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krainian drones struck a major oil refinery in southeast Moscow for the second time in three days on Thursday, triggering a massive fire, disrupting transportation across the Russian capital, and underscoring Kyiv’s growing ability to carry the war deep inside Russian territory.

The attack targeted one of Moscow’s key fuel-processing facilities, located just 16 kilometers (10 miles) from the Kremlin and within the city’s ring road, making it one of the most symbolically significant strikes on Russian infrastructure since the war began more than four years ago.

Video footage shared on social media showed thick black smoke billowing into the sky above the refinery after a powerful explosion. Witnesses reported that the blast was so intense that the giant metal lid of an oil storage tank was hurled into the air.

The strike appeared to evade Russian air defenses and ignited a blaze that emergency crews battled for hours.

War reaches the heart of Russia

The attack forms part of a broader Ukrainian campaign targeting Russia’s energy sector, which Kyiv argues provides crucial revenue for Moscow’s military operations in Ukraine.

But beyond the economic impact, the strike carried substantial symbolic significance.

By successfully targeting infrastructure inside the Russian capital, Ukraine appears intent on demonstrating to ordinary Russians that the consequences of the war are no longer confined to distant battlefields.

Ukraine’s Foreign Minister, Andrii Sybiha, used social media to directly address residents of Moscow following the attack.

“One of the most popular questions asked by Muscovites this morning is ‘What is going on?'” Sybiha wrote. “Your country started a war of aggression against ours. For years, it has been killing our people.”

The comments reflected Kyiv’s effort to frame the attacks as a response to Russia’s invasion rather than an escalation of the conflict.

Disruption across Moscow

The strike caused widespread disruption throughout the Russian capital, home to more than 13 million people.

Authorities temporarily suspended flights at all Moscow airports as security services assessed the threat posed by additional drones.

Operations were halted at Sheremetyevo Airport, Russia’s busiest air hub, and parts of the airport were evacuated as a precaution.

Traffic was also disrupted along major roads surrounding the refinery, creating significant delays for commuters.

Residents in online forums complained that no air raid sirens or emergency alerts were issued before the attack.

Some suburban residents reported finding oily residue on vehicles and windows after rainfall passed through areas affected by smoke from the refinery fire.

The incident highlighted the growing vulnerability of Russia’s largest city to long-range Ukrainian drone operations.

While Moscow has experienced occasional drone attacks since 2023, including an incident involving the Kremlin itself, such strikes have generally had limited impact on daily life.

Thursday’s attack represented one of the most disruptive incidents the capital has experienced since the conflict began.

Economic impact growing

The latest refinery strike also points to the increasing economic consequences of Ukraine’s campaign against Russia’s energy infrastructure.

Russia remains one of the world’s largest oil producers and a major exporter of crude oil and refined fuel products.

Repeated attacks on refineries, storage facilities, and transportation networks have begun affecting domestic fuel supplies.

Industry sources told Reuters that Russia is expected to import fuel by sea this month, an unusual step for a country that is normally a major fuel exporter.

Reports of gasoline shortages have emerged in several regions in recent weeks.

Although Moscow city authorities insisted that fuel supplies in and around the capital remain stable, Russia’s federal anti-monopoly service has launched an inquiry after one major retailer reportedly increased gasoline prices by nearly 19 percent within a week.

Energy analysts say sustained attacks on refining capacity could place additional pressure on domestic fuel markets while increasing operational costs for Russia’s economy.

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krainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has for the first time publicly outlined a 20-point draft peace framework being discussed with the United States, describing it as a potential foundation for ending the war with Russia.

Speaking after weeks of negotiations to revise an earlier 28-point proposal, Zelenskiy said Ukraine and Washington had significantly narrowed their differences. However, he confirmed that no agreement has yet been reached on two key issues: territorial control and the future of the Russian-held Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. Zelenskiy said further discussions with U.S. President Donald Trump would be necessary to resolve those matters.

The proposal reaffirms Ukraine’s sovereignty and calls for a comprehensive non-aggression agreement between Kyiv and Moscow, supported by space-based monitoring systems to oversee ceasefire lines and detect violations.

Security guarantees, reconstruction and EU membership

Under the framework, Ukraine would retain its current armed forces strength of around 800,000 personnel and receive security guarantees from the United States, NATO and European countries comparable to NATO’s Article 5 collective defense clause.

The plan also envisions Ukraine joining the European Union on a defined timeline, gaining short-term preferential access to EU markets, and receiving a global development package aimed at long-term economic recovery. Several reconstruction and humanitarian funds would be established with the goal of mobilizing up to $800 billion.

Ukraine would remain a non-nuclear state, while Russia would be required to formalize a policy of non-aggression toward Ukraine and Europe through binding domestic legislation.

Territorial issues remain the most contentious element. Kyiv supports halting fighting along current battle lines, while Russia demands Ukrainian withdrawal from parts of eastern Donetsk. The United States has proposed demilitarized zones and a free economic area in contested regions.

The proposal also includes provisions for full prisoner exchanges, the return of civilian detainees and children, freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and Dnipro River, post-war elections in Ukraine, and a legally binding enforcement mechanism overseen by a Peace Council chaired by President Trump.

A full ceasefire would take effect immediately once all parties approve the agreement.

(Source: Reuters)

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krainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Monday that “tough issues” remain unresolved after intensive U.S.–Ukraine talks in Florida, as Kyiv launched a new round of high-level diplomacy across Europe and a top envoy of U.S. President Donald Trump headed to Moscow to brief the Kremlin.

The remarks came amid fast-moving diplomatic activity aimed at reshaping the U.S. peace proposal for ending nearly four years of full-scale war with Russia.

The recent meetings in Florida, hosted by U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio at Trump envoy Steve Witkoff’s Shell Bay resort in Florida, marked Washington’s most serious push yet to accelerate negotiations. However, the initial American proposal has drawn significant concerns in Kyiv and among European allies.

The original plan reportedly endorsed key Russian demands—including that Ukraine give up additional territory, limit its military forces, renounce its bid to join NATO, and bar Western troops from its soil. Ukrainian officials have said such terms would amount to “capitulation,” leaving the country vulnerable to future Russian aggression.

“There are some tough issues that still have to be worked through,” Zelenskiy wrote on X, adding that Ukraine faces a “very substantive day” of talks with European leaders following the Florida negotiations.

Zelenskiy met French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris on Monday, receiving a public show of support as both sides emphasized efforts to narrow the gaps with Washington.

“The work for peace continues,” Macron said in a post alongside a photo of the two leaders at the Elysee Palace. Zelenskiy is expected to travel to Ireland next, while Ukraine’s defense minister arrived in Brussels for meetings with NATO officials.

Rubio: ‘We’ve made progress’

Rubio, speaking after the Florida talks, described the discussions as constructive but incomplete.

“We’re realistic about how difficult this is, but optimistic… We’ve made progress,” he said, noting that further steps would depend on the outcome of Witkoff’s visit to Moscow.

Witkoff is due to meet Russian President Vladimir Putin on Tuesday to convey the results of the Florida negotiations.

The diplomatic push comes at a difficult moment for Kyiv. Ukrainian forces have been slowly losing ground along the 1,200-km front line, while a major corruption scandal has shaken the government.

Zelenskiy’s chief of staff—who also led the Ukrainian delegation in the peace talks—resigned on Friday after anti-corruption investigators searched his home. Two ministers have been dismissed, and a former business partner of the president has been named as a suspect.

Trump, who campaigned on ending the war rapidly, voiced frustration over the lack of an agreement. “Ukraine’s got some difficult little problems,” he told reporters on Air Force One, referring to the corruption scandal. Still, he insisted that both Kyiv and Moscow want to end the conflict. “There’s a good chance a deal could be reached,” he said.

Russia advances on frontline, intensifies strikes

Moscow has shown no sign of softening its demands. Russian forces continue to make incremental advances in eastern Ukraine and claimed Monday to have captured the settlement of Klynove in the Donetsk region—part of an offensive aimed at seizing Pokrovsk, which would be Russia’s biggest territorial gain in nearly two years. Reuters could not independently verify the battlefield situation.

Overnight, at least four people were killed and 22 injured in a Russian strike on the city of Dnipro, Ukrainian officials said.

Russia has stepped up long-range attacks on Ukrainian cities, frequently targeting energy infrastructure and plunging residents into darkness as winter sets in.

Ukraine has also intensified its own long-range campaign, striking Russia’s oil infrastructure. On Monday, the Kremlin condemned Ukrainian attacks on the Yuzhny oil-exporting terminal and two tankers in the Black Sea.

Ukraine’s diplomatic outreach across Europe is set to continue throughout the week as Kyiv presses allies to help reshape the U.S. plan before any formal response is delivered.

(Source: Reuters)

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ussia has used a ground-launched cruise missile in Ukraine whose secret development prompted the United States to withdraw from a landmark nuclear arms control treaty in 2019, according to Ukrainian officials. The revelation raises concerns that Moscow is employing weapons once banned under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and escalating the risks for European security as efforts intensify to negotiate an end to the war.

Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha told Reuters that Russia had fired the 9M729, known by NATO as the SSC-8, at targets in Ukraine in recent months — the first confirmed use of the missile in combat. “Russia’s use of the INF-banned 9M729 against Ukraine in the past months demonstrates President Vladimir Putin’s disrespect to the United States and President Trump’s diplomatic efforts to end Russia’s war,” Sybiha said in written remarks.

A senior Ukrainian military source said Russia had launched the missile 23 times since August, adding that two other launches were recorded in 2022. One missile fired on October 5 traveled roughly 1,200 kilometers before striking its target, according to the source.

Ukraine’s foreign ministry did not provide detailed dates or locations for the strikes, but Reuters reviewed images of debris from an attack on the village of Lapaiivka that killed four people earlier this month. Missile fragments found at the site were marked “9M729,” and independent weapons analysts who examined the images said the components matched the missile’s design.

Arms control disputes of the post-Cold War era

The 9M729 missile was at the center of one of the most consequential arms control disputes of the post-Cold War era. The United States accused Moscow of secretly developing and deploying the weapon in violation of the INF Treaty, which banned ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The treaty, signed in 1987 by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, was widely credited with ending a dangerous phase of the Cold War nuclear standoff in Europe.

Washington withdrew from the INF Treaty in 2019 under then-President Donald Trump, citing Russia’s noncompliance. Moscow denied violating the pact but later confirmed that it had developed the 9M729. The missile can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead and is believed to have a maximum range of 2,500 kilometers, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

Experts say the missile’s recent use in Ukraine adds a troubling dimension to Russia’s long-range strike capability. “If it’s shown that Russia’s using INF-range missiles, which could easily be nuclear, in Ukraine, then that is an issue for European security, not just Ukraine,” said John Foreman, a former British defense attaché to Moscow and Kyiv.

The launches, he said, demonstrate Moscow’s willingness to project power beyond the immediate battlefield and to signal to Western capitals that it retains escalation dominance.

Why the missile’s deployment?

Analysts also see the missile’s deployment as part of a broader pattern of strategic signaling by the Kremlin. William Alberque, senior adjunct fellow at the Pacific Forum think tank, said the move was likely designed to increase pressure ahead of ongoing peace negotiations involving the Trump administration. “Putin is trying to ramp up pressure as part of the Ukraine negotiations,” he said. “The 9M729 was built to hit targets in Europe — and its use now is a reminder of that capability.”

The missile’s range allows Russia to launch it from deep within its territory, making detection and interception difficult. Douglas Barrie, senior fellow for military aerospace at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said the 9M729 gives Moscow an advantage by expanding attack routes across Ukraine. “This gives them slightly different attack axes, which complicates air defenses and increases the pool of available missiles,” Barrie said. He added that the missile’s use could also serve as a live battlefield test for the weapon’s performance.

Russia has continued to expand its missile arsenal even as the war drags into its fourth year. In recent weeks, Moscow tested the nuclear-powered Burevestnik cruise missile and a nuclear-capable torpedo known as Poseidon. In August, Russia announced it would no longer restrict the deployment of intermediate-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, effectively ending the self-imposed limits that followed the INF’s collapse.

A serious breach of arms control norms

The White House did not comment on reports of Russia’s use of the 9M729, but U.S. officials have previously said any such deployment would represent a serious breach of arms control norms. The revelations come just days after Trump ordered the resumption of U.S. nuclear testing, citing “other countries’ testing programs” and warning that America would not “fall behind in nuclear preparedness.”

For Ukraine, the missile strikes are another reminder of Russia’s overwhelming firepower and of the growing risks the war poses beyond its borders. Kyiv has called on Washington to provide long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles, which are sea-launched and were not restricted by the INF Treaty, to help offset Russia’s advantage. “Boosting Ukraine’s long-range capabilities will help persuade Moscow to end its war,” Sybiha said.

Analysts warn that the reintroduction of INF-range weapons into active combat could push Europe into a new era of nuclear insecurity. “The INF Treaty kept Europe safe from these types of weapons for more than three decades,” said Alberque. “Once those lines are crossed again, it’s very difficult to put the genie back in the bottle.”

(Source: Reuters)

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uropean Union leaders on Wednesday discussed a new scheme to sustain long-term financial and military assistance to Ukraine by leveraging hundreds of billions of euros in frozen Russian assets, a move Moscow condemned as “theft.”

The proposal underscores the bloc’s growing resolve to act independently in supporting Kyiv amid the United States’ retreat from direct financial aid under President Donald Trump. Washington has halted most assistance to Ukraine, leaving European partners scrambling to fill the gap as the war with Russia grinds through its fourth year.

According to the European Commission, Ukraine’s budgetary and defense requirements for 2026 and 2027 are expected to total around 130 billion euros ($153 billion). The EU has already disbursed 174 billion euros in support since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022, but officials warn that the financial burden is becoming unsustainable without new mechanisms.

Frozen Russian sovereign assets

At the center of the debate are frozen Russian sovereign assets, primarily held in European institutions since the start of the war. The largest tranche — about 194 billion euros — is located in Belgium, while Japan holds roughly $50 billion, and smaller amounts are stored in the U.S., U.K., and Canada.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said her team was working on a “reparation loan” backed by these frozen assets. The concept would allow the EU to raise up to 140 billion euros ($165 billion) in financing for Kyiv, with repayment deferred until Russia pays reparations for the destruction caused by its invasion.

“We are not confiscating the assets, but we are taking the cash balances for a loan to Ukraine,” von der Leyen told reporters in Copenhagen. “Ukraine has to pay back this loan if Russia pays reparations. Russia is the perpetrator. It has caused the damage and must be held accountable.”

She added that the plan offered “a sound legal way” to provide Ukraine with immediate relief while keeping faith with international law and maintaining cohesion among the bloc’s 27 member states.

Legal and political hurdles

The initiative, however, faces stiff legal and political challenges. While several countries, including Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, have expressed strong support, others remain cautious about potential repercussions.

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, who hosted the EU summit, praised the plan as “a good way forward” but admitted there were “some legal questions that have to be asked.”

The European Central Bank (ECB) has also raised concerns, warning that outright confiscation of Russian assets could undermine confidence in the euro and destabilize global markets. Belgium, home to the financial clearinghouse Euroclear, is particularly wary of acting unilaterally, fearing possible Russian retaliation and reputational damage.

“If we don’t take those assets into account, then it’s on our taxpayers — that’s for sure,” said EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, while acknowledging that the proposal is “not supported by everybody yet.”

The European Commission insists the scheme does not involve seizing Russian funds but using the profits generated by the frozen assets — mainly interest and investment returns — as collateral for the loan. That distinction, officials argue, could help the EU sidestep accusations of illegality while providing crucial funds to Kyiv.

Russia fumes over ‘theft’

The Kremlin swiftly denounced the EU’s discussions. Spokesman Dmitry Peskov said in a conference call with reporters that any move to repurpose Russian assets “amounts to plans to illegally confiscate Russian property — in Russian, we call it theft.”

Moscow has repeatedly warned that such actions would lead to retaliation and further strain relations with European capitals. Russia has already enacted laws allowing it to seize Western assets within its borders in response to similar measures.

Nonetheless, von der Leyen and several European leaders insist the bloc has both the legal and moral grounds to act. “Russia launched this war, caused the destruction, and must pay for it,” von der Leyen said. “Europe cannot wait indefinitely while Ukraine’s economy bleeds.”

France cautious, Nordics supportive

Among EU heavyweights, France has taken a cautious stance. President Emmanuel Macron expressed tentative support for the idea but stressed that Europe must remain “a place that’s attractive and reliable.”

“When assets are frozen, we respect international law,” Macron said, noting that any deviation could deter global investors.

Other northern European states have been more forthright. In a joint letter to their EU counterparts, Finland and Sweden called the reparation loan “a responsible and necessary step.”

“Investing in Ukraine is an investment in European security as a whole,” the letter said. “It is key that the loan to Ukraine is only to be repaid once Ukraine receives war reparations from Russia.”

The Council of the European Union had decided to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova in December 2023. On June 25, 2024, the EU held the first meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference at ministerial level to officially open accession negotiations with both Ukraine and Moldova. In many ways, this accession negotiation process was different from others. A brief look at the EU’s previous enlargements is needed to understand this difference.

A Brief History of EU Enlargement

Enlargement policy is the EU’s most important foreign policy instrument. The reason for this is the transformative power of the EU, the power to transform the countries that will become members of the EU by means of conditionality. By spreading its values through enlargement, the EU is able to ensure its stability, security and prosperity. Moreover, by enlarging with new member states, the EU becomes a much stronger Union economically, politically and geopolitically, and increases its effectiveness in the international system.

Since its first enlargement in 1973, the EU has gone through several rounds of enlargement, bringing the number of member states up to 28. Following Brexit and the UK’s withdrawal from the Union, the EU now has 27 Member States. Each enlargement has been assessed in the context of the needs of the time and has taken place when the conditions have been met. For example, the UK, Ireland and Denmark applied to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1961, but were rejected twice, first in 1963 and again in 1967, because of French President Charles De Gaulle’s concerns over Britain’s close ties with the United States that would be detrimental to the Union. The first wave of enlargement, which included the UK, did not take place until after De Gaulle’s resignation.

The second wave of enlargement was also dealt with assessing in the context of the needs of the time. The EEC had suspended the Association Agreement with Greece after the Greek junta seized power in 1967 and installed the regime of the colonels. After the military junta had handed over power to civilians and a democratic government had been restored, Greece applied for membership again. After six years of negotiations, the Member States, instead of excluding Greece, arguing that its democratization could be achieved more effectively within the EEC, acted with the idea that we would admit Greece as a member in 1981 and democratize it.

Under the regime of General Francisco Franco, Spain’s application to join the EEC in 1962 was rejected. Following political reforms and democratic elections, Spain submitted its formal application in 1977, which led to the EEC’s decision to open accession negotiations in 1978. Similarly, after the resignation of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar in 1968 and the replacement of the regime established by the military coup of 1974 with a democratic regime following the 1975 elections, Portugal formally applied to the EEC in 1977 and began negotiations in 1978. The 1981 enlargement to include Greece and the 1986 southern enlargement to include Spain and Portugal changed the EU from a “club of democracies” into a “school of democracy”.

In addition to political issues, obstacles to Iberian enlargement included the fact that these two countries produced similar agricultural products to France. In addition, the fact that Spain and Portugal, which had been ruled by dictatorships for many years, were economically lagging the other members caused concern among other EEC member states because of the possible influx of workers from these two countries.

Although Bulgaria and Romania failed to meet the EU’s criteria on corruption and an impartial judiciary, they were granted membership in 2007, albeit belatedly. Rather than leaving Bulgaria and Romania outside the EU, as was the case with Greece, they were helped to continue their transformation and development within the EU.

The most recent enlargement of the EU was the accession of Croatia. Croatia, which gained independence after the break-up of Yugoslavia, was able to join the EU after resolving its border issue with Slovenia. The growing strategic importance of the Balkans for the EU paved the way for Croatia’s accession process and the prospect of future Balkan enlargement.

For Turkey, which started accession negotiations to the EU at the same year with Croatia in 2005, the EU negotiation process was de facto frozen. When Balkan enlargement on the agenda and accession negotiations officially opened with Ukraine and Moldova, the question arises as to what will happen to the accession negotiations with Turkey. Although Turkey has recently expressed its willingness to take steps to revive its EU membership process it has not been included in these new enlargement perspectives of the EU.

Ukraine and Moldova’s EU Accession Process

We are witnessing that the EU, long suffering from enlargement fatigue, has begun taking important steps in the enlargement process. In a changing world and in the new European security environment, the EU has put aside its longstanding anti-enlargement approach. The war in Ukraine and its aftermath, as well as the changing conjuncture, have given a new impetus to EU enlargement, with both Ukraine and Moldova and the Western Balkans on the EU agenda.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen signaled this change in her State of the Union speech on 13 September. In her speech, von der Leyen said that a new group of states, including the Western Balkans, would be admitted as new member states of the EU. The date for this enlargement scheduled to 2030. On 7 May 2024, the EU member states took a decision to support the Western Balkan countries with 6 billion euros, 4 billion euros in loans and 2 billion euros in grants to make them economically ready to join the Union. The fulfillment of this support based on two conditions: achieving political reforms and foreign and security policy alignment with the EU against Russia.

Ukraine and Moldova, previously part of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP), began to be considered in new enlargement policy. The relationship between Ukraine and the EU evolved into a different process with the Association Agreement, negotiated between 2007 and 2011 and signed in 2014, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA).

The pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych’s reluctance to sign the DCFTA led to pro-EU protests in November 2013, the so-called Euromaidan uprisings, and Yanukovych’s removal from power, and Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, which is called as “special military operation” by Russian government, became the factor that accelerated Ukraine’s accession process. On 28 February 2024, 4 days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine applied for EU membership and on 23 June Ukraine was granted candidate status by the EU.

