S

yria and Russia have reached an agreement that will significantly reshape Moscow’s military presence along Syria’s Mediterranean coast, with Damascus set to take control of two strategically important facilities previously used as Russian military outposts.

Under the agreement announced by Syria’s Foreign Ministry, Syria will assume control of the Hmeimem air base near Latakia and the commercial berth at Tartus port as part of its civil administration. Military facilities at both locations will instead be transformed into joint training and qualification centers.

The ministry described the arrangement as a “reorganizing of the Russian presence” along Syria’s coast and said it represented the most significant development since negotiations began about a year and a half ago.

Russia’s military presence in Syria

Russia had been the most important political and military ally of former President Bashar Assad throughout Syria’s civil war. The Hmeimem air base and Tartus naval facility became central pillars of Russia’s military presence in the eastern Mediterranean, allowing Moscow to project air and naval power into the region.

The agreement comes after Assad was overthrown following a lightning insurgency. Russia did not intervene to prevent his removal but subsequently granted asylum to Assad and his family. Russian forces remaining in Syria have gradually withdrawn since the change of government.

Despite the reduction of Russia’s military role, Syria’s new leadership has sought to maintain relations with Moscow. Interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa has visited Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow twice since taking power, with the future of the two Mediterranean facilities among the key issues discussed.

The latest agreement does not appear to end Russian-Syrian cooperation altogether. Instead, the conversion of the military facilities into joint training centers suggests that Damascus and Moscow intend to preserve some form of defense and institutional relationship while reducing Russia’s role as a military power stationed on Syrian territory.

Russia had not immediately issued a public comment on the agreement.

Syria’s new foreign policy

The development also reflects a broader transformation in Syria’s foreign policy following Assad’s fall. While Damascus has maintained ties with Moscow, it has simultaneously strengthened relations with Western governments and neighboring Arab states that had distanced themselves from Syria during Assad’s crackdown on opposition protests.

The United States has lifted most of its sanctions on Syria, while European countries have also begun rebuilding diplomatic relations with Damascus.

French President Emmanuel Macron visited Syria in July, during which he announced that France and Syria would appoint ambassadors for the first time in 14 years.

The shift has placed Syria at the center of a wider geopolitical realignment. For years, Russia’s military presence in Syria provided Moscow with a strategic foothold in the Mediterranean and helped sustain Assad’s government. The new arrangement indicates that this role is now being substantially reduced under Syria’s new leadership.

For Damascus, taking control of Hmeimem and the commercial facilities at Tartus represents an important assertion of sovereignty over strategic infrastructure. For Moscow, maintaining joint training facilities could preserve elements of its longstanding relationship with Syria even as its former military footprint is scaled back.

The agreement is likely to become an important marker of Syria’s transition from the Assad era, as the country seeks to balance its longstanding relationship with Russia against growing engagement with Türkiye Europe, the United States and Arab countries.

(Source: CNN)

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said on Wednesday that Türkiye would not tolerate coercion, piracy or other provocations threatening its maritime interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, saying Ankara was closely monitoring risks to its Blue Homeland, a term used in Türkiye to refer to Türkiye’s maritime borders, and to Turkish Cypriots.

In a New Year’s message released by the Presidency, Erdoğan said Türkiye was alert to rising tensions in the region and would defend its rights and interests. “We will never tolerate coercion, piracy or banditry in our seas,” he said.

Erdoğan used the address to reflect on domestic and foreign policy developments over the past year, paying tribute to Turkish security forces killed in operations against terrorism and organized crime and thanking veterans for their service.

Despite the growing climate of war and crisis in the region, Erdoğan said Türkiye was continuing its path with confidence. He said the government’s economic program was yielding results, citing easing inflation, strengthening central bank reserves and gains in production, investment, employment and exports.

He added that Türkiye had broken records in sectors including tourism and the defense industry, and said a large-scale social housing project of 500,000 units would help low-income citizens and ease housing and rental pressures.

Earthquake reconstruction priority

Erdoğan said rebuilding areas devastated by the Feb. 6, 2023, earthquakes remained the government’s top priority. He noted that keys to the 455,000th housing unit had been handed over to beneficiaries in Hatay on December 27, and said infrastructure, public spaces and cultural sites in affected cities were being restored.

He thanked workers, institutions and donors involved in reconstruction and said the government would continue to deliver on its promises.

On regional affairs, Erdoğan said Türkiye would continue to support communities beyond its borders, pointing to its policies in Syria and Gaza.

He said recovery in Syria had accelerated following the country’s December 2024 revolution, adding that political stability was advancing and voluntary returns were increasing. According to Erdoğan, around 600,000 Syrians had returned from Türkiye to Syria over the past year.

Türkiye would continue to support Syria’s new administration to ensure security and stability without discrimination based on ethnicity or sect, he said.

On Gaza, Erdoğan said Türkiye would not remain silent until those responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of Palestinians were held accountable. He said a ceasefire reached in October was holding despite Israeli violations, and that Ankara was working to increase humanitarian aid and support reconstruction.

Erdoğan also said Türkiye would continue efforts to help end the war in Ukraine through a just and lasting peace.

Domestic security

Turning to domestic security, Erdoğan said key thresholds had been crossed in the government’s “terror-free Türkiye” initiative, adding that a parliamentary commission was nearing completion of a report intended to give the process new momentum.

He said the initiative should not be undermined by short-term political interests and pledged that the government would do what was necessary to ensure its success.

Erdoğan concluded by saying his government would continue to focus on concrete projects and investments in 2026, extending New Year’s wishes to Türkiye, the region and the world.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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eneral Assembly calls Israeli presence in Syrian Golan ‘illegal,’ urges withdrawal to 1967 line; separate resolution reaffirms two-state solution and calls for end to occupation

The UN General Assembly on Tuesday adopted two significant resolutions addressing the decades-long Israeli occupation of Arab territories, declaring Israel’s continued control over the Syrian Golan Heights “illegal” and calling for an end to its occupation of Palestinian lands captured in 1967.

The twin votes, held during the 80th session of the General Assembly, underscored the deepening international concern over Israel’s expansion of settlements, ongoing military operations, and deteriorating humanitarian conditions across the region.

123 nations back Golan resolution

In the first vote, the General Assembly adopted a draft resolution penned by Egypt, which demanded that Israel withdraw fully from the occupied Syrian Golan to the line of June 4, 1967.

The resolution passed with 123 votes in favor, seven against and 41 abstentions, reaffirming longstanding UN positions that Israel’s effective annexation of the territory is unlawful under international law.

It declared the Israeli decision of Dec. 14, 1981 — which imposed Israeli laws, administration, and jurisdiction on the territory — “null and void and without any legal validity whatsoever.”

The text further determined that Israel’s continued occupation and de facto annexation of the Syrian Golan remains “a stumbling block to achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the region.”

Israel captured the Golan Heights from Syria during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, later extending domestic law to the territory in a move unrecognized by the UN and widely rejected by the international community. Syria has repeatedly called the area an integral part of its sovereign territory and demanded its full return.

Western diplomats noted that support for the resolution remains consistent with prior years, reflecting broad international consensus. The United States, Israel, and a handful of allies voted

Two-state solution

In a separate vote earlier in the day, the General Assembly adopted a resolution titled “Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine,” calling for an end to Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories captured in 1967 and reaffirming support for a two-state solution based on UN parameters.

The draft — co-sponsored by Djibouti, Jordan, Mauritania, Qatar, Senegal and Palestine — received 151 votes in favor, 11 against, and 11 abstentions, reflecting broader support than the Golan resolution.

The text reaffirms the UN’s historical responsibility for the question of Palestine and emphasizes the urgent need to uphold international law and UN Security Council resolutions in pursuit of peace. It calls on Israel to halt all settlement activities, cease unilateral measures altering the status of Jerusalem, and refrain from actions that undermine the prospects of a negotiated settlement.

The resolution also urges renewed, credible negotiations to achieve a just and lasting peace, while calling on all states to refrain from recognizing any changes to the 1967 borders — including with regard to Jerusalem — unless agreed upon by the parties.

Humanitarian concerns drive calls for international action

The resolution highlights the worsening humanitarian situation facing Palestinians, urging UN member states to increase assistance to address what it describes as a “severe and escalating humanitarian crisis.”

According to UN agencies, millions of Palestinians across the occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza remain affected by movement restrictions, settlement expansion, renewed military operations and the collapse of essential services. Aid workers say the situation has deteriorated significantly in 2025.

The General Assembly called on donors to step up support to UNRWA, the UN agency for Palestinian refugees, and pressed for unimpeded humanitarian access across all occupied territories.

Israeli representatives dismissed both resolutions as politically motivated and one-sided, arguing that they ignore Israeli security concerns and complex realities on the ground. They accused the General Assembly of maintaining a “systematic bias” against Israel.

Palestinian officials, meanwhile, welcomed the strong vote totals, describing them as evidence of overwhelming international backing for Palestinian rights and the two-state solution.

Syrian diplomats praised the Golan resolution as an important reaffirmation of Syria’s sovereignty, calling Israel’s occupation a “grave and ongoing violation of international law.”

Arab states, several non-aligned countries, and many from Africa, Asia and Latin America also voiced support, stressing that the international community must ensure compliance with UN decisions.

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or the first time in nearly 60 years, a Syrian president addressed the U.N. General Assembly on Wednesday, marking a dramatic turn in the country’s international standing after the collapse of the Assad family’s decades-long rule.

President Ahmad al-Sharaa told world leaders that “Syria is reclaiming its rightful place among the nations of the world,” as thousands of Syrians watched his speech on big screens in Damascus and other cities, waving national flags. His appearance was the first by a Syrian head of state at the U.N. since Noureddine Attasi spoke in 1967, months after Syria lost the Golan Heights to Israel during the Arab-Israeli war.

The speech comes just nine months after Bashar Assad’s sudden ouster in a lightning insurgent offensive that ended the Assad dynasty’s 54-year rule, a period marked by repression, mass killings and torture. Al-Sharaa, who rose to power after the fall of the Assad, framed his address as the beginning of a new chapter, promising accountability, reconciliation, and a break from Syria’s past.

Israel and regional tensions

Al-Sharaa used the U.N. platform to accuse Israel of continuing threats against Syria since Assad’s fall, warning that its policies “contradict with the international community’s support to Syria and its people” and risk destabilizing the region. Negotiations are underway over a potential security deal that could revive the 1974 disengagement agreement between the two countries, though Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has downplayed the prospects of a breakthrough.

Netanyahu’s office later confirmed that talks are in progress, stressing that Israel’s interests must be guaranteed, including demilitarization of southwestern Syria and security protections for the Druze minority.

Since coming to power, al-Sharaa has emphasized coexistence and pledged to protect Syria’s diverse communities. Al-Sharaa told the General Assembly that Damascus had formed fact-finding missions and granted U.N. investigators access to probe the killings. “I promise to bring anyone whose hands are tainted with the blood of Syrian people to justice,” he said.

Battling Syria’s drug trade

The president also touted his government’s campaign against the illicit Captagon trade, a multi-billion-dollar narcotics industry that flourished under Assad and helped finance his war effort amid Western sanctions. Authorities have closed dozens of production facilities in recent months, al-Sharaa said, while urging the international community to lift sanctions he argued now “shackle the Syrian people.”

U.S. President Donald Trump, who met al-Sharaa in May in Saudi Arabia, has already lifted or waived some sanctions. But the toughest measures, imposed by the U.S. Congress in 2019, remain in place and can only be removed through legislative approval.

Al-Sharaa’s speech was met with celebration in Damascus, where large crowds filled Umayyad Square to cheer his appearance. But in New York, members of the Syrian diaspora staged rival demonstrations outside the U.N.

Supporters waved Syria’s three-starred revolution flag, now recognized as the country’s official emblem, and praised al-Sharaa as the leader who ended decades of dictatorship.

Al-Sharaa’s international debut highlights Syria’s uncertain transition after decades of authoritarian rule and 14 years of devastating civil war that killed more than a million people and displaced millions more. His pledges of justice, coexistence, and economic revival face daunting obstacles: fragile security, lingering sectarian distrust, and the difficult task of rebuilding a shattered state.

“Syria does not wish the pain it passed through for anyone,” al-Sharaa said, closing his speech with an appeal for global solidarity and a statement of support for Palestinians amid the ongoing genocide in Gaza.

(Source: The Associated Press)

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yrian Information Minister Hamza Mustafa has accused Israel of working to divide Syria by backing local separatist actors in the southern governorate of Suwayda, particularly Druze leader Hikmet al-Hajri, in an effort to create autonomous canton-like regions and weaken the Syrian state.

“Israel does not want the existence of a united and stable Syria,” Mustafa told Anadolu in an exclusive interview. “It continues its policy of keeping the country fragmented and unstable. Unfortunately, some internal parties also serve Israeli policies with narrow political calculations.”

His comments come after weeks of rising tensions and intermittent clashes between Syrian security forces, tribal factions, and groups loyal to Hajri in Suwayda, a predominantly Druze province. According to Mustafa, a recent ceasefire agreement in the region was reached through U.S.-led mediation, supported by several other unnamed countries.

Ceasefire built on political dialogue

Minister Mustafa emphasized that Damascus had pursued dialogue—not war—over the past six months with political and armed factions in Suwayda, including Hajri’s group.

