In recent years, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin have become strategically important regions, both regionally and globally. One of the main reasons for this is its location at the intersection of global energy and trade routes. This characteristic places the region at the centre of the struggle for influence among regional and global actors, while it simultaneously experiences a high level of political uncertainty and an unstable security environment due to instability and external interventions. While some of these actors exacerbate instability through destructive actions, others contribute to stability and development goals through constructive policies.

Türkiye, a pioneer in constructive policies towards the region, has recently intensified its stabilizing efforts and prioritized cooperation with other regional actors. In this context, Ankara appears to favor a foreign policy that prioritizes coordination over competition, particularly with Cairo and Riyadh, with regard to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. This approach suggests that Türkiye is attempting to utilize its cooperation-oriented bilateral relations to contribute to resolving crises in third countries.

While this strategy has the potential to evolve into an inclusive alliance among the involved parties, it also demonstrates the possibility of cooperation in specific areas and the potential for these partnerships to yield tangible results. Indeed, it reveals that, in a global political landscape where complete alignment of interests is challenging, it is possible to achieve common interests through the coordination of foreign policies. In this context, it can be said that Türkiye aims to significantly impact the political landscape of these countries by coordinating its policies more closely with Egypt regarding Somalia and with Saudi Arabia regarding Sudan. It should also be noted that the gradual normalization process with Cairo, and the strengthening of the alliance with Riyadh following the establishment of trust, played a significant role in reaching this point.

Coordinated engagement in Somalia

In this context, Somalia is one of the countries in which foreign policy partnerships are most commonly observed. The country has long struggled with issues such as state-building, establishing security, creating a national army, and achieving political unity and integrity. These difficulties have been exacerbated by the privileged relationships established by certain external actors with local factions, which have undermined the central authority. Somaliland and Puntland, two federated regions of Somalia, are treated as independent actors by regional and global powers, separate from Mogadishu. This is considered a serious threat to Somalia’s national sovereignty.

Therefore, for many years, Türkiye has been working closely with the Mogadishu government to take the necessary steps to protect Somalia’s national integrity and achieve stability. In this regard, Türkiye’s military training support, infrastructure investments and humanitarian aid activities have been of great importance in strengthening Somalia’s institutional capacity. Recognizing that Somalia’s stability is vital for security and political stability in the Horn of Africa, Ankara has maintained a clear stance against any threats directed at the Mogadishu government.

A similar approach can be seen in Egypt’s recent policy towards Somalia. Indeed, Egypt views policies such as Ethiopia’s disregard for Somalia’s national legitimacy and Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as threats to regional stability. In this context, Cairo has begun to pursue a foreign policy aligned with Ankara’s on Somalia. Egypt’s prioritisation of Somalia’s territorial integrity and stability in the context of Red Sea security provides a rational basis for Ankara and Cairo’s converging policies on Somalia.

This approach has undoubtedly been made possible by the recent steps taken by Egypt and Türkiye to align their foreign policies in various areas and enhance coordination. These steps have revealed areas in which they can cooperate on foreign policy, while also helping to identify threats that need to be combated. Consequently, cooperation in Somalia is one of the most tangible outcomes of the rapprochement between the two countries since 2021. This is evident in both countries’ statements regarding actions against Somalia’s sovereignty, their stance on strengthening its central institutions, and the steps taken against actors that could undermine Somalia’s stability.

In the coming period, it is inevitable that Türkiye and Egypt will take more decisive steps in line with their common interests, in response to political, diplomatic, economic and military initiatives that could destabilize Somalia. This increases the likelihood that diplomatic steps will be taken first to resolve crises and that military options will only be considered if diplomatic efforts fail. For all actors wishing to strengthen their relations with Somalia, it is critically important to adopt an approach that promotes unity, not division, among local elements within the country. Comprehensive policies on vital issues for Somalia, such as political stability, economic development, counter-terrorism and maritime security, will benefit all parties, especially Somalia.

The Sudan crisis and the balance of power in the Red Sea

A similar scenario can be said to apply to Sudan, which has been experiencing a civil war for the past three years. Türkiye has long been making intensive diplomatic efforts to prevent instability in Sudan from worsening, but has been relatively isolated in this regard. The direct or indirect intervention of certain regional actors in the Sudanese conflict has exacerbated the situation in the country, resulting in a serious humanitarian crisis. However, Türkiye’s consistent approach, particularly its engagement with key regional stakeholders, has recently begun to bear fruit.

Furthermore, the resolution of the political crisis with Saudi Arabia and the rapid rapprochement process that followed has impacted foreign policy in Sudan. In other words, the normalization of relations between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia has paved the way for bilateral coordination on the Sudan issue, making the Sudanese crisis one of Ankara and Riyadh’s shared foreign policy agendas.

Indeed, the political crisis and instability in Sudan could have consequences that affect not only the domestic balance, but also the entire Red Sea region. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, a maritime neighbor of Sudan, will undoubtedly be directly affected by these developments. The Riyadh administration has made previous attempts to resolve the crisis in Sudan, as it is increasingly concerned about the situation. These diplomatic initiatives and mediation efforts were primarily aimed at preventing the conflict from escalating into a regional proxy war. This scenario poses risks for Saudi Arabia, which lies just across the Red Sea. Similarly, Türkiye is concerned about the potential for the regional crisis to spread, and aims to prevent the deepening of humanitarian tragedies. It has therefore made efforts to protect Sudan’s territorial integrity.

Resolving conflicts rather than competing with each other

Therefore, recognizing their overlapping foreign policy priorities regarding Sudan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia have begun to demonstrate a willingness to combine their forces in resolving the conflict rather than competing with each other, leveraging their diverse instruments and the actors they interact with. While this approach has not yet caused those responsible for the destructive effects in Sudan to back down, the rebel actors in Sudan are being forced to retreat, particularly due to the deployment of military instruments. The joint stance of Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, as well as Egypt’s support for these initiatives, has been key in determining the outcome of this process.

In conclusion, the relationship that Türkiye has developed with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, prioritizing coordination over competition, has yielded positive results for all parties on a pragmatic, mutually beneficial basis, producing concrete policy outcomes. These dialogue-based relationships could usher in a new era of cooperation in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin, replacing competitive policies. This could weaken external factors that fuel instability and create a deterrent effect for those pursuing negative agendas.

Rather than regional actors clashing over their interests in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin, it would be more positive and realistic for them to manage these interests through shared foreign policies and coordinated crisis management. Examining the cases of Somalia and Sudan, it can be seen that such a strategic choice is feasible, but the involved parties must also demonstrate their willingness to do so. While it is acknowledged that local actors are the primary subjects of these processes, the abandonment of competitive policies by external powers involved in regional politics is also a key requirement for achieving lasting stability.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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ewly released documents from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) show that disgraced financier and convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein attempted to cultivate relationships with influential political and business figures across the Middle East.

The most immediate fallout in the region came with the resignation of Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem, chief executive and chair of Dubai-based ports operator DP World.

According to two sources familiar with the matter, the decision followed increased scrutiny after Bin Sulayem’s name appeared in the DOJ’s document release. DP World confirmed the leadership change but declined further comment. Bin Sulayem did not respond to requests for comment.

Dubai’s ruler also issued a decree appointing a new chairman for Dubai’s Ports, Customs and Free Zone Corporation, one of several roles previously held by Bin Sulayem.

Email exchanges and personal correspondence

Some of the correspondence reviewed by Reuters included personal email exchanges between Epstein and Bin Sulayem. In one 2007 email, Bin Sulayem described meeting a woman in New York with whom Epstein had helped arrange contact.

An undated photograph included in the files shows Epstein and Bin Sulayem cooking together in what appears to be a relaxed setting.

Being named in the files does not constitute evidence of criminal wrongdoing. However, following the disclosure, some of DP World’s international financial partners raised concerns.

The UK development finance agency British International Investment (BII) and Canadian pension fund La Caisse announced they would pause new investments in DP World pending clarification. After the resignation was announced, both institutions signaled their willingness to continue cooperation under new leadership.

Attempted political influence during Qatar blockade

The DOJ documents suggest Epstein also attempted to engage political figures during the 2017–2021 blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt.

In exchanges with Sheikh Jabor Yousuf Jassim Al Thani, a Qatari businessman and member of the ruling family, Epstein offered strategic advice during the diplomatic crisis. He reportedly criticized Qatar’s leadership at the time and suggested steps to improve relations with Washington.

Epstein urged Doha to consider strengthening ties with Israel to maintain favorable relations with then–U.S. President Donald Trump. Qatar ultimately maintained its policy course, and the regional blockade ended in 2021 when ties were restored.

Qatar’s current prime minister and foreign minister, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, has not publicly commented on Epstein’s characterizations in the documents.

The files also reveal that Epstein discussed the potential public listing of Saudi Aramco in multiple email exchanges.

In correspondence dating back to 2016 and 2017, Epstein warned that a public offering could expose Saudi Arabia to legal risks and asset seizures. He also floated alternative proposals, including selling a major stake to China rather than pursuing a traditional IPO.

Saudi Aramco declined to comment on the emails.

Outreach to Egypt’s Mubarak family

Epstein’s network appeared to extend to Egypt as well. Documents show that following the 2011 ouster of former President Hosni Mubarak, a request for assistance from a family member — reportedly connected to Gamal Mubarak — was passed on to Epstein.

The nature of the requested assistance remains unclear, and Reuters was unable to determine whether Epstein took any action.

The large cache of emails, text messages and related documents reinforces what investigators have previously alleged: that Epstein sought to leverage his wealth and global access to build relationships with powerful figures in politics, finance, academia and business worldwide — including across the Middle East.

Reuters reported it could not determine how successful Epstein was in influencing decision-makers in the region.

The latest revelations add to ongoing scrutiny surrounding Epstein’s international connections, years after his 2019 death while in federal custody in the United States.

(Source: Reuters)

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sraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced Wednesday that Israel has approved a $35 billion natural gas export agreement with Egypt, calling it the largest gas deal in the country’s history.

Valued at 112 billion shekels, the agreement will see 130 billion cubic meters of natural gas exported from Israel’s offshore Leviathan field to Egypt through 2040. Deliveries will be carried out by U.S. energy giant Chevron, which operates the field alongside Israel’s NewMed Energy Partnership and Ratio Oil Exploration.

Netanyahu said in a televised statement that the deal would strengthen Israel’s position as a regional energy power and contribute to stability in the Middle East. He added that the agreement ensures gas will also be sold domestically at favorable prices for Israeli consumers. About half of the proceeds are expected to go to Israel’s state treasury.

Egyptian authorities have not issued an official confirmation of the agreement.

Deal follows months of political tension

Reports of the agreement had circulated for months amid diplomatic strains between Israel and Egypt. Israeli media previously reported that Netanyahu had delayed approval of the deal amid Israeli allegations—denied by Cairo—that Egypt violated the 1979 peace treaty by increasing military deployments in the Sinai Peninsula.

The agreement expands an existing gas export arrangement signed in 2019. Israeli Energy Minister Eli Cohen, who had earlier opposed the deal’s terms, stood alongside Netanyahu during the announcement and said he now supports the final agreement.

Egypt has played a key mediating role during the war in Gaza and the U.S.-brokered ceasefire reached in October, while also criticizing Israel’s military offensive that has caused widespread destruction in the enclave.

Israel discovered significant natural gas reserves in the Mediterranean Sea in the early 2000s and began exporting gas nearly a decade ago, first to Jordan and later to Egypt. The latest agreement further deepens energy cooperation between the two countries despite ongoing political tensions in the region.

(Source: Anadolu Agency and the Associated Press)

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thiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has built a global reputation around grand national projects — from completing the massive Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) to planning Africa’s largest airport and preparing the groundwork for a nuclear power plant. Yet as the landlocked nation pushes for its most contentious ambition yet — direct access to the sea — fears of a new conflict are rapidly escalating.

In a triumphant address to parliament in late October, Abiy hailed Ethiopia’s transformation. Addis Ababa has been reshaped by a development boom, while the GERD’s inauguration in July was billed as a milestone that could free Africa’s second-most populous country from reliance on foreign aid. But despite these achievements, Ethiopia faces mounting headwinds that could upend its fragile recovery.

Rising tensions with Eritrea

A central flashpoint is Ethiopia’s demand for Red Sea access, lost when Eritrea seceded in 1993. Although the two countries made peace in 2018 — a breakthrough that won Abiy the Nobel Peace Prize — relations have deteriorated sharply.

In June, Eritrea accused Ethiopia of harboring a “long-brewing war agenda” to seize its ports. Ethiopia denies any aggressive intent, insisting it seeks sea access “peacefully,” but has accused Eritrea of supporting rebel groups and “actively preparing to wage war.”

Magus Taylor, deputy Horn of Africa director at the International Crisis Group, described the situation as volatile. “There’s a possibility of mistakes or miscalculation,” he warned. “And the situation could deteriorate further in the coming months.”

Tensions also remain high with Egypt, which relies almost entirely on the Nile for drinking water and views the GERD as a threat to its survival. After years of stalled negotiations, Cairo hardened its stance following the dam’s inauguration.

In September, Egypt declared it reserved “the right to take all necessary measures” to protect its vital interests. Cairo has strengthened security ties with Eritrea and signed a pact with Somalia — moves interpreted by Ethiopia as attempts to exploit regional frictions.

Somalia reacted angrily last year when Ethiopia signed a port agreement with Somaliland, the breakaway region Mogadishu claims as sovereign territory.

Ethnic violence erupts across Ethiopia

Internally, Ethiopia remains deeply unstable despite the 2022 peace agreement that ended the devastating Tigray war. New conflicts have exploded in the Amhara and Oromia regions, where the Fano militias and Oromo Liberation Army accuse the federal government of repression.

Massacres, kidnappings, and extrajudicial killings have been reported by multiple witnesses. Humanitarian agencies say insecurity has made aid delivery dangerously difficult.

Even in Tigray, peace is fragile. Southern areas have seen clashes between regional forces and militias aligned with Addis Ababa. Tigrayan leaders accuse the government of breaching the peace deal after a drone strike on their forces — and federal officials now allege Tigray is colluding with Eritrea.

Economic reforms clash with rising inequality

This instability contrasts sharply with the optimism in Addis Ababa, where Abiy’s government has poured billions into parks, museums, bike lanes, and new commercial districts. The prime minister aims to turn Ethiopia’s capital into a continental tourism and investment hub.

Major reforms — floating the currency, opening the banking sector, launching a stock exchange — helped secure a $3.4 billion IMF bailout last year. But investor confidence remains fragile as insecurity persists and conflict risks grow.

Meanwhile, poverty has surged. Around 43% of Ethiopians now live below the poverty line, up from 33% in 2016, according to the World Bank. Rising food and fuel prices, alongside increased defense spending, have deepened hardship.

The uneven distribution of prosperity fuels resentment. “Abiy has a firm grip on the country at the center,” Taylor said, “but the periphery conflicts are driven by feelings of injustice — that they are poor and the center is rich. So we expect instability to continue.”

As Ethiopia pursues mega-projects and seeks a return to the sea, the stakes — economic, political and military — are rising. The question now is whether Abiy’s sweeping vision will propel the country forward, or ignite a new era of conflict in the Horn of Africa.

(Source: The Associated Press)

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he recent rapprochement in Turkey-Egypt relations is becoming increasingly evident through mutual visits and cooperation in various fields. Following visits by the presidents of both countries last year, relations gained new momentum, resulting in concrete outcomes. The two countries’ joint stance on Israel’s attacks on Gaza; joint foreign policy moves in crisis areas such as Libya, Sudan and Somalia; increased economic and social interaction; and, finally, accelerating cooperation in the defense industry can be considered important concrete outcomes.

Ministerial-level visit to Egypt

Meanwhile, diplomatic actors have been working intensively to maintain the momentum of this process. In this context, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan visited Egypt three times over the past year, demonstrating Turkey’s determination to develop relations. The most recent of these visits took place in August 2025. During the visit, Hakan Fidan, who was received by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, also met with his Egyptian counterpart Bedir Abdulati and Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Abu Ghait to discuss regional issues, particularly Gaza, and bilateral relations.

The main agenda of Fidan’s visit was undoubtedly to stop Israel’s massacres in Gaza. In a press statement with his Egyptian counterpart Abdulati, Fidan stated that Israel’s intention to completely occupy Gaza would be a new phase of genocide, emphasising that they rejected this plan. In his statement, Foreign Minister Fidan also targeted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, saying, “The oppressor will be erased from history along with his oppression. You will see this happen to Netanyahu too. You will see that the blood of the people he has condemned to starvation, killed, and targeted daily by snipers for his own pleasure will drown him.”

Egyptian Foreign Minister Abdulati similarly emphasized that Israel’s massacres must end, and a ceasefire must be implemented immediately, demonstrating Cairo’s determination to end the crisis.

Joint stance against Israel

The anti-Israel stance in the two ministers’ statements reveals that Turkey and Egypt have adopted a common policy on this issue. Indeed, Ankara and Cairo are seen as leading actors in protecting the rights of Palestinians at a time when Gulf countries have remained relatively unresponsive and the U.S. has given its full support to Israel. This issue is particularly critical for Turkey. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s clear stance against Israel is a clear indication of this. At this point, Turkey’s efforts to stop Israel by intensifying its cooperation with other Arab countries in the region and other Islamic countries are noteworthy.

On the other hand, Egypt is being pressured by both domestic and regional public opinion to be more active on the Palestinian issue due to the deepening humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The Israeli administration’s plan to force the population of Gaza to migrate to Egypt, with the support of U.S. President Donald Trump, is putting serious pressure on Cairo. Feeling this pressure increasingly, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi is forced to act more cautiously so as not to damage his close relations with the U.S. and Gulf countries. On the other hand, the El-Sisi administration is also attempting to form a united front against Israel by acting in concert with Turkey.

Turkey’s advanced technology

Following contacts between the military staffs of the two countries, Egyptian Chief of Staff Ahmed Halife visited Turkey in May and inspected Turkey’s advanced technology products in the defense industry, particularly the KAAN project. The contacts that continued after the visit accelerated the process of intensifying cooperation between the two countries on the joint production of both KAAN and other military equipment. Claims that official agreements in this area could be signed before the end of 2025 have been reported in international media outlets.

These developments are closely related to Turkey and Egypt’s desire to reduce their dependence on foreign countries, particularly in the defence industry, while also strengthening their position as exporters of defence products. In this sense, Ankara’s performance, which has made significant progress in recent years, has also attracted the attention of countries prioritising economic diversification initiatives in the region.

Turkey, one of the world’s leading exporters of UAVs and UCAVs, has also become a major player in the export of unmanned naval vehicles, military land vehicles and other defense industry products. Aiming to become the fourth country after the U.S., Russia and China to produce this technology with its national capabilities through its fifth-generation fighter jet project, Turkey attaches great importance to the KAAN project.

Cooperation between Turkey and Egypt in this area could usher in a new era in regional alliances and lead to the emergence of a deterrent political will against Israel, which is seen as a threat by many actors in the region. Indeed, Israel’s massacres in Gaza, its violent actions against Palestinians and its aggressive policies in Syria are drawing the reaction of not only regional but also many global actors, prompting initiatives to increase international pressure on Tel Aviv to change its policies.

At this point, Turkey aims to take more deterrent measures against Israel, with the support of countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Pakistan and Spain. In addition, by developing fifth-generation fighter jet projects such as KAAN and air defense systems such as SİPER, Ankara also aims to prevent Israel from posing a direct threat in the future.

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resident Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Egypt on February 14 and his bilateral meetings with his counterpart Abdel Fattah Sisi can be seen as a result of the normalization talks that started in 2021 and as a clear statement of a concrete will to reestablish partnerships between the two countries in many fields. Undoubtedly, the potential cooperation between Turkey and Egypt, which are the main actors in regional issues such as Libya, Sudan, and the Eastern Mediterranean, especially on the Gaza issue, can pave the way for the transformation of these crisis areas. However, when regional issues are considered within the framework of global geopolitics, the two countries’ common stance on regional crises has different meanings.

In fact, the ongoing diplomatic rapprochement between Ankara and Cairo signals a significant shift in global power dynamics. At this point, the harmonization of Turkey’s and Egypt’s foreign policy approaches can position the two countries as a united center of power against the backdrop of the multipolar world order. This scenario comes to the fore as the U.S. influence in the Middle East diminishes noticeably and the sanctions it imposes through economic, military, and political engagements lose their effect. The evolution of relations between the two countries from competition to cooperation will provide important opportunities to fill the perceived gaps in the regional strategies of the United States, and will allow the development of partnerships with countries that seek to expand the European Union’s influence, especially in the region.

The European Union and the Eastern Mediterranean equation

From the perspective of the EU, the emerging Ankara-Cairo axis can be assessed in more than one dimension. First, the rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt may provide an opportunity within the EU for joint negotiations on the issue of more coordinated migration flows through the Eastern Mediterranean. The cooperation of two regional powers, which in the past were at opposite poles, means ensuring stability and peace in various crisis spots such as Libya and Sudan, which are seen by EU countries as the source of uncontrolled migration flows.

On the other hand, Turkey’s and Egypt’s control and coordination of migration management, especially for EU countries bordering the Mediterranean, means that the two countries can use their positions as key transit countries to tip the balance in ongoing negotiations with European countries in their favor. The two countries’ chances of gaining concessions or support on other regional issues may also increase.

