T

o see what effects the shift of the world’s centre of gravity from the Europe-Middle East axis towards the People’s Republic of China-South Asia axis has brought about, it is sufficient to note the visits to Beijing by US President Trump and, shortly afterwards, Russian President Putin within the space of a week, and to realize that Europe was not even mentioned during these visits. We can see how Europe’s equilibrium has been disrupted by developments in Beijing through the shifting stance of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen over the course of a month.

In a speech delivered on 20 April 2028 at the 80th anniversary event of the newspaper Die Zeit, she stated: “We must succeed in uniting the European continent as a whole so that it does not fall under Russian, Turkish or Chinese influence. We must think on a larger, geopolitical scale,” Von der Leyen stated. She must have quickly realized that the so-called power she represents does not belong in the league of superpowers, neither in terms of energy, defense nor technology, as she received the necessary lesson regarding the strategic importance of Turkey-EU relations during her telephone conversation with President Erdoğan on 19 May. In fact, this fundamental lesson was the result of a series of Turkey-centered developments throughout May.

The hard mathematics of geopolitics

Looking at the sequence of events, the visit to Turkey on 11 May by Queen Mathilde of Belgium, accompanied by a large delegation of businesspeople, can be considered the first link in this chain of developments. During the visit, Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prevot, responding to questions from TRT Haber, made the following remarks that explicitly targeted the President of the European Commission, serving as proof of how the EU’s perspective on Turkey has shifted: “Of course, the European Union needs Turkey. Turkey also needs Europe. In my view, it was illogical to use a phrase that places Turkey, China and Russia on the same level, on the same platform, as stated by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. You are a stabilizing force. For this reason, we must take Turkey’s strategic role in Europe’s future security architecture into account more than ever before.”

The developments necessitating a reorientation of von der Leyen’s course did not end there. On Monday 18 May, as part of Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Germany, the third meeting of the Turkey-Germany Strategic Dialogue Mechanism was held after a 12-year hiatus. The fear of Russia and US pressure must have put Berlin in such a state that German Foreign Minister Wadephul felt compelled to make the following remarks regarding this meeting: “After many years, we have re-engaged in strategic dialogue with Turkey. We wish to devote more time to this, as we want to examine the issues in greater depth. I am pleased that we have re-engaged on this path; we have reached a new level of quality in bilateral relations.”

For Wadephul’s quest for quality to achieve its aim, he must first begin with self-criticism. For instance, he could start by addressing the covert embargoes imposed on Turkey’s submarine manufacturing and the Akkuyu nuclear power plant. Or, if he were to explain how the investigation files regarding the NSU (National Socialist Underground) terrorist organization’s murder of eight Turks were deleted on 11 November 2011 – the very day the Federal Prosecutor’s Office took over the case – we might be able to move a little closer to the desired quality in Turkey-Germany relations. To understand Germany’s real concern, it is sufficient to look at the Welt newspaper’s report, also dated 18 May. Following the US’s suspension of Tomahawk missile deliveries to Germany, Berlin is seeking a solution in the Turkish defense industry.

What is interesting is that the Berlin-Paris duo, which has favored Greece since the 1970s under the banner of Hellenic romanticism, still cannot raise its voice against Athens, which is blocking Turkey’s participation in the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program. On the contrary, the overwhelming majority of member states are now aware that this 150-billion-euro program for joint defense procurement cannot achieve its objectives without Turkey, and have adopted the approach of bypassing the Greek obstacle by entering into independent agreements with Turkey. Indeed, reports have begun to emerge in the press suggesting that France is also making moves to join this initiative. However, it has been made clear to Paris, which is attempting, on the one hand, to stir up trouble in the Caucasus and, on the other, to upset the balance in the Eastern Mediterranean to Turkey’s detriment by aligning with the Greek Cypriot administration, that cooperation with Turkey in this area is impossible.

The Berlin-Paris axis: Coming to terms with Turkey

Although Turkey’s well-intentioned appeals have failed to yield results, the shifting geopolitical balances in the world are ultimately teaching the Berlin-Paris axis that it must come to terms with Turkey. The European Union, led by Germany, has now realized that it will be on the menu in any potential global power-sharing agreement between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. What they must now do is make up for the time and money they have squandered so generously since the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1992. Furthermore, they must admit that the energy they have expended on stalling Turkey has also been in vain.

The current state of the European Union was summarized by Germany’s former Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, on 4 May 2026 during a program he attended at the Harvard Kennedy School, part of Harvard University in the US. “The US and Germany have become a nation of lawyers. Other countries can build a national railway network in 20 years. Why can’t we build an urban rail line in 20 years?” As can be seen, Scholz, unlike von der Leyen, prefers to turn the spotlight on himself rather than targeting Turkey.

I do not believe Scholz chose this phrase, ‘a country of lawyers’, by chance. This phrase reminded me of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s 1993 book *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century*, in which he served as National Security Advisor to former US President Carter. In this work, Brzezinski warned the US administration, which was intoxicated by the victory of the First Cold War, that it needed to redirect its resources towards structural reforms as a matter of urgency. Had this warning been heeded, it is certain that we would not be seeing Donald Trump in the White House today.

In his book, Zbigniew presented a 20-point list of measures that needed to be implemented for the structural reforms the US required. The tenth item on this list concerns the issue of becoming a ‘nation of lawyers’, to which Scholz also refers. Brzezinski summarizes his complaint about this situation under the heading ‘The Presence of Parasites in the Legal System’ as follows: ‘One-third of the world’s lawyers work in the US. Legal fees paid in tort cases alone amount to three per cent of the US gross domestic product. This ratio is three times higher than in the countries with which the US competes. This high ratio has a deterrent effect on investors.”

Borrell’s garden has become a jungle

Instead of investing in technology and industry, or establishing a common defence and energy policy, the European Union, which offers those living within its borders a fantasy paradise, is now at a loss as to what to do in the face of developments centred on the People’s Republic of China. Yet on 13 October 2022, Josep Borrell, then the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, addressed students at the European Union Diplomatic Academy and brazenly likened the world beyond the European Union’s borders to a wild forest.

According to Borrell, the European Union represented a well-tended garden, that is, the best political harmony humanity could achieve. However, there was a danger that the forest might invade the garden, and according to Borrell, the European Union’s gardeners should go into the forest and engage with the rest of the world. Fortunately, thanks to the inflation driven by rising energy prices over the past four years, we now have the opportunity to observe a Europe that has turned into a jungle, where the far right is constantly gaining strength, from the island of stability that is Turkey.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

P

rominent left-leaning leaders from across the world are convening in Barcelona this weekend in a coordinated effort to strengthen progressive alliances and push back against the growing influence of far-right movements globally.

The gatherings are spearheaded by Spain’s Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, and Brazil’s President, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who are co-hosting a series of high-level meetings bringing together political leaders, activists, and civil society representatives.

The initiative, dubbed the “Global Progressive Mobilization,” aims to rally support for multilateralism, democratic institutions, and coordinated action on issues such as climate change and social inequality. Organizers say the meetings will culminate in a joint declaration outlining shared priorities and strategies.

The summit comes amid shifting global dynamics, including policy changes under U.S. President Donald Trump, whose administration’s cuts to humanitarian aid, military actions, and critical stance toward NATO have unsettled traditional alliances and prompted renewed debate over international cooperation.

Prominent leaders to attend

Several prominent leaders are expected to attend, including South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum. Sheinbaum’s visit marks the first trip by a Mexican president to Spain since 2018, following years of diplomatic tensions related to historical grievances over Spain’s colonial legacy.

A parallel event organized by Spain’s ruling Socialist Party is set to draw around 3,000 participants, including current and former heads of state, hundreds of mayors, trade unions, and grassroots organizations. The two-day gathering will focus on mobilizing support for progressive policies and strengthening political networks across borders.

The meetings also reflect concerns among left-wing leaders following the rise of far-right parties in recent years, particularly after gains in the 2024 European Parliament elections. Organizers describe the Barcelona summit as a response to that trend, aiming to demonstrate that alternative political pathways remain viable.

International cooperation is important

Speaking ahead of the event, Sánchez emphasized the importance of international cooperation among progressive forces. “It is important that progressive parties and governments unite to show that there is something beyond domestic politics,” he said during a recent visit to China, where he met President Xi Jinping to discuss closer ties.

The summit follows recent political developments in Europe, including the electoral defeat of Hungarian nationalist leader Viktor Orbán, which Sánchez has pointed to as evidence that far-right momentum can be challenged.

Organizers say the overarching goal is to present a unified front against what they describe as “extreme right-wing movements” and to reinforce commitments to democratic governance and international collaboration.

The Barcelona meetings are expected to conclude with a joint statement from participating leaders, outlining coordinated efforts to address global challenges and strengthen progressive political movements worldwide.

(Source: Reuters)

I

n Germany, in September 2013, a new party narrowly missed entering the federal parliament (Bundestag) in its first election, receiving only 4.7% of the vote. The Alternative for Germany Party, or AfD for short, founded in April 2013, quickly completed the necessary registration requirements at the federal level and qualified to participate in the parliamentary elections. At the time, it was not surprising that the AfD, considered by many to be a populist, anti-European party fueled by conspiracy theories and making empty promises and threats in its political rhetoric, failed to enter parliament. Indeed, experts had stated that German voters would never show interest in such political movements.

The most unpredictable turning point in the political history of Germany, which was rebuilt after World War II, was the dismissal of the AfD after the 2013 federal parliamentary elections, and its being seen as a politically insignificant movement. This policy of ignoring the AfD shaped the political attitude towards it. It paved the way for the unstoppable rise of the AfD in Germany, which began with the 2014 European Parliament elections. At the same time, it created rifts in the German social structure, opening the way for far-right and populist movements like PEGIDA and helping the AfD to build voter support.

Far-right movements in Europe, long ignored as in Germany, began to emerge as a rooted political movement from 2010 onwards. In January 2017, the “ENF (Europa der Nationen und der Freiheit)” political group in the European Parliament met in Koblenz, Germany. This meeting witnessed some very interesting encounters and statements. Nearly 40 far-right representatives from 9 countries that had far-right parties represented in the European Parliament at the time attended this meeting.

Led by Marie Le Pen of the French Front National, the meeting also featured speakers including Geert Wilders from the Netherlands, Frauke Petry from the AfD leadership in Germany, and Matteo Salvini representing the Lega Nord in Italy. The outcome of the meeting was quite alarming: Nine far-right European parties, led by Le Pen, who describe the European Union as an oppressive regime for the European people, pledged a new European future, declaring that the current EU and world system has ended and that the construction of a new future has begun.

The Bannon effect on the European far right

Another significant event at the Koblenz meeting was the celebration of Trump’s election as U.S. President in 2017 by representatives of European far-right movements, who called for a new wave of freedom in Europe, a “European Nationalism.” Even today, many consider the Koblenz meeting, although Steve Bannon did not directly attend, to be one of the first movements in Europe within the context of his “Global Populism” network, and the first example of the European far-right movement becoming jointly visible on the international stage.

Bannon’s success in Trump’s election, his subsequent impeachment, and his then-return to Europe present a rather interesting chain of events. His active involvement in European politics through “The Movement,” a Brussels-based foundation he established in 2017, his overt efforts to create a far-right, anti-EU supergroup within the European Parliament, and the similarities between these actions and the call made by far-right political parties at a meeting in Koblenz in 2017 are all highly noteworthy.

Following the Koblenz meeting, an examination of undeniable connections reveals that Steve Bannon met with numerous far-right populist politicians and political party officials in 2018-2019. One of Bannon’s biggest admirers is the leader of the Dutch PVV party, Geert Wilders. Many other far-right or right-wing populist politicians, including Alice Weidel of the AfD, Matteo Salvini of the Lega, UKIP leader Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen of France, and Giorgia Meloni of Italy, also frequently met with Bannon.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Czech President Zeman are also among those who have met with Bannon in the past. His participation in Le Pen’s party general assembly in France in 2018, and his invitation to a conference in the Bundestag by the AfD, are examples of the unhidden connections within the Populist/Global Network that Bannon is trying to build.

Prior to the EU Parliament elections in May 2019, Bannon made various efforts to unite the European far right. Although his target of one-third of the vote was not achieved in the 2019 European Parliament elections, Bannon provided the European far right with an unprecedented opportunity, creating a political network of far-right and populist groups across Europe and even across the Atlantic.

Just as there was a tendency to ignore the rise of the far right, a large media outlet, looking at the results of the 2019 EU Parliament elections, lamented Bannon’s failure. However, what seemed like a failure to those trying to save the day, or even the moment, for European politics, actually brought together the European far right and populist political base. Bannon’s intervention gave further impetus to the European far right and populist movements. In Germany, the AfD became the main opposition party in the federal parliament after the 2017 Federal Parliament elections. In the 2025 elections, it increased its number of members in parliament to 152 as the main opposition party.

The far-right on the rise in Europe

In 2023, Wilders’ party PVV emerged as the leading party in the Dutch elections. In last year’s Czech elections, the right-wing populist party ANO, with Andre Babis, won as the leading party. Marine Le Pen reached the second round twice against Macron in the French presidential elections and lost, but increased her vote share each time. The party, formerly known as Front National, changed its name to Rassemblement National (RN) and won the local elections as the leading party. It is highly likely to be the leading party again in the elections to be held in March 2026. Furthermore, Le Pen is considered a sure winner of the 2027 presidential elections – providing she remains eligible to run.

The situation is no different across Europe. Far-right radical parties and right-wing populist parties, which have a significant presence in national elections, entered the EU Parliament in the 2024 elections with 187 members in three different groups. In the EU Parliament, far-right and right-wing radical parties formed a group under the name European Patriots (Patriots.eu), while anti-EU right-wing parties such as the European Conservatives and Innovators (ECR) and far-right radical parties like the AfD formed a group under the name ESN (Europe of Sovereign Nations). These far-right parties, constantly appearing to be seeking innovation and new directions across the EU, have increased their number of members in the parliament through name changes. The common characteristic of these groups is their anti-EU skeptical nature.

News that the Trump administration would focus on Italy, Austria, Poland, and Hungary leaving the EU, as outlined in the National Security Document (NSS) released in the U.S. in December 2025, sent shockwaves across Europe. While the White House denied these statements were included in the NSS, the fact that Bannon could, even years later, achieve his goal of creating an anti-European movement seems quite plausible after witnessing the examples of UKIP and Brexit.

Examinations of the released Epstein files indicate that Epstein and Bannon corresponded regularly between 2018 and 2019 regarding European politicians and the European far right and populist right-wing movements. In these communications, Bannon reportedly shared information about his influence on right-wing movements in Europe, specifying which politicians and parties he advised, and even naming the parties and politicians involved. While the AfD has not denied the portion of the conversations related to them, they have stated that the allegations of receiving advice from Bannon are untrue.

Anti-EU sentiment – ​​anti-immigrant sentiment – ​​Islamophobia

From the perspective of far-right and populist right-wing movements, it is possible to state that far-right political movements in Europe share three distinct common narratives. These narratives are: opposition to the European Union or the withdrawal of their countries from the European Union; xenophobia and hostility towards immigrants and foreigners, aiming to eliminate immigration to Europe; and the exclusion of Islam from the public sphere in Europe, imposing bans on Islam at the national level and restricting the rights of Muslims. According to AfD ideologue Björn Höcke, Muslims, considered foreign elements in Europe, should be expelled east of the Bosphorus. Bannon’s statements also periodically emphasize the need for a “very strict and aggressive stance against radical Islam.”

Another point worth emphasizing is the emboldening of far-right and populist movements in Europe following Trump’s re-election for a second term. It is noteworthy that these movements have brought Trump’s MAGA (Make America Great Again) or America First slogans to Europe. Babis’s campaign in the Czech Republic with the slogan “Czech Republic First,” and Hungarian Prime Minister Orban’s implementation of the MEGA (“Make Europe Great Again”) slogan during Hungary’s rotating presidency, demonstrate the spread of a different kind of Trumpism across Europe.

The stance of the Visegrad countries, members of the EU, on anti-immigrant sentiment has long been well-known. In other Western European countries, anti-immigrant sentiment and the halting of immigration are at the forefront of the main election slogans of political parties. Trump’s claims that Europe will lose its identity due to immigration by the end of 2025, and that the continent is destroying itself due to an immigrant invasion, have strengthened the rhetoric of right-wing populist and far-right parties in Europe. Even at the local level, in the German state of Bavaria, the AfD party has included in its party program the possibility of establishing a special team called AFA (Refugee Search and Deportation Police), similar to ICE in the U.S., if they come to power in that state.

I

n conflict zones, some of the most enduring damage is unseen.

Although Kashmir is widely discussed in terms of territorial contestation in conventional political analysis, there is surprisingly little focus on how sustained exposure to conflict, violence, and systemic uncertainty influences everyday experiences, social behavior, and expression. Even after the headlines fade, these effects continue to shape how people live, think, and relate to their surroundings.

Restricted access to data and the risks associated with open communication in a tightly controlled environment severely limit research. The conditions necessary for systematic study are difficult to secure; therefore, empirical research on vital issues in Kashmir remains scarce.

However, it is critical to understand Kashmiris as subjects with agency whose responses reflect adaptive and strategic navigation within a highly constrained and closely monitored environment.

In regions marked by sustained instability, the essential foundations of childhood development are destabilized. Children are deprived of emotional security, access to stable social networks, physical protection, and a sustained sense of safety. Political instability frequently results in prolonged school closures, sometimes lasting entire semesters. Consequently, students have sometimes been promoted en masse despite prolonged interruptions to classroom instruction. During these periods, online education has not consistently served as a viable alternative, largely due to recurring internet shutdowns.

Setbacks and long-term effects

Children who are socialized in contexts of chronic insecurity and surveillance experience learning setbacks and are at risk of enduring behavioral, emotional regulatory, social trust, and political consciousness effects as adults. Hypervigilance and hypersensitivity often develop from an early age. In such conditions, children may remain in a persistent state of alertness or “fight mode,” where anger, irritability, and aggression mask underlying feelings of sadness and social isolation.

For many, silence is internalized early on, leading to self-censorship. Children observe and learn which questions lead to tension, which topics are avoided in gatherings, and which words are never spoken aloud.

This internalization of restraint develops into a broader psychological condition resembling learned helplessness with features of duality. Repeated exposure to uncontrollable loss, surveillance, or instability teaches individuals that their actions rarely alter outcomes. Taking action becomes risky, even futile. In such contexts, avoiding harm, adapting, not drawing attention, and survival become ways of life.

A scarcity mindset

Over the course of many decades of uncertainty and disruption, many Kashmiri households developed what psychologists describe as a scarcity mindset: A survival-oriented approach to resources shaped by prolonged instability. This mindset often manifests in everyday practices, such as stocking essential items for extended periods. In many Kashmiri households, for example, staple foods like rice are purchased in large quantities and stored for years as a rational adaptation to chronic uncertainty.

This mindset also extends into other areas of personal and social life. For example, communal solidarity in Kashmir is most visibly activated during moments of loss. Entire neighborhoods come together in times of grief. However, the same intensity of togetherness is largely absent during moments of joy or personal success. Successes tend to be shared quietly and are often prefaced with accounts of hardship, health concerns, or struggles that bear little direct relation to the joy being expressed.

Overt expression of joy seems discordant in contexts where loss is common. Thus, restraint and self-regulation become adaptive mechanisms of collective survival. This is one of the many unspoken social understandings: Visibility is risky.

Constant negotiation has produced a form of social “conflict correctness,” in which maintaining harmony and avoiding discomfort take precedence over direct expression.

The paradox of hospitality and hunger

Duality is deeply ingrained in Kashmiri social life. People often communicate guardedly, carefully calibrating what they say, to whom, and in what setting. Consequently, it can be challenging to discern sincerity from strategic restraint. However, it is important to understand that this is not due to an absence of honesty; caution is ingrained in Kashmiri society as a survival mechanism. This pattern can be seen extending into intimate spaces, such as the dinner table, if studied.

Kashmiri culture places immense value on hospitality. Yet, accepting food, expressing hunger, or stating personal preferences is often deferred or declined unless repeatedly insisted upon and often accompanied by emotional appeals or promises. If not confronted or engaged, this adaptive caution runs the risk of becoming a permanent psychological trait over the years.

Parents who are raising children while experiencing chronic stress often do so from a place of unresolved fear and grief. In households where loss or disappearance has altered family structures, caregiving roles are often reorganized. Widows and half-widows, in particular, take on a disproportionate amount of emotional and social responsibilities. This places them at the center of the intergenerational transmission of fear, resilience, and restraint.

For young people already living in a state of learned helplessness, the growing infiltration of drugs into Kashmiri society now fills the void left by the absence of meaningful work. Substance use often functions as a form of escapism. Interestingly, this coincides with agendas of weakening collective resistance and social cohesion.

Z

ohran Mamdani was inaugurated on Thursday as the 112th mayor of New York City during a large public ceremony at City Hall, becoming the first Muslim and first South Asian to lead the largest city in the United States.

Mamdani, 34, took the oath of office on the Quran, marking another historic first. He is also the youngest mayor in generations, and the first New York City mayor born in Africa.

The oath was administered by U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont, a prominent democratic socialist who endorsed Mamdani during his campaign. Sanders later praised Mamdani’s victory as a major political upset against entrenched political and economic interests.

In his inaugural address, Mamdani pledged to govern for all New Yorkers, regardless of political differences.

“If you are a New Yorker, I am your mayor. Regardless of whether we agree, I will protect you, celebrate with you, mourn alongside you, and never, not for a second, hide from you,” he told the crowd.

He reaffirmed his identity as a democratic socialist, saying he would not abandon his principles, and reiterated key campaign pledges including universal childcare, rent freezes and policies aimed at lowering the cost of living.

Focus on affordability and inclusion

Mamdani said his administration would work to ensure that no New Yorker is priced out of basic necessities, rejecting what he described as governance favoring only the wealthiest residents.

“This will not be a tale of one city governed only by the 1%, nor will it be a tale of two cities, the rich versus the poor,” he said.

He emphasized New York City’s diversity, noting that its residents speak many languages and practice a wide range of faiths — or none at all — and said this diversity would be reflected in his leadership.

He also referenced Palestinian New Yorkers, saying they should not be excluded from politics that claim to be universal.

Sanders said Mamdani’s campaign had defeated political establishments across party lines, calling it “the biggest political upset in modern American history.” He rejected criticism that Mamdani’s proposals were radical, arguing that affordable housing, childcare and public transit are essential policies.

Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, who introduced Mamdani at the ceremony, described his election as the start of “a new era for New York City,” saying he represents a mayoralty centered on the working class.

“Zohran will be a mayor for all of us,” she said.

Interfaith presence and city officials sworn in

The ceremony included remarks from Imam Khalid Latif of the Islamic Center of New York City, alongside priests and rabbis, highlighting the city’s interfaith character.

During the event, Mark Levine was sworn in as New York City’s 52nd comptroller and Jumaane Williams was sworn in as public advocate.

Mamdani was born in Kampala, Uganda, to Indian immigrant parents and moved to New York City at age seven. He is the son of filmmaker Mira Nair and academic Mahmood Mamdani and became a U.S. citizen in 2018.

