I

n recent years, the Eastern Mediterranean has become one of the most sensitive arenas of regional competition shaped around energy resources. The main reason for this sensitivity is that regional resources are viewed not merely as economic assets, but also as strategic instruments in terms of sovereignty, security, and power politics. Indeed, the intensifying competition in the Eastern Mediterranean has further deepened the existing political and military tensions in the region. One of the most striking examples of this tension today is Israel’s attempt to render ineffective the maritime border understanding reached between Lebanon and Israel in October 2022 under US mediation through unilateral and coercive moves.

The process leading to the agreement was the outcome of a long-standing maritime jurisdiction dispute. The area between Lebanon’s Line 29 claim and the border approach imposed by Israel in its own favour had gone far beyond a technical issue of maritime delimitation because of its high hydrocarbon potential. Under the understanding reached, the maritime boundary was drawn on the basis of Line 23. Thus, while Israel secured its sovereign rights over the Karish field, which was ready for natural gas production, Lebanon was given the opportunity to continue exploration activities in Block 9, which includes the Qana field. However, the Beirut administration, under a severe economic crisis, not only had to step back from its Line 29 claim, but was also forced to accept the concession of granting Tel Aviv a share of the possible revenues from the part of the Qana field extending into the Israeli side.

Nevertheless, Lebanon has not yet been able to obtain the short-term economic gains it expected from this understanding. The identification of commercially viable reserves in the Qana field and the transition to actual production are, by their nature, processes that will take time. Moreover, political instability, institutional weaknesses, and uncertainty in the investment environment make Beirut’s energy planning even more fragile. The current conjuncture, in turn, feeds Israel’s effort to transform Lebanon’s political and economic vulnerabilities into an asymmetric advantage in its own favor. Tel Aviv’s approach should therefore be read as part of a broader strategy aimed at eroding Lebanon’s rights over the Qana field and establishing a new hegemonic sphere in favour of Israel within the Eastern Mediterranean energy equation.

The historical continuity of geopolitical conflict

Essentially, although the tension surrounding Lebanese gas in the Eastern Mediterranean may at first appear to be a current maritime jurisdiction dispute between two states, it is part of a broader struggle for power shaped by the control of energy resources.  Throughout the twentieth century, oil in the Middle East, and following the dissolution of the Soviet Union,, energy resources in the Caspian Basin, were among the main factors fuelling sovereignty disputes, external interventions, and struggles for regional influence. From this perspective, the dispute over Lebanese gas can also be read as the contemporary reflection in the Eastern Mediterranean of the historical role of energy resources in generating geopolitical rivalry and power competition.

However, it is not sufficient to explain Israel’s position only through the general conflictual logic of energy geopolitics. The main point that deserves attention here is that Tel Aviv has brought an agreement signed through international mediation back into question in such a short period of time and has sought to create the ground for its unilateral termination. The regional conflicts that have intensified since October 2023, the silence of Western states in the face of Israel’s genocidpole in Gaza, and Tel Aviv’s strategy of leaving Beirut helpless on the ground through military pressure directly extended into the Lebanese arena have turned Israel into a maximalist and revisionist actor that recklessly violates the limits of the international legal order.

Indeed, Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen’s statement in March 2026 describing the 2022 Maritime Border Agreement as a “document of surrender” for Israel and bringing the option of cancellation onto the agenda shows that Tel Aviv is trying to exploit the regional chaos it has deepened in order to reopen Lebanon’s maritime jurisdiction areas to discussion. In other words, Israel’s move targeting Lebanon’s maritime jurisdiction areas and natural gas fields points directly to a development that can be described as an “energy grab”.

The west’s double standards and Europe’s energy supply security

The United States, which was the main architect and mediator of the maritime border understanding in 2022, has not shown any significant reaction to the Israeli Energy Minister’s statements aimed at cancelling the agreement. On the one hand, the Washington administration explains Tel Aviv’s military operations in the region through the discourse of “self-defense”; on the other hand, it does not raise a strong objection to the de facto reopening of maritime borders to discussion or to Israel’s moves that put pressure on Lebanon’s sovereign rights.

Europe’s stance is not very different from that of the United States. Brussels’ position is shaped not by the protection of international law, sovereign rights, or Lebanon’s legitimate claims, but rather by the potential value of Eastern Mediterranean gas for European energy supply security. For the European Union, which significantly reduced its dependence on Russian gas after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022, Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon reserves have become one of the important alternatives due to their geographical proximity and potential for supply diversification.

In this new geopolitical environment, the Tel Aviv administration seeks to realize its objective of becoming the dominant actor in the control of energy resources and transport routes in the Eastern Mediterranean by pursuing a more aggressive strategy. Despite this, the silence of Western actors in the face of Israel’s moves to narrow Lebanon’s maritime jurisdiction areas and establish de facto superiority over energy resources reveals the existence of a clear double standard. While the Western world strongly emphasizes territorial integrity and international law when Ukraine is at stake, its reluctance to defend the same principles against Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean reveals a clear double standard.

Lebanon’s economic future and investment risk

For Lebanon, which is grappling with political instability, economic challenges and infrastructure collapse, the potential revenues from the Qana field are viewed not merely as an economic gain, but as a significant opportunity for the state’s recovery and the strengthening of its institutional capacity. However, for a country such as Lebanon, marked by limited economic resources, a fragmented political system and vulnerability to external interference, any uncertainty surrounding energy projects carries serious consequences. In this regard, Israel’s attempt to revive the maritime border dispute has the potential to undermine not only the future of a specific gas field, but also the broader investment climate in Lebanon’s energy sector.

This is because offshore natural gas projects are high-cost, long-term investments that are highly sensitive to political stability. An increase in legal and political uncertainty in such projects may heighten investors’ risk perception, thereby further weakening Lebanon’s position in the regional energy equation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the statements about unilateral cancellation and the threatening rhetoric issued by Tel Aviv clearly show that the issue in the Eastern Mediterranean is not merely a technical border dispute. The picture before us is Israel’s attempt, relying on its military superiority and the silence of Western actors, to erode Lebanon’s right to exercise control over its legitimate energy resources and to establish de facto superiority on the ground. In other words, this process should be read not as a diplomatic disagreement, but as a systematic state-led “energy grab.”

Tel Aviv’s approach once again reveals that Israel is far from being a predictable actor committed to its obligations under international law. International law, diplomatic agreements and border arrangements can easily be eroded in the face of Israel’s Zionist expansionist reflexes. For this reason, Israel’s stance once again confirms the existence of a deep and structural trust problem regarding the sustainability of long-term agreements with Tel Aviv.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

T

o see what effects the shift of the world’s centre of gravity from the Europe-Middle East axis towards the People’s Republic of China-South Asia axis has brought about, it is sufficient to note the visits to Beijing by US President Trump and, shortly afterwards, Russian President Putin within the space of a week, and to realize that Europe was not even mentioned during these visits. We can see how Europe’s equilibrium has been disrupted by developments in Beijing through the shifting stance of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen over the course of a month.

In a speech delivered on 20 April 2028 at the 80th anniversary event of the newspaper Die Zeit, she stated: “We must succeed in uniting the European continent as a whole so that it does not fall under Russian, Turkish or Chinese influence. We must think on a larger, geopolitical scale,” Von der Leyen stated. She must have quickly realized that the so-called power she represents does not belong in the league of superpowers, neither in terms of energy, defense nor technology, as she received the necessary lesson regarding the strategic importance of Turkey-EU relations during her telephone conversation with President Erdoğan on 19 May. In fact, this fundamental lesson was the result of a series of Turkey-centered developments throughout May.

The hard mathematics of geopolitics

Looking at the sequence of events, the visit to Turkey on 11 May by Queen Mathilde of Belgium, accompanied by a large delegation of businesspeople, can be considered the first link in this chain of developments. During the visit, Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prevot, responding to questions from TRT Haber, made the following remarks that explicitly targeted the President of the European Commission, serving as proof of how the EU’s perspective on Turkey has shifted: “Of course, the European Union needs Turkey. Turkey also needs Europe. In my view, it was illogical to use a phrase that places Turkey, China and Russia on the same level, on the same platform, as stated by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. You are a stabilizing force. For this reason, we must take Turkey’s strategic role in Europe’s future security architecture into account more than ever before.”

The developments necessitating a reorientation of von der Leyen’s course did not end there. On Monday 18 May, as part of Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Germany, the third meeting of the Turkey-Germany Strategic Dialogue Mechanism was held after a 12-year hiatus. The fear of Russia and US pressure must have put Berlin in such a state that German Foreign Minister Wadephul felt compelled to make the following remarks regarding this meeting: “After many years, we have re-engaged in strategic dialogue with Turkey. We wish to devote more time to this, as we want to examine the issues in greater depth. I am pleased that we have re-engaged on this path; we have reached a new level of quality in bilateral relations.”

For Wadephul’s quest for quality to achieve its aim, he must first begin with self-criticism. For instance, he could start by addressing the covert embargoes imposed on Turkey’s submarine manufacturing and the Akkuyu nuclear power plant. Or, if he were to explain how the investigation files regarding the NSU (National Socialist Underground) terrorist organization’s murder of eight Turks were deleted on 11 November 2011 – the very day the Federal Prosecutor’s Office took over the case – we might be able to move a little closer to the desired quality in Turkey-Germany relations. To understand Germany’s real concern, it is sufficient to look at the Welt newspaper’s report, also dated 18 May. Following the US’s suspension of Tomahawk missile deliveries to Germany, Berlin is seeking a solution in the Turkish defense industry.

What is interesting is that the Berlin-Paris duo, which has favored Greece since the 1970s under the banner of Hellenic romanticism, still cannot raise its voice against Athens, which is blocking Turkey’s participation in the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program. On the contrary, the overwhelming majority of member states are now aware that this 150-billion-euro program for joint defense procurement cannot achieve its objectives without Turkey, and have adopted the approach of bypassing the Greek obstacle by entering into independent agreements with Turkey. Indeed, reports have begun to emerge in the press suggesting that France is also making moves to join this initiative. However, it has been made clear to Paris, which is attempting, on the one hand, to stir up trouble in the Caucasus and, on the other, to upset the balance in the Eastern Mediterranean to Turkey’s detriment by aligning with the Greek Cypriot administration, that cooperation with Turkey in this area is impossible.

The Berlin-Paris axis: Coming to terms with Turkey

Although Turkey’s well-intentioned appeals have failed to yield results, the shifting geopolitical balances in the world are ultimately teaching the Berlin-Paris axis that it must come to terms with Turkey. The European Union, led by Germany, has now realized that it will be on the menu in any potential global power-sharing agreement between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. What they must now do is make up for the time and money they have squandered so generously since the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1992. Furthermore, they must admit that the energy they have expended on stalling Turkey has also been in vain.

The current state of the European Union was summarized by Germany’s former Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, on 4 May 2026 during a program he attended at the Harvard Kennedy School, part of Harvard University in the US. “The US and Germany have become a nation of lawyers. Other countries can build a national railway network in 20 years. Why can’t we build an urban rail line in 20 years?” As can be seen, Scholz, unlike von der Leyen, prefers to turn the spotlight on himself rather than targeting Turkey.

I do not believe Scholz chose this phrase, ‘a country of lawyers’, by chance. This phrase reminded me of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s 1993 book *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century*, in which he served as National Security Advisor to former US President Carter. In this work, Brzezinski warned the US administration, which was intoxicated by the victory of the First Cold War, that it needed to redirect its resources towards structural reforms as a matter of urgency. Had this warning been heeded, it is certain that we would not be seeing Donald Trump in the White House today.

In his book, Zbigniew presented a 20-point list of measures that needed to be implemented for the structural reforms the US required. The tenth item on this list concerns the issue of becoming a ‘nation of lawyers’, to which Scholz also refers. Brzezinski summarizes his complaint about this situation under the heading ‘The Presence of Parasites in the Legal System’ as follows: ‘One-third of the world’s lawyers work in the US. Legal fees paid in tort cases alone amount to three per cent of the US gross domestic product. This ratio is three times higher than in the countries with which the US competes. This high ratio has a deterrent effect on investors.”

Borrell’s garden has become a jungle

Instead of investing in technology and industry, or establishing a common defence and energy policy, the European Union, which offers those living within its borders a fantasy paradise, is now at a loss as to what to do in the face of developments centred on the People’s Republic of China. Yet on 13 October 2022, Josep Borrell, then the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, addressed students at the European Union Diplomatic Academy and brazenly likened the world beyond the European Union’s borders to a wild forest.

According to Borrell, the European Union represented a well-tended garden, that is, the best political harmony humanity could achieve. However, there was a danger that the forest might invade the garden, and according to Borrell, the European Union’s gardeners should go into the forest and engage with the rest of the world. Fortunately, thanks to the inflation driven by rising energy prices over the past four years, we now have the opportunity to observe a Europe that has turned into a jungle, where the far right is constantly gaining strength, from the island of stability that is Turkey.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

T

urkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Wednesday that he “sincerely believes” Türkiye and Greece should keep dialogue channels open on the basis of cooperation as two neighbors and NATO allies.

Erdoğan spoke at a joint news conference in Ankara with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis following their talks held within the framework of the 6th meeting of the High-Level Cooperation Council.

Erdoğan said they once again discussed their positions on the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean in an open and frank manner.

“Although the existing issues are complicated, they are not unsolvable within the framework of international law. What is needed is goodwill, constructive dialogue and the will to reach a solution,” he said, adding that he was pleased to see that he and Mitsotakis shared a similar understanding.

The Turkish president recalled his visit to Athens on December 7, 2023, when both sides registered their commitment to maintaining dialogue and improving relations through the Athens Declaration. He said the leaders reviewed how to advance ties further through a positive agenda.

Trade and economic cooperation

Erdoğan expressed hope that the documents signed during the visit would strengthen the contractual basis of bilateral relations.

He noted that the two countries continue to work toward their goal of increasing bilateral trade from nearly $7 billion last year to $10 billion. Business councils from both sides also met to explore new opportunities, he added.

Erdoğan said he also conveyed Türkiye’s expectations regarding the fight against terrorism and organized crime.

“We must act with a sense of historical responsibility regarding minorities, which constitute the human dimension of our relations,” he said. Erdoğan reiterated expectations that the Turkish minority in Western Thrace should fully benefit from religious freedoms and educational opportunities.

Regional developments

The two leaders also discussed regional issues, including Gaza and Syria.

Erdoğan said Türkiye rejects Israel’s recent decisions aimed at expanding control in the West Bank and weakening the Palestinian administration. He stressed that lasting peace and stability in the Middle East can only be achieved through a just two-state solution.

He voiced hope that Greece, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 2025-2026, would keep the two-state perspective on the council’s agenda.

On Syria, Erdoğan underlined the importance of stability and preserving the country’s territorial integrity, adding that Türkiye’s constructive role contributes not only to Syria but also to the security of Greece and Europe.

“As two neighbors and allies, I sincerely believe we must keep dialogue channels open with an understanding based on cooperation,” he said.

Mitsotakis: Meetings show value of good neighborly ties

Mitsotakis thanked Erdoğan for the hospitality and said the meetings in Ankara demonstrated how valuable dialogue and good neighborly relations are.

He recalled that in 2023 the two sides made a strategic choice to develop contacts based on political dialogue, a positive agenda and confidence-building measures.

“Through open channels of communication, we had the opportunity to address the issues between us,” he said, adding that Greece remains committed to continuing cooperation in good faith and mutual respect.

Mitsotakis said cooperation with Türkiye on irregular migration had been very productive, noting a 60% decrease in illegal migration in 2026.

He also praised the short-term visa scheme that enabled hundreds of thousands of Turkish citizens to visit Greek islands, saying it helped bring the two peoples closer. Athens will work with the European Union to continue the practice, he added.

T

here was an expectation- and still there is- about possible coordination and dialogue among regional actors of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) especially after the Trump Administration announced Gaza Peace Deal. This expectation is relying on probability of rise of a new balance of power-based order in the region. The regional states have had hopes to take some concrete steps related to functional, normative and institutional sides of this newly establishing order.  Ankara may be one of the most eager regional actors in this regard. Türkiye wants to institutionalize its bargaining power and influence in this new regional diplomacy-first atmosphere. That is not surprising if one reminds that Ankara prioritized normalization and improvement in bilateral relations in MENA – especially within the period 2021-2023, till October 7 attacks and Gaze War.

Back to Polarization?

However, these expectations have not fully realized so far. There are still many unresolved conflicts and uncertainties in the MENA region. Meanwhile Eastern Mediterranean geopolitics is giving signals of back to the future, back to the atmosphere of polarization that was dominant feature of the region in the period of 2017-2021. Recently there are many minor and major developments strengthening this tension. Some of these developments may not have the objective of fueling polarization in the region, but consequently they contribute to increase strategic competition in the Eastern Mediterranean. Two examples easily come to mind: The first one is signing of an agreement, that limits Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of the Greek Cypriot Administration and Lebanon in November 2025.

The second example is Israeli’s approval of Egypt export gas deal in December 2025. While these agreements may seem like functional collaborations for Lebanon and Egypt, which are currently experiencing political uncertainty and economic vulnerabilities, these deals also strengthen the positions of the Greek Cypriot Administration and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean, demonstrating that South Nicosia and Tel Aviv have a kind of actorness in the region. These deals were used by Tel Aviv and South Nicosia to give certain messages to the other regional players, including Ankara. On the one hand South Nicosia wants to show that it may continue to ignore rights of Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

On the other hand, Israel wants to prove that Tel Aviv can find partners in the region even if the Palestinian issue remained unresolved. However, these messages might have been weakly voiced if not for another obvious development: the triparty strategic rapprochement among Israel, the Greek Cypriots and Greece. At the end of 2025 Athens, Tel Aviv and South Nicosia not only deepened their defense and security ties but also did everything to make it visible for other regional actors including Ankara.

What does the trio want to achieve?

The rapprochement between South Nicosia, Tel Aviv, and Athens in the Eastern Mediterranean is not new. In the early 2000s, the discovery of natural gas in the region brought the three capitals into dialogue about potential East-West gas trade. However, this dialogue was never confined to the intended functional framework and failed to trigger regional stability and cooperation. Therefore, the Obama administration’s attempts to promote intercommunity reconciliation and cooperation in Cyprus issue through “imaginary pipelines” became unsuccessful. While the dream of Eastern Mediterranean gas bonanza returned to be a fantasy rather than a reality, the triparty ties have evolved into strategic partnership aims to constrain and marginalize Türkiye — albeit not explicitly — by exploiting existing fault lines and disagreements in the MENA region following the Arab Spring.

After 2015 the U.S. was uneasy with Russia’s presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and hence Washington was also partially drawn into this three-party re-alignment to constrain Russian posture in the region. Greece and the Greek Cypriots are the member of the EU. Between 2017 and 2021 some of the EU members wanted to increase their influence in the Eastern Mediterranean by supporting Athens’ and South Nicosia’s posture there. These European actors also misinterpreted what is happening in Libya, Lebanon and Syria. As a result, Türkiye felt that Ankara was facing with multiple challenges and the trio- supported by Washington and by some European capitals- tried to restrain Ankara’s hand in the region.

However, this regional context has gradually changed after 2021. Washington also revised its priorities in the Eastern Mediterranean and the U.S. concluded that exclusionary, polarizing alignments were unsuccessful in limiting Türkiye’s influence. Besides, Washington did not want to lose Ankara as a potential partner in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Between 2017-2021, Ankara succeeded to strengthen its strategic and diplomatic presence in Syria, Libya, and the TRNC by increasing its civil-military maritime assets in the neighboring seas. Observing the realities on the ground Biden Administration decided to withdraw its support from the East-Med natural gas pipeline project. That means the East-West natural gas trade through this tripartite alignment failed as well by 2021.

Polarization logic has slowly changed

Although the strategic environment based on polarization logic has slowly changed after 2021, this high-tension period between 2017 and 2021 revealed two facts related to the strategic game in the region. First, the Greek Cypriots and Greece can take, and indeed took, the advantage of the above-mentioned polarization to procure new weapon systems from various sources, primarily Israel and the United States. That has led revival of arm race/security dilemma logic in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Sea region. Washington was well aware of risks of security trap in the region among Athens, South Nicosia and Ankara but the U.S. also calculated the potential of constraining Russia.

It is a well-known fact that Washington can more easily support its Trans-Atlantic/European allies, like Greece and South Cyprus by arm procurement than others since the U.S. has upper-hand over NATO. As a result, the U.S. ignored Ankara’s and North Cyprus’ protests and decided to arm both Athens and South Nicosia – which endangers the delicate balance between Türkiye and Greece, as well as Turkish and Greek Cypriots on Cyprus. Meanwhile, Israel viewed Greece and Greek Cypriots as useful components of its revitalized Peripheral Doctrine. One of the major aims of this new Peripheral Doctrine is increasing Israel’s strategic depth without direct conventional deployment around Tel Aviv’s rivals, particularly Ankara. Therefore, Türkiye would face costs for its increasing presence in areas important to Israel.

Secondly, the 2017-2021 period proves that Western actors, both the U.S. and Europeans, prioritize area control within the framework of East-West connectivity – assumed to be provided by Greece-Greek Cypriot-Israel connection. However, it soon became clear that, to achieve full control or area denial capacity, all Western/U.S. allies (including those in the Gulf, Egypt, and Türkiye) needed to be part of the East-West connectivity, or at least they do not challenge the way of this connection. This explains why both the Biden and first Trump administrations worked on different formulas especially to attach the Gulf monarchies and Türkiye to the Europe-Israel/ West-East connection. The Biden Administration encouraged normalization agreements among the players, Trump Administrations suggested different versions of Abraham Accords.

What’s new in Greek-Greek Cypriot- Israeli quasi alliance in 2025?

Today’s three-party rapprochement can be seen as an extension of above-mentioned competitive logic. Therefore, it is also part of the process of creating perception that Ankara’s influence in the Eastern Mediterranean can be restrained by a rival bloc although the parties claim that this triparty cooperation is not against any other external actor. Accordingly, there are three elements in this renewed re-alignment: The first element is the deepening of security and defense cooperation between these three countries, though this cooperation does not include a joint defense guarantee or pledge. The second element is the establishment of mutual interoperability in the fields of defense and security. The third element is the rearmament of Greece and the Southern Cypriots by Israel that emerges as the main security provider. These three elements form the backbone of this renewed alignment among Athens, South Nicosia and Tel Aviv.

Within this context, recently, the South Cypriots acquired Barak air defense system from Israel. Meanwhile, Greek Foreign Minister Dendias claimed that Ankara’s progress, particularly in the field of UAVs/UCAVs, poses a threat to Greece. Dendias also stated that they would strengthen air defense in the Aegean Sea and deploy missile and anti-aircraft systems — some of which are expected to be procured from Israel— to the Aegean Islands. Leaders from three countries met in Jerusalem at the end of December, and they applauded Netanyahu’s words: “We will defend the area against those who want to rebuild their empire.” Considering that Athens and South Nicosia are part of Western institutions, this gathering, while not reflecting a common Western view, is a performance reflecting the desire of actors to use a hypothetical expansionism as a convenient excuse for Israel’s current expansionism.

Therefore, Jerusalem summit among Greek, Israeli and Greek Cypriot leaders was not just a realist act of balancing. It was a tacit support of two Western/European capitals to Israel’s policies in Gaza and West Bank- including war crimes. Hence, Athens, South Nicosia and Tel Aviv could find each other as available partners in micro-state strategy but because of shadow of war crimes and atrocities committed by Israel in Gaza, the cost of this reproachment for the Western actors will likely be greater than just triggering security dilemma between the trio and Ankara.

Without doubt, by this alignment Israel, Greece and Greek Cypriots attempt to provoke Ankara. By poking Türkiye unnecessarily, these three capitals, not only test the limits of Ankara’s reaction but also try to push Türkiye to make strategic mistakes. This strategy is an unreasonable strategy because it will not help western desire to have access and control on East-West as well as South-North (Eastern Mediterranean-Caspian) connectivity.

All in all, the atmosphere in the Eastern Mediterranean has turned from moderate hopes to polarization very quickly. This shift may be expected but the pace of this shift is still surprising. Therefore, one should ask, why this shift is happening now?

T

he presidential election in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) concluded with Tufan Erhürman, the leader and candidate of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), securing 62.76 percent of the vote and winning the election. Erhürman’s confident rhetoric, evident in his pre-election statements, was thus confirmed. On election day in Nicosia, where I was present, a close race was anticipated. A second round was not expected given the low potential vote totals of the remaining six candidates. However, the contest between Ersin Tatar and Tufan Erhürman was expected to remain uncertain until the very end. That was not the case.