“The government had no intention of launching a military operation in Suwayda,” he said. “Our approach was political from the beginning. We offered local concessions, including allowing young people from the area to participate in maintaining order.”

Despite accusations from opposition figures that the government used force, Mustafa insisted that the military involvement was reactive, not pre-planned, and stemmed from rising tension between Druze groups and Bedouin tribes.

He described the ceasefire as a three-stage process: halting armed clashes and withdrawing security forces from the city center; expelling tribal groups from urban areas; and restoring services such as fuel, food, telecommunications, and internet access.

“Though Hajri-affiliated groups initially tried to violate the ceasefire, it stabilized within days,” he said.

Rejecting aid blockade allegations

Addressing allegations that the Syrian government was besieging Suwayda and restricting aid, Mustafa denied any such strategy, asserting that the state continues delivering humanitarian support without sectarian discrimination.

“Hajri and similar factions promote a false narrative about an aid blockade to gain political leverage,” he said. “They want to appear as the only protectors and providers for the region.”

According to Mustafa, Hajri’s faction has been monopolizing aid distribution, not the government, to “buy loyalty and punish opposition.” He said international aid organizations have been invited into the region to supervise distributions transparently.

“The so-called siege narrative is not only false but dangerous—it serves separatist goals and fragments Syrian society,” he warned.

Israel’s role and regional destabilization

Additionally, Minister Mustafa accused Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of exploiting Syria’s instability and fostering fragmentation in the name of domestic political survival.

“Netanyahu has relentlessly risked the entire region for his own future,” he said. “Israel’s handling of Gaza has already strained its Western alliances. It sees any attempt at a united, independent Syria as a threat.”

Mustafa added that while Israel claims to support Druze communities in occupied Palestine, it exerts pressure on them and uses their identity as a political tool.

“Israel is trying to export this model to Syria through groups like Hajri’s,” he said. “But the vast majority of Syrian Druze have historically sided with Damascus and continue to see Israel as an occupier.”

I

ran has reportedly invested tens of billions of dollars in building an aerial defense network in war-torn Syria by deploying personnel and equipment, an unknown intelligence source from a nation allied to the United States told Newsweek. Reports suggest Iran’s new defense mission over the course of the “last two years” is an attempt to counter repeated Israeli airstrikes targeting “Iranian military assets and interests in the Syrian territory.”

The Iranian involvement in Syria dates back to the 2011 civil war, which broke out after anti-government protests were crushed and turned violent. Being one of the key supporters of the Assad regime, Iran funds, equips, and supports a number of Syrian and foreign proxies including Lebanon’s Hezbollah.

Iran and Israel have long been rivals and engaged in what many describe as a “shadow war.” For years, Israel has carried out hundreds of strikes on targets in Syria; however, it rarely admits such operations. Meanwhile Israel has previously acknowledged that it attacks the facilities of Iran-allied Hezbollah  in Syria, which has sent troops to Syria in support of President Bashar Al-Assad. Syria has frequently blamed Israel for the strikes and its state-run media has documented the death of Syrian soldiers and civilians.

The source listed nearly seven Israeli military operations against the rising Iranian network over the past two years. This includes operations in Palmyra and Tartus in October 2021, Latakia in December 2021, Damascus in March 2022, another operation in Tartus in July 2022, and two operations in Homs in November and December 2022. These strikes have killed 10 Iranians in Syria, including two air defense engineers.

The strikes were responsible for the death of the high-profile Iranian Davoud Jafari, also known as “Malek,” a key commander of Iran’s air defense efforts in Syria. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of Iran has vowed staunch retaliation in response to these deaths.

According to the source, Brigadier General Fereydoun Mohammadi Saghaei, the deputy commander of IRGC Aerospace Force, serves as commander of Iran’s air defense project in Syria. “The promotion of these capabilities is carried out as a project shared with the Syrian army and possibly even with the aim of enabling the independent Iranian operation of the aerial defense systems from within parts of Syria.”

“In addition, the Iranians assisted the Syrians in upgrading their radar array, designed to aid in detection and prevention of Israeli attacks—mainly against the Iranian establishment in Syria,” the source told Newsweek.

The source also added that weapons involved in the defense mission include the Bavar-373 surface-to-air missile system paired with the Sayyad 4B solid-propellant missile. Iranian officials have claimed these systems will have a range of more than 186 miles with a radar range of more than 280 miles.

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On November 13, a terrorist attack killed six civilians and injured 81 others on Istanbul’s crowded Istiklal Avenue. While the perpetrator was captured shortly after the terrorist attack, tens of people who were found to have connections to the attack were detained and most were arrested by court decision.

Individuals as important as the people involved in the attack provided evidence that the attack had been planned and carried out by the PKK/YPG terrorist organization. The statements by the arrested terror suspects clearly revealed that they had received instructions from the northern Syrian city of Manbij, or, in other words, from the PKK/YPG terrorist organization.

After the Istiklal Avenue attack, on November 20, Turkey launched a large-scale military air campaign against northern Iraq and northern Syria named “Operation Claw-Sword.” According to official data, 89 targets were destroyed, and many terrorists were killed in the first phase of the operation, which targeted shelters, bunkers, caves, tunnels, ammunition depots, and headquarters and training camps belonging to terrorists.

Turkey grounds it cross-border military operations on the legal principle of the right to self-defense; however, there are critics and statements that question the legitimacy of its operations. This makes it imperative to evaluate briefly the history of the county’s cross-border operations against terrorist organizations.

Cross-border operations against the PKK/YPG

Founded in 1978, the PKK is classified as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, and many other states. In 1979, some of the initial leadership of the PKK first settled in Syria and Lebanon with the support of the Syrian government. As the PKK initiated its first terrorist acts in August 1982, it started also to settle in northern Iraq, using the opportunity created by the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988. The PKK established camps in the Kandil Mountains, close to the Iran-Iraq border in northern Iraq, which became its main headquarter and served as a base to attack Turkey.

Since 1983, Ankara has had to initiate cross-border operations against the PKK to fight back terrorist attacks coming from cross-border bases. The legal bases for Turkey’s operations have periodically changed from the expressed or tacit consent of the Iraqi governments to the right to self-defense. Turkey has carried out a large number of cross-border military operations; some followed Iraqi approval, while others were in hot pursuit and based on the right to self-defense.

The latest of these operations is Operation Claw which started on May 27, 2019. The operation is ongoing and so far has included Operation Claw 2, which began on May 27, 2019; Operation Claw 2, which began on July 13, 2019; Operation Claw 3, which began on August 23, 2019; Operation Claw-Eagle, which began on June 15, 2020; Operation Claw-Tiger, which began on June 17, 2020; Operation Claw-Eagle 2, which began on February 10, 2021; and Operations Claw-Lightning and Claw-Thunderbolt, which have continued throughout 2022. It has been stated that via these operations more than 830 terrorists have been neutralized, 1,281 weapons have been seized, and 1,407 caves and 1,812 handmade explosives have been destroyed.

In recent years, Turkey has had to direct some of the cross-border operations to northern Syria due to the new developments caused by the Syrian conflict. These operations include Operation Euphrates Shield (August 24, 2016 – March 29, 2017, in Jarablus and Al-Bab, Aleppo, Operation Olive Branch (January 20, 2018 – March 24, 2018 in Afrin and Aleppo), Operation Peace Spring (October 9, 2019 – October 18, 2019 in Rasulayn and Tel Abyad), and Operation Spring Shield (February 27, 2020 – March 5, 2020 in Idlib).

The legal basis of Operation Claw-Sword

Turkey’s most recent cross-border military operation named “Operation Claw-Sword” targeted the Kandil, Asos, and Hakurk regions in northern Iraq including the Sinjar region. In northern Syria, the military operation further targeted places in the regions of Ayn al-Arab, Tel Rifat, Cizire, and Malikiye (Derik). Karacok Mountain, Derbesiye, Ayn Issa, Minniğ Airport and Maranez were also targeted in the following stages.

Specifically, the operations targeted the terrorist group’s shelters, bunkers, caves, tunnels, ammunition depots, headquarters, and training camps that posed a direct threat to Turkey’s security.

The legal aspect of Turkey’s cross-border operations

Some objections have been voiced against Turkey’s Operation Claw-Sword, leading to the need for a clarification of Turkey’s legal stance.

Article 51 of the UN Charter regulates the right to self-defense. The article stipulates that the right to self-defense is natural; in other words, every state has this right by nature. This right comes into effect in case of an armed attack. A state’s right to self-defense can be exercised either alone or together with other states which come to the help of the state under attack. Until the UN Security Council takes measures to protect international peace and security, all states can exercise this right.

Although not expressed in the article, proportionality is an element of the right to self-defense: a response should be in proportion to the attack and not exceed the boundaries necessary to stop and/or eliminate the threat.

The decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case concerning “Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua” (Nicaragua v. United States of America) established that a state must be subject to an “armed attack” in order for the right of self-defense to arise.

The court held that an armed attack is not only limited to “action by regular armed forces across an international border,” but also the “sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular forces,” or “its substantial involvement therein.”

Therefore, armed attacks by irregular groups give rise to the right of self-defense, as long as they are categorized as “armed attacks” rather than “frontier incidents.”

The court further emphasized that the description contained in Article 3, paragraph (g) of the Definition of Aggression annexed to General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) may be taken to reflect customary international law. That is to say that the legal approach concerning the use of the right of self-defense is legally binding to all states as customary rule of international law.

The PKK/YPG’s constant attacks on Turkey from northern Iraq and northern Syria exceed the level of border friction and can be classified as “armed attacks” carried out by regular armed forces. According to the officially announced figures, since 2015, a total of 764 mortar attacks, rockets, and missiles have been fired from Syrian territory, targeting the populous cities of Hatay, Gaziantep, Kilis, Şanlıurfa, Mardin, and Şırnak in southeast Turkey. Thirty-two Turkish citizens have been killed and 261 people have been injured in these attacks. In a very recent attack, two civilians lost their lives and six people were injured, two of them seriously, in a rocket attack carried out against the Turkish town of Karkamış from the north of Syria.

Apart from these attacks and murders, 173 civilians and 153 security guards have lost their lives in 87 separate terrorist acts by the PKK and related organizations inside the borders of Turkey within the last seven years.

Statements and images from Turkey’s most recent cross-border military operations reveal that the operations specifically target the terrorist camps, shelters, and related compounds.

Turkey’s right to self-defense requires it to conduct cross-border military operations in northern Syria and northern Iraq. This right emanates and is regulated by Article 51 of the UN Charter.

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fter normalizing relations with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Egypt, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has overtly stated that he can meet Syria’s Bashar Assad “when the time is right.” Erdoğan-led governments in the recent past supported popular uprisings during the Arab Spring, expecting that protests would culminate in the overthrow of authoritarian regimes. While some Arab dictators were indeed toppled, they were replaced by new ones. Others yet remained in power, such as Assad, thanks to the help of their allies and the reluctance of the West to pressure them to leave their posts.

Overall, after a decade, it could be argued that the Arab Spring has totally failed. Based on this fact, countries supporting the Arab people have revised their foreign policies against authoritarian Arab regimes since their stance neither helps a democratic transition nor their state interests. Turkey actually resisted mending relations with dictators longer than any other country, but eventually saw that it has been left alone and therefore started to normalize relations with the unwelcomed victors of the Arab Spring.

The last chain of Turkey’s normalization process with Arab states is overhauling relations with the Assad regime. It is beyond doubt that Erdoğan and his government have commenced returning to the previous normality reluctantly. It is not Erdoğan’s preference, but rather compelling conditions that have forced him to improve relations with the Syrian regime. Also, the rapprochement is a result of Russian pressure rather than Ankara’s and Damascus’s wills. As Russia is busy with Ukraine and international pressure, it wants good relations with its ally Syria and its reliable neutral partner Turkey.

As Syrian analysists highlight, the reconciliation path is irreversible and would remain confined to reciprocal diplomacy and temporary security arrangements. A full reconciliation is difficult to achieve as long as Turkey’s concerns are not adequately addressed by Damascus, which is neither willing or capable of providing Ankara with the acceptable guarantees or actions. On the other hand, from the Turkish point of view, Assad is not a reliable neighbor, and Syria will continue to be a source of terrorism and migrant influx as long as he is in power. Despite this fact, the Turkish government uses a narrative of reconciliation due to internal and international pressure.

From another perspective, facts on the ground show that a permanent peace between the two is almost impossible unless Assad cedes power. The foremost fact is that the hostility is reciprocal and Assad family’s enmity towards Turkey goes back to the days of Bashar Assad’s father, Hafez Assad. Ankara suffered a lot from Hafez Assad’s protection of the PKK cadres in Syria. The two countries were about to go to war as Abdullah Öcalan was living in Syria until 1998. There was only a 10-year entente beginning with Erdoğan’s coming to power in 2002 until 2011 when the Arab Spring reached Syria.

Second, Turkey’s concern about Syria’s being a hub for terrorist organizations will not be removed by the Assad regime. Besides not being capable of doing so, Damascus seems happy to see clashes between Turkey and the YPG. The more Ankara suffers, the happier Assad seems to become. Moreover, Assad’s protector, Russia, does not fight the YPG and even prevents Turkish attacks on the group. What is more, even if the regime and Russia decide to fight the YPG, the U.S. will certainly protect its so-called ally, the SDF (YPG). Therefore, the security problems arising from the YPG will not end by a likely rapprochement.