Although relations between Moldova and the EU began in 1994, when Moldova signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, the main obstacle to Moldova’s membership in the EaP under the ENP was the fact that the country’s economy did not meet EU standards and, most importantly, the situation in the Russian-backed Transnistria region.

Moldova, like Ukraine, applied for EU membership on 3 March following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Together with Ukraine, it was granted candidate status on 23 June 2022. Ukraine is currently at war with Russia, while Moldova is concerned about a possible war situation due to Russia’s support for the Transnistria region.

The start of negotiations with Ukraine on 25 June was only possible after convincing Hungary, which was opposed both because of the war in Ukraine and because of the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine. Negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova were officially launched before Hungary took over the rotating EU presidency on 1 July, thus avoiding a potential stumbling block. But there are many other features of this wave of enlargement that make it different from the others.

Ever wondered why the prices of commodities keep rising? In the realm of commerce, the change of prices is a constant. However, when the prices of a multitude of goods and services rise collectively, a phenomenon known as inflation emerges.  If you feel like your money doesn’t stretch as far as it used to, that’s the erosion of currency value over time that we call inflation. But here is the twist – even when inflation is slowing down, prices aren’t necessarily falling; but rather, increasing at a slower pace.

Recent times have witnessed a noteworthy shift in economic discourse, marked by a renewed concern over inflation. After a prolonged period of perplexity surrounding persistently low inflation, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic instigated a substantial departure, introducing an era characterized by stubbornly high inflation. This surge in prices is linked to various factors.

These factors for the inflationary trend can be interpreted along the lines of supply and demand. On the supply side, disruptions stemming from COVID-19, such as logistical challenges and workforce shortages, converged with spikes in energy and food prices induced by geopolitical events, notably the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Simultaneously, on the demand side, substantial financial injections into households and enterprises by governments during the pandemic aimed at mitigating the impacts of lockdowns and layoffs resulted in an increased money supply, potentially contributing to the inflationary surge.

This economic shift, has exacerbated financial burden as a result of pivotal commodities experiencing substantial price increments—such as housing, energy, and food, particularly for those whose income has not kept pace with inflation. In many countries around the world, peaking inflation had threatened governments with social unrest, noteably in Sri Lanka ,Pakistan and numerous countries in Latin America, as well as protests in relatively high income countries like the U.K.

As inflation persists, in this month’s book bundle we examine books that demystify inflation, delve into unexplored trends, address common policy mishaps, and offer solutions to aid both policymakers and citizens to sustainably navigate these seemingly precarious times.

Inflation: What It Is, Why It’s Bad, and How to Fix It unravels the complexities of the most significant inflationary upheaval in over four decades, a phenomenon that has gripped headlines and left many grappling with the tangible impacts on their finances. Against the backdrop of the cost-of-living surge triggered by the COVID pandemic, the book sounds the alarm about the potential resurgence of a “Great Inflation,” with some observers expressing concerns of an even more ominous descent into hyperinflation that has historically devastated nations.

In response, the authors, Steve Forbes, Nathan Lewis, and Elizabeth Ames, engage readers in a captivating discussion that not only answers pressing questions but also charts a course for preparing for an uncertain future.

The authors draw on their expertise—Forbes as the chairman of Forbes Media, Lewis as an internationally recognized authority on money and taxation, and Ames as an accomplished author and journalist—to challenge prevailing misperceptions that have contributed to the current crisis.

They confront the widely held belief that central banks can spur prosperity by conjuring money “out of thin air” and debunk the notion that a certain level of economic “stability” necessitates “a little inflation.” These ideas, treated as sacrosanct in Washington for decades, are scrutinized in detail in Inflation exposing why they are flawed and how they have fueled the existing challenges.

The book critically examines the heedless money-printing and underscores the perilous path such policies could lead us down. Through a compelling blend of examples drawn from contemporary headlines and historical episodes, Inflation offers a real-world exploration of the subject, directly addressing the everyday concerns of individuals dealing with the tangible consequences of rising prices. Moreover, the authors provide practical steps that readers can take to protect their wealth.

Steve Forbes, Nathan Lewis, and Elizabeth Ames, Inflation: What It Is, Why It’s Bad, and How to Fix It (Encounter Books, 2022) ISBN: 9781641772433, 196 pages

In The Inflation Myth and the Wonderful World of Deflation, Mark Mobius embarks on a journey that might just prove everything we conventionally know about inflation wrong, presenting a thought-provoking narrative that questions the very foundations of our economic understanding.

In a world marked by rapid technological advancements, Mobius contends that our traditional metrics for measuring inflation are no longer adequate, urging readers to reconsider long-held beliefs about the economic phenomenon.

Mobius explorates of the shifting landscape of technological innovation driving the creation of cheaper and superior products. The heart of his argument lies in the assertion that these transformative changes are not accurately reflected in the ways we currently measure inflation. The book boldly contends that our contemporary understanding of inflation is nothing short of a myth.

One of the book’s standout features is its illumination of the political dimensions of inflation measurement. Mobius exposes the unsettling reality of governments manipulating and exploiting inflation figures to align with their economic agendas. He delves into the extreme challenges involved in gathering accurate data for inflation measurement, highlighting the inherent inaccuracies that result from these endeavors.

A crucial point of contention raised by Mobius is the fallacy of relying on currencies as a measure of inflation when these very currencies are continually being debased by the governments that issue them. This revelation challenges readers to reconsider the reliability of traditional economic indicators and prompts a deeper examination of the intricate relationship between currency devaluation and inflation.

Most significantly, Mobius underscores the impact of technological advancements and automation on the continuously falling costs of goods and services. The book articulates how these advances contribute to a deflationary trend, contrary to the prevailing narrative of perpetual inflation. Through compelling arguments and well-supported evidence, Mobius encourages readers to recognize the transformative power of technology in reshaping our economic landscape.

Mark Mobius, The Inflation Myth and the Wonderful World of Deflation (Wiley, 2020) ISBN: 978-1-119-74142-8, 256 Pages

Another important myth-busting source is We Need to Talk About Inflation: 14 Urgent Lessons from the Last 2,000 Years. In the book, economist Stephen D. King delivers a compelling exploration of the resurgence of inflation, exposing the desperate gullibility of central bankers, finance ministers, and the collective failure to learn from historical lessons. The book dismantles the widespread assumption that inflation was a relic of the past, revealing a new economic reality that threatens to exacerbate wealth inequality on a global scale.

In a world where investors, monetary authorities, governments, and policy makers had collectively believed inflation to be a thing of the past, King highlights the startling emergence of a poisonous economic reality. This new reality brings with it the ominous specter of increasing wealth inequality, forcing individuals worldwide to confront the profound implications of this unforeseen turn of events.

King, having been among the few to sound the alarm ahead of the latest inflationary upheaval, delves into the roots of the current situation. We Need to Talk About Inflation becomes a beacon, shedding light on the key lessons from history that policy makers either ignored or chose not to heed. From the days of ancient Rome through the American Civil War and up to the asset bubbles of today, King traces the common threads of inflation, attributing its resurgence to policy errors, sovereign greed, and a collective loss of faith in currencies.

The book stands as a sobering reminder that the economic challenges we face today are not unprecedented; they are deeply rooted in a historical continuum of bad judgment and misunderstanding. We Need to Talk About Inflation serves as a crucial intervention, cutting through centuries of oversight and misinformation to offer actionable insights that can be implemented now.

Stephen D. King, We Need to Talk About Inflation: 14 Urgent Lessons from the Last 2,000 Years (Yale University Press, 2023) ISBN: 9780300270471, 240 pages

Paul Mattick’s The Return of Inflation: Money and Capital in the 21st Century emerges as both a historical retrospective and a contemporary analysis, offering a profound examination of what is undeniably the defining economic concern of our time.

Mattick’s work delves into the surprise surge in price increases. Amidst the varying perspectives on the current economic landscape, there is unanimous agreement on one aspect: the imperative to curb inflation, even if the methods to achieve this goal are a subject of contention.

The Return of Inflation distinguishes itself by placing contemporary events within the broader context of capitalism’s history. Mattick skillfully entwines the past and the present, providing readers with a comprehensive understanding of the economic forces at play. An exploration into the nature of money serves as a foundational element of the book, offering readers a concise and jargon-free grasp of recent inflation trends and the strategies implemented to manage them.

What sets this book apart is its ability to demystify the complexities surrounding inflation. Mattick takes the reader on a journey through the historical antecedents of inflation, shedding light on the evolving dynamics of the economy. Through this lens, the book illuminates the state of our contemporary economic landscape, offering insights that bridge the gap between past and present.

Mattick’s insightful exploration provides a nuanced perspective on the current economic challenges and offers a valuable resource for those seeking clarity on the defining economic concern of our time.

Paul Mattick, The Return of Inflation: Money and Capital in the 21st Century (Reaktion Books, 2023) ISBN: 9781789147919, 184 pages

The Russian invasion of Ukraine marked a pivotal moment in international relations, sparking outrage and condemnation from the global community while igniting deep-rooted tensions that had been simmering for decades. The invasion, which began in the early days of 2022, cast a dark shadow over the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. As Russian forces advanced, cities and towns across Ukraine were transformed into battlefields, with civilians caught in the crossfire and their lives altered by the devastating consequences of war.

In 77 Days of February, a group of distinguished writers from Reporters Magazine, the only Ukrainian publication dedicated to long-form literary journalism, present a remarkably powerful collection of 24 personal narratives. The anthology aims to give readers unprecedented access to first-hand accounts of the atrocities suffered during the early days of the invasion.

It also serves as a tribute to the indomitable spirit and fortitude of the Ukrainian people, who continue to demonstrate unwavering strength and pride in the face of adversity. Marichka Paplauskaite, editor-in-chief of Reporters Magazine, joins us for an interview about 77 Days of February and her accounts of enduring the war as a Ukrainian journalist.

Q. At the beginning of the book there is an emphasis on why it is important to talk about the war in Ukraine from the beginning, with a reference to memory being unreliable. Would you like to share that with our readers?

The initial months of the war presented a profoundly challenging period for us. My colleagues and I felt an overwhelming urge to contribute to the cause of our country, and given our writing skills, we set out to create narratives. The primary goal of our magazine, Reporters, was to tell the story of Ukraine through the lens of personal stories, moving away from traditional hard news and focusing on the encounters, sentiments and emotions of individuals. So when the war broke out, our choice was clear: to share these stories first with fellow Ukrainians and then with a global audience.

This book carries an intense emotional weight, because it was simply not possible to discuss this subject without emotion. It encompasses our homeland and our own firsthand encounters. At first, we wondered if it was premature to delve into such intimate experiences. However, as the war continues and the timing of victory is uncertain, we decided to tackle the subject now, while the wounds are still raw.

Human memory is indeed very fragile, especially when it comes to traumatic events. The mind tries to forget events that have caused suffering. That’s why what we have managed to capture in texts about the events and memories of the first months of the war seems very important to me.

Q. What has changed between the beginning of the war and now?

We have been living under the conditions of a full-scale war for a year and a half now. It’s unfortunate to admit it, but we have managed to get accustomed to the war. In our cities, we still hear the air raid siren every day, which always means that Russian missiles or Iranian drones used by Russia are heading towards our territory to commit new acts of violence against innocent people. Nevertheless, under these circumstances we continue our work and try to live, adapting to the conditions of war.

Q. As a journalist, you’ve had the opportunity to interact with various individuals impacted by the war, is there a story that was particularly inspiring to you?

It’s hard for me to say which story impressed me the most. Because all the stories in the book are incredibly personal. There is one change that happened to us journalists at the beginning of the war: we became the heroes of our own texts. For instance, there are two stories about Chernihiv by our author Vira Kuriko. Her husband went off to fight, and she returned twice to the city surrounded by Russians, describing the life of people under siege.

Another story is “Pasha and the Old Man” by Olga Omelyanchuk. Her acquaintance overheard a phone conversation in a basement. Someone was talking about a paralyzed old man whose relatives had left him in a flat in Irpin. At the time, fierce street battles were raging in the town. Olga found soldiers who agreed to find the old man and evacuate him. It was a risky operation. But the soldiers managed to navigate the streets where gunfire echoed and rescue the man. I am struck by the humanity of this story. It shows an example of how one can remain human even in times of war.

Another story I would like to mention is titled “The Sea”. It tells the story of fishermen from the Kiev Sea – a vast reservoir. Villages on one bank were occupied by Russians in the early days, while on the other bank there was a fishing base. In times of peace these men would have been considered poachers, but in times of war they became heroes. They would cross the sea in their boats and rescue people from the occupation. This was dangerous because the sea was still covered with ice and the Russians were shelling the boats. Nevertheless, these fishermen risked their lives to save others.

As you can see, these stories depict not only the horrors of war, but also courage, compassion, desperation, and light.

Q. How has covering these stories affected you? Have you had the space to reflect on your own grief?

When we were working on these stories, we had to prepare everything so quickly that we had no time to think. But afterwards I had some time to think and I realized that it’s not about the stories, it’s about the lessons I learned during the war and during my work as a journalist and editor living in Ukraine.

We feel that we must live now; if you want to do something, do it today. If you want to tell someone you love them, tell them today. It’s not only because of the conditions of our personal lives during the war in general, but also because there are many stories, for example about nameless graves, that remind us to appreciate what we have.

Q. What struggles do you face bringing these stories to a global audience?

It was so important for us to share our work with readers abroad because we are afraid that the war will be normalized, as I mentioned before. We still need support, and I absolutely understand that people abroad can lose interest in the war in Ukraine and think, “Well, it’s news from Ukraine again. But for us, it’s a real and ongoing tragedy, all the time, in every town.

We want people to not just read the stories, but to empathize and think about how they would feel and act in that situation. And I hope that through these stories our readers can form an emotional connection with Ukraine. I think the biggest challenge is that it’s incredibly difficult to comprehend the experience of war unless you’ve been through it. I’ve read numerous books about different conflicts around the world. But when it came to war in my own country, I wasn’t prepared.

War is the worst experience one can have. Our subconscious can block the desire to understand this experience because it’s too painful. That’s why I hope that the stories in the book, which are very emotional and personal, will give foreign readers a chance to somewhat grasp our reality.

Q. Could you tell us about networks of collaborations amongst journalists at this time?

Our team isn’t large; besides editors, we only have two full-time correspondents. However, we have a large pool of freelance authors across the country. When the war started, they all reported to me about the stories they were witnessing and wanted to describe. It was a unique time of unity for all citizens, and journalists were no exception. We worked as a single team, driven by the importance of documenting events of historic magnitude, recording the crimes of the Russians, and capturing new pages in Ukrainian history. It was a time of solidarity and professional unity within the journalistic community.

Q. How has misinformation made life more difficult for the Ukrainian people during the war?

Personally, I haven’t found this to be a problematic issue because we don’t watch or rely on Russian propaganda TV channels or anything of that sort. If we come across something that raises suspicion or doubt, we check it out. Sometimes, when we come across something dubious, we instinctively recognize its lack of credibility. We make sure to verify and re-verify; after all, we have colleagues in all regions of Ukraine.

For instance, when a Russian propaganda channel tried to dismiss the atrocities in Bucha as a hoax and labeled the alleged victims as actors, my colleagues and friends were in Bucha. They witnessed the bodies on the streets, took videos and photographs that unequivocally confirmed the reality of the situation. Russian propaganda doesn’t shake us because we are here, on the ground, witnessing everything first hand.

Q. What important remarks would you like to share with our readers?

The main message I want to convey is that the war is an ongoing reality and our struggle persists. Readers may peruse the accounts documented within the 77 Days of February and recognize the tragedies and turmoil depicted, but they have the privilege of closing the book and returning to their daily lives. The reality we face, however, remains unchanged, with analogous stories unfolding every day across Ukraine. Our need for support continues.

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, NATO and its close partners have increasingly provided military support to Ukraine. The  nature of the support has changed over time and some policies that were previously avoided in order not to cross Russia’s “red lines” have been chosen. For instance, after much controversy, Germany authorized the delivery of Leopard tanks to Ukraine. Britain provided Challenger tanks. Poland and Slovakia gave Ukraine MiG-29 aircraft. This military support has had a significant impact on the course of the war. Thanks to the military aid given to Ukraine, countries have removed Soviet legacy weapons from their inventories. These were mostly replaced by American military equipment. With the intensive military support provided, the Ukrainian army has become considerably more modernized than it was before the war.

However, Ukraine does not believe that the current military support is sufficient, at least in the long term. On July 11, the first day of NATO’s Vilnius Summit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy slammed NATO for its lack of a timeline for his country’s future NATO membership, calling it “unprecedented and absurd.” Ukraine’s main goal in the summit is to be presented with a road map for NATO membership. In this regard, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and senior Ukrainian officials have frequently made statements and succeeded in putting pressure on NATO. It was even stated that Zelensky’s participation in the summit would be meaningless if there was no signal from the Alliance in this direction. Thus, Ukraine’s possible future NATO membership and the security guarantees that could be provided until then became one of the main items on the agenda ahead of the Vilnius summit.

In September 2022, Zelensky announced that Ukraine was already a de facto NATO member and that it was applying for membership in order to formalize its status. Ukraine is currently awaiting an official invitation to become a member in response to this application. In Ukraine’s view, if accession to NATO is not assured at the end of the war, a new war with Russia will be inevitable. The only way to prevent this is to deter Russia by Ukraine becoming a NATO member.

While Ukraine’s NATO membership will only be possible after the end of the war, it will be difficult to draw a clear road map with concrete security guarantees in the interim period, as security guarantees are inherently ambiguous. In a climate of uncertainty, many countries are more likely to avoid such commitments and to show a desire to maintain military support for Ukraine. Only a clear commitment by the United States can resolve this dilemma.

On the other hand, NATO’s top priority since the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has naturally been to strengthen the Alliance’s eastern flank. In this scope, various measures have been taken, in particular to increase the Alliance’s level of combat readiness. New multinational battlegroups were established and deployed to Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia; Turkish soldiers are serving in the groups deployed to Bulgaria and Hungary.

Of course, mobilizing such a large multinational force in a short period of time is a very demanding and costly endeavor which requires the member states to increase their military expenditures in many dimensions such as personnel, logistics, and equipment.

Lastly, by ratifying Finland’s accession in March 2023, Turkey had demonstrated its historic and principled support for NATO’s open-door policy and sent a message to Sweden, which was given the green light by Turkey on the first day of the Summit. Indeed, the trilateral memorandum had broken the deadlock in Madrid last year and shown that a diplomatic compromise could be reached quickly. This is because such major summits always offer the possibility of last-minute solutions, and this was the case with Turkey’s last-minute green light for Sweden’s NATO membership. Turkey will expect Sweden to continue to increase its efforts against the fight against terrorism in its all forms in the coming period.

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razil has been at the center of speculations between Western expectations towards a renewed regional leadership and the increasing ties with BRICS. In April 2023, Lula da Silva, or simply Lula, Brazil’s president, visited China, welcomed Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s minister of foreign affairs, in Brasilia, and sent Celso Amorim, his closest foreign policy advisor, to meet Volodímir Zelenski. While Lula is showing democratic credentials and holds hard feelings towards Washington, Brazil’s  new international strategy looks to take advantage of the great power competition with an active nonaligned perspective. Latin America seems to be going in the same direction but not necessarily due of Brazil’s new active diplomacy.

Brazil is back

After overcoming a judicial process that included serving a period in prison and returning to the political arena, Lula’s 2023 electoral victory allowed him to resume an active foreign policy with an autonomist orientation that seeks a balance between developed Western powers and revisionist visions of the global order. As Ryan Berg, director of the Americas Program at the at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), argues, Brazil is hedging among great powers and pursuing an agenda of nonalignment, as exemplified in Lula’s visit to Beijing.

Lula has made clear that his priority is to focus on Brazil’s international reinsertion, strongly criticizing the Bolsonaro era both for its authoritarian attitudes domestically and for its erratic foreign policy. Among the main priorities of his new international agenda are the search for peace in the Ukrainian conflict, the establishment of a new regional leadership, and an active and determined projection in the Global South. Special attention has been given to regions where Brazil had regressed in the Bolsonaro era, such as the Middle East and Africa.

However, the new administration faces significant challenges due to the current international landscape, which differs considerably from when it left power. Back then, Brazil was considered a rising star and major powers had a generally positive perception of its role in the global governance agenda—at least until the signing of the tripartite agreement with Iran and Turkey. Today, however, strategic competition among major powers imposes constraints on pursuing a more autonomous foreign policy, especially vis-à-vis traditional partners such as Washington or new strategic partners such as Moscow.

Autonomous decisions have a higher cost. Moreover, the regional context has changed. During the Bolsonaro era, Brazil became a major non-NATO ally (MNNA), which increased its degree of strategic interdependence with the U.S., while the growing presence of China forces Brazil to have a more balanced position given the existing tensions between China and the U.S.

Finally, Lula intends to rebuild the Union of South American Nations (USAN, or UNASUR in Spanish), but South America is less ideologically and politically homogenous than it used to be, which in some ways hinders plans to relaunch this regional body that was deactivated during the previous administration.

Latin America and the Russo-Ukrainian War

The Russian presence has not gone unnoticed in discussions in Latin America. The war in Ukraine is the focus of foreign policy debate in most of Latin America; the discussions are framed in a context of how the region should navigate the rise of China and the emergence of new global actors such as Russia. Among academics, experts, and decision-makers, there are broadly two perspectives on Latin America’s place in an increasingly multipolar world: on the one side, to side with the U.S., or China and/or Russia in the new great power competition, or, on the other, to remain outside of the competition.