He rose to prominence after winning a seat in the New York State Assembly in 2020, representing parts of Queens. In the Nov. 4 mayoral election, he defeated former New York Governor Andrew Cuomo and Republican candidate Curtis Sliwa.

His campaign focused on affordability and expanded social services, including pledges for free public buses, universal childcare, city-run grocery stores, expanded rent-stabilized housing and raising the minimum wage to $30 an hour by 2030.

A symbolic private swearing-in took place shortly after midnight at Manhattan’s Old City Hall subway station, ahead of Thursday’s public ceremony.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

N

ot only did Republican candidate Donald Trump win the US presidential election on 5 November 2024 by a landslide, but the Republican Party also captured majorities in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, painting the US map almost entirely red. The fact that the colour blue, representing the Democrats, was confined to certain states sparked intense debate about the political future of the Democrats in the US. Joe Biden’s weak leadership and Kamala Harris’ failure to make an impact as Trump’s opponent have brought arguments about a leadership problem within the Democratic Party to the forefront.

With Trump in the White House and the Republicans holding both houses of Congress, Democratic elites in Washington were contemplating the party’s future when an unexpected name emerged: Zohran Mamdani. Mamdani won the mayoral election in New York, the country’s financial heart, leaving his rivals, who had the support of almost all the elites, behind. The question now being asked in the US media and among the public is: What could Mamdani represent for the future of the Democratic Party?

The Mamdani phenomenon: From zero to mayor in one year

The New York mayoral election, held on 4 November, essentially became a political contest that concerned not just one city, but the entire American political landscape. Mamdani, who won the Democratic Party primaries against former New York Governor Andrew Cuomo, has become such an extraordinary figure in American society that, just a year ago, it would have been unimaginable that he would become mayor of New York. Mamdani, who is only 34 years old and was born in Uganda, has defined himself as a ‘democratic socialist’ from the outset.

He has also clearly emphasised his Muslim identity on every issue, including Gaza and opposition to Israel. Furthermore, he has promised many socialist-style reforms for the city if elected. He was therefore elected as ‘New York’s first Muslim mayor’. Not only did Mamdani defeat the establishment elites and the traditional Democrat-Republican voter perception in these elections, he also defeated his rivals, who had the strong support of the Israel lobby and Jewish groups. In this respect, Mamdani’s election victory will be remembered as a success story worthy of many books on American political history.

What does ‘democratic socialist’ Mamdani represent for Democrats?

Mamdani won over 50 per cent of the vote in New York, a city that is already democratic and liberal, leaving Cuomo behind. He received the most votes from young people. According to exit polls, he won 78 per cent of the vote among 18- to 29-year-olds, while 56 per cent of voters over 65 voted for Cuomo. This reveals how Generation Z currently views politics in the US.

It is clear that young people are forming their own political views and voting based on them, rather than being influenced by big corporations, the Israel/Jewish lobby, the established elite or the mainstream media. This relatively ‘independent’ approach among young people is quite fitting for the political spectrum represented by the ‘progressive’ wing within the Democratic Party. However, Mamdani occupies a slightly different position due to his Muslim identity. Nevertheless, given his ‘democratic socialist’ rhetoric and his closeness to Bernie Sanders, the ‘most socialist’ senator in the US Senate, Mamdani exemplifies the growth of the progressive wing within American society, particularly among young people under the age of 30.

Undoubtedly, the founding members and moderate elements of the Democratic Party are not particularly pleased with the growth of this progressive wing that is shifting towards socialism. These core elements of the party believe that progressive politics will never win presidential elections in the ‘cradle of capitalism’, and are closely monitoring the potential influence of figures like Mamdani within the party.

While Democratic Party leaders and 40-year-old Democrats in Congress may have their reservations, one thing is certain: young Democrats in the US may well prefer a 34-year-old figure like Mamdani, who promises to tackle economic inequality, to more traditional political figures. While Mamdani’s economic promises were a key factor in his election victory, his identity as a ‘democratic socialist and Muslim immigrant’ also enabled most New Yorkers to see part of themselves in him.

Where could Mamdani go in US politics?

The impact of Mamdani’s highly successful social media campaigns on the public is undeniable. However, the events during and after the election suggest that he could play an even more significant role within the Democratic Party in the future. Although Mamdani was not born in the United States and is therefore ineligible to become president under the US Constitution, he is widely seen as a strong contender in the near future of Democratic politics.

However, his performance as mayor of New York will, of course, largely determine this potential. If he continues his sympathetic leadership and rhetoric during the election process, as he is doing now, he will maintain his popularity, particularly among young people. This could open new doors for the still very young Mamdani in US politics. His calm and composed demeanour during his meeting with US President Trump at the White House was also seen as an example of his ability to survive in the long and dark corridors of politics.

Ultimately, Mamdani won the New York election with his performance and political rhetoric in just one year. His true strengths and weaknesses will become apparent as he serves as president, but if he can maintain his current momentum, he could become a key figure for the Democrats in the short to medium term. The 2028 presidential elections and the political landscape that emerges afterwards will reveal more about how far he can go in US politics.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

I

ndia has recently put into effect a citizenship law that has drawn widespread criticism for its exclusion of Muslims, marking a significant development under Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Hindu nationalist government. The law, announced on Monday, establishes a religious criterion for migrants from major South Asian faiths, effectively excluding Islam. Here’s a breakdown of what this means and why it’s stirring controversy.

The Citizenship Amendment Act provides an expedited path to citizenship for migrants belonging to Hindu, Parsi, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, and Christian communities who fled Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan before December 31, 2014. Notably, it excludes Muslims, who form a majority in these nations. This law, which is the first of its kind in India, sets a religious standard for citizenship in a country known for its religious diversity.

The implementation of this law has been met with widespread backlash and protests, particularly from India’s Muslim community and its supporters. The legislation was passed by Parliament in 2019 but was delayed following deadly protests. Critics argue that the law undermines India’s secular foundation and could be used in conjunction with proposed citizenship registries to marginalize Muslims.

International concern and domestic response

The United States has expressed concern over the law’s implementation and emphasized the importance of religious freedom and equal treatment under the law for all communities. Meanwhile, within India, opposition parties, rights groups, and minority communities have vehemently opposed the law, labeling it exclusionary and unconstitutional.

India’s Muslims, who constitute a significant minority within the country, have voiced concerns over the law’s discriminatory nature and its potential to further marginalize their community. Critics accuse Prime Minister Modi of advancing a Hindu nationalist agenda that threatens India’s secular fabric and fosters intolerance towards religious minorities. Modi’s government has faced criticism for its handling of anti-Muslim violence and its perceived alignment with Hindu nationalist sentiments.

Exclusion of Muslims

The Citizenship Amendment Act offers an expedited pathway to citizenship for Hindus, Parsis, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, and Christians who sought refuge in India, primarily from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, up to December 31, 2014. Notably, this legislation excludes Muslims, who constitute the majority population in all three countries.

Furthermore, the act revises the previous law that prohibited illegal migrants from attaining Indian citizenship. This marks a significant departure for India, which is officially a secular state with a population characterized by religious diversity, as it introduces religious qualifications for citizenship for the first time.

As India grapples with the implications of this controversial citizenship law, tensions between religious communities and political factions are expected to persist. The law’s implementation reflects broader debates over secularism, nationalism, and religious identity in one of the world’s most populous democracies.

The impact of India’s citizenship law will continue to shape discussions on human rights, religious freedom, and the future of democracy in the region.

Source: The Associated Press

I

n a significant move, far-right Dutch politician Geert Wilders, the leader of the Party for Freedom (PVV), announced on January 8, 2024, that he is withdrawing a controversial 2018 proposal that called for the ban on mosques and the Quran. This decision, seen as a crucial concession to potential coalition partners, comes just a day before the resumption of talks to form the next government following the November 2023 elections.

Wilders’ withdrawal of the legislation is considered a key step in gaining the trust and support of three mainstream parties that he aims to include in a coalition government alongside the PVV. One of the party leaders, Pieter Omtzigt of the New Social Contract, had raised concerns about the compatibility of some of Wilders’ policies with the Dutch Constitution, which upholds liberties, including freedom of religion.

The proposed legislation, dating back to 2018, was part of a series of laws presented by Wilders that aimed to restrict what he labeled as “Islamic expressions.” The bill characterized Islam as a “violent, totalitarian ideology” and called for the prohibition of mosques, the Quran, Islamic schools, as well as the wearing of burqas and niqabs. The decision to withdraw this legislation indicates a potential softening of the PVV’s strident anti-Islam stance.

Wilders’ more moderate position

During a parliamentary debate last year, following the PVV’s success in winning 37 seats in the 150-seat lower house of the Dutch parliament in the November 2023 general election, Wilders hinted at a more moderate position regarding his party’s anti-Islam policies. This move is seen as an effort to align the PVV’s proposals with the Dutch Constitution, addressing concerns raised by potential coalition partners.

In response to the withdrawal of the legislation, Wilders stated during the parliamentary debate, “Sometimes I will have to withdraw proposals, and I will do that. I will show the Netherlands, the legislature, Mr. Omtzigt’s party — anybody who wants to hear it — that we will adapt our rules to the constitution and bring our proposals in line with it.”

Wilders is scheduled to resume coalition talks on January 9, 2024, with Pieter Omtzigt and the leaders of two other parties: the center-right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy led by outgoing Prime Minister Mark Rutte and the Farmer Citizen Movement led by Caroline van der Plas.

Laws lack majority vote

Wilders presented the three laws to the parliament in 2017, 2018, and 2019; however, they failed to secure a majority in the lower house.

Regarding the suggested ban on Islamic expressions, the Council of State, an independent legislative watchdog, recommended Wilders discard the proposal. In a 2019 advisory statement, the council stated, “The Advisory Division urges the initiators to reject the bill as it is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the democratic constitutional state, principles that the initiators aim to safeguard.”

The withdrawal of the controversial legislation marks a significant development in Dutch politics, showcasing a potential shift in the PVV’s approach and creating room for broader cooperation within the political landscape.

Source: The Associated Press

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mnesty International has released a report on November 23, 2023, accusing Germany of failing to effectively tackle systemic racism, pointing to ingrained structural issues and a lack of recognition of the root causes. Presented in Berlin, the report provides a critical analysis of Germany’s approach to hate crimes, police behavior, and historical injustices.

Julia Duchrow, Secretary General of Amnesty International’s German section, asserted that despite Germany’s commitment in the 1960s to protect all people from racial discrimination and violence, the nation continues to struggle with racism.

Duchrow highlighted several high-profile cases that have exposed these shortcomings, including the murders by the National Socialist Underground (NSA) and racial attacks in Munich, Halle, and Hanau.

Discriminatory practices sanctioned by the state

The report criticizes discriminatory practices sanctioned by the state, such as the headscarf ban for Muslim women in public service and the prohibition of demonstrations in support of Palestinian rights. According to Duchrow, these forms of state discrimination are as pressing as the issues caused by non-state actors.

Amnesty International’s report draws attention to the problem of racist stereotypes within German law enforcement, specifically mentioning the controversial term “clan criminality.” The human rights organization is calling for an investigation into racism in the police force and for concrete steps to be taken to address and prevent it.

The report insists on the necessity of independent bodies to investigate police misconduct. Amnesty International urges Germany to establish these at both federal and state levels to ensure thorough and unbiased investigations into all allegations of racially motivated behavior by police.

Call to action

This call to action emphasizes the importance of accountability and the need for Germany to live up to its international commitments to fight racial discrimination. The detailed findings and recommendations from Amnesty International aim to prompt German authorities to take decisive and transparent actions to address these deep-rooted issues.

Amidst growing concerns over racial profiling and discrimination, Amnesty International’s recommendations aim to prompt German legislators and policymakers to take concrete actions to reform the current system. The move towards independent investigations reflects a broader global trend emphasizing the importance of transparency and accountability in law enforcement.

Source: Anadolu Agency.

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new study has brought to light the pervasive nature of racism faced by Muslim men in Germany, with over 40% reporting experiences of racial discrimination in their daily lives. The findings, released on November 7, by the German Center for Integration and Migration Research (Dezim) in Berlin, indicate that 41.2% of Muslim men feel affected by racism.

The report underscores discrimination encounters in public offices and interactions with authorities, including the police. A notable 39% of Muslim men recounted more frequent experiences of discrimination within the police force, while a significant 51% reported adverse experiences when dealing with public offices and authorities.

Muslim women also face substantial discrimination, with 46% reporting similar experiences in offices and authorities. The figure drops to 25% when referring to interactions with the police.

Discrimination in Germany’s healthcare system

The study also highlighted discrimination in Germany’s healthcare system. Frank Kalter, the director of the Dezim Institute, noted that individuals who are racially characterized often receive inferior appointments and their grievances are less acknowledged.

This alarming revelation comes at a time when Germany’s government, led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz, is expressing concern over rising anti-Muslim racism in the aftermath of the recent Gaza war that began on October 7. Government spokesman Steffen Hebestreit stated that any attacks on Muslims, whether for religious reasons or otherwise, are “absolutely unacceptable.”

The nearly 5 million Muslims residing in Germany have an inherent right to protection, he asserted at a news conference in Berlin.

Last week, the Berlin-based Alliance Against Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Hate (CLAIM) warned of escalating anti-Muslim racism amidst the intensifying conflict between Israel and Palestine. Rima Hanano, head of CLAIM, emphasized the urgent need to address the uptick in anti-Muslim racism, which threatens social cohesion.

CLAIM has documented numerous instances of anti-Muslim threats, violence, and discrimination in a short span, including attacks on mosques. The organization highlighted that many incidents likely go unreported, particularly in the realm of online hate speech.

The NGO advocates for comprehensive measures to counter anti-Muslim racism and safeguard those affected. “It is imperative for our democracy and societal cohesion to actively combat anti-Muslim racism, antisemitism, and other misanthropic ideologies,” CLAIM asserts, emphasizing the immediate need for action.

The recent study and calls from advocacy groups serve as a stark reminder of the challenges facing Muslim communities in Germany and the importance of concerted efforts to foster an inclusive and equitable society.

Source: Anadolu Agency

Narendra Modi is roaring to the world that India is a worthy contender on the global scene. India has come to the fore with its massive economy, recent successes at the space front, potential megaproject linking India, the Middle East and Europe via rail and sea, and playing the role of a distanced ally towards to the competing world powers: the U.S. and China.

All eyes were on the G20 summit taking place in New Delhi this year, and Modi surely wanted to make a good impression. Schools and offices were shut, roads were blocked, and street vendors were removed. Even whole slums near the venue were covered in tarpaulin! Ironically, Modi’s speeches repeatedly described India as the world’s largest democracy and the ‘voice of the Global South’.

However, behind this sterilized facade lies discrimination, oppression, and erasure— on brand with the Hindu nationalism fueled by Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Numerous attacks on minority communities sweep through the country, including demolitions of Muslim houses, mosque and church attacks, grave desecrations and violent killings. Meanwhile, the government takes every step to define India as a Hindu nation.

In this month’s book bundle, we examine how Modi’s India both oppresses and suppresses its minority citizens. Through books that explain the political dynamics in India, the impact of state-sanctioned violence, and the silencing of critical voices, we observe how the world’s largest democracy goes wrong.

In the book Modi’s India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy, Christophe Jaffrelot delves into the intricate dynamics of Indian politics over the last two decades, with a particular focus on the rise of Hindu nationalism coupled with national-populism, largely attributed to Narendra Modi’s leadership. This confluence of factors has not only secured Modi’s electoral success, starting in Gujarat and extending to the entire country but has also transformed the very nature of democracy in India.

Jaffrelot’s work spotlights Modi’s ability to captivate a significant portion of the Indian populace by offering promises of development while simultaneously exploiting ethno-religious fault lines within the electorate. This national-populism is marked by Modi’s personalized political style, characterized by direct communication with voters through various channels, effectively saturating the public discourse.

To shed light on the consequences of this political shift, Jaffrelot conducts original interviews across India, revealing a troubling evolution toward what he terms an “ethnic democracy.” In this model, the majority community is equated with the nation, while religious minorities, specifically Muslims and Christians, find themselves relegated to the status of second-class citizens, vulnerable to harassment by ‘vigilante’ groups.

Furthermore, Jaffrelot elucidates how the political landscape in India has developed authoritarian tendencies for various reasons. In its quest for power not only at the national level but also in the states, the government has centralized authority at the expense of federalism, eroding the very institutions that once served as checks and balances, including India’s Supreme Court.

In sum, Modi’s India showcases a government, supported by popular mandate, stifles dissent and grows increasingly intolerant of ethnic and religious minorities. The book provides essential insights into politics, nationalism, and populism in contemporary India.

Christophe Jaffrelot, Modi’s India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2021) ISBN: 9780691206806, 656 pages

In Composing Violence: The Limits of Exposure and the Making of Minorities, Moyukh Chatterjee examines the haunting memory of the 2002 anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat, India, where armed Hindu mobs unleashed brutal attacks on Muslims in broad daylight, resulting in a staggering death toll that shocked the nation. Chatterjee’s investigation goes beyond the horrific events themselves, aiming to dissect how such highly visible political violence against minority communities serves as a catalyst for profound transformations in the domains of law, public culture, and power dynamics.

Contrary to the expectation that exposing state-sanctioned anti-Muslim violence would lead to its suppression, Chatterjee argues that these incidents actually set the stage for a fundamental shift in India, pushing it toward a Hindu supremacist state. He contends that examining the responses of both the state and civil society to this violence offers crucial insights into the inherent features of modern democracy, where riots and pogroms become tools for molding a society defined by a vulnerable minority and a dominant majority.

Chatterjee’s exploration focuses on multiple facets, including courtroom procedures, police archives, legal activism, and mainstream media coverage. Through this multifaceted approach, he constructs a theory of violence as a form of governance, effectively engineering minority populations.

Composing Violence invites readers to grapple with the profound and unsettling implications of anti-Muslim violence in India. Chatterjee’s meticulous analysis paints a picture of how violence can shape the course of democracy, raising profound questions about the fragility of minority rights and the complex interplay between power and prejudice in contemporary societies.

Moyukh Chatterjee, Composing Violence: The Limits of Exposure and the Making of Minorities (Duke University Press, 2023) ISBN: 978-1-4780-1966-4, 184 pages

What happens to those who dare question the injustices of the Modi regime? The book How Long Can the Moon Be Caged? provides a piercing examination of the authoritarian regime under Narendra Modi in India, where the suppression of critical voices and the silencing of dissent have become central objectives for the ruling BJP party. Their ethno-nationalist aspiration of establishing an exclusively ‘Hindu’ India, involves targeting anyone who dares to voice questions or opposition.

Authors Suchitra Vijayan and Francesca Recchia present a unique perspective highlight the experiences of political prisoners. Their approach combines astute political and legal analysis with firsthand accounts, offering readers an in-depth exploration of the subtle acts of resistance that occur both within and beyond prison walls, involving not only the prisoners themselves but also their families. The narrative unravels a tale of institutional decay and the erosion of fundamental rights.

The book spotlights the stories of those who have been falsely accused of inciting the Bhima Koregaon violence, student leaders who have protested against the discriminatory citizenship law of 2020, and activists associated with the Pinjra Tod movement. By weaving together these voices, How Long Can the Moon Be Caged? celebrates the remarkable bravery, unwavering humanity, and moral integrity of individuals who have been incarcerated for their unwavering solidarity with marginalized and oppressed communities.

In a world where the struggle for dissent and the preservation of civil liberties are ever more vital, this book serves as a powerful testament to the resilience of those who refuse to be silenced, while painting a vivid picture of the ongoing battle for justice and equality in India.

Suchitra Vijayan and Francesca Recchia, How Long Can the Moon Be Caged?: Voices of Indian Political Prisoners (Pluto books, 2023) ISBN 9780745347981, 216 pages

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he journey of the veil transcends time. From its depiction in French couture to a resurgence in 1990s fashion trends, the veil’s versatility continues unabated. Amidst ever-changing cultural norms, it remains a reflection of identity. From ancient Greece to the present day, the veil reflects the history of mankind.

The veil has a history going back thousands of years and is intricately woven into the cultural fabric of Europe. It is not only a sign of changing fashion, but also a reflection of women’s evolving roles, changing social norms, and religious ideologies. From ancient traditions to modern representations, the history of the veil offers a deep insight into the complexity of European history.

Its evolution from religious symbols to fashion statements reflects the changing currents of society. As Europe continues to evolve, the multilayered meaning of the veil remains. It serves as a tangible link to the past and a lens through which we view the complexity of our shared cultural heritage.

Roots beyond Christianity

Although Christianity played a crucial role in shaping the European veil tradition, the origins of the veil can be traced back to ancient cultures. In ancient Greece, the veil was a sign of respectability and high status. It distinguished women who were protected and women with loose morals. It was illegal for lower status women, such as slaves and prostitutes, to wear a veil, illustrating the role of the veil in the social hierarchy.

With the rise of the Roman Empire, the tradition of veiling took on a new dimension. Women wore the veil as a symbol of their marital bond. The veil became a strong symbol of the husband’s authority, which was emphasized by traditions such as the colorful bridal veil. The roots of this practice reached back to Roman matrons, the vestal virgins, and their particular veiling rituals.

Theological debates further defined the role of the veil. Tertullian’s On the Veling of Virgins emphasized the subjugation of women and spoke of a dangerous attraction that needed to be concealed. Clement of Alexandria echoed similar thoughts in his writings, emphasizing modesty as a reason for veiling. The Council of Gangres reinforced this idea and solidified veiling as a sign of submission.

The development of fashion in medieval Europe gave new meanings to the veil. Noblewomen veiled themselves with hoods and caps, embodying both fashion and humility. The Renaissance, characterized by elaborate headdresses and an evolving esthetic, influenced the development of the veil style. The Protestant Reformation challenged veiling and led to different practices in different denominations. For instance, in Anabaptism, it is believed that wearing a head covering aligned with Saint Paul’s teachings, making it obligatory to be worn continuously.

Transition to modernity: From tradition to accessory

The early 20th century marked a turning point for veiling traditions. The change was epitomized by the rise of “flapper” culture in the 1920s. Flappers were young women who rebelled against the social norms and expectations of the time. They wore short skirts, had bobs, and challenged traditional gender roles. They embraced a freer and more independent lifestyle, and often enjoyed jazz music, dancing, and socializing. This cultural movement symbolized a break with tradition and reflected the general social changes of the time.

Fast-forward to the 1960s and Europe was swept by another wave of cultural change. World War I and the social changes that followed set the stage for the so-called sexual revolution in the Western world. Traditional norms were challenged and the role of women began to change. The birth control pill and the increasing availability of contraceptives triggered the sexual revolution. Conventional notions regarding gender roles, relationships, and clothing norms were completely overturned. The veil, once a symbol of modesty and marital status, was relegated to the background.

Meanwhile, in the United States, the southern states cultivated a unique “church crown” culture inspired by biblical verses: hats, worn with strict etiquette, became a cultural emblem.

Even though veiling has become less common in everyday life in the Western world, it is still present. Mourning veils and religious practices preserve the solemnity of this tradition. The symbolism of the veil is also changing: from obedience to identity, it remains in various forms. In some Orthodox Christian countries, the veil is maintained in churches, while religious communities such as the Amish and Mennonites, maintain the tradition in everyday life.