The outcome was clear from the first ballot box announced. The clearest indication of the difference observed in almost all ballot boxes was that Erhürman received more votes in six different provincial electoral districts. During normal elections, the first votes announced in cities would go to the CTP or its candidate; then, the votes coming in from the countryside would change the balance. This time, however, the votes did not differ in geographical distribution. For the first time since the 1990 election, a candidate exceeded 60 percent, and general projections were inaccurate.

What did Erhürman promise his electorate?

The Cyprus issue, with its geopolitical dimensions, has been one of the dominant topics on Türkiye’s foreign policy agenda for decades. The ethnic conflict and its legacy, similar to the Palestinian issue, brought about by years of British rule (1878-1960), complicated the problem. In this context, the Turkish and Greek sides have met on various platforms for years. However, the unresolved marathon talks with the Greek side in recent years reduced interest in the process in Türkiye.

The issue has been assessed in terms of its proximity to regional and geographical conflicts, as well as energy exploration, rather than the current problems facing the Turkish Cypriot people, who are isolated. This election marks a turning point in the context of the “Cyprus Issue,” which has been on hold for a long time and is now back on the agenda. Erhürman believes that gains can be made, particularly in the negotiation process. During the election campaign, he promised to build on the progress made on issues such as the establishment of the Immovable Property Commission (2005), a key tool in resolving the property issues of Turkish Cypriots.

The candidates’ differing positions on solutions to the Cyprus deadlock led to a tense election campaign, with tensions rising periodically. Erhürman’s support for the federal roadmap was portrayed, particularly by the Tatar camp, as a declaration of surrender. However, the Erhürman camp emphasized that the “two-state solution” formula was “devoid of content” and that such an argument would mean Türkiye relinquishing its guarantee rights over the entire island.

Erhürman gained prominence during the election campaign due to the government’s failure to address basic humanitarian services and the informal economy. In particular, Turkish Cypriots have complained that structural transformation has lagged behind, as confirmed by our observations on the ground. During his campaign, Erhürman pointed out that the Cyprus negotiations had been frozen for five years, emphasizing that there had never been a similar “climate of apathy” during any other TRNC leader’s term. The deepening of the “deadlock in the current status quo” to the detriment of Turks resulted in the Greek Cypriot side walking away from the table after the Crans-Montana talks in 2017. This turned into negative sentiment among Turkish Cypriots, making the anti-Tatar sentiment more visible.

Erhürman’s campaign slogan, “I promise seriousness,” was not merely a criticism of Tatar’s rhetorical politics. It also referred to the failure to implement policies that affect citizens’ lives, beyond the vicious cycle of foreign policy. Complaints that the government formed after the 2022 political crises was inadequate were also among the factors that paved the way for Erhürman’s victory. It should be noted that the Tatar camp also observed that the current government’s performance negatively affected them.

Sociological fault lines on the Island

A key factor in the Erhürman-Tatar rivalry and the National Unity Party (UBP)-CTP competition is the sociocultural differences between Turkish Cypriots who lived on the island before 1974 and those who migrated from Türkiye after that date. This difference in identity and historical heritage has led to conflicts over the decades and is reflected in voting trends during elections. Tatar, who is in the UBP, experienced one of his disappointments in these elections when he found that the voting preferences of those who came from Türkiye did not turn into a block voting practice, as they had in previous elections. The previously polarized masses showed a more heterogeneous distribution this time. Moreover, the turnout rate in the first round was higher than in previous elections (64 percent).

Erhürman promised to grant the right to obtain a Cyprus-EU passport to children born to couples in mixed marriages (i.e., marriages between children of families who lived on the island before 1974 and Turks who migrated there afterwards). Emphasizing this issue from a human rights perspective, Erhürman took a convincing stance, arguing that gains could be achieved at the negotiating table. He promised that, as a result of negotiations with the EU, favorable mechanisms for Turks could be established with the support of the Greek Cypriot side. This approach addresses the issue as a human rights issue rather than a matter of “confidence-building measures,” which could ignite a restoration process that spreads to other issues.

The current status quo in Cyprus forces Turkish Cypriots to live in undeserved isolation woven with embargoes, as well as commercial and cultural isolation. Recently, one of the significant indicators of the international discrimination faced by Turkish Cypriots occurred. Jordan announced that it would not import halloumi cheese from the TRNC. While the Greek Cypriot administration welcomed the decision, the Turkish side opposed it. Such developments directly affect the lives of Turks and influenced the elections.

The narrowing regional pincer: the shadow of the Israel-Greek Cypriot alliance

Although the Cyprus issue has not been as prominent in Türkiye’s calculus in recent years, geopolitical tensions have drawn attention to developments on the island and in the surrounding area. Notably, the escalating military cooperation between Israel and the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) violates the “Cyprus Agreement” and bypasses Türkiye, the island’s guarantor. This cooperation also endangers the security of Turkish Cypriots, who have an inherent right to live on the island. Israel’s aggressive expansionism has resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians in recent years.

Ignoring the negative impact of this reality on regional countries and deploying Israel’s air defense systems at Baf Air Base constitutes a further violation of the guarantee framework. The Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus Defense Minister’s announcement that they have opened their air and naval bases to Israel creates a situation that poses a threat in the short, medium, and long term. It should be emphasized that the new president, Erhürman, also has a sharply critical perspective on the Greek Cypriot side. He stresses that Israel, France, and the US usurp the “founding partner rights” by including the Greek Cypriot side in their security umbrella. In the current rhetorical analysis, it is important to note that Türkiye and the new TRNC president share the same perspective on this issue.

D

evelopments in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, which surround Turkey’s 4,000-kilometer coastline and over which Turkey has sovereign rights, are of great importance to Turkey. In light of recent developments in the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean, predictions of possible developments in 2024 are also important in this regard. In the recent past, Turkey has shown a determined attitude in defending its sovereign rights in the seas and airspace of these two important regions.

In the Aegean Sea, Turkey has maintained its stance against Greece’s expansion of its territorial waters and the arming of the Eastern Aegean islands, as well as its legal position on the delimitation of the continental shelf. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey has continued its actions to protect its continental shelf rights and to protect the rights of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). At the same time, Turkey has sought to improve its bilateral relations with Greece, Egypt, and Israel. As a result, local tensions stemming from fundamental problems in both the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean have decreased significantly.

This analysis will focus on whether there are threats to this positive trend in 2024, especially after Israel’s ongoing attacks on Gaza that began in early October 2023 and possible Turkish positions vis-à-vis such threats.

Turkey’s Approach to the Aegean Problems in the Recent Past

The deterioration of relations between Turkey and Greece, especially since 2016, has led to serious tensions over existing core issues in the Aegean. Issues such as the arming of the Eastern Aegean islands and Greece’s national airspace have led to concrete frictions. In early 2021, consultative talks between the two countries resumed, but they were broken off after only three rounds. Greece’s efforts to persuade the U.S. to take a position against Turkey led to the suspension of all talks, including high-level ones.

However, both countries are aware of the fact that even if bilateral problems cannot be solved, as neighbors, it is necessary to ensure that bilateral relations remain good. Even at the NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, on July 11-12, 2023, President Erdoğan and Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis met and agreed to activate several channels of communication between the two countries and to initiate a High-Level Cooperation Council at the level of heads of state or ministers.

Another positive development is the economic diplomacy initiatives, or “Positive Agenda” meetings, which started in April 2021 with an agreement between Foreign Ministers Çavuşoğlu and Dendias in Ankara. These initiatives made progress after the disasters experienced by both countries and paved the way for new areas of cooperation in the economic context. An important step in this positive process was the visit of Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis to Turkey on September 5, 2023. During the visit, a meeting was held with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara.

Finally, President Erdoğan’s visit to Athens on December 7, 2023 marked the first meeting of the Turkey-Greece High-Level Cooperation Council in almost seven years since its inception in 2010. The fourth meeting of the Turkey-Greece High-Level Cooperation Council was last held in Izmir on March 8, 2016.

During his visit to Athens, President Erdoğan met with Greek President Sakelaropoulou and Prime Minister Mitsotakis. The official statements following the talks indicate that, as expected, mainly Positive Agenda items were discussed and progress was made. At the end of the talks, the “Athens Declaration on Friendly Relations and Good Neighborliness between Turkey and Greece” was issued. Some concrete decisions were also announced within the framework of the understanding stated in the Athens Declaration. Accordingly, the parties agreed to hold “continuous, constructive and meaningful” consultations on the basis of the specified “pillars.”

Another important stated intention was to continue “confidence-building measures,” including military measures, which would contribute to the elimination of unwarranted sources of tension and related risks. The parties undertook to refrain from any declaration, initiative, or action that would undermine this declaration or jeopardize the maintenance of peace and stability in their region.

Aegean Forecasts for 2024

Turkey’s position on sovereignty issues in the Aegean Sea will continue with the same determination. Indicative of this was Foreign Minister Fidan’s statement that Turkey’s rights in the Aegean Sea and the rights of the Turkish Muslim minority in Western Thrace and the Dodecanese Islands will be protected. It is clear from the official statements made before President Erdoğan’s visit to Athens that there was a “sovereignty issues are not up for discussion” approach on the Greek side. This essentially meant that the core issues could not be the subject of negotiations.

However, the main objective at this stage will be to maintain the moderate atmosphere in relations and strengthen the positive agenda. As President Erdoğan has stated, Turkey wants to conduct a process in which both sides will win. Although it was stated that the Athens Declaration would not be a binding international agreement for the parties in accordance with international law, the commitment to continue dialogue, good relations, and cooperation was expressed by stating that the letter of the document should not be violated.

There are some important expectations for the next period. The first is that the good atmosphere created between the two countries at the beginning of 2023 will now be transformed into a system of bilateral cooperation, and that the political dialogue and cooperation mechanisms will continue. As stated in the Athens Declaration, the parties are expected to avoid statements and attitudes that would complicate this process, and, even beyond that, to take steps to strengthen the process. The most important aspect of this process is that third parties, such as the U.S. and the EU, should not be allowed to undermine it.

The second expectation is to resume the process of consultative talks in order to resolve the main issues that cause tension between the two countries. The question of when it would be appropriate to start this process can be evaluated separately; however, in order to achieve results, it is important that the process start at a stage that is free from elements that could disrupt or stop it again.

President Erdoğan’s proposal, just before his visit to Athens, that “not only the delimitation of the continental shelf, but all Aegean problems should be taken to the International Court of Justice” is of great importance. This proposal both negates Turkey’s allegations that it “does not abide by the law” and forces Greece to change its “single problem” approach that blocks the solution of the problems. President Erdoğan’s approach is expected to have important repercussions in the context of the solution of fundamental problems in the future.

Recently, Turkey has taken a harsh stance against Israel’s attacks on Gaza, which have been ongoing for the past two months. On the other hand, most EU countries, including Greece, and the U.S. have taken almost the opposite stance and supported Israel, creating an anti-Turkey atmosphere which has the potential to have an impact on Turkey-Greece relations as well.

Meanwhile, Greece’s skeptical and exaggerated “fear of Turkey” persists. Even a routine statement by Foreign Minister Fidan that Turkey’s rights in the Aegean Sea and the rights of the Turkish Muslim minority in Western Thrace and the Dodecanese Islands will be protected was presented as a matter of concern in the Greek press. In the coming period, such situations threaten to have a negative impact on bilateral relations, which have been progressing with a positive agenda.

T

urkish-Greek relations, which navigated a strained course after 2016 with harsh discourse and even frictions on the ground, have ushered in a new era with the earthquakes disaster that occurred in Turkey on February 6, 2023. Greece was among the first countries to offer help and dispatch search and rescue teams to Turkey.

Shortly after the disaster, on February 12, Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias came to Turkey and paid a visit to the earthquake-hit region alongside his Turkish counterpart Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. With this visit, the diplomatic relations, which were suspended completely during the era of frayed relations, were somewhat revitalized.

The official statements given by both sides in the course of the ensuing months became moderate. In addition, Turkish President Erdoğan and Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis held a meeting in the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius, on the margins of the NATO Summit. The meeting, which involved the participation of the foreign ministers as well, was stated to be held in “good atmosphere,” and the statements on the heels of the meeting included expressions such as “both sides agreed to build on this positive momentum and activate the multiple channels of communication between the two countries in the upcoming period.”

They also agreed that the next meeting of the High-Level Cooperation Council at the leaders or the ministerial level be held in Thessaloniki in autumn. It was indicated that the leaders tasked their foreign ministers with “guiding the processes and reporting on the progress.”

The meeting between Foreign Ministers Fidan and Gerapetritis

Another crucial step of the abovementioned positive process was the visit of the Greek foreign minister to Turkey on September 5, 2023. During the visit, Giorgos Gerapetritis held a meeting with his counterpart Hakan Fidan, both of whom had newly assumed their positions. The statements of the foreign ministers during the press release following their meeting, offered hints of a deepening of the dialogue between the two parties.

First and foremost, Foreign Minister Fidan proclaimed the inauguration of a new era. “We have entered a new and positive era in our relations with Greece,” he stated. He said that the relations were exhaustively reviewed in Vilnius in line with the directives of the countries’ leaders and that they have been working on a road map for the forthcoming periods. He went on to add that the “Political Consultations and Joint Action Plan” meetings at the deputy foreign ministerial level would be held in Greece in October, and emphasized that the meetings of “Confidence-Building Measures” and exploratory talks were also on the agenda.

Another important matter, expressed in Vilnius, was that the decision to hold the fifth meeting of the High-Level Cooperation Council under the chairmanship of their leaders in Thessaloniki before the end of the year. This statement revealed that both parties are determined to resume relations at the highest level. In addition, the two leaders would meet at the inaugural meetings of the UN General Assembly in mid-September.

Fidan affirmed that they were pleased with the Joint Action Plan, and that the deputy foreign ministers would hold a meeting in Greece in December during which they would also discuss the progress made. The steps to be taken on the commercial matters would also be discussed.

Another remarkable point, which is equally important as the concrete steps in the dialogue process, is Turkey’s vigorous will to uphold the process. Minister Fidan indicated that revitalization of the channels of dialogue and the high-level contacts were a positive step, and that Turkey retains the will to maintain this by reaffirming that Turkey is ready to carry on with the process unconditionally and to develop relations in all aspects on the basis of common interests. Turkey has always espoused this approach and Minister Fidan reiterated that the problems between the two neighbors and allies can only be resolved through constructive dialogue.

Beyond the clear-cut determination regarding the dialogue process, it is important to clarify the developments that took place or are likely to take place on the settlement of the problems between the two countries. Explaining that the problems regarding the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean were also comprehensively assessed, Fidan revealed that a tangible dialogue has begun for the settlement of the problems. He highlighted that these problems had been addressed in the past during the consultative talks, and that they have been in talks to restart the process. More importantly, Fidan affirmed that they are in consensus about “introducing novel ways to resolve the problems.” He also stressed that Turkey has always defended the principle of equitable sharing in the context of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Nearly all important matters were, thus, discussed during the Fidan-Gerapetritis meeting. While demanding more cooperation on the fight against the PKK, FETÖ, and the DHKP-C terrorist organizations and irregular migration, the Turkish side also raised the issue of the need to resolve the problems facing the Muslim Turks in Western Thrace. Addressing regional problems and the questions of Ukraine, Russia, and Syria, and EU-Turkey relations, Turkey stressed that the bilateral problems can be settled “on the basis of mutual rights and interests as well as respect to international law.”

Gerapetritis’s statements indicated that the Greek approach is quite similar to the Turkish one. Rather than discussing the specific issues that were addressed in the meeting, Gerapetritis underscored the need to keep the lines of communication open and stressed the principles to form the basis of the settlement of the problems. Underlining that attempts to commence and maintain dialogue would contribute to the development of bilateral relations, he indicated that this is of paramount importance for the tranquility of the region. In this vein, he explained that the commitment which was assumed was a historical one and that this assigned the task of “maintaining good neighborly relations, observing the mutual interests of the people, and taking initiatives within the framework of a sustainable peace” to both countries.

Athens’s move to express that it is in favor of dialogue with such unambiguous and conclusive terms indicates that dialogue is an irrevocable process for Greece, which is promising.

The emphasis on building new and positive approaches by setting aside mutual biases, and even overcoming the animosity between the two countries that stems from historical events, constitutes an integral part of good relations and the settlement of bilateral issues. Reaching a reconciliation by making mutual compromises requires the alleviation—and if possible the elimination—of biases and animosity.

In this respect, a few points that Gerapetritis touched upon in his speech are worth noting. He conceded that the grief of the past cannot be erased with a stroke of a pen, but underlined that they were compelled to contain crises-prone disagreements and stereotyped understandings by investing more in sincerity and mutual understanding. Stating that it is difficult to harbor hopes to patch up all problems in the near future as their settlement requires a milder environment, Gerapetritis stressed that it is better to focus on the unifying factors and to stay away from what has set the two countries apart.

Emphasizing the fact that the dialogue is a three-pronged process, Gerapetritis explained that the first stage would be the “level of political talks,” the second was the “Confidence-Building Measures” negotiations soon to be started, and the third the aides agree that the positive agenda ought to be chaired by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece Konstantinos Fragkogiannis,. The last stage would cover areas such as trade, maritime sector, communication, and climate and environmental problems.

Athens does not appear to have had a change of heart with regard to its attitude towards Ankara-Brussels relations and Turkey’s EU membership bid. As Gerapetritis expounded, Greece has long bolstered Turkey’s EU orientation but has not backed away from referring to the preconditions (which extend beyond the membership criteria) that vex Ankara. By the same token, Gerapetritis was not unaware of politically driven and unilateral preconditions to Ankara’s membership when he suggested during a press conference in the wake of the meeting that Greece backed Turkey’s bid provided that the latter fulfill the EU criteria.

A

lthough on May 21 New Democracy (ND) won the general election in Greece securing the high percentage of 40.79 of the votes, it didn’t win the parliamentary majority which required an additional five seats. In May 2023, ND returned the mandate to form a government without seeking a coalition, as an amendment to the electoral code stipulates that the winning party will be granted additional parliamentary seats effective from the most recent election. As none of the other parties could form a coalition government, runoff elections were set for June.

On June 25, in line with expectations, ND won the elections with 40.55% of the vote, winning 50 additional parliamentary seats. In 58 out of 59 constituencies, ND came first, lagging behind the Coalition of the Radical Left – Progressive Alliance (SYRIZA) only in Rhodope, a region in Western Thrace that is home to people of Turkish origin.

It is not surprising that ND, the flagship of the center-right in Greek politics, has become so powerful given the country’s economic and geopolitical situation. When the 2009 debt crisis took its toll, SYRIZA, with its radical rhetoric, was seen by the masses as a savior against the center-right ND and the center-left PASOK. However, despite winning both elections in 2015, SYRIZA failed to secure a parliamentary majority and had to share power with the nationalist Independent Greeks (ANEL) party.

A rapid privatization drive

During this period, the party stepped back from its radical rhetoric, concluded a debt restructuring agreement with the EU, and failed to implement its own program on economic policies, civilianization, secularism, and human rights. Therefore, no one was fully satisfied with its volatile economic and foreign policies. In the 2019 general elections, New Democracy came back to power on its own, promising economic growth and full alignment with the Western world.

In its first term in power, ND implemented these promises. Since coming to power in 2019, the first Kyriakos Mitsotakis government has launched a rapid privatization drive and sought to attract foreign investment by offering incentives and facilities to various entrepreneurs. It has focused on tourism, production, energy, and technology. The harmonious relations it has developed with the West provided confidence to foreign investors and facilitated the procurement of foreign resources. As a result, in 2019 and 2021, Greece achieved the highest levels of foreign investment in its history in proportion to its annual income. It also prepared a comprehensive program of reforms and projects in 2021, securing €17.77 billion in grants and €12.73 billion in loans from the EU Rescue Fund.

As a result, since the COVID19 pandemic, the Greek economy has grown at an average annual rate of more than 7%. Exports, which were less than $40 billion a year before the pandemic, reached $57.5 billion in 2022. Last year, the EU terminated the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) on Greece with the view that the structural conditions that led to the crisis. In the near future, international credit rating agencies are also expected to rate Greece “investment grade” for the first time since 2010. Thus, Greece will be able to attract even more foreign investment and cash money in the coming years.

Turkey and the EU

New Democracy’s economic policies make even more sense when considered in conjunction with its foreign policy. In foreign policy, as in the economy, the Greek government has identified the Euro-Atlantic alliance as its sole and undisputed geopolitical direction. Presenting itself as a loyal and reliable ally of the Western world, Greece has taken advantage of its geographical position in the increasing competition between Russia and the West, and has aspired to be assigned to various tasks and responsibilities. By doing so, it has increased its geopolitical importance by strengthening its interdependence with the Western world, especially in the fields of defense and energy.

For the same purpose, the Mitsotakis government did not hesitate to use Turkey’s problems with the Western world to its advantage. Killing several birds with one stone, Greece obtained diplomatic and military support from countries such as the U.S. and France, and ensured decisions against Turkey were being taken at the EU level. At the same time, Greece sought new cooperation opportunities with its active diplomacy against Turkey in various regions of the world, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean. These opportunities found support in the Western world.

Between 2019 and 2023, a period characterized by numerous crises and security risks at the global and regional levels, ND achieved visible results in both the economy and foreign policy by pursuing neoliberal economic policies and a purely Western-oriented foreign policy. Of course, these policies had negative consequences as well. The easing of taxes on big capitalists in the name of investment incentives, the significant burden of public revenues on middle- and low-income citizens through indirect taxes, and the limited increases in the minimum wage and public salaries have led to a steady increase in income inequality under ND’s rule.

Train crash

The opposition has blamed the Greek government for the train crash on February 28 in which 57 people were killed, while the Greek government failed to adequately address infrastructure deficiencies due to frugality in public spending. In the name of order and stability, the government has pursued ruthless policies against asylum seekers, and it was revealed that the phones of politicians and journalists who were considered to be a threat to the government were tapped. In foreign policy, the confrontation with Turkey posed a significant security risk for the country, while increased military expenditures put an additional burden on the budget.

Despite such criticisms, it appears that the Greek public prefers a decisive and consistent course in the fields of economy and foreign policy. Faced with three major crises in recent years—the refugee crisis, the coronavirus pandemic, and the Russia-Ukraine war—Greece needs Western support as the severe effects of the debt crisis continue. Given these factors, by virtue of its political-ideological profile New Democracy stands out as the party that can maintain relations with the West at the most advanced level. Moreover, ND, which has a nationalist-conservative base as well as a liberal one, can appeal to a wide audience through populist rhetoric and practices. Thus, for example, the statements made by ND officials regarding the conflicts with Turkey and the support that Mitsotakis receives in the Western world have a positive effect on the party’s image in the eyes of the public.

When Mitsotakis came to power in Greece for the first time, he said that it would take two terms for the country to truly recover. At the end of the first term, macroeconomic indicators led the public to believe that the crisis was being overcome, while steps taken by the government in production, exports, and development gave hope for the future. Moreover, in a period full of crises and geopolitical risks, the support that Mitsotakis has received from the Western world is considered important by a large part of the Greek public.

Thus, despite all the existing problems, voters in Greece brought ND back to power. We can already foresee that the policies of New Democracy, which has solidly won the approval of voters in two consecutive elections, will continue in the same direction. However, time will tell for how long the public will remain patient while awaiting the concrete effects on daily life of the macro indicators of economic policies. Moreover, the preference of the second Mitsotakis government to feed on disputes with Turkey instead of seeing the post-earthquake détente as an opportunity to strengthen mutual understanding and co-operation could lead to larger crises in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean than those of the past.

M

ohamed Auajjar, the chair of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya (FFM), led a three-year investigation by the UN Human Rights Council to investigate human rights abuses committed by all parties to the conflict in Libya since 2016.

The mission urged the Libyan authorities to cooperate more closely to uncover the truth behind the widespread crimes committed against both Libyans and migrants in the country.

According to the FFM, there are reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity have been committed. These crimes include arbitrary detention, murder, torture, rape, enslavement, sexual slavery, extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances.

The EU’s indirect support for human rights abuses in Libya

During the course of its investigation, the UN fact-finding mission visited Libya and urged local authorities to cooperate more extensively to establish the truth about these heinous and massive crimes.

The mission focused on identifying human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law in various Libyan cities.

FFM investigator Chaloka Beyani has stated that the European Union’s support for Libyan authorities has “aided and abetted rights breaches against migrants.”

