U

kraine is facing a €23 billion shortfall in defense funding this year, forcing Kyiv to seek additional financial support from its European allies as it struggles to sustain its war effort against Russia.

The funding gap comes as Ukrainian and European leaders gathered in Kyiv on Monday to mark Ukraine’s Independence Day and reaffirm support for the country. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy urged Western governments to provide Ukraine with the resources needed to end the war more quickly.

“We are not asking you to fight for us. Give Ukraine everything to stop this war,” Zelenskyy said during a speech.

The shortfall has emerged partly because Ukraine’s Defense Ministry accelerated spending earlier in the year, using funds originally intended for the second half of 2026. At the same time, a planned €90 billion European Union loan package has been delayed by political opposition from Hungary.

Zelenskyy said the government had brought forward spending on military equipment, including fiber-optic drones, strike drones and interceptor systems. The decision helped meet urgent battlefield needs but left Ukraine facing a significant financing gap later in the year.

The €23 billion shortfall is in addition to roughly €30 billion in European funding already pledged to Ukraine this year through the EU loan package.

The European Commission moved Monday to provide some immediate assistance, approving €6.1 billion for new defense procurement. The money is expected to finance air-defense missiles, ammunition and radar systems, all of which remain among Ukraine’s most urgent military requirements.

But the new funding is far below what Kyiv says it needs.

“Normal start”

Zelenskyy said Ukraine requires between €6.8 billion and €8.5 billion to ensure a “normal start” to 2027, including money needed in advance to purchase weapons and other military supplies for January. A further €17 billion is needed for military salaries, payments to families of fallen soldiers and other defense-related expenses.

The funding crisis comes as Ukraine continues to depend heavily on European financial and military assistance to maintain its war effort.

At Monday’s meeting in Kyiv, British Prime Minister Andy Burnham joined European Council President António Costa, Luxembourg Prime Minister Luc Frieden, Moldovan President Maia Sandu, Estonian President Alar Karis, Finnish President Alexander Stubb and other European leaders. French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz participated remotely.

Burnham said Ukraine deserved continued support and expressed his determination to work with other members of the so-called coalition of the willing.

But securing further European assistance could prove difficult.

Reform requirements linked to Western funding

Ukraine itself faces political obstacles in meeting some of the reform requirements linked to Western funding. Zelenskyy acknowledged that parliament is delaying the implementation of reforms required for some international aid to be released.

According to the report, lawmakers are currently holding up 24 reform bills connected to Western funding. Although not all of the funds are directly related to defense, delays in receiving European financial assistance could further strain Ukraine’s limited domestic resources and make it harder for the government to finance military needs.

The Ukrainian parliament’s law enforcement committee last week removed five government and judicial reform bills from consideration, with lawmakers arguing that some were no longer relevant to Ukraine’s commitments for EU funding.

Zelenskyy is now seeking to accelerate the release of European funds in order to close the financing gap.

“I am working on this with the French and the Germans,” he said, adding that Ukraine needs to bring forward the next portion of European funds allocated to the country.

The financial pressure comes at a critical stage of the war, with Ukraine seeking to maintain its military capabilities while preparing for continued fighting into 2027. The country is particularly dependent on Western assistance for sophisticated air-defense systems, ammunition and increasingly important drone technologies.

European governments have repeatedly pledged to maintain support for Kyiv, but the latest funding dispute highlights the growing challenge of translating political commitments into timely financial assistance.

For Ukraine, the immediate concern is ensuring that the military has enough money not only to continue operations through the remainder of 2026, but also to enter 2027 without a major disruption in weapons supplies or military payments.

With €23 billion still to be secured, Kyiv is pressing its European partners to accelerate existing commitments and find additional resources before the funding shortage begins to directly affect its ability to sustain the war.

(Source: Politico)

I

srael is facing growing international criticism after its warplanes struck an abandoned military airfield in northwestern Syria, with regional governments and international organizations warning that continued attacks threaten Syria’s sovereignty and regional stability.

The Israeli strikes targeted the disused Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase in Idlib province. Syrian officials said Israeli aircraft carried out eight separate strikes, damaging the runway and hitting a derelict structure inside a hangar. No casualties were immediately reported.

The Syrian Foreign Ministry condemned the operation as a violation of the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, saying Israeli attacks on Syrian territory have continued since December 8, 2024.

Damascus said it has pursued a policy of restraint in an effort to strengthen domestic stability and prevent a wider regional escalation.

Regional governments condemn Israeli strikes

Türkiye strongly condemned the Israeli operation and called for greater international pressure to end what it described as Israel’s continuing aggression against Syria.

“We call on the international community to display a more decisive stance to ensure an end to Israel’s aggression against Syria,” the Turkish Foreign Ministry said, urging accountability for actions it said disregarded international law.

Jordan described the strikes as an “unjustified hostile attack” and said they violated international law and Syrian sovereignty. Egypt similarly warned that repeated Israeli violations of Syrian territory and airspace could trigger a dangerous escalation and undermine wider regional peace efforts.

The Gulf Cooperation Council also condemned the strikes. Saudi Arabia denounced the attack in the strongest terms and rejected the targeting of the Abu al-Duhur facility, while Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait warned that continued military action against Syria threatened regional security.

GCC Secretary-General Jasem Mohamed al-Budaiwi called for stronger international action to protect Syrian territory and uphold regional stability.

U.N. and U.S. express concern

The Arab League also criticized the Israeli strikes, with Secretary-General Nabil Fahmy accusing Israel of using provocative military action to intensify regional tensions.

Pakistan expressed solidarity with Syria and described the strikes as a violation of international law that threatened regional stability. Islamabad called on the international community to ensure accountability.

At the United Nations, spokesperson Stephane Dujarric said the strikes represented another “alarming violation” of Syria’s territorial integrity and airspace.

“These airstrikes must stop, and we are opposed to them,” Dujarric told reporters.

The United States also expressed concern. Tom Barrack, the U.S. ambassador to Ankara and special envoy for Syria and Iraq, said Washington remained committed to diplomatic efforts and talks between regional parties.

Barrack said Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s government had not adopted an aggressive posture toward Israel and had instead repeatedly favored de-escalation.

The latest strikes come as Syria seeks to consolidate its new political order and strengthen relations with regional and international partners. The growing criticism of Israeli military operations, meanwhile, reflects broader concerns that continued attacks could undermine efforts to stabilize Syria and prevent another escalation across the Middle East.

(Source: Daily Sabah)

S

yria and Russia have reached an agreement that will significantly reshape Moscow’s military presence along Syria’s Mediterranean coast, with Damascus set to take control of two strategically important facilities previously used as Russian military outposts.

Under the agreement announced by Syria’s Foreign Ministry, Syria will assume control of the Hmeimem air base near Latakia and the commercial berth at Tartus port as part of its civil administration. Military facilities at both locations will instead be transformed into joint training and qualification centers.

The ministry described the arrangement as a “reorganizing of the Russian presence” along Syria’s coast and said it represented the most significant development since negotiations began about a year and a half ago.

Russia’s military presence in Syria

Russia had been the most important political and military ally of former President Bashar Assad throughout Syria’s civil war. The Hmeimem air base and Tartus naval facility became central pillars of Russia’s military presence in the eastern Mediterranean, allowing Moscow to project air and naval power into the region.

The agreement comes after Assad was overthrown following a lightning insurgency. Russia did not intervene to prevent his removal but subsequently granted asylum to Assad and his family. Russian forces remaining in Syria have gradually withdrawn since the change of government.

Despite the reduction of Russia’s military role, Syria’s new leadership has sought to maintain relations with Moscow. Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa has visited Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow twice since taking power, with the future of the two Mediterranean facilities among the key issues discussed.

The latest agreement does not appear to end Russian-Syrian cooperation altogether. Instead, the conversion of the military facilities into joint training centers suggests that Damascus and Moscow intend to preserve some form of defense and institutional relationship while reducing Russia’s role as a military power stationed on Syrian territory.

Russia had not immediately issued a public comment on the agreement.

Syria’s new foreign policy

The development also reflects a broader transformation in Syria’s foreign policy following Assad’s fall. While Damascus has maintained ties with Moscow, it has simultaneously strengthened relations with Western governments and neighboring Arab states that had distanced themselves from Syria during Assad’s crackdown on opposition protests.

The United States has lifted most of its sanctions on Syria, while European countries have also begun rebuilding diplomatic relations with Damascus.

French President Emmanuel Macron visited Syria in July, during which he announced that France and Syria would appoint ambassadors for the first time in 14 years.

The shift has placed Syria at the center of a wider geopolitical realignment. For years, Russia’s military presence in Syria provided Moscow with a strategic foothold in the Mediterranean and helped sustain Assad’s government. The new arrangement indicates that this role is now being substantially reduced under Syria’s new leadership.

For Damascus, taking control of Hmeimem and the commercial facilities at Tartus represents an important assertion of sovereignty over strategic infrastructure. For Moscow, maintaining joint training facilities could preserve elements of its longstanding relationship with Syria even as its former military footprint is scaled back.

The agreement is likely to become an important marker of Syria’s transition from the Assad era, as the country seeks to balance its longstanding relationship with Russia against growing engagement with Türkiye Europe, the United States and Arab countries.

(Source: CNN)

A

ugust 7, 2026, marks a historic turning point at which the cards of Afro-Eurasian geopolitics and the global security architecture were reshuffled. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s working visit to Saudi Arabia brought together Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, who had arrived in Saudi Arabia the day before the visit, and General Asim Munir at the same table. The defense-focused trilateral ‘Mecca Agreement’, were signed following months of diplomatic maneuvering, and were announced at a time of rising military tensions in the region and US-Iran conflict threatening Gulf security.

Analyzing this critical development from the perspective of Islamabad is of vital importance for understanding Pakistan’s defense network, which stretches from Africa to the Gulf; its chronic and hybrid challenges in internal security; and its foundational role at the crossroads of Afro-Eurasia.

From nuclear power to regional security architecture: Pakistan’s role

As the only nuclear-armed state in the Muslim world, Pakistan constitutes the most deterrent and high-calibre military human capital component of this alliance. The bilateral defense pact signed with Saudi Arabia in 2025 was a consequence of Riyadh’s quest for military assurances, including nuclear deterrence, against potential security threats. However, Turkey’s inclusion in this equation as an official and institutional partner elevates Pakistan’s role as a bilateral ‘security provider’ to a much broader and more balanced framework.

From the perspective of the Islamabad administration, this agreement is not merely a single Gulf commitment, but the culmination of a multi-layered strategy stretching from the Horn of Africa to the Persian Gulf. Indeed, the Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation signed last week between Pakistan and Somalia, a year after it was approved by the Somali Cabinet, demonstrated Islamabad’s determination to play an active role in ensuring the security of navigation in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Furthermore, the Kuwaiti Parliament’s approval in late July of the long-awaited defense cooperation agreement with Pakistan, alongside the pursuit by actors such as Bahrain and Jordan of reciprocal defense agreements modelled on the Saudi model, has cemented Islamabad’s position as the region’s ‘security architect’. Consequently, the Turkey–Saudi Arabia–Pakistan triad forms the backbone not only of these three countries but also of a broader Afro-Eurasian security network.

Synergy of capital, technology and military manpower

Viewed from the perspective of Islamabad, the tripartite alliance is more than just a military pact; it is an industrial lever that brings together finance and high technology. For many years, Pakistan’s military diplomacy has provided Saudi Arabia with training, military personnel and security support, whilst in return it has relied on Gulf funding. However, when the high technology, unmanned systems and operational capabilities of the Turkish defense industry are added to this equation, Pakistan finds an opportunity to move beyond being a passive exporter of security and position itself at the center of a tripartite industrial synergy.

When Saudi Arabia’s financial strength, Turkey’s advanced defense technology and Pakistan’s regional military expertise and growing production infrastructure are combined, a domestic and independent defense bloc and an integrated ecosystem emerge at the very intersection of Afro-Eurasia. At a time when Pakistan is grappling with financial difficulties, this agreement enables it to secure direct Saudi investment whilst also modernizing its domestic defense industry through joint defense projects with Turkey, thereby opening up new market opportunities for both Turkish and Pakistani defense companies.

Internal security challenges and allegations of sabotage

Pakistan’s ambitious foreign policy on the global stage is being tested by chronic internal security challenges and regional hybrid threats. The Islamabad administration has long been grappling with violence perpetrated by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, whilst in the south-west it has been combating separatist actions by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) targeting economic infrastructure and Chinese projects.

However, the recent escalation of social tensions and protests in Pakistan-administered Kashmir (Azad Kashmir) has added a new dimension to the security equation. Strategic circles in Islamabad argue that the unrest erupting in Kashmir is not merely the result of local administrative or economic grievances; rather, they contend that it has been exacerbated by the instigations of external actors who are displeased with Pakistan’s key role in its independent balancing diplomacy with Iran and within the now-concrete Turkey-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Tripartite Alliance, which is now taking concrete form. This situation illustrates that, whilst Islamabad is fighting the actions of the TTP and the BLA on the one hand, it is also forced to contend with the hybrid front opened up via Kashmir by forces seeking to undermine the regional influence of the Tripartite Alliance.

H

istory rarely announces itself. But occasionally, a single agreement tells us that something fundamental has changed.

The defense pact signed in Mecca between Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye may be one of those moments.

Its most consequential provision is remarkably simple: an armed attack against one of the three countries will be considered an attack against all three.

For Pakistan, this represents something bigger than another defense agreement.

For decades, Pakistan’s military power, including its nuclear deterrent, was viewed overwhelmingly through the prism of South Asia, particularly its rivalry with India. Pakistan was already a formidable military power, but the strategic reach of that power was largely geographically contained.

That is beginning to change.

Pakistan’s security sxtends beyonf South Asia

Pakistan is now part of a collective-defense architecture stretching from South Asia through the Gulf to Türkiye.

And consider what these three countries bring together.

Türkiye possesses NATO’s second-largest army and has transformed itself into a major defense producer, from drones and missiles to warships and advanced aerospace technology. US President Donald Trump himself recently described the Turkish military as “tremendous” and “powerful.”

Saudi Arabia brings enormous economic and energy influence and the political weight of one of the Arab and Islamic world’s most consequential states.

Pakistan brings one of the world’s largest militaries, considerable operational experience and, crucially, is the world’s only Muslim-majority nuclear-armed state.

The nuclear question is therefore unavoidable.

Nothing publicly released about the agreement says Pakistan has extended a nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia or Türkiye. It would be wrong to claim otherwise.

But deterrence is also about perception. Any state contemplating a major confrontation with one member must now factor in the possibility of Pakistani involvement. The presence of a nuclear-armed state within that collective-defense framework inevitably becomes part of the strategic calculation.

Also, it’s worth mentioning that for Türkiye and Pakistan, this is the culmination of something much older.

Ankara and Islamabad: A growing relationship

The relationship between Ankara and Islamabad has long gone beyond diplomacy. It is rooted in unusually strong political and public ties and has evolved into substantial military cooperation,  from training and joint exercises to defense-industrial collaboration and Turkish-built MILGEM warships for Pakistan.

The Mecca pact takes that relationship a significant step further: from close defense partners to countries formally bound by collective defense.

And its implications stretch beyond the three signatories.

India says it is closely following the agreement. Its “great friend” Israel will surely be watching closely too.

Just a day before the agreement was signed, Narendra Modi received a call from Benjamin Netanyahu. According to India’s Foreign Ministry, the two discussed developments in West Asia and reviewed progress in the India-Israel Special Strategic Partnership.

There is no evidence connecting that call to the Mecca pact, and India has explicitly rejected subsequent reports that it sought a defence agreement with Israel to counter it.

But the wider picture is difficult to ignore. From New Delhi to Tel Aviv, capitals will now be assessing what this new arrangement means for a strategic landscape already undergoing profound change.

Having ties to China and the US at the same time

Pakistan occupies an especially interesting position within it.

China remains Pakistan’s “all-weather” strategic partner. Yet Islamabad continues to engage Washington, while simultaneously playing an active mediating role between the United States and Iran.

Perhaps US Vice President JD Vance summed up Pakistan’s standing in Washington most simply when asked about Islamabad’s role in the latest diplomatic efforts: “Very good, we love Pakistan.”

That ability to maintain relationships across geopolitical divides is increasingly rare.

Pakistan can speak to Beijing and Washington, Riyadh and Tehran, and the wider Gulf — without being completely confined to any single geopolitical camp. And now it has added a collective-defense commitment with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye to that equation.

That puts Pakistan in a remarkably unusual strategic position.

The pact also reflects a wider transformation in the Middle East. For decades, regional security depended heavily on external powers. Years of war, uncertainty and shifting American priorities have increasingly encouraged regional states to look towards one another.

Is this agreement like NATO? Well, we still do not know how integrated military planning will become or how its obligations would work during an actual war.

But deterrence begins long before a shot is fired. It begins with the calculations an adversary makes before deciding whether to fire one.

Turkish military and technological power, Saudi economic weight and Pakistani conventional and nuclear strength are now connected through a formal mutual-defense commitment.

(A version of this article was first published in Turkish by Kriter)

T

he Russia-Ukraine War continues to be the primary catalyst for the process of change and adaptation that NATO is currently undergoing. Russia’s loss of its status as a partner within the Western security architecture following the attack it launched in February 2022, and its subsequent classification as a ‘threat’, has shaped the political and geopolitical dimension of the issue, whilst the military and technological aspects of the war’s conduct have also presented challenges to the Alliance’s defense and deterrence capabilities. Measures relating to this process featured as key issues on the agenda of the Ankara Summit and in the Summit Declaration.

Political-geopolitical dimension

It comes as no surprise that the Ankara Summit Declaration defines Russia as a long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security and stability, as the prevailing view amongst the vast majority of allies is that Russia’s objectives are not limited to Ukraine. This view underpins the rapid increase in defense spending across the Alliance, the removal of barriers to defence industry production, and the strong continuation of military and non-military support for Ukraine.

Since February 2022, NATO’s top priority has been to strengthen the Alliance’s capabilities, whilst the second has been to ensure the sustainability of Ukraine’s combat capabilities. To date, 99 per cent of the military aid provided to Ukraine has come from NATO allies. We can see that this resolve has been maintained at the Ankara Summit, as evidenced by the scale of the support package announced. Whilst the allies have pledged 70 billion euros’ worth of military aid to Ukraine for 2026, this figure has also been set as the baseline for the following year.

What is particularly noteworthy here is that this aid will be funded largely by the European Union (EU). With the Ukraine Support Facility adopted in April 2026, the EU had decided to provide Ukraine with 30 billion euros in financial aid and 60 billion euros in military aid for the period 2026–2027. It should be recalled that in March 2025, all US military aid to Ukraine was cut off, and the flow of American weapons to Ukraine could only be maintained through the intervention of European countries.

On the other hand, the statement in the Ankara Summit Declaration that Ukraine is contributing to transatlantic security by fighting against Russia is significant, as it indicates that the allies recognize Ukraine as a major military power. Speaking at the Defence Industry Forum held on the sidelines of the summit, Ukrainian President Zelensky emphasized that his country is no longer an actor seeking security but one that produces it, and that Ukraine has become an ‘extraordinary source of defense capability’ for Europe. Whilst there is some truth in Zelensky’s remarks, linking this to NATO membership does not seem realistic at this stage, as the war is ongoing and, even if a lasting peace were to be achieved, the US administration’s unequivocally negative stance on the matter is well known.

Military and industrial dimension

The Russia-Ukraine War has highlighted the critical importance of defense industry production and innovation in the theatre of war. With the intensive use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), artillery munitions and various missile systems, the war has turned into an industrial race in design and production. The rapid, innovative and high-volume production of these systems has had a direct impact on the combatants’ success on the ground. This can be seen in the changing nature of UAV warfare. Today, on the battlefield, UAV systems are being used not merely to target isolated tactical elements, but to shape the battlefield itself.

New-generation UAV systems have played a major role in the war taking on a distinctly positional character from late 2023 onwards and in manoevristic operations coming to a virtual standstill. The ‘kill zones’—areas 10–15 kilometers deep where artillery fire and electronic warfare have intensified alongside the use of UAV systems—have transformed the war into a series of battles taking place in isolated areas. Efforts by the opposing sides to gain the upper hand, whether through kamikaze attacks using UAVs or by deploying them to drop explosives from above, are concentrated in these zones.

The race for innovation, which is characterized by constant dynamism on the Russia-Ukraine warfront, is also taking place in the field of unmanned maritime and land vehicles. For example, whilst it has been observed over the past year that Ukraine has begun to utilize unmanned maritime systems (UMS) much more intensively and effectively, we are now seeing new-generation amphibious operation trials aimed at deploying unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) – transported by UMS – to critical areas. Ukraine’s recent operation on the Kinburn Peninsula has been described as the first unmanned amphibious operation in history.

Ukraine’s increasing military power

Looking at the current course of the war, it is clear that Ukraine has, over the past few months, acquired an increasing ability to strike targets within Russia. Ukraine is specifically targeting bridges, motorways, railways and fuel tankers with the aim of disrupting Russia’s logistical capabilities. The reason for this is to thwart Russia’s ability to launch a new offensive during the spring and summer months. Similarly, these attacks aim to isolate the Donbas region from occupied Crimea through the selection of specific geographical targets (thereby blocking the use of the corridor between them). Judging by the results of Ukraine’s attacks and the pace of Russian advances, it appears that this objective has so far been achieved with considerable success.

The impact of these systems on the war extends beyond the battlefield. As a result of drone and missile attacks by both sides, the agricultural sectors of both Ukraine and Russia have suffered serious damage. Long-range missile and UAV attacks are disrupting the production of grain, wheat and sunflower oil, either directly or indirectly, whilst the targeting of Russian ships carrying wheat in the Sea of Azov by UAV systems is also producing negative consequences for the global market.

Similarly, it must be noted that unmanned systems are also having an impact on the sociological dimension of the war. For example, it is well known that UAV systems flying at low altitude and then diving create great fear amongst the civilian population. Last week, a spokesperson for the Ukrainian Air Force highlighted this situation, emphasizing that Russia’s jet-powered Shahed UAVs were flying at high speed at low altitude and that Russia’s aim was to force the residents of Kyiv to flee the city. In this regard, the prospect of unmanned systems becoming part of systematic intimidation and terror-inducing operations targeting the civilian population in the medium to long term represents a critical risk.

NATO’s comprehensive budget

All these factors have led NATO to establish a comprehensive budget and adopt reform processes in the fields of unmanned systems and their countermeasures (counter-UAS). Whilst it was announced at the Ankara Summit that the Alliance would undertake defense procurement worth 50 billion dollars, the ‘Drone Edge’ initiative, worth 40 billion dollars, was also launched to support anti-UAV systems. By the end of 2027, the allies have committed to increasing the number of UAV operators fivefold. Consequently, unmanned systems – which are shaping modern warfare – constitute a significant part of NATO’s military capability requirements, an issue that has largely been brought to the fore through discussions on budget increases.

Similarly, new steps are being taken to remove obstacles to defense industry cooperation – an area Turkey has long advocated for, but whose importance within the Alliance has only become apparent in recent years, and which can be understood in the context of production shortcomings. Initiatives announced at the Ankara Summit, such as ‘NATO Front Door for Industry’ and ‘NATO Engine’, aim to achieve greater integration of defense industries on a transatlantic scale.

Until now, the focus within NATO has been on military interoperability; however, modern warfare has highlighted the necessity of industrial interoperability to meet defense industry requirements. Indeed, the interoperability issues observed with Western-manufactured 155-millimeter artillery ammunition in the Ukrainian theatre had already demonstrated the inevitable need for close coordination between military operations and defense production.