The Amish branched off from Switzerland, Alsace, Germany, Russia, and Holland and they migrated to the US in the 19th and 20th centuries. In some parts of Europe, the tradition of women wearing a veil during religious practices is maintained. In Orthodox Christian countries, for example, veiling is still required in churches. In Catholic countries, such as Spain and Portugal, however, the custom has disappeared over time.

Continuing legacy and debates

The changing meaning of the veil reveals deeper social currents. Especially with the Muslim worker migration to Europe in the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s. Veiling practices have often been associated with male dominance and female subjugation, and interpreted as tools of patriarchal control. Mona Eltahawy and some contend that instead of symbolizing choice and devotion, the veil has, on occasion, been employed to oppress women’s autonomy and erode gender equality.

Moreover, current considerations about the veil have sparked controversial debates about cultural integration, religious freedom, and secularism. The presence of the veil in European societies has sometimes been questioned for its perceived deviation from secular values, with some voices calling for stricter regulations on its use in public.

From its ancient origins to its role in Christianity and fashion, the veil has reflected changing social norms and beliefs. It is a timeless symbol of evolution and continuity in the fabric of European tradition. In today’s world, where debates continue not only in European society but also on a global scale, the veil retains its complex status as a symbol of tradition, identity, and self-determination. While discussions and bans on the issue continue in global political discourse, people remain determined to preserve their deeply held beliefs.

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ould Brigitte Macron, the wife of President Macron, secretly be a Muslim? According to Gabriel Attal, Minister of National Education and Youth, it is possible.  If Madame Macron were a teenager who tried to enter school in the long white Louis Vuitton dress she wore to the White House reception in December 2022, would she be allowed in? Or, would she be allowed to enter school in the long black dress she wore on her husband’s visit to China?

Last week, a female student wearing a hip-length black jacket and trousers was refused entry on the grounds that her outfit was “too black.”  A female student named Nasima, wearing a cotton, cream-colored tunic and trousers, was also denied entry to her school. Both female students are Muslim. So is Madame Macron secretly Muslim?

Perhaps the answer would be clear if the two moderators on the TV channel BFM TV cross-examined her like they did Nasima: “So your dress is not a religious dress for you, is it? Then, why are you wearing this outfit that is a little bit draped? If it’s fashionable, where did this trend come from? Are you wearing this slightly flowy outfit to hide your curves? Is this outfit related to your religious beliefs? Are there any non-Muslims who dress like this, and if so, can they go inside? Do you wear a headscarf outside school?”

It, thus, transpires that if Madame Macron were a teenage schoolgirl, she would have managed to prove that she was not a Muslim at the very beginning of this interrogation and she could have entered the school without any problems, taking into account her attire on other occasions.

You may be thinking, “What an absurd and stupid fictional discourse!” But I am not the one who started it. What I am trying to do is to explain, in the laconic words of Le Figaro, “the ban on the abaya, the symbol of an education system that fails to transmit the richness of reason, the joy of freedom and the pride of a common heritage.” Otherwise, thank goodness, I am sufficiently intelligent and have common sense.

At the start of the new school year, Minister of National Education and Youth Gabriel Attal announced: “I have banned long dresses for Muslim girls in schools. If you wear pants or a skirt under a short dress or tunic, that is also forbidden.” However, the actual ban would have sounded something like this: “I have banned the wearing of abaya in schools. When you step into the classroom, you should not be able to tell at a glance which religion the students belong to.”

Just like the 2004 ban on the use of large crosses, kippahs, and headscarves in schools, Muslims are the subject of the ban and are facing open discrimination, racism, and persecution. Since students wearing crosses go to private Catholic schools, and Jewish students wearing kippahs from kindergarten onwards go to private Jewish schools, it is no secret that from the very beginning the 2004 ban targeted Muslim girls attending public schools.

Now, the French state is trying to control the body of Muslim girls from head to toe! Like his predecessors, Attal does not openly say “we are practicing cultural racism or Islamophobia,” but instead proclaims “secularism is the freedom to save oneself through education.” “These garments,” he contends, “are a religious expression that tests the resistance of the Republic in schools that are supposed to be the refuge of secularism!” According to the minister, 298 students wearing tunics and long flowing dresses were identified in the first week, more than half of them changed, 67 did not and were not allowed to enter the school. France has launched a mobilization to successfully implement the ban, and starting this year, 14,000 teaching staff will be trained by the end of 2024 and 300,000 by 2025.

President Macron also commented on the ban. “It is not our intention to label,” he began, in an assessment that, because he is the president of the Republic, naturally brought his formidable “French wisdom” to the fore. “We cannot pretend that the terrorist attack or the murder of Samuel Paty did not happen,” he said, emphasizing that the French people live with a minority in French society that “challenges the Republic and secularism” and “abuses religion,” sometimes with “very bad” consequences.

Jérôme Legavre, a deputy from the far-left La France Insoumise (LFI) said, “Are these girls suspects who want to behead their teacher? What is Macron looking for? Does he want to create worse conflicts?” He presumably doesn’t want to, but if one remembers that the gap between him and his far-right rival Marine Le Pen in the 2017 presidential elections narrowed from 32 points to 17 points in the 2022 elections, one gets an idea of where France is heading.

This is how Jews, whose Frenchness is not doubted today, were targeted 80 years ago, denounced by their French neighbors, until France eventually became an accomplice to the Holocaust. Thanks to strong legal protection against anti-Semitism after the Holocaust, no one today talks about the Jews observing a kosher diet, the floor-length skirts of Jewish women, the bonnets or turbans worn by some Jewish women, the robes of Jewish men, the beards that go halfway down their chests, their kippahs, or the academics asking people to help them turn on the light switch at the university on the Sabbath. No one calls it “bondage” when religious Jewish women walk behind their husbands and greet their husbands’ friends only from a distance.

Eighty years later, Muslims are demonized with the help of the media and intellectuals through the “Law of principles strengthening respect for the values of the Republic,” the “Charter of Imams,” and the invention of so-called French Islam. Islam is portrayed as a dangerous religion in need of mass surveillance and repression, and Muslims as an existential threat to the country’s “Civilization,” “Tradition,” and “Values.” Speaking on the occasion of this latest ban, Government Spokesperson Olivier Véran said that these disguises amount to “a political attack,” but also “an act of proselytizing,” and “an act of trying to convert people to Islam.”

According to the national education minister’s formula, it will not be possible to tell what religion a student is when they walk into class—only a few minutes later, perhaps, when asked for their name, “it will be obvious who is a Muslim!” In other words, the names of Muslim students could well be defined as “offenses” as well. Indeed, far-right leader Èric Zemmour has suggested that the names of Muslims should also be frenchized. Considering that Macron’s former interior minister Gérald Darmanin criticized Marine Le Pen for being “soft on Muslims,” why not?

O

n August 14, millions of people in Bangladesh watched in shock and disbelief as news broke of the death of Allama Sayeedi. Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, a popular scholar, preacher, and Islamist politician had been imprisoned by Sheikh Hasina’s government since 2010 and died of a heart attack at the age of 83. According to local sources, he suffered a heart attack on August13, but was transferred to a specialist hospital by the authorities a day later. At the hospital, his condition deteriorated rapidly and he was reported to have died at 8:40 p.m. local time.

Experts have pointed to inconsistencies in statements from the medical team, which just hours earlier had said his condition was stable, leading many to suspect that poor medical care was the reason for his death. News of his deteriorating health and subsequent death spread like wildfire on social media, and thousands of his supporters surrounded the BSMMU hospital premises in Shahbag, in the heart of Dhaka, anxiously awaiting news. When news of his death broke, the crowd swelled to thousands, demanding that his funeral prayers be held the next day at Dhaka’s central Baitul Mukarram Mosque.

The Bangladeshi government refused to accept to the request, insisting that the body be buried in his hometown, far from the capital, and that only a limited number of people be allowed to attend his funeral. While Allama Sayeedi’s supporters remained outside the hospital until late into the night, a brutal police force finally dispersed the protesters and his coffin was taken away. The next day, 50,000 people attended his funeral prayers in his home town of Pirojpur.

Allama Sayeedi feared in life and death

Sheikh Hasina’s government had every right to be afraid of the gathering masses in Dhaka on the night of the scholar’s death—the last time people took to the streets in Allama Sayeedi’s name was to protest the 2013 verdict in the case investigating his alleged involvement in war crimes during Bangladesh’s 1971 War of Independence. The same Hasina government ordered security forces to take a hard-line stance and more than 100 innocent protesters were slaughtered when police and army used live ammunition to disperse mass protests in major cities across Bangladesh.

But who was Allama Sayeedi who so terrified the Hasina government both in life and in death? A man of humble scholarly origins, Delwar Hossain Sayeedi was born in 1940 in Pirojpur, Barisal district of Bangladesh, into a family with a madrassa background. He dominated the Islamic lecture circuit in Bangladesh for the past 50 years, clearly delivering the message of Islam and the Koran in vaaz mehfils (open-air/open-air mass meetings) attended by hundreds of thousands of people. His oratorical style, both eloquent and melodious, made him popular with people from all walks of life.

It is very common to hear his lectures still being played loudly in vehicles, restaurants, mobile phones, and people’s homes in Bangladesh, despite a government ban on mentioning his name in public. But that is not all: Allama Sayeedi was also a two-time member of parliament for the Pirojpur-1 constituency in the Barisal Division in southern Bangladesh, representing a Hindu-majority constituency, from July 1996 to October 2006. Fluent in Bangla, Arabic, and Urdu, the author of 75 books, he was also very active in humanitarian causes and was instrumental in raising funds for Muslim communities in the West, such as Europe and the U.S.

A witness in favor of Allama Sayeedi was abducted

At one point in the trial, Sukhranjan Bali, a prosecution witness who was testifying as a defense witness instead, was abducted from the courthouse steps and forcibly disappeared as he was about to testify that Allama Sayeedi had not murdered his brother. Bali was found many months later in an Indian prison, but by then it was too late: Sayeedi had been found guilty by the ICT and sentenced to death. However, Sayeedi’s immense popularity was a factor the government had not taken into account. In the afternoon of the day of the first verdict on February 28, 2013, police and army forces were ordered to crack down on demonstrators, firing on them. An estimated 100 protesters died across the country in the days of political violence that followed.

Following the state-sponsored violence and the exposure of the trial as a farcical, politically motivated witch hunt, the senior judges were forced to resign and Sayeedi’s death sentence was inexplicably commuted to life imprisonment in September 2014, presumably to maintain a veneer of impartiality and, more importantly, to prevent popular protests that could potentially topple the government from getting out of hand.

The trial of Allama Sayeedi at the ICT, along with a number of other trials of well-known opposition and Islamist politicians such as Abdul Quader Mollah, Kamaruzzaman, Golam Azam, Motiur Rahman Nizami, Ali Ahsan Mujahid, Mir Quasem Ali, and Salahuddin Quader Chowdhury, were touted by the Hasina government and its allies as necessary to bring closure and justice to the victims of the 1971 war. Instead, the farcical and biased nature of these political trials exposed deep-rooted plans to decimate the opposition to the Hasina regime through judicially sanctioned killings of key opposition figures and to strengthen the incumbent regime’s grip on power, effectively establishing dynastic rule for decades to come.

An enormous cost of the Hasina government

Hasina and her allies appear to have succeeded so far, ruling Bangladesh with an iron fist since 2009. But the cost has been enormous. Throughout this long period of Hasina’s misrule, the biggest victims have been the Bangladeshi people. Large-scale corruption, security, and governance failures, high inflation, high unemployment, rising poverty and a general lack of basic services are just some of the everyday problems that are getting worse for ordinary Bangladeshi citizens. Public dissatisfaction with the government is high; serious allegations of widespread vote rigging, ballot stuffing, and voter intimidation by the authorities in the last two general elections in 2014 and 2019 have severely undermined public confidence in the current regime and regularly trigger periods of mass unrest and political agitation.

Whatever relief Hasina and her supporters imagined they would get from Sayeedi’s death, it does not seem to have materialized. Far from diminishing his legacy, the circumstances of Sayeedi’s death and the injustice done to him in life have made him a shaheed (martyr) in the eyes of ordinary Bangladeshis. Many members of Hasina’s political party have criticized her on social media, saying “Islam comes first” when they were expelled for supporting Allama Sayeedi as a victim of Hasina’s injustice.

Tens of hundreds of funeral prayers were held for the revered scholar both locally and internationally. Unable to stop the national and international outpouring of support for Allama Sayeedi and his family, the government has resorted to tactics of surveillance, widespread raids, arrests, and imprisonment of opponents.

If anything, Sayeedi’s death is a Pyrrhic victory and has done more to diminish Hasina government’s legitimacy in the eyes of Bangladeshi citizens than to glorify it. His death has exposed a horrible side of the Hasina government and made it clear for all to see how Islamophobic, incompetent, and authoritarian this government really is. The authoritarian government of Sheikh Hasina may still be in power, but it is long dead in terms of political legitimacy and the right to represent the people of Bangladesh. You can kill many people, but you cannot kill an idea.

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Qadir’s observations underscore an important point: Muslims living in the West often find themselves caught up in the complexities of politics and day-to-day life. While this might sound exhausting, it’s not a rarity, but rather a common experience for Muslims in the West.

In stark contrast, Qadir points out that this level of complexity is noticeably absent in Turkey. The challenges Muslims face in the West seem less pronounced in the Turkish context and daily life as a Muslim is significantly less burdensome. The more streamlined and unburdened life gives Turkish Muslims a sense of ease and clarity.

Qadir’s perspective is a testament to the attraction Istanbul holds for Western Muslims and provides insight to the growing trend of Western Muslims moving to Turkey.

Islamic heritage and Western comfort

Adding to Turkey’s allure is the presence of numerous mosques, shrines, and landmarks intimately tied to Islamic history. These structures serve as tangible reminders of Turkey’s rich spiritual heritage and accentuate its appeal to Western Muslims, allowing them to embrace their faith openly while staying connected to their Western lifestyle. 

Lauren Booth, a British Muslim, author, and activist, shares her perspective on Turkey’s appeal: “It’s a great mix of Islamic and Turkish culture—that’s what’s incredible to me as a European.” “I can feel at home here as a Muslim and as a European. For me, it’s like two sides of my life are matched, finally,” she adds.

Booth also notes the growing trend of many Muslims being drawn to Turkey from countries such as the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. She describes this as a significant coming together that promises a hopeful atmosphere of prosperity and unity. Her experiences in Turkey, especially her visits to the grand mosques, led her to reevaluate her ideas about the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish people, and to acknowledge that her earlier understanding had been influenced by Western-centric Orientalism.

The lure of Western comfort and Islamic character make Turkey an ideal destination for Western students of Islam. Students from countries such as the United States find the mix of a developed society and political freedom and Islamic values particularly appealing.

Turkey’s educational institutions offer comprehensive Islamic Studies programs which attract those with a thirst for in-depth knowledge of theology, history, Islamic fine arts, and jurisprudence. Western Muslims who want to learn more about their faith, history, and culture respond to these points of attraction as well. 

Family ties and cultural bridges

Family ties and cultural heritage influence Western Muslims’ decision to make Turkey their new home. These ties provide a familiar touchstone in a foreign land and foster a sense of community and support. The presence of established networks can ease the transition and help newcomers navigate their new lives in Turkey.

Turkey’s social openness, and the warmth and welcome by the local population offer comfort and a sense of acceptance to Western Muslims who face discrimination in their home countries. In addition, the diversity within expatriate communities creates a supportive environment for newcomers seeking companionship and mutual understanding as shared experiences bridge cultural differences.

Muhammad Tahiri, a longtime resident of Turkey who leads a community of Western Muslims, emphasizes the appeal of Istanbul’s Islamic diversity and modernity. Unlike other Muslim countries with polarizing labels, Turkey has a harmonious atmosphere where labels such as “Salafi” or “Sufi” are less important. The ease of hearing the adhan (call to prayer) on the street and then shopping in well-stocked malls adds to this unique experience.

In addition, the freedom to access the Internet and mobile applications without surveillance contrasts with more controlled environments. Complementing this context, the Majlis of Istanbul Muslims has emerged as an initiative dedicated to fostering spiritual, social, intellectual, and professional dialogue within the Istanbul Muslim community, providing avenues for growth, collaboration, and the promotion of Islamic values and thought.

The migration of Western Muslims to Turkey reflects a blend of historical significance, religious freedom, social openness, and educational prospects. Turkey’s rich history, religious tolerance, and promising opportunities continue to attract Western Muslims seeking a fresh start. In their search for an environment that is consistent with their values and conducive to their faith, Turkey is proving to be a destination where these aspirations can be realized.

B

osnia and Herzegovina is made up of different ethnic and religious communities. The Serbs, as a prominent minority, have their own autonomous entity, the Republika Srpska, which makes up half of the Bosnian state, the other being the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Republika Srpska has its own legal authorities and institutions, but it still has to abide by national laws. However, this system does not appear to work as intended—especially when the largest minority demands secession.

The issue of secession has a legal and political background. Milorad Dodik’s recent legislation, which was passed on June 27, targets property ownership. His desire is to protect Serbian property as he fears that Bosnian authorities will either confiscate it or give it to Europeans seeking to buy property in Bosnia. Meanwhile Bosnian lawmakers are promoting the nationalization of state property since for them, real estate should not be under the jurisdiction of state entities but should belong to the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole.

The Serbian constituents of Republika Srpska are alarmed by such news: they want to take full control of the properties under their jurisdiction. The attitude signals the desire for independence, and Dodik is threatening Bosnia with an independence referendum which would allow it to secede from the country.

Bosnian Serbs’ strife for an independent foreign policy

Dodik’s motive for secession can be traced back to his vision of foreign policy. He believes that the West is responsible for dragging countries into wars, and follows a pro-Russian stance in most policymaking. For example, he blames the West for causing the war in Ukraine. This attitude stems from his political experience in the Yugoslav Wars, which he believes were instigated by the West. That is why he wants to keep Bosnia away from Western influence.

Dodik found an alternative in the policy goals of Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić. As of 2020, Vučić has been formulating new goals for his country’s foreign policy which he calls “Srpski Svet” (Serbian World). These policy goals include the expansion of Serbian influence in the Balkans. According to “Srpski Svet,” Serbia should have more influence in countries where Serbian minorities live and Serbia should become an independent actor which connects Europe and Eurasia.

Dodik is known as a pro-Russian figure and Putin often vocalizes his support for him. Vučić’s foreign policy agenda bears similarities to Putin’s “Russkiy Mir” (Russian World) wherein Putin promotes ethnonationalism and independence. However, Bosnia is governed by international law and EU regulations—a fact that Dodik interprets as his country being governed by foreign institutions, comparing the situation to that of the Russian minority which lives in the eastern provinces of Ukraine. If Bosnia does not change its pro-Western policy, he suggests Republika Srpska should secede.

Religious and ethnic distinctiveness of Bosnian Serbs

Domestic concerns have also been a powerful reason for promoting secession in the Balkans. Ethnic and religious divisions are in the political rhetoric of populist politicians. On July 30, Dodik denied the genocide of Muslims in Srebrenica and claimed that Bosniaks needed public support, reinforcing the myth of Serbian martyrdom. Dodik believes that Bosniaks are “second-class people” who have exchanged their original Orthodox faith for material gain.

The Republika Srpska holds public ceremonies in which Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosnians (Bosniaks) are cursed. These events glorify Serbian war criminals such as Ratko Mladić. Dodik deliberately keeps alive the nationalistic fervor of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s fueled by his desire to keep Republika Srpska under his jurisdiction ethnically homogeneous. As a result, other ethnic groups such as Croats and Bosniaks do not settle in Republika Srpska.

Dodik also shuns the Serbs who volunteer to serve in the Bosnian army. Legally, Republika Srpska cannot deploy an independent armed force under international agreements and Bosnia’s multinational army is obliged to protect all citizens, regardless of religion and race. As a matter of principle, the army cannot be composed of a single ethnic group; however, Dodik argues in favor of a Serbian army to protect Serbians. An ethnicity-based regional army would drastically reduce Sarajevo’s control over Republika Srpska.

Dialogue for the future of Bosnian Serbs

Dodik does not limit his diplomatic ties to Russia and Serbia. Last year, he invited Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Croatian President Zoran Milanović to participate in a dialogue for his handling of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s internal problems. He was also invited by Erdoğan to the Turkish Parliament where he celebrated Erdoğan’s statements on reducing foreign influence in Bosnia.

Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán tried to persuade Dodik to integrate with the EU instead of becoming an independent foreign state. The two have a close relationship and Dodik pays close attention to Orbán’s proposals.

The mediation efforts by Orbán, Erdoğan, and Milanović, who are all familiar with the political culture of the Balkans, can help Bosnia contain the secession issue. While traditional actors such as Russia and the United States are on opposite sides, new mediators can find a middle ground.

O

n June 27, 17-year-old Nahel M of Algerian descent was killed in France for fleeing such a routine procedure. According to the testimony of the two motorcycle police officers who carried out the identity check, Nahel was shot in the heart in self-defense. In the video footage, described by the interior minister as “shocking” and confirmed by the French news agency AFP, one of the police officers can be seen pointing a gun at Nahel M while the other can be heard saying “You will be shot in the head.”

Nahel did not have a driver’s license and had been out with a friend in a borrowed car. Two weeks earlier, Alhoussein Camara, a 19-year-old French teenager of Guinean origin, was killed by police during an identity check on his way to work in the southwestern town of Angoulême. According to French media reports, he “had a regular job, a driver’s license, and his car was insured.” Since 2022, 13 people have been killed by police during routine identity checks in France.

After Nahel M’s death, a silent protest, attended by his mother, turned into a violent demonstration in a few hours and gripped the whole country. France witnessed a riot of this magnitude for the first time in 18 years. In 2005, in the Paris suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois, 15-year-old Bouna Traore and 17-year-old Zyed Benna were returning from a soccer match when they ran away from a police identity check, drove into a transformer, and burned to death.

In the last 50 years in France, children and teenagers, on foot, ridding a scooter or in a car, have tried to evade police checks and died: Youssef Khaïf (Mantes-la-Jolie, 1991), Malik Oussekine (Paris, 1986), Lahouari Ben Mohamed (Marseille, 1980), Mohamed Diab (Versailles, 1972). Following the killing of these young men, who were all of Arab or African origin, there were protests and outbreaks of violence.

Since the riots in the suburbs of Lyon in the 1980s, in the last 40 years, there have been no more than ten suburban riots in France; some local, some in big cities, and the largest in 2005. Both in the past and now, people in the suburbs have not been able to organize themselves like other social protest movements in the country, nor have they been able to turn their reactions into permanent political pressure.

Romain Gavras’s movie Athena, which was broadcast on Netflix last year, ended with the message that those who burn and destroy end up burning and destroying themselves and their relatives. Similarly, quoted on a front-page interview in the newspaper Liberation, a father who participated in the weeks-long events of 2005, said to his son, now involved in Nahel’s protests and violence: “I swear to you, this is not helping anything.”