Third, Turkey has a serious Syrian migrant problem emanating from Assad’s brutality. Assad has lost his legitimacy among the Syrian population but he is still seen as the leader of Syria. None of the millions of displaced Syrians want to return home, fearing torture by the regime. Those in Turkey and fleeing to Idlib and its vicinity reject Assad’s authority and clearly underline that they will not live under his rule. The Assad regime also does not want migrants to return as Syrians who are not loyal to the regime will create problems for Damascus. Besides security issues, returnees mean a further economic burden on the Syrian government, which will have a destabilizing impact on the country.

Therefore, the Assad regime will not meet Turkey’s requests both because of unwillingness and incapability. What is more, despite Turkey extending its hand in rapprochement, the regime is reluctant to reciprocate the gesture. Reuters claimed that Bashar Assad has rejected Russia’s offer to meet President Erdoğan, refusing to give Erdoğan a leverage before elections, which will be held next year.

Assad does not want to help Erdoğan before the elections as a meeting would be seen as a consolation by the Turkish population which is frustrated with the presence of four million Syrian refugees in their country. In addition, Damascus is asking for a full withdrawal of Turkish troops from Syria.

The withdrawal request is almost impossible to be realized as Turkey fears more migrant influxes and terrorist attacks. Also, Ankara can easily evade this request by asking the regime to stop terrorist attacks and create a peaceful environment for the return of Syrians. It is unwise to expect Turkey to withdraw troops while millions of Syrians live in Turkey. What is more, the Turkish government could never justify its withdrawal to the Turkish people. Perhaps, the Assad regime is aware of this fact, and uses it as a leverage against Ankara to hinder rapprochement.

Compelling factors and actors push Turkey and Syria into a rapprochement course, but the facts on the ground may impede it. Perhaps, the only solution is a political transition that will allow all factions of the Syrian people to participate in the political system, which is possible with Bashar Assad.

Without the approval of the Syrian people, a new era in Turkish-Syrian relations will not see the light. It may even create more problems as armed groups of the Syrian opposition may turn their guns towards Turkey. Meanwhile, the American factor should not be ignored as the U.S. has other plans for Syria, most of which clash with those of Turkey, Syria, Russia, and other state and non-state actors.

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan officially visited Tehran on July 19, after a 4-year hiatus. The seventh Turkey-Iran High-Level Cooperation Council meeting was held during the visit. Following the Astana Talks format, a meeting on Syria was also held on the same day with the participation of Russian President Putin and Iranian President Raisi. While President Erdoğan had the opportunity to talk about the critical topics in Turkey-Iran and Turkey-Russia relations with his counterparts, negotiations were also held on the future of Syria and the anti-terrorism operation that Turkey is planning to conduct in Northern Syria.

Outcomes of the Tehran Summit for Syria

Erdoğan’s trip to Tehran made clear Turkey’s stance on a number of topics. Showing how determined Turkey is to clear the terrorist organization YPG/PYD, which operates in Syria, from the region, Erdoğan underlined the steps that need to be taken to reach a political solution to the Syrian crisis. He highlighted the necessity to engage in the Constitutional Committee’s work and that progress on the repatriation of refugees should be expedited.

Russian and Iranian leaders did not directly mention the YPG/PYD, although they engaged in a similar discourse to Erdoğan on the importance of fighting terrorism. Both countries’ direct or indirect relationship with this terrorist organization may have prevented the leaders from voicing its name openly. Therefore, Erdoğan’s call that “we want to see actions, not words” remain unanswered.

Although Russia and Iran do not support the planned Turkish operation, they do not openly say that they would prevent it, and Turkey may conduct an operation against the terrorist organization despite their objections.

The Tehran Summit showed that there was no change in the positions of the parties on the war in Syria. However, the leaders’ face-to-face meetings after the pandemic bracket were a vital sign that the political solution process in Syria is set to accelerate. On the other hand, the summit succeeded in as far as Turkey, Russia, and Iran kept the diplomacy table afloat in the face of challenges such as the COVID19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war, which tested the international system and proved that international organizations failed.

Where Are Turkey-Iran Relations Heading?

Specific to the relations of Turkey and Iran, some points of cooperation and conflict came to the fore. While the points of cooperation were emphasized by the President of the Republic of Iran and the members of the government, the points of disagreement were expressed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The different approaches of the two figures to relations with Turkey is due to the dual structure of the political system in Iran: since Khamenei determines Iran’s general policy, the president cannot go beyond the limits most often drawn for him.

Nevertheless, since the president conducts intergovernmental relations and has political responsibility, he emphasizes cooperation and takes a constructive stance. However, despite all these emphases on cooperation, it is understood from the statements of the religious leader that a certain level of tension will remain on the Ankara-Tehran line.

President Raisi reiterated the target of $30 billion of bilateral trade volume and expressed hope for extending the 25-year natural gas agreement. He also mentioned the goal of establishing joint industrial facilities. The two sides signed a long-term comprehensive cooperation plan which aims to deepen economic relations between the two countries. Also, delegations started negotiations for the extension of the 25-year natural gas agreement.

In the meeting with President Erdoğan, Supreme Leader Khamenei expressed Iran’s dissatisfaction with the new geopolitical reality that emerged after Azerbaijan liberated Karabakh from Armenia by saying that they would not allow the closure of the Iran-Armenia border.

Khamenei also stated his discomfort with the normalization of Turkey-Israel relations. Iran does not want the two countries to resolve their differences as, according to Tehran’s point of view, in such a case, Turkey and Israel would act together and harm Iran. Iranian intelligence has recently targeted Israeli tourists and businesspeople on Turkish soil, both in an attempt to respond to the assassinations that took place inside Iran and to target the Turkey-Israel normalization process. These attempts were prevented by timely interventions of the Turkish intelligence, but they draw Turkey’s reaction and cause tension in bilateral relations.

Iran’s stance is clearly negative to Turkey’s possible operation. Khamenei claimed that a military operation by Turkey in Syria would benefit the terrorists at the expense of Turkey and neighboring countries. This stance is not unique to Syria. Iran views almost all of Turkey’s cross-border operations negatively as it regards Turkey as the strongest competitor in the region and, therefore, views any military operation by Ankara as a threat to its sphere of influence.

On a rhetorical level, Tehran states that it understands Turkey’s security concerns, and Khamenei recommends dialogue and negotiation as a method to address them. Yet, dialogue is unlikely to work because the Assad administration’s control in Syria is fragile. Moreover, Assad himself supports terrorist organizations. Iran proposes a dialogue, but does not hesitate to keep its soldiers or proxies in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon and to arm them.

The Tehran Summit produced significant results on regional and international levels. It is evident that the Turkish government’s planned action in Syria will not receive help from Russia or Iran. Although Putin, and Raisi have not publicly said that they would try to stop the operation, they might make an effort to undermine it through armed groups on the ground. For this, Iran stands out more than Russia as it has many proxy groups in Syria and Iraq that can directly target the Turkish Armed Forces.

Another possibility is to put the Turkish army under serious accusations with false flag operations. The attack on civilians in Iraq’s Zakho region brings to mind such a scenario. It is known that some armed groups close to Iran stand in solidarity with the YPG/PYD against Turkey’s operation. These groups also work to establish an anti-Turkey image and there is strong evidence that the Zakho attack was carried out along this line. Turkey has stated that it holds no reservation for the investigation of the incident by an international and impartial commission.

The meeting between Erdoğan and Putin in Tehran was instrumental in taking important steps for global issues such as the Russia-Ukraine war. President Putin conveyed his thanks to President Erdoğan for the role Ankara played in reaching the grain deal. It would be no exaggeration to say that the foundations of the grain corridor agreement signed in Istanbul on July 22 were laid during the earlier meeting of Erdoğan and Putin in Tehran.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently disclosed Turkey’s intention to launch a new military operation along the country’s southern border to eliminate terrorist elements and strongholds of the YPG, the PKK’s Syrian offshoot. The operation aims to realize the Turkish goal of creating a 32 km safe zone, which was commenced in September 2019.

The safe zone, for which four military operations have already been conducted, is more necessary than ever as the Turkish government is currently creating conditions for the return of one million Syrian migrants. According to the Turkish media, the new operation aims to clear Tal Rifaat, Manbij, Ayn al-Arab, and Ain Issa from the YPG.

Reasons for the likely operation

As President Erdoğan has stated, the YPG continues to attack Turkish troops and the Syrian National Army (SNA) from the towns they control. Particularly, Tal Rifaat and Manbij pose a great threat to Turkey since the YPG uses them as bases for all car bombings on the Syrian side and launching missiles against Turkish territories. The last such attack was on May 12, killing a Turkish soldier and injuring six soldiers and civilians in total. Therefore, Turkey’s military operation into northern Syria is vital to prevent new attacks, and perhaps end them permanently.

In addition, the Turkish government is about to resettle voluntarily one million Syrians who currently live in Turkey. This number may rise to 2.5 million. However, a secure environment in the safe zone is a prerequisite for the plan’s success. The towns and cities in the safe areas of northern Syria might get overcrowded with newcomers, so an enlargement of the safe zone is a sine qua non for Turkey’s resettlement plan.

Current conjunctures in world politics might be an opportunity for Turkish authorities to act. Russia is bogged down in Ukraine and is withdrawing a large number of its forces from Syria to beef up its Ukrainian fronts and leaving its military bases to pro-Iran proxies. In fact, the deployment of Iranian proxies is not a great concern for Turkey with the exception of Tal Rifaat, controlled by the Syrian regime and the YPG, where the Turkish army and SNA are already exposed to attacks. If non-state actors and proxies arrive there, the threat will be more dangerous than ever.

Meanwhile, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Çavuşoğlu complained about the U.S. administration’s contradictory policies on Turkey. Besides promises by the U.S. regarding Manbij and their support for the YPG, Çavuşoğlu expressed his discomfort with America’s pro-Greece policy against Turkey while asking the Turkish government not to veto Sweden’s and Finland’s application to NATO.

In all likelihood, the Turkish government feels disappointed following the U.S. support for the YPG, and is reluctant to rely on Washington’s promises. Thus, Turkey wants to resume its military operations given that following the U.S. administration’s wishes just worsens the situation on the ground in Syria.

On the other hand, the allegation that Turkey is behaving opportunistically at a time when the U.S., Europe, and NATO are focusing on Ukraine is invalid. The Turkish army has already conducted four military operations to clear terrorist organizations from northern Syria, and started to create a 35 km belt safe zone on its southern borders. The imminent operation is the most recent and might not be the last. Most probably Turkey would have conducted this operation even if there had not been a Russian attack on Ukraine.

A few months before the Turkish government announced that one million Syrians would voluntarily return to their homes, sources close to Ankara discussed the return of Syrians to Syria and added that Manbij would be taken with the consent of the Syrian regime, which favors the unity of Syria and is disturbed by the YPG’s presence there.

A legitimate government should stop terrorism that hurts neighboring countries or the victimized neighbors, like Turkey in this instance, will have to take action. Turkey cannot be expected to stand by and watch in silence while being constantly attacked by a terrorist group and while the Syrian regime looks the other way.

On the other hand, the Adana Agreement signed between Turkey and Syria on October 20, 1998 lays down the duties of the Turkish and Syrian sides in relation to the PKK and its affiliates, and enables Turkey to intervene. A similar legitimacy stems from Article 51 of the UN Charter, which the U.S. uses to justify its presence in Syria.

It is no secret that some countries in the Arab world and Europe object to the likely Turkish operation; however, concerns and condemnations look mostly unilateral and ignore Turkey’s security concerns.

As Turkish Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu reiterates, while Russia had promised to oust the YPG from Tal Rifaat, the U.S. said they would remove the terrorist group from Manbij. However, both countries have not fulfilled their promises. These unfulfilled promises legitimize the Turkish intervention to remove the group from towns near its borders.

Turkey hosts about four million Syrians and their long stay in the country is being exploited by far-right political parties in Turkey and distorting domestic politics. It is noteworthy that other states oppose Turkey’s operations, but do not offer a solution or want to understand Turkey’s concerns. The terrorism threat and growing migration problem, coupled with the unwillingness of the international community to find solutions, leave Turkey no other option but to intervene in northern Syria.

Months after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the war seems to have fallen short of its main objectives. At the moment, Russian forces are pursuing a strategy of fortifying the Russian separatist regions in eastern Ukraine and restoring the land connection between Crimea and these regions. Moscow seems to have abandoned its goal of a regime change in Ukraine by occupying Kyiv, at least for now.

Although diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions have isolated and harmed Russia, the chief reason behind Russia’s revision of its goals is the heavy military losses. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have claimed that more than 4,500 military vehicles belonging to the Russian Armed Forces were destroyed, severely damaged, or captured by the Ukrainian forces. Although there is no objective data on the causalities, according to the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ statements, Russian causalities in Ukraine are more than 25,000.

The impact of the war in Ukraine on Syria and Libya

Russian military losses not only affect the Russian prospects for Ukraine, but also Russia’s military presence in the Middle East. Some Wagner units, who are Russian mercenaries and were deployed in Libya and Syria, have reportedly started withdrawing. These units redeployed in Ukraine to back Russian forces.