The alignment calls for a choice between the United States and China. This option is generally marginal in Latin American foreign policy discussions, and often has a strong liberal ideological component. The strong pro-democratic and liberal affinities generally favor a special closeness with the United States and the Western world, but there are also growing pro-China sympathies, for example, in Venezuela and among some of Latin America’s left-wing movements.

Across the region there is a near consensus not to engage in the new great power competition, while seeking opportunities for economic development and strategic alliances with other countries. The second option has different expressions but can be summarized as a form of nonalignment. The recent book “Latin American Foreign Policies in the New World Order: The Active Non-Alignment Option” edited by Fortin, Heine and Ominami reunites different voices which call for an equidistant position between the White House and Beijing while seeking to deepen regional integration and more active diplomacy both with rising players and in the Global South.

For example, facing the Russo-Ukrainian War, the major Latin American regional players—Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico—have shown a more pragmatic and less forceful stance with respect to condemnation, with a mixture of balanced positions and a search for compensation. Thus, no country in Latin America adopted sanctions against Russia. The case of Brazil is particularly interesting since it shows an important degree of continuity between Bolsonaro and Lula except for the new “peace coalition” project which has been at the core of the current presidential diplomatic maneuvers. Although Bolsonaro’s and Lula’s diplomatic responses offered different nuances within and across different regional players, they signaled an autonomous perspective facing global pressures.

What does active nonalignment mean for Latin America?

Are Brazil and Latin America nonaligned? The answer is yes. Neutrality and nonalignment have been at the center of Latin America’s external choices both in relation to the Russo-Ukrainian War and the U.S.-China strategic competition. However, only to stand aside in a changing global environment is not enough to strengthen agency in world politics. Latin America suffers from a structural relevance deficit in the global scenario, so a more active and prompt approach towards global affairs is needed. Diversification, open regionalism, multilateralism, and soft power are optimal routes to increase regional presence and relative weight in international affairs.

While nonalignment is a fact in current times, the active side of the equation seems to be far behind regional needs. Regional fragmentation and stagnation have been increasing in recent years and the multilateral position does not mean that the regional players coordinate their policies—even those related to the Russo-Ukrainian War— while diversification and soft power policies fluctuate in relation to the importance that governments give to international issues. The relations between Turkey and Latin America are a vivid example of the lack of continuity, with the initiative usually coming from Ankara. In the end, Lula’s new Brazil offers an opportunity to put the region back on the international stage, although it will most likely be following Brasilia’s and not a collective agenda.

After months of tergiversations, Chinese President Xi Jinping finally made a phone call to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy – the first time the two leaders have spoken since the outbreak of the war. Zelenskyy tweeted in praise for this meaningful move, highlighting the need for collaboration in paving the way for peace. Subsequently, China pledged to send a special envoy to lead its mediation efforts and help provide vital humanitarian aid.

The road to peace is long, gruelling, and full of obstacles, and no observer expects a single phone call to stop this conflict. However, this step represents an important signal that China is interested in peace, thus kick-starting a process that may end this devastating war.

Beijing-Moscow Ties as a Leverage? 

The War in Ukraine boosted the China-Russia partnership. Beijing brought a breeze of fresh air to the sanctions-thorn Russian economy thanks to a $190 billion trade deal. Moreover, China’s diplomatic support was pivotal in insulating Russia from international condemnation in the UNSC. Beijing also dismissed parts of the joint statement at the G-20 that condemned Russia.

Nevertheless, China is the major partner in this relationship, retaining the upper hand owing to discounted energy prices and an expanding volume of Yuan in Russian markets and treasury.

Can China use its strategic advantage to pressure Moscow into ending the war in Ukraine? China has already revealed its diplomatic prowess by bringing Saudi Arabia and Iran to the negotiating table, and now it is offering to help facilitate peace talks in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the conflict in Ukraine presents a unique challenge that may require a different approach.

BRICS and Yuan

While the allure of cheap oil, the Yuan’s volume in the Gulf, and the BRICS membership can be attractive to some lower-league players, building a global reputation as a responsible superpower is another ball game. But let’s be real: China’s lifeline to Russia may give them the upper hand, but the Ukraine war is also a golden opportunity for its global stature.

Ending the conflict in Ukraine could bring an invaluable reputational gain that cannot be measured in dollars or Yuan. China would gain more from the cessation of hostilities in Ukraine than any further escalation.

Meanwhile, Beijing is playing a multi-faceted game – boosting its reputation and keeping an eye on the potential for reconstruction opportunities that could arise from a de-escalation scenario leading to peace. Rebuilding a region devastated by war is a lucrative business, and China appears poised to have its share of the pie.

Getting the West Out of the Way

China’s actions carry a tacit warning to Washington to keep its distance. It is important to note that China’s 12-point political solution proposal to the Russia-Ukraine War, released on the first anniversary of the conflict, includes two significant points: the rejection of a Cold War mentality and the ineffectiveness of sanctions. These points are direct jabs aimed at NATO expansion and the stance of Western countries that joined the U.S. bandwagon in imposing sanctions. China is reminding the latter, particularly the U.S., that they have effectively removed themselves from the negotiation table by adopting such a posture.

French President Macron’s visit to China revealed cracks in the European standpoint, as some players were forced to fend for themselves, refusing to become mere followers of the United States, even if the latter provided the continent’s security for decades.

No one knows what game Macron is playing, and many find his goal of reaching “strategic autonomy” in Europe unrealistic. In any case, Macron’s statement that France would not interfere in the case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan irked most U.S. and European decision-makers. While it demonstrates Europe’s unwillingness to get caught in the middle of crises, it weakens Washington’s hand, raising questions about the sustainability of sanctions on Russia and similar other containment strategies intended for China in the future.

What Can Beijing Do?

If Beijing’s resolve persists, the conflict will likely witness a peace process preceded by confidence-building measures. Xi Jinping can keep Putin’s offensive tendencies in check. There is a growing consensus that a nuclear showdown would be a lose-lose situation for all parties involved. This situation is contingent upon the Ukrainian side’s cessation of any major offensives.

Moreover, the hostility towards NATO, which unites Russia and China, means that the transatlantic alliance will not be part of a China-led peace scenario.

Furthermore, Beijing could use its leverage to limit escalation, bolster humanitarian aid, and maintain the grain corridor deal spearheaded by Turkey last year.

In international politics, progress can be slow and incremental, and the recent phone call between China and Russia is unlikely to yield immediate results. The White House will not sit idle and could push for a major spring Ukrainian offensive. Meanwhile, whether Russia will come to terms with China’s efforts to de-escalate ongoing conflicts remains to be seen. At the end of the day, as Confucius wisely said, “It does not matter how slowly you go as long as you do not stop.”

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ecently, people in Moldova feel threatened by a possible Russian attack. Concerns have grown over Moscow’s possible plans to use the country as a launchpad for an incursion into Ukraine.

Moldovans, government officials and people alike, are worried that Russia might destabilize the country, especially through the autonomous Transdniestria region, where Moscow has 1,500 troops stationed.

Why Transdniestria is important

The Transdniestria region is a breakaway Moldovan province located to the east of the country.

Russians constitute the region’s main ethnic group (30% of the population), followed by Moldovans (28%), and Ukrainians (22%). The rest includes Romanians and other smaller groups that do not specify nationality.

The Transdniestria region broke away from Soviet Moldova in 1990. Following the demise of the USSR in 1991, the Moldovan government forces and the pro-Russian secessionists fought each other.

Transdniestria’s self-declared government is not recognized by the international community but backed by Russia militarily and economically.

The referendum in September 2006, recognized by neither Moldova or the international community, embodied Transdniestria’s willingness to be annexed by Russia.

In 2014, the Transdniestria parliament urged Russia to recognize its independence—a call left unanswered by the latter.

Nevertheless, the region has its own administration, currency, constitution, flag, national anthem, police, and postal services.

Today, the Transdniestria issue poses a grave threat to Moldova’s unity and development, and undermines efforts to establish regional peace.

Historical background

After World War II, Russia determined Moldova’s future based on two regions: the heavily Russian-spoken Dniester region, and the Bessarabia region, which came under Romanian rule between 1918 and 1940.

When the USSR was on its deathbed, alarm bells rang over rising Moldovan nationalism. The 1989 law that made Moldovan an official language escalated tensions and the region broke away in September 1990.

Transdniestria’s paramilitary troops seized Moldovan institutions in 1991. The battle took place on the Dniester River in June 1992.

Fighting was aggravated by the successive declarations of independence from the USSR, and Moldova’s entry into the UN. Nearly 700 people were killed in the battles.

A ceasefire was reached in July 1992, and a demilitarized security zone was formed. The arrangements were overseen by the Russian troops in the area.

Russian clout in Transdniestria

The ongoing presence of Russian troops in the region impedes the development of peace talks. The Russian withdrawal began in 2001 but came to a halt when Transdniestria impeded the transfer of weapons.

Negotiations were brokered by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Ukraine, and Russia, but no tangible solution was reached.

Transdniestria is home to most of the industrial infrastructure of Moldova, but remains economically weak due to international sanctions.

Russia backs Transdniestria, which is reputed to have rampant inflation and a high rate of organized crime, with economic aid.

According to Gulru Gezer, a former Turkish diplomat, Russia’s main purpose is to prolong the conflict and prevent Moldova’s integration into the West. “Russia’s influence is not restricted to this region. Ever since Moldova’s independence, Russia has intervened in the elections and promoted the settlement of pro-Russian politicians in politics,” she added.

Moldova-EU relations

Moldova-EU relations date back to the 1994 Association Agreement, which was renewed in 2014, lifting the visa regime for Moldovan citizens arriving in the EU.

This drew the ire of Moscow, which imposed sanctions on goods imported from Moldova.

However, Moldova officially declares that it has not deviated from its balancing policy between Russia and the West. The government called for cooperation with Russia in resolving the Transdniestria crisis.

In 2020, pro-Western president Maia Sandu was elected, and pro-Russian forces, by and large, were neutralized.

Moldova was granted the candidate status by the EU in June 2022 along with Ukraine due to concerns after Russia started its war.

Recent developments trigger concerns

Ever since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, Moldova has felt threatened by tangible concerns that it might be Russia’s next target.

Moldova, beset by high inflation and an energy crisis, has in recent weeks witnessed a rise in demonstrations by both pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian supporters.

Dionis Cenusa, an expert on Moldova, noted that Moldova has many weak spots such as protecting public order and energy supplies that could be utilized by Russia.

“Moldova was all too aware of this before Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy publicly warned Moldova from Brussels on February 9 about Russia’s intention to carry out subversive actions there,” said Cenusa.

A year ago today, Russia launched its “military operation” in Ukraine which has not only caused ongoing suffering to the Ukrainian people but has also turned global politics upside-down. Since then, many books have been written about Russia’s war on Ukraine. From the personal accounts of a young Ukrainian girl, journalists on the ground, and soldiers to insightful analyses compiled by experts, this month’s book bundle provides diverse and outstanding sources of information to understand and summarize the important milestones and dynamics leading to and occurring during the war as well as its devastating effects on the world.

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ussia’s 2022 attack on Ukraine saw confrontation between Moscow and the West spill over into open conflict once again. Hostile acts abroad, from poisoning dissidents to shooting down airliners, interfering in elections, spying, hacking, and murdering, have long seemed to be the Kremlin’s dealings. But what is it all for?

Keir Giles, who works as a senior research fellow at the Russia and Eurasia program at Chatham House, explains how and why Russia pushes for more power and influence wherever it can reach, beyond Ukraine; what this means not just for governments, but for ordinary people across the globe; and how its effects may be more damaging than we realize.

Keir Giles, Russia’s War on Everybody and What It Means for You (Bloomsbury Academic 2023) ISBN: 9781350255081, 264 pages

R ussia’s brutal February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has attracted widespread condemnation across the world. Government and media circles present the conflict as a simple dichotomy of good and evil. War in Ukraine: Making Sense of a Senseless Conflict brings together a balanced look at the events leading up to the conflict and surveys the different parties involved.

Medea Benjamin and Nicolas J.S. Davies show how the picture is more complicated. While recognizing that Russia’s aggression is ultimately indefensible, the authors argue that the West’s eastward expansion of NATO, the U.S. involvement in the 2014 Ukraine coup, and Ukraine’s failure to implement the Minsk peace agreements prompted Putin to act.

Medea Benjamin and Nicolas J.S. Davies, War in Ukraine: Making Sense of a Senseless Conflict (OR Books 2022) ISBN 9781682193716, 198 pages

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nvasion: The Inside Story of Russia’s Bloody War and Ukraine’s Fight for Survival is the firsthand reporting on the Russian invasion of Ukraine from Luke Harding, New York Times bestselling author and Guardian correspondent. Harding writes about the astounding resilience in Ukraine and devastating atrocities in Bucha and elsewhere. With a focus on human stories and portraits of the leaders on both sides of war, Invasion captures a crucial moment in history that was the biggest news event of 2022 and an inflection point in international politics.

Luke Harding, Invasion: The Inside Story of Russia’s Bloody War and Ukraine’s Fight for Survival (Vintage, 2022) ISBN: 9780593685174, 336 pages

Yeva Skalietska, a young survivor of the war in Ukraine, shares her memories of the war in Ukraine through her diary entries. She began writing the diary when her grandmother and her found shelter in a bunker when the city where she lived came under Russian attack on February 24, 2022.

Skalietska describes the bombings she endured and her desperate escape journey from the conflict. From endless train rides and an overcrowded refugee center to settling in Ireland to put together a new life, You Don’t Know What War Is: The Diary of a Young Girl from Ukraine is an inspiring and intimate story of a survivor hoping to be able to return home one day.

Yeva Skalietska, You Don’t Know What War Is: The Diary of a Young Girl from Ukraine (Union Square & Co., 2022) ISBN: 9781454949695, 128 pages

No one has been more surprised by Volodymyr Zelensky’s power to inspire and mobilize his compatriots and the world than Vladimir Putin. Outfoxed and isolated, Putin is not the first person to have underestimated the former comedian.

Who is Volodymyr Zelensky? How did he become the international hero of our time? Zelensky: The Unlikely Ukrainian Hero Who Defied Putin and United the World tells you everything you need to know about this inspiring leader, covering his childhood, family history, and his career as a TV celebrity to the president of Ukraine.

Andrew L. Urban and Chris McLeod, Zelensky: The Unlikely Ukrainian Hero Who Defied Putin and United the World (Regnery Publishing, 2022) ISBN: 9781684513789, 192 pages

Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine is an overview of the conflicts in which Russia has been involved since Vladimir Putin became prime minister and then president of Russia starting from the First Chechen War to the two military incursions into Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, and the eventual invasion of Ukraine itself. Mark Galeotti delves into Putin’s recreation of Russian military power and its expansion to include a range of new capabilities from mercenaries to operatives in a relentless information war against Western powers. Putin’s Wars provides an engrossing strategic overview of the Russian military and its successes and failures on the battlefield.

Mark Galeotti, Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine (Osprey Publishing, 2022) ISBN: 9781472847546, 384 pages

T his collective work analyzes the ongoing conflict in Ukraine beyond simplistic media interpretations that limit the analysis solely to Vladimir Putin. The War in Ukraine’s Donbas: Origins, Contexts, and the Future gives voice to different social groups, scholarly communities, and agencies relevant to Ukraine’s recent history.

The authors reveal the deeper roots linked to the autonomy and history of the Donbas as a region, exploring local society and traditions, and the alienation from Ukraine caused by the events of Euromaidan. The book also takes a close look at the Minsk Accords in 2014 and the impact of the new president Volodymyr Zelensky with his efforts to bring the war to an end by negotiations.

David R. Marples, The War in Ukraine’s Donbas: Origins, Contexts, and the Future (CEU Press, 2022) ISBN: 9789633865972, 244 pages

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Economic Challenges, Embargo Issues, and a New Global Economic Order presents a cutting-edge analysis of the economic effects and challenges of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, touching on the EU sanctions on Russian energy, the global effects of an EU energy import boycott on Russia, and Ukraine’s political relationship with the EU in a global context. The book also explores the challenges to relations between the EU, China, and Russia caused by the invasion, the effects of the unfolding refugee crisis, military and humanitarian aid pledges to Ukraine, and the risks of reduced multilateralism within the world economy as a direct result of the war.

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine provides a broader picture of the international effects of the conflict and its potential implications for policy design as we enter a new global order marked by the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Paul J.J. Welfens, Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Economic Challenges, Embargo Issues, and a New Global Economic Order (Springer International Publishing, 2022) ISBN: 9783031191374, 387 pages

In Ukraine’s Unnamed War: Before the Russian Invasion of 2022, the authors argue that Russia packaged the conflict in Crimea and Eastern Donbas as a “civil war” to claim non-involvement and lay out social science literature on civil wars to help understand why no political solution was found between 2015 and 2022.

Drawing on Ukrainian documentary sources, the book explains how Russia, after seizing Crimea, was reacting to events it could not control and sent troops only to areas of Ukraine where it knew it would face little resistance. Kremlin decision-makers misunderstood the attachment of the Russian-speaking population to the Ukrainian state and failed to anticipate that their intervention would transform Ukraine into a more cohesively “Ukrainian” polity.

Dominique Arel and Jesse Driscoll, Ukraine’s Unnamed War: Before the Russian Invasion of 2022 (Cambridge University Press, 2023) ISBN: 101316511499, 320 pages

Diary of an Invasion is a collection of Andrey Kurkov’s writings and broadcasts from Kyiv documenting the shocking impacts of the Russia-Ukraine war. Kurkov has been a consistent satirical commentator in Ukraine and became an important voice for his people throughout the Russian invasion. He spends the sleepless nights of continuous bombardment of his city delivering the truth about this invasion to the world, and has also been able to fly to European capitals where he has been working to raise money for charities.

Diary of an Invasion is a remarkable record of a brilliant writer at the forefront of the war. It provides political and historical commentary and accounts from Kurkov’s personal journal, exploring Russian and Ukrainian history and their complicated coexistence, and describing how Ukraine defies its occupation.

Andrey Kurkov, Diary of an Invasion (Mountain Leopard Press, 2022) ISBN: 9781914495847, 304 pages

The award-winning Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar provides a history of Ukraine, scoping from its emergence as a post-Soviet state to a country with increasing economic, cultural, and political ties to Europe and the United States, leading to Putin’s invasion.

As soon as the Russian invasion of Ukraine began, Zygar circulated a Facebook petition that led to a new law in Russia criminalizing criticism of the war forcing him to flee Russia. In his time as a journalist, Zygar has interviewed President Zelensky and has had access to many prominent politicians and oligarchs. As an expert on Putin’s moods and behavior, he has spent years studying the Kremlin’s plan regarding Ukraine, and in clear, chronological order explains how we got here.

Mikhail Zygar, War and Punishment: Putin, Zelensky, and the Path to Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine (Scribner, 2023) ISBN13: 9781668013724, 320 pages

ZOV: Inside Putin’s Corrupt War in Ukraine – A Dissident Soldier’s Story is a detailed, voluntary account by a Russian soldier participating in the invasion of Ukraine. Pavel Filatyev was a paratrooper in the invasion force that shelled the city of Kherson in February 2022. He grew sickened and angry with his part and posted a shocking exposé on social media of what he had witnessed. After his injury, he evacuated from the conflict and gave a day-by-day description of how the Russian army crossed into Ukraine and captured the city of Kherson.

Now in hiding, Filatyev bears witness to Ukraine’s battlefields, shelled cities, and the Russian conscripts’ inescapable choice of fighting in a senseless war or facing imprisonment back home. His story provides a chilling insight into life behind enemy lines and a powerful account of the people caught in Putin’s war. ZOV: Inside Putin’s Corrupt War in Ukraine will be published on July 6, 2023 and is a forthcoming title to keep an eye on.

Pavel Filatyev, ZOV: Inside Putin’s Corrupt War in Ukraine – A Dissident Soldier’s Story, Random House, 2023) ISBN: 9780593597385, 208 pages

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n December 14, the Bayraktar Kizilelma jet-powered drone made its maiden flight from Çorlu airfield in Turkey. The achievement was announced by the Chief Technology Officer of the Baykar Technology firm, Selcuk Bayraktar. Capable of carrying various guided weapons inside its body and under its wings, the stealth drone is planned to enter serial production in late 2023. The Bayraktar Kizilelma is one of the very few jet-powered combat drone projects in the world. Other examples include Okhotnik by Russia, MQ-20 Avenger and XQ-58 Valkyrie by the United States, and WZ-7 Soaring Dragon by China.

Before the maiden flight, another important milestone in the development process of the aircraft was Kizilelma’s taxi test on November 20. This was praised by Ukraine’s ambassador to Turkey, Vasily Bodnar. Pointing to the Turkish-Ukrainian cooperation on the project, Bodnar stated in a tweet in Turkish that “it is a Ukrainian engine that lifts the Kizilelma to the sky”: the Kizilelma is powered by an AI-25TLT turbofan engine, designed by Ukrainian Ivchenko-Progress.

Kizilelma is the latest product that benefits from the Turkish-Ukrainian defense cooperation, which has expanded significantly over the past five years. The most well-known product of this cooperation is the Bayraktar TB2 armed drone, which has been extensively used by the Ukrainian armed forces since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War on February 24. Drones have been at the center of the cooperation as Ukraine has become the engine supplier for the Akinci and Kizilelma drones. The issue has become particularly important because of Ukraine’s war with Russia and the recent bombing of the facilities of manufacturer Motor Sich by Russia on November 20.