Of course, it is not acceptable or excusable to disrupt public order, no matter how justified the cause. Yet, this is not a method of protest and rioting specific to the suburbs or to young people of Muslim origin or Black youth. This time, suburban youth have led a popular uprising; such uprisings  have taken place in the streets since the French Revolution in 1789, which laid the foundations of the Republic.

Suburban youth were not present in the spiral of violence of burning, destroying, and looting that accompanied the protests that began in November 2018, which lasted for months in response to the rise in energy prices. However, the current suburban youth uprising has been joined by the yellow vests, extreme leftists, and those angry with government policies. According to official data, more than 6,000 vehicles and 12,400 garbage bins were set on fire, 147 attacks on municipal buildings and libraries were recorded, and 3,700 people were detained, a third of them children.

There are millions of silent people like the mother in Gavras’s Athena, whose 13-year-old child is killed just like Nahel and who weeps in silent prayer with her neighbors with an imam at their head.  They too are worried about the youth rebellion, no matter what happens. If these people were to suddenly leave the country, France’s hospitals, the post office, the subway, and the train company RATP would collapse and the whole system would be paralyzed.

The movie mentions them for a few minutes, but it does not focus on them. Instead, it focuses on a small minority among these millions of people and their anger: Karim, who attacks the police station with a Molotov cocktail after the news that his brother was killed by the police and starts a rebellion with his friends; his older brother Abdel, who fought for the French army in Mali; and his older brother Moktar, a drug dealer.

Abdel, who initially tried to suppress Karim and the rebels, was accused of being a “harki,” a traitor, by his sister, and he confronted Karim. The only historical reference in the movie appears indirectly in this scene. During the Algerian National Liberation Front’s war against France on the road to independence in Algeria, Muslims who stayed loyal to the French army under the mistaken impression that they were caught between two fires were called “harki.”

As for the brother, Moktar, the drug dealer, it is no secret that in some neighborhoods in the suburbs it is not easy to manage the tensions between crime and law enforcement. In many suburbs there is drug trafficking, petty crime, and gangs. Many of the young people involved in these incidents have no ties to their homeland, do not recognize the authority of their parents, and even threaten to turn to the police if their parents pressure them, reminding them that they are in France.

They are a small minority, often trying to exist in a state of hatred and resentment. But the aggression and impunity of law enforcement in France is no secret. The trial of two police officers charged in the 2005 riots centered on a police radio statement that “if they enter a transformer, there is little chance of getting out alive.” Both were acquitted in 2015.

Moreover, a new law passed in 2017 authorizes the police to use weapons in five controversial circumstances in case of failure to obey a “stop” warning.  In addition, young people often evade identity checks because they are bored of being subjected to them and want to outsmart the police fueled by the anger they feel towards them.

What remains after the riots in the suburbs end is the image of the police with shields, batons, and tear gas canisters, on one side, and the youth throwing objects at them, burning cars, fireworks, and mortars. Whether reporting favorably or against the riots, they are always reported with the same headlines, analyzed the same way, and after the events are over, they are not talked about until the next one. Not only according to the far right, but also according to society at large, the suburban youth are the most likely group to be scapegoated for such incidents, and they are sidelined until the next incident.

In today’s world where reality and fiction are blurred, the movie Athena is being revisited on social media and in the French press, with some going as far as to claim that the movie is an inspiration for young people. In addition, the murderer in the movie is not a police officer, as initially believed, but a far-right militant wearing a police uniform.

Karim, who never believed he was a police officer and started the rebellion, eventually loses his life in the film, while the film labels Abdel, who has won the admiration of the French state and integrated into the system, a potential criminal: after Karim’s death, Abdel is driven by this pain to organize the continuation of the rebellion.

Even though President Macron introduced some of the most Islamophobic legislation in Europe during his first term and Muslims have become a minority in France that is routinely targeted and discriminated against, Macron has shown restraint on this occasion. During the 2005 events, Sarkozy, who was minister of the interior at the time, called the protesters a “rabble” and talked about purging them.

On the contrary, in his first statement after Nahel’s murder, Macron strongly condemned the incident, calling it “unforgivable.” As for his electoral rivals, on the far left, Jean-Luc Mélenchon refused to “call for calm”; far-right Eric Zemmour likened the suburban riots to the “prodromes of a civil war”; and, on the right, Les Republicains president Éric Ciotti called the rioters “barbarians.” Far-right theorists such as Renaud Camus have long labeled them “invaders” and their smear propaganda goes as far as arguing that “they will colonize us.”

An article in Le Monde stated, “Although many forget and don’t want to see it, what has led to the violence in recent days is indeed a sense of injustice that makes one weep.” The banner on the Paris ring road outside the Parc des Princes stadium simply reads, “God rest Nahel’s soul.”

W

hat distinguishes the attack on the Qur’an in Sweden from other hate crimes? How have Swedish officials approached the most recent attack on the Qur’an? These and similar questions will be addressed below in an effort to understand the story behind the hate crime of burning a copy of the Holy Qur’an in front of the Turkish embassy in Sweden.

What distinguishes the attack against the Qur’an in Sweden from other hate crimes?

First and foremost, this attack must not be treated as a random hate crime by an isolated individual. That is because Rasmus Paludan, a Danish politician who chairs the Stram Kurs (Hard Line) party in Sweden, carried out the attack, and the courts have already established that Paludan, who also has Swedish citizenship, is a racist. In 2020, he received a prison sentence in Denmark and was disbarred. Paludan’s acts of provocation have consistently been placing Muslims in Sweden and Denmark at risk. The Swedish police continues to protect the politician despite the fact that since 2017 he has committed hate crimes against Islam and undermined public order. The situation is only made more severe as these attacks have been perpetrated by a collective/political movement, have become international, and have been defended by government officials.

How do Swedish officials approach the latest attack on the Qur’an?

Last year, citing freedom of expression, the Swedish police and justice minister allowed Paludan to burn the Qur’an during the holy month of Ramadan, despite objections from the country’s Muslim minority, which constitutes approximately 8 percent of the population, and Muslim countries. Something similar occurred within the framework of the most recent attack. Despite Turkey’s warnings, Paludan burned the Qur’an near the Turkish Embassy in Stockholm with the Swedish police’s permission. In a written statement, the Swedish police stressed the importance of freedom of expression and assembly. However, an important point that Swedish and other European officials who share the same view seem to miss is that such racist behavior has hijacked the political mainstream which has been for the most part ignored.

Why do hateful and insulting statements and acts, which target sacred values, not qualify as free speech?

Like many other rights and liberties, neither the freedom of expression nor the freedom of assembly are unlimited in modern democracies. One cannot enjoy such liberties in a way that violates the rights of others or undermines public order. Indeed, Article 19 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) stipulates that freedom of expression may be subject to certain restrictions to ensure respect for the rights or reputation of others, or for the protection of national security, public order, public health, or morals. Moreover, Article 20 takes a more authoritative step by stating that “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) features a similar regulation. Accordingly, Article 10 of the convention stipulates that freedom of expression “may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder and crime [and] for the protection of the reputation or rights of others.” The United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) also prohibits racist propaganda and activities.

Likewise, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) stresses that hate crimes and the incitement of discrimination must be punished. Accordingly, the commission argues that such punishment would send a strong signal to all social groups that democracy does not condone any action that violates its fundamental values, including tolerance, respect for human rights, pluralism, and non-discrimination.

Freedom of expression is undoubtedly a sine qua non of liberal democracy. However, it is unacceptable for the freedom of expression to jeopardize pluralism, a fundamental goal of democracy, and peaceful co-existence. That is exactly why international norms include reasons for its restriction. It goes without saying that the true purpose of insults and attacks against Islam’s values, such as the burning of the Qur’an and defamation of Prophet Muhammad, is to target European Muslims and, by extension, pluralistic societies.

Is Sweden’s position in line with international human rights laws?

Sweden is a party to the conventions of the United Nations and the Council of Europe that have been mentioned above. Accordingly, Sweden’s decision to allow Paludan, who was convicted of undermining public order in his country last year, to engage in the same act of provocation represents an abuse of freedom of expression, and violates the rights and liberties of others and undermines public order. In this regard, Sweden’s position is not in line with its commitments under international law. At the same time, such attacks, which promote discrimination and target multiculturalism and tolerance, also place Swedish democracy at risk.

Indeed, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), in its General Policy Recommendations Nos. 5 and 15, asked all member states, including Sweden, to combat and discourage hate speech in light of concerns over racist attacks and hate crimes targeting Islam. It is obvious that hurling insults at the Qur’an lays the groundwork for racist/discriminatory attacks against Muslims and aims to provoke Muslims. Consequently, permitting Paluden’s actions despite the severe and present danger they pose to public order represents a violation of international human rights laws.

What does the European Court of Human Rights’ 2018 ruling mean for attacks against religious values?

On October 25, 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled in E.S. v. Austria that insulting sacred values was not covered by freedom of expression, citing the possibility of inciting religious intolerance. The court also held that imposing a ban on acts like the most recent attack in Sweden, which involved harassment against religious values, was legitimate and necessary for upholding a democratic public order. Moreover, the court agreed with the local courts in Austria that the defendant’s statements regarding Prophet Muhammad amounted to “harassment,” rightfully fueled anger among Muslims, and placed religious peace at risk by promoting prejudice.

All in all, the ECtHR ruling establishes that Sweden’s reference to freedom of expression cannot be considered lawful. In this sense, it is necessary for the Swedish authorities to overhaul their national laws and practives to prevent the abuse of freedom of expression in a way that threatens to eliminate the culture of tolerance and social pluralism and to undermine public order.

The Swedish government’s approach is not in line with the country’s domestic laws either, since the Swedish Constitution requires public institutions to combat religious discrimination. Moreover, individuals who humiliate a social group based on their religious beliefs and incite others against that religious community can be sentenced to up to four years in prison under the Swedish penal code.

According to official data, 3,150 hate crimes took place in Sweden in 2020 alone. The weak response of Sweden’s public institutions to the rise of Islamophobia and hate crimes, together with their failure to enforce international and national laws, is deeply worrying.

C

arlos Martens Bilongo, a member of the French National Assembly, suggested the need for cooperation among European countries to rescue migrants in the Mediterranean. As a response, French MP Grégoire de Fournas insulted his colleague with racist words which caused immediate chaos in the assembly, prompting the suspension of the session.

Later, Grégoire de Fournas defended himself and asserted that he was referring to migrants rather than his colleague. He justified his words by saying, “There is a difference between saying he should go and they should go. He underlined the role of France in preventing illegal trafficking of migrants. Accordingly, migrants should go back to their home countries. As a result, I was not mentioning him in that content.”

Similar incidents

This incident brought back memories of another incident in which lawmaker Danièle Obono was represented in the magazine Valeurs actuelles with chains around her neck. The story was about slavery in the 18th century. “It humiliated my family and my ancestry,” Obono said.

In 2020, it was reported that French policemen used violence against dispossessed migrants forcing them to abandon their tents. A protestor shouted at police officers, “They are not animals, don’t act like they are!”

Racism, old and new

De Fournas did not offer any apology: he believes his words were misinterpreted and took no responsibility for the turmoil created by his racist remarks which ended the session.

President Macron did not accept De Fournas’s claim of misinterpretation, and stated that “he was overwhelmed by the words of the MP.” A couple of demonstrations against the racist comment took place in which Bilongo himself participated. Far-right party leader Marine Le Pen defended De Fournas by saying he was referring to migrants who were coming illegally to France. De Fournas explained that he received many messages from people on Twitter, who stand by him.

Grégoire de Fournas expelled from parliament

“Today, some people once again put my skin color at the center of a debate. I’m born in France and I am a French lawmaker and I didn’t think that today I will be insulted [like this] at the National Assembly,” Bilongo told reporters after the incident.

Mathilde Panot, leader of the far-left La France Insoumise group in the National Assembly, has demanded the expulsion of De Fournas, the toughest punishment for a French lawmaker.

De Fournas received a short-term expulsion order from the National Assembly. He argued that the punishment was too harsh and unfair; however, he added, “I accept this sanction because I am respectful to the institution I am working at.” De Fournas was expelled from the parliament for 15 days.

Growing nationalist tensions in France

 French nationality law provides for jus soli citizenship which refers to the right to obtain citizenship via birthplace. German citizenship, for example, is obtained jus sanguinis, which means gaining citizenship rights by blood, which is to say the nationality of one or both parents. The segregationist attitude of French politicians towards immigrants contradict the inclusive regulations of law regarding citizenship issues in the country.

Ethnic-based discrimination in France is becoming prominent. A society based on a liberal concept of citizenship is turning in favor of race- and ethnicity-based concepts of citizenship. Nowadays, a large number of people in France are more eager to live in a more homogenous society, alongside people consisting of the same ethnicity and color. The notion of citizenship is embracing an exclusionary tone and leading people to demand stricter restrictions on immigration.

France will choose its new president in April of this year. Current president Emmanuel Macron has not yet announced his candidacy, but he is expected to announce it officially soon. There are around 40 candidates who will run for the election.

The presidency is the strongest organ of the country’s two-headed executive branch. Thus, the French presidential election attracts a global interest as French presidents determine the country’s foreign policy and domestic politics.

While far-right politicians in France have been already mobilized, Macron, who was elected in 2017 with great expectations, wants to be re-elected. No prediction for a future election is easy, and neither is predicting whether Macron will be elected again. To this end, we need to have a brief look at Macron’s four-year term in office.

Macron’s failed tests

Emmanuel Macron faced many challenges in domestic politics after he was elected in 2017. The yellow vests protests and the COVID-19 pandemic were the most important tests. In November 2018, civil protests broke out against the rising fuel prices and living costs. The police response was violent and used disproportionate force against civilians participating in the protests, leading to severe criticism of the Macron administration.

The Macron government did not prevent the excessive violence by the security forces, but on the contrary, made legal arrangements for the use of violence. The General Security Law emerged as a reaction to the protests and was approved in France’s National Assembly, empowering security forces and justifying the use of excessive force to defend and protect themselves.

Macron failed another test in the fight against the COVID19 pandemic. His administration couldn’t efficiently overcome the socio-economic problems that emerged due to the pandemic, reducing confidence in Macron’s leadership. As a result, La République En Marche! (LREM) founded by Macron suffered a great defeat in the municipal and regional elections that took place in 2020 and 2021, respectively. LREM fell short of expectations and lost big cities such as Lyon, Marseille, and Paris to the Greens and Socialists, respectively.

Islamophobic aspects of the candidates

The Islamophobic views of prominent candidates such as Macron, Le Pen, and Zemmour in the lead-up to the election point to a serious threat to Muslims in the country. In fact, the marginalization and securitization of Muslims in France since the September 11 terrorist attacks reveal that the French governments follow an institutionally Islamophobic stance.

The Islamophobic views of prominent candidates such as Macron, Le Pen, and Zemmour in the lead-up to the election point to a serious threat to Muslims in France.

More recently, Macron’s government has closed down 17 mosques with vague claims of violating security laws or not meeting the required safety standards, and has surveyed nearly 90 mosques. Moreover, the government pressured the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) to sign a charter of “Republican values” as a part of its so-called French Islam project.

With elections drawing near, the French government is looking for ways to appeal to far-right voters. For instance, on February 5, 2022, they officially introduced the Forum of Islam in France (FORIF) that took over from the CFCM. What’s controversial about this forum is that all its members will be handpicked by the government, evidently undermining the political representation of Muslims in the country.

As part of their far-right ideology Marine Le Pen and Eric Zemmour are quite notorious for holding both Islamophobic and anti-Semitic stances. Both oppose the presence of Islam and Muslims in France. More extreme than Le Pen, Zemmour calls for the assimilation of Muslims and demands that French Muslims renounce their faith.

Muslims in France are struggling to decide which candidate to vote for in the election. Whatever the outcome of the election is, difficult days lie ahead for French Muslims, which comprise around 10 percent of the population. The worst-case scenario is a far-right candidate coming to power. Then Muslims would face innumerable difficulties including facing more violent acts in the coming years.

How might the election results affect relations with Turkey?

It seems that two political/ideological factions stand out in the French presidential elections. The first is the relatively moderate line represented by Macron, and the other is the far-right line represented by Le Pen and Zemmour. If Macron is re-elected, as seems probable at the moment, the current tense atmosphere in Turkish-French relations may continue. More specifically the tensions in Libya, Syria, and the Eastern Mediterranean, where the concerned parties are in direct confrontation, are likely to remain.

The second scenario would be catastrophic. If the far right comes to power in France, then, there would be a paradigm shift in France’s relations with Turkey. Turkish-French relations cannot remain healthy under a Turkophobic and Islamophobic government. In such a scenario, ideological motives would dominate the relationship and the bilateral relations may come to a breaking point. Therefore, Macron’s victory in the presidential election seems the more preferable option for Turkey.

On February 19, 2020, the right-wing extremist terrorist Tobias R. shot nine people with a migration background in a café in Hanau, Germany. The xenophobic attack targeted Muslims and showed that Germany has a serious problem with radical right-wing terror. The new German government declared that it wants to fight right-wing terror, and now, the question is how serious Germany is about this declaration.

Right-wing extremism is not a new phenomenon

Since the end of World War II, right-wing extremist ideas have been a taboo in Germany, and the aim has been to “de-Nazify” the German population. The strategy was to prevent a similar scenario to that which occurred between 1933 and 1945. Despite this, right-wing extremist political currents can still be found today. In addition to the minor parties NPD (National Democratic Party of Germany) and Der Dritte Weg (The Third Path) or the right-wing extremist movements PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident) and Identitäre Bewegung (Identitarian movement), the AfD (Alternative for Germany) is a symbol of how strongly right-wing extremism is present at the political level in Germany.

The entry of the AfD into the German parliament in 2017 as the biggest opposition party and the re-election of the right-wing extremist party to parliament in 2021 show that right-wing extremism is not a temporary problem but one that has deeper roots.

Although right-wing extremist attacks were a problem for society as a whole in Germany, it was not until the reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990 that the Federal Criminal Police Office of Germany (BKA) began to collect statistics for victims of right-wing extremist attacks. In 2002, the BKA introduced the system of definitions known as “Politically Motivated Crime” (PMK-System) in order to better record the number of victims. The system is considered inaccurate, and as a result the BKA’s victim figures differ from the victim figures of non-governmental organizations.

The federal government has been recording the number of victims of right-wing extremist attacks since 1990; as of September 2020, 109 victims have been registered. The newspapers Frankfurter Rundschau, Der Tagesspiegel, and Die Zeit, after a joint investigative research, recorded 187 victims for the same period; the Amadeu Antonio Foundation counts at least 213 victims.

Muslims are the main target

Since the reunification of Germany, Muslims have been the main target of right-wing extremist attacks. Between 1991 and 1993, there was an increase in racist attacks among the German population. At that time, the asylum debate was a very controversial issue, which is why asylum seekers were the main target of right-wing extremist attacks. The riots in Hoyerswerda (1991) and Rostock-Lichtenhagen (1992) were sensitive because the police, in particular, took a passive stance and even fuelled the mood against foreign citizens through populist statements.

Attack in Hanau – Insecurity grows for Muslims

On February 19, 2020, a right-wing extremist attack occurred in Hanau in which nine people with migration background were killed, six of them were Muslims. Politicians reacted to the attack with shock. Angela Merkel, chancellor at the time, said that racism is a poison and that such attacks were aimed at dividing society. The far-right party AfD did not make a clear statement and did not classify the attack as politically motivated or right-wing extremism, but as an act of a a lone wolf.

German public reacted with shock to the attack in Hanau shows that Germany does not realize the problem of right-wing extremism.

The fact that the general public reacted with shock to the attack in Hanau shows that Germany does not realize – or does not want to accept – the problem of right-wing extremism, especially against Muslims. The number of right-wing extremist attacks on Muslims and their religious institutions increases every year. In 2020, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) recorded 1,026 Islamophobic attacks, 103 of which were directed against mosques.

In 2010, the BMI recorded “only” 22 attacks on mosques. In 2022, armed attacks on mosques and Muslims continue. A desecration of 30 Muslim graves in Iserlohn, an arson attack on a mosque in Chemnitz, and an armed attack on praying Muslims in Halle are current examples of how Muslims in Germany have to live – namely, in fear of hate attacks because of their faith.

Federal government remains passive – until now?

Under Merkel, Germany did not always prioritize the problem of right-wing extremist attacks. The statements by former interior minister Horst Seehofer (CSU) that Islam does not belong in Germany, the book by Thilo Sarrazin (SPD) Germany Abolishes Itself (Deutschland schafft sich ab), and the xenophobic statements by Tübingen mayor Boris Palmer (Greens) show that Islamophobic ideas can be found in all political parties. With the murder of politician Walter Lübcke (CDU) in 2019, Germany was punished for its passivity: the district president of Kassel had spoken out in support of refugees and was subsequently killed by right-wing extremist Stephan Ernst.

The roots of right-wing extremism in Germany run deep. The AfD and other parties have members who hold xenophobic views. The new minister of the interior, Nancy Faeser (SPD), at least gave some hope of Islam being accepted in German politics and society when she stated, “Islam, of course, belongs in Germany.

However, the number of victims and attacks on mosques show that the tendency further excludes Muslims from society. If Germany wants to preserve a stable political environment and avoid further polarization in society, it must be more active. Otherwise, Otherwise, more German state officials could become victims of right-wing extremist terror along with countless other innocent civilians, as in the case of Walter Lübcke.

Finally, it’s been put to rest. The passionate and polemical debate between those of true faith and the heretics; equality and exclusivity; those who believe in freedom and those who oppress. If anything could sound the moral death knell of Europe’s purported universalism and nonsenses their ethical absolutism, it is their treatment of refugee children. The awful abuse by those with unrivalled power upon the powerless – that too, children, is the surest indicator of venality.

Whether it’s the sexual abuse of unaccompanied children throughout Europe or the recent forcible seizure of children in Sweden, something truly unholy is happening. What kind of sick, depraved system relishes in inflicting further suffering on the grief-stricken? Pity the weak in the lands claiming liberty. More specifically, the manner in which Sweden is precariously confiscating refugee children from their biological parents is outright shocking. Not just in the grotesque manner that children have been treacherously taken away from their parents, but in the cruel, sanctimonious justifications by Swedish Social Services.

High-sounding, grand glutinous words that boldly advocate for child welfare are parroted to claim the moral high ground and then weaponized to pulverize their tender lives. Imagine the utter hypocrisy of justifying mental anguish upon already troubled, scarred families and their children, all of whom fled war. This is a criminal absurdity. Without due care, thought or consideration, the Swedish state violently disrupts the lives of some of the most alienated segments of their own society, and justifies inflicting violence with reckless allegations of parental impropriety. Could anything be more perverse and misshapen? Villainy wears many masks, none more dangerous than virtue.

Critically, to further explore this crime of stealing innocence from war-scarred refugee children, it is important to judiciously deconstruct the claims that Sweden makes. How does it justify such unscrupulous behavior? In other words, what is the rationale for taking children away from their loved ones? To begin, Sweden justifies these extreme steps based on promoting their own self-image of being ‘champions of children’s rights and by claiming “Sweden has very strong legislation in order to protect the welfare of children.” Of course, nothing more to talk about then. Let’s just take their word for it.