At the same time, the united front formed by Turkey and Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean raises various concerns in terms of energy exploration by EU companies and the energy trade interests of the countries concerned. In some respects, however, it also offers strategic opportunities. To elaborate: in the recent past, the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, in which Greece, the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC), and France were active, tried to include Egypt in the formation in order to leave Turkey on its own in the regional equation—and was relatively successful in this goal. In fact, the maritime agreement signed between Egypt and Greece damaged Egypt’s interests and priorities in realpolitik, and jeopardized its gains according to international law in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The fact that in the same period the agreement offered by Turkey to Egypt added an area in the Mediterranean Sea the size of three islands of Cyprus to Egypt’s territory was important in that it put the Sisi government in a difficult position vis-à-vis domestic public opinion and showed that national interests would be at risk if Egypt pursued the EU path. Currently, the manifestation of the Ankara-Cairo axis in the Eastern Mediterranean means that Turkish and Egyptian energy companies take the lion’s share of the reserves in the region. At this point, the energy cooperation in question will also enable EU countries to have more reliable access to energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In this sense, it has become increasingly clear in recent years that the energy resources of the Eastern Mediterranean and Africa are of vital importance to Europe. Since the Russia-Ukraine war broke out in February 2022, the Eastern Mediterranean has played a central role in the global energy equation and in import/export supplies. So much so that EU countries seeking to reduce their dependence on Russian natural gas see countries in Africa and the Middle East as the strongest and most realistic alternative, with Algeria, Libya, and Nigeria standing out in this respect. Indeed, the new balances in the Eastern Mediterranean and the rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt could make these plans a more rational option in the medium to long term, both politically and commercially.

The US Perspective on Turkish-Egyptian Rapprochement

From the perspective of the U.S., which has minimized its footprint in the Middle East under the Biden administration, the cooperation that is developing between Ankara and Cairo can be assessed under two subheadings. First, it should not be forgotten that throughout history Turkey and Egypt have been traditional and strategic U.S. allies. At a time when Israel’s political, economic, and cultural involvement in the Middle East is decreasing due to the Gaza issue, the U.S. will maintain its sphere of influence in the Middle East at low cost by implementing the “remote balancing” strategy. As is well known, the U.S. has been providing Egypt with serious military aid since the Camp David agreement in 1979.

However, since the day he took office, Biden has distinguished himself from the Trump administration by maintaining a distant attitude towards the monarchies in Egypt and the Gulf countries. This approach is one of the main factors behind Egypt’s move towards regional partnerships. Moreover, the emergence of the Turkey-Egypt bloc as a regional power could provide certain advantages in balancing Iran, one of the United States’ main regional rivals. In parallel, Iran’s recent expansion into Africa and the Houthis’ attacks in the Red Sea have led to arguments that a space has opened up for Iran in the Middle East after October 7, 2023. In this conjuncture, the fact that two actors—Egypt and Turkey—that have distant relations with Iran are positioned side-by-side in regional crisis areas points to opportunities rather than threats and difficulties in the eyes of U.S. policymakers.

The second issue is the defense industry, which was mentioned during President Erdoğan’s visit to Cairo, and military cooperation, which is likely to deepen in the medium to long term. The Turkish defense industry has been continuously increasing its market share by building on its successes in the Libyan and Karabakh wars, and is becoming the first choice of countries experiencing conflicts and civil wars in Africa. The entry of Turkish defense industry equipment into the Egyptian market, which is dominated by U.S. and Israeli companies, could position Turkey as a prominent player in the sector.

The Sisi government’s counterterrorism operations in the Sinai Peninsula require this advanced technology and equipment, adding additional strain to Egypt’s relations with Israel over Gaza. Due to the tensions in Gaza, the city of Rafah, which lies within Egypt’s borders, is frequently subjected to Israeli air strikes. Therefore, the possible cooperation with Turkey to increase Egypt’s armed unmanned aerial vehicle capacity could be another important parameter in the relations between the two countries.

Although the Turkish-Egyptian rapprochement is mainly examined through regional units of analysis, it has the potential to influence global political dynamics. The move presents both difficulties and opportunities for Western powers including the management of migratory flows, the transfer of energy resources to global markets, the EU’s position in relation to developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the U.S. reaction to its relatively diminished presence in the Middle East. With its military, economic, and political dimensions, the Turkey-Egypt rapprochement could usher in a new paradigm in the global geopolitical balance.

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elations between Turkey and Egypt have been particularly strained in the aftermath of the 2013 military coup against then president Mohamed Morsi, with tensions manifesting themselves in multiple areas. Positioned on opposing sides, particularly on issues in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, the two countries have made efforts to counterbalance each other diplomatically, economically, and militarily in key conflict zones in the Middle East and Africa. Within this historical context, the 2021 normalization efforts mark a discernible shift toward a détente in this previously tense relationship.

The progression of diplomatic engagements, beginning at the level of deputy ministers and culminating in a significant institutionalized framework with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Egypt on February 14, indicates a pivotal moment of rapprochement. This newfound proximity paves the way for multifaceted opportunities for cooperation, with Libya standing out as a key area given the discord it has caused since 2014.

Key factors that elevate Libya’s importance in the foreign policy considerations of both nations include strategic interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, migration routes, and energy resources. In this sense, the potential for joint efforts promises to produce tangible results in the country which has been characterized by political volatility and a precarious security landscape.

Encouraging the implementation of electoral processes

Libya’s elections, scheduled for December 2021, were postponed due to a number of constitutional and political challenges. This development, which facilitated the formation of the government led by Fathi Bashagha with the support of the eastern-based parliament and the backing of militia leader Khalifa Haftar, has exacerbated fragmentation and conflict in the country. Currently, the election issue remains in a state of ambiguity. Ongoing efforts by the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) under the leadership of Secretary General Abdoulaye Bathily, coupled with initiatives by Western actors and legislative discussions within Libya, have failed to achieve the desired resolution. At this juncture, the involvement of Turkey and Egypt could play a key role in reducing the prevailing division.

While maintaining substantial ties with the eastern segment, Egypt has also actively engaged in diplomatic relations with the Government of National Unity (GNU), which was formed in February 2021. In parallel, Turkey initiated a diplomatic outreach to eastern Libyan actors in the same year. Moreover, prior to his visit to Libya, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan announced Ankara’s intention to reopen its consulate in Benghazi in a joint media briefing with Malta’s Minister for Foreign and European Affairs and Trade Ian Borg, underscoring Turkey’s commitment to reestablishing its diplomatic presence in eastern Libya. This scenario accentuates the potential and capacity of both Turkey and Egypt to mitigate the competition between Libya’s eastern and western factions or, alternatively, to play a mediating role in the reconciliation process.

On the other hand, given their different priorities and agendas, Turkey and Egypt could serve as catalysts for the establishment of peace and stability in Libya. Turkey needs a certain level of stability to protect its national interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and to maintain its commercial ties with Libya. Conversely, the Abdel Fattah al-Sisi government prioritizes the foreign exchange earnings of Egyptian workers in Libya and the potential role Egypt could play in Libya’s reconstruction phase. The Libyan dossier is also sensitive for Egypt because of the extensive land borders it shares with Libya’s eastern region and is critically important for strengthening its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

It should be noted that Turkey and Egypt are key actors in western and eastern Libya, respectively. The most tangible cooperation that could materialize between the two countries, specifically regarding Libya, would be their commitment to overcoming the disputes of local actors and ensuring that elections are held in a fair and transparent environment. In such a scenario, instead of power-sharing models, both countries could increase their influence in local, regional, and international organizations to support the establishment of a people-based governance system, thereby reducing the influence and control of spoilers.

Steps and potential DDR initiatives

Since 2011, Libya has witnessed a rapid proliferation of armed factions, a phenomenon largely attributed to the power vacuum and the ensuing internal conflict. These groups, which vary in size, allegiance, and ideological orientation, have become entrenched in Libya’s sociopolitical landscape, posing complex challenges to the peacebuilding process. As a result, effective implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) in Libya requires a nuanced understanding of the local environment, the heterogeneity of these armed entities, and the intricate interplay of regional and international influences.

Several international organizations have demonstrated their commitment to the DDR process in Libya. In particular, the UNSMIL, led by Senegalese diplomat Abdoulaye Bathily, has been active in facilitating dialogue and providing technical assistance. The United States, the European Union, and countries such as Italy and Germany have made significant contributions through financial assistance and capacity-building initiatives. For these efforts to be truly effective, however, there must be a concerted effort to align them with Libya’s national goals and priorities.

When it comes to the Turkish-Egyptian model, it is safe to say that their consensus could produce more effective results and gain local support. Turkey’s and Egypt’s positive relations with the various factions in Libya could serve as a crucial bridge in the implementation of the DDR process. Turkey’s close ties with elements of the Libyan army and Egypt’s relationship with the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar could facilitate a basis for dialogue and reconciliation between these two factions. Particularly during the disarmament and demobilization phase, both countries have the potential to influence actors on the ground to increase efforts to disarm and disband military units.

The spectrum of DDR efforts currently underway in Libya demonstrates a range of methodologies. These initiatives range from basic disarmament and demobilization activities to more holistic programs that include psychosocial support, vocational training, and the facilitation of employment opportunities for ex-combatants. In the reintegration phase, Turkey and Egypt have the potential to promote social cohesion and create jobs in Libya through economic and social development projects.

For example, support for infrastructure and education projects as part of Libya’s reconstruction could facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life. Regarding the transition to a unified army in Libya, the sharing of military and security expertise by Turkey and Egypt is expected to contribute to the modernization and professionalization of Libya’s defense and security sectors. This is expected to strengthen central authority in Libya and help achieve security and stability throughout the country.

As two actors involved in the process since the beginning of the Libyan file, Turkey and Egypt have supported peace and stability in Libya according to their own priorities and agendas. The current rapprochement between the two countries, which is different from similar initiatives in the past, could lead to a more cautious approach and consensus on Libya. In this context, addressing the issue of elections and overcoming the security challenges posed by militias are priorities, while the establishment of a unified army and the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs remain crucial.

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gypt has issued a threat to nullify its long-standing peace treaty with Israel, which kept the two countries from war for decades. The warning comes in response to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s declaration of intent to send troops into Rafah, a city in Gaza near the Egyptian border.

The peace treaty, forged in 1979 at Camp David, marked a historic moment as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, with the mediation of U.S. President Jimmy Carter, shook hands, bringing an end to decades of hostilities.

Under the Camp David Accords, Israel agreed to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, which Egypt would maintain as a demilitarized zone. The treaty facilitated diplomatic relations, allowing Israeli ships passage through the Suez Canal, a vital trade route.

Current threat to the treaty:

The potential unraveling of the peace treaty stems from the genocide in Gaza. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s vow to send troops into Rafah, which he identifies as Hamas’ last stronghold, has drawn strong opposition from Egypt.

The Egyptian government is concerned that an Israeli offensive in the region could lead to a mass influx of desperate Palestinians across the border, impacting Egypt’s territory and its ability to serve as a crucial entry point for humanitarian aid.

Egyptian officials, speaking anonymously to the Associated Press, stated that Egypt may suspend the peace treaty if Israeli troops enter Rafah. This move could have significant repercussions for both nations.

Israel’s southern borders with Egypt

The treaty has limited troop deployments on both sides of the border, contributing to stability. If nullified, Israel might face challenges in maintaining its southern border as a peaceful zone, potentially straining its military resources already engaged in various fronts.

For Egypt, the consequences could extend beyond the geopolitical realm. The country has received substantial U.S. military assistance since the signing of the peace agreement. Voiding the treaty may jeopardize this funding and place additional strain on Egypt’s struggling economy, particularly if a massive military buildup becomes necessary.

Paige Alexander, CEO of the Carter Center, warned that any step drawing Egypt into the hostilities would be catastrophic for the entire region. The situation remains fluid, and the international community closely watches the developments, hoping to avert the potential collapse of a treaty that has endured for over four decades.

Source: The Associated Press

I

n a new development, Turkey has agreed to provide combat drones and other cutting-edge technologies to Egypt, marking a pivotal moment in the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two nations. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan confirmed this announcement on Sunday, highlighting the importance of the burgeoning ties and the potential for technological collaboration.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is scheduled to visit Egypt on February 14, a historic trip that signifies the restoration of diplomatic relations after a decade of strained ties. The relations between Turkey and Egypt had been tense since the 2013 military coup that ousted the late Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi, leading to a prolonged period of diplomatic standoff.

Fidan, in an interview with private A Haber television, stated that the normalization of relations holds significant importance for Egypt to gain access to specific technologies. He expressed that Turkey and Egypt have reached an agreement to provide unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), commonly known as drones, and other advanced technologies. While the details of the technological collaboration were not explicitly outlined, the move suggests a deepening of cooperation in various sectors, including defense.

Demand for Turkey’s drones

The demand for Turkey’s drones has soared on the international stage, gaining recognition for their effectiveness in conflicts across regions such as Syria, Libya, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine. Turkey’s drones, particularly the Bayraktar TB2 developed by Baykar, have played pivotal roles in altering the course of conflicts, making Turkey a major global supplier in the defense industry.

The Bayraktar TB2, known for its long endurance, operational altitude, and versatility, has been instrumental in conflicts where it demonstrated its capability to neutralize advanced anti-aircraft systems, artillery, and armored vehicles. Baykar, the developer of these drones, has successfully exported them to more than 30 countries, solidifying Turkey’s position as a key player in the global defense market.

President Erdoğan’s upcoming visit to Egypt is expected to address various bilateral and regional issues, including trade, energy, and security. The commitment to providing combat drones and advanced technology underscores the depth of the evolving partnership between Turkey and Egypt.

Turkey’s ambition to become self-reliant

This move also reflects Turkey’s ambition to become a self-reliant defense industry powerhouse, with technologies ranging from UAVs to fighter jets and warships. The collaborative efforts between Turkey and Egypt are anticipated to extend beyond defense, contributing to mutual economic and strategic interests.

As Turkey continues to expand its global influence through technological collaborations and diplomatic initiatives, the visit of President Erdoğan to Egypt holds the promise of further cementing ties and fostering a new era of cooperation between the two nations. The potential sale of Turkey’s advanced drones to Egypt is not only a strategic move for both countries but also underscores the transformative impact of Turkey’s defense industry on the geopolitical landscape.

Sources: Daily Sabah and Reuters

I

n a strong statement on Sunday, January 21, 2024, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi affirmed that Egypt would not tolerate any threat to Somalia’s security. This declaration follows Ethiopia’s consideration of recognizing Somaliland’s independence in a deal that includes access to a strategic seaport.

The remarks indicate Egypt’s potential involvement in a dispute that has heightened tensions in the Horn of Africa, where it already maintains frosty relations with Ethiopia.

Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991 but has not gained international recognition. The proposed port lease deal, yet to be finalized, would provide landlocked Ethiopia access to the sea through the port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden. The deal has sparked outrage from Somalia and now draws Egypt into the geopolitical fray.

Egypt will protect Somalia

“Egypt will not allow anyone to threaten Somalia or affect its security,” President Sisi stated during a joint news conference with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. He warned against attempts to challenge or threaten Egypt, particularly if its intervention is requested by its brothers.

In a memorandum of understanding signed on January 1, Ethiopia expressed its willingness to consider recognizing Somaliland’s independence in exchange for the port access. The agreement includes a lease of 20 km of coastland around the port for military and commercial purposes over 50 years. Ethiopia’s primary port for maritime exports is currently located in Djibouti.

President Sisi emphasized the need for cooperation on development rather than attempts to seize land, suggesting a more strategic and peaceful approach to resolving conflicts. Ethiopia rejected criticism from Egypt, characterizing the deal as a commercial agreement aimed at securing sea access rather than an annexation attempt.

Tension

The tension surrounding the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal further complicates relations between Egypt and Ethiopia, already strained due to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam constructed on the Blue Nile. Talks over the dam’s operation and water release have yet to yield an agreement, contributing to ongoing disputes between the two nations.

As Somalia rejects the deal and seeks international support, the involvement of Egypt introduces a new dimension to the complex geopolitical landscape in the Horn of Africa. The situation underscores the broader implications of regional conflicts on global diplomacy and stability.

Sources: Reuters, and Aljazeera

T

he Nile River basin is shared by eleven riparian states. The vast portion of the river course originates from Ethiopia’s Blue Nile, or Abbay River, while Egypt and Sudan are the predominant consumers of the Nile River’s waters. As a result, the Nile’s key riparian states are Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan.

After several attempts to deal with integrated basin-wide watercourse management, in 2010, the three states along with the remaining eight riparian states, namely Burundi, D. R. Congo, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, were able to craft the first-ever inclusive legal regime known as the “Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework” that would lay the ground for establishing a basin-wide commission.

Unfortunately, the states were unable to reach a consensus, however, on the fate of the major colonial treaties, mainly the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and its extended 1959 Egypt-Sudan agreement, as Egypt and Sudan insist on their continued enforcement while Ethiopia and other upstream riparian states assert otherwise.

Save the basin-wide deadlocked negotiations on The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) that is awaiting minimum ratification to enter into force, the three riparian states have been in dispute over various issues concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which is being built on the course of the Abbay River since 2011.

Since the commencement of the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the three riparian states have held on-and-off talks regarding the references that would create a conducive environment for their roundtable negotiation over the dam. Accordingly, despite the intermittent nature of the talks, the decade-long negotiations have borne fruit in establishing various technical committees, such as the International Panel of Experts (IPoE) in 2012 and the National Independent Scientific Research Group (NISRG) in 2018. The negotiations also brokered the “Declaration of Principles on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam” in 2015, which is applauded for laying a fertile ground for the forthcoming negotiations, especially, for talks over the dam’s first filling and operation.

With the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as a corner stone, the three riparian states have agreed to be bound to, inter alia, the principles of cooperation, development, no significant harm rule, and equitable and reasonable use per Article I, II, III & IV of the “Declaration of Principles,” respectively. Furthermore, Article V dictates that the three riparian states respect and act as per the outcomes and recommendations of the technical committee. Although the three states have endorsed the IPoE’s final report, they could not agree to do the same for the studies of the other technical committees. Especially, the NISRG, which was tasked with providing alternative procedures on the first filling and operation of the GERD, made promising progress; however, it failed to come to terms with the baseline scenarios, which dragged them toward the colonial agreements.

The African Union and the GERD

Even though the trilateral and/or AU-led negotiations have not been exhaustively utilized, Egypt internationalized the issue and requested the intervention of the UN Security Council. Ethiopia objected to the request stating that the GERD is a regional matter, which procedurally should either be resolved through tripartite negotiation or be dealt with under the auspices of the AU. The UN Security Council backed down and dictated that the three countries come together and solve their differences amicably.

For the last couple of years, negotiation over the GERD has been put on hold due to the conflict in Ethiopia and political instability in Sudan. Although the three riparian states have not issued an official communiqué, there are reports indicating several confidential negotiations have taken place in the United Arab Emirates, but with no significant progress.

Recently, after Ethiopia’s prime minister vowed to delay the fourth filing of the dam until September 2023, a joint statement was issued following a meeting with the Egyptian president in Cairo in early-July 2023. It was agreed to re-initiate tripartite negotiation over the GERD and a pledge was given to conclude negotiations in four months. Despite the unrealistic ambition of the statement given the track record of the last ten years, the statement shows the ambition, willingness, and commitment of the riparian states to solve the sticking issues quickly. The move is a big step and could be a huge relief if the three states pursue the negotiation in good faith, compromise their interests, and come to agreeable terms in a win-win manner.

Currently, more than a month after the joint statement, it was not clear yet where and when these negotiations were going to take place, until it was made public that the negotiations commenced on August 27, 2023 in Cairo, Egypt. Moreover, recalling the ongoing war in Sudan, it is naïve to assume Sudan is going to engage proactively in tripartite negotiations. What is more, the joint statement was issued by two riparian states, and primarily Ethiopia. Thus, the talks are practically going to be bilateral, notably between Ethiopia and Egypt.

As the move impliedly ignores Sudan, it raises trust issues. Reports have already started indicating that Sudan is dismayed by the move. Although Ethiopia and Egypt are the two major riparian states, Sudan’s concerns should not be ignored given its geographical location midstream, and its role and significance in the tripartite negotiations.

There is little doubt that states are free to negotiate openly or secretly whenever and/or wherever they want in the presence or absence of a third party. The three riparian states might openly or secretly pursue their negotiations either in their respective state/city, under the auspices of the AU, in a third country like the U.S. or UAE or agree otherwise and negotiate accordingly. What matters the most is whenever and wherever talks are going on, it has to be pursued in a good faith whereby their respective national interests, tripartite negotiations, and basin-wide cooperation are prioritized in a balanced manner.

Against the above context, before the actual commencement date was made public, there was an assumption that negotiations might have already confidentially begun in the UAE given the experience of the last two years. Recalling the two downstream riparian states’ mechanisms to pressure Ethiopia, and the Arab League’s position on the GERD, there could be scenarios in which the UAE, using its economic leverage, might pressure Ethiopia to sign a binding deal. Had the assumption been true although the UAE, like the Washington-led negotiations, is not expected to pursue an active role in the negotiation process, it would be unwise to rule out such a possibility.