Turkish-Ukrainian Defense Cooperation

On February 3, 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky signed an agreement on Turkish-Ukrainian cooperation in high technologies, aviation, and space. The agreement covered the manufacture of the Bayraktar TB2 armed drones in Ukraine through transfer of technology and know-how. Ukraine started acquiring the TB2 in 2019 for its air force and navy, and according to Ukrainian officials, local manufacture would be modified to incorporate local products and subsystems, such as a Ukrainian engine for the drones.

Three weeks after the signing of the agreement, Russian Armed Forces initiated a large-scale attack on Ukraine and started an invasion of the country’s southern and western parts. Since the start of the war, the TB2s have been used extensively, hitting many Russian armored vehicles and air defense systems. It is claimed that the drone participated in the missile attack on the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s flagship, Moskva, on April 13, which resulted in the sinking of the ship the next day.

Although the TB2 is the most popular product of the Turkish-Ukrainian defense cooperation and one of the symbols of Turkey’s defense exports, it is not the only area of collaboration in this Black Sea partnership: Ukraine has stood out as a major powerplant supplier for Turkey and has benefited from its indigenous solutions.

The Bayraktar Akinci is a heavy reconnaissance-surveillance and strike drone. With a maximum take-off weight of around 6,000 kg, the Akinci is designed to be equipped with various precision guided missiles and bombs, and different types of sensors, such as electro-optical camera, radar, and electronic intelligence/signals intelligence (ELINT/SIGINT) systems. Akinci is designed to be able to be equipped with engines. The baseline model, Akinci A, is powered by Ivchenko-Progress AI-450T, whereas Akinci B is equipped with Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-135A engines. During the SAHA Expo exhibition in 2021, Baykar Technology signed an agreement with Motor Sich for the MS500 turboprop engine.

At the same time, another agreement was signed with Ivchenko-Progress for the AI-322F and AI-25TLT turbofan engines for the Bayraktar Kizilelma. The AI-25TLT is powering the A version of Kizilelma, and the AI-322F will be used in the B model. According to Baykar Technology information, Kizilelma C will have two AI-322F engines and will be able to fly faster than the speed of sound.

Engine procurement from Ukraine is not limited to drones. In June of last year, Turkish Aerospace (TA) signed a contract with Motor Sich for TV3-117 turboshaft engines for use in the prototypes of the T929 ATAK 2 next-generation attack helicopter project. The Ukrainian company is also offering the same engine for TA’s T925 10-ton class general purpose helicopter project. TA plans to fly T929 for the first time in March 2023.

In addition to marine and aviation domains, there have also been talks over cooperation in the land vehicles sector. Ukrainian heavy vehicle engine and armored vehicle manufacturer Kharkiv Morozov Machine Building Design Bureau (KMDB) proposed a cooperation with Turkey on various fighting vehicles, namely Altay main battle tank and Firtina self-propelled howitzer. The sale of the latter to Azerbaijan was stalled because of Germany’s refusal to supply the engine and transmission, whereas the failure to obtain the engine and transmission from Germany for the Altay main battle tank prompted Ankara to look for alternatives, ending up with a South Korean solution.

Motor Sich

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited the large research, development, and production enterprises specialized in gas turbines. Ivchenko-Progress and Motor Sich focus on aviation engines, with the latter being one of the leading manufacturers of aircraft and helicopter engines in the world. Based in Zaporizhzhia, privately owned Motor Sich also provides services for maintenance, overhaul, and upgrade of engines. Ivchenko-Progress, on the other hand, is a state-owned design bureau specialized in aviation engines, including gas turbines. The two companies work very closely: Motor Sich, while producing its own designs, also acts as a manufacturer for Ivchenko-Progress.

Motor Sich’s great experience in design and manufacture of aero engines made it a lucrative investment opportunity, especially for China. In 2017, the Chinese firm Skyrizon Aviation bought a 41% stake in Motor Sich. This agreement was met with a harsh reaction by the U.S., and subsequently shelved after Ukrainian President Zelensky took the decision to impose sanctions on Skyrizon in January 2021. Although there were reports that 50% of the company’s shares could be sold to an undisclosed Turkish company in May 2021, this did not happen.

The owner of Motor Sich, Vyacheslav Boguslayev, was taken into custody by the Ukrainian intelligence on October 22 on charges of treason for providing engine parts to Russia. It was alleged that the owner of the company, which manufactures engines for Mil and Kamov helicopters and provides maintenance and repair services, made a secret agreement with Russia, which had maintenance, repair, and logistics support problems due to the ongoing war.

On November 7, the management of Ukraine’s five leading companies, including Motor Sich, was transferred to the Ministry of Defense in accordance with the “Law on the Transfer of Goods Under Martial Law.” On November 20, the company’s production facilities were severely damaged after a missile attack by Russia. It is still unclear how much damage the production infrastructure and capacity have suffered, and how this will affect the Kizilelma, the Akinci, and the T929.

The Future?

Turkish-Ukrainian defense cooperation has rapidly expanded in the past five years, covering many complex programs and products. The most important aspect of this partnership is engine development and production. Having many ambitious aerospace development projects, Turkey has a stated goal of achieving self-sufficiency and independence in many critical components, including engines for its indigenous air, sea, and land platforms.

TUSAŞ Engine Industries (TEI) and Kale are the two major companies that are active in this field, and their projects have recently entered the test and production phase. TEI’s TF6000 and TF10000 engines are promising candidates for powering the Kizilelma and other platforms that Turkey will develop. Delivering an aero engine for a high-performance combat aircraft whether piloted or not, however, is a challenging task, requiring extensive infrastructure, skilled workforce, and an industry ecosystem. China, for example, has gone through a similar path for the past 25 years with the assistance of Russia and Ukraine.

Achieving operational independence is Turkey’s top priority when devising defense planning and industrial strategies. In order to increase the local content and indigenous solutions, a “top-down” approach has been selected: Turkey first started with platform projects such as Altay, Anka, and MILGEM, and then went for indigenization of the major subsystems and components of these platforms. Engine, transmission, and associated technologies are the most crucial elements of this endeavor. A reliable partner is therefore important to avoid risks, unnecessary cost, and uncertainties. Ukraine is a good candidate for being such a partner, since it is possible to establish a defense industry-military partnership with benefits for both sides.

That said, there are realities that may or may not limit Turkey’s opportunities. The most obvious and important risk factor is Russia’s invasion and war with Ukraine and all the political, military, industrial, and financial uncertainties it has produced since February 24, 2022. Turkey’s relations with the two warring sides are both crucial and fragile. Managing these risks is a challenging task, even more so than the challenges involved in developing an indigenous engine. In the end, the Russia-Ukraine War was a stark reminder for Turkey that complex aerospace and defense programs are important assets in foreign relations.

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n October 6, U.S. President Joe Biden said the risk of nuclear “Armageddon” was at its highest level since the Cuban Missile Crisis. Biden said Russian President Vladimir Putin was a guy he knew fairly well, and that Putin was “not joking when he talks about the use of tactical nuclear weapons or biological or chemical weapons.”

Lately Russia has been suffering major setbacks and losing strategic cities in Ukraine. Putin has repeatedly suggested using nuclear weapons if the “territorial integrity of our country is threatened.” The frequency of such rhetoric is escalating as the Russian army suffers major disappointments.

Joe Biden added that the threat from Vladimir Putin may be serious because the Russian military seemed to be “significantly underperforming.”

How have Russia’s nuclear threats evolved? What are Russia’s nuclear capabilities? Should the world really worry about a potential nuclear war?

Russia’s nuclear moves

Three days after Russia began the military invasion of Ukraine on February 24, Putin ordered the placement of Russian nuclear forces on high alert.

Russia drew criticism from many world leaders when Putin threatened to use nuclear weapons to defend annexed territories during the week of the annual UN General Assembly Meeting.

“This is not a bluff… those who try to blackmail us with nuclear weapons should know that the wind vane can turn and point toward them,” warned Putin.

On September 30, Putin also stated that the U.S. created a “precedent” by using nuclear weapons in World War II.

According to the Russian nuclear doctrine, Russia considers nuclear weapons as a deterrent. They can be used if attacked by nuclear weapons or other types of weapons of mass destruction targeting the Russian territories or the territories of its allies; when the existence of the Russian state is in danger with the use of conventional weapons; or when Russian critical governmental or military sites are attacked threatening its nuclear capability.

In this context, Putin’s signing of the four federal constitutional laws annexing the regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson is important because in order to “defend” these annexed regions, Putin can resort to the Russian nuclear doctrine.

How destructive can these weapons be?

Even the smallest warhead could cause major damage and loss of life at the moment of strike, not to mention the long-term effects of radiation. However, there are factors that determine how destructive a nuclear weapon can be: yield and the surface where the blast takes place.

Yield is what defines the power of a nuclear weapon. Modern tactical weapons have a capacity of around 10 to 100 kilotons, which makes them more destructive than the nuclear bombs used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which respectively had yields of 15 and 21 kilotons.

Russia possesses the most powerful nuclear bomb that has ever exploded, the Tsar Bomba with a yield of at least 50 megatons.

Where the blast occurs may have an effect on the damage; depending on the terrain or on whether it occurs underground or on the surface, the surroundings may absorb some of the blow.

The immediate impact zone would likely be annihilated, and structures that are hit by the blast wave could be destroyed up to several kilometers.

Should we worry?

Yes—and no: while the destruction that these weapons cause is catastrophic, and Russia seems to be playing with fire, the tactical weapons that Russia may choose to use in Ukraine need to be transported and deployed. This could take days, and in the meantime, intelligence services from other countries would likely detect such activity.

Yet, the state of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is deplorable. According to the Federation of American Scientists, nuclear-armed states retain large arsenals for the indefinite future instead of planning for nuclear disarmament. Meanwhile, all nuclear-armed states continue to modernize their remaining nuclear forces at a “significant pace,” and several are adding new types and/or increasing the role they serve in national strategy and public statements.

This includes Russia, which continues a “comprehensive” modernization program to replace most of the Soviet-era weapons and introduce new types.

Almost 70 years after the establishment of the United Nations (UN), the aim to protect international peace and security remains as relevant and urgent as ever. Today’s conflicts cause immense human sufferings in terms of human casualties, displacement, and humanitarian needs. Approximately one and a half billion people live in about fifty conflict zones around the world under the threat of violence.

The UN was established to prevent the reoccurrence of the great destructions and humanitarian sufferings caused by the past wars, World War II being the most prominent. For a series of reasons, however, the UN has mostly failed to fulfill its most fundamental task, its raison d’être: protecting peace and security.

The Russia-Ukraine War is another striking example of a UN failure. Let’s have a look at how, where, and why the UN system fails.

The UN Peacekeeping System

As in all legal systems, the main purpose of international law is to protect the existence of the international community through preventing violence. Article 1 of the UN Charter states that the main purpose of the UN is to “maintain international peace and security” by taking “effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace.”

The main responsibility for eliminating the threats to peace or suppressing aggression is given to the UN Security Council which can take binding decisions for all states in order to inflict collective measures, as stated in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, against an aggressor such as political, economic, and even military measures when other measures fail.

The Security Council makes decisions with the majority vote of 9 out of 15 members. However, for a decision to go through permanent members of the Security Council, i.e., China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, must not veto said decisions. These countries have the “veto power” to preventing passing any resolution.

The UN, as a whole, also deals with issues like the protection of human rights and the environment, the peaceful use of space and seas, international commercial and/or economic issues, and international organizations, as they indirectly affect the protection of international peace and security.

How the UN Failed to Prevent the Russia-Ukraine War

About eight years prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which started on February 24, 2022, Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea in 2014 and the confrontations in the Donbas region had already caused enormous tensions and even military confrontations between the two countries, signaling a major conflict.

Unsurprisingly, Russia launched a major military attack in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, naming it a “special military operation.” At the very least, it was an “armed attack” clearly meeting the definition of “aggression” as worded by the UN Charter and endorsed by the UN General Assembly with a decision taken on March 2, 2022.

However, the UN Security Council failed to take any decision to prevent or stop the aggression due to Russia’s veto. During the time, the UN could not carry out an effective process at the level of both the General Assembly and the Security Council to stop the war in Ukraine. The General Assembly failed to organize an extraordinary meeting to decide on possible measures.

The Security Council, which has the authority to take binding decisions, has not been able to take measures against Russia. As a matter of fact, the Security Council came together at two extraordinarily meetings with no results. Russia preferred to start the attack while the Security Council meeting was in process. As U.S. ambassador to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield said, Putin somewhat disdainfully declared the war while the council meeting was going on.

After the beginning of the Russian attack, the Security Council, at its first meeting on February 26, 2022, similarly could not take any coercive decision against Russia, again due to Russia’s use of its veto. Ironically, Russia, which held the rotating presidency of the Security Council, for a period of one month when the invasion of Ukraine took place, has even taken steps that have caused more tensions rather than help move towards peace, by calling the Security Council to a meeting to discuss the “biological weapons” of the U.S. in Ukraine.

Since no decision could be taken, there have been no collective and coordinated measures by the international community against Russia. States are left on their own to decide what to do to stop the war and restore peace in Ukraine, a process that has been quite insufficient.

There has only been partial UN success in reporting, investigating human rights violations, and helping Ukrainian civilians. Raising funds for Ukrainian civilians seems relatively successful. The United Nations and its humanitarian partners launched emergency appeals totaling $1.7 billion to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to people in Ukraine and refugees in neighboring countries. On March 7, the World Bank approved an emergency funding of $700 million to support Ukraine. These funds will ensure the continuation of essential services to the population.

However, the inability of the UN Security Council to take a globally binding decision, which could include collective sanctions, has prevented the international community from assuming a joint and coordinated position towards Russia. As a result, the UN, has remained ineffective in fulfilling its duty in such a challenging situation.

Why Is the UN Peacekeeping System Not Working?

Although the UN has achieved certain success in supporting the right of many countries to self-determination, the development of international law, free trade, human rights, and peacekeeping operations, it has not achieved a similar success in maintaining international peace and security.

The first of the fundamental reasons behind the UN peacekeeping system’s lack of success is structural. The fact that permanent members of the Security Council are given the authority to veto draft resolutions demonstrates that the system was established to work only with the consensus of five countries.

The fact that permanent members of the UN Security Council do not actually agree on many peace-related international issues means that the system in most of the cases is blocked. Moreover, the UN Security Council could not work against any permanent member even if it is an aggressor, like the case of Russia in Ukraine. In the limited cases where the UN peacekeeping system has worked, it did so only for the common interests of its permanent members.

The second reason for the failure of the UN peacekeeping system is the lack of budgetary autonomy. Major contributors to the UN General Budget include the U.S. and other countries that use their financial power to affect the functionality of the UN and to make sure it operates according to their own interests rather than those of the international community.

Another fundamental reason relates to the capacity—or lack thereof—of the UN to enforce its decisions relating to international peace and security, including those of the Security Council. Even if the Security Council is able to take a decision despite difficulties, there is no permanent structure for the UN that will enforce the resolutions. The enforcement is actually left to the power of the member states, if any is willing to act.

The Russia–Ukraine war threatens global food security, especially in Asia and the MENA region, which heavily rely on Russian and Ukrainian wheat, oilseeds, and fertilizers. The world, already hit by the COVID19 global pandemic and struggling with the climate crisis, now faces another serious problem: food insecurity. Nihan Duran of Politics Today interviewed Caitlin Welsh, the director of the Global Food Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., on the alarming consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the road ahead to address future global shocks on food security.

Q. On February 24, 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine started and the war doesn’t appear to be ending anytime soon. Meanwhile, the war has started to threaten food security globally. But, let’s start at the very beginning: what do we mean by food insecurity?

Food insecurity means the lack of access to a diet that allows for an active and healthy lifestyle. So, it is not only the lack of access to sufficient food but the lack of access to food of the right nutritional quality, which will encourage physical and cognitive development.

There are multiple ways to improve food security; such as long-term agricultural development and short-term humanitarian emergency assistance, as we are seeing in response to the Ukraine crisis right now. Ukrainians fleeing the country—and also populations inside Ukraine—are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, as they are currently experiencing food insecurity due to the existing conflict situation.

Q. Apart from Ukrainians experiencing food insecurity due to the ongoing war, there are increasing concerns that the war will impact food security globally. Many countries heavily rely on Russian and Ukrainian wheat and oilseeds. What is this situation like?

It is true that Russia and Ukraine produce a significant amount of the world’s grains and oilseeds, in addition to fertilizers. So, a lot of agricultural commodities are not just produced there, but also exported from there. Worth noting is that Russia and Ukraine combined account for a substantial portion of the exports of those commodities around the world.

We have to consider that wheat is the most important part of the diets in the Middle East and North Africa. There are 26 countries that rely on imports from Russia and Ukraine to meet at least 50% of their wheat imports. And then, there are 50 countries that rely on Russia and Ukraine for 30% of their wheat imports. Therefore, the countries that are going to be most affected are the ones that import their wheat needs mostly from Russia and Ukraine.

Q. I understand that the situation may get worse and become dire for the MENA region. What would be the short- and long-term consequences of the Ukraine war on food security there?

The best-case scenario will be, of course, one in which the war ends quickly. However, even if there could be a ceasefire tonight, the damage will take some time to repair. There is a significant amount of infrastructure that has been damaged; we see fields plowed over by tanks, railroads destroyed, ports closed export facilities due to bombardments, and so on.

If the war were to end now, then two important things could happen in the agriculture cycle. One would be that the current crop of cereals, which is in the ground right now, could be cultivated and harvested in the summertime, and the next crop of cereals, which would be planted in late summer, could be put in the ground for harvest in 2023. Then those grains could be exported to global markets, which, as I mentioned, is critical for the countries that are dependent on Ukrainian wheat.

Q. What would the international response to such a threat be?

We actually already see some coordination among multilateral organizations. The G7 put out a call advising countries around the world not to impose export bans. The head of the World Trade Organization also said that the organization is calling member states and advising them against export bans.

When it comes to sanctions on Russia, most countries have so far avoided putting sanctions on Russian agricultural products. It remains critical for countries to continue not to attack Russia’s agriculture sector with sanctions.

Relatedly, it is incredibly important to keep fertilizer markets open. It is not just the grain that is being exported from Russia and Ukraine, it is also fertilizer. Russia and Belarus together are the main exporters of low-cost fertilizer. Threatening those exports would make farming more expensive for all types of farmers, from the poorest farmers to large industries.

Q. What about local responses to support the food and agriculture sector in war-torn Ukraine, and other countries that rely on imports from Russia and Ukraine?

It is crucial to support Ukraine’s agricultural sector even in the midst of the war. Ukraine’s Ministry of Agriculture did a survey about the input needs of its farmers. Listening to Ukraine’s Ministry of Agriculture and supporting their agriculture industry is vital at this very moment.

Equally important is to support the countries that rely on imports from Russia and Ukraine and to find other sources for food imports. This is a time to boost investments and social safety net systems to help the poorest of the poor to still access food during price increases.

Q. My last question will be a lessons-learned one. The world was trying to handle the climate crisis, was then hit hard by the COVID19 global pandemic in early 2020, and now the Ukraine war and global food insecurity! What lessons should we draw?

Right now, what we are seeing is another recognition that food systems are global, and that an event happening in one part of the world can affect food security in other countries that have nothing to do with that particular event. Two years ago, when COVID19 hit, we saw shocks throughout the supply chain with significant impacts on household food insecurity. The shock that we had during COVID19 had nothing to do with supply. Supply was there; it just had to do with markets.

When we probably thought that there would be several more years out from another shock like this, now we have the war in Ukraine. But this shock is completely different in nature.

As we are thinking about short-term responses to address the impact of this particular crisis, we also need to be prepared for other global shocks of different types and magnitudes. This current crisis is a reminder that we need to continue to be prepared for shocks of different natures. The former one had to do with a pandemic, this current one has to do with a war, and the next could be due to climate change and a severe weather event. We might not be able to anticipate what the nature of the shock would be, but in the longer term, we need to be looking at how we can strengthen our own national and global systems, so that we can withstand these shocks.

In two years, we went from living in a stable global economy and a relatively peaceful international order to a troubled global economy and shaky international order. This abrupt decline was mainly due to two major developments: the COVID19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The pandemic disrupted not just our daily lives but also led to cracks in our interdependent world. From banning international flights and closing borders to limiting export of healthcare products, government interference in the global economy on the grounds of national interest has become widespread.

In response to the pandemic, many governments initiated national vaccine development programs and increased their efforts towards self-sufficiency in healthcare technologies. As the global shipping slowed because of COVID19-related restrictions, manufacturing industries were also urged to relocate their factories from China to the United States and Europe.

At the beginning of this year, many thought the pandemic would be over soon and we could go back to some form of normalcy. But when the pandemic slowed down, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shattered the hopes for return of normalcy to global economy and politics. Analysts caution that the war in Ukraine may spread to neighboring countries and pave the way for a world war. The global economic stability is also endangered by conflict, as many European nations, particularly Germany, depend on Russian natural gas for their energy needs.

The economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the West seek to trigger a regime change in Russia. However, thus far, the sanctions only led to Russia’s introduction of the export bans on some of its minerals and agricultural products, which hurt both Russian companies and the importers of their products.

The overall picture is thus one of tit-for-tat between Russia and the West, and the result may be the end of globalization and concomitant interdependence of the world economy. There is no doubt that the COVID19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine weakened global interdependence as a norm and brought self-sufficiency to the forefront.

Although self-sufficiency may appear ideal to deal with the challenges we experience today, I argue that self-sufficiency efforts are mostly futile. We are embedded in a “complex” interdependence which guarantees that every country and each individual will be worse off in the case of self-sufficiency replacing interdependence as the global norm.