The Swedish state – through its child welfare services  – the ‘Social,’took possession of a newborn baby immediately after delivery.

With such logic, it is inconceivable that the Swedish social system is not altruistic, trustworthy and reliable. However, when probing the reasoning behind child seizures, the opposite is true. Stealing children is often on unfounded, flimsy allegations by third-parties, unverified checks of domestic abuse, or dubious contentions of extremism. The Swedish state – through its child welfare services  – the ‘Social,’ rapidly intervenes without a process of mediation.

In one alarming case, they took possession of a newborn baby immediately after delivery. What is especially unbelievable is that any basic level of understanding of the principles of social work and child welfare undisputedly cautions against taking children away from their families and allows so only under the strictest situations and as a ‘last resort.’

A few further problematic issues further stand out: (a) What is the record of Swedish social services when seizing children; (b) How effective are they in providing a loving, caring home to the seized children; (c) Are the religious, moral rights of the parents being respected in raising the stolen children as Muslims? First, the situation for unaccompanied refugee children in Europe, and state-seized refugee children in Sweden specifically, is abysmal.

A report, based on research conducted by Human Rights Watch in Sweden from January 25 to February 8, 2016 identifies key shortcomings in the Swedish child welfare system. As a result of these shortcomings, some children “are not receiving the care and attention they need and to which they are entitled.” In other words, the evidence by independent investigators is the Swedish child welfare program suffers from serious drawbacks. Second, there are horrific stories of child abuse occurring in the homes of the children by their adoptive guardians.

The situation for unaccompanied refugee children in Europe, and state-seized refugee children in Sweden specifically, is abysmal.

In fact, on October 16, 2021, Swedish TV Channel aired a segment on the sexual abuse of Syrian refugee children, including instances of rape of children by their Swedish legal guardian. Also, there are at least, two cases of Syrian children, Yasmine and Dina, who were forcibly taken away from their families and later committed suicide.

The suicide of those two children should raise alarm about the repercussions of the Swedish Social horrific process. So much for the unquestionable standards of Swedish child welfare. Third, the seized children rarely are placed in the care of families that recognize, or even respect, the rights of their families to have their children raised according to their own faith and ethical values. Is this not basic in a democracy which recognizes and allegedly champions pluralism? Again, no concern for the Muslim faith and heritage of these children.

Altogether, the Sweden government’s reasoning is not convincing. In fact, it is eerily familiar to the residential school system in Canada that led to unspeakable crimes against Native Canadian children who were seized by the state. Similarly, the horrible situation of child welfare services in Sweden curiously ignores the following: clear directives to only institutionalize children as a last resort; ensure the safety of refugee children; account for the horrific suicide of refugee children and prevent the alarming cases of rape and drug abuse by refugee children taken away from their families.

All of this, unequivocally, indicates that that Sweden’s policy on seizing refugee children is illegal, immoral, and untenable. And what we are witnessing in the new emerging global political, socio-economic, and cultural transformations is not just the making of a counter-world order. Rather, it is the unmasking of the utter hypocrisy, of countries like Sweden, who advocate for rights of children in order to erase them.

Four weeks after Amnesty International was forced to halt is operations in India in September 2020, citing the Indian government’s crackdown on civil society, the UK-based human rights organization published a report warning of a coordinated effort to target journalists and activists in India and Kashmir, specifically those critical of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

The Indian government “must immediately halt its intensifying suppression of dissent,” said Amnesty International, following a series of counter-terrorism raids on human rights groups and human rights defenders and journalists in Jammu and Kashmir.

Since then, the situation has deteriorated from bad to worse for journalists in both Kashmir and India, culminating with terrorism charges levelled against me and 101 other journalists, lawyers, academics, and human rights defenders in November of last year – for “promoting enmity between religious groups” across social media, an Orwellian way to describe reporting violent attacks committed by right-wing Hindu groups against Muslims in Tripura state in late October.

These criminal charges were filed under the country’s draconian anti-terror law – the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) – a legacy of British colonial rule, prompting a strong rebuke from Reporters Without Borders, which said our “only crimes were to cover the recent attacks against mosques in the North-eastern state of Tripura,” while the Editors Guild of India described the bogus charges as an attempt by the BJP ruled state government to “deflect attention away from its own failure to control majoritarian violence.”

International silence has created space for New Delhi to carry out “counter-terrorism raids” against journalists and editors.

But whereas human rights and civil society groups have been vocal in their condemnation of the Modi regime’s anti-democratic and unconstitutional crackdown on dissent, India’s international allies, particularly Western governments, have been conspicuously silent, showing a willingness to ignore its attacks on free speech and free press in exchange for New Delhi’s unfettered cooperation in the contestation between Washington DC and Beijing for primacy in Indo-Pacific.

This international silence has created space for New Delhi to carry out an ever-increasing number of cynically named “counter-terrorism raids” against journalists and editors, particularly those in Indian administered Kashmir. Notably these raids go unreported in the intimidated and ever-compliant mainstream media ecosystem, which has helped Modi build the most extraordinary personality cult in modern political history,” as noted by former UN under-secretary-general and Congress MP Shashi Tharoor.

If convicted of sedition under the draconian anti-terrorism legislation, known as the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), both Shah and Gul face life imprisonment. It’s for this reason Sanjay Kapoor, head of the Editors Guild of India, accused the government of “stifling” democracy in Kashmir, and for painting journalists as the “enemy of the state.”

Meanwhile, Hindu nationalist leaders who publicly call for a genocide against Muslims and other religious minorities are ignored by security forces and the Indian government. The double standard and motive of the Modi government could not be more obvious.

It must also be noted here that this anti-democratic campaign to intimidate and silence journalists in Kashmir is taking place alongside continued government-controlled communications blackouts and curfews. The Modi government is desperate to deny the international community evidence of its human rights violations in the disputed territory, which have become measurably worse since 2019, the year India revoked Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status, as illustrated in an upward spike in extrajudicial killings.

“Indian authorities appear determined to prevent journalists from doing their jobs,” says Steven Butler, Asia programme coordinator of the U.S.-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), which partly explains why India has seen its democracy downgraded by 53^rd position on the most recent Democracy Index published by The Economist Intelligence Unit, while falling to 142^nd position out of 180 countries in the 2021 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders.

The Sweden-based V-Dem Institute went even further in its latest report on global democracy in describing India an “electoral autocracy,” and accusing the Modi government of “diminishing freedom of expression, media and civil society” to a point where it’s “as autocratic as Pakistan and worse than its neighbours Bangladesh and Nepal.”

Any number of Indian news media watchers have observed how the country’s mainstream media has essentially functioned as the public relations arm of Modi and BJP, leading many to mock influential television news channels as the “Godi Media,” a pejorative Hindi term that accuses journalists and editors of performing as lapdogs for the Hindu nationalist agenda.

“Perhaps the best example of how journalists have become accustomed to not challenging the government is the fact that Modi failed to hold a single press conference in his first term in office,” says iconic Indian editor and journalist Vir Sanghvi, who also observes how access to the Modi government has become conditional on the journalist’s ideology.

Clearly, the Indian government’s war on the free press and democracy hasn’t gone unnoticed.

The question is what will New Delhi’s democratic allies do about it?

For many years now, Belgium has been struggling with a teaching staff shortage. According to a survey conducted by Teacher Tapp Flanders, students are frequently left with no classes for several hours a day. In Brussels, Belgium’s capital, some schools lack up to 25 percent of teaching staff. The shortage is so severe that a number of schools could have to shut down. While the number of primary, middle, and high school students have steadily been rising since 2000, the number of teachers has steadily been decreasing.

Many teachers are retiring and newcomers tend to quit after a short period of working. Especially during the COVID19 pandemic, this shortage has become ever more pronounced as many teachers are on sick leave or in quarantine. In August 2021, there were roughly 1,500 teaching positions posted on the government-sponsored employment service page VDAB, whereas in August 2020, there were only about 600 – that is almost three times fewer.

While statistically, Belgium has a lower student-teacher ratio compared to its neighboring countries, the picture isn’t nearly as pretty as it seems. In some smaller areas, there are both Catholic and private schools which pull down the average. Whereas in larger cities, the case tends to be the opposite. The student-teacher ratio is much higher.

The steady rise of new students enrolling in schools in Belgium is a result of the presence of migrants, and it is particularly the case in larger cities. Ironically, this increase in diversity is not reflected in the teaching staff, especially the increase in the numbers of Muslims. With the hijab ban, discrimination, and Islamophobia, the number of Muslim teachers is extremely low.

Islamophobia discourages many migrants in Belgium from pursuing higher education.

As has been shown in several surveys and reports (see European Islamophobia Report 2021, people with a migrant background, no matter whether they are first-generation migrants or not, are often discriminated against at work simply because of the color of their skin or their names.

Islamophobia discourages many migrants in Belgium from pursuing higher education as they feel it will not provide them with anything extra as doors are already shut for them and will remain so. On the other hand, those who wish to continue their studies and become teachers are discouraged because they are not allowed to teach with a headscarf with the exception of Islamic religious education. Belgium’s biggest migrant groups are Turkish and Moroccan, and large portions of these groups adhere to Islam and believe that the hijab is part of it.

Ben Weyts, the Flemish Minister of Education, came up with ten measures to increase the number of (active) teachers; however, none of these measures included actions to help/allow citizens with a Muslim-background into the teaching system, including those with wearing hijabs. Ironically, Weyts is more willing to hire people who have not graduated from an educational program providing that they enroll in a short formational program rather than hiring hijabis who have graduated from relevant departments.

Another poll held by Teacher Tapp Flanders suggests that only in very few schools, teachers with hijabs are allowed to teach all classes; in most schools they can teach only specific classes. However, the vast majority of whom stated that either this was not possible, or, perhaps even more painfully, that they had no clue whatsoever on this matter.

Furthermore, Weyts has launched a campaign to make the teaching profession more appealing to potential teachers, and intends to call back retired teachers and install a system of seniority to encourage young teachers to stay longer. Again, no mention of the hundreds and maybe thousands of trained yet unemployed veiled teachers who are eagerly awaiting the chance to do the job they love and have been trained for. The hijab ban stems from the ban on all religious symbols and yet, it is the Muslim community in Belgium that is unevenly targeted by this ban as religious identity becomes clear with veiled women.

As the Jewish and Catholic communities have their own schools, it is only Muslim women who are left in the lurch by the hijab ban. The reasoning behind the ban is that a teacher is obliged to be neutral. However, this reasoning completely ignores the reality of the composition of current Belgian society, in which over 500,000 Belgian citizens identify as Muslim. What is more, this number is continuously growing, along with the number of Muslim children attending schools. Yet, the Belgian government obstinately takes the position that these two identities cannot coexist – you are either Muslim or Belgian.

If the Belgian government were sincere in its wish to grant all citizens their basic rights to work and freedom of religion, it would accept its Muslim citizens as they are and recognize that their religion and hijab are an inherent part of their identity, and that Muslims citizens wish to represent and be represented. Conversely, the government’s constant infringement of the rights of Muslim Belgians makes one wonder about its sincerity when it clamors for “neutrality” and “equal rights.” The only explanation for this is Islamophobia.

Tareq Alaows is one of the initiators of the Seebrücke (1) Initiative and a member of Flüchtlingsrat (2) Berlin. In February 2021, he launched his candidacy for the Green Party to represent Oberhausen in North Rhine-Westphalia. Although there was a public interest in his candidacy, he decided to withdraw due to threat calls that he received against him, and people close to him. Politics Today interviewed Tareq Alaows about his experience as a Syrian refugee in Germany and the political participation and representation of refugees in Germany.

Q. Could you please briefly introduce yourself and tell us about your journey as a Syrian refugee to Germany?

I left Syria in July 2015. After traveling to Lesbos, Greece through Turkey, I took the Balkan route. I took most of the way to Germany from Athens on foot, and I finally arrived in the German city of Dortmund in September 2015. I had studied law back in Syria, and for more than five years now, I work as a jurist, who is engaged in providing legal aid for refugees during their asylum and residency processes in Germany. I am a political activist too and one of the initiators of the political movement called the Seebrücke. I am still a part of the coordination circle and serve as the press secretary.

Q. When and how have you become politically active in Germany?

Well, I haven’t become politically active ever since I arrived in Germany. I furthered my work in the humanitarian field, which I had started much earlier in Syria and continued here in Germany. But the central issue of my work was no longer human rights in Syria, but human rights in Germany. I took the cause for people, who came here as refugees.

I had no other choice than to become politically active. When I arrived here, I saw that our legal rights as refugees were not being properly applied in practice. I was detected in a military center in the middle of nowhere. When I wanted to buy something, I was supposed to walk five kilometers to the nearest supermarket. There were no buses or trains or any other means of transportation. After two months, I was transferred to Bochum. There, I was supposed to live in a basketball hall at a school with sixty other people. Families, men, women, children, all of us, were in one room, and we were not allowed to do anything that we wanted.

I lived in this situation, where we could not even enjoy our basic human rights for six months and I could not stand it anymore. I had to react to this situation and started an action. I organized the people in our accommodation and set a protest camp in front of the City Hall.

Q. Quite naturally, you demanded to live in dignity. How did German authorities react to this? What was your experience with the first protest?

We managed to make our demands heard thanks to our protest in front of the City Hall. Thereafter, we were organized under Refugee Strike Bochum and continued to be active in the negotiations. We observed the implementation process of our demands in regard to the asylum policy in Bochum in the following years. We started to have regular meetings with the City Hall. There, we did only talk about our problems, but also provided solutions. The administration in the city hall was responsible and saw that we, as refugees, were a part of the solution. In the end, we learned a lot from each other.

Q. To protect your basic rights and demands, you have democratically organized and taken a political role at the local level. But what has motivated you to take an active part at the federal level?

During my political activism at the local level, I recognized that everything I said reached the German politicians in my city better than what the German activists or the political parties in the opposition were saying. Because I was talking about my life and the very conditions that I was living in. I think they could not argue against it.

And I see that I am not an exception. I know thousands of refugees from different countries, as well as people from Germany, who are doing a great job here in uplifting the refugee voices and working to maintain the human rights for refugees.

I just have been lucky to have the media attention, which helped shed light on and bring solutions to the issues we -as refugees- encountered. But the question eventually transformed into how could we represent these persons, who have arrived in this society?

I was eventually transformed from being a normal person running for candidacy to a target of racism and hate speech. People who target me are not targeting me as Tareq Alaows but target a person of color with a refugee background, a person who showed the courage to claim his rights to be represented in the German parliament.

I just run for the elections, and this is a democratic right. At the end of the day, it will be German voters’ decision to elect or not to elect me. But the right-wing party viewed it differently. They were afraid of me being elected in a democratic way and they did everything to stop me.

Q. What did exactly happen, and you decided to withdraw your candidacy?

I was receiving hundreds of comments and messages on the internet, that said that they knew where I am living, where I am walking, and where I am eating, and I had to be careful. And I saw that most of the messages were written in the “we” form, and not in the “I” form. It was like groups in the background and not like single persons. There were two people in my team, who were deleting those racist comments and messages on social media and documenting things that are relevant for my safety for the police.

I just run for the elections, and this is a democratic right. It’s the German voters’ decision to elect or not to elect me. But the right-wing party viewed it differently.

Most of the messages were anonymous and we could not tell by whom they were sent, or which persons or groups were doing it, so, there was nothing we could do. For me, it was a very dangerous situation, and nobody could calculate consequences. I had to protect my family and people working with me. I had no guarantee for my safety. So, I had to withdraw my candidacy in the elections. But as a jurist and political activist, I still defend the basic human rights of refugees.

Q. What was the reaction of the Green Party, or of other political parties, to this incident?

Both the Green Party and other democratic parties learned something from this experience. The Green Party, of which I was a candidate, accepted my withdrawal from candidacy and drafted a document in order to avoid a possible future incident as such and to establish a mechanism to counsel and support victims of such racisms. I think every political party in Germany must start debates about racism in politics and work for developing awareness.

Q. Your experience, then, highlights that there are serious obstacles concerning the participation and representation of minorities in political life in Germany. How do you think it could be overcome?

This could be overcome only by empowering those people in politics, who are victims of racism and encouraging them to get involved in democratic processes. Because the only way to fight against racism in politics is to have more people with a refugee or a minority background in politics. We can talk about democracy if every group in our society, including the minorities and the newcomers, are represented. Otherwise, it is nothing but a mock debate. We need to have more democratic environments and dialogue between members of the host society and the newcomers.

We also need to work to create awareness among the youth via programs for young persons, immigrants, or non-immigrants and let them be involved in these political debates. Above all, we need to put it in a context; when we talk about refugees we talk about humans.

Importantly, all these debates and dialogues need to be translated to a legal basis. We need more clear and strict laws against racism and extremism both on online platforms and in real life. Racism is not an opinion, it is a criminal act, and we have to name it and fight against it.

Although I decided to cancel my candidacy for the German federal elections of 2021 and continue my work in the humanitarian field, I am optimistic that political parties in Germany have learned something from that experience.

Last month, Congresswoman Ilhan Omar (D-MN) was referred to as a terrorist and “suicide bomber” by Rep. Lauren Boebert, who has made several Islamophobic remarks towards Omar, and other members including Rep. Rashida Tlaib. Yet again, these remarks went unchecked, leading Muslim staff within Congress to send an open letter to House leadership. Signed by a total of 440 House and Senate staffers, 62 being Muslim, the letter urged leaders to act in the face of heightened Islamophobia, especially within the building, by rejecting and condemning anti-Muslim bigotry.

“Witnessing unchecked harassment of one of only three Muslim members of Congress – and the only visibly Muslim member – we feel that our workplace is neither safe nor welcome,” the letter to House Leadership read.

In the last two decades, mainstream U.S. political discourse has dehumanized Muslims and served as a justification for their persecution domestically and abroad.

From the post-9/11 surveillance apparatus structured by the Patriot Act to the gruesome wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that took the lives of millions, the common denominator was the use of Muslims as political collateral. Islamophobia is the manifestation of the dehumanization of Muslims, which was institutionalized through these kinds of policies.

Many Muslims have joined the political sphere to lobby for their full rights and protections under the U.S. constitution.

Muslims in America have mobilized and organized against racist domestic and foreign policy across this time by creating advocacy organizations, mutual aid groups, and community centers. They have worked to counter the discrimination faced by Muslims in America at a grassroots level. Many Muslims have even joined the political sphere to lobby for their full rights and protections under the U.S. constitution.

The number of Muslims running for office and participating in political decision-making has risen worldwide. With the emergence of Muslims being elected into spaces such as Congress, Parliamentaries, and state legislatures, unhinged right-wing attacks on Muslim candidates and elected officials have been on the rise, too.

Given the rise of anti-Muslim rhetoric, bigotry, and violence fueled by political parties, transnational white supremacists, and Islamophobic hate group networks, this bill seems like an obvious step towards humanizing and protecting Muslims in the U.S. and across the world.

But even with the disturbing statistics portraying the need to work against anti-Muslim bigotry and rhetoric, republicans spent their time mocking the Islamophobia bill during the hearing, further demonstrating the dehumanization of Muslims.

The bigotry displayed by politicians such as Boebert’s factors into an extensive history of Islamophobia, and Xenophobia in general, being weaponized against ethnic and religious minorities within positions of power, mainly to provoke fear and cause division. It is also a product of the threat felt when an individual such as Ilhan Omar, a Black Muslim woman who’s also an immigrant, brings a new political perspective that represents more than just White Americans in discourse and policy.

The U.S. is in the midst of confronting the skeletons in its closet. One of the most common and consistent forms of Islamophobia within the U.S. has been structural. It has reflected itself within the historical roots of our political dynamics via common attempts of anti-Muslim legislation and perpetuated by deeply politicized dialectic Islamophobia through different modes.

These methods consist of consistent misrepresentations of Muslims within media, policing and surveillance, and unequal treatment within the legal system. The cherry on top has been the repetitive use of anti-Muslim rhetoric and statements made by political candidates and government officials heightened through social media.

Silence is not an option. To deinstitutionalize Islamophobia within our political systems, it must start with Congress taking a firm stance against the rising dehumanization of Muslims and open anti-Muslim bigotry. This is not an issue that is limited to political figures such as Congresswoman Omar- it is directly affecting hundreds of Congressional staffers and millions of U.S. Americans.

Furthermore, our duty as Americans is to ensure all are treated equally within our political and legal system. As Muslims continue the fight against institutionalized Islamophobia through grassroots advocacy efforts, we must continue to vocalize our demands for justice and equality with our elected officials and the American public.

The elections held in Germany on September 26, 2021, produced interesting results. The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) increased its votes by 1.8% to become the first party after nearly 23 years, while Chancellor Angela Merkel‘s Christian democratic alliance of two political parties – the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU) – lost 7.7% of votes with Armin Laschet and came in second position.

No party could get enough votes to form a single party government. Compared with the 2017 elections, the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) received only 10.3%, a drop of 2.3% compared to 2017. Another significant change was the withdrawal from political life of Angela Merkel who had been Germany’s chancellor uninterruptedly since 2005.

Angela Merkel: “We can do this”

Chancellor Merkel led not only Germany but Europe as a whole in the fight against the Euro crisis, the so-called immigration crisis, Brexit, and COVID-19. In particular, her slogan “We can do this” (Wir schaffen das), which she put forward on August 31, 2015 during the European “migrant crisis”, was later used in many other crises.

This concept, also known as “welcoming culture” (Willkommenskultur), became a concept that presented Germany’s positive attitude towards immigrants, especially in the eyes of politicians and public institutions. However, politics in Germany did not evolve as optimistically as the slogan would have one believe: the AfD, a new political party, used Merkel’s slogan against her to rise in politics.

The rapid rise and fall of the AfD

The AfD was established in 2013 with anti-Muslim and anti-immigration policies and increased in popularity rapidly. In 2015, intense immigration to Europe from Middle Eastern countries, primarily Syria, and Germany’s reception of approximately 1.2 million immigrants in 2015 and 2016, caused the AfD to find quick social support and to rise in the 2017 elections. This rise started to decline before reaching high levels.

Given the legacy of WW II, it was unknown whether support for the AfD, Germany’s first far-right party in recent times, would continue given the fact that violations of Muslims’ rights and attacks against Muslims, Islamic organizations, and foreigners have been increasing across the country. The AfD had received 4.7% of the votes in 2013, and it turned the 2015 immigration crisis into an opportunity and received 12.6% of the votes in the 2017 federal elections.

Elections in Germany and the far right

The most important factor in the drop in AfD votes is that the party lost credibility by not making specific policy recommendations for the problems that Germany is facing.

First of all, although the vast majority of Muslims in Germany are peaceful and tolerant, the AfD has created hostile rhetoric about Islam. It incites fear, classifies people, and pits groups against each other, especially during elections. The AfD conflates the concepts of Islam, immigration, and terrorism. On the other hand, COVID-19 underlined the codependency and interconnectedness of all segments of German society.

Although the vast majority of Muslims in Germany are peaceful and tolerant, the AfD has created hostile rhetoric about Islam.

The AfD claimed that internal security deteriorated due to the increasing number of foreigners and Muslims in Germany. However, the police crime statistics, which have been recorded since 1993, demonstrate the crime rates have been constantly decreasing.