Consequently, the Russia-Ukraine War remains NATO’s top priority. Despite transatlantic divisions and pro-Russian allegations leveled at Donald Trump, the fact that Russia continues to be defined as a long-term threat in the Ankara Summit Declaration is noteworthy in this regard. Similarly, the continuation of strong support for Ukraine also points to the same conclusion. In this sense, whilst the dynamics of transatlantic relations will determine the political dimension of the transformation taking place within NATO, the Russia–Ukraine War and the war’s innovation dynamics will continue to shape the process of change and adaptation in the Alliance’s military capabilities.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

S

audi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan are set to sign a trilateral defense agreement on Friday, marking a significant expansion of security cooperation among three of the Muslim world’s most influential military powers as conflict with Iran reshapes the strategic landscape of the Middle East.

The agreement will be signed in the Saudi Red Sea city of Jeddah during a summit attended by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, is also expected to participate in the high-level meeting, underscoring the military significance of the pact.

Regional officials familiar with the negotiations said the agreement follows nearly a year of discussions aimed at strengthening defense coordination among the three countries amid mounting security challenges across the Gulf and surrounding waterways.

Although officials have confirmed that an agreement will be signed, none of the governments has publicly disclosed the precise scope of the pact or the commitments each country will undertake.

The trilateral accord comes at a time of heightened instability following the U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran earlier this year and Tehran’s subsequent retaliation against military installations, energy infrastructure and strategic targets across the Gulf. The conflict has exposed vulnerabilities in regional security arrangements while threatening one of the world’s most critical energy corridors.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supplies normally pass, has experienced repeated disruptions since hostilities escalated. Commercial shipping has slowed considerably as insurers raised premiums and shipping companies rerouted vessels due to fears of further attacks.

Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan have increasingly sought closer strategic coordination, reflecting concerns that existing regional security mechanisms may not adequately address evolving threats.

A Turkish official confirmed that the defense agreement would be signed but declined to provide further details.

Expanding strategic partnership

The agreement would bring together three countries with considerable military and geopolitical influence.

Türkiye possesses NATO’s second-largest military and has significantly expanded its domestic defense industry over the past decade, becoming a leading exporter of drones, armored vehicles and missile systems.

Saudi Arabia remains one of the world’s largest defense spenders and has accelerated efforts to modernize its armed forces while investing heavily in domestic military manufacturing as part of its Vision 2030 economic transformation program.

Pakistan, meanwhile, is the only Muslim-majority nation possessing nuclear weapons and maintains one of Asia’s largest standing armies. Islamabad has long maintained close defense ties with Riyadh, including military training, intelligence cooperation and joint exercises.

Security analysts say combining the capabilities of the three countries could create one of the region’s most significant military partnerships, although its effectiveness will ultimately depend on the operational mechanisms established under the agreement.

Building on existing cooperation

The new arrangement appears to build upon the Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement signed between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in September 2025.

According to Saudi officials who previously described the agreement, the bilateral pact treats an attack against either country as an attack against both and provides for cooperation using “all military means.”

Whether Türkiye will assume identical obligations under the expanded framework remains unclear.

Reuters reported earlier this year that negotiations were underway to broaden Saudi-Pakistani security cooperation to include Türkiye, reflecting Ankara’s growing role in regional diplomacy and defense affairs.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said in January that Ankara supported establishing broader regional security platforms capable of promoting stability through multilateral cooperation rather than relying exclusively on outside powers.

Friday’s signing appears to represent the first major institutional step toward realizing that vision.

Maritime security takes center stage

Regional media reports suggest maritime security will feature prominently in discussions during the Jeddah summit.

The three countries have already backed Saudi Arabia’s recently announced multinational maritime initiative aimed at protecting commercial shipping through the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

The initiative gained urgency after repeated attacks on commercial vessels and energy infrastructure during recent regional conflicts disrupted global trade routes.

The Houthis in Yemen have also intensified attacks against Saudi-linked shipping in the Red Sea, further complicating regional security calculations.

Meanwhile, tensions in the Strait of Hormuz have highlighted the vulnerability of energy exports from Gulf producers, particularly Saudi Arabia, whose economy remains heavily dependent on oil exports.

Analysts say closer military coordination could improve intelligence sharing, naval patrols and joint responses to emerging threats affecting maritime commerce.

G

ermany’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) marked a turning point both in the shaping of the post-Second World War European security architecture and in Germany’s reintegration into the international system. Following its defeat in 1945 and the subsequent division between East and West Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) found itself on the front line of the Cold War.

Within this geopolitical reality, under the leadership of its first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, Germany saw ‘integration with the West’ (Westbindung) as the sole means of regaining the country’s sovereignty, securing its safety and forging lasting ties with the Western world. Germany’s membership of NATO, which took shape in line with Adenauer’s strategic vision and was formalized on 6 May 1955, represented not merely participation in a military alliance, but also a historic paradigm shift that reinforced Germany’s democratic identity and redefined the balance of power in continental Europe.

With its NATO membership, Germany began to re-establish a regular army and rearm. The fact that Germany was on the ‘hot front’ of the Cold War—a situation in which it could become the direct centre of hostilities in a potential conflict—is best understood through Chancellor Adenauer’s statement: ‘The sole aim of Germany’s rearmament is to contribute to the preservation of peace.’

Germany’s NATO objectives: Peace or the pursuit of economic interests?

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Cold War giving way to regional hot conflicts, the late 1990s and early 2000s saw Germany playing an active role within NATO. In addition to its participation in the Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR) in the Balkans, Germany’s deployment of troops to the US-led operations in Afghanistan in 2001, at NATO’s request, is particularly noteworthy. Germany’s participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – established by a United Nations resolution and subsequently placed under NATO command – with a force that at times exceeded 5,000 troops, is regarded as the largest overseas military mission in modern German history.

In an interview given during a visit to German troops in Afghanistan in 2010, the then German President Horst Köhler stated that Germany’s overseas military mission should be viewed in a different light, remarking: “As a country of our size, as a country focused on foreign trade and therefore dependent on it, we must recognise that military intervention may also be necessary to protect our interests when required or in emergencies – for example, to secure free trade routes or to prevent regional instability – as such instability would undoubtedly have a negative impact on our opportunities in terms of trade, employment and income. ‘All of this must be discussed, and in my view, our situation is not all that bad…’ he had stated.

Horst Köhler’s remarks, made at a time when there had also been military casualties, raised questions about the constitutionality of Germany’s role in ISAF whilst also sparking intense domestic political debate; Horst Köhler subsequently resigned from the office of President.

Similar remarks were made by the then Federal Minister of Defence, Peter Struck, in December 2002, when the decision was taken to continue sending troops to Afghanistan. In a speech to the Federal Parliament, Struck said: “To clarify the matter, I had mentioned that our security is also defended in the Hindu Kush. ‘When we combat international terrorism alongside our allies and partners—using military means where necessary—in the very places where it originates, Germany becomes a safer place. Our security is further enhanced when the Bundeswehr successfully participates in the reconstruction process in the Balkans and Afghanistan, in accordance with democratic principles, thereby helping to establish the secure environment urgently required in these regions.”

These remarks, which are still the subject of debate today, signalled the dawn of a new era in German foreign policy at the time they were made. They marked the beginning of a new phase in which German foreign policy was no longer confined to defending its own borders, but also encompassed international preventive efforts. National interests were aligned with international interests, thereby justifying a military presence beyond Germany’s borders.

Despite all the past debates, although the number of troops is smaller, Germany still maintains a military presence at 17 locations with 2,000 troops as part of various NATO missions.

NATO or a European common defense system, or both?

Another initiative coinciding with this turning point in Germany’s foreign policy from a military perspective was the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP – Gemeinsame Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik), which was proposed at the European Union summit in Cologne in 1999 under Germany’s presidency and officially incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The CSDP, which was officially implemented in 2009, also led to the establishment of the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs through the provisions added to the Treaty of Lisbon. Just as in the NATO Treaty, the provision for a call for assistance and support, to be activated at the request of a member state, was also incorporated into the Treaty of Lisbon, thereby giving the CSDP practical effect. The first to invoke this provision, by requesting assistance and support, was French President Hollande following the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015.

With 23 member states within NATO, the EU began setting strategic objectives through the CSDP to enable the EU to meet the expectations placed upon it as a security actor operating on a global scale. In 2020, under Germany’s Presidency, the ‘Strategic Compass’ was launched as the key document of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), setting out a clear direction and defining both the policy’s objectives and the necessary resources to achieve them. The first joint threat analysis by EU Member States was drawn up. The Strategic Compass also aims to foster even better cooperation in the field of security and defence and to enable the EU to respond more swiftly and effectively to crises through forward planning.

The EU Global Strategy, developed in 2016, stands out as a new and shared commitment regarding the security policies of Member States, whilst steps were also taken that same year to establish the EU Common Defence Fund under the CSDP.

Although the CSDP may at first glance appear to be an alternative to NATO, it is a structure without a standing army or an existing military chain of command. Since 2020, whilst the EU has undertaken various global missions under the CSDP, joint operations with NATO have also taken place.

Within the EU, a group of countries led by France argue that Europe must become an independent military and strategic actor, separate from the other side of the Atlantic. However, the former Warsaw Pact members that joined the Union through eastern enlargement—Poland, Romania, Hungary and the Baltic states—view NATO as an irreplaceable security umbrella for Eastern Europe. These states, which view Russia as a direct existential threat, currently regard the CSDP’s military deterrence as inadequate and position NATO—which hosts US nuclear and conventional capabilities—as the absolute preference for their own national defence. These countries advocate that the transatlantic bond must not be severed.

Furthermore, the rule within the EU requiring unanimous decision-making on CSDP matters hinders the EU’s ability to respond swiftly and effectively to crises. This situation impedes the CSDP’s operational capabilities.

Germany, meanwhile, is endeavouring to strengthen the CSDP whilst simultaneously seeking to bolster its role within NATO by increasing its defence budget. Ahead of the NATO summit, Germany – which had been criticised by the US President for not increasing its defence budget sufficiently and for failing to provide adequate support within NATO – has already countered Trump’s criticisms through Chancellor Merz, stating that defence spending has now reached 4 per cent of annual gross domestic product.

The debate over the relationship between NATO and the EU’s CSDP was also raised during Chancellor Merz’s meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during his visit to Ankara. President Erdoğan emphasised to Chancellor Merz that preserving the ‘Transatlantic Bond’ was crucial for strengthening NATO’s European pillar, and stressed that Turkey could support the European Union’s defence initiatives provided they complemented NATO. This situation demonstrates, on the one hand, that the CSDP is being closely monitored in Ankara and, on the other, that it has once again been emphasised that, from Turkey’s perspective, a common defence strategy against global threats must be defined within the framework of NATO. However, Merz’s statement that ‘a new European NATO is being established’ has failed to provide any indication as to what role the CSDP will play within NATO.

Turkey-Germany relations in the context of NATO

Relations between Turkey and Germany, which form NATO’s south-eastern flank, have followed a contentious course due to geopolitical shifts, diverging strategic priorities, Germany’s approach to Turkey’s cross-border operations, and the ‘clash of national interests’ between the two countries within the alliance. The fundamental strategic disagreement between Turkey and Germany stems from the asymmetrical nature of their threat perceptions. As a border state directly affected by instability in its immediate region (Syria, Iraq and the Mediterranean), Turkey prioritizes issues such as ‘counter-terrorism’ and ‘safeguarding territorial integrity’—not only its own but also that of its neighbors—whilst Germany has adopted a stance that disregards Turkey’s determination in the fight against terrorism.

During the Syrian civil war, following an increase in the ballistic missile threat against Turkey, Turkey requested an air defense system from NATO. In response to this request, Germany deployed the Patriot missile defense system to Kahramanmaraş; however, in 2015, despite the threat persisting, Germany withdrew the Patriot missile defence systems prematurely, citing Turkey’s counter-terrorism policies as justification. This situation, which led to a serious loss of trust in Germany and called into question NATO’s deterrent capability, persisted until recently.

Despite the friendly and warm remarks made by Merz in Ankara, Germany; its embrace of the PKK and FETÖ, the fact that these organizations still find a foothold in Germany, and the German state’s belief that by providing a platform for these terrorist organizations it could politically weaken Turkey, indicate that relations will not improve in the short term and that the alliance between the two countries within NATO will continue to be turbulent for some time to come.

Among the key issues included in the latest coalition agreement—that is, the government program—regarding Germany’s role within NATO are improvements to the federal armed forces’ contingents deployed as part of NATO’s defense efforts and an increase in military equipment. It has been stated that, due to its geographical location in Europe, Germany will be further strengthened as a central hub of NATO. Similarly, the government program views NATO as one of the cornerstones of the transatlantic partnership and emphasizes its indispensability for European security.

Among the objectives is the commitment to work towards establishing a European Defence Union with the aim of strengthening NATO’s European pillar. This objective is also in line with the argument that Germany must become more Europeanized in order for NATO to remain ‘Transatlantic’. In doing so, it also intends to pursue a trilateral cooperation protocol with France and the United Kingdom.

Whilst Germany is moving towards becoming a logistics hub within NATO, it will, at the same time, seek to bring together its EU member allies under a common budget and logistics framework by utilizing the CSDP mechanisms within the EU to strengthen NATO. In the long term, it will seek to secure its economic and political leadership on the European continent through its strength in the defense industry and its military power.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

I

ran is increasingly relying on economic disruption rather than direct military confrontation to pressure the United States into making concessions over the Strait of Hormuz, expanding threats to regional shipping routes and energy infrastructure as the conflict enters a prolonged phase.

According to Gulf officials, regional sources and analysts, Tehran believes that sustained pressure on global trade and energy markets will prove more effective than conventional military escalation in forcing Washington to reconsider its position.

Rather than seeking a decisive battlefield victory, Iran has adopted a strategy of calibrated escalation designed to steadily raise the economic and political costs of the conflict while avoiding an all-out regional war. The objective, analysts say, is to convince the United States and its allies that accommodating Iran’s demands over the Strait of Hormuz is less costly than continuing the current confrontation.

“Iran, from the beginning, has tried to out-escalate the United States by stretching out its escalation options so that it always has something new to bring every week — a new geography, a new type of weapon, a new type of target,” Michael Knights of the Washington Institute told Reuters.

He argued that Iran’s greatest leverage lies not in its ability to inflict military damage on the United States or Israel, but in its capacity to disrupt regional economies and global commerce.

“The bigger advantage they have is not that they can hurt America or Israel,” Knights said. “Their big advantage is that they can hurt the regional states and the global economy.”

Pressure beyond Hormuz

After demonstrating its ability to disrupt maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz — a waterway that carried around one-fifth of global oil consumption before the conflict — Iran has signaled that its pressure campaign could extend well beyond the strategic chokepoint.

Threats directed at the Red Sea and Saudi energy infrastructure suggest Tehran is seeking to widen the geographical scope of the crisis, increasing the cost of protecting international shipping while testing Washington’s willingness to sustain a prolonged confrontation.

One Gulf source said commanders in Iran’s Revolutionary Guards believe recent developments have strengthened Tehran’s negotiating position.

“The Iranians believe that by widening the war and increasing the pressure, he will eventually give in,” the source said, referring to U.S. President Donald Trump. “Trump thinks he can hit the Iranians hard and bring them to the negotiating table, but they won’t bend.”

That assessment has shaped Tehran’s negotiating strategy, according to Iranian and regional sources.

Trump said on Monday that negotiations with Iran would take place after he canceled a planned military strike in hopes of securing an agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian officials, however, denied that talks with Washington were currently underway.

A senior Iranian source said Tehran’s leadership has concluded that previous attempts at flexibility only encouraged greater pressure from Washington, reinforcing the belief that meaningful negotiations can occur only after Iran establishes stronger leverage.

In Tehran’s view, the source said, Trump interprets concessions as weakness and responds only to sustained pressure.

Michael Singh, another senior fellow at the Washington Institute, said Iranian leaders appear convinced they still hold the initiative because the Trump administration remains uncertain about how far it is willing to escalate militarily.

“The Iranians are trying to press their advantage,” Singh said. “They’re interested in establishing sovereignty over the strait and exercising selective control over the waterway.”

Dispute over the Strait

At the heart of the standoff is the future administration of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors.

Regional sources say Oman has presented Tehran with a Gulf-backed proposal that would establish a mechanism for managing shipping through the strait, including voluntary user fees.

Iran, however, is reportedly seeking administrative authority over the waterway and the right to impose service charges on vessels passing through it.

Washington has rejected any arrangement that would allow Iran to exercise control over the strait, insisting it must remain an international waterway open to unrestricted commercial navigation.

Former U.S. diplomat Alan Eyre said Iran’s broader strategy is intended to deter further American military action while forcing Washington to lift its naval blockade and reconsider its negotiating position.

“They don’t want the U.S. to dictate the pace of events,” Eyre said.

War of endurance

Analysts say Iran’s campaign has already shifted the focus of regional and international efforts.

Rather than intensifying military pressure on Tehran, Gulf states and Western governments are increasingly concentrating on protecting commercial shipping and critical energy infrastructure.

The formation of a Saudi-led maritime coalition reflects that shift. According to Gulf sources, the initiative is primarily defensive, focusing on escorting commercial vessels, sharing intelligence and safeguarding vital sea lanes instead of confronting Iran directly.

Knights compared the effort to Europe’s Aspides naval mission in the Red Sea, which was established to protect merchant shipping rather than alter the regional military balance.

For Tehran, forcing rivals into an expensive defensive posture represents a strategic success despite its military disadvantages.

Unable to match U.S. military capabilities directly, Iran can still impose significant costs by compelling regional governments and foreign navies to devote increasing resources to securing global trade routes.

Each new threat, whether in the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait or elsewhere, increases the financial and military burden of keeping international commerce flowing.

Analysts describe the conflict as increasingly becoming a contest of endurance.

Iranian leaders appear to believe they can withstand economic pressure longer than the United States and its partners can tolerate repeated disruptions to global energy supplies and maritime trade.

The strategy also serves a diplomatic purpose.

By demonstrating an ability to expand the crisis whenever necessary, Tehran hopes to strengthen its bargaining position before any future negotiations.

“If there are going to be negotiations, they will define the terms,” said Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign Relations. “Both sides are matching escalation with escalation.”

Despite intermittent diplomatic efforts, neither Washington nor Tehran has shown signs of backing down.

As both sides continue to test each other’s resolve through economic pressure, military deterrence and political signaling, analysts warn that a strategy intended to maximize leverage could still spiral into a wider conflict that neither side intends or is fully able to control.

(Source: Reuters)

I

ran transported Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders, military advisers, and missile- and drone-related equipment to Yemen earlier this month, according to four sources familiar with the matter, in a move that could strengthen the military capabilities of the Iran-aligned Houthi movement and increase threats to shipping in the Red Sea.

The sources, including two Iranian officials, Yemen’s information minister, and a regional security analyst, told Reuters that the personnel and equipment arrived aboard a Mahan Air flight that departed Tehran on July 13. The aircraft was reportedly bound for the Houthi-controlled capital, Sanaa, but diverted to the Red Sea port of Hodeidah after Sanaa International Airport came under attack by forces aligned with Yemen’s Saudi-backed government.

According to the two Iranian sources, between 10 and 21 IRGC personnel, including senior commanders, were aboard the flight. One source said the officers were deployed to support Houthi military operations and provide training on new missile systems. The source also alleged that Iran shipped gold on the aircraft to help finance Houthi activities.

Reuters could not independently verify the claims.

Iran denies allegations

Iran’s Foreign Ministry did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Tehran has consistently denied supplying the Houthis with missile capabilities or directing the group’s military operations.

Abdel Rahman al-Ahnomi, a Houthi media official who said he was on the flight, rejected the allegations, describing them as “lies and fabrications.” He said all passengers were civilians. The Houthis have repeatedly maintained that they develop their own weapons and are not acting as an Iranian proxy.

The reported deployment comes amid escalating regional tensions following renewed fighting involving Iran and the United States.

Three days after the reported flight, Reuters reported that Tehran had instructed the Houthis to prepare to close the Bab al-Mandab Strait if U.S. attacks targeted Iranian power infrastructure, raising concerns over global energy supplies and maritime security.

On Monday, the Houthis announced a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia, describing it as retaliation for the July 13 bombing of Sanaa airport, which they blamed on Saudi Arabia. The announcement effectively ended a four-year truce between Riyadh and the Houthis and heightened concerns over the security of one of the world’s busiest shipping routes.

The group later claimed responsibility for attacks on two Saudi oil tankers, further escalating tensions in the Red Sea.

Multiple confirmations

Yemen’s Information Minister Moammar al-Iryani confirmed to Reuters that IRGC personnel and military equipment had been transferred to Yemen, citing intelligence reports. He said their mission was to strengthen Houthi military capabilities and enable the group to threaten international maritime traffic through the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

Regional security analyst Mzahem Alsaloum also confirmed the arrival of the Iranian advisers, saying the cargo included components for short- and medium-range missiles and drones similar to systems previously used in attacks on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Alsaloum further alleged that Iran had deployed military advisers to Yemen during last year’s conflict with Israel by routing them through Somalia, a claim Tehran has denied.

The reported transfer followed the resumption of direct flights between Tehran and Sanaa, which the Houthis say are intended to ease what they describe as a Saudi-imposed blockade on Yemen.

Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei said the July 13 flight was primarily intended to return a Houthi delegation that had traveled to Tehran to attend the funeral of Iran’s late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, along with Yemeni citizens who had received medical treatment in Iran.

According to the sources, the return flight also carried IRGC commanders and military advisers. Before landing in Sanaa, however, the aircraft diverted to Hodeidah after strikes targeted the airport.

The developments underscore growing concerns among regional governments and maritime security analysts that Yemen’s conflict could become increasingly intertwined with the broader confrontation between Iran and the United States, raising the risk of further disruption to international shipping through the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait.

(Source: Reuters)

Y

emen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement announced a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia on Monday, threatening to expand the regional conflict linked to the ongoing U.S.-Iran war and raising concerns over global energy supplies and international shipping.

The Houthis said the “maritime embargo” would take effect immediately, describing it as retaliation against what they called Saudi Arabia’s continued blockade of Yemen. The announcement broadens the conflict beyond the Gulf, bringing the strategically vital Bab el-Mandeb Strait into focus after shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has already been severely disrupted.

The Saudi-led coalition said it would respond “with force” to the Houthi announcement and confirmed that additional security measures had been implemented to protect commercial and military vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a critical route for Saudi oil exports.

The latest development raises the possibility of simultaneous disruptions at both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb, two of the world’s most important maritime energy corridors.

Analysts warn that a prolonged closure of Bab el-Mandeb could significantly reduce Saudi oil exports and further strain global energy markets already affected by the fighting in the Gulf.

Diplomacy continues despite escalation

The Houthi announcement came as diplomatic efforts to restore a ceasefire between Washington and Tehran appeared to continue.

A senior Iranian official told Reuters that mediators had presented Tehran with a proposal for a 10-day ceasefire aimed at preserving the interim agreement reached last month.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry confirmed that mediators had submitted proposals but did not disclose further details.

Separately, Pakistani officials said Iranian Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni had requested Islamabad to resume mediation efforts between the United States and Iran.

Despite renewed diplomatic contacts, military operations continued across the region.

U.S. Central Command launched another wave of strikes against targets in Iran, while President Donald Trump defended the attacks, saying they were carried out in response to recent Iranian attacks that killed American service members.

The Pentagon identified two U.S. soldiers killed in an Iranian strike on a U.S. base in Jordan last week and said unidentified remains believed to belong to a third missing soldier had been recovered. A fourth U.S. service member was killed separately in northern Iraq during the controlled detonation of unexploded ordnance from an Iranian drone.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it launched missile attacks against U.S. military facilities in Jordan, Kuwait and Syria, while Bahrain reported repeated air raid sirens and Kuwait said its air defense systems intercepted Iranian drones overnight.

Shipping and oil markets under pressure

The Houthis’ announcement briefly pushed oil prices higher before markets stabilized amid hopes that diplomatic negotiations could prevent a broader regional war.

Insurance premiums for vessels operating in the Red Sea increased as shipping companies assessed the heightened security risks.

Meanwhile, the IRGC said two oil tankers had exploded after attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz via what it described as an “unsafe” route, though Reuters was unable to independently verify the claim.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) also reported that a commercial vessel had been struck by an unidentified projectile off the coast of Oman.

