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hat do white supremacist Silicon Valley tech bros and terrorist mass shooters of mosques, synagogues, and migrant centers have in common?

They all subscribe to a death cult that dreams of a utopic world where there is racial and cultural hierarchy, and all non-white migrants are deported from Western countries and imperialism, hard power and exploitation to reign again in the global order.

The world is facing a new form of terrorism threat and fascism: it is called Accelerationism. Accelerationists disdain non-white migrants, Muslims, ethnic minorities, radicals and politicians that advocate for diversity, integrating migrants, decolonial justice, and the reparation for slavery and colonialism.

Death cults

On May 19, 2026, two teenagers attacked a San Diego Mosque, killing three people and livestreamed their shooting. A 75-page manifesto written by the shooters espoused Islamophobia, antisemitism, anti-Black racism, Hispanophobia, accelerationism and misogyny was later found online. This was not an isolated incident. On March 15, 2019, a gunman walked into the Al Noor Mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand, and murdered 51 Muslims while livestreaming the massacre on Facebook. He left behind a manifesto soaked in the language of accelerationism and had similarities with the San Diego shooters’ manifesto.  Accelerationism espouses the idea that Western/White civilization must be pushed to a violent breaking point so that white and “pure” ethnostates can rise from the ashes and reclaim their glorious past.

The terrorism in Christchurch and accelerationism have a long history. It echoed Anders Breivik’s 2011 massacre in Norway, where 77 people, most of them teenagers, were murdered in the name of protecting Europe from cultural Marxism and Muslim migration. It echoed the Pittsburgh synagogue shooting, the El Paso Walmart attack targeting Hispanic shoppers, the Buffalo supermarket massacre aimed at Black Americans.

Accelerationist terrorism is carried out in the name of ideological and cultural warfare, carried out by mostly young white men who believe that accelerating racial, cultural and religious conflict would hasten a white supremacist revolution, response and reaction.

AI and the far-right

The question the world has been too slow to ask is this: who is building the intellectual, ideological and political infrastructure that makes this violence justifiable?

Look no further than Silicon Valley.

Elon Musk, today the world’s richest man, owner of X (formerly Twitter), and now the single most powerful unelected figure in the United States, has spent recent years amplifying white nationalist accounts, and platforming “great replacement” conspiracy theories, and signal-boosting neo-Nazi rhetoric to hundreds of millions of followers across the world. His very public embrace of far-right European parties, his attacks on Muslim communities, his obsessive promotion of white demographic anxiety, are not the eccentricities of a distracted Trillionaire. When Musk performed a Nazi salute at a post-inauguration rally and the world shrugged, it confirmed what many had long suspected: white supremacy has found its most powerful champion not in the backrooms of a skinhead bar but in the boardrooms of the most valuable companies on earth.

Marc Andreessen, the venture capitalist and co-founder of Netscape, published his “Techno-Optimist Manifesto” in 2023, declaring that there is no problem “that cannot be solved with more technology” and that the “techno-capital machine” exists to serve humanity. What he did not say is whose humanity he had in mind. The effective accelerationist movement (e/acc) that Andreessen and his Silicon Valley peers champion is accelerationism with a smile: the same ruthless logic of letting destructive forces run unchecked, dressed up in the language of progress, technology and innovation. The merger of white nationalist politics and Silicon Valley capital is no longer a fringe concern. It is the ideology of most Far Right and white supremacist political movements.

Underneath all of it runs a single obsession: replacement. The “great replacement” theory, the paranoid anxiety that white Western populations are being deliberately displaced by non-white migrants, has migrated from the fever swamps of the internet into mainstream conservative politics across Europe, America, and Australia. Replacement paranoia is the connective tissue between the Christchurch shooter and the French Far Right, between the neo-Nazi accelerationist and the Arktos circle and the recently exposed Dialog list of Peter Thiel. This is an ideological project: a far-right internationalism that stretches from Budapest to Buenos Aires, from Washington to Warsaw, and united by the shared paranoid conviction that the non-white world and its peoples are an existential threat to Western civilization.

Techno-fascism

And now this far right international has acquired its most powerful tool yet: Artificial Intelligence.

The global AI economy is being built on a foundation that replicates, with algorithmic precision, the colonial extraction of previous centuries. The data that trains the large language models powering Silicon Valley’s fortunes is harvested from populations across the Global South, often without consent, without compensation, and without benefit. The content moderation labour that makes these platforms usable is outsourced to workers in Kenya, the Philippines, India and Pakistan, paid poverty wages to absorb the worst of humanity’s digital violence so that Western users need not see it.

Moreover, the rare earth minerals that power the hardware are extracted from the Congo, from Bolivia, from Indonesia, by workforces whose conditions would be unthinkable in any country whose citizens Musk and Andreessen consider fully human.

This is the new colonialism, not the colonialism of the gunboat and the governor-general, but of the server farm and the terms of service agreement. The Global South is being incorporated into the AI economy not as a beneficiary but as raw material: its people as cheap labour, its data as free resource, its governments as compliant hosts, and most consequentially the Silicon Valley tech bros dream of a hierarchical world where the Global South is exploited and enslaved.

The accelerationists and the tech bros, in both their violent and techno-utopian forms, agree on one thing: some lives are the fuel, not the destination.

In their hyper-technological and advanced futuristic utopian world, where Musk, Jeff Bezos, Peter Thiel and other billionaires will go for vacation to Mars, there is no place for Muslims, Africans and peoples of the Global South.

Violent death cults have always worn different suits and hoodies in different eras. Today they wear a hoodie or suit and call themselves disruption innovationists, Techno-Utopianists or efficiency strategists.

The mosques of Christchurch and the sweatshops of Nairobi are not separate stories. They are the same story, told in different registers of the same accelerationist logic: that some people exist to be exploited so that others may prosper and build a civilization that reaches Mars and beyond while the Global South is robbed of its wealth, labour and minds and rendered perpetually poor and miserable.

We should not look away.

All forms and manifestations of hatred, dehumanization and exploitation ought to be challenged and resisted – even when it’s clothed in the language of technological advancement or saving a particular civilization, culture or race.

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ndia’s student protest movement has gained momentum online after demonstrations against examination paper leaks triggered a wave of social media posts criticizing Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government.

The protests, led by students demanding the resignation of Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan, intensified after a march toward Parliament on July 20 brought central New Delhi to a standstill.

According to protesters, more than 100 students were injured during a police crackdown. Police denied allegations of excessive force, but videos recorded by demonstrators circulated widely across social media platforms.

The footage showed scenes from the protests, including clashes between police and demonstrators, tear gas, baton charges, and students fleeing the area. The videos quickly spread on Instagram and other platforms, generating memes, commentary, and calls for further demonstrations.

“If nothing, we are televising our revolution,” protester Avanshika Singh told Al Jazeera during the demonstrations.

Cockroach Janta Party leads campaign

Young protesters said social media had become a central tool for documenting events and mobilizing support.

Posts criticizing the government and demanding accountability over repeated examination paper leaks have spread widely, while official posts by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party have reportedly been flooded with comments calling for the education minister’s resignation.

The protests have also inspired demonstrations in other Indian cities, including Mumbai, Bengaluru, Patna, Lucknow, and Aizawl.

The demonstrations are being organized by the Cockroach Janta Party, a political pressure group formed after remarks by India’s chief justice comparing young people to “cockroaches” and “parasites” sparked backlash online.

The group has said protests will continue peacefully until three demands are met: the resignation of Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan, assurances that criminal cases will not be pursued against protesters, and compensation for families of students who died by suicide following exam paper leaks and cancellations.

A reversal of social media dominance

Political analysts say the movement represents a significant shift in India’s online political landscape.

Modi and the BJP were among the earliest political forces in India to effectively use social media to build support. However, analysts say Generation Z protesters are now using the same platforms to challenge the government’s narrative.

Cultural critic Anurag Minus Verma described the protests as an example of online irony and meme culture being transformed into a political organizing tool.

“The criticism and hate directed at Modi in the capital is not only acceptable now, but even cool,” Verma told Al Jazeera.

Prime Minister Modi addressed the issue on social media, saying that “nothing is more important than the welfare and future of our youth” and noting that the government had established fast-track courts to punish those responsible for examination paper leaks.

The response was quickly challenged online by leaders of the Cockroach Janta Party, who continued to criticize the government’s handling of the crisis.

As protests continue in New Delhi, organizers say social media remains central to their strategy, allowing students to document events in real time and build support beyond the streets of the capital.

(Source: Aljazeeera English)

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.S. President Donald Trump on Thursday declassified a series of documents that he said revealed Chinese interference in U.S. elections, renewing his long-standing focus on election security despite previous intelligence assessments concluding that Beijing did not alter the outcome of the 2020 presidential election.

In a 25-minute televised address from the White House, Trump claimed the documents exposed “shocking vulnerabilities” in the U.S. electoral system and alleged that China had obtained personal information from approximately 220 million American voter records.

The president also accused members of the U.S. intelligence community of suppressing information about China’s activities and urged Congress to pass stricter election laws, including voter identification requirements, proof of citizenship for voter registration and limits on mail-in voting.

The address comes ahead of November’s midterm elections, as Republicans seek to defend narrow majorities in Congress amid political headwinds linked to the Iran conflict and rising energy prices.

However, Trump’s claims appeared to conflict with findings by the U.S. intelligence community. A declassified intelligence assessment issued in 2021 concluded that no foreign government attempted to alter any technical aspect of the 2020 presidential election, including voter registration systems, ballots, vote tabulation or certified results.

CIA thinks otherwise

The assessment, conducted under then-Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe—now serving as CIA director under Trump—found that while China had collected publicly available information on American voters and political trends for years, it did not attempt to interfere directly in the election outcome.

According to Reuters, two people familiar with the matter said the voter data cited by Trump consisted largely of publicly available voter files that political campaigns and consultants routinely purchase and could not be manipulated to alter election results.

Some White House officials reportedly expressed concern before the speech that releasing the documents could create a misleading impression about the nature of China’s activities.

Trump nevertheless argued that the newly declassified material demonstrated significant weaknesses in U.S. election security and reiterated claims that large numbers of non-citizens were registered to vote, although he did not provide evidence that those registrations resulted in illegal ballots being cast.

Rare voter fraud

Election experts and previous studies have consistently found that voter fraud and non-citizen voting in U.S. elections are rare.

Democratic Senator Mark Warner, vice chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, rejected Trump’s assertions, saying the U.S. intelligence community had unanimously concluded that China “did not even try to change a single vote” in the 2020 election.

The president also renewed his call for lawmakers to approve the SAVE America Act, legislation that would require photo identification to vote, proof of U.S. citizenship for voter registration and tighter restrictions on mail-in ballots. The measure has passed the Republican-controlled House of Representatives but remains stalled in the Senate amid Democratic opposition.

Despite Trump’s assertions about election vulnerabilities, the declassified documents released Thursday did not provide evidence that votes in the 2020 election were altered or manipulated, according to Reuters.

(Source: Reuters)

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he United States’ World Cup campaign has been plunged into controversy after FIFA took the extraordinary step of suspending Folarin Balogun’s automatic one-match ban, allowing the striker to play against Belgium in the tournament’s last-16 despite receiving a straight red card in the previous match.

The unprecedented ruling came after U.S. President Donald Trump personally urged FIFA President Gianni Infantino to review Balogun’s dismissal, according to a source familiar with the conversation, sparking accusations of political interference and prompting an angry reaction from Belgium ahead of one of the tournament’s biggest knockout matches.

FIFA announced Sunday that Balogun’s mandatory suspension would not be enforced immediately but instead placed under a one-year probationary period under Article 27 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code.

The decision means the 25-year-old striker will be available for Monday’s clash against Belgium in Seattle while retaining the red card on his disciplinary record.

The ruling immediately became one of the World Cup’s defining controversies, shifting attention away from football and onto questions about the independence of FIFA’s disciplinary process and the influence of political leaders over international sport.

Balogun had scored his third goal of the tournament during the United States’ 2-0 victory over Bosnia and Herzegovina before being sent off after a VAR review for stamping on defender Tarik Muharemovic’s ankle during the second half.

U.S. coach Mauricio Pochettino immediately disputed the dismissal, insisting the challenge did not warrant a red card.

According to Reuters, Trump later telephoned Infantino and requested that FIFA review the incident.

Automatic one-match ban lifted

Although FIFA has not overturned the sending-off itself, the governing body exercised its disciplinary discretion to suspend the implementation of the automatic one-match ban.

“In line with Article 27 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code, the implementation of the match suspension is suspended for a probationary period of one year,” FIFA said in a statement.

It added that if Balogun commits another offense of similar nature during the probation period, the suspended sanction would automatically take effect in addition to any new punishment imposed.

FIFA declined repeated Reuters requests to comment on the circumstances surrounding the decision or on Trump’s reported intervention.

Trump celebrated the outcome on his Truth Social platform.

“Thank you to FIFA for doing what was right, and reversing a great injustice,” the U.S. president wrote.

The White House also welcomed the decision, posting “USA-USA-USA” on social media shortly after FIFA’s announcement.

U.S. Soccer accepted the ruling without further comment.

American players said they first learned of Balogun’s reinstatement while traveling to training.

“We found out about it just coming over here,” captain Christian Pulisic told reporters.

“At first, you’re like, ‘Oh really, is this real?’ And then, ‘Oh, this is great news.'”

Belgium questions legality of FIFA ruling

The decision drew an immediate protest from the Royal Belgian Football Association (RBFA), which described itself as “astonished” and questioned whether FIFA had violated its own disciplinary regulations.

Belgian officials argued that while Article 27 allows disciplinary sanctions to be suspended under certain circumstances, another section of FIFA’s rulebook specifically requires players sent off during a match to miss their team’s next fixture.

“Article 66.4 of the FIFA Disciplinary Code clearly provides that a red card automatically results in a suspension for the team’s next match, as has been the case for all previous red cards issued during this FIFA World Cup,” the RBFA said in a statement.

Belgium also cited Article 10.5 of the tournament regulations, which states that any player receiving a direct or indirect red card “will automatically be suspended from their team’s subsequent match.”

The Belgian federation said it was examining all available legal options before Monday’s encounter.

Pochettino rejected suggestions that FIFA had created a special exception for the United States, insisting previous disciplinary cases showed sanctions could legally be deferred.

“I think 99.9% of people in football have said this is an unfair punishment,” the Argentine coach said.

“There’s evidence from the past that makes it possible to suspend a punishment and fulfill it later on, so I don’t understand how people can be surprised.”

He added that similar disciplinary discretion had been exercised in previous FIFA competitions.

One example frequently cited is Portuguese captain Cristiano Ronaldo, who was permitted to play at the start of the World Cup after FIFA suspended part of a three-match ban imposed during qualifying.

Highly unusual move

Another case involved Qatar midfielder Assim Madibo, whose lengthy suspension for a dangerous tackle remained fully enforced because of the seriousness of the offense.

Legal experts noted that while Article 27 grants FIFA’s disciplinary committee broad discretion to suspend sanctions, its use in relation to an automatic World Cup suspension is highly unusual and likely to generate continued debate about consistency in the application of tournament rules.

The controversy has also reignited broader concerns about FIFA’s governance and its relationship with political leaders.

Although Trump has publicly supported the U.S. national team throughout the tournament, critics questioned whether direct intervention by a head of state in an active disciplinary case risks undermining confidence in football’s independent judicial processes.

Supporters of the ruling, however, argued that FIFA acted within its legal authority and corrected what many believed was an excessively harsh punishment.

Monday’s United States-Belgium last-16 encounter will now unfold under intense scrutiny, with Balogun’s presence ensuring that debate over FIFA’s decision is likely to continue well beyond the final whistle.

Whatever the result on the field, the episode has become one of the most controversial moments of the tournament, raising difficult questions about disciplinary consistency, political influence and the balance between justice and sporting regulations at football’s biggest event.

(Source: Reuters)

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hile’s newly inaugurated president, José Antonio Kast, has reignited debate about the country’s authoritarian past after expressing admiration for former military ruler Augusto Pinochet.

Kast was sworn in on March 11 in Valparaíso after winning December’s presidential runoff with more than 58 percent of the vote — the largest vote total in Chilean electoral history.

The symbolism of his inauguration drew attention even before the ceremony. In an official portrait released weeks earlier, Kast wore a presidential sash bearing a coat of arms not used by Chilean presidents since Pinochet’s rule.

Pinochet governed Chile from 1973 to 1990 after leading the 1973 Chilean coup d’état that overthrew democratically elected president Salvador Allende. His regime was responsible for widespread repression, with more than 3,000 people killed or disappeared and thousands more imprisoned, tortured, or forced into exile.

Kast has long been associated with a sympathetic view of the former dictator. In past campaigns he suggested that Pinochet, if alive, would likely have supported his candidacy. Critics say that admiration is also reflected in his political alliances and cabinet appointments.

Among those named to his government are lawyers who previously defended Pinochet, including Fernando Barros as defense minister and Fernando Rabat as minister of justice and human rights.

Felipe González Mac-Conell, author of Kast: The Chilean Far-Right, says the new president’s political agenda echoes elements of the Pinochet era, including neoliberal economic policies and a strong emphasis on law-and-order measures.

“What has permeated his political project is a vindication of the cultural values and economic model associated with the dictatorship,” he said.

Frustration with politics fuels support

Despite the controversy surrounding Kast’s views, analysts say his electoral success cannot be explained simply by nostalgia for authoritarian rule.

Instead, many voters appear to have supported him out of frustration with Chile’s political system and economic conditions in recent years. The country has experienced rising crime concerns, social unrest and political polarization.

Discontent grew during the presidency of Kast’s predecessor, Gabriel Boric, whose ambitious reform agenda faced political resistance and economic challenges.

Kast capitalized on those frustrations by campaigning on promises of stronger security policies, tighter immigration controls and economic stability. His Republican Party positioned itself as a harder-line alternative to both the left and the traditional conservative establishment.

Jose Alejandro Godoy, a Peruvian political scientist studying democratic backsliding in Latin America, says Kast’s rise reflects a broader regional trend in which voters turn toward strong leadership when they lose faith in traditional politics.

“People feel politics is not improving their lives,” Godoy said. “In that environment, leaders who promise order and decisive action become attractive.”

Similar dynamics have appeared elsewhere in Latin America. In Brazil, former president Jair Bolsonaro openly praised the country’s past military dictatorship, while in Argentina, President Javier Milei has minimized some of the abuses committed during that country’s military rule.

Security versus democratic freedoms

Chile remains deeply divided over the legacy of Pinochet. A 2023 survey by the polling firm Mori Chile found that more than one-third of Chileans believe the 1973 coup that brought the general to power was justified.

Supporters of Kast argue that references to Pinochet reflect admiration for the economic reforms introduced during his rule, which helped transform Chile into one of Latin America’s most market-oriented economies.

Critics, however, warn that glorifying authoritarian figures risks weakening democratic norms and respect for human rights.

“The concern,” Godoy said, “is that societies may begin to trade civil liberties for promises of security and order.”

As Kast begins his presidency, Chile now faces the challenge of addressing public demands for stability while safeguarding the democratic principles that have guided the country since the end of Pinochet’s rule in 1990.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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The idea that YouTube’s algorithm steers users towards increasingly extreme content has long been debated. Brenton Tarrant, the perpetrator of the Christchurch attack, confessed during his investigation that YouTube had inspired him. The Prime Minister of New Zealand also stated that the platform’s algorithm was the source of radicalisation. Similarly, it is known that Anders Breivik, who killed 77 people in Norway in 2011, had contact with racist and far-right circles online long before carrying out the attack, and adopted and tried to spread an ideology of violence through manifestos and videos. Academic studies also show that a significant proportion of videos recommended to right-leaning users promote extremist ideologies. In short, these examples reveal that YouTube’s algorithm can gradually bring users of different ideologies closer to extremism. YouTube adapts its content distribution and visibility algorithms according to pressure points in different countries.

In Türkiye specifically, marginal radical content with religious motifs is spreading rapidly among young people. Some Salafist preachers on YouTube define the current socio-political order in terms of the concept of ‘taghut’ (tyranny/false gods), constructing a language that justifies violence through theological concepts such as jihad and martyrdom. The romanticization of death and martyrdom in this content in Turkey can pave the way for the glorification of armed struggle against state institutions and trigger processes of individual radicalization.

Young people can easily encounter such propaganda online without any control. Given all this, it is inevitable to ask whether the YouTube algorithm can rapidly radicalise a young person who starts out with pure religious curiosity.

Experimental research method

For our research, we created personas of conservative young people who are interested in Islam but not violent. Using three different phones and clean YouTube accounts with no search history, we conducted daily religious content queries (e.g. ‘What is Islam?’, ‘What does Sharia mean?’, ‘What is martyrdom?’, ‘What is Jihad?’) in different locations over the course of a week. We watched the first videos that appeared and continued by clicking on the new videos suggested after each one. In this way, we observed and recorded the content recommended by the algorithm based on the user’s viewing history, day by day.

