this.

The US has no further expectations of a Russia under Putin’s rule

Returning to the final communiqué of the NATO Summit in Ankara, it appears that the mobilization launched against the Russian threat directed at Ukraine – and even Poland and the Baltic states – will continue with an open-ended timeline. The communiqué, referencing the NATO Hague Summit Communiqué dated June 25, 2025, emphasised that Russia poses a long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. In other words, NATO members will channel more of their economic capacity into deterrence and defense against threats originating from Russia.

The emphasis on Russia as a “long-term threat” could be interpreted as the US having given up hope on the Putin administration. The visits to Moscow by US Special Envoys Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff – which the Kremlin has been awaiting for nearly two months but which have yet to materialize – could also be seen as a manifestation of this “loss of hope”. Reports by the Russian TASS news agency in the first week of July stated that this visit, which Moscow was apparently eagerly awaiting, “could take place by the end of the summer, though a definite date has not yet been set”.

A report published in the British newspaper The Telegraph on July 10, 2026, however, indicates that the growing aversion towards Russia, particularly in Washington and other NATO capitals, is set to increase exponentially. According to the British newspaper’s report, the Dutch intelligence services, the AIVD (Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service) and the MIVD (Military Intelligence and Security Service), have discovered that doorbell cameras at hundreds of homes along the routes leading from NATO bases in the Netherlands to airports and seaports have been hacked. So, who would want access to the footage from hundreds of doorbell cameras?

According to the Dutch intelligence services, the culprits are cybercriminals backed by Moscow. Their aim is to determine the contents and quantities of arms shipments to Ukraine. According to The Telegraph, this Russian operation is not limited to the Netherlands. Across Europe, thousands of doorbell cameras are under the control of Russian intelligence. In other words, the Ukraine-Russia War has reverted to the ‘factory settings’ established at the outset by the US-UK duo. The objective is no longer limited to simply expelling Russia from Crimea and the Donbas region, which it has annexed. The ultimate goal has been updated to create the conditions necessary to topple Putin’s regime in Moscow.

(This article was originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

Y

emen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement announced a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia on Monday, threatening to expand the regional conflict linked to the ongoing U.S.-Iran war and raising concerns over global energy supplies and international shipping.

The Houthis said the “maritime embargo” would take effect immediately, describing it as retaliation against what they called Saudi Arabia’s continued blockade of Yemen. The announcement broadens the conflict beyond the Gulf, bringing the strategically vital Bab el-Mandeb Strait into focus after shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has already been severely disrupted.

The Saudi-led coalition said it would respond “with force” to the Houthi announcement and confirmed that additional security measures had been implemented to protect commercial and military vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a critical route for Saudi oil exports.

The latest development raises the possibility of simultaneous disruptions at both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb, two of the world’s most important maritime energy corridors.

Analysts warn that a prolonged closure of Bab el-Mandeb could significantly reduce Saudi oil exports and further strain global energy markets already affected by the fighting in the Gulf.

Diplomacy continues despite escalation

The Houthi announcement came as diplomatic efforts to restore a ceasefire between Washington and Tehran appeared to continue.

A senior Iranian official told Reuters that mediators had presented Tehran with a proposal for a 10-day ceasefire aimed at preserving the interim agreement reached last month.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry confirmed that mediators had submitted proposals but did not disclose further details.

Separately, Pakistani officials said Iranian Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni had requested Islamabad to resume mediation efforts between the United States and Iran.

Despite renewed diplomatic contacts, military operations continued across the region.

U.S. Central Command launched another wave of strikes against targets in Iran, while President Donald Trump defended the attacks, saying they were carried out in response to recent Iranian attacks that killed American service members.

The Pentagon identified two U.S. soldiers killed in an Iranian strike on a U.S. base in Jordan last week and said unidentified remains believed to belong to a third missing soldier had been recovered. A fourth U.S. service member was killed separately in northern Iraq during the controlled detonation of unexploded ordnance from an Iranian drone.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it launched missile attacks against U.S. military facilities in Jordan, Kuwait and Syria, while Bahrain reported repeated air raid sirens and Kuwait said its air defense systems intercepted Iranian drones overnight.

Shipping and oil markets under pressure

The Houthis’ announcement briefly pushed oil prices higher before markets stabilized amid hopes that diplomatic negotiations could prevent a broader regional war.

Insurance premiums for vessels operating in the Red Sea increased as shipping companies assessed the heightened security risks.

Meanwhile, the IRGC said two oil tankers had exploded after attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz via what it described as an “unsafe” route, though Reuters was unable to independently verify the claim.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) also reported that a commercial vessel had been struck by an unidentified projectile off the coast of Oman.

The latest escalation underscores the widening geographic scope of the conflict, with military operations now stretching from Iran and the Gulf to Yemen, Jordan, Syria and Iraq.

While diplomatic initiatives remain underway, continued exchanges of military strikes and expanding maritime threats have raised fears that the conflict could further destabilize regional security and disrupt global energy and trade routes.

(Source: Reuters)

T

urkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan warned on Thursday against the expansion of the Russia-Ukraine war into the Black Sea, saying attacks on civilian maritime infrastructure threaten regional stability and should not be tolerated.

Speaking alongside Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha after talks in Kyiv, Fidan said Türkiye remains committed to preventing the conflict from spreading into the strategically important waterway.

“We do not want the war to spread to the Black Sea,” Fidan said, stressing that peace and security in the region must be preserved.

He condemned attacks targeting civilian maritime assets, saying ports, oil tankers and fishing vessels should not become military targets.

“Targeting ports, tankers and fishing boats and putting civilians’ lives at risk is not something that can be justified,” Fidan said, urging all parties to act with restraint and responsibility.

Fidan said Türkiye continues to explore new strategic approaches with the warring parties and international mediators to break the deadlock in the conflict.

Call for negotiations

He reaffirmed Ankara’s support for continuing negotiations under the Istanbul format, arguing that direct talks between Russian and Ukrainian officials had produced valuable transparency and dialogue.

“I believe it would be very beneficial for the Türkiye negotiations, particularly the Istanbul talks, to continue,” Fidan said, adding that ongoing hostilities should not prevent diplomatic engagement.

The Turkish foreign minister noted that while U.S. negotiators later became involved in efforts to achieve a broader settlement, the conflict continues with an increasing risk of escalation.

Addressing potential post-war security arrangements, Fidan said security guarantees for Ukraine would likely include land, air and naval components.

He revealed that Türkiye has agreed to lead the maritime component of those guarantees in coordination with allied countries.

“Türkiye has accepted to lead the maritime component, and we have a common understanding with our allies on this issue,” he said, adding that planning work is already being carried out by the naval forces of participating allied nations.

Ukraine is ready for a ceasefire

For his part, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha reiterated Kyiv’s readiness for a ceasefire and voiced support for Türkiye as the venue for future high-level peace negotiations.

“We believe that negotiations, especially a possible meeting between President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and President Vladimir Putin, could take place in Türkiye,” Sybiha said.

He added that only a summit between the two leaders could inject new momentum into the peace process.

“As Ukraine, we are ready for a ceasefire,” Sybiha said.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

T

he United States has used unmanned surface vessels (USVs) in combat for the first time, marking a significant milestone in modern naval warfare after the US military confirmed that autonomous sea drones were employed in strikes against an Iranian naval facility.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) said three one-way Corsair sea drones struck a submarine and ship maintenance facility at Iran’s Bandar Abbas Naval Base on Monday as part of operations aimed at reducing Iran’s capacity to target commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

The attack represents the first known offensive use of US autonomous surface vessels, highlighting a shift in naval strategy toward unmanned maritime systems after similar technologies gained prominence during the Russia-Ukraine war.

Autonomous sea drones enter frontline combat

The Corsair is an autonomous surface vessel developed by Texas-based defense technology company Saronic. Measuring approximately 24 feet (7.3 meters) in length, the vessel has a range exceeding 1,000 nautical miles, can travel at speeds above 35 knots, and is capable of carrying payloads of nearly 1,000 pounds (453 kilograms).

Designed with a modular architecture, the platform can perform intelligence, surveillance, logistics, force protection and one-way strike missions while operating with limited human intervention.

Until now, USVs in the US military had primarily been deployed for reconnaissance, maritime security and search-and-rescue operations rather than offensive missions.

The combat debut follows Saronic’s rapid growth since its establishment in 2022.

The company expanded its shipbuilding capacity by acquiring Louisiana-based Gulf Craft in 2025 and later announced a $300 million expansion of its production facilities. In December 2025, the US Navy awarded Saronic a $392 million production contract for the Corsair, accelerating the transition from prototype development to operational deployment.

Since then, the company has secured $1.75 billion in funding, reaching a valuation of $9.25 billion while broadening its portfolio of autonomous maritime systems and command-and-control technologies.

Shift in naval warfare

Military analysts increasingly view unmanned surface vessels as a transformative capability for future naval operations.

Compared with conventional warships that require large crews and significant financial investment, autonomous vessels can be produced at lower cost, deployed in larger numbers and operate in high-risk environments without exposing personnel to danger.

The concept gained prominence during the Russia-Ukraine war, where Ukraine employed maritime drones to challenge Russia’s naval superiority in the Black Sea, forcing Moscow’s fleet to adapt its operations.

Iran and Yemen’s Houthi movement have also used one-way naval drones to threaten commercial shipping in strategic waterways.

The latest strike follows another milestone for the Corsair after the vessel was reportedly used last month to help rescue two crew members from a downed US Army helicopter off the coast of Oman.

The vessel was operated by Task Force 59, the US Navy’s unit dedicated to unmanned maritime systems.

Defense analysts say the Bandar Abbas operation could signal a broader transformation in US naval doctrine, with autonomous vessels increasingly operating alongside traditional warships as part of distributed and networked fleets capable of carrying out reconnaissance, logistics and combat missions.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

T

he death of longtime Republican Senator Lindsey Graham has renewed debate over his enduring influence on U.S. foreign policy, with supporters praising his commitment to American leadership abroad and critics pointing to his advocacy for military intervention and unwavering support for Israel.

Graham, who died on Saturday at the age of 71 following what his office described as a brief and sudden illness, was one of the most recognizable Republican voices on national security issues for more than two decades. Throughout his career, he consistently championed military action, backed strong U.S. alliances with Israel, and maintained a hardline stance toward Iran, Russia and China.

His passing prompted tributes from U.S. President Donald Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and several Republican lawmakers, while also drawing criticism from anti-war advocates and Palestinian rights groups, who argued that Graham’s legacy was defined by support for prolonged military conflicts.

Political analysts say two themes are likely to dominate assessments of Graham’s career: his advocacy for interventionist foreign policy and his transformation into one of Trump’s closest allies.

Michael Hanna, U.S. Program Director at the International Crisis Group, said Graham had cultivated a long-standing reputation for promoting military solutions to international crises.

“He was a major supporter of the Iraq War and remained a strong advocate for the use of military force throughout his career,” Hanna said, adding that Graham played an influential role in encouraging the Trump administration’s hardline approach toward Iran.

Strong backing for Israel

Support for Israel remained central to Graham’s foreign policy positions. He repeatedly called for expanded U.S. military assistance to Israel and defended its military operations following the October 7, 2023 attacks and the subsequent war in Gaza.

In 2021, Graham successfully pushed for an additional $1 billion in U.S. military assistance after visiting Israel, where he posed alongside Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu holding a sign reading “More for Israel.”