Now that the whereabouts of the negotiations over the GERD are public, the riparian states need to pursue their talks in a way that would address the remaining unresolved issues on the filling and operation of the grand dam. Most importantly, they should consciously pursue their negotiations in such a way that would not affect future basin-wide negotiations over the equitable and reasonable use, and the fair share of the entire Nile River course among all riparian states.

Furthermore, in the past, the AU has sponsored the GERD matter and has not issued a communiqué indicating any new developments. Thus, the righteous approach would be to continue negotiating under the AU. The riparian states need to pursue the dogma of “African solutions to African problems,” retain the GERD matter under the AU, and transparently walk the talk under its chairmanship.

A

gainst the backdrop of the Nile’s flowing currents, a complex struggle unfurls between Egypt and Ethiopia, each driven by their distinct needs and aspirations. As the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) nears completion, tensions rise, underscoring the challenge of balancing development and preservation in a region with scarce water supplies. The Nile River, one of the longest rivers in the world, passes through eleven different countries from south to north, and its appears that Ethiopia and Egypt are unwilling to share it. Egyptians cannot live without the Nile, and they depend on it completely for water. Ethiopia also needs GRED for development.

Throughout history, Egypt has had a profound connection to the Nile. The country consists of more than 90% desert and the Nile is called the “Gift of the gods.” At the same time, Ethiopia needs the Nile water to fill GERD and help the country supercharge its economy. More than 60% of Ethiopia is not connected to the power grid, which is something the government wants to change.

This is where the tension begins between the two countries. Mohammed Mahmoud, director of the Climate and Water Program at the Middle East Institute, warns, “Folks have never actually gone to war just because of water.” “Now, we could be at the point in history where that changes.”

What will Ethiopia gain from GERD?

With a budget of $4.2 billion, GERD is in the western Benishangul-Gumuz region and has been a source of contention between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt since the beginning of its construction in 2011.

Sudan and Egypt fear the Ethiopian project could reduce their share of the Nile waters. Ethiopia insists the dam is the key to its economic development: the dam is Africa’s biggest hydroelectric project to date and is expected to generate over 5,000 megawatts of electricity, doubling the nation’s electricity output when it has been fully completed.

More than 60% of Ethiopians cannot access electricity. Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed stated that “Ethiopia doesn’t have any intention to cause harm to Sudan and Egypt.” “But we also don’t want to live in darkness,” he added. Currently, 90% of construction has been completed.

What has caused the Nile waters crisis?

Egypt is in the grip of a water crisis caused by an increasing population and a limited water supply. The country has less water per person each year and is already below the United Nation’s water poverty threshold. By 2025 the UN predicts that Egypt will be approaching an “absolute water crisis.” Climate change, poor water management, recurring droughts, and the new Ethiopian hydropower dam on the Nile River are worsening the water crisis in the country.

In a report by Fast Company Middle East, Mohamed El-Kamel, the managing director of Alashanek ya Balady Association for Sustainable Development (AYB-SD), mentions a combination of factors that make Egypt susceptible to drought such as diminished rainfall, exacerbated by the increase in greenhouse gas emissions which leads to elevated temperatures. These changes also contribute to a shift in the distribution path of water. The escalating temperatures and impacts of climate change further cause water evaporation and decrease the water levels in Egypt’s lakes and rivers.

Depending solely on the Nile presents a heightened challenge in mitigating water scarcity for the country. The shrinking of the Nile is a result of increasing temperatures and prolonged drought periods. During the Cairo Water Week, Egypt’s Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Dr. Hani Sewilam underscored the country’s significant reliance on the Nile for nearly 97% of its irrigation and drinking water, outlining the interconnected transboundary risks.

Egypt is deeply concerned by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in terms of its water security. According to Dr. Sherine Ahmed El Baradei, associate professor at the Civil Engineering Program at the German University in Cairo, “Filling the reservoir over a more extended period would be a beneficial approach, as Ethiopia’s reservoir filling every five to seven years could lead to a reduction of Egypt’s water share by approximately 12 to 25% during the filling period.”

How to solve the water crisis

With a population that exceeds 109 million now, Egypt’s population is predicted to more than double within 50 years. The population problem is exacerbated by a lack of natural resources and habitable space, although Egypt extends over one million square kilometers. Most Egyptians live in just 7% of the country, mainly along the Nile and the Nile Delta. Due to overpopulation, the government began a family planning campaign to reduce birth rates and control overpopulation, dubbed “Two children are enough.” The government believes that this campaign will be a solution to Egypt’s pending water crisis.

Rice plays an important role in Egyptian cuisine with annual rice consumption standing at 67.5 kg per capita. Egypt switched from a rice exporter to a rice importer following governmental measures reducing rice-cultivated areas due to the water shortage crisis. According to the Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN), the country approved a law to circumvent illegal rice cultivation.

If a farmer is found to be planting rice outside of the allotted rice growing area set by the government, they could face a fine ranging from EGY 3,000 to EGY 10,000, or face a maximum six-month prison sentence. This was another government measure to combat water scarcity. 

Due to climate change, increasing human population pressure, and Ethiopia constructing a giant hydropower dam on the Nile, Africa is facing a water crisis. However, this crisis poses particular challenges for Egypt as the river provides nearly all Egyptians with drinking water. Without water, there can be no Egypt. As part of Egypt’s national strategy to improve accessibility to drinking water, a seawater desalination plant in New Mansoura recently began operations. The project is a part of the first phase of Egypt’s strategy which aims to build 21 seawater desalination plants that will reduce water extraction from the Nile.

The proposed desalination plants will be able to provide the water-stressed nation with an additional 3.3million m³/d of water that can be used to irrigate crops or for public water supply. Once the second phase is completed, the plants are expected to increase the country’s desalination capacity by 8.8 million m³/d at a total cost of $8 billion.

Is a water crisis imminent?

The citizens of Ethiopia are suffering from lack of electricity and hope to remedy this with the Rennaisance Dam. Furthermore, the completion of the Renaissance Dam will boost Addis Ababa’s economy by exporting electricity. However, countries like Egypt, at the end of the trail that receives the water, are worried about not having enough water to survive.

Egyptians have always depended on the Nile for their survival. Meanwhile, the construction of Ethiopia’s dam is currently 90% complete, and many meetings, agreements, and discussions between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan have been held with no mutual agreements.

Egypt and Ethiopia are unlikely to budge as both countries want what is best for their future. At the same time, Egyptians and Ethiopians want a suitable alternative to the impasse – and the sooner the better.

H

ave you ever experienced power cuts lasting more than five hours in the middle of a scorching heatwave? This is what Egyptians have been experiencing for the past two weeks and will continue to do so for the next month, according to Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly. The public, which has endured a heatwave of 40°C or more as well as power cuts, has expressed its growing discontent on various platforms in the hope that government officials will hear their voices.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian government continues to promote and invest in urban megaprojects such as the New Administrative Capital, the Cairo Monorail, and Capital Med. Madbouly recently claimed that these projects are being pursued for the necessary development of the Egyptian economy and were it not for them, the country would have collapsed some time ago.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia has been promoting its latest megacity project in the province of Tabuk known as “The Line.” If you have ever imagined living inside a mirror, The Line promises to make your fantasy come true. It is a 170-kilometer-long linear smart city stretching from west to east, and aims to be the world’s first city powered by renewable energy.

The Line

In his latest effort to promote this project, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) has teamed up with the Discovery Channel and produced a documentary titled “The Line: Saudi Arabia’s City of the Future in Neom.”

In the documentary, MBS dismissed critics of his vision, claiming that his futuristic urban megaproject, which is being constructed in an “untouched” area, will go a long way towards meeting the environmental sustainability needs of the population by 2030. He stated, “They say that a lot of the projects that are done in Saudi Arabia cannot be done, that they’re too ambitious. They can keep saying that and we can keep proving them wrong.”

Is it true that they are building The Line in an “untouched” area? According to Courtney Freer, a research fellow at the Middle East Center at the London School of Economics and Political Science, it is not. The Saudi security forces killed Abdul-Rahman Al-Howeiti of the Howeitat tribe in 2020 because he refused to leave his home, which was on the megaproject’s site.

In the same year, his tribe sent an urgent request to the UN for protection against their allegations of the government’s forced displacement. Furthermore, a report in the Wall Street Journal estimated that 20,000 people would be evicted from the area to make way for the city.

Utopian vision: Supporters of the urban megaprojects

With the current global environmental crisis, many seem to agree on the need to develop sustainable urban projects as a solution to the crisis. In addition, MENA’s largest cities are suffering from housing problems due to rapidly growing populations. So, it seems only fair that governments would come up with urban projects that can solve both problems.

Taking The Line as an example, Tarek Qaddumi, an executive director from Neom’s urban project, told the magazine Dezeen that the city will combat the negative effects of urban sprawl. Since the city is vertically layered, the structure will limit the expansion of urban areas. The city will also offer technological progress and sustainability as a way of life.

On the business side, many businesspeople believe that these urban projects will boost the economy and attract good investments. Take Mohamed Khaled, a commercial real estate consultant, as an example: he told Egypt Today that the New Capital will be the perfect place for those who want to invest their money in good locations, as it will offer great business opportunities.

The investment of the Talaat Mustafa Group, one of the biggest construction companies in Egypt, is evidence to this end. Reports have indicated that they have invested in the foundations for the “Noor City” project within the New Capital. Similarly, Rawan Ahmed, a Saudi entrepreneur, told the National that it is very exciting to have innovations such as The Line be featured in the kingdom.

In terms of smart sustainability, housing, and business, many believe that MENA’s urban megaprojects offer innovation for a better future.

Dystopian vision: Critics of the urban megaprojects

Many critics from different fields have criticized MENA urban megaprojects as dystopian because of the authoritarian nature of regional political structures, the cost of these projects, and the delusional goals set for them. Starting with the authoritarian nature, experts such as Robert Draper, a correspondent for GQ, claim that the urban megaprojects have clearly proven that governments do not involve their citizens in the decision-making process.

Returning to the Egyptian case, Michele Dunne, a nonresident scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, claimed that the New Capital’s emptiness proves that President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s vision doesn’t include most Egyptian citizens: ordinary citizens are not allowed there on the grounds that it is a “military compound.”

Similarly, the Saudi government hasn’t consulted its citizens on whether they would agree to evacuate their homes for the megaproject nor has it offered them adequate compensation. While MBS claims that The Line is being constructed in an “untouched” area to provide housing for the population, the reality tells a different story.

Local population and cost

According to a New York Times report, MBS has never mentioned the tribal community that is forced to leave the project’s site or the consequences they face for not complying. On October 2, 2022, the kingdom’s special courts handed down the death sentence to three members of the Howeitat tribe who protested against the forced eviction of their homes in 2020.

Experts such as Philip Oldfield, head of school at the School of Built Environment, University of New South Wales (UNSW), have also criticized the cost of these plans. Despite governments’ claims that these projects are being implemented to save the region from the ongoing climate and overpopulation crises, Oldfield has warned that the projects are costly for all the wrong reasons. A project like The Line could destroy the biodiversity of the Saudi desert. Would the migrating birds understand what a mirror is?

Furthermore, according to Oldfield, the financial and environmental costs of building the project will overwhelm any promised environmental benefits. He told Dezeen that the project will require a huge amount of steel, glass, and concrete – all of which are not considered low-carbon materials. His findings could also be applied to the Egyptian case.

T

he elections in Turkey, the most important elections of 2023 worldwide, rolled on after the May 28 runoff, with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan getting 52.18 percent of the votes against his rival, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, and being re-elected.

On June 3, Erdoğan attended the swearing-in ceremony at the parliament and named the cabinet members right after the ceremony, the same evening. New faces have appeared in fifteen ministerial positions except for two ministries: the ministries of health and culture. The foreign, interior, defense, and finance ministries were among the most crucial cabinet posts with new incumbents. These four vital positions have been filled by well-known, experienced, and respected politicians and bureaucrats who have played critical roles in the country’s past two decades.

The replacement of the foreign minister, Mevlut Çavuşoğlu, with Dr. Hakan Fidan, who served as the head of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), and the assignment of Prof. Ibrahim Kalin, who served as a presidential spokesperson and advisor to Erdoğan, as the new head of Turkish intelligence have attracted the attention of not only regional powers but also international players due to the duo’s importance for the country and President Erdoğan.

Despite some analysts considering the new assignments as indicators of change, this is not the case. In the past three years, Turkey has adopted a normalization policy merged with its financial aims of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI).

The past three years’ diplomatic and economic attempts have aimed at the deliberate preparation of Turkey’s transforming foreign policy and economy. This transformation has brought about a series of hardships for the country resulting from the fall of the Turkish currency as Turkey seeks to be a regional financial hub. However, the Turkish government plans to make Turkey a “center country” as suggested by Wallerstein’s world systems theory which argues that the world economic system serves to benefit some countries and exploit others.

Turkey’s recent achievements in the defense industry (fighter jets, drones, missiles, etc.), technology, and its indigenous car (TOGG) are among the vital indicators of this intention. Rather than being exploited, Turkey wants to decrease the value of the Turkish lira, and stabilize and improve its relations with regional powers as part of its normalization efforts.

What is more, the country’s proactive role in several conflicts has brought it to the fore as a regional and international spot for resolving conflicts. Since this strategy requires a stabilized region and good diplomatic ties, Ankara, witnessing the decreasing hegemonic power of the U.S., started mending its ties with its neighbors, particularly the Gulf countries, which could impact a wide range of areas and regions, including the Maghreb.

Turkey and the Maghreb

What can be expected next in Turkey’s relations with the Maghreb countries in light of Turkey’s new cabinet?

First, it is vital to remember the fact that the newly assigned foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, has been behind the scene of Ankara’s normalization efforts with regional powers. Egypt is among the countries with which Turkey has sought normalization, and Ankara and Cairo have already announced the assignment of their ambassadors after several years of cold diplomatic ties. The normalization between Ankara and Cairo is important since it can help resolve Libya’s more than decade-long conflict, along with the disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s strengthening ties with Egypt would provide Ankara with an advantage against Greece, which signed an MoU with Cairo a year after Ankara signed one with Libya’s UN-backed government.

This can also provide an opportunity to find a solution for the Eastern Mediterranean gas and border rift. Regarding Libya, Turkey has been backing the UN-recognized government headed by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah while being in touch with several parties to the conflict. On the contrary, Egypt has been one of the closest allies of warlord Khalifa Haftar, the Tobruk-based parliament’s speaker and its PM-designate Fathi Bashagha. During Bashagha’s failed attempts to enter Tripoli, Turkey played a balancing role by stopping the clashes and mediating between the warring parties.

Following the visit of CIA Director William Burns to Libya in the middle of January in which he met with Dbeibah and Haftar, Fidan was quick to take action and meet Dbeibah, Menfi, Khalid al-Mishri, the Chairman of the High Council of State, and even Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

Hakan Fidan

Turkey’s foreign policy during Hakan Fidan’s tenure at the MIT was a conversion of his background activities into diplomatic steps, with Ankara’s grand strategy remaining the same: making Turkey a more independent, balanced, and proactive foreign approach, considering the decreasing hegemonic power of the U.S. in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have been seen to be happy with Erdoğan’s re-election as they were among the first countries to congratulate him on his election victory. Considering the upcoming visits and meetings between Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, Fidan could lead Ankara towards a solution of its long-standing issues.

With an operational intelligence service, proactive foreign policy efforts, and a qualified staff comprising among others the aforementioned ministers, Turkey only needs to eliminate its economic hardships. An improving Turkish economy would also help heal the wounds of the region and the world at large. As the U.S. is losing its hegemony across the region, Turkey, after recovering from an economic and diplomatic crisis, will seek to become a regional and global hub for trade, diplomacy, and politics as per its grand strategy.

N

ine Arab countries have entered the club of the top 40 weapons-buying countries in the world, according to a recent report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). At the same time, between 2018 and 2022, arms imports by European countries increased by 47% compared to 2013-17 while imported arms decreased by 40% in Africa, 21% in the Americas, 7.5% in Asia and Oceania, and 8.8% in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the global powers’ share in arms exports has varied, with the U.S. share increasing from 33% between 2013-2017 to 40% from 2018-2022, while Russia’s share fell from 22% to 16% in the same years. China’s share of global arms exports amounted to 5.2%, Germany’s share stands at 4.2%,  Italy’s at 3.8%, and Israel’s at 2.3% between 2018-2022.

For the first time, two Arab countries, namely Jordan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have joined the list of top 25 arms exporters globally.

Algeria’s global share of arms imports has declined from 4.1% in 2013-2017 to 1.8% in 2018-2022, moving the country from 12^th position to 18^th in arms-importing countries globally. Algeria remains the top country in Africa importing arms.

Morocco’s arms sales have declined from 1.1% in 2013-2017 to 0.8% in 2018-2022 globally. Morocco currently ranks 29^th among arms-exporting countries—a decline from the 21^st position it held.

The GCC takes the lead

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) occupied the first ranking in arms imports, with 180 war jets ordered by the Gulf monarchies out of 260 exported to the Middle East. Notably, arms exports to the Arab Maghreb have declined while exports to Egypt, which has 4.2% of the global share of arms imports, remained the same.

In 2018-2022, Saudi Arabia came after India in global arms imports, with a total percentage of 9.6% following India’s 11%.

Saudi Arabia’s arms imports declined slightly from 10% of global arms purchases in 2013 to of 8.7% in 2017.

Qatar moved from the position of the world’s 17^th arms importer in 2013-2017, to third in the world in 2018-2022, with an increase of 311%.

The United States was the main contributor to exporting arms to Qatar with 42%, followed by France with 29%, and Italy with 14%.

Egypt and the UAE

The economic crisis in Egypt did not affect the share of its arms imports. Although Egypt receives approximately $1.3 billion annually in U.S. military aid, the United States is not among the top three arms suppliers to Cairo.

Instead, Russia topped this list with circa 34%, followed by Italy and France with 19% each.

On the other hand, the UAE arms imports have declined moving the country from fifth place in the world (2013-2017) to 11^th (2018-2022).

It is likely that the decline in the country’s arms imports is related to the country’s shift towards manufacturing its own weapons, and even exporting them, thus joining the club of top 25 arms exporters.

The UAE ranked 18th in the world in arms exports, accounting for 0.4% of the world’s total arms exports.

Between 2018 and 2022, the UAE exported 28% of Egypt’s arms imports, 27% of Jordan’s, and 15% of Algeria’s.

The United States was the main supplier of arms to the UAE, with about 66%, followed by Turkey (7.4%).

Russia ranked third with 5.4%, although the UAE army is known for its reliance on Western weapons.

The war in Ukraine and East Asian arms exports

Ukraine has become the third-largest recipient of global arms in 2022, accounting for 2% of global arms purchases between 2018 and 2022.

Between the years 2013 and 2017 and the years 2018 and 2022, arms imports by East Asian states increased by 21%. The SIPRI report concluded that “[a]rms imports by China rose by 4.1 per cent, with most coming from Russia. However, the biggest increases in East Asia were by U.S. allies South Korea (+61%) and Japan (+171%).” The report went on to state, “Australia, the largest arms importer in Oceania, increased its imports by 23 per cent.”

The list of major arms importers did not include Arab countries such as Oman, Sudan, Libya, Iraq, Tunisia, Syria, Mauritania, and Lebanon.

On February 6, 2023, Turkey experienced one of the most catastrophic earthquakes in its history. Syria has also deeply suffered from the earthquake. In the aftermath of the tragic events, huge efforts, supported by domestic and international rescuers, continued to save those trapped under the rubble. One of the interesting aspects of the early days of the earthquake was the increasing diplomatic traffic centred around Turkey.

Within a few days following the earthquake disaster, the Emir of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani was the first head of state to visit Turkey. At the same time, due to the earthquake, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov, Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias, Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen, UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed, and U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken visited Turkey and earthquake-stricken areas, and held talks with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu.

Within this framework, diplomatic activities carried out during disaster period witnessed another significant development on February 27. Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sameh Shoukry visited Turkey, marking the highest-level visit between the two countries in almost a decade. Shoukry’s visit signalled a concrete step in the long-awaited normalization in Turkey-Egypt relations.

In the statement made after the meeting of the two foreign ministers, Çavuşoğlu emphasized the importance of Egypt’s visit at a time when Turkey is experiencing difficult moments, a fact underlining that Egypt and Turkey mutually need each other.

A will to reconcile?

At the same time, he drew attention to the will of the two countries to take their relations to higher levels as shared by the presidents of Turkey and Egypt. Çavuşoğlu stated that the visit of the Egyptian foreign minister might also lead to a meeting of the two presidents in the near future.

The reactions of Turkey and Egypt towards regional politics after the Arab popular movements caused the two countries to experience tense political relations. It was a period in which the power struggle in the Eastern Mediterranean, the course of the war in Libya, and policies towards the Muslim Brotherhood formed the main points of tension in the relations between the two countries.

However, the Gulf region-oriented normalization that started in the Middle East in late 2020, rapidly spilled over across the region and, to a certain extent, brought about the normalization of Turkey-Egypt relations. There are three, if not more, dynamics that pushed Ankara and Cairo to speed up the normalization.

The first is that both countries seem to have the political will to restore bilateral relations. Both Turkey and Egypt are aware of the importance of the other in terms of regional security, economic opportunities, and sociocultural issues. Turkey and Egypt, with a total population of almost 200 million, are among the regional powers of the Middle East and would be able to form one of the largest partnerships in the region with their vast resources and potential.