Accordingly, Ankara decided to close its airspace to Russian military and civilian planes flying between Russia and Syria. Thus, the route from the Hmeimim Air Base to Russia has become longer and costlier. On the other hand, as a move against Ukraine’s open-door strategy to foreign fighters, especially citizens of European countries, Moscow stated that there are volunteers from the Middle East who want to fight on its behalf.

Following this move, allegations were made from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) and Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) that Russia voluntarily registered thousands of Syrians for a possible deployment to the Donbass region. These moves speak of the impact of the Ukraine war and Russia’s losses in Syria. Russia’s possible withdrawal of military forces in Syria would diminish its influence and this would work in favor of Iran, both ally and rival of Moscow over Syria.

High-level officials from Syria and Iran had met in the early days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and discussed the opportunities that a possible decrease of the Russian influence could create in the medium term. While the spymaster of the al-Assad regime Ali Mamlouk met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and the Secretary General of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani in Tehran on February 28, the president of the Syrian regime Bashar al-Assad received Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Asghar Haji in Damascus on March 1.

Israel targeted certain Iranian militias such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iranian-backed militias such as Hezbollah, as these pro-Iran forces were challenged by Russian-backed militias on the ground. However, Tehran responded to Moscow’s policy of challenging Iran through the Iran-backed foreign militia forces in the region, and the regime-affiliated National Defence Forces (NDF), the Local Defense Forces (LDF), and the 4th Armored Division units. The result was a loss for Moscow.

Russian-backed militias, including former rebels, lost ground in Daraa and the Iranian-backed elements gained ground. If Iran increases its influence in the region by taking advantage of the decrease in Russian influence, Russian influence in the vicinity of Damascus may be threatened. In addition, it is possible for Israel to increase its air attacks and even a limited cross-border intervention is possible.

Another possibility is that assassinations and armed attacks targeting regime and Iranian-backed figures in the region may increase, leading to a vacuum of power. While the Russia-brokered reconciliation agreements convinced Syrian opposition fighters in Daraa to reach a ceasefire, the deterioration of the balance of power in favor of the regime and Iran may cause the undercover opposition cells to become visible and active.

On the other hand, in Deir ez-Zor, Iran has turned the region into a hub for its militias. The IRGC, Hezbollah, Baqir Brigade, Liwa Fatemiyoun, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada units are positioned on a line from Bukemal in the south to Tebni in the north. This massive militia presence is an assurance for Iran’s Iraq-Syria militia logistics. Tehran uses these militias to counterbalance both the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Russia, and is trying to make militias a permanent actor in Deir ez-Zor through cultural centers, NGOs, and real estate purchases.

Meanwhile, Russia is trying to establish a balance of power by increasing diplomatic efforts with the Arab tribes of Deir ez-Zor and recruiting militias from the local population. However, the financial effects of the Ukraine invasion may hit Russia’s plans in Deir ez-Zor. This situation may lead Tehran, which does not have problems in logistics and funding—in the case of Deir ez-Zor—to increase its influence there.

The Iraq-Syria border becoming a full Iranian sphere of influence will be a reason for intervention for both the U.S. and Israel. This, in turn, will translate into intense airstrikes and special operations against Iranian-backed militias. Such a scenario could lead to full-scale chaos in the region and DAESH may take advantage of this to strengthen its presence in the Syrian desert.

Russia’s losses on the Ukrainian front have encouraged Iran, which wants to become the leading actor in Syria, to advance further. The actors that will balance these moves by Iran, which is increasing its influence especially in southern and eastern Syria through militias, seem for now to be Israel and the U.S. On the other hand, Russia may turn a blind eye to the interventions of various actors, especially the U.S. and Israel, in order to balance Tehran.

Recently, the debates in Turkish politics around migrants and refugees have heated. A short film titled Silent Invasion (Sessiz İstila in Turkish) funded by far-right nationalist Victory Party leader Ümit Özdağ, brought the topic to the fore. The film contains polarizing, racist, and exaggerated depictions of Istanbul in 2043 overtaken by Syrians where the Turkish population has become a minority and is oppressed. The film utilizes populist rhetoric urging people to consider migration issues as black-and-white.

The volume of posts circulating on social media that claim to show disorderly behavior by foreigners (mainly Syrian and Afghani refugees) has also increased. These posts amplified in number at a time when the Turkish population has become economically vulnerable due to the economic hardships, primarily the high inflation. Nowadays, the government’s policies for regulating legal and illegal migration are being questioned more frequently.

Frustrations surrounding migration

The arguments surrounding migration escalated in 2021 over refugees from Afghanistan who left their country following the U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban’s immediate takeover. Concerns surrounding Afghani refugees triggered those already existing over Syrians, aggravating calls from the public for stronger border security.

Since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, Turkey has hosted a large influx of refugees, a development for which the country was not well prepared. Turkey adopted an open-door policy for people fleeing the conflict, granting them temporary protection status.

The temporary protection regime grants legal residence and access to health care services, education, social assistance, and interpretation. It also provides a safeguard from being sent to Syria against the will of the recipient. Today, the number of refugees in Turkey has reached 4 million, 3.6 million of them Syrian.

The refugee crisis has cost Turkey around 40 billion dollars as it endures high inflation and economic problems. For many migrants, Turkey is a transit point to Europe or other countries in the West. Although the EU pledged 6 billion euros in aid for refugees, it has only provided half of the amount.

As a policy to combat economic problems partially, Turkey facilitated visas, residencies, and acquisition of Turkish citizenship by investment. This piled on to the recent economic frustrations.

New regulations to control migration and population integrity

In February, Turkey restricted additional settlement of refugees in 16 provinces. Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior announced that residency applications are closed to foreigners within local communities where the population of foreign nationals surpasses 25% of the total population. Upon implementation, 781 neighborhoods in Turkey were closed to registry.

Foreigners in areas with high concentration of foreign nationals will be relocated to different districts and provinces on a voluntary basis. According to Çataklı, they were given around two months to change their address with the help of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to facilitate the process. Those under temporary protection risk losing their status if their new address is not notified after two months.

The deputy minister also mentioned that unregistered newcomers from Syria will not automatically be given protection statuses. They will be taken to camps where it will be investigated whether they need temporary protection or not, as people from regime-controlled areas are entering Turkey for economic reasons rather than fleeing war or persecution.

New measures have been introduced to prevent regular migrants from turning into irregular ones upon visa expiry. Fingerprints will be taken upon visa application so that the migrants who enter the country with visas but do not leave when their visa expires and destroy their passports can be duly identified.

Furthermore, in April, it was announced that the amount required for Turkish citizenship through buying real estate increased from $250,000 to $400,000.

The Turkish government seems to be dealing with migration more extensively compared to previous years as signs of social discontent are strongly surfacing. However, it remains to be seen whether existing measures are sufficient or satisfying to public opinion. As elections in 2023 near, it seems migration will continue to remain a hot topic in Turkish politics.

In April 2022, I had the opportunity to visit northern Syria, Azaz and Idlib, which locals define as liberated both from the PKK terror and from the tyranny of Bashar al-Assad since Turkey’s military operations in 2016.

I plan to share here my observations particularly on the question of education. Among others, I will address the questions: How do education and life look like in Syria? What does education mean for Syrian children? How do Turkey’s military operations reflect on education?

Education matters

Contrary to my expectations, social life in Syria is vibrant and the economy is somehow functioning. The local economy is alive, and people are engaged in trade, with agriculture taking the lead. The economy is functioning independently in these places and is controlled by local authorities—not by the Assad regime, and no taxes are paid to the regime. Even though the challenges to achieving economic growth are so many, Syrians have not given up their struggle for survival.

Schools play a major role in keeping hope for the future alive. In northern Syria, schools mean more than just educational centers. For many, schools are safe spaces for socializing with others. Education and socialization protect people from joining terrorist or other armed groups.

Northern Syria consists of two educational zones. The first one starts from Afrin and includes Azaz, Jarablus, al-Bab, Ras al-Ayn, and Tel Abyad. Education in this zone is coordinated by Turkey and run by locals. The second educational region is the Idlib region. Classes in both regions are directed by the local ministry of education, which manages to administer them by dividing them into four educational directorates, namely Idlib, Hama, Aleppo, and Sahel.

Due to the insufficient economic resources of the local Syrian government and the limited support by the United Nations and other international aid organizations, around 6,000 teachers out of a total of 33,000 work voluntarily with no salary. More than 410,000 students are currently enrolled and receiving education in these educational zones from preschool to the last year of the high school. There are approximately 250,000 students who have reached school age and cannot go to school. This figure increases when adding those who have reached high school age and are unable to go to school.

There are approximately 30,000-35,000 university students in northern Syria. Aleppo and Idlib have state universities, while Turkey permitted Gaziantep University and the University of Health Sciences to operate in the region, opening new faculties such as the Faculty of Islamic Sciences, the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, and the Faculty of Education.

The Turkish NGO Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH) opened the International Damascus University six years ago in Azaz. The latter and the aforementioned faculties of Gaziantep University and University of Health Sciences are given utmost importance and public attention by Syrians.

Ahmad told me that after he started working in northern Syria, many opportunities emerged especially in the field of education in Azaz, Jarablus, and Tel Abyad. Many Turkish NGOs are actively working to provide education to displaced Syrians. Some NGOs directly send financial aid whereas others are working on projects such as building schools and education centers.

Turkey welcomed Syrians by building camps for refugees, and providing material and moral support for them. After Ankara launched military operations to secure its borders, the security situation and living standards of Syrian refugees changed. For example, after Jarablus was liberated from the DAESH (ISIS) terror group, many Syrian refugees returned to their homes. With Turkey’s help and empowerment, local assemblies were authorized and made breakthroughs in education.

The Turkish presence seems to have revived trade in northern Syria. Through Turkey, international trade increased from liberated areas in Syria to third countries. Projects such as constructing briquette houses created employment opportunities. Industrial zones established close to the Turkish border by local councils with Turkey’s support have also had a positive impact on the economy. Undoubtedly, economic vibrancy is positively affecting education.

As northern Syria becomes safer, the materialization of Turkish President Erdoğan’s plan, recently announced, to return one million Syrian refugees voluntarily to their homes becomes more likely. This is possible now because life in Azaz, Jarablus, and other liberated parts of Syria is currently significantly more secure.

Turkey has placed a three-month ban on Russian planes flying to Syria. The ban spans both civilian and military planes. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Foreign Minister of Turkey, stated on April 23 that Russia had been informed in March about the decision and given time until April.

He also mentioned at a press conference during his flight to Uruguay that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had informed his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on the matter, adding that Russian authorities had made assurances that they would not fly anymore. It is likely that Russia will divert planes to Syria over Iran instead.

Çavuşoğlu further stated that the process had been part of a dialogue between Turkey and Russia regarding, among others, the Montreux Convention. In line with the latter, Turkey closed its straits to Russian vessels after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Turkey also took a similar decision for the passage of NATO warships for a preplanned exercise in the region.

Relations between Turkey and Russia can be considered overall to be good. While the two countries share a profound co-operation economically, the relations remain complicated and circumstance-based politically. The two countries have supported opposing sides in the Syrian civil war and Turkey is a part of the NATO alliance.

Along with Iran, Russia has been a key supporter of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, while Turkey has backed Syrian rebels during the conflict. Yet, in so far as the negotiation process between Russia and Ukraine in the ongoing war, Turkey is perceived as neutral and is respected by both sides, enabling it to host and mediate peace efforts.

Russia-Ukraine negotiation efforts in Turkey

Turkey has played an active role in the mediation between Russia and Ukraine. Turkey condemned Russia for the invasion but abstained from taking part in sanctions against Moscow. Two meetings for peace talks between Russia and Ukraine have taken place in Turkey so far.

The first of the peace talks was attended by foreign ministers Sergey Lavrov and Dmytro Kuleba, and took place on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum on March 10. The second round took place on March 29 between negotiators from both countries in Istanbul. The former was the first high-level meeting since the conflict began. The second meeting was deemed difficult but more productive than earlier talks, yet no substantial results were yielded in brokering a ceasefire.

Over the weekend, Erdoğan conducted telephone diplomacy with both Russia and Ukraine discussing the intent to hold further peace talks and underlining readiness to support negotiation efforts. He told Zelenskyy that Turkey would be willing to take up a guarantor role.

On Monday, April 25, António Guterres, U.N. secretary general, met with Erdoğan in Ankara before his talks in Moscow on April 26 and Kyiv on April 28. Guterres expressed support for Turkey’s diplomatic efforts. Both sides stressed the importance of ending the war and maintaining effective humanitarian corridors.

Challenges to peace pertain

Although diplomatic efforts in a peace process are significant, the tension of war is still high. Atrocities uncovered in Bucha and other regions including mass graves have received international reactions. Such images make it difficult to maintain a setting for a peace agreement. Some countries like the U.S. have called for more sanctions against Russia, while others have also backed an International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation into war crimes.

On April 25, Lavrov accused Zelenskyy of only pretending to negotiate and stated peace talks would continue, but criticized Ukraine’s approach to the talks saying “goodwill has its limits, [b]ut if it isn’t reciprocal, that doesn’t help the negotiation process.” Lavrov also said that weapon deliveries by NATO to Ukraine in essence meant engagement in war with Russia, making those weapons legitimate targets. Lavrov warned of a World War III given the current tensions.