Initially, the videos watched contained more moderate religious discussions and basic religious information. However, the suggested content gradually became more severe in the following days. By the end of the week, the person’s viewing history had reached an extremely “extreme” point: “fighting against taghut’ “. At this stage, we changed our search strategy, searching for terms such as ‘fighting against taghut’. Based on the videos we watched, we then searched for terms consistent with them, such as ‘weapon making’, ‘bomb making’, ‘how to use’ and ‘how to fight against taghut’. Our goal was to test whether the algorithm would present violent content to a user with this profile. Using this methodology, we were able to demonstrate how a user with innocent curiosity can quickly become caught up in a cycle of radicalization.

The radicalization cycle in the suggested content

In the first few days, the suggested videos were balanced and moderate. They mostly consisted of sermons by renowned preachers, explanations of Islamic jurisprudence and interpretations of the Quran. However, by the second and third days, the algorithm had learned about the user’s preferences from the videos watched, and the recommendations became more extreme. By the end of the third day, the main page was dominated by content from preachers of the Salafi school of thought. These videos criticized the existing regime as ‘taghut’ and urged true believers to oppose it.

On the fourth and fifth days, the suggested videos became even more extreme. We came across videos of sermons by preachers who are known in Turkey for their Salafist leanings, and who have previously been arrested for radical propaganda. Videos of a preacher known for his violent views were also consistently suggested.

By the end of the week, the suggested videos were almost entirely focused on a single ideology. However, during the experiment, we never searched for terms such as ‘ISIS’ or ‘al-Qaeda’; we only followed the videos suggested by the algorithm. This demonstrates the power of the algorithm to create an echo chamber.

Based on our viewing history, YouTube assigned a Salafi identity to the persona and shaped its recommendations accordingly. Consequently, the user encountered increasingly extreme videos instead of traditional Islamic content. At each stage, the algorithm shifted the threshold of interest to a slightly more extreme point. Our observations showed that the ‘filter bubble’ effect observed on social media was also present on YouTube. As the user was surrounded by like-minded content, they began to normalise increasingly extreme views.

Left-tilted content experiment

Using a similar method, we experimented with creating a persona who was young, left-leaning, interested in justice and equality, and concerned with social issues, but not violent. Using a newly created account, we conducted general left-wing searches, such as ‘social justice’, ‘equal society’, ‘what is the left’ and ‘left-wing thought in Türkiye. The first videos to appear were educational content about social inequalities and labour rights, or mainstream left-wing discourse. After watching these videos, similar, balanced left-wing content also appeared on the YouTube homepage. Over the course of a week, we did not observe the extreme tendencies seen in right-wing personas in the left-wing persona. Videos from radical left-wing organizations such as DHKP-C or MLKP did not appear in the suggested content list. The suggested content remained focused on mainstream topics such as inequality, labour struggles and historical left-wing leaders.

These results show that the YouTube algorithm in Türkiye can promote some ideologies to a greater extent than others. While significant radicalization was observed in right-wing conservative content over a short period, a similar process did not occur in left-wing content. This difference may be due to radical left-wing content having less visibility on the platform, or it may stem from the algorithm’s interaction dynamics. Nevertheless, these findings suggest that the risk of radicalization, particularly along the religious-right axis, is higher in Türkiye.

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eftwing independent Catherine Connolly has won Ireland’s presidential election by a decisive landslide, securing 63% of first-preference votes in a result that stunned the political establishment and delivered a major symbolic blow to the ruling coalition.

The 68-year-old Galway TD and long-time social justice campaigner will become the Republic’s 10th head of state, succeeding Michael D Higgins after his 14-year tenure.

Speaking at Dublin Castle on Saturday night after being officially declared president-elect, Connolly pledged to be “a president for all”, vowing to defend Irish neutrality, champion climate justice and give a platform to the marginalized.

“I will be a voice for peace, a voice that builds on our policy of neutrality, a voice that articulates the existential threat posed by climate change,” she said, switching between Irish and English. “Together, we can shape a new republic that values everybody and champions diversity.”

A shock for the political mainstream

Connolly secured 914,143 of 1,442,698 valid votes, far ahead of Fine Gael’s Heather Humphreys, who received 424,987 (29%). Fianna Fáil’s candidate, Jim Gavin – who had withdrawn following a financial scandal but remained on the ballot – won 103,568 votes (7%).

Despite the commanding win, turnout fell to 46%, unusually low for a presidential election, and more than 213,000 ballots were spoiled or invalid, reflecting frustration with the lack of choice and the perception of a two-horse race.

Though the presidency is largely ceremonial, Connolly’s victory is widely interpreted as a rebuke to the two big centrist parties that have dominated Irish politics for a century.

Her candidacy surged on the back of anger over Ireland’s housing and cost-of-living crises, missteps by government strategists, unity among leftwing parties, a viral, youth-driven online campaign.

Sinn Féin, Labour, the Social Democrats and People Before Profit all backed Connolly once her momentum became clear, giving her a rare pan-left coalition of support.

A more outspoken presidency ahead?

Connolly has long been a critic of western foreign policy and has accused the U.S. and U.K. of enabling genocide in Gaza. Her victory raises questions about how far she will test the traditionally soft-spoken boundaries of the presidency.

Political analysts say friction with the government is likely if she uses the Áras as a platform for moral advocacy in the tradition of Mary Robinson and Michael D Higgins—but with a more radical tone.

For her supporters, Connolly embodies a generational shift and a rejection of politics-as-usual.

She gained traction with younger voters through podcasts, cultural endorsements and viral videos—including a lighthearted football keepy-uppy clip that became a campaign trademark. She was publicly supported by musicians and artists such as Kneecap and The Mary Wallopers.

Outgoing president Higgins congratulated her in a statement, saying the office would offer “full support” as she prepares for her inauguration next month.

Connolly will take office amid high expectations from Ireland’s left — and deep unease within government ranks — setting the stage for a presidency unlike any other in recent decades.

(Source: The Guardian)

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anada’s reputation as a welcoming multicultural society is facing renewed scrutiny as a surge in Islamophobia and anti-Palestinian sentiment sweeps the country, fueled in part by the ongoing genocide in Gaza. Muslim advocacy groups, community leaders, and victims say the rise in hate incidents has reached levels unseen since the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in 2001 — and, in some cases, has now surpassed them.

The flashpoint for one recent controversy came in Toronto, where Mayor Olivia Chow posted an Instagram video greeting newly arrived Palestinian refugees with the words “Salam Aleikum! Welcome to Toronto!” Within days, the short clip had racked up 51,000 views and about 1,000 comments, more than half of which were Islamophobic, according to her office. Many mocked the refugees’ appearance, suggesting they were not truly in need.

Chow’s team said the mayor often shares stories to humanize policy decisions, but the video was removed after concerns were raised for the family’s safety. It was replaced with a statement explaining the decision, citing “abusive comments” and “safety concerns for the family.”

Predictable backlash

Fareed Khan, founder of Canadians United Against Hate, said the backlash was predictable. “Since October 2023, Islamophobia and anti-Palestinian racism has exploded across Canada to levels higher than they were after 9/11,” he told Anadolu Agency. Khan blamed years of normalized anti-Muslim narratives, which he said have intensified during the Gaza conflict.

For some Canadian Muslims, the rise in hostility has moved from online platforms into their neighborhoods. In Toronto’s east end, Marycarmen Lara-Villaneuva, her husband Khurram Shahzad, and their two children have been repeatedly targeted since late March. On the last day of Ramadan, a man attempted to break into their home while shouting anti-Muslim slurs. The family believes their Ramadan decorations — including an inflatable mosque and a “Ramadan Kareem” sign — made them a target.

Just two weeks later, a woman confronted Lara-Villaneuva, calling her a “terrorist” over a pro-Palestinian display outside the house. The man from the March incident was arrested but allegedly violated his release conditions twice in the following months, including by making new death threats and hurling fresh insults at Shahzad.

“We’ve had to adapt to living in fear,” Lara-Villaneuva said in an interview with CP24. “But how long are we supposed to live like this? It’s exhausting and it’s debilitating. This is our home and our community.” Shahzad added that his work-related travel now leaves him deeply uneasy about his family’s safety.

Encourage Muslims to report hate crimes

The couple has chosen to speak publicly to encourage other Muslims to report hate crimes. “It’s not just us,” Lara-Villaneuva said. “This is about the community, other racialized families, other Muslim families.”

Khan described their ordeal as “just the tip of the iceberg” in terms of anti-Muslim hate across Canada. He cited surveys showing that more than half of Canadians express distrust toward Muslims, with significant portions viewing Islam as harmful to Canadian society or blaming Muslims for the discrimination they face.

These concerns are echoed by Amira Elghawaby, Canada’s special representative on combatting Islamophobia. In her latest annual report, she wrote that Canadian Muslims are experiencing a wave of harassment, threats, vandalism, and economic consequences, including job losses and exclusion from opportunities, since the escalation of the Gaza conflict.

Her report also highlights a troubling statistic: Canada has the highest rate of targeted killings of Muslims among the G7 nations. Recent high-profile incidents include the 2017 Quebec City mosque shooting, which left six dead, and the 2021 vehicle attack in London, Ontario, that killed four members of one family. A Canadian Senate report in late 2023 catalogued dozens of other incidents — from hot drinks thrown at Muslim pedestrians to hijabs being forcibly removed.

1,000 incidents of Islamophobia and anti-Palestinian racism

Between October 7, 2023, and March 2024, Elghawaby said, more than 1,000 incidents of Islamophobia and anti-Palestinian racism were reported nationwide. “Quite simply, being Muslim in Canada is not as safe as it should be,” she wrote.

The Canadian government continues to officially promote the country as a “multicultural, pluralistic nation” that embraces diversity. But for many Muslims living in Canada today, the reality feels increasingly different. The growing hostility — whether in the form of online abuse, physical intimidation, or systemic discrimination — is forcing them to navigate daily life with heightened vigilance.

As Lara-Villaneuva put it, “We’ve taken steps to proactively protect our family, but there’s only so much we can do.” Her words capture a wider sentiment in Canada’s Muslim community: that the promise of multicultural harmony will remain unfulfilled unless society confronts the prejudice still simmering beneath the surface.

(Source: Anadolu News)

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n a surprising turn of events, Geert Wilders, an anti-Islam and Euroskeptic politician, is projected to be the unexpected winner of the Dutch election. According to an initial exit poll, his Party for Freedom (PVV) is expected to secure around 35 of the 150 seats in parliament, which is more than double the number they won in the previous election in 2021. This outcome is likely to have a significant impact on European politics.

Frans Timmermans’s Labor-Green alliance came in second place, winning 25 seats, a significant increase from their current 17 seats. Dilan Yeşilgöz, who is set to succeed outgoing Prime Minister Mark Rutte as the leader of the center-right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) party, is projected to win 24 seats, which represents a loss of 10 seats according to the exit poll conducted by the national broadcaster NOS.

Yeşilgöz, who has made notable anti-Turkey statements throughout her political career, is recognized for her stance against immigration despite being an immigrant herself. Earlier this year, as Minister of Justice and Security she indicated that police officers and special investigating officers should be “neutral” and not wear a headscarf (hijab) at their work.

Forming a coalition government with Wilders?

However, the question remains whether other parties would be willing to form a coalition government with Wilders, as he would lack a majority in parliament despite being the largest party. In the past decade, mainstream party leaders have refused to work with Wilders in power-sharing arrangements. Nevertheless, in recent weeks, Wilders has expressed his desire to be part of a coalition after this election, downplaying his radical views on Islam and emphasizing other priorities.

The PVV still includes anti-Islam measures in its government program, such as banning mosques, the Quran, and Islamic headscarves in government buildings. Wilders is also a staunch Euroskeptic, advocating for a referendum on leaving the EU. Despite winning the most seats, it is unlikely that Wilders will become the prime minister. Yeşilgöz has already stated that she would not support Wilders as prime minister even if he had the largest share in parliament.

Pieter Omtzigt, a Dutch Christian Democrat MP has also ruled out joining forces with Wilders, citing his anti-Islam policies as contradictory to the freedoms of expression and religion protected by the Dutch constitution. Timmermans has firmly positioned himself against supporting Wilders as well.

After all the affairs and scandals in Dutch politics in recent years, such as the child benefits scandal in which thousands of families were wrongly accused of fraud on the basis of their ethnicity, it is remarkable that Dutch voters are once again choosing a right-wing party. The question of whether radical right-wing politics will last is no longer a question—it is here to stay for a while.

The PVV ultimately won due to so-called issue ownership, which in the case of the PVV was the subject of migration. In his victory speech, Wilders pledged to put an end to what he referred to as a “tsunami of asylum seekers and immigrants.”

It seems that the Dutch voted strategically to make a statement. In recent years, Wilders has appeared to move towards the center for Dutch people without migration background by putting them “first,” which was a very smart campaign strategy. Thus, he argued for more hospitals and care for Henk and Ingrid, but not for Fatima and Mohammed.

Wilders strategically appealed to Dutch voters without a migration background by prioritizing their concerns, such as healthcare, while maintaining his anti-Islam stance.

People with a migration background from different parts of the country are expressing their concerns about the increasing polarization within society.

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n Eurowhiteness, Hans Kundnani, Associate Fellow in the Europe Programme at Chatham House, challenges a sanitized and linear history of the EU, prompting the reader to rethink Europe’s peaceful image against its imperial past. He goes on to tackle myopic assumptions about the European project throughout the book.

Kundnani argues that pro-Europeans, who cradled cosmopolitanism and renounced nationalism, have failed to perceive the reality of European regionalism. This provocative critique dissects both the civic and ethnic elements that shape European identity by highlighting Europe’s interaction with the “Other” and linking “Europeanness” and “whiteness.” 

Eurowhiteness may come off as unpalatable to many pro-Europeans, but it raises valuable questions against a backdrop of a rising far-right in Europe. Especially in the wake of the 2015 refugee crisis, the complex relationship between European identity and race demands urgent reflection.

Q. What are some of the myths that cause blind spots in understanding the European identity?

I would mention two in particular. The first is the idea that the EU is a cosmopolitan project. Cosmopolitanism usually has something to do with the whole world, and Europe is not the whole world. There’s a tendency by pro-Europeans and the EU to mistake Europe for the world. For example, when they talk about European integration, they sometimes seem to think that they’re talking about global integration, but they’re not.

Similarly, when they say “I’m a European or I’m a European citizen,” they seem to think they’re saying I’m a citizen of the world, but they’re not; They’re saying I’m a citizen of this particular region that has a very particular history and relationship with the rest of the world.

This is what I call in Eurowhiteness “the of myth of cosmopolitanism in Europe”, and related to that is the idea to think European integration is good for the whole of the world, but that may not necessarily be the case; It may be good for Europeans or may not be good for Europeans, arguably. But even if it is good for Europeans, it’s not clear if it’s good for the whole world.

The second myth would be that the EU is a peace project, and that is not entirely wrong. However, the way that pro-Europeans talk about it is sometimes simplistic; that after 1945 Europeans rejected war, and since then Europeans stand for peace. In reality, Europeans did not reject war in general in 1945. They only rejected war with each other.

In 1950 as the Schuman Declaration, which can be seen as the beginning of the idea of the EU as a peace project, is made by France’s then-foreign minister Robert Schumann, France is simultaneously fighting a brutal colonial war in Indochina.

Similarly, seven years later, when the Treaty of Rome is signed, France fought a brutal colonial war in Algeria. This demonstrates that Europeans are continuing to fight colonial wars until they’re defeated or exhausted.

Europeans like to think of themselves as being uniquely peaceful. The real story is more complicated, and in particular, as I say, to the extent that Europeans have rejected military force, it is military force within what has become the European Union, not even within Europe at large, that is being rejected.

Q. Has the EU’s focus shifted from peace to power?

I wouldn’t say it has shifted from being about peace to being about power. I think it was always about power as well as peace. In particular, it gets to what I was just saying about the idea of the EU as a peace project.

If you go back to the interwar period pan-European movement, which is the inspiration for the post-War European integration project, it is very clear that at that time already that the European integration project is about power and the perception of European decline accelerated by fighting one other.

The idea is: If we want to maintain our position in the world – and at that time this is a position of colonial domination- we have to stop fighting with each other. Not so that we can end European colonialism, but so that we can continue it. So in other words, European integration would take the competitive element out of European colonialism, allowing its practice collectively.

Part of the point of European integration in 1950s was for France and Belgium to consolidate their colonies in Central and West Africa at a time when they were no longer able to on their own. In particular, they needed an injection of West German capital.

The idea of geopolitical Europe goes back to the 1920s. It only seems new because pro-Europeans like to tell a story of Europe through the aforementioned myths. It only seems like a shift because we’ve forgotten the real history of how European integration began.

Q. Does the EU still export the European social model and the general welfare state?

Social market economy and the welfare state are no longer what the EU can to claim export anymore. It may have done once, but even in Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War we observe that this is not the case. In fact, the former communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe had much more generous welfare states when they were communist countries.

What happened as they joined the EU during the enlargement process is that those welfare states were dismantled as part of their transition to democracy. There are obviously lots of things that you can criticize about the communist systems in those countries, such as the lack of political freedom and so on, but they did have welfare states.

What has happened now is a further stage in which the EU is putting pressure on member states to dismantle the welfare state. For example, during the euro crisis, the austerity Germany imposed on Greece dismantled what was left of the Greek welfare state.

Q. Your book suggests that civic ideas of Europe are being replaced by ethnic-cultural ones. What is the connection of the neoliberalization of Europe to identity politics?

What I try to show in the book is that there have always been both of the elements of civic and ethnic-cultural idea in the history of what I call European regionalism- which is similar to nationalism on a larger continental scale. I’m suggesting that we can think of the history of ideas of Europe in the way we think about the history of nations. Therefore, regionalism is like nationalism.

The earliest ideas of Europe are predominantly ethnic-cultural. For example, in the medieval period, Europeanness is synonymous with Christianity. From the modern period onwards, you begin to get civic ideas of Europe. Then, in the post war period is when the EU came closest to evolving into a purely civic regionalism. Particularly, in the period from the 60s to the 90s-2000s, there was an idea of Europe centered on the social market economy, the welfare state and depoliticized mode of governance which European integration had produced.

I think what’s happened is that the social market economy and the welfare state have been hollowed out by neoliberalism in the EU. Meanwhile, there has been a backlash against the depoliticised mode of governance where the older civic idea of Europe is no longer persuasive in the same way it was before.

The way I understand neoliberalism is not just financialization, but it’s also the depoliticization of economic policy. In other words, it’s taking economic policy out of the space of democratic contestation. Although, to some extent, this has happened in the whole world in the last 30-40 years through things like the World Trade Organisation rules, the EU has taken it further through the creation of the single market, and also the Eurozone and the fiscal rules. Therefore, it’s very difficult now to pursue a left wing economic policy in the Eurozone because the fiscal rules don’t allow you to do it.

My argument is basically that when you take economic policy out of the space of democratic contestation and no longer have big fights between left and right about economic policy, your democratic politics shifts to cultural questions.

The point of democratic politics is to reconcile different interests and to have fights about questions where people in your society have different ideas or different interests. I think a healthy democratic politics is one where you do that about economic issues because there are real differences between the interests and different ideas as well.

What has happened now is that the center left parties and the center right parties converged in the center around neoliberal economic policy, which the EU has constitutionalized. Therefore, the way parties can differentiate themselves from each other now is around cultural questions.

In terms of what Europe says to the rest of the world, there was a time it would say it stood for the social market economy and the welfare state and now it says it stands for European civilisation.

A good example of this is the phrase “the European way of life,” which used to be used by French socialists, specifically, to refer to the social market economy and the welfare state and the idea of solidarity that it was meant to embody, saying “that’s what we in Europe stand for as opposed to the United States.”

Now when you look at the way that the phrase is used, it is in more civilizational terms. In the current European Commission, the Commission of Ursula Von Der Leyen since 2019, a European Commissioner for promoting the European way of life and his job is to keep migrants out, which makes it very explicit that migrants- only migrants from the South, not migrants from the east- are a threat to the European way of life. That is a very explicit expression of civilizationalism where the European way of life is defined in terms of culture and civilisation, not in terms of the social market economy and the welfare state.

Q. In your book you imply that the center right is increasingly mimicking the far right. Is there a pro-European version of the great replacement theory, if so, what is it?

There is an idea that the EU represents a European civilisation which is being increasingly threatened. This is basically a far right idea that has now been taken on by the center right in Europe.

For example, a couple of weeks ago, Eric Zemmour was doing a rally in the South of France with the young far right leader Marion Maréchal, and the slogan on the lectern at which he was speaking was ‘Defend our civilization.’  The way the far right is thinking about Europe is there’s a European civilisation that is threatened right now. The far right tends to talk about this in the context of migration. That is, it’s the migration of non-white and non-Christian people that is threatening European civilisation.