Beyani clarified, “We’re not saying that the EU and its member states have committed these crimes. The point is that the support given has aided and abetted the commission of the crimes.”

The EU’s response to allegations

In response to these allegations, European Union Spokesman for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Peter Stano denied that the EU intends to “push and keep migrants in Libya.”

Stano emphasized that the EU “does not finance any Libyan entity and does not give material funds to partners in Libya.”

Despite the EU’s denial of involvement, the report highlights its indirect support in facilitating these human rights abuses. This raises concerns about the EU’s role in the ongoing crisis in Libya and the subsequent impact on human rights and international law.

Survivors speak out

The report found that the violations were carried out under the nominal or actual control of Libya’s Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration, the Libyan Coast Guard, and the Stability Support Apparatus.

According to the report, the FFM asserts that the “European Union and its Member States, directly or indirectly, provided monetary and technical support and equipment,” including boats to the Libyan Coast Guard and the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration for the interception and detention of migrants.

The report revealed alarming crimes against humanity in Libyan detention centers, where migrants faced torture, rape, enslavement, and starvation.

One victim who was held in Maya, Ayn Zarah, and Gharyan detention centers said, “Our concern is not dying in the water, but our concern is to go back to the prison where we will be oppressed and tortured by guards.”

The report disclosed numerous survivors and witnesses of rape cases, indicating that such crimes were widespread and routinely experienced in detention centers.

Pregnancies resulting from rapes in detention centers were frequently observed according to the report, and women often gave birth without access to professional medical assistance.

In this regard, victims often became aware of being sold or bought only when confronted with new circumstances and abuse. Enslavement, including sexual slavery, occurred in detention centers, and the mission found evidence of such crimes in Sabratha and Bani Walid.

The report documented cases of migrants forced to work in factories, construction,   and agriculture.

“In a case of enslavement and forced labor, a child from Mali was taken to a farm and forced to work with animals, only to be told he had been bought when he asked to leave.”

T

here have been remarkable developments in Turkey-Egypt relations, particularly since the beginning of 2021. The diplomacy and dialogue mechanisms of the bilateral relations between the two countries have quite a variety of variables and dimensions. In this context, despite the conflicting foreign policy priorities of both parties, the relations between Ankara and Cairo, which have a deep-rooted common history from a political, economic, and cultural perspective, progress in a balanced manner.

The exploratory talks held in May and September of 2021 played a major role in the formation of such a balance. The diplomatic contacts between the two countries, which began at the level of deputy ministers, had a symbolic value in terms of normalizing the relations that had been reduced to a minimum since 2013. The contacts, however, did not aim to achieve a final result in the short term.

Contrary to expectations, decisive steps were taken towards the solution of many problematic issues of the agenda of the two countries during this process, and the two parties achieved significant momentum. However, the parties’ divergent stances regarding Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean slowed down the normalization steps, and brought the relations back to a tense atmosphere. In this tense atmosphere, the handshake between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Sisi, despite all the existing differences, at the opening ceremony of the World Cup held in Qatar in 2022, has raised hopes, once again, for a dialogue on normalization.

Libya and Turkey-Egypt bilateral relations

Turkey and Egypt closely followed the chain of events taking place in Libya after Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown as a result of the popular movement that started in 2011. The fragile nature of the local political dynamics and the ever-changing system of alliances in Libya have placed the two countries in opposite camps in the post-2014 regional competition. In 2019, the coup attempt by Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the eastern militia forces, against the capital Tripoli and the events that followed, led to the political rivalry between Ankara and Cairo over Libya to break out.

The Turkey-Libya Maritime Boundary Delimitation and Defense Cooperation Agreement signed between Ankara and the then Government of National Accord (GNA) of Libya translated into a close coordination and collaboration between Turkey and the internationally recognized and legitimate political leadership in Tripoli. One of the main reasons of Ankara’s increasing engagement with the political processes in Libya was to help defend Turkey’s national interests with regard to the competition in the Eastern Mediterranean.

As Turkey considered insecurity vis-à-vis its interests in Libya and the Mediterranean, it followed a more proactive and determined political approach. On the other hand, the possible takeover of the country’s administration by Haftar, who has a long record of numerous human rights violations and war crimes, was interpreted as a strong threat by decision-makers at the time. At this point, among the reasons that forced Turkey to act was the demographic, social, and economic damage that could have been caused not only in Libya but in the region and the world at large by the potential mass migration waves that could start due to possible violence against civilians.

At the same time, Egypt, due to its wide borders with eastern Libya, remained indifferent to the formation and development of a homogeneous security apparatus in the Cyrenaica region, the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA) affiliated to Khalifa Haftar, and affiliated itself politically with Aguila Saleh, the head of the Tobruk-based parliament and the related political structure. Egypt’s desire to have an influence in the political developments in Libya is another reason for the Sisi administration’s engagement with political figures, armed groups, and tribes in the eastern region.

Egypt has strong commercial and economic relations with Libya. For years, the remittances brought into the country by Egyptians working in Libya were an important source of income for the Egyptian economy. In addition to security-based, political, and economic parameters, the regional alliance of which Egypt was a party pushed Cairo to implement more aggressive policies in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean. The alliance with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) made Egypt participate in regional formations with weak feasibility from the perspective of international law that undermined its possible gains in the Eastern Mediterranean with the conclusion of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) agreements.

Within this framework, following the signing of the hydrocarbon agreement between Turkey and the National Unity Government (MBH) in October, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry announced that Cairo had suspended normalization talks due to Turkey’s stance on Libya. This agreement, which was crafted as an extension of the Maritime Deal dated November 27, 2019, is based on the principle of cooperation and benefit in maximizing the national interests of both Turkey and Libya, and it would be wrong to interpret it as a warning to Egypt.

On the contrary, the agreement reveals the possible gains that Egypt could garner in case of cooperation. As Turkish authorities have been asserting, since the start of the normalization negotiations, Egypt reaching an agreement on the maritime border could give it an area of 11,500 square kilometers. On the other hand, despite Egypt’s harsh reaction to the agreement, Turkey’s moderate approach still shows its determination and desire for normalizing ties.

Is renormalization possible?

The ongoing crisis between Turkey and Egypt was moved to the back burner after the leaders of the two countries shook hands at the opening ceremony of the World Cup held in Qatar in December 2022. Indeed, the picture that shows President Erdoğan and President Sisi shaking hands for the first time is not a sufficient indication on its own of the resumption of normalization talks. Due to its weight both in Libya and in the African continent, Egypt is an important factor for Turkey’s new foreign policy based on normalizing ties, which started with the Gulf countries, gained momentum with Egypt, and continued with Israel. However, success in diplomacy necessitates the willingness of both actors, and depends on strong communication channels and negotiations.

Some of the indicators suggest that Egypt has not fully demonstrated such determination. One recent example of such an action was the decree issued by President Sisi on December 20 in which the Cairo administration unilaterally determined the Western borders of Egypt with Libya, including the EEZ. It is argued that while this decision targets the hydrocarbon agreement that Turkey signed with Libya, it also shows that Egypt has no intention of making any concessions on the Libyan issue.

The decree was also not welcomed by the internationally recognized government of Libya. The Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that with the unilateral declaration of the said borders, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Libya were targeted, and the decree violated the principle of goodwill. Ankara’s reaction, on the other hand, came in parallel with its past balanced stance. In a statement made by Turkey, Libya and Egypt were invited to initiate dialogue and negotiations as soon as possible to determine the borders between the two countries in accordance with international law.

In sum, despite strong signs of normalization between Turkish and Egyptian political leaders, the challenges of the past are still relevant and threaten the prospect of normalization. However, it is important to protect the communication channels by keeping the existing problematic issues at a minimum level. In this sense, it is not difficult to see that Turkey exhibits a more rational and moderate approach to bilateral relations compared to Egypt.

Cooperation with Turkey in the region in the fields of political, economic, and security relations could bring important gains for Egypt, which is struggling with various internal and external problems. Accordingly, in addition to Egypt’s preferences in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, the political tone of the Sisi administration, will largely determine whether renormalization in bilateral relations will be possible.

A

lexandroupolis is a port city in Greece, known as “Dedeağaç” in Turkish. Back in the nineteenth century, this small town was located on the transportation and trade routes of the Ottoman Empire. Under the Greek administration, Alexandroupolis, which lies in the north easternmost part of the country, did not make a breakthrough for about a century. However, due to the developments in the energy sector and the changing security perceptions in the West, today, the city is emerging as a vibrant hub.

Energy transmission capacity

Alexandroupolis brings together a highway, railway, and airport network stretching from the Aegean Sea to the Black Sea. The highway and railway are directly connected to the port, and  Alexandroupolis is also the connection point of TAP and TANAP, two major pipelines of the Southern Gas Corridor.

More recently, the Alexandroupolis Independent Natural Gas System (INGS), which includes both LNG storage with a capacity of 170,000 m3 and a regasification unit with a capacity of 5.5 billion m3, was constructed. The Alexandroupolis Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) will be stationed 17.6 km southwest of Alexandroupolis at a depth of 40 m in the Thracian Sea.

The energy brought from the FSRU will be transmitted to the National Natural Gas System (NNGS) and distributed to consumers in Greece via power plants being built across Western Thrace. North Macedonia- and Bulgaria-linked companies are making investments to carry the energy via interconnectors to their own countries.

With the LNG terminal, planned to be built by the end of 2023, the Alexandroupolis port has the potential to become an energy hub. A plan to expand its capacity has been prepared by the port authority with the support of the Greek government. This includes a new electric rail line connecting the port to the Trans-European railway, the addition of much more quay space, a new cargo terminal, an additional 500-meter pier, and a bypass to the local highway.

Greece will make significant economic gains not only from the port and FSRU, but also from carrying the LNG as it holds more than 22% of the global LNG carrying capacity. With an interconnector extended into Bulgaria from TAP’s processing facilities in Komotini, and another from Sofia to Niš, gas will be transferred into Bulgaria and Serbia. Thus, a non-Russian gas option will be born in the region.

Greece’s Alexandroupolis policies

Alexandroupolis’s potential for the transmission of energy is strongly linked with Greece’s policies to be the key country in Europe’s energy security. To this end, Greece strengthens its diplomatic ties with both energy-exporting Gulf countries and importing European countries.

The Greek authorities’ rhetoric reveals that Greece aims to compete with Turkey’s role as an energy hub. At a recent meeting, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman signed important agreements on energy. Prince Salman stated that Saudi Arabia is interested in hydrogen energy and making Greece a hub for hydrogen energy in Europe.

In his statement after the agreements with Saudi Arabia, the Greek Minister of Development and Investments Adonis Georgiadis claimed that Greece has very close strategic relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel, and added, “What a great foreign policy the Turks have had for all these years, the opposite is happening now. Turkey is completely isolated and the biggest player in the region is undoubtedly Saudi Arabia, with which Greece has the strategic relationship I mentioned above.” Such developments are not only limited to Saudi Arabia.

As soon as Turkey and Israel declared that they were going to normalize diplomatic ties and reappoint ambassadors, Mitsotakis paid a visit to Qatar which is considered a geopolitical ally of Turkey. In the meeting, Mitsotakis, by pointing out that Qatar is a natural gas producer, mentioned the importance of Greece, especially Alexandroupolis, in energy transportation. More recently, President of the United Arab Emirates Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed met Mitsotakis as part of his visit to Athens. In the meeting, Mitsotakis briefed Zayed on the infrastructure facilities being built in Greece for LNG import, storage, and regasification. He claimed that these efforts, combined with Greece’s strategic geographical location, make the country an energy hub for the Middle East and a bridge connecting the East to Europe.

U.S. interest in Alexandroupolis

Alexandroupolis saw several development projects worth 2.3 million euros in order to reach the capacity to serve Arleigh Burke-class U.S. destroyers. In the context of NATO and U.S. military shipments, numerous military vehicles were delivered through the port. These include Black Hawk, Apache, Sikorsky, Chinook, and Romeo helicopters, and M1 Abrams tanks. Only in the summer of 2022, 2,400 pieces of military equipment passed through the port, making this the largest number of U.S. weapons ever to pass through a single port.

Numerous other mechanized units were reported to have been sent to the port, some of which were then sent to the islands that Turkey claims should be demilitarized. In the first stage, the claimed intention by Greece and the U.S. was to transfer them to Ukraine. In addition to arms transfers, in the context of Operation Atlantic Resolve, the U.S. Army 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team with 4,000 soldiers and 2,000 pieces of equipment deployed in the region. U.S. jets were sent to Alexandroupolis to replace those is Larissa.

Moving beyond NATO, in 2019, the U.S. provided funds for the dislodging of a sunken dredger ship from the port basin. This provided access to the full capacity of the port and opened the possibility of serving large vessels. In the same year, Greece and U.S. signed a protocol which extended the scope of the 1990 Greece-U.S. Defense Cooperation Agreement and provided the United States access to the Alexandroupolis port.

In 2020, the U.S. Congress released funds for the installation of precision approach radars (maritime domain awareness) throughout the Aegean Sea. Consequently, Alexandroupolis came to the agenda in terms of Greece-U.S. cooperation before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the Russian-Ukrainian war accelerated the port’s development attempts and provided a legitimate explanation for the policies being carried out in the port.

On the other hand, the privatization of the Alexandroupolis port is on the agenda, and two of the four candidates planned to participate in the tender have ties to Russia. Considering that the Port of Piraeus is operated by a Chinese state-owned company and the Port of Thessaloniki is operated by Russia-backed companies, Greece maintains its relations with non-Western powers too. Knowing the U.S. and European sensitivity toward Alexandroupolis, Greece may use these two candidates as a trump card to obtain potential U.S. or European aid under the excuse of aligning foreign policy objectives.

Fruits of lobbying

Greece’s initiatives in Alexandroupolis are supported by the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish lobbies in the United States. A report published by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) focuses on Greece, particularly Alexandroupolis, in all seven solutions it proposes for resolving the energy crisis created by the Russia-Ukraine war. The report emphasizes the importance of solidarity between the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus (GASC), Israel, Egypt, and Greece. In this context, the report calls for the U.S. to take the financial and diplomatic leadership in the axis of the Three Sea Initiatives to develop the railway and road infrastructure of Alexandroupolis and increase defense aid to Greece. In the report, there is no mention of Turkey, NATO’s easternmost corner.

Moreover, in an interview with the Greek daily Kathimerini, Jonathan Rue, director of foreign policy at JINSA, explained his perspective with the statement that Turkey has deliberately abandoned its traditional role as NATO’s southeast anchor against Russia and other threats and that Alexandroupolis, bypassing the Turkish Straits, became an important alternative to Turkey in securing a position for the NATO forces in the region.

Meanwhile, Greek lobbying efforts appear to have borne fruit as witnessed in the statements of Bob Menendez, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who recently paid a visit to Alexandroupolis and gave a statement claiming that the port has unlimited possibilities for Greece and its allies. He also claimed that Turkey, a NATO member, is the biggest threat in the Eastern Mediterranean.

T

he Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 was used to settle many disputed aspects of the Greek-Turkish traumatic relations in the early 1990s—but not all. In addition to the conclusively unsettled issues like the title to some islets in the eastern Aegean Sea, newly emerging rules of international law concerning maritime and airspace have created new areas of disagreements, such as the extent of the Greek territorial waters, national airspace, and the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea.

The Aegean Sea is characterized by disputes rather than friendly relations and cooperation. The two countries do not even agree on what constitutes the dispute in the Aegean Sea: while Greece maintains a “single-dispute approach,” Turkey argues that there are multiple disputes to be settled.

Greece’s long-standing insistence that there is only the continental shelf delimitation dispute leads to a restrictive approach. Greece submits the issue as such to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which implies  one way of settlement. On the other hand, Turkey insists that there are many disputes such as the title to certain islets, the violation of the demilitarized status of the eastern Aegean islands, the illegitimate attempt to extend the Greek territorial waters beyond the current six miles, and the illegal extension of the Greek national airspace which is four miles wider than its territorial waters. Turkey’s perspective is that all these issues should be negotiated as a whole with any unresolved dispute eventually being brought to international adjudication.

With this approach Turkey insists that Greece acknowledges all the existing disputes that are key to a sincere negotiation. The next step, according to Turkey, would be bringing the unresolved disputes to the international courts in order to find durable solutions acceptable to both sides. However, Turkey’s stance is regarded by Greece as refusing to go to international adjudication, which is actually not the case.

The Greek obstructions

The first concrete sign of Greece’s single-dispute approach was to unilaterally submit the continental shelf dispute to the ICJ in 1976. The court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to handle the case due to the lack of Turkey’s consent. This move is used by Greece to argue that Turkey is “against a legal settlement.”

The picture is, however, quite the opposite. Greece obstructed the process of finding a legitimate solution by bringing the dispute to the ICJ unilaterally. This is unequivocally evidenced in Greece’s 2015 declaration whereby it announced that it recognizes the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ ipso facto and without special agreement in relation to all legal disputes with any other state accepting the same obligation.

At the same time, Greece puts quite comprehensive restrictions on the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. The first exception covers “any dispute relating to military activities and measures taken by the Hellenic Republic for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, for national defense purposes, as well as for the protection of its national security.”

This exception is vague and ambiguous enough that any issue which constitutes a dispute between Turkey and Greece could fall under its jurisdiction—therefore, all bilateral disputes can be excluded from the jurisdiction of the ICJ, thus obstructing the way to judicial means.

Greece goes even further by putting a further exception: “[a]ny dispute concerning State boundaries or sovereignty over the territory of the Hellenic Republic, including any dispute over the breadth and limits of its territorial sea and its airspace” is to be excluded from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.

This exception directly refers to the disputes in the Aegean Sea that Greece refuses to acknowledge. These are the disputes over the extent of the Greek national airspace, the territorial waters, and the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf.

A third exception includes two categories of states with which Greece encounters disputes. First, the exemption prevents Greece from accepting the jurisdiction of the ICJ in regard to states which have accepted the the compulsory jurisdiction of the court “only in relation to that dispute.” Secondly, states which have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the court “less than twelve months prior to the filing of the application” are also excluded.

These restrictions are far-reaching because any issue which does not fall under the first two exceptions would still be excluded due to the fact that the other side has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction only in relation to that dispute or has accepted the jurisdiction less than a year prior to the filing of the ICJ application.

Reflections on the settlement of the Turkish-Greek disputes

Contrary to the distorted perception successfully created by Greece, it is not Turkey but Greece that has closed the doors to international jurisdiction as a way of settling Aegean disputes.

A review of the Greek declaration demonstrates that Greece excludes all the Aegean disputes from the jurisdiction of the ICJ. This is even true for the continental shelf dispute for which Greece once turned to the ICJ. The Greek refusal to go to the ICJ is so strong that the declaration lists the disputes by name such as the extent of the Greek national airspace, the territorial waters, and the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf.

Ironically, Greece does not give any chance to negotiation either. Despite many meetings and even a process of talks initiated in 2002, which lasted for 14 years, all the meetings were declared by Greece as “exploratory.” The underlying reason behind the failure of the talks is the Greek refusal to acknowledge the disputes as real and existing.

I

srael and Lebanon are moving towards an agreement on the longstanding maritime border dispute. The dispute had been a cause of tension between the two sides for over a decade and indirect negotiations have been going on since 2020.

U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein sent the latest proposal to the two sides last week, on September 30. The draft aims to settle claims over offshore gas fields. Recent discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean have shown the disputed waters to be rich in natural gas and have raised the stakes.

Hezbollah, which had been opposing the previous drafts of the deal and had threatened Israel against utilizing offshore gas fields, seems to now be giving the green light.

On October 1, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah said in a speech that the draft deal was a “very important step” and that the next few days would be “crucial.”

“We support the Lebanese position so that we safeguard our right to demarcate our maritime borders and invest in our gas,” senior Hezbollah official Mohammad Raad said.

With the Lebanese economy suffering, Hezbollah has pledged to abide by the agreement which may relieve some of the strain on the economy.

“A positive atmosphere”

On October 1, Lebanese President Najib Mikati spoke of a “positive atmosphere” on the topic and that a deal would soon be reached, possibly before his term expires on October 31.

Nabih Berri, one of Lebanon’s powerful leaders and an ally of Hezbollah, said that the draft agreement “in principle meets the Lebanese demands.”

Lebanon has submitted a list of changes that it would like to see in a proposal on how to delineate a contested maritime border with Israel to the United States.

Lebanon presented its response to the deal with modifications to the U.S. ambassador on October 4. “I think that it is now in the hands of the U.S. mediator,” deputy parliament speaker Elias Bou Saab said. Bou Saab also stated that he does not think the proposed changes would derail the deal.

Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid said that they were “discussing the final details” and that it was too early to commend a done deal. While the details of the draft were not revealed to the public, Lapid stated it “safeguards Israel’s full security-diplomatic interests, as well as economic interests.”

“The security of the north will be strengthened,” he continued. “Money will flow into the state’s coffers and our energy independence will be secured.”

The Libyan capital Tripoli was shaken by a wave of clashes between rival armed groups during the early hours of May 17. The clashes were instigated by the sneaking into Tripoli of Fathi Bashagha, who was designated as the prime minister by the Tobruk-based parliament, the House of Representatives (HoR), in February this year on the grounds that the incumbent Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli had expired its mandate since elections did not occur on December 24, 2021.

The fact that a “designated prime minister” had to sneak into the capital of the country is itself telling enough. Bashagha had to keep his entry into Tripoli, in the middle of the night, highly secret. He revealed his arrival on social media, bragging about his ultimate “successful entry,” as this was his third attempt to enter Tripoli. The previous two unsuccessful attempts were both foiled by the tenacity of the armed groups who either remained loyal to the incumbent prime minister Abdel Hamid Dbeibah or were unconvinced by Bashagha’s claim to be prime minister.

In his first attempted entry into Tripoli, Bashagha was expelled after a heated “negotiation” between armed groups barely avoiding an armed conflict. His eventual entry on May 17 resulted in anti-Bashagha forces attacking the Nawasi Brigade, which had escorted Bashagha into Tripoli and hosted him in its headquarters. Eventually, it had to give in to the heavy pressure from the anti-Bashagha forces and handed him over to a neutral military force to escort him out of the city on the same day.

Bashagha’s attempts to enter Tripoli and the subsequent clashes among armed groups are symptoms of a wider political and regional power struggle. Formalities aside, Bashagha’s claim to premiership became possible only after his coalition with the HoR and more importantly, its speaker Aguila Saleh. The Saleh-Bashagha coalition aims at dismantling the Dbeibah-led GNU and replacing it with the Bashagha-led Government of National Stability (GNS), which would be heavily under the influence of the “kingmaker” of the coalition—Khalifa Haftar.

The Regional and International Aspect of the Saleh-Bashagha Coalition

Although the initiative started as Saleh and Bashagha’s pursuing their personal interests, the coalition was not built in a vacuum. The Saleh-Bashagha coalition lobbied in certain capitals for their alliance, and made their move once they received the green lights and blessing of those same capitals. Although the coalition promised to be useful to many, each capital committed to it to varying degrees.

While some capitals endorsed the coalition openly, others demonstrated their support more indirectly. Paris and other European capitals as well as Riyadh were among the lower-profile supporters of the Saleh-Bashagha coalition. However, Cairo and Moscow were much more straightforward in their endorsement.

While Dbeibah did not hide Turkey’s special place among Tripoli’s friends, he did not leave Egypt out, either. On the contrary, Dbeibah granted more contracts to Cairo than he did to Ankara to placate the former and ensure its neutrality vis-à-vis Tripoli. As a matter of fact, Ankara was not bothered by losing some Tripoli stakes to Cairo as it thought that they would work as the proverbial carrot for the latter. Nevertheless, Cairo chose to proceed with a zero-sum mentality: winning was not good enough for Cairo, it wanted to make sure that Ankara was not winning as well.

An agreement over Dbeibah would mean a rapprochement slightly more favorable to Ankara than Cairo. Cairo, on the other hand, wanted to keep the rapprochement with Ankara on its own terms. Thus, Cairo came up with a rival premiership proposal with purportedly “pro-Turkey” Bashagha, which would also supposedly appease Ankara. However, this was the greatest smokescreen in the whole parallel government scheme: Cairo consented to the Saleh-Bashagha coalition only after making sure that Bashagha was transformed into something else—the junior partner of the greater coalition of Haftar and Saleh.