The latest escalation underscores the widening geographic scope of the conflict, with military operations now stretching from Iran and the Gulf to Yemen, Jordan, Syria and Iraq.

While diplomatic initiatives remain underway, continued exchanges of military strikes and expanding maritime threats have raised fears that the conflict could further destabilize regional security and disrupt global energy and trade routes.

(Source: Reuters)

T

he United States has used unmanned surface vessels (USVs) in combat for the first time, marking a significant milestone in modern naval warfare after the US military confirmed that autonomous sea drones were employed in strikes against an Iranian naval facility.

US Central Command (CENTCOM) said three one-way Corsair sea drones struck a submarine and ship maintenance facility at Iran’s Bandar Abbas Naval Base on Monday as part of operations aimed at reducing Iran’s capacity to target commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

The attack represents the first known offensive use of US autonomous surface vessels, highlighting a shift in naval strategy toward unmanned maritime systems after similar technologies gained prominence during the Russia-Ukraine war.

Autonomous sea drones enter frontline combat

The Corsair is an autonomous surface vessel developed by Texas-based defense technology company Saronic. Measuring approximately 24 feet (7.3 meters) in length, the vessel has a range exceeding 1,000 nautical miles, can travel at speeds above 35 knots, and is capable of carrying payloads of nearly 1,000 pounds (453 kilograms).

Designed with a modular architecture, the platform can perform intelligence, surveillance, logistics, force protection and one-way strike missions while operating with limited human intervention.

Until now, USVs in the US military had primarily been deployed for reconnaissance, maritime security and search-and-rescue operations rather than offensive missions.

The combat debut follows Saronic’s rapid growth since its establishment in 2022.

The company expanded its shipbuilding capacity by acquiring Louisiana-based Gulf Craft in 2025 and later announced a $300 million expansion of its production facilities. In December 2025, the US Navy awarded Saronic a $392 million production contract for the Corsair, accelerating the transition from prototype development to operational deployment.

Since then, the company has secured $1.75 billion in funding, reaching a valuation of $9.25 billion while broadening its portfolio of autonomous maritime systems and command-and-control technologies.

Shift in naval warfare

Military analysts increasingly view unmanned surface vessels as a transformative capability for future naval operations.

Compared with conventional warships that require large crews and significant financial investment, autonomous vessels can be produced at lower cost, deployed in larger numbers and operate in high-risk environments without exposing personnel to danger.

The concept gained prominence during the Russia-Ukraine war, where Ukraine employed maritime drones to challenge Russia’s naval superiority in the Black Sea, forcing Moscow’s fleet to adapt its operations.

Iran and Yemen’s Houthi movement have also used one-way naval drones to threaten commercial shipping in strategic waterways.

The latest strike follows another milestone for the Corsair after the vessel was reportedly used last month to help rescue two crew members from a downed US Army helicopter off the coast of Oman.

The vessel was operated by Task Force 59, the US Navy’s unit dedicated to unmanned maritime systems.

Defense analysts say the Bandar Abbas operation could signal a broader transformation in US naval doctrine, with autonomous vessels increasingly operating alongside traditional warships as part of distributed and networked fleets capable of carrying out reconnaissance, logistics and combat missions.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

T

he death of longtime Republican Senator Lindsey Graham has renewed debate over his enduring influence on U.S. foreign policy, with supporters praising his commitment to American leadership abroad and critics pointing to his advocacy for military intervention and unwavering support for Israel.

Graham, who died on Saturday at the age of 71 following what his office described as a brief and sudden illness, was one of the most recognizable Republican voices on national security issues for more than two decades. Throughout his career, he consistently championed military action, backed strong U.S. alliances with Israel, and maintained a hardline stance toward Iran, Russia and China.

His passing prompted tributes from U.S. President Donald Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and several Republican lawmakers, while also drawing criticism from anti-war advocates and Palestinian rights groups, who argued that Graham’s legacy was defined by support for prolonged military conflicts.

Political analysts say two themes are likely to dominate assessments of Graham’s career: his advocacy for interventionist foreign policy and his transformation into one of Trump’s closest allies.

Michael Hanna, U.S. Program Director at the International Crisis Group, said Graham had cultivated a long-standing reputation for promoting military solutions to international crises.

“He was a major supporter of the Iraq War and remained a strong advocate for the use of military force throughout his career,” Hanna said, adding that Graham played an influential role in encouraging the Trump administration’s hardline approach toward Iran.

Strong backing for Israel

Support for Israel remained central to Graham’s foreign policy positions. He repeatedly called for expanded U.S. military assistance to Israel and defended its military operations following the October 7, 2023 attacks and the subsequent war in Gaza.

In 2021, Graham successfully pushed for an additional $1 billion in U.S. military assistance after visiting Israel, where he posed alongside Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu holding a sign reading “More for Israel.”

Netanyahu paid tribute to Graham following his death, describing him as one of Israel’s strongest supporters in Washington and recalling that the senator often advocated for greater U.S. assistance than Israel itself requested.

Graham’s rhetoric on the Gaza war frequently drew international criticism. He defended Israel’s military campaign in Gaza in uncompromising terms and made several controversial remarks about the conflict that human rights advocates condemned as inflammatory.

Palestinian advocacy groups said Graham consistently supported policies that contributed to escalating violence in the region, while critics described him as one of the most outspoken proponents of military solutions in U.S. foreign policy.

Graham was also among the leading congressional advocates for confronting Iran militarily. Earlier this year, he publicly supported U.S. military action against Tehran and maintained close contact with President Trump as tensions between Washington and Iran escalated.

Analysts say Graham’s influence was one of several factors shaping the administration’s approach, although decisions ultimately rested with the president.

Alliance with Trump

Although Graham was an outspoken critic of Trump during the 2016 Republican presidential campaign—calling him “unfit for office” and “a kook”—the senator later became one of the president’s closest political allies.

The two frequently met at the White House and appeared together at public events, with Graham emerging as a trusted adviser on national security and foreign affairs.

Following Graham’s death, Trump called on South Carolina Governor Henry McMaster to appoint Graham’s sister, Darline Graham Nordone, to temporarily fill the Senate seat, describing the move as a fitting tribute to the late senator.

Observers say Graham’s death comes at a time when the Republican Party is increasingly divided over foreign policy, particularly regarding military intervention abroad.

Recent polling indicates younger Republican voters are less supportive of overseas military operations and more skeptical of interventionist policies than previous generations.

Hanna said Graham represented a generation of Republican leaders whose worldview was shaped by post-Cold War American global leadership and extensive military engagement overseas.

While his Senate seat is expected to remain in Republican hands, analysts suggest his absence could further accelerate debates within the party over the future direction of U.S. foreign policy, military intervention and Washington’s role in global conflicts.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

U

kraine and nine European countries have announced the creation of a joint anti-ballistic missile coalition aimed at strengthening the continent’s defenses against emerging missile threats through closer military, technological and industrial cooperation.

The initiative, unveiled by the leaders of Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom, seeks to develop an integrated European missile defense architecture designed to improve protection against ballistic missile attacks.

In a joint declaration issued on Sunday, the participating countries described the coalition as a “purely defensive” initiative intended to bolster Europe’s collective security amid evolving regional threats.

“We believe that the protection of Europe requires a global solution of integrated missile defense architecture to deter and defeat future missile threats,” the leaders said.

The coalition’s centerpiece will be a flagship project to develop a shared anti-ballistic missile capability. Member states will coordinate on common operational requirements, technical standards and defense industrial cooperation while establishing a roadmap for deploying the coalition’s first operational systems.

Complement, rather than replace

Officials said the new initiative is intended to complement, rather than replace, existing national and multinational missile defense programs already operated or planned by participating countries.

“By bringing together our defense industrial base, our research, and our operational experience, we aim to build a shared anti-ballistic missile capacity for Europe,” the declaration stated.

The coalition also emphasized Ukraine’s battlefield experience gained during its defense against Russia’s invasion, describing Kyiv’s operational knowledge as a valuable contribution to the project.

“We acknowledge the unique experience of Ukraine, gained in defense against Russia’s war of aggression,” the statement said.

Beyond missile interception capabilities, participating countries agreed to explore joint research and development projects, expanded funding mechanisms, enhanced defense industrial collaboration and improved sharing of defense-related information and operational data.

The founding members said the coalition would remain open to additional countries that share its objectives and are willing to contribute to the development of a common European missile defense capability.

The announcement comes as European governments continue to increase defense spending and deepen military cooperation in response to heightened security challenges across the continent, with missile defense emerging as a key priority for NATO members and partner countries.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

R

ussia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has resulted in more than 2 million military casualties on both sides, making it one of the deadliest conflicts since the Second World War, according to a new study by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

The report estimates that Russia has suffered approximately 1.4 million casualties, including soldiers killed, wounded and missing, while Ukraine has endured between 525,000 and 625,000 casualties. Combined, the figures place the total human cost of the war above 2 million military casualties.

Researchers said Russia has lost around 450,000 troops killed, representing roughly 1% of the country’s population. Ukraine’s military fatalities were estimated at between 125,000 and 150,000.

Neither Moscow nor Kyiv regularly publishes official casualty figures, making independent verification difficult. However, the CSIS estimates broadly align with assessments previously released by Western governments and intelligence agencies.

The study, authored by Seth G. Jones and Riley McCabe, describes Russia’s losses as unprecedented in the post-World War II era.

“These rates are astounding,” the authors wrote, arguing that Russian fatalities in Ukraine now exceed the combined U.S. military deaths in all conflicts since World War II and are substantially higher than total Soviet and Russian military deaths across all wars during the same period.

According to the report, casualty rates have become increasingly uneven as the conflict has evolved.

During much of the war, Russian forces suffered approximately two to three casualties for every Ukrainian casualty. In the first half of 2026, however, researchers estimate the ratio has widened to nearly eight Russian casualties for every Ukrainian casualty.

The report attributes much of that shift to Ukraine’s expanding drone warfare capabilities.

Researchers said Kyiv has significantly enlarged what they describe as the battlefield “kill zone,” using drones to make it increasingly difficult for Russian forces to advance toward Ukrainian defensive positions.

“Ukraine’s defense-in-depth strategy has been effective in killing and wounding Russian soldiers, as well as limiting Russian maneuver,” the study concluded.

Recruitment challenges mount as battlefield losses increase

Beyond Ukraine’s technological improvements, the researchers identified several structural weaknesses contributing to Russia’s growing losses.

These include Moscow’s reliance on attrition warfare, shortcomings in combined-arms operations, poor tactical planning, inadequate troop training, corruption and declining morale among frontline forces.

The study also suggests Russia is no longer recruiting replacement soldiers at the same pace that it is sustaining battlefield losses, raising questions about the long-term sustainability of its military campaign.

The burden of casualties has fallen disproportionately on Russia’s poorer regions and ethnic minority communities, according to the report.

Researchers noted that economically disadvantaged regions have supplied a significant share of military recruits, with Russian independent media increasingly reporting that some remote villages have lost much of their male population during the conflict.

Although Russia has continued to mobilize volunteers through financial incentives and recruitment campaigns, the study argues that mounting casualties are placing increasing strain on the country’s manpower resources.

The report also highlights the broader historical significance of the conflict.

With military casualties now estimated to exceed 2 million, researchers said the war has likely surpassed the total casualties suffered during the Battle of Stalingrad, long regarded as one of history’s bloodiest battles.

The findings underscore the enormous human cost of a war that has entered its fifth year with no comprehensive peace agreement in sight. Despite repeated diplomatic initiatives, fighting continues across multiple fronts as both Russia and Ukraine seek military advantages while preparing for potential future negotiations.

The CSIS report concludes that although Ukraine continues to face severe military and humanitarian challenges, Russia is bearing increasingly heavy battlefield losses as technological changes, particularly the widespread use of drones, reshape the nature of modern warfare.

(Source: CNN)

R

ussia’s defense minister personally approved a covert military training program in China for Russian forces linked to the war in Ukraine, with at least four senior generals from both countries directly involved, according to European officials and classified documents reviewed by Reuters.

The program, conducted in 2025, included instruction in radiological, chemical and biological (RCB) warfare, underscoring the increasingly strategic nature of defense cooperation between Moscow and Beijing despite China’s repeated insistence that it remains neutral in the Ukraine conflict.

The revelations have heightened concern among European governments, which are already reassessing China’s role in supporting Russia’s military capabilities while balancing extensive economic ties with Beijing.

According to the documents, Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov authorized the initiative through an internal decree issued in August 2025, allowing Russian military delegations to travel to China for specialized training at facilities operated by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

One classified report described a three-week course held at a military academy in Beijing in November 2025, where Russian personnel received instruction on radiological, chemical and biological protection. Images attached to the report showed Russian officers attending lectures by Chinese instructors, examining a model nuclear reactor and participating in exercises on chemical and radiation reconnaissance as well as protection of ventilation systems from contamination.

European officials told Reuters that the participation of senior military commanders from both countries demonstrated that the program enjoyed backing at the highest levels of government and reflected the strategic importance Moscow and Beijing attach to expanding military cooperation.

The defense ministries of both Russia and China did not respond to Reuters’ requests for comment.

China’s Foreign Ministry rejected the allegations, describing them as “entirely unfounded” and reiterating that Beijing’s position on the Ukraine conflict has remained consistent. Chinese officials continue to present the country as a neutral actor seeking to promote peace negotiations.

The latest disclosures follow an earlier Reuters investigation published in June, which cited European intelligence agencies and military documents indicating that approximately 200 Russian soldiers underwent military training in China during November 2025 before returning to participate in the war in Ukraine.

At the time, the Kremlin declined to comment directly on the report but dismissed Western media coverage as “false information.”

European concerns grow over strategic partnership

The newly revealed documents identify senior military officials who oversaw the program. According to European officials, a July 2 agreement establishing the training was signed by Russian Major General Rustam Khusainov and Chinese Senior Colonel Sun Dayun.

Russian Colonel General Rustam Muradov, deputy commander-in-chief of Russia’s land forces, led the Russian delegation, according to participant lists reviewed by Reuters. Chinese Major General Li Jinsun, head of the PLA’s Military Academy of Radiological, Chemical and Biological Defense, participated in the opening of one of the courses, while Russian Major General Vitaly Gerasimov also attended training sessions in Bengbu.

The documents included detailed participant information, listing military ranks, birth dates, institutional affiliations and security clearance levels.

European officials said the emphasis on radiological, biological and chemical warfare highlighted the strategic significance of the exchanges, noting that such training is considered highly sensitive by armed forces worldwide.

The disclosures come as European policymakers debate how to respond to expanding defense ties between Russia and China.

Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, European governments have regarded Moscow as the continent’s primary security threat. At the same time, China remains one of the European Union’s largest trading partners, complicating efforts to formulate a unified policy.

EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said earlier this month that the European Union had independently confirmed the training had taken place and was evaluating its implications.

Beijing dismissed her remarks as “nothing but smears.”

A Brussels-based European official told Reuters that the bloc should increasingly assess China through a security rather than purely economic lens, arguing that Beijing has become what Kallas previously described as a “decisive enabler of Russia’s war.”

The European Union has already imposed sanctions on several Chinese companies accused of supporting Russia’s defense industry.

Despite the growing military relationship, Russian officials have publicly downplayed any need to learn from China’s armed forces.

Russian lawmaker Andrei Kartapolov, who heads the defense committee in Russia’s parliament, dismissed Reuters’ reporting as “complete nonsense” and argued that Russia’s military had nothing to learn from China.

However, internal Russian military evaluations reviewed by Reuters offered a more nuanced assessment.

The quality of Chinese military equipment

The reports praised the quality of Chinese military equipment, the extensive use of training simulators and the high theoretical expertise of Chinese instructors. At the same time, they noted a significant limitation: China’s lack of recent combat experience.

While Russia has accumulated extensive battlefield experience during more than four years of fighting in Ukraine, China’s military has not engaged in a major war for decades.

The latest revelations are likely to intensify Western scrutiny of China’s role in Russia’s military campaign. Although Beijing continues to deny providing direct military assistance, European governments increasingly view cooperation such as specialized military training as evidence of deepening strategic alignment between the two powers.

The findings also reinforce broader concerns that the partnership between Moscow and Beijing extends beyond diplomatic coordination and economic cooperation into increasingly sophisticated military collaboration, even as China maintains its public position of neutrality regarding the conflict in Ukraine.

(Source: Reuters)

G

ulf Arab states are reassessing their long-standing security relationship with the United States following Washington’s emerging agreement with Iran, amid concerns that the proposed deal could reshape the regional balance of power and leave key security issues unresolved.

The framework agreement between the United States and Iran, announced after months of conflict and negotiations, has been welcomed across the Gulf as a step away from a wider regional war. However, analysts and diplomats say many governments in the region remain deeply uneasy about its long-term implications, particularly regarding Iran’s military capabilities and growing regional influence.

The agreement seeks to end hostilities between Washington and Tehran, reopen the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping and establish a process for broader negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions relief and economic reconstruction. While Gulf capitals support efforts to prevent another devastating conflict, many officials are questioning whether the arrangement adequately addresses their security concerns.

Trust in US erodes

For decades, Gulf monarchies have relied heavily on the United States as their principal security guarantor. American military bases, naval deployments and defence partnerships have formed the backbone of regional deterrence against external threats, particularly from Iran.

Yet confidence in those guarantees has gradually weakened over the past several years.

Regional observers point to a series of developments that have fuelled doubts, including the limited U.S. response to attacks on Saudi oil facilities in 2019 and Washington’s broader shift toward reducing its military footprint in the Middle East.

Those concerns have resurfaced following the latest U.S.-Iran agreement, which many Gulf officials view as another indication that Washington is increasingly prioritising diplomacy and strategic disengagement over long-term military commitments in the region.

The agreement also introduces new arrangements affecting navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors. Under the framework, Iran is expected to play a role in future discussions on managing commercial shipping alongside Oman and other regional stakeholders.

Possible Iranian influence on maritime security

For Gulf countries whose economies depend heavily on energy exports passing through the waterway, the prospect of expanded Iranian influence over maritime security has generated considerable debate.

Analysts argue that while reopening shipping lanes would benefit global energy markets, Gulf governments remain cautious about any arrangement that could strengthen Tehran’s leverage over regional trade.

The deal also leaves several contentious issues unresolved.

Although negotiations on Iran’s nuclear activities are expected to continue during a 60-day transition period, the current framework does not directly address Tehran’s ballistic missile programme or its relationships with armed groups across the Middle East.

Many Gulf governments have long regarded those issues as posing a more immediate security challenge than Iran’s nuclear ambitions alone.

During a regional tour following the announcement of the agreement, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio sought to reassure Gulf allies that Washington would continue consulting closely with them throughout negotiations and would not pursue policies that undermine their security.

Rubio emphasised that future discussions concerning Iran’s missile program would be coordinated with regional partners and reaffirmed America’s commitment to longstanding alliances in the Gulf.

Despite those assurances, regional analysts say trust has been weakened by years of uncertainty surrounding U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Diversifying military partnerships

Several experts argue that Gulf states increasingly believe they must prepare for a future in which they shoulder greater responsibility for their own defense.

As a result, some governments have accelerated efforts to diversify their military partnerships and defence procurement beyond traditional suppliers.

Turkey has emerged as one potential alternative source of military equipment and defense cooperation, reflecting a broader strategy of reducing dependence on any single security partner.

At the same time, Gulf countries continue to strengthen economic ties with the United States. Major investment commitments announced in recent years demonstrate that while questions persist over security arrangements, economic cooperation remains a central pillar of bilateral relations.

The proposed agreement with Iran also includes plans for a multibillion-dollar reconstruction and investment fund intended to support Iran’s economic recovery after the conflict.

Although Washington has indicated that Gulf participation would be important, several regional governments have said they have not yet committed funding and are awaiting further details before making any decisions.

For many Gulf leaders, preventing another regional war remains the immediate priority.

The recent conflict exposed the vulnerability of Gulf states to missile and drone attacks and highlighted the economic consequences of disruptions to energy exports and international shipping.

U

krainian drones struck a major oil refinery in southeast Moscow for the second time in three days on Thursday, triggering a massive fire, disrupting transportation across the Russian capital, and underscoring Kyiv’s growing ability to carry the war deep inside Russian territory.

The attack targeted one of Moscow’s key fuel-processing facilities, located just 16 kilometers (10 miles) from the Kremlin and within the city’s ring road, making it one of the most symbolically significant strikes on Russian infrastructure since the war began more than four years ago.

Video footage shared on social media showed thick black smoke billowing into the sky above the refinery after a powerful explosion. Witnesses reported that the blast was so intense that the giant metal lid of an oil storage tank was hurled into the air.

The strike appeared to evade Russian air defenses and ignited a blaze that emergency crews battled for hours.

War reaches the heart of Russia

The attack forms part of a broader Ukrainian campaign targeting Russia’s energy sector, which Kyiv argues provides crucial revenue for Moscow’s military operations in Ukraine.

But beyond the economic impact, the strike carried substantial symbolic significance.

By successfully targeting infrastructure inside the Russian capital, Ukraine appears intent on demonstrating to ordinary Russians that the consequences of the war are no longer confined to distant battlefields.

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister, Andrii Sybiha, used social media to directly address residents of Moscow following the attack.

“One of the most popular questions asked by Muscovites this morning is ‘What is going on?'” Sybiha wrote. “Your country started a war of aggression against ours. For years, it has been killing our people.”

The comments reflected Kyiv’s effort to frame the attacks as a response to Russia’s invasion rather than an escalation of the conflict.

Disruption across Moscow

The strike caused widespread disruption throughout the Russian capital, home to more than 13 million people.

Authorities temporarily suspended flights at all Moscow airports as security services assessed the threat posed by additional drones.

Operations were halted at Sheremetyevo Airport, Russia’s busiest air hub, and parts of the airport were evacuated as a precaution.

Traffic was also disrupted along major roads surrounding the refinery, creating significant delays for commuters.

Residents in online forums complained that no air raid sirens or emergency alerts were issued before the attack.

Some suburban residents reported finding oily residue on vehicles and windows after rainfall passed through areas affected by smoke from the refinery fire.

The incident highlighted the growing vulnerability of Russia’s largest city to long-range Ukrainian drone operations.

While Moscow has experienced occasional drone attacks since 2023, including an incident involving the Kremlin itself, such strikes have generally had limited impact on daily life.

Thursday’s attack represented one of the most disruptive incidents the capital has experienced since the conflict began.

Economic impact growing

The latest refinery strike also points to the increasing economic consequences of Ukraine’s campaign against Russia’s energy infrastructure.

Russia remains one of the world’s largest oil producers and a major exporter of crude oil and refined fuel products.

Repeated attacks on refineries, storage facilities, and transportation networks have begun affecting domestic fuel supplies.

Industry sources told Reuters that Russia is expected to import fuel by sea this month, an unusual step for a country that is normally a major fuel exporter.

Reports of gasoline shortages have emerged in several regions in recent weeks.

Although Moscow city authorities insisted that fuel supplies in and around the capital remain stable, Russia’s federal anti-monopoly service has launched an inquiry after one major retailer reportedly increased gasoline prices by nearly 19 percent within a week.

Energy analysts say sustained attacks on refining capacity could place additional pressure on domestic fuel markets while increasing operational costs for Russia’s economy.

B

ritish Prime Minister Keir Starmer faced a major political setback on Thursday after Defense Secretary John Healey resigned from the government, accusing the prime minister of failing to provide the armed forces with the resources needed to address growing security threats.

The resignation, which came amid a heated dispute over military spending, was quickly followed by the departure of Armed Forces Minister Al Carns, deepening a crisis within the government just days before a crucial NATO summit and amid mounting pressure on Starmer’s leadership.

In a resignation letter addressed to the prime minister, Healey said the government’s planned defense spending levels were inadequate for the challenges facing Britain and its allies.

“The funding allocated falls well short of what is required for defence and the country at this dangerous time,” Healey wrote.