The AfD’s asylum policy consists of harsh political demands and provocative slogans: they want to close the borders, exercise deportation, and cut off social support. Even the right of asylum provided by international law means nothing to them. The party wants to abolish individual protection and asylum guarantees. However, statistics reveal that Germany needs more foreign labor every year. If the AfD’s policy propositions had, in fact, been realized, there would have been serious problems in the labor supply in Germany as was the case in the U.K.

Elections and Germany’s domestic politics: immigration and Islamophobia

Although public support for the AfD has declined, having received 10.3% or 4,803,902 votes in a country with a high population like Germany suggests that it still has many supporters across German society. The AfD’s active use of digital platforms and social media is enhancing its popularity, especially among the youth. The AfD is the vanguard party for young people under 30. While 19% of voters under 30 voted for the AfD, 18% preferred the CDU.

The AfD is followed by the Green Party with 13% of the votes. This figure shows that the middle-aged and elderly population prefer the traditional parties; however, this points to a danger lurking in  Germany’s future. On the one hand, cases of violence related to discrimination and xenophobia are increasing in society, and on the other hand, votes for the far-right AfD are decreasing.

This may seem like a contradiction, but it shows that people with far-right ideas resort to violence more than in the past. Research has shown that 38% of AfD voters are strictly populist and 35% are partially populist. The majority (56%) of AfD voters seem to have embraced far-right views: 27% are potentially far-right advocates while 29% explicitly adhere to far-right ideology.

The September 2021 elections in Germany show that hopefully for at least four years, Muslims and foreigners will not face extra legal restrictions as the new German government is not expected to step up the abuses of the rights of Muslims or foreigners. The so-called Traffic Light Coalition (Ampelkoalition) consisting of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the Free Democratic Party, and the Greens declared a coalition agreement that promised granting some rights to immigrants.

For instance, children who were born in Germany will receive German citizenship immediately at birth if one of the parents has lived in Germany for at least five years. Another important promise for immigrants is that they can become dual citizens. The conditions for acquiring German citizenship after five years of residing in the country could be made easier in Germany.

In other words, there is a room for hope. However, the AfD still poses a threat to Germany’s future. Time will tell whether the AfD will opt for further radicalizing its voter base and try to make them more aggressive towards Muslims and foreigners in an effort to gloss over its election loss.

On November 12, thousands of protesters took to the streets of the Maldivian capital Male, calling for and an end to the Indian military presence and interference in domestic affairs, while chanting, “Indian Military Out,” making it one of the largest ever political protests on the archipelagic country, and igniting similar protests elsewhere, including Fuvahmulah city, where thousands gathered on Sunday, November 14, 2021.

Despite the Maldivian government’s efforts to ignore and downplay the protester’s demands, the hashtags “IndiaOut,” “IndianMilitaryOut,” and “DefendMaldives” have since become the top trending topics on social media in the country.

While the Maldives and India have long enjoyed warm ties, with Indian nationals accounting for 90,000 of the roughly 1.5 million tourists who visit the Maldivian islands each year, there’s been a noticeable shift in attitudes among the general population in recent times, as resentment grows towards New Delhi’s ever-more aggressive policies and meddling in the country and region.

These anxieties were given a jolt in June, when a series of leaked documents, showing communication between the Maldives Foreign Ministry and the Indian High Commission, revealed the Indian government denied a request by the previous Maldivian administration, under President Abdulla Yameen, to withdraw its Indian Military helicopters from the country in the months leading up to the 2018 Presidential Election.

Mr. Yameen was ultimately defeated by his Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) rival and current President – Ibrahim Mohamed Solih – in the November 2018 polls, a victory secured among allegations New Delhi had tipped its finger on the scales by meddling in the election.

The Indian government denied a request to withdraw its Indian Military helicopters from the Maldives in the months leading up to the 2018 Presidential Election

These allegations were given undeniable credibility when former President and current Speaker of Parliament – Mohamed Nasheed – gave an interview to India Today in 2019, in which he praised Indian officials and diplomats for creating a “small window” to help MDP win the election.

Worryingly, for many Maldivians, President Solih has been acting as New Delhi’s “yes-man” since the election, prompting widespread concerns he has traded the country’s sovereignty and independence to enrich his political and personal fortunes, while also dressing up Indian military expansionism as “infrastructure projects.”

More troubling still is the way some of the agreements between the two countries have been signed in secrecy, and made available to the public only because of leaked documents obtained by The Maldives Journal earlier this year.

Worryingly, for many Maldivians, President Solih has been acting as New Delhi’s “yes-man” since the election.

At the core of the protesters grievances is revelation the current Maldivian government has signed a secretive deal with New Delhi, allowing for Indian military personnel to enjoy full diplomatic immunity and tax exemption status, thus constituting a violation of the Maldivian Constitution, which states foreign soldiers may not be stationed in the country without full approval from Parliament.

Hamdham Shakeel, co-founder and editor of the independently operated Maldives News Network, explained to Politics Today how Maldivians don’t wish to be caught in the middle of a potential future shooting war between India and China in the increasingly contested Indian Ocean, a concern he described as “one of the major driving forces behind anti-Indian military sentiments.”

“Stationing and operating military assets in the Maldives would mean that it has become a point of military operation. Maldivians would have to face collateral damages for stationing Indian military personnel and hardware in the Maldives,” therefore breaking from its long-held policy of remaining neutral in regional and great power rivalries, said Shakeel.

Of particular concern is an agreement signed between the current Maldivian government and India on 21 February to develop and maintain the country’s most strategic military naval bases – Uthuru ThilhaFalhu (UTF) – which is not only located within close proximity to the capital city, but also described as its “last line of defence.”

Details of the agreement became public only after it was leaked to local newspapers, revealing Indian military personnel will be allowed to carry arms and live ammunition and conduct their own surveillance and patrols in the country.

It’s for these reasons, the “Indian Military Out” protest movement continues to gather steam, becoming better organized, with the group “Defend Maldives,” consisting of the opposition coalition, a breakaway faction of the ruling party and many other smaller groups, lending its support and infrastructure.

Expectedly, the Maldivian government launched a counter campaign against the protest movement on 17 November, when it issued a statement condemning the protesters as only a “small group of individuals with the objective of tarnishing the country’s long-standing cordial ties with India,” while accusing them of “spreading false information.”

Conspicuously, however, the Maldivian government mischievously removed the word “military” in its statement, therefore mislabelling the protest movement as “India Out,” a naked effort to malign the “Indian Military Out” protest movement as anti-India.

Shakeel scoffed at the government’s characterization of the protesters, describing the Maldivian people as great friends of the Indian people and culture, and saying they specifically oppose India’s BJP government’s “aggressive foreign policy revolving around Indian imperialism in the Indian Ocean” and encroachment on the country’s sovereignty and independence.

On October 16, 2021, the leading Dutch daily, NRC, reported that during the past few years, mayors of several municipalities in the Netherlands have commissioned a private agency to investigate a number of mosques. As part of this operation, undercover investigators attended mosque services, mingled and socialized with other believers, and reported their findings and impressions to the mayors. The mosques were unaware of these unannounced visits, because the investigators were Muslims themselves – as are the agency’s managers.

In a letter to parliament, the Dutch justice minister, Ferd Grapperhaus, has since commented on the newspaper report, because it also implicated the National Antiterrorism and Security Coordinator (NASC), which is a directorate-general of the Ministry of Justice and Security. The NASC had allegedly recommended this particular agency to the mayors, while it also provided subsidies to cover the costs of the investigations.

In his letter, the justice minister acknowledges that as early as 2017, NASC officials already suspected that the private agency conducted unlawful undercover operations. However, the mayors were not warned about this since, according to the minister, they were the ones responsible for guaranteeing the lawfulness of the investigations.

This is hardly convincing, since, as Grapperhaus acknowledges, the NASC covered the costs of the investigations and recommended the agency to the mayors. As part of this process the NASC assessed the applications for subsidy submitted by the mayors. This should have included a check on the appropriateness of the methodology, especially since reservations had already emerged within the ministry. Since Grapperhaus is also responsible for religious services, his civil servants should have ensured that these investigations would not include infiltration in mosques.

By law, the authority to investigate organizations and persons who pose a threat to democracy and the rule of law has been entrusted exclusively to the Dutch intelligence agency.

This is not the only concern raised by the letter. Grapperhaus admits that mayors, in close cooperation with the NASC, have been involved in detecting tendencies within the Muslim community that might undermine the rule of law and democracy for years. However, mayors and the NASC have no role to play in this area.

By law, the authority to investigate organizations and persons who pose a threat to democracy and the rule of law has been entrusted exclusively to the Dutch intelligence agency. In addition, to be able to use these powers the intelligence agency has to meet strict requirements, such as to demonstrate that there is a serious suspicion that a threat exists. Therefore, the mayors have acted unlawfully.

Research shows that joining terrorist organizations is not triggered by religion, but instead by social exclusion, discrimination, and the treatment of Muslims by Western countries, and in particular the Palestinian people. What is more, it is actually the lack of knowledge about Islam which causes people to join al-Qaeda and Daesh, since possession of such knowledge would make them immune to the claims made by recruiters.

By treating Muslims as a “suspect community,” these problems are not solved but deepened. To combat terrorism effectively, society needs the help of Islam and the Muslim community. As is the case in many countries, the Dutch Muslim community is more than willing to assist and it has even reached out by presenting a plan to combat terrorism, which has ended up in a government drawer.

At the international level, the Dutch government champions the rights of Muslims. Within the EU, Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte is being nicknamed the “rule of law sheriff.” These laudable international efforts would be much more effective if the Dutch government would lead by example at home.

Facing a labor shortage after World War II, in October 1961, Germany created a program to bring in so-called gastarbeiter or guest workers from Turkey. Besides Germany, other Western countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Austria also needed workers to boost production in their booming postwar economy.

Many of the Turkish guest workers who arrived in the country never left, and created a minority community that forever changed the demographics of Western European countries. As stated by the German Federal Foreign Office, “We called for workers, but people came.”

Today, sixty years on, individuals with Turkish roots form one of the largest minority groups in EU countries. Politics Today interviewed six motivated, educated young adults from five different countries who all share a migrant background.

Burhan Bayhan, 31, Denmark

Burhan Bayhan, a 31-year-old Danish-Turkish historian living in Copenhagen, told Politics Today he was never able to meet his grandfather as he died when Burhan was still a baby. This made him try to meet his grandfather through understanding and studying his legacy.

My grandfather Kemal Bayhan was one of many guest workers who sought their luck in Denmark in the late 1960s. He was born in a village in Sivas, Turkey, where he worked as a farmer. He got an invitation letter from an employer through a friend from his village who was already working there. He left behind a wife and five children, and came to Denmark in November 1969. He worked for many years in low-paying industrial jobs to build a better future for his family which he brought to Denmark in 1980 through family reunification. 

As a kid I used to play with his coin collection and ask my parents questions about him. But many questions about his first years in Denmark remained unanswered. So last year, I went to the Danish National Archives in hope of learning more about him. I found his immigration case, which answered all my questions. To my big surprise, I also found a picture of him and my grandmother which I had never seen before – this was really an emotional moment for me.

In a time where hatred and anti-immigrant rhetoric against immigrants became the norm, we should remember that these hardworking guest workers sacrificed a lot including their health for building and straightening our welfare system from which we benefit today. I feel really proud and lucky to be a descendant of a Turkish guest worker. Thanks to him, today, I am a well-educated and open-minded person, and their struggles keep inspiring me and giving me strength.

Rıdvan Denizoğlu, 21, Belgium

The process of adjusting to Belgian culture made the 21-year-old Rıdvan Denizoğlu question his background. This led to an identity crisis in which Denizoğlu has been asking himself whether he is Turkish or Belgian. After a long period, he came to the conclusion that it is a huge benefit to be in-between both cultures.

My grandparents were among the first Turkish guest workers to arrive in Limburg, Belgium, in the 1960s. My grandfather worked here for years in the Beringen coal mines. My mother was the first child of six, making the future generations of my family in Belgium a fact. I love to listen to my grandparents’ stories about this time, and they love to tell them. The common theme in all their stories is how hard it was to adapt when you come from a rural village in Ardahan in northeastern Turkey, and suddenly find yourself in industrial and ‘modern’ Belgium/Europe where nothing is the same.

Because of my background and experiences, I am following a primary school teacher training course because I do not agree with the way children with a migration background are treated. That is why, as a teacher with Turkish roots, I hope to realize a renaissance in which future Turkish children are treated fairly and can make the best of themselves. I am also president of the Youth of Willebroek (YoW) association. Our goal is to bring out the best in young people from all cultural backgrounds.

While dealing with such matters, I try to motivate the next generations to speak up, to use their talents, to show that we, as a younger generation, must continue the “legacy” of our grandparents. They came to an unknown place during difficult times to provide a better life for us. Despite the fact that we still have a hard time as “immigrants,” we have to thank them by working hard and to show them that their efforts were not in vain.

Büşra Suratlı, 27, Germany

Büşra is 27 years old, and was born and raised in Germany where she works as a civil servant. In addition to her work, she is studying to get her degree in business administration. Büşra talked to Politics Today about how her grandfather was homesick his entire life.

My grandfather Mustafa Özcan who was originally from Trabzon, left his family behind and came to Duisburg, Germany, as a “Gastarbeiter” in 1970 where he stayed with many other Turkish guest workers in a dormitory. They stayed in one room where everyone had his own closet and shared the same bathroom. My grandfather could only communicate with his family in Turkey through letters. Sometimes he would record an audio on cassettes and send them by mail which would take 10 days.

After 1976, my grandmother and children also came. In Hüttenheim, a total of six people lived in a two-and-a-half-room apartment. My dear grandfather used to travel 20 km a day by bike to go to the train station in the city center and buy the Tercüman newspaper which wasn’t even up to date. Most of the times it was from two days ago, but it was a great blessing for him.

Although his children lived in Germany, in the late ’90s, my grandfather decided to go back to Turkey. Then, he was only able to see his children and grandchildren during holidays when they would visit Turkey. The Turkish word “gurbet,” which means the state or feeling of being a stranger in a foreign country, or longing for one’s homeland, always remained part of my grandfather until his death. Being alone in Turkey made him become homesick for his family.

As a bilingual European Turk, I am currently working as a civil servant in Germany. I proudly tell the story of my grandfather to everyone. I feel very lucky for the decision he made. Most of the time, I think about his suffering and visualize it in my mind. My wish is to pass on these memories to the next generations, and not to let them forget that we are here because of them. I think it is important to represent our culture and homeland in an exemplary way for the sake of all the sufferings they went through.

Ahmet Turan Atmaca, 26, Netherlands

Ahmet Turan is 26 years old and is working in the field of environmental sustainability through recycling. He was born and raised in Rotterdam in the Netherlands where he was able to study at the same building his grandfather once worked at as a guest worker.

In the beginning of the 1960s, my grandfather Ahmet Atmaca came to the Netherlands where he stayed and worked at the Rotterdamsche Droogdok Maatschappij, which pre-World War II was the largest shipbuilding, ship-repair, and machine building facility in the port city of Rotterdam – it existed between 1902 and 1996. I’m proud to say that my grandfather was part of such an important company when it comes to the Dutch shipping industry.

I’m even more proud of the fact that I was able to study later at the same place my grandfather once worked. The older I get the more I realize what kind of hardship my grandfather had to endure. From a small village in Trabzon, a city on the Black Sea coast of northeastern Turkey, to the port city of Rotterdam situated on the Maas River. Only for this reason these two cities will forever hold a special place in my heart.

In 1994, my grandfather decided to move back to Istanbul. He would come and visit us in the Netherlands from time to time. Every time he came, we would take different walking routes in Rotterdam where we had the most precious conversations. I remember he loved to look at the Maas River, maybe because it felt like home, the Black Sea. I really think that my passion for caring for nature, the environment, and my admiration for the sea comes from the relationship I had with my grandfather.

Unfortunately, my grandfather passed away earlier this year. As the grandchild of a migrant, I think it is important to continue talking about their sufferings otherwise the next generations won’t be aware of what our grandparents once did for us. They really sacrificed their lives for us. Most of the Turks in Europe owe this to their parents and grandparents.

Yasin Güler, 25, France

Yasin is a motivated councilor of the municipality of Erstein, a city near Strasbourg, where he was born and raised. Yasin, who is 25 years old, holds a master’s degree in international law and currently lives in Paris. Here he works as a compliance Manager for an MGA Insurance Managing General Agent. He also has a great passion for Turkish classical music.

My story starts the same as a lot of other Europeans with Turkish roots. My father saved some money in the early ’80s to move to France. As a result of the introduction of the law on family reunification, my mom too, was able to come to France. Being the youngest child of a family of 5, I have always been very interested in culture, sports, and music. At this stage of my life, I realize that I, just like other children of migrant parents, have been asking myself questions the answers of which weren’t actually that hard to find.

I realized that even though my roots are miles away, through my passion for art and music, I slowly start to understand that I belong to both countries. From a very young age, I’ve been aware of the possibilities the country I was born gave me, and, therefore, it was more than crucial to give back to the French community through my education and personal achievements. An example of this is my work for the municipality after I became a councilor. As the second- and third-generation Turks in Europe, our lifestyle and achievements today we owe to our family members, friends, and every individual who helped us through this process.

Sometimes I’m exposed to the question of whether I feel more Turkish or French. I use the term “exposed” because I don’t think that there is a certain answer to this: there are just people with stories and paths they have walked on – that is what matters.

Latife Özdemir, 23, Netherlands

My grandfather Vahdettin Özdemir was born and raised in a small village in Elazığ, southeastern Turkey. After elementary school, he had to stop his education and work with his father because of their poor conditions. He once told that they only had one pair of shoes at home and that he had to share this with all his siblings. In the winter, he sometimes had to walk barefoot through the snow.

In the early ’60s, my grandfather went to Germany, where he worked in the coal mines for a long time. After a few years, he decided to move to the Netherlands where he stayed in a dormitory with a lot of other guest workers while working at the harbor of Scheveningen in The Hague.

My grandfather used to send voice messages through cassettes from The Hague to his village in Elazığ to my grandmother and their children. My father tells us that whenever a cassette would come, the whole village would come together to listen to his stories and how hard life was abroad. Sometimes the cassettes came months later. My grandfather used to sing Kurdish songs known as “Dengbêj” (a genre of singing storytelling) in which he expressed his feelings and the hardships he was going through.

Because my grandfather had to stop his education from a very young age, he encouraged my father to study. Although my father was lucky enough to be able to continue his education in the Netherlands, it wasn’t always easy to adapt to the culture and learn the Dutch language. In 2001, three years after I was born, my father got his master’s degree in criminal law from Leiden University. Currently, I am studying law as well, and I am more than proud to hear these stories and reflect on the migration and integration history of our family. I hope the next generation of Turkish Europeans will continue telling these stories and become more active as an integral part of modern European culture.

The T-shirt promoted by the Israeli military with an image of a pregnant Arab woman under the gaze of an Israeli sniper and with the slogan “ONE SHOT TWO KILLS” can still be found easily on the web, and remains fresh in the minds of many.

Recently, the world was shocked to see yet another photo where Panamanian policemen, in a joint exercise with Israeli trainers, pointed and fired their bullets at a target of a figure – it is not clear if it is a man or a woman –  wearing the traditional Palestinian keffiyeh.

The aberrant image was captured in what the Panamanian police called a “part of a training course with military instructors from the Israeli embassy.” A few hours later, the police institution of the Central American country issued a brief statement in which it apologized, clarifying that its values ​​are not represented in the leaked images.

The apology was issued in large part thanks to pressure from the Panamanian Committee of Solidarity with Palestine and various personalities of Arab origin.

Panama is a country that was born in 1903 when it separated from Colombia, largely thanks to U.S. imperialist ambitions. Today, the country has a population of just over 4 million, and is home to both Jewish and Arab communities which are among the most influential and powerful in the world.

Despite the fact that the country’s Arab and Jewish population numbers only 40,000 individuals, with Arabs and Jews being equal in number, their coexistence is absolutely peaceful and they have even forged social and commercial ties over time. That said, there have been cases in which Jewish families have sent their children to join the Israeli occupation army.

The Israeli influence, supervised by the United States, is very strong in Panama. One example is that Panama is one of the only two Latin American nations, along with Mexico, that still do not recognize Palestine as a state. In the UN Israel-Palestine votes, the Panamanian diplomatic representation usually votes in abstention, which in practice generally amounts to supporting Israel.

As soon as the infamous photo of the Panamanian policemen shooting the figure with the keffiyeh while being advised by Israeli instructors was made public in Panamanian media and social networks, the Arab community and several voices of local society were heard, resulting in a public apology by the police. Yet, Israel is unfazed. Israeli summer camps offering military training where even minors and tourists pay to go shoot figures in Arab dress continue their activities. Can you imagine what would happen if in a country somewhere in the world civilians or soldiers were trained to shoot at figures with the Jewish kippah?

Most of the Arabs in Panama are Muslims; many Arab women wear the hijab, the traditional headscarf that many female followers of Islam wear, and it is also possible to find men and women wearing keffiyeh. Knowing that the police of Panama, their country, and the very state body created to protect them, is being trained to kill people who look like them cannot be a pleasant feeling.

In neighboring Colombia, a few months before elections, there is a latent possibility that alternative movements will take power through democratic procedures. A large section of Colombians still remember that a few decades ago, a large part of a political party called the Patriotic Union, which opposed the traditional Colombian establishment, was eliminated through assassinations that in many cases went unpunished.

It has been proven that the paramilitary forces responsible for thousands of these deaths received advice from former Israeli military personnel. Countries like Argentina, Guatemala, or Honduras also still remember the role that Israel played in providing arms, and logistic and diplomatic support to dictatorial regimes that committed abuses against their peoples.

Many Panamanians are aware of the history of their neighboring countries. They are also clear that their country is a U.S. colonialist target. The U.S. invasion of Panama at the end of 1989 with the supposed objective of overthrowing General Manuel Noriega, a former CIA agent, and the mysterious plane crash in 1981 causing the death of General Omar Torrijos, who displeased Republicans by advocating for Panama’s rights and negotiating new terms for the administration of the Panama Canal with former U.S president Carter, are two facts that continue to serve as open wounds in the nation of the isthmus. Not all Panamanians welcome the fact that the U.S. protégé has so much influence over their military and police apparatus. It is not just the Arabs of Panama who have been upset by recent events.

The political stability of Panama is remarkable with the country being a place of peaceful coexistence for many cultures, and the Panamanian people know that what the police did was wrong. Its rectification has not really convinced Panamanian Arabs, but at the same time something important has happened: thanks to the fact that thousands of Panamanians did not remain silent, it is very likely that, at the very least, such an abomination will not be repeated on Panamanian soil and that the Israeli hasbara machine will think twice next time before provoking a community that, although far from its ancestral lands, is still part of them.

Throughout history, ties between Christian and Islamic leaders have had more downs than ups. It was Pope Urban II who launched the first Crusade in 1095 triggering almost two centuries of hostilities. But in recent times, relations have largely improved. Pope John Paul II made significant efforts to advance the cause of Catholic-Islamic relations. He condemned the siege of Sarajevo repeatedly. When John Paul II visited Damascus, and prayed at the Umayyad Mosque in 2001, it was the first ever Papal visit to a mosque. Pope Benedict XVI prayed in the Blue or Sultan Ahmet Mosque in his visit to Istanbul in 2006.