This is one of the greatest reasons why both countries maintain commercial and economic relations to a certain extent even during periods when political relations were tense.

“Share” in regional normalization

The second point is that both countries want to ensure their “share” in regional normalization and have the desire to keep diplomacy alive in times of disaster. Along with the climate of normalization in the region, Turkey, which has normalized relations with countries with which it has long-term problematic relations such as Greece, Armenia, France, and Israel, has tried to resolve the tension areas with Egypt through diplomacy and continuous dialogue.

Following Egypt’s economic crisis and the situation after the food and energy crisis caused by the Russia-Ukraine war, the country has adopted a strategy of re-establishing strong partnerships with its partners in the region.

The third point is that both countries have a huge market and potential for the other. In this sense, in case of enhanced normalization, Turkish companies in Egypt are going to be able to increase their business, and this process will have a positive impact on the Egyptian economy. Also, as Çavuşoğlu stated, it may be possible for Egyptian and Turkish companies to share their experiences and render the benefits of these relations more permanent. Therefore, at this stage, a normalization carried forward could herald extremely positive developments for both Turkish and Egyptian people.

The future of Turkish-Egyptian relations

In conclusion, there are obviously many reasons to be optimistic about the future of Turkish-Egyptian relations. It may be only a matter of time that the leaders of Turkey and Egypt meet in one of the two capitals. Their main aims will be to restore the already damaged relations and to eliminate differences in regional policies. Much of the discussion will probably be focusing, among other bilateral issues, the issues of the Eastern Mediterranean, Libya, and Africa.

Finally, both countries do not have the luxury of scaling down their roles and ambitions as assumed leaders in regional politics. For decades, Egypt has enjoyed a leading position in the Middle Eastern political and social arena with its huge capabilities diplomatically, militarily, and culturally. Meanwhile Turkey has been the most successful example of a well-functioning and prosperous democratic Muslim-majority nation.

Turkey has also recently transformed itself into a military power that has allowed Ankara to play a role in regional politics by being involved in regional and global crisis areas in a game-changing capability. Therefore, both Turkey and Egypt see each other’s potential, and have concluded that cooperation would be more beneficial than confrontation.

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multipolar regional order is in the making in the Middle East, the preponderance of the U.S. is waning and rising powers, primarily China and Russia, are deepening their involvement in the region. For the U.S., the Middle East has been losing its significance and the Asia Pacific region is considered economically and militarily more vital. The stable supply of oil from the Middle East is no more a top U.S. concern as the booming shale oil production in North America helps towards energy independence.

The badly ended invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq showed the limits of the U.S. power and influence in the region, which makes American policymakers less willing to play a major role in Middle Eastern affairs. The most recent escalation of violence between Israel and Palestinians in Jenin was met with mere calls for calm by the U.S. and President Biden so far has been quite unwilling to reinitiate the Middle East peace process. As the U.S. interest in the region diminishes, the rising powers of China and Russia are increasingly more interested in strengthening their ties with the Middle East.

The longstanding U.S. allies in the Middle East, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Turkey, are forming new intra and extra regional alliances. The Abraham Accords (2020) largely ended Israel’s isolation in the region, on an official level, as it established diplomatic relations with the UAE and Bahrain. In 2020, Morocco also recognized Israel and Sudan declared such an intention, which has not materialized yet. After four years of rupture, diplomatic relations between Israel and Turkey were restored in December 2022. Even Saudi Arabia’s relations with Israel are on the mend, though a normalization between the two is still not in the offing. In short, Israel is no more isolated officially and hence less dependent on the U.S. for its security.

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE are all establishing stronger ties with China and Russia. Egypt and China have fast growing economic and military ties, and Egypt is one of the major focus countries of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The two countries call their relationship a “strategic partnership.” Saudi Arabia is strengthening its strategic ties with China. Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Riyadh in December 2022 and the two sides agreed that “they firmly support each other’s core interests” and would strengthen their partnership on energy and defense. President Jinping also met with representatives of other oil-producing Gulf states and the Arab League countries in the same visit, and called for the use of Chinese yuan, instead of U.S. dollars, in oil and gas transactions as he promised that China would continue its large volume oil imports from the region.

The increasing trade with the region is not simply driven by oil, there is also strong demand for the Chinese goods in the Middle East. Most strikingly, U.S.-banned Huawei technologies, such as its 5G equipment, are welcomed in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The U.S. refusal to sell certain advanced technology weapons to a number of Middle East countries, along with Russia’s focus on its war in Ukraine, have led China to become “the secondary arms supplier of choice for many Middle East countries” in 2022.

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are already partners of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’s dialogue. Russia is also making inroads in the region beyond its already entrenched regional alliances, e.g., with Syria. The Saudi-Russia cooperation is particularly strong in OPEC+, where both countries seek to cut oil supplies to prevent a drop in oil prices. Saudi Arabia’s oil alliance with Russia is a serious concern for the U.S., and American policymakers argue that this alliance benefits Russia for continuing its invasion of Ukraine. Egypt and Turkey also have close ties with Russia.

Turkey’s purchase of the Russian-made S400 air defense system and the ongoing construction of the first Turkish nuclear power plant by a Russian state-owned company are notable examples of the strengthening Turkish-Russian relationship. In July 2022, Egypt and Russia signed a deal for Egypt’s first nuclear power plant to the chagrin of the West, which has placed economic sanctions on Russia due to the war in Ukraine. Both Egypt and Turkey have maintained neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine war and chose not to implement any economic sanctions against Russia. That’s also the case with all other major U.S. allies in the Middle East: neither UAE nor Israel or Saudi Arabia has taken sides in the war.

China maintains a close relationship with Iran, the main U.S. rival in the region. The trade between Iran and China provides Iran with the badly needed cash for its economic survival in the face of U.S.-led sanctions imposed on Tehran for its nuclear program. Although Iran is worried over China’s growing cooperation with Saudi Arabia, China has thus far managed to develop its ties with the two rival countries. The U.S. is particularly worried about China’s increasing cheap oil imports from Iran.

China weakens U.S. influence in the Middle East and Iran sustains its economy through trade with China. There is no reason for China and Iran to abandon such mutually beneficial trade. The relationship between Iran and Russia is also deepening as Iran supplies Russia with drones and other military equipment in its war against Ukraine, and Russia remains a key Iranian ally in countering the U.S.-led sanctions.

Regional powers in the Middle East seem to have already benefited from the lessening of U.S. interest in the region. The growing ties with China and Russia enable regional actors in the Middle East to withstand U.S. influence. However, this does not entail a breakup of their relations with the U.S. Egypt, Israel, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are not going to part ways with the U.S. They are rather more likely to hold on to the middle ground, being neither fully committed allies nor rivals to the U.S. If that path is to be continued by regional actors, we may well be witnessing the emergence of a multipolar order in the Middle East, one that is not dominated by any external or regional player.

On the other hand, China’s growing influence in the Middle East is a fact that does not necessarily mean replacing the U.S. The Chinese are keen on improving their economic and trade ties with the Middle East, but there is no evidence of any plans for military presence in the region. The U.S. still remains the major power in the Middle East, though its influence is in decline. The regional actors in the Middle East are likely to exploit the U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia rivalries at the global and regional levels to strengthen their positions. A multipolar order in the Middle East is definitely not the guaranteed outcome of shifting alliances and growing ties between regional and rising powers, but it appears as the most likely option.

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here have been remarkable developments in Turkey-Egypt relations, particularly since the beginning of 2021. The diplomacy and dialogue mechanisms of the bilateral relations between the two countries have quite a variety of variables and dimensions. In this context, despite the conflicting foreign policy priorities of both parties, the relations between Ankara and Cairo, which have a deep-rooted common history from a political, economic, and cultural perspective, progress in a balanced manner.

The exploratory talks held in May and September of 2021 played a major role in the formation of such a balance. The diplomatic contacts between the two countries, which began at the level of deputy ministers, had a symbolic value in terms of normalizing the relations that had been reduced to a minimum since 2013. The contacts, however, did not aim to achieve a final result in the short term.

Contrary to expectations, decisive steps were taken towards the solution of many problematic issues of the agenda of the two countries during this process, and the two parties achieved significant momentum. However, the parties’ divergent stances regarding Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean slowed down the normalization steps, and brought the relations back to a tense atmosphere. In this tense atmosphere, the handshake between Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Sisi, despite all the existing differences, at the opening ceremony of the World Cup held in Qatar in 2022, has raised hopes, once again, for a dialogue on normalization.

Libya and Turkey-Egypt bilateral relations

Turkey and Egypt closely followed the chain of events taking place in Libya after Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown as a result of the popular movement that started in 2011. The fragile nature of the local political dynamics and the ever-changing system of alliances in Libya have placed the two countries in opposite camps in the post-2014 regional competition. In 2019, the coup attempt by Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the eastern militia forces, against the capital Tripoli and the events that followed, led to the political rivalry between Ankara and Cairo over Libya to break out.

The Turkey-Libya Maritime Boundary Delimitation and Defense Cooperation Agreement signed between Ankara and the then Government of National Accord (GNA) of Libya translated into a close coordination and collaboration between Turkey and the internationally recognized and legitimate political leadership in Tripoli. One of the main reasons of Ankara’s increasing engagement with the political processes in Libya was to help defend Turkey’s national interests with regard to the competition in the Eastern Mediterranean.

As Turkey considered insecurity vis-à-vis its interests in Libya and the Mediterranean, it followed a more proactive and determined political approach. On the other hand, the possible takeover of the country’s administration by Haftar, who has a long record of numerous human rights violations and war crimes, was interpreted as a strong threat by decision-makers at the time. At this point, among the reasons that forced Turkey to act was the demographic, social, and economic damage that could have been caused not only in Libya but in the region and the world at large by the potential mass migration waves that could start due to possible violence against civilians.

At the same time, Egypt, due to its wide borders with eastern Libya, remained indifferent to the formation and development of a homogeneous security apparatus in the Cyrenaica region, the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA) affiliated to Khalifa Haftar, and affiliated itself politically with Aguila Saleh, the head of the Tobruk-based parliament and the related political structure. Egypt’s desire to have an influence in the political developments in Libya is another reason for the Sisi administration’s engagement with political figures, armed groups, and tribes in the eastern region.

Egypt has strong commercial and economic relations with Libya. For years, the remittances brought into the country by Egyptians working in Libya were an important source of income for the Egyptian economy. In addition to security-based, political, and economic parameters, the regional alliance of which Egypt was a party pushed Cairo to implement more aggressive policies in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean. The alliance with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) made Egypt participate in regional formations with weak feasibility from the perspective of international law that undermined its possible gains in the Eastern Mediterranean with the conclusion of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) agreements.

Within this framework, following the signing of the hydrocarbon agreement between Turkey and the National Unity Government (MBH) in October, Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry announced that Cairo had suspended normalization talks due to Turkey’s stance on Libya. This agreement, which was crafted as an extension of the Maritime Deal dated November 27, 2019, is based on the principle of cooperation and benefit in maximizing the national interests of both Turkey and Libya, and it would be wrong to interpret it as a warning to Egypt.

On the contrary, the agreement reveals the possible gains that Egypt could garner in case of cooperation. As Turkish authorities have been asserting, since the start of the normalization negotiations, Egypt reaching an agreement on the maritime border could give it an area of 11,500 square kilometers. On the other hand, despite Egypt’s harsh reaction to the agreement, Turkey’s moderate approach still shows its determination and desire for normalizing ties.

Is renormalization possible?

The ongoing crisis between Turkey and Egypt was moved to the back burner after the leaders of the two countries shook hands at the opening ceremony of the World Cup held in Qatar in December 2022. Indeed, the picture that shows President Erdoğan and President Sisi shaking hands for the first time is not a sufficient indication on its own of the resumption of normalization talks. Due to its weight both in Libya and in the African continent, Egypt is an important factor for Turkey’s new foreign policy based on normalizing ties, which started with the Gulf countries, gained momentum with Egypt, and continued with Israel. However, success in diplomacy necessitates the willingness of both actors, and depends on strong communication channels and negotiations.

Some of the indicators suggest that Egypt has not fully demonstrated such determination. One recent example of such an action was the decree issued by President Sisi on December 20 in which the Cairo administration unilaterally determined the Western borders of Egypt with Libya, including the EEZ. It is argued that while this decision targets the hydrocarbon agreement that Turkey signed with Libya, it also shows that Egypt has no intention of making any concessions on the Libyan issue.

The decree was also not welcomed by the internationally recognized government of Libya. The Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that with the unilateral declaration of the said borders, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Libya were targeted, and the decree violated the principle of goodwill. Ankara’s reaction, on the other hand, came in parallel with its past balanced stance. In a statement made by Turkey, Libya and Egypt were invited to initiate dialogue and negotiations as soon as possible to determine the borders between the two countries in accordance with international law.

In sum, despite strong signs of normalization between Turkish and Egyptian political leaders, the challenges of the past are still relevant and threaten the prospect of normalization. However, it is important to protect the communication channels by keeping the existing problematic issues at a minimum level. In this sense, it is not difficult to see that Turkey exhibits a more rational and moderate approach to bilateral relations compared to Egypt.

Cooperation with Turkey in the region in the fields of political, economic, and security relations could bring important gains for Egypt, which is struggling with various internal and external problems. Accordingly, in addition to Egypt’s preferences in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, the political tone of the Sisi administration, will largely determine whether renormalization in bilateral relations will be possible.

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he Russian invasion of Ukraine not only led to a war between the two countries, but also brought about a discursive and value-laden struggle between western and eastern countries. The most recent developments indicate that the East-West axis in international relations entail costs on both sides. Political, military, and economic changes in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans immensely affect the choices of regional actors’ foreign policies who have to choose between the policy options set before them by Russia, China, or the Western powers with the U.S. taking the lead among the latter.

Meanwhile, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey act in accordance with the realities of contemporary multipolar global politics. Turkey, for example, as a regional player successfully maintains political, military, and economic ties with multiple states, which occasionally have conflicting interests, and avoids a unilateral alignment in its foreign policy. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, two prominent powers in the Middle East, try to pursue their national interests almost independently of the great powers’ political, military, and economic agendas.

These three nations, which have lately undergone a degree of political normalization, may now be progressing towards the next level of cooperation within one of the most important groupings of emerging economies, namely BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). In this regard, BRICS as one of the organizations of non-Western actors in the international political and economic system points to the weight of these actors in the international economic system.

Turkey’s mediator role

With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Turkey took on a significant role on issues such as ceasefire talks between Russia and Ukraine, and the resolution of global/transboundary crises, combining historical diplomatic experience with the relevance of its geographical location. As an international actor in cooperation with international organizations and as part of its own foreign policy, Turkey maintained talks with both Russia and Ukraine. Turkish authorities brought the warring parties together in Turkey, and established the Grain Corridor Deal together with Russia, Ukraine, and the UN to tackle the regional and global food crisis.

It is worth highlighting that Turkey is both a NATO member and maintains ties with Russia, and could thus keep communication and diplomatic channels open. As the most trustable third party, Turkey garners the appreciation of both Russia and Ukraine, while after the Grain Corridor Deal, Turkish-Russian nuclear cooperation continues to develop as witnessed by the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant.

Saudi Arabia and Egypt are two regional powers that tread cautiously in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, as well as other regional and international challenges. Egypt, for instance, while preserving ties with the United States, cooperates with Russia on nuclear issues.

Egypt condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine at the UN General Assembly but did not entirely oppose Russia and tries to sustain a balanced policy. On the one hand, Egypt historically needs the West’s political backing, especially in terms of political legitimacy and foreign aid, but, on the other, the high number of Ukrainian tourists visiting Egypt and the substantial amount of grain imported from Russia required it to pursue a more balanced approach toward the conflict.

The balanced approach of Saudi Arabia

Although today’s international relations have a multipolar structure, the Russian invasion of Ukraine again triggered and revealed an East-West struggle. At this point, similar to Turkey and Egypt, Saudi Arabia follows a neutral and balanced approach in this regard. Saudi Arabia, like other Gulf states, pursues a balanced policy not only in opposing Russia’s invasion but also with regards to the East-West axis. Saudi Arabia is improving its military and diplomatic ties with China and Russia, has been in talks with Russia for the procurement of Russian military hardware, and has signed a defense cooperation agreement with Russia. The kingdom is also cooperating with China on ballistic missile development on Saudi soil.

At the Jeddah Security and Development Summit 2022, attended by U.S. President Joe Biden who met with the leaders of the GCC states and Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq, the U.S. administration did not succeed in building a front against Russia, Iran, and China—the basic motivation behind Biden’s visit. This idea was politely overridden by several states that have close and interdependent political, military, and economic ties with Russia and China.

Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt want to strengthen their ties with BRICS members, and this interest is not one-sided. According to Purnima Anand, a representative of the BRICS International Forum, these three states may join the BRICS countries soon.

What would the BRICS group bring to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt?

The three countries becoming members of the BRICS group would immediately be a vital turning point for them, the BRICS member-states, and the organization itself. Particularly in the Chinese media, it is claimed that the three countries’ participation would strengthen the organization’s discourse on global governance and a fairer international political and economic system. In addition, the GDP of Saudi Arabia and Turkey, each more than $800 billion, and Egypt’s GDP, which also exceeds $400 billion, would mean that BRICS would grow by almost $2 trillion, and its international economic potential and role would be tremendously augmented.

Along these lines, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s attendance of the 2018 BRICS meeting in South Africa’s capital had furthered discussion over the country’s membership—a discussion that occasionally pops up on the Turkish foreign policy agenda. The economic forum, which is comprised of five states with a combined GDP of $21–22 trillion and roughly half of the world’s population, is undeniably significant.

The relations that Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt can develop with various economic organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) would help these states sustain their balance-oriented foreign policies within the framework of the East-West axis, and would also serve as a healthy bridge between the region and the West.

U.S. President Joe Biden announced that U.S. peacekeepers would withdraw from the Red Sea islands of Tiran and Sanafir by the end of the year during his visit to Saudi Arabia on June 16.

The announcement came after quietly negotiated deals between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Israel approved the outline of a deal ceding control of the strategic islands from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, while Saudi Arabia opened its airspace to Israeli flights.

Formerly, Saudi Arabia had only allowed Israeli airplanes flying from Tel Aviv to the UAE and Bahrain through its airspace. The kingdom’s new decision allows unlimited use of its airspace by Israeli airlines to fly to and from the country.

For months, the Biden administration sought to formalize security and economic deals between the two countries to possibly pave the way for the normalization of their relations. Biden hailed the kingdom’s decision, saying that it could aid in moving toward Israel’s further integration into the region.

Strategic importance of the islands

The Tiran and Sanafir Islands, which were ceded from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, are currently uninhabited, yet they hold key strategic value. In line with the terms of the 1978 Camp David Accords, Egypt was not allowed to station troops on the islands and only peacekeepers—now to be replaced by cameras—are present. The islands were kept demilitarized to maintain peace in the region.

According to the treaty, Israel needs to ratify the islands’ territorial status. With the deal, Israeli officials, including the Israeli prime minister’s office, and the foreign and defense ministries, gave the green light for the Tiran and Sanafir Islands to be taken over by Saudi Arabia.

The two islands are located at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba where Tiran controls all shipping to Eilat harbor, Israel’s only access to the Red Sea. The islands remain vital to Israeli trade with Southeast Asia, while Saudi Arabia seeks to utilize the islands for tourism and economic development.

Why did Egypt cede Tiran and Sanafir Islands to Saudi Arabia?

Egypt decided to cede Tiran and Sanafir Islands to Saudi Arabia in April 2016. Saudi Arabia had made sovereignty claims over Sanafir and Tiran twice: first in 1957 and then in 1968, pledging free maritime passage. In 1990, Hosni Mubarak relinquished control of the islands to Saudi Arabia when he issued a presidential decree sent to the UN that set Egypt’s maritime baselines in the Red and Mediterranean Seas.

In 2010, Saudi Arabia posted its maritime baseline to the UN and made another sovereignty claim. When Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi decided to cede the islands to Saudi Arabia, the decision was met with nationalist backlash and protests.

Some accused Sisi of selling out the islands in exchange for an estimated $25 billion pledged in aid and investments from Saudi Arabia at the time. The Egyptian government argued the islands were originally leased to Egypt from Saudi Arabia in the 1950s.

In 2018, Egypt’s Supreme Court approved the deal by nullifying the contradictory rulings of two lower courts opposing ceding control of the islands, and therefore, a final decision was reached by the Egyptian side. With Israeli agreement, the islands’ sovereignty will be transferred to Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia has put forth that normalization with Israel would not be possible unless the Palestinian issue is resolved. Following the Abraham Accords of 2020 and the series of normalization deals between Israel and the Arab states of the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco, this work-around agreement brokered by the U.S. may signal an advance in Saudi-Israeli relations. Will Biden set the “crown jewel” of the Arab-Israeli relations?

The Libyan capital Tripoli was shaken by a wave of clashes between rival armed groups during the early hours of May 17. The clashes were instigated by the sneaking into Tripoli of Fathi Bashagha, who was designated as the prime minister by the Tobruk-based parliament, the House of Representatives (HoR), in February this year on the grounds that the incumbent Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli had expired its mandate since elections did not occur on December 24, 2021.