From the beginning of the Syrian uprising, several Arab countries were almost unanimous in isolating the Syrian regime to punish it for its violations of Arab League resolutions and the rights of the Syrian people. This approach was translated by Qatar’s leadership in the Arab League and the important support of Saudi Arabia and post-revolutionary Tunisia and Egypt into a resolution that led to the suspension of the regime’s membership in the Arab League in November 2011.

In the following years, most Arab countries called on the regime to stop military operations against civilians, and some of them even played a greater role in actively seeking regime change in diplomatic manners and by supporting and financing the opposition. However, in the coming years, political changes occurred in some Arab countries such as in Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, causing a departure from regime change politics to the restoration of pre-Arab spring MENA security order, thus affecting the regional attitude towards the Syrian regime.

Egypt resumed consular relations in 2013, when most Arab countries took a stand against the Syrian regime, but has not fully normalized its relations with the regime to date. This shows that Egypt prioritizes the stability of the Syrian regime in its foreign policy, as Egypt distrusts the opposition and considers it a proxy for Turkey. Moreover, Egypt prefers to work with the army and considers it more reliable.

The UAE and Jordan, on the other hand, were on the opposite side and supported the Syrian opposition to varying degrees, but after the Russian intervention in 2015, the situation on the ground had changed, which, along with other factors such as the UAE’s attempt to counter Turkey and contain Iran with a different approach in Syria, led to a change in the countries’ priorities in their foreign policy toward Syria. In 2018, the UAE and Bahrain reopened their embassy in Damascus and resumed relations with the Syrian regime. The UAE wants to normalize its relations with the Syrian regime in order to have relations with all parties on the ground.

Similarly, when the Syrian opposition lost control of southern Syria in 2018 and signed reconciliation agreements, Jordan reopened its border with Syria with some restrictions, as it had done before 2015, Jordan has not completely severed relations with the Syrian regime, but it has downgraded its representation. It normalized its relations only in October 2021 after a telephone conversation between King Abdullah and Bashar al-Assad, which was expected after King Abdullah’s speech on CNN during his visit to Washington and after his meeting with President Biden.

Looking at the factors behind this action, the first one seems to be the economic factor, because the country is in a difficult economic situation, aiming at normalization and cross-border trade, as the Arab gas pipeline will help the Kingdom’s economy. In addition, the security factor is not as important as the economy, but it plays a role because the Kingdom is concerned about stability on its northern border and normalization will help in security coordination with the Syrian regime to prevent possible threats.

Although it has not severed its relations with the regime, Jordan has taken positions close to the Syrian opposition over the past decade, but has kept its border open with the Syrian regime for economic reasons. The Kingdom believes that normalizing its relations with the regime will help its economy recover and that it wants to play a role in resolving the conflict. Jordan has also sought to reactivate the bilateral agreement with Syria on various issues such as water. It also wanted to reactivate the Arab Gas Pipeline to reach Lebanon through Syria, which is part of the kingdom’s ambitions to become an energy hub in the region.

What sets Jordan apart, however, is that it is not only Jordan that wants to engage with the regime, but also brings along other countries that have the same idea of changing the regime’s behavior through concessions and vice versa. It is an approach that has met with the approval of the Biden administration. As part of its strategy to manage the Syria conflict by focusing on changing the regime’s behavior rather than regime change, this administration’s new approach to Syria is the opposite of the previous administration, which pursued a policy of maximum pressure.

In March 2022, another important UAE rapprochement with the Syrian regime took place, namely Bashar al-Assad’s visit to the country. This visit is considered very significant, mainly because it was al-Assad’s first visit to an Arab country since the beginning of the uprising. The visit can be analyzed from various points of view, such as future investments, the possibility of the regime’s return to the Arab League, and Iran’s influence.

The possibilities of reinstating the Syrian regime in the Arab League

In terms of support for the Syrian regime, not all of these countries are equally committed to Syria’s return to the Arab League in order to normalize the country’s relations with the world, but we can see some differences. In late January this year, Arab League Secretary General Ahmed Aboul Gheit said that Syria’s return to the Arab League was not discussed at the consultative meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Kuwait. He later added that Syria’s return to the Arab League depends on consensus among Arab countries. These are indications that a return is unlikely at the next summit.

The irony is that Egypt is playing a role in the Syrian regime’s return to the Arab League but has not yet fully normalized its relations with the Asaad regime, which could happen in the near future. As mentioned earlier, Egypt sided with the Syrian regime under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and the two countries have since restored consular relations.

The UAE changed its stance on Syria after 2015 until it normalized its relations with the regime. After that, they began to support the Assad regime and promote the normalization of their relations with other countries in the region. They went even further by calling for the lifting of sanctions imposed on Syria.

In Jordan, however, we see a different approach that accepts the current status quo in Syria as a reality. For example, Jordan does not fully side with the regime in the Syrian conflict, but rather seeks to benefit from the opening of its relations with the Syrian regime on an economic level and restore the situation to what was before the border between the two countries. In doing so, it advocates its approach to Syria “step by step” as a comprehensive plan for dealing with the regime.

Ultimately, these approaches are similar in some respects, but they are not identical. This means that not all of the approaches these countries are taking have the same goals. Moreover, not all countries approaching the Syrian regime can be considered allies of the regime; rather, it is about their needs.

Finally, these approaches are similar in some respects, but they are not identical. This raises the question of which of these approaches will be successful and how this will affect the situation on the ground. To what extent these approaches will be able to bring the Syrian regime back to the Arab League.

So far, these approaches have not been able to change the position of Riyadh and Doha in terms of normalizing relations with the Syrian regime, which may show how effective these processes have been so far. On another level, will the relations between the Syrian regime and the international community remain the same? Will we see some changes in the position of some countries like the U.S., or could other approaches be taken?

The just war doctrine debate goes back to the Middle Ages, when philosophers and theologians linked to the Roman Catholic Church, such as Augustine of Hippo in his encyclopedia on the city of God against the pagans (De civitate Dei contra paganos), commonly referred to as The City of God and Thomas Aquinas in his theological compendium Summa Theologica (Summary of Theology), provided theological justifications for waging wars. These wars were seen as a necessary evil by the Church to bring about better outcomes and justice, and to help those who the Church saw as worthy.

The reason the Church had to justify going to war was that as a pacifist institution being involved in wars was against its founding principles. Thus, the Church and its theologians introduced new concepts such as the theology of liberation, which was understood as the liberation of an oppressed people, justifying war as a last resort to achieve justice.

The theology of liberation manifested itself in the form of crusades—wars in the Middle East to save Jerusalem and Eastern Christians from what the Roman Catholic Church at the time saw as “oppression” by Muslims. For the Catholic Church, their crusades were “just,” but for people in the Levant, including large sectors of Christians, they were simply unjust.

It is important to note that when the crusaders arrived in the Levant, certain Christian groups fought alongside Muslims to repel the invading forces. Also, when the same Catholic Church revived the theology of liberation in the1960s in Latin America, in an attempt to explain the role, the Church should play in public life and politics, it was faced by a strong opposition by theologians linked to centers of power and government. Subsequently, when Pope John Paul II visited Nicaragua in 1983, he called for the removal of five priests from their jobs over their liberation theology advocacy.

The doctrine of just war

Michael Walzer, an American philosopher and the leading figure of the just war theory, outlines his approach in his well-known book Just and Unjust Wars, published in 1977, and still widely read today. Walzer speaks of two stages of war: jus ad bellum, the conditions leading to war, and jus in bello, the rules governing conduct during war. The first stage of just war requires meeting specific conditions before going to war, namely a just cause, a right intention, a legitimate authority, proportionality, and making war a last resort.

Still challenging, defining a just cause is subjective, and it could differ from one person and one actor to another (state or non-state). For the crusaders, waging a war was a just cause to “save” Christians. For the people of the Levant, including some Christians, these wars were unjust, and the crusaders had to be fought off.

We have seen how a spark can lead to a world war when the assassination of Austria’s Archduke Franz Ferdinand led to the outbreak of World War I. Of course, there were underlining reasons such as nationalism and expansionism, but nonetheless individual acts were also important to the buildup to war.

There are instances, especially in the context of anti-colonization struggles such as the National Liberation Front (FLN) of Algeria, where all attempts at dialogue for the withdrawal of the French failed. This lack of will to end colonial rule peacefully has left the colonized people with no other option but to take up arms against their oppressors.

The concept of a war as a last resort is a matter of interpretation as state actors—in the above case, colonial authorities—can always claim the absence of a partner for reaching an agreement to prevent a war. A prime example of this is Israel which puts forth the “absence” of a Palestinian partner as its excuse for not engaging in the process to achieve a sustainable and long-term peace.

Proportional and indiscriminate war

Despite the principles of jus in bello, in almost all wars, whether waged by state or non-state actors, civilians have always, directly and indirectly, fallen victims of attacks carried out by parties that claim to be fighting a just war.

In many instances, the response of colonial authorities to the colonized people was so brutal that it left scars on civilians for years to come such as France’s response to the May 1945 protests, where nearly 45,000 Algerians and 86 European settlers/soldiers were killed.

Israel’s use of force against Palestinians is another example of this colonial violence where in all confrontations to this day, the number of Palestinian victims has always been unproportionally higher. In fact, in many instances, even a comparison is impossible. Equally important, attacks against military targets located in civilian areas have also been documented in Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan, where the harm is undoubtably and disproportionately higher than the benefits.

The third way: justice as an end

It appears clear that the just war doctrine is not perfect and there is an urgent need for a third way debate that moves beyond the confines of a just war, on the one hand, and terrorism, on the other. This is true because the theory of a just war, despite including state and non-state actors, is still widely a state-centric theory. At the same time, many non-state actors seem on the defensive and don’t have the privilege of choosing their own designation. Both theories of just war and terrorism are western-centric, in as much as the agency of the colonized people is trivialized.

The third way theory should seek justice as an end, based on two important principles: people’s right to self-determination, and stressing the agency of non-state and state actors alike, by setting the rules of conduct during armed conflicts. The framework governing this theory of justice should be international law rather than national interests, history, or political calculations. This way, the theory becomes less subjective and not open to interpretation, power and interest relations.

Seeking justice should be the driving force of oppressed people. A balanced approach to peace and war is the only way to achieve justice. Non-state actors, with all their agency, are also responsible for making sure that injustice does not take place while seeking justice. For this reason, non-state actors must abide by the rules of conduct in wars in line with their right to self-determination, as defined by international law.

Syria is the only Arab state to support Russia’s recognition of Donetsk and Luhansk as “independent” republics and its invasion of Ukraine. Now pro-Assad Syrian forces will reportedly go to Ukraine to fight on Russia’s side in this war. All of this speaks volumes of Damascus’ indebtedness to Moscow.

Syria was one of only four countries worldwide to join Russia in recognizing Donetsk and Luhansk’s “independence”. The day the war began, President Bashar al-Assad told his Russian counterpart that “Western nations bear responsibility for the chaos and bloodshed.” Then, on 2 March, Syria joined only four other states in opposing a UN General Assembly resolution condemning the invasion.

With Russia facing high levels of international opposition to its invasion of Ukraine, this conflict gives Moscow’s closest allies opportunities to demonstrate loyalty to the Kremlin. “For Putin, the invasion of Ukraine is a clarifying moment of who is a friend, and who is an enemy,” explained Randa Slim, the director of conflict resolution at the Middle East Institute, in an interview with Politics Today.

Assad’s support for Russia in Ukraine has been necessary given Damascus’ dependency on Moscow. “Assad is forever indebted to Putin,” Mona Yacoubian, a senior adviser at the US Institute of Peace, told Politics Today. “Moreover, as a brutal dictator whose regime has been accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, Assad has no compunction about supporting Russia in its brutal and illegal invasion of Ukraine.”

With Russia having done so much to help turn the tide in Syria beginning in 2015, saying that the Ba’athist regime’s survival is largely attributable to Moscow’s military intervention is no exaggeration.

“Syria owes almost everything to Russia (and Iran) in the last eleven years,” Marco Carnelos, a former Italian diplomat, told Politics Today. “Without Moscow’s military support it is quite uncertain that Bashar Al-Assad [would] have prevailed in the civil war that has so far ravaged country. On these political points, Syria had no other option than to recognize Donetsk and Luhansk Republic and support Russia’s position on the conflict in Ukraine.”

Carnelos told Politics Today that “maybe Russia needs soldiers better trained to the sort of guerrilla warfare that apparently is taking place in Ukraine, and that it is quite like what we have been watching in Syria all along these last years.”

According to Makki, the Syrian Arab Army has, at least for now, refrained from formally recruiting these pro-Assad fighters. He said there would have to be a presidential decree or something similar for any special dispensation. “It is most likely that the pool of recruits heading for Ukraine will be from the rougher auxiliary forces several of whom already have a past history in dealing with the Russians in Syria, such as National Defense Forces.”

Jomana Qaddour, a resident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs, where she leads the Syria project, said one should be cautious before reaching definitive pronouncements given how issues surrounding the recruitment question are evolving. “Most sources indicate that [the ex-National Defense Forces] are still only in a phase of registering volunteers, and not actually transporting them to Ukraine yet,” explained Qaddour.