For example, Valérie Pécresse, the Republican candidate in the French Presidential election in 2022, was talking about white replacement theory or alluding to it in terms of migration. However, in addition, what the centre right tends to do is not talk so much about migration as a racial threat, but more in foreign policy terms as a threat to European civilisation. Macron has given speeches where he’s quite explicit about this.

In other words, international politics is a clash of civilizations, like how Samuel Huntington argues, and Europe is a distinct civilization. Moreover, for someone like Macron, the West is not one civilization, which is what Huntington thought but that Europe is a distinct civilisation, separate from the United States as well.

Where I see a connection with great replacement theory is that this is almost the international political equivalent of the great replacement theory. It’s not about migration but it’s that if Europe does not unite and defend itself, it will be also replaced by other civilizations. Macron has basically said that.

Q. What are some key takeaways from history regarding Europe’s interaction with those who it sees as the “Other”?

I try to show in Eurowhiteness that there’s a long history of defining Europe against various different “Others” at various different times and it’s constantly shifting. But roughly, I would say, in the medieval period when Europe is pretty much synonymous with Christianity, Jews are defined as the primary internal other and Muslims as the primary external other, excluding the divide between Western Christendom and Eastern Christendom.

Then, in the modern period, I try to show how there is a new complex modern idea of Europe, which is partly to do with the European enlightenment and the scientific revolution. It is a rationalist, secular idea of Europe rather than a religious one. At the same time, the idea of Europe also emerges in the context of the encounter of Europeans with the populations of Africa and Asia, and especially the Americas, and that’s the context in which the idea of whiteness emerges.

So, the modern idea of Europe is not just a rationalist one as opposed to a religious one, it’s also a more racialized idea of Europe that is closely connected to the idea of whiteness. What I think happens in that context is that non-white people around the world are the “Others” against which Europeans define themselves.

In the 20th century and particularly after World War I, you have the new idea of Europe as a geopolitical bloc, which I mentioned earlier. European civilisation or the European spirit, as they talked about it at that time, is being threatened by the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other hand. In that context, Russia and also the United States are respectively an “Other.” What I think we’re seeing today is a mixture of all of those “Others.”

Narendra Modi is roaring to the world that India is a worthy contender on the global scene. India has come to the fore with its massive economy, recent successes at the space front, potential megaproject linking India, the Middle East and Europe via rail and sea, and playing the role of a distanced ally towards to the competing world powers: the U.S. and China.

All eyes were on the G20 summit taking place in New Delhi this year, and Modi surely wanted to make a good impression. Schools and offices were shut, roads were blocked, and street vendors were removed. Even whole slums near the venue were covered in tarpaulin! Ironically, Modi’s speeches repeatedly described India as the world’s largest democracy and the ‘voice of the Global South’.

However, behind this sterilized facade lies discrimination, oppression, and erasure— on brand with the Hindu nationalism fueled by Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Numerous attacks on minority communities sweep through the country, including demolitions of Muslim houses, mosque and church attacks, grave desecrations and violent killings. Meanwhile, the government takes every step to define India as a Hindu nation.

In this month’s book bundle, we examine how Modi’s India both oppresses and suppresses its minority citizens. Through books that explain the political dynamics in India, the impact of state-sanctioned violence, and the silencing of critical voices, we observe how the world’s largest democracy goes wrong.

In the book Modi’s India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy, Christophe Jaffrelot delves into the intricate dynamics of Indian politics over the last two decades, with a particular focus on the rise of Hindu nationalism coupled with national-populism, largely attributed to Narendra Modi’s leadership. This confluence of factors has not only secured Modi’s electoral success, starting in Gujarat and extending to the entire country but has also transformed the very nature of democracy in India.

Jaffrelot’s work spotlights Modi’s ability to captivate a significant portion of the Indian populace by offering promises of development while simultaneously exploiting ethno-religious fault lines within the electorate. This national-populism is marked by Modi’s personalized political style, characterized by direct communication with voters through various channels, effectively saturating the public discourse.

To shed light on the consequences of this political shift, Jaffrelot conducts original interviews across India, revealing a troubling evolution toward what he terms an “ethnic democracy.” In this model, the majority community is equated with the nation, while religious minorities, specifically Muslims and Christians, find themselves relegated to the status of second-class citizens, vulnerable to harassment by ‘vigilante’ groups.

Furthermore, Jaffrelot elucidates how the political landscape in India has developed authoritarian tendencies for various reasons. In its quest for power not only at the national level but also in the states, the government has centralized authority at the expense of federalism, eroding the very institutions that once served as checks and balances, including India’s Supreme Court.

In sum, Modi’s India showcases a government, supported by popular mandate, stifles dissent and grows increasingly intolerant of ethnic and religious minorities. The book provides essential insights into politics, nationalism, and populism in contemporary India.

Christophe Jaffrelot, Modi’s India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2021) ISBN: 9780691206806, 656 pages

In Composing Violence: The Limits of Exposure and the Making of Minorities, Moyukh Chatterjee examines the haunting memory of the 2002 anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat, India, where armed Hindu mobs unleashed brutal attacks on Muslims in broad daylight, resulting in a staggering death toll that shocked the nation. Chatterjee’s investigation goes beyond the horrific events themselves, aiming to dissect how such highly visible political violence against minority communities serves as a catalyst for profound transformations in the domains of law, public culture, and power dynamics.

Contrary to the expectation that exposing state-sanctioned anti-Muslim violence would lead to its suppression, Chatterjee argues that these incidents actually set the stage for a fundamental shift in India, pushing it toward a Hindu supremacist state. He contends that examining the responses of both the state and civil society to this violence offers crucial insights into the inherent features of modern democracy, where riots and pogroms become tools for molding a society defined by a vulnerable minority and a dominant majority.

Chatterjee’s exploration focuses on multiple facets, including courtroom procedures, police archives, legal activism, and mainstream media coverage. Through this multifaceted approach, he constructs a theory of violence as a form of governance, effectively engineering minority populations.

Composing Violence invites readers to grapple with the profound and unsettling implications of anti-Muslim violence in India. Chatterjee’s meticulous analysis paints a picture of how violence can shape the course of democracy, raising profound questions about the fragility of minority rights and the complex interplay between power and prejudice in contemporary societies.

Moyukh Chatterjee, Composing Violence: The Limits of Exposure and the Making of Minorities (Duke University Press, 2023) ISBN: 978-1-4780-1966-4, 184 pages

What happens to those who dare question the injustices of the Modi regime? The book How Long Can the Moon Be Caged? provides a piercing examination of the authoritarian regime under Narendra Modi in India, where the suppression of critical voices and the silencing of dissent have become central objectives for the ruling BJP party. Their ethno-nationalist aspiration of establishing an exclusively ‘Hindu’ India, involves targeting anyone who dares to voice questions or opposition.

Authors Suchitra Vijayan and Francesca Recchia present a unique perspective highlight the experiences of political prisoners. Their approach combines astute political and legal analysis with firsthand accounts, offering readers an in-depth exploration of the subtle acts of resistance that occur both within and beyond prison walls, involving not only the prisoners themselves but also their families. The narrative unravels a tale of institutional decay and the erosion of fundamental rights.

The book spotlights the stories of those who have been falsely accused of inciting the Bhima Koregaon violence, student leaders who have protested against the discriminatory citizenship law of 2020, and activists associated with the Pinjra Tod movement. By weaving together these voices, How Long Can the Moon Be Caged? celebrates the remarkable bravery, unwavering humanity, and moral integrity of individuals who have been incarcerated for their unwavering solidarity with marginalized and oppressed communities.

In a world where the struggle for dissent and the preservation of civil liberties are ever more vital, this book serves as a powerful testament to the resilience of those who refuse to be silenced, while painting a vivid picture of the ongoing battle for justice and equality in India.

Suchitra Vijayan and Francesca Recchia, How Long Can the Moon Be Caged?: Voices of Indian Political Prisoners (Pluto books, 2023) ISBN 9780745347981, 216 pages

In recent years, the rapid advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has sparked both excitement and apprehension about its potential impact on our daily lives and the future of humanity. As AI becomes increasingly integrated into various aspects of society, from banking and shopping to job applications, concerns about its inherent biases and discriminatory tendencies have come to the forefront. Perhaps one of the most alarming issues surrounding AI is the presence of racism.

AI algorithms rely on vast amounts of data to make decisions, and this data is often sourced from historical records and human interactions. The legacy of racism, unfortunately, is deeply ingrained in our historical data, leading to biases being unintentionally encoded into AI systems. These biases can manifest in various forms, including racial profiling, prejudiced hiring practices, and unfair treatment in areas like banking and lending.

In Is Artificial Intelligence Racist?: The Ethics of AI and the Future of Humanity Arshin Adib-Moghaddam explores the troubling presence of racism within the very fabric of the algorithms that now govern our daily lives. This thought-provoking book takes readers on a journey through the history of enlightenment racism and its connection to the discriminatory practices embedded in modern-day Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems.

Providing an examination of the data that feeds into AI technology and how it will inevitably shape the future of humanity, Adib-Moghaddam unveils the profound implications of such data-driven technology on international security and human rights, urging readers to confront the potential consequences of unbridled AI development.

The book delves into the narratives surrounding the birth and progression of AI systems, placing particular emphasis on the influence of tech giants like Mark Zuckerberg, Elon Musk, and Bill Gates. Through this exploration, the author sheds light on how technology inadvertently assists and enables various forms of extremism, perpetuates social hierarchies, and reinforces discriminatory boundaries within our societies.

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estern Europe is currently experiencing a wave of public desecrations of the Quran. In the Netherlands, the leader of PEGIDA tore pages from the Quran and trampled them. In Denmark and Sweden, activists have on several occasions burned copies of the Quran in front of buildings belonging to Islamic organizations.

What is striking is that the authorities in these countries have acted as mere bystanders, claiming that they are powerless to deal with such activities. They argue that the desecration of the Quran is a reprehensible act, but that it is legal and therefore cannot be stopped. Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson recently said, “It can be legal and still be horrible.”

Many Muslims in the countries concerned and around the world are outraged by the authorities’ passive attitude and are calling on them to act. In July, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution, introduced by Pakistan and Palestine, condemning such desecration and calling on states to close the legal loopholes that prevent them from tackling it.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been a vocal critic of the Swedish authorities’ refusal to stop such desecrations. This raises the stakes considerably, as Sweden’s accession to NATO has yet to be ratified by the Turkish parliament. President Erdoğan has indicated that this is unlikely to happen as long as copies of the Quran are being burned. Thus, the question of whether the Swedish authorities are right to claim that their hands are tied has become politically important.

Freedom of expression?

The Swedish authorities claim that rallies where the Quran is burned are protected by freedom of expression and therefore cannot be restricted, thus giving freedom of expression priority over other rights. However, Sweden is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, which does not recognize such a hierarchy of rights. All rights in the convention are equal, and if they conflict, they must be weighed against each other. In the case of the desecration of the Quran, there is a conflict between freedom of expression and freedom of religion.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in its judgment in E.S. v. Austria, has shown how the right to freedom of expression must be balanced against the right of others to have their religious feelings protected. The case concerned an Austrian politician who had been fined for making derogatory remarks about the Prophet Mohammed. She claimed that the fine amounted to an unlawful interference with her freedom of expression.

The ECtHR disagreed: it recognized that religious groups must tolerate criticism by others of their religious beliefs. However, if that criticism incites hatred or religious intolerance, restrictions are justified. The applicant’s offensive attack on the Prophet Mohammed  went beyond the permissible limits of objective debate and her comments were likely to cause justified indignation among Muslims. The ECtHR reiterated that state parties have an obligation under the convention to maintain religious peace, i.e., the peaceful coexistence of religious and non-religious groups.

ECtHR key judgement

It is not clear what is stopping the Swedish authorities from applying E.S. v. Austria to the desecration of the Quran. The verdict is not obscure: the ECtHR has described it as a key judgment, meaning that it has strong precedential value, and although the ruling concerned Austria, it is expected to be followed by all state parties, including Sweden. The ECtHR is the final authority on the interpretation of the convention and state parties are expected to apply the principles arising from its judgments.

The convention has been incorporated into Swedish law by an Act of Parliament and the Swedish Constitution prohibits the adoption of laws that contravene the convention. Thus, even if there were a law allowing people to burn the Quran, such a law would be contrary to the convention, which would render it null and void. The authorities also cannot avoid banning the desecration of the Quran by claiming that they have no express legislative authority to do so; Swedish courts have consistently held that the convention can serve as a legal basis for action in the absence of enabling legislation.

The Swedish government has announced that it has introduced legislation to tighten border controls in order to prevent the entry of persons who might endanger Sweden’s security interests. Presumably this is intended to silence fervent critics of Sweden’s hands-off policy; however,  this is not how the ECtHR expects Sweden to maintain religious peace. The Swedish government has also indicated that it is considering changing the law to allow the police to prevent copies of the Quran from being burned in public. It need not look far: a simple application of E.S. v. Austria will suffice.

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n the realm of international affairs, the actions and decisions of intelligence agencies wield tremendous influence. Yet, the role of Western intelligence agencies in perpetuating global inequalities through racialized and orientalist worldviews has often gone unexamined.

In The Covert Colour Line: The Racialised Politics of Western State Intelligence, Oliver Kearns presents a provocative and eye-opening exploration of the failures within Western intelligence, particularly in the context of the Middle East and North Africa.

The author delves into the repeated intelligence mishaps in Iraq, Libya, and beyond, questioning the prevailing narratives and searching for the underlying causes of these catastrophic mistakes.

Kearns begins by highlighting the prevalent issue of intelligence failures and the persistent search for accountability. While many critics have focused on identifying a smoking gun or examining who misread or manipulated the intelligence, he argues that a crucial truth remains unaddressed: Western intelligence is fundamentally flawed and incapable of truly understanding the world it operates in.

Drawing on a deep analysis of historical context, Kearns explores how the mistakes made by British and U.S. intelligence services since the tragic events of 9/11 are rooted in orientalist worldviews and racist assumptions that originated during the Cold War-era colonial retreat. He puts forth that comprehending this historical backdrop is essential to understanding why anglophone state intelligence agencies struggle to grasp the motives and international solidarities of their perceived adversaries.

The Covert Colour Line challenges the traditional understanding of intelligence and examines its role in perpetuating global inequalities. Kearns argues that the intelligence agencies’ imagination of “non-Western” states and geopolitics, deeply influenced by colonial legacies, significantly shaped British intelligence assessments that subsequently underpinned the ill-fated 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent interventions.

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hat distinguishes the attack on the Qur’an in Sweden from other hate crimes? How have Swedish officials approached the most recent attack on the Qur’an? These and similar questions will be addressed below in an effort to understand the story behind the hate crime of burning a copy of the Holy Qur’an in front of the Turkish embassy in Sweden.

What distinguishes the attack against the Qur’an in Sweden from other hate crimes?

First and foremost, this attack must not be treated as a random hate crime by an isolated individual. That is because Rasmus Paludan, a Danish politician who chairs the Stram Kurs (Hard Line) party in Sweden, carried out the attack, and the courts have already established that Paludan, who also has Swedish citizenship, is a racist. In 2020, he received a prison sentence in Denmark and was disbarred. Paludan’s acts of provocation have consistently been placing Muslims in Sweden and Denmark at risk. The Swedish police continues to protect the politician despite the fact that since 2017 he has committed hate crimes against Islam and undermined public order. The situation is only made more severe as these attacks have been perpetrated by a collective/political movement, have become international, and have been defended by government officials.

How do Swedish officials approach the latest attack on the Qur’an?

Last year, citing freedom of expression, the Swedish police and justice minister allowed Paludan to burn the Qur’an during the holy month of Ramadan, despite objections from the country’s Muslim minority, which constitutes approximately 8 percent of the population, and Muslim countries. Something similar occurred within the framework of the most recent attack. Despite Turkey’s warnings, Paludan burned the Qur’an near the Turkish Embassy in Stockholm with the Swedish police’s permission. In a written statement, the Swedish police stressed the importance of freedom of expression and assembly. However, an important point that Swedish and other European officials who share the same view seem to miss is that such racist behavior has hijacked the political mainstream which has been for the most part ignored.

Why do hateful and insulting statements and acts, which target sacred values, not qualify as free speech?

Like many other rights and liberties, neither the freedom of expression nor the freedom of assembly are unlimited in modern democracies. One cannot enjoy such liberties in a way that violates the rights of others or undermines public order. Indeed, Article 19 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) stipulates that freedom of expression may be subject to certain restrictions to ensure respect for the rights or reputation of others, or for the protection of national security, public order, public health, or morals. Moreover, Article 20 takes a more authoritative step by stating that “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) features a similar regulation. Accordingly, Article 10 of the convention stipulates that freedom of expression “may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder and crime [and] for the protection of the reputation or rights of others.” The United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) also prohibits racist propaganda and activities.

Likewise, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) stresses that hate crimes and the incitement of discrimination must be punished. Accordingly, the commission argues that such punishment would send a strong signal to all social groups that democracy does not condone any action that violates its fundamental values, including tolerance, respect for human rights, pluralism, and non-discrimination.

Freedom of expression is undoubtedly a sine qua non of liberal democracy. However, it is unacceptable for the freedom of expression to jeopardize pluralism, a fundamental goal of democracy, and peaceful co-existence. That is exactly why international norms include reasons for its restriction. It goes without saying that the true purpose of insults and attacks against Islam’s values, such as the burning of the Qur’an and defamation of Prophet Muhammad, is to target European Muslims and, by extension, pluralistic societies.

Is Sweden’s position in line with international human rights laws?

Sweden is a party to the conventions of the United Nations and the Council of Europe that have been mentioned above. Accordingly, Sweden’s decision to allow Paludan, who was convicted of undermining public order in his country last year, to engage in the same act of provocation represents an abuse of freedom of expression, and violates the rights and liberties of others and undermines public order. In this regard, Sweden’s position is not in line with its commitments under international law. At the same time, such attacks, which promote discrimination and target multiculturalism and tolerance, also place Swedish democracy at risk.

Indeed, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), in its General Policy Recommendations Nos. 5 and 15, asked all member states, including Sweden, to combat and discourage hate speech in light of concerns over racist attacks and hate crimes targeting Islam. It is obvious that hurling insults at the Qur’an lays the groundwork for racist/discriminatory attacks against Muslims and aims to provoke Muslims. Consequently, permitting Paluden’s actions despite the severe and present danger they pose to public order represents a violation of international human rights laws.

What does the European Court of Human Rights’ 2018 ruling mean for attacks against religious values?

On October 25, 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled in E.S. v. Austria that insulting sacred values was not covered by freedom of expression, citing the possibility of inciting religious intolerance. The court also held that imposing a ban on acts like the most recent attack in Sweden, which involved harassment against religious values, was legitimate and necessary for upholding a democratic public order. Moreover, the court agreed with the local courts in Austria that the defendant’s statements regarding Prophet Muhammad amounted to “harassment,” rightfully fueled anger among Muslims, and placed religious peace at risk by promoting prejudice.

All in all, the ECtHR ruling establishes that Sweden’s reference to freedom of expression cannot be considered lawful. In this sense, it is necessary for the Swedish authorities to overhaul their national laws and practives to prevent the abuse of freedom of expression in a way that threatens to eliminate the culture of tolerance and social pluralism and to undermine public order.

The Swedish government’s approach is not in line with the country’s domestic laws either, since the Swedish Constitution requires public institutions to combat religious discrimination. Moreover, individuals who humiliate a social group based on their religious beliefs and incite others against that religious community can be sentenced to up to four years in prison under the Swedish penal code.

According to official data, 3,150 hate crimes took place in Sweden in 2020 alone. The weak response of Sweden’s public institutions to the rise of Islamophobia and hate crimes, together with their failure to enforce international and national laws, is deeply worrying.

T

wo months after the collapse of Mario Draghi’s unity government, Giorgia Meloni, a far-right candidate, is set to become the first woman prime minister in Italy.

The roots of the Brothers of Italy— Giorgia Meloni’s party—in the Italian Social Movement (MSI), known to be the successor of Mussolini’s fascism, sparks debates about the implications of her leadership and policies.

Italy had no comparable de-Nazification process to Germany whereby the fascist parties were enforced to reform. The logo of Meloni’s party maintains the tricolor flame, perceived as the fire burning on Mussolini’s tomb; however, Meloni strongly rejects any fascist label.

As a teenager, she participated in the youth wing of Italy’s neo-fascist movement. In 2008, Meloni served as Italy’s youngest-ever minister. In 2012, she founded Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia) as a right-wing, populist, and national-conservative political party. In the last election that took place in 2018, she won 4.4% of the votes.

On the Sunday snap elections, Brothers of Italy garnered around 26% of the votes. Her right-wing alliance with Matteo Salvini (Northern League) and Silvio Berlusconi (Forza Italia) gives the right a majority in parliament, claiming both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies with around 44% of the vote.

The lack of an electoral coalition between the center-left Democratic Party and the Five Star Movement in a disproportionate system allows them this majority. Meloni’s government is to form Italy’s most right-wing government since World War II.