Netanyahu paid tribute to Graham following his death, describing him as one of Israel’s strongest supporters in Washington and recalling that the senator often advocated for greater U.S. assistance than Israel itself requested.

Graham’s rhetoric on the Gaza war frequently drew international criticism. He defended Israel’s military campaign in Gaza in uncompromising terms and made several controversial remarks about the conflict that human rights advocates condemned as inflammatory.

Palestinian advocacy groups said Graham consistently supported policies that contributed to escalating violence in the region, while critics described him as one of the most outspoken proponents of military solutions in U.S. foreign policy.

Graham was also among the leading congressional advocates for confronting Iran militarily. Earlier this year, he publicly supported U.S. military action against Tehran and maintained close contact with President Trump as tensions between Washington and Iran escalated.

Analysts say Graham’s influence was one of several factors shaping the administration’s approach, although decisions ultimately rested with the president.

Alliance with Trump

Although Graham was an outspoken critic of Trump during the 2016 Republican presidential campaign—calling him “unfit for office” and “a kook”—the senator later became one of the president’s closest political allies.

The two frequently met at the White House and appeared together at public events, with Graham emerging as a trusted adviser on national security and foreign affairs.

Following Graham’s death, Trump called on South Carolina Governor Henry McMaster to appoint Graham’s sister, Darline Graham Nordone, to temporarily fill the Senate seat, describing the move as a fitting tribute to the late senator.

Observers say Graham’s death comes at a time when the Republican Party is increasingly divided over foreign policy, particularly regarding military intervention abroad.

Recent polling indicates younger Republican voters are less supportive of overseas military operations and more skeptical of interventionist policies than previous generations.

Hanna said Graham represented a generation of Republican leaders whose worldview was shaped by post-Cold War American global leadership and extensive military engagement overseas.

While his Senate seat is expected to remain in Republican hands, analysts suggest his absence could further accelerate debates within the party over the future direction of U.S. foreign policy, military intervention and Washington’s role in global conflicts.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

U

kraine and nine European countries have announced the creation of a joint anti-ballistic missile coalition aimed at strengthening the continent’s defenses against emerging missile threats through closer military, technological and industrial cooperation.

The initiative, unveiled by the leaders of Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom, seeks to develop an integrated European missile defense architecture designed to improve protection against ballistic missile attacks.

In a joint declaration issued on Sunday, the participating countries described the coalition as a “purely defensive” initiative intended to bolster Europe’s collective security amid evolving regional threats.

“We believe that the protection of Europe requires a global solution of integrated missile defense architecture to deter and defeat future missile threats,” the leaders said.

The coalition’s centerpiece will be a flagship project to develop a shared anti-ballistic missile capability. Member states will coordinate on common operational requirements, technical standards and defense industrial cooperation while establishing a roadmap for deploying the coalition’s first operational systems.

Complement, rather than replace

Officials said the new initiative is intended to complement, rather than replace, existing national and multinational missile defense programs already operated or planned by participating countries.

“By bringing together our defense industrial base, our research, and our operational experience, we aim to build a shared anti-ballistic missile capacity for Europe,” the declaration stated.

The coalition also emphasized Ukraine’s battlefield experience gained during its defense against Russia’s invasion, describing Kyiv’s operational knowledge as a valuable contribution to the project.

“We acknowledge the unique experience of Ukraine, gained in defense against Russia’s war of aggression,” the statement said.

Beyond missile interception capabilities, participating countries agreed to explore joint research and development projects, expanded funding mechanisms, enhanced defense industrial collaboration and improved sharing of defense-related information and operational data.

The founding members said the coalition would remain open to additional countries that share its objectives and are willing to contribute to the development of a common European missile defense capability.

The announcement comes as European governments continue to increase defense spending and deepen military cooperation in response to heightened security challenges across the continent, with missile defense emerging as a key priority for NATO members and partner countries.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

C

hina has successfully recovered the first-stage booster of an orbital launch vehicle for the first time, marking a significant advance in its efforts to develop reusable rocket technology and narrow the gap with the United States in commercial and strategic space capabilities.

The breakthrough came during the launch of the Long March-10B rocket from the Wenchang Spacecraft Launch Site on Hainan Island on Friday. According to Chinese state broadcaster CCTV, the rocket’s first-stage booster separated approximately six minutes after liftoff before returning to a floating platform, where it executed a controlled vertical landing.

Video released by state media showed the booster descending under powered flight and touching down on the offshore platform, with smoke visible near its upper section during the landing.

The mission also successfully placed a satellite into orbit, state media reported.

Historic breakthrough

China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), the state-owned company that developed the rocket, described the achievement as a “historic breakthrough” for the country’s reusable launch technology.

“This mission signifies a historic breakthrough in China’s reusable rocket technology and lays a solid foundation for accelerating improvements in China’s space access capabilities,” the company said in a statement.

The successful recovery represents a key step in Beijing’s broader ambition to become a leading space power while reducing the cost and turnaround time of future launches.

Reusable rockets have transformed the commercial launch industry by allowing expensive boosters to be recovered and flown multiple times, significantly lowering launch costs. The technology has become a cornerstone of U.S.-based SpaceX’s dominance of the global launch market after the company pioneered routine booster landings nearly a decade ago.

Blue Origin, another American space company, also achieved its first successful recovery of the New Glenn rocket’s first-stage booster last November.

Reusable rocket tests

China has intensified efforts to develop comparable capabilities through both its state-backed aerospace program and an expanding commercial space sector. Several Chinese companies have conducted reusable rocket tests in recent months, although earlier attempts experienced setbacks.

The Long March-10 series is expected to play a central role in China’s long-term space ambitions, including planned crewed missions to the Moon. Chinese authorities have identified reusable launch systems as a strategic priority for strengthening the country’s access to space and supporting future satellite, exploration and defense-related missions.

(Source: CNN)

I

ran launched a new wave of missile and drone attacks against U.S.-linked military installations across the Gulf on Sunday, targeting sites in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan and Oman after the United States carried out another round of strikes on Iranian military infrastructure.

The latest exchange marks a significant escalation in the conflict, with both sides intensifying military operations despite previous diplomatic efforts to contain hostilities.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it had entered the fifth phase of its retaliatory campaign, claiming missile and drone strikes against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain and radar installations in Oman.

The IRGC said it targeted military infrastructure in Juffair, Bahrain, as well as long-range aerial surveillance and vessel-detection radar systems in Oman, claiming the radar facilities were destroyed.

It warned that continued U.S. military operations in the Strait of Hormuz would further disrupt global energy markets.

“The only way to open the Strait of Hormuz to vessel traffic is to end the interventions of the aggressive U.S. military in this strait and respect the sovereignty of countries over their own coastal waters,” the IRGC said.

Earlier, Iranian forces claimed they struck a U.S. missile base in Kuwait, saying two HIMARS launchers and missile storage facilities were destroyed.

Iran also said it targeted military sites in Jordan, including Prince Hassan Air Base, although Jordan said its air defenses intercepted four missiles that entered its airspace.

US expands strikes across southern Iran

The latest Iranian attacks followed a new wave of U.S. air and naval strikes against dozens of military targets across southern Iran.

According to the U.S. military, the operation targeted air defense systems, coastal radar installations, missile and drone facilities, naval assets and other military infrastructure.

Iranian media reported explosions in Bandar Abbas, Qeshm Island, Sirik and Jask along the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz, as well as several locations in Khuzestan province.

Authorities also reported that at least one civilian was killed and four others injured after a U.S. strike hit an agricultural water pumping station near Mahshahr.

Following Iran’s retaliation, several Gulf countries activated emergency measures.

Bahrain’s Interior Ministry urged residents to seek shelter and avoid open areas as air defense systems responded to incoming threats.

Kuwait’s military announced that its air defenses had engaged “hostile aerial targets,” while authorities advised residents not to panic if they heard explosions resulting from interception operations.

Jordan confirmed intercepting four missiles launched from Iranian territory before they reached their intended targets.

Strait of Hormuz tensions fuel oil market concerns

The renewed fighting has heightened fears over the security of the Strait of Hormuz, a maritime corridor through which roughly one-fifth of global oil shipments normally pass.

Brent crude prices climbed above $79 per barrel as traders reacted to the increased risk of prolonged disruption to global energy supplies.

Analysts warned that depleted global oil inventories leave markets more vulnerable to sustained conflict than during previous crises.

While both Washington and Tehran continue to exchange military strikes, experts suggest neither side is likely to seek a prolonged war due to the potentially severe economic consequences, particularly for global energy markets and regional stability.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

T

he United States and Iran exchanged another round of military strikes on Thursday, sharply escalating tensions in the Gulf and raising fresh concerns over the stability of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global energy corridor.

The latest escalation came after U.S. forces launched a second wave of attacks against Iranian military infrastructure overnight, with Washington saying the operation was intended to safeguard freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz following Iranian attacks on commercial shipping.

Iran responded hours later by launching missile and drone strikes against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, marking another direct exchange between the two countries despite previous diplomatic efforts to halt the conflict.

The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) said its latest operation struck approximately 90 military targets across Iran, including air defense systems, coastal surveillance installations, missile and drone storage sites, naval assets and military logistics infrastructure along Iran’s southern coastline.

The strikes followed an earlier round of attacks this week in which U.S. forces targeted more than 80 Iranian military sites.

Speaking to reporters while returning from the NATO summit in Türkiye, U.S. President Donald Trump defended the operation, describing it as retaliation for Iran’s attacks on commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

“We just hit them very hard,” Trump said. “Every time they hit us, we’re going to hit them 20.”

Earlier, Trump declared that the interim agreement intended to halt fighting between Washington and Tehran was effectively “over.”

Iran retaliates against US bases

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced that it had carried out strikes against U.S. military positions in Bahrain and Kuwait in response to the American attacks.

The Guards warned that further retaliation would follow if the United States launched additional strikes against Iranian territory.

Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf said the Strait of Hormuz would operate only under what he described as “Iranian arrangements,” adding that U.S. “bullying and breaking its commitments no longer come without a cost.”

Iranian state media reported that three people were killed and several others injured in U.S. strikes near Ahvaz in southwestern Iran.

Multiple locations along Iran’s southern coast were reportedly hit, including Bandar Abbas, home to Iran’s largest commercial port and major naval facilities belonging to both the Iranian Navy and the Revolutionary Guards.

Additional strikes were reported in Konarak, Chabahar and Iranshahr, where a firefighter was killed during an attack on the city’s airport. Iranian media also reported damage to a railway bridge near Aqqala in northern Iran.

Oil prices climb

Global oil prices rose as markets reacted to renewed fighting and concerns that continued hostilities could threaten shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies normally pass.

Brent crude futures rose more than 1% to nearly $79 per barrel, while U.S. West Texas Intermediate crude also gained more than 1%.

The latest exchange follows a familiar pattern seen during previous rounds of fighting, with Iranian attacks on commercial shipping followed by U.S. military retaliation and subsequent Iranian strikes on American military facilities in the Gulf.

Despite the escalating military exchanges, analysts say both sides may still be seeking to strengthen their negotiating positions while avoiding a broader regional war, although the collapse of the interim agreement has significantly reduced prospects for an immediate diplomatic breakthrough.

(Source: Reuters)

P

resident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said NATO must evolve into an alliance that strengthens its members rather than creating dependency, as Türkiye concluded its hosting of the 36th NATO Summit with calls for greater burden-sharing, stronger defense industrial cooperation and renewed diplomatic efforts to address global conflicts.