The war in Ukraine was not unexpected; a full-fledged war between Russia and Ukraine was anticipated since the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014. That is why most commentators agreed that the EU should have prepared itself to cope with its dependence on Russian gas, and energy self-sufficiency should now be prioritized by the union. But this argument only holds if we assume that Russia is not dependent on the West, ignoring its dependence on European trade and goods.

Between the EU and Russia there existed some form of complex interdependence as each needed the other for something which may either be costly or inaccessible if sought from elsewhere. The removal of Russia from SWIFT and the withdrawal of Western companies and investment from the country are all towards disentangling Russia from the cobweb of complex interdependence, which will inevitably hurt both the Russians and their trade partners.

In short, there is no winner in moving towards self-sufficiency, both Russia and the West stand to lose. Disintegration of the liberal political and economic order of the world would lead to economic stagnation and political upheaval, the complex nature of the existing economic and political relationships cannot be undone in an efficient and peaceful way.

The response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine should target the Russian elites but not seek to exclude Russia from the global economic architecture. Sanctions such as SWIFT and Western companies’ withdrawal from the Russian retail market are counterproductive. Sanctions targeting ordinary people usually prove ineffective in authoritarian regimes and rather serve as justification of the governments’ self-sufficiency efforts.

Most efforts seeking to replace the complex interdependence at the international level with self-sufficiency at the national level are doomed to fail. The level of complexity has increased dramatically since the concept was first coined. Compared to the 1970s, today’s world relies on electronic devices, for instance. All electronic devices, such as computers and smartphones, are built with microchips and powered by sophisticated software. The design and manufacturing of the microchips and software are progressing so fast that no country can dominate either field or fully control both sectors.

Food self-sufficiency is also no longer a possibility; many nations currently have a much more reduced amount of arable land than they had in the 1970s and larger populations which make them ever more reliant on each other to feed their population. In brief, given the ever-increasing complexity of interdependence, even in the times of global crises, self-sufficiency cannot match the level of well-being provided to us by the sophisticated global economy.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine stirred up debates and policy decisions regarding defense and security, especially in Europe. Many countries made decisions to increase military spending. Recently, Finland and Sweden, which traditionally take an approach of non-alignment and military independence, face predicaments of policy change with respect to their pacifism and the historic decision of joining NATO.

The Russian aggression and the growing public concerns put pressure on the governments of Sweden and Finland to join NATO. Finland, which shares a border with Russia, seems to be treating the situation with more urgency and plans to join NATO as soon as the summer of 2022. Sweden, which was taking a more cautious path towards membership, also seems to be in favor of following in Finland’s path.

According to local media the Nordic countries will submit their NATO application simultaneously in mid-May, likely the week of May 16. Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Pekka Haavisto commented that no fixed date has been set but that it would be “useful” for the bid to launch in conjunction. On April 25, Finnish media Iltalehti reported that suggestions from the Swedish leadership about submitting the applications at the same time had met with agreement from the Finnish side, providing Sweden goes ahead with its plan to join NATO.

Why are Sweden and Finland neutral states?

Historically, Finland has been a buffer state. Until the Russian Imperial Army annexed it in 1808, Finland was a part of the Swedish Kingdom. It remained an autonomous buffer state for a century under the Russian Empire, known as the “Grand Duchy of Finland,” and declared independence during the Russian Revolution in 1917. During the interwar period, relations between Finland and the Soviet Union were tense. Later, during World War II, Finland was regarded by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany to be under the Soviet sphere of influence.

Finland officially adopted neutrality in the Cold War period, and a 1948 treaty with the Soviet Union consolidated its desire to remain out of great power conflicts. The treaty would ensure that Finland would not be hostile towards the Soviet Union and deter any attack on the Soviet Union carried out via Finnish soil by Germany or its allies. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Finland tilted towards the West and finally became an EU member in 1995.

Sweden was a historically non-aligned country and stayed out of both world wars. Although Sweden saw the Soviet Union as a threat and cooperated with NATO during the Cold War period, the country opted for military independence and stayed out of the alliance. It joined the EU the same year as Finland.

Remaining outside of the NATO umbrella— similar to Ukraine—and observing NATO’s limited response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine have provoked Sweden and Finland to rethink their military neutrality and non-alignment policy. With their foundation from earlier training programs, the integration of Finland and Sweden to NATO will not be difficult. Both the U.S. and NATO have given positive signals that their membership request would likely be accepted swiftly; however, the admittance process may take four months to a year. It is also unlikely that the countries would face difficultly fulfilling the unanimous vote requirement to join NATO.

Public opinion and political will in both countries favor NATO membership

The public opinion and political will in both countries are in favor of joining the military alliance. In Finland, the public that had been uninterested in joining NATO now see its importance. Opinion polls show that more than 60% of Finns favor joining NATO, a figure that had remained at 20-30% before the war in Ukraine. In the upcoming weeks, Finland is to come to an official decision as well as an outline to its path to joining NATO.

The ruling party in Sweden, the Social Democrats, released a statement that read, “When Russia invaded Ukraine, Sweden’s security position changed fundamentally.” The party’s position is in favor of following in Finland’s path in terms of NATO membership. However, the Swedish government will face general elections in September 2022 and may want to avoid voter alienation by making such a drastic change, and, therefore, has been treading a more careful path in the past weeks.

Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet reported earlier in April that Magdalena Andersson, prime minister of Sweden, was planning to apply for membership in time for a NATO summit in late June. A poll on April 20 showed that the percentage of Swedes that are in favor of joining NATO went up from 51% in March to 57%, those opposing fell to 21% from 24%, and undecided votes decreased to 22% from 25%. This shows more certainty among the public as Russia increases its threats.

The expansion of NATO was essentially the situation Russia wanted to avoid. Dmitry Peskov, the Kremlin spokesperson, stated that the NATO alliance remained a tool towards confrontation and its expansion would not bring stability. Moscow threatened to readjust the balance at the border and reposition nuclear weapons in the Kaliningrad region between Poland and Lithuania if Finland and Sweden joined NATO (nuclear installations in the region already exist).

Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Security Council of Russia, also mentioned that Russia would have to strengthen its land, naval, and air forces in the Baltic Sea.

For now, the accession process of Sweden and Finland to NATO is set to heighten tensions, but the possibility of direct confrontation from Russia is unlikely given that its troops are allocated to Ukraine. Still, nuclear buildup in the Baltic puts the region on edge.

The inflation rate in Germany has reached 7.3 percent, the highest level in forty years. Although an increase in inflation was expected, this number has surprised most economists. The Russia-Ukraine war has further increased the already rising energy prices and exacerbated the inflation. Consumer prices rose by 7.3 percent in March 2022 compared to March 2021. While the inflation rate was 4.9 percent in January and 5.1 percent in February of this year, the current inflation rate of 7.3 percent shows a significant increase.

The German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Wirtschaftsweisen) expects a record inflation of 6.1 percent for 2022. This would be the highest rate since reunification. By comparison, last year’s inflation was 3.1 percent. Now the coalition government in Germany is discussing how to pursue its Russia policy that has a significant impact on the economy, especially in the energy sector.

Disagreement among economists

Not only Germany is struggling with economic difficulties, but the whole euro zone is affected by the Russia-Ukraine war. The European Central Bank might raise interest rates, but it wants to keep insisting on its loose monetary policy. Michael Heise, chief economist at HQ Trust, describes the situation, as follows: “For European monetary policy, the situation is getting more difficult from week to week. High inflation and further disruptions in production processes threaten to slow economic growth to zero.”

The so-called Wirtschaftsweisen (economic experts), who advise the German government on economic issues, have set their forecast for economic growth in Germany’s gross domestic product at 1.8 percent for 2022, significantly lowering expectations.

Other economists warn against a complete halt to imports of Russian energy, as inflation could otherwise rise to as much as 10 percent. Institute for Economic Research President Marcel Fratzscher claims that “some companies would probably have to stop production and put more people on short-time work.”

Other economists, in turn, claim that an import freeze from Russia is a distinct possibility. For the German economy, this would pose a major challenge, but it would not be impossible. Economist Veronika Grimm has pointed out that the German government should not only pay attention to economic developments, but also draw on moral and ethical values.

According to the YouGov survey conducted in March, 15.2 percent of the German population can no longer pay their living expenses. The respondents also stated that their situation was currently threatening their very existence. In January, this rate was 11 percent.

23.6 percent of people with a net income of at least 2,500 euros said they were no longer able to meet regular expenses because prices were rising disproportionately to wages. In January, this figure was only 17 percent.

The German coalition government had announced a relief package to offset rising prices. Among other things, the traffic light coalition has decided to reduce the energy tax for three months to make gasoline and diesel cheaper. In addition, employees will receive a one-time energy allowance of 300 euros on their gross salary and families will receive a 100-euro bonus per child on their child allowance. The relief package adopted for the month of February has cost the German government 16 billion euros.

According to the YouGov survey, 53.4 percent of respondents said they are very worried about rising prices of goods and services. Three months ago, the figure was 44 percent. Therefore, 61.3 percent would like to receive further support from the state. In their view, the federal government’s relief package is not enough to mitigate the effects of inflation.

Uncertain future

The Russia-Ukraine war has been very damaging to the German economy. Currently, the voices are not yet so loud due to the current economic situation. Still the Russia-Ukraine war dominates the political discourse. However, Federal Finance Minister Christian Lindner is already warning that Germany is facing hard times.

“The Ukraine war is making us all poorer. I have serious concerns about economic development. Growth is declining, prices are hiking. In the long term, we will have to lay new foundations for prosperity. Germany must renew its growth model of a social and ecological market economy,” he said.

Lindner’s statement and the YouGov survey show that Germany is sailing towards an economically unstable and uncertain future. Until the outbreak of the COVID19 pandemic, in recent years, the German people had been spoiled by strong economic growth.

While Germany was still able to manage the pandemic confidently, the Russia-Ukraine war has revealed the limits of the German economy. Only the future can tell to what extent the fluctuations in the German economy will affect German domestic policies and foreign politics.

Could Russian President Vladimir Putin be prosecuted for war crimes in Ukraine? What about Russian military commanders and ordinary Russian soldiers? On the other side, could Ukraine President Volodmyr Zelensky, Ukrainian commanders or ordinary Ukrainian soldiers be prosecuted?

These questions have taken on increased urgency as Russia’s military action in Ukraine promises to continue for an extended period of time. To answer these questions, one must ask, first, what constitutes a crime in warfare. And second, if crimes are committed, is there a court that can actually prosecute and impose punishment.

The rules of war apply to all those who participate in war, from soldiers on the ground to the top commanders. They may lawfully kill people on the other side, but they may not kill civilians. If they take captives, they must treat them humanely. It matters not who started a war. Once a war begins, the rules apply equally to both sides.

Eyes on Russia

In the current hostilities in Ukraine, most attention has been on crimes that may have been committed on the Russian side. It is the Russian army that has taken action resulting in the deaths of at least several thousand Ukrainians. Bombardment by long-range missiles has resulted in many deaths. If bombardment is intended to harm civilians, then it is a crime.

Even if not intended to harm civilians, it is a crime if done “in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects.” That is wording from the Statute of the International Criminal Court, the court established twenty years ago in the Hague to prosecute persons who commit war crimes and other internationally defined offenses.

The recent bombing of a rail station in the city of Kramatorsk similarly appears to be an attack on a civilian objective. Investigators must determine whether the rail station was targeted intentionally, or whether the attack could have been aimed at some military objective in the vicinity. So far, no such evidence has appeared. Even if the Kramatorsk rail station was hit accidentally, it might still be a war crime on the basis that care was not taken to avoid hitting civilians.

So if a missile is launched against a military target, such an attack is unlawful if civilians are nearby and can be expected to be hit. Images from Ukraine circulating in the media show apartment buildings destroyed by missile attack. On the face of it, such attacks seem to be unlawful. Even if Ukrainian fighters are present in an apartment building, the harm to others is so predictable that an attack is not lawful.

One hospital was bombed by a Russian missile attack in the Ukrainian city of Mariupol. On the face of it, this appears to be an unlawful attack. There was some information, however, that this hospital had been taken over by a Ukrainian military unit and was not at the time functioning as a hospital. This is the kind of situation that must be investigated to determine if a war crime was committed.

There are allegations about acts of Russian soldiers in areas they have captured, like the town of Bucha near Kyiv. Civilians were apparently killed during the time the Russian army was in occupation. Investigators are working to find evidence as to how civilians were killed in Bucha and in other towns under Russian occupation.

It must be determined first whether they were killed by Russians. If that is the case, it must be determined whether the killings were carried out by Russian soldiers at their own initiative, or whether Russian commanders ordered or condoned the killings. If that is so, then commanders too would be guilty of war crimes.

Ukraine’s responsibility

On the Ukrainian side, its army is not causing damage on a similar scale against the Russians. It is directing its fire against the Russian military. So any prosecution of Ukrainian leadership figures is unlikely. The situation in which crimes have been alleged against Ukrainian personnel involve Russian captives, for example, shooting Russian prisoners in the knee. If prisoners are abused, this is a war crime. If commanders condone such abuse, they too are guilty.

The importance of all this law on war crimes is that it lets everyone know that they might be held accountable. Actual accountability, however, is far from certain. Sometimes the authorities of an army prosecute their own personnel. Sometimes prosecutions are undertaken by authorities of an opposing army. Sometimes they are undertaken by prosecutors in states that are not directly involved. Recently, Syrians alleged to have committed war crimes in the Syrian civil war have been prosecuted in Germany.

The International Criminal Court

The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, a British lawyer named Karim Khan, has opened an investigation into possible crimes committed in Ukraine. The International Criminal Court focuses on high-level personnel. Khan is not likely to indict ground troops. Indictments against Russian commanders, particularly for bombardment of civilians, appear a serious possibility, however. The prosecutor may be able to identify particular commanders responsible for particular missile strikes. Under the court’s procedures, even cabinet ministers and presidents can be indicted.

The International Criminal Court does actually try persons and sentences them to prison. The court does not have its own prisons, but different countries house prisoners on the court’s behalf. The difficulty for the International Criminal Court is to gain custody in order to conduct a trial. The court does not try anyone in their absence. If Russian commanders, or even top civilian leaders are indicted, the Russian government is unlikely to surrender them.

States that are party to the International Criminal Court, however, have an obligation to surrender persons who are under indictment. Over one hundred states are parties. Anyone under indictment who travels to such a state risks arrest.

The United States: double standards?

The United States has been publicly accusing the Russian military and civilian leadership of war crimes. Last year, when the International Criminal Court’s prosecutor opened an investigation that may result in prosecution of Israeli officials over Israel’s unlawful settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, the United States criticized the prosecutor. Israel is not a party to the International Criminal Court, and the United States stated its view that there is no legal basis to prosecute nationals of a state that is not a party.

Russia, similar to Israel, is not a party. So, by the U.S. logic, there should be no prosecution of Russian nationals. The United States did not criticize Khan, however, for opening an investigation that may lead to prosecution of Russian nationals. The United States thus is open to an accusation of double standards.

Ukraine too finds itself in an awkward legal position. Like Russia, Ukraine is not a party to the International Criminal Court. Technically, the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction to prosecute for war crimes committed in Ukraine, because Ukraine has taken advantage of a special provision that allows a state that is not a party to the court to give the court the right to prosecute for crimes in its territory.

However, since Ukraine is not a party, if Ukrainians were to commit war crimes in a foreign country, they could not be prosecuted. So Ukraine is asking for Russians to be prosecuted for war crimes in Ukraine, while Ukrainians cannot be prosecuted by the court for war crimes they might commit in other countries.

The Haydar Aliyev Centre for Eurasian Studies at Ibn Haldun University in Turkey held a webinar on the impact of the war in Ukraine on Central Asia on March 30, 2022. The webinar included Prof. Luca Anceschi, an expert on Eurasian studies who teaches at the University of Glasgow, UK; Akbota Zholdasbekova, an associate professor at L.N Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Nur-Sultan, Kazakhstan; Emil Dzhuraev, co-founder and fellow at Crossroads-Central Asia, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; and Prof. Yaşar Sarı from Ibn Haldun University, Istanbul, Turkey.

Response from state and civil society in Central Asia

Speaking of Turkmenistan’s official position, which is unclear at present on the Russia-Ukraine war, Luca Anceschi noted that Turkmenistan “is a country where war is not debated in the public press. Whatever the news makes internationally, doesn’t make it in Turkmenistan because the government decides what goes and what doesn’t go into the news. The country has been engaged very publicly in the presidential transition as well.”

He added, “This is a very inwards-looking country; it’s a country that only cares about themselves, not because the people are like that but because the regime forced them to do so.”

Emil Dzhuraev elaborated on the issue of the official position of Central Asian countries on the Russia-Ukraine war. According to Dzhuraev, “All Central Asian countries, in one way or another, expressed a position of neutrality.” Countries are using the cover of official state neutrality in order to escape the ire of parties involved in the ongoing war.

One can also see the evolution in these neutral positions when countries like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have showcased their greater sympathy towards Ukraine. “However, that doesn’t mean an open condemnation of the aggressive actions by Russia,” said Dzhuraev.

While addressing the response of civil society in Kyrgyzstan, Dzhuraev said, “There have been public protests and demonstrations in support of both countries [Russia and Ukraine],” but “there is a lack of information, if not ignorance about what the matter really is” among the people. Because of the strong presence of Russian state-controlled media from which a large part of Kyrgyz population gets their daily news, “there is an urgent need for countries [Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan] to consider their information security question.”

Dzhuraev argued there is a prevailing division of allegiance between young and older Kyrgyz. According to Dzhuraev, old generation Kyrgyz are pro-Russian due to the “imprint of many years in close affinity with Russia under the Soviet Union.” He also noted the role of Russia’s “propaganda campaign that has been working successfully with Putin in the center in Kyrgyzstan.”

In this regard, Dzhuraev stated that the “lump-sum value of remittances has come down during the COVID19 restrictions to 20%, which is less than normal.” He added that during the Russia-Ukraine crisis, “one could expect even a sharper decline in remittances.” He further stressed the debates which are emerging in Kazakhstan around Kyrgyz migrants in Russia and the fear of their possible recruitment in the war against Ukraine.

A large number of goods that Kyrgyzstan receives from EU markets and other countries apparently come through Russia. Dzhuraev put emphasis on revisiting the “question of whether Kyrgyzstan can refigure its supply routes for imports of essential goods such as medicine, food items, technology, etc.”

Central Asian countries “treading a fine line”?

Countries in Central Asia are maintaining the position of neutrality. An Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson clarified that Uzbekistan maintained neutrality regarding the war in Ukraine. Uzbekistan hasn’t recognized the pro-Russian separatist-controlled districts in Ukraine’s Donbas, known as the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. The same is the case with Turkmenistan, which maintains a position it calls “positive neutrality.”

Turkmenistan seems to uphold its long-standing principle of “permanent neutrality” by avoiding all public comments on the Russia-Ukraine war. Kyrgyzstan’s foreign minister reiterated the country’s commitment to the principle of territorial integrity.

Dzhuraev concluded that “the Central Asian positions of neutrality should be read actually as covers for stances against the war. Central Asian countries have appealed to resolve the crisis on the basis of international law, and there is no doubt that international law would certainly be on the side of Ukraine and condemning Russia.”

According to Dzhuraev, “Neutrality should be read as the timid signs of siding with Ukraine as far as these countries can afford.”

While speaking on the relations of Kazakhstan with Russia and Ukraine, Zholdasbekova maintained that they “will be coming to more neutrality.” She further stated that “we believe in a bright future, and we believe that our great principle of multivectorism will still serve us after Russia’s aggression.”

Press freedom in Central Asia

Dzhuraev pointed out Russia’s tendency to “write Kyrgyzstan into a position of support of Russian actions by Russian sources.” It happened when Kyrgyzstani president Sadyr Japarov talked with Russian president Putin over the phone. After the call, Russia’s media agency reported that the Kyrgyz president supports Russia’s actions in Ukraine. However, as Dzhuraev said, “From Kyrgyzstan, there was no such word, not even close to that.”

Many cases are also coming to the surface regarding the declining press freedom in the Central Asian countries, particularly Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Recently, Kyrgyzstan authorities raided the broadcaster Next TV and detained its director over their published posts covering claims by a former head of Kazakhstan’s intelligence agency that Kyrgyzstan has secretly agreed to provide military support to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

“These kinds of troubling signs are there in Kyrgyzstan, but the press and civil society are fighting for their freedom and rights every day while dealing with numerous trials/changes against them,” said Dzhuraev.

Speaking of the existence of free press in Kyrgyzstan, Zholdasbekova gave the examples of a few instances where news channels were banned because of content. According to Zholdasbekova, “There is no limitation to what you are watching, but sometimes when channels become too aggressive, they somehow might be closed without any explanation.”

In Switzerland, people filed a petition calling for the deportation of Olympic gymnast Alina Kabaeva, Putin’s alleged mistress and mother of four of his children, drawing 70,828 signatures as of Sunday, March 26, 2022. The petition reads, “It is time to reunite Eva Braun with him,” in reference to Putin.

Kabaeva responded to the petition with dismay and anger, describing it as embarrassing and adding that “there has never been a more shameful page in the history of world sports.”

Kabaeva is the latest victim, among countless others, of rising Russophobia. Thousands of Russian art workers, businesses, and businesspeople face pressure either from Russia or from countries that oppose the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It’s not only businesses under pressure but also Russian culture.

Putinizing all Russians

Shortly after the Russian occupation of Ukraine, anti-Russian opposition began to rise in the Czech Republic. Attacks targeted Russians in the country. Some social media users went too far and made statements such as “It would be nice to somehow mark Russian citizens with a red star.”