The fact that a “designated prime minister” had to sneak into the capital of the country is itself telling enough. Bashagha had to keep his entry into Tripoli, in the middle of the night, highly secret. He revealed his arrival on social media, bragging about his ultimate “successful entry,” as this was his third attempt to enter Tripoli. The previous two unsuccessful attempts were both foiled by the tenacity of the armed groups who either remained loyal to the incumbent prime minister Abdel Hamid Dbeibah or were unconvinced by Bashagha’s claim to be prime minister.

In his first attempted entry into Tripoli, Bashagha was expelled after a heated “negotiation” between armed groups barely avoiding an armed conflict. His eventual entry on May 17 resulted in anti-Bashagha forces attacking the Nawasi Brigade, which had escorted Bashagha into Tripoli and hosted him in its headquarters. Eventually, it had to give in to the heavy pressure from the anti-Bashagha forces and handed him over to a neutral military force to escort him out of the city on the same day.

Bashagha’s attempts to enter Tripoli and the subsequent clashes among armed groups are symptoms of a wider political and regional power struggle. Formalities aside, Bashagha’s claim to premiership became possible only after his coalition with the HoR and more importantly, its speaker Aguila Saleh. The Saleh-Bashagha coalition aims at dismantling the Dbeibah-led GNU and replacing it with the Bashagha-led Government of National Stability (GNS), which would be heavily under the influence of the “kingmaker” of the coalition—Khalifa Haftar.

The Regional and International Aspect of the Saleh-Bashagha Coalition

Although the initiative started as Saleh and Bashagha’s pursuing their personal interests, the coalition was not built in a vacuum. The Saleh-Bashagha coalition lobbied in certain capitals for their alliance, and made their move once they received the green lights and blessing of those same capitals. Although the coalition promised to be useful to many, each capital committed to it to varying degrees.

While some capitals endorsed the coalition openly, others demonstrated their support more indirectly. Paris and other European capitals as well as Riyadh were among the lower-profile supporters of the Saleh-Bashagha coalition. However, Cairo and Moscow were much more straightforward in their endorsement.

While Dbeibah did not hide Turkey’s special place among Tripoli’s friends, he did not leave Egypt out, either. On the contrary, Dbeibah granted more contracts to Cairo than he did to Ankara to placate the former and ensure its neutrality vis-à-vis Tripoli. As a matter of fact, Ankara was not bothered by losing some Tripoli stakes to Cairo as it thought that they would work as the proverbial carrot for the latter. Nevertheless, Cairo chose to proceed with a zero-sum mentality: winning was not good enough for Cairo, it wanted to make sure that Ankara was not winning as well.

An agreement over Dbeibah would mean a rapprochement slightly more favorable to Ankara than Cairo. Cairo, on the other hand, wanted to keep the rapprochement with Ankara on its own terms. Thus, Cairo came up with a rival premiership proposal with purportedly “pro-Turkey” Bashagha, which would also supposedly appease Ankara. However, this was the greatest smokescreen in the whole parallel government scheme: Cairo consented to the Saleh-Bashagha coalition only after making sure that Bashagha was transformed into something else—the junior partner of the greater coalition of Haftar and Saleh.

Bashagha’s role was envisioned as nothing more than being a subordinate to the Haftar-Saleh duo. His function was supposed to be to extend the influence over Tripoli of both Haftar and Saleh, and their external backers, none more so than Cairo. Therefore, Cairo saw in the Saleh-Bashagha coalition the prospect of undermining Ankara’s prevalence in Tripoli and duly supported it.

The idea of negotiating with Ankara after diluting its position of strength in Tripoli through a change of government appeared much more attractive than engaging in a win-win setting with Ankara. Unless Cairo comes to terms with Ankara’s presence and influence in Tripoli, Libya will not be a theatre of convergence between the two countries.

Throughout history, ties between Christian and Islamic leaders have had more downs than ups. It was Pope Urban II who launched the first Crusade in 1095 triggering almost two centuries of hostilities. But in recent times, relations have largely improved. Pope John Paul II made significant efforts to advance the cause of Catholic-Islamic relations. He condemned the siege of Sarajevo repeatedly. When John Paul II visited Damascus, and prayed at the Umayyad Mosque in 2001, it was the first ever Papal visit to a mosque. Pope Benedict XVI prayed in the Blue or Sultan Ahmet Mosque in his visit to Istanbul in 2006.

However, Benedict’s gesture was in large part to make up for what was seen as a disastrous Regensburg address in September 2008. In the speech, he cited a conversation between a Byzantine emperor and a Persian scholar, “Show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.”

Most Muslims took offence at what they perceived to be the Pope arguing that Islam was inherently violent and evil. The former Pope perhaps to heal ties then changed his position from opposing Turkish entry to the European Union to supporting it. Relations with Al Azhar also were put on pause after Pope Benedict called for the protection of Egyptian Christians after an attack on a Coptic church in 2011. Benedict as a German Pope tended to see everything through a very Eurocentric prism.

Pope Francis has over the last seven years made strenuous efforts to reset ties. Aside from his meetings with the Grand Shaikh of Al Azhar, he has reached out to many figures in the Islamic World. In 2014, he visited Palestine and met with the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Sheikh Mohammad Hussein. This year he made the first ever Papal visit to Iraq in March and was able to sit down with Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, one of the pre-eminent clerics in Shia Islam. Islamic prayers were uttered within the walls of the Vatican for the first time ever back in 2014.

The Vatican-Azhar ties were most profoundly illustrated when Pope Francis and Sheikh Ahmed signed the document on “Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together” in February 2019. The introduction described the document as “…a joint declaration of good and heartfelt aspirations. It is a document that invites all persons who have faith in God and faith in human fraternity to unite and work together so that it may serve as a guide for future generations to advance a culture of mutual respect…” This formed the basis for an ensuing Papal encyclical entitled, “Fratelli tutti” that was certainly forward thinking.

Productive ties between leaders of different religious traditions matter. One hopes that they retain a positive influence amongst their flock. Who knows if some of the more extreme elements might turn their heads when Popes, Grand Ayatollahs and Grand Muftis work together? One can only hope that increasingly such comings together include senior Jewish and other religious figures from other faiths.

In Europe and North American anti-Islamic sentiment is rife. It has existed of course for centuries in differing forms but in the modern era the events of 1979 and 2001 certainly drove Islamophobia on. The Iranian Revolution saw a major rift with the West and notably the U.S. which continues today. The fatwa against the author Salman Rushdie did not help at all nor did the Danish cartoons crisis, both issues where the divides were considerable. The 9/11 attacks triggered huge anger in the U.S. and elsewhere but also a series of wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere which saw hundreds of thousands of Muslim civilian lives lost.

The Islamist extremist attacks by the likes of Al Qaida and Daesh also drove these sentiments. The world stood with Paris, Berlin and London as they suffered vile attacks with major landmarks being lit up.

Much of the above anger is understandable. Such attacks were unconscionable. But the 9/11 attacks did not represent Islam and nor does Al Qaida and Daesh. For the overwhelming majority of Muslims, they are an abomination. Even Donald Trump pointed out that the greatest victims of Al Qaida and Daesh violence have been Muslims. However, at a public level, this is rarely understood. All too often the Western media focusses intently on the western victims of Islamist violence not the Muslims. Daesh’s beheadings of western journalists and aid workers in Syria led to military intervention but little was said of the much larger numbers of Syrians and Iraqis beheaded and even crucified by the group.

However, too many leaders in Europe and North America instrumentalized this hatred as opposed to calming the situation and directing the struggle at those truly responsible. It was more convenient to depict Islam and Muslims as a threat than as part of the solution. This continues today as the likes of Viktor Orban of Hungary likes to portray his country as the last bastion of Christendom against the hordes of Islam as if Vienna was back under Ottoman siege once more. “Is it not worrying in itself that European Christianity is now barely able to keep Europe Christian? There is no alternative, and we have no option but to defend our borders.”

Anti-Immigration like Islamophobia is a vote winner. Hence Muslim immigrants are doubly vulnerable to this, depicted as a cultural, economic and a terrorist threat.’

Anti-Immigration like Islamophobia is a vote winner. Hence Muslim immigrants are doubly vulnerable to this, depicted as a cultural, economic and a terrorist threat’ even though research shows that every act of terrorism in the U.S. since 9/11 has been committed by a citizen or legal resident. The threat is not foreign as the far right likes to portray. But blame the immigrant anyway.

The treatment of refugees is also damning, not least when European powers do so little to help those making the terrifying dangerous Mediterranean crossings. Few make the difference between migrants and refugees, those fleeing conflicts and oppression. Our societies are the poorer for putting up walls, physical and psychological. We need to explore other means of resolving these crises without having to resort to inhuman incarceration or refusing to help save lives of innocent people.

Pope Francis tried to play a positive role. In 2016, he washed the feet of 12 immigrants, some of whom were Muslim and following a visit to the Moria camp on the Greek island of Lesbos, he arranged for the Vatican to host 12 Syrian Muslim refugees. But did this get the attention it deserved, and did it stem in any meaningful way the tidal wave of anti-Muslim, anti-immigration hatred? The Pope called on every Catholic diocese to host refugees but the take up was very poor.

Islamophobia still does not get the attention it merits. Many belittle the issue and fail to recognize how widespread this issue has become. Social media is a cesspool of hatred on all issues. In the first 24 hours after the Christchurch mosques’ massacres in 2019, Facebook removed 1,500,000 videos of the attack that killed 50 Muslims. Some uploads were watched over 20,000 times.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not help. Extremists feel empowered by conflicts to vent their hatred. Jewish communities in Europe are not responsible for Israeli crimes, just as Muslims worldwide are not responsible for the crimes of Al Qaida and Daesh.

In March 2010, at the last Arab summit held in Libya, then secretary-general of the Arab League Amr Moussa proposed to expand the Arab League to include Turkey. Moussa called on Turkey to be part of the Arab regional system in a strategic dialogue as a friendly neighboring major power with strong historical, cultural, and economic ties to the region. However, Moussa’s “Arab neighboring policy” was postponed to the next summit and was never realized after the region was shocked by the wave of Arab uprisings that started a few months later.

In the pre-Arab uprisings era, Turkey was enjoying the golden days in its relations with regional countries, in particular the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). On the Turkish side, economic considerations and the enhancement of its position in the Middle East were the driving force, while on the GCC states, the adverse impact of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which strengthened the Shiite position in the country, and the rising Iranian influence in the region had an important impact on their consideration of Turkey as a potential partner.

Despite their domestic differences, Turkey and the GCC states agreed on the fact that without mutual cooperation, it would be quite difficult for the two sides to maintain the balance of power in the region in such a way as to favor their own interests. Thus, domestic factors did not play a large role in shaping the foreign policy decisions of Turkey and the GCC states when the nature of the regional developments, such as in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, were more related to the balance of power in the Middle East. For the sake of their regional interests, Turkey and the GCC states did not allow their domestic differences to come to the surface and adversely affect their cooperation.

However, the harmony that Turkey and the GCC enjoyed ended fairly soon with the Arab uprisings, especially after Egypt’s military takeover in 2013. The regional security perceptions of two opposing alliances – one that supported the popular movements, spearheaded by Turkey and Qatar, and another that opposed them championed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Egypt – diverged significantly over regional crises, creating an “ideological proxy war” which preponderated over their mutual concerns.

In recent months, this picture has begun to change as several signs of a rapprochement between these actors have emerged. The era of military-based hard power politics that had led to subsequent crises between these actors seems to have closed and a fresh start is on the horizon.

Breaking the ice, but gradually

Following the recent visit of UAE National Security Adviser Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed al-Nayhan to Ankara, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held a rare phone call with UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ). That was followed by a call between their foreign ministers. It was reported that Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani, a good friend of both Erdoğan and MBZ, helped facilitate the rapprochement between Turkey and the UAE – two countries that confronted on almost all regional issues concerning Libya, Egypt, the Horn of Africa, Yemen, and the Eastern Mediterranean throughout the past decade.

Triggering factors for rapprochement 

Due to external factors, both international and regional, and domestic factors related to economy and security, countries within these opposing blocs have equally started to recalibrate their positions and reset their relations, which had previously been predicated on confrontation. The main theme of this new era is realpolitik as actors seem determined to put ideology aside and focus on the economy for solid gains to end a period of intense regional rivalry.

International: The new U.S. administration under Joe Biden is determined to prioritize Asia, to deal with its own domestic issues, and to push for diplomacy in the Middle East, unlike the preceding Trump administration. This change in the global context came at a time when the U.S. is re-evaluating its military footprint in the region, which has been a triggering factor in pushing Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia towards a de-escalation era.

Biden’s tenure not only led these countries to question the U.S. security commitment but also raised the importance of relying on regional cooperation just like in the pre-2011 era. Ultimately, the recent reconciliation climate aligns with the Biden administration’s policies in the region.

Regional: The signing of the Al-Ula declaration that officially ended the Gulf dispute created further incentives for Ankara to break the ice with Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. As such, Turkey’s attempts to normalize relations with Egypt paved the way to the rapprochement with the other Gulf countries as well. Turkey and Qatar started a dialogue with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, while in order not to remain on the sidelines of this regional era of rapprochement the UAE also rolled up its sleeves.

Another regional factor that triggered these developments was the growing relations between Egypt, Israel, Greece, and the Greek Cypriot administrations in the Eastern Mediterranean at the expense of Turkish interests. For Turkey, cooperation with Egypt on the issues related to Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean is vital, while the same applies to Cairo as well.

Domestic: Domestic considerations play a significant role in shaping a country’s foreign policy. In the domestic context, Turkey’s precarious economic situation and the UAE’s need to make investments in accordance with its “Vision 2030” have been a driving force in the Turkey-UAE rapprochement. Erdoğan underlined that trade was the main focus of talks with Tahnoun, saying that “serious Emirati investments” lay on the horizon. Cultivating economic ties not only benefits the two sides, but could also prove beneficial to both countries’ political and security interests.

To conclude, the Middle East has proven this several times: yesterday’s enemy could be tomorrow’s ally. Changing geopolitics and realities in the region have pushed countries to put aside ideological differences for the sake of national interests and stability in the region.

Now that the Turkey-Qatar and the UAE-Egypt-Saudi Arabia blocs seem to perceive this rapprochement as an opportunity to maintain their regional influence, it is unlikely that they will allow minor internal political calculations to hamper this rapprochement process.

Time will show whether regional countries will be able to build confidence similar to the pre-2011 era, when interest-driven pragmatism outweighed ideologically-driven foreign policy.

Iraqi Premier al-Kadhimi and his mentor Iraqi President Barham Saleh are making a futile attempt against all odds at home to carve a new leadership role for the country by availing themselves of the chaotic internal conditions and the strained and fragile post-Arab Spring Middle East order.

A conference was held in Baghdad on August 28, 2021, which the two Iraqi leaders were originally hoping would be a summit. However, the list of attendees shows that it turned out to be a one-day ministerial-level conference.

Al-Kadhimi co-sponsored the conference in Baghdad with French President Emmanuel Macron to discuss the war in Yemen, Lebanon’s collapse, the regional water crisis, and the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement. The Iraqi and the Arab media paid special attention to the conference, raising the expectations.

The statement of the London-based Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper read, “The Saudi and Iranian presence, through their foreign ministers, Faisal bin Farhan and Hussein Amir Abdullahian, also indicated an increasing desire on both sides to find lines to meet.”

Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein indicated that the Saudi-Iranian meetings are continuing and that they began in Baghdad with a meeting that took place between the ruler of Dubai and the Iranian foreign minister. Iraqi officials viewed the meetings between the emir of Qatar, Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, and Bin Rashid of Dubai as a major breakthrough.

Nevertheless, the rapprochement between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors had commenced before the Baghdad conference. The Saudi-Iranian dialogue was launched in April this year as the U.S. and Iran held negotiations on reviving the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran (JCPOA) – a development which alarmed the Saudis. The latter are afraid of a possible deal at their expense.

Tehran’s sensitive relationship with Baghdad and the issue of not using Iraq as a launching pad to launch attacks on neighboring countries were not addressed.

Al-Kadhimi and Macron are trying to seize the opportunity presented to them to assert leadership and enhance their dwindling power base at home as elections are approaching. It appears that President Joe Biden’s strategic shift in foreign policy orientation from the Middle East to Asia, his stated policy of making human rights the priority of his foreign policy abroad, and the recent debacle in Afghanistan have alarmed Arab regional leaders, Saudis, and the United Arab Emirates and convinced them to chart a new foreign policy in the region and regard Washington as unreliable.

Iran has its own reason to be receptive of regional dialogue as well. Being hard-pressed by the U.S.-led economic embargo initiated by the earlier U.S. administrations, and intensified by the Donald Trump administration to maximum pressure, and which the Biden administration so far has done nothing tangible to alleviate, Iran was not in a position to refuse negotiation. What is more, the hardline President Raisi stated during his inauguration speech that there will be serious openings internally and externally to better the conditions in the country.

Finally, being hard-pressed by COVID19, and the shadow war which is continuing with Israelis, Iran had no choice but to act on pragmatic considerations and accept peaceful engagements with its regional foes. However, this does not stop Iran from pursuing its war against the U.S. and its regional allies through regional proxies.

The Baghdad government’s initiative to hold a regional conference also had an Iranian blessing.

Thus, the Baghdad government’s initiative to hold a regional conference also had an Iranian blessing: it is an attempt to find a loophole in the siege wall and isolation imposed by the United States and its allies on Iran.

U.S. officials are fully aware of Iran’s foreign policy objectives but still seem to be committed to the success of the Vienna Talks. For this reason, Biden has empowered Macron, who aspires to a new leadership role abroad to stop his declining popularity at home, to be the channel for conveying messages to Iran. Due to Macron’s occasionally voiced opposition to Trump’s unilateralism, Iran seems to have accepted Macron’s mediating role.

President Saleh of Iraq, following the footsteps of his group leader Jalal Talabani, a former Iraqi president who tried to play a mediating role between Iranian and western leaders, especially the U.S., seems to have convinced al-Kadhimi to initiate this conference.

Saleh has recently been engaged in intensive shuttle diplomacy in Iraq with various influential groups, especially the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and regional countries, while he also met President Reisi to ensure his second term as president of Iraq. The holding of the regional conference was an attempt to enhance his chance to be re-elected for a second term.

Although al-Kadhimi has made numerous statements to the effect that in the future he will not stand for any post, his recent political statements and the numerous measures he has taken recently indicate that he is hopeful that he will continue in his post most probably in an alliance which will be composed by the opponents of Iran’s dominant influence in Iraq: the Sadr followers of Sairun, the Nasr bloc, and the Kurdish groups. The success of this conference could enhance his role regionally and internally.

According to Bayat, Islamic political movements experience certain phases. The first phase is the experimentation, in which the movement gains power. Then, they face the paradoxes of being in power in addition to failure to realize their promises. In the end, the appeal, energy, symbols, and sources of legitimacy of political Islamism evaporate.

Bayat believes that this procedure does not lead to an anti-Islamic approach. However, the supporters of political Islamism tend to resecularize it which negatively affects their political career and their ability to hold on to power and remain as the winner their political career and simultaneously give up their religious ends and ambitions.

In recent years, scholars have tried to apply the post-Islamism theory to different cases, specifically the contexts where political Islam has been active in the past decades. Yadullah Shahibzadeh is among those who have followed political Islam in Iran. In his book Islamism and Post-Islamism in Iran: An Intellectual History, he explains the crisis of political leadership in post-1979 revolution Iran.

By detecting “Islamist totalism” in Iranian politics, he follows the career of Islamists in power. He discusses the challenges they faced with democracy, and the challenges with Islamist and non-Islamist reformists in their effort to guarantee democracy in Iran. Shedding light on Iranian political and intellectual history after the 1979 revolution, Shahibzadeh focuses on Iranian Muslim intellectuals and their understanding of politics and democracy in reference to their religious background and religiosity.

He argues that by providing a large amount of epistemological, ethical, and political insights to society, Iranian Muslim intellectuals have contributed to the transformation of Iranian Islamism into post-Islamism. Therefore, the past, solid Islamic ideology in terms of its avid eagerness to preserve political power and dominance has been enormously weakened and delegitimized.

Although the discussions on post-Islamism were more concerned with Iran, Egypt, and Turkey, after the downfall of the Baathist regime, Iraq also entered the current scholarship on post-Islamism. In Patriotic Ayatollahs: Nationalism in Post-Saddam Iraq, Caroleen Sayej has followed the attitudes of Islamist parties and activists in post-2003 Iraq and has provided a deep analysis of senior Iraqi clerics in the Iraqi political sphere.

Sayej focuses on Shiite clerics’ pronouncements and fatwas on political issues, and narrates their ideas and ideals on contested issues such as democracy. In Patriotic Ayatollahs, she narrates the most important Shiite religious scholars and their followers’ positions. For her, they have selected a progressive and secular approach in post-2003 Iraq. The case becomes more critical as most Shiite politicians and political leaders lived in Iran for years and were influenced by the theory of the “Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist” which is currently prevalent in Iran.

In other words, the Iranian experience has pushed the Iraqi Shiite religious scholars toward a post-Islamist inclination in Iraqi politics. Sayej’s main contributions to the issues of post-Islamism in this work are, first, her reference to the role of high-ranking religious leaders in insisting on the necessity of democracy and its legitimacy over any Islamic theocracy; and second, the vital role that nationalism plays in the political thinking and behavior of an Arab Muslim nation in the Middle East amidst sectarian temptations and tendencies.