Speaking at a press conference following the two-day summit at the Presidential Complex in Ankara on Wednesday, Erdoğan said the meeting marked a significant step toward building a stronger alliance at a time when Euro-Atlantic security faces unprecedented challenges.

“NATO should be an alliance of allies that strengthen one another, not one of countries dependent on each other,” Erdoğan said, arguing that genuine deterrence depends not only on defense spending but also on technological superiority, industrial capacity and sustainable military production.

The summit, the first NATO leaders’ meeting ever held in Ankara and Türkiye’s second time hosting the alliance after more than two decades, brought together heads of state and government from all member countries.

Erdoğan said allied leaders agreed on the need for European members to assume greater responsibility for collective defense while maintaining fair burden-sharing within the alliance.

“We have laid the foundations for a stronger NATO in which European allies undertake greater responsibility and military capabilities are reinforced through equitable burden-sharing,” he said.

Türkiye highlights military contributions

The Turkish president stressed that Türkiye has become one of NATO’s leading military contributors after decades of confronting regional conflicts and terrorism largely on its own.

He noted that Türkiye commands NATO’s second-largest land army and has safeguarded the alliance’s southeastern flank for decades while making substantial contributions to NATO missions, operations and common funding.

Erdoğan announced that Turkish F-16 fighter jets will deploy to Estonia beginning in August as part of NATO’s Air Policing mission.

He also said Türkiye will continue commanding the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) until September 2026 and will assume command of the NATO Response Force during 2028-2029.

“Türkiye has always fulfilled its responsibilities within the alliance, taking risks and paying the price when necessary,” Erdoğan said.

Defense industry emphasized

A central theme of Erdoğan’s remarks was Türkiye’s growing defense industry, one of the country’s key strategic advantages.

He said Türkiye now manufactures its own fighter aircraft, tanks, warships and air defense systems while ranking among the world’s leading producers of unmanned aerial and naval vehicles.

“True deterrence comes from three dimensions: advanced technology, sufficient scale and sustainable production,” Erdoğan said.

He welcomed the adoption of the “Ankara Strategy” during the NATO Defense Industry Forum, saying it would strengthen cooperation between NATO and defense manufacturers.

Erdoğan also renewed calls for the removal of remaining restrictions on defense trade among allies and argued that European Union defense initiatives should complement NATO rather than duplicate its efforts.

He warned that excluding non-EU allies such as Türkiye from European defense projects would limit their effectiveness.

Ukraine, Middle East discussed

The summit also addressed ongoing security crises, including Russia’s war in Ukraine and instability across the Middle East.

Erdoğan reiterated Türkiye’s offer to facilitate renewed peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine.

“The war has become a machine of destruction that claims tens of thousands of casualties every month,” he said. “There are no losers in a just peace.”

Turning to the Middle East, Erdoğan welcomed the Islamabad Agreement, which Türkiye has supported, while expressing concern over continued violence in Lebanon and Gaza.

He said attacks in Lebanon have displaced civilians and destroyed cities, while the humanitarian crisis in Gaza continues.

“There is no room in our region for new tensions or new conflicts,” Erdoğan said. “Humanity needs peace, stability and security.”

N

ATO leaders gathered in Ankara on Wednesday for the second day of a high-stakes summit dominated by renewed military tensions between the United States and Iran, the ongoing war in Ukraine, and growing debates over defense spending and alliance unity.

The summit, hosted by Türkiye, was expected to focus primarily on strengthening NATO’s collective defense capabilities. However, fresh military exchanges in the Middle East quickly shifted attention toward regional security and the risk of a broader conflict.

The United States launched new strikes against Iranian targets overnight, saying the attacks were a response to Iranian assaults on commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Iran retaliated by launching missiles and drones at U.S. military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, marking the most significant escalation since the two countries reached a preliminary ceasefire agreement last month.

Speaking alongside NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte before the main summit session, U.S. President Donald Trump declared that the interim understanding with Tehran was effectively finished.

Defense spending remained another major issue throughout the summit. Rutte praised Trump’s long-standing pressure on allies to increase military expenditures, arguing that recent commitments represented a significant transformation in European defense policy.

“When you have achieved this, this is a huge win,” Rutte said, noting that European allies and Canada had dramatically increased investments in military capabilities over recent years.

Trump nevertheless criticized several NATO members, reserving particularly strong criticism for Spain, which he accused of failing to contribute adequately to the alliance. He even suggested ending trade with Spain, calling it “a terrible partner in NATO.”

Ukraine on the Agenda

Meanwhile, Ukraine remained high on the summit agenda as Russia continued large-scale attacks across the country.

According to Ukrainian officials, Russia launched another overnight assault involving missiles and drones, highlighting Kyiv’s continued need for advanced air defense systems. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy urged NATO partners to accelerate military assistance, particularly in strengthening Ukraine’s ability to intercept cruise missiles and other aerial threats.

Russia, for its part, reported intercepting hundreds of Ukrainian drones overnight while accusing Kyiv of attacking energy infrastructure deep inside Russian territory, including oil refineries and fuel facilities.

The renewed violence reinforced concerns that diplomatic efforts to end the more than four-year war have stalled despite repeated international mediation attempts.

A comprehensive 360-degree security approach

Beyond immediate military challenges, NATO leaders also discussed the alliance’s long-term strategy. Türkiye emphasized the importance of maintaining a comprehensive 360-degree security approach that addresses threats on both NATO’s eastern and southern flanks while strengthening cooperation on cyber security, infrastructure protection, and defense industrial production.

Alliance officials stressed that military readiness now extends beyond traditional armed forces and includes resilient supply chains, secure communications, and the ability to counter cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.

The deteriorating security situation in both Eastern Europe and the Middle East has underscored NATO’s growing challenge of responding simultaneously to multiple crises while maintaining unity among its members.

As discussions continued behind closed doors, leaders faced mounting pressure to produce concrete commitments on defense capabilities, support for Ukraine, and coordinated responses to instability in the Middle East.

With tensions rising on several fronts, the Ankara summit is expected to shape NATO’s strategic priorities for the coming years, testing the alliance’s ability to balance collective defense, crisis management, and political cohesion in an increasingly uncertain global security environment.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

T

he United States and Iran exchanged their heaviest military strikes since last month’s ceasefire on Wednesday, raising fears that the fragile truce between the two longtime adversaries has effectively collapsed as President Donald Trump declared the interim agreement with Tehran was “over.”

The renewed escalation unfolded as NATO leaders gathered in Ankara, where Trump confirmed that Washington had resumed military operations against Iran following what U.S. officials described as Iranian attacks on commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

According to the United States, the latest strikes were launched in response to Iranian attacks on three commercial vessels transiting the strategic waterway, one of the world’s most important oil shipping routes.

Iran responded by announcing missile and drone strikes against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait, marking one of the most significant direct confrontations between the two countries since fighting resumed.

The exchange represents the most serious breach of the preliminary ceasefire reached last month following weeks of conflict and negotiations mediated by regional partners.

“I think it’s over”

Speaking alongside NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on the sidelines of the alliance summit, Trump signaled that Washington no longer viewed the interim memorandum of understanding with Tehran as viable.

“I think it’s over,” Trump told reporters when asked about the agreement that had temporarily halted fighting.

The U.S. president also dismissed prospects for renewed engagement with Iran, saying he no longer wished to negotiate with Iranian leaders, whom he described as “sick people.”

His remarks suggested the diplomatic process that had accompanied the ceasefire has effectively broken down, even as military exchanges continue to intensify.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry accused Washington of undermining the agreement through both military action and economic pressure.

In a statement released Wednesday, Tehran said recent U.S. airstrikes, together with Washington’s decision to revoke Iran’s oil sales license, had rendered key parts of the ceasefire arrangement “ineffective.”

Iran also accused the United States of interfering with maritime arrangements governing passage through the Strait of Hormuz, arguing that such actions had made implementation of the truce increasingly impossible.

The ministry warned neighboring countries hosting U.S. military forces not to allow their territories to be used for further American attacks against Iran, an apparent reference to Gulf states including Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

The warning followed Iran’s announcement that it had launched missiles and drones against U.S. military targets in Bahrain and Kuwait earlier in the day.

Iran’s Revolutionary Guards also reported that one member of its naval forces had been killed while confronting U.S. drones near the southern port of Mashahr.

The latest military exchanges have raised concerns that the conflict could once again spread across the wider Gulf region, threatening global energy supplies and commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil exports.

Regional tensions grow as aviation warning expanded

The renewed fighting has already prompted international aviation authorities to strengthen safety warnings across the Middle East.

The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) announced that commercial airlines should avoid operating within both Iranian and Iraqi airspace because of the heightened risk of military activity.

The updated advisory remains in effect until August 31 and replaces an earlier warning that had also covered Lebanese airspace.

EASA continues to advise airlines to exercise caution when operating near Bahrain, Kuwait, Israel, Jordan, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates because of the potential for further military escalation.

The deteriorating security situation overshadowed discussions at the NATO summit in Ankara, where alliance leaders were expected to focus on defense spending, regional security and support for Ukraine.

Instead, much of the attention shifted to Trump’s remarks on Iran and his broader comments on NATO allies.

Criticism against Spain

The U.S. president also launched a sharp attack on Spain, accusing Madrid of failing to meet its defense commitments within NATO.

Trump said he had instructed Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent to halt all trade with Spain, calling the country “a terrible partner” in the alliance.

“I don’t want anything to do with Spain,” Trump told reporters.

He also criticized NATO over Greenland, renewing longstanding complaints about the Arctic territory and alliance burden-sharing.

The renewed conflict between Washington and Tehran comes after weeks of fragile diplomacy aimed at preventing another prolonged regional war.

Although the interim agreement had reduced direct military confrontation, tensions remained high over Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions, maritime security and regional influence.

With both sides exchanging military attacks and publicly questioning the viability of previous agreements, regional governments are increasingly concerned that the Gulf could once again become the center of a wider confrontation involving U.S. forces and Iranian-backed groups.

The latest developments also place additional pressure on NATO leaders meeting in Ankara, many of whom have emphasized the importance of preventing further instability in the Middle East while maintaining freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz.

As military operations continue and diplomatic rhetoric hardens, the future of any negotiated settlement between Washington and Tehran appears increasingly uncertain.

(Source: Reuters)

F

ollowing approximately 100 days of tension, Iran and the US announced on Sunday 14 June that they had reached an agreement on a memorandum of understanding. On 17 June, the text of the 14-point memorandum of understanding was signed by US President Donald Trump and Iranian President Mesud Pezeşkiyan. Thus, an agreement has been reached that will launch a 60-day negotiation process between the two countries. The final outcome will be determined by the agreement reached at the conclusion of these 60 days of negotiations. From this perspective, it is fair to say that the current memorandum of understanding serves as a sort of ‘goodwill document’ to initiate the negotiation process between the two countries. This document also serves as a guide regarding the issues to be addressed during the negotiation process. In this context, it is worth examining in detail the matters covered by the Memorandum of Understanding.

Matters covered by the memorandum of understanding

The provisions set out in the 14-article Memorandum of Understanding are broadly divided into two categories. Some of these are provisions that come into force upon the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, whilst others are provisions expected to come into force subject to the outcome of the 60-day negotiations.