Nonetheless, pro-Assad Syrian fighters entering the fray could prove problematic for Moscow. “Even if these fighters are transported to Ukraine, there are serious concerns about their lack of urban combat experience since in the Syria context many of them were tasked with intelligence work or manning of checkpoints after the Syrian government would capture land – and would task them, instead of official state forces – with carrying out war crimes against subdued populations,” according to Qaddour.

Cultural and linguistic barriers can’t be overlooked. These Syrian forces, who don’t speak Russian or Ukrainian, will be unfamiliar with local conditions. Also unclear is the Russian government’s ability to financially compensate these Syrian forces, particularly mindful of the economic problems that Russia must contend with as the world’s most sanctioned country. Qaddour told Politics Today that upon considering these factors, “it is likely cheaper and more practical for them to recruit pro-Russian fighters from neighboring countries.”

An important question is, how could the transfer of these Syrian forces to Ukraine weaken Damascus’ control of territory which it has spent years fighting to retake? Carnelos said that Damascus faces a “hard dilemma: honoring its debt towards Russia but doing so it risks losing ground somewhere in its endless civil war.”

As the war in Ukraine further internationalizes, anti-regime forces in Syria might seize opportunities to re-intensify their insurgency. “To have Russia bleeding more could be the moment to reignite the low intensity warfare that the Syrian battleground has been experiencing for a few years,” Carnelos told Politics Today. “Multiplying the fronts where Russia is engaged is the best way now to further complicate its Ukrainian adventure.”

As Slim put it, “The more difficulties Putin’s army experiences in Ukraine, the more his position will weaken in Syria mainly because of diversion of leadership, manpower and military resources to Ukraine away from other military theaters Russia is involved in including Syria.”

Yet under such circumstances the Syrian regime could count on support from its Lebanese ally. “Hezbollah can send enough fighters to make up for the shortfall in manpower should the Assad regime experience difficulties in holding on to territories it has retaken,” according to Slim.

Ultimately, it remains to be seen how Russia’s military campaign in Ukraine plays out on the ground in Syria. To be sure, the war in Ukraine has given Syria opportunities to prove to Moscow that Damascus is a reliable ally which is willing to help Russia amid its worst foreign policy crisis of the 21st century. With Syria continuing to depend on Russia, demonstrating such loyalty to Putin is a high priority for the regime in Damascus. But the price that Assad must pay for his country’s close alliance with Moscow is one that will be realized in coming weeks and months as the Russian-Ukrainian war rages on.

Iran-backed proxies are involved in almost every major crisis in the Middle East. Recently, the Houthis, or Ansar Allah, of Yemen launched another missile attack on Abu Dhabi, called on foreign companies and investors to leave the UAE, and vowed to make the country unsafe. Also, the Fatah Alliance and other Iran-backed parties affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) rejected Iraq’s recent parliamentary election held in October 2021 and tried to further destabilize the already chaotic Iraqi politics.

Moreover, elements within the PMF such as Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq with strong ties to Iran, have been trying to hinder Turkey’s fight against PKK terror in northern Iraq as they present it as “a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty,” a point which was also made by Iraj Masjedi, Iran’s ambassador in Baghdad last year in February.

Most recently, Kata’ib Hezbollah issued a statement which threatened Turkey and demanded the withdrawal of its forces “before it’s too late.” To these Iranian proxies, the presence of Iran’s militias in Syria must also be added. In short, alongside the Hezbollah of Lebanon, Iran’s proxy par excellence, Iran-backed Shiite militant groups are active all across the Middle East.

Why does Iran need proxies?

Iran is undoubtedly a major Middle Eastern power with its geostrategic position, abundant natural resources, and significant human capital. Nevertheless, Iran’s conventional military capacity has, for decades, either fallen behind its political aspirations or remained untested with the notable exception of the tragic and devastating defensive war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1980-1988.

In the twentieth century, the country was not involved in any substantial and direct military conflict against any major enemy. For that, Iranian elites’ masterful political maneuvers and their use of the international balance of power to their advantage deserves a huge credit, but that’s a different story.

The country stayed neutral during the two World Wars, “solved” the oil nationalization crisis in the early 1950s without facing military aggression – unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt which was jointly attacked by Israel, the United Kingdom, and France upon President Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 – and even got away with the Iran hostage crisis at the end of 1979 without an open military confrontation.

While doing this, Iran envisioned itself as the true leader of all the Shiites in the region and beyond. These proxies consolidated Iran’s defensive capabilities but gradually turned into a security risk for the region. Furthermore, although Iran’s short-term expectations from these proxies were mostly military, there was a strong political dimension from the beginning. In essence, Iran was reproducing, in different countries, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps which were established by Ayatollah Khomeini following the revolution and in time turned into a military, economic, political, and even social power.

How do Iran’s proxies function?

From its inception, the Islamic Republic of Iran emerged as an interventionist regime that interposed in the affairs of regional states through the rhetoric and practice of exporting the revolution. This was clearly reflected in Article 154 of Iran’s constitution which declared Iran’s support for the “just struggles of the mustada‘fun [the oppressed] against the mustakbirun [the oppressor] in every corner of the globe,” while “scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations.”

As it turned out, Iran cared little about the non-intervention principle of the United Nations. The hostility between the Islamic Republic, the U.S., and Israel, along with the unfavorable attitude of certain Arab regimes in the region, with the notable exception of Hafez Assad’s Syria, towards the Islamic Republic’s policies certainly added to Iran’s desire to look for non-state allies to consolidate its security in the region. Nevertheless, paradoxically these proxies caused, for all intents and purposes, Iran’s further isolation in the region.

Although the “axis of resistance,” Iran’s preferred term for the large network of proxies under its control, is anti-American, anti-Zionist, and counter-hegemonic in rhetoric, it is characterized, in fact, by two main features: Iran’s proxies grew in weak and war-torn states, and they targeted Iran’s regional enemies – not only Israel – along with the U.S. as the first and foremost global hegemonic power. Yet, the real risk for Iran’s proxies has always been their political influence rather than their military capability.

Iran’s proxies after Qasem Soleimani

Iran’s Middle East proxies have for a long time been predominantly associated with Qasem Soleimani, the former commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. There is no question that Soleimani played an immensely decisive role in coordinating Iran’s network of Middle East proxies especially after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

But, although his assassination by the U.S. in January 2020 came as a shock for Iran, his weight in in laying out Iran’s Middle East foreign policies was already put under increasing question by those such as Javad Zarif, Iran’s former minister of foreign affairs, who sought to reintegrate Iran in the international community.

In the changing landscape of today’s Middle East and Iran’s normalization attempts with its Gulf neighbors, Iran’s proxies can no longer effectively function like they did in the past as sheer militant groups. Yet their political influence in their respective countries also poses challenges to the region.

Their sectarian approaches, reliance on arms, and their close ties with Iran further complicate the possibility of their integration into national politics. In a nutshell, at best, Iranian proxies can hope to replicate the Lebanese Hezbollah, which itself suffers from these defects and acts like a state within a state.

As nuclear negotiations continue in Vienna to find a common ground between Iran and the U.S., Iran’s proxies once again became a critical issue. It goes without saying that the U.S. regards these proxies as a security risk for itself and its Middle Eastern allies, but they are primarily a regional problem.

Thus, although reaching a renewed nuclear deal which would effectively limit Iran’s nuclear capacity and undermine the security risks of its proxies must be a shared priority for the region, there needs to be a regional initiative to secure stability in the greater area.

Turkey’s attempts to normalize relations and repair broken ties with a number of states in the region can be a good starting point to deescalate tensions in the Middle East. Also, the lifting of illegal sanctions on Iran can encourage it to take part constructively in the region’s normalization process.

In order to realize this, Iran must respect the principle of “scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations” as stipulated in its constitution.

On the morning of February 24, Russia began its invasion of Ukraine, surprising many experts, politicians, and country leaders. Until then, most forecasts predicted that Russia’s aggression would be limited to eastern Ukraine. However, Russia’s simultaneous attacks on Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, Odessa, Crimea, and the Donbass meant a clear invasion of a sovereign state and an undisputed violation of international law.

While many countries have defended Ukraine’s territorial integrity and political unity, very few countries have supported the Russian invasion be it implicitly or explicitly. Iran is one of the countries that has supported the invasion of Ukraine explicitly.

Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi held a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the day the invasion started. President Raisi blamed NATO for the war started by Russia, saying, “NATO expansion is a serious threat to the stability and security of independent countries in different regions.”

Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Saeed Khatibzadeh invited parties to the conflict to a “dialogue” to reduce tensions as soon as possible, while Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said the war is “rooted in the NATO provocations.”

The highest political authority in Iran, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, broke his silence on the invasion on March 1, by tweeting, “The U.S. dragged #Ukraine to where it is now. By interfering in Ukraine’s internal affairs, creating color revolutions and toppling one government and putting another in power, the U.S. dragged Ukraine into this situation.” All official Iranian authorities have unanimously repeated that NATO, specifically the U.S., provoked Ukraine, and Russia was not responsible for the war.

Different voices have also emerged within Iran. Outspoken former MP Ali Motahhari said it is necessary to pursue an independent foreign policy and support Ukraine. Small-scale demonstrations were also held in the capital Tehran to support Ukraine. Nevertheless, in official discourse and media coverage, the theme that war is the Western world’s fault has been reiterated. Thus, the official discourse tries to draw the Iranian public into an anti-Ukrainian position.

Blaming the West for the Russia-Ukraine crisis is not only a function of the anti-Western orientation that brings Iran and Russia together, but it is also compatible with the new foreign policy understanding that has come into effect, especially after Raisi was elected president and announced relations with the East as his priority.

Many European countries, especially Germany, initially acted timidly towards Russia and did not give Ukraine the necessary military, economic, and even diplomatic support. Germany did not support Ukraine and prevented Estonia from sending German-made weapons to the country. Behind Germany’s attitude lay its dependence on Russia in terms of energy.

This was also related to Germany’s Nord Stream 2 project, which received Russian gas via the Nord Stream 1 line. Germany did not want to confront Russia, which could lead to a natural gas supply crisis.

The newly elected Olaf Scholz government in Germany, which has already experienced the highest inflation rate in recent years, hesitated to take bold steps. However, Germany’s Russian policy took a 180-degree turn, as criticisms towards the German government increased internally and externally. Germany now gives military support to Ukraine and contributes to isolating Russia diplomatically.

The disagreements between the U.S. and European countries and even among European countries themselves, allowed Russia to exploit this disjointedness and invade Ukraine. However, if there had been diversification in Europe’s energy resources, countervailing steps against Russia could have been taken, and perhaps Putin would have had to think twice about invading Ukraine.

Moreover, a potential energy source for European countries, Iran, has been stripped of all its choices by the U.S. and European countries, and forced to turn to Russia. With the withdrawal of U.S. President Donald Trump from the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) in 2018, heavy sanctions were imposed on Iran again.

On the other hand, the European countries on their own could not functionalize the agreement, even though they said they are committed to it. Therefore, the EU could not carry out an independent Iranian policy without being influenced by the United States.

As a response to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran accelerated its nuclear activities and exceeded the limits stipulated in the 2015 nuclear agreement. Although attempts were made to find a diplomatic solution after this development, which caused concern in the Western world, no concrete progress could be made until the election of Joe Biden and Ebrahim Raisi.

The Iran nuclear negotiations started again in Vienna on November 29, 2021. In recent days, reportedly significant progress has been made in Vienna. If a new agreement is signed between Iran and the world powers in line with expectations, Iran can freely sell oil and natural gas. Before the sanctions, Iran was selling oil to many European countries, especially Germany, Italy, and France, via tankers.

Iranian oil can be shipped to Europe again, and Iranian natural gas can be transported to Europe if the necessary infrastructure is built. Turkey’s approach in this regard is also positive. All in all, the energy that Europe needs can be supplied from Iran through Turkey.

Possible common ground for a nuclear agreement with Iran will have two consequences: First, NATO member countries will be less hesitant to respond to Russia’s aggression, as it will ensure diversification in Europe’s energy resources. Second, Iran can act independently from Russia without fear of a backlash on issues such as Ukraine, as the improvement of relations with the West will reduce its dependence on Russia.

Since Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine began on February 24, the eastern European country has experienced death, destruction, and trauma. NATO and EU members are becoming increasingly unified in their actions against Moscow, seeking to pressure Russia into ending its assault against Ukraine.

With even Hungary, the most Russia-friendly state in NATO and the EU, vowing to not oppose multilateral sanctions against Moscow, Vladimir Putin’s campaign in Ukraine is clearly uniting European powers against the Kremlin in ways that only weeks ago were difficult to imagine.

Yet some commentators have pointed to the world’s inability to stop Russia’s intervention in Syria as a sign of what could come next in Ukraine. There are key questions to ask. How similar are Russia’s assault against Ukraine and Moscow’s operations in Syria that began in September 2015? How useful are comparisons between the two Russian military campaigns? What lessons can NATO countries draw from Moscow’s experiences in Syria when addressing the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war?

Differences

Although there are some clear common denominators, particularly given the brutality employed by the Russians, there are significant differences between the two operations that might give analysts limited reasons to see such comparisons as useful.