The departing defense secretary argued that the government had failed to match its rhetoric about growing international threats with the financial commitments needed to strengthen Britain’s military capabilities.

His resignation represents one of the most serious cabinet departures since Labour came to power in 2024 and raises fresh questions about divisions within the government over defense priorities.

Second resignation intensifies pressure

Shortly after Healey announced his resignation, Armed Forces Minister Al Carns also stepped down, delivering another blow to the government.

Carns, a former Royal Marine officer and one of the military’s most vocal advocates within government, criticized what he described as a widening gap between the demands placed on Britain’s armed forces and the resources available to meet them.

“The character of conflict is changing faster than our procurement can keep up with,” Carns wrote in a resignation letter posted on social media.

“We are asking our Armed Forces to operate in a more dangerous world on a budget written for a calmer one.”

Carns also accused the government of failing to show sufficient commitment to military personnel and veterans, saying ministers were not providing the support necessary for Britain’s armed forces to carry out their responsibilities effectively.

The dual resignations come at a sensitive moment for the government as it prepares to unveil a long-awaited defense investment plan intended to modernize Britain’s military and respond to growing international security challenges.

Debate over defense spending

At the heart of the dispute is the question of how much Britain should spend on defense in an increasingly volatile global security environment.

Like many NATO members, the United Kingdom faces pressure to increase military spending as concerns grow about Russia’s military ambitions and broader geopolitical instability.

Healey pointed to recent warnings from British intelligence services that Russia could potentially pose a threat to NATO territory within the next decade.

In his resignation letter, he argued that while the government publicly acknowledged the dangers facing Europe, it had failed to provide the funding necessary to prepare for them.

“You have been unable, and the Treasury has been unwilling, to commit the resources that the nation needs to defend the country at this time of rising threats,” he wrote.

The criticism centered on disagreements over the pace and scale of planned increases in military spending. Although the government has committed to raising defense expenditure significantly over the coming years, Healey and his allies reportedly pushed for faster and larger increases.

The dispute has delayed publication of the government’s defense overhaul strategy several times, reflecting deep disagreements within Whitehall over budget priorities.

Starmer defends record

Prime Minister Keir Starmer moved quickly to defend his government’s approach, insisting that Labour had already delivered the largest sustained increase in defense spending since the Cold War.

In a public response to Healey’s resignation, Starmer highlighted Britain’s military support for Ukraine, cooperation with Gulf allies, and efforts to strengthen security in strategically important regions, including the Strait of Hormuz.

“When we entered government in 2024, I took the decision to increase defence spending after the Conservatives hollowed out our armed forces,” Starmer wrote.

The prime minister argued that increased defense spending had required difficult choices elsewhere in government, including reductions to the international aid budget.

“I will always do what is needed to keep our country safe,” he said.

Starmer also defended the government’s forthcoming Defence Investment Plan, saying it would increase military spending in a financially sustainable way while supporting British industry and economic growth.

He acknowledged that additional investment would require significant reallocations of public spending but argued that such decisions were necessary to rebuild Britain’s military capabilities after years of underinvestment.

D

evelopments in Mali over recent months indicate that the security crisis in the Sahel region has entered a new phase. In particular, the “tactical cooperation” that has emerged between the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin – JNIM) and the Azawad Liberation Front (Front de Libération de l’Azawad – FLA), which represents the Tuareg separatist faction, has exerted serious military pressure on the Bamako administration.

The recapture of Kidal in April 2026, the targeting of the areas around Bamako and Kati, and the assassination of Defence Minister Sadio Camara have demonstrated that Assimi Goita’s administration is facing one of the most severe security crises of recent years. However, the emerging picture suggests, contrary to initial appearances, not the regime’s imminent collapse in the short term, but rather the deepening of a protracted war of attrition between state authority and armed groups in Mali.

The fundamental issue in Mali today is not so much the military capacity of the armed groups, but whether this capacity can be transformed into a sustainable political order. Indeed, whilst the recent coordination between JNIM and the FLA has yielded significant results in terms of wearing down the regime, it has failed to articulate a shared political vision capable of jointly governing Mali. Consequently, whilst this alliance may be able to put pressure on the Goita administration in the short term, it remains far from producing a comprehensive alternative capable of establishing a new model of governance across the country.

Recent background

Developments in Mali over the past two years have brought this structural problem into sharper focus. Whilst clashes between the FLA—which reorganised in the north by the end of 2024—and the Malian army intensified, JNIM also expanded its influence, particularly in central and western Mali. Attacks carried out along the Dioura, Boulikessi and Timbuktu line throughout 2025 have highlighted the Malian army’s capacity issues. Meanwhile, JNIM’s systematic attacks on fuel convoys along the Senegal-Mali border during the same period have demonstrated that the group effectively employs not only military but also economic pressure tactics. The fuel crisis, power cuts and transport problems in the capital, Bamako, have laid bare the erosion of the state’s capacity to provide basic services.

In response, the Goita administration has further restricted the political sphere in parallel with the security crisis. The closure of political parties, the suppression of opposition figures and the postponement of the electoral process on the grounds of ‘pacifying the country’ have reinforced the trend towards the institutionalisation of military rule in Mali. The Goita administration has transformed the security crisis into a tool of legitimacy not only in military but also in political terms. In particular, anti-French rhetoric and an emphasis on sovereignty play a significant role in the Goita regime’s ability to generate social support.

In fact, this is precisely the fundamental reason why the Goita regime remains in power today. It survives not because the regime is strong, but because its rivals have failed to present a common state project. The armed opposition in Mali, whilst appearing militarily effective, is politically fragmented. At the heart of this fragmentation lie the structural differences between JNIM and the FLA. JNIM is an al-Qaeda-linked organisation that ‘exploits Islam’, and this radical group claims that its long-term objective is to establish a Sharia-based order in Mali. The organisation is attempting to establish alternative governance mechanisms, particularly in rural areas.

It is filling the state vacuum through methods such as tax collection, setting up checkpoints, mediating local disputes and operating Sharia courts. Consequently, JNIM has become a hybrid actor seeking to establish influence not only in the military sphere but also in the social and economic spheres, deriving legitimacy from these domains. The relationships it has developed with Fulani communities, particularly those spreading across the Sahel region, have given the organisation significant social depth in central Mali.

Ethno-regional motivation?

In contrast, the FLA’s primary motivation is not ideological but ethno-regional. The Tuareg separatist movements have for many years been advocating for autonomy or independence centered on Azavad in northern Mali. Consequently, the FLA’s priority is not to Islamize the Malian state, but to establish a Tuareg-dominated political sphere in the north. This explains why the relationship between JNIM and the FLA is limited and fragile. Both actors seek to weaken the Bamako administration; however, they have quite different political projects regarding ‘how Mali should be governed’.

This difference becomes particularly apparent in discussions regarding the ‘post-victory order’. Whilst JNIM aims to establish ideological hegemony across the whole of Mali, the FLA appears to be seeking regional dominance in the north. In other words, whilst one seeks ideological transformation of the unitary state, the other advocates a political model based on the fragmentation of the state. Consequently, whilst joint military operations may be possible, a joint governance model appears a highly unlikely prospect.

Moreover, the difference between these two structures is not merely ideological. Their spheres of legitimacy also differ. The FLA’s social support is largely confined to the Tuareg region in the north and lacks a strong political counterpart in southern regions such as Bamako, Sikasso or Kayes. JNIM, on the other hand, is able to operate across a wider geographical area, particularly in regions where state violence is intense, presenting itself as an ‘alternative security provider’.

However, even this does not grant the organization a sustainable governance capacity across the country. Indeed, as seen in the case of Mali, armed groups in the Sahel, whilst possessing the military capacity to erode state authority, are unable to produce a sustainable and inclusive governance model capable of replacing it. JNIM’s economic blockade and rural control capacity may exert pressure on Bamako, but it lacks the administrative and economic infrastructure to replace modern state mechanisms. The same applies to the FLA. There is a significant difference between establishing control over symbolic areas such as Kidal and governing a country with a population of over 20 million, which is ethnically fragmented and economically oriented towards the south. Consequently, the current situation in Mali represents the ‘spread of multiple spheres of authority’ rather than the ‘construction of an alternative state’.

External support commitments

The Goita administration’s external support commitments are also bolstering the regime’s resilience. The security vacuum created following France’s withdrawal and the conclusion of MINUSMA has been attempted to be filled by Russian-backed security structures. The transition from Wagner to the Africa Corps demonstrates that Russian influence is taking on a new form. Although Russian support has not fully ensured security in Mali, it constitutes a significant security buffer preventing the regime’s sudden collapse. Furthermore, the Sahel States Alliance (Alliance des États du Sahel – AES) axis, developed by Mali alongside Burkina Faso and Niger, provides the regime with a regional sphere of solidarity.

Consequently, the most likely scenario in Mali in the coming period is the deepening of a fragmented security order rather than the country falling entirely under the control of a single party. A prolonged war of attrition, in which the FLA increases its influence in the north and JNIM in the central regions, whilst the Bamako-based military core maintains its presence, appears a more realistic prospect. In this process, internal power struggles within the regime and new military alignments may also come to the fore.

However, current data suggests that whilst JNIM and the FLA do not possess the capacity or a shared vision to jointly govern the whole of Mali, JNIM is strengthening its position within the FLA and pursuing a medium- to long-term strategy. Consequently, the crisis unfolding in Mali today is not merely a security issue. It is also a crisis of state capacity, representation, centre-periphery relations and legitimacy. One of the factors fueling JNIM’s growth is the inadequacy of state capacity and exclusionary security policies. The factor fueling the FLA’s resistance, however, is the chronic issue of autonomy and representation in the north. Yet the common ground between these two structures is merely their opposition to the current regime. Indeed, this alliance is insufficient to produce a sustainable political vision and also fuels the underlying rivalry between these groups.

Consequently, the picture emerging in Mali today reflects a ‘crisis of mutual governance’ rather than a regime change. The Goita administration is unable to establish effective sovereignty across the entire country, yet its rivals are also unable to offer a comprehensive political order capable of replacing it. Therefore, however remarkable the recent “military successes” of the JNIM and Tuareg groups may be, it is quite difficult for these successes to translate into a sustainable state model. In Mali, the determining factor in the short term will not be the decisive victory of one side, but rather how this long-term balance of attrition between the state and armed groups will shape the nerve centers inside and outside Bamako.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

T

aiwan’s military conducted a large-scale coastal defense exercise on Tuesday, simulating the destruction of an invading Chinese force in what officials described as a more realistic combat scenario designed to strengthen the island’s readiness against a potential amphibious assault.

The drill, held along Taiwan’s western coastline facing mainland China, involved the coordinated use of rockets, artillery, mortars, anti-tank missiles, and mobile weapons systems to create a defensive “kill zone” aimed at stopping enemy forces before they could establish a beachhead.

The exercise comes amid growing military pressure from China, which claims Taiwan as its territory and has not ruled out the use of force to bring the self-governed island under Beijing’s control. Chinese military aircraft and naval vessels regularly operate around Taiwan, while Beijing has intensified military activities in the Taiwan Strait in recent years.

The drills were conducted simultaneously from eight locations across a 20-kilometer stretch of coastline near the central city of Taichung, an area considered one of the most likely landing points for a potential Chinese invasion.

Military officials said the exercise reflected a broader effort to make Taiwan’s armed forces more agile and prepared for actual battlefield conditions.

“What is different about this training compared with the past is that we are no longer conducting heavy artillery firing in a fixed, routine formation,” artillery commander Ong Yih-ming told reporters during the exercise.

“The timing for entering positions this time was based on realistic combat conditions. Therefore, the level of difficulty for our troops was considerably higher,” he said.

Overhauling military doctrine

Taiwan has been overhauling its military doctrine in recent years, shifting away from traditional large-scale formations toward a more flexible defense strategy focused on mobility, survivability, and rapid response.

The latest exercise showcased several key weapons systems, including the domestically produced Thunderbolt-2000 multiple launch rocket system, a truck-mounted platform designed to deliver concentrated firepower while maintaining high mobility.

Military officials said Tuesday marked the first time in seven years that the Thunderbolt-2000 had conducted live-fire operations in an active deployment area.

Rocket commander Liao Neng-cheng said the exercise significantly reduced preparation times to better mirror wartime conditions.

“In previous years, units would often arrive at firing positions a week in advance and spend several days preparing,” he said.

“This time, we arrived only one day before the exercise and completed all preparations within a much shorter timeframe.”

Improving military’s ability

The changes are intended to improve the military’s ability to survive and operate under conditions where enemy surveillance, missile attacks, and electronic warfare could limit opportunities for lengthy preparations.

Alongside the Thunderbolt-2000 systems, troops deployed U.S.-made Paladin self-propelled howitzers, anti-tank missiles, conventional artillery pieces, and mortar units. The weapons were used in a simulated operation designed to halt an amphibious landing force approaching Taiwan’s shores.

Military planners have long regarded Taiwan’s western coast as one of the most vulnerable areas in any future conflict. The region’s beaches and mudflats provide some of the few locations suitable for large-scale amphibious landings by the Chinese military.

The exercise took place as tensions between Taipei and Beijing remain elevated.

Taiwan’s government rejects China’s sovereignty claims, insisting that only the island’s 23 million people have the right to determine their future. Beijing, however, considers Taiwan a breakaway province and has repeatedly stated that reunification is inevitable.

Chinese officials have increased military and political pressure on Taiwan since the election of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, whom Beijing has labeled a separatist.

China’s growing intolerance of Taipei

China has also suspended formal communications with Taipei and stepped up military patrols near the island. Taiwanese authorities have reported an increase in Chinese coast guard activities around Taiwan’s waters, including near the Taiwan-controlled Pratas Islands in the northern South China Sea.

Speaking to local media on Tuesday, Chiu Chui-cheng, head of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, accused Beijing of attempting to alter the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

“The one trying to change the status quo is the Chinese Communist Party,” Chiu said.

“We will use strength and sufficient deterrent capability to prevent the Chinese communists from changing the status quo by force.”

The Chinese government’s Taiwan Affairs Office did not immediately comment on the exercise.

Security analysts say Taiwan’s military modernization efforts reflect growing concerns over China’s expanding military capabilities and increasingly frequent operations near the island. While many experts believe an invasion would remain an extraordinarily complex undertaking, Taiwan continues to strengthen its defenses and improve readiness for a range of possible conflict scenarios.

Tuesday’s exercise highlighted Taipei’s determination to demonstrate its ability to defend the island’s coastline and respond quickly to potential threats, even as cross-strait relations remain among the most sensitive flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific region.

The drill also underscored Taiwan’s ongoing efforts to adapt its military strategy to an evolving security environment, one increasingly shaped by China’s military rise and the growing strategic competition between Beijing and the United States.

(Source: Reuters)

E

uropean intelligence agencies believe China secretly trained around 200 Russian military personnel last year, with some of those soldiers later returning to fight in Ukraine, according to intelligence sources and documents reviewed by Reuters.

The covert training program, reportedly focused heavily on drone warfare and counter-drone tactics, represents one of the clearest indications yet of direct Chinese military support connected to Russia’s war effort, despite Beijing’s repeated claims that it remains neutral in the conflict.

According to Reuters, the training was outlined in a Russian-Chinese military agreement signed in Beijing on July 2, 2025. The document reportedly detailed plans for Russian troops to receive instruction at Chinese military facilities in cities including Beijing and Nanjing, while Chinese personnel would also participate in training programs inside Russia.

European intelligence officials told Reuters that some Russian soldiers trained in China later took part in combat operations involving drones in occupied Crimea and the Zaporizhzhia region.

Drone warfare at center of training

The reported courses concentrated on modern battlefield technologies that have become central to the war in Ukraine.

Reuters said the training included instruction in:

• Drone operations and first-person-view (FPV) drones
• Electronic warfare
• Counter-drone systems
• Combined arms warfare
• Explosives handling and demining
• Armored infantry tactics
• Army aviation

One internal Russian military report reviewed by Reuters described a December 2025 training course involving around 50 Russian personnel at a branch of the People’s Liberation Army Infantry Academy in Shijiazhuang.

According to the document, Russian soldiers trained with 82mm mortars while using drones to identify targets — a tactic widely employed on the Ukrainian battlefield.

Another course reportedly focused on counter-drone measures, including electronic warfare rifles and net-launching systems designed to disable incoming drones.

Reuters also described a training session at a PLA aviation center in Yibin where Russian troops used drone flight simulators and practiced operating several FPV drone systems.

China denies direct involvement in war

China’s foreign ministry rejected suggestions that Beijing was directly involved in the conflict.

In a statement to Reuters, Chinese officials said Beijing had consistently maintained an “objective and impartial stance” and supported peace negotiations.

The report nevertheless raises new questions about the depth of military cooperation between China and Russia, whose leaders have repeatedly emphasized their “no limits” strategic partnership since shortly before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

The intelligence findings emerge just as Chinese President Xi Jinping hosts Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing for high-level talks focused on energy, security and global geopolitics.

Western governments have long accused China of indirectly supporting Russia through purchases of Russian energy exports and the supply of dual-use technologies. But training Russian troops at operational and tactical levels would mark a more direct form of assistance.

Russia increasingly dependent on Chinese support

The report highlights the growing military and economic ties between Beijing and Moscow.

China has become a critical economic partner for Russia since Western sanctions were imposed after the invasion of Ukraine. Chinese purchases of Russian oil, gas and coal have helped stabilize Moscow’s economy, while Chinese technology and manufacturing networks have helped offset some Western export restrictions.

European intelligence officials told Reuters that Russia benefits particularly from China’s advanced drone industry and training infrastructure.

Although Russia has extensive combat experience from Ukraine, China’s rapidly expanding drone sector offers technological expertise, simulation systems and industrial capacity that Russian forces increasingly value.

One intelligence agency said many of the Russian personnel trained in China were instructors themselves, meaning the knowledge gained there could spread through Russia’s military structure after their return.

S

ince the war began on February 28, the US administration has suffered from profound strategic blindness in assessing the crisis between Washington and Tehran. This is particularly evident in its misjudgement of Iran’s strategic resilience and decision-making mechanisms. Washington continues to formulate strategy based on a flawed analogy with Venezuela, one entirely detached from on-the-ground realities, just as with its decapitation strategy aimed at regime change in Iran.

The idea that President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance see Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf as similar to Venezuela’s pragmatic politician Delcy Rodríguez and believe he could be pressured to negotiate is wishful thinking. In reality, however, the final decision-making authority in Iran does not lie with civilians or individual politicians. Rather, it is the exclusive preserve of a rigid military-security core consolidated around the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

This new hegemonic elite, which includes Kalibaf, is firmly committed to the fundamental ideological tenets of the Islamic Republic. The idea that individuals like Kalibaf could transcend military tutelage, alter Iran’s strategic trajectory, and become negotiating partners is a delusion on Washington’s part. This notion disregards the regime’s decision-making structure.

At the heart of the current impasse between Washington and Tehran is the asymmetry between the U.S.’s coercive approach to diplomacy and Iran’s survival priorities. The Trump administration’s classic “carrot-and-stick” approach, based on the assumption that every actor will yield at a certain cost, is ineffective against Tehran. The issues that the US brings to the negotiating table—the right to enrich uranium in its nuclear program, ballistic missile capabilities, regional proxy forces, and freedom of movement in the Strait of Hormuz—are not negotiable for Tehran.

The Iranian leadership interprets American demands that would undermine these existential pillars as a call for surrender. Tehran is prepared to bear enormous economic and military costs rather than yield to these demands because simply surviving American pressure is a victory in itself. As long as both sides persist in their mutual illusion of self-confidence—believing that their gains on the ground have forced the other side to make concessions and that the other side has suffered more damage from this crisis than they have—the formation of a credible basis for diplomatic agreement seems highly unlikely.

The ‘neither war nor peace’ dilemma and the naval blockade

The Trump administration’s decision to extend the ceasefire was not a quest for peace but a strategy of attrition aimed at altering the nature of the conflict in the US’s favor. Tehran perceives the indefinite extension of the ceasefire while the de facto naval blockade against Iran continues as the worst-case scenario, which is intended to gradually erode its strategic capabilities. Iran rejects this state of suspension — this “neither war nor peace” limbo. A report in The Wall Street Journal on April 28 detailed Donald Trump’s directive for an expanded naval blockade aimed at choking off Iran’s oil exports. This indicates that the crisis has not subsided, but rather been tactically recalibrated. However, according to Iran’s strategic community, this move is a psychological delaying tactic designed to create the illusion that active hostilities have ended. This would weaken the country’s security mechanisms and pave the way for a surprise US-Israeli attack.

Conversely, the belief that Washington could force Iran to submit through a naval blockade is as misguided as expecting regime change. Iran has developed asymmetric resistance against economic sanctions for decades, so a naval blockade is not just another routine embargo for them; it is a declaration of war waged through other means. Therefore, from Iran’s perspective, the current situation is not a de-escalation, but rather the beginning of an escalation phase that will, sooner or later, trigger a more intense wave of asymmetric conflict. Iran will not confine its response to its own waters but will spread the cost across the global system.

Although its conventional navy has largely been destroyed, the DMO has built a massive, asymmetric “mosquito fleet” in the Strait of Hormuz. This fleet comprises hundreds of low-cost speedboats, unmanned systems, and advanced sea mines, such as the Maham series. Rather than focusing on controlling the strait, this structure enables Iran to block rivals’ access and retain the leverage to provoke a crisis in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, as well as the Strait of Hormuz, should the blockade intensify.

The nuclear paradox and the new security architecture

Military action is also far from resolving the structural issues between the US and Iran. Attacks by the U.S. and Israel targeting missile or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) facilities in the region only temporarily reduce capacity. This tactic, known in military literature as “mowing the grass,” does not permanently eliminate the threat. Iran’s military infrastructure is deeply integrated into the geography and relies largely on domestic production, so it can be rapidly replenished.

Furthermore, the maximum military and economic pressure being applied has created an extremely dangerous paradox regarding the nuclear program. Rather than deterring Iran from its nuclear objectives, the growing existential threat and successive conflicts are reinforcing the belief in nuclear armament within the DMO. In the eyes of Iranian decision-makers, achieving nuclear capability is no longer merely desirable; it is now viewed as an indispensable guarantee of the regime’s survival.

Looking back at the recent past, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei presented a pragmatic profile despite being an ideological leader. He possessed the flexibility to reach a nuclear agreement with the Obama administration and was cautious enough to avoid risks while responding to the period following October 7, 2023, and the direct Israeli attacks in 2024. However, with his death, this delicate balance vanished, giving rise to an Iran that is far more unpredictable and dangerous to regional security. Terminating the 2015 Nuclear Agreement (JCPOA) without a concrete alternative was a major political blunder rather than a strategic move. This move removed international restrictions and monitoring mechanisms on Iran, creating an opportunity for the regime to expand its nuclear capabilities.

As a result, Iran has increased its uranium enrichment level from 3.67 percent to 60 percent, shortened the time needed to acquire a nuclear weapon from one year to a few weeks, and effectively become a “nuclear threshold state.” For Iran, 90 percent enrichment is now a matter of choice, not capability. Since crossing the technological critical threshold, Iran has the ability to process its existing stockpile of 440 kilograms of enriched uranium to the final stage in small-scale facilities. Completely halting the nuclear program by military means would require a ground operation that is virtually impossible in the current situation.

Inevitable escalation

The gap between Iran’s unwavering stance and the US’s minimum acceptable limits is so wide that diplomatic efforts have devolved into mutual accusations rather than compromise. There is no credible way out, nor any room for flexibility, to defuse the tension. Washington’s reliance on sanctions and temporary military interventions, dubbed “mowing the lawn,” is insufficient to resolve this strategic impasse.

Consequently, unless Washington scales back its maximalist objectives or Iran fundamentally alters its security approach, this spiral of coercive pressure will yield neither compromise nor capitulation. This scenario, in which no sustainable diplomatic solution exists, is more likely to usher in a far more destructive phase of conflict. In this phase, costs would be spread across the global system through asymmetric means, transcending borders and rendering predictability entirely lost. This phase would be far worse than simply plunging the parties into a conventional war of attrition.