Hard-line conservative policies

Meloni’s campaign ran on the preservation of Christian identity and the “traditional” family, and Italian patriotism under the slogan of “God, family and homeland.” In a rally of the Spanish far-right Vox party Meloni stated, “Yes, to the natural family, no to LGBT lobbies!”

Her views on abortion and migrants bring concerns to many. The leader has pledged to impose a naval block on Libya and push back “masses of illegal immigrants.” Her coalition partner Matteo Salvini closed migrant camps and blocked boats carrying migrants rescued from the Mediterranean from entering port when he was interior minister.

At the same rally in Spain, she continued, “No to Islamist violence, yes to secure borders, no to mass migration… no to big international finance… no to the bureaucrats of Brussels!”

Meloni also vows to put Italians’ interests above everything in the EU. Some critics frame her prime ministry as a danger to the EU, often comparing her to Viktor Orbán of Hungary who is often in the headlines due to his quarrels with the EU.

However, it is important to note that Italy is dependent on EU funds which it has little interest in putting at risk, especially at a time of energy and living crises. Italy suffers one of the worst impacts of the pandemic and recession in Europe, and receives the heaviest portion of the EU recovery fund.

Meloni has supported Ukraine during the Russian invasion and stands for the sanctions against Russia in line with Italy’s Western allies. However, Salvini has maintained that sanctions against Russia should be reconsidered. Like many countries in Europe, Italy also is dependent on Russian energy.

Meloni has pledged tax cuts on energy and other essential items to curb economic issues, and has promised to introduce a flat tax for the self-employed and renegotiate Italy’s massive EU COVID19 recovery plan.

She also wants to end Italy’s ban on nuclear power. Meanwhile, her party seeks to up Italy’s birth rate with increased family allowances.

Lastly, the far-right leader wants to bring constitutional change and have Italy’s president elected by popular vote.

Brothers of Italy are mostly experienced in local government. At a particularly challenging time to ascend to government, the party has a lot to prove by tackling large-scale issues like the economy.

Written By Dilara Özer – ISTANBUL.

“For they have sown the wind, and they shall reap the whirlwind.” To make things worse, the storms that French President Emmanuel Macron will face are not of only one kind. Whatever had not happened before in the history of the Fifth Republic has taken place in the second round of the French presidential elections.

For the first time, a president could not win the absolute majority in the parliament just two months after being elected; for the first time, no political bloc could achieve the absolute majority in the parliament; and for the first time, a far-right political party became the main opposition party on its own with the highest number of deputies in its history. President Macron, who wanted a strong and clear support for his second five-year term, is now facing an outcome beyond even the worst scenarios.

Undoubtedly, Marine Le Pen was the elections’ most successful name. Le Pen, who could not get enough deputies in the past elections even to form a group in the parliament, increased her party’s number of deputies 11 times and won 89 seats. In the second round of elections, the ultra-leftist party leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon was the rival of President Emmanuel Macron, who, for two consecutive elections, had run against the far-right party leader Le Pen for the Élysée Palace.

This led some commentators to argue that the far right was weakening, but it actually was not. Comments that the second-largest political power in the country had shifted from the far right to the far left within two months, and that the voters in France were acting on a very unpredictable ground were also not true.

In the second round of the 2017 presidential elections, Le Pen was behind Macron by 32 points. In the 2022 elections, again in the second round, the difference dropped to 17 points. The difference between Macron’s and Le Pen’s votes was only 4.69 percent in the first round of the 2022 election. However, the parties on the left united and formed a single bloc despite the rivalry among them, whereas far-right parties could not. If Marine Le Pen had been able to convince Eric Zemmour, who preferred to run independently, and bring him under her party’s umbrella, she could have found herself abreast with Ensemble (the bloc supporting Macron) and NUPES (the bloc supporting Mélenchon) in the first round.

Notorious for his hostility towards Muslims and immigrants and some anti-Semitic rhetoric, Jewish far-right Eric Zemmour was the most talked about name in the presidential elections. Zemmour received 4.25 percent of the votes in the first round and split Le Pen’s vote. No one could predict that Zemmour could get such a high score, while it was considered almost certain that Le Pen would increase the number of deputies of her party, which was founded 50 years ago by her father, with 18.66  percent of votes in the first round. In fact, Marine Le Pen would run in 208 of 577 constituencies, 88 more than the last election held five years ago.

The NUPES alliance, led by the former Marxist Mélenchon, won 131 seats, less than expected and did not please the left. Hopes were indeed higher for the NUPES alliance for the second round. The alliance’s score in the first round was celebrated in the left press with headlines such as “The Left Is Coming Back.” The right press saw headlines along the lines “Will Communism Come to the Country This Summer?” aiming to frighten undecided voters. However, Mélenchon’s party, Unsubmissive France, which one day was portrayed in the media as the dreadful shark in Spielberg’s 1975 movie Jaws, another day was a monster, and yet another a bogeyman, eventually won 72 seats—in 2017, it had only 17.

Eight months before the 2017 presidential elections, Macron had resigned from his position as minister of economy in the socialist government, and first won the presidential elections and then 308 seats in the second round of elections with his party, whose motto was “Neither right nor left, both right and left.” Five years later, his La République En Marche ! (Republic Forward), which changed its name to Renaissance, received only 170 seats in the election.

Macron could not reach the numbers of five years ago, even with the votes of a total of seven parties, large and small, united behind the bloc and entering the election together. The Ensemble, the alliance of political parties supporting Macron, won 245 seats and thus remained 44 seats short of an absolute majority.

Along with Macron’s unsatisfactory performance in the last five years, there were other reasons, of course, behind the election results such as the COVID19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the economic and social consequences of the war. However, the economic policies of President Macron and his government, which further widened the gap between the rich and those with a low income, and his Islamophobic rhetoric and legal regulations targeting Muslims that were actually unprecedented in Europe affected both election results.

Thus, while the far-right politics moved to a legitimate ground, Le Pen and the like, on the one hand, and those who took a hostile position against such policies, on the other, like the far-leftist Mélenchon, gained strength just for this reason by winning the votes of 70 percent of Muslims.

In the 2017 elections, the traditional right and left parties had weakened to a great extent against Macron’s brand-new party and were finally buried in the 2022 presidential elections. The socialist party, which had 30 seats in 2017, was able to get 26 seats, while the Republicans, which had 112 seats, could only get 61 deputies. The Union of Democrats and Independents (UDI), another right-wing party that entered the election with the Republicans, had 18 deputies last time, but could only get three this time. It deserves mentioning also that for the first time in its history, Paris will not have either a socialist or a republican deputy.

Another important result in the second round of elections was the indifference of the French people to the elections: a new record was set with 53.77 percent abstention and 7.67 percent protest votes. According to the detailed analyses of the election results by poll companies, although all parties were affected by this situation, the left was affected the most. It seems that indifference to the left bloc and sometimes the fact that there was no left bloc candidate in some electoral districts despite the risk of the far-right candidate being elected in the second round and no votes for the bloc supporting Macron all contributed to this new record.

Before his visit to Romania and Moldova, President Macron spoke recently in Orly and asked for an absolute majority in order not to add “French disorder to the world’s disorder.” There was no absolute majority in the elections, and even the Republicans, judging by the statements of their officials, do not want to cohabitate the same political space as Macron. As Élisabeth Borne, prime minister of France, said, the country is indeed in an “unprecedented state”!

At least ten people were shot in the Brooklyn subway on Tuesday, April 13 in the morning rush hour, and a total of at least 20 people were injured in the chaos. The shooter opened fire after setting off a smoke grenade in the subway car while the train was still moving from 25th Street to 36th Street station.

Investigators believe that the shooter’s gun jammed preventing him from firing further. The case is currently not suspected to be an act of terrorism but a lone wolf attack; however, the possibility has not been ruled out. Initial worries of an explosion or a bomb were rebutted as the police stated there were no explosives found.

Videos and photos showed people rushing out of a train to 36th Street subway station platform in panic, the platform covered in smoke with bloody passengers lying on the ground.

Shooter still at large

The suspect, who fled, was identified as dressed similarly to a Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) worker, wearing a hooded sweatshirt with an orange construction vest and a gas mask. The U.S. Department of Justice and the FBI are among federal organizations that are working with the New York Police Department (NYPD) to apprehend the shooter.

It was reported that the cameras at three subway stations investigated had malfunctioned but had not been tampered with. Investigators recovered the nine mm gun the shooter used to carry out the attack, detonated and undetonated smoke grenades, extended magazines, a hatchet, a garbage bag, gasoline, a rolling cart, and the key to a van parked near the subway station where the suspect is thought to have entered.

Gun violence and policing have been an ongoing area of debate in New York City. Gun violence in the city shows an increase compared to 2019, with people emerging out of lockdown. Major crimes in New York have experienced an uptick of nearly 60% compared to last year.

The indiscriminate nature of Tuesday’s attack makes it stand out. A similar attack was prevented in 2017 when an attacker partially detonated a pipe bomb at a Port Authority transit hub adjoining a subway station to a bus terminal at rush hour.

President Joe Biden remarked on the attack briefly while speaking about energy prices at a bioprocessing plant in Iowa. He said that the first lady and he were praying for the victims of the attack, thanked the civilians who performed first aid before responders arrived to the shooting scene, and stated that he had been in touch with Mayor Adams and the NYPD.

Mayor Adams condemned the attack in an interview with CNN and called it a “senseless act of violence” while praising transit workers for their conduct during the attack. New York politicians and lawmakers also stated that they were closely monitoring the situation.

New York Governor Kathy Hochul addressed the shooting in a press conference saying, “No more mass shootings.” She emphasized that “it has to end now” and stressed that this was true for other forms of violence as well. She pledged to commit the resources of the city to fight the surge of crime.

Gun control debate once again sparked in the U.S.

Adams called for a “national response” for gun control in a CNN interview. Other Democrat politicians touched upon the need for gun control, Congresswoman Nydia Velázquez among them. Velázquez wrote that she was monitoring the situation, underlined the diverse immigrant community of Sunset Park where the attack took place, and voiced the need to push for stricter gun control laws in a Twitter thread.

Congressman Jamaal Bowman shared an interview about guns and underlying mental health challenges that lead to gun violence. On Monday, a day before the subway shooting, Biden had announced a new gun control measure on “ghost guns,” while the president is increasingly under pressure to address the country’s gun violence crisis.

In light of the New York City subway shooting, Canada’s Toronto mayor John Tory announced police and transit staff would be increasing patrols in their transit system, which has been experiencing cases of assault and crime recently.

In Switzerland, people filed a petition calling for the deportation of Olympic gymnast Alina Kabaeva, Putin’s alleged mistress and mother of four of his children, drawing 70,828 signatures as of Sunday, March 26, 2022. The petition reads, “It is time to reunite Eva Braun with him,” in reference to Putin.

Kabaeva responded to the petition with dismay and anger, describing it as embarrassing and adding that “there has never been a more shameful page in the history of world sports.”

Kabaeva is the latest victim, among countless others, of rising Russophobia. Thousands of Russian art workers, businesses, and businesspeople face pressure either from Russia or from countries that oppose the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It’s not only businesses under pressure but also Russian culture.

Putinizing all Russians

Shortly after the Russian occupation of Ukraine, anti-Russian opposition began to rise in the Czech Republic. Attacks targeted Russians in the country. Some social media users went too far and made statements such as “It would be nice to somehow mark Russian citizens with a red star.”

Russians were stigmatized and attacked just because they spoke their language. Martin Dlouhý, a professor at the Prague University of Economics and Business, wrote on Facebook on February 24, 2022, that he would not conduct, test, or correct the final thesis of Russian students “due to conscience and moral principles.” Dlouhý deleted the tweet after the backlash.

Czech hotels refused to host Russians. Russian children were attacked in schools, and a woman was kicked out of a taxi just for speaking Russian. Maison de la Poutine restaurant said it received insults and threats after Russia invaded Ukraine—this was because the restaurant is exactly pronounced the same as Putin (Poutine).

Performances by Russian pianist Alexander Malofeev were canceled. His condemnation of the war in Ukraine did not help prevent the cancellation of concerts in both Montreal and Vancouver.

The University of Milano-Bicocca in Italy responded to the Russian invasion of Ukraine by canceling a lecture on Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky. In response, a street artist painted an image of Dostoevsky on a university wall in protest.

Kirill Sokolov, a filmmaker of Ukrainian roots, was excluded from the Glasgow Film Festival despite his anti-war stance because his film has received Russian state funding, according to a spokesperson of the festival.

Many Russians have been excluded from international events because of their nationality, and many Russian businesses have been attacked.

Russian-owned businesses in the U.S. have been the target of backlash because of the war in Ukraine with many businesses being vandalized. Anti-Russian slogans have been written on restaurants’ walls and windows have been smashed. The Russian House restaurant in Washington, D.C. was attacked twice in connection with the war in Ukraine. The owner of the restaurant told the Washington Post that he had received threat calls.

In Tokyo, the Russian shop “Aka no Hiroba” was the target of vandalism. Despite promoting peace since the beginning of the war, it did not escape hate attacks.

Hundreds of bars across the U.S. disposed of their Russian vodka to show solidarity with Ukraine. Russian vodka, as well as all Russian alcoholic beverages, were removed from shelves in the U.S. Meanwhile, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand joined the U.S. in sanctioning vodka and Russian alcoholic beverages, and chain stores in Europe tightened sanctions on Russian products.

Not only Russians but also animals living in Russia got their share of sanctions. The Fédération Internationale Féline, an international federation of cat registries founded in France banned Russian cats from participating in its events due to the war.

Cyberspace and technology became a part of the anti-Russia campaign as well. The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project launched the “Russian Asset Tracker,” a database to track the assets of prominent Russians with ties to Vladimir Putin.

Social media giant Meta allowed users to engage in hate speech against Putin and Russian forces. A Meta spokesperson said, “As a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine we have temporarily made allowances for forms of political expression that would normally violate our rules like violent speech such as death to the Russian invaders. We still won’t allow credible calls for violence against Russian civilians.”

On February 19, 2020, the right-wing extremist terrorist Tobias R. shot nine people with a migration background in a café in Hanau, Germany. The xenophobic attack targeted Muslims and showed that Germany has a serious problem with radical right-wing terror. The new German government declared that it wants to fight right-wing terror, and now, the question is how serious Germany is about this declaration.

Right-wing extremism is not a new phenomenon

Since the end of World War II, right-wing extremist ideas have been a taboo in Germany, and the aim has been to “de-Nazify” the German population. The strategy was to prevent a similar scenario to that which occurred between 1933 and 1945. Despite this, right-wing extremist political currents can still be found today. In addition to the minor parties NPD (National Democratic Party of Germany) and Der Dritte Weg (The Third Path) or the right-wing extremist movements PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident) and Identitäre Bewegung (Identitarian movement), the AfD (Alternative for Germany) is a symbol of how strongly right-wing extremism is present at the political level in Germany.

The entry of the AfD into the German parliament in 2017 as the biggest opposition party and the re-election of the right-wing extremist party to parliament in 2021 show that right-wing extremism is not a temporary problem but one that has deeper roots.

Although right-wing extremist attacks were a problem for society as a whole in Germany, it was not until the reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990 that the Federal Criminal Police Office of Germany (BKA) began to collect statistics for victims of right-wing extremist attacks. In 2002, the BKA introduced the system of definitions known as “Politically Motivated Crime” (PMK-System) in order to better record the number of victims. The system is considered inaccurate, and as a result the BKA’s victim figures differ from the victim figures of non-governmental organizations.

The federal government has been recording the number of victims of right-wing extremist attacks since 1990; as of September 2020, 109 victims have been registered. The newspapers Frankfurter Rundschau, Der Tagesspiegel, and Die Zeit, after a joint investigative research, recorded 187 victims for the same period; the Amadeu Antonio Foundation counts at least 213 victims.

Muslims are the main target

Since the reunification of Germany, Muslims have been the main target of right-wing extremist attacks. Between 1991 and 1993, there was an increase in racist attacks among the German population. At that time, the asylum debate was a very controversial issue, which is why asylum seekers were the main target of right-wing extremist attacks. The riots in Hoyerswerda (1991) and Rostock-Lichtenhagen (1992) were sensitive because the police, in particular, took a passive stance and even fuelled the mood against foreign citizens through populist statements.

Attack in Hanau – Insecurity grows for Muslims

On February 19, 2020, a right-wing extremist attack occurred in Hanau in which nine people with migration background were killed, six of them were Muslims. Politicians reacted to the attack with shock. Angela Merkel, chancellor at the time, said that racism is a poison and that such attacks were aimed at dividing society. The far-right party AfD did not make a clear statement and did not classify the attack as politically motivated or right-wing extremism, but as an act of a a lone wolf.

German public reacted with shock to the attack in Hanau shows that Germany does not realize the problem of right-wing extremism.

The fact that the general public reacted with shock to the attack in Hanau shows that Germany does not realize – or does not want to accept – the problem of right-wing extremism, especially against Muslims. The number of right-wing extremist attacks on Muslims and their religious institutions increases every year. In 2020, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) recorded 1,026 Islamophobic attacks, 103 of which were directed against mosques.

In 2010, the BMI recorded “only” 22 attacks on mosques. In 2022, armed attacks on mosques and Muslims continue. A desecration of 30 Muslim graves in Iserlohn, an arson attack on a mosque in Chemnitz, and an armed attack on praying Muslims in Halle are current examples of how Muslims in Germany have to live – namely, in fear of hate attacks because of their faith.

Federal government remains passive – until now?

Under Merkel, Germany did not always prioritize the problem of right-wing extremist attacks. The statements by former interior minister Horst Seehofer (CSU) that Islam does not belong in Germany, the book by Thilo Sarrazin (SPD) Germany Abolishes Itself (Deutschland schafft sich ab), and the xenophobic statements by Tübingen mayor Boris Palmer (Greens) show that Islamophobic ideas can be found in all political parties. With the murder of politician Walter Lübcke (CDU) in 2019, Germany was punished for its passivity: the district president of Kassel had spoken out in support of refugees and was subsequently killed by right-wing extremist Stephan Ernst.

The roots of right-wing extremism in Germany run deep. The AfD and other parties have members who hold xenophobic views. The new minister of the interior, Nancy Faeser (SPD), at least gave some hope of Islam being accepted in German politics and society when she stated, “Islam, of course, belongs in Germany.

However, the number of victims and attacks on mosques show that the tendency further excludes Muslims from society. If Germany wants to preserve a stable political environment and avoid further polarization in society, it must be more active. Otherwise, Otherwise, more German state officials could become victims of right-wing extremist terror along with countless other innocent civilians, as in the case of Walter Lübcke.

Four weeks after Amnesty International was forced to halt is operations in India in September 2020, citing the Indian government’s crackdown on civil society, the UK-based human rights organization published a report warning of a coordinated effort to target journalists and activists in India and Kashmir, specifically those critical of Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

The Indian government “must immediately halt its intensifying suppression of dissent,” said Amnesty International, following a series of counter-terrorism raids on human rights groups and human rights defenders and journalists in Jammu and Kashmir.

Since then, the situation has deteriorated from bad to worse for journalists in both Kashmir and India, culminating with terrorism charges levelled against me and 101 other journalists, lawyers, academics, and human rights defenders in November of last year – for “promoting enmity between religious groups” across social media, an Orwellian way to describe reporting violent attacks committed by right-wing Hindu groups against Muslims in Tripura state in late October.

These criminal charges were filed under the country’s draconian anti-terror law – the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) – a legacy of British colonial rule, prompting a strong rebuke from Reporters Without Borders, which said our “only crimes were to cover the recent attacks against mosques in the North-eastern state of Tripura,” while the Editors Guild of India described the bogus charges as an attempt by the BJP ruled state government to “deflect attention away from its own failure to control majoritarian violence.”

International silence has created space for New Delhi to carry out “counter-terrorism raids” against journalists and editors.

But whereas human rights and civil society groups have been vocal in their condemnation of the Modi regime’s anti-democratic and unconstitutional crackdown on dissent, India’s international allies, particularly Western governments, have been conspicuously silent, showing a willingness to ignore its attacks on free speech and free press in exchange for New Delhi’s unfettered cooperation in the contestation between Washington DC and Beijing for primacy in Indo-Pacific.

This international silence has created space for New Delhi to carry out an ever-increasing number of cynically named “counter-terrorism raids” against journalists and editors, particularly those in Indian administered Kashmir. Notably these raids go unreported in the intimidated and ever-compliant mainstream media ecosystem, which has helped Modi build the most extraordinary personality cult in modern political history,” as noted by former UN under-secretary-general and Congress MP Shashi Tharoor.

If convicted of sedition under the draconian anti-terrorism legislation, known as the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA), both Shah and Gul face life imprisonment. It’s for this reason Sanjay Kapoor, head of the Editors Guild of India, accused the government of “stifling” democracy in Kashmir, and for painting journalists as the “enemy of the state.”