Russians were stigmatized and attacked just because they spoke their language. Martin Dlouhý, a professor at the Prague University of Economics and Business, wrote on Facebook on February 24, 2022, that he would not conduct, test, or correct the final thesis of Russian students “due to conscience and moral principles.” Dlouhý deleted the tweet after the backlash.

Czech hotels refused to host Russians. Russian children were attacked in schools, and a woman was kicked out of a taxi just for speaking Russian. Maison de la Poutine restaurant said it received insults and threats after Russia invaded Ukraine—this was because the restaurant is exactly pronounced the same as Putin (Poutine).

Performances by Russian pianist Alexander Malofeev were canceled. His condemnation of the war in Ukraine did not help prevent the cancellation of concerts in both Montreal and Vancouver.

The University of Milano-Bicocca in Italy responded to the Russian invasion of Ukraine by canceling a lecture on Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky. In response, a street artist painted an image of Dostoevsky on a university wall in protest.

Kirill Sokolov, a filmmaker of Ukrainian roots, was excluded from the Glasgow Film Festival despite his anti-war stance because his film has received Russian state funding, according to a spokesperson of the festival.

Many Russians have been excluded from international events because of their nationality, and many Russian businesses have been attacked.

Russian-owned businesses in the U.S. have been the target of backlash because of the war in Ukraine with many businesses being vandalized. Anti-Russian slogans have been written on restaurants’ walls and windows have been smashed. The Russian House restaurant in Washington, D.C. was attacked twice in connection with the war in Ukraine. The owner of the restaurant told the Washington Post that he had received threat calls.

In Tokyo, the Russian shop “Aka no Hiroba” was the target of vandalism. Despite promoting peace since the beginning of the war, it did not escape hate attacks.

Hundreds of bars across the U.S. disposed of their Russian vodka to show solidarity with Ukraine. Russian vodka, as well as all Russian alcoholic beverages, were removed from shelves in the U.S. Meanwhile, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand joined the U.S. in sanctioning vodka and Russian alcoholic beverages, and chain stores in Europe tightened sanctions on Russian products.

Not only Russians but also animals living in Russia got their share of sanctions. The Fédération Internationale Féline, an international federation of cat registries founded in France banned Russian cats from participating in its events due to the war.

Cyberspace and technology became a part of the anti-Russia campaign as well. The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project launched the “Russian Asset Tracker,” a database to track the assets of prominent Russians with ties to Vladimir Putin.

Social media giant Meta allowed users to engage in hate speech against Putin and Russian forces. A Meta spokesperson said, “As a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine we have temporarily made allowances for forms of political expression that would normally violate our rules like violent speech such as death to the Russian invaders. We still won’t allow credible calls for violence against Russian civilians.”

The ongoing impact of the COVID19 pandemic and the long-term adverse effects of climate change have led to significant increases in food prices. Declining productivity in many parts of the world, rising global demand, and food supply chain problems have led to reduced stocks of grains and oilseeds. Prices reached the highest levels in the last decade.

Declining soybean yields in South America, reduced palm oil supply in Malaysia, and the use of palm and soybean oil for biodiesel production are driving vegetable oil prices to a record high. On the other hand, prices of energy-intensive basic inputs such as fuel, fertilizers, and pesticides continue to increase rapidly. Finally, the war in Ukraine is giving new impetus to food and input prices.

Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine is threatening world agriculture and thus food security. Ukraine and Russia are agricultural powerhouses that make up a very important share of the world’s wheat, corn, oilseed, and fertilizer exports. The Ukraine war negatively affects all aspects of agriculture in the country and slows down exports from Russia.

Twenty-six countries across the world import at least half of their wheat from Russia and Ukraine. Low supply and high prices are likely to hit these most food-insecure countries first. On the other hand, the low supply and high prices of maize, oilseeds, and fertilizers play an increasing role in the prices of other commodities with their expansionist effects.

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) announced that the global Food Price Index for March 2022 reached an all-time high with steady gains. In addition to the effects of climate change, the UN estimates that the number of people experiencing food insecurity worldwide could be at its highest level of the last 15 years due to the effects of the COVID19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

FAO’s moderate scenario shows that wheat prices may increase by about 9% in the short term, and over 21% in the severe scenario. Undernutrition scenarios show that the additional increase in the number of undernourished people in the world could reach more than 13 million in a few years. In short, war threatens the food security of millions of people.

Figures on agricultural trade

Over the past 30 years, the Black Sea region has become a major global supplier of grains and oilseeds, including vegetable oils. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the early 1990s, the region was a net importer of grain, while Russian and Ukrainian exports today account for about 12% of the total calories traded in the world. The two countries are among the top five global exporters of many important grains and oilseeds, mainly wheat with 34.1%, barley with 26.8%, sunflower with 23.9%, and corn with 17.4%.

Ukraine is also an important source of sunflower seed oil, providing about 49.6% of the global market. When we add Russia to this figure, this share rises to 72.7%. Many importing countries depend on these products from Ukraine and Russia. North Africa and the Middle East import more than 50% of their grains from these two countries, and most of their wheat and barley. Ukraine is an important supplier to many North African markets, including Egypt and Libya, as well as the EU and China.

Risks created by the Russia-Ukraine war

The war causes a decrease in the agricultural production of the region, problems in the food supply chain, and logistics disruptions, as well as risks that have already reflected on the whole world and negatively affect global food security. These risks can be examined both globally, in terms of Ukraine and Russia, and in terms of Turkey, which imports substantial amount of agricultural products and inputs from these two countries.

The most obvious risks are the trade-related ones. Due to the sudden and sharp decline in shipments between and by Russia and Ukraine, as already seen, countries importing wheat from Russia and Ukraine will definitely find alternative sources, pay higher prices or, worst of all, face shortages of supply. The war has already caused the closure of ports, oilseed processing plants, and other critical commercial facilities. In this sense, Turkey also experienced difficulties in the shipment of sunflower oil.

Price risk is also one of the leading risks. The global Food Price Index published by FAO averaged 159.3 points in March 2022, up 17.9 points (12.6 percent) from February, making a giant leap to a new highest level since its inception in 1990. The latest increase reflects new all-time highs for vegetable oils, cereals and meat sub-indices, while those of sugar and dairy products also rose significantly. The price increases in food supplies such as flour and sunflower oil in March added to the constantly increasing food prices and increased Turkey’s March food price index by 4.73 percent.

On the other hand, logistical risks also come to the fore. These include damages to roads, ports, storage, and processing facilities as well as port blockades. Ninety percent of exports from Ukraine take place through ports. In other words, there is a risk of loss of more than 15 million tons of different commodities that Ukrainian farmers cannot export. The capacity of the Western Ukraine border and the railway connection is around 300,000 tons per month. Ukraine, which usually exports around 4-5 million tons of goods in the spring, will not be able to do this. Therefore, Ukrainian trade logistics are at risk.

Meanwhile, production risk threatens the next production period. Considering the livelihoods of the Ukrainian farmers, their families, and those living in the countryside, the situation is alarming. What will be the output of the harvesting of crops currently planted? Will farmers be able to plant next spring? According to a field study, farmers in Ukraine have only 20% of the diesel fuel needed and 65% of the other inputs. Multinational companies that stop their operations for the safety of their employees, for example, cannot process sunflower into oil. Damages caused between the fields and the processing facilities, production logistics problems, and labor supply difficulties are important production risks.

The energy risk is one of the most common risks raised by those concerned. Agriculture is completely dependent on energy for, among others, the production of fuel, electricity, fertilizers, pesticides, and lubricants. These risks concern not only the war zone, but the whole world. Russia is a very important supplier of agricultural inputs, especially fertilizers and natural gas. This fact creates an additional layer of risk. Turkey, which imports a significant amount of these inputs from Russia, is also at significant risk.

Exchange rates, borrowing, and economic growth risks increase due to war. There is already a significant loss of value in currencies that will adversely affect investments. There are significant decreases in money conversion speed. Agriculture is the backbone of the economy in many developing countries of the world that borrow in U.S. dollars. The permanent appreciation of the dollar against the currencies of these countries due to the war causes very serious risks for these economies. The depreciation of the Turkish lira in the last three months gained a new momentum with the effect of the war and became a very serious source of risk.

Of course, the most important are human-centered risks. In this sense, besides the fact that Ukrainians are refugees in excess of three million, the risks to their lives and livelihoods come to the fore. Before the war, one in four Eastern Ukrainians was already receiving international support as they were food insecure.

We are entering a period in which the purchasing power of a whole nation will decrease with the decrease in agricultural production, decrease in economic activity, and increase in prices. It is clear that these developments will increase food insecurity and malnutrition in Ukraine.

On April 3, Viktor Orbán, the candidate of Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance and the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), claimed victory for his fourth consecutive term as prime minister against the six-party United for Hungary coalition’s candidate Péter Márki-Zay.

In the final days leading to the elections, the war in Ukraine reflected heavily on campaign narratives, increasing voter turnout to 69.54% and advantaging Orbán who largely dominates Hungarian media. The opposition maintains that the elections were not on fair grounds with checks and balances issues and gerrymandering.

Following his 53% win, Orbán mocked Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky as an opponent to overpower through his campaign, and sent a message to the EU saying that conservative civic and patriotic politics was the future. He was able to maintain a two-thirds majority in the parliament, which the opposition claims

Orbán used to his advantage in his prior terms. However, a referendum in which Orbán advocated in favor of banning educational material for minors claiming that it promotes homosexuality and sex reassignment was deemed invalid.

The war in Ukraine and the election in Hungary

On March 15, during rallies commemorating the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, an important event shaping the formation of the Hungarian national identity, the war in Ukraine shaped the electoral campaigns’ narratives. Orbán presented his followers with a choice of a “pro-peace right” or “pro-war left.” Similarly, Márki-Zay remarked a “single historic choice: to choose Europe over the East, freedom over tyranny.”

While Orbán’s idea of taking a pro-peace approach is keeping Hungary neutral and out of the war, his party accused his opponent of wanting to send Hungarian soldiers to fight in Ukraine. Márki-Zay stated that these were “slanderous claims.”

Márki-Zay criticized Orbán for serving Putin’s interests, and argued that Hungarians thought it was Putin and not Brussels that needed to be stopped for peace to prevail. The opposition ran with a promise for a new constitution to restore the rule of law that it claims Orbán has marred, alongside accusing Orbán of promoting a hate campaign towards minorities and certain persons, namely George Soros. The opposition mainly stood for a pluralistic political system and the repairing of alliances with the EU and NATO.

Opening to the East

During Orbán’s 12 years in power, Hungary has cultivated an amicable relationship with Russia alongside dissent from the EU. Their relations started flourishing in 2011, when Hungary introduced an “Eastern Opening” policy to trade with countries like Russia, China, and Turkey to counterbalance economic ties with the West.

Three years later, Hungary gave a construction project to Russia for expanding Hungary’s only nuclear plant with Russian financing, which has caused much speculation within the EU. Hungary has confirmed it will move forward with the project after calls from the opposition to scrap it in the wake of the Ukraine war.

Furthermore, during the Russian annexation of Crimea, Hungary was hesitant to sanction Russia. In November 2021, the Hungarian foreign minister was awarded the highest state honor for non-Russians, the “Friend of Russia” award.

Orbán’s reasoning can be summarized in an interview on March 3, where he stated Hungary was caught up between major geopolitical powers and that it was NATO expansions that triggered the war by not appealing to Russian security demands.

He described Russia-Hungary relations as balanced and fair, hailed China’s strong economic endurance post-2008, and articulated his interests in developing a beneficial relationship with China, which he acknowledged as an emerging world power in the shifting world order.

Orbán evaluated the current Anglo-Saxon order in a manner reminiscent of his issues with the EU, saying, “Anglo-Saxons want the world to recognize their position as morally right. For them, it’s not enough to accept the reality of power; they also need you to accept the things that they think are right. The Chinese have no such need.”

Hungarian voters and the Ukraine crisis

A recent Pulzus Research survey shows the differences in how voters of different parties perceive the war. It found that 25% of Fidesz-KDNP supporters said that Russia had launched a “justified war” to protect the Russian minority in Ukraine.

Fewer than half of Fidesz-KDNP voters agreed that the attack on Ukraine was a show of great power aggression, and 26% percent said they did not know why the war broke out. Meanwhile, 89% of opposition supporters view the conflict as a war of great power aggression.

The major difference in perception may be due to the government’s pro-Russia stance over the years in addition to some pro-government media rhetoric. Although most major pro-government outlets have displayed neutral reporting on the war, pro-Russia narratives were put forward by some experts.

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, intelligence activities by the Russian Intelligence Services (RIS) in Ukraine have come under the global spotlight. The RIS consists of three components: the FSB, the domestic security service; the SVR, the foreign intelligence service; and the GRU, the military intelligence service. The FSB and the SVR are hierarchically linked to the Russian President Vladimir Putin, while the GRU is directly accountable to the Russian Armed Forces General Staff.

The Russian GRU is active in Ukraine, and there is information available in open sources allowing for the close examination of its operational capabilities. It’s worth remembering the Georgia experience in 2008 when the GRU failed terribly, shaking the credibility of the RIS. The appointment of Igor Sergun as the GRU director in 2011 was a turning point.

Thereafter, the GRU became successful in both planning cyber-operations and coordinating the activities of special forces units and pro-Russian separatists, especially before and during the Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014. This increased Sergun’s prestige and power; however, in January 2016, Sergun died suddenly and unexpectedly from a heart attack at a relatively young age—a development that has been considered suspicious by some western sources.

The success of Sergun’s term at the GRU is related to the principles set by the Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov, outlined in the article “The Value of Science in Prediction” published in the newspaper Military-Industrial Courier in 2012.

With the Gerasimov Doctrine, Russia aimed to manage the close combat processes with less conventional means in order to reduce human loss and the costs by incorporating non-military methods into its military capacity.

This method entails the coordinated use of cyberattacks, psychological warfare, demoralization to break defense resistance, and damaging the target countries’ economy through demolishing their critical infrastructure. These methods have been actively used since 2014 in Russia’s military mobility and intelligence activities in Ukraine.

Intelligence at Work during the Russia-Ukraine War?

There are some observable and striking shortcomings of Russian intelligence. Russia’s strategic intelligence on Ukraine seems to be flawed. It is reasonable to speculate that Russian intelligence has a deficiency and that intelligence is being leaked to Ukraine, a former Soviet territory.

It would appear that geographical factors—namely the weather and terrain conditions—the resistance ability of the Ukrainian army, the will of the Ukrainian people, and Zelenskyy government’s determined stance are being ignored by Russia. The Russian government seems overconfident in its military capacity.

The main actor of Russia’s tactical intelligence in the conflict zone is the GRU. It is not difficult to guess that the “civilian saboteurs,” who were caught in cities such as Kyiv, Kharkov, and Odessa, were organized by the GRU.

On the other hand, Ukraine seems to have accurate and timely intelligence by NATO member states. The Ukrainian intelligence service (SBU) is showing an effective counter-espionage capacity to Russia’s intelligence activities. For example, Denis Kireev, an important figure in the Ukrainian intelligence, who participated in the ceasefire talks between Ukraine and Russia, was detected spying on behalf of Russia and shot dead while resisting arrest.

The cyberspace struggle is another dimension of the conflict. Ukraine declared “cyber mobilization” on February 25, 2022, in the struggle against Russia: cyber teams formed with the participation of more than 500 hackers started carrying out DDoS (distributed denial-of-service)-based attacks on the Russian national cyberinfrastructure.

Information available in open sources shows that both Ukraine and Russia are carrying out cyberattacks against each other’s critical infrastructures. Russia received an unexpected cyberattack response from Ukraine in the first week of the war.

Russia was on the receiving end of a scraping cyberattack with the involvement of several non-Ukrainian hacker groups on the Ukrainian side. Their cyberattacks damaged Russia economically, while the internet infrastructure of Sberbank, one of the largest banks in Russia, was hacked.

In addition to Russia’s financial sector, Russian TV channels and the websites of government institutions were targeted by cyberattacks. The hacker groups operating against Russia may have been supported by Western intelligence services. One of the most outstanding supports to Ukraine in cyberspace came from the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), which announced that Ukraine will become a member of the center as a “contributing participant.”

Cyberattacks from Russia intensified against the critical infrastructures of European countries, which declared their support for Ukraine. According to news on social media, Russian cyber threat actors such as Conti, APT28, APT29, Turla, CyberBerkut, Sandworm, Gamaredon, and GhostWriter target not only Ukraine but also conduct cyberattacks against NATO, Europe, and the United States.

In addition to the cyberspace struggle, mutual disinformation activities continue on social media. The RIS and Ukrainian intelligence supported by Western intelligence services stand behind these disinformation activities. In fact, Western media sources have aptly described the current Russia-Ukraine war as the first “TikTok war” in history.

On February 27, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called the citizens to create the “International Legion of Territorial Defense of Ukraine.” This call was answered by more than 20,000 volunteer fighters, especially from Europe, whose governments accepted the mobilization of a number of their citizens.

On the opposite side, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced before the Russian National Security Council on March 11 that Russia would also accept volunteers who want to fight against Ukraine. He called fighters who would join the Russian army “volunteers” and those joining the Ukrainian army “mercenaries.”

Russian defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, announced on March 11, 2022, that 16,000 fighters showed interest in fighting along with the Russian army in the Donbas region of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian diplomatic missions in Washington, D.C. set conditions for accepting applications, the most important of which is prior combat experience, and a number of applicants have been refused for lack of said experience. Ukraine published a QR code on social media for embassies to download a commitment form. A website has been set up explaining the seven steps one must take to be enlisted to defend Ukraine.

Foreign fighters reportedly came from 52 countries including the United States, France, and Japan. The Ukrainian diaspora worldwide is reportedly involved in the fighting too. The Black African Defense League (LDNA) made calls to show solidarity with Ukraine and to send volunteer fighters.

U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson warned their citizens who travel to fight that they could be prosecuted under anti-terrorism legislation. During his visit to Estonia, Johnson stated, “I can understand why people feel as they do, but we have laws in our country about international conflicts and how they should be conducted.”

African countries such as Senegal, Algeria, and Nigeria warned their citizens not to join the Russia-Ukraine war. “Nigeria discourages the use of mercenaries anywhere in the world and will not tolerate the recruitment,” Nigeria’s foreign ministry said in a statement.

The rules of international law criminalize the use of mercenaries. The Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949) and its Additional Protocol criminalize the use of mercenaries and prevent them from being called or treated as prisoners of war.

The UN Security Council has adopted a number of related resolutions, including Resolution 1373 (2001), Resolution 2178 (2014), and Resolution 2396 (2017) on the prohibition of the use of mercenaries.

The consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war will not only revise the geography of Eastern Europe and the chessboard of international politics, but will also have an impact on the global economy.

While Europe is trying to reduce its dependency on Russian gas, the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries could experience a serious food crisis due to their high dependence on Ukrainian and Russian wheat and other grains.

Russia is the top global exporter of wheat, while Ukraine is the fifth global exporter. Both countries have a 25% share of global wheat export.

Wheat is fundamental to the diet of MENA countries as it represents 37% of caloric consumption in the region. Across the Middle East and Africa, bread represents 18% of the total diet, according to Euromonitor data, while wheat price saw a 17% increase since Russian tanks entered Ukrainian soil.

The Russia-Ukraine war may cause severe shortages or even a food security crisis in the MENA region.

MENA’s Dependency on Russian and Ukrainian Wheat

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, several MENA countries announced that the war could cause a wheat shortage as most of them import wheat and other types of grain from Russia and Ukraine.

Lebanese Minister of Economy and Trade Amin Salam said that the country—which is cash-strapped— has wheat reserves sufficient for six weeks to two months.

The Tunisian government reportedly asked officials not to address the media regarding an impending wheat crisis. However, on February 25, the ministry of agriculture had stated that it was able to secure enough wheat for three to four months.

Egypt, the largest wheat importer globally, said it has no wheat shortage. Still, it banned the export of flour, lentils, and wheat to safeguard its food, and it is exploring alternative wheat sources amid the Ukraine crisis.

Turkey has said it wouldn’t experience wheat and sunflower oil shortages. However, the war in Ukraine sparked panic buying of sunflower oil in the last week.

In Turkey, last year, 78% of wheat imports came from Russia and 9% from Ukraine. The devaluation of the Turkish lira exacerbates the country’s food insecurity. Furthermore, the rising cost of fuel and fertilizers and sanctions on Russia may disrupt the food supply chain.

Turkey’s government had reduced the import duty on sunflower oil to zero earlier in 2021. As a further precaution, Turkey has extended the customs tax exemption on sunflower oil to the end of June 2022 and on wheat, rye, barley, oats, maize, chickpeas, and lentil imports to the end of 2022.

Syria is the only Arab state to support Russia’s recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk as “independent” republics and its invasion of Ukraine. Now pro-Assad Syrian forces will reportedly go to Ukraine to fight on Russia’s side in this war. All of this speaks volumes of Damascus’ indebtedness to Moscow.

Syria was one of only four countries worldwide to join Russia in recognizing Donetsk and Luhansk’s “independence”. The day the war began, President Bashar al-Assad told his Russian counterpart that “Western nations bear responsibility for the chaos and bloodshed.” Then, on 2 March, Syria joined only four other states in opposing a UN General Assembly resolution condemning the invasion.

With Russia facing high levels of international opposition to its invasion of Ukraine, this conflict gives Moscow’s closest allies opportunities to demonstrate loyalty to the Kremlin. “For Putin, the invasion of Ukraine is a clarifying moment of who is a friend, and who is an enemy,” explained Randa Slim, the director of conflict resolution at the Middle East Institute, in an interview with Politics Today.