(Originally published in Turkish by Middle East Africa)

W

hen we hear news of a conflict in the Middle East or across the Sahel, one of the first images that comes to mind is the pickup truck with a heavy machine gun mounted on its bed. Racing along desert roads, sometimes accompanying the convoy of a state army, sometimes forming part of a militia raid, these vehicles have become one of the most familiar images of modern warfare.

The footage that emerged from Mali on the morning of April 25, 2026, revived that memory once again. Coordinated attacks carried out by al-Qaeda-linked JNIM and the FLA forces advocating Azawad independence brought these desert cavalrymen back into the global spotlight.

Yet, of course, no “victory” won in this region comes merely through off-road vehicles fitted with PK machine guns. So before asking who is financing and directing the war in the Sahel today, it is worth looking at who first turned these vehicles into some of the most iconic war machines of irregular warfare, and under what circumstances.

The 1986–1987 Libya–Chad War, a.k.a. the Toyota War

At the heart of the crisis unfolding in the Sahara in the second half of the 1980s lay the Aouzou Strip, located along the Chad–Libya border. This desert territory, covering roughly 114,000 square kilometers, carried the burden of vague, arbitrarily drawn borders inherited from the colonial era. Libya, under Muammar Gaddafi, regarded the area as a matter of historical right, while Chad saw this claim as a direct threat to its national sovereignty.

When the war began, the military balance on paper heavily favored Libya. The Libyan army resembled a Soviet-equipped steel fist. Gaddafi’s regime controlled the Aouzou Strip with roughly 8,000 troops, T-55 tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery units, and Mi-24 helicopters, famously known as “flying tanks.” Facing them were the Chadian National Armed Forces, who knew the terrain far better but had only limited technological capabilities.

By 1987, however, the intelligence, weapons, and air support provided by France under Opération Épervier quickly shifted the course of the war in Chad’s favor. France was the most critical actor behind the Chadian government, seeking both to protect Western bloc interests and to break Libya’s influence south of the Sahara. These were, after all, the years when Cold War rivalry increasingly turned local conflicts into proxy wars.

The Battle of Fada on January 2, 1987, marked the turning point in this shift. The French Air Force had suppressed Libyan air operations and largely neutralized Gaddafi’s air superiority. Alongside this, hundreds of Toyota pickups supplied by France, together with MILAN anti-tank missiles capable of destroying a tank from roughly two kilometers away, were among the main factors that turned the battlefield equation against Libya. Indeed, Khalifa Haftar, one of the most influential figures in Libyan politics today, was among those captured by Chadian forces during that period.

100 kilometers into Libyan territory

By September 1987, Chadian units carried out a daring raid, infiltrating roughly 100 kilometers into Libyan territory and striking the Maaten al-Sarra Air Base. Numerous aircraft, ammunition stocks, and military assets belonging to the Libyan air force were destroyed before they could even take off. Conducted under French command, this raid became one of the most critical moves in undermining Libya’s air superiority in the region and forcing Gaddafi toward the diplomatic table.

The Chad–Libya War of 1986–87 is now remembered as the “Toyota War.” These low-cost pickup trucks, brought into the country with French support and fitted with heavy machine guns and anti-tank missiles, had been transformed into mobile war machines capable of destroying million-dollar T-55 tanks from hundreds of meters away. While Libya’s heavy Soviet tanks sank into the sand and turned into static targets, the lightweight Toyotas, with their wide tires, seemed almost to float across the desert surface. According to an account that even found its way into military reports, Chadian soldiers would cross Libyan minefields at speeds exceeding 100 kilometers per hour. They moved so fast that even if a wheel triggered the fuse of an anti-tank mine, by the time the explosion occurred the pickup had already left the blast radius.

The real strength of these vehicles, known in modern military literature as “technicals,” lay not in their armor but in their speed and simplicity. When a tank broke down, it required a team of specialist engineers, heavy maintenance infrastructure, and a complex supply chain for spare parts. When a Toyota broke down, basic technical knowledge, limited equipment, and a bit of ingenuity were often enough.

Of course, these vehicles were not what won the war on their own. Without France’s suppression of Libya’s air superiority, the MILAN anti-tank missiles it supplied, the flow of intelligence, and the political-military guarantee provided by Paris, such an outcome would not have been possible. For this reason, the Toyota War is remembered not merely as a story of light vehicles defeating heavy tanks, but as a striking example of how asymmetric warfare, when combined with external support, can change the outcome of a conflict.

The Toyota Hilux and similar vehicles, which have entered popular culture as the archetypal “terror pickup,” have become a constant feature of conflict zones stretching from the Middle East to the Sahel due to their durability, low cost, and ease of weaponization. Having first emerged in the deserts of Chad in the 1980s, where speed, simplicity, and geography gave them an edge against heavy tanks, these vehicles are now back on the battlefield in Mali.

So, are the pickups and drones now pushing southward in Mali truly being commanded by the rebel alliance alone?

A

planned withdrawal of 5,000 US troops from Germany may appear limited in scale, but analysts warn it reflects a far broader challenge confronting NATO and European security.

The decision, announced by Donald Trump, comes amid escalating tensions between Washington and its European allies. Disputes over tariffs, disagreements on support for Ukraine, and sharp rhetoric surrounding the Iran conflict have deepened divisions across the Atlantic alliance.

The troop reduction follows criticism from German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who accused the United States of mishandling tensions with Iran. In response, Trump signaled not only the withdrawal from Germany but also hinted at possible reductions in other European countries, including Italy and Spain.

Spain has already refused US requests to use its bases for operations linked to the Iran conflict, while Trump criticized both countries for what he described as insufficient support.

For years, Trump has argued that Europe relies too heavily on US military protection, frequently singling out Germany for failing to meet defense spending expectations.

A shift in US priorities

Despite the planned reduction, Germany still hosts tens of thousands of US troops, far fewer than during the Cold War, when troop levels reached around 250,000.

Officials in Washington suggest the shift reflects a broader strategic pivot. According to Pentagon leadership, the US intends to focus on regions where its military power is uniquely decisive, particularly in Asia and the Western Hemisphere.

European leaders, however, view the move as a sign of weakening commitment. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned that internal divisions now pose a greater threat to the alliance than external adversaries.

The withdrawal highlights Europe’s long-standing dependence on US military support, even as threats from Russia persist.

In response, key nations, including France, United Kingdom, and Germany, have pledged to significantly increase defense spending. Projections suggest European defense budgets could nearly double by 2030.

Yet financial investment alone may not be enough.

Europe’s defense industry remains fragmented, with multiple countries producing competing systems rather than coordinating efforts. This lack of integration drives up costs and slows development. For example, Europe manufactures several types of battle tanks, while the US focuses on a single main model, improving efficiency and scale.

Joint defense projects have also struggled. A high-profile effort between France and Germany to develop next-generation fighter jets has faced repeated delays due to disagreements over leadership and design priorities.

Capability gaps and strategic risks

One of the most urgent concerns is missile defense. European systems currently lack the scale and sophistication of US platforms such as Patriot and THAAD systems, which have been heavily deployed in recent conflicts.

At the same time, the Pentagon has canceled plans to deploy additional long-range missile units to Europe, further widening capability gaps.

The European Union is attempting to address these vulnerabilities by encouraging member states to source more defense equipment domestically. By 2030, at least half of defense procurement is expected to remain within the EU.

However, transitioning away from US systems presents risks, particularly as global demand for weapons increases amid ongoing conflicts.

A crossroads for NATO

Europe now faces a strategic choice. A faster path to rearmament would rely on continued US cooperation, but that depends on trust that appears increasingly strained.

The alternative is a slower, more independent route requiring greater spending, deeper industrial integration, and political willingness to pool sovereignty, an objective that has long proved elusive.

Despite the challenges, there are signs of progress. Defense companies such as Saab, Rheinmetall, and BAE Systems report record demand, while newer NATO members Sweden and Finland have rapidly integrated into the alliance.

Still, the withdrawal of 5,000 troops underscores a critical reality: Europe’s security architecture is entering a period of transition, with uncertain implications for the future of transatlantic cooperation.

(Source: CNN)

I

n the early hours of the morning of 28 February, the Middle East faced serious developments that would determine the region’s future following an attack by the US and Israel on the compound housing the office of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, known as ‘Beyt-i Rehberi’. It had long been suggested by Israelis that these attacks would be carried out as a final phase, particularly following the 12-day Iran-Israel war in June 2025.

Regarding how and why the situation has reached this point, it can be argued that the harsh suppression of the protests that erupted in Iran in recent months, coupled with the significant backlash and pressure from the Iranian diaspora, presented an opportunity that Israel and the US could not afford to miss. At the outset of the events, protests by opposition groups—who initially took to the streets largely in response to the country’s economic crisis but subsequently demanded regime change and targeted the government directly—escalated and spiraled out of control, prompting the government to take harsh measures and resulting in the ‘bloodiest’ crackdown in the 47-year history of the Islamic Revolution. The events resulted in the deaths of thousands of regime opponents.

Opposition groups, which had previously experienced similar protests—such as the allegations of electoral fraud in the 2009 presidential elections, the November 2019 protests, and the Mahsa Amini incident in 2022—but failed to achieve their goals, have now launched a serious campaign, both domestically and internationally, calling for military intervention by the US and Israel in the wake of the latest events. In this context, footage of protests and the security forces’ harsh crackdown, which has spread globally across online platforms, has been frequently shared. Particularly in the US, under pressure from Reza Pahlavi—the son of the former Shah of Iran—and other Iranian lobbies, the narrative that the only way to combat the Iranian regime is now through military intervention and conflict has been presented in Washington and Tel Aviv as the will of the Iranian people.

For Israel, which for many years had characterized Tehran as the “head of the snake” in its opposition to Israel, the bloody protests and calls from Iranian dissidents provided an opportunity to add a humanitarian dimension to the rhetoric of military action against Iran. Trump and Netanyahu had repeatedly assured the Iranian people that the aid and support they sought on the path to “freedom” would come. Although the negotiations between Iran and the US throughout February raised the question in the minds of the opposition – “might a new agreement be reached that would keep the regime afloat?” – and triggered a brief wave of backlash against Trump, the messages delivered in the final week before the operation and the military build-up in the region demonstrated the inevitability of the operation for both the regime and the opposition.

Why has Iran weakened and become a target?

Whilst the protests in Iran and the calls from the Iranian people may have served as a trigger for the US and Israel, the ongoing conflict has far more significant underlying causes. Having lost its influence and allies in the region following 7 October, the Iranian regime was experiencing one of its most vulnerable and fragile periods since its inception, facing threats and dangers. In this context, the weakening or neutralization of elements of the ‘Axis of Resistance’—such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Ansarullah and Bashar al-Assad—created the golden opportunity Israel had been waiting for, leading to the 12-day war.

Iran’s air defense systems, which had been weakened by repeated small-scale air strikes in the period from 7 October to the 12-day war, were almost completely destroyed during the June conflict, leaving Iran effectively exposed to subsequent operations. Perhaps the most critical aspect of all these operations for the Iranian regime was that, due to intelligence failures and the absence of effective air defence systems, senior officials became targets in air strikes and were eliminated by being killed.

In fact, the assassination of political, military and bureaucratic figures of vital importance to the regime—often attributed to Israel—is not a new phenomenon. Israel has been carrying out assassination operations against high-ranking figures, particularly scientists involved in Iran’s nuclear program, for many years. Mustafa Ahmedi Ruşen in 2012, Muhsin Fahrizade in 2020, Razi Musevi in 2023 and Muhammad Rıza Zahidi in 2024 were among the most prominent nuclear scientists and commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps killed by Israel. In particular, the death of Fahrizade, known as the key figure in Iran’s nuclear programme, highlighted the extent of the intelligence gap in Iran and led to serious questioning and debate within the regime’s leadership.

Whilst these significant losses suffered by Iran over the years have caused disruptions to its nuclear and missile programs, it is fair to say that none have left as lasting a damage as the 12-day war. During the attacks on the first night of that war, almost the entire senior command was killed in the very first wave of attacks. Among those killed were Revolutionary Guards Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami, Air and Space Force Commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh – the public face of Iran’s missile program – and Chief of the General Staff Mohammad Baqeri.

Iran’s firepower and response capabilities were adversely affected by the sudden attacks it faced in the first two days, as it was caught unprepared; however, after overcoming the initial two-day shock, it managed to launch a counter-offensive despite intense air strikes, thereby preventing the complete severing of the command chain that Israel had targeted.

A regime expected to collapse but resisting

Looking at the situation, it appears that the Iranian leadership, having learnt lessons from the June conflict and the losses incurred, is preparing for a second round of fighting that it is almost certain will take place. In interviews with the US media, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi stated that the Iranian regime is not dependent on individuals or specific names, and that in the event of the death of its leaders or key figures, the names of those to whom duties and responsibilities would be transferred have been determined up to three or four levels down the hierarchy.

Indeed, on the very first day of the war, one of Iran’s greatest red lines, the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei; the Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Guards, Muhammad Pakpur, the Chairman of the Supreme Defence Council, Ali Shamkhani, and many other key figures were killed in an airstrike. New figures were appointed to fill all the vacant positions, including the post of Supreme Leader, and Iran was able to continue the war, achieving some surprising successes without appearing to be in disarray.

The most significant factor in Iran’s unexpected successful resistance against the US-Israel coalition and its ability to sustain the war was the assassination of the Supreme Leader on the very first day of the conflict. Ali Khamenei, in his capacity as the Wali al-Faqih and Supreme Commander, was regarded as a figure of such unique and distinguished standing that even his opponents would not have considered subjecting him to a direct attack. Although, due to changing circumstances, many senior officials now considered it possible that anyone—even themselves—could be targeted, no one had anticipated the possibility that the Supreme Leader could be killed on the first day of the war. It was assumed that lessons had been learnt from the 12-day war and security/intelligence failures, and that at the very least, the regime’s most important figure would be protected at the highest level.

Before the war began, it had been calculated among Iranian opposition circles—and even in Washington and Tel Aviv—that Khamenei’s death would rapidly bring the regime to the brink of collapse. However, whilst his death caused a major shock among the regime and its supporters and deeply affected the morale of the military forces, it did not lead to a major fracture within the system. On the contrary, as Ali Larijani, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council—who was later killed in subsequent attacks—stated, it provided them with a strong motivation for resistance, making them even more determined to seek revenge.

Factors ensuring the regime’s continuity

In Iran, the position of Supreme Leader is not merely a religious office; it is an authority and institution that commands all armed forces, including the army, police and Revolutionary Guards; it directly or indirectly shapes presidential, parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections; and its approval is required for everything from the country’s long-term strategic plans down to minor decisions. No politician or bureaucrat who is not loyal to him or who acts outside the framework he has drawn can survive within the system.

Ali Khamenei, having held all these powers for decades, has succeeded in shaping Iran’s structure and institutions to his own liking. For example, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), one of the forces absolutely loyal to him, is no longer merely an armed force; it has transformed into an economic giant overseeing the country’s largest projects, possessing an intelligence network in numerous countries abroad, and acting as a colossal entity that directs wars—a structure of unprecedented scale.

However, upon examining the religious and political structures in Iran, it is possible to observe that these structures have been shaped in such a way as to be able to operate independently of, and without dependence on, individual figures. The system of governance in Iran functions as an interconnected, multi-layered network rather than relying on individual figures. In this context, the regime’s continuity in recent years has been linked not directly to the consent of the majority of the population, but to control over the country’s critical sectors.

The fact that areas such as energy resources, the banking system, major economic structures, the security bureaucracy, the intelligence network, the judicial mechanism and the media are almost entirely controlled by the same power centre makes it difficult for the system to be destabilised from the outside. The fact that institutions in Iran adhere to the same ideological line ensures that, in times of crisis, the system consolidates more tightly rather than disintegrating from within. Over time, this structure has evolved beyond being merely a model of governance; it has transformed into a multi-layered power network where military, economic and ideological elements are intertwined.

From a sectarian perspective, the behaviour exhibited by Imam Hussein at Karbala—the greatest example for Shia believers—is prioritised as a guiding principle. Mottos such as ‘fearing not death’, ‘fighting until the very end’, and ‘never bowing to humiliation’ have traditionally been central tenets in the history of the Shia sect; since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, they have been the most emphasised aspects in the education system, cultural activities, the media, and even political discourse. It is extremely difficult to dissuade the generations who have been raised with this mindset—and who serve as the regime’s supporters and defenders—from fighting, or to make them accept defeat, even if their leaders were to die. During this war, the emphasis placed by clerics and orators on this very subject—namely resistance and martyrdom—in the commemorative programmes and ceremonies held in the main squares of Tehran and other cities is particularly striking.

S

ince the start of the US/Israel-Iran War, one of the developments set to reshape the region’s political and social fabric fundamentally is unfolding in Lebanon despite a fragile and uncertain ceasefire announced by the US and Iran. At a time when the eyes of the world are focused on the Gulf, Tel Aviv is making a concerted effort to exploit opportunities and irreversibly alter the status quo on the ground, disregarding Lebanon’s sovereign rights.

Factors such as rising energy prices on the international stage, the pressure that the prolongation of the war will exert on production and supply chains, and the tendency of foreign investors in Gulf monarchies—which are beginning to lose their ‘safe haven’ status—to leave their host countries have led to all discussions and expectations regarding the war being centred around the Persian Gulf. In this process, where attention has been focused on a limited area due to potential risks whose destructive effects will be felt globally, the Zionist regime has launched a move towards the annexation of South Lebanon, in line with the aggressive expansionist strategy it has accelerated in recent years.

Following the assassination of Ali Khamenei, Hezbollah’s launch of attacks on occupied territories and its de facto intervention in the war prompted the Zionist regime to intensify its attacks on Lebanon, despite the long-standing ceasefire. Following the Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October 2023, the occupying army implemented a strategy of diversion and securing significant gains in Lebanon through aggressive and provocative attacks on Lebanese territory, to continue the genocide in Gaza. Having gained significant psychological superiority following the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah in September 2024, Tel Aviv postponed its strategy of focusing on Lebanon, despite inflicting serious damage on Hezbollah, due to the strong resistance demonstrated by the resistance in Gaza despite limited resources.

Gaza’s realities

Given the realities on the ground in Gaza, an army severely demoralized psychologically, launching a large-scale ground operation in Lebanon could have meant facing a result far beyond the Zionist administration’s expectations. For this reason, placing Lebanon in a position where it would be constantly monitored and could be attacked if necessary was, in fact, the most reasonable option for Tel Aviv. On the other hand, Hezbollah’s reluctance to engage in an all-out war created a reality that heightened the fragility in southern Lebanon and multiplied the risks.

Despite the occupation army launching hundreds of attacks on southern Lebanon and targeting Hezbollah members following the ceasefire signed between the parties in November 2024, no retaliation was carried out against Israel. Seeking to avoid becoming the actor escalating tensions on the ground under the “Strategic Patience” approach, Hezbollah endeavored to keep its contact with Israeli forces as limited as possible, adhering as closely as possible to the rules of engagement adopted after the 2006 war.

The deep crisis unfolding in the country, driven by Lebanon’s political and economic conditions, was in fact one of the main reasons behind the strategy adopted by Hezbollah. Seeking to avoid a complete loss of its already shaken legitimacy within the country, the organization attempted to defuse the Zionist administration’s aggressive stance; however, following the commencement of attacks against Iran on 28 February, it shifted from a defense-oriented passive strategy to a military activism strategy that prioritized the offensive.

What has changed for Hezbollah in Iran since the war?

In the weeks following the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, the question of whether Hezbollah would declare war on the occupying state was the one everyone was most eager to have answered. Following the announcement on 6 November 2023 that Hassan Nasrallah would address the nation, all news agencies immediately turned their attention to Lebanon and Nasrallah’s speech. What put an end to expectations of a declaration of war was Nasrallah’s statement at the very beginning of his speech that they had gathered “to commemorate the martyrs”.

Despite the heavy blow dealt to Hezbollah by the occupying forces, the movement’s decision to limit itself to deterrence was linked not only to the sensitive conditions in Lebanon mentioned above but also to the fact that the process had been initiated by Hamas, or more specifically, the Qassam Brigades. Hizbullah, unwilling to become a part of someone else’s war, strove not to back down from the strategy it had adopted, despite losing two of its secretaries-general and founding members of its leadership cadre. The fact that the US-Israeli coalition directly targeted the Supreme Leader in its war against Iran, however, made it imperative for Hizballah to engage in the process actively.

The elimination of the highest echelons of the Iranian leadership in the opening hours of the war led the proxy forces in the region to face an existential crisis of unprecedented magnitude. Any change in Tehran would have signified, in particular, the complete collapse of Hezbollah. This new situation, arising without the movement being able to regain the ground it had lost within Lebanon’s political and social structure, compelled Hezbollah’s leadership to assess the two options and act swiftly. The movement would either adopt a stance of waiting for the process in Iran to conclude, thereby tolerating the Zionist administration’s moves, or it would choose the path of attack to weaken the occupying army, thereby enabling Iran to emerge from the process with gains and strengthen its own presence in Lebanon.

Given the risks the first scenario would pose to the organization, Hezbollah opted to enter the war directly, despite the possibility of the occupation expanding within Lebanese territory. In particular, Hezbollah’s primary expectation upon entering the war was to force the Tel Aviv administration to withdraw by inflicting the heavy losses they hoped to inflict during the occupying army’s planned ground operation. In the current situation, where Zionist leaders have escalated matters to the point of claiming sovereignty over Southern Lebanon, Hezbollah is resisting the occupiers with all the means at its disposal. Meanwhile, the Israeli army is attempting to alter Lebanon’s borders and annex them to its own territory by supporting its air strikes with ground forces.

Israel’s strategy in Lebanon

Tel Aviv, which does not hesitate to resort to any form of aggression or unlawful action to implement its political vision built on religious references, aims to apply a similar policy in Lebanon to that pursued in the Palestinian territories. Believing that a significant portion of the region has been granted to them by God, and pursuing an expansionist strategy that is difficult to contain in this context, the Zionist administration hopes to take another step towards its goal of expanding its territory by annexing South Lebanon.

Bolstered by political backing from the US and leading European states, the decision-makers of the occupying state—who deem any unlawful action permissible—are seeking to capitalize on international concern over the situation in the Gulf to engineer a major shift in the status quo in Southern Lebanon. The fact that the country does not hold a significant position within either the regional or global system, coupled with the absence of a powerful patron, is the primary reason why many parties remain indifferent to developments in Lebanon during this process. Seizing upon this environment to shape the process as it sees fit, Tel Aviv intends to establish a status quo over Lebanon that is independent of the war against Iran.

The Zionist regime, which invaded southern Lebanon in 1982 under the pretext of the country’s civil war, had not embarked on establishing settlements in southern Lebanon similar to those it had built for Jewish settlers in the West Bank, owing to regional and global dynamics. The occupying army, which remained in the region until 2000, pursued a security-focused protection strategy.

Subsequently, the withdrawal process from Lebanon was completed due to the rising political cost of maintaining a presence there. At that time, as conditions were not yet ripe, Tel Aviv did not implement its Judaization strategy in southern Lebanon; however, it is now seeking to exploit the vacuum that has emerged to extend Israel’s fluid borders as far as the Litani River. In recent days, the occupying army has continued its advance despite ground resistance, consolidating its presence in the region by seizing strategic points in the south.

T

he war launched by the US-Israel alliance on 28 February 2026 through a direct attack on Iran has, within the current geopolitical equation, evolved from a limited conflict into a multi-layered and multi-actor regional security crisis. The military escalation between these three countries has not been confined to traditional front lines; through Iran’s asymmetric warfare strategy, it has spread across the entire region via energy fields, sea lanes and proxy forces, evolving into a global issue in terms of its consequences.