Meanwhile, Hindu nationalist leaders who publicly call for a genocide against Muslims and other religious minorities are ignored by security forces and the Indian government. The double standard and motive of the Modi government could not be more obvious.

It must also be noted here that this anti-democratic campaign to intimidate and silence journalists in Kashmir is taking place alongside continued government-controlled communications blackouts and curfews. The Modi government is desperate to deny the international community evidence of its human rights violations in the disputed territory, which have become measurably worse since 2019, the year India revoked Kashmir’s semi-autonomous status, as illustrated in an upward spike in extrajudicial killings.

“Indian authorities appear determined to prevent journalists from doing their jobs,” says Steven Butler, Asia programme coordinator of the U.S.-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), which partly explains why India has seen its democracy downgraded by 53^rd position on the most recent Democracy Index published by The Economist Intelligence Unit, while falling to 142^nd position out of 180 countries in the 2021 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders.

The Sweden-based V-Dem Institute went even further in its latest report on global democracy in describing India an “electoral autocracy,” and accusing the Modi government of “diminishing freedom of expression, media and civil society” to a point where it’s “as autocratic as Pakistan and worse than its neighbours Bangladesh and Nepal.”

Any number of Indian news media watchers have observed how the country’s mainstream media has essentially functioned as the public relations arm of Modi and BJP, leading many to mock influential television news channels as the “Godi Media,” a pejorative Hindi term that accuses journalists and editors of performing as lapdogs for the Hindu nationalist agenda.

“Perhaps the best example of how journalists have become accustomed to not challenging the government is the fact that Modi failed to hold a single press conference in his first term in office,” says iconic Indian editor and journalist Vir Sanghvi, who also observes how access to the Modi government has become conditional on the journalist’s ideology.

Clearly, the Indian government’s war on the free press and democracy hasn’t gone unnoticed.

The question is what will New Delhi’s democratic allies do about it?

For India’s religious minorities, 2021 has been described a “year of fear” and “annus horribilis,” after the country experienced an unprecedented level of communal violence, but what makes the previous year stand out from others during the Narendra Modi era is the way in which Christians have come under increasing pressure and attack.

While attacks against Muslims have become the norm since 2014, with Hindu nationalist leaders and hate preachers openly urging genocide, as mobs belonging to fringe Hindu organizations, such as Bajrang Dal, hunt and lynch Muslims in the streets – the country’s 25 million Christians had, until now, been spared the worse of what has become a government backed effort to transform India into a Hindu-only nation.

These radicals have deliberately engineered a “hate storm,” and it’s without coincidence that a wave of attacks were carried out against Christians days after Hindutva hate preachers at the Dharma Sansad (Hindu convention) in mid-December vowed to “kill and die” for a Hindu nation, and “be ready to kill and go to jail,” while others urged Indian security forces to mimic the Myanmar military’s crackdown against Rohingya Muslims.

The final month of 2021 saw a spike in violence against Christians and their places of worship, including attacks on churches in Karnataka, a Christian school in Madhya Pradesh, a Jesus statue in Haryana and the disruption of Christian celebrations in Assam and Uttar Pradesh, with Christmas Day witnessing more than a half-dozen hate crime incidents alone.

A total of 486 incidents of violence against Christians in India were recorded in 2021, representing a 75 percent increase on the previous year, with 104 of these attacks occurring in the final two months of the year, according to the United Christian Forum, which called 2021 the “most violent year for Christians in India since 2014.”

While Persecution Relief, a non-profit that tracks violence against Christians, has documented a steady rise in attacks against the religious minority since Modi came to power, climbing 60 percent from 2016 to 2019.

The upward spike during the past year has come largely on the back of Hindu nationalist groups falsely accusing Christians of using Christmas celebrations as a front to lure Hindus into the Christian faith, and then forcibly convert them. The regional general secretary of Hindutva outfit Bajrang Dal in Uttar Pradesh told members, “They [Christians] lure [Hindu] children by making Santa Claus distribute gifts to them and attract them towards Christianity.”

Tejasvi Surya, a BJP member of parliament and card carrying member of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), stated demands for Christians to be “brought back” into the Hindu fold, perpetuating the myth India’s religious minorities were duped or forcibly pulled away from the Hindu faith, which signals the government’s support to those who commit violence against Christians and Muslims under the pretence of forced conversions.

In fact, India’s ruling party – Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) – says its working on a “strong law” to combat religious conversion in several states, including Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh, while promising prison sentences of up to 10 years for those found guilty of converting others by “force” or “fraudulent methods,” despite there been zero evidence Hindus are being lured or forced against their will into Christianity or Islam, which is why critics have described these proposed laws as the “Nazification of India’s laws.”

Christian leaders fear these bills will further embolden Hindu nationalist groups and individuals to further target the community, with Peter Machado, Archbishop of Bangalore, telling BBC Hindi, “Once the bill is passed, we will have to wait for more persecution and more difficulties.”

These proposed anti-conversion bills draw their inspiration from the passing of a so-called “anti-Love Jihad” law in BJP-ruled Uttar Pradesh last year, after an online conspiracy alleged Muslim men are tricking Hindu women into marriage with the aim of converting them to Islam. The state’s Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath threatening death to those who lure Hindu women, saying “I warn those who conceal identity and play with our sisters’ respect. If you don’t mend your ways your ‘Ram naam satya’ (a chant associated with Hindu funerals) journey will begin.”

Notably, the Modi government has not only refused to condemn calls for genocide and violent attacks against religious minorities, but also has signalled its support for anti-Christian attitudes in recently blocking Missions for Charity, a Catholic-based charity associated with human rights icon and Nobel laureate recipient Mother Teresa, from receiving international dominations in response to allegations it is forcibly converting Hindus to Catholicism, therefore cutting off a major source of funding for desperately impoverished and disabled Indians.

But nobody should be surprised by this unjustified and callous cruelty, given there’s zero daylight between Modi’s BJP and Hindu nationalist organizations, as noted by a former RSS member who said exactly that, proclaiming, “There is no difference between the BJP and RSS. BJP is the body. RSS is the soul, and the Bajrang Dal is the hands for beating.”

This escalating attacks against Christians by Hindu nationalist supporters in the streets and accompanying support by BJP in the country’s legislatures are taking place inside an ecosystem of hate and a culture of impunity. In the minds of Hindu nationalists, the logic becomes self-evident – if authorities have done nothing to halt anti-Muslim violence, then why not also target Christians?

The objective is clear, according to political scientist Zoya Hasan, who says isolating and demonizing minorities is part of the “plan” to consolidate Hindu supremacism and establish a Hindu state. “It is well thought out and purposeful,” he says.

More concerning still is the way in which the country’s institutions, particularly the police and courts, have been corrupted by Hindu nationalist sensibilities, which is why human rights groups have witnessed an institutional siding with Hindu perpetrators over non- Hindu victims of violence, leaving religious minorities nowhere to turn.

In other words, violent Hindu extremists have been given a “free run” to attack religious minorities whenever and wherever they find them, which is why experts are warning Christians and Muslims find themselves on the brink of genocide in Modi’s India.

As COVID19 was declared a global pandemic and started to impact public health systems, many countries rushed to close their borders to foreign visitors to stem the spread of the coronavirus. Japan, however, went one step further than most, banning not only foreign visitors, but even foreign residents from re-entering the country.

For example, foreign nationals who had lived twenty years in Japan who went abroad to visit family (or who happened to be abroad when the new measures went into effect) were prohibited from returning, in many cases losing their jobs and their homes. Even spouses of Japanese nationals were unable to return to Japan. At the same time, Japanese nationals who may have lived abroad for twenty years could swan into the country without any serious restrictions. The situation would have been almost comical, had it not been overtly discriminatory. However, there was barely a peep of protest within the country.

Measures targeting foreign national residents were finally rescinded in September 2020, after many diplomatic protests. However, foreigners who had not yet taken up residency were still barred, meaning, for example, highly qualified students and workers waiting to come to Japan continued to be left in limbo. Not surprisingly, many simply gave up, and went to other, more welcoming countries. Restrictions were finally eased for “exceptional cases” in November 2021, but new arrivals still had to fulfill excessive requirements that were clearly designed to make sure people could not take advantage of the new “exceptions” in practice.

For example, from November 2021, fully vaccinated foreigners could come to Japan for business purposes – only for business purposes – self-isolating “exceptionally” for three days instead of the usual fourteen. However, this was only if their business partner agreed to meet them at the airport, ensured they did not use public transport for the full fourteen days, and submitted beforehand a detailed plan of the visitor’s movements covering the entire two-week period. Approval by the government for all of this could take up to a month. People who were not partnering with a large institution that could handle these administrative demands were simply out of luck.

Even the normally diplomatic WHO was forced to make sarcastic remarks about Japan’s measures, pointing out that viruses do not read passports or choose their victims according to where they have legal residency.

In any case, as the Omicron variant emerged, after only three weeks all of these “exceptions” were frozen, and foreign visitors (though not residents this time) have once again been banned. Even the normally diplomatic WHO was forced to make sarcastic remarks about Japan’s measures, pointing out at a press conference that viruses do not read passports or choose their victims according to where they have legal residency. However, according to one poll, the measures are supported by 89 percent of the population.

Sakoku: The closing of the country

Of course, Japan is hardly unique in taking extreme measures against COVID19. However, the current situation must be viewed within the context of the xenophobia that is arguably fundamental to the Japanese psyche.

Selected foreign advisors were welcomed for their expertise, but only if their reforms did not challenge the fundamental power structures of Japanese society. The elite ran a tight ship in steering the process, and would tap the brakes whenever they felt things had gone too far.

Therefore, the general underlying attitude of both the sakoku era and the modernization period was basically constant: foreign matter (people, influences, ideas, etc.) was inherently suspect. It was to be allowed into Japan only to the extent it would be clearly advantageous for the country; otherwise, it must be shut out.

The bubble economy and ongoing “sakoku”

All of a sudden, Japan was number one, and no longer had anything to learn from the West – or from anyone.

Whether that was the right approach at the time is debatable, but at least there was willingness to learn from other countries and regions. This changed in the 1980s, with the “bubble” economy. Exporters poured profits into real estate and stock speculation, and a strong yen allowed Japanese to travel and indulge in luxuries only dreamt of before.

All of a sudden, Japan was number one, and no longer had anything to learn from the West – or from anyone. There was no need to import foreign ideas, and certainly not foreigners themselves, except for the undocumented laborers and foreign “interns” who worked (and still work) as virtual slaves.

The bubble burst in 1991, ushering in a period of economic decline that continues to this day. Japan has been overcome in economic size by China, and – a fact not widely reported in Japan, presumably because the reality is too humiliating to face – by Korea in terms of average income. The Japanese elite remain frozen, incapable of pushing forward any meaningful reform.

Extremely rigid hiring practices have resulted in a massive increase in persons in precarious employment (currently 40 percent of the workforce). Academia is ineffectual, with Japan’s internationally low-ranking universities incapable of producing free-thinking, innovative graduates. The level of English ability and of public interest in international affairs and in foreign countries, in general, is plummeting.

Academia is ineffectual, with Japan’s internationally low-ranking universities incapable of producing free-thinking, innovative graduates.

Finding fertile soil, bullish, aggressive nationalism has been on the rise. Since at least the early 2000s, Japanese popular culture (books, magazines, television, internet, etc.) has been inundated with output of the “Japan is amazing!” genre. The genre is dedicated to presenting Japan as (still) economically and socially superior to the rest of the world and arguing that pessimism is unwarranted. Many of those books and programs are downright delusional, relying on “racial superiority” type claims of the inherently moral character of the Japanese people.

In recent years, these media outputs have been taking a more sinister turn, focusing on criticisms (justified and otherwise) of China and Korea in a transparent attempt at elevating Japan in contrast. Left-leaning media and human rights organizations are also targeted for abuse, and branded as “anti-Japanese” – a situation strikingly similar to the wartime years.

During his reign as prime minister from 2012 to 2020, Shinzo Abe did his utmost to fan these nationalistic flames: refusing to accept responsibility for Japan’s wartime atrocities, promoting militarism, and attempting to have schoolchildren marked on the level of their patriotism, to name but a few. The successive two prime ministers have been less overt, but the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), from which they all come, is full of extremists with similar views. And the populace, fed a near constant diet of nationalistic propaganda, is as compliant – perhaps even willing – as can be.

In many ways, Japan seems to be reverting to a “sakoku” state: insular, inward-looking, and ever more xenophobic. Completely closing the borders like in the 17th century is of course not feasible, but the “sakoku” mental state is much more insidious. Japan may be incapable of overcoming this malaise, meaning even further decline.

Almost immediately after the announcement had been made that a new variant of COVID19 – Omicron, as it was later named by the World Health Organization – had been identified, wealthy northern nations rushed to impose travel bans on a number of southern African countries and, later on other African nations as well.

In some very undiplomatic language from African governments, the move was labelled racist, hypocritical, unsupported by science, “travel apartheid” and even “swart gevaar” – particularly because these same northern states did not impose similar bans on each other, despite their infection rates being hugely higher than in southern Africa. The opprobrium was subsequently also extended to countries of the global South that also imposed travel restrictions on southern African states.

It is difficult to believe that the quick actions of the governments imposing the restrictions were not racist; it is even more difficult to believe now it is known that many of these countries already had cases of the Omicron variant before it had been identified in Botswana and South Africa, and seemingly without any spread from southern Africa.

The drama around these travel restrictions began when, on November 23, scientists from Botswana uploaded three Sars-CoV-2 genome sequences to a public database that looked different from the other 96 uploaded that day, which were of the Delta variant. The database had been receiving regular uploading of such sequences since March 2020. On the same day, a South African team uploaded seven genomes that were almost identical. Scientists around the world began discussing the new variant and, within three days, the WHO had named it Omicron.

The teams from the two southern African countries alerted the world because of the need for rapid responses to COVID19 and its various variants, despite the fact that they understood the risks, as indicated by a tweet from a member of the South African genomics team, Tulio de Oliveira. Announcing the variant, he added that the world should support these efforts by South Africa “and not discriminate or isolate it! By protecting and supporting it, we will protect the world!”

Nevertheless, by November 24, dozens of countries imposed travel restrictions not just on South Africa and Botswana where Omicron had been detected, but also on other southern African countries with no confirmed cases: eSwatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Angola and Zambia were subsequently added on, and, later Nigeria and Egypt.

This did not prevent Omicron being referred by western media as the “South African variant” or “the virus from Africa”. A Spanish publication, Tribuna Albacete, published a cartoon of a boat with the South African flag named Omicron filled with caricatured Africans shaped as viruses, approaching Europe, thus combining its racism, xenophobia and hatred of refugees into one image.

Some of this racism was reminiscent of the outbreak of HIV in Africa. In 2001, the head of USAID opposed funding ARVs for Africans, suggesting we would not be able to maintain a disciplined treatment regime because we did not “know what watches and clocks are”.

Many African leaders – especially in southern Africa – have responded with (in some cases uncharacteristic) anger. South Africa’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa, and foreign minister, Naledi Pandor, were, perhaps, most forthright on the issue. Ramaphosa, during a recent tour of West Africa, called the travel restrictions “harsh”, “unfair” “arbitrary and discriminatory”, “unscientific” and “counter-productive”, and suggested that the leaders of Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire agreed with him. He also evoked the colonisation of Africa to make his point.

“[The world] says, ‘No, we know what is good for you, we just want you to do fill-and-finish [of vaccine doses], that’s it,” Ramaphosa said at the opening of the Dakar International Forum on Peace and Security. “We say, ‘We no longer want that. You did that long ago when you colonised us, and when you raped and pillaged our countries’. We say ‘no’ now, we have the capability [to manufacture vaccines] and we want to make full use of it.” Africa, he said, wanted to do business with the West on a respectful basis, but “maybe that is why we were colonized, because we respect too much, and [now] we say, ‘Respect us as well.’”

The South African president said he agreed with UN secretary-general Antonio Guterres that the travel restrictions were “travel apartheid.”

The South African president said he agreed with UN secretary-general Antonio Guterres that the travel restrictions were “travel apartheid”, and drew attention to a term previously used by South Africa’s apartheid government: “Swart Gevaar” – Black danger/threat. “It is an Afrikaans language term used by our former oppressors to scare the white population about the perceived threat of black majority rule, and to keep themselves in power.”

His criticism was not limited to northern states; he accused certain African states of behaving “like our former colonizers”. He was referring to Rwanda, Mauritius, Seychelles and Egypt, which followed the European example and also imposed travel restrictions on southern Africa.

On 4 December, the U.K. added Nigeria to its “red list”, followed by other states. The Nigerian health minister responded with similar language to Ramaphosa, and Nigeria’s aviation minister, Hadi Sirika, announced on 12 December that he planned, in retaliation, to ban flights from Argentina, Britain, Canada and Saudi Arabia.

For Africans in general, and southern Africans in particular, there is no question that the response of northern states to the detection of the Omicron variant is racist, with no concern by, especially Europeans, for the destruction of African economies and livelihoods. Suddenly, overnight, many middle- and upper-class Africans discovered the cold, unwelcoming reception, and lack of concern for African lives, that poorer Africans had discovered for decades in their attempts to migrate to Europe.

The elections held in Germany on September 26, 2021, produced interesting results. The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) increased its votes by 1.8% to become the first party after nearly 23 years, while Chancellor Angela Merkel‘s Christian democratic alliance of two political parties – the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU) – lost 7.7% of votes with Armin Laschet and came in second position.

No party could get enough votes to form a single party government. Compared with the 2017 elections, the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) received only 10.3%, a drop of 2.3% compared to 2017. Another significant change was the withdrawal from political life of Angela Merkel who had been Germany’s chancellor uninterruptedly since 2005.

Angela Merkel: “We can do this”

Chancellor Merkel led not only Germany but Europe as a whole in the fight against the Euro crisis, the so-called immigration crisis, Brexit, and COVID-19. In particular, her slogan “We can do this” (Wir schaffen das), which she put forward on August 31, 2015 during the European “migrant crisis”, was later used in many other crises.

This concept, also known as “welcoming culture” (Willkommenskultur), became a concept that presented Germany’s positive attitude towards immigrants, especially in the eyes of politicians and public institutions. However, politics in Germany did not evolve as optimistically as the slogan would have one believe: the AfD, a new political party, used Merkel’s slogan against her to rise in politics.

The rapid rise and fall of the AfD

The AfD was established in 2013 with anti-Muslim and anti-immigration policies and increased in popularity rapidly. In 2015, intense immigration to Europe from Middle Eastern countries, primarily Syria, and Germany’s reception of approximately 1.2 million immigrants in 2015 and 2016, caused the AfD to find quick social support and to rise in the 2017 elections. This rise started to decline before reaching high levels.

Given the legacy of WW II, it was unknown whether support for the AfD, Germany’s first far-right party in recent times, would continue given the fact that violations of Muslims’ rights and attacks against Muslims, Islamic organizations, and foreigners have been increasing across the country. The AfD had received 4.7% of the votes in 2013, and it turned the 2015 immigration crisis into an opportunity and received 12.6% of the votes in the 2017 federal elections.

Elections in Germany and the far right

The most important factor in the drop in AfD votes is that the party lost credibility by not making specific policy recommendations for the problems that Germany is facing.

First of all, although the vast majority of Muslims in Germany are peaceful and tolerant, the AfD has created hostile rhetoric about Islam. It incites fear, classifies people, and pits groups against each other, especially during elections. The AfD conflates the concepts of Islam, immigration, and terrorism. On the other hand, COVID-19 underlined the codependency and interconnectedness of all segments of German society.

Although the vast majority of Muslims in Germany are peaceful and tolerant, the AfD has created hostile rhetoric about Islam.

The AfD claimed that internal security deteriorated due to the increasing number of foreigners and Muslims in Germany. However, the police crime statistics, which have been recorded since 1993, demonstrate the crime rates have been constantly decreasing.

The AfD’s asylum policy consists of harsh political demands and provocative slogans: they want to close the borders, exercise deportation, and cut off social support. Even the right of asylum provided by international law means nothing to them. The party wants to abolish individual protection and asylum guarantees. However, statistics reveal that Germany needs more foreign labor every year. If the AfD’s policy propositions had, in fact, been realized, there would have been serious problems in the labor supply in Germany as was the case in the U.K.

Elections and Germany’s domestic politics: immigration and Islamophobia

Although public support for the AfD has declined, having received 10.3% or 4,803,902 votes in a country with a high population like Germany suggests that it still has many supporters across German society. The AfD’s active use of digital platforms and social media is enhancing its popularity, especially among the youth. The AfD is the vanguard party for young people under 30. While 19% of voters under 30 voted for the AfD, 18% preferred the CDU.

The AfD is followed by the Green Party with 13% of the votes. This figure shows that the middle-aged and elderly population prefer the traditional parties; however, this points to a danger lurking in  Germany’s future. On the one hand, cases of violence related to discrimination and xenophobia are increasing in society, and on the other hand, votes for the far-right AfD are decreasing.