Accordingly, Articles 1, 4, 5, 10 and 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding cover the matters that come into force upon its signing. Article 1 stipulates that the US, Iran and their allies must immediately and permanently cease hostilities on all fronts where tensions persist, particularly in Lebanon. This article also emphasises that the parties shall henceforth refrain from initiating war or military operations against one another, shall not issue threats, and that Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity shall be guaranteed. Consequently, the implementation of this article extends not only to the US and Iran but also to Israel and Hezbollah. Indeed, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi stated in a statement that one party to the agreement consists of the US and Israel, whilst the other comprises Iran and Hezbollah. From this perspective, any potential conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is of critical importance. Given Israel’s statements that it will not withdraw from the territories it occupies in Lebanon, it is clear that this provision is also one of the factors rendering the agreement fragile.

Another important issue—the keeping of the Strait of Hormuz open and the regulation of transit—is addressed in Articles 4 and 5 of the Memorandum of Understanding. Accordingly, the US will lift its naval blockade against Iran within 30 days, commencing immediately after the signing of the agreement. In return, Iran will ensure that traffic through the Strait of Hormuz returns to pre-war levels within 30 days. It has been stated that Iran will not charge fees to ships transiting through the Strait of Hormuz for a period of 60 days. Once the 60-day period has ended, it is envisaged that Iran will reach an agreement with Gulf states, primarily Oman, regarding transit arrangements. It has also been stated that the US will withdraw its troops from the vicinity of Iran. According to statements by US officials, this does not imply that the US will withdraw from its bases in the region; rather, it refers to the restoration of the US military presence to its pre-war status.

Iran’s frozen assets

Another issue expected to be implemented following the signing of the memorandum of understanding concerns Iran’s frozen assets and restrictions on its oil sales. Under Articles 10 and 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding, the US Department of the Treasury will issue the necessary authorizations regarding Iran’s oil sales and related insurance, transport and banking transactions, which will remain in force until sanctions are lifted. In addition, Iran’s frozen assets will be released. The details regarding the implementation of these articles will be determined during the negotiation process.

In addition to the provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding that come into force upon signature, there are also provisions that will come into force with the final agreement, which is expected to be signed following 60 days of negotiations. These provisions cover more fundamental issues than those that come into force upon the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding and require detailed technical information.

The sanctions imposed on Iran in connection with its nuclear program also constitute one of the provisions contained in the Memorandum of Understanding. The sanctions are addressed in Articles 6 and 7 of the Memorandum of Understanding. Accordingly, all sanctions imposed on Iran – primarily those enacted through United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and those unilaterally imposed by the US – will be lifted. In addition, the US will plan an investment program worth at least 300 billion dollars, with the assistance of its regional allies, to support Iran’s economic development. The program will operate entirely under US supervision. It is stated that this program has been established by the US as an alternative to Iran’s claim for war reparations. [OO1] The implementation of the program is contingent upon a final agreement following the negotiations. The issue of sanctions, meanwhile, constitutes one of the first matters to be addressed upon the commencement of negotiations.

An examination of the articles of the Memorandum of Understanding reveals that, alongside operational provisions, there are also articles containing general provisions. For example, Article 2 of the Memorandum emphasizes that Iran and the US shall respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and shall not interfere in each other’s internal affairs.

Finally, Articles 12, 13 and 14 regulate the operation of the Memorandum of Understanding. According to these articles, a mechanism will be established to monitor the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding. Once the provisions set out in Articles 1, 4, 5, 10 and 11 of the Memorandum of Understanding have entered into force, the two parties will commence 60 days of negotiations. The final agreement reached following the 60-day negotiations will also be confirmed by a UN Security Council resolution.

Risks and opportunities

One of the most significant aspects envisaged by the Memorandum of Understanding concerns Lebanon. Accordingly, it provides for an immediate cessation of hostilities in Lebanon and guarantees of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, Israel has stated that it will not withdraw from the territories it occupies in Lebanon; not content with this, it has also launched attacks on Lebanese territory following the announcement that an agreement had been reached between Iran and the US. Similarly, the memorandum of understanding signed between Iran and the US has drawn predominantly negative reactions from within Israeli domestic politics.

Channel 14, based in Israel and a staunch supporter of Netanyahu, has levelled harsh criticism at Trump over the signed memorandum of understanding. This situation has prompted a reaction from US Vice-President JD Vance. Consequently, it is evident that the memorandum of understanding is highly fragile, given that Israel – one of its indirect parties – has adopted such an adversarial stance. However, as can be inferred from the reactions of Trump and his deputy Vance, the US administration appears determined to secure a final agreement. Yet, only time will tell whether this US determination will be sufficient to rein in Israel.

Another risk factor is the potential for new regulations governing transit through the Strait of Hormuz. According to the provision in the memorandum of understanding, Iran will temporarily allow transit through the Strait of Hormuz without charging any fees. However, once the 60-day period has expired, a new arrangement will be put in place in consultation with other Gulf states, primarily Oman. Indeed, Iran has previously held discussions with Oman on this matter. Iran maintains that transit through the Strait of Hormuz should be under the control of both Oman and Iran. In this regard, it proposes that a specific fee be charged in return for the service provided. Furthermore, Iran has raised the issue of distinguishing between military and civilian transit. Iran’s refusal to back down from these demands, coupled with the other side’s refusal to accept them, poses a risk to the negotiation process.

Although the signed memorandum of understanding contains elements of risk, it represents the highest-level interaction between the two countries since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. For the first time since then, the presidents of the two countries have signed a document aimed at securing peace. This not only signals the beginning of a new era but also demonstrates that 47 years of hostility have borne no fruit. The most concrete example of this is the tensions and conflicts that have arisen between the two sides over the past year. For this reason, the memorandum of understanding signed is more likely to evolve into a lasting agreement than previous ones.

Unlike other negotiations, the current talks are taking place against a backdrop where other options – primarily war – have already been tried alongside diplomacy. Given that war, as the most radical option, has proved fruitless, it is clear that the two sides have no alternative to diplomacy. Consequently, it is highly likely that the new process that has been initiated will result in peace. However, given that the negotiations leading to the KOEP lasted 18 months, it is clear that a 60-day period is not sufficient for a comprehensive agreement. It is therefore reasonable to assume that this period will be extended and that a longer-term process is on the cards.

(Originally published in Turkish by SETA Foundation)

R

ussia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has resulted in more than 2 million military casualties on both sides, making it one of the deadliest conflicts since the Second World War, according to a new study by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

The report estimates that Russia has suffered approximately 1.4 million casualties, including soldiers killed, wounded and missing, while Ukraine has endured between 525,000 and 625,000 casualties. Combined, the figures place the total human cost of the war above 2 million military casualties.

Researchers said Russia has lost around 450,000 troops killed, representing roughly 1% of the country’s population. Ukraine’s military fatalities were estimated at between 125,000 and 150,000.

Neither Moscow nor Kyiv regularly publishes official casualty figures, making independent verification difficult. However, the CSIS estimates broadly align with assessments previously released by Western governments and intelligence agencies.

The study, authored by Seth G. Jones and Riley McCabe, describes Russia’s losses as unprecedented in the post-World War II era.

“These rates are astounding,” the authors wrote, arguing that Russian fatalities in Ukraine now exceed the combined U.S. military deaths in all conflicts since World War II and are substantially higher than total Soviet and Russian military deaths across all wars during the same period.

According to the report, casualty rates have become increasingly uneven as the conflict has evolved.

During much of the war, Russian forces suffered approximately two to three casualties for every Ukrainian casualty. In the first half of 2026, however, researchers estimate the ratio has widened to nearly eight Russian casualties for every Ukrainian casualty.

The report attributes much of that shift to Ukraine’s expanding drone warfare capabilities.

Researchers said Kyiv has significantly enlarged what they describe as the battlefield “kill zone,” using drones to make it increasingly difficult for Russian forces to advance toward Ukrainian defensive positions.

“Ukraine’s defense-in-depth strategy has been effective in killing and wounding Russian soldiers, as well as limiting Russian maneuver,” the study concluded.

Recruitment challenges mount as battlefield losses increase

Beyond Ukraine’s technological improvements, the researchers identified several structural weaknesses contributing to Russia’s growing losses.

These include Moscow’s reliance on attrition warfare, shortcomings in combined-arms operations, poor tactical planning, inadequate troop training, corruption and declining morale among frontline forces.

The study also suggests Russia is no longer recruiting replacement soldiers at the same pace that it is sustaining battlefield losses, raising questions about the long-term sustainability of its military campaign.

The burden of casualties has fallen disproportionately on Russia’s poorer regions and ethnic minority communities, according to the report.

Researchers noted that economically disadvantaged regions have supplied a significant share of military recruits, with Russian independent media increasingly reporting that some remote villages have lost much of their male population during the conflict.

Although Russia has continued to mobilize volunteers through financial incentives and recruitment campaigns, the study argues that mounting casualties are placing increasing strain on the country’s manpower resources.

The report also highlights the broader historical significance of the conflict.

With military casualties now estimated to exceed 2 million, researchers said the war has likely surpassed the total casualties suffered during the Battle of Stalingrad, long regarded as one of history’s bloodiest battles.

The findings underscore the enormous human cost of a war that has entered its fifth year with no comprehensive peace agreement in sight. Despite repeated diplomatic initiatives, fighting continues across multiple fronts as both Russia and Ukraine seek military advantages while preparing for potential future negotiations.

The CSIS report concludes that although Ukraine continues to face severe military and humanitarian challenges, Russia is bearing increasingly heavy battlefield losses as technological changes, particularly the widespread use of drones, reshape the nature of modern warfare.

(Source: CNN)

T

aiwan has conducted its most comprehensive civil defense and wartime preparedness exercise to date, simulating a cascading national emergency that began with a Chinese blockade and earthquake before escalating into cyberattacks, sabotage, civil unrest and a full-scale military invasion. The drills, observed exclusively by Reuters, underscore Taipei’s growing efforts to strengthen national resilience as military pressure from China continues to intensify.

Held over two days in central Taiwan’s Nantou County, the exercise brought together more than 370 government officials, military officers and emergency responders. Organizers described the scenario as a realistic test of the island’s ability to maintain essential government functions during a complex, multi-dimensional crisis.

The exercise reflected President Lai Ching-te’s broader strategy to prepare Taiwan’s civilian institutions for conflict, drawing lessons from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, where attacks on civilian infrastructure, information warfare and prolonged disruptions have become defining features of modern warfare.

Officials participating in the drill confronted a rapidly deteriorating scenario beginning with a Chinese naval blockade coinciding with a magnitude 6.8 earthquake that killed dozens of people and damaged critical infrastructure. According to the exercise, Beijing exploited the natural disaster to launch cyberattacks, spread disinformation, hijack television broadcasts and sabotage key facilities before initiating a full-scale military assault.

Rare access to the closed-door exercise

Reuters, which was granted rare access to the closed-door exercise, reported that officials were required to coordinate responses across multiple agencies while simultaneously maintaining emergency services, public order and communications under wartime conditions.

“Our adversary is right on our doorstep, just across the Taiwan Strait. That is very close,” Chi Lien-cheng, Taiwan’s minister without portfolio overseeing the exercise, told Reuters.

“If you don’t defend your own country, who else will defend you?” he added, while acknowledging that Taiwan still faced significant shortcomings in resources and preparedness.

The drills represent a shift from Taiwan’s previous emergency exercises, which had often been criticized as overly scripted and symbolic. This year’s program was designed to expose weaknesses and force officials to make decisions under increasingly realistic battlefield conditions.

The first day focused on a lengthy tabletop simulation, while the second featured field exercises that included counter-drone operations, emergency food distribution and coordination between civilian authorities and military reserve forces.