Understanding these dynamics necessitates setting aside normative approaches and the reflex to take sides, and instead viewing the situation through an objective and analytical lens from an international relations perspective. Consequently, this article will attempt to clarify the current positions of Israel and Iran in light of these projections.

What is Israel’s objective?

Israel’s regional moves, initiated following 7 October 2023 and escalating into a full-scale war with direct US involvement by 28 February 2026, represent an attempt to establish a new status quo along a broad geopolitical axis stretching from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Gulf of Basra, from the Red Sea to the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb and the Arabian Sea. This multi-dimensional strategy, in which military expansion, control of energy resources and demographic engineering tools are mobilized in concert, is aimed at becoming a ‘proxy hegemonic power’ by exploiting power vacuums in the Middle East.

At the heart of Israel’s new regional strategy lies the dismantling of Iran—which it has designated as its greatest enemy—and its network of proxy forces. In this context, Tel Aviv has succeeded in integrating American military power into its own strategy, thereby risking an open-ended and protracted regional war launched on 28 February. Washington, however, has been swept into a position serving Tel Aviv’s priorities due to the extreme vagueness of the ultimate strategic objective in this war.

The target set for Israel’s military attack on Iran, with US support, goes beyond a mere act of military weakening, focusing instead on the total elimination of Tehran’s leadership, command-and-control, deterrence and institutional survival capabilities. In this regard, the Tel Aviv-Washington alliance aims to paralyze Iran’s asymmetric force projection at its source by destroying integrated air defense systems, ballistic missile production facilities and nuclear infrastructure in critical locations such as Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz and Kerman. Another move in the alliance’s military doctrine involves conducting systematic decapitation operations targeting the Revolutionary Guide and senior Revolutionary Guards generals, with the aim of collapsing the regime’s ‘centre of gravity’.

Israel’s quest to establish a new regional status quo

This multi-layered set of objectives represents the most aggressive manifestation of Israel’s quest to establish a new regional status quo by sidelining its greatest adversary in the regional power balance along the axis extending from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Gulf, where it has initiated a process of hegemonic consolidation. However, as a backlash to this strategy, Iran is far more eager to acquire nuclear weapons than it was in the pre-war period. This motivation could materialize in the near future.

Israel’s new strategy relies not only on military objectives but also on the control of regional energy resources and strategic territories by land and sea. Seizing the opportunity presented by the power vacuum in Syria, Israel has established a permanent forward base by occupying the Syrian side of the strategic Mount Hermon (Jebel al-Sheikh) following intensive air strikes that paralysed the military infrastructure, thereby expanding its influence in Western Syria. In the context of energy and maritime geopolitics, Israel is expanding its exclusive economic zones by securing control over disputed natural gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean—such as Gaza Marine, Karish and Kana (where some agreements were reached with Lebanon in October 2022)—as well as energy reserves like Leviathan and Tamar.

The desire to control a corridor extending as far as the Litani River in Lebanon is based on the logic of securing access to water resources and safeguarding maritime energy objectives from land. Furthermore, projects such as the EastMed pipeline and structures like the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) have become exclusionary geopolitical mechanisms instrumentalised to exclude regional rivals such as Turkey from the energy equation and to reinforce maritime asymmetries in its favour.

Iran’s new geopolitics

Tehran’s decision to launch simultaneous attacks targeting US military bases and strategic economic infrastructure across the Gulf region has created a new geopolitical rupture in the Middle East that is virtually unprecedented. These actions have gone beyond a mere cycle of regional tensions, triggering a structural transformation in the region’s security dynamics. Given the reality that the Iranian regime will not collapse in the near future despite the severe military pressure it faces, this regional crisis will reshape security relations and geopolitical balances in the Middle East for years to come.

Iran’s operational doctrine is largely shaped by the concept of the ‘indirect approach’ and aims to exert structural pressure on the US and Israel by increasing the global economic cost of the war. Through this strategy, Tehran seeks to spread the conflict across a wide geographical area and, in particular, to raise the global economic cost of the war by effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz and increasing pressure on energy routes and trade corridors. Ultimately, this doctrine seeks to exert structural and political pressure on the US and Israel—going beyond mere military success—by depleting expensive defence systems with low-cost munitions and imposing inflationary pressure on global markets.

In this context, more than half of Iran’s ballistic missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks in the region have been directed not at US or Israeli targets, but at Gulf Arab states. Although this strategy, which Iran has adopted at great cost to avoid ‘losing’, deepens its regional isolation, it has been seen to generate severe shockwaves on a global scale; particularly in global oil markets. In terms of escalation dynamics, Iran’s greatest trump card is the desalination plants that supply 90 per cent of the Gulf Arab states’ water needs. Targeting these facilities would trigger a crisis of existential proportions in the region. The US and Israel’s response to this could be to target Kharg Island, Iran’s oil export hub, and its domestic energy infrastructure. However, in the current state of the conflict, both sides are deliberately crossing escalation thresholds through calculated moves.

I

n a dramatic shift in Middle East politics, tensions between the United States and Iran have eased following the announcement of a two-week ceasefire, described by observers as a potential “last chance” to prevent a wider regional war.

The breakthrough came after Donald Trump confirmed that Washington had agreed to halt military operations against Iran for two weeks, citing a 10-point proposal from Tehran as a “workable basis for negotiations.” The announcement was made just hours before a deadline previously set by the U.S. administration.

The ceasefire, facilitated through mediation by Pakistan, includes an immediate halt to hostilities across multiple fronts, including Lebanon and other areas affected by the broader war. Pakistani officials have invited delegations from both sides to meet in Islamabad on Friday for continued negotiations, marking what could be the first face-to-face talks since the war began.

Trump stated that “significant progress” had been made toward a long-term agreement, adding that the temporary pause in military action would provide the necessary space to finalize a comprehensive deal.

Widespread international support

The agreement has been met with broad international approval, with countries across Asia and beyond urging both sides to use the opportunity to pursue lasting peace.

Indonesia called on all parties to respect sovereignty and prioritize diplomacy, as Australia welcomed the ceasefire as a step toward ending the war. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said his country is working with international partners to support diplomatic efforts and reopen the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz.

Similarly, Japan emphasized continued diplomatic engagement, particularly regarding the safe reopening of the strait, a critical global energy route. Malaysia also expressed support, with Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim calling for the Iranian proposal to evolve into a comprehensive peace agreement benefiting not only Iran but also Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.

UN and regional reactions

The United Nations welcomed the ceasefire, with Secretary-General António Guterres urging all parties to commit to international law and work toward a sustainable resolution. His spokesperson stressed the importance of adhering to the ceasefire terms as a pathway to comprehensive peace in the region.

Regional powers also reacted positively. Egypt described the move as a significant step toward de-escalation and stability, highlighting its importance for global security and international navigation. Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty reportedly discussed the development with U.S. Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff, expressing strong support for renewed diplomatic efforts.

Meanwhile, Iraq’s Foreign Ministry called for a “serious and sustained dialogue” between Washington and Tehran to address the root causes of their tensions and build mutual trust.

Next steps and uncertainties

According to U.S. officials cited by American media, the ceasefire is expected to take effect once Iran reopens the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for global oil shipments. Sources indicate that the upcoming talks in Pakistan could mark a turning point, as they would be the first direct negotiations between the two sides since the outbreak of war.

However, some uncertainty remains. Reports suggest discrepancies between the Persian and English versions of Iran’s ceasefire proposal, particularly regarding uranium enrichment—an issue likely to remain central in upcoming negotiations.

While the agreement has sparked optimism worldwide, analysts caution that the two-week ceasefire represents only a narrow window for diplomacy. Whether it leads to a lasting peace or merely a pause in hostilities will depend on the willingness of both sides to compromise on long-standing disputes.

For now, the deal offers a rare moment of hope in a region long marked by instability, with global leaders urging both Washington and Tehran to seize what may be their final opportunity to avoid a broader war.

(Source: News Agencies)

I

srael’s top military commander has warned that the country’s armed forces could face internal collapse if urgent steps are not taken to address a growing personnel shortage, according to local media reports. Speaking during a high-level security cabinet meeting, Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir said he was raising “10 red flags” about the army’s condition, cautioning that the strain on manpower has reached a critical level.

The warning comes as Israel continues to manage multiple military operations across several fronts, including Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and the occupied West Bank. Military sources described “tremendous concern” within the ranks, noting that even in peacetime the army would require additional troops to maintain operational readiness. The ongoing war has significantly increased the burden, exposing gaps in personnel coverage that could undermine the military’s effectiveness.

Officials indicated that without a rapid increase in troop numbers, the army risks leaving key areas under-defended. The shortage has been exacerbated by the heavy reliance on reservists, many of whom have been repeatedly called up since the escalation of hostilities. Analysts say this reliance is becoming increasingly unsustainable, raising concerns about long-term readiness and morale.

Government weighs extending military service

In response to the growing crisis, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has signaled plans to extend mandatory military service and revise existing conscription laws. Speaking at the same cabinet meeting, Netanyahu said the government would move forward with reforms after the Jewish holiday of Passover, including potentially lengthening service periods for both men and women.

Under current law, Israeli men are required to serve 32 months, while women serve 24 months. Proposals under discussion could extend service to 36 months, reflecting the increased operational demands placed on the military. Government officials have also indicated that a new draft law aimed at expanding enlistment will be considered in the coming weeks.

The issue of conscription has become particularly contentious due to the longstanding exemption granted to the ultra-Orthodox, or Haredi, population. Efforts to expand mandatory service to include more Haredi men have repeatedly stalled due to political sensitivities. Netanyahu had previously set aside a proposed law to maintain unity within his governing coalition during wartime, but mounting pressure from military leaders and opposition figures has brought the issue back to the forefront.

Cabinet Secretary Yossi Fuchs confirmed that both extending service periods and advancing new legislation would be examined immediately after the holiday. Netanyahu dismissed objections from legal advisers regarding easing draft requirements, emphasizing that final decisions rest with the government.

Political divisions deepen over conscription policy

The growing manpower shortage has intensified political tensions within Israel, with opposition leaders sharply criticizing the government’s handling of the issue. Yair Lapid warned that the failure to act decisively could lead to serious security consequences, stating that the government would not be able to claim ignorance in the event of future crises.

Other prominent figures have echoed these concerns, calling for sweeping changes to the conscription system. Avigdor Liberman has advocated for universal military service, while former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett urged the government to act without delay. Former military chief Gadi Eisenkot also stressed that mandatory service for all eligible citizens is “the need of the hour.”

The debate has exposed deep divisions within Israeli society, particularly over the role of the Haredi community in national defense. Some members of Netanyahu’s coalition have resisted changes to the current system, even boycotting parliamentary votes over proposed reforms. Critics argue that maintaining exemptions is no longer viable given the scale of the current conflict and the strain on the military.

A shortfall of approximately 15,000 troops

Meanwhile, the Israeli army has acknowledged a shortfall of approximately 15,000 troops, including around 8,000 combat soldiers. Military officials say the gap reflects both the expansion of operational responsibilities and a decline in available personnel. The army is currently engaged in sustained operations in Gaza, while also conducting strikes in Lebanon and responding to regional tensions involving Iran.

Recent escalations have further complicated the security landscape, including cross-border clashes with Hezbollah and broader regional confrontations. Analysts note that the increasing scope of military engagements has stretched Israel’s resources, making personnel shortages more acute and harder to manage.

As the government prepares to revisit conscription policies, the stakes remain high. Military leaders have made clear that without structural changes, the army’s ability to operate effectively across multiple fronts could be compromised. The coming weeks are expected to be critical in determining whether Israel can address its manpower crisis or face mounting risks to its national security.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

W

hen Pakistan’s defense minister went on television at the end of February and spoke of an “open war” with the Taliban government in Kabul, he was not simply using a dramatic phrase for a familiar border clash. He was signaling that the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre – long managed through deniable strikes, proxy groups and quiet understandings – had entered a new and more dangerous phase.

His announcement came as Pakistani warplanes hit Taliban-controlled areas near the capital and along the eastern frontier, targeting what Islamabad describes as TTP safe havens that fuel attacks inside Pakistan. For people on both sides of the border, this looked less like the start of a brand-new conflict and more like a sharp escalation in a security problem that never really went away.

Islamabad said the strikes targeted militants of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) responsible for repeated attacks across the border and inside Pakistan. Taliban authorities in Kabul countered that civilians, including women and children, were among the dead, and that Afghan sovereignty had been violated yet again by a neighbor that long used their soil as a strategic area. Both sides accused each other of sheltering militants and of turning a porous line on the map into a revolving door for armed groups.

The first theatre of the “war on terror” is now moving toward an undeclared confrontation between two governments that once cooperated closely. As this front heats up, the question becomes more concrete: in a crowded and contested international agenda, who has both the interest and the capacity to help limit the damage? Middle powers such as Türkiye are increasingly part of the answer, but their real room for maneuver is still being tested.

From counterterrorism to open war

For years, Afghanistan-Pakistan borders sat in a grey zone. Pakistani jets and artillery occasionally hit suspected militant camps across the border. Taliban leaders quietly tolerated some of these strikes, publicly condemned others and tried to manage a relationship built on decades of covert cooperation, refugee flows and shared enemies. The line between a counterterrorism operation and a cross-border skirmish was kept deliberately vague.

Late February 2026 changed the atmosphere. Pakistani warplanes bombed Taliban-held areas near Kabul and in eastern provinces, while officials spoke openly about dismantling what they describe as TTP safe havens inside Afghanistan. Taliban spokesmen responded with their own casualty figures, allegations of civilian deaths and an ultimatum: respect Afghan territory or face consequences. When both sides use language such as “open war,” the space for quiet de-escalation narrows quickly.

This is not only a matter of public rhetoric. When armed groups move across borders, governments still have a certain flexibility in how they respond and how they explain their actions. Once capitals and regular forces are engaged in a declared confrontation, domestic audiences, rival factions and external partners all push for more rigid positions. Political costs rise for any actor who wants to step back.

A nuclear shadow over a crowded map

The Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier links two nuclear-armed states and sits close to a third, India, which has its own history of war with Pakistan. It also lies on top of the supply routes, smuggling lines and ideological networks that have sustained jihadist movements since the 1980s. In a relatively small space, tribal structures, armed groups and long-standing border disputes overlap and feed into each other.

In such an environment, escalation can move faster than intentions. A few days of airstrikes and retaliatory raids might remain limited; several weeks of miscalculation could start to affect stability in Central Asia, the Gulf and even China’s Xinjiang region. Pakistani security planners are clearly aware of these linkages. Taliban commanders understand as well that allowing TTP fighters extensive freedom of action from Afghan territory increases the chance of additional punitive strikes.

The timing of this crisis matters. It comes as the U.N. Security Council is already dealing with a crowded agenda dominated by the fourth year of the Ukraine war and the unresolved consequences of the Gaza genocide. Diplomatic bandwidth in many capitals is limited. Intelligence services and foreign ministries are managing several urgent files at once. Adding Afghanistan-Pakistan to this list makes coordination harder at the very moment when it is most needed.

Where middle powers step in

At this point, middle powers come into focus. States with regional reach, flexible diplomacy and no colonial baggage in Afghanistan-Pakistan have a specific advantage. Various reports and commentaries already point to regional mediators such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia, as well as Türkiye and possibly the UAE. All of them have channels to Islamabad, some degree of contact with the Taliban and a clear interest in avoiding a prolonged war on the edge of the Muslim world.

Türkiye enters this picture with a record that combines alliance ties and autonomous initiatives. As a NATO member that maintained dialogue with Moscow during the Ukraine war, Ankara helped build the Black Sea grain corridor when many saw little space for compromise. On Gaza, Turkish officials engaged in back-channel contacts involving Israel, Egypt, Qatar and the United States while keeping a critical public line. In Afghanistan, Türkiye sought a role at Kabul airport after the U.S. withdrawal, signaling that it did not intend to disappear from the file when Western militaries left.

This pattern has strengthened Ankara’s claim to a certain mediation capacity. Middle powers accumulate influence not only through defense sales or summit diplomacy, but also by repeatedly entering crisis management roles when larger powers are divided or simply tired. The Afghanistan-Pakistan confrontation is another test case. For Pakistan’s leaders, a Muslim-majority partner with established defense links and personal relationships is a good option. For Taliban figures who do not want to depend on a single patron, an interlocutor that talks about security, trade and political process at the same time has clear value.

This does not mean a middle power can impose a settlement between Pakistan’s security establishment and the Taliban leadership. It does mean expectations are shifting about which actors are asked to “do something” when escalation threatens to spin out of control.

In recent years, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin have become strategically important regions, both regionally and globally. One of the main reasons for this is its location at the intersection of global energy and trade routes. This characteristic places the region at the centre of the struggle for influence among regional and global actors, while it simultaneously experiences a high level of political uncertainty and an unstable security environment due to instability and external interventions. While some of these actors exacerbate instability through destructive actions, others contribute to stability and development goals through constructive policies.

Türkiye, a pioneer in constructive policies towards the region, has recently intensified its stabilizing efforts and prioritized cooperation with other regional actors. In this context, Ankara appears to favor a foreign policy that prioritizes coordination over competition, particularly with Cairo and Riyadh, with regard to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. This approach suggests that Türkiye is attempting to utilize its cooperation-oriented bilateral relations to contribute to resolving crises in third countries.

While this strategy has the potential to evolve into an inclusive alliance among the involved parties, it also demonstrates the possibility of cooperation in specific areas and the potential for these partnerships to yield tangible results. Indeed, it reveals that, in a global political landscape where complete alignment of interests is challenging, it is possible to achieve common interests through the coordination of foreign policies. In this context, it can be said that Türkiye aims to significantly impact the political landscape of these countries by coordinating its policies more closely with Egypt regarding Somalia and with Saudi Arabia regarding Sudan. It should also be noted that the gradual normalization process with Cairo, and the strengthening of the alliance with Riyadh following the establishment of trust, played a significant role in reaching this point.

Coordinated engagement in Somalia

In this context, Somalia is one of the countries in which foreign policy partnerships are most commonly observed. The country has long struggled with issues such as state-building, establishing security, creating a national army, and achieving political unity and integrity. These difficulties have been exacerbated by the privileged relationships established by certain external actors with local factions, which have undermined the central authority. Somaliland and Puntland, two federated regions of Somalia, are treated as independent actors by regional and global powers, separate from Mogadishu. This is considered a serious threat to Somalia’s national sovereignty.

Therefore, for many years, Türkiye has been working closely with the Mogadishu government to take the necessary steps to protect Somalia’s national integrity and achieve stability. In this regard, Türkiye’s military training support, infrastructure investments and humanitarian aid activities have been of great importance in strengthening Somalia’s institutional capacity. Recognizing that Somalia’s stability is vital for security and political stability in the Horn of Africa, Ankara has maintained a clear stance against any threats directed at the Mogadishu government.

A similar approach can be seen in Egypt’s recent policy towards Somalia. Indeed, Egypt views policies such as Ethiopia’s disregard for Somalia’s national legitimacy and Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as threats to regional stability. In this context, Cairo has begun to pursue a foreign policy aligned with Ankara’s on Somalia. Egypt’s prioritisation of Somalia’s territorial integrity and stability in the context of Red Sea security provides a rational basis for Ankara and Cairo’s converging policies on Somalia.

This approach has undoubtedly been made possible by the recent steps taken by Egypt and Türkiye to align their foreign policies in various areas and enhance coordination. These steps have revealed areas in which they can cooperate on foreign policy, while also helping to identify threats that need to be combated. Consequently, cooperation in Somalia is one of the most tangible outcomes of the rapprochement between the two countries since 2021. This is evident in both countries’ statements regarding actions against Somalia’s sovereignty, their stance on strengthening its central institutions, and the steps taken against actors that could undermine Somalia’s stability.

In the coming period, it is inevitable that Türkiye and Egypt will take more decisive steps in line with their common interests, in response to political, diplomatic, economic and military initiatives that could destabilize Somalia. This increases the likelihood that diplomatic steps will be taken first to resolve crises and that military options will only be considered if diplomatic efforts fail. For all actors wishing to strengthen their relations with Somalia, it is critically important to adopt an approach that promotes unity, not division, among local elements within the country. Comprehensive policies on vital issues for Somalia, such as political stability, economic development, counter-terrorism and maritime security, will benefit all parties, especially Somalia.

The Sudan crisis and the balance of power in the Red Sea

A similar scenario can be said to apply to Sudan, which has been experiencing a civil war for the past three years. Türkiye has long been making intensive diplomatic efforts to prevent instability in Sudan from worsening, but has been relatively isolated in this regard. The direct or indirect intervention of certain regional actors in the Sudanese conflict has exacerbated the situation in the country, resulting in a serious humanitarian crisis. However, Türkiye’s consistent approach, particularly its engagement with key regional stakeholders, has recently begun to bear fruit.

Furthermore, the resolution of the political crisis with Saudi Arabia and the rapid rapprochement process that followed has impacted foreign policy in Sudan. In other words, the normalization of relations between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia has paved the way for bilateral coordination on the Sudan issue, making the Sudanese crisis one of Ankara and Riyadh’s shared foreign policy agendas.

Indeed, the political crisis and instability in Sudan could have consequences that affect not only the domestic balance, but also the entire Red Sea region. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, a maritime neighbor of Sudan, will undoubtedly be directly affected by these developments. The Riyadh administration has made previous attempts to resolve the crisis in Sudan, as it is increasingly concerned about the situation. These diplomatic initiatives and mediation efforts were primarily aimed at preventing the conflict from escalating into a regional proxy war. This scenario poses risks for Saudi Arabia, which lies just across the Red Sea. Similarly, Türkiye is concerned about the potential for the regional crisis to spread, and aims to prevent the deepening of humanitarian tragedies. It has therefore made efforts to protect Sudan’s territorial integrity.

Resolving conflicts rather than competing with each other

Therefore, recognizing their overlapping foreign policy priorities regarding Sudan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia have begun to demonstrate a willingness to combine their forces in resolving the conflict rather than competing with each other, leveraging their diverse instruments and the actors they interact with. While this approach has not yet caused those responsible for the destructive effects in Sudan to back down, the rebel actors in Sudan are being forced to retreat, particularly due to the deployment of military instruments. The joint stance of Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, as well as Egypt’s support for these initiatives, has been key in determining the outcome of this process.

In conclusion, the relationship that Türkiye has developed with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, prioritizing coordination over competition, has yielded positive results for all parties on a pragmatic, mutually beneficial basis, producing concrete policy outcomes. These dialogue-based relationships could usher in a new era of cooperation in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin, replacing competitive policies. This could weaken external factors that fuel instability and create a deterrent effect for those pursuing negative agendas.

Rather than regional actors clashing over their interests in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin, it would be more positive and realistic for them to manage these interests through shared foreign policies and coordinated crisis management. Examining the cases of Somalia and Sudan, it can be seen that such a strategic choice is feasible, but the involved parties must also demonstrate their willingness to do so. While it is acknowledged that local actors are the primary subjects of these processes, the abandonment of competitive policies by external powers involved in regional politics is also a key requirement for achieving lasting stability.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

J

oe Kent, the head of the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, has resigned in protest over the ongoing war with Iran, becoming the highest-ranking official to step down over the conflict and publicly challenge the administration’s justification for military action.

In a resignation letter released on social media, Kent said he could not “in good conscience” support the war, arguing that Iran posed no imminent threat to the United States at the time military operations began. His departure marks the first major internal break within the administration of Donald Trump since the conflict entered its third week.

“Iran posed no imminent threat to our nation,” Kent wrote, adding that the decision to go to war was influenced by external pressure rather than clear national security necessity.

The White House swiftly rejected Kent’s assertions. Officials maintained that the president acted on credible intelligence indicating that Iran was preparing to strike U.S. interests.

“President Trump had strong and compelling evidence that Iran was going to attack the United States,” said a spokesperson, dismissing Kent’s claims as inaccurate.

Tulsi Gabbard, who oversees the intelligence community and was Kent’s superior, also defended the administration’s position, emphasizing that determining what constitutes an imminent threat ultimately falls under presidential authority.