This may seem like a contradiction, but it shows that people with far-right ideas resort to violence more than in the past. Research has shown that 38% of AfD voters are strictly populist and 35% are partially populist. The majority (56%) of AfD voters seem to have embraced far-right views: 27% are potentially far-right advocates while 29% explicitly adhere to far-right ideology.

The September 2021 elections in Germany show that hopefully for at least four years, Muslims and foreigners will not face extra legal restrictions as the new German government is not expected to step up the abuses of the rights of Muslims or foreigners. The so-called Traffic Light Coalition (Ampelkoalition) consisting of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, the Free Democratic Party, and the Greens declared a coalition agreement that promised granting some rights to immigrants.

For instance, children who were born in Germany will receive German citizenship immediately at birth if one of the parents has lived in Germany for at least five years. Another important promise for immigrants is that they can become dual citizens. The conditions for acquiring German citizenship after five years of residing in the country could be made easier in Germany.

In other words, there is a room for hope. However, the AfD still poses a threat to Germany’s future. Time will tell whether the AfD will opt for further radicalizing its voter base and try to make them more aggressive towards Muslims and foreigners in an effort to gloss over its election loss.

Azeem Rafiq is a 30-year-old former professional British-Pakistani cricketer who played for Yorkshire for the majority of his career. He captained England at the youth level before becoming Yorkshire captain in 2012. In a September 2020 interview with ESPN Cricinfo, he claimed that “institutional racism” at Yorkshire County Cricket Club had driven him to suicidal ideation. During his time at the club, Rafiq states he was subjected to constant abuse, including the use of racist language about his Pakistani heritage.

He addressed UK parliamentarians about his requests for Yorkshire County Cricket Club (YCCC) to take disciplinary action after an inquiry revealed he had been exposed to racial harassment and bullying. Rafiq spoke before a parliamentary Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) hearing on Tuesday 16, 2021, following a tumultuous month that saw many charges of racism levelled against former YCCC players. Senior Yorkshire administrators are also expected to testify. He said: “All I wanted to do was play cricket. Towards the end of my first spell but constantly throughout I knew there was something wrong. I started taking medication for my mental health. It was really tough.”

Rafiq‘s experience

A 57-page witness testimony, published by the DCMS select committee as part of Rafiq’s submission to an employment tribunal, went into excruciating detail about Rafiq’s experiences, which included hearing racist remarks from several other former Yorkshire and England players, including Matthew Hoggard, as well as sustained abuse and bullying from Ballance and former Yorkshire coach and captain Andrew Gale.

In his testimony he stated, “throughout my time at YCCC, I experienced racism, discrimination, and bullying, which I believe was because of my Pakistani ethnic origins. This made me feel unwelcome and that I wasn’t a valued cricketer or member of the club. It undermined my confidence and ultimately my performance, and drove me to depression and suicidal thoughts”.

He also stated that a former Yorkshire player Gary Ballance used the name “Kevin” as a disparaging term to refer to Black and Asian players and he later understood that another England player named his dog Kevin as it was a black dog.

Reactions from the British Asian community

Azeem Rafiq’s statement about the prejudice he faced as a cricket player has sparked outrage within the British Asian community, not only in Yorkshire but across the country. The alarming charges that players of color were referred to as “Kevin” and used terms like the “P-word,” “elephant washers,” and othering them as “you bunch” were widespread and have shined a bright light on the sport’s profound systemic racism.

Azeem’s testimony, as a result, has shown a wide support from ethnic minority communities across the UK on the importance of speaking out against systemic racism. Many have felt that they wouldn’t have been supported and that it would have been swept under the rug, which is why he feels that it is “important that we don’t let this moment go”.

Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro is facing mass demonstrations across the country calling for him to step down, in the context of the government’s mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic and growing allegations of corruption. “Bolsonaro has a knack for creating enemies out of his supporters,” Prof Anthony Pereira was quoted as saying recently, in the context of demonstrations in Brazil against the government’s mishandling of the coronavirus pandemic.

But will the protests be enough to bring Bolsonaro down, especially when the rift between the left wing and the right wing in Brazil remains so pronounced? COVID19 mismanagement might create a common ground, but only within the pandemic context as, behind the scenes, Bolsonaro and his supporters have benefited from his right-wing, neoliberal agenda.

Brazil has the highest COVID19 death toll in Latin America and the second highest globally, exacerbated by an absence of planning and complete disregard for the country’s collapsed healthcare system. It is not merely the inequalities inherent in Brazilian society which have influenced the collapse, but the government’s refusal to consider any measures other than a strategy to achieve herd immunity through infection, under the pretext of curbing people’s freedoms. While Europe is waking up to the complexities of curbed freedom of movement despite available vaccines due to countries pursuing different policies, in Brazil the people are facing a totally different scenario.

Brazil’s former health minister Luis Henrique Mandetta was fired by Bolsonaro after challenging his unscientific approach to the pandemic. With Bolsonaro disregarding health professionals’ advice, and playing a dangerous game regarding the availability of vaccines, which have reduced the death toll especially in the case of the elderly and the vulnerable, Brazilians are concerned about their wellbeing and the government’s refusal to provide for their health.

In March, Brazil sent a delegation to Israel to view the process of an experimental medication being developed for COVID19, with an adviser to Bolsonaro stating the visit would “yield partnerships that will make a difference in combating the health crisis and in the resumption of the Brazilian economy.” By May, Brazil was seeking deals to acquire surplus doses of the Astra Zeneca vaccine from the U.S. and U.K.

Brazilians are concerned about their wellbeing and the government’s refusal to provide for their health.

Since August 2020, Brazil engaged diplomatically with Russia to obtain the Sputnik V vaccine, which was later suspended by the country’s national health service, Anvisa, on account of alleged “lack of consistent and reliable data,” despite favorable reviews in the leading health journal, The Lancet. Reuters has recently reported the definite cancellation of a contract with Russia for 10 million doses of the Sputnik V vaccine.

However, the coronavirus pandemic has forced a different sort of reckoning among Brazilians, although the process may be temporary until an outcome is achieved. Bolsonaro’s mishandling of the pandemic happened amid growing accusations of corruption. A poll in July revealed that 54 percent of Brazilians would support the impeachment of Bolsonaro, while 51 percent disapproved of him, indicating growing resentment since his tenure started in 2019.

The statistics reflect a possible turning to the left, which is not impossible especially with the return of former president Lula da Silva to the political scene. Polls indicate a probable win for Lula in the forthcoming presidential elections. and Bolsonaro has already accused the Supreme Court of favoring his opponent.

Given the rise of the left in Latin America – Chile is the most prevalent example at the moment of the right wing’s spectacular fall – Bolsonaro is guaranteed U.S. support for the time being. In July, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director William Burns met with Bolsonaro to discuss the political situation in Latin America, and the Brazilian leader specifically mentioned Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile and Argentina in comments discussing the visit.

COVID19 might trigger more widespread displeasure among Brazilians, but the military, as well as Bolsonaro’s neoliberal policies favoring privatization are also a force to be reckoned with. For a definite shift to occur, the left will have to continue leading the mobilization struggle in Brazil, which would then encourage the already occurring decrease in support for Bolsonaro, who has exploited the masses for the interests of the privileged.

But there are indications that, across Brazil, a more profound reckoning might be happening. Just as in Chile, the rise in transport fares triggered a vast outcry against right-wing President Sebastian Pinera, resulting in drastic losses for the right-wing and the rewriting of a new constitution to replace that of former dictator Augusto Pinochet, Brazilians may want to reconnect politically with their past.

The burning down of the statue of Borba Gato by a group of demonstrators recently; a memorial which represents the colonial violence which ravaged Brazil’s indigenous people, is a case in point. The action was intended to ignite debate about Brazil’s past and the glorification of the colonizers, but the action itself was powerful enough to steer political thought towards opposing Bolsonaro’s dictatorship nostalgia.

Brazil lags behind in terms of dictatorship memory and justice, and despite not having the highest death toll when it comes to dictatorship victims, 50,000 people were imprisoned and 10,000 forced into exile. Bolsonaro’s government abused the democratic mandate to recreate dictatorship oppression. COVID19 may well be the moment for political change in Brazil, yet the pandemic must not obscure the reasons behind the Brazilian people’s dissent.

God is dead, said Nietzsche long ago. Since then the phrase has been interpreted in many different ways. One is an observation of the collapse of order, the dissolution of hierarchies of power between leaders and followers, teachers and students, parents and children, employers and employees, men and women, news producers and newsreaders—An exponential surge in student protests, and social media interactions of once-newsreaders-now-turned-news-producers, among others, substantiates the argument.

Some call this state of affairs the chaos of postmodernism, an era dominated by a loss of trust in authority, a questioning of power, followed by the belief that with no order, no right and wrong, that every value is necessarily right, every concern as equal as any other; others identify it as the phenomenon of moral and cultural relativism. But dissidents react by saying, ‘Stop! We have to draw the line somewhere! There must be standards!’

The ingenuity of Nietzsche’s statement lies in its prescience. Made at the turn of the twentieth century, it foretells the news headlines we are now privy to, more than one hundred years later. Through the mouthpiece of Zarathustra, Nietzsche warned posterity about the imminent danger of a world that found no merit in hierarchies and dividing lines. Through Zarathustra, Nietzsche reproduced the trope of the quintessential madman in literature. Thus Spake Zarathustra is the story of an unpopular prophet, castigated and excoriated for his cryptic statements, who broaches matters we now know were ahead of his time.

Nietzsche foresaw the eradication of order, systems, and hierarchies as a preliminary to nihilism; a negation of the individual rather than a longed-for affirmation of the self, which has ironically dominated the political forefront of countries with liberalist agendas. Such an agenda has sought to celebrate individualism, exalt every trait and concern of the individual, in order to allow him/her to grow to be healthy, wholesome, unique. Rather than that, these steps in the direction of caring for individualism, of pushing the liberalist agenda forward by recognizing every trait (and hence creating labels for everything) is fostering a culture of hypersensitivity, drowning the individual in a bucket of labels so that he/she is beginning to matter less and less.

African-Americans feel their identity to be threatened, especially by their White, American counterparts.

These labels do not manifest the ‘Who am I?’, but instead emphasize ‘What am I sensitive about?’ (Interestingly, and quite tellingly, as an indication of how labels are also relative, in Western and Central Europe this aspect of the liberalist agenda that exalts the individual is embraced by right-wing economic liberals and heavily criticized by left-wing radicals, whereas in the US it is resonant with what is seen as the progressive left.)

The growing trend of associating the label of ‘Ethnocide’ on the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement in the United States has encouraged people from other cultures to wonder whether they are victims of the same phenomenon. Ethnocide it must be recalled, is the practice of destroying the soul of a people, as opposed to genocide which aims at decimating a whole genus or race. Ethnocide is the cultural assimilation of a non-dominant group by a dominant one, and the BLM movement has waved this card because African-Americans feel their identity to be threatened, especially by their White, American counterparts.

Yet, the distinction between pain and trauma slowly disintegrated. About twenty years ago, ‘trauma’ began to include experiences that were both physical and emotional, roping in a subjective element to is determination.  The label of ‘trauma’, or for that matter, ‘PTSD’ is now widely used, furthering the culture of ‘antifragility’, ‘safetysim’, or hypersensitivity that are weakening us.

One point must be stressed upon at the outset: the United States has for a long time been the ‘trend-setter’; the originator of most labels that have in no time, gained currency in other parts of the world. Raphael Lemkin for instance, knew that he had to come to the United States for his cause to gain legitimacy; for the label of ‘genocide’ to be recognized as a punishable crime.

Naturally if this country is where labels usually originate, there is a lot to say about how this process can and has gone wrong, for one of the insights one gains in a thorough study of anything, is that no system, no phenomenon, no process can be perfect.

So for example, the sensitivity we have developed to every remotely negative experience/reaction/feeling to external stimulus (of whatever form), and following that, our decision of affixing ourselves with an associative label (among the myriad of those to choose from) has made labelling—or self-labelling for that matter—rather effortless. Many of us now feel that in respecting the sensitivities of the other (to avoid the other from being ‘triggered’), we’re constantly having to walk on eggshells.

These practices of self-censure place barriers on communication, on the freedom of expressing ourselves, and while some groups may feel liberated by being given the chance to speak up, others feel threatened to express themselves in case their speech, or any part of it should encroach upon the sensitivities of an interlocutor.

The result: a constant atmosphere of tension and apprehension in which no speaker is at ease, and where one must necessarily begin with a barrage of disclaimers. (In the past few months, it has now become a requirement on several websites accepting submissions for novels, short stories, and other art work, to insert one or more disclaimers in case content may hurt the sensitivities of the reviewer/s).

Overall, a feeling of malaise seems to have crept in, especially (and ironically) in forums that are meant to foster creative thought and writing, and in the context of free speech, one of the pinnacles of liberalist constitutions, young writers, as validated by Sir Kazuo Ishiguro, seem to be intimidated and silenced.

It is justifiable that certain words should be used carefully, because of their meaning and purport, and the reactions they may stir up in marginalized groups suffering centuries of torture, oppression, and abuse, but the matter is quite another when one has to question whether it is legitimate for a writer from a dominant group to create characters in his/her novel who hail from a non-dominant one.

Questionable when one can no longer feel free to express a violent experience one has endured because it may expose a reader/listener/viewer to violence. If we don’t arm ourselves with our interior defences, or to put it a different way, develop and strengthen our immunity against external attacks, even the slightest, then all these labels, these shields, or the sources of distress they denote, would drown us, weaken us, and expose us to harsher threats later in life.

In the space of a mere three decades hateful and divisive Hindu nationalist slogans have propelled Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) from a fringe political party to a national party to India’s ruling party, a result that has inflicted great harm on the country’s democratic institutions, bilateral relationships, global reputation and religious minorities.

It’s easy to forget today but BJP won just two parliamentary seats in the 1984 election, emerging as a national political force only after whipping up anti-Muslim sentiments leading up to, during and after the destruction of the historic Babri Mosque in 1992 at the hands of 150,000 Hindu nationalists associated with BJP and Hindutva organization Vishva Hindu Parishad, an event that helped put the party into position to form a coalition government in 1998 and then ultimately unilateral power in 2014.

In the six years since Narendra Modi led the party to victory in the 2014 elections, the BJP ruled government has chipped away at the rights of Muslims and cracked down on its critics, including political opponents, journalists, and human rights activists, forcing Amnesty International to cease its operations in the country out of concern its employees were being threatened and intimidated by the government for publishing reports on the Delhi Police Force’s role in the February 2020 violence, which resulted in the murder of more than 50 Muslims, and the use of torture by its security forces in Kashmir.

It’s for these reasons India’s democracy was downgraded from “free” to “partly free” in the most recent Freedom House democracy report, which delivered a scathing indictment on the Modi government, accusing it of “driving India towards authoritarianism” and encouraging the “scapegoating of Muslims” and cracking down on critics.

Worryingly – the worst the economy performs, or the louder critics of the Modi government grow, the more BJP dials up the vilification of religious minorities to divert attention away from its failings or transgressions.

Notably, Freedom House wasn’t alone in its condemnation of the Modi government, with Sweden based V-Dem Institute also downgrading India’s democracy to what it calls “electoral autocracy.”

Worryingly – the worst the economy performs, or the louder critics of the Modi government grow, the more BJP dials up the vilification of religious minorities to divert attention away from its failings or transgressions.

When protesters joined hands across the country to oppose the government’s anti-Muslim citizenship laws, known separately as the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and National Register of Citizens (NRC), party leaders threatened to shoot, drown or deport Muslim migrants.

When the government mishandled the initial COVID19 outbreak, the government joined online miscreants in falsely accusing Muslims of deliberately spreading the virus, and when farmers from Punjab and Haryana linked arms and marched to the capital Delhi to protest against laws that pave the way for the corporate takeover of the agricultural sector, leaving their farms and communities vulnerable to exploitation and destruction, BJP leaders falsely accused them of being part of foreign funded Sikh separatist plot.

What has become increasingly evident in recent weeks is that Hindutva organizations have expanded their influence and reach throughout the Indian diaspora, as witnessed recently when a mob of right-wing Indian Australians ambushed and attacked a car carrying several Sikh men in Sydney earlier this month, presumably because they had participated in a solidarity march for the Indian farmers protest in Delhi.

“For the first time in Australia we are witnessing tensions within Indian community groups, with one group attacking another because they demanded justice from the Indian government,” Deepak Joshi, an executive with The Humanism Project, a secular Indian expatriate advisory group, told me.

“In the past year or so we have witnessed several instances of online hate and threats of violence against those who criticise the Modi Government and against Muslims in particular in Australia, but this hate has been particularly directed against the Sikhs and social media since the farmers movement began.” 

Hindutva organizations and individuals have also been calling for a boycott of Sikh and Muslim owned businesses, prompting an Australian parliamentarian to warn of a growing threat within the Indian expatriate community, specifically “extremist, right-wing Hindu nationalist part of the community.”

There are different societal undercurrents at play in the United States today. On the one hand, there is the ongoing Black Lives Matter movement, and on the other, the growing radicalism of white-supremacist groups, who recently invaded the U.S. Capitol on January 6. Nihan Duran interviewed Sundiata Cha-Jua, Associate Professor of History at the University of Illinois on how to understand the fault lines of American society and politics given the concurrently rising movements: BLM activism and the white-supremacism.

َQHow do you evaluate the recent Black Lives Matter protests in the U.S., following the global reactions to the killing of George Floyd on May 25, 2020? Have the Black struggles for justice and equality re-surfaced as a political force in the 21st century?

The COINTELPRO destruction of the radical stream of the Black Power movement in the late 1970s produced a prolonged period of relative quietude in the Black Liberation Movement (BLM). Around 2010, the movement began to resurge. Activists introduced several tactical innovations, such as the initiation of the #hastag for organizing in response to the killing and murder of Oscar Grant and Trayvon Martin. Cell phone footage of Grant’s killing, for example, went viral on the then four-year-old YouTube platform, as it was watched by 500,000 people in four days.

Q. What impact did such a reach-out have on the acceleration of the movement?

The national response to the murder of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin in 2012 accelerated the use of online petitions as an innovative movement organizing tactic. Martin’s murder also gave rise to #hashtag BlackLivesMatter, which has also made an impact as activists used another relatively new social media format, Twitter to mobilize protests. Consequently, new organizations sprung up and older groups were reenergized. New youth-led and oriented groups such as the Dream Defenders, the former Million Hoodies Movements (now Brighter Days for Justice), and the Black Youth Project (BYP-100) emerged.

Since Michael Brown’s death at the hands of Ferguson, MO police officer Darren Wilson in 2014, a new phase of struggle in the Black Liberation movement focused on police killing and criminal justice has swept the U.S. and, in the summer of 2020, surged beyond the borders of the U.S.

Q. You mentioned that there is a “shift in emphasis.” What does that “shift” indicate when the long tradition of Black liberation movements in the U.S. is considered.

#Black Lives Matter’s slogan “we are not your grandparent’s revolution” links it to a divisive strategy more reminiscent of the Yippies, “don’t trust anyone over 30,” than the intergenerational legacy of Black liberation movement organizing. That is not to deny Frantz Fanon’s observation that “each generation must discover its mission and either fulfill or betray it.”

The point is that older more experienced activists have always played a mentoring role in the Black Liberation movement. The cutting edge of the 1960s movements, specifically the organizations, strategic visions, and political analyses still relevant come from the nationalistic Black Power wave, not the liberal integrationist Civil Rights movement.

So, the infantile divisive generational politics are doubly irresponsible, because it erases the Black Power movement. M4BL has reversed that error. It has adopted the symbolism of the Black Power movement- the fist-and centered its programmatic initiatives on a five-year plan under the slogan “Black Power Rising 2024!”

Q. What does white people’s involvement in America in the BLM movement indicate?

The involvement of such a large number of Euro-Americans evidences the Black Liberation movement’s ability to convince a broad sector of the U.S. public that systemic racism accurately describes American society. However, white engagement would be better utilized if they built solidarity, created a constituency inside white communities and civic associations that practiced the politics of the Black Panther Party’s rainbow coalition. I am also quite mindful of A. Phillip Randolph’s 1940 admonishment that “where you get your money you also get your ideas and control. We need white ‘allies’ to organize support for Black self-determination, and a pro-labor, pro-socialist movement” in white neighborhoods and social spaces.

Q. Do you think that Black politics can find its way to move from merely a critical progressive to mainstream American politics?

Why not? Since the 1830s, the Black Liberation movement has demonstrated its ability to intrude into and shape U.S. politics. The Abolitionist movement, the Civil War, Reconstruction, and the Civil Rights and Black Power movement are examples of moments in which the Black Liberation movement seized the center stage and focused the eyes of the empire on us. C.L.R. James powerfully made this argument more than 70 years ago in the “Revolutionary Answer to the Negro Question” (1948).