In other words, the importance of Sayej’s work lies in the fact that she illustrates a path in which a transnational Shiite movement has been replaced by a local endeavor to guarantee a democratic system and to reinterpret Islamism in a way that deals with personal and communal piety and not with structural-political issues.

Are Knudsen and Basem Ezbidi have edited several articles and published them in a volume called Popular Protest in the New Middle East: Islamism and Post-Islamist Politics. The editors have considered a group of political uprisings in different parts of the Middle East, known generally as the “Arab Spring,” whose immediate outcome was overthrowing decades-long political regimes and substituting them with unstable states.

More than any other place, in post-Mubarak Egypt and post-Ben Ali Tunisia, Islamist political movements have gained power: the Freedom and Justice Party and the Ennahda Movement, respectively. In addition to a foreword by Asef Bayat, the authors have provided insightful analyses of Islamist and post-Islamist trends in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Turkey.

Popular Protest in the New Middle East deliberately moves away from the generalizations and abstractions of post-Islamism attributed to the Muslim world as a whole. The book, an essential read for all those interested in the subject, has applied the concept of post-Islamism and its related notions to different cases in Middle Eastern countries and dealt with the concept in relation to Muslim political activists’ experiences in the past decades in their countries and dealt with the concept in relation to Muslim political activists’ experiences in the past decades in their countries.

Last but not least in this grouping is a selection of articles edited by Mohammed Abu Rumman and published under the title Post-Islamism: A New Phase or Ideological Delusions? It discusses the main problems of post-Islamism as a term and concept. To put it concisely, the authors believe that although post-Islamism is controversial, they have decided to use it “in the absence of a more fitting label.”

Drawing on the experience of the Arab Revolutions, the authors ascertain that the revolutionaries failed to achieve certain of the classical goals of political Islam such as the Islamic state due to ideological delusions and sociological realities. The authors refer to the transformations of Islamists’ experiences in countries such as Iran, Iraq, Indonesia, and Jordan, and try to read the changes in different countries of the Middle East.

Published in 2018 and appearing later than the other works on post-Islamism, Post-Islamism: A New Phase or Ideological Delusions? draws on a range of theories and past discussions of the term. In each article, authors have used, challenged, and developed the theory of post-Islamism, based on its rich literature, and have contributed to this discussion by direct reference to different Muslim countries.

In Egypt and most of the Arab world, the holy month of Ramadan is TV series’ prime season. This year, during Ramadan, Islamist movements and terrorism were among TV series’ main themes; however, this topic has already been a focus point in films and on TV since the 1990s.

Many works such as Al-Irhabi (The Terrorist), Toyour Elzalam (The Birds of Darkness), or El-Nagoon Min el-Nar (Survivors of Hell) addressed the subject of Islamist movements and terrorism. Interest in the subject continued for the film and drama industry in the following years through works such as “Dam El-Ghazal” (The Blood of the Deer, 2005), The Yacoubian Building (2006), and El-Gamaah (2010).

Egyptian filmmakers tend to refer to Islamist groups and terrorism synonymously. This association continued in various TV dramas in 2021 such as “The Choice 2: Men of the Shadow”, “Cairo: Kabul”, and “Counterattack.”

The discursive association of Islamism with terrorism is based on three main typologies of Islamic groups in the Egyptian film industry. The first is Islamist groups or movements which aim to establish an Islamic political, economic, and social order, and to reorient the state accordingly. The second is non-political, traditional Islamic groups, which involve many subgroups such as Sufis, or local mosque communities that are mostly nonpolitical, with less public influence, and that are limited to local communal activities. The last type is the group of scholars (ulama) who are dominantly associated with Al-Azhar.

The Audience

In Egypt, the film and drama industry associates terrorism with Islamists by capitalizing on the armed practices of some of these groups. Among these are the armed activities in Egypt of groups such as al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya between the 1970s and 1990s, and the more recent operations of Daesh (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda. The industry has also capitalized on the political turbulence during and following the ruling period of the Muslim Brotherhood between 2012 and 2013. Political instabilities created an atmosphere in which negative representations of such groups were widely accepted by society.

What makes the story more interesting is that the traditional Islamic groups and the ulama were used in the derogatory portrayals of the Islamist groups. In these dramas, both the traditional Islamic groups and the ulama criticize and demonize Islamist groups, while also serving as a reference for how true and pious Muslims and Muslim congregations should be. The latter are represented as peaceful, practicing, ethical, and polite Muslims.

Most importantly, unlike the “rebellious” Islamists, they comply with the political authority (waliyy’al-amr) as a religious requirement. Thus, they tacitly criticize the Islamists by representing them as people that are misinterpreting Islam – the correct interpretation of Islam appears in the actions of the traditional groups.

In the case of the ulama, only the members who back the state and criticize the political activities of the Islamists are represented, such as the scholar Ali Gomaa. However, this time, their criticism is direct. In the movies, as in reality, the ulama condemn the activities of Islamists, regarding them un-Islamic. This has happened even when movies depict real-life cases for which there is no solid evidence of Islamist involvement.

The shows oversimplify and naively portray the reality through stereotypes that eventually produce a form of self-orientalist discourse. Using similar stereotypes and clichés, Egyptians, as non-Westerners, view their fellow citizens who have a different political affiliation – in this case, Islamists – as old-fashioned orientalists.

A brief analysis of the self-orientalist representations of these TV dramas shows that there are generally three characters representing three factions in Islamist groups: the leader, his disciples, and the newcomer.

Sheikh – The Leader: This character is usually a man over 50, with a long, white beard who speaks Classical Arabic (Fusha). He wears a traditional Arab dress (thawb) and is very invested in women as he has more than one wife and keeps changing them. He recites hadiths and passages of the Qur’an frequently in his casual discourse, but often misinterprets the meaning to fit his agenda. He manipulates the public, especially the youth. Meanwhile, he is aware of his distortion of religion, yet, he is only concerned about his personal interests.

The Disciples: These characters are the direct assistants of the leader. They are usually a younger version of the latter in terms of physical appearance, dress, and speech. However, they are divided into two categories: those, like the leader, who are aware of the distortion and manipulation they cause but who benefit from it, and those who are deceived by the leader and think that they are truly serving the religion and applying “Jihad.”

The Newcomer: This is the main character, who is generally a young man suffering from poor socioeconomic conditions. He finds his way to salvation in religion by joining a religious group, which offers him the prospect of escaping his miserable conditions; however, he falls victim to manipulation by the leader of the group and his disciples.

The group is depicted as a violent, terrorist organization, which proclaims anybody who refuses its objectives or disagrees with its statements as an infidel. The group is generally depicted as resorting to violence with shootings and bombings that take innocent lives.

Such characters and religious groups have been portrayed in a similar fashion in various Western TV shows, especially ones produced in the United States such as “24”, “Sleeper Cell”, and “The West Wing.” Such shows have used similar representations of “terrorist” organizations and their members. Evelyn Alsultany, an expert on the history of the representations of Arabs and Muslims in the U.S. media, calls these Western depictions the “terrorist stereotype.”

In her analysis of U.S. shows, Alsultany points out that they use certain strategies in an attempt to give the impression that the Muslim or Arab characters in the shows are complex, but in truth, they are simplified and stereotypically linked to terrorism. One of these strategies is “inserting patriotic Arab or Muslim Americans.” This strategy entails a “positive” patriotic Muslim character who knows the religion well and fights “bad” terrorist Muslim characters who are abusing Islam.

A similar method is followed in many Egyptian TV series, which take terrorism as their theme. The most recent examples are “The Choice 2: Men of the Shadow”, “Cairo: Kabul”, and “Counterattack,” aired during Ramadan this year. These TV shows all include religiously well informed officers, agents, and even a whole police unit, as in the case of “The Choice.” These practicing Muslim state officials fight the terrorist Islamist groups which, once again, misuse religion to deceive youth and attain their goals.

Let me be clear from the beginning: what happened in Tunisia on July 25, 2021 is a coup against the constitution. There is no doubt about it and no argument.

As for the decision of the coup, it was not taken in haste on the Sunday before last nor was it a reaction to the widespread protests taking place that day. There is no doubt that Kais Saied has been planning this coup from at least the beginning of this year, which means that he had already consulted with the army leadership and secured the necessary support before taking these drastic measures.

There is no direct material evidence that there is any foreign involvement in Saied’s decision to embark on this coup. However, there is an important question to be asked: Kais Saied is over sixty years of age, a university lecturer, and was able to win the presidential elections. Is it reasonable to believe that he would suspend the parliament and move to monopolize all of the state’s power in his hands without having coordinated in advance with foreign powers such as the French president to secure international support, and then with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to secure the necessary financial support to cement his coup?

Moreover, there is much to be gleaned from the international response to the coup. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s first public words on the coup were, “I had a good call with President Kais Saied.”

These words indicate that the U.S. administration will not seriously obstruct Saied’s plans to change the political course in Tunisia. The Americans are not interested much in competing with France for influence in Tunisia, and have far more important issues such as Afghanistan, Iraq, China, Russia, and COVID-19.

The social and economic situation in Tunisia has deteriorated significantly since 2011.

Yet it cannot be denied that there is significant popular support for Saied’s decisions. The social and economic situation in Tunisia has deteriorated significantly since 2011. Over the course of the past two years, the newly elected parliament, and the two governments which were bestowed with its vote of confidence, have resoundingly failed to improve the lives of ordinary citizens – just as the previous governments before it. The situation has been compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic that has ripped through the country with devastating impact.

President Kais Saied’s coup against the constitution has, of course, significant effects at home, as well as in Tunisia’s regional surroundings, particularly with regards to neighboring Libya. Among the countries that supported Saied’s measures immediately after they were announced, are two countries that have great interests in Libya, which outweigh their interests in Tunisia – namely, Egypt and the UAE.

President Kais Saied’s coup against the constitution has significant effects at home as well as in Libya.

The leaders of both countries fully understand that Tunisia is a lifeline for the Tripoli government, and that if a regime closer to them is established in Tunis, and they have a tangible influence on it, it will be possible to tighten the noose around the Tripoli government in coordination with their ally Haftar who is ever-present in the east.

Two years ago, Khalifa Haftar was about to enter Tripoli victorious, after he had besieged it with the support of Egypt and the UAE. But, Turkish support and an open border with Tunisia, where the Ennahda movement has enjoyed an advanced political position, saved Tripoli and its rulers from defeat.

But now that Ennahda has been removed from power with the coup of Saied, Egypt and the UAE may hope that what they failed to accomplish in 2019 can now be achieved in coordination with a friendly regime in Tunisia, and with more support for their ambitious Libyan ally, General Hafter.

Of course, the governments of Egypt and the UAE also have a strong alliance with France, with whom they share mutual interests and cooperation on regional issues, and in particular Libya: oil for France; the employment of Egyptian workers and the granting of construction contracts to Egyptian companies for the el-Sisi regime; and uprooting the Muslim Brotherhood movement and ending its presence in Libya for the UAE (which Egypt and France also want to see).

It is very clear, then, that the Tunisian coup has a strong relationship with the Libyan issue. This naturally leads us to consider Algeria, Tunisia’s most important neighbor, and how it will react to the Tunisian coup and its repercussions in the region.

There are no official Algerian statements that can be relied on to know the actual mood among Algerian policymakers. However, there was a call between the Tunisian and Algerian presidents on July 26 and a visit by the Algerian foreign minister to Tunisia the next day, during which he met with Saied.

Algerian comments on social media and press leaks indicate that Algeria will not accept the control of Tunisian foreign policy by Egypt and the UAE – a control that would seek to facilitate Haftar’s bid to gain control of all of Libya’s regions. Algeria views Haftar as an opponent, and he, in turn, reciprocates this stance. Algeria also sees the UAE as an antagonist in the region. Abu Dhabi has established a consulate in the disputed Western Sahara, much to the chagrin of Algiers. Coupled with the normalization of ties with Israel, the intention of the UAE to flex against Algeria by drawing on international support in favor of Morocco is clear.

On this basis, Algeria may put pressure on Saied not to dissolve parliament and not to overextend the period afforded to him to wield emergency powers in order to preserve the position of the Ennahda movement in the Tunisian political scene, and thereby to ensure there is a check on the governments of Egypt and the UAE that prevents them from exercising influence on the foreign policy of Tunisia.

This March, the accident that blocked the maritime traffic in the Suez Canal for several days renewed the attention on the impact that straits have on international politics and economy. To begin with, a strait is an arm of water between two lands that connects two contiguous water basins. Maritime shipping is a core element in globalized trade and therefore, straits offer a key advantage in this context.

The Suez Canal is a man-made sea passage in Egypt, connecting Europe and Asia through the Red Sea. Its geographical position makes it one of the most important routes for trade of energy, oil and hydrocarbons, commodities, and consumer goods from Asia and the Middle East to Europe and the U.S. Its relevance can be measured by the fact that around 50 vessels travel the strait on a daily basis, amounting to roughly 18,900 in 2020. Given that more than 80% of global trade is moved by sea, about 12% of it passes through this waterway.

Without this canal, other routes for global trade would be possible but would involve a much longer shipping time, greater fuel consumption, and higher ship-operating costs. Certainly, the strategic position of straits is not taken for granted. Whoever controls the straits is careful to make the most of the almost “mandatory” passage of thousands of cargo ships per year, by charging tolls. Therefore, straits represent a significant source of national income. In the case of the Suez Canal, the traffic of vessels provides Egypt with about $5 billion a year in revenue.

The crisis in the Suez was caused by the grounding of the 400-meter-long Ever Given, carrying 18,000 containers headed to the Netherlands, engendering tailbacks and blocking the traffic of 400 other vessels. At the time, Lloyd’s List estimated that the cargo strand cost around $9.6 billion per day.

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is, indeed, considered one of the most strategic gateways of maritime transport.

To make up for estimated losses, the Egyptian authorities sued the vessel’s owner, Shoei Kisen Kaisha Ltd., for almost $1 billion over profit and reputational losses, underlining the centrality that this channel holds not only in terms of international politics but also for the Egyptian national economy and politics. However, the final negotiation reached an agreement of approximately $200 million.

As the Suez Canal was finalized in 1869, another strait gained key importance in the geopolitics of the region. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is, indeed, considered one of the most strategic gateways of maritime transport. This strait offers a way to connect the Arabian and Red Seas to the Mediterranean Sea, connecting Europe and Asia.

Moving a little further east, the Strait of Hormuz plays a particular role in the oil trade and in the geopolitical dynamics between Iran on the northern coast and the United Arab Emirates and Musandam, an exclave of Oman, on the southern coast. The 20.3 million barrels of oil moved via the Strait of Hormuz per day in 2017 represented nearly a third of worldwide maritime oil commerce.

More to this, this sea passage represents the world’s most strategically important choke point, as a third of the global gas and almost 25% of oil takes this route, while also considering that an important part of the oil-dependent international economy’s wealth is situated there.

As in the previous cases, Hormuz is subject to intertwining national interests and geopolitical dynamics. While the Strait of Hormuz is regulated by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Iran has only signed the convention but not ratified it. Furthermore, important and traditionally held interests in the strait, which Iran has acted upon in order to protect, have often resulted in standoff situations, leading to fear escalation between Iran and the West.

At this point, the logic behind the Turkish government’s decision to build a new canal in Istanbul becomes clear. Turkey already enjoys the presence of two straits in its territory, namely the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles Straits, which connect Europe and Asia through the Black Sea basin. However, as has been shown with the Suez Canal, the efficiency of the straits is undermined by the occurrence of accidents often due to intense traffic, security issues, and political and national interest entanglements.

To redress this issue, in 2011, the Turkish government started planning the construction of a third canal between the Black Sea and the Marmara Sea, and approved the project last year despite several dissident voices, which raised questions regarding the environmental impacts of the Canal Istanbul.

The construction of this new canal could bring forward some dynamics linked to national interests. Indeed, Turkish authorities declared that they are not willing to review the 1936 Montreux Convention nor place the new canal under its provisions. Russia was thus worried that this could lead to an increased presence of NATO-flagged ships in the Black Sea basin.

Nonetheless, it seems more likely that Ankara will use the Canal Istanbul in order to increase its own standing as a central player in the region. Furthermore, the Canal Istanbul will allow Ankara to regulate the maritime traffic passing through the new waterway at its own discretion, and to charge a fee for the passage – a factor of significant importance for the Turkish economy and for its influence in the region.

The construction of straits is not a new strategy, but perhaps it will become ever more beneficial for international actors to have better access and control over a sea passage, in view of an increasingly complex and globalized world order.

The Eastern Mediterranean is a relatively narrow strip in the Mediterranean Sea surrounded by the coasts of ten different states, making coastal relations between these countries a technically complex issue. In addition, the area contains islands including the island of Cyprus and numerous Greek islands, which further complicate the maritime delimitation.

Such technical matters, however, do not represent the whole picture. There are fierce political confrontations in the Eastern Mediterranean such as the well-known Palestine issue, the Cyprus issue, as well as the uneasy political relations between Greece and Turkey, Egypt and Turkey, Syria and Turkey, Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon.

All these difficulties make maritime delimitation quite complicated. Although some maritime delimitation agreements have been signed to date – such as the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus [GASC]-Egypt Agreement of February 17, 2003; the GASC-Lebanon Agreement of January 17, 2007; the GASC-Israel Agreement of December 17, 2010; the Turkey-Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [TRNC] Agreement of September 21, 2011; the Turkey-Libya Agreement of November 27, 2019; and the Greece-Egypt Agreement of August 6, 2020 – there are many matters yet to be settled.

Firstly, all these agreements have been objected to by one or more of the other concerned regional states making the agreements another source of friction. Secondly, there are maritime areas that are yet to be delimited; some of them directly concern Turkey such as the delimitations between Turkey, on the one hand, and Greece, the GASC, Syria, Egypt, and Palestine, on the other.

The Legal and Political Challenges of a Delimitation Agreement between Turkey and Egypt

Legally, Turkey and Egypt have opposite coasts in the Eastern Mediterranean, which do not involve complicating geographical features such as islands. Establishing maritime borders seems a relatively straightforward matter between the two countries. However, there are legal and political elements that adversely affect this process.

Egypt has so far established delimitation agreements with the GASC and Greece, which Turkey objected to on the premise that they are “violating the continental shelf areas of Turkey in the region.” Turkey considers some parts of the maritime borders established by Egypt as partially infringing the Turkish continental shelf areas.

It should be emphasized that Egypt has so far preferred to proceed with the GASC and Greece when it comes to maritime arrangements despite Turkey’s continuous objections. There is, therefore, a possibility of Egypt not proceeding with Turkey so as to revise the existing agreements simply because it may not want to sacrifice the established relations with Greece and the GASC.

Egypt still seems sensitive about its relations with Greece and the GASC while handling the process with Turkey. When noting that the relations between Egypt and Turkey would improve steadily, the Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shukry also pointed to the fact that it will not be easy. Therefore, it is not appropriate to expect that Egypt will unconditionally support Turkey’s all desired moves in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Moreover, the historic rivalry or political competition between Turkey and Egypt over the Middle East will not disappear anytime soon. As a result, the improvement in the existing relations may take more time than expected.

Legal and Political Challenges to a Border Agreement with Palestine

Some argue that Turkey may establish a maritime border with Palestine as the coastal projections of the two countries overlap, which according to the international jurisprudence on maritime delimitation is the necessary legal element for two states to sign a maritime delimitation agreement.

Though technically possible, there are some legal and mostly political impediments to this proposal. As the potential delimitation will be based on the coasts of the Gaza Strip, the political division inside the state of Palestine creates the issue of who the “legitimate legal authority” is to sign such an agreement with Turkey.

Politically, the issue is even more complicated. The Palestinian Authority government has so far followed a policy which is closer to the Egypt-Greece forum on the Eastern Mediterranean maritime issues. Palestine is a member of EastMed Gas Forum along with the GASC, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, and Jordan. It would be immature to expect that the Abbas administration would sign a maritime delimitation agreement with Turkey at the expense of negatively impacting its relations with the above countries.

A similar attitude may be expected from Israel. Although the relations between Turkey and Israel are currently at an improvement stage – President Erdoğan congratulated Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and the two heads of state held a phone call recently –  there are no appropriate circumstances for Israel to support a possible Turkey-Palestine delimitation agreement. Israel is in a process of an accelerated application of the EastMed Energy Project to deliver its natural gas to Europe through an EastMed pipeline.

Israel, Greece, and the GASC have already signed a deal on January 2, 2020, to build a 1,900 km long subsea pipeline to carry natural gas from the Eastern Mediterranean’s rapidly developing gas fields to Europe. Moreover, Israel already ratified the agreement in July 2020. Therefore, one can expect that Israel would prefer to avert any possible delimitation agreement between Turkey and Palestine, which would further complicate the exiting issues.

Since the maritime area to be delimited by a possible Turkey-Palestine agreement has already been delimited through the Egypt-the GASC Delimitation Agreement of 2003, it is inevitable that Egypt may also oppose such a delimitation agreement.

Considering the above legal and political complications that emerge from both the Palestinian internal rift and the well-known positions of two closely related States, namely Israel and Egypt, a possible delimitation agreement between Turkey and Palestine seems not to be an easy one to conclude. The fact that such a delimitation agreement is legally appropriate does not therefore make it politically prospective in the near future.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi arrived in Baghdad on June 27, 2021 and was received by Iraqi President Barham Salih. This visit marks the first official visit by an Egyptian head of state to Iraq since the Gulf War in 1990. It marks the fourth in a series of trilateral summits between Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq as part of their growing regional collaboration.