Assad’s support for Russia in Ukraine has been necessary given Damascus’ dependency on Moscow. “Assad is forever indebted to Putin,” Mona Yacoubian, a senior adviser at the US Institute of Peace, told Politics Today. “Moreover, as a brutal dictator whose regime has been accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, Assad has no compunction about supporting Russia in its brutal and illegal invasion of Ukraine.”

With Russia having done so much to help turn the tide in Syria beginning in 2015, saying that the Ba’athist regime’s survival is largely attributable to Moscow’s military intervention is no exaggeration.

“Syria owes almost everything to Russia (and Iran) in the last eleven years,” Marco Carnelos, a former Italian diplomat, told Politics Today. “Without Moscow’s military support it is quite uncertain that Bashar Al-Assad [would] have prevailed in the civil war that has so far ravaged country. On these political points, Syria had no other option than to recognize Donetsk and Luhansk Republic and support Russia’s position on the conflict in Ukraine.”

Carnelos told Politics Today that “maybe Russia needs soldiers better trained to the sort of guerrilla warfare that apparently is taking place in Ukraine, and that it is quite like what we have been watching in Syria all along these last years.”

According to Makki, the Syrian Arab Army has, at least for now, refrained from formally recruiting these pro-Assad fighters. He said there would have to be a presidential decree or something similar for any special dispensation. “It is most likely that the pool of recruits heading for Ukraine will be from the rougher auxiliary forces several of whom already have a past history in dealing with the Russians in Syria, such as National Defense Forces.”

Jomana Qaddour, a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs, where she leads the Syria project, said one should be cautious before reaching definitive pronouncements given how issues surrounding the recruitment question are evolving. “Most sources indicate that [the ex-National Defense Forces] are still only in a phase of registering volunteers, and not actually transporting them to Ukraine yet,” explained Qaddour.

Nonetheless, pro-Assad Syrian fighters entering the fray could prove problematic for Moscow. “Even if these fighters are transported to Ukraine, there are serious concerns about their lack of urban combat experience since in the Syria context many of them were tasked with intelligence work or manning of checkpoints after the Syrian government would capture land – and would task them, instead of official state forces – with carrying out war crimes against subdued populations,” according to Qaddour.

Cultural and linguistic barriers can’t be overlooked. These Syrian forces, who don’t speak Russian or Ukrainian, will be unfamiliar with local conditions. Also unclear is the Russian government’s ability to financially compensate these Syrian forces, particularly mindful of the economic problems that Russia must contend with as the world’s most sanctioned country. Qaddour told Politics Today that upon considering these factors, “it is likely cheaper and more practical for them to recruit pro-Russian fighters from neighboring countries.”

An important question is, how could the transfer of these Syrian forces to Ukraine weaken Damascus’ control of territory which it has spent years fighting to retake? Carnelos said that Damascus faces a “hard dilemma: honoring its debt towards Russia but doing so it risks losing ground somewhere in its endless civil war.”

As the war in Ukraine further internationalizes, anti-regime forces in Syria might seize opportunities to re-intensify their insurgency. “To have Russia bleeding more could be the moment to reignite the low intensity warfare that the Syrian battleground has been experiencing for a few years,” Carnelos told Politics Today. “Multiplying the fronts where Russia is engaged is the best way now to further complicate its Ukrainian adventure.”

As Slim put it, “The more difficulties Putin’s army experiences in Ukraine, the more his position will weaken in Syria mainly because of diversion of leadership, manpower and military resources to Ukraine away from other military theaters Russia is involved in including Syria.”

Yet under such circumstances the Syrian regime could count on support from its Lebanese ally. “Hezbollah can send enough fighters to make up for the shortfall in manpower should the Assad regime experience difficulties in holding on to territories it has retaken,” according to Slim.

Ultimately, it remains to be seen how Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine plays out on the ground in Syria. To be sure, the war in Ukraine has given Syria opportunities to prove to Moscow that Damascus is a reliable ally which is willing to help Russia amid its worst foreign policy crisis of the 21st century. With Syria continuing to depend on Russia, demonstrating such loyalty to Putin is a high priority for the regime in Damascus. But the price that Assad must pay for his country’s close alliance with Moscow is one that will be realized in coming weeks and months as the Russian-Ukrainian war rages on.

Putin’s speech following the Russian military intervention in Ukraine outlines Russia’s justification on political and military grounds. Putin show determination to intervene in Ukraine but left minds doubtful about how much further Russia could go. Putin’s way of correcting the Russian Head of Intelligence Sergey Naryshkin implied that the Russian military intervention in Ukraine would be limited.

But his subsequent speech indicates a shift of intention. Putin’s recognition of the independence of the self-proclaimed People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk was an overlooked part of the speech. Putin emphasized the absence of a Ukrainian identity and stressed its Russian roots, demographic purification, Soviet investments and favoritism to Ukraine, and the so-called Nazi-type ideology of the Ukrainian leadership—all according to his reading the events.

Russia’s Political Goals and Military Objectives

Military objectives generally target achievable political goals and avoid utopic adventures that may end up in devastation. It is proper to ask, then, whether Russia’s political goals are achievable. This question is related to Russia’s grand strategy. Putin and his comrades represent a generation that enjoyed the triumph of the Russia-dominated Soviet Empire, the demise of the latter, and the emergence as the Russian Federation. It seems highly likely that a romantic yearning for the Russian imperial days of the 18^th century and the Communist Soviet system of the Cold War may be an underlying motivation.

Russian political thinking praises Russian pride, but it is also concerned with survival. Russia needs a story to keep its continent-sized territory functioning and to make its multiethnic yet Russified demography resilient. The danger for the Russian leadership is to experience a further retreat that could make Russia a loose state on the path of collapse. Such a concern makes Putin more assertive and expansionist, mainly across Russia’s perceived sphere of influence.

For instance, Russia gained leverage after the Second Karabakh War by asserting its military presence at the heart of Karabakh for an extendable five-year period. The Kazakhstan stalemate at the beginning of 2022 presented another chance where Russia intervened in the Central Asian states in order to maintain stability. Furthermore, these regions have energy reserves satisfying the appetite of energy seekers as Russia indirectly prepared itself to challenge the energy demand of the broader globe.

Putin’s statements indicate a “nationalist imperialism,” which could have destructive consequences for regional and global orders—let alone Russia itself. Putin’s inclination is nationalist since Russia is at the core of his argument. On the other hand, nationalism in Russian thinking carries the risks of provoking ultranationalism or Slavophobia once a success story is concluded by tangible gains.

Second, Russian private military companies such as the Wagner Group are sent to war zones to support pro-Russian figures such as Khalifa Haftar of Libya and attempt to encircle NATO for strategic leverage such as the Russian military presence in Africa.

Third, mediation has become a primary effort to obtain political and military initiative, as was the case in the Karabakh war and Syria.

Fourth, the Collective Security Treaty Organization has become the platform to inject Russian interests and military presence.

Last, Russia has kept third parties silent through defense sales and military cooperation such as the cases of China, India, and Egypt.

These cases show that Putin successfully employs political and military means by well-planned strategies, the ultimate goal being the survival of Russia through nationalism and expansionism over the Slavic states, and building a sphere of influence in its near abroad.

Russian Strategy in Ukraine

The Russian political goals in Ukraine are threefold. These are the fundamental tenets of the Russian quest for domination: (1) Repelling the West, unified under the NATO umbrella, from Russia’s “borders”; (2) Making the Russian identity dominant over Slavic nations, setting Ukraine as a lesson for the rest; (3) Show the “able” Russia to the former members of the Soviet Union.

Russia needs a success story to achieve its goals and, as a result, Russia’s possible failure on the ground may create undesirable consequences for the Russian identity, once Russians realize their country’s weakness.

This may cause both a disillusionment and a subsequent dissolution in the pro-Russian regimes, including Putin’s Russia. In this context and at this point, Russia’s coercive strategy over Ukraine and its current war with Ukraine have turned to a matter of life and death.

Russian Nuclear Threat

Putin’s order to activate the Strategic Nuclear Forces escalated the military and political tension with the West. Russia regularly updated its nuclear doctrine after 1993 so as to be able to use nuclear weapons if it was not the first to do so. In this sense, Russia challenged the concepts of deterrence and mutually assured destruction (MAD) for atomic warfare. The reason for such a preference would be the following.

Russia knows that its conventional military inventory is aged and cannot win a a full-scale traditional war despite its numeric superiority. Modern warfare, including proxy, hybrid, and asymmetric, defy the Russian conventional capabilities, but the West, or NATO, may hesitate to respond to a nuclear threat.

Nuclear warfare includes tactical and operational assets other than strategic assets. The slow pace of the Russian advance may need a tactical nuclear attack to create a gap in the defense lines of the weaker but stubborn Ukrainian forces. Urban warfare is costly for the Russian conventional forces.

A tactical or operational nuclear attack may clear the cities and push the Ukrainian leadership to accept Russian terms. In short, Russian aggression over Ukraine is related to its expansionism inspired by a political logic based on nationalist imperialism. The primary motivation is to revive Russia’s modern imperialism across its sphere of influence. However, despite Putin’s imperial quest, Russia lacks capacity to sustain a full-scale expansionism due to limited economic diversity, ageing weaponry, and an inconsistent strategy-making process.

The scenes of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees fleeing war to Europe have received unprecedented western media coverage and solidarity. To be clear, there is nothing wrong in expressing solidarity with any people fleeing war and no group of people should be denied this solidarity. No one should ever become a refugee in the first place and only people who were once refugees can really feel the pain and relate to the experience of other refugees.

However, the treatment of Ukrainian refugees and victims of war has triggered comparisons with other conflicts and war-torn countries, and only reveals the limits of western liberalism and its selective solidarity towards refugees and victims of war.  In this regard, Palestine and other war-torn countries in the Middle East can speak volumes to this selective solidarity, which reveals the limits of western liberalism and its perception of who makes an authentic victim and refugee.

Soon after mostly Ukrainian refugees started flooding into Europe from war-torn Ukraine, statements of solidarity by members of the public, journalists, and politicians started pouring in. These particular statements only reflected an orientalist view of war-torn countries in the Middle East, whose people were not white or blonde enough (some of them ironically are!) to win the solidarity of right-wing political parties and politicians in Europe.

Middle Eastern refugees don’t fit the criteria

For shocked Europe, Middle Eastern refugees and people fleeing war in that region of the world were not civilized enough. Speaking of Kyiv and people fleeing the city, Charlie D’Agata of CBS news said, “This is a relatively civilized, relatively European—I have to choose those words carefully, too—city,” He later had to apologize for this statement. This was said despite the fact that cities such as Baghdad, Damascus, or Aden are hundreds and sometimes thousands of years older than Kyiv and other European cities.

David Sakvarelidze, Ukraine’s deputy chief prosecutor, joined the orientalist chorus, speaking to the BBC News, and noting that “European people with blue eyes and blonde hair are being killed every day.” For Sakvarelidze, the exception is to have Europeans with colored eyes and blonde hair killed, indirectly suggesting that it is the norm, or maybe more acceptable, that people with brown eyes and dark skin suffer the same fate daily. The only difference here is that the death of “people of color” goes unnoticed or at least don’t seem to shock Sakvarelidze and Europeans.

In Palestine, too, which has the longest unsettled refugee crisis in recent history, there are many ironies and parallels that could be drawn with the refugee crisis in Ukraine. When Israel bombed Gaza repeatedly over the years 2008/9, 2012, 2014, and most recently in May 2021, western media outlets were very careful with their “both sides” language so as not to hurt the feelings of the Israeli army that was killing civilians in Gaza and levelling entire residential buildings to the ground.

Of the 256 Palestinians who lost their lives at the hands of the Israeli army in May 2021, 60 were children and 40 were women. We could hardly read a news piece in western media mentioning their names, ages, or talking about their dreams cut short, and when the New York Times did so once, the Israeli lobby lost its mind. These Palestinian victims were once again invisible, because they didn’t fit the definition of western liberalism and its selective solidarity with the victims of war and refugees.

European: definition by appearance?

Some victims of war in Palestine were actually Europeans or looked like what Europeans are supposed to look like. But they still didn’t fit the definition of a people who deserve the same level of solidarity. Palestinian-German Ibrahim el-Kilani, his wife Taghreed and their five children were massacred after an Israeli airstrike hit a building in central Gaza to which they evacuated after warnings for evacuation from the Israeli army. They rarely got any mention by the German media, which rather keeps an eye on silencing Palestinian journalists who dare to speak of Israel’s human rights violations.

On the contrary, Palestinian Ahed Al-Tamimi got unusual coverage in the western media after she slapped an Israeli soldier in 2017 who entered the courtyard of her family’s house in the West Bank. Moments earlier, her cousin was shot in the head by an Israeli sniper and a considerable portion of his skull had to be removed.

An Israeli court eventually sentenced her to eight months in prison. Her mother said the family thinks her blonde hair was her ticket to western media coverage. The same Ahd Al-Tamimi’s photo spread like fire on social media claiming that she was a Ukrainian girl facing Russian forces.

The same way it made use of all other crises in the past to bring in Jewish settlers, Israel announced plans to settle 25,000 Ukrainian Jews, along with 5,000 non-Jewish Ukrainians.

Meanwhile, Palestinian refugees who live in refugee camps in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a few miles from where Israelis protested the invasion of Ukraine, observe in shock, and wait. They are waiting for the day western media will give them the same treatment that Ukrainian refugees in Europe are receiving—a treatment Palestinians also deserve.

They are waiting for the day when they can return to their homes and when Israel stops accepting refugees based on their religion. All refugees and victims of war deserve to be treated with dignity and respect, and on the basis of justice and equality because no refugee’s life is less valuable than another’s—be they Ukrainian, Palestinian, or Jewish.

On February 24, in the morning, following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s public address to the nation, Russia launched its so-called special military operation, which has proven to be a full-scale invasion and war, never officially declared as such by Moscow.

On a declarative level, the “special military operation” had three main goals. First, the protection of the self-proclaimed People’s Republics of Luhansk and Donetsk, which were formally recognized by Russia on February 21, as the two manufactured breakaway entities that formally asked Moscow for military assistance.

Second, the de-militarization of Ukraine, which, de-facto meant erasing Ukraine’s military potential which has grown after 2014. Third, the so-called de-Nazification of the country, not clearly explained in Russian sources, which arguably means “cleansing” the country of allegedly anti-Russian political and intellectual forces.

In reality, however, in launching its military offensive against Ukraine, Russia’s strategic goal should be viewed as follows: further dismemberment of the country—ideally breaking it up into two separate and, perhaps, loosely connected entities based on geographic and ethnic-linguistic principles—and the restoration of a pro-Russian puppet government, potentially led by Ukraine’s former president Viktor Yanukovych who fled to Russia in 2014, which will be completely subordinate to the Kremlin’s will. If Russian goals and objectives with regards to Ukraine are to be accomplished, the country is likely to cease to exist.

While Russian armed forces are muddling through Ukraine’s outskirts reportedly suffering unprecedentedly high military losses in Russia’s post-1991 history and the Russian economy is nearing the brink of collapse as a result of heavy economic sanctions imposed by the U.S., the EU, their allies, and regional partners, many large brands (more than 150) have walked out of the Russian market. Now, Russian political leadership is reportedly seeking ways to garner international support to legitimize its actions in Ukraine.

Aside from Belarus, which has found itself in a complete dependency on Russia both economically and politically, Russia’s seemingly best bet in terms of drumming international support could come from other members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and members of the Central Asia macro-region.

However, Tokayev adamantly refused to send Kazakhstani troops to Ukraine. Moreover, he blamed the “refusal to follow the Minsk Agreements”—without actually pointing to the culprit—as the main source of the “developments in Ukraine.”

Apparently, Tokayev’s position was a negative surprise for Putin, who counted on a much more cooperative attitude given Russia’s role in dealing with public protests earlier this year. Thus, it is highly likely that Kazakhstan, which has been able to preserve strategic distance from all regional/global centers of power, will not become embroiled in the Russia-spurned war against Ukraine.

Moreover, Russia’s growing international isolation, which is turning the country into an international pariah and a “toxic” partner, will make the Kazakh leadership act even more cautiously, potentially, articulating its leaning toward other actors, such as China and Turkey, even stronger.

Added to this, an armed conflict against a neighboring state (Ukraine) under the guise of “protecting the Russian-speaking population,” which greatly disturbed Kazakhstani authorities back in 2014, especially in light of Russia’s rhetoric, should be a great source of uneasiness for Kazakhstan —even though this may not be publicly declared.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are other Central Asia actors on whose support Russia could theoretically count on. However, things are all but simple with these two states as well.

Tajikistan, which is also a member of the CSTO and a country dependent on Russia economically and for security, was approached by Russia shortly after the outbreak of the war. On February 27, during her visit to Dushanbe, Valentina Matviyenko, chairwoman of the Federation Council of Russia’s Federal Assembly, stated that relations between the two countries “have stepped to a new level of strategic partnership.”

Yet, following this meeting, Tajikistan cancelled all flights to a number of Russian cities, at the same time refraining from giving any further comments on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

Another member of the CSTO, Kyrgyzstan, which is also a member of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, took an extremely reserved stance as well, distancing itself from the conflict. In regard to these two states and their reaction to the Russo-Ukrainian war, it makes sense to underscore two aspects.

First, a recent border clash in April 2021 between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan that resulted in dozens of casualties demonstrated both the weakness of the CSTO and the evasiveness of Russia’s position—a reality that was hailed neither by Tajikistan nor Kyrgyzstan.

Thus, most likely, the reserved reaction by both countries now might, at least in part, be owing to that. Second, the abovementioned border crisis identified yet another trend that is likely to grow:  the increasing influence of Turkey in Central Asia, especially in light of Russia’s reckless behavior in the post-Soviet space and Ankara`s extremely well-calculated and balanced approach.

Finally, analyzing the impact of the Russian aggression against Ukraine and its impact on Central Asia from a more macroregional/global prospective it makes sense to highlight yet another aspect. Russia’s embroilment in Ukraine, its political and economic isolation, and the decreasing presence of the U.S. in the region (particularly visible after its withdrawal from Afghanistan), make China the likeliest winner of this whole situation.

In addition to remaining Russia’s only strong economic partner—incidentally, Beijing is also not breaking ties with Kyiv and/or Western powers—China is the likeliest beneficiary of Russia’s isolation. For Central Asia, this also means that Beijing’s regional presence, already strong, will increase even further.

Interest in the history of statehood arose in the minds of the intellectual elite of the Russian society in the second half of the 18th century, largely under the influence of the French Enlightenment, the ideas of which Empress Catherine II tried to apply locally in the first decade of her reign. However, faced with the rebellion of the non-Russian population of the Lower Volga region and the Southern Urals, which is known in Russian historiography as the “Peasants’ War” or “Pugachev’s Rebellion,” led by Yemelyan Pugachev (1773-1775), Catherine II quickly curtailed all research efforts in the area, and made all the results of studies obtained at the time public but only to a narrow circle of academic professors.

This does not mean that other Russian monarchs were not interested in the origins of their power or the historical heritage of the country over which they ruled. At the end of the 17th century, Tsar Pyotr Alekseyevich (Peter the Great), a quarter century before his proclamation as emperor, ordered Andrei Lyzlov, now called the “father of Russian historiography,” to conduct the first special study on the history of Russia. Only the tsar himself and a dozen of his close and most trusted persons read this study.

Naturally, under such conditions, in the decline of the Middle Ages in Russia, free academic thought could exist and develop, the fruit of which could become actual scientific knowledge, independently determining or forming the state’s ideology and policy.

At the end of the first third of the 19th century, for the first time in Russian history, the state used science as a tool for the institutionalization of domestic policy. More precisely, immediately after the suppression of the Polish uprising of 1830-1831, the question of Russian origin was raised by Russian professors at the highest level: where does Polish nationalism come from and how to counter it?

The work of the Vilno Archaeographic Commission did not have much political success, since the nobility of the provinces of the Russian Empire, on whose territory Belarus and Lithuania are located today, considered themselves descendants of the chivalry of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

They saw themselves as an integral part of the Commonwealth, connected by family and legal ties to the Polish gentry. The work of the Kiev Archaeographic Commission was much more successful—it fully managed to formulate and promote the notion of ​​the Little Russian Cossack (Ukrainian) people, ethnically, culturally, and religiously opposed to all manifestations of the sociocultural tradition of Polish statehood and nationalism.

The founder of this idea was Vladimir Antonovich (1834-1908), a professor and dean of the Faculty of History and Philology of the Imperial University of St. Vladimir in Kyiv. He wrote On the Origin of the Cossacks, a monograph in which he formulated and scientifically substantiated the postulates of Ukrainian nationalism as opposed to Polish nationalism.

He was also the author-compiler and editor of 9 out of 15 volumes of the fundamental collection of published documents on the history of the territory of modern Ukraine in the Middle Ages entitled Archive of South-Western Russia. Antonovich can rightfully be considered the founder of the first Ukrainian histography and state ideology.

His successor and follower in the field was Dmitry Yavornitsky (1855-1940), who taught at Kharkiv, St. Petersburg, Kazan, and Moscow universities, and served as an academician at the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). He also worked as the permanent head of the Yekaterinoslav (Dnipropetrovsk) Historical Museum, and enriched the ideology of Ukrainian national statehood with a thesis about its origin from the medieval republic of the Dnieper Cossacks, the Zaporozhian Sich.

Prince Dmitry Vyshnevetsky, who entered the history of Eastern Europe as a personal enemy of the sultan of the Ottoman Port, Suleiman the Magnificent, under the name “Dmitrashka,” is considered the founder of Ukrainian statehood.