However, Benedict’s gesture was in large part to make up for what was seen as a disastrous Regensburg address in September 2008. In the speech, he cited a conversation between a Byzantine emperor and a Persian scholar, “Show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.”

Most Muslims took offence at what they perceived to be the Pope arguing that Islam was inherently violent and evil. The former Pope perhaps to heal ties then changed his position from opposing Turkish entry to the European Union to supporting it. Relations with Al Azhar also were put on pause after Pope Benedict called for the protection of Egyptian Christians after an attack on a Coptic church in 2011. Benedict as a German Pope tended to see everything through a very Eurocentric prism.

Pope Francis has over the last seven years made strenuous efforts to reset ties. Aside from his meetings with the Grand Shaikh of Al Azhar, he has reached out to many figures in the Islamic World. In 2014, he visited Palestine and met with the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Sheikh Mohammad Hussein. This year he made the first ever Papal visit to Iraq in March and was able to sit down with Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, one of the pre-eminent clerics in Shia Islam. Islamic prayers were uttered within the walls of the Vatican for the first time ever back in 2014.

The Vatican-Azhar ties were most profoundly illustrated when Pope Francis and Sheikh Ahmed signed the document on “Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together” in February 2019. The introduction described the document as “…a joint declaration of good and heartfelt aspirations. It is a document that invites all persons who have faith in God and faith in human fraternity to unite and work together so that it may serve as a guide for future generations to advance a culture of mutual respect…” This formed the basis for an ensuing Papal encyclical entitled, “Fratelli tutti” that was certainly forward thinking.

Productive ties between leaders of different religious traditions matter. One hopes that they retain a positive influence amongst their flock. Who knows if some of the more extreme elements might turn their heads when Popes, Grand Ayatollahs and Grand Muftis work together? One can only hope that increasingly such comings together include senior Jewish and other religious figures from other faiths.

In Europe and North American anti-Islamic sentiment is rife. It has existed of course for centuries in differing forms but in the modern era the events of 1979 and 2001 certainly drove Islamophobia on. The Iranian Revolution saw a major rift with the West and notably the U.S. which continues today. The fatwa against the author Salman Rushdie did not help at all nor did the Danish cartoons crisis, both issues where the divides were considerable. The 9/11 attacks triggered huge anger in the U.S. and elsewhere but also a series of wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere which saw hundreds of thousands of Muslim civilian lives lost.

The Islamist extremist attacks by the likes of Al Qaida and Daesh also drove these sentiments. The world stood with Paris, Berlin and London as they suffered vile attacks with major landmarks being lit up.

Much of the above anger is understandable. Such attacks were unconscionable. But the 9/11 attacks did not represent Islam and nor does Al Qaida and Daesh. For the overwhelming majority of Muslims, they are an abomination. Even Donald Trump pointed out that the greatest victims of Al Qaida and Daesh violence have been Muslims. However, at a public level, this is rarely understood. All too often the Western media focusses intently on the western victims of Islamist violence not the Muslims. Daesh’s beheadings of western journalists and aid workers in Syria led to military intervention but little was said of the much larger numbers of Syrians and Iraqis beheaded and even crucified by the group.

However, too many leaders in Europe and North America instrumentalized this hatred as opposed to calming the situation and directing the struggle at those truly responsible. It was more convenient to depict Islam and Muslims as a threat than as part of the solution. This continues today as the likes of Viktor Orban of Hungary likes to portray his country as the last bastion of Christendom against the hordes of Islam as if Vienna was back under Ottoman siege once more. “Is it not worrying in itself that European Christianity is now barely able to keep Europe Christian? There is no alternative, and we have no option but to defend our borders.”

Anti-Immigration like Islamophobia is a vote winner. Hence Muslim immigrants are doubly vulnerable to this, depicted as a cultural, economic and a terrorist threat.’

Anti-Immigration like Islamophobia is a vote winner. Hence Muslim immigrants are doubly vulnerable to this, depicted as a cultural, economic and a terrorist threat’ even though research shows that every act of terrorism in the U.S. since 9/11 has been committed by a citizen or legal resident. The threat is not foreign as the far right likes to portray. But blame the immigrant anyway.

The treatment of refugees is also damning, not least when European powers do so little to help those making the terrifying dangerous Mediterranean crossings. Few make the difference between migrants and refugees, those fleeing conflicts and oppression. Our societies are the poorer for putting up walls, physical and psychological. We need to explore other means of resolving these crises without having to resort to inhuman incarceration or refusing to help save lives of innocent people.

Pope Francis tried to play a positive role. In 2016, he washed the feet of 12 immigrants, some of whom were Muslim and following a visit to the Moria camp on the Greek island of Lesbos, he arranged for the Vatican to host 12 Syrian Muslim refugees. But did this get the attention it deserved, and did it stem in any meaningful way the tidal wave of anti-Muslim, anti-immigration hatred? The Pope called on every Catholic diocese to host refugees but the take up was very poor.

Islamophobia still does not get the attention it merits. Many belittle the issue and fail to recognize how widespread this issue has become. Social media is a cesspool of hatred on all issues. In the first 24 hours after the Christchurch mosques’ massacres in 2019, Facebook removed 1,500,000 videos of the attack that killed 50 Muslims. Some uploads were watched over 20,000 times.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not help. Extremists feel empowered by conflicts to vent their hatred. Jewish communities in Europe are not responsible for Israeli crimes, just as Muslims worldwide are not responsible for the crimes of Al Qaida and Daesh.

Despite the national outrage caused by last summer’s terrorism attack in London, Ontario, when a right-wing extremist used his truck to target and kill four members of a Canadian Muslim family, Islamophobia continues to persist in Canadian politics. Earlier this month, the Alliance Citoyenne Quebec, a marginal party competing in next month’s municipal elections, issued a statement declaring that: “Islam is contrary to fundamental Quebec values. Islam is a cancer that is slowly growing inside Quebec society.”

The statement was released by the proudly Islamophobic party’s candidate for mayor of Quebec City, Alain Giasson, in response to the candidacy of Boufeldja Benabdallah. Benabdallah is running in the Cap-aux-Diamants district for Équipe Marie-Josée Savard, the heir-apparent of outgoing mayor Régis Labeaum, who will be stepping down from politics.

Giasson told CTV News that: “The trigger [for the statement] was the fact that the co-founder of the Islamic Cultural Centre of Quebec [Benabdallah] is up for election… His whole adult life in Quebec City, he has worked very publicly for the Islamization of Quebec.”

This justification is even more startling considering that in 2017, six Muslim men were shot dead at the Islamic Cultural Centre. The murder victims were: Ibrahima Barry, 39; Mamadou Tanou Barry, 42; Khaled Belkacemi, 60; Aboubaker Thabti, 44; Abdelkrim Hassane, 41; and Azzedine Soufiane; 57. Nineteen other worshippers were injured.

After decades of campaigning, Benabdallah helped to launch the region’s first Muslim cemetery in 2019. Giasson cites this move as proof of Islamization. Benabdallah, who has lived in Canada for more than 50 years now, told media that: “I was really hurt that there are still people who don’t see me as a citizen, who just see me as a religion.”

Although the party’s statement was subject to a hate speech complaint, Elections Quebec, the agency that oversees campaigns across the province, refused to intervene because of its proclaimed “neutrality,” saying that there is “no Quebec law that addresses the content of political platforms.” Note, this comes only months after the national government held a conference on the importance of combatting Islamophobia in Canada.

In Quebec, the majority of its citizens are still Catholic, and historically the Catholic Church “took advantage of this situation to guide the French-Canadian population through institutions and symbolism.” Although Québécois finally started to embrace secularism with the rest of Canada, spurred on by the Quiet Revolution (1960–1970), many Quebecois still saw – and continue to see – other religions as a threat to their own Christian identity.

As Quebec has increasingly become more multicultural with the arrival of new immigrants, the divisions have intensified. The white, Francophone population often express their outrage towards demands from minorities who request reasonable accommodation for their religious practices. The government of Quebec eventually created the Consultation Commission on Accommodation Practices Related to Cultural Differences in 2007. However, the resulting report further erased the presence of religious difference in the province by “recommend[ing] that agents of the state be banned from wearing any religious symbols.”

This is why earlier this year, the Quebec Superior Court upheld the new Quebec law barring civil servants in positions of “authority” from wearing religious symbols at work, saying that “Quebec had the right to restrict the religious symbols donned by government employees.” The law mainly targets Muslim women and members of other minority religions, not Christians, which demonstrates a clear bias against some groups over others.

This is a key feature of the brand of secularism that Quebec has embraced, after the French model. This kind of secularism claims to be neutral, instead of geographically linked to the West and favoring Christianity. As a result, other religions are marginalized.

Today, the problem of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hatred is not limited to Quebec or Canada; a significant portion of Western society also questions if Muslims can be good citizens. Many scholars now argue that Muslims are perceived as dangerous or threatening to society if they are openly Muslim. The result has been stark: Muslims in the West are tolerated only so long as they do not make any political claims and practice their religion in private. When Muslims do become politically active, Islamophobia flourishes. Although the national conversation is improving, the stark reality is that almost half of Canadians (46%) still viewed Islam unfavorably in a 2017 poll conducted by the Angus Reid Institute.

Muslims in the West are tolerated only so long as they do not make any political claims and practice their religion in private.

Fortunately, the Alliance Citoyenne Quebec is a marginal party: in the previous election, Giasson only received 0.61 per cent of the vote. Furthermore, in 2017, the party ran 13 candidates, whereas only five are running this year on election day, November 7. Nevertheless, it should not take two massacres for Canadian politicians to firmly address the scourge of Islamophobia that persists in Canadian society and politics. The country’s secular institutions are only fueling the problem, not offering any working solutions.

The right of religious adherents to wear religious clothing remains a divisive issue in Europe. Not only national governments have restricted this right in recent years, but private employers too are increasingly imposing bans on religious clothing. And while such bans are usually couched in neutral terms, they are often directed against Muslims, raising the fear that they will entrench Islamophobia. Nonetheless, the EU’s highest court has ruled that private employers may pursue a policy of neutrality and cite their business interests to justify discrimination against female Muslim employees.

Already in 2017, the EU Court of Justice had ruled that private employers may not discriminate directly against employees wearing the hijab, but that they may project an image of neutrality: they may not single out Muslim employees but can effectively reach the same result by cloaking their discriminatory intentions in neutral terms. Despite the torrent of criticism that followed, the Court confirmed its decision last week. Employers may adopt a policy of neutrality if there is a genuine need on their part, for example preventing social conflicts at work or meeting the wishes of customers not to see religious people.

According to the Court, member states can maintain laws that offer greater protection against religious discrimination than the EU minimum, but such laws should not unduly harm the interests of employers. In essence, the right not to be discriminated against was found to be less important than the desire of colleagues and customers not to interact with female Muslim employees.

How will the judgment affect Muslim employees?

How the judgment will affect the rights of Muslim employees in Europe is not entirely clear. Defenders of last week’s ruling point out that individual states may still adopt rules that are more protective of the right to religious freedom at work. In the 2017 judgment, the Court seemed to suggest that all EU member states must allow private employers to project an image of neutrality, including states with rules that are more favorable to the protection of religious freedom. Last week, however, the Court clarified that EU law does not impose uniform standards: member states can maintain rules that are more favorable to the right to wear religious clothing.

How the judgment will affect the rights of Muslim employees in Europe is not entirely clear.

However, the Court also ruled that more favorable national rules must not unduly harm the business interests of employers, a finding that is contrary to EU anti-discrimination legislation. The legislation aims to contribute to the full participation of all citizens in economic life.

To that end, it provides a robust framework for combating discrimination in employment, while allowing member states to adopt rules that are more favorable to the protection of equality than the EU minimum. The Court, instead, ruled that more favorable rules may need to be disapplied when the economic interests of employers are at stake. It found that the pursuit of equal opportunities for religious groups may be less important than the desire of companies to cater to the anti-religious views of their customers.

In particular, they should ask the Court to reflect on the real reasons behind so-called neutrality policies. These policies are not neutral between different beliefs, but disproportionally affect female Muslims. Moreover, private employers seem to have no reason to project an image of neutrality, were it not for their desire not to offend employees or customers with different beliefs. Should they really be allowed to cater to customers who are so prejudiced that they get upset at the sight of religious garment? Asking the question is answering it, but not, unfortunately, for the EU’s highest court.

Perhaps the Court’s approach to religious discrimination is explained by a fear of being drawn into the fractious debate over neutrality in France and Belgium.

Is religion different?

The European Union can be justly proud of its approach to discrimination. EU legislation offers comprehensive protection against discrimination on grounds such as race, gender, sexual orientation, and religion. The Court has been fairly consistent in ruling that exceptions to the right to be free from discrimination must be drawn narrowly. According to settled case law, for example, employers may not invoke their business interests to justify discrimination on the basis of their race or sexual orientation. For some reason, however, its approach to religious discrimination is different. This poses the question: Is religion so different from other protected grounds that a different approach is justified?

Some have defended the Court saying that it would be too controversial to meddle with national approaches to religious freedom. Perhaps the Court’s approach to religious discrimination is explained by a fear of being drawn into the fractious debate over neutrality in France and Belgium. However, even these countries make a distinction between public and private sector employment: the principle of laïcité does not apply to private employment. The Court could have respected the Franco-Belgian conception of neutrality without allowing private employers to pursue similar policies.

Another reason that has been put forward for treating religion differently is that it might seem unfair to distinguish between different expressions of personal belief. If an employer may wear the hijab, may a conservative person wear an “Abortion is Murder” t-shirt? May a vegetarian employee wear a hoodie that reads “Meat is Murder”? However, not all personal beliefs are equally worthy of protection. First, unlike the “Abortion is Murder” t-shirt, no one can reasonably be offended by someone wearing the hijab.

Second, while the hijab can often not be removed without remorse, our conscience is not usually burdened by a ban to manifest our commitment to vegetarianism. So yes, regulating religion clearly poses difficult questions, but that does not justify the EU court dodging such questions at the expense of religious minorities. And the right answer to such questions is certainly not to sacrifice the rights of Muslims on the altar of economic interest.

India’s ruling party – the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – has not only been chipping away at the rights of religious minorities in the courts since taking power under Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2014, but also in the streets, where Muslims are faced with escalating threats from roaming Hindutva radicalized gangs.

The data shows that 90 percent of religious hate crimes in the previous decade occurred after Modi was sworn into office, and that an overwhelming majority of the victims were Muslims and perpetrators Hindus.

What we are witnessing today is the mass radicalization of a Hindu majority under a regime that has made no secret of its intent and desire to transform the country’s secular democracy into a tyrannical Hindu theocracy.

At the same time the Modi Government and BJP ruled states enact laws to make Muslims second class citizens, their most vociferous supporters are lynching Muslims, Dalits and other religious minorities with a perceived sense of total impunity.

And who could blame Hindu nationalists for thinking the Indian state had given them its explicit blessing to carry out dastardly deeds.

And who could blame Hindu nationalists for thinking the Indian state had given them its explicit blessing to carry out dastardly deeds, given the way in which Delhi Police officers so enthusiastically participated in the slaughter of 52 Muslims during the 2020 Delhi Riots?

A fact-finding report into the violence cited “instances of sexual harassment of Muslim women by the cops and also instances of police engaging in direct violence and abuse” during the riots that broke out in Northeast Delhi, after a former BJP leader urged his followers to attack anti-Citizenship Amendment Act protesters.

Victims of the violence, and their lawyers, have accused authorities of pressuring them to drop their respective cases and of sabotaging the investigation by carrying out raids of law firm offices to destroy evidence against Delhi Police.

On 23 May, police raided the home of 42-year-old Mohammed Aquil Qureshi in the state of Uttar Pradesh, after Hindu locals accused him of cow slaughter. According to his surviving wife and two daughters, the police tried extorting a bribe from Qureshi, before cracking him over the head with the butt of a gun and then throwing him to his death from the home’s terrace.

On 23 May, police raided the home of 42-year-old Mohammed Aquil Qureshi in the state of Uttar Pradesh, after Hindu locals accused him of cow slaughter.

What we are witnessing here is the radicalization of the country’s police departments by Hindu nationalist forces, a reality brought clearer into view by the recent upward surge in the deaths and torture of Muslims in police custody.

On 31 May, a 21-year-old Muslim man in Haryana was tortured to death in the custody of Haryana’s cybercrime police unit. The killers not only used anti-Muslim slurs against his family members but threatened violence against them should they file a report.

“If you file a complaint, I will make your entire family like Junaid’s state”, a police officer reportedly told the victim’s brothers, according to their mother.

Sadly, he wouldn’t be only Muslim murdered in police custody that day in Haryana.

Fifty-year-old Ayub Khan was tortured to death by police officer at Panipat’s Quila police station.

On 1 June, police in Uttar Pradesh’s Amroha are reported to have tortured six Muslim men in custody the “whole night,” after locals had falsely accused them of slaughtering an ox. One of the victims said the police boasted that even if they were to murder them, they would only be “transferred” as punishment.

A recent report into custodial torture and death across the world reveals that 1,731 people died in the custody of Indian security forces and correction officers in 2019, with most of the victims hailing from minority communities, particularly Muslims and Dalits.

The authors of the report also found that a majority of the deaths were caused by torture, and that the use of torture is “rampant” in India and meant to punish them or gather information or extract confessions.

Apart from most common methods of torture, such as punching, kicking and slapping, the study found that torture methods used by the police also included administering electric shocks, hammering iron nails into the torso, beating the soles of the feet, hanging detainees upside down and then hitting in private parts, stabbings with hand held tools, pouring petrol onto private parts, branding with hot iron rods, urinating into the mouth, inserting hard blunt object into anus and kicking pregnant women.

On May 27, the Austrian government presented an Islam Landkarte (Islam Map) as a novel contribution and a breakthrough tool to fight “political Islam.” However, this map has been around for years. The project was initiated back in 2012, by Ednan Aslan, the head of the Institute for Islamic Theological Studies at the University of Vienna and the Documentation Center for Political Islam which was set up by the government.

Nine years later, Susanne Raab, minister for integration from the ruling conservative party (ÖVP), launched a website with an interactive map listing the names and locations of more than 600 mosques and Muslim organizations in Austria as well as their alleged connections abroad.

The map is designed to serve as a monitoring tool for the Documentation Center for Political Islam which is a data-collecting center for integration policy and security agencies. However, the data it collects is problematic to the extent that it is outdated and incorrect; some of the names recorded on the website are no longer actively in service. The most problematic part, however, is that it publishes private addresses of organizations.

When starting a non-profit organization in Austria, individuals have the possibility to register the organization using their personal address. As a result, when the Islam Map was published, not only the addresses of organizations but also personal addresses of individuals were made public.

In her presentation, Minister Susanne Raab (ÖVP) further explained that the “Islam Map” does not mean a general suspicion of all Muslims and the intention is exclusively to fight “political ideologies, not religion.”

Even though, Austrian officials categorize the map as an instrument of combatting “political Islam,” which is an ambiguous term as adopted by the Austrian government that describes any Islamist movement seeking to restructure society according to religious ideas and opposing democratic principles, there is no general agreement on what exactly can be labelled as an Islamist movement.

This has resulted in the listing of cultural centers for Bosnian and Albanian immigrants, youth organizations or even sports clubs, without any proof or any links to extremism. Faika El-Nagashi, the spokeswoman for integration of the Greens party which is part of the ruling coalition, affirmed that “no Green minister or MEP was involved or even told about it. The project mixes Muslims with Islamists and is the contrary to what integration policy should look like.”

There was a massive backlash against this action, not only from the Muslim community in Austria but also from the University of Vienna, which was added as a partner to this project.

There was a massive backlash against this action, not only from the Muslim community in Austria but also from the University of Vienna, which was added as a partner to this project. University officials have since distanced themselves and prohibited the use of the university logo on the map’s page with the argument that “the logo on the site gives the impression that the University has scientifically edited and reviewed the contributions, which is not the case.” Meanwhile, the logo has been removed and instead “A project of the University of Vienna – Institute for Islamic Theological Studies – Islamic Religious Education” has been added to the website.

Muslim Youth Austria announced legal action against the violation of personal and data protection rights. An announcement or complaint does not exist yet, however, as a spokeswoman of the organization has declared that “the publication of all names, functions and addresses of Muslims and Islamic institutions represents an unprecedented border crossing and the organization will exhaust all legal possibilities against it.”

While Muslim Youth Austria demands the end of this criminalization of Muslims and that the Islam Map be removed from the internet, the association for Jewish Austrian Students in Austria showed solidarity and sharply criticized the map.

While Muslim Youth Austria demands the end of this criminalization of Muslims and that the Islam Map be removed from the internet, the association for Jewish Austrian Students in Austria showed solidarity and sharply criticized the map. The students told Politics Today that Muslims must not feel “observed and placed under general suspicion and at the same time fear because locations of Muslim institutions are exposed to the public, which is a handbook case of discrimination.”

On May 31, the spokesperson for the secretary general at the Council of Europe, Daniel Holtgen, stated that “[u]nfortunately, the ‘Islam Map’ of Austria overshoots the mark, serves existing resentments and therefore has a potentially counterproductive effect. Many Muslims perceive the form and timing of the publication as extremely discriminatory. They feel stigmatized and feel their security threatened by the publication of addresses and other details. The ‘Islam Map’ of Austria should therefore be withdrawn in its current form.”

In fact, the launching of an interactive “Islam Map” serves as a watch list or a blacklist. The map will only serve as another blow to the presence of Islam in the country, as the map disclosing Muslim organizations not only caused controversy in the country but also led to a spate of Islamophobic incidents. Moreover, the map stirs up prejudices and puts all Muslims under general suspicion. Prior to the introduction of the “Islam Map,” the Documentation and Counseling Center Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Racism – also known as the Dokustelle Österreich – released the “Anti-Muslim Racism Report” with 1,402 cases of racism against Muslims in 2020 alone. This records an increase of approximately 33% from the previous year.

After barely a week since the website of the controversial map was launched, the government decided to take the map offline. Not only was it criticized by Austria’s Muslim community, various people from all walks of life reacted on the website. The Catholic Church, for example, joined the criticism and rejected the map. The head of the church stated that Islam is now “under general suspicion.” He wondered why Islam has a map and other faith communities do not.

Ümit Vural, the head of the IGGOE, warned against stigmatizing all Muslims living in Austria as a potential danger. His organization stated that several Muslims had already been attacked and a mosque was vandalized since the map became available online. Muslim Austrians Initiative chairman Tarafa Baghajati told broadcaster ORF, “Imagine if we had a Judaism map or a Christianity map in Austria.”

It is without doubt that this map is an indirect attack on all Muslims in Austria, many of whom are of Turkish descent. Tanju Bilgiç, spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, who has been calling for an end to Islamophobia for a long time now, declared the map to be “xenophobic, racist, and anti-Islamic.”