Since the Ferguson Uprising and particularly this past summer, Black people reaffirmed their capacity to boldly reshape both social movement and electoral politics in the U.S. Perhaps, the best example of the power of the Black Liberation to remake U.S. politics is the rise of the African American reparations movement. Before the end of the 20th century, the Black reparations movement was virtually unknown to the U.S. public.

In the last six years, the African American reparations movement has gone from a fringe movement in U.S. politics to a strategy endorsed by all leading contenders for the 2020 Democratic Party nomination, though largely through some universal policy scheme. Nonetheless, there have now been two congressional hearings and several cities have passed reparations resolutions and few, notably Evanston, Illinois, and Asheville, North Carolina have enacted legislation.

Q. You mean that politically as well, the U.S. has come to acknowledge the persistent predicament of its Black people?

Definitely. Millions of people in 200 cities, domestic and abroad took to the streets to protest the police murder of Black men, women, and children. The Black Liberation movement has forced American society to admit the existence of systemic racism, which I prefer to call racial oppression and to “commit” to its elimination from U.S. institutional life in colleges and universities, corporations, and government agencies.

Q. Despite growing awareness, what is the possibility or limitations of a “post-racial” America? Especially today, when we witness the white-supremacist undercurrent getting more and more visible both on the social and political scenery.

Sorry but the “post-racial” idea is ridiculous and odious. It is rooted in a colorblind racial ideology that denies structural racial oppression. It insidiously contrasts the success of the meager Black elite to the assumed failures of the working-class Black majority. That the election of Barack Obama sparked the rise of right-wing social movements such as the Tea Party and that his administration was followed by Trumpist fascism that used racist appeals and policies to pursue the neoliberal agenda of tax cuts, deregulation, and privatization, all exposing that the postracial ideal is fallacious.

Q. What about the U.S. Capitol siege on January 6 then? What did make this possible? Was Donald Trump the chief responsible for this or only a symptom of undercurrents?

Ultimately, we can trace the rise of contemporary fascism that culminated in the January 6 assault of the U.S. Capitol building to the economic crisis caused by the transition to a financialized global racial capitalism, but it would be a grave error to underestimate the central role played by anti-Black racial oppression. The dislocations and alienation caused by the new structure of capital accumulation is the foundational cause but Donald Trump’s rhetoric, policy agenda, and explicit xenophobic and racist appeals mobilized white supremacists and nationalists. He recruited and weaponized them into an anti-democratic battering ram against egalitarian public policies.

Q. What to expect now, after the U.S. Capital Siege? How do you think this will impact the future of U.S. domestic politics?

The Trump regime rolled the rock back and unleashed fascist hordes who now control one of the two corporate parties. The fascists are here to stay. They are likely to elect dozens, if not scores of new congresspersons and continue to control more than a score of state governments.

A historic presidential election was held in the United States on November 3, 2020. The election campaigns, the topics discussed, and the bickering between the candidates for the presidency were considered by many unprecedented. Joe Biden won the race and has formed one of the most ethnically diverse administrations in United States’ history.

The U.S. 2020 presidential election was exceptional in many different ways. The new ways of casting votes due to COVID-19, the controversial statements by Donald Trump on the results of the election, and the recount of votes in critical states all made this election different. The Trump administration left its mark on U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy, also leaving behind the highest number of resignations in U.S. administrative history. His administration was also pre-dominantly white – like all administrations before him.

To erase the legacy of the Trump administration, Joe Biden has taken great care in relation to the ethnic diversity of his team. Many Republicans are dissatisfied with his choices. These reactions stem from the fact that to some extent the political opposition nurtures a white-supremacist discourse on the issue of the ethnic diversity of the new administration.

To overhaul the Trump legacy, President Biden pledged to make his cabinet one of the most diverse in the country’s history. It was U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris who first caught the attention of far-right groups. Harris is the daughter of an immigrant family and is of African American and South Asian descent, with a Jamaican father and an Indian mother. She is not only the first woman to be elected as vice president in the United States – she is also the first woman of color to hold this position.

Lloyd Austin, the U.S. defense secretary, became the first African American to be appointed to this position following Senate approval on January 22, 2021. The Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas, of Cuban heritage, has drawn attention as the first homeland secretary with a migrant background. His nomination was approved by the Senate with 56-43 votes.

Deb Haaland is expected to be appointed as the secretary of interior in the Biden cabinet. Haaland will be the first Native American to serve as secretary of interior.

Sameera Fazili is a Muslim face of the Biden administration. She has roots in Kashmir, India. Fazili’s parents immigrated to the United States and she served as a lawyer in her earlier career. She has been elected for the position of deputy director of the National Economic Council with a focus on manufacturing, innovation, and domestic competition. Fazili is an advocate of the rights of the Kashmiri people against Indian oppression.

Vice President Harris’s thoughts and plans to have more restrictions on far-right groups’ ownership of weapons make such groups feel worried. Upon taking office, Harris has been subjected to criticisms by far-right groups over regulations to be imposed on some arms manufacturers. The regulation will introduce new laws that restrict the use of weapons and impose a ban on automatic weapons.

Immigrants and ethnic groups constitute the majority of the U.S. population. Currently, people of more than 200 different ethnic origins live in the United States. U.S. citizens of migrant backgrounds and ethnic origins are in favor of the presence of persons deemed fit to represent them in the U.S. administration. The representation of citizens belonging to different ethnic groups is important to convey their voices in the higher echelons of power.

Biden’s decisions show that he wants to ensure ethnic diversity in the bureaucracy and attract small ethnic groups. He might also say he is targeting votes in the next election.

The Biden government states that despite protests, which started with the Capitol Hill riot by right-wing and white supremacist groups such as the Proud Boys and Three Percenters (who are now targeting his cabinet choices), it will preserve the diversity of its cabinet.

The “Let’s Rebuild America” slogan is at the heart of this policy of diversity. The Biden administration may open new doors for ethnically diverse people in the following years, including, among others, providing opportunities for immigrants to acquire U.S. citizenship. More importantly, these efforts are likely also to include combating the rise of white supremacism.

Islamophobia is on the rise everywhere in Europe, and politicians increasingly play with Islamophobic sentiments for political gains. Following the discernibly hostile rhetoric of French President Emmanuel Macron against the Muslim communities in France, Faruk Yaslicimen and Nihan Duran interviewed French sociologist Raphael Liogier, professor at Sciences Po Aix (Institut d’Études Politiques d’Aix-en-Provence) and visiting scholar at Colombia University, on the history and current state of Islamophobia in France.

Q. French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent rhetoric and acts targeting Muslims have aroused a lot of controversy not only in France but also in the global public. Where are we now with the eminent rise of Islamophobia?

Islamophobia emerged in the 20th century in Europe, but the very nature of this Islamophobia has changed over the last decade. It is not a change only in intensity, it is a change in the very nature of what Islamophobia is now. Today, we don’t have Islamophobia, but Islamo-paranoia in France.

Because when you are in a paranoid state, it is very different. You think there is a plot, you presume that there is an intention. The very presumption justifies the action. Because whatever the reaction could be of the Muslim community, we always think that they are constantly at war with us. That is the reason why it would be more accurate to call it Islamo-paranoia rather than Islamophobia.

Q. You talk extensively about the transformation from Islamophobia to Islamo-paranoia. Can you date this back to a certain sequence of events or time? When did it start and how did we get here?

It is a collective paranoia, which is borne out of a narcissistic wound. This means that you think you are losing something narcissistically, you are losing the image of yourself, the image you want to show to others, to the rest of the world.

It is very important for everybody, but it is even more important for Western Europeans because they are used to the idea of being at the center of the world, and this created some kind of a complex; again, I am using the psychological metaphor. And, anti-Islamism, which exists in some parts of the world is directly fed, even constructed, through this complex.

Europe was like the center of the world and what we see throughout the 20th and 21st centuries is the loss of this centrality. The first was the military loss at the beginning of the 20th century.

We [Europeans] lost centrality to the United States of America. But still, until 2003, we had something, we kept our symbolic preeminence, meaning that Europe was still supposed to be the land of human rights, or some kind of moral power.

But in 2003, something incredible happened. The U.S. decided to go to war with Iraq without European powers for the first time. They did not even ask them. And when they talked to them, they talked to them as if they were a colony, not a real ally.

That was the moment when there was some kind of a reversal in the European conscience in general, that created the feeling of being surrounded by enemies. And if you look at it precisely, you can see that all the political parties, which we call the new populist parties were either founded or developed this very year of 2003. All across Europe, these new political parties were anti-Muslim. They all have the same program.

Q. Can you give some examples of these?

The French Front National, for example. It already existed. But from 2003 onward, it changed its ideology completely. Before it was recognized more as an anti-Semite far-right party, but now it turned to an anti-Muslim party. What is more interesting is that this party had an anti-laicity stance before 2003, and after 2003, it became a guardian of laicity, completely the opposite. In the meantime, laicity changed its meaning.

Before 2003, laicity meant the freedom of expression in the public space. Well, laicity stands for that, right? It doesn’t stand to prevent people from expressing their religion; it is to allow people to express their beliefs and opinions.

That is the reason why we have the neutrality. Not at all the neutrality of people, but of the state. However, from 2003 onwards, we changed its interpretation. It was not only the neutrality of the state, but also the neutrality of people, which is very different.

So, we changed completely. In 2004, you can see the act of parliament to prevent the scarf, the simple scarf, in public schools in France. Similar acts reflect the picture all over Europe; and there is something strange with the laicity in France. It is becoming the object of our narcissistic anxiety.

The target is now Muslims. Why? Because Muslims have a peculiar definition in our minds: enemies of the Christian culture, and enemies of modernity and progress.

We are losing something, but we do not know what specifically we are losing and therefore, we need to find a target. And the target is Muslims. Why? Because Muslims have a peculiar definition in our minds: enemies of the Christian culture on the one hand, and enemies of modernity and progress on the other. Thus, you can mobilize masses, both from the right Christian conservative electorates and from the left progressivist electorates.

Q. This is where a deep sense of antagonism in the French society emerges, right?

This is related to the other argument that Muslims see themselves as Muslim first, hence, they value their citizenship less than their Muslim identity. Sometimes on the radio during prime-time shows or in widely read magazines, Muslims are depicted as people who think deep inside that they are Muslims first, and French second.

I remember I watched a film, where they go to a depo in a “secret” place. I myself went to this kind of place with my students and it is no secret. So, in the film, the camera is showing shadowy scenes and there are people with beards, face veils, and headscarves everywhere – quite a scene! And while we watch this on TV, a person in the film says, “If the French law prevents me from practicing my religion, I will not obey.”

Aha! A tremendous scandal against the French republic, and people who are watching immediately react “Look at that! It is awful. If a French law will prevent him from practicing his religion, he will not obey and therefore, he is betraying the republic,” or “He is against the republic.”

Religion is the most intimate thing in our lives, so I find it completely crazy to say “oh, they betray the country” just because they say they choose their faith over a political system. I think it is quite the opposite. And now we are coming to what is happening now.

If one day, the French state, the republic, enacts that people cannot practice their religion freely, and that I cannot practice my religion in the public space, I won’t have any problem with disobeying this law, because it means this state is not a republic anymore.

Due to our imagination of who a Muslim is supposed to be, we are “able” to create a sense of unity. So, we know against whom we can fight. This happened after 2003 in the very structure of the discourses we use.

We presume that Muslims have a plan for France. In such a paranoid state of mind, you’re allowed to do anything to protect yourself. You can react and be violent because whatever you do will always be less violent than what they plan behind closed doors.

Q. Do you think this is a strategic move for the upcoming election?

I know, because I know Macron’s advisors and I talk to them. I examined his program in detail before he was elected. And it was almost symmetrically the opposite of what he is doing now. He just believes in the economy. And I think he wanted sincerely to change the economy in France step by step. And suddenly an identity crisis has popped up on his way.

Following the terrorist attack in Paris in October 2019, he changed his discourse, because he knows well that waging a tight war against terrorism can give him the chance to unite larger numbers of people behind him.

At first, he did not pay attention to mosques or to the questions of the veil and all that. He left it to the other members of his government. But it seems that his political advisors convinced him that if he wanted to win the election, he could not carry on the way he used to, and thus Macron took the issue at hand. He knows that the majority of the French population is concerned with these issues, so, he tries to anticipate what they would expect from him.

Q. You say that there is a recent change in the discourse and the overall attitude of President Macron regarding the Muslim community in France. How does this resonate with the French public?

The problem is that the French public is completely immersed in this paranoia. There is some kind of a theater, a tragic one. In the scenario, there are different roles and functions for different actors. You have these populists, saying “the real” French people are in danger. These real and good citizens are in danger. And, in front of them, you invent, “the fake” people, the enemy, the Muslims.

You are either a hero or a betrayer. You cannot be both. It is impossible. Macron was about to become a betrayer. Now, he wants to become the hero again.

So, we found the enemy, right? Now, you need to have heroes. Then, journalists as well as politicians have to choose their sides, whether they are with the “real people” or they are with the “fake” ones. So, you are either the hero or the betrayer. You cannot be both. It is impossible. And Macron was about to become a betrayer. Now, he wants to become the hero again, because otherwise, they will think he is with the “enemy.”

And so, to answer your question precisely, what is preoccupying me is not Macron because he is just a politician. He knows, and he is right, that he cannot be elected if he carries on not caring about the collective anxiety of losing French identity, because he will be perceived as a betrayer and will not be elected because the majority of the French people consider themselves as the “real people” in danger by the “fake people.” I am sorry to say that, but that is the case.

Q. The division seems so deep. Do you think there is a way to overcome these problems? How can France start to debate this from the right angle?

The first thing we should do is to stop talking all the time about Islam. Because when we comment on Islam, we are discussing Islam per se, and not the Muslim people. But we are just manifesting our own complexes. So, this is the first thing.

Secondly, to ease our socio-psychological tensions, we should stop looking for a reason outside and we need to have public debates to address this very complex issue. We should accept that we are not at the center of the world anymore. We feel weak, but we pretend to be strong externally.

By doing that, we are spending our energy in an extremely useless way and not even addressing the real problems of what is happening here and now. It is pointless. So, what are we scared of? We are scared of our own shadow.

Raphael Liogier is a professor at Sciences Po Aix (Institut d’Études Politiques d’Aix-en-Provence), visiting scholar at Colombia University, and the author of numerous books. Among them are The Myth of Islamization: Essay on a Collective Obsession (2012, Turkish edition is published by Epos in 2012), and The War of Civilization Will Not Take Place: Coexistence and Violence in the XXI Century (2016, Spanish edition, 2017; Arabic edition, 2018). His research focuses on identity, religious identities, collective identities, identity reactions including populism, and how people deal with identity by excluding the identity of others.

Following the end of colonialism which saw the enslavement and migration of hundreds of thousands of people who were brought to foreign lands to serve the interests and wishes of their colonizers, immigrants had to survive by doing manual jobs. In this context, political engagement was severely hindered, if not completely impossible.

The new generations and descendants of these slaves and the new immigrants, however, grew up in different circumstances. Unlike their ancestors, they felt grounded in these new lands, which they came to call their home.

The path to citizenship for people of color was not easy. In the United States, the Civil Rights Movement was able to achieve success, although not a full and a decisive one, in the 1960s, after long years of fighting for equal rights for black people. People of color had to overcome many challenges to be able to engage in politics and to achieve representation.

Growing up in post settler-colonial societies such as the United States and New Zealand and having received the necessary education and skills, the younger generation had a different view of their new home countries and treated the political establishments differently.

Usually, the first generation of immigrants struggle to find work in order to survive. They have to learn a skill that helps them find their way in a foreign place in addition to facing cultural, economic, political, and assimilation challenges.

Their children, however, tend to have fewer such problems; they learn the language and culture of the countries they are in and adapt to their lifestyles.

The second and third generations of immigrants feel that their home is where they were born, although they might not forget their cultural heritage. They find their way in society more easily despite facing problems related to racial discrimination and family pressure.

The second and third generations of immigrants tend to be more involved in politics. This includes family and informal political debates, being involved with political groups on campus, being part of political parties and movements, leading the masses to bring about change, and ultimately running for political posts.

This second generation of immigrants have access to education, and this allows them to play a more prominent role in society. The fact that the second generation usually receives an education, empowers them and makes them feel less foreign. An empowered generation is better prepared to act politically. This political involvement of immigrants appears more prominently in the second and third generations who are more willing to take political action.

The second and third generations of immigrants tend to be more involved in politics. This includes family and informal political debates, being involved with political groups on campus, being part of political parties and movements, leading the masses to bring about change, and ultimately running for political posts.

Recent years have seen a trend in countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand, among others, of second- and third-generation immigrants who feel politically empowered and who want to be part of bringing about a political change.

In the United States, more and more people with migrant backgrounds started actively participating in politics and forming groups that seek to be part of the political scenes of their country. Recent years have seen the election to the U.S. Congress of more radical and younger voices that call for political, economic, and social change.

Palestinian-American Iman Jodeh is the first Muslim American to be elected to represent the 41^st district in the Colorado House of Representatives in the 2020 general election, becoming the first Muslim lawmaker in the state’s history.

Leaving behind a war-torn country, Ilhan Omar arrived in the United States as a refugee from Somalia and is a U.S. representative for Minnesota’s 5th congressional district. Rashida Tlaib is of Palestinian origin and is serving as the U.S. representative for Michigan’s 13th congressional district, which has a large presence of Arab and Palestinian voters.

Ayanna Pressley is an African American politician who made her way to politics through her early political engagement; she was the first African American woman to be elected to Boston City Council in 2010 and the first black women elected to the congress from Massachusetts.

Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez also fought a hard battle to get to the U.S. Congress when she ran against Democratic Caucus Chair Joe Crowley, a 10-term incumbent, defeating him and becoming a national sensation.

The Squad was doubled in 2020 with the addition of more members. The 2020 elections in the U.S. were remarkable in the sense that they saw the election of more Native American representatives to the US Congress such as Deb Haaland, who, if confirmed, will become the first Native American Secretary of State under President Biden.

Palestinian-American Iman Jodeh is the first Muslim American to be elected to represent the 41^st district in the Colorado House of Representatives in the 2020 general election, becoming the first Muslim lawmaker in the state’s history.

In a webinar organized by American Muslims for Palestine, Jodeh said, “We need immediate criminal justice reform; I will do it from the lens of a practicing Muslim Palestinian Arab woman of color.”

Derya Taskin, an American politician of Turkish origin, made history after being elected to the Electoral College, becoming the first U.S. politician of Turkish origin to be elected to such a post. Taskin served as the deputy mayor of Paterson in New Jersey.

“I read and learned more about the United States system, I wanted more involvement. I contacted my local party and started passing out fliers and going door to door during the local election. As time passed, I wanted to make more of a difference because I started to help my community who did not speak English to fill out forms and take advantage of certain benefits the state offered. This brought me to the idea that with politics I can do more, but I had to start from the bottom and this is what I did,” Taskin said.

According to the official French narrative, the “values ​​of the Republic” express the citizens’ affiliation to the country and their perception of themselves. Therefore, the concept of the nation is inherent in the concept of the “Republic.”

The French concept of the “Republic” is not limited to the abstract political system and its institutions; it also evokes historical moments and symbols dating back to the French Revolution and with it comes a package of values, meanings, ideas, charters, and legislation.

On this basis, specific values and intellectual commitments are presented as conditional to the French identity, defining whether one belongs to the “French nation” or is excluded from French society. Currently, French Muslims are subjected to this trial.

In a speech on October 2, 2020, President Emmanuel Macron coined the term “Islamic separatism” by stating that the Muslim suburbs, which he described as “ghettos,” have been witnessing a tendency to secede from the Republic. He then asked the representatives of Muslim institutions in France, when he summoned them on November 18, to illustrate their commitment to a “charter of republican values” and sign it within a few days. He stipulated the inclusion of specific contents in this charter, one of which was to strictly define Islam as a belief and not a political movement.

It should be noted that Macron exclusively asked the Muslim citizens of France to declare this special loyalty to the Republic by resorting to drawing up this new charter — as if the general charters and legal texts do not suffice or make an exception for Muslims citizens, like for instance the Charte de laïcité, which has been present in every classroom for years.

The campaign against “separatism” does not target mosques alone; it also pursues civil society organizations such as the Collective Against Islamophobia in France (CCIF), an organization that works against racism and discrimination.

In the context of the 2013 debate revolving around Islam and Muslims, warnings were raised about secularism being “under threat” and that “the values ​​of the Republic are in danger.”

This resulted in the “secularism charter” being issued for schools. However, the political values, which emphasize the strict separation of religion and politics, did not prevent senior French politicians from dictating a specific direction of religious practice and Muslim presence, enforced through a Council of Imams that would allow control, for example, of the sites of the imamah and the rhetoric in mosques.

The above official orders are accompanied by the cultural examination and placement of French Muslims, their mosques, and institutions under the political microscope, and successive announcements of the closure of dozens of their institutions and mosques.