Mikhail Hrushevsky (1866-1934) was a professor at Lviv University; the chairman of the Ukrainian Central Rada, the first Ukrainian parliament, in 1917-1918; and an academician at the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. He is the author of a 10-volume monograph titled History of Ukraine-Rus and was the first in the academic tradition of historical science to oppose Ukrainian nationalism and the idea of an Ukrainian people not only in reference to Poland, but also to Russia.

Grushevsky should be considered to be behind all the existing basic ideological contradictions between Ukraine and Russia, and completed the creation of the main theses of the modern ideology of Ukrainian national identity.

Of course, in addition to these figures, one can also name other leading advocates of Ukrainian national thought who have contributed to the formation of the current worldview of Ukrainian society: Mykola Nikolai, Nikolay Kostomarov, Dmitry Bahaliy, Mikhail Lyubavsky, Alexander Skalkovsky and others. But it was the first three who had the most influence on Ukrainian nationalism in the collective memory of people.

Speaking of the content of the studies of the authors listed above, it should be said that they did not claim the continuity of Ukrainian statehood from any empire that existed earlier, a claim that was characteristic of most other European historiographic traditions, including Polish and Russian.

They were quite satisfied with the autochthonism and the Ukrainian national tradition in the formulation they proposed, free from the canons and postulates of feudal historiography, according to which the status and attributive significance of the state are largely determined by the antiquity of the origin of the ruling imperial or royal dynasty.

Unlike the official state ideology of the Russian Empire, which deduces the origin of Russia and the Muscovite kingdom that preceded it from the Byzantine Empire and the Palaiologos dynasty, the creators of the theory of the origin of Ukrainian statehood did not burden themselves with the concern of proving the legitimacy of their monarchs and dynasties from the previous dynasties.

Since, from the very beginning, the idea of ​​a democratic origin of Ukrainian statehood was postulated, the basis for the formation was made up of people from the North Caucasus who moved to the center of Dnieper at the end of the 13th century at the behest of one of the khans of the Golden Horde.

Russia’s attack on Ukraine can be analyzed from different perspectives. For example, one can focus on the human rights aspect and, in this context, on how much Russia’s previous war tactics in Chechnya and Syria have come to the fore in Ukraine. Do the attacks on the cities of Kharkiv, Kherson, and Mariupol resemble the policy of creating “decivilized” zones with the “carpet bombing” tactic used in Grozny and Aleppo? I wonder whether approaches based on “blondeness”, “Slavism”, and “Europeanism” or perspectives centered on “hegemony” and “power policy” will be decisive for Kiev’s future.

Another analysis could focus on examining the issue from the perspective of international law. Despite the serious steps towards the construction and strengthening of international law after World War II, how was a country with a population of 45 million like Ukraine exposed to such an unlawful invasion? Were the gratuitous and unpunished clear violations of international law, which were previously committed especially by global powers, the main factors that encouraged Russia?

The reciprocation of violations of international law, such as the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, the unlawful withdrawal of the United States from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018, and Israel’s bombing of Gaza, can be analyzed as decisive in shaping Putin’s Ukraine policy.

Russian Attack and international power struggle

This article will focus on what the Russian attack on Ukraine means in terms of the international power struggle. Of course, this is not completely independent of the aforementioned perspectives, but human rights and international law are generally not considered factors in the global power struggle and do not affect the development of events.

This has also been the case in Ukraine so far: Russia has continued to advance by force, regardless of international law and human rights, despite all the objections from the international community. Russia continues to seize cities while simultaneously targeting civilians in Ukraine, which it has begun to occupy in violation of the fundamental principles of international law.

This Russian initiative can be seen as a manifestation of its effort to exist as an independent actor in the global power struggle by protecting and expanding its sphere of influence. Seeing that the international political system is gradually turning into a bipolar system torn between the U.S. and China, Putin believes that if he fails to take the necessary measures, there is a risk that even Russia will come under the influence of one of these two powers in the future. In terms of both GDP and annual military expenditure figures, Russia lags far behind these two countries.

While the 1990s, under Boris Yeltsin, represented a period when Russia hit rock bottom economically, Yeltsin’s successor, Putin, effectively brought energy resources into the economy, preventing the country from disintegrating. Between 2000 and 2013, Russia’s GDP grew by about 8.8 times, rising from $259.7 billion to $2,292 billion. However, from 2014 onwards, things started to slow down for the Russian economy.

The decline in oil and natural gas prices, political corruption, and Moscow drifting into conflicts and wars first in Ukraine and then in Syria brought along economic problems. By 2020, Russia’s GDP decreased to $1,483 billion. Considering that the economies of China and the U.S. continued to grow rapidly in the same period, the gap in the global economic power competition between Russia and the aforementioned two is getting vaster.

The fact that Russia is lagging behind the U.S. and China in the economic power race is naturally reflected in the military power race. Between 2013 and 2020, Russian military expenditure decreased from $88 billion to $62 billion, while the U.S. military expenditure increased from $679 billion to $778 billion, and Chinese military expenditure increased from $164 billion to $252 billion. (Graph 2) These figures show that Russia’s conventional military power is gradually decreasing.

At this point, the question of whether Russia’s attack on Ukraine, is a sign of rational behavior by Moscow is paramount. It is clear that the failure of this attempt and the prolongation of the war will have devastating consequences for Russia. The cost of prolonging the war after the economic sanctions imposed by Western countries may deeply shake the Russian economy, and as a result, the country may descend into chaos.

If Russia’s failure to achieve its goals in Ukraine entails such negative consequences, why did Moscow take such a risky step? There are a number of factors that impacted Putin’s decision: nuclear weapons, China, energy leverage, and the West’s disunity.

Above all, it appears that Putin is considering compensating for his country’s conventional weakness vis-à-vis NATO with Russia’s massive nuclear weapons. He thought that his military superiority over Ukraine would be enough to defeat the country and that he could prevent possible NATO intervention by using his nuclear weapons as a deterrent. NATO’s refusal to close Ukraine’s airspace shows that Putin’s calculations have been accurate so far.

China and the energy factors

Second, China’s emergence as a counterbalance to the West and the United States’ main focus on potential threats originating from China led Putin to calculate that Washington and its allies will not go very far in supporting Ukraine. Although the SWIFT sanctions and the freezing of the Russian Central Bank’s assets in the West show that he is partially wrong on this front, Putin may think that he can keep his economy afloat until the end of the Ukraine war by maintaining relations with China and other countries that do not accept the sanctions against Moscow.

Third, Russia commenced its military operation in Ukraine, considering that its energy resources and leverage would prove useful against Europe’s sanctions. Putin may have calculated that with the crisis, energy prices would rise significantly, and this would force European countries to take a step back. The statement of Deputy Chairman of the National Security Council of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev after Germany’s decision to stop Nord Stream 2 epitomizes this notion: “Welcome to a brave new world where Europeans will soon pay 2,000 Euros for a thousand cubic meters of natural gas.”

Fourth, Putin is likely to have taken into account the disunity of Western institutions such as NATO and the EU, and that these institutions would not act jointly in the event of a Russian attack on Ukraine. He might have calculated that the West, which remained silent in the face of Russia’s attacks in Georgia and Syria and didn’t do much against the annexation of Crimea, would show a similar attitude towards the occupation of Ukraine and would not want to escalate the tension with Russia.

Limitations

In the first days of the Russian invasion, the reluctance of some European countries such as Germany and Italy to impose SWIFT sanctions showed that these calculations almost paid off. However, Germany’s change of attitude in the face of pressure from the public among with similar changes in Germany’s allies showed that Putin’s calculations were largely in vain. For now, Russia’s attack on Ukraine seems to have had a consolidating effect on NATO and the EU.

Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees are fleeing from their home country due to the Russian invasion. Many are still trying to leave Ukraine, filling the routes out with cars stretching for miles. But those who could cross the borders require help.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine began on February 24 and is ongoing, forcing more people to leave to the neighboring countries. The war has so far has cost tens of thousands of lives and can leave a war-torn Ukraine behind.

Valeria’s journey to becoming a refugee

Valeria, 21, a student who crossed the borders of Poland from Ukraine, is mourning the fact that she won’t return to her normal life in Ukraine. She never thought about leaving her country, even her village, when the war started. She told Politics Today, “We thought that it would be safer in villages; but it wasn’t.” Her father drove her to Kyiv, the capital, where she got on an evacuation train to Lviv on her way to Poland.

She added that “it was horrible. Too many people were on the train, there was no place. We stayed on the train for 12 hours, and sometimes we got a chance to sit on suitcases or the floor.” After she arrived in Lviv, she stayed there for a few days. Her friend drove her to the border, which she crossed on foot. Later, a volunteer took her and drove her to Warsaw. She notes that “it was quite amazing how people in other countries volunteered and helped us get to places, have food or somewhere to stay.”

EU Open-Door Policy

EU countries opened their doors to Ukrainian refugees from the first day. However, many host states are ill-prepared for this scale of mass displacement. In many countries, locals have opened their houses while many NGOs and governmental agencies are trying to protect and assist the refugees by providing for their basic needs.

Filippo Grandi, the United Nations high commissioner of refugees, recently identified the refugee crisis in Ukraine as “the fastest-growing refugee crisis in Europe since World War Two.” The UN reported that there are over two million refugees according to data published on March 8, 2022. Many of the refugees landed in Poland, which shares a border of 428 km with Ukraine. According to a UN report, the government of Poland has accepted over 1.2 million refugees, and the Poles have shown a warm reception to their neighbors.

Over the past few weeks, many other countries have also accepted a significant number of refugees. Moldova, a country with a population of four million, has taken 82,000 refugees. The country bears a great importance in terms of its long border with Ukraine, which stretches for 939 km, the longest after Ukraine’s border with Russia.

Ukraine’s neighbor in the Black Sea, Turkey, is one of the countries that is watching the conflict with alarm. According to Turkey’s Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu over 20,000 Ukrainians arrived in Turkey by March 6.

At the same time, many people had to leave their homes to flee to safer cities within Ukraine. The UNHCR has reported that over one million people have been internally displaced in Ukraine. Lviv, a city located in the northwest of Ukraine, is a destination people are trying to reach. The city had a population of 720,000 people before the war. Tens of thousands of people flooded the city, especially those who escaped the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv. The city is a passage point for those who want to cross to Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary.

Apart from the Ukrainian refugees who have managed to flee, many are still trying to cross the borders to European countries. Most of them are women and children since men aged between 16 and 60 have been banned from leaving the country by the Ukrainian authorities.

Amid the escalating war between Russia and Ukraine, a major brawl is taking shape over the control of content on social media. On March 4, 2022, Moscow blocked access to social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter within its federation. This step was taken in response to what it said were actions of Meta and Twitter to restrict the access of Russian state-owned/affiliated media outlets such as the Zvezda television channel, RIA Novosti news agency, Sputnik, RT (formerly Russia Today), Lenta.ru, and Gazeta.ru.

While initiating the blockade, Roskomnadzor the Russian federal executive agency that acts as the state’s communication watchdog cited “26 [alleged] discrimination cases toward Russian media” by Facebook. It was further stated that platforms like Facebook had been blocked to “prevent violations of the key principles of the free flow of information.”

In addition, the Russian Duma also introduced a “fake news” law imposing imprisonment of up to 15 years for spreading fake news that could lead to severe consequences. As this law came into force, social media platforms such as TikTok suspended options for new video uploads and live streaming services.

In a similar vein, numerous international media outlets such as the BBC, CNN International, ABC News, CBS News, Bloomberg, etc., stopped airing in Russia. The companies stated they are worried about the safety of their employees. Other blocked platforms in Russia include the U.S. government-funded Voice of America, German broadcaster Deutsche Welle, and Latvia-based website Meduza. As the information crackdown intensifies in Russia, concerns are raised about the ongoing censorship, aptly labelled by Bloomberg columnist Parmy Olsen as “Putin’s Iron Firewall.”

Social Media Giants and Russia in the Past

Prior to the complete blockade of Facebook, Russia had limited its access while accusing social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook of censoring Russian media content of censoring Russian media content. Nick Clegg, vice-president of global affairs and communication at Meta, stated that “Russian authorities ordered us to stop the independent fact-checking and labelling of content posted on Facebook by four Russian state-owned media organizations. We refused.” The refusal to stop fact-checking Russian news, irked the Russian authorities.

It is interesting to note that before Moscow’s ban on social media platforms, Meta itself had proposed to pull Facebook out of Russia. The rationale behind it was to punish Moscow for its actions against Ukraine. However, it was later realized that this move would only limit the ability of Russian people to access information that isn’t affiliated with Russian state-backed media.

With the exception of Western platforms blocked by Moscow, many technology companies have suspended their operations and services in Russia as a sign of support to Ukraine. These companies include, among others, Apple, Dell, Google, Netflix, and Ikea. Snapchat has announced that it will “not accept revenue from Russian state-owned entities.”

How Social Media Companies Joined the War in Ukraine

As Russia blocked access to social media platforms, the usage of virtual private networks (VPNs) in Russia escalated immediately. However, numerous attempts have been made by Moscow over the last couple of years to ban virtual private networks. Last year, Russia blocked close to six virtual private networks, NordVPN and ExpressVPN being among the most notable ones.

As the war in Ukraine continues, some Russians have managed to use VPNs as they look for ways to access sites that are currently blocked in their country.

Data from Top10VPN shows that on March 9, the demand for a VPN in Russia saw an increase of 956% compared to the day before the invasion. Additionally, social media platforms responded to the Russian government’s decision to block access to social media.

Meta released a statement regarding Facebook mentioning that “we will continue to do everything we can to restore our services so that they remain available to people to safely and securely express themselves and organize for action.”

Meta has also made an unusual change in their hate speech policy. According to a recent email received by Reuters, Facebook and Instagram users in some countries will be allowed to call for violence against Russia and Russian soldiers in the context of the Ukraine invasion. The policy change will apply to countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, and Ukraine.

A Meta spokesperson further stated that “as a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we have temporarily made allowances for forms of political expression that would normally violate our rules like violent speech such as ‘death to the Russian invaders’. We still won’t allow credible calls for violence against Russian civilians.” In response, the Russian embassy in the U.S. demanded Meta stop what is regarded as “extremist activities.”

Twitter has also launched a new service called Onion, allowing users to access Twitter by downloading it on Tor Browser. This service will help the Russian people surpass the surveillance and censorship imposed by Moscow. Similarly, media outlets like the BBC are recommending people access its Ukraine page by using Tor Browser. The BBC is providing safe downloading links to people who are unable to access App stores.

Tor Browser and VPN usage can help users remain anonymous while accessing sites that are currently part of what is regarded as the dark web.

The war between Russia and Ukraine has certainly increased the phenomenon of internet fragmentation. The introduction of temporary changes in Meta’s hate speech policy raised numerous ethical and policy implications. As the military conflict intensifies between Russia and Ukraine, the pressure grows on social media platforms to deal in conformity with their government’s national interests while mitigating the financial damages.

The Russia-Ukraine war marks a historic turn in German foreign and security policy. Chancellor Olaf Scholz has announced that Germany wants to invest €100 billion in rearming the military. Almost all parties in the Bundestag support this historic decision. While the AfD remains passive, the Left Party is divided.

One of the first consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine for Germany and for its new Ukraine policy was the cancellation of the very important and, at the same time, very controversial Nord Stream 2 project. Manuela Schwesig of the SPD, head of the government of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (MV), announced her intention to dissolve the Stiftung Klima- und Umweltschutz MV (MV Climate and Environmental Protection Foundation).

The foundation originally served to protect the Nord Stream 2 project from American sanctions. Several investors such as Shell and the Austrian energy company OMV have also withdrawn from the project. The German company Uniper estimates a loss of €900 million. The German environmental aid organization Deutsche Umwelthilfe even speaks of the Nord Stream 2 project being terminated definitely. The pipeline, which cost billions, will go down as one of Europe’s biggest misinvestments.

Another figure affected by the termination of the Nord Stream 2 project is former SPD Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. He was the main initiator of the gas pipeline by actively lobbying for it. Now the Taxpayers’ Association is calling on Chancellor Scholz to confiscate Schröder’s office equipment in Berlin.

Schröder’s long-time office manager and speechwriter Albrecht Funk ended his co-operation employment with Schröder after more than 20 years of working together.

The football club BVB Dortmund has withdrawn Schröder’s honorary membership and Hannover 96 is considering kicking the former chancellor out. The pressure exerted on Schröder at different levels shows that Schröder’s distancing himself from Putin is of high importance in Germany.

Schröder is the best-known German politician who maintains a good relationship with Putin. If Schröder were to step down and end his relations with Putin, Germany and Russia would lose a trustworthy mediator in a possible diplomatic solution.

How other German parties responded

While there is a general consensus within the coalition government on Germany’s rearmament, and the largest opposition parties (CDU/CSU) also support this decision, reactions differ among the marginal parties AfD and Left Party. CDU foreign policy expert Norbert Röttgen praised Chancellor Scholz’s decision to increase Germany’s armament and said he was positively surprised.

The AfD, on the other hand, which is known for its close ties to Russia, for the time is internally discussing its future attitude towards Russia. Several sections in the party are calling for a change in the course of the AfD’s policy on Russia. AfD MP Joachim Wundrak, for example, is in favor of sanctions against Russia, but they should not be so far reaching as to harm Germany.

The AfD parliamentary group leader Alice Weidel calls Russia’s invasion illegal under international law, but rejects arms deliveries to Ukraine and favors a diplomatic solution between Russia and Ukraine.

In the Left Party, the situation looks much more complicated. Here there is an open conflict between the foreign policy spokesperson Gregor Gysi and the former parliamentary group leader Sahra Wagenknecht. Wagenknecht and six other Left Party MPs had issued a statement categorically rejecting German arms deliveries to Ukraine and imposing economic sanctions against Russia. Gysi clearly criticizes Wagenknecht and says that her statement would in effect deny Ukraine’s right of self-defense.

Gysi accuses Wagenknecht of lack of emotion and empathy for the Ukrainian people, and at the same time questions the current course of the Left Party. Wagenknecht responds to Gysi’s accusations, calling his statements defamation of character and stating that she holds sympathy for the Ukrainian dead and injured. Wagenknecht, however, continues to stand by her position and emphasizes the possibility of resolving the war diplomatically.

Russia-Ukraine impact on German politics

The developments in the Russia-Ukraine war have influenced several levels of German politics. Germany’s rearmament, the sanctions against Russia, the cancellation of the Nord Stream 2 project and its consequences for Gerhard Schröder, and the diverging positions between and within political parties show the importance of the relationship between Germany and Russia.

The Russia-Ukraine war will not only change Germany’s attitude towards Russia but will also have far-reaching consequences for German foreign and security understanding. Germany’s discourse on military issues will be conducted differently in the future.

The fact that this change is taking place at a time when pacifist parties are in government can be seen as a paradox; however, this change can occur specifically because no opposition party of significant size is objecting to German rearmament and, as a result, the move is not up for debate.

After the Russian military invasion of Ukraine, the West has unanimously slapped severe sanctions on Moscow that, at the moment, have further raised energy and commodity prices in the international market. This is due to the fact that Russia covers one third of the world’s gas supply needs using pipe gas.

China’s stand and role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict is key for the larger Russia-West conflict, and will set the tone for the U.S.-China competition in the emerging global order. China has all the tools in its armory to gain maximum benefit from this conflict.

China is already Russia’s largest trading partner and sanctions-hit Russia will sell its oil, gas, and other natural resources to the Chinese market using the Chinese alternative to SWIFT, the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System, or CIPS. Central Asian states, Belarus, and a few other countries can’t survive without financial transactions with Russia. This will give China’s CIPS a great opening to enter into large global financial transactions.

SWIFT or CIPS?

Shutting Russia off from the SWIFT payment system may help China’s efforts to advance an already established alternative to SWIFT. Strict Western sanctions on Russia and the expulsion from the SWIFT system of international financial transactions will force Russia to adopt the Chinese alternative to SWIFT. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and strict Western sanctions on Moscow will undoubtedly increase Chinese clout in the global order.

A new Chinese option could allow Russia to conduct the majority of its trade in yuan rather than US dollars. CIPS, which was established in 2015, will receive a much-needed boost. In principle, there is no reason why CIPS cannot be used in the place of SWIFT. And if Russia successfully transitions its trade payments away from the dollar system, American prestige and power would suffer greatly.

Russia may also demand all payments for Russian goods be paid through SPFS, which is Russia’s SWIFT alternative. Cutting off Russia from SWIFT won’t do the damage it did to Iran. Russia and China saw how SWIFT was being used as a sanctions weapon and developed their own SWIFT alternatives.

Russia’s total exports reached $489.8 billion in 2021, according to the country’s central bank. Crude oil accounted for $110.2 billion, oil products for $68.7 billion, pipeline natural gas for $54.2 billion, and liquefied natural gas for $7.6 billion. Europe is so reliant on Russian oil and gas that it purchases more than 70% of the country’s natural gas and roughly half of its oil.

Russia-China Future Collaboration

For the Russians, the two-decade-old Russia-China “Treaty of Good Neighbourliness, Friendship, and Cooperation” will be crucial. During the recent Putin-Xi meeting, it was agreed that China will continue to buy Russian oil and gas.

That is, if a difficulty arises in Russia’s European market, the next buyer is ready to step in. During the meeting, Russia’s Gazprom and China’s CNPC agreed to supply gas through a new route for the next 25 years. By 2025, the “Power of Siberia” pipeline, which began operations in 2019, will be fully operational.

China, for its part, has begun to reposition itself in relation to the United States. The United States may be able to encircle Russia near its border and as a result, the United States’ efforts to contain China through its Indo-Pacific strategy, may be hampered.