The summit included King Abdullah II of Jordan, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi and Egypt’s president al-Sisi. The summit was held in Baghdad within the framework of a tripartite cooperation initiative, which started in Cairo in March 2019.

The Egyptian, Jordanian, and Iraqi leaders met in Baghdad for the latest summit to discuss political and economic cooperation, investments, and other developments in the Middle East. A joint statement was released at the end of the meeting.

The statement highlighted possible ways of cooperation in the fields of energy, trade, and security. The talks also covered regional issues including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Syria crisis, and the war in Yemen. The leaders called for restoring stability in Libya and Yemen.

Al-Sisi emphasized Egypt’s respect and support for Iraq’s territorial unity. He shared Egypt’s intention to cooperate with Iraq within the framework of economic integration and strategic cooperation. Al-Sisi stated Egypt’s desire to increase communication between cultural, educational, and religious institutions in both countries.

Similarly, Iraqi President Barham Salih tweeted, “Our deep-rooted historical relations would be a starting point for a promising future for our peoples and the youths. It is a powerful message amid formidable challenges in the region. Iraq’s recovery will pave the way for a regional integrated system, based on contending extremism, respecting sovereignty, and economic partnerships.”

Along the same lines, Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi  stated, “We are keen on continuing this effort and developing relations to build joint ventures serving everyone. We try to crystalize a mechanism for tripartite cooperation, and dedicate our efforts and capabilities to keep this level of cooperation.”

Egyptian presidential spokesperson Bassam Rady stated, “The new round of talks builds on what has been achieved during the previous three summits, evaluates developments in various cooperation fields, and follows up on projects being implemented as part of efforts aiming to support and deepen historical ties between the three countries. We are trying to crystalize political consultation over means to counter challenges facing the Arab world and the Middle East.”

Previous trilateral summits between Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq

The latest round is the fourth summit held between the three countries. The first summit was held in Cairo in March 2019 and a joint statement highlighted major areas for cooperation following the summit. The three countries’ rulers acknowledged the importance of their strategic and economic cooperation.

The second summit took place in New York in September 2019, during which the three leaders stressed their full support for the Palestinian cause, which is a rallying point for the Muslim world, and that it was Palestinians’ right to enjoy legitimate rights including an independent state with East Jerusalem as its capital. This was in line with the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 and international agreements.

Talks among the three leaders urged regional powers to face and oppose any state or entity funding or supporting terrorism in the region. Full support was declared for Iraqi efforts to rebuild the state and help displaced people after their towns were captured by the ISIS (Daesh) terrorist group.

In 2020, a one-day summit in Amman covered trade, investments, and economic cooperation, along with other regional developments. The summit was seen as an attempt to build a regional alliance to neutralize Iranian influence in Iraq, especially after accusations of Iranian intervention in Iraqi internal affairs.

The third summit discussed joint security issues and food security in the region. King Abdullah II stressed the importance of the meeting, considering the exceptional circumstances faced by both the region and the world. He pointed especially to food security, claiming that it would be one of biggest challenges in 2021 and that it would require uniting efforts to find common solutions.

On the last weekend of May, Addis Ababa Stadium was filled with thousands of energized demonstrators, protesting foreign interference in Ethiopian internal affairs.

The event was meant to be directed at growing American pressure (including sanctions) on Ethiopia to end its war in Tigray, but Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute with Egypt also featured large.

Speeches were made in Arabic and posters about Ethiopia’s right to use the Nile were abundant in an event that appeared directed as much at Egypt as it was the United States.

Whilst the demonstration was ongoing, Sudan hosted a military exercise with Egypt which included the land, naval, and air forces of both countries, not so subtly dubbed “Guardians of the Nile.”

The tensions between Ethiopia and the downstream countries over the Nile have drastically increased as Sudanese officials accuse Ethiopia of beginning its second filling of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam scheduled for this month.

Sudan has said the second filling threatens its national security, with Egyptian President al-Sisi ominously warning of “unimaginable instability” if Ethiopia proceeds without an agreement.

Earlier in June, Egyptians were angered when Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed said his country plans to build hundreds of more dams across Ethiopia prompting a sharp verbal riposte. But Sudan and Egypt have long gone beyond limiting their responses to words.

Sudan’s civilian & military leaders appear to have adopted a twin policy of military pressure at the border in the al-Fashqa region (with Egypt’s encouragement) alongside attempts to expand the number of actors which are party to negotiations to find a solution. Sudan has however recently dialed back, signaling its openness to an interim agreement.

Egypt’s efforts, however, have been far more comprehensive. Last week the Arab League was convened by Egypt and Sudan in Doha at the ministerial level where Egyptian FM Shourky was successful in soliciting the support of Arab countries to raise the issue with the United Nations Security Council.

Just as Ethiopia mobilized its mufti’s to give religious legitimacy to its position, Egypt’s Al Azhar, one of the Muslim world’s most prestigious institutions, has also sprang into action sharply condemning Ethiopia’s policy with an argument also couched in Islamic terms.

“Depriving others from benefiting from these natural resources is an act of oppression and aggression on Allah’s provisions” said Shaykh Ahmed al Tayeb.

But whilst the clerics probe the religious legitimacy of these policies Cairo has also thrown its full weight behind re-developing political, military and humanitarian ties with Ethiopia’s neighbors in a diplomatic blitzkrieg to isolate it.

Following the 2013 military coup which overthrew former president Mohammed Morsi, Egypt had years of diplomatic absence in African forums and indeed the Middle East. Cairo turned inwards, generally following the lead of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, whilst paying less attention to its own neighborhood.

Veteran Egyptian diplomat and Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Abou Gheit would describe those as “lost years.”

Abdal Fattah al-Sisi, unlike Morsi, put more faith in negotiations with Ethiopia, initially dialing back the rhetoric. In 2015, the countries signed the Declaration of Principles of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which was expected to lay the foundation for a broader agreement with then Ethiopian PM Hailemariam Desalegn.

When Desalegn told al-Sisi that “the Renaissance Dam will not cause any damage to our three states and especially to the Egyptian people,” al-Sisi apparently believed him.

Faith in that promise remained despite a seismic shift in Ethiopian politics when Abiy Ahmed became prime minister in 2018. During a light-hearted press conference, shortly after he assumed office, the Egyptian president asked Ahmed to repeat the following in Arabic: “By Allah, by Allah we shall not cause any harm to Egypt’s water.”

That approach however didn’t appear to yield the results Cairo wanted drawing sharp criticism. Mohammed Ali, an influential Egyptian opposition figure in exile, called upon Egyptians to take to the streets in a “Nile Revolution” and overthrow Sisi’s regime for not protecting Egyptian water rights.

Outsourcing its foreign policy to countries which didn’t share Egypt’s primary security concerns left Egypt facing serious threats which it hadn’t prepared itself to manage, and ultimately forced Egypt to review its approach.

Egypt’s decision to begin normalizing relations with Turkey earlier this year was an indicator that things were beginning to change despite hiccups on that front. “Egypt is realizing it is its own man; it cannot rely on any ‘big brother’ whether it be Abu Dhabi or anyone else,” Jalel Harchaoui said.

Egypt appeared to be the loser in regional shifts which took place in 2018 & 2019.

Eritrea, a country closely allied with Egypt, signed a peace treaty with Ethiopia with which it fought a brutal war in the late 90s leading to a standoff that Ahmed overcame in a gesture which won him the Nobel Peace Prize.

In Sudan a revolution swept away the regime of Omar Bashir, with civilian rule emerging initially as a distinct possibility which Abiy Ahmed supported through mediation.

In early April, the Egyptians signed an intelligence sharing agreement with Uganda explicitly referencing the challenges in the Nile. In the same month, Egypt also signed a military protocol with Burundi. Egypt and Sudan deepened their military cooperation in March this year.

Egypt’s charm offensive hasn’t just been in the military domain, however. In late May, al-Sisi visited Djibouti, the first visit of an Egyptian head of state to the country, following which Egypt sent medicine, medical supplies and food aid. After the meeting Djibouti’s president called for a “fair and binding legal agreement” on the Nile dispute, an Egyptian demand that Ethiopia has rejected.

Egyptian aid packages have also been regularly delivered to South Sudan, which al-Sisi visited in November last year with his head of intelligence to meet his counterpart Salva Kiir. That was also a first for an Egyptian head of state.

An unverified report quickly denied by South Sudan’s government also said Egypt intended to establish a military base in a South Sudanese town near the Ethiopian border.

Whilst President Biden has attempted to adopt a more constructive and balanced approach than his predecessor, Egypt’s efforts to broker a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel will almost certainly endear al-Sisi to Washington.

Ethiopia on the other hand appears increasingly isolated. This comes at a time where relations between Washington & Addis Ababa have sharply deteriorated because of the violence of the Tigray war & American sanctions on Ethiopian officials.

Talks to find an amicable solution to how these countries will share the Nile have gone on for over a decade without a workable solution. Egypt and Sudan want a legally binding agreement which protects their share of the Nile, whilst Ethiopia argues that such an agreement would infringe on its sovereignty.

How the talks are to be conducted have also been subject to dispute. Sudan and Egypt want outside powers to take part including the EU, the UN & the U.S., whilst the Ethiopians prefer the African Union umbrella.

The Biden administration has appointed Jeffrey Feltman as its special envoy to the Horn of Africa, and solving GERD is one of his top priorities as he shuttles between the region’s capitals to lobby and build consensus for a path forward. If he can succeed where others have failed is yet to be seen.

Whether he does or doesn’t however, one fact is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. Egypt is no longer likely to sit idly as its water interests are threatened and is taking matters into its own hands.

Saying that Turkish-Egyptian relations have had a turbulent period since the ousting of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi would be an understatement. Since the 2013 Egyptian coup d’état, Turkish-Egyptian relations have been demoted to the charges d’affaires level, primarily acting on economic and cultural communication. Furthermore, since then the attitude of both countries towards each another has been hostile due to a series of factors.

From the Turkish perspective, Morsi’s ousting from the Egyptian presidency was regarded not only as the defeat of free elections and the will of the people, but also as a vital blow to the democratization process witnessed in the country and the MENA region as a whole, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Keeping in mind Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s strong support for the democratization process in Egypt and in the Middle East, the establishment of an undemocratic regime under Abdel Fattah el-Sisi led to a hostile approach between the two countries. At the same time, later events also contributed towards Turkey’s pessimistic outlook on the Egyptian political sphere.

Following the 2016 Turkish coup attempt, Ankara underlined its critical stance against coup attempts towards elected governments around the world. This stance has further aggravated Turkish-Egyptian ties, which has led Cairo to an oppositional stance toward Turkey’s new active regional policy. The latter is evident from a brief glance at the contemporary political disputes in places such as Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean, where Ankara and Cairo have been in opposite blocs of the disputes until recently.

However, the recent developments in the relations between Ankara and Cairo have brought about a possible partnership between the two countries, which could benefit both sides of the Mediterranean and lead to a possible normalization of bilateral relations in the near future. Therefore, the normalization initiative should not be seen as a one-sided approach but rather a bilateral one. That means that both parties would benefit from normalizing relations in domestic, foreign, and economic policies.

With its serious and eminent challenges in domestic and foreign policy, Egypt desperately needs normalization with Turkey.

Recently, experts have tried to answer the question of which actor stands to benefit the most from the normalization. Some argue that it is Turkey that initiated the normalization and therefore Ankara is in a weaker position. Others disagree and argue that with its serious and eminent challenges in domestic and foreign policy, Egypt desperately needs normalization with Turkey.

It would be a one-sided and incomplete approach to assume that Turkey has been unilaterally compelled to initiate the normalization based on political and economic factors. In fact, the normalization initiative is a clear sign of Ankara’s constructive foreign policy agenda, which aims to reduce regional tensions in order to prevent further deterioration in regional politics.

From Egypt’s perspective, Cairo perceives the normalization process as an opportunity and necessity to counter some of the political and economic weight it has had to carry since the 2013 military coup. Furthermore, like any form of ties between states observed within international diplomacy, their context and, subsequently, the dynamics that influence and shape them can be subject to change or alteration.

Therefore, it can safely be said that the normalization initiative was launched by both parties which are aware of the fact that they will both benefit from this process. It is important to address, however, the factors that drive the two countries to come to terms at this particular period.

One of the factors in the normalization of relations between Turkey and Egypt is the diminishing importance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the bilateral relations. While there is some level of interaction between Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood, it does not go beyond the regular relations of a state and a global civil society organization. Turkey considers the Muslim Brotherhood a grassroots civil society organization that has enjoyed a strong social base in the Arab world. The group is no longer a political organization and does not aspire to a political future in the region. Therefore, it must be stated that the Muslim Brotherhood should only be treated as a civil organization, and both Ankara and Cairo have arranged their positions accordingly.

The Muslim Brotherhood is no longer in a position to challenge the current government. Nor does the organization have any aspiration for political leadership throughout the region. In addition, it no longer wants to hold back the potential ties between the two countries, as stated by journalist Moataz Matar. This partly paves the way for the enlargement of bilateral trade as well. However, how Egyptian authorities will assess this new face of the Muslim Brotherhood remains contested amid Saudi and Emirati interventions to demonize the group further in regional politics.

From Egypt’s perspective it has become apparent that the initiative in the Eastern Mediterranean does not stand a chance without Turkey’s participation.

A second factor leading to the normalization process between the two countries is the developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. From Egypt’s perspective it has become apparent that the initiative in the Eastern Mediterranean does not stand a chance without Turkey’s participation. A recent example of this is the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF). The organization, which has attempted to marginalize Turkey and excluded regional countries like Libya, Syria, and Lebanon from cooperation, is not portraying itself as a long-term initiative.

With the vetoing of the participation of the UAE in the EMGF by Palestine, cracks are already emerging between the members of the initiative. Furthermore, the EEZ agreement between Ankara and Tripoli has severely hindered the idea of a proposed pipeline through the region without the approval of Turkey. These developments pushed Cairo to come to the conclusion that including Turkey in Eastern Mediterranean initiatives would better serve Egypt’s interests and those of the region as well.

Another factor from the Egyptian side is the growing tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia, with regards to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) dispute. The GERD is a matter of national security for Cairo as the country relies heavily on the water supply from the Nile. A decrease in the volume of water coming into the country would be a disaster for more than 90% of the population, which resides in the Nile Basin.

The years-long negotiations did not produce any positive outcome as the two most populous countries in the Nile Basin face a violent confrontation. In this regard, Cairo seeks to reach out to new allies like Turkey to strengthen its foreign policy engagements. Egypt also considers that Turkey can have a constructive position in resolving the crisis with Ethiopia as Ankara has warmer ties with Addis Ababa.

A fourth factor to consider in the Turkish-Egyptian normalization process is the ongoing developments in neighboring Libya. Resembling the GERD dispute, Cairo perceives the stability of Libya as an important matter of national security. Within this context, the state-building processes undertaken in the country have alienated Khalifa Haftar, who was supported by Cairo since the second round of the Libyan Civil War. On the other hand, Turkey had stood beside the internationally recognized Tripoli-based government and signed various agreements with the latter that have also been recognized by the Government of National Unity, including those relating to the military.

Greater Arab integration has long been a dream of the Arab people. Wherever one travels in the Middle East, the romantic idea of Arab unity and brotherhood pervades conversations, and it is not uncommon to hear Arabs speaking positively about the idea of forging closer bonds with their fellow Arabs in other countries.

Therefore, when news emerges of summits being held and planned by two historically important Arab powers such as Iraq and Egypt, there are always murmurs of “what could be?” should these summits bear fruit.

However, considering recent Arab history, the chances of anything fruitful emerging from these talks to establish greater Arab interdependency should be taken with a fistful of salt.

The Egypt-Jordan-Iraq land bridge

Alongside Jordan acting as a nexus between the two, the leaders of the three countries have hatched preliminary agreements to create land corridors between Iraq and Egypt, allowing for cross-border trade, investments, and the transfer of manpower and energy between the three nations.

The idea is that, for $130 dollars per ticket. Egyptian passengers could board a ferry at Nuweiba, cross over to Jordan’s Aqaba, and then use the Jordanian road network to access Iraq and even Syria when the security situation permits. This would facilitate a two-way exchange of goods, expertise, labour, and energy, providing a tripartite economic partnership that benefits all.

Iraq currently cannot support its own energy needs, despite its rich oil wealth and natural gas deposits.

By utilizing Egypt’s vast human resources to enhance the labour force in Iraq in particular, and by exploiting Iraq’s substantial fossil fuel reserves to provide energy to its energy starved neighbors, it appears like a win-win for all involved. In fact, an agreement between Egypt and Iraq at the end of last year has already paved the way for Egyptian contractors to redevelop dilapidated and bombed out Iraqi cities in exchange for oil.

But this plan is poor from the outset. Iraq currently cannot support its own energy needs, despite its rich oil wealth and natural gas deposits. Indeed, Baghdad currently imports most of its energy needs from neighboring Iran, which has a disproportionate level of influence over Iraqi affairs and has infiltrated most of its political, economic, and security institutions leaving Iraq as a rump state servicing the needs of Tehran rather than the Iraqi people.

A history of failure

If it flounders, the imperiled tripartite agreement will not be the first to fail in the Arab world. Arab unity and cooperation has been tried many times throughout the modern Middle East since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, the first attempt at uniting the Arab world was the Arab Revolt that was supported by the British Empire in a successful attempt to undermine the Ottomans and divide their lands.

However, rather than live up to their end of the bargain by allowing their client Sharif Hussein bin Ali to become king of the Arabs, the British divided up Arab lands between themselves and the French, beginning decades of brutal and exploitative colonial rule.

In the post-colonial era, nominally independent yet weak and incompetent Arab rulers again made a cosmetic attempt at uniting their forces in 1948, this time in a military alliance to defeat the nascent Israeli state and expel the Jewish occupation of Palestinian Arab lands. That campaign ended in monumental failure, as did the wars of 1967 and 1973.

But before the wars of the 1960s and the 1970s, the secular nationalist Arab rulers of Egypt and Syria attempted a political union under the leadership of Egyptian independence icon Gamal Abdel Nasser. The United Arab Republic, as it was known, brought together Egypt and Syria in a political union in 1958 that had the potential to be as effective as the united territories of the same lands under Sultan Salahuddin al-Ayoubi who, in 1187, reconquered Jerusalem from the Crusaders.

However, Nasser’s undeniable charisma could not plug the shortfalls caused by his incompetence, poor planning, and institutionally poor governance. Eventually, the Syrian military forced themselves into the equation and restored the pre-UAR Syrian republic, re-establishing their independence in 1961. This paved the way for the Syrian coups of 1963, 1966, and 1971 that established Hafez al-Assad as the sole dictator of a Ba’athist regime. We all know the results of those events, as Hafez’s son, Bashar, is currently in the process of butchering his own people.

This long history of failure by greedy, weak, and self-interested Arab rulers places into doubt any enterprise that they engage in or appear to be making moves towards agreeing. After all, the Saudi-Egypt Causeway that has been in development since the mid-2000s has yet to see the light of day, in large part because Israel has opposed it.

The stark reality is that any plan that may appear to benefit the Arab people will either be scuppered by Arab leaders or else will be vetoed by more powerful interlocutors such as Israel or the United States.

It is therefore highly doubtful that these states, who suffer from so much internal instability as aptly demonstrated by an attempted coup in Jordan earlier this month, will be able to make anything substantial work.

To understand how deep political differences between Turkey and Egypt are at the moment, one need not look further than the different reactions to the “four-finger salute” or Rabia sign in both countries. In Egypt, this gesture is treated as a political symbol of the Muslim Brotherhood and the opposition to the current Egyptian government.

In Turkey, it brings to mind then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s gesture in 2013 to express his opposition to the military coup in Egypt and his support to the democratically elected late President Mohamed Morsi.

The hand salute became a symbol of the breaking down of diplomatic relations between Egypt and Turkey in 2013, after Egyptian President Morsi was ousted by a military coup. Since then, cold diplomatic showdowns left their place to bilateral hostility and resulted in the two countries expelling each other’s ambassadors.

Politically, President Erdoğan made use of many platforms to criticize the undemocratic government in Egypt while the Egyptian government issued several statements targeting the Turkish government. Egypt also criticized Turkey for hosting members of the Muslim Brotherhood who fled Egypt due to political persecution.

Conflicts and Rivalry

Turkey and Egypt became rivals in the region following the 2013 diplomatic standoff. When the Libyan civil war broke out, Egypt supported the Libyan National Army led by Khalifa Haftar, while Turkey backed the UN-recognized Government of National Accord in Tripoli. In the ongoing Eastern Mediterranean conflict over natural gas and maritime borders, Egypt supported Greek Cyprus against Turkey.

Egypt is considered a regional power in the Middle East and the Arab world, while Turkey is regarded as a role model for Muslim democracy in the region.

When Egypt discovered natural gas fields in the Mediterranean, it chose to cooperate with the Greek Cypriot administration. This cooperation would enhance, it was thought, the Egyptian economy, but it adversely affected Egypt’s already deteriorating relations with Turkey.