One scenario involved a Chinese drone strike on the county’s emergency response headquarters, forcing officials to activate a backup command center after 75 personnel were declared missing.

Emergency responders also rehearsed protecting power stations, maintaining healthcare services and restoring communications while coping with widespread infrastructure failures.

Civil-military coordination takes center stage

A key objective of the exercise was strengthening cooperation between Taiwan’s civilian institutions and its armed forces.

Military reserve units coordinated directly with local governments, while officials monitored unfolding events through advanced tactical mapping systems and interactive digital platforms that tracked emergency resources in real time.

Lin Fei-fan, deputy secretary-general of Taiwan’s National Security Council, said demonstrating societal resilience was intended to strengthen deterrence against Beijing.

“The message to our adversary is clear: when they know Taiwan’s society is prepared, they will have to think very carefully about whether to launch such a costly war against Taiwan — one that may not succeed,” he said.

Taiwanese officials have increasingly argued that modern conflicts require not only military readiness but also the ability of civilian governments, businesses and communities to continue functioning during sustained attacks.

Lessons from Ukraine have featured prominently in Taiwan’s planning, particularly regarding the importance of decentralized command structures, resilient communications networks and maintaining essential public services.

This year’s drills included moving hospital operations underground, testing backup government facilities and inviting professional cybersecurity experts to attack official networks in simulated cyber warfare.

Participants also faced extensive information warfare scenarios.

In one simulation, local television broadcasts were replaced with Chinese propaganda while false information spread rapidly through social media and printed leaflets. Officials were required to identify disinformation, hold emergency press briefings and reassure the public.

Community leaders also took part in the training

Lee I-yuan, a 75-year-old borough chief who participated in the exercise, said the simulations highlighted the growing importance of combating false information during crises.

“If the other side attacks, they will definitely use AI to spread false information,” he said.

The drills assigned Nantou County, Taiwan’s only landlocked county, a strategic wartime role as a logistical rear base where civilians fleeing frontline regions could seek shelter while government agencies relocated critical operations inland.

Local officials were questioned extensively about emergency preparedness, including the availability of food supplies, infant formula, reserve manpower and medical resources.

Some participants struggled to answer detailed questions as commanders deliberately increased pressure throughout the exercise.

“We can’t actually put them through a real war, so we can only use scenarios to help them understand that war is extremely cruel — all situations will be severe and urgent,” one official involved in the exercise told Reuters.

China, which considers democratically governed Taiwan part of its territory, has never ruled out using force to achieve reunification.

While the resilience exercise concluded, Taiwan’s defense ministry reported that China had simultaneously conducted another combat readiness patrol around the island involving warships and at least 22 military aircraft, including nuclear-capable H-6 bombers.

Beijing accused President Lai of escalating tensions across the Taiwan Strait.

Chinese Foreign Ministry and Taiwan Affairs Office officials said Lai’s policies were increasing the risk of conflict, describing him as a “creator of crises” in cross-strait relations.

Taiwan rejects China’s sovereignty claims, insisting that only the island’s 23 million people can determine their future.

As military activity around Taiwan continues to increase, Taipei hopes its expanding civil defense program will strengthen national resilience while reinforcing its message that any attempt to seize the island by force would face not only military resistance but also a prepared and functioning civilian society.

(Source: Reuters)

G

erman federal prosecutors have charged a 50-year-old Ukrainian national with helping coordinate the 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines, marking the most significant legal step yet in one of Europe’s most consequential infrastructure attacks.

The suspect, identified only as Serhii K under German privacy laws, is accused of playing a leading role in the operation that destroyed the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 pipelines beneath the Baltic Sea, severing a major route for Russian natural gas exports to Europe months after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Federal prosecutors filed the indictment on Wednesday but declined to comment on its specific contents.

According to German public broadcaster ARD, Serhii K faces charges of attacking civilian energy infrastructure, causing explosions and destroying critical infrastructure.

The charges stem from an investigation into the September 2022 underwater blasts near Denmark’s Bornholm Island, which severely damaged both pipelines and disrupted Russian gas supplies to Europe during an already escalating energy crisis.

Court documents from December 2025 allege that Serhii K coordinated a team that used the sailing yacht Andromeda to transport explosives to the pipelines. Prosecutors claim he acted as the team’s on-board coordinator and operational leader rather than serving as a diver or explosives specialist.

The Berlin-based law firm Menaker, which represents the accused, has not commented publicly on the indictment.

German prosecutors confirmed that Serhii K is the same individual arrested in Italy in August 2025 following a German arrest warrant. Italy’s highest court later approved his extradition to Germany, where he was transferred in November 2025 to face investigation.

At the time of his arrest, German authorities alleged that the suspect had used forged identity documents to charter the Andromeda in the northern German port of Rostock before the vessel departed on the mission that investigators believe culminated in the sabotage operation.

Serhii K has denied any involvement in the explosions. His defense has maintained that he was serving with the Ukrainian armed forces and was inside Ukraine when the attacks occurred. His lawyers have argued that, even if military service were established, he would be entitled to what they describe as “functional immunity” under international law.

Ukraine denies involvement as investigation continues

The Nord Stream explosions remain among the most politically sensitive investigations in Europe, given their impact on regional energy security and the absence of any formal attribution of responsibility nearly four years after the attack.

Ukraine has consistently denied any state involvement in the sabotage or knowledge of any plot targeting the pipelines.

Speaking at a news conference in Dublin on Wednesday, Volodymyr Zelenskyy said it was too early to comment on the German indictment because Kyiv had not officially received details of the case.

“We have not officially received any details; at least I have not seen them,” Zelenskyy said, adding that it was premature to draw conclusions.

The twin Nord Stream pipelines, running beneath the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany, had been central to Russian gas exports to Europe before relations between Moscow and the West deteriorated sharply following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Although Nord Stream 2 had never entered commercial operation, both pipelines were rendered inoperable by the explosions, eliminating a key component of Europe’s energy infrastructure.

The investigation has involved authorities from Germany, Denmark and Sweden, with investigators examining evidence including vessel movements, explosive residue and maritime records.

The indictment represents the first formal criminal case brought by German prosecutors against an individual alleged to have participated directly in the sabotage. However, investigators have not publicly alleged that the Ukrainian government authorized or directed the operation.

The case is expected to proceed through Germany’s federal court system, where prosecutors will seek to prove that Serhii K coordinated the team responsible for carrying out one of the most significant attacks on critical energy infrastructure in recent European history.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

P

resident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said the upcoming NATO Leaders’ Summit in Ankara will serve as the strongest platform for sharing experience among allies, while urging greater solidarity within the alliance to address growing regional and global security challenges.

Speaking at the NATO Parliamentary Summit in Istanbul on Monday, Erdoğan said the alliance faces a historic turning point as wars, terrorism, irregular migration and geopolitical instability reshape the Euro-Atlantic security environment.

“It is my belief that the Ankara Summit will be the strongest platform for sharing experience,” Erdoğan said, referring to the NATO Heads of State and Government Summit scheduled to take place in the Turkish capital on July 7-8.

Addressing parliamentary representatives from NATO member states, Erdoğan said the Istanbul meeting carried added significance ahead of the leaders’ summit and thanked participants for contributing to cooperation among allied legislatures.

Global security environment changing rapidly

Erdoğan said traditional assumptions about international security were no longer sufficient to explain today’s rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape.

“Europe-Atlantic security is passing through a historic turning point,” he said, pointing to conflicts, regional crises, terrorism and irregular migration along NATO’s eastern and southeastern borders.

He argued that growing instability had replaced predictability in international affairs and warned that existing international institutions had suffered a loss of credibility in the face of recent conflicts.

Referring to developments in Gaza and Lebanon, Erdoğan said recent massacres had left deep scars on humanity’s conscience while undermining confidence in international organizations.

“In this environment, preserving NATO’s deterrence and strengthening solidarity among allies has become even more critical,” he said.

The Turkish president stressed that Türkiye remains one of NATO’s leading contributors, citing its strategic location, military capabilities and more than seven decades of participation in the alliance.

Sharing borders stretching more than 1,800 kilometers with conflict regions, Türkiye continues to play an active role in NATO missions and peacekeeping operations while sharing its experience in crisis management with allies, he added.

Erdoğan said international interest in the Ankara summit extends well beyond NATO member states.

“Our fundamental expectation from the summit is to achieve outcomes that strengthen the spirit of alliance while respecting the national security sensitivities of all allies,” he said.

Defense cooperation and regional diplomacy

Erdoğan also called for a fairer sharing of defense responsibilities within NATO and urged the removal of barriers affecting defense industry cooperation among allies.

“If we want to confront today’s challenges successfully, we must ensure balanced burden-sharing while removing obstacles to defense industry trade,” he said.

He noted that Türkiye continues to increase defense spending in line with commitments adopted at the recent NATO summit in The Hague and remains among the alliance’s five largest contributors to NATO missions and operations.

Despite these contributions, Erdoğan argued that Türkiye’s role in European security is sometimes overlooked.

He called for Ankara’s inclusion in European Union defense and security initiatives, saying Türkiye’s defense capabilities should not be excluded because of narrow political considerations.

“We must establish a security and defense network stretching from Texas to Ankara without reservations or conditions,” he said.

The president said the Ankara summit would place particular emphasis on defense industry cooperation through a NATO Defense Industry Forum, where Türkiye plans to showcase its latest defense technologies and discuss measures to deepen industrial collaboration among allies.

Participants would also review key regional and international developments, including the situations in Ukraine, Iran, the Gulf region and Palestine, he said.

Erdoğan reaffirmed Türkiye’s commitment to supporting efforts aimed at turning the ceasefire between the United States and Iran into a lasting settlement, saying Ankara would continue working alongside Pakistan, Qatar and other friendly countries.

Turning to Palestine, Erdoğan said lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved without ending the Israeli occupation and establishing an independent Palestinian state.

“An independent, sovereign and territorially contiguous Palestinian state within the 1967 borders must be established,” he said.

He also warned against actions that could undermine regional stability, particularly attacks targeting Lebanon, and urged NATO parliamentarians to support efforts aimed at preventing further escalation.

Erdoğan reiterated Türkiye’s readiness to continue mediating efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine war through dialogue, saying Ankara remains one of the few allies trusted by both sides.

“As a country that can speak with both parties and has initiated successful diplomatic processes, we will continue to contribute actively to peace efforts,” he said.

The event concluded with a family photograph hosted by Turkish Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş as part of the NATO Parliamentary Summit in Istanbul.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

R

ecent legislative amendments have brought about changes to the structure of the National Security Council in Turkey, which has played a decisive role in domestic politics throughout the history of the Republic. With the establishment of the Directorates of Internal Security Research and Assessment, External Security Research and Assessment, and Defense Planning Coordination, the expanding nature of security in the global arena has been taken into account. Furthermore, such an expansion should also be viewed as a consequence of Turkey’s changing foreign policy and geopolitical perceptions.

President Erdoğan delivered a speech highlighting key points at the opening of the National Security Conferences, a series planned to articulate Turkey’s approach to security. Alongside an emphasis on historical state tradition, the speech drew attention to the harmonious coordination between Turkey’s institutions in the face of the region’s ongoing and seemingly endless ‘ring of fire’, whilst also heralding the National Security Council’s return to its core remit. In light of the reforms implemented and this announcement, it is worth asking whether there has been a shift in Turkey’s security culture alongside its evolving foreign policy approach.