To begin, Moscow’s involvement in Syria came after the country’s UN-recognized government invited Russia to enter the fray. A key Russian goal was not only to help President Bashar al-Assad’s regime survive, but also to prevent the Syrian nation-state’s collapse.

At the time, even countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and some western powers, which backed rebels fighting to topple Assad, agreed upon Syria’s internationally recognized borders and recognized the country as a legitimate nation-state. In Ukraine the picture is totally different, and this is an important distinction.

Moscow’s myriad interests in Syria include a desire to strengthen Russia’s military presence in the Mediterranean via its first warm water seaport and most westward military position after Sevastopol on the Black Sea. Russia’s footing in the eastern Mediterranean has given Moscow significant leverage in regional conflicts stretching from Iraq and deep into sub-Saharan Africa.

Back in 2015, the Russians were fighting NATO-backed rebel groups and Islamic State (DAESH). Russia entered Syria under the banner of fighting global terrorism, giving Moscow a greater degree of perceived legitimacy in its bombing campaigns that helped Assad’s regime regain much territory. Moscow’s partners were active in the warfare too. Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah’s forces were on the ground fighting these anti-Assad groups as well.

The Obama administration, while not supportive of Russia’s actions, was not necessarily too much at odds with it. This was partly because the U.S. was also waging its anti-DAESH campaign and Israel was comfortable with Moscow’s intervention in Syria. Put simply, there was some common cause between Russia and the West when it came to the conflict in Syria. Today in Ukraine there is no such common cause.

International Sympathy

International sympathy and opinion must be considered too. In Ukraine the Russians are fighting forces loyal to the Kiev government and Moscow’s narrative about a mission to “denazify” Ukraine is far less likely to attract international acceptance of Russian aggression.

Furthermore, except for a Turkic Muslim minority in Crimea, Moscow’s interventions in Ukraine have targeted Europeans Christians, unlike in Syria where most victims of Russian military operations were Sunni Muslim Arabs. Unfortunately, biases and outright racist tropes propelled by western media outlets and politicians have resulted in far more humanizing coverage and discussions about the human suffering in Ukraine compared to Syria.

Ultimately, it has not even been one week since Putin declared war on Ukraine and the Russian military operation is still in an early phase. The extent to which Moscow will succeed in terms of achieving its goals in Ukraine is difficult to predict at this stage.

Whereas the situation in Syria evolved in ways which were favorable to the Russians, the unique factors in play in Ukraine should give analysts reason to think that Moscow’s experience fighting in the eastern European country could fundamentally differ from the outcomes of Russia’s intervention in Syria.

Syrian Kurds who fled Afrin in 2018 with the YPG/PKK are now returning to Afrin from the Shahba region, controlled by the YPG/SDF, and the Syrian regime-held Aleppo and Erbil.

Kurds massively fled Afrin when the Turkish army and the Syrian National Army (SNA) first entered the district at the beginning of 2018. However, according to the Independent Kurdish Coalition of Syria (KKS), more than half of the Kurds who fled from Afrin to Tel Rif’at and villages in the Shahba area and Aleppo have returned.

An estimated 151,000 Kurds had fled the area according to the UN in 2018, more than half of them returned and most of them did so within four months of fleeing. “When people realized the brigades that came to Afrin were not jihadists, unlike the PKK media had been telling them, they started to return. It’s better to live in your own house, even with some trouble than staying in a tent,” KKS members explain.

On the other hand, at the beginning of 2016, an estimated 100,000 Arabs had fled from the Arab town of Tel Rif’at and its surroundings after the YPG/PKK took control of the area with Russian air support. However, none have been able to return to their home as of yet.

According to the KKS, which aids the Kurds return, the PYD, the political wing of the YPG obstructs their departure. In recent months, there has been a rise in the number of returnees to Afrin. Members of the KKS state, “The ones who fled together with the YPG to the Shahba region have to pay a bribe to be able to return.” They go on to say, “Of course, the bad behavior of some SNA groups is also not encouraging, but the situation has improved from the chaos in 2018, since the local Kurdish councils have been installed there.”

Azaad Osman, KKS chairman in Afrin, works with Ahmad Misto, a Kurdish leader of al-Jabha al-Shamiya, the largest SNA brigade. “We first tried to prevent people from leaving Afrin, then we organized big convoys to bring people back to Afrin in 2018. We help civilians who face problems here,” Misto says.

The KKS office is a central place in Afrin for Kurds asking for help. I visited the office several times in October 2021 and I saw this firsthand. Azaad Osman is also on the PKK’s hit list, and was imprisoned by the Assad regime for five years in the notorious Sednaya Prison. He used to have a business in Turkey and returned from there in 2018 after the PKK’s removal.

During my latest trip in October 2021, I had a chance to talk to Kurds who took the short, expensive route and some who took the longer but cheaper one. They told me: “Kurds in the Shahba area, between Afrin and Aleppo, who don’t have the financial means to return, can’t do so. They are, for example, farmers, and need to cultivate the land to have an income.” They warned, “The short route via Kemar is long and steep. It’s impossible for elderly people.”

“I consider the PYD/YPG the enemy of the Kurdish people due to their inhumane actions against us such as kidnapping children and forced military conscription.”

Misto explains why he joined al-Shamiya: “I consider the PYD/YPG the enemy of the Kurdish people, because of their inhumane actions against us – like kidnapping young children, forced military conscription, and forcing these children to join the military to fight the Free Syrian Army and the Syrian people, creating national strife in Syria.”

“I organized peaceful demonstrations against the regime and after al-Jabha al-Shamiya entered Aleppo, I joined them as a trainer, because I used to be a kung fu trainer. I trained their members until the liberation of Afrin. During and after its liberation, al-Shamiya leadership asked me to enter the Kurdish villages under their control, to support people, and offer them aid and services to open schools. I am both a son of the area and of al-Shamiya; with al-Jabha al-Shamiya, I will help the area to leave discrimination behind.”

Misto goes on to say, “Afrin was exposed to dictatorship and injustice, and we as revolutionaries of Syria are Arabs, Kurds, Turkmens, all the components. I see the Turkish intervention as the liberation of Afrin because of the YPG’s injustice towards it.”

I asked KKS members how the situation in Afrin is nowadays and was told that “it varies from area to area, from good to average to still bad.” Giving further detail about the current state of affairs, they told me, “In the areas controlled by al-Jabha al-Shamiya it is good… in the areas controlled by Ahrar al-Sharqiya (from Deir Ezzor) it is bad. Al-Jabha al-Shamiya are our neighbors, from Marea and Azaz. We have mixed marriages of Arabs from Azaz in Marea to Kurds from Afrin, for instance.”

At their headquarters outside Azaz in November 2021, Abu Ammar, one of the leaders of al-Jabha al-Shamiya, told me, “In Ma’batli, the whole population is Alawite Kurds … 95% are back. Ma’batli is under the control of al-Jabha al-Shamiya. We have 10 houses that belong to Kurds, and the owners came back.”

By now, other families are living in houses that were evacuated in Eastern Ghouta. These new inhabitants were brought to Afrin by buses. For example, they lived in tents and upon seeing empty houses for several months, they moved in. Abu Ammar adds, “So we went there and told them, “You have to leave.’” They started to organize demonstrations, claiming ‘’al-Jabha al-Shamiya wants to expel us by force” and they spoke to the media.

Europe as a whole is not ready to normalize relations with Damascus, but some countries are exploring their options with their eyes closed.

A few European Union member states have mixed opinions about normalization with Bashar Alassad and their policies reflect that.

Denmark and Germany started sending refugees with criminal records back to Syria declaring that Damascus is a safe place to live.

But that may not be enough to meet the requirements of the Dublin Accords which protect refugees from being sent back to their home countries if they face possible detention or revenge attacks because of their political views.

Even though discussion about normalization with Alassad has become a geopolitical trend, the reality is that the situation in Syria is unstable and unpredictable.

European countries, along with the United States, and a long list of Arab countries, are unable to solve the huge humanitarian crisis in Syria, and some would rather revert to the pre 2011 revolution status quo.

Hundreds of thousands of Syrians amassed on European borders.

The most prominent example of this policy was the European migration deal struck with Turkey in 2016. Europe offered Turkey monetary incentives to prevent the massive flow of migrants across land and sea towards Europe. At the time, hundreds of thousands of Syrians amassed on European borders and lined back roads and footpaths across the European continent with hopes of starting new lives.

They were escaping a Syria that was in decline but already unlivable in many ways.

Even before the revolution individual rights were heavily restricted, free market conditions were abhorrent, opportunities for youth were limited, long droughts negatively impacted agricultural production, intelligence agencies were loyal to the Alassad family, and the dictatorial tendencies of Bashar Alassad were no mystery to Syrians inside and outside the country.

Many countries conveniently ignored the fact that the Daesh terror group was coordinating directly with Bashar Alassad’s intelligence agencies and many of the members, including mid to top level leaders, were released from Syrian prisons only to directly join the terror group. This was a major turning point in the progression of the revolution, since the regime was able to convince European countries that the revolution was actually a threat to them because Daesh represented the kinds of ideas that the antigovernment protesters carried.

It was Alassad’s intention to force Europe’s hand using the fear card from the very beginning of the revolution. Recently forced into retirement, then Grand Mufti of Syria Ahmed Bedreddin Hassoun, threatened to send suicide bombers to Europe in 2011 if western countries intervened in Syria.

Years later, multiple Daesh inspired terror attacks took place across Europe. Then in 2018, German parliament members of the far-right political party, Alternative for Germany, visited Damascus, and met with many people including Hassoun. They wanted to find a way to send Syrians back and they needed to declare the country safe.

Despite mounting evidence of human rights violations going back decades, some European countries are more comfortable looking the other way.

The most recent evidence of Europe turning a blind eye to the horrors of Alassad family is the return of Bashar’s estranged uncle Rifaat.

Rifaat was exiled from Syria by his brother Hafez, Bashar’s father, in 1984. While in Europe, Rifaat embezzled money and was investigated in both Spain and France for related violations. But his criminal record began years before he went to Europe.

Rifaat Alassad worked hand in hand with his brother Hafez to conduct the coup that put Alassad family in power and according to most informed sources directly oversaw what is now known as the “Hama massacre”.

In 1982, Rifaat Alassad, or the “Butcher of Hama”, was the commanding General who carried out the siege of Hama where according to some estimates up to 40,000 people were killed. The military operation put to an end a religiously motivated political uprising that started in 1976 by the Muslim Brotherhood.  Two years later, Rifaat failed to overthrow his brother Hafez and went into exile, settling in France.

Rifaat Alassad recently escaped France on a private jet avoiding a four-year jail sentence for embezzlement but more importantly he was also able to escape possible prosecution resulting from an ongoing investigation in Switzerland about his role in committing possible war crimes in Hama.

Some European countries are using normalization with Alassad to put pressure on Turkey, especially Greek Cyprus and Greece.

It remains a mystery how Rifaat was able to flee France unhindered and why Swiss authorities were unable to impress upon the French the severity of the allegations against him. For Rifaat, Bashar, and Europe – the uncle’s return to Syria carries significant implications.

Bashar allowed his uncle to return to build comradery with the Alawite community which holds Rifaat in high regard and have grown frustrated with Bashar. Using his uncle as a counterbalance to his cousin Rami Makhlouf who spent the past two years pleading with Bashar via social media to stop expropriating his personal assets.

But more importantly for Bashar, he wanted to prevent his uncle from cooperating with European authorities revealing family secrets implicating Bashar, his narco-trafficking kingpin brother Maher Alassad, or others, in a long list of crimes, both past and present.

While some European countries are happy to see Alassad family consolidate its criminal enterprises and reign in the vast network of beneficiaries relieving Europe from having to face off with the mafia-like family in European court rooms; other European countries are using normalization with Alassad to put pressure on Turkey, especially Greek Cyprus and Greece.

The Italian director Gianfranco Rosi’s film Notturno (2020) is a compelling meditation on life in and around the borders of Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. The film offers a critique of foreign, colonial and extremist meddling within the region in terms of constructed borders and disaffected citizenry while presenting a visual style that consists of slow-moving landscape and a story-telling approach that leans on oblique characters that display withdrawn emotion. At times the film seems to be a deliberate anachronism to the images of conflict from the region that viewers have become accustomed to.

Observational Documentary

Notturno is an interesting work both because of its subject matter and its formal approach. It partially presents itself in the tradition of Poetic Documentaries such as G. Reggio’s Koyaanisqatsi (1982) which both translates as ‘Life out of Balance’ and evokes both the beauty and absurdity of humans and the planet.

The difference with Rosi’s film is that he introduces and follows a number of subjects or characters and touches upon harsher and even brutal elements of life in the region of Iraq and Syria while consistently maintaining a kind of distance.

Rosi spent three years living in the border areas of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and there is an obvious ‘verite’ feeling to some of the scenes- he reportedly accumulated 90 hours of footage which both lends a veracity to the project while also making the complete edit feel too long at times and lacking a clear structure.

Some of the most disturbing scenes in the film are also the ones that fit the least in terms of the formal structure and tone; a series of interviews between therapists and children who recount the horrors of life in Syria or under Daesh. The children recount graphic accounts of beheadings and depict ISIS (Daesh) leader Al-Baghdadi alongside his followers in drawings with particular emphasis given to Yazidi victims.