Egypt is considered a regional power in the Middle East and the Arab world, while Turkey is regarded as a role model for Muslim democracy in the region. Turkey’s increased involvement in the Middle East has had wider implications for the country. According to a report by the UNHCR in October 2020, since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Turkey has hosted approximately 3.6 million Syrian refugees.

The Egyptian government did not confirm this statement. An unnamed Egyptian official commented that “there is no such thing as resuming diplomatic contacts.” The official said that Egypt and Turkey have diplomatic ties already at the level of chargé d’affaires.

Egypt criticized Turkey and backed Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is widely believed to be behind the brutal murder of Khashoggi.

During the same speech, Çavuşoğlu emphasized Turkey’s interest in mending relations with the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, both of which are major supporters of the Sisi regime. It seems that the hostile approach by the UAE towards Turkey results from Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood – many of its supporters and leaders are based in Turkey, where they broadcast and issue statements, a move that has always angered Egypt.

When Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was murdered by Saudi operatives in Saudi Arabia’s consulate in Istanbul in 2018, Turkey revealed the facts behind the crime to the international public. Egypt criticized Turkey and backed Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is widely believed to be behind the brutal murder.

Egypt has always been a loyal ally of Saudi Arabia. In 2015, Egypt supported the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen against the Houthi rebels and boycotted Qatar in 2017 in response to the request by the Saudi-UAE political axis. Saudi Arabia has been a main actor in the Egyptian political and economic scene. Through its economic aid packages to Egypt following the military coup in 2013, Egypt’s foreign policy has come under strong Saudi influence.

The UAE supported Egypt in its war against the Muslim Brotherhood, which the Emirati and Egyptian governments view through the same lens of an alleged threat posed by political Islam. The fact that Turkey hosts anti-coup members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who fled political purge and persecution in Egypt, strains the relations between the two countries.

Win-Win Rapprochement

In a relatively softer tone, President Erdoğan has stated that relations with Egypt will be strengthened if diplomatic efforts result in positive outcomes. He stated, “Friendship between the Egyptian and Turkish peoples will not be the same as relations between the Egyptian and Greek peoples.”

Turkey is well aware of Egypt’s political importance in the Middle East. If Turkey and Egypt leave their ideological differences aside, focus on prospects of growth, and reach a reconciliation initially on their economic interests and for the stability in the region, other steps will follow suit. Turkey and Egypt can find common grounds on the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya. If the two countries normalize their relations, Turkey could be a potential importer of Egyptian natural gas through the Mediterranean.

Turkey and Egypt share the historical, centuries-long legacy of the Ottoman Empire. Whether or not they follow their mutual interests, only time can tell. Diplomatic relations between the two can’t be mended with a quick fix and ultimately actions will speak louder than words.

Egypt and Turkey broke their diplomatic relations in 2013, after a military coup ousted the late Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi. Both countries expelled each other’s ambassadors and since then, their relations have gradually worsened. President Erdoğan criticized Abdel Fattah el-Sisi for violating the emergent democracy and massacring Egyptians while Sisi criticized Erdoğan for safeguarding Muslim Brotherhood members who fled to Turkey.

Since 2013, anti-coup media channels based in Turkey such as Mekameleen TV and EL Sharq TV have been tough critics of the Sisi regime in Egypt. Aired from Istanbul, Egyptian authorities have associated these media outlets with the Muslim Brotherhood political movement and have labelled them “terrorist.” As a result, Turkey is presented in Egyptian national media platforms as an enemy state.

During a recent interview with Anadolu Agency, Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlut Çavuşoğlu, announced that some steps have been taken to resume diplomatic relations with Egypt and that neither country set preconditions to proceed. In response, Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sameh Shoukry commented by saying, “Words alone are not enough. They must be accompanied with actions. If we witness a change in Turkey’s policy, approach, and goals that are aligned with Egyptian policies, we might consider it a ground to normal relations.”

National Egyptian newspapers covered the efforts of rapprochement between Egypt and Turkey. “Turkey has approached Egypt since it is willing to remark its maritime borders. Ankara needs Cairo more than Cairo needs Ankara. Therefore, it has been ‘flirting’ with Egypt lately,” claimed Mohammed Hamed, director at the East Mediterranean Gas Forum.

Mustafa Bakri, an Egyptian journalist, explained the Turkish actions by saying, “Turkey must prove its goodwill to Egypt through practical actions. It must hand over any parties that Egypt declared to be legally involved in terrorism or violence.”

In an interview with UAE-based Sky News Arabia, Osama Abdel Aziz, an expert on Turkish affairs, said that Erdoğan surprisingly changed his strategy. Abdel Aziz stated, “Turkey has first to maintain its diplomatic relations with Egypt. It must give up on its interference in internal affairs of Arab states, specially in Libya and Iraq.”

Certain social media users in Egypt believe that Turkey focuses on its own interests but considered Turkey’s willingness to normalize relations with Egypt as a Turkish government’s recognition of the Sisi regime.

This news received a mixed reception by the public, and divided media platforms. Several public figures and media outlets claimed it was a victory for the Sisi regime against Turkey and against the Muslim Brotherhood, and that these channels would soon be completely closed down. Others argued that Egyptian media tend to exaggerate news to glorify Sisi’s regime and that this was fake news.

Egyptian State Minister of Media & Information Osama Heikal stated that “ensuring opposition channels in Istanbul follow the principles of media ethics is a good sign from the Turkish side.” Heikal went on to say that such a step would create an atmosphere conducive to discussing several issues that were subject to dispute between the two countries.

On the whole, it seems that Egyptian and Arab media outlets chose to focus on the issue of the Turkey-based Egyptian opposition channels rather than on the regional political and economic implications of a possible diplomatic reconciliation between the two countries.

Mutual suspicion and unresolved border disputes have been major issues in the Ethiopia-Sudan relations for the past several decades. These problems heat up when there are developments in the region, such as the dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam with Egypt (GERD), and calm down when the disputes are resolved.

Domestic politics in Ethiopia and Sudan fuel the conflict and the border disputes, which are also conditioned by the geopolitical developments in Northeast Africa.

The most recent border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan erupted when Sudan’s military took control of Al-Fashqa, a fertile agricultural area in Gonder, in northwestern Ethiopia. Dina Mufti, the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, recently stated that his country is “running out of patience with its neighbor’s continued military buildup in a disputed border area despite attempts to diffuse tensions with diplomacy.”

The spokesperson of Sudan’s Sovereign Council, Mohamed Al-Fakki, said that his country “doesn’t want war with Ethiopia,” adding that Sudan is “capable of protecting our lands and restoring those left with Ethiopia.”

It is vital to notice that the Khartoum-Addis Ababa border tension is happening while the latter is occupied with the law enforcement operation in Tigray. There is fear that the growing tension and hostility might escalate to a conventional war. There is also considerable fear that the border tension will affect the Egypt-Ethiopia-Sudan negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

Colonial roots of the border tension

In most cases, colonial agreements are used as a reference in the process of border negotiations between African countries. However, the difference in understanding and/or interpretation of colonial agreements sparks disputes, which can lead to full-scale wars between conflicting parties.

Despite this, Ethiopia has chosen to use the 1900 and 1901 agreements as a reference for the negotiations to demarcate their mutual borders, while Sudan favors the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1902 and the 1903 and 1909 Gwynn surveys as a basis to initiate the demarcation.

Ethiopia emphasizes over and over again that the 1903 and 1909 Gwynn surveys were non-participatory and unilateral, and, therefore, they don’t bind Ethiopia.

Ethiopia emphasizes over and over again that the 1903 and 1909 Gwynn surveys were non-participatory and unilateral, and, therefore, they don’t bind Ethiopia. Additionally, the country invoked the necessity to respect the June 1966 status quo accord between the two countries that forbid either side to employ any unilateral action that would affect the de facto situation along the borders until the issue of demarcation is solved.

Why is the current border tension different?

The current confrontation between Addis Ababa and Khartoum is, however, different from the past ones for the following reasons. First, the current confrontation is happening after Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia and South Sudan gained independence from Sudan. Therefore, if not managed properly, the border confrontations between Ethiopia and Sudan might escalate to include Eritrea and South Sudan, which will have similar complications for Ethiopia and Sudan respectively.

Second, the current confrontation follows the Ethiopia-Egypt confrontation over the Nile River, which shifted from veiled animosity to overt hostility following the official beginning of the construction of the GERD over the Blue Nile in 2011. Third, in the current tension, the military, political and economic roles of emerging actors such as China, Turkey, UAE, and Saudi Arabia are increasing in the Horn of Africa and Northeast Africa regions as never before. So, if a full-scale war breaks out, the possibility of causalities are higher than ever before.

Why Sudan turned its back to Ethiopia

Ethiopia and Egypt, which view each other as natural foes, look at the political activity in Sudan with suspicion and compete to get Sudan on their side. At no time in history has Sudan not been the center of gravity of the Ethiopia-Egypt competition. The ills of internal politics and the weak economic situation in the country created a fertile ground for Egypt and Ethiopia to exploit the weakness of Khartoum for their own political advantage. Particularly Egypt openly uses its economic strength, military superiority, and political dominance in the Arab world to influence Khartoum and to widen the gap between the latter and Addis Ababa.

It is also vital to note that the last decade of the rule of former Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir was comparatively good for Ethiopia. This is true because al-Bashir’s approach to Ethiopia was based on good neighborly relations in regard to the two countries’ water and border issues. Whereas now Abdalla Hamdok and Al Burhan turn their back on Ethiopia and prefer the hardline approach towards these two complicated issues. As a result, Sudan’s forces entered deep into the disputed territories between the two counties violating the 1966 accord that obliged the two countries to respect the status quo until the demarcation process is completed.

Since the beginning of construction of the GERD in 2011, Khartoum has been playing a balancing role in the Ethiopia-Egypt water diplomacy battle. However, recently Khartoum has turned its back on Ethiopia and is favoring Egypt.

The following developments are behind Khartoum’s decision to turn its back to Ethiopia (i) Sudan’s new leaders insist on protecting their rule from Cairo’s subversive role toward the new administration in Khartoum; (ii) Sudan’s new leaders will probably benefit from Cairo’s economic, security, and diplomatic capacity to aid their fragile economy and security; (iii) the new administration in Khartoum might be disappointed because of Ethiopia’s bilateral negotiation with Egypt on the “Trump Deal”; and/or (iv) Sudan’s attachment to Cairo most likely stems from the power rivalry between the pro-Egypt military wing and the civilian administration in Sudan.

The other reason that has been suggested for Sudan violating the status quo and occupying the fertile agricultural region of Al-Fashqa stems from Sudan’s view of Ethiopia as a “weak other” because of the unfolding domestic civil war. History shows that in the 1970s Sudan under the leadership of Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiry made a similar move while Ethiopia was fighting the Ogaden War with Somalia. Further back in history, in 1880s, Sudan attacked Ethiopia while the latter was in confrontation with Italy.

It may have taken four years, but the Italian investigation of the killing of doctoral student Giulio Regeni, in February 2016, was conclusive. Regeni was killed at the hands of members of Egypt’s security agency, Italian prosecutors concluded on December 10, 2020. But, the story doesn’t end here.

Since the mutilated body of Regeni was discovered in a ditch by the side of a highway at the outskirts of the Egyptian capital, Cairo, relations between Italy and Egypt deteriorated, or at least it appeared so.

Pressured by relentless Italian media coverage of the grisly murder of the once-promising student, the Italian government was eventually forced to act, especially as the Egyptian government denied any responsibility or knowledge of the circumstances that led to the killing.

In April 2016, Rome recalled its ambassador to Cairo as a show of frustration in the face of Egyptian unwillingness to apprehend the perpetrators. A few weeks later, on April 29, then Foreign Affairs Minister, Paolo Gentiloni, insisted in an interview with the official RAI radio that “a return to normality of relations depends on serious collaboration” on the Regeni case, adding that Italy was “maintaining a position of dissatisfaction”.

What then seemed an uncompromising position became flexible a year or so later, when the country’s new Foreign Minister Angelino Alfano declared, in August 2017, that “it’s impossible for countries that are in front of each other not to have high-level political and diplomatic relations.”

Since then, and despite public statements expressing indignation towards Egypt’s reluctance to investigate, let alone take responsibility for Regeni’s murder, relations between the two countries were quickly restored, in fact, thrived in terms of cooperation in military trade and other areas.

Although Egypt is constantly criticized by international rights groups for its systematic violations of human rights, it still remains one of Italy’s major arms importers. Despite a call made by Human Rights Watch to Italy to halt arms sales to Egypt, the flow of weapons continued uninterrupted. On June 11, 2020, for example, the Italian government approved the sale of two warships to Egypt, a decision that was confirmed, despite protestations, in August.

Hypocrisy in Italy’s handling of Regeni’s case becomes more evident when Egypt’s dismal human rights record is considered

In fact, according to Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Italian arms sales to Egypt tripled in 2019, and plans for a series of arms deals for 2020 total €11 billion.”

This hypocrisy in Italy’s handling of Regeni’s case becomes more evident when Egypt’s dismal human rights record is considered. Italian officials and media are now treating the two issues, that of trade and diplomatic ties, on the one hand, and Regeni’s murder and human rights violations, on the other, as if two separate matters.

While such moral stances are highly admirable, one wonders why this constant emphasis on Egypt’s poor human rights records was absent in Italian media and mainstream intellectuals following the brutal military coup in 2013. It was then that the Egyptian dictator, Sisi, overthrew democratically elected President Mohammed Morsi, killing thousands and imprisoning many more in the process.

Italy is not the only western power that conducts its foreign policy dealings with obvious double standards. Former U.S. President Barack Obama, too, refused to call Morsi’s ouster a military coup at the time. Italy is merely following suit.

The same logic can be applied to this odd separation between intrinsically linked matters, arming the very state that derives its legitimacy through violence.

Italy is not the only western power that conducts its foreign policy dealings with obvious double standards. Former U.S. President Barack Obama, too, refused to call Morsi’s ouster a military coup at the time. Italy is merely following suit.

But the hypocrisy in the Italian case is even more palpable, as the brutality of the regime and refusal to abide by the minimal standards of justice and transparency has affected more than the Egyptians themselves, but an Italian national as well.

The Italian government cannot plead ignorance, as in not knowing the full extent and persistence of human rights violations in Egypt. Indeed, the Middle Eastern country, aside from Israel, is the most unrepentant human rights violator in the whole region.

In fact, what has befallen the Italian victim, Regeni, is precisely what has fallen on thousands of Egyptians in the last few years. “Despite the continuous demands of the Egyptian authorities for the necessity to stop the use of enforced disappearance against citizens due to its severe negative effects on the disappeared and their families, they do not back down from expanding its use against larger segments of citizens,” the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms (ECRF) stated in a recent report.

The same sentiment was conveyed by Amnesty International in its 2016-17 report, which covered the time frame of Regeni’s murder and official cover-up by the regime. According to Amnesty, the very National Security Agency (NSA) – which was directly incriminated by Italian prosecutors in December – has “abducted hundreds of people without judicial order and held them incommunicado for prolonged periods, outside of judicial oversight and without access to family members or legal representation.”

And as in Regeni’s case, the Egyptian government “continued to deny that such enforced disappearances occurred”.

The story of Regeni may, on the surface, appear to be a genuine search for justice and a hunt down for his murderers. However, a deeper look indicates that it is also a story of official hypocrisy on the part of the Italian government, and merely one of the numerous tragic murders and forced disappearances conducted by the Egyptian authorities.

If justice is to be served, those who have murdered Regeni, and thousands of innocent Egyptians, must see their day in court. They should include, not only the goons of the NSA, but the very men who are receiving Europe’s highest, but most undeserved, honors.

The Club Champions League, the final game of the CAF (Confederation of African Football), took place on November 27, 2020. The game was played between the two biggest Egyptian teams, Al-Ahly and Al-Zamalek in Cairo Stadium and ended by the crowning of Al-Ahly as the African champion for the 9th time. A crowd of fans of both teams would normally be expected to fill the stadium.

However, this was not the case since the Egyptian public and hardcore fans known as “Ultras” have been banned from Egyptian stadiums since 2012. This ban has been part of the anti-revolutionary policies by the military regime in Egypt. These policies especially targeted the Ultras due to their effective social mobilization capacity during the January 25 Revolution that took place in Egypt in 2011.

The political involvement of the Ultras in Egypt was not a spontaneous reaction during the January 25 Revolution. Rather, it was a process that started with the very establishment of the Ultras in 2007. The Ultras of the two clubs in Egypt, Al-Ahly and Al-Zamalek, are called “Ultras Ahlawy” and “White Knights” respectively. From their establishment, both groups condemned police brutality and the dictatorship of the Mubarak regime. They were also influential during the 2011 events, thanks to their discipline, commitment, and their overriding principle of following the orders of their leaders.

In addition, their financial independence gave them a certain freedom and kept them away from any state control. When Mubarak stepped down and the military took control of the country in February 2011, the state aggression against the Ultras started to increase and was crystalized in two major massacres: Port-Said, on February 1, 2011, and the Egyptian Air Defence Stadium massacre on February 8, 2015. These two incidents were followed by mass arrests of members of both groups who were tried in the courts.

The Influence of Turki Al-Sheikh on Egyptian Football

The counterrevolutionary policies of the Egyptian state under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have been supported by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as part of their anti-Arab Spring policies. The Ultras were targeted by this Saudi- and UAE-supported witch hunt that is related to the presence and position of Turki Al-Sheikh in Egypt.

Turki Al-Sheikh is a Saudi adviser of the royal court and is the current chairman of the General Authority for Entertainment in Saudi Arabia. He started to appear on the Egyptian football scene in December 2017. Since then, he was announced as the honorary president of Al-Ahly. Later on, he resigned, refused an offer to preside over Al-Zamalek, but still invested huge amounts of money in transfers for both clubs.

Fans who directed criticism towards Al-Sheikh have had to apologize publicly following legal actions taken against them.

Furthermore, he became involved in many disputes between the clubs and their players, and bought the Egyptian club Al-Assiouty Sport, changed its name to “Pyramids FC,” and then sold it to Emirati businessman Salem Al-Shamsi. Reports of Turki Al-Sheikh’s involvement in Egyptian sports have heavily criticized his policies and their impact on the efforts of the Saudi government under Mohammad bin Salman to influence Egyptian sports

The founders and the early members of the Ultras in Egypt are currently either imprisoned, exiled, or have preferred to disappear from the public scene following the oppression they experienced. In addition, for the past eight years sports fans in general have been banned from interacting with football clubs.

Sport fans in general have been banned from interacting with football clubs for eight years. Thus, the reactions of the new generation of football fans, in general, and Ultras, in particular, can only be observed through social media.

A general observation of social media reveals that Turki Al-Sheikh became the central topic of discussions even after his “official” withdrawal. The attitude he showed towards football fans was problematic as he took legal action against some of them and shared their names publicly on his Facebook account over claims of personal insult allegations.

His position on players such as Abdullah Al-Said and transferring him to the rival team, Al-Zamalek, or the dispute with Al-Ahly’s former captain, Hossam Ashour, and his retirement plans have been hot topics among football fans on social media networks. Al-Sheikh joined controversial Al-Zamalek chairman Mortada Mansour in his attacks and criticisms against the Ultras.

As a result, the discussions of football fans across social media became mainly concerned with Al-Sheikh’s actions. Discussions within groups of fans of one team or between rival fans focused mostly on the problems that Al-Sheikh was involved in, and his influence on both the big clubs and Egyptian football in general.

Al-Sheikh and his interventions in the policies of football clubs were used by rival fans as a sarcastic reference point and to mock each other and belittle their managerial boards. Meanwhile, various political and social events took place when Turki Al-Sheikh was the honorary president of Al-Ahly Club in Egypt and an investor in Egyptian football.

These events include calls made by former military-affiliated contractor Mohamed Ali for protests against the Egyptian regime, or for protests against more recent events such as the demolishing of unlicensed houses, carried out by the Sisi regime.. In addition, a social media campaign was launched against sexual harassment by survivors who started publicly shaming abusers and were supported by celebrities and social media influencers.

These events would have seen a huge reaction from the Ultras, both at the stadiums and on social media, had they taken place eight or nine years ago. Nonetheless, fans on social media networks merely expressed their reactions to the matches and to the actions of Turki Al-Sheikh. Al-Sheikh has already sold Pyramids FC and is currently the owner of the Andalusian club UD Almería. However, Al-Sheikh is still present and influential through his financial support to both Al-Ahly and Al-Zamalek, and his continuous engagement with different media channels and talk shows in Egyptian media.

Al-Sheikh’s presence helped the current Egyptian regime to continue to oppress the Ultras as an effective group of the January 25 Revolution and as a presence that continues to pose a threat to its existence.

Fans who dared to become involved in such political, social, or public discourse have experienced firsthand the state’s reaction towards the Ultras. Fans who directed criticism towards Al-Sheikh and the atmosphere he created in Egyptian football, have had to apologize publicly following legal actions taken against them. These actions of Al-Sheikh, alongside securitizing the Egyptian sports, managed to push football fans away from such sensitive social and political causes. It also served the Saudi-Emirate plans carried out against groups involved in the Arab Spring revolutions.

Thus, the presence of Al-Sheikh helped to immobilize fans across social media and threatened anyone who openly talked about his corrupting influence. Al-Sheikh’s presence helped the current Egyptian regime to continue to oppress the Ultras as an effective group of the January 25 Revolution and as a presence that continues to pose a threat to its existence.