Bashagha’s role was envisioned as nothing more than being a subordinate to the Haftar-Saleh duo. His function was supposed to be to extend the influence over Tripoli of both Haftar and Saleh, and their external backers, none more so than Cairo. Therefore, Cairo saw in the Saleh-Bashagha coalition the prospect of undermining Ankara’s prevalence in Tripoli and duly supported it.

The idea of negotiating with Ankara after diluting its position of strength in Tripoli through a change of government appeared much more attractive than engaging in a win-win setting with Ankara. Unless Cairo comes to terms with Ankara’s presence and influence in Tripoli, Libya will not be a theatre of convergence between the two countries.

Efforts towards normalization in bilateral ties between Turkey and Israel have been underway for some time. The process of normalization is expected to bear fruit with Israeli President Isaac Herzog’s planned visit to Turkey on March 9-10. The Israeli president’s acceptance of the invitation by the Turkish leadership to visit the country after more than a decade of frosty relations merits attention and deliberation.

The normalization of Turkish-Israeli relations is dictated by regional and global pressures as well as driven by mutually expected opportunities both at regional and global levels.

The Middle East as we know it? No more

Turkish-Israeli normalization is taking place within the context of a structural change in the regional environment of the Middle East. All prominent players in the Middle East such as Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel as well as the UAE and Qatar–who happen to be also traditional U.S. allies–are going through a period of reckoning and due adjustment for more strategic autonomy, which is not a result of their own choice. Now, all regional players feel the urgency of safeguarding their interests with limited expectations from Washington.

The abrupt withdrawal of the U.S. from Afghanistan was a wake-up call for all traditional American allies in the region: the U.S. is not omnipresent there anymore to provide unwavering security in the Middle East, and since Obama’s “Asia Pivot” its focus is rather on the Asia-Pacific. The corollary is that regional actors must act together and take care of their own security and survival.

Thus, regional actors in the Middle East cannot afford to be involved in an unending geopolitical struggle with each other, especially when the Iranian threat is looming. Iran is becoming a commonly perceived threat among the traditional U.S. allies both with its potential for regional expansion in light of the renewed nuclear talks with the U.S. and with the actual attacks by Iranian proxies, showcased by Houthi attacks against the UAE, the tanker attacks in the Gulf in the past, and the ongoing missile attacks on Saudi oil facilities.

Opportunities, like systemic pressures, are driving the wave of normalization, too. The diversification in the interests and priorities of certain regional powers–Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE especially on specific cases such as Yemen, the OPEC, the Ethiopia-Renaissance Dam, etc.–that since 2013 used to move in concert with one each other and Israel on almost all issues, opened up a lot more options for all: no actor is hostage to any specific camp, coalition, or alliance anymore. “Out of the box” options such as aligning with Turkey became viable for all actors.

With the thaw in relations between Qatar and the rest of the Gulf and Egypt as well as Turkey’s active signaling of its interest in normalization with Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE, the regional environment became much favorable to cooperation rather than conflict.

The Biden administration’s withdrawal of support from the EastMed project has been a watershed moment for the normalization of relations between Turkey, on the one hand, and Israel and Egypt, on the other. The project functioned as a divisive force between Turkey, Israel, and Egypt due to the Greek and Greek Cypriot input. The realization of EastMed’s unfeasible nature paved the way for other feasible alternatives such as the pipeline project between Turkey, Israel, and Egypt.

Changes in international politics

The COVID19 pandemic and its impact on the global economy has taken a toll on each and every national economy. The world is yet to recover from the disruption in supply chains and food security became extremely important as many regions are experiencing partial food crises. This makes geopolitical struggles a luxury, especially in certain regions. Connectivity became much more important, and concerns for the Chinese domination of the world’s supply chains require the creation of alternatives.

The Turkish-Emirati normalization, for example, has a distinct aspect of ameliorating the problems created by the pandemic. With envisaging investments in logistics, agriculture, health, and manufacturing, Turkey and the UAE are poised to ride this wave efficiently. Likewise, Turkish-Israeli normalization is also well suited for cooperation especially in agriculture and energy among other areas.

There is growing tension and confrontation between the Western alliance and Russia over Ukraine, which will have an inevitable impact on the energy security of Europe as the Nord Stream 2 project has already been suspended. Along with LNG supplies from the U.S., Qatar, Canada, Algeria, and the pipeline gas from Azerbaijan, the transfer of Israeli gas to Europe via Turkey will be extremely valuable. This would also cement a stable and long-term Turkish-Israeli cooperation.

Iran, the common denominator?

Alliances are formed against a specific threat. Although it is too early to talk about an “alliance formation” between Turkey and Israel, Iranian expansion across the Middle East and its capacity to inflict damage on other regional actors from the Persian Gulf to Israel and from Yemen to Syria makes it a common source of concern for both Turkey and Israel. Israel already has a routine of targeting Iranian assets in Syria via airstrikes and Turkey’s performance against Iran-backed militias in Syria over a decade is beyond question.

Turkey is the greatest bulwark against Iranian expansion and aggression in northern Iraq and northern Syria. The common interest in curbing Iranian expansion could motivate Turkey and Israel towards rapid and greater cooperation. Israel cannot counter Iran solely by allying with the UAE or even Saudi Arabia–Turkey’s support is crucial.

Risks and prospects

It wouldn’t be wrong to argue that both Ankara and Tel Aviv bided their time to mend ties in the past. While Erdoğan and Netanyahu were at the steering wheel of their respective countries, it was extremely difficult to normalize ties. Netanyahu’s provocative and aggressive policies would dynamite any effort towards rapprochement anyway. Therefore, change in the Israeli government was an opportunity, very well seized by Ankara, to kick off the process, which helped both sides break the undesired deadlock.

Normalization is not a road without bumps. The Israeli government’s precarious coalition creates doubts regarding its longevity in power, which makes the Israeli presidency a much more reliable interlocutor for long-term planning in bilateral relations. Plus, the right-wing components of the Israeli government, and the aggressive and provocative policies towards Al-Aqsa Mosque, East Jerusalem, and Gaza might put the Turkey-Israel normalization in jeopardy in the future.

Notwithstanding the risks, the Turkey-Israel normalization could prioritize focusing on issues and areas of great potential rather than on disagreement points. Disagreements are already dwarfed by the greater potential of cooperation in many areas, so compartmentalization is easy.

The transfer of Israeli natural gas to Europe via Turkey could be the backbone of a solid partnership. In the best-case scenario, normalization in Turkish-Israeli relations might even relieve Turkey from the bipartisan anti-Turkish lobby in the U.S. Congress, which has been a disruptive force in Turkish-American relations for the past decade.

Many policy-makers had warned of the potential Russian aggression against Ukraine, but with few exceptions nobody had expected Putin’s war jets to bomb the capital of Ukraine or the Russian army to invade Ukrainian territory. Vladimir Putin shocked the world and expectedly, this created turbulence in international politics as countries are economically interdependent. Meanwhile, Europe was faced with the tough reality of its dependency on Russian energy, slowing down its reaction time with sanctions.

For days now Russia has been bombing and trying to invade Ukrainian cities. Not only soldiers but also hundreds of civilians have been killed or injured, while hundreds of thousands have been displaced. The initial American and European reaction to the Russian invasion was weak and limited, and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukrainians felt abandoned by their allies. European allies had hoped to deter Putin with sanctions.

Even though Biden and European leaders bragged about severe economic sanctions, this didn’t stop Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Energy export is the backbone of the Russian economy and sanctions against this sector would perhaps be the most devastating tool. However, it is unrealistic to expect the West to sanction the Russian energy trade, meaning oil and gas. Here is why.

Russian dominance over Western energy markets

In the 1960s, when Western Europe had begun to import gas from the Soviet Union, it was Western Germany that imported Soviet gas first. Over the years, as European demand for gas increased, European gas imports from the USSR increased as well. Things changed in the 1990s as states in Europe started diversifying their gas supplies and the Russian share in gas imports declined.

During that time, domestic gas production also increased in countries producing gas in Europe, notably the Netherlands, Norway, and the UK. But the amount they produced did not entirely replace Russian gas supplies; European countries’ dependence just decreased from about 90 percent to 75 percent in the late 1990s.

In the 2000s, liquified natural gas (LNG) became an alternative way to import gas. Europe started to construct regasification terminals. Today, led by Spain, more than 10 European countries have a total of about 210 billion cubic meters of LNG import capacity. This, however, does not mean that the EU does not import Russian gas anymore. In the first half of 2021, Russia was the main natural gas supplier of the EU with a share of 47 percent, followed by Norway with 20.5 percent.

The degree of the EU’s dependency on Russian gas differs from country to country. Eastern Europe is the most dependent on Russian gas, whereas Germany imports the most Russian gas by far. Overall, more than one third of the total of imported gas in Europe comes from Russia.

Most people confuse energy security with the security of natural gas supplies. This is a common mistake by the EU policy-makers, who focus exclusively on the gas supplies. Energy security means more: it is also about oil and coal imports. Both crude oil and petroleum products as well as coal imports by the EU are also dominated by Russia – 25 percent and 46 percent respectively.

Moreover, Europe is not the sole market that imports Russian energy products. China, along with other major Asian economies, and even the U.S., import oil and gas from Russia. Asian countries’ limited indigenous hydrocarbon resources have pushed them to turn to their energy-rich neighbor, Russia.

But due to infrastructure constraints caused by the rough geography of the U.S. that does not facilitate the construction of pipelines, the United States, the world’s number one oil and gas producer, is forced to buy both oil and gas from its ultimate rival, Russia.

Can sanctions deter Russia?

Russia is now facing critical sanctions over the invasion of Ukraine. The EU, the UK, the U.S., and Canada with many of their allies limited the Central Bank of Russia’s access to its $630 billion reserve. They also froze Putin’s and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s assets in their respective countries. But putting sanctions has its limits.

The circumstances were different when the U.S. led the international community-imposed sanctions on Iran, Venezuela, or Libya – all three are members of OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries), and Iran is the second-largest producer of crude oil in the organization. But Russia is not Iran. Russia is the second-biggest producer of global oil and gas, and its supply is desperately needed to heat homes, run factories, and generate electricity in Europe.

Since the last quarter of 2021, the world has been facing severe energy shortages which pushed the gas and electricity prices to levels that have never been seen before. As part of the sanctions against Russia, the EU just targeted the oil refineries of the Russian energy sector aiming to prevent their modernization. On February 27, the EU, the UK, Canada, and the U.S. decided to remove a number of Russian banks from the SWIFT system in order to restrict their ability to do business across borders.

This is expected to bring tremendous damage to the Russian economy. But then, European capitals began to import more Russian gas via Ukraine since the sanctions still do not target energy payments.

Time to rethink energy security in Europe

The Russian aggression in Ukraine once again has shown that the European Union deeply needs alternative energy suppliers. The fact that LNG is not a substitute for pipeline gas ties the hands of European states.

Neither Qatar, the second-biggest LNG exporter, nor the U.S., the number one natural gas producer, can replace Russian gas. It is not just about the capacity that they can supply, it is also about the European gas market structure. Many energy analysts seem unaware that the EU does not have a continent-wide natural gas transmission system. This means that we cannot talk about a single European gas market.

For instance, Spain, Europe’s largest gas liquefaction capacity holder, cannot transmit its gas to Germany or to Poland since it is disconnected from the rest of European gas infrastructure. Therefore, at the moment, LNG cannot offset the Russian pipelines’ gas. Most states with LNG facilities also import Russian LNG because it is cost-efficient.

Ever since the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) signed an agreement with Egypt in 2003 on the delimitation of an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean and declared concession areas for the purpose of oil and gas exploration in 2007, a high tension has grown over the possible maritime boundaries and related activities.

The tension has primarily been between Turkey, Greece, and the GCA, and escalated with further delimitation agreements such as those between Lebanon and the GCA (2007), Israel and the GCA (2010), Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) (2011), Turkey and Libya (2019), and Greece and Egypt (2020).

Some of the actual tension has always been associated with the resource-related activities considering that there are not fully agreed maritime boundaries by all sides in the Eastern Mediterranean. The regional states have therefore confronted each other not only over the possible maritime boundaries but also other related activities.

The Eastern Mediterranean Pipeline Project, known as the EastMed Project, has been one of these activities ever since it was initiated. First pronounced in 2016 by Greece with the EU’s encouragement and funds to finance the preliminary works (the EU pledged 36.5 million euros for research and technical planning), the project gained an official status with an intergovernmental agreement signed between Greece, Israel, and Cyprus (GCA) on January 2, 2020 in Athens, Greece.

The pipeline was planned to run for about 1,900 km, starting from a midpoint between Israel and the island of Cyprus in the sea,  in the Israeli section of the Levantine Basin, and eventually reaching Italy via the island of Crete and Greece with the Poseidon and IGB pipelines, a gas interconnector pipeline which connects gas supplies coming from both Bulgaria and Greece.

It was said that it would carry at least 11 billion cubic meters of gas per year and cost around 6 billion euros to construct. It is being developed by IGI Poseidon S.A., a 50/50 joint venture between the Greek gas company Public Gas Corporation of Greece (DEPA) and the Italian gas company Edison. The project is aimed to be completed by 2025.

The IGB pipeline project was regarded by the related or supporting states as not only a means of transporting the extracted gas from the Eastern Mediterranean to Europe but also a means of achieving strategic goals.

These strategic goals belong to Greece for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the IGB Pipeline Project is a means of establishing a partnership with regional states such as Israel and Egypt as well as non-regional states such as the United States and EU countries over the resources of the Eastern Mediterranean. The Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis made a statement upon signing the agreement saying, “Today we did not simply sign a beneficial agreement. We sealed our resolve for a strategic connection between our countries in a region that now more than ever needs growth and security.”

Despite Turkey’s objections, Greek efforts seem well approved as the project has been supported by regional states such as Israel, Egypt, Jordon, and the Palestinian Authority, and by some non-regional states such as the U.S. and France.

Egypt had already worked for the creation of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum on July 25, 2019 with the participation of seven countries, namely Egypt, Jordan, the GCA, Greece, Italy, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority, and further signed an agreement with the GCA on September 19, 2018 to construct a line linking Egypt and Cyprus’s Aphrodite gas field to Egypt’s gas liquefaction stations.

The Israeli reason for joining the forum seems to be commercial. On the signing of the agreement, former Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu said, “This is a historic day for Israel… Just days ago, we started pumping [the] Leviathan [gas field]… We have huge quantities there. This means a lot of money will come into the economy. That is good for peace because we have agreements with our Arab neighbors.”

For the EU, the reason for joining the East Mediterranean Gas Forum was also commercial alongside the aim not to depend heavily on Russian gas. Competition to provide gas to Europe is fierce, as the continent seeks to rid itself of coal and high greenhouse gas emissions. Despite the various pipelines coming to Europe such as the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) or the shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the U.S., there is still a gap in the market.

The U.S. had been supportive of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum from the very beginning. Frank Fannon, then assistant secretary for the Bureau of Energy Resources (ENR), was present at a meeting in Athens in August 2019 when the project was agreed upon. The primary reason for the U.S. supporting the forum seems to have been to diminish the European countries’ dependency on Russian gas. It is also alleged that the U.S. has used the EastMed project to counter Turkey for some “unproved acts” such as its relations with Russia.

The U.S. withdrawal of support from the EastMed project

Despite the above-mentioned compelling reasons for supporting the project, recently, the U.S. has officially withdrawn its support from the project. In a statement by the U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Greece, it announced, “The United States continues to strongly support regional efforts that enhance and promote cooperation and regional stability, including the 3+1 mechanism in which the Republic of Cyprus (ROC), Greece, Israel, + the United States participate… We are shifting our focus to electricity interconnectors that can support both gas and renewable energy sources. We support projects such as the planned EuroAfrica interconnector from Egypt to Crete and the Greek mainland, and the proposed EuroAsia interconnector to link the Israeli, Cypriot and European electricity grids.”

The U.S. State Department sources have been cited as saying that the EastMed pipeline project should be abandoned altogether. The inevitable question is why the U.S. decided to shift its focus away from the EastMed Project. To answer this, it is possible to identify a number of reasons.

The EU aims to reduce the use of natural gas in Europe by 25% by 2030 and for it to be abandoned completely by 2050.

One of the most frequently stated reasons is the fast-growing focus on green energy. Due to the universal trend towards green energy to meet the Paris Agreement on Climate Change targets (COP21), the future of fossil resources seems blurred beyond 2030. The abovementioned statement by the U.S. notes that “at a time when Europe’s energy security is–more than ever–a question of national security, we are committed to deepen our regional relationships and promote clean energy technologies. We are shifting our focus to electricity interconnectors that can support both gas and renewable energy sources.” The Biden administration is looking “critically at new fossil fuel infrastructure projects to ensure U.S. support is not directed to carbon-intensive sources and does not result in future stranded assets as we accelerate the clean energy transition.”

Similarly, the EU aims to reduce the use of natural gas in Europe by 25% by 2030 and for it to be abandoned completely by 2050. It is noted that even Israel announced that it will stop searching for natural gas and will focus on greater use of renewable energy sources (RES). In fact, Greece is doing the same, setting the production of 61% of its electricity from RES as a goal.

Since the last months of 2021, the UAE’s diplomatic moves in foreign policy have been attracting the attention of Gulf scholars and observers. In an interview, Dr. Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, the UAE’s minister of industry and advanced technology, noted that the recent diplomatic moves by the UAE are critical to the country’s new foreign policy. “The art of partnership is part of our DNA, and it has been key to our success over the years,” said Al Jaber. Signals of change and using diplomacy instead of military power from Hormuz to the Suez constitute a sharp rupture for UAE foreign policy.

Following the withdrawal of its military presence from Yemen in mid-2019, the UAE regional security policy entered a de-escalation mode. Political conflicts with neighbors started being replaced with an economic interests-driven foreign policy. The Gulf states’ regional loneliness, partly due to the Biden administration’s hesitancy to take an active role in regional affairs, forced the UAE and other GCC states to fend for themselves within the shifting regional security dynamics and alliances.

While the Al-Ula reconciliation ended the groupings of the GCC states, the post-reconciliation process sparked a diplomacy rivalry among the GCC actors which strived to present themselves as the region’s important stabilizers and peacemakers.

The rhetorical shift in UAE foreign policy can be best understood by looking into the “10 Principles” announced in the “Projects of the 50” campaign in 2021. The projects publicized the strategic roadmap planning for the UAE’s economic, political, and social development. Among the “10 Principles,” “good neighborliness” stands as one of the UAE’s essential principles for stable political, economic, and social relations with its neighbors.

While openness, tolerance, and peace were mentioned as the state’s core values, the UAE calls for peace, harmony, negotiation, and dialogue to resolve all conflicts by envisioning bilateral relations based on a non-security or non-military perspective. This new narrative will help the Emirates to overcome its thorny relations with Turkey.

The Saudi-Emirati tension

Following the UAE’s military withdrawal from Yemen, the UAE-Saudi relations entered a period of standoff where distrust rose. After the 2017 Qatar diplomatic crisis, the UAE had adopted a common security understanding with Saudi Arabia that endured until the withdrawal of the Emirates from Yemen in mid-2019. Although the UAE was also militarily disengaged from several bases like Eritrea or Somaliland, its departure from Yemen made Saudi Arabia the foremost responsible for Yemen’s humanitarian crisis internationally.

The new pragmatism of the UAE foreign policy resulted from the Emirati decision-makers’ abandonment of a proactive foreign policy and military interventions in Syria, Yemen, and Libya. Although the UAE did not experience demonstrations such as those in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, the potential for the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, through the Al-Islah movement that was founded in 1974, was perceived as a threat to the existing state structure and the royal families of the seven emirates of the UAE. This fear caused the demonization and the labeling of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group working against the stability of the Gulf monarchies.

The close rhetoric between Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood for almost ten years, pushed Emirati decision-makers to adopt adverse policies towards Turkey in various regional crises.

The close rhetoric between Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood for almost ten years, pushed Emirati decision-makers to adopt adverse policies towards Turkey in various regional crises like the Syrian Civil War and the Eastern Mediterranean until the visit of Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MBZ), the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and de facto ruler of the Emirates, to Turkey in November 2021.

Before visiting Turkey, Sheikh Mohammed and other UAE decision-makers made diplomatic visits to Jordan, Egypt, and Syria as part of the claimed Emirati diplomatic activism in the region. However, the visit to Turkey attracted more regional and international attention due to the lousy record of bilateral relations since 2011 and accusations over the UAE’s financial support to the foiled coup d’état attempt in Turkey in 2016.

Despite tense political relations, Turkey’s trade ties with the UAE have continued to improve, and UAE exports to Turkey rose to 110 percent while total trade increased by 21 percent from 2019 to 2020. The satisfaction on both sides following the Erdoğan-MBZ meeting and the agreements focusing on the strategic investments to generate steady and safe revenues in the long term, including the logistics, health, and energy sectors, demonstrated both states’ preference to overlook their political divergences for the sake of economic advantages.

As a result, regional cooperation, dialogue, and negotiation themes initiated new diplomacy rhetoric between Turkey and the UAE. Similarly, one might emphasize the change of Turkish foreign policy rhetoric towards the Gulf, such as referring to the six Gulf states as Turkey’s friends – not only “brotherly Qatar” anymore.

UAE exports to Turkey rose to 110 percent while total trade increased by 21 percent from 2019 to 2020.

Throughout the 2017 Qatar crisis, Turkey adopted a security-oriented approach and claimed to provide a security umbrella to the whole Gulf. Turkey adopted this controversial rhetoric to calm the anxieties of Saudi Arabia and the UAE after establishing a Turkish military base in Qatar. Still, it made Turkey’s relations with the prementioned Gulf states even tenser. Now, one can observe a change in the rhetoric of almost every Gulf state towards establishing non-military bilateral ties. This does not harm Turkey’s relations with Qatar, but allows Turkey to include itself in the Gulf regional security architecture through cooperation, trade, and peaceful means.

In contrast to Saudi Arabia, the UAE has been more willing to establish relations regional actors like Iran or Israel. The UAE’s maneuver capacity can be related to the abandonment of religious themes in its foreign policy rhetoric. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has historically adopted a “distinctive” status for itself in the Arab world.

While Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar have always cultivated significant relations with Iran, Saudi and Emirati decision-makers have viewed Iranian regional activities and proxy wars as working against the domestic security of regional states such as Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, or Iraq. Interestingly, Iran’s imports from the UAE reached $5.39 billion in the period of March-August 2021, illustrating the high volume of trade relations between the two even in times of crisis.

However, since April 2021, behind-the-scenes meetings between Iranian and Saudi officials were revealed, which jump-started efforts to normalize  diplomatic ties with Iran. The endeavors of the Gulf states came in the form of re-establishing diplomatic relations with Iran without waiting for the Biden administration’s steps to renew the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal, which would bring Iran a vainglorious opponent to the diplomacy table.

Similar to the Saudi side, at the Baghdad Summit held in August 2021, the UAE’s Vice President and Ruler of Dubai Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum met Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian to discuss the possibilities of a “neighborhood policy and diplomacy.”

Despite its limited capacity, Greece assumes itself to be a major playmaker in regional politics, and thus follows an aggressive foreign policy towards Turkey. It’s worth asking why Greece pursues this strategy and what it hopes to achieve.

Neorealism, also known as structural realism in International Relations, offers a simple answer to this question: “Greece is trying to balance Turkey.” Drawing on Kenneth Waltz, the pioneer of the Neorealist School, states try to balance other states, which they lag behind, or try to limit others’ ability to some extent by resorting to internal balancing and/or external balancing mechanisms.

Internal balancing is the first and most common method of a balancing strategy. This happens as states strengthen their material capacity and power, and when they try to survive by their own means in the anarchic world system. If this is not enough, they resort to external balancing either to defend themselves or to minimize the threats they face. This generally occurs when states look to form alliances with stronger states. In this regard, Greece applies both internal and external balancing methods in order to counterbalance Turkey.

Initiatives for internal balancing

Following the Kardak (Imia) crisis with Turkey in 1996, Greece launched an armament program as part of an internal balancing against Turkey and came a long way towards this purpose. However, it temporarily paused the program due to the 2008 economic crisis and its effects.

Since Greece’s domestic and national defense industry is weaker than Turkey’s, the country needs the support of other nations.

Thanks to the relative economic recovery in recent years and due to the current high tension in the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece resumed its armament program. In order to counterbalance Turkey, it launched a new armament and military modernization program. The Athens administration increased its armament expenditures fivefold in 2021 compared to 2020, and launched a 10-year armament program worth 10 billion euros.