The campaign against “separatism” does not target mosques alone; it also pursues civil society organizations such as the Collective Against Islamophobia in France (CCIF), an organization that works against racism and discrimination.

These developments came in the context of a wave of heightened populism that has been mounting in France since the end of the summer of 2020. On September 17, for instance, deputies boycotted a parliament meeting attended by Maryam Pougetoux, the president of the Students’ Union at the Paris-Sorbonne University (UNEF), because she is a Muslim who wears a headscarf, which allegedly contradicts the stipulated “values ​​of the Republic.”

This coincided with the start of the trial against those accused of carrying out the Charlie Hebdo attack, and the satirical newspaper’s continued publication of comics that are insulting to Muslims and their beliefs.

Following this, a number of bloody assaults took place, including the brutal murder of a French teacher and the killings in Notre-Dame de Nice by a homeless man who had just entered the country a few days prior to the attack.

One of the possible interpretations of “separatism” in this context includes some aspects of cultural diversity and the right to difference.

However, this concept of “separatism” is hazy and loose, raising the fear that it could be abused by politicians and the executive bodies in a country where the extreme right is aggressively rising and trying to sweep the elections.

One of the possible interpretations of “separatism” in this context includes some aspects of cultural diversity and the right to difference. In any case, it is clear that some of the leading French elites are used to showing discontent with manifestations of diversity in the public sphere. Even the former French Minister of the Interior Gerard Collomb described the appearance of Pougetoux on a French television screen on May 19, 2018 as a “shocking matter” due to her being “different from French society.”

There are clear contradictions emerging from this cultural campaign of the new ruling class in France that mixes political and electoral interests and politically aligned business leaders and entrepreneurs.

The most evident example is that the same government that speaks of freedom is now seeking to restrict other freedoms and expand the powers of the police and security forces, causing nationwide fear and protest.

The brutal attack on the black music producer Michel Zecler on November 21 was a shocking point in this development, since the recorded incident brought to mind the persistent complaints of suburban residents in regard to police brutality and the suspected racist motives behind it.

Freedom of expression as a public value has increasingly been stressed during the cultural escalation in France, especially since the armed attack on the Charlie Hebdo office in 2015. At the time, President François Hollande rallied with world leaders in a march that was also joined by French Muslims and representatives of their institutions despite the fact that they were being targeted by the humiliating comics in the satirical newspaper.

These comics together with the slogan “Je suis Charlie” turned into a cultural expression linked to the values ​​of the Republic. However, the unprecedented emphasis on freedom of expression has paradoxically been accompanied by increasing insults and contempt directed at Muslims and their religion, with officials not expressing the slightest discomfort about these offenses.

Invoking freedom of expression in this selective manner has placed the French official discourse in a crisis of credibility. The French leadership ignores the reference to this freedom in other situations and does not welcome content that does not suit its taste – in fact, it even resorts to measures to curb it.

Marco Perolini, a discrimination and racism researcher at Amnesty International, wrote, “The French government is not the champion of free speech that it likes to think it is.”

Within a context of international Islamophobia and the persecution of Muslim populations in many countries, it has become more and more commonplace amongst Muslims to lament the lack of unity in the ummah, the global community of believers.

Many Muslim rulers seem all too ready to neglect solidarity with Muslims for the sake of narrowly defined national interests.

Certainly, the most prominent example is Palestine. Despite unrelenting Israeli colonization and the entrenchment of apartheid, several important Muslim countries have taken the bold step of normalizing relations with Israel, and appear to be abandoning the Palestinian cause.

Unfortunately however, Palestine is far from the only example. A number of Muslim countries in Southeast Asia have pushed back boats of Rohingya refugees fleeing Myanmar.

Meanwhile, the governments of many Muslim countries have shied away from criticizing China for its cultural genocide of the Uyghur people in Xinyang, where Muslims are openly targeted for imprisonment and “re-education” for praying, avoiding pork and alcohol, or fasting during the holy month of Ramadan.

Despite these violations, no Muslim state joined an initiative in July 2019, when 23 countries sent a letter to the president of the UN Human Rights Council demanding action against China.

Far from campaigning for the rights of Muslims, Muslim states sided with the oppressor.

Indeed, four days later, 27 member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) signed a counter letter, praising “China’s remarkable achievements in the field of human rights,” and thanking it for its firm measures against “religious extremism.” Far from campaigning for the rights of Muslims, in other words, Muslim states sided with the oppressor.

However, the situation is not completely grim. In November 2019, Gambia, with the support of the OIC, filed a genocide case against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

The case is ongoing, but the evidence of genocide committed by the Myanmar military is overwhelming, and the court has already ruled in favor of Gambia’s request for provisional measures.

Many historians note that, outside of the earliest days of Islam, the Muslim ummah has never truly functioned as a unified political entity as a result of the state-based international system being deeply entrenched. The ummah has always been predominantly a spiritual community of believers, not a political force.

Gambia, a West African country many thousands of kilometers away from Myanmar, took the case to the ICJ. This shows that Muslim countries can act in solidarity to advance the rights of Muslims, even when their national interests are not directly at stake.

Nevertheless, that does not preclude the possibility of creating a strengthened ummah, unified in the face of current challenges. The question is one of political will.

In this regard, the Gambia case is an important precedent.

The fact that Gambia, a West African country many thousands of kilometers away from Myanmar, took the case to the ICJ shows that Muslim countries can act in solidarity to advance the rights of Muslims, even when their national interests are not directly at stake.

What is needed urgently is a rethinking of what the ummah should look like in today’s world, and of the concrete framework and institutions that need to be built.

Freedom of movement

International legal standards protecting the rights of refugees and other migrants are sorely inadequate, with millions – more and more of whom are Muslim – unable to secure protection from human rights violations.

Liberal citizenship is also being weakened as Islamophobic policies in many countries target Muslim minority communities for exclusion. A new, modern ummah can and should act as a counterforce to these trends, and put forward a more inclusive form of citizenship: a Muslim citizenship that would allow all believers access to safety.

It is proposed that Muslim countries should issue common travel documents, providing freedom of movement. Similar to the EU, any citizen would be allowed to enter, reside, and work in any other Islamic bloc country, with equal rights and duties as citizens of that country.

Refugees from Muslim countries would automatically have the right to protection, not as a refugee with the limited rights that often entails, but as a citizen of the ummah. Borders within the Islamic bloc would, for most practical purposes, cease to exist.

This is the case in the EU, and while progress has not been linear (and the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in some steps back), it is clear that the EU is moving toward a form of common citizenship that will transcend individual states.

Refugees from Muslim countries would automatically have the right to protection, not as a refugee with the limited rights that often entails, but as a citizen of the ummah. Borders within the Islamic bloc would, for most practical purposes, cease to exist.

This is the case in the EU, and while progress has not been linear (and the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in some steps back), it is clear that the EU is moving toward a form of common citizenship that will transcend individual states.

What is needed urgently is a rethinking of what the ummah should look like in today’s world, and of the concrete framework and institutions that need to be built.

There are potential pitfalls to this proposal, not least that Islamophobic governments could use it to advance even more exclusionary policies towards Muslims.

Despite this being a serious concern, Muslim countries should not refrain from taking steps towards greater unity simply because of the abusive practices of other states.

Countries that wish to exclude Muslims will, unfortunately, find ways to do so. The first obligation of the Islamic bloc should be to protect other members of the ummah, and to provide them with a safe haven if necessary.

Universal rights

Providing for freedom of movement is only half of the picture, since it would not be able to protect Muslim minorities who are unwilling or unable to leave their country of nationality.

Therefore, the ummah must have effective mechanisms to highlight violations of the rights of Muslims and put effective pressure on abusive governments.

Attempting to continue stale debates on the alleged lack of compatibility of the international human rights regime with Islamic religious laws and values is pointless. Even worse, it plays into the Islamophobic narrative that Islam is incompatible with modern norms.

The undeniable reality is that the vast majority of Muslims everywhere by and large accept the universal validity of international human rights standards.

Contrary to the wishes of their people, many Muslim governments have spent far too much time and energy at international meetings arguing against universal standards in a transparent effort to use religion to deflect criticism of their own oppressive practices.

This has damaged the credibility of those governments and, in the eyes of many, Islam itself.

The 2020 presidential election showed record number turnout from American Muslim communities. 70 percent voted for Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden, while 17 percent voted for Donald Trump. As American Muslim communities voted overwhelmingly Democrat in the previous years, their vehement opposition to another Trump presidency does not come as a surprise. Trump reminded American Muslims of the violence they experienced under George W. Bush. Islamophobia in its rawest form was on display in the very onset of his presidency from the announcement of the Muslim Ban on immigrants coming from Muslim-majority countries to halting assistance to Syrian refugees to valorizing the death of Muslim prisoners “dipped in pigs’ blood.”

American Muslims did not always vote Democrat, however. Prior to 2001, 80 percent of American Muslims were Republican and 70 percent of registered Muslims voted for the Republican presidential candidate George W. Bush in 2000. However, 9/11 changed the political landscape of American Muslims.

The violent policies and wars of post-9/11 America are embedded in the memories of Muslims today. Domestically, Muslims were targeted as a suspect population and government policies as well as the social climate of socio-political exclusion drastically shaped American Muslim life. Muslims faced deportation (sometimes regardless of citizenship status), interrogation, surveillance, random searches and acts of hate crime. Violence against Muslims was institutionalized. This became evidently clear with the wars on Iraq and Afghanistan. The state convinced the American people they were fighting acts of violence as they destroyed Muslim-majority countries to oblivion. American Muslims watched in anxiety as the state created Islam its enemy.

By 2017, 47 percent, nearly half of American Muslims believed neither party was friendly towards the interest of American Muslims. For some, the Obama presidency revealed that the Democratic establishment did not relieve Muslims from the expansion of the War on Terror, but accelerated it.

Just as it was apparent with Obama, Joe Biden and his VP pick, Kamala Harris are not anti-Islamophobia candidates.

Just as it was apparent with Obama, Joe Biden and his VP pick, Kamala Harris are not anti-Islamophobia candidates. Just as violence against Muslims happens through various methods, including war, both Biden and Harris are vicious allies of the military. Biden was directly involved in the advancement of the Iraq war and just recently professed his intention to keep special operations in the Middle East, while Harris voted against even a moderate cut in the gargantuan military budget in the middle of the COVID-19 crisis.

Yet some American Muslims responded differently to these challenges than others. What formed was a more radical politic: a group of American Muslims who understood that in order to combat state violence, you needed to avoid collaboration and instead, actively fight against it. Other Muslims however, were satisfied with Obama’s presidency. They believed that by welcoming law enforcement into their mosques, and accepting CVE grants (which gave access to private information on congregants and community members), there would be more trust between the state and Muslim communities, emphasizing they have nothing to hide.

The election of Donald Trump however, grayed the political differences of American Muslims. For the last four years many segments of the American society, including Muslims, became occupied with getting Trump out of office. The term ‘resistance’ became mainstream and suddenly the “soul of the country was on the ballot.”

A group that took advantage of the horrors that Trump represented and Muslims’ desire to see anyone else in office was Emgage. Emgage is the American Muslim community’s first “issue advocacy organization” and refers to themselves as the “political home for Muslim Americans.” In anticipation of the 2020 election, Emgage promised the Biden campaign one million Muslim votes and stated that their aim is to get many American Muslims registered to vote before the 2020 election. Of course, there is not any concrete proof Emgage succeeded in their promise, but the bigger controversy lies with their tendency to disregard the community’s concerns with the U.S.’s foreign policy ills for a so-called ‘seat at the table.’

As Palestine has always been an important foreign policy issue for American Muslims, Emgage disregarded a serious and sensitive issue as many high ranking members, including board members, worked with Islamophobic and anti-Palestinian organizations such as the Muslim Leadership Initiative, the Anti-Defamation League and the American Jewish Committee. Notable board member Farooq Mitha, who also served as Biden’s Muslim Engagement Advisor and now is on his Pentagon transition team, formerly helped the Obama administration “to normalize ties between Israel and Arab nations under the banner of Track II diplomacy” and boasted to former employees that he was a member of AIPAC, the largest pro-Israel lobbying group in the U.S.

Eventually, a campaign called “Drop Emgage” was formed. The group calls on Emgage to “formally end its current normalization activities” and asserts that “Farooq Mitha does not represent the views or will of our communities.” They end their claims by urging “all people of conscience to no longer tolerate unprincipled leadership threatening our community.” Subsequently Emgage was removed as a member from their umbrella organization, U.S. Council of Muslim Organizations USCMO.

The politics of American Muslim communities will see a starker divide.

It is a flaw to consider all Muslims who voted for Biden as pro-Biden. It is more appropriate to view them as anti-Trump. While Biden pleasantly shocked some by saying “Inshallah” on the debate stage, others remember humiliating White House iftars that told us who the “good” Muslims in our communities are and why they must support war overseas. As the country’s electoral process forces American Muslims to concede to establishment Democrats, they have to reconcile that their politics is not in fact unified, and more divided than ever.

The politics of American Muslim communities will see a starker divide based on the probable return of a newly-termed CVE strategy, the continuation of the Islamophobic wars under Biden and the re-emergence of gatekeepers who claim they know what is best for Muslims.

Yet, there is another theory. As we continue to see more and more organizers prioritize fighting Islamophobia in its grandeur scale, we can hope for American Muslims who will unite together and pressure a Biden presidency to confront these challenges. We can look forward to the younger generation of Muslims and the emergence of a more radical politic that pushes for universally just policies which fights against state violence on local and international levels. We will also see more Muslims running for office and calling for an end of unnecessary and unconstitutional surveillance on their communities.

The future of Muslims in America is entirely dependent on whether we are willing to set aside the convention and be innovative in ways to empower our communities.

The number of emails commencing with or entailing the phrase “we live in unprecedented times” or a variation of this has surely mounted to unsustainable levels since the onset of COVID-19 as a global crisis. But it is no exaggeration to say that history has reached a point of imminence, a point where the viral pandemic, the failure of neoliberal democracies, and the smartphone-to-internet-to-media-exposure of police brutality has necessitated a climax that has been building for some centuries. The murder of George Floyd links at the last bolts of a long chain of events that is fastened to the colonial empire.

The problem is now clearly systemic, has always been systemic, but its institutional hold is being foregrounded. The new politics of antiracism is not, in fact, new. In Ibram X Kendi’s 2019 book How To be an Antiracist, an Amazon top-seller on the subject of race, Kendi defines that “‘Racist policy’ says exactly what the problem is and where the problem is. ‘Institutional racism’ and ‘structural racism’ and ‘systemic racism’ are redundant. Racism itself is institutional, structural, and systemic.” The nature of the power-structures that uphold racist policy is not the subject here, but that this policy is as much a problem of cultural weight as political.

Even so, the move for equity in representation is valuable. The movements and decisions of galleries, publishers, and other cultural institutions are in this way no less acts of policy than those of the state. What the galleries, the publishers, the film studios police, is not the rights of individuals in relation to the law, but the way individuals think about their rights. When a gallery or civil building is stocked with neoclassical evocations of Columbus and other colonial figures, with the works of white-American and white-European artists, the presence of “Black artists” and “artists of color” is very often represented in a skewed pop-urban way. And the political dialectic here – of featured guest, of novelty, of difference – has the effect of distancing. If this does not fade when the patron leaves the gallery, when the book is put down, when it continues to govern: it is a cultural policy.

In 2019, Kara Walker’s Fons Americanus was installed in the Turbine Hall of the Tate Modern. The 43-foot tall cement composite sculpture became one of the most visited installations in the gallery’s 20-year history. Nothing in its curatorship suggested novelty: it was left unadorned by signage in the central space of the hall, an immense monument for the memory of trans-Atlantic slavery, against the legacy of the empires it built. Its presence was calm, quiet, reflective, its message clear. This seems an example of a cultural policy that has moved beyond its blurry definitions, a resolute artistic display without pretense. The artwork was demolished this year.

Black-authored books have surged in sales. Reni Eddo-Lodge’s Why I’m No Longer Talking to White People About Race is the first Black-British-authored book to ever top the U.K. bestseller list. But it remains consistently difficult, even in literary circles, to find individuals with an awareness of African authors from a region with such a rich literary output as Nigeria, beyond Chinua Achebe and more recently Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie. When British and American publishing houses remain predominantly white, it does not take a wide stretch of the imagination to feel a sting of situational profiteering.

As recently as 2018, controversial author Jordan B Peterson’s 12 Rules for Life also topped bestseller lists. The allegedly reluctant Canadian star-theorist is known for his refutation of postmodern gender politics, and his denial of the concepts of patriarchy, Islamophobia, and white privilege – all points he aims to disprove through philosophical logic. Unsurprisingly, he has often been canonized by the alt-right, a complex, clustered movement defined by narcissism and violent acts of white supremacy.

The United States was shaken by the death of black American George Floyd, who was pinned to the ground as police officer, Derek Chauvin, knelt on his neck for nearly nine minutes on May 25th and three other officers looked on. His last words, “I can’t breathe”, have become a motto for the millions who took to the streets to protest the violence against black people and the Trump administration’s handling of the issue. Floyd’s death sparked mass demonstrations in cities across the US, demanding an end to racial injustice and police brutality. Yet the peaceful demonstrations partly turned into violent protests and many people started to defy violence and looting. The murder was further politicized when President Trump declared the protestors as “anarchists” and “radical left”. The United States has now been soul-searching on how to end racial inequalities and securing law and order.

“I can’t breathe” protests

After thousands flooded the streets of Minneapolis to protest the killing of Floyd, four officers involved in his death were fired. Protests spread to major cities across the country, including New York City, Washington DC, Los Angeles, Memphis, Denver, and others in a couple of days.

Lafayette Park across from the White House became the center of the “I can’t breathe” protests, and soon turned into an anti-Trump base. President Trump’s reaction was to call the protesters “thugs” and take to Twitter saying: “When the looting starts, the shooting starts.” The tweet caused an outrage and was labeled as “glorifying violence” by the American public.

National Guard soldiers were deployed in some states; nighttime curfews were imposed and Donald Trump vowed to suppress the “thugs”. As nationwide protests continued, Trump said the administration would list far-left, anti-fascist movement “Antifa” as a terror group. Trump doubled efforts to stem the protestors and threatened to deploy the military if states and cities failed to quell violence during protests. Trump’s controversial visit to St. John’s Episcopal Church in Washington, DC marked a turning point as the pundits blamed Trump for mixing religion with politics.

The United States has now seriously divided into two main camps: Trump-lovers and Trump-haters. It is unfortunate that there is no middle-way between these two polar opposites. It’s becoming increasingly common to view everything that happens in the U.S. under these two main perspectives. Floyd’s tragic death could have led to a broader consensus going beyond this bipolar politics, yet it failed. Floyd is dead because American history is full of racial inequalities against African Americans from the very first day of Mayflower’s arrival to the New World. This story didn’t change much when African Americans got their “legal freedom” in 1865. American history books are full of lynching stories awful enough to fill one’s heart with horror. The idea is simple – the main reason why police brutality against black people hasn’t been averted in the U.S. is that it’s a systemic and institutional problem.

Data from 2019 of all police killings in the U.S. compiled by Mapping Police Violence shows that black Americans are nearly three times more likely to die at the hands of the police than white Americans. Other statistics have shown that black Americans are nearly one-and-a-half times more likely to be unarmed before their death. In 2019 alone, black people were 24% of those killed despite only being 13% of the population.

Another dimension of systemic racism is the lack of accountability of police officers whose actions have led to the death of a black person. “Mapping Police Violence” also tracked what had been happening in the aftermath of any white police officer killing an African American citizen. According to data, they reveal more than 200,000 internal investigations that were opened against approximately 85,000 police officers over the last 10 years. Yet, most of them were internally closed without any submission to the jurisdiction. All these speedy internal investigations seem to have set a precedent for officers dealing with black people.

There is one last thing about why a white police officer could kill Floyd so easily: the lack of education. This subject is sometimes not given due attention, yet it’s as important as other items on racial inequality in the U.S. A high school diploma or equivalent is enough to be considered qualified to get admission into police academies where the training lasts between 13-19 weeks. This implies that many American police officers do not have adequate education on the issue of racial profiling. As a result, systemic racism in the U.S. carries on with impunity as a lack of education and racial bias continues the problem of police brutality against African Americans in different parts of the country.

Any gain from the nationwide protests?

As the nationwide protests spread the flame of Black Lives Matter through Washington D.C., Democrats stepped up to change some laws to honor Floyd’s memory. The House Democrats have unveiled some resolutions targeting police misconduct and racial bias; there is no concrete outcome yet. On the other hand, President Trump signed an executive order last week in an effort to bring significant reform to law enforcement. Trump’s order will ban police from using chokeholds “except if an officer’s life is at risk,” as part of a wider effort to incentivize police departments to adopt nationwide standards. Those that choose to be certified by independent credentialing bodies will be eligible to receive Department of Justice grants under his order.