A rare internal dissent

Kent’s resignation is notable not only for its timing but also for his political alignment. A longtime supporter of Trump’s “America First” agenda, he has previously argued against U.S. military interventions abroad, warning of prolonged conflicts similar to those in Iraq and Afghanistan.

His criticism underscores growing unease within certain factions of the administration and its broader political base, particularly among those skeptical of foreign entanglements.

Before leading the counterterrorism center, Kent served as a U.S. Army Special Forces soldier and later as a CIA officer. He was confirmed to his post less than eight months ago.

Reaction to Kent’s resignation has been sharply divided along political lines.

Mark Warner, a senior Democrat on the Senate Intelligence Committee, said Kent’s assessment aligned with existing concerns about the administration’s rationale for war.

“There was no credible evidence of an imminent threat from Iran,” Warner said, calling the conflict a “war of choice.”

However, Republican leaders and White House allies strongly disagreed. President Trump described Kent as “weak on security,” adding that his departure was “a good thing.”

Some lawmakers also criticized the language in Kent’s letter, particularly his references to Israeli influence, arguing that such claims risk echoing harmful stereotypes.

Strategic concerns persist

Kent’s resignation comes amid broader concerns within the intelligence community about the potential consequences of the war. Assessments prior to the conflict reportedly warned that Iran was unlikely to collapse quickly and would instead retaliate against U.S. forces and regional allies.

Those warnings have gained renewed attention as the conflict continues, raising questions about long-term strategy and the risks of escalation.

Analysts say that while Kent’s departure alone is unlikely to alter U.S. military policy, it adds to mounting scrutiny of the administration’s decision-making process.

With midterm elections approaching, the resignation could carry political consequences. Kent’s standing within pro-Trump circles means his criticism may resonate beyond traditional voices, potentially influencing public opinion among segments of the president’s support base.

Still, experts caution that a single resignation is unlikely to shift the administration’s course in the near term. Instead, it may serve as part of a broader pattern of dissent that could shape debate in Washington in the weeks ahead.

For now, the war in Iran continues, even as questions surrounding its justification and trajectory intensify within the U.S. government and beyond.

(Source: Reuters and Aljazeera)

U

kraine is increasingly concerned that shifting global attention toward the Middle East could weaken crucial support from the United States, as its war with Russia enters a prolonged and critical phase.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned that Kyiv does not want to “lose the Americans,” emphasizing that Washington is “without question” more focused on developments in the Middle East.

Zelensky expressed fears that U.S. military engagement in the region—particularly strikes involving Iran—could delay or reduce the delivery of key weapons and defensive supplies to Ukraine.

“The risk is very high,” he said, noting that the volume of munitions being used elsewhere could directly impact Ukraine’s battlefield capabilities.

After more than four years of war with Russia, Ukraine remains heavily dependent on Western military assistance, especially from the United States.

Ukraine assisting in the Middle East

In a notable development, Zelensky revealed that Ukrainian drone experts are currently assisting countries in the Gulf region in defending against Iranian attacks.

Led by Defense Minister Rustem Umerov, several Ukrainian teams are providing consultations and technical guidance.

According to Zelensky, the United States had requested this support multiple times, highlighting Ukraine’s growing expertise in countering Iranian-designed drones—technology widely used by Russia in its attacks.

In an interview with Fareed Zakaria, Zelensky claimed that Russia has been supplying Iran with drones and related technology.

Meanwhile, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov declined to comment on reports that Moscow may be sharing intelligence with Iran about U.S. military movements.

Ukraine has significantly advanced its air defense capabilities in response to sustained drone and missile attacks, developing both electronic warfare systems and interception technologies.

Zelensky said Ukraine is ready to share its technological advancements with the U.S., proposing a joint initiative involving dozens of companies to develop advanced interceptor systems.

However, he noted that discussions with U.S. President Donald Trump have not yet produced a clear commitment.

Seeking alternatives in Europe

With uncertainty over U.S. support, Ukraine is exploring other options, including the Franco-Italian SAMP/T air defense system.

Zelensky described SAMP/T as “the only alternative in Europe” capable of potentially intercepting ballistic missiles, though its effectiveness remains to be fully tested.

Zelensky also criticized the Trump administration’s decision to allow limited purchases of Russian oil, arguing that easing sanctions would strengthen Moscow economically.

“I believe that lifting sanctions on Russia will not help the world; it will only help Russia,” he said, claiming the country earned around $10 billion in just two weeks from oil sales.

Ukraine, he added, will continue targeting Russian energy infrastructure while working with allies such as Emmanuel Macron to curb Russian oil revenues.

Despite ongoing fighting, Zelensky said Russia has failed to achieve major breakthroughs in its recent operations. Ukrainian forces, he noted, have recently regained some territory, marking a shift after months of setbacks.

He also warned that Russia plans to mobilize up to 400,000 troops annually but insisted Ukraine aims to neutralize a comparable number.

Zelensky addressed political tensions with neighboring Hungary, stating that Ukraine is willing to work with any future leadership—provided it is not aligned with Vladimir Putin.

He criticized current Prime Minister Viktor Orbán for maintaining close ties with Moscow and obstructing European Union support for Ukraine.

(Source: CNN)

S

everal Democratic lawmakers in the United States Senate say they are increasingly concerned about the direction of the war with Iran after attending classified briefings from officials in the administration of Donald Trump.

The lawmakers say the White House has not clearly explained why the United States entered the conflict, what its long-term goals are, or how long the war might last.

Following the latest closed-door briefing on Tuesday, several senators called for public hearings to allow Americans to better understand the scope and strategy of the military campaign.

“I just came from a two-hour classified briefing on the war,” Democratic Senator Chris Murphy told reporters.

“It confirmed to me that the strategy is totally incoherent,” he said, adding that Congress has not been properly consulted about the war.

Murphy argued that if the administration had formally sought congressional authorization for the war, it likely would not have been approved.

“If the president did what the Constitution requires and came to Congress to seek authorization for this war, he wouldn’t get it,” he said. “The American people would demand that their members of Congress vote no.”

Classified briefings raise concerns

Since the United States and Israel launched military strikes against Iran on February 28, senior administration officials have provided several classified briefings to members of Congress about the military campaign.

Among those briefing lawmakers were Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.

Because the meetings are classified, lawmakers are restricted in what they can publicly disclose.

However, several Democrats said they left the briefings frustrated, arguing that officials did not provide clear answers about the war’s objectives, timeline or broader strategy.

Democratic Senator Richard Blumenthal said the administration’s messaging appeared contradictory.

“There seems to be no endgame,” Blumenthal told reporters after Tuesday’s meeting.

“The president, almost in a single breath, says it’s almost done, and at the same time, it’s just begun. So this is kind of contradictory.”

Some lawmakers have also raised concerns that the war could eventually involve a deployment of US ground forces in Iran.

“We seem to be on a path toward deploying American troops on the ground in Iran to accomplish any of the potential objectives here,” Blumenthal said.

“The American people deserve to know much more than this administration has told them about the cost of the war, the danger to our sons and daughters in uniform and the potential for further escalation.”

Questions over civilian casualties

Several Democrats have also demanded an investigation into a strike on a girls’ school in the southern Iranian city of Minab.

Reports indicate the attack killed at least 170 people, most of them children.

Six Democratic senators earlier this week called for a formal inquiry into the incident, amid claims that US forces may have been involved in the strike.

Democratic Senator Elizabeth Warren raised concerns about both civilian casualties and the financial cost of the war.

“The one part that seems clear is that while there is no money for 15 million Americans who lost their health care, there’s a billion dollars a day to spend on bombing Iran,” Warren told reporters.

She said Congress could potentially use its budget authority to restrict funding for the war.

“The one thing Congress has the power to do is to stop actions like this through the power of the purse,” she said.

Republican support largely intact

Despite Democratic criticism, most Republicans in Congress have supported the military campaign.

Republicans currently hold a narrow majority in the Senate, with a 53-47 advantage, giving them significant control over what legislation or debates reach the chamber floor.

Some Republican leaders say the strikes are necessary to weaken Iran’s missile program and curb Tehran’s regional influence.

Brian Mast, the Republican chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, publicly thanked Trump for launching the attacks.

He said the president was acting within his constitutional authority to defend the United States against what he described as an “imminent threat” posed by Iran.

Still, a small number of Republicans have voiced concerns about the war.

Republican Senator Rand Paul criticized the administration’s shifting justifications for the war.

“We keep hearing new reasons for war with Iran — none convincing,” Paul wrote on social media.

“‘Free the oppressed’ sounds noble, but where does it end?” he said. “War should be a last resort, not our first move.”

Republican Representative Nancy Mace also warned against sending US troops into another prolonged Middle East war.

“I do not want to send South Carolina’s sons and daughters into war with Iran,” she wrote in a post online.

T

he U.S., which ended the 12-day war between Israel and Iran by striking Iran’s Fordo and Natanz nuclear facilities on June 12, 2025, has once again set its sights on Iran over the past two months. Its military build-up in the region and threats to strike Iran in order to force a new nuclear agreement are being followed with a mixture of concern and curiosity around the world.

Although the tension and threatening rhetoric between the U.S. and Iran are not new, it appears that the U.S. is projecting its power, perhaps for the first time, to persuade Iran to sign a full surrender agreement. If this proves impossible, the U.S. may carry out a comprehensive attack to change the regime and continue on its path with a new administration.

Consequently, the most pressing question is why the U.S., which has so far avoided direct confrontation with Iran despite Israel’s efforts to persuade it otherwise, has become so hawkish today, pushing Iran towards war by imposing not only its nuclear program but also many other issues. To find the answer to this question, it is necessary to look closely at the reasons for the change in U.S. policy towards Iran. Although there may be some domestic political reasons for the change in attitude in the U.S., such as the need to write a success story to win the upcoming midterm elections, to make people forget economic failures, and to cover up the Epstein case, the main culprit is, as might be expected, Israel.

Therefore, although the parties to the war that erupted again on the morning of February 28 appear to be the U.S. and Iran, Israel, as the instigator and the initiator of the attack that led to the war and therefore the target of Iran, is considered to be a direct party to the war. To better understand Israel’s role in this process, we will first briefly touch upon the United States’ relations with Iran after 1979, then explain how Israel managed the change in U.S. policy towards Iran and finally attempt to clarify the extent of Israel’s involvement in the process after the war broke out and what its preparations for the war were.

US Policy Towards Iran After 1979

The U.S., a major actor in the international system established after the Second World War, did not remain indifferent to Iran, a country rich in oil and bordering the Soviet Union. It determined the regime that would last until 1979 with the 1953 coup against Mossadegh and became its closest ally. However, following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran distanced itself from the Western camp and the United States under Khomeini’s slogan, ‘Neither East nor West, only the Islamic Republic,’ and labelled the United States the ‘Great Satan.’

From this point onwards, Iran was subjected to U.S. sanctions and embargoes. While attempting to institutionalize its new regime, it also began nuclear research following revelations that Israel possessed nuclear weapons. However, Iran’s nuclear program was exposed in 2003, and from that point on, Israel began its persistent pursuit of bringing the United States and Iran into confrontation and seeking Iran’s fragmentation or, at worst, a change in its regime.

Despite Israel’s objections, Obama signed a nuclear agreement with Iran in 2015, leading to a brief thaw in relations between Iran, the U.S., and the EU. However, this period ended when Trump withdrew from the agreement in 2018 at Israel’s insistence. Nevertheless, it appears that the U.S. preferred to kill Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force, which coordinates Iran’s proxy forces, rather than confront Iran directly.

At the start of his second term, Trump signaled his openness to negotiations with Iran and stated his desire to secure a better deal than the nuclear agreement he had withdrawn from in 2018. Indeed, following these statements, negotiations commenced between the parties, with five rounds of talks taking place until the outbreak of the 12-Day War.

How did Israel change the US position towards Iran?

Despite all the tension between the U.S. and Iran, it was explained in the previous section that they did not want to be a party to a direct war. In fact, the background to this was that Iran appeared stronger than it actually was thanks to the proxy power structure it had established in the region, and the U.S. was unable to fully assess the cost of attacking Iran. Therefore, it was predicted that Iran would not be as easy a target as Iraq, and there was no desire to embark on an adventure that would entail heavy costs and possibly end in failure.

However, after October 7, 2023, Israel launched attacks on Gaza under the pretext of eliminating Hamas, expanding into Lebanon, Syria and Yemen to weaken and, if possible, eliminate Iran’s proxy forces in the region, thereby changing the dynamics in the region. The infliction of heavy losses on Hezbollah, the overthrow of the Assad regime in Syria, which removed Iran from the equation, and the Houthis being rendered unable to support Iran, caused Iran’s security architecture based on proxy forces to collapse. Israel’s strike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus on April 1, 2024, believing it had succeeded in its war of attrition against Iran, marked a turning point in the tension that had been ongoing through proxy actors until then. This is because, after this date, the parties targeted each other directly for the first time.

Consequently, the U.S., which closely monitored the process and provided air defence support to Israel during retaliatory operations, also realized that Iran could be struck without incurring high costs. This explains why Trump gave Israel the green light to attack Iran while nuclear negotiations with Iran were still ongoing. Moreover, Israel’s performance in the first two days of the 12-Day War proved once again that Iran was not as powerful as claimed, laying the groundwork for the frequent threats of attack against Iran that we hear today. Ultimately, although Iran appeared to be balancing the situation in the war with ballistic missile attacks, the war ended with U.S. intervention. Moreover, even though the U.S. struck Iran, it remained outside the war, and Iran responded with a symbolic retaliation, showing that it did not want to go to war with the U.S.

However, despite Trump’s statements that the war was over and that ‘Iran’s nuclear facilities had been completely destroyed,’ Israel has not committed itself to refraining from attacking Iran again and has stated that it will attack again if Iran resumes its nuclear activities. In fact, statements made by Iran that the U.S. attack did not completely destroy the nuclear facilities and that these facilities would be repaired again have played into Israel’s hands. This allowed Netanyahu to maintain pressure on Trump, making Iran the top agenda item during his visits to the White House until the end of the year, trying to persuade Trump to attack Iran. Trump, who did not seem very enthusiastic about this at first, changed his stance after the protests that broke out in Iran in the last days of the year, in addition to the statements coming from Iran, and began to threaten to strike Iran.

Therefore, the most important reason for the change in Trump’s rhetoric towards Iran is that he believes Iran is not as powerful as it was after the 12-Day War and, consequently, calculates that attacking Iran would not impose a significant cost on him. However, intense pressure from Israel and the Jewish lobby, and his desire not to lose the support of the Jewish lobby, which he will need in the upcoming midterm elections, are also among the reasons. With the persuasion of pro-Israel figures in his inner circle and the easy success achieved in the operation against Venezuela, Trump has escalated his threats against Iran and started talking about regime change.

As an inevitable outcome of this entire process, a large military force has been amassed in the region and Iran has been presented with two alternatives. Iran will either accept the agreement, which means unconditional surrender, or the agreement will be enforced by force and, if necessary, by regime change. In other words, Iran will accept the agreement imposed on it in any case. The nuance lies in whether this will be achieved through bloodshed or without bloodshed.

To what extent and how will Israel intervene in the war?

As previously stated, Israel, the actor that wants the U.S. to go to war with Iran, has been lobbying/pressuring for this for years and changed Trump’s stance towards Iran. Israel was one of the first targets announced by Iran to be hit if the U.S. attacked.

While the whole world expected the U.S. to strike first and Israel to then become involved in the process, Israel seized an intelligence opportunity on the morning of February 28 and launched an attack on the compound where Iran’s religious leader Khamenei resides, thereby initiating the war. With this move, Israel not only instigated the conflict but also became the party that actually started the war.

However, Israel, which failed to fully anticipate Iran’s response, faced perhaps the largest and most destructive attack in its history with the missiles launched by Iran. As the exact stockpile of ballistic and hypersonic missiles in Iran’s possession is unknown, and it is impossible to predict what additional capabilities and capacities Iran may have acquired since the 12-Day War, it is impossible to accurately gauge how long these attacks will continue and what impact they will have on Israel.

Apart from the missiles Iran has launched at Israel, it seems unlikely that it will pose a threat through its proxy actors in the region as it did in the past. This is because Israel’s pressure on Hezbollah continues, and although Hezbollah has stated that it will be supported by Iran, it is known that its ability to attack Israel is very limited. Furthermore, it is estimated that other Shiite proxy forces in the region, believed to be subordinate to Iran, are also unable to protect Iran or attack its enemies due to similar problems.

A

hmad Vahidi is a senior Iranian military and political figure who has recently been appointed commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), one of the most powerful institutions in Iran. His appointment comes at a critical moment, as Iran faces a large-scale military confrontation with the United States and Israel.

Vahidi assumed leadership of the IRGC after the deaths of several senior Iranian commanders during the war with Israel and the United States. His predecessor, Mohammad Pakpour, was killed during the initial phase of the joint U.S.-Israeli attacks in February 2026. Pakpour himself had replaced Hossein Salami, who was killed earlier during the 2025 war with Israel.

This rapid turnover highlights the danger surrounding the position. The IRGC has previously lost prominent commanders, including Qassem Soleimani, the former head of the elite Quds Force who was killed in a U.S. drone strike ordered by then-U.S. President Donald Trump in 2020.

Early career and rise in the IRGC

Vahidi has been involved with the Revolutionary Guards since shortly after the Iranian Revolution. During the 1980s he rose through the organization’s ranks, holding positions in intelligence and military leadership.

Iranian state media report that he commanded the IRGC’s external operations branch, the Quds Force, from 1988 to 1997. He later handed the role to Soleimani, who expanded Iran’s regional influence across the Middle East until his assassination in 2020.

In December 2025, Iran’s then-Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Vahidi as deputy commander of the IRGC, positioning him as a key figure in preparing Iran’s forces for potential conflict.

Unlike some previous IRGC commanders, Vahidi has also held important civilian posts in the Iranian government.

He served as defense minister under former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and later became interior minister in the administration of President Ebrahim Raisi. His experience across both military and political institutions has given him strong influence within Iran’s security establishment.

Controversies and sanctions

Vahidi has also been the subject of international controversy. In the late 2000s, Interpol issued a red notice for him at the request of Argentina over alleged involvement in the 1994 bombing of the AMIA Jewish Community Center, which killed 85 people. Iranian officials have denied any role in the attack.

He has also been sanctioned by the European Union and the United States over Iran’s crackdown on protests following the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody in 2022.

As IRGC commander, Vahidi now faces the challenge of leading Iran’s most powerful military force during an ongoing war while maintaining coordination among Iran’s armed forces and political leadership. Analysts say his experience within Iran’s security and political institutions may help him manage the decentralized structure of the Revolutionary Guards.

The survival of Iran’s political system is closely tied to the IRGC, making Vahidi’s leadership central to how the country responds to the current military crisis.

(Source: Aljazeera)

S

enior leaders in Iraq and Northern Kurish region have reaffirmed that their territories will not be used as platforms for conflict against Iran, emphasizing neutrality and regional stability amid escalating tensions following large-scale military strikes by the United States and Israel.

Nechirvan Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), said the autonomous Kurdish region would not participate in ongoing regional conflicts and would instead continue supporting diplomatic efforts to de-escalate tensions.

According to a statement from the KRG presidency, Barzani made the remarks during a phone conversation with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.

The two officials discussed bilateral relations and regional developments, stressing the importance of maintaining peace and stability.

Barzani stated that the KRG “will not be part of the conflicts” and will remain “a factor of peace,” supporting diplomatic initiatives aimed at easing tensions and protecting civilians from the threat of war.

Both sides also highlighted the need to maintain strict border security to prevent destabilizing activities or attempts by third parties to escalate tensions.

Barzani further expressed condolences to Iran over casualties caused by the recent military strikes and reiterated the KRG’s commitment to maintaining friendly relations with Tehran.

Baghdad rejects use of Iraqi territory against Iran

Meanwhile, Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani said Iraq would not allow its territory to be used to threaten Iran.

During a separate phone call with Araghchi, al-Sudani condemned the U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran and described them as violations of international principles and norms.

According to a statement from Iran’s Foreign Ministry, the Iraqi leader also expressed condolences over the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who was reportedly killed in the strikes along with several senior Iranian military officials.

Al-Sudani stressed that Iraq “will under no circumstances allow any threat to the Islamic Republic to originate from Iraqi borders.”

Araghchi thanked the Iraqi government, religious authorities and the Iraqi public for their support and solidarity with Iran.

Rising regional tensions

The diplomatic exchanges come as the United States and Israel continue a large-scale military campaign against Iran that began last weekend. Iranian authorities say the strikes have killed at least 926 people, including senior political and military leaders.

In response, Iran has launched drone and missile attacks targeting Israel and Gulf countries hosting U.S. military bases, raising fears of a broader regional war.

Araghchi warned during the conversations that the military actions have heightened insecurity across the Middle East and could have global consequences if the conflict continues to escalate.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

I

n the context of the ‘Turkey Without Terror’ process, which began with statements by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli calling for the PKK to lay down its arms and ultimately cease to exist, the Turkish state has been in contact with Öcalan and the organization’s leadership for months. Following Öcalan’s call, the PKK announced its decision to dissolve, marking a new phase in the process. A commission comprising representatives from political parties within the Turkish Grand National Assembly has started working on the necessary political and legal reforms.

While the process is not yet complete, the fact that Kandil has heeded Öcalan’s call for the organization’s self-dissolution — at least rhetorically — and the existence of a legal framework for the continuation of the process are positive developments. However, in Syria, which has been seen as a potential focal point since the beginning of the process, events are unfolding in an undesirable manner for the organization.

The isolation of the YPG

Although the YPG (the Syrian branch of the PKK) initially stated that they viewed Öcalan’s call for the region positively, they never formally accepted it. Events show that the Kandil cadres were the decisive actors in shaping the YPG’s stance. Nevertheless, under pressure from Ankara and Washington, YPG leader Mazlum Abdi met several times with the new Syrian leader, Ahmed Shara, and negotiations began. However, these negotiations reached an impasse due to the Damascus government’s unwillingness to share sovereignty with an organization whose leadership was based in Kandil, and the YPG’s resistance to genuine integration with Damascus.

In this context, Damascus made several constructive offers to the YPG, such as integrating several of its divisions into the army and granting various positions to its political cadres as part of the integration process, including the governorship of Hasakah. The army also avoided entering cities with large Kurdish populations. However, the YPG’s demands were so inflexible and unreasonable that a sovereign government would not accept them. Ultimately, the YPG has become largely isolated on the ground, while the US has moved closer to the Damascus side.

Ultimately, Damascus refused to accept the continuation of the YPG as an independent or autonomous military structure, demanding that the organization’s armed elements be placed under the army’s command. The US indicated its approval of this demand through Tom Barrack’s statements. However, the YPG insisted that it would only accept this scenario if it could maintain its autonomy within the army, instead opting to play for time. The YPG’s irrational and distant attitude towards this compromise stems from its fear of losing its military and financial gains in the region, as well as Israel’s interventions in Syria. Israeli air strikes have increased in recent months, taking on a different dimension with the Tel Aviv administration playing the ‘protector’ card for the Druze in Syria.

The Druze factor

The fact that Druze political and military elements, most of whom have organic ties to the Assad regime, are resisting the new regime in Syria with Israeli support and are currently in an autonomous position along the Suweida line, has whetted the appetite of the YPG. Israel’s dissatisfaction with the new Damascus administration and its interventionist policies has led the YPG to believe that they could receive Israeli support too. In early January, Ilham Ahmed, a prominent figure in the organization’s political wing, held a telephone conversation with Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar. In the following days, she announced that they were “open to all kinds of assistance”.