Since Greece’s domestic and national defense industry is weaker than Turkey’s, the country needs the support of other nations. For example, Greece ordered a total of 18 fighter jets from France last year, with a cost of 2.3 billion euros. In 2021, it signed a contract to buy three frigates from France. Again in the same year, it purchased four warships worth $6.9 billion and signed an agreement with the U.S. for the modernization of its existing frigates worth $2.5 billion. These examples indicate that since Greece is incapable of modernizing its army by using its own sources, it needs outside support to activate its internal balancing elements.

Aside from the French and American military support, Greece uses its EU membership as a political and economic leverage against Turkey with the unconditional support of the GCA as its main ally in the region. So much so that Greece, acting together with the GCA, imposed sanctions on Turkey for its activities in the Eastern Mediterranean by using the EU’s legislative bodies, the European Parliament and the European Council. However, Turkey has not compromised its stance at the table and on the ground, and has insisted on protecting its rights in the region.

Can Greek counterbalance against Turkey work?

The question now is whether Greece will succeed in counterbalancing Turkey. In terms of internal balancing, Greece has almost no chance. There are two reasons for this. The first is related to Turkey’s current capacity which is incomparably greater than Greece’s. So much so that according to the rounded Armed Forces data, Greece, with a population of 11 million, has 100,000 active soldiers and an annual defense budget of $5 billion. Turkey, with a population of 85 million, has 350,000 active soldiers and an annual defense budget of $20 billion.

Greece has 1,300 tanks, 3,400 armored vehicles, and 1,200 artilleries whereas Turkey has 3,000 tanks, 11,500 armored vehicles, and 2,500 artilleries.

All of Greece’s land and air forces lag behind Turkey’s. For instance, in terms of ground power Greece has 1,300 tanks, 3,400 armored vehicles, and 1,200 artilleries whereas Turkey has 3,000 tanks, 11,500 armored vehicles, and 2,500 artilleries. Likewise, although Greece is rapidly modernizing its air power, it cannot compete with Turkey in this field either. In terms of the most important elements of air power, Greece has 600 aircraft, 200 multirole aircraft, and 270 helicopters whereas Turkey has 1,500 aircraft, 250 multirole aircraft, and 650 helicopters.

Moreover, while Greece does not have any armed unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) in its inventory, Turkey has 170 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and UCAVs, and almost all of them are produced domestically. These UAVs and UCAVs are Turkey’s strong trump card: they are battle-proven and have proven to be game changers in conflict zones such as Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Libya. As for naval power, Turkey and Greece have more or less similar numbers of warships, frigates, and submarines. Overall, it is not possible for Greece to compete with Turkey in terms of total military power – at least not on its own.

Turkey and Greece are members of NATO and therefore Greece’s repertoire of moves against Turkey is limited.

The second pillar of Greece’s balancing strategy against Turkey is a relatively more functional deterring capacity. Undoubtedly Athens enjoys a high-level military cooperation with the U.S. and also benefits from the advantage of EU membership vis-à-vis Turkey, which is an EU candidate country. However, both Turkey and Greece are members of NATO and therefore Greece’s repertoire of moves against Turkey is limited.

It should never be forgotten that relations between states are interest-oriented and may change according to new conjunctures. Although Athens seems to have “secured” the support of the U.S. and France, nobody can know how long this alliance will last. In fact, the “AUKUS incident” experienced by France recently stands out as an example of how states can act against their allies when their interests are in question. Accordingly, Turkey’s determined stance to protect its rights in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean can foil Athens’s attempts to counterbalance Turkey politically, militarily, and economically.

To summarize, the Greek aggressive foreign policy to counterbalance Turkey pushes the Athens administration toward an extensive armament project and the modernization of its army. Greece has strengthened its cooperation with the U.S. and France and secured the political and economic backing of the European Union.

However, given the fact that the Turkish army is getting stronger every year by relying on its own domestic and national capacity, and given that Athens’s cooperation with France and the U.S. is susceptible to change in the long run, Greece may face disappointment in the future. Greek initiatives carry the risks of creating further tension and serious consequences if the country opts to lead Turkey toward security dilemmas instead of looking for ways to cooperate and establish permanent peace.

The year 2021 has witnessed an escalated tension in the Middle Eastern and European security complexes. Early this year, Saudi Arabia and Greece strengthened their bilateral cooperation. Simultaneously, France encouraged Greece to increase its armament while blaming its European partners for turning a deaf ear to the threats the European Union is facing.

France, Saudi Arabia, and Greece seem to have twofold gains from this cooperation. They could both better materialize their energy cooperation and target Turkey’s gas explorations as well as challenge Turkey’s maritime superiority in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean.

Since early 2021, Turkey is voicing its concern over the Saudi F-15s to be based in the Souda air force base in Crete. The first quarter of the year signaled a potential escalation regarding the military drills to be conducted in the Aegean Sea. Turkey’s chief objection was to the Saudi F-15s that would be piloted by Greek lieutenants during military drills.

In February 2021, the Philia Forum brought Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain together to integrate into the pre-established Greek-Egypt-Cyprus cooperation. The main actor behind this initiative was Saudi Arabia. France conducted the White Shark 21 maritime drills, which symbolized the new hawkish stance against the Turkish energy pivot in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Military drills jointly conducted by France, Greece, Israel, Cyprus, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in the heart of the Aegean Sea are obviously a significant development. The dynamic of this alliance is issue-specific and narrow-scoped; however, it has a potential to attain short-term goals.

In the last three years, one of Turkey’s most important advantages has been its natural gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In the last three years, one of Turkey’s most important advantages has been its natural gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean, which created political complications with states such as Greece, Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, and France as well as with institutions including NATO and the European Union. The current balance of power created room for maneuver for Turkey which is now being constrained by rival energy-seekers such as France, Italy, Greece, and Israel.

Nevertheless, this alliance has been forged to preserve the status quo, and an stalemate might be an actual gain for the guarantor states such as France. There are two interrelated motives behind the French foreign policy: defense exports and international prestige. France is a leading actor in defense exports and tries to be an alternative to the United States.

Greece and Israel try to increase their political influence to protect or obtain bargains from the European search for more reliable energy sources.

In the last three years, France has been the second-largest defense exporter to Saudi Arabia after the U.S. For the last 5 to 10 years, only the UK has been able to compete with France. Besides, Greece and Israel try to increase their political influence to protect or obtain bargains from the European search for more reliable energy sources. There are a lot of pull factors of entering such a dynamic such as increased resolve to engage in conflict, better military resources, and the higher chance of deterrence, etc.

Such circumstances create a potential conflict on the Turkish maritime borders in the Eastern Mediterranean. It seems like the age-old Turco-Greek debate on the naval border is going to evolve into a bitter rivalry over the control of the Eastern Mediterranean energy flow. Certain stakeholders such as energy providers like Egypt, Algeria, and Israel will set the tone for which side will have the wind at its back.

Turkey can become a trendsetter by discovering natural gas reserves. It might also play a transmitter role with a plan that bypasses Cyprus and Greece, and transfers the Eastern Mediterranean gas directly to the EU. In this context, the problem for the gas alliance builders in the Eastern Mediterranean seems to be Turkey’s potential to be simultaneously a trendsetter and a transmitter.

Turkey’s potential to attain this power is perceived as a threat by its rivals. From an international relations perspective, such conflicts are quite natural; the most formidable alliance will once again force the other to succumb to its demands.

Time flies when it comes to the rapidly developing sequence of events in Libya. As of early 2021, there was an atmosphere that was regarded as promising for the first stage of elections in the country.

Fast-forward to December 24, and Libyan politics is debating how to have legitimate elections in order not to allow yet another tyranny in the war-torn country.

Representatives of around 30 countries arrived in Paris in November to discuss the recent political situation in Libya. Political actors such as the UK, Germany, Turkey, and Italy emphasized the need for a consensus on election law while France and Egypt are obsessed with having an election as soon as possible.

Due to the election laws unilaterally issued by the Aguila Saleh-led House of Representatives, Khalifa Haftar could now run for Libya’s presidency. The laws issued by Saleh have not been voted and passed in the parliament. Moreover, dual citizens, war criminals, and people who hold military posts are not permitted to run for the Libyan presidency, and Haftar faces several impediments to running for the elections.

Everybody, including France and Egypt, knows the warlord cannot even get 10 percent of the votes if elections are held freely in Libya.

Furthermore, it seems, Haftar’s ambitions are such that he is even ready to destroy his long-term supporters, showing no mercy. According to rumors, Saleh’s wish to run for Libya’s presidency was refused by Haftar and Egypt recently.

Haftar threatened people in east Libya against supporting Saleh as a candidate to run for the presidency.

When Saleh insisted, Haftar threatened people in east Libya against supporting him as candidates are obliged to collect 5,000 signatures to run for the presidency. Sending a message to Saleh’s potential supporters, Haftar stated that anyone who signs Saleh’s candidacy will be jailed. Despite all this, in a surprising move, Saleh announced his candidacy.

The overwhelming majority of Libyan people and politicians first want to have a solid foundation for an electoral system – a constitutional law that will be reached through consensus. That’s why the laws announced by the House of Representatives are considered flawed.

Yes, Libya needs elections to erase the traces of the civil war and chaos, and to heal its wounds, but not by unilaterally imposing “laws” which favor a warlord rather than a civil authority.

It is not only the High Council of State that demands a delay in order to reach a mutually accepted consensus on electoral laws, but also the Government of National Unity officials and political figures in the west along with the members of Tobruk-based House of Representatives.

France is among the countries which have been supporting Haftar at all costs, and the conferences organized in Paris, in general, have been a tool in its attempt to remain a key actor.

Nonetheless, even some of the Western participants of the most recent Paris Conference on Libya in November emphasized the need for change in election law.

Elections per se cannot enable Libya to rebuild its war-torn soul, but free, fair, and legitimate elections based on equitable laws can. And delaying elections to have a free and fair election is much better than having a flawed one.

Libya has been waiting for stability for more than a decade – the missed time can be tolerated, but the destruction of the efforts that have been made in this time cannot.

On November 25, Turkey’s Vice President Fuat Oktay met with Saudi Minister of Commerce Majid bin Abdullah Al Qasabi in Istanbul amid warming ties between Ankara and its Gulf rival, the UAE. This meeting is part of a series of high-level engagements that have taken place between Turkish officials and their Saudi counterparts since October 2020. 

The importance of the meeting stems from the fact that Al Qasabi is one of the high-profile ministers with close ties to Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman (MBS). It builds on previous meetings between Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and his Saudi counterpart Faisal bin Farhan, during which they agreed to “work on positive issues on [the] common agenda and to hold regular consultations.”

Following the normalization of relations with Abu Dhabi and Oktay’s meeting with Al Qasabi, Turkey’s President Erdoğan reiterated in an interview with TRT, the Turkish state broadcaster, that Ankara intends to enhance its ties with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The recent overtures by Tehran for a long-term road map with Ankara, Cairo’s extension of good intentions to Doha, the engagement between Riyadh and Tehran, and the normalization of relations between Abu Dhabi and Ankara are examples of conciliatory attitudes suggesting a region-wide quest for a modus vivendi after a long period of vicious rivalry. 

Meanwhile, a scheduled visit by MBS to Qatar on December 8, just two days after Erdoğan’s visit to Doha, has raised questions on a possible Qatari role to bring Turkey and Saudi Arabia closer. 

Since 2016, Turkey, the second-largest army in NATO, has banked on its military capabilities to counter rising threats to its national security and secure its interest in the highly volatile Middle East. Yet, some economic vulnerability has pushed it lately to prioritize financial considerations. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter and its primary strategic energy power, has endured no major economic challenges recently. 

A scheduled visit by MBS to Qatar on December 8, just two days after Erdoğan’s visit to Doha, has raised questions on a possible Qatari role to bring Turkey and Saudi Arabia closer. 

Yet, it has been facing increasing defense hardships and security vulnerabilities vis-à-vis growing threats to its national security from its surroundings, and particularly from pro-Iran militias. These facts suggest compelling reasons for both Saudi Arabia and Turkey to normalize their relations and achieve mutual interests.

Normalizing the relations between Saudi Arabia and Turkey would take precedence over all the regional rapprochement efforts in 2021. This step would offer the kingdom the much-needed space to increase its space for political maneuver, connectivity, and partnerships versus other regional countries perceived by Riyadh as rivals or disrupters. Additionally, it would give the Saudi internal and regional policies an unprecedented boost. 

Better Saudi-Turkish relations would create new political, economic, and defense opportunities for the kingdom to regain its traditional regional role and efficiently address the defense challenges and security vulnerabilities.

In this sense, the normalization between Saudi Arabia and Turkey is critical to Riyadh. Better Saudi-Turkish relations would create new political, economic, and defense opportunities for the kingdom to regain its traditional regional role and efficiently address the defense challenges and security vulnerabilities.

The Saudi government has been stuck in the Yemeni quagmire. Taking into consideration Turkey’s experience in Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan and its efforts to support Saudi Arabia’s position in that war in 2015, Ankara is very well-positioned to help Riyadh politically and even militarily once trust is restored between the two countries. Whether Riyadh chooses to engage diplomatically with the Houthis or their sponsors, or increase the military pressure on the militia, it would be able to carry this out from a far better position than the current one.

Furthermore, although there has been no serious progress in the U.S.-Iran talks to resume work in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the two parties will ultimately reach an agreement sooner or later. Riyadh needs to be prepared to deal with the outcomes of this scenario and the alternative scenario in which Iran advances towards a nuclear weapon. This is another issue where Turkey can potentially play a constructive role.

Accordingly, normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia holds the prospect of augmenting Turkey’s economic, diplomatic, and strategic assets in its foreign policy.

As for Turkey, the regional de-escalation moment provides a unique opportunity for Ankara to shift from hard power to soft power again while addressing its economic challenges and priorities. Accordingly, normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia holds the prospect of augmenting Turkey’s economic, diplomatic, and strategic assets in its foreign policy. Strained relations between the two regional players have proven inimical to realizing the true potential of economic ties between Ankara and Riyadh. 

For Turkey, mutual investments are preferable to counterproductive economic measures between the two regional economies. In particular, investment funds originating in Saudi Arabia would undoubtedly contribute to the resilience and vitality of the Turkish economy which has been undergoing financial challenges for some time. 

Additionally, resolving the outstanding commercial disputes with Saudi Arabia would re-incentivize the two sides’ private sectors to rehabilitate bilateral trade and stimulate commercial transactions. Al Qasabi’s meeting with Turkey’s vice president is the most recent indication of Turkey and Saudi Arabia’s growing interest to reach a measure of normalcy in their economic relations.

In a more general framework, incremental normalization of relations between Ankara and Riyadh would also bolster their diplomatic capacity in regional and international platforms as well as in their dealings with matters of mutual concern. Moreover, it will positively affect other Gulf countries such as Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman. Normalization between Ankara and Riyadh will allow these Gulf countries to boost their relations with Ankara without the encumbering shadow of Turkey-Saudi Arabia disputes on their individual approaches to Turkey.  

Defense industry cooperation between Ankara and Riyadh is also not unfathomable. Speculations over the last months on the Saudi interest in Turkish unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) indicate the potential in security cooperation between the two regional actors. With the Turkish defense industry continuously gaining greater sophistication in its products and services, Saudi Arabia presents an additional regional partner for Turkey in defense cooperation.

A new and strategic actor in Africa, Turkey has intensified its military cooperation as well as political, economic and cultural ties with most of the African countries. Since labelling 2005 the “Year of Africa”, Turkey has built strong relations across Africa, this vision even goes back to 1998, when Turkey’s African Initiative Policy process started, and when Turkey became an observing member of the African Union in 2005 and 2008. Turkey’s African Initiative Policy has then developed in 2013 to become Africa Partnership Policy.

Political relations has developed between Turkey and Africa in the last two decades, as during Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Erdoğan era 31 new embassies have opened and the total number of Turkish embassies in Africa has increased from 12 in 2002 to 43 in 2021, which will soon reach 44 embassies, with the opening of the Turkish embassy in Guinea-Bissau.

In addressing the Angolan parliament this year, Erdogan described Turkey as an “Afro-Eurasian state”. Additionally, Turkey has established joint Business Councils with 45 African countries and 40 Sub-Saharan African countries.

Ankara is now preparing for the third Turkey-Africa Partnership Summit, which will take place in Istanbul on 17^th and 18^th December 2021, a summit discussed by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, during his visit to Ankara in September, 2021.

When it comes to trade and investment, the Turkey-Africa Economic and Business Forum has facilitated to increase the economic ties between both parties. Turkey’s trade with African countries have reached $25.3 billion by 2020 from $5.4 billion in 2003 when Erdogan came to power.

In addition to trade, investment and cultural projects in Africa, security and military cooperation have cemented the relations between Turkey and many African influential countries.

According to the Turkish president, Ankara is determined to raise the bilateral trade figure with Africa to $50 billion. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that the volume of projects undertook by Turkish contracting companies in the African Continent has reached $71.1 billion and reached $19.5 billion in the Sub-Saharan African countries.

The military cooperation also has extended to Chad – during the visit of the transitional President Mahamat Idriss Deby to Ankara, last month, Erdogan stated that Turkey will develop cooperation with Chad in the military and security fields, beside the bilateral trade which has reached $112 million and expected to double in the near future. Chad is currently undertaking the periodical presidency of the G5 Sahel and the Community of Sahel–Saharan States.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed a military and financial cooperation deal with Ankara, during his visit in August this year to Turkey. Ambassador Dina Mufti, the Ethiopia ministry of foreign affairs spokesman, told Anadolu Agency that Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous country, would accept if Turkey played a role in mediating in the border dispute between Sudan and Ethiopia. Turkey is also a commercial player in Ethiopia, as $2.5bn has been invested in Ethiopia out of a total of $6bn already invested by Turkish companies in sub-Saharan Africa.

In Sudan, before the current political crisis, the bilateral trade volume between Turkey and Sudan was expected to reach $2 billion, as Sudan has become the sixth largest export Turkish partner in Africa

From Sudan to Niger, a cooperation agreement has been signed between Ankara and Niamey which allowed Ankara a military presence in the country in July 2020. Turkey has signed agreements on military cooperation, sports, and youth during Cavusoglu’s visit to Niger, and during his visit to Togo, agreements were signed concerning cooperation in defense.

In North Africa, Turkey has been involved in trade and defense in the region, providing support for the UN-backed administration in Libya. In its neighbor, Algeria has become Turkey’s second largest trading partner in Africa after Egypt, with exchanges that reached $4.2 billion in 2020, and with expectations that the two countries will expand trade to $5 billion in 2021, exceeding Egypt, thanks to the agreement Turkey has signed with Algeria, the “Friendship and Cooperation Agreement with Algeria”.

In a military deal between Morocco and the Turkish manufacturer Baykar, Ribat has received the first units of Turkey’s Bayraktar TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs). Additionally, the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces (FAR) attended a training program in Turkey in July according to media reports. The Turkish military technology and products will now compete with the French market in the North African, as Morocco has been long been using the French Heron drones.

Morocco and Turkey have the potential to establish a promising political and economic cooperation, based on mutual respect and national interests. In addition to the shared cultural and religious ties, both are important geopolitical actors of the MENA region, the Mediterranean, and the Islamic world at large.

Over the past two decades, Morocco and Turkey have intensified their diplomatic relations and trade volume, sharing experience in many sectors such as migration, military cooperation, security affairs as well as the textile and construction sectors.

Turkey regards Morocco as an important partner given the dynamism of Morocco’s economy and the kingdom’s geographical location as a gateway to Africa. But there is also a competitive aspect to this relationship.

From 2011 onward, the Turkish-Moroccan relations indicate a state of reluctance to establish strong relations. Invited by the chief of the government in 2013, then Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visited Morocco, seeking a strategic partnership, but he was not received by King Mohammed VI. Moreover, Erdoğan was boycotted by the General Confederation of Moroccan Enterprises.

While the coalition government’s leading political party, the Party for Justice and Development in Morocco, had a strong cooperation with Turkey’s JDP (Justice and Development Party or AKP), the monarchy refused to have strong relations with Turkey. However, in December 2014, King Mohammed VI and his family were received by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at his home. It was a friendly and unofficial meeting.

In the summer of 2016, two years later, Morocco condemned the coup attempt against Turkish President Erdoğan and met the Turkish government’s demands to crack down on FETO (Fetullah Terrorist Organization) institutions in Morocco. As a response, in 2017, Morocco closed seven FETO schools and arrested many of those who are affiliated with the group.

Unbalanced Free Trade Agreements

The Turkey-Morocco free trade agreement (FTA) signed on April 7, 2004, in Ankara, and entered into force at the beginning of 2006, provides a significant impetus to bilateral cooperation.

In 2018, the trade volume between Turkey and Morocco increased to around $2.7 billion, which is a positive indicator of the agreements made earlier. Despite the gradual increase, Morocco requested a review of some clauses of the FTA after its local industries and businesses suffered a loss, and the trade balance with Turkey experienced a deficit following the entry into force of the accord in 2006.

This imbalance is due to the similarity of certain sectors in both countries, such as textiles, leather, construction, public works, and distribution networks. In parallel, the Turkish investments in the Kingdom of Morocco were not materialized as expected. The volume of Turkish investments in Morocco does not exceed 1% due to the lack of the promotion of direct Turkish investment in the country, notably through joint-venture operations. However, to increase Turkish investment, Ankara should invest in new sectors such as the pharmaceutical industry, banking services, or insurance, in addition to the establishment of joint investment platforms.

In October 2020, up to 90% additional customs taxation was imposed on Turkish products for a period of five years. These additional taxes cover a total of 1,200 different products in different categories, led by the industry, food, and textile sectors.

The changes and additional taxation were implemented after a controversial 18 months. The Moroccan government thinks that the 2004 free trade agreement with Turkey has a negative impact on Morocco’s trade deficit. For Morocco, enhancing the free trade agreement to overcome impediments for equitable sharing of benefits is critical for sustainable cooperation and is necessary for a win-win perspective.

A Strategic Partnership to What Extent?

While Morocco and Turkey’s bilateral relations are based on common interests on security, migration, development, and territorial integrity, the former Saudi-Turkish confrontation affected regional stability and led to further geopolitical polarization in the Maghreb region. The long-standing rivalry between the two important powers of North Africa, Morocco and Algeria, has always been the determining factor in the steps of international and regional powers toward the region. Maintaining economic and political relations with both countries is an important factor in Turkey’s insistence on a neutral policy toward the region’s two important countries.

One of the most sensitive and important issues is the Sahara crisis. Here, Algeria is providing both financial and political support to the Polisario militias, and Turkey’s relationship with Algeria and its lack of clarity on this issue has led to tense relations between it and Morocco.

In December 2019, the state-owned Turkish television channel TRT World aired an interview with Sahrawi separatist Aminatou Haidar. Haidar’s critical discourse towards the Moroccan state triggered a wave of criticism by Moroccan media. The broadcast was considered blackmail after a call for a readjustment of a free trade deal with Turkey by the Moroccan government.

In economic terms, the visit of Algerian Foreign Minister Sabri Bukadoum to Turkey on September 1, 2020, and his commitment to offering important opportunities to Turkish investor companies, is an indicator of the rivalry between Morocco and Algeria in the Maghreb region and the African continent.

Turkey’s NTSP (New Type Submarine Project) is among the country’s most striking national defense industry projects. It is an advanced submarine force with a maximum indigenous industrial participation based on the agreement between Turkey and Germany, signed in July 2009, for the co-production of German Type 214 submarines in Kocaeli, Turkey.

The Type 214 submarine has advanced technological features, particularly its air independent propulsion (AIP), that will provide the Turkish Navy with both a peacetime deterrent and power projection capabilities. Turkish security planners also expect that the project will significantly enhance Turkish know-how in the submarines industry which in turn translates into enhanced capabilities in realizing Turkey’s indigenous MILDEN (Milli Denizaltı) National Submarine Program.

Considering the current regional underwater balance, Turkey enjoys a numerical superiority over its regional counterparts with a total of 12 diesel-powered attack submarines (Ay class, Gur class, and Preveze class) which are based on the German Type 209 family. Yet, Ay-class submarines, which joined the Turkish Navy in the early 1970s and throughout the late 1980s, are quite old.

Turkey has retired two Ay-class submarines and may retire another two in the coming years, whereas the Greek Navy has been equipped with Type 214 submarines between 2010 and 2015, granting it a technological edge over Turkey and complicating undersea balance. Similarly, Egypt received four German S-44 submarines recently to modernize its outdated submarine inventory while it desires to purchase more under its ambitious naval modernization program.