The relationship between foreign policy and security culture

Security culture is a concept frequently used in the study of International Relations (IR). In this context, it is defined as the totality of norms that shape how a state or society perceives security, defines threats and formulates responses to the security challenges it faces. Security culture, centered on the perception of threats, helps us understand what a state regards as a threat, or which policies it views as such, and, in parallel, the values by which it defines itself and the historical memory through which it does so. At the same time, the behavioral framework that develops through these elements forms a state’s established code of conduct in the international arena.

Consequently, the perception of security becomes a concept directly linked to foreign policy as a natural outcome of these definitions and perceptions. For when a state’s strategic mindset and self-definition change as a product of an internal process, foreign policy is naturally updated, which in turn implies a shift in the reference points of the security narrative. Just as a definition of interests, resulting from a protectionist mindset and a narrow geopolitical narrative, reflects a limited context, such a narrative also leads to the perception of security threats being viewed from a considerably broader perspective.

What is Turkey’s security culture?

The most fundamental element shaping Turkey’s security culture has been the identity redefined alongside the establishment of the state. With the acceptance of a Western identity as the cornerstone of the state, foreign policy was entirely shaped by a Western geopolitical narrative, and security culture was naturally shaped by the perception of areas outside the West as sources of threat. Paradoxically, despite waging war against the West, Turkey has constructed its security culture on a plane identical to that of the West, defined its perception of threat as originating from outside the West, and sought to meet its security needs through Western organizations or alliances.

Historical experiences inherited from the Ottoman Empire led to the new state being security-focused; the new Republic, through discourses on national sovereignty, territorial integrity and the unity of the state, necessitated a strong state structure. This, in turn, led to Turkey’s security culture becoming state-centered, and institutions have largely defined their roles as significant power factors in domestic politics by relying on this discourse.

The Middle East and the Caucasus represented the core regions perceived as threats by this security culture; the attempt to demonize Islam, the Kurdish issue and the identities defined through these factors were framed as problems for Turkey. As a result of the geopolitical narrative reflecting a narrow hinterland, distant regions did not even fall within the scope of this security culture. Consequently, Turkey’s security culture has reflected a framework synonymous with the West and its interests; adherence to the NATO concept, both during and after the Cold War, has been Ankara’s foremost priority.

The shift in the security paradigm

Since 2002, the changes in Turkish foreign policy have naturally led to a shift in the security paradigm, as they also signified a significant transformation of identity. Firstly, the norms guiding foreign policy have diverged, and Turkey has begun to perceive its historical ties not as a threat but as a source of strength. A foreign policy approach has begun to prevail in which Turkey defines itself through an identity that, without disregarding Western values, places greater emphasis on its own identity elements, an identity that, in the simplest terms, can be expressed by the concept of our ‘heartland’. In parallel with this shift in self-definition, the definitions of interests and threats have changed, and the geopolitical perspective has expanded from a framework confined to the West to encompass a much broader geography stretching as far as Africa, Asia and the Americas.

So, what has changed in Turkey’s security culture? First and foremost, Turkey has become a country that understands very clearly that it must ensure its own security. In particular, the situation into which European states have fallen following the war in Ukraine continues to be discussed as an example illustrating just how accurately Ankara has assessed the situation. In this respect, from its very inception, Turkey has moved away from relying on international coalitions and policies dictated by them, and has begun to define its own security framework. In the words of Erdoğan, Turkey has shattered the glass ceiling over it and has transformed into an actor capable of redefining concepts at a regional level, writing its own narrative and shaping its own future. This situation has been interpreted as a reflection of self-confidence; by enhancing its own capabilities, Turkey has been able to devise solutions through its own policies whenever it perceives a threat to its security.

Regions where the traditional security culture held a perception of security threats have largely come to be viewed as areas for cooperation; security has been perceived not merely as a need secured by closing oneself off within borders, but rather as synonymous with taking proactive action. Security has been linked to the deepening of relations and increased mutual interdependence; where security vulnerabilities have arisen as a result of this approach, necessary measures have been taken to expand security boundaries. In this context, cross-border operations have constituted one of the most significant indicators of the shift in Turkey’s security paradigm. Consequently, security boundaries have been expanded, and Turkey has risen to the status of a state capable of implementing its own policies, demonstrating that security can also be ensured through new points established beyond its borders. Furthermore, it is a fact that, in line with Turkey’s evolving and expanding geopolitical understanding, the country now maintains military bases in many countries.

T

he official visit to Türkiye by Niger’s President Abdourahamane Tchiani, at the invitation of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, marks a new strategic milestone in relations between Ankara and Niamey. The fact that Tchiani was accompanied during his visit by a large delegation, including the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, energy, mining, the economy, agriculture and trade, demonstrates that relations between the two countries are progressing on the basis of multi-dimensional cooperation spanning from security to energy, and from trade to institutional capacity-building. For this reason, the visit should be assessed not merely as a routine diplomatic engagement between the two countries, but within the context of shifting power balances in the Sahel and Niger’s quest to diversify its external partnerships.

According to a statement from the Communications Directorate of Türkiye, following the meetings between President Erdoğan and Tchiani at the Presidential Complex in Ankara, three agreements and a joint declaration were signed between Türkiye and Niger in the fields of education, health, trade and diplomacy. Within this framework, a protocol regarding the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation in higher education for the period 2026–2030, a joint declaration on the establishment of the Economic and Trade Partnership Commission (JETCO), a protocol on the joint operation and handover of the Niger-Türkiye Friendship Hospital, and a memorandum of understanding between the Diplomacy Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye and the National Institute for Diplomatic and Strategic Studies of the Republic of Niger.

To interpret the cooperation that has developed between Türkiye and Niger in recent years solely as a result of current security and economic needs would be an oversimplification. Relations between the two countries are based on a multidimensional cooperation where historical heritage, the pursuit of mutual trust and a shared strategic vision for the future intersect. The ties between the two countries stretch back to the cultural, political and strategic influence of the Ottoman Empire in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in Niger, during the 16th century. The relationships based on mutual trust that the Ottoman Empire established with local communities in the region, such as the Tebu and Tuareg peoples, who came under its administration, have left a historical legacy that continues to foster a positive perception of Türkiye in Niger.

Türkiye’s Africa policy

This historical legacy of the Ottomans gained further significance following Ankara’s institutionalization of its Africa policy through the ‘Action Plan for Opening Up to Africa’, launched by Türkiye in 1998. This process of opening up paved the way for diplomatic contacts with Niger to gain momentum from the 2000s onwards. The mutual opening of embassies by Türkiye and Niger in 2012, and the official visit to Niger by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in his capacity as Prime Minister in 2013, marked the beginning of a new era in bilateral relations.

Since then, Türkiye’s relations with Niger, which it regards as a strategic partner in Africa, have moved beyond diplomatic contacts to take on a more concrete character in areas such as energy, defense, trade, education and cultural cooperation. Ankara is strengthening the historical and cultural ties between the two countries through the Programme Coordination Office (PKO) of the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and the schools run by the Türkiye Maarif Foundation. In the health sector, one of the most significant steps,  the Niger-Türkiye Friendship Hospital, was opened in October 2019. Through these measures, Türkiye aims to establish a long-term, multi-dimensional partnership with Niger, rather than pursuing a policy focused solely on economic interests.

Following the coup in Niger in 2023, Türkiye did not sever its diplomatic ties and continued its strategic investments whilst maintaining its interest in Niger. On 17 July 2024, a high-level delegation, including Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, Minister of National Defence Yaşar Güler and Minister of Energy Alparslan Bayraktar, visited Niamey. During the visit, significant agreements were signed in the fields of security, energy and trade, whilst decisions on cooperation in the fields of education and health were also taken. Furthermore, the signing of a declaration of intent for cooperation in the oil and natural gas sector during these talks, and the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cooperation in the mining sector in October 2024, demonstrate that relations between the two countries have now extended to the energy and mining sectors as well.

The fight against terrorism

Other key issue that came to the fore between the two countries in recent years is cooperation in the fight against terrorism and in the field of security. Niger is one of the countries most affected by the rise in terrorist incidents in the Sahel in recent years. The country is exposed to terrorist activities by the Al-Qaeda-linked JNIM and the ISIS-linked ISSP, particularly in its western border regions via the Liptako-Gourma security zone, and by ISWAP and Boko Haram elements in the south-east via the Lake Chad Basin. In this context, where Niger has terminated its military cooperation with Western partners, notably France and the US, Türkiye is emerging as a reliable strategic partner thanks to its growing defense industry capacity, experience in counter-terrorism, security cooperation and active diplomatic initiatives.

These factors are strengthening the strategic dimension of relations between the two countries and ensuring that Türkiye is viewed as an important partner by Niger. In this context, Niger, which cooperates with Türkiye in the fields of defense and security, is importing various defence industry products from Türkiye to enhance its capacity in the fight against terrorism. Furthermore, the On-Site Training Support Protocol signed in April 2026 demonstrates that security cooperation between the two countries is not limited to the supply of defence industry products, but also encompasses military training support and intelligence. It is evident that, through these collaborations, Niger aims to achieve its objective of conducting more effective and successful counter-terrorism operations.

One of the key pillars of the developing relations between the two countries is the strengthening of economic ties and trade. Following the military intervention in Niger in 2023, the country has gone through a difficult period due to sanctions imposed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the suspension of financial support and security cooperation by Western partners. During this difficult period, Niger’s Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance, Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine, visited Türkiye to strengthen economic and political ties. Within this framework, Türkiye has continued to develop its economic relations with Niger.

Investments in the energy, mining, construction and trade sectors have not only enhanced Türkiye’s economic presence in Niger but have also contributed to Niger’s efforts to diversify its development and external partnerships. Indeed, the fact that the volume of trade between Türkiye and Niger is projected to rise from approximately 38.9 million dollars in 2012 to 273 million dollars by 2025 is one of the concrete indicators of this economic rapprochement. In the same year, Türkiye’s exports to Niger amounted to 214 million dollars, whilst imports from Niger stood at 59 million dollars. Furthermore, the signing of the joint declaration on the establishment of JETCO during Tchiani’s visit to Ankara can be regarded as a significant step towards conducting economic cooperation on a more structured and institutionalized basis.

In conclusion, these developments demonstrate that the multi-dimensional cooperation between Türkiye and Niger, which has gained momentum since 2020, has moved beyond diplomatic rhetoric and has begun to produce tangible results through trade, institutional agreements and sectoral partnerships.

(Originally published in Turkish by the Middle East Africa website)

T

he U.S. Senate has voted to direct President Donald Trump to halt military action against Iran, marking the first time since the passage of the 1973 War Powers Act that both chambers of Congress have approved a resolution seeking to end a president’s involvement in an ongoing conflict.

The Senate approved the measure on Tuesday by a vote of 50-48, following its earlier passage in the House of Representatives. The resolution reflects growing unease in Congress over the war that began on February 28, when U.S. and Israeli forces launched attacks on Iran, and signals a widening split between Trump and some members of his own Republican Party.

Although the practical effect of the resolution remains uncertain, the vote represents one of the most significant congressional challenges to Trump’s foreign policy since he returned to office.

Historic congressional action

The measure was passed under the framework of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, legislation enacted after the Vietnam War to limit presidential authority to conduct military operations without congressional approval.

No previous war powers resolution had successfully passed both the House and Senate.

Under the legislation, Congress directed the president to remove U.S. armed forces from hostilities involving Iran. However, the White House maintains that the resolution has no legal force because it is not submitted to the president for signature or veto.