However, the intense diplomatic efforts of the Syrian government have also yielded results with the US. Damascus’ participation in the International Coalition against ISIS and the constructive roles undertaken by Riyadh and Ankara in Washington–Damascus relations have improved US–Syria relations to the best point in 60 years. This has paved the way for sanctions to be lifted and capital to flow more freely to Damascus, including US capital. The US’s recognition of the Damascus administration as a promising source of “stability and cooperation” has also led to a cessation of Israeli air strikes and ground harassment in Syria in recent weeks. Consequently, for objective observers, the support that the YPG expected from the Israeli air force against Damascus has become nothing more than an irrational wish.

Ground for defeat

As 2025 drew to a close, the deadline set by Damascus for the YPG to leave also expired, and the front lines began to heat up. The process of clearing the Ashrafiyeh and Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhoods in the centre of Aleppo, which were YPG strongholds that regularly threatened civilian life in the city, continued amid rapid changes in territorial control on both banks of the Euphrates River and in the Raqqa-Deir ez-Zor-Hasakah triangle. The YPG/SDF were quickly defeated by the changing international balances and demographics, or in other words, by the realities on the ground.

Arab tribal groups, who had established close ties with the Damascus government during the Druze-Bedouin clashes in Suweida, gradually broke away from the SDF and revolted in their regions. This led to a new reality in which Damascus gained control of most of the oil fields and vast territories that the YPG/SDF had used as bargaining chips within a few weeks. By the end of January 2026, Deir ez-Zor and the entire southern countryside of Hasakah, as well as the city centre of Raqqa, had fallen into the hands of Damascus. The organization had lost all its Arab forces, been driven out of most of its territory and was confined to the Ain al-Arab-Hasakah-Qamishli-Malikiyet line.

Although the ceasefire process is being maintained despite violations by the YPG, thanks to US mediation efforts, Kandil’s uncompromising stance could reignite the conflict in February or lead to a wave of assassinations targeting certain figures in the organization’s leadership. By choosing to ignore all mediation efforts and the negative momentum on the ground, Kandil is perpetuating the conflict with every move, paving the way for an even heavier defeat.

In conclusion, Turkey’s strong military presence along its borders, its close cooperation with the US on integrating the YPG into Damascus and the influx of billions of dollars into Damascus with US approval and partnership are all obstacles to the YPG initiating a large-scale conflict that would lead to chaos. This is because, if Turkey and the US act in coordination, the YPG would not dare engage in a prolonged conflict, as this could lead to consequences that would result in the organization’s demise. Conversely, the Damascus government will not launch an all-out war against the YPG without a green light from the US, in order to maintain good relations with it. However, periodic mutual provocations and clashes lasting a few days may occur along the border.

Prolonged clashes could lead to problems such as the operation of oil wells and the distribution of water resources in eastern and northern Syria, which could negatively impact daily life in the region. However, unless the conflict escalates to include Turkey and Israel – which the current situation does not suggest – it is not expected to affect regional and global capital investments or cause capital flight. The large-scale agreements reached, and the role played by the US in them, have effectively made the US a guarantor against the escalation of a possible conflict between Damascus and the YPG.

V

enezuela has accused the United States of deploying previously unused military technology during the January 3 abduction of President Nicolás Maduro, claims that gained renewed attention after US President Donald Trump referred to a mysterious weapon he called a “discombobulator”.

Venezuelan Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López said the operation amounted to turning Venezuela into a “weapons laboratory”, alleging that advanced technologies powered by artificial intelligence were tested during the raid in Caracas. The US has not officially detailed the operation, which resulted in Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, being taken into US custody.

Speaking earlier this month, Padrino López said 47 Venezuelan soldiers and 32 Cuban personnel providing security to Maduro were killed during the operation. He later claimed Washington had used weapons “never before seen on the battlefield”.

“The president of the United States admitted they used weapons no one else in the world possesses,” he was quoted as saying by the Venezuelan newspaper El Universal.

Trump’s remarks fuel speculation

Trump appeared to confirm the use of unconventional technology in interviews with US media outlets. Speaking to NewsNation, he said a “sonic weapon” had been used during the raid on what he described as a heavily fortified military compound guarded by Cuban forces.

“Nobody else has it,” Trump said. “We have weapons no one knows about.”

Days later, Trump told the New York Post that US forces had used a device designed to disable defensive systems. “The discombobulator,” he said, declining to provide further details.

Speculation intensified after social media posts attributed to a Venezuelan security guard described intense sound waves, severe physical distress and bleeding during the operation. Al Jazeera and other international media outlets have been unable to independently verify these claims.

The White House has not commented on the alleged injuries.

Experts cast doubt on ‘sonic weapon’ claims

Military analysts say known US “sonic” systems, such as long-range acoustic devices (LRAD), are primarily designed for communication, crowd control and deterrence, not for disabling military hardware.

“These systems can cause discomfort or disorientation but cannot shut down air defenses or communications networks,” said Brussels-based military analyst Elijah Magnier.

Other non-lethal systems, such as the Active Denial System, affect people through directed energy but similarly do not interfere with electronics.

Experts suggest the reported failure of Venezuelan defense systems is more consistent with electronic warfare, cyber operations or high-powered microwave technology, all of which the US has used in past conflicts.

Such tools can jam radar, disrupt communications, disable electronics or cut power without visible damage.

“There is no evidence of a new weapon,” Magnier said. “The term ‘discombobulator’ appears to be political language referring to a combination of existing non-kinetic capabilities.”

No evidence of new weapon technology

While major powers routinely deploy new systems in real-world conflicts, analysts stress that there is currently no public evidence that the US used a previously unknown weapon during the Caracas operation.

“The effects described can be explained by conventional electronic warfare and standard disorientation tools,” Magnier said. “There is no need for a science-fiction explanation.”

The US government has yet to formally respond to Venezuela’s accusations.

(Source: Aljazeera)

N

ATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said Wednesday that Ukraine must remain the alliance’s top priority, warning against distractions such as territorial disputes over Greenland while Russia continues its attacks on Ukraine.

Speaking at a panel discussion during the World Economic Forum in Davos, Rutte emphasized that European and US security depends on sustained military, financial, and political support for Kyiv.

Rutte stressed that while issues like Greenland should be addressed through dialogue, they should not overshadow the war in Ukraine.

“Focus in Ukraine should be our number one priority, and then we can discuss all the issues, including Greenland,” he said, noting that Russian missiles and drones are continuing to strike Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.

Warning against diplomatic distractions

The NATO chief expressed concern that excessive attention to secondary disputes could weaken collective resolve at a critical moment in the conflict.

“As we speak, Russian attacks are ongoing,” Rutte said, warning that losing focus could undermine efforts to support Ukraine’s defense.

Rutte acknowledged the importance of diplomatic initiatives and financial backing, including the EU-led €90 billion ($105 billion) support package, but said immediate military assistance remains essential.

He underscored the need to ensure Ukraine has sufficient resources to defend itself against Russian aggression.

Transatlantic unity at the core of NATO

Highlighting NATO’s integrated defense system, Rutte reaffirmed the alliance’s reliance on strong cooperation between Europe and the United States.

He noted that European countries have increased defense spending in response to US expectations and stressed mutual commitment within the alliance.

“I have no doubt the US will come to the rescue here, and we will come to the rescue of the US,” Rutte said, emphasizing NATO’s collective security principle.

Rutte concluded by stressing that NATO’s effectiveness depends on unity and sustained investment in defense capabilities on both sides of the Atlantic, particularly as the war in Ukraine continues to shape the security landscape in Europe and beyond.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

S

yrian authorities announced Tuesday that security forces have recaptured 81 ISIS (Daesh) detainees after their release by Syria Democratic Forces (SDF) from al-Shaddadi prison in the northeastern province of Hasakah, as operations continue to locate the remaining fugitives.

In a statement, Syria’s Interior Ministry said that a total of 120 ISIS detainees were released from the prison by the YPG/SDF, a terrorist organization fighting in Syria. Following the incident, units of the Syrian Army and special operations forces affiliated with the Interior Ministry were deployed to the city of al-Shaddadi.

According to the ministry, government forces carried out extensive search and sweep operations in and around the city, resulting in the arrest of 81 ISIS members. “The search for the remaining ISIS elements is ongoing,” the statement said.

YPG/SDF responsible for the release

The Interior Ministry held the YPG/SDF responsible for the release of the detainees, warning that such actions pose a serious threat to security and stability in northeastern Syria.

The development comes just days after Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa announced a comprehensive ceasefire and a framework agreement for the full integration of the SDF into Syrian state institutions. Under the agreement, SDF military formations are to withdraw to areas east of the Euphrates River, while administrative and security control of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor provinces is to be transferred to the Syrian state.

The deal also includes the integration of SDF military and security personnel into the Ministries of Defense and Interior following individual security vetting, as well as the handover of border crossings, oil and gas fields, and civilian institutions to government control.

The agreement followed a recent military operation by the Syrian Army, during which government forces regained significant territory in eastern and northeastern Syria. Damascus said the operation was launched after repeated violations by the SDF of previous agreements signed nearly a year ago.

Syrian authorities emphasized that efforts to pursue remaining ISIS detainees will continue, reaffirming their commitment to maintaining security amid the ongoing political and military developments in the region.

(Source: Anadolu)

A

lthough the announcement of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is a diplomatic move, it reveals a process that undermines the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity in the Horn of Africa. This move is also a strategic step toward shifting the balance of power in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean. The timing of this move is no coincidence.

Recent regional developments include renewed momentum for southern secession in Yemen, discussions of a de facto division in Sudan’s Darfur region, successful direct elections in Somalia’s Benadir region (including the capital), the crash of an aircraft carrying the Libyan chief of staff and his delegation, and Israel’s decision to recognize Somaliland. These events have transformed the situation into an issue of regional security architecture, especially given the more visible anti-Türkiye alliance in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean.

It is important to understand which negotiations and settlements recognition opens the door to, as well as the consequences it will have on the regional process. Recognition is more than an outcome; it creates a situation that gives rise to new demands, risks, and precedents. Furthermore, today’s events raise concerns about the principle of state integrity across the continent, including Somalia, as well as the fundamental pillars of the international order.

The strategic logic of recognition: Sea routes, platforms and corridor policy

The best way to understand the Somaliland issue is to look at a map of the region. In today’s global politics, geopolitical analyses and efforts to understand the transformation of the global system necessitate an update to traditional methods of interpretation. It is now imperative to understand the process within the context of security, the immediate environment, alliances, balancing, multilateralism, geo-economics, connectivity, and capacity.

Therefore, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea are too dynamic to be viewed merely as bottlenecks of global trade or vital transit points of the global economy. At the same time, this region is a force field where military access, intelligence, pressure, and deterrence are produced. The Houthis’ ability to target maritime traffic in Yemen strengthens the pursuit of a “southern encirclement.” In this context, Somaliland’s geography offers external actors a lower-cost, higher-leverage option through its port infrastructure and access opportunities. Thus, recognition is a strategic instrument that goes far beyond a political gesture, paving the way for the construction of a platform on the ground.

The second axis of this process can be interpreted as corridor politics. The trade and energy links stretching from India to the Gulf, Eastern Mediterranean, and Europe should be discussed as the backbone of geopolitical competition, not just economic projects. Israel’s deepening relations with India, the UAE’s regional networks established through its ports and logistics, and the emerging alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) place a potential recognition of Somaliland within a broader strategic context.

If recognition is detailed through port, access, and base agreements at this point, the debate will move beyond legal status and actively enter the field. Therefore, this situation represents the most critical threshold. The nature of the issue will shift from Somaliland’s independence to whether Somalia’s sovereignty is effectively curtailed. Thus, recognition, beyond the debate of international law, will open the door to establishing a permanent settlement, which will bring numerous potential crises.

Regional chess and multi-front pressure on Türkiye

Although the recognition of Somaliland is presented as a single issue, it should actually be understood as part of a broader regional chess game. The rapprochement between Israel and the UAE, and its consequences in Libya, Sudan, Gaza, Yemen, Syria, and the Eastern Mediterranean, are particularly significant for Türkiye.

Prominent issues include the emergence of anti-Türkiye coordination in the Eastern Mediterranean, the establishment of spheres of influence through port and logistics power in the Gulf, overlapping moves in the Sudan and Syria files, and competition centered on oil, port, and space projects in the Horn of Africa. All of this makes it possible to interpret the Somaliland move as a means of applying pressure to regions where Türkiye’s capacity expansion is at stake, rather than as a form of recognition.

Five critical issues stand out here: Ethiopia, Yemen, Sudan, Syria, and the Eastern Mediterranean. First, prior to the Ankara Declaration, Addis Ababa’s search for access to the sea clashed with Somalia’s sovereignty sensitivities, escalating tensions. Second, Israel’s move towards recognition could set a precedent for Ethiopia. It could encourage other countries to more readily consider recognizing Somaliland. This would put pressure on Somalia from two fronts simultaneously. The erosion of international legitimacy and the growing debate over coastal access and sovereignty are indeed among the pressures.

The second issue is the southern division shaped by Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The new balance of power over control areas and oil regions in southern Yemen is fueling another wave of division around the southern Red Sea. Read in conjunction with the recognition of Somaliland, this perception is reinforced, suggesting that a fragmented sovereignty pattern is being encouraged in the southern belt rather than a state-centered order. This perception pushes regional countries toward tougher security measures and deepens the security dilemma.

Warnings that the presence of the Darfur-based Rapid Support Forces (RSF) carries the risk of de facto division highlight the danger of the Somaliland example. If the option of “recognition” is offered as a lifeline to proxy structures trapped on the ground, the Sudan file could become the second link in a similar chain of fractures. In this case, the Red Sea basin would experience multiple separation crises simultaneously. This situation could lead to the further militarization of maritime security discourse and a prolonged period of instability.

Finally, Türkiye is under multi-pronged pressure, combined with issues in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean. In every issue that could potentially harm Türkiye, Israel’s overt engagement and moves such as those in Somaliland appear to be linked to Türkiye’s regional projects and spheres of influence. This interpretation is reinforced by the simultaneous increase in rhetoric challenging Türkiye, accompanied by imagery and statements from the Eastern Mediterranean.

While maintaining steadfast support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, it is crucial to address the issue in terms of regional stability and the fundamental principles of the international system, rather than merely at the level of bilateral relations. This is because recognizing Somalia would set a precedent that concerns not only Somalia, but also all of Africa and the future of the principle of sovereignty.

What might happen in the coming period?

This process considers three main scenarios for the future. The first, and least likely, scenario is the emergence of a controlled tension process. In this scenario, while recognition remains a political message, it does not turn into a broad wave of recognition. In this scenario, Somaliland gains practical advantages. Its level of representation increases, and it makes more bilateral agreements. However, there is no significant progress regarding ports, bases, or access. Mogadishu increases its diplomatic mobilization, and the territorial integrity of Africa is more visibly defended. Tensions remain manageable. Nevertheless, the fragilities do not completely disappear.

A second scenario is emerging: a wave of gradual recognition. In this scenario, Somaliland could become a platform. One or more countries will take steps toward recognizing Somaliland. Through port access and surveillance systems, Somaliland effectively transforms into a security platform. This reduces Somalia’s sovereignty. It also increases pressure on Ethiopia to gain access to the sea. It also deepens the security dilemma in Djibouti and neighboring countries. The region settles into a state of constant yet manageable tension. A process of “normalized militarization” emerges in the region.

In the final scenario, a domino effect occurs, resulting in a fragmented order along the Yemen-Somalia-Sudan border. The separation of South Yemen accelerates in this scenario. Following Somaliland’s recognition, new fractures are created in the region and on the continent. There are attempts to politicize the de facto areas of control in Sudan. The Red Sea basin simultaneously experiences multiple “recognition/separation” crises. This could extend as far as Morocco, Mali, and other Sahel countries. The discourse on maritime trade security becomes more militarized. Proxy networks harden and the capacity for compromise diminishes. This scenario is considered the highest-risk scenario. Once a fragmented sovereignty order becomes entrenched, the cost of reversal becomes prohibitively high.

Ultimately, while it may appear to be a mere statement, the recognition of Somaliland could evolve into a framework on the ground in the future. The fundamental issue is the trade-offs on which these frameworks are built and the new precedents they will set. Stability in the Horn of Africa will not be determined by individual moves, but rather by the new architecture created by linking these moves together. If this architecture erodes sovereignty, both Somalia and the entire Red Sea region will become a long-term zone of tension.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

S

yrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa announced on Sunday a comprehensive ceasefire and a far-reaching integration agreement between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), marking a major shift in the balance of power in the country’s northeast after years of fragmentation and conflict.

According to details published by the state-run Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), the agreement provides for an immediate and full ceasefire across all fronts and contact lines between Syrian government forces and the SDF. The deal is to take effect alongside the withdrawal of all SDF-affiliated military formations to areas east of the Euphrates River, a move described as a preparatory step for redeployment and reintegration.

Under the agreement, the provinces of Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa will be handed over fully and immediately to the Syrian government, both militarily and administratively. This includes the transfer of all civilian institutions, public facilities, and local administrative bodies to state control. Employees currently working in civil institutions in the two provinces will be retained within relevant Syrian state ministries, and the government pledged not to take punitive measures against SDF personnel or members of the existing civil administration.

The integration of all civilian institutions in Hasakah

The deal also stipulates the integration of all civilian institutions in Hasakah province into Syrian state administrative structures, further extending Damascus’ authority over territories that had remained outside direct government control for much of the past decade.

A key element of the agreement concerns strategic economic assets. The Syrian government will assume control of all border crossings as well as oil and gas fields in the northeast. According to SANA, Syrian forces will secure these sites to ensure that revenues are returned to the state, a development expected to have significant economic implications for a country struggling under years of war and sanctions.

Developments on the ground appeared to move in parallel with the political announcement. In eastern Deir ez-Zor, Syrian tribal forces took control of major oil and natural gas facilities previously held by the YPG/SDF, Anadolu Agency reported. Tribal groups operating east of the Euphrates, reinforced by fighters arriving from the western side of the river, seized the Al-Omar oil field and the Koniko natural gas field, two of Syria’s most important energy sites.

Withdrawal of U.S. forces

Local sources said the advances followed the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the area, which had previously used several of the oil and gas facilities as military bases. The U.S. pullout created a security vacuum that accelerated the collapse of SDF control in large parts of the region.

As tribal forces advanced, they also took control of several towns and villages east of the Euphrates, including Shehil, Al-Hawayij, Ziban, Tayyane, Abu Hamam, Hatla, Garanij, Baghouz, Susah and Shafeh. SANA broadcast images showing SDF withdrawals from key locations such as the Al-Halabiya Roundabout, described as a major transportation hub linking the eastern, western and northern countryside of Deir ez-Zor.

The Syrian army and internal security forces expanded their presence in other strategic areas. SANA reported that government forces took control of al-Tabqah Prison west of Raqqa province, while the army’s Operations Command announced full control of the al-Tabqah military airport. Internal security units were also deployed to villages in the western Deir ez-Zor countryside to consolidate control and restore order.

Regional reactions

Regional reactions to the developments were swift. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held a phone call with President al-Sharaa on Sunday, stressing that the complete removal of terrorism from Syrian territory is vital for Syria and the wider region. According to a statement by Türkiye’s Communications Director Burhanettin Duran, Erdoğan reaffirmed that Türkiye’s support to Syria, particularly in counterterrorism efforts, would continue to increase.

During the call, the two leaders discussed bilateral relations and recent developments in Syria. Erdoğan emphasized that Türkiye attaches great importance to Syria’s territorial integrity, unity, stability and security—principles Ankara has repeatedly highlighted in its policy toward the Syrian conflict.

The agreement between Damascus and the SDF represents one of the most significant political and military shifts in northeastern Syria in recent years. The region, long shaped by U.S. military presence, SDF administration and complex tribal dynamics, is now witnessing a rapid reassertion of Syrian state authority.

While questions remain about the long-term implementation of the deal and the future role of former SDF militants within state structures, the combination of political agreements, tribal mobilization and regional backing signals a decisive moment in Syria’s protracted conflict, potentially closing one of its most enduring territorial and governance divides.

(Source: Anadolu News)

R

Attacks on commercial ships in the Black Sea

Although attacks using unmanned maritime vehicles (UMVs) have occurred periodically in the Black Sea, there had not been a series of large-scale attacks until recently. However, this situation changed significantly in the last month. Since November 2025, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has begun targeting commercial vessels in the Black Sea. Ukraine has begun attacking Russia’s “shadow fleet,” which is used to circumvent sanctions. This fleet consists of commercial vessels (including tankers) traveling to Russia, which Ukraine has targeted using UMVs.

In early November, Ukraine increased its attacks on oil export infrastructure in Tuapse and Novorossiysk. Toward the end of November and beginning of December, Ukrainian UAVs hit the Gambian-flagged tankers Kairos and Virat in the Black Sea. The Kairos was attacked in the southwest part of the Black Sea, and the Virat was attacked further east in the central part. These attacks occurred at a time when Ukraine aimed to reduce Russian oil sales and prevent Moscow from financing the war.

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that the attack on the Kairos and Virat ships, which were sailing in international waters in the Black Sea, was an “act of terrorism” that Russia condemns. She noted that the ships were sailing under the Gambian flag toward the port of Novorossiysk when they were attacked by unmanned naval vehicles on November 28-29. On December 2, 2025, the Russian tanker Midvolga-2, traveling from Russia to Georgia, was attacked off the coast of Sinop.

In retaliation, Russian forces have increased missile and drone attacks on Ukraine’s Odessa port. These ports are vital to Ukraine’s export-based economy, and have been crucial to the country’s economic survival throughout the nearly four-year war in Ukraine since Russia’s invasion in February 2022.

These attacks have also damaged some Turkish-owned merchant ships in Ukrainian ports. On December 13, 2025, the Turkish-owned, Panama-flagged ro-ro ship Cenk T., which was anchored in the port of Odessa, was hit by a Russian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and caught fire. The ferry was reportedly on a voyage from Karasu to Odessa and was carrying fresh fruit, vegetables, and other foodstuffs. Then, on December 26, three more ships flying the flags of Slovakia, Palau, and Liberia were reportedly damaged by Russian UAV attacks in the ports of Odessa and Mykolaiv.

Turkey’s position

Turkey has condemned the attacks on civilian vessels in the Black Sea and stated that such actions must cease. President Erdoğan emphasized that civilian vessels and critical trade routes, such as the grain corridor in the Black Sea, should not be targeted. He called on all parties to protect civilian infrastructure.

While in Turkmenistan for the International Peace and Security Forum on December 12, he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and expressed concern about attacks on ports and energy facilities in the Black Sea. He called for a “limited ceasefire” in these areas. He stated that “we cannot in any way condone these attacks, which threaten navigation, life, and environmental safety, especially in our own exclusive zone” and said that the attacks also concern Turkey’s rights and authorities in its maritime jurisdiction.

At the Ambassadors’ Conference in Ankara on December 16, the president stated that they were “conveying their warnings” to Ukraine and Russia. He added, “The recent mutual attacks seriously threaten navigation safety in the Black Sea. Targeting merchant ships and civilian vessels benefits no one. We are clearly conveying our warnings to both sides on this matter.”

Assessment

The attacks carried out by Ukraine and Russia in the Black Sea that target civilian merchant ships should undergo legal assessment. First, targeting civilian ships constitutes a violation of the fundamental rules of the law of armed conflict, even under conditions of war and even if a blockade is in place.

According to international maritime law, the movement of ships on the high seas and the authorities that may be exercised over them are regulated by the relevant provisions of the 1982 United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The maritime areas beyond the territorial waters of Black Sea-bordering states constitute the relevant states’ exclusive economic zones. As a rule, exclusive economic zones have the status of the high seas for the purpose of navigation. The fundamental principle governing the legal status of the high seas is the principle of “freedom of the high seas.” According to this principle, the high seas are maritime areas not under the sovereignty of any state and can be used freely by all states, regardless of whether they have a coastline. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea also constitutes rules of customary international law, creating rights and responsibilities for all countries, even those that are not parties to the convention, such as Turkey.

Generally, all ships on the high seas (whether civilian or military, privately or state-owned) are subject to the legislative, executive, and judicial authority of the state under whose flag they are registered. In other words, no other state may exercise such authority over these ships.