Although Turkey is implementing a national modernization program on its submarine inventory, it mostly serves as a stopgap solution until the Type 214 submarines arrive. Turkey’s first Type 214 submarine was named after the legendary Ottoman admiral and cartographer Piri Reis. The submarine was placed in “floating docks earlier this year and is scheduled to be put into service in 2022. The remaining five Reis-class submarines (all Type 214 family) will follow in successive years. Considering the possible retirement of some of the Ay-class submarines, it can be argued that the Turkish Navy will still maintain its numerical superiority.

Naval Power and Submarine Warfare

Naval power is often defined both as a military and diplomatic instrument. Developing robust surface and underwater forces provides not only defense, deterrence, or offense, but also enhances diplomatic and economic influence via the effect of showing the flag. Meanwhile, the impact of naval power is multiplied in accordance with the country’s length of coastline as seen in the example of Turkey, a country with over 8,000 km of coastline and located at the choke points of vital global maritime lines.

First, Turkey is geographically surrounded by semi-enclosed seas and shallow waters. This weakens the effectiveness of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) instruments by reducing the detection capability of active and passive sonars, making it harder to expose submarines. This geographical feature is accompanied by the stealthy features of the Reis class which may multiply the submarine effectiveness in shallow waters or littorals.

Reis-class submarines will have AIP which ensures much longer and silent underwater operations without the need to access atmospheric oxygen, thus avoiding exposing themselves to detection.

Reis-class submarines will have AIP which ensures much longer and silent underwater operations without the need to access atmospheric oxygen, thus avoiding exposing themselves to detection. Open sources suggest that AIP submarines can operate for three weeks underwater while traditional diesel-electric submarines need to surface for air supply after two to three days. Germany’s modern submarine operation concept warrants this as it is designed to counter increasing Russian influence in the shallow waters of the Baltic Sea. In sum, relevant geography and technology favor the operation of Reis-class submarines in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean Seas.

Second, Reis-class submarines will be equipped with technologically advanced weapons. Among the planned weapons to be integrated to the submarines are IDAS (Interactive Defense and Attack System for Submarines) SAM and AKYA. IDAS SAM is designed by Germany to increase the self-defense capability of submarine forces. It provides engagement against ASW helicopters, small- to medium-sized surface vessels, and specific coastal targets. AKYA is a Turkish national heavy class torpedo and is expected to enter the Turkish Navy’s inventory in the coming months.

Along with Reis-class submarines, AKYA will be used by Preveze– and Gur-class submarines. Turkish defense industry officials argued that the torpedo is significantly better than its global counterparts. Furthermore, President of Turkish Defense Industries İsmail Demir stated that the submarine version of ATMACA anti-ship cruise missile is being improved. It is also expected that GEZGIN long-range cruise missile will be integrated into the Turkish submarine fleet inventory.

Third, Reis-class submarines with their offensive capabilities could satisfy Turkey’s defense priorities which have emerged in the last decade. Recent Turkish foreign policy in its surrounding regions demonstrates that Turkish decision-makers are inclined to forwardly counter threats and to intervene in ongoing crises in order to aid allies. This policy best manifested itself in Turkey’s support to Libya’s UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). By virtue of their stealthy features and conventional strike capabilities, Reis-class submarines will enhance Turkey’s military capacity in distant locations.

Of utmost importance for Turkish decision-makers is to achieve a maximum level of independence in the production of key defense platforms. In terms of underwater vehicles, this means that the experience developed under the New Type Submarine Project will be transferred to the country’s MILDEN National Submarine Program. For instance, at the 15th International Defence Industry Fair (IDEF 2021), Turkish defense companies unveiled the conceptual designs for three mini submarines. Similar experience is gained by the upgrade of three Pakistani Agosta 90B submarines. Turkey’s emerging submarine force will likely function both as a deterrent and a power projection instrument through the late 2020s.

On August 29, 2021, Baykar Savunma delivered the first batch of Bayraktar Akinci (Raider) drones to the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). Designed and developed by Baykar Savunma, Akinci is the latest culmination of the company’s drone development projects. The introduction of Akinci into service is a major milestone in Turkey’s efforts to become a major drone power and leading defense and aerospace technologies developer.

In the past few years, Turkey’s drone industry, its products and their performance in various operations and conflicts have generated great interest. This is especially true in regard to the impact of Anka-S and Bayraktar TB2 armed drones on the Syrian regime forces during Operation Spring Shield in early 2020, which stimulated debates among scholars, observers, and professionals in defense and security circles regarding the future of drones and warfare in general.

As a direct result of their performance in various conflicts, Turkish drones have attracted the interest of numerous countries. Turkey has so far exported Bayraktar TB2 to Qatar, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Libya, Morocco, and Poland, while Turkish Aerospace Industries has sold Anka to Tunisia. Selçuk Bayraktar, the chief technology officer of Baykar Savunma, has recently stated that the company is in talks with ten countries for the export of Bayraktar TB2.

As a project, Akinci represents the opening of a new chapter for Turkey both in terms of its air power with its new capabilities, and with regard to its aerospace industry by virtue of its new technological competencies.

Akinci and its capabilities

The Bayraktar TB2 is a tactical armed drone, capable of flying at 18,000 feet altitude for up to 27 consecutive hours. The aircraft can carry two or four guided bombs, and is capable of executing a fully autonomous takeoff and landing. Serving the Turkish Armed Forces, the Bayraktar TB2 has fulfilled over 350,000 flight hours since 2014. Having a maximum takeoff weight of around 700 kg, Bayraktar TB2 carries a sophisticated electro-optical camera system to detect and track targets while collecting imagery intelligence (IMINT).

Akinci, on the other hand, is much bigger, heavier, and more sophisticated than Bayraktar TB2. According to the information on the company’s website, Akinci has a maximum takeoff weight of around 6,000 kg, making it the biggest aircraft designed and developed in Turkey. Akinci is powered by two turboprop engines provided by Ukrainian engine manufacturer Ivchenko-Progress. It can carry around 1,500 kg of guided bombs and missiles as well as an electro-optical camera, radar, and various electronic intelligence/signals intelligence (ELINT/SIGINT) sensors. Akinci can remain airborne for approximately 24 hours at 30,000 and 40,000 feet altitude.

Also, with the use of laser target designator systems, Akinci can illuminate a target, calculate guidance information for onboard precision weapon systems or pass along that target information to friendly units for strike. The TAF showed remarkable capabilities in executing such complex air-to-surface strike operations in Idlib, Syria and in Libya, and assisted Azerbaijan in achieving the same in Nagorno Karabakh. By virtue of its greater payload-carrying capacity both in terms of weapons and sensors, Akinci will boost the network-centric organization of the TAF.

Akinci will also be equipped with an advanced radar system, under development by ASELSAN. Incorporating active electronically scanned array (AESA) technology, the radar will enable Akinci to detect aerial and ground targets over a long range irrespective of weather. The AESA radar is highly resistant to enemy electronic countermeasures and enables the platform to track several targets simultaneously. Akinci, through onboard air-to-air missiles, can engage with aerial threats on its own or pass along the target information to friendly units, contributing to the update of the strategic air threat scene.

Last but not least, Akinci will be equipped with various types of ELINT/SIGINT sensors, which are extremely crucial in executing strategic intelligence missions during both times of peace and conflict. With its capability of flying for long periods at high altitudes, Akinci will be able to cover large regions around Turkey, collecting intelligence over different segments of the electromagnetic spectrum.

All the aforementioned imagery, radar, and electronic intelligence data will be transmitted to the ground control system and other friendly assets through an onboard satellite communications (SATCOM) system developed by ASELSAN. With the help of the SATCOM and Türksat satellites, Akinci can be controlled over an extremely long range, receiving command signals, and sending back all intelligence data. In this way, the SATCOM-equipped Akinci will increase Turkey’s strategic intelligence and strike range.

The transformation of the Turkish aerospace industry

Akinci is the largest air platform to be designed, manufactured, tested, and flown by Turkey. Designing and manufacturing a six-ton drone that is equipped with various sensors and precision guided weapons as well as a ground control system to monitor and control all functions through direct line-of-sight and SATCOM communications data links require advanced skills and know-how in several engineering and project management skill sets.

To establish and maintain a supply chain to manufacture the aircraft and the incorporated ground systems, and deliver them on time to various customers, The Turkish Aerospace Industries and the entire ecosystem of subcontractors and suppliers needed to transform. In other words, Akinci, as well as other ambitious Turkish Aerospace Industries projects such as the TUSAŞ MMU (Milli Muharip Uçağı or National Fighter Jet), Hürjet, and T625 Gökbey, can be considered as catalysts of the transformation of the Turkish aerospace industry. Through the realization of these challenging projects, the Turkish aerospace sector build up the necessary experienced human resources and infrastructure to reinforce and develop its position in the global market.

Akinci epitomizes Turkey’s ambitions of becoming a drone power through indigenous development of advanced technologies and the possession of highly capable systems and platforms. The effectiveness and efficiency of armed drones in counterterrorism operations and in regional conflicts arguably provided enough motivation to decision-makers for devising, planning, and executing a national drone strategy. Starting with the Anka and Bayraktar projects, Akinci is the latest step in this strategy.

Akinci’s impact, both as an armed drone and as an aerospace industry product, for Turkey is worth monitoring. Without a doubt, it will act as a capability multiplier for the Turkish Armed Forces in the short term. Its export performance and role in Turkey’s regional security policies will likely be seen in the medium term.

The Eastern Mediterranean is a relatively narrow strip in the Mediterranean Sea surrounded by the coasts of ten different states, making coastal relations between these countries a technically complex issue. In addition, the area contains islands including the island of Cyprus and numerous Greek islands, which further complicate the maritime delimitation.

Such technical matters, however, do not represent the whole picture. There are fierce political confrontations in the Eastern Mediterranean such as the well-known Palestine issue, the Cyprus issue, as well as the uneasy political relations between Greece and Turkey, Egypt and Turkey, Syria and Turkey, Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon.

All these difficulties make maritime delimitation quite complicated. Although some maritime delimitation agreements have been signed to date – such as the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus [GASC]-Egypt Agreement of February 17, 2003; the GASC-Lebanon Agreement of January 17, 2007; the GASC-Israel Agreement of December 17, 2010; the Turkey-Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [TRNC] Agreement of September 21, 2011; the Turkey-Libya Agreement of November 27, 2019; and the Greece-Egypt Agreement of August 6, 2020 – there are many matters yet to be settled.

Firstly, all these agreements have been objected to by one or more of the other concerned regional states making the agreements another source of friction. Secondly, there are maritime areas that are yet to be delimited; some of them directly concern Turkey such as the delimitations between Turkey, on the one hand, and Greece, the GASC, Syria, Egypt, and Palestine, on the other.

The Legal and Political Challenges of a Delimitation Agreement between Turkey and Egypt

Legally, Turkey and Egypt have opposite coasts in the Eastern Mediterranean, which do not involve complicating geographical features such as islands. Establishing maritime borders seems a relatively straightforward matter between the two countries. However, there are legal and political elements that adversely affect this process.

Egypt has so far established delimitation agreements with the GASC and Greece, which Turkey objected to on the premise that they are “violating the continental shelf areas of Turkey in the region.” Turkey considers some parts of the maritime borders established by Egypt as partially infringing the Turkish continental shelf areas.

It should be emphasized that Egypt has so far preferred to proceed with the GASC and Greece when it comes to maritime arrangements despite Turkey’s continuous objections. There is, therefore, a possibility of Egypt not proceeding with Turkey so as to revise the existing agreements simply because it may not want to sacrifice the established relations with Greece and the GASC.

Egypt still seems sensitive about its relations with Greece and the GASC while handling the process with Turkey. When noting that the relations between Egypt and Turkey would improve steadily, the Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shukry also pointed to the fact that it will not be easy. Therefore, it is not appropriate to expect that Egypt will unconditionally support Turkey’s all desired moves in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Moreover, the historic rivalry or political competition between Turkey and Egypt over the Middle East will not disappear anytime soon. As a result, the improvement in the existing relations may take more time than expected.

Legal and Political Challenges to a Border Agreement with Palestine

Some argue that Turkey may establish a maritime border with Palestine as the coastal projections of the two countries overlap, which according to the international jurisprudence on maritime delimitation is the necessary legal element for two states to sign a maritime delimitation agreement.

Though technically possible, there are some legal and mostly political impediments to this proposal. As the potential delimitation will be based on the coasts of the Gaza Strip, the political division inside the state of Palestine creates the issue of who the “legitimate legal authority” is to sign such an agreement with Turkey.

Politically, the issue is even more complicated. The Palestinian Authority government has so far followed a policy which is closer to the Egypt-Greece forum on the Eastern Mediterranean maritime issues. Palestine is a member of EastMed Gas Forum along with the GASC, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, and Jordan. It would be immature to expect that the Abbas administration would sign a maritime delimitation agreement with Turkey at the expense of negatively impacting its relations with the above countries.

A similar attitude may be expected from Israel. Although the relations between Turkey and Israel are currently at an improvement stage – President Erdoğan congratulated Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and the two heads of state held a phone call recently –  there are no appropriate circumstances for Israel to support a possible Turkey-Palestine delimitation agreement. Israel is in a process of an accelerated application of the EastMed Energy Project to deliver its natural gas to Europe through an EastMed pipeline.

Israel, Greece, and the GASC have already signed a deal on January 2, 2020, to build a 1,900 km long subsea pipeline to carry natural gas from the Eastern Mediterranean’s rapidly developing gas fields to Europe. Moreover, Israel already ratified the agreement in July 2020. Therefore, one can expect that Israel would prefer to avert any possible delimitation agreement between Turkey and Palestine, which would further complicate the exiting issues.

Since the maritime area to be delimited by a possible Turkey-Palestine agreement has already been delimited through the Egypt-the GASC Delimitation Agreement of 2003, it is inevitable that Egypt may also oppose such a delimitation agreement.

Considering the above legal and political complications that emerge from both the Palestinian internal rift and the well-known positions of two closely related States, namely Israel and Egypt, a possible delimitation agreement between Turkey and Palestine seems not to be an easy one to conclude. The fact that such a delimitation agreement is legally appropriate does not therefore make it politically prospective in the near future.

Recently, Turkey has made significant progress in the energy field. Turkey’s gas discoveries in the Black Sea region are regarded as a major achievement for the country’s energy security in the near future. Including the latest announcement, herein Turkey’s President Erdoğan declared the new discovery “good news” (müjde) as has become a tradition after every new discovery, the total quantity of the discovered reserves in the Black Sea reached 540 billion cubic meters (bcm).

According to the latest estimates in 2020, the total amount of the ten biggest gas discoveries in the world amounted to approximately 3.2 trillion cubic meters. Turkey’s gas discovery last year was the largest deep-sea discovery in the world and the second-largest of all gas discoveries. These discoveries and ones that might follow in the coming months can make Turkey a game changer in the regional and global energy markets, adding a further geopolitical importance to the country’s growing foreign policy capacity.

Opportunities Offered by the Gas Discoveries

Turkey’s gas discoveries will have effects on the country along two axes: economic and strategic. The economic value of these discoveries is estimated at $130 billion based on the current gas prices. In this respect, Turkey will gain a huge financial benefit. Moreover, Turkey is almost completely dependent on foreign gas resources and due to this dependency, it has to pay a significant amount for its energy imports annually.

Turkey’s annual gas expenditure is approximately $12.5 billion. With these discoveries, it is predicted that Turkey will save $5-6 billion and the total amount of the energy expenditure will be reduced by half. No doubt, the gas discovery and possible other discoveries are economically important for Turkey insofar as they will reduce the current account deficit due to energy imports and strengthen its energy supply security.

Gas discoveries in the Black Sea have broken a common conviction that there are no fossil fuel reserves in Turkey and that the existing ones are not economically profitable.

Gas discoveries in the Black Sea have broken a common conviction that there are no fossil fuel reserves in Turkey and that the existing ones are not economically profitable. Therefore, the natural gas discoveries in the Black Sea will provide an important motivation for Turkey’s future explorations and drilling activities.

On the other hand, Turkey will increase its bargaining power in the global gas markets. As is known, Turkey had made some long-term contracts with its current gas suppliers. With the expiry of the gas contracts amounting to approximately 18 bcm in 2021 and 38 bcm in 2025, Turkey will have an important chance to negotiate on more competitive gas prices and flexible terms – especially with Russia. As a result, Turkey will have an opportunity to reduce its energy import bill.

With Turkey gradually becoming self-sufficient in energy in the medium and long terms, the country’s foreign policy can also be expected to be more independent as Turkey seeks further self-reliance and multiple engagements in a world of multipolar politics.

Looking at different examples in the world, these dates are reasonable. For instance, in Egypt’s Zohr field, which was discovered in mid-2015, production started at the end of 2017, approximately 28 months after the discovery. Also, in Israel’s Tamar field, one of the most important natural gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean, the production process began 3.5 years following the discovery.

Therefore, Turkey can reasonably install the floating platforms, pipelines, and production facilities within three years. At the same time, Turkey should definitely increase its technological capacity and know-how within this period in order to accelerate the efficiency of the process.

The global energy equation will be shaped around three issues: ownership of energy resources, controlling the energy resources, and transferring them to the international markets.

Future Energy Equation and Turkey’s Position

The global energy equation will be shaped around three issues: ownership of energy resources, controlling the energy resources, and transferring them to the international markets. Turkey carries out extremely important energy projects so that it can play an essential role in the above equation such as the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) from Azerbaijan through Georgia and Turkey to Europe, and TurkStream from Russia to Turkey and Europe. Via these pipelines, while Turkey receives 22.75 bcm of gas annually, an additional 25.75 bcm will be transferred to the European gas network via Turkey. Therefore, these two pipeline projects strengthen Turkey’s claim as an energy hub.

In addition to this, Turkey’s underground gas storage capacity is currently 4.5 bcm and this capacity is planned to reach 11 bcm – approximately 20 percent of the country’s annual gas consumption – in 2023.

Another dimension of Turkey’s recent natural gas discoveries in the Black Sea is that Turkey now has a substantial relief from its dependency on imported fossil fuels. Moreover, as a net importer of fossil fuels, the possibility of finding new hydrocarbon resources in the region provides an important motivation for Turkey.

Currently, the local and international gas infrastructure of Turkey is sufficient. Natural gas is delivered to all cities of Turkey. In addition, nearly 100 bcm of gas can potentially be transferred to Europe via Turkey in the long run which corresponds to almost 20 percent of the European annual natural gas demand.

Furthermore, Turkey is becoming a prominent market player with its liquified natural gas (LNG) facilities. With two LNG plants (Marmara Ereğli and Ege-Gaz Aliağa) and two floating storage and regasification units (FSRU) (Etki Liman and Hatay-Dörtyol), Turkey is the top country in the region in terms of LNG facility capacity.

Turkey has a total of 133 billion cubic meters of gasification potential in the national gas network per day through these plants. By creating a domestic seismic and drilling fleet and by virtue of the new natural gas discoveries and infrastructure investments in the Black Sea, the country has a crucial advantage in the independent pursuit of exploration activities in both the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Saying that Turkish-Egyptian relations have had a turbulent period since the ousting of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi would be an understatement. Since the 2013 Egyptian coup d’état, Turkish-Egyptian relations have been demoted to the charges d’affaires level, primarily acting on economic and cultural communication. Furthermore, since then the attitude of both countries towards each another has been hostile due to a series of factors.

From the Turkish perspective, Morsi’s ousting from the Egyptian presidency was regarded not only as the defeat of free elections and the will of the people, but also as a vital blow to the democratization process witnessed in the country and the MENA region as a whole, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Keeping in mind Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s strong support for the democratization process in Egypt and in the Middle East, the establishment of an undemocratic regime under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi led to a hostile approach between the two countries. At the same time, later events also contributed towards Turkey’s pessimistic outlook on the Egyptian political sphere.

Following the 2016 Turkish coup attempt, Ankara underlined its critical stance against coup attempts towards elected governments around the world. This stance has further aggravated Turkish-Egyptian ties, which has led Cairo to an oppositional stance toward Turkey’s new active regional policy. The latter is evident from a brief glance at the contemporary political disputes in places such as Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, where Ankara and Cairo have been in opposite blocs of the disputes until recently.

However, the recent developments in the relations between Ankara and Cairo have brought about a possible partnership between the two countries, which could benefit both sides of the Mediterranean and lead to a possible normalization of bilateral relations in the near future. Therefore, the normalization initiative should not be seen as a one-sided approach but rather a bilateral one. That means that both parties would benefit from normalizing relations in domestic, foreign, and economic policies.

With its serious and eminent challenges in domestic and foreign policy, Egypt desperately needs normalization with Turkey.

Recently, experts have tried to answer the question of which actor stands to benefit the most from the normalization. Some argue that it is Turkey that initiated the normalization and therefore Ankara is in a weaker position. Others disagree and argue that with its serious and eminent challenges in domestic and foreign policy, Egypt desperately needs normalization with Turkey.

It would be a one-sided and incomplete approach to assume that Turkey has been unilaterally compelled to initiate the normalization based on political and economic factors. In fact, the normalization initiative is a clear sign of Ankara’s constructive foreign policy agenda, which aims to reduce regional tensions in order to prevent further deterioration in regional politics.

From Egypt’s perspective, Cairo perceives the normalization process as an opportunity and necessity to counter some of the political and economic weight it has had to carry since the 2013 military coup. Furthermore, like any form of ties between states observed within international diplomacy, their context and, subsequently, the dynamics that influence and shape them can be subject to change or alteration.

Therefore, it can safely be said that the normalization initiative was launched by both parties which are aware of the fact that they will both benefit from this process. It is important to address, however, the factors that drive the two countries to come to terms at this particular period.

One of the factors in the normalization of relations between Turkey and Egypt is the diminishing importance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the bilateral relations. While there is some level of interaction between Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood, it does not go beyond the regular relations of a state and a global civil society organization. Turkey considers the Muslim Brotherhood a grassroots civil society organization that has enjoyed a strong social base in the Arab world. The group is no longer a political organization and does not aspire to a political future in the region. Therefore, it must be stated that the Muslim Brotherhood should only be treated as a civil organization, and both Ankara and Cairo have arranged their positions accordingly.

The Muslim Brotherhood is no longer in a position to challenge the current government. Nor does the organization have any aspiration for political leadership throughout the region. In addition, it no longer wants to hold back the potential ties between the two countries, as stated by journalist Moataz Matar. This partly paves the way for the enlargement of bilateral trade as well. However, how Egyptian authorities will assess this new face of the Muslim Brotherhood remains contested amid Saudi and Emirati interventions to demonize the group further in regional politics.

From Egypt’s perspective it has become apparent that the initiative in the Eastern Mediterranean does not stand a chance without Turkey’s participation.

A second factor leading to the normalization process between the two countries is the developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. From Egypt’s perspective it has become apparent that the initiative in the Eastern Mediterranean does not stand a chance without Turkey’s participation. A recent example of this is the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). The organization, which has attempted to marginalize Turkey and excluded regional countries like Libya, Syria, and Lebanon from cooperation, is not portraying itself as a long-term initiative.

With the vetoing of the participation of the UAE in the EMGF by Palestine, cracks are already emerging between the members of the initiative. Furthermore, the EEZ agreement between Ankara and Tripoli has severely hindered the idea of a proposed pipeline through the region without the approval of Turkey. These developments pushed Cairo to come to the conclusion that including Turkey in Eastern Mediterranean initiatives would better serve Egypt’s interests and those of the region as well.

Another factor from the Egyptian side is the growing tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia, with regards to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute. The GERD is a matter of national security for Cairo as the country relies heavily on the water supply from the Nile. A decrease in the volume of water coming into the country would be a disaster for more than 90% of the population, which resides in the Nile Basin.

The years-long negotiations did not produce any positive outcome as the two most populous countries in the Nile Basin face a violent confrontation. In this regard, Cairo seeks to reach out to new allies like Turkey to strengthen its foreign policy engagements. Egypt also considers that Turkey can have a constructive position in resolving the crisis with Ethiopia as Ankara has warmer ties with Addis Ababa.

A fourth factor to consider in the Turkish-Egyptian normalization process is the ongoing developments in neighboring Libya. Resembling the GERD dispute, Cairo perceives the stability of Libya as an important matter of national security. Within this context, the state-building processes undertaken in the country have alienated Khalifa Haftar, who was supported by Cairo since the second round of the Libyan Civil War. On the other hand, Turkey had stood beside the internationally recognized Tripoli-based government and signed various agreements with the latter that have also been recognized by the Government of National Unity, including those relating to the military.