The administration also argues that active hostilities effectively ended following a ceasefire reached on April 7.

A White House official dismissed the vote as largely symbolic, saying it had “no significance” and noting that the resolution passed only because two Republican senators were absent.

Trump responded sharply to the vote, calling it “poorly timed and meaningless” in a social media post. He accused lawmakers who supported the measure of making negotiations with Tehran more difficult and providing “comfort” to Iran.

Republican support signals growing unease

The Senate vote largely followed party lines, but four Republicans broke ranks to support the resolution.

The Republican senators voting in favor were Susan Collins, Rand Paul, Bill Cassidy, and Lisa Murkowski.

Meanwhile, Democratic Senator John Fetterman voted against the measure, becoming the only Democrat to oppose it.

Two Republican senators, Mitch McConnell and David McCormick, did not participate in the vote.

The House had approved the same measure earlier this month by a margin of 215-208, with four Republicans joining Democrats in support.

The vote highlights growing frustration among lawmakers over a conflict that has become increasingly unpopular with the American public.

Public opinion turning against the war

According to a Reuters/Ipsos poll released Tuesday, only one-quarter of Americans believe the war against Iran has been worth its costs. A majority of respondents also expressed concern that any ceasefire or peace agreement could collapse.

The conflict has generated political challenges for the Trump administration as it seeks congressional approval for tens of billions of dollars in additional funding linked to military operations.

At the same time, several Republican lawmakers have recently shown greater willingness to oppose the president on key issues, including immigration spending and a proposed fund intended to compensate political allies whom Trump says were unfairly targeted by federal authorities.

U

krainian drones struck a major oil refinery in southeast Moscow for the second time in three days on Thursday, triggering a massive fire, disrupting transportation across the Russian capital, and underscoring Kyiv’s growing ability to carry the war deep inside Russian territory.

The attack targeted one of Moscow’s key fuel-processing facilities, located just 16 kilometers (10 miles) from the Kremlin and within the city’s ring road, making it one of the most symbolically significant strikes on Russian infrastructure since the war began more than four years ago.

Video footage shared on social media showed thick black smoke billowing into the sky above the refinery after a powerful explosion. Witnesses reported that the blast was so intense that the giant metal lid of an oil storage tank was hurled into the air.

The strike appeared to evade Russian air defenses and ignited a blaze that emergency crews battled for hours.

War reaches the heart of Russia

The attack forms part of a broader Ukrainian campaign targeting Russia’s energy sector, which Kyiv argues provides crucial revenue for Moscow’s military operations in Ukraine.

But beyond the economic impact, the strike carried substantial symbolic significance.

By successfully targeting infrastructure inside the Russian capital, Ukraine appears intent on demonstrating to ordinary Russians that the consequences of the war are no longer confined to distant battlefields.

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister, Andrii Sybiha, used social media to directly address residents of Moscow following the attack.

“One of the most popular questions asked by Muscovites this morning is ‘What is going on?'” Sybiha wrote. “Your country started a war of aggression against ours. For years, it has been killing our people.”

The comments reflected Kyiv’s effort to frame the attacks as a response to Russia’s invasion rather than an escalation of the conflict.

Disruption across Moscow

The strike caused widespread disruption throughout the Russian capital, home to more than 13 million people.

Authorities temporarily suspended flights at all Moscow airports as security services assessed the threat posed by additional drones.

Operations were halted at Sheremetyevo Airport, Russia’s busiest air hub, and parts of the airport were evacuated as a precaution.

Traffic was also disrupted along major roads surrounding the refinery, creating significant delays for commuters.

Residents in online forums complained that no air raid sirens or emergency alerts were issued before the attack.

Some suburban residents reported finding oily residue on vehicles and windows after rainfall passed through areas affected by smoke from the refinery fire.

The incident highlighted the growing vulnerability of Russia’s largest city to long-range Ukrainian drone operations.

While Moscow has experienced occasional drone attacks since 2023, including an incident involving the Kremlin itself, such strikes have generally had limited impact on daily life.

Thursday’s attack represented one of the most disruptive incidents the capital has experienced since the conflict began.

Economic impact growing

The latest refinery strike also points to the increasing economic consequences of Ukraine’s campaign against Russia’s energy infrastructure.

Russia remains one of the world’s largest oil producers and a major exporter of crude oil and refined fuel products.

Repeated attacks on refineries, storage facilities, and transportation networks have begun affecting domestic fuel supplies.

Industry sources told Reuters that Russia is expected to import fuel by sea this month, an unusual step for a country that is normally a major fuel exporter.

Reports of gasoline shortages have emerged in several regions in recent weeks.

Although Moscow city authorities insisted that fuel supplies in and around the capital remain stable, Russia’s federal anti-monopoly service has launched an inquiry after one major retailer reportedly increased gasoline prices by nearly 19 percent within a week.

Energy analysts say sustained attacks on refining capacity could place additional pressure on domestic fuel markets while increasing operational costs for Russia’s economy.

T

he United States and Iran have released the text of a 14-point memorandum of understanding that lays the foundation for ending months of conflict, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, easing economic restrictions on Tehran, and launching negotiations toward a comprehensive peace agreement.

The document, formally titled the “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran,” was read to reporters by a senior U.S. official on Wednesday and is expected to serve as the basis for intensive negotiations over the next 60 days.

While the memorandum establishes an immediate ceasefire and outlines broad commitments by both sides, many of the most difficult issues—including Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions relief, and regional security arrangements—remain subject to future negotiations.

Immediate end to war

The first provision commits both countries and their allies to the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including Lebanon. Both sides pledged not to initiate future military action against one another and agreed to respect Lebanon’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Under the second point, Washington and Tehran agreed to respect each other’s sovereignty and refrain from interference in internal affairs.

The third provision establishes a negotiation period of up to 60 days, which may be extended by mutual agreement, to finalize a broader peace settlement.

The fourth and fifth points focus on restoring maritime commerce through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy shipping routes.

The United States agreed to begin lifting its naval blockade immediately and to remove all restrictions within 30 days. Washington also committed to withdrawing military forces from Iran’s vicinity within 30 days after a final agreement is reached.

Iran, for its part, pledged to facilitate safe passage for commercial vessels through the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Tehran also agreed to remove mines and military obstacles and restore normal shipping operations over the next month.

The agreement further calls for consultations between Iran, Oman, and other Gulf states regarding future administration and maritime services in the strategic waterway.

Massive reconstruction package

One of the most significant elements of the agreement is contained in point six.

The United States committed to working with regional partners to develop a reconstruction and economic development package worth at least $300 billion for Iran.

The mechanism for implementing the fund will be finalized during negotiations, while Washington pledged to provide the necessary licenses, waivers, and permissions required for financial transactions.

Point seven outlines a U.S. commitment to terminate all sanctions imposed on Iran, including United Nations-related restrictions, nuclear-related measures, and both primary and secondary U.S. sanctions.

The timing and sequencing of sanctions removal remain subject to negotiation during the upcoming talks.

Both sides described sanctions relief as one of the most important issues to be addressed during the next phase of diplomacy.

Nuclear program left for future talks

The eighth provision addresses Iran’s nuclear activities but postpones major decisions until a final agreement.

Iran reaffirmed that it would not seek or develop nuclear weapons.

The two countries agreed that the future of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium would be determined through a mutually agreed mechanism. At a minimum, any solution would involve down-blending enriched material under supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Future discussions will also address uranium enrichment levels and Iran’s civilian nuclear requirements.

Under point nine, both countries agreed to maintain the status quo while negotiations continue.

Iran will not expand its current nuclear activities, while the United States pledged not to impose additional sanctions or deploy new military forces to the region.

Point ten requires the U.S. Treasury Department to issue waivers immediately permitting Iranian oil exports, petroleum product sales, banking transactions, shipping, insurance, and related services.

Point eleven concerns Iranian assets frozen abroad.

The United States agreed to make those assets available for use and to work with Iran on procedures governing their release. Washington also committed to issuing the necessary licenses and authorizations to facilitate access to those funds.

W

ithin the framework of international relations, powerful states often act with an excessive demonstration of power to protect their political and economic interests, even if this behavior goes on to negatively impact weaker states. They employ various means to achieve this, including military alliances, economic influence, political and military intervention, and sanctions on their perceived enemies. These actions embody the characteristic of “states’ arrogance” since such an act is not exercised within the framework of accepted international legitimacy, and without a mandate from international institutions such as the United Nations. The stronger party uses its greater power and develops the belief that it has the right to impose its vision on other parties, conceiving this from the notion of holding an obligation to achieve a situation of peace and stability. Nevertheless, this is in fact solely derived from the desire to reach certain objectives within its own national security interests, using only the logic of power.

The development of the concept of “states’ arrogance” represents a radical shift in international relations, explaining as it does the inability of powerful states to adapt to a changing global order. These states tend to believe that their political system, economic influence, and military power grant them the right to dominate international affairs and exert pressure so as to steer other countries’ positions in their favor. This has led to a fundamental transformation in the role played by powerful actors, a role that may be driven by both internal and external pressures. This article intends to shed the light on the behavior of the United States in recent decades and how it embodies the role of an arrogant power deviating from the traditional concept of international relations.

States’ arrogance in International Relations

The concept of arrogance within approaches to international relations has differed according to how it is situated in terms of each state’s interaction with the outside world. Although not directly addressed with this term, “states’ arrogance”, it is often referred to using terms that hold similar meanings, such as “vanity” and “domination”. Within the realist approach, Thomas Hobbes addressed the concept in his ideas on the social contract, describing human nature as being driven by glory and pride, which leads to conflict with others. In 1948, the German-American Hans Morgenthau published his book “Politics Among Nations”, arguing that the concept is “the selfish manifestation” of a subjective stance of states to adopt narcissistic and often “hostile” policies. Employing a more extreme definition of arrogance, Kenneth Waltz suggests that the term involves a degree of reckless policies in pursuit of national security.

In the liberal school, arrogance is viewed as an obstacle to the achievement of peace and freedom. David Hume, the philosopher, historian, and economist, argues that a world driven by commercial competition cannot avoid conflicts without also avoiding the arrogance and selfishness of the more powerful states. In his book “Beyond Hegemony: Cooperation and Conflict in the World Political Economy”, Robert Cohen emphasizes the need for “strong communication” to fill the gap between strong and less powerful states, and therefore, enhance cooperation in order to achieve peace. The constructivist approach assumes that the arrogant behavior of states is a reality that is a social construct which states respond to according to their particular perspectives.

This approach treats the concepts of “pride” and “ego” as elements of states’ arrogance. This means that states with strong nationalist foreign policies act arrogantly toward actors that differ in terms of ideology. Nicholas Onoff, a pioneering advocate of the constructivist school, argues that states that are in conflict and which hold identity and religious differences such as Pakistan and India view each other as being arrogant, while referring to their own behavior as being truthful and legitimate. While states adopting a rhetoric that reflects their culture and identity, such as Iran, are viewed as being arrogant by the United States, the latter represents a clear example of arrogant behavior, with its possession of hard power and its complex network of international relations.

The case of the United States

In recent decades, the behavior of the United States has stood out as a prime example of states’ arrogance, representing a radical shift from behavior within the traditional concept of international relations to a more problematic form of international relations, one from which the concept of states’ arrogance emerges.

Immediately after the end of World War II, the United States emerged as a superpower in a global system, rivaled only by the Soviet Union. It enjoyed military and economic power, as well as a political influence that played a pivotal role in the establishment of numerous international institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Although the United States exploited its influence within these institutions to serve its own interests, these institutions undoubtedly contributed to enhancing a degree of stability and cooperation among member states.