Although the “Islam Map” has been taken offline, the attention it got from anti-Muslim, racist groups is worrying. The map definitely signifies a general suspicion of the Muslim community. The growing Islamophobia in Austria and the rest of Europe makes Muslim Europeans, and especially young Muslim Europeans, feel concerned about their future. The social pandemic of hate crimes against Muslims is destroying European values, which once were held in high esteem.

The Canadian public has not been immune from globalized Islamophobic and anti-Arab discourse in popular media. However, we have a problematic local political history that we need to contend with. It was in 1975 that the Globe and Mail published a false story during Montreal’s hosting of the 1976 Olympics, claiming that the Mounties had uncovered a conspiracy by fourteen Canadian Arabs to commit terrorism at the Games. The justice minister and the RCMP commissioner denied the story, but it was picked up by every newspaper and TV and radio station across the country.

During the first Gulf War, Canada joined forces with the United States and began targeting its own Iraqi-Canadian population with CSIS interrogations as it was receiving intelligence from Canadian posts in Iraq. Iraqi-Canadians were pulled out of workplaces, called at home and asked pointed questions about whether they supported Canadian “allies” in the gulf war. At this time, stories of “internal threats” in Canada were rampant in the media, filtered through often less than rigorous journalistic standards.

On January 6 1991, ten days before the United States began bombing Baghdad, the Toronto Sun published a story identifying 12 “pro-Iraqi agents” in Toronto, planning a “disturbance” in case war began in Iraq. A few days later, the Sun ran a headline that read “Police Task Force Targets Agents of Terror.” A slew of “terrorism alerts” were published in various newspapers in Toronto, feeding off of each other, unverifiable by their purported sources.

Discourse about anti-terrorism rang through media without much activity to qualify it, sensationalizing banal threats and connecting it to the language of the “war on terror,” which many Canadians often think began after 9/11. The stories ended up focusing more on security alerts than terrorist activities. The Canadian government did little to dispel this paranoia and CSIS continued to interrogate Iraqi Canadians.

Decades later, when—in the same week—a Muslim family of 5 (the Afzaal family) is run over in London, Ontario (leaving a nine year old boy as the only survivor); three white people show up at a mosque in Toronto, threatening to detonate a bomb, and a black Muslim woman is attacked in Edmonton,  the Canadian public is asking, “How did we get here?,” “How did this happen?” When the Quebec shootings during which six Muslims were killed and eight injured in prayer in 2017 happens in cold blood; when mosque caretaker Mohamed-Aslim Zafis was brutally slain by a white supremacist in Toronto last year, politicians state: “this is not our Canada” and other similar rhetorical repulsions of this violence.

The truth is that Islamophobia has been a fundamental part of the Canadian political fabric and public discourse for decades, operating to help define Canadianness through the very abjection of Muslims, Arabs and other minorities who are read as Muslim or Arab. And this abjection is reproduced and protected by state systems and institutions.

The Toronto Police have been recently reacting in a biased fashion, protecting white supremacists during their marches of propaganda while at the same time CSIS is often found undercover at university campuses in the greater Toronto area, trying to entrap Muslim students into saying something hateful, sometimes even knocking on their doors.

Islamophobic discourse in Canada is often closely linked with “anti-immigration” discourse in politics. Indeed, many extremist groups like the Yellow Vest movement in Canada (to be distinguished in content and nature from the Yellow Vesters in France), and PEGIDA, the Three Percenters have an affinity to politicians who express anti-immigration rhetoric.

In recent years, the tenets of Canada’s Multiculturalism Act have been articulated through the accommodation model—that “Old Stock Canadians” are accommodating Muslims and require of them full cultural assimilation (relying on misleading tropic binaries of cultural differences).

In April 2009, the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism, Jason Kenney delivered a speech entitled, “Good Citizenship: The Duty to Integrate” at Huron University College’s Canadian Leaders Speakers’ Series. The minister noted that The Multiculturalism Act and The Citizenship Act and programs are “pathway[s] through which people must pass to join our Canadian political community.”

Anchoring the concept of old stock Canadians, Kenney cites The Unfinished Canadian, which “deplores the way Canada is becoming…‘The greatest hotel on earth.’” Kenney urges his audience “to take this metaphor of ‘Hotel Canada’ very seriously.” Quoting Rudyard Griffiths, he goes on that this phenomenon “is undermining the very strengths and underpinnings that have made Canada a great country. The lack of knowledge of what has given us the country we know, he warns, is potentially disastrous.”

The idea of “race suicide” is a common rhetoric of extremist groups who are often prophesizing about an imminent so-called Islamicization of Canada. Islamophobic violence is seen as a kind of “defense” or necessary evil to stop this takeover, however, this fear and hate is quite literally born out of the decades of Islamophobic myth creation—supported by Canadian media and the state—that would come to validate Western hands in imperial projects in the Middle East.

In 2015, Kellie Leitch and Chris Alexander (politicians and former members of the Conservative Party) implemented The Barbaric Cultural Practices Act (a snitch line through which one could call about their Muslim neighbors’ violence against women), framing domestic violence as particularly unique to Muslim families. This was following the tragic “honor killing” of Aqsa Parvez. In the same year, there were 84 domestic homicides in Ontario related to Intimate Partner Violence, not to mention horrific structural violence against indigenous women.

Yet, Parvez’ murder is seen to have been exceptional to this national epidemic of violence against women, across identity group categories. Leitch’s policies framed Gender Based Violence as exceptional to Muslim cultures, further dichotomizing Islam and Canadianness. Islamophobia is not growing in some seedy corner of Canadian society—it is being nourished in the public eye, for all to see. It is stitched in the fabric of our political atmosphere.

Kenney’s anti-immigration rhetoric, Stephen Harper’s introduction of Bill C24 (essentially creating a second class citizenship system, disproportionately affecting the Muslim community), and more overtly, Paul Fromm’s (Hamilton mayoral candidate) public celebratory description of the 2019 New Zealand massacre (wherein a white male killed 51 Muslims and injured 40 during Friday prayers) as “cogent” and the alarmingly significant amount of votes for Faith Goldy’s run for Toronto mayor despite her right wing extremist work with the Daily Stormer all illustrate the banality of Islamophobic hate speech in mainstream politics—legitimating the “race suicide” thesis. Such an environment sews the seeds of hate, no matter how covertly this normalization hides behind immigration restriction or integration policies.

Many in the Canadian Muslim community were uncomfortable with the ways in which politicians from the liberal and conservative parties showed up to the emotional vigil for the Afzaal family in London, Ontario last week, arguing that it felt like they were using it as a political platform and not addressing the culpability of Canadian institutions in fear mongering and vilifying Muslims.

Currently, Quebec’s Bill 21 bans religious symbols prohibiting Muslim women from wearing hijab in positions of authority in the workplace as well as public sector jobs; and there appear to be hesitant and murky debates about opposing anti-Islamophobia legislation. The M-103 motion which condemns Islamophobia has seen some debate within the Conservative Party since 2017; and Doug Ford (the Premier of Ontario) blocked a motion on Islamophobia two days after the June 2021 London vigil (even if another was put forth, afterwards).

Austria along with France are currently at the forefront of criminalizing Muslim civil society. The Documentation Center for Political Islam, established in July 2020, has released one of its projects, which has been met with fierce criticism. An “Islam Map” showing the addresses of 623 mosques and Muslim civil society institutions was presented and has created a large societal backlash in Austria.

The Documentation Center for Political Islam

Johann Gudenus of the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs), who has since resigned due to his involvement in the Ibiza-gate, was the first to present the idea of a Documentation Center for Political Islam when his party was still in a coalition with the Christian democratic Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP, Österreichische Volkspartei) in 2018. After the Ibiza-gate put an abrupt end to the alliance, the project was now reintroduced and implemented by the ÖVP.

This time, however, the Greens are the ÖVP’s coalition partners. It did not help the Greens to water down the name somewhat in the government agreement and to rename the fund, which was highly subsidized by the state and thus exempt from parliamentary control, the “Austrian Fund for the Documentation of Religiously Motivated Political Extremism (Political Islam).” For what was in parenthesis and henceforth politically communicated applied: a documentation center for so-called political Islam.

The center has an annual budget of half a million euros and is designed to designate Muslim associations with which public authorities can and cannot cooperate – i.e., those which are blacklisted from public funding and space. It is part of the National Strategy for the Prevention of Extremism and Deradicalization, an internationally increasingly challenged concept.

After the project began its work in mid-2020, a first report was presented in December of the same year, which was scientifically very poor and essentially rehashed previously published rumors. But the goal had been achieved: Chancellor Sebastian Kurz had announced in November 2020 following the militant attack in downtown Vienna that he wanted to introduce a new criminal offense for “political Islam.” The Documentation Center could perfectly serve the purpose of identifying this “political Islam.”

But political Islam, for the Austrian government, was not militancy. Rather, it is imagined to pave the ground intellectually for militant action. Hence, political Islam is about thought. And one could add religious practice. Several legislations and political measures had been implemented in the past, linking the Hijab ban or the closure of mosques to the fight against political Islam. One was the ban of the hijab, another two were the closing of mosques. While all three measures have been repealed by the courts, the government still continues its fight against personal Muslim belief and organized Muslim communities.

Relaunch of the “Islam Map”?

The Documentation Center for Political Islam had its second press conference, where Minister for Integration, Susanne Raab, alongside Muslim theologian Mouhanad Khorchide from the University of Münster in Germany, political scientist Elham Manea, and Muslim theologian Ednan Aslan presented their latest findings. These scholars are known for their support of many anti-Muslim legislations implemented by the ÖVP under the leadership of Sebastian Kurz.

The “Islam Map” was originally launched in 2012 by Ednan Aslan and met only low-voiced critique. But the relaunch was different. While Aslan tried to convince the public that the Islam Map was no Islamism Map, the fact that the project was now financed and presented under its name meant that the 623 addresses were now potentially seen as a target by being linked to “political Islam.” And since the government has presented a bill to make political Islam a criminal offense, what are the implications of being on such a map?

Clearly, the addresses of individuals and institutions on this map have been made vulnerable. When the far-right Identitarian Movement started hanging signs with the words “Beware: Political Islam nearby” next to several mosques, a new dimension of this threat became clear. Very soon, criticism came from the European Council, the Conference of European Rabbis, the Austrian Bishops’ Conference, Muslim Youth Austria, and many others.

The rector of the University of Vienna requested the logo of the university be removed from the website and distanced the university from the project. While the Documentation Center for Political Islam took the map offline as a first reaction, its director said that the information will only be made public by logging in via an account.

Protecting Muslims against “political Islam”

The Minister for Integration reaffirmed that she does not want to stir up “general suspicion against Muslims.” And indeed, we should take her words seriously. Because for her, it seems, the Muslim associations and mosques do not represent the vast majority of Muslims. This is in line with a widespread narrative in continental European countries that follows a divide-and-rule politics by marginalizing organized Muslims and substituting their voices with state-funded and self-proclaimed “liberal” Muslim voices.

If the 623 sites of organized Islam according to Austrian Integration Minister Raab are not “the Muslims,” then she is indeed consistent in stigmatizing 623 Muslim institutions as potentially dangerous, while all the time pretending to save the Muslims. In a way, this is another episode in the recurrence of a colonial mindset that pretends to save the many good – read obedient – Muslims from the bad ones, i.e., those who claim their own agency.

What is needed

Currently, Austria’s political leadership sees Muslims as a walking danger that is criminalized with surveillance programs like this map, intimidated by raids, and problematized as a national security threat. This hawkish politics against the Muslim minority has to stop. Otherwise, the Muslim minority that makes around nine percent of the whole population, will be further estranged and the societal divide instigated by the government will create the ground for major conflicts.

Attempts in the West to combat terrorism allegedly related to Islam suffer from three serious flaws: terrorism is attributed to Islam in general; governments believe that they can handle it all by themselves; and they rely almost exclusively on criminal law.

Terrorism is supported only by a few and rejected by many

First of all, among political and media circles, terrorism is often portrayed as the inevitable outcome of a “clash of civilizations.” In this view, Islam is regarded as being incompatible with Western values. This position is exemplified by the statement made by French President Emmanuel Macron last year that Islam needs to come to terms with Enlightenment. In so doing, the French president lost sight of the fact that Enlightenment has actually incorporated key elements of Islam, such as tolerance, which was a hallmark of the Ottoman Empire, and human reason, which was introduced by Ibn Rushd.

The “clash of civilizations” discourse denies that Islam has contributed significantly to Western civilization. The West owes much of its knowledge in the area of the natural sciences and medicine to Muslim scholars. Although the Renaissance is often seen as the result of Europeans rediscovering classic Greek and Latin texts, it actually relied heavily on the work of Muslim scholars. Not only had they saved the texts for posterity by translating them into Arabic, they had also further refined and developed the ideas contained therein.

This “clash of civilizations” position also fails to recognize that according to Islam, Muslims who live as minorities in non-Muslim countries are supposed to respect the government, obey the laws, and fit into society. As soon as Muslims apply for a visa, a residence permit, or citizenship, they enter into an agreement, under which they are supposed to discharge their duties loyally towards the state.

The large majority of Muslims relate such a jihadist view to a biased and distorted interpretation of religion.

In return, the government is supposed to ensure their freedom of religion. Therefore, instead of trying to domesticate Islam by replacing it by a state-sanctioned, watered-down version of this religion, governments should respect Muslims’ freedom of religion and allow Islam to do its remedial work.

The truth is that only an extremely small number of Muslims take part in terrorist activities with the conviction that the governments in many Muslim-majority countries are corrupt because they fail to rule in accordance with Islamic law. They believe that these regimes are being supported by Western states. By stretching the theological notion of jihad beyond its limits, these militant extremists feel justified in fighting Western governments as well as the regimes and governments in Muslim countries.

The large majority of Muslims relate such a jihadist view to a biased and distorted interpretation of religion. Therefore, to marginalize these militant views, the Muslim community, rather than secular outsiders, should be relied upon to challenge and correct them.

To bypass these theological and constitutional obstacles, governments instead rely on a psychosocial approach which assumes that Muslims can gradually develop from moderation to militancy. In their view, this transition becomes visible by increasing piety and observable changes in dress. These two function as indicators of radicalization, which must be undone through “de-radicalization,” i.e., by deprogramming “radicalized” Muslims through psychological treatment to turn them into model citizens.

The concepts of “radicalization” and “de-radicalization” were developed as quick fixes after 9/11, to make terrorism manageable to law enforcement in the U.S.

The concepts of “radicalization” and “de-radicalization” were developed as quick fixes after 9/11, to make terrorism manageable to law enforcement in the U.S. Consequently, their academic credentials are weak and no conclusive evidence exists to show that they actually work.

On the other hand, this approach has huge drawbacks. It creates suspicion: why to trust your nice Muslim neighbors if they could one day turn into violent radicals? In addition, it puts an onus on pious, orthodox Muslims who are actually allies in combating militant jihadism because they condemn and reject it on theological grounds.

Moreover, Western governments’ unilateral tackling of this religious extremism feeds into the propaganda of the militant jihadists, who claim that these governmental measures aim at destroying Islam. Last but not least, policymakers are trying to fit a secular square peg into a round theological hole, which is bound to fail.

Relying on criminal law is counterproductive

Thirdly, Western governments believe that relying on criminal law is the best way to tackle terrorism, and many anti-terrorism laws have been enacted for this purpose. These are not, like ordinary criminal law, aimed at the rehabilitation of those who have gone astray, but at incapacitating them, so that they can no longer pose a threat. This is what Günther Jakobs has called “enemy criminal law.”

The power to revoke the nationality of terror suspects in order to keep them abroad – and consequently turn those suspects into the concern of other countries – is an example of such incapacitation. Anti-terror laws violate the same principles of the rule of law which they are supposed to uphold.

These laws select suspects on the basis of group characteristics; construe the intentions of the perpetrators instead of judging them on their acts; and intervene at a very early stage when the suspects have not even begun to put their plans into practice. This legal approach also stigmatizes Muslims as a “suspect community.”

An alternative approach is both necessary and available

In view of these three shortcomings, an alternative approach needs to be developed which acknowledges first and foremost that only a small number of militants with a religious affiliation engage in terrorist acts. This approach should also take Islam and the Muslim community as allies in fighting against terrorism. And lastly, the new approach should set aside criminal law and seek different means to tackle the issue at hand.

To this end, the Cross Cultural Human Rights Centre at the Free University of Amsterdam, in cooperation with the Dutch Muslim community, has developed such an approach which has been translated into a project proposal. As part of this project, young Muslims will be made more familiar with the opportunities offered by democracy and the rule of law to channel grievances and realize ambitions. They will be given the chance to brush up their knowledge of Islam to enhance their ability to see through the propaganda of recruiters.

In the space of a mere three decades hateful and divisive Hindu nationalist slogans have propelled Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) from a fringe political party to a national party to India’s ruling party, a result that has inflicted great harm on the country’s democratic institutions, bilateral relationships, global reputation and religious minorities.

It’s easy to forget today but BJP won just two parliamentary seats in the 1984 election, emerging as a national political force only after whipping up anti-Muslim sentiments leading up to, during and after the destruction of the historic Babri Mosque in 1992 at the hands of 150,000 Hindu nationalists associated with BJP and Hindutva organization Vishva Hindu Parishad, an event that helped put the party into position to form a coalition government in 1998 and then ultimately unilateral power in 2014.

In the six years since Narendra Modi led the party to victory in the 2014 elections, the BJP ruled government has chipped away at the rights of Muslims and cracked down on its critics, including political opponents, journalists, and human rights activists, forcing Amnesty International to cease its operations in the country out of concern its employees were being threatened and intimidated by the government for publishing reports on the Delhi Police Force’s role in the February 2020 violence, which resulted in the murder of more than 50 Muslims, and the use of torture by its security forces in Kashmir.

It’s for these reasons India’s democracy was downgraded from “free” to “partly free” in the most recent Freedom House democracy report, which delivered a scathing indictment on the Modi government, accusing it of “driving India towards authoritarianism” and encouraging the “scapegoating of Muslims” and cracking down on critics.

Worryingly – the worst the economy performs, or the louder critics of the Modi government grow, the more BJP dials up the vilification of religious minorities to divert attention away from its failings or transgressions.

Notably, Freedom House wasn’t alone in its condemnation of the Modi government, with Sweden based V-Dem Institute also downgrading India’s democracy to what it calls “electoral autocracy.”

Worryingly – the worst the economy performs, or the louder critics of the Modi government grow, the more BJP dials up the vilification of religious minorities to divert attention away from its failings or transgressions.

When protesters joined hands across the country to oppose the government’s anti-Muslim citizenship laws, known separately as the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and National Register of Citizens (NRC), party leaders threatened to shoot, drown or deport Muslim migrants.

When the government mishandled the initial COVID19 outbreak, the government joined online miscreants in falsely accusing Muslims of deliberately spreading the virus, and when farmers from Punjab and Haryana linked arms and marched to the capital Delhi to protest against laws that pave the way for the corporate takeover of the agricultural sector, leaving their farms and communities vulnerable to exploitation and destruction, BJP leaders falsely accused them of being part of foreign funded Sikh separatist plot.

What has become increasingly evident in recent weeks is that Hindutva organizations have expanded their influence and reach throughout the Indian diaspora, as witnessed recently when a mob of right-wing Indian Australians ambushed and attacked a car carrying several Sikh men in Sydney earlier this month, presumably because they had participated in a solidarity march for the Indian farmers protest in Delhi.

“For the first time in Australia we are witnessing tensions within Indian community groups, with one group attacking another because they demanded justice from the Indian government,” Deepak Joshi, an executive with The Humanism Project, a secular Indian expatriate advisory group, told me.

“In the past year or so we have witnessed several instances of online hate and threats of violence against those who criticise the Modi Government and against Muslims in particular in Australia, but this hate has been particularly directed against the Sikhs and social media since the farmers movement began.” 

Hindutva organizations and individuals have also been calling for a boycott of Sikh and Muslim owned businesses, prompting an Australian parliamentarian to warn of a growing threat within the Indian expatriate community, specifically “extremist, right-wing Hindu nationalist part of the community.”

November 11, 2001 marked the beginning of an era of American terror – an era of reckless massacre, carpet bombing, pillage and rape, and the use of radioactive weaponry against Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan. The War on Terror expanded into Georgia, Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, Eretria, and programs like extraordinary rendition were active in collaboration with oppressive, tortuous regimes across the Muslim world.

The U.S. government intelligence agencies tapped into foreign government, social circles, and religious networks abroad to mass gather information in pursuit of political and military warfare. Reflectively, the U.S. government organized and executed a discriminatory, racist, anti-Muslim security and surveillance apparatus that (to this day) targets, monitors and entraps Muslims on the basis of their religious identity and practice.

Government programs like the Patriot Act, which Biden has taken credit for establishing the foundation of, greatly expanded the surveillance capabilities of U.S. law enforcement agencies in the pursuit of identifying threats to national security. This was weaponized and translated into the political imprisonment of community leaders like Dr. Sami al-Arian, the first to be charged under the Patriot Act.

As a Palestinian Muslim, he was targeted by the U.S. government for advocating for Palestinian human rights. The targeting of Muslims through discriminatory domestic policy is aligned with America’s foreign policy interests, as seen in the hyper-surveillance and targeting of Palestinians to protect Israel’s (fracturing) hegemony of support in American government and society.

Under the Trump administration, the Department of Homeland Security relaunched the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program as the Targeted Violence and Terrorism Prevention (TVTP) program. CVE and TVTP trains teachers, mental health workers, imams and others to use faulty social science and racialized indicators to identify those who are supposedly vulnerable to ‘radicalization’ within the Muslim community. The government maps and tracks religious, political, and social activity across Muslim communities.

For example, NYPD agents would document how often Muslims students prayed during school trips, which Egyptian businesses shut their doors for daily prayers, which restaurants would show al-Jazeera, and which Newark businesses sold halal products and alcohol.

According to law enforcement documents, the NYPD post-9/11 eyed and interpreted signs of Muslim religiosity as ‘radicalization.’ For example, NYPD agents would document how often Muslims students prayed during school trips, which Egyptian businesses shut their doors for daily prayers, which restaurants would show al-Jazeera, and which Newark businesses sold halal products and alcohol.

The report Mapping Muslims: NYPD Spring and its Impact on American Muslims outlines how the NYPD surveillance program, as a case study on the impacts of the American surveillance system as a whole, has suppressed religious practice, stifled speech and association, sowed suspicion and distrust, and censored student activists in the Muslim community.

Sowing Distrust and Fracturing Brotherhood

The surveillance of Muslims and the Muslim community at large is often done through the hiring of informants. Informants are people who are typically already in a position to know or learn information from the target individual or community. They can make up to $100,000 annually, and some are hired in exchange for legal favors; such as dismissing criminal charges or expediting immigration proceedings.

As Muslims are overwhelmingly aware of the heightened surveillance of their communities, many Muslims have admitted to being more hesitant to create new relationships with new members like converts.

Since 2009, paid FBI informants have played a ‘central role’ in nearly 50% of all domestic terrorism cases. The known presence of informants in the Muslim community, both at colleges and mosques, has raised suspicion in meeting new people, the development of political and social programming, and maintaining the unity and trust among community.