On April 27-29, the foreign ministers of Turkey, Greece and Britain joined Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders in Geneva to discuss the future of the so-called Cyprus Problem. As promised, the Turkish Cypriot side, led by President Ersin Tatar, submitted a plan that envisions a two-state solution for Cyprus – a message very much different from the one presented by his predecessor Mustafa Akinci the last time the two sides convened for talks in Crans Montana some four years ago. To no surprise, the informal meetings concluded with no common ground to proceed with formal talks, with the prospect of any solution to the Cyprus Problem appearing further away than ever.

Back in 2017, both sides were in agreement with regards to the framework for negotiations. Both were touting a bizonal, bicommunal federal (BBF) solution that would have seen an autonomous Turkish Cypriot entity officially established in the island’s north, and an equally autonomous Greek Cypriot entity in the south. The two sides would have been ruled under a joint, rotational presidency while each side would maintain control over their respective internal affairs. Land swaps and compensation payments would have likely occurred to settle territorial disputes that arose when Cyprus was divided during a Turkish military intervention which came as a response to a Greek-inspired coup in 1974. Furthermore, a joint committee would have been established to ensure the equal sharing of the island’s natural resources.

There was strong momentum on both sides in the lead-up to those talks, which many considered to be the closest the two sides had ever come to a compromise, especially as all three guarantor powers – Britain, Turkey and Greece – had approved of these UN-endorsed proposals. But alas, it wasn’t to be, as the issue of guarantors itself became a point of contention.

There are conflicting reports as to why exactly the talks broke down in 2017. Some suggest that the Greek Cypriot side had insisted on tearing up the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, which grants the three guarantors conditional rights to militarily intervene in Cyprus. This was a demand the Turkish Cypriots were unwilling to accept. Other reports, however, suggest that Turkey was happy to negotiate a gradual withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island.

But instead of this concession being welcomed by Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades, it was surprisingly rejected, much to the abhorrence of diplomats and observers who attended the talks. More detailed narrations about what happened in Crans Montana even suggest that Anastasiades himself indicated that he’d be open to discuss a two-state solution after Greek Cypriot elections in 2018.

Ersin Tatar has argued that a two-state solution is now the only way forward for Cyprus after 47 years of division.

Needless to say, the outcome of the Crans Montana talks rendered then-Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci redundant. For many Turkish Cypriots, the collapse of these negotiations was the last straw, and in October 2020, they elected Ersin Tatar into office. Unlike his pro-reunification predecessor, Tatar vowed to put forward a case for a permanent division of the island, with the currently unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) officially giving up on the UN-backed federal plan.

Tatar has argued that a two-state solution is now the only way forward for Cyprus after 47 years of division, not to mention the additional 11 years since Turkish Cypriots were forced to boycott the once shared Republic of Cyprus parliament due to Greek Cypriot violations of the 1960 constitution. He also claims that a two-state solution would solve many of the ongoing problems between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, and would allow them to establish warm diplomatic ties that would not only prove mutually beneficial to both communities on the island, but would likewise bring about greater prosperity to the entire Eastern Mediterranean.

Challenges to peace in Cyprus

President Tatar however has thus far failed to explain exactly how he plans to gain international recognition for the TRNC. He has repeatedly recited a timeline of unfortunate events to argue that Turkish Cypriots deserve sovereign equality, but even Turkish Cypriots themselves are not entirely convinced by his moral standpoint.

However, a lack of cooperation from the Greek Cypriot side would not necessarily spell ‘Game Over’ for the Turkish Cypriot campaign for recognition. As was recently seen in the Balkans, Serbia’s non-recognition of its breakaway neighbor Kosovo did not stop half of the world’s nations recognizing it as a separate state. Even EU member states were left divided over the recognition of Kosovo, and to this day five of the bloc’s 27 members do not recognize it.

When one looks at the Caucasus, the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia enjoy limited international recognition despite Georgia still claiming ownership of the enclaves. So, what have these states done right that the TRNC has thus far failed to do? Well, one thing that these nations have in common is that they all have at least one ally in the UN Security Council.

In the 37 years that the TRNC has been a self-declared independent state, it has only ever had one ally – Turkey. Pakistan and Bangladesh briefly recognized the TRNC in 1983, but they were quickly forced to back down after coming under international pressure. Despite its growing global influence, Turkey to this day has not been able to exercise enough soft power to get others onboard. So naturally, the Turkish Cypriots are looking for an ally in the UNSC to back their position – and what better an ally than Britain?

Lobby Efforts

Besides being a guarantor power in Cyprus, Britain, unlike the other four UNSC members, is home to a significantly large Turkish Cypriot diaspora. Census results are yet to be confirmed, but some estimates put the number of Turkish Cypriots in the UK as high as 400,000 – possibly three times more than the Turkish Cypriots living in the TRNC. A large proportion of Turkish Cypriots in Britain are British-born.

They hold British citizenship, speak English fluently, and some even hold influential positions. Many also maintain strong links to their homeland, and the majority can be considered to be relatively more conservative than their relatives back in Cyprus. They are perfectly placed to lobby local MPs to support the TRNC in the UK Parliament and even fight for wider Turkish causes such as Turkey’s military operations in northern Syria against the PKK, as well as Turkey’s maritime disputes with Greece in the Aegean. But again, it isn’t that simple.

There are believed to be just as many Greek Cypriots living in the UK as there are Turkish Cypriots, and both communities largely reside in the same constituencies as each other. The Turkish Cypriots in the UK therefore struggle to lobby their local MPs without being challenged by what is an arguably better organized, better funded and less polarized Greek Cypriot lobby.

It is also very difficult for British Turkish Cypriots to cooperate and coordinate their efforts with the migrant community from Turkey, firstly because of a lack of communication and understanding between them, and secondly because the mainland Turkish community is dominated by supporters of the HDP, which is claimed to have organic links to the PKK. Many of the migrants from Turkey to Britain prefer not to identify themselves as Turks, but rather as Alevis and/or Kurds, and they feel no affiliation with the Turkish Cypriot cause. As a result, Turkish Cypriots have only been able to elicit the support of a few politicians from a handful of constituencies that host a relatively uncontested community of Turkish Cypriots.

It seems, therefore, that the TRNC is not going to get Britain onside through lobby efforts alone. The TRNC is going to have to appeal to Britain’s sense of self by focusing on its geopolitical interests. A bottom-up approach through grassroots campaigning might be futile, but if the Turkish Cypriots can convince Britain that its own interests lie in recognizing the TRNC, a top-down strategy might stir enough MPs to switch allegiances.

There are already some big names who have signed up for the two-state solution, including former Foreign Secretary Jack Straw from the Labour Party, and former Conservative Party leader Iain Duncan Smith. The number of Turkish Cypriot allies in the British government could increase if the Turkish Cypriots are able to channel their voice through international bodies such as NATO so that they can be heard by strategic decision-makers in Britain’s security and intelligence circles. They would of course need Turkey’s help to do this.

Brexit Fever

There’s no guarantee that the aforementioned strategy would work, but it is certainly the right time to try. Britain has just exited the EU, and with Brexit fever still in the air, the UK and the EU are finding themselves increasingly at loggerheads with each other. Britain has two sovereign military bases in Cyprus – Dhekelia and Akrotiri. These bases are vital for securing British interests in the Middle East. But as the EU’s stranglehold on the Republic of Cyprus tightens and Britain’s influence in Cyprus becomes evermore irrelevant, the security of those bases comes under even greater threat.

Gone are the post-Cold War days where Western hegemony in the region was kept together by the United States. As the U.S. shows less and less interest in Mediterranean and its surroundings, a power vacuum is opening up into which various players are attempting to step in. France has particularly taken advantage of tensions between Turkey and Greece over hydrocarbon drilling to boost their presence in the area.

With its strategy in North Africa in tatters and its bases in Lebanon exposed to the dangers of what some may say is already a failed state, France is desperate to consolidate its standing in the region, and is doing so by riding the wave of European solidarity with Greece and the Greek Cypriots. France may even want to eclipse or replace Britain in Cyprus, a move that would leave Britain entirely dependent on Europe when it comes to securing its interests in the Middle East. This would leave Britain with no choice but to side with Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to counter French attempts to wrestle its way to regional dominance.

But the question is, is Britain ready to take such an assertive stance? Sure, Britain will take any opportunity available to improve its relations and cooperation with Turkey, as recent trade deals between the two have indicated, but that doesn’t necessarily mean that it is prepared to go against the EU and its members so directly, at least not unless France’s hidden agenda becomes more overt. For the time being, there are just way too many geopolitical risks involved for Britain to challenge EU foreign policy in an aggressive manner.

The Biden Era and Cyprus Peace Talks

At the moment, Britain is grappling with its own domestic issues, primarily the economic downturn brought about by the coronavirus pandemic, as well as a lack of strong political leadership. Britain is also unclear about where it stands with its closest ally, the U.S. Former U.S. president Donald Trump was in no way a friend of the EU, and Brexit took place in a political climate of Trumpism, or neo-transatlanticism, as well as euroscepticism.

Moreover, even though relations between Turkey and the U.S. dropped to all-time lows while Trump was in charge, Trump as an individual was considered to be relatively more sympathetic to Turkey than others in his administration. But now that Joe Biden has taken over as U.S. president, the mood has changed.

In the U.S., the Democrats are seen as being more friendly to the EU than the Republicans are. Biden is therefore more likely to have a better relationship with his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron in comparison to the rocky relationship shared between Macron and Trump. Biden has also made no secret of his enmity towards Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his administration, having started off his presidency by giving Ankara a dose of silent treatment before then recognizing the so-called Armenian Genocide of 1915.

Britain may have freed itself from the strings of the EU, but in the era of Joe Biden, how far the UK can take its relationship with Turkey will be limited by U.S.-EU relations. Without firm assurances from the U.S., Britain cannot even begin dreaming of taking moves as bold as recognizing the TRNC to spite the EU.

TRNC and Limited Recognition

For now, it seems that Britain will continue to uphold a neutral stance when it comes to the Cyprus peace talks. As was demonstrated during the latest meetings in Geneva, Britain will remain committed to the UN-backed peace plan and, in the vague words of British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab, will continue to urge both sides to use “creativity and flexibility” in talks – whatever that’s supposed to mean. Britain remains aloof and uninterested in Turkish Cypriot demands for equal sovereignty, no matter how much they kick and scream about how much they deserve it.

To the contrary, instead of punishing the Greek Cypriots for their part in keeping the Turkish Cypriots internationally isolated for half a century, Britain continues to boost its diplomatic, trade and military cooperation with the Republic of Cyprus. Rather than risk having their bases in Cyprus shut down by the Greek Cypriot government, Britain prefers to earn its keep by constantly reaffirming its ties with Nicosia and reminding them of Britain’s strategic and economic relevance to the island.

If the TRNC is to get any kind of international recognition, it seems like it’ll have to do so without the backing of any UNSC members. The TRNC is completely dependent on Turkey exercising whatever influence it has in the international arena if it is to gain even limited recognition. This leaves only a handful of countries who may opt to take the leap of faith and establish ties with the TRNC – Azerbaijan being the main, and perhaps only one. But Turkey must be careful not to invite too many guests to the party, especially countries that can easily be swayed by the EU to become gateways of foreign interference in Turkish Cypriot politics, lest these nations work to undermine Turkey’s own interests in the TRNC. That includes non-EU states that currently have good relations with Turkey but are susceptible to being coerced by Brussels into becoming EU vassals.

In this writer’s humble opinion, asides from Azerbaijan, other potential candidates to recognize the TRNC include Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Somalia, Nigeria, Venezuela, Cuba, Libya and – perhaps as a real game-changer – Qatar. But that being said, the Turkish Cypriots will have their work cut out for them when it comes to convincing these nations to step out of their comfort zone for the sake of an estimated 150,000 people living on one-third of a semi-arid rock in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In recent weeks, Tripoli has seen a steady stream of visits by European officials after the Government of National Unity (GNU) won the confidence of the Libyan parliament to lead the country to elections in late December of this year.

At a time when the new Libyan government is rejoicing in a diplomatic watershed – illustrated by the intense schedule of visits to Tripoli by foreign dignitaries – the need for EU members to boost relations with Libya is already emerging as one of the most acute foreign policy challenges. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ visit to the Libyan capital on April 6, demonstrated the difficulty of this task.

“Let those who tried to question our relations in the past stay back,” said Mitsotakis during his meeting with his Libyan counterpart, Abdel Hamid Dbeibah, who was appointed in February to head the new Government of National Unity bringing together representatives from the west and east of the country for the first time since 2014.

In 2019, Faiz al-Sarraj’s Government of National Accord (GNA), backed by Turkey, had driven General Haftar’s forces out of western Libya. To further the cooperation and in exchange for vital support for the GNA, al-Sarraj signed two memoranda of understanding, “The Security and Military Cooperation” and “Restriction of Marine Jurisdictions,”  with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Istanbul on November 28, 2019.

Mitsotakis asked Tripoli “to cancel the illegal documents presented as agreements between states when they have no legal value.” But days after his short visit, Erdoğan and Dbeibah reaffirmed their commitment to the “Restriction of Marine Jurisdictions” agreement.

This angered some of their neighbors in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as some EU members who were willing “to circumvent the agreement if it cannot be cancelled” as a European diplomat told Le Monde. Erdoğan and Dbeibah also signed numerous agreements following one-on-one and inter-delegation talks.

Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio said that Italy and the United States have “a common concern about the presence of foreign forces, both Russian and Turkish, in Libya,” meaning that there is a perception of “stronger” cooperation between the two countries on this matter.

Europe has recently shown interest in the upcoming elections in Libya.

During a meeting in Washington on Monday with his U.S. counterpart Antony Blinken, the two officials discussed the importance of the “full implementation of the ceasefire in Libya and the holding of elections [scheduled for December 24] on time.”

Europe has recently shown interest in the upcoming elections in Libya. Last month, the Libyan High National Electoral Commission held a meeting attended by foreign ministers from Italy, Germany, and France. The commission said the ministers “continued to support the commission in carrying out the elections scheduled for December 24 of this year.”

On Tuesday, French Ambassador to Libya, Béatrice Le Fraper du Hellen, signed an agreement with Gerardo Noto, the resident representative of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Libya, by which

France pledged to contribute one million euros to support the UNDP project “Promoting Elections for the Libyan People,” bringing the total funds contributed by France to the said project to 1,850,000 euros. This is particularly interesting after France backed General Haftar with military support during his 2019 attempt to take over Tripoli.

In many ways, Libya presents unparalleled benefits to EU members and the ongoing EU diplomatic efforts are proof of Europe’s interest in the political upturn in this neighboring country after a decade of chaos.

President Biden’s agenda will have to focus overwhelmingly on U.S. domestic politics given the pressing challenges surrounding COVID-19 and the economic fallout from this unprecedented public health crisis. His administration has underlined their commitment to a foreign policy that better reflects the concerns and priorities of America’s middle class.

There is much debate about what this “foreign policy for the middle class” will look like, but you can be sure that the administration will be focusing on ending the “forever wars” and attempting to more substantively pivot away from the Middle East toward Asia and competition with China, a goal that proved elusive during previous administrations.

The Biden administration is not seeking to end U.S. engagement in the Middle East, but rather to limit the U.S. military presence in the region and to engage in greater multilateral diplomacy. The U.S.-led regional security architecture that has been in place for decades is no longer sustainable, and the new administration is eager to cultivate partnerships to increase burden sharing and encourage regional stability, while also assuring that its own strategic interests are still protected.

Biden’s Foreign Policy Priorities

The Biden administration is working on reinvigorating America’s State Department, which suffered from an unprecedented level of resignations and long-term vacancies during the Trump administration, and on cultivating greater multilateral cooperation with allies that were often disregarded over the last four years.

Biden officials speak much more of human rights and democratic norms, in stark contrast to Trump, but it’s unclear how much of this will lead to a substantive realignment of policy priorities in the Middle East. Sanctions over human rights violations are already being implemented, but they rarely target the major violators in conflicts and human rights violations, especially not heads of state.

The conflict in Libya will constitute a significant policy priority in the Transatlantic relationship between the United States and Europe.

Regarding Middle East priorities, Biden officials have laid out very clear priorities, namely returning to the Iran Nuclear Deal and supporting conflict resolution efforts in Yemen, both of which Biden’s teams are working vigorously to advance. This translates to a significant strategic focus on regional security in the Gulf and on Iranian influence in conflict theaters like Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.

North Africa will not feature high on the list of priorities. However, the conflict in Libya will constitute a significant policy priority in the Transatlantic relationship between the United States and Europe.

The United States maintains important bilateral relations with foreign patrons on both sides of the Libyan divide, namely Turkey, UAE, Egypt, France, and Russia, and is working to apply pressure on these actors to withdraw from Libya’s conflict by pushing all parties to respect the UN arms embargo, which the UN Panel of Experts recently argued was “totally ineffective.”

Libya offers a crucial milieu where the Biden administration can put its commitment toward multilateralism and diplomacy into action.

Former acting UN envoy on Libya and veteran American diplomat Stephanie Williams stated that an estimated 20,000 foreign fighters were present in Libya. Some reports indicate that some countries which have mercenaries in Libya are now planning to withdraw them in line with the current reconciliation process.

Libya offers a crucial milieu where the Biden administration can put its commitment toward multilateralism and diplomacy into action. This conflict also represents an opportunity to reinvigorate the Transatlantic partnership, which was damaged during the Trump administration.

Biden has emphasized time and time again that the United States needs to repair its ties with key European allies, and supporting conflict resolution efforts in Libya is a key modality through which to pursue this policy goal. Libya is at the top of the agenda in talks between the United States and European allies like Germany and France.

The Libyan conflict is in many ways more pressing for America’s European allies, who are preoccupied by concerns of regional instability, counterterrorism, migration, and Russian presence at NATO’s backdoor. The internationalized nature of the Libyan war is also linked with other regional tensions along Europe’s southern border, namely the tensions between Turkey, Greece, and other European and Middle East powers over maritime rights and resources in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Beyond supporting the tenuous ceasefire and political transition in Libya, the Biden administration can offer more humanitarian support and coordination for the estimated 574,000 foreign migrants, 316,000 internally displaced persons, and 44,000 refugees in Libya. The outbreak of COVID19, on top of the political instability and violence, hurts these vulnerable communities especially hard. It will take a long-term commitment from the international community to help rebuild Libya’s fragmented and under-resourced institutions, not to mention to ensure that the ceasefire holds.

Libyan experts have laid out a host of economic, political, and security challenges facing the Government of National Unity. Already the optimism surrounding the parliament’s approval of this interim government has been tamed by several high-profile political assassinations in both Benghazi and Tripoli, yet another indication of the urgent need for security sector reform.

Conflict Resolution Across the Region

Moving forward the Biden administration needs to maintain its active diplomatic efforts in Libya and work as closely as possible with its European allies on supporting the ceasefire and the political transition, as well as on pressuring foreign actors to withdraw from the conflict. This will be a difficult feat. The U.S. administration should take this a step further by helping to push the Libya Stabilization Act through Congress.

To understand how deep political differences between Turkey and Egypt are at the moment, one need not look further than the different reactions to the “four-finger salute” or Rabia sign in both countries. In Egypt, this gesture is treated as a political symbol of the Muslim Brotherhood and the opposition to the current Egyptian government.

In Turkey, it brings to mind then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s gesture in 2013 to express his opposition to the military coup in Egypt and his support to the democratically elected late President Mohamed Morsi.

The hand salute became a symbol of the breaking down of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Turkey in 2013, after Egyptian President Morsi was ousted by a military coup. Since then, cold diplomatic showdowns left their place to bilateral hostility and resulted in the two countries expelling each other’s ambassadors.

Politically, President Erdoğan made use of many platforms to criticize the undemocratic government in Egypt while the Egyptian government issued several statements targeting the Turkish government. Egypt also criticized Turkey for hosting members of the Muslim Brotherhood who fled Egypt due to political persecution.

Conflicts and Rivalry

Turkey and Egypt became rivals in the region following the 2013 diplomatic standoff. When the Libyan civil war broke out, Egypt supported the Libyan National Army led by Khalifa Haftar, while Turkey backed the UN-recognized Government of National Accord in Tripoli. In the ongoing Eastern Mediterranean conflict over natural gas and maritime borders, Egypt supported Greek Cyprus against Turkey.

Egypt is considered a regional power in the Middle East and the Arab world, while Turkey is regarded as a role model for Muslim democracy in the region.

When Egypt discovered natural gas fields in the Mediterranean, it chose to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot administration. This cooperation would enhance, it was thought, the Egyptian economy, but it adversely affected Egypt’s already deteriorating relations with Turkey.

Egypt is considered a regional power in the Middle East and the Arab world, while Turkey is regarded as a role model for Muslim democracy in the region. Turkey’s increased involvement in the Middle East has had wider implications for the country. According to a report by the UNHCR in October 2020, since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Turkey has hosted approximately 3.6 million Syrian refugees.

The Egyptian government did not confirm this statement. An unnamed Egyptian official commented that “there is no such thing as resuming diplomatic contacts.” The official said that Egypt and Turkey have diplomatic ties already at the level of chargé d’affaires.

Egypt criticized Turkey and backed Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is widely believed to be behind the brutal murder of Khashoggi.

During the same speech, Çavuşoğlu emphasized Turkey’s interest in mending relations with the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, both of which are major supporters of the Sisi regime. It seems that the hostile approach by the UAE towards Turkey results from Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood – many of its supporters and leaders are based in Turkey, where they broadcast and issue statements, a move that has always angered Egypt.

When Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was murdered by Saudi operatives in Saudi Arabia’s consulate in Istanbul in 2018, Turkey revealed the facts behind the crime to the international public. Egypt criticized Turkey and backed Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is widely believed to be behind the brutal murder.

Egypt has always been a loyal ally of Saudi Arabia. In 2015, Egypt supported the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen against the Houthi rebels and boycotted Qatar in 2017 in response to the request by the Saudi-UAE political axis. Saudi Arabia has been a main actor in the Egyptian political and economic scene. Through its economic aid packages to Egypt following the military coup in 2013, Egypt’s foreign policy has come under strong Saudi influence.

The UAE supported Egypt in its war against the Muslim Brotherhood, which the Emirati and Egyptian governments view through the same lens of an alleged threat posed by political Islam. The fact that Turkey hosts anti-coup members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who fled political purge and persecution in Egypt, strains the relations between the two countries.

Win-Win Rapprochement

In a relatively softer tone, President Erdoğan has stated that relations with Egypt will be strengthened if diplomatic efforts result in positive outcomes. He stated, “Friendship between the Egyptian and Turkish peoples will not be the same as relations between the Egyptian and Greek peoples.”

Turkey is well aware of Egypt’s political importance in the Middle East. If Turkey and Egypt leave their ideological differences aside, focus on prospects of growth, and reach a reconciliation initially on their economic interests and for the stability in the region, other steps will follow suit. Turkey and Egypt can find common grounds on the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya. If the two countries normalize their relations, Turkey could be a potential importer of Egyptian natural gas through the Mediterranean.

Turkey and Egypt share the historical, centuries-long legacy of the Ottoman Empire. Whether or not they follow their mutual interests, only time can tell. Diplomatic relations between the two can’t be mended with a quick fix and ultimately actions will speak louder than words.

Turkey and Greece have many differences which gain new dimensions through regional and international incidents. It is a curious question whether there could ever be a path toward a long-term dialogue between the two nations and a sustainable solution to their differences. So far, to promote dialogue and peaceful settlement, third parties such as the EU, the U.S., and NATO have played important roles. Some observers argue that the Greek-Turkish NATO partnership has kept the bilateral problems under control, while others think that the post-World War II order and the U.S. role in Greek-Turkish disputes have worsened the situation.

A number of experts believe the EU still has the potential to push Greece and Turkey to reach a solution and others argue that the EU created further tension and turbulence by recognizing the membership of the Greek Cypriot government as representative of the whole island before a resolution to the conflict had been reached. What is certain, however, is that the role of third parties in Greek-Turkish disagreements will determine to a great extent the success of the bilateral talks. Regional and global actors will play a decisive role in the disputed matters according to their interest definitions or priorities.

Exploratory talks between Turkey and Greece started after a crisis between the two countries at the end of the 1990s. Talks and rapprochement were stimulated when Turkey’s EU initiative for accession was supported by Greece. Turkey and Greece have held 60 rounds of talks over 14 years. However, rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean turned the Aegean crises into a larger problem premised on the delimitation of maritime borders and especially in relation to the islands near Turkey’s coast.