The American role has been manifested in the exercise of its influence and dominance through intervention in the internal affairs of several countries, such as in Korea, Vietnam, Chile, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Such interventions were sometimes justified by the assumption that they were protecting the global order from the threat posed by weaker and relatively unstable states, and at other times under the pretext of protecting democracy and preventing the spread of other political systems such as communism, or because of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in those states, thus undermining the sovereignty of weaker countries and suppressing the desires of their people.

The United States invasion of Iraq is an example of states’ arrogance, supported by some of the United States’ allies such as the UK, where former US President George W. Bush presented the rest of the countries with two choices: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” Following the claim that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, the international community viewed the United States through the lens of having acted unilaterally and without authorization from international organizations, thereby exploiting its influence and military power, resisting the international community, and showing distrust in the role of the international organizations. Such an act intensified criticism directed at Washington, and damaged the reputation of the United States, its foreign policy, and its international role, which had for long maintained global stability and established a remarkable period of relative calm.

The unipolar international system

Perhaps one of the most significant factors contributing to US arrogance was the transformation of the post-Cold War world order into a unipolar international system, granting the United States absolute hegemony. However, this did not last long, especially as the world witnessed the rise of China and the increasing influence of Russia, demonstrated through its intervention in Ukraine in February 2022 without international authorization, which represents another version of states’ arrogance.

Despite the losses and depletion of resources which the United States suffered in its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, diplomacy and international partnerships were not Washington’s primary options. This has been evident in its recent handling of the Iranian issue, where it has opted for the military option alongside its ally Israel, seizing the initiative at a time when negotiations sponsored by Oman were on the verge of reaching an agreement. Once again, the military option yielded no declared results and, in fact, caused harm to the region and the whole world.

Prior to this, Washington had even attempted to annex Canada after the election of current US President Donald Trump in late 2024, following a wave of threats to impose tariffs, and demands for Canada to increase its military spending. This was followed by talk of annexing Greenland since March 2025, with the primary objective of controlling a region that would allow the United States to monitor economic and military activities across three continents (Europe, Asia, and the Americas). The arrogance of the United States became yet more visible through the kidnapping of the Venezuelan president and his wife in January 2026, and their transfer to New York to await trial on drug trafficking charges. These are a series of actions carried out by Washington within the joint framework of hegemony and arrogance, driven by its military capabilities, which are sometimes overestimated.

A

proposed $300 billion private investment fund aimed at revitalizing Iran’s economy has emerged as a central component of the framework agreement reached between the United States and Iran to end months of conflict, according to a source with direct knowledge of the negotiations.

The fund, which would be known as the Reconstruction and Development Fund, is designed to encourage both sides to finalize a comprehensive peace agreement by offering a powerful economic incentive for post-war recovery and long-term investment.

According to the source, more than half of the proposed funding—over $150 billion—has already been pledged by companies and financial institutions across multiple regions, including North America, Asia, the Gulf, Africa, and South America.

The initiative remains contingent on the successful completion of a final agreement between Washington and Tehran. Negotiators are expected to spend the next 60 days working on unresolved issues, including Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions relief, and regional security arrangements.

Economic dimension of peace deal

The investment proposal represents one of the most ambitious economic initiatives linked to a Middle Eastern peace agreement in recent decades.

Unlike traditional reconstruction packages financed by governments or international organizations, the proposed fund would be entirely privately financed.

The source familiar with the negotiations said no government money, grants, or direct public financing would be involved.

Instead, private companies and financial institutions have committed investment capital intended for projects in key sectors of Iran’s economy, including energy, transportation, logistics, manufacturing, and industrial development.

The fund is separate from ongoing discussions regarding the release of Iranian assets frozen abroad and the lifting of U.S. sanctions.

Negotiators have reportedly established distinct tracks for those issues, with separate timelines and objectives.

“This is not compensation, reparations, or a government aid package,” the source said. “It is an investment vehicle intended to unlock economic opportunities once a final settlement is achieved.”

From compensation demand to investment plan

The idea reportedly emerged after Iran initially sought substantial compensation for damage caused during the conflict.

A senior Iranian source told Reuters that Tehran had requested approximately $400 billion in compensation from the United States for wartime losses.

Washington rejected that proposal, leading negotiators to explore alternative mechanisms capable of supporting economic recovery while remaining politically acceptable to all parties.

The resulting concept focuses on investment rather than compensation.

Under the proposed structure, regional countries and international investors would contribute through various mechanisms, including financing projects directly, establishing credit facilities, guaranteeing loans, and supporting reconstruction efforts at damaged industrial and infrastructure sites.

Projects under consideration reportedly include repairs and modernization of refineries, airports, transportation networks, industrial facilities, and major manufacturing centers damaged during the conflict.

Among the sites expected to benefit is the Mobarakeh Steel complex, one of Iran’s largest industrial enterprises.

Untapped economic potential

Supporters of the initiative argue that Iran presents significant long-term opportunities for investors if geopolitical risks and sanctions barriers can be reduced.

Despite decades of economic isolation, Iran remains one of the largest economies in the Middle East.

The country possesses the world’s second-largest proven natural gas reserves and the fourth-largest oil reserves, making it a major potential energy producer.

In addition, Iran has a population exceeding 92 million people, a relatively educated workforce, extensive industrial infrastructure, and significant potential in sectors ranging from petrochemicals and mining to tourism and agriculture.

However, successive rounds of international sanctions and political tensions have largely excluded Iran from global capital markets for more than four decades.

As a result, foreign direct investment has remained limited despite the country’s economic potential.

Analysts say that if sanctions are eased and political stability improves, Iran could attract substantial foreign investment in the coming years.

While the investment initiative has generated considerable attention, its implementation depends entirely on the success of broader negotiations.

The framework agreement announced earlier this week established a 60-day period during which U.S. and Iranian negotiators will seek to reach a comprehensive settlement.

One of the most difficult issues remains Iran’s nuclear program.

According to U.S. Vice President JD Vance, access to the reconstruction fund would depend on Iran meeting strict conditions, including dismantling key elements of its nuclear program, eliminating stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, and accepting extensive international inspections.

Iran has consistently maintained that its nuclear activities are intended for peaceful purposes and has rejected accusations that it seeks nuclear weapons.

The issue remains one of the most contentious points in negotiations.

D

evelopments in Mali over recent months indicate that the security crisis in the Sahel region has entered a new phase. In particular, the “tactical cooperation” that has emerged between the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin – JNIM) and the Azawad Liberation Front (Front de Libération de l’Azawad – FLA), which represents the Tuareg separatist faction, has exerted serious military pressure on the Bamako administration.

The recapture of Kidal in April 2026, the targeting of the areas around Bamako and Kati, and the assassination of Defence Minister Sadio Camara have demonstrated that Assimi Goita’s administration is facing one of the most severe security crises of recent years. However, the emerging picture suggests, contrary to initial appearances, not the regime’s imminent collapse in the short term, but rather the deepening of a protracted war of attrition between state authority and armed groups in Mali.

The fundamental issue in Mali today is not so much the military capacity of the armed groups, but whether this capacity can be transformed into a sustainable political order. Indeed, whilst the recent coordination between JNIM and the FLA has yielded significant results in terms of wearing down the regime, it has failed to articulate a shared political vision capable of jointly governing Mali. Consequently, whilst this alliance may be able to put pressure on the Goita administration in the short term, it remains far from producing a comprehensive alternative capable of establishing a new model of governance across the country.

Recent background

Developments in Mali over the past two years have brought this structural problem into sharper focus. Whilst clashes between the FLA—which reorganised in the north by the end of 2024—and the Malian army intensified, JNIM also expanded its influence, particularly in central and western Mali. Attacks carried out along the Dioura, Boulikessi and Timbuktu line throughout 2025 have highlighted the Malian army’s capacity issues. Meanwhile, JNIM’s systematic attacks on fuel convoys along the Senegal-Mali border during the same period have demonstrated that the group effectively employs not only military but also economic pressure tactics. The fuel crisis, power cuts and transport problems in the capital, Bamako, have laid bare the erosion of the state’s capacity to provide basic services.

In response, the Goita administration has further restricted the political sphere in parallel with the security crisis. The closure of political parties, the suppression of opposition figures and the postponement of the electoral process on the grounds of ‘pacifying the country’ have reinforced the trend towards the institutionalisation of military rule in Mali. The Goita administration has transformed the security crisis into a tool of legitimacy not only in military but also in political terms. In particular, anti-French rhetoric and an emphasis on sovereignty play a significant role in the Goita regime’s ability to generate social support.

In fact, this is precisely the fundamental reason why the Goita regime remains in power today. It survives not because the regime is strong, but because its rivals have failed to present a common state project. The armed opposition in Mali, whilst appearing militarily effective, is politically fragmented. At the heart of this fragmentation lie the structural differences between JNIM and the FLA. JNIM is an al-Qaeda-linked organisation that ‘exploits Islam’, and this radical group claims that its long-term objective is to establish a Sharia-based order in Mali. The organisation is attempting to establish alternative governance mechanisms, particularly in rural areas.

It is filling the state vacuum through methods such as tax collection, setting up checkpoints, mediating local disputes and operating Sharia courts. Consequently, JNIM has become a hybrid actor seeking to establish influence not only in the military sphere but also in the social and economic spheres, deriving legitimacy from these domains. The relationships it has developed with Fulani communities, particularly those spreading across the Sahel region, have given the organisation significant social depth in central Mali.

Ethno-regional motivation?

In contrast, the FLA’s primary motivation is not ideological but ethno-regional. The Tuareg separatist movements have for many years been advocating for autonomy or independence centered on Azavad in northern Mali. Consequently, the FLA’s priority is not to Islamize the Malian state, but to establish a Tuareg-dominated political sphere in the north. This explains why the relationship between JNIM and the FLA is limited and fragile. Both actors seek to weaken the Bamako administration; however, they have quite different political projects regarding ‘how Mali should be governed’.

This difference becomes particularly apparent in discussions regarding the ‘post-victory order’. Whilst JNIM aims to establish ideological hegemony across the whole of Mali, the FLA appears to be seeking regional dominance in the north. In other words, whilst one seeks ideological transformation of the unitary state, the other advocates a political model based on the fragmentation of the state. Consequently, whilst joint military operations may be possible, a joint governance model appears a highly unlikely prospect.

Moreover, the difference between these two structures is not merely ideological. Their spheres of legitimacy also differ. The FLA’s social support is largely confined to the Tuareg region in the north and lacks a strong political counterpart in southern regions such as Bamako, Sikasso or Kayes. JNIM, on the other hand, is able to operate across a wider geographical area, particularly in regions where state violence is intense, presenting itself as an ‘alternative security provider’.

However, even this does not grant the organization a sustainable governance capacity across the country. Indeed, as seen in the case of Mali, armed groups in the Sahel, whilst possessing the military capacity to erode state authority, are unable to produce a sustainable and inclusive governance model capable of replacing it. JNIM’s economic blockade and rural control capacity may exert pressure on Bamako, but it lacks the administrative and economic infrastructure to replace modern state mechanisms. The same applies to the FLA. There is a significant difference between establishing control over symbolic areas such as Kidal and governing a country with a population of over 20 million, which is ethnically fragmented and economically oriented towards the south. Consequently, the current situation in Mali represents the ‘spread of multiple spheres of authority’ rather than the ‘construction of an alternative state’.