Bilateral relations deteriorated in the 2010s, not because of the delimitation of the maritime borders, but due to the July 15, 2016 coup attempt in Turkey and the Gülenists who sought refuge in Greece. After the coup attempt, exploratory talks were hindered by Greece’s refusal to extradite the Gülenists to Turkey. Moreover, other regional problems poisoned the bilateral disagreements, such as the Syrian civil war and the flow of immigrants to the Aegean Sea and the region of Evros in Greece.

These new problems are no longer excluded from the agenda of the bilateral relations. Greece continued the EU-ization of Greek foreign policy priorities and Turkey rejected any kind of fait accompli. In this context, Greece’s naval exercises with the inclusion of numerous third actors as a show of strength and Turkey’s exploration ships in the Eastern Mediterranean will be regarded as the continuation of previous problems and are seen as having a multilateral character.

Recently, the most prominent issue in the Eastern Mediterranean has been the drilling activities around the island of Cyprus. Officially, this is out of the frame of exploratory talks between Greece and Turkey, but there is no doubt that the issue of Cyprus has always been poisonous for Greek-Turkish relations. In 2003, the Greek Cypriot leadership signed a maritime deal with Egypt for gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The deal aimed to create an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that complicated the Cyprus problem of how to share sovereignty between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Greeks belittle the Cyprus problem reducing it to “occupation” in reference to the 1974 Turkish operation on the island after the brutal murders of Turkish Cypriot civilians by the Greek Cypriot militias backed by the Greek military junta with an idea of uniting the island with Greece. The real cause of the problem has been kept hidden: what will the rights of the Turkish Cypriots be?

In the 1960 constitution, Turkish Cypriots had the same rights as Greek Cypriots as constituent citizens of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC). Problems were exacerbated when the Greek side argued that the number of Greek Cypriots were higher than their Turkish counterparts, and therefore Turkish Cypriots should not have equal rights and that this should be addressed by introducing several amendments in the founding constitution.

Despite the existence of EU mechanisms, the exclusion of Turkey from all multilateral platforms and a maximalist insistence on using these platforms and mechanisms to achieve Greek national priorities are still the dominant attitudes in the Eastern Mediterranean. This irreconcilable attitude was reflected in the use of maps such as the Seville Map to decide the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in international summits – a move that triggered Turkey’s reaction.

The most recent example of Greece’s efforts to exclude and marginalize Turkey from international platforms is the Philia Forum.

In 2006, the concept of “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan) which includes Turkey’s EEZ was introduced by Admiral Cem Gürdeniz. With the studies of Turkish Navy Commander Cihat Yaycı, in 2010, the concept became a doctrine (of the Turkish Republic). The first application of Blue Homeland came in 2017 when Turkey started to send seismic exploration ships to the region. The peak in the tensions in Greek-Turkish relations came when Turkey signed a delimitation agreement with Libya on November 28, 2019. Today, Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean policy depends on the Turkey-Libya EEZ deal that challenges  the Mediterranean Energy Plan of Israel, Cyprus, and Greece.

In 2013, the EastMed pipeline project was designed under the European Commission Regulation without referring to any probable cooperation with Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. This was taken as another sign of how Greece tries to use its EU membership to its national advantage. The most recent example of Greece’s efforts to exclude and marginalize Turkey from international platforms is the Philia Forum. The Greek government aims to utilize Turkey’s tensions with several regional countries in order to delegitimize and minimize Turkey’s rightful demands and rights in the Mediterranean.

As part of this strategy, the Greek government wants to find a solution to the delimitation issue with other neighboring countries such as the agreements with Italy on June 6, and with Egypt on August 6,  2020. The Albanian-Greek EEZ border had several problems despite continuous efforts since 2009. In 2018, the Tsipras government tried to push the negotiations with no success. On October 20, 2020, Albanian and Greek authorities confirmed that they had reached an agreement to take the issue to The Hague.

As a result of the rising tension in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg took the initiative to reduce the risk of incidents between the Greek and Turkish navies. With the support of Germany, Turkey and Greece resumed exploratory talks in Istanbul on January 26, 2021 with the hope to create a base for bilateral negotiations after months of tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. After a five-year break, the 61st Round of Exploratory Talks were launched in the hope of supporting the EU efforts to promote a positive agenda in Turkish-EU relations.

Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Sedat Önal and retired Greek diplomat Pavlos Apostolidis represented their countries at the negotiation table. However, both sides approach each other reluctantly and do not act in good faith. To gain diplomatic benefits, both try to project the image of a peaceful actor towards the international community. Some analysts say diplomats know how to solve the problems in the Aegean Sea while others claim no progress is being made. However, making progress in the exploratory talks is now a matter of a deeper question.

The relations between Greece and Turkey are part of the EU-Turkey relations. Greek officials state it clearly, and believe that the European Union can provide a solid victory for Greece by implementing sanctions against Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey wants a positive agenda – but the question is at what expense. Turkey accuses the EU countries of being unjust but is equally aware that the solution will come through an international meeting which must include all actors in the Eastern Mediterranean. So, the lack of trust and the existence of many different actors with a range of different priorities make the exploratory talks less promising in terms of reaching a comprehensive resolution in the near future.

Third parties play an important role in the game and according to Turkey it is not a fair game. This is the main reason why Turkey is active in the field with military exercises that manifest its decisiveness to preserve its maritime borders. However, the beginning of the exploratory talks shows that both Greece and Turkey do not want to increase the tension further. This creates a motivation to back the dialogue channels. To this day, the only reliable method to solve the existing problems between Turkey and Greece is peaceful negotiations through fair international summits with the participation of all relevant actors.

No doubt, Turkey’s relationship with the European Union has not been a rose garden. The first contact dates back to the 1960s and the Ankara Agreement, and over time led to the establishment of a customs union. The gradual institutional rapprochement culminated in 2005, when the negotiations for full Turkish membership began.

The process immediately exposed fractures within the European block, attributable for the most part to the existence of a certain criticism towards Ankara. The admission process introduced significant issues to the political debate in Turkey, aiming primarily at a more democratic governance.

However, from the very beginning, the accession path has been affected by a lack of cohesion and a lack of a joint perspective from the European side, mainly due to the divergent stances of some member states.

Hence, the negotiations progressed only slowly, and the unresolved Cyprus issue in conjunction with the double standards by member states led by Germany and France contributed to undermining the principle of pacta sunt servanda.

Though since 2004 Ankara has continued to support the solution offered by the Annan Plan, it has faced not only the intransigence of the Greek administration, but also the full annexation of Cyprus as a member state of the European Union, which, in turn, has vetoed most of the significant chapters by causing to halting the negotiation process.

If those were the assumptions, nowadays the relations with the European Union experience growing tensions leading to a mutual crisis of confidence. What we have witnessed in the recent months in the Eastern Mediterranean and over the main European negotiation tables are nothing more than the products of those unresolved issues and stances that have little to do with realpolitik.

Although the European Union acts and operates according to the principle of unity and solidarity in itself, a careful analysis reveals that the treatment of Turkey has been different.

On the one hand, there is a tendency by a block in the EU to dominate the European debate and its key issues with reference to a self-assumed political and moral superiority expressed chiefly by Emmanuel Macron who tries to monopolize the European rhetoric and represent France as the leader of the liberal world.

On the other hand, there are mediating attempts based mainly on strategic and consistent considerations. French President Macron, along the lines of the traditional anti-Turkish sentiment, has not skimped on granting support to Greece and Cyprus over the critical issue related to the delimitation of territorial waters, which recently has seen an escalation of tones and maneuvers in the Mediterranean.

Among the representatives at the table only Greece accepted the proposal to punish Turkey, while Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Malta opposed more severe sanctions against Ankara. Therefore, in preparation for the Special European Council on October 1-2, which convened specifically to assess the situation in the Aegean Sea, a more intense collaboration has emerged between Paris, Athens, and Nicosia, while the other coastal states opted for a constructive approach based on dialogue.

In this frame, Rome plays a key role by proposing a positive agenda towards Turkey. Since the very beginning, Italy has supported Ankara’s EU accession, which is considered of great importance from both a strategic and a political point of view. At that time, the so-called Friends of Turkey, including Italy, Spain, the UK, and Sweden, was established with the explicit aim of balancing the existing negative approaches.

However, more recently, in the resolution following the meeting of the Council of Europe on December 10-11, EU leaders reaffirmed the EU’s strategic interest in the development of a cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Turkey and stressed the importance of keeping channels of communication between the EU and Turkey open.

A positive EU-Turkey agenda is on the table, provided by Turkey’s readiness to resolve differences through dialogue and to act in accordance with international law.

The offer of a positive EU-Turkey agenda remains on the table, provided Turkey shows readiness to promote a genuine partnership with the union and its member states, and to resolve differences through dialogue and in accordance with international law. This approach confirms that Italy, Spain, and Malta – supported as well by Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Germany – have succeeded in prevailing a softer line towards Ankara.

The reasons behind this dialogue-based orientation are manifold. First, there is a subtle acknowledgement of the legitimacy of certain Turkish requests and of the importance of Turkey as a valuable partner, proving how much Europe and Turkey need each other. In a time of uncertainty and several crises, Turkey stands as a crucial gateway in the containment of threats and risks for Europe.

The fight against terrorism, arms trafficking, and human trafficking are some factors underlying the existence of a strong complementarity. Moreover, Angela Merkel on behalf of the whole EU, was one of the main architects of the Refugees Deal signed with Turkey in 2016, whose aim was to stem the irregular migratory flow across the Mediterranean and the Balkans. Despite the numerous vicissitudes and certain non-compliances on the European side, the agreement has been effective in containing irregular immigration, demonstrating once again that Turkey is a partner Europe can count on.

For the same reasons, a certain degree of support and sympathy are expressed by Hungary and Poland, whose relations with Turkey are very positive. In other words, a further deterioration in the relations and in the mutual trust could generate a snowball effect that the whole EU, considering the fragility of some internal mechanisms of control and on the migrants’ reception policies, would not be able to cope with.

As a matter of fact, the Mediterranean is an area of shared historical and strategic interest where Ankara as a smart power is acting in an increasingly assertive way. After all, the Turkish presence in scenarios that suffer from the decision-making vacuum left by the European powers, has led to a certain level of stabilization.

In Libya, alongside Fayez al-Sarraj and the government legitimately recognized by the UN, Ankara has effectively established itself as a peacekeeping force, protecting the interests of European countries as well. All EU states support the UN-recognized government of al-Sarraj with the exception of France which stands close to the warlord Haftar and therefore had to complain about the presence of Turkish soldiers in Tripoli.

In the frame of the Berlin Conference of January 29, 2020, Italy and Germany contributed toward mediating and channeling Turkish expectations to the European tables. Speaking of the alignments and divisions on the fields, Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio reiterated, “We must accept the Turkish presence in Libya.”

On June 22, 2020, participating in Operation Irini, the German frigate Hamburg searched the Turkish merchant ship MV Roseline A.  It was subsequently stated that the soldiers who boarded the ship questioned the crew and conducted detailed examinations of the ship by opening the freight containers.

The Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately condemned the EU move in an official statement by declaring that no advance permission had been acquired either from the captain or from Turkey.

The ministry pointed out that information concerning the EU move was conveyed to Turkey exclusively through the ship’s staff. This rare incident that led to a formal objection from Turkey and caused serious tension deserves to be examined as it raises significant political and legal issues.

The Legal Framework of Intervention on the High Seas

The rules regulating the operation of merchant ships on the high seas are established by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter, Law of the Sea Convention). Although Turkey is not a party to the convention, the relevant rules reflect customary principles of international law and are abided by Turkey and all other states.

The doctrine of the high seas is based on the principle of the freedom of the seas. Therein, all states can enjoy the freedom of navigation of the high seas and the right of their aircraft to fly in the airspace over the high seas, to place submarine cables and oil pipelines, to fish, conduct scientific research, and construct artificial islands and other facilities permitted by international law.

The Legal and Political Reflections

Considering the legal framework summarized above, the first issue that needs to be addressed is whether there were “reasonable grounds for suspecting” the Turkish merchant ship was involved in any activities banned in the Law of the Sea Convention.

The intervention is described in the official statement of the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs as “ambiguous” and “suspicious.” This implies that Turkey was not presented with satisfactory evidence that there were reasonable grounds to intervene.

Moreover, the fact that no weapon was found as a result of the search shows that the ship was searched based on a general suspicion rather than concrete one.

No weapon was found as a result of the search shows that the ship was searched based on a general suspicion rather than concrete one.

It was pointed out in the statement made by the ministry that the purpose and benefit of Operation Irini “are open to debate” and that the operation itself was not “impartial” as it did not control “the arms support to the outlawed Haftar” but instead it “punished the legitimate Libyan Government.”

The statement points out that neither NATO nor the governments of Turkey and Libya were consulted, and that the consent of the flag state, i.e. Turkey, was not obtained.

It is without doubt that there are controversial matters surrounding Operation Irini. First, the operation was not directly established by a UN Security Council resolution nor was there any UN supervision. In fact, the EU launched the operation with objectives that do not comply with the task of inspecting the arms embargo.

Considering that the task of Operation Irini is not limited to searching for weapons but also covers the prevention of oil smuggling and human trafficking, it becomes clear that it is, in fact, actually associated with the protection of the security and defense interests of the EU in the Mediterranean Sea.

The command council of the operation is dominated by France and Greece which are recently in serious conflict with Turkey in the Mediterranean Sea and Libya. The deputy operation commander is a French national and Italy and Greece will alternate the Force Commander every six months.

Therefore, the activities carried out under Operation Irini are inevitably partial against Turkey and lacking goodwill, which makes any activity illegitimate according to the fundamental principle of international law.

As can be understood from the UN Security Council resolutions mentioned above, it is not clear whether the arms embargo also targets the legitimate government of Libya. In some decisions, the legitimate government is held exempt from restrictions in order to ensure stability in the country.

The Libyan Government of National Accord has established defense agreements with certain countries, including Turkey. The arms embargo should therefore not prevent the arrival of armed elements from countries like Turkey given the signed bilateral defense cooperation agreements between the two countries.

Turkey’s Response

Following the search of the Turkish ship, Turkey’s priority is to prevent similar interventions on Turkish merchant vessels in the Mediterranean Sea. This said, there are legal measures against such unlawful interventions.

As the ships on high seas are under the jurisdiction of the flag state and are considered a part of that country, the flag state has the right to take all necessary legitimate measures to prevent such illegitimate acts on the basis of the right of self-defense.

These measures may include military measures as long as they are necessary and proportionate.

On the other hand, the flag state has the right to initiate the necessary legal procedures in the courts of the intervening state in order to get compensation for all damages that resulted from an illegal intervention.

The Law of the Sea Convention provides that all the damages should be compensated “if the suspicions prove to be unfounded.”

A criminal procedure against the personnel who intervened can also be initiated, if there is enough evidence that the intervention and the related acts constituted criminal violations.

The acts during the intervention were conducted on a Turkish-flagged merchant ship that is regarded as Turkish territory. The personnel who carried out the acts could therefore be subject to a criminal investigation in the Turkish courts in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Turkish Criminal Code.

In the past few months Luigi Di Maio, the youngest Italian Foreign Minister since Galeazzo Ciano, who served from 1936 until 1943 in the nefarious government of his father-in-law, Benito Mussolini, has been involved in rebuilding the international supply chain and reopening borders to free circulation after the country was hit hard by COVID-19. However, Di Maio’s second priority has been to protect Italy’s interests in Libya in the new scenario that emerged after Turkish intervention in favor of the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA).

Italian Foreign Policy on Libya

Irregular migration, energy and security are the three main Italian interests in Libya. Despite the diversification policies since the early 1970s, Libya still plays a relevant role in Italy’s energy policy because of the amount of oil imported, the exceptional quality of Libyan crude oil, and the Greenstream subsea gas pipeline laid by the Italian energy giant, ENI (State Hydrocarbons Authority), and opened in 2004. Moreover, for Rome, Libyan gas is probably the only reliable alternative to Russian natural gas.

As in all European countries, the issue of immigration is at the top of the political debate in Italy too. Most of the irregular migrants entering the country come from the shores of Libya. The issue has created enormous tensions domestically – just remember that the Catholic Church has pressed for a policy of open borders, but the Italian right is basing much of their populist discourse on stopping migration by all means. Irregular migration has also created significant tension at the EU level, which is refusing the modification of the Dublin Regulation.

Future perspectives

Thus, Di Maio’s priority is to provide stability in the country, to provide security, the flow of oil and natural gas, and the containment of irregular immigration. For Rome, the ideal option is to reach a political compromise between the different parts and maintain the unity of the country. However, in the present situation, where different regional and global actors have sided with opposing groups, it appears a remote option.

Turkish intervention in favor of the GNA has even reduced the chances for an Italian role and has created a situation that (from Rome’s viewpoint) resembles the first phases of the unending Syrian crisis. Consequently, Italy is now faced with a difficult choice of taking a leading role opposing Ankara or cooperating with it.

Di Maio initially attempted to reduce the GNA’s dependency on Ankara with a more active and independent role. Nevertheless, this would mean a radical shift in Italian foreign policy and unprecedented deployment of its military as well as economic resources. This is unlikely because of three constraining elements. Firstly, foreign policy choices must enjoy domestic support. The Italian media, however, continue to follow the Libyan crisis sporadically and without interest. Italian public opinion also deplores the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy, as an “enemy” is not regarded as an implacable foe that needs to be confronted with military power and, instead, can be more effectively engaged using diplomacy.

Secondly, Italian defense policy, as stated by the White Book of the Italian Ministry of Defense, is concentrated on the Euro-Atlantic geopolitical area and on the Euro-Mediterranean geopolitical area. The Euro-Atlantic security is guaranteed by NATO, EU, “common values” and strong economic and cultural ties. The Euro-Mediterranean area, however, is characterized by anarchy and suffers political and economic instability and intra-state competition. Yet, despite its relevance, it is very unlikely that the Italian Armed Forces can intervene in the Euro-Mediterranean area outside the U.S.-led mission scenario –  something that the Trump administration is not considering.

Consequently, Italy has pointed to a UN-sponsored solution to the crisis and to the reinforcement of Mission Irini, the EU military operation to enforce the arms embargo to Libya. Both efforts appear difficult in materializing when key members of the EU and permanent members of the Security Council either backed Haftar (Russia and France), who aims to destroy the GNA militarily or are uninterested in the crisis (U.S., U.K., and China).

Italy has relatively small economic resources to invest in Libya or to apply pressure. Because of the huge public debt and the poor performance of its economy, the country cannot afford big investments abroad. Private investments are also unlikely. Major companies like FIAT or UniCredit, which have been important actors of Italian foreign policy in Libya and the East Mediterranean, are now focused on the American or internal market. The only relevant economic player is ENI, which has been active in Libya since 1959 and has lobbied the Italian government extensively.

Exactly because of these three restrictions, to not lose a role in North Africa, Italy should look into a compromise with Turkey, which deployed enormous resources in Libya. However, this compromise may need brave decisions: Turkey’s image with the Italian public is particularly poor, and the Rome-Ankara alliance may damage relations with France, Greece, and Egypt. With the first two countries, there is a high level of interconnection that will not be damaged by an eventual competition in Libya. Moreover, Paris has been frequently in conflict with Rome on the issue of migration and proved highly destabilizing in Libya. Italian policymakers define Egypt as an “inescapable partner” in the Middle East. This view has been maintained even after Giulio Regeni’s brutal killing in February 2016, presumably by members of the Egyptian security apparatus, and the fact that none have been brought to justice.

At the moment Italy appears to be in a cul de sac in Libya with a young Foreign Minister who will not be able to change Italian foreign policy because he lacks strong political support; his party is in turmoil and he recently lost its leadership. Everybody hopes, though, that he will not share the young Foreign Minister Ciano’s fate, who watched powerless the decline of Italy’s power in the Mediterranean.

The dream of natural gas bonanza in the Eastern Mediterranean naturally boosted littoral states’ expectations of economic benefit from ownership, exploration, exploitation, and transportation of natural gas reserves discovered in the region. Accordingly the international community – at the beginning – hoped that exportation of Israeli gas to Europe (possibly via a sub-sea pipeline to Turkey) could advance cooperation among regional states, make a political solution easy for already existing disputes like the Cyprus Question, and strengthen interdependence between Europe and the region.

These positive expectations led the Obama Administration to believe that the interested parties, which were potential stakeholders as buyers and sellers of natural gas as well as beneficiaries of energy firms, could be convinced to invest in a new Mediterranean cooperation. However, after 2011, neither did the USA show its willingness to support regional economic cooperation on the Eastern Mediterranean gas basin, nor did they support the newly found gas reserves by Israel. The Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) and Egypt led the reinvigoration of an inclusive gas partnership. Geopolitical conditions radically changed after the Arab Spring and stakeholders of Eastern Mediterranean gas basins adopted competitive agendas in the ongoing conflicts. Since then geopolitical rivalry, not economic rationality, has become the main determinant of the limits of Eastern Mediterranean energy cooperation.

This competitive geopolitical atmosphere was first used by the GCA to violate the legitimate rights of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). On one hand, the GCA signed so-called EEZ agreements with Israel, Egypt, and Libya without taking the consent of the TRNC therefore, ignoring the economic, political, and legal rights of Turkish Cypriots, and also unilaterally dividing its so-called EEZ into blocks and inviting energy companies like ENI and Total to explore and drill offshore reserves around Cyprus. This is a violation against a part of Turkey’s continental shelf in so-called blocks 1,4,5,6, and 7. On the other hand, Tel Aviv exploited geopolitical faultlines in the region to marginalize the rights of Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, and TRNC in the maritime zones of the Eastern Mediterranean and to exclude them from the institutionalized attempt of regional energy cooperation (the East Mediterranean Gas Forum).

Energy firms are reminding us of the economic rationale behind the drillings

Within this framework of geopolitical rivalry, the economic side of the story, the expectation of benefits as well as the feasibility of the cost of investing in East-Mediterranean natural gas dreams, are forgotten. As is known until now, the projects excluding Turkey and the TRNC from the energy deals have not produced any tangible economic results. Therefore it is not wrong to assume that East-Med-like projects have turned out to be an illusion that was shattered recently when energy companies like Exxon-Mobile, ENI, and Total stopped their drilling operations in blocks 6 and 10 and postponed them till March/April 2021 because of the current energy landscape.

The most remarkable feature of the current energy outlook is falling oil prices. At the time of writing, the Brent crude is 42.30 USD which is not enough to motivate key energy companies to take high financial burdens and even higher political risks of investing in East-Med partners’ pipeline dreams. As one can remember oil prices began dropping in January because of the fall of demand to hydrocarbons in Asian markets affected by the coronavirus outbreak. Before European markets were hit by Covid-19, a price war begun between Russia and Saudi Arabia. The USA, feeling the negative impact of dropping oil prices on its national oil industry, had to pressure Riyadh to reach a deal with Moscow on production cuts.  Since then oil prices have gradually risen. However, this sign of improvement is not expected to change market conditions in the Eastern Mediterranean energy game because of two reasons:

The first reason is related to the current hydrocarbon surplus in the energy markets. Even before the coronavirus crisis there was more supply than demand for oil and gas and Covid-19 is just amplifying this problem. The Asianization of energy markets (reversing the route of East-West energy trade) has been proposed as a remedy but there is no such aspect of Asianization in trilateral Eastern Mediterranean energy partnership plans yet. Indeed, energy experts from the stake-holding firms, like ENI, have already announced their doubts about the economic and technical feasibility of the East-Med pipeline (1200 km off-shore, 500 km onshore length connecting Greece to Italy as well as 1550 km off-shore, 20 km on-shore pipeline connecting Greece to Bulgaria).

Moreover, some actors like France that are eager to take part in East Mediterranean geopolitics by providing security support to stakeholders in dealing with risks against critical infrastructure, are faced with the problem of maritime sustainability when the Covid-19 pandemic hit their naval deployments in the region. Hence security costs associated with the longest and expensive East-Med pipeline project become more apparent under the coronavirus pandemic. Therefore, it can be expected that international energy companies will lose their incentives to continue drilling activities in the Mediterranean. While energy companies are postponing drilling operations, Greek Cypriot and Egyptian authorities keep talking about the expansion of natural gas production from the East Mediterranean reserves. Thinking about the capabilities of planned pipelines like East-Med, expanding national gas production can be counterproductive even if it will be realized. Besides, WHO voiced the possibility of a second wave of Covid-19 which may further restrain global hydrocarbon demand.