The film opens with a series of marching soldiers passing under a majestic sky and this theme of unobtrusively allowing events to unfold comprises much of Notturno; we see everything from a drum beater of Ramadan wandering the streets to wake people from their slumber and rise for the pre-dawn meal to the sounds of gunfire to a boy cleaning his gun on guard duty to wider imagery of an American convoy of jeeps and SUV tanks and a refugee camp.

In almost all of these cases throughout the film the director gives little clue as to where this is taking place and has deliberately re-blurred borders and asked the audience to either hypothesize on location or get swept up in the idea of a conflict so complex and multi-faceted that it becomes meaningless to know where exactly on the map you are.

Oblique dramatics include a series of audio messages with a distraught mother whose daughter is being held ransom by ISIS which eventually dwindle to nothing but remembrances of the missing young woman as well as the absurd sight of a single car ferry transporting its load near a destroyed bombed-out bridge.

One sequence that does give more clues involves a group of women YPG militants holding guns and later retreating to their barracks, taking off their shoes. They cook and watch training videos on a tablet with the red, white and green flag visible on their soldiers. This and the American flag are the only ones noticeable over the course of the film.

Another episode early in the film includes a wailing mother who revisits the eerily empty prison (which is in Erbil, Iraq) where the son died- the scene proves both distant and uncomfortable to the viewer.

A later scene offers a birds-eye view of another prison yard (again the location is unclear) where orange-clad male prisoners have their limited exercise walk; little to no context is given and this scene proves disturbing because it plays out in real time and later cuts to close-up shots of them with hands cuffed behind their backs.

There is both a banality and silence to the scene as the viewer tries to reconcile media representations and earlier references in the film (ISIS/Daesh) with the state-sponsored retribution that is unfolding.

Theatre of the Absurd

This most compelling part of Notturno is the casting, direction and performance of a play on the history of Iraq called ‘Homeland’ that takes place in a psychiatric ward; the viewer is first greeted by images of wailing patients and then witness the director (a doctor) choose six patients to act in his play.

A video montage is projected in the background that provides glimpse of archival context that has been missing throughout the film- Assad, Saddam, burning oil fields, American invasion… from Monarchy to Republic to Daesh. The doctor-director gives the patient-actors scripts to memorize and the viewer witnesses both this strange approach to rehabilitation and a fiercely dedicated troupe of misfit performers express their collective outrage at the loss of their country.

One of the actors shouts ‘no to America… no to Iran’ as another video montage throws a blitz of imagery that reveals colonial roots to Iraqi civil war alongside a ‘Palestine is Lost’ mantra; Notturno seems about to end with an Arabic song of lament and the close-up of the actors but instead the film turns back to imagery of the everyday (one of the earlier characters, Ali and his silent work assisting bird hunters).

Following the First Gulf War, the foreign ministers of Syria, Egypt, and the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), met in Damascus and agreed on a new security cooperation initiative for the Gulf which came to be known as the “Damascus Declaration.” Although the GCC states later moved away from implementing the declaration, it contained an important aspect related to Turkey which is key to understanding the dynamics that shape the region today.

The thorny relations between Damascus and Ankara in the 1990s due to water and terrorism issues had adversely affected Turkey’s relations with the Arab countries, including those in the Gulf. The declaration, which aimed to pressure Ankara on the international platform, criticized Turkey’s plan to construct a new dam on the Turkish-Syrian border, called foreign contractors not to cooperate with Turkey, and warned Ankara over its actions. The importance of the Damascus Declaration was that, for the first time, the GCC countries expressed public and clear support for Syria in its dispute with Turkey.

However, since then balances have changed rapidly in international politics. When it comes to the Middle East, one of the world’s least peaceful regions, dynamics change even faster. Turkish-GCC relations within the context of the Syrian war is an interesting case to show the degree to which several factors shape the convergence and divergence in their relationship in Syria, which is known as the “heart” of the Arab world.

When protests erupted in 2011 in Syria, the GCC stood by the opposition that aimed to topple the Bashar al-Assad regime and recognized the opposition bloc as the “legitimate representative” of the Syrian people. The GCC states, which were motivated by several factors, most importantly political and sectarian ones, aimed to weaken Iran’s hand and bring Syria, a country predominantly Sunni but ruled by a Nusayri family, back into the Arab sphere of influence. Ankara also was among the most vocal critics of the regime and the staunchest supporter of the opposition when it failed to convince the regime to make reforms.

In Syria, Turkey and the GCC countries stood by the opposition, but supported different factions, as they harbored different visions for the post-Assad era.

In Syria, Turkey and the GCC countries stood by the opposition, but supported different factions, as they harbored different visions for the post-Assad era. Thus, the Syrian theater became the first backdrop of rivalry between Turkey and GCC states, namely Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, based on ideological differences.

In recent years, the power dynamics in the region have started to shift again as some Gulf countries, which cooperated with Turkey against the Syrian regime in the initial years of the crisis, seem to have put their differences aside and in varying degrees have approached Damascus, pitting Syria against Turkey as they did in the 1990s. Now their priority is their interests, both political and economic, rather than the fate of the regime as was the case a decade ago.

Normalization suit 

In December 2018, the UAE, which once supported the Syrian opposition forces alongside Saudi Arabia and Qatar, reopened its embassy in Syria. The UAE justified the move by declaring, “Given the regional expansionism of Iran and Turkey, there is an Arab role to play in Syria that has become even more necessary.” In March 2021, the UAE reiterated its position: “Syria’s return to the Arab fold is essential and has nothing to do with who wants or who does not want it. It is a matter of public interest and the interests of Syria and the region.”

A day after the UAE reopened its mission, Bahrain announced that its mission in Damascus continues its duty, underlining its keenness to maintain relations with what it referred to as a “brotherly” country. Manama, in particular, emphasized the significance of strengthening and activating the “Arab role” in preventing the dangers of regional interference in Syria’s internal affairs.

In October of last year, Oman sent an ambassador to Syria, becoming the first Gulf state to do so since they downgraded or shut missions in Damascus in 2012. Meanwhile Kuwait has said it would reopen its mission in Damascus if there was an agreement among the 22-member Arab League.

So far, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, two countries that firmly supported the opposition, have not taken any step forward. Traditionally, Riyadh pursues a “wait and see” policy and seeks gradual and slow partial normalization. Prospects for change in the Saudi position have increased particularly after the reports that Saudi intelligence chief Khalid al-Humaidan met with his Syrian counterpart in Damascus, the first meeting of its kind since the conflict broke out in Syria.

If there is a change of heart in Riyadh regarding the return of Syria to the Arab fold, Qatar – Turkey’s closest Gulf ally and a critical center for opposition meetings – will be the only Gulf country not involved in the normalization suit with Syria.

Factors driving normalization

The first factor of the Gulf rapprochement to Syria is Russia’s position. In 2015, when Russia, the regime’s staunchest ally, militarily intervened in the war, the balances on the ground rapidly changed. Russia’s interference became the game-changer that also altered the perception of the GCC towards the opposition and eliminated the idea of toppling Assad by force.

In this context, Moscow, which built a perception of Russia as a crucial geopolitical actor in the region, started to deepen its relationship with each GCC state, and engaged in dialogue over the Syria file. In recent years, there has been increasing support by the GCC states of Russia’s role in Syria, particularly at a time when the U.S. influence is fading away.

The second factor that drives the GCC rapprochement with Damascus is related to both the domestic and international context. The assertive members of the GCC, namely the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have started to move away from a foreign policy focusing on hard power (military tools), while prioritizing soft power (diplomacy).

The economy plays a central role in this diplomacy. Restoring relations with Damascus, not only politically, but economically, is significant and especially in terms of the reconstruction of Syria. On the international level, the election of U.S. President Joe Biden has significantly influenced the shift of the Gulf foreign policy from hard to soft power as the new administration, unlike its predecessor, pushes for de-escalation in the region.

The last factor is the antagonism of Turkey’s growing role in Syria. When Turkey conducted military operations in northern Syria (Operation Olive Branch, Operation Peace Spring, Spring Shield) to eliminate terrorist elements, Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE and Bahrain, opposed them on the grounds of “threatening Arab national security.”

Lebanese Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri recently completed a two-day visit to Moscow, during which he met Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and a number of Russian officials. Hariri’s visit coincides with talks of an upcoming initiative by Russian President Vladimir Putin which will break the deadlock and stagnation surrounding the Lebanese crisis and facilitate the formation of a new government, headed by Hariri.

This impossible task would be achieved after Russia summons Gebran Bassil, President Michel Aoun’s son-in-law and one of the main obstacles standing in the way to Lebanon’s political normalization.

The Russian initiative comes in the midst of the nuclear talks in Vienna and with the pressure on the Iranian regime from Israeli strikes and military operations – most recently the attack on Iran’s nuclear facility in Natanz and daily airstrikes that target Iran’s militias in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

The fact that Prime Minister Hariri received a royal reception at Moscow airport, with President Putin’s special representative in the Middle East and North Africa Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov, Deputy Chief of Protocol in the Russian government Ambassador Kuznetsov, and the Lebanese ambassador to Moscow in attendance, is no minor detail. A scene which stood in utter contrast to the lukewarm reception the Hezbollah delegation received a month prior when they visited Moscow which many thought would be a chance to resolve the Lebanese stalemate.

The Russian side insists on forming a government of technocrats and stressing to their Lebanese visitors that obstructing the formation of the cabinet and impeding the normalization of political life is completely unacceptable. Thus, at the moment, Russia is more or less supportive of the initiative of French President Emmanuel Macron, which he announced on his visit to Lebanon after the deadly Beirut port explosion on August 4 which left the capital partially destroyed and thousands displaced.

Macron’s initiative, however, is dead in the water after the Lebanese political elite failed to honor their commitment to facilitate the formation of a so-called mission government, one which will carry out key structural reforms to allow Lebanon to receive a much-needed $10bn loan, which was supposedly heralded as a step pending the formation of the next government.

Russia’s current mindset vis-à-vis the Lebanese crisis, assumes that Gebran Bassil’s presidential chances are slim to none especially as his designation on the Global Magnitsky Act for corruption precludes him from running for president – at least in theory. Yet, Russia believes that Bassil’s political career can be salvaged if he is willing to cooperate with Russia, which will moderate the crisis and provide him and Hariri the much-needed political support and sponsorship.

Russia, formerly the supreme state in the Soviet Union, was dominant in the Lebanese political scene especially during the Civil War (1975-1990); however, with the collapse of communism it has struggled to regain its position which is partly dominated by the United States and partly by Iran via its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah.

Thus, Russia wishes to reenter Lebanon with noticeable vigor, and aspires to end the long period of its absence. Consequently, it aims to undermine and neutralize the United States’ historical role in Lebanon, a role which already seems in decline under the Biden administration. Naively, Russia seeks to move Lebanon from the traditional U.S. orbit to the Russian one, and with this, Russia’s greater role in Syria will be accompanied by curbing and later putting an end to Iranian expansion toward the Mediterranean.

Abandoned by his traditional Arab Gulf patron, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Hariri sees in Russia the only remaining lifeline, as Russia is in a better position than the U.S. in terms of the pressure it exerts on Iran and its militias in Syria. Russia simply has the ability to block the borders with Lebanon and Iraq, and corner Iran in Syria. By coordinating with the Israeli side, Russia can extract concessions from Iran and force Hezbollah to facilitate the formation of the Lebanese government.

Just like France before it, Russia is trying to deal with Hezbollah separately from Iran, and this is evident from it receiving the Hezbollah delegation in Moscow last month and projecting the idea that Hezbollah can decide on its own without Iranian consent. Yet, such an approach clearly demonstrates Russia’s lack of insight – not to say gullibility – about Hezbollah and Iran’s mindset. Iran, through Hezbollah and other similar proxies in the region, is in de facto control of Lebanon, and feels no need to concede to anyone at least of all to Russia.

Russia’s interest in Lebanon is beyond politics and is based on a desire to recuperate the cost of the Syrian war through their entry into future deals with the Lebanese political class in the energy and gas sector, as well as their desire to obtain the main investment of the port of Tripoli, which will play an important role in Syria’s postwar reconstruction.

Above all, Russia is interested in establishing a strong relationship with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and ultimately in replacing the United States as its main source of weapons and training. However, while the U.S. donates weapons to Lebanon, Russia will charge a high premium, and many of Lebanon’s politicians will profit from brokering such deals.

The issue of arming the LAF with eastern or even Iranian weapons is a recurrent topic which surfaces occasionally but never leads anywhere. This is because the Lebanese army is a Western-trained and -equipped organization with a solid relationship with its U.S. counterpart, and provides operational capacity for the U.S. in the Levant, a reality which cannot be changed simply by Russian wishful thinking.

Russia sends clear messages to Iran, Israel, and the United States that it is the only country capable of securing stability on the shores of the Mediterranean. While this might be true, Russia cannot claim to be a superpower by meddling in the trivial affairs of corrupt politicians like Bassil and his band of corrupters. If it truly wishes to replace the United States in Lebanon, it has to be willing to pay a very hefty price, starting, by confronting the regional expansionism of Iran, which has no constant allies or enemies, Russia might find itself a victim of Iranian aggression. In the end, opening up the Lebanese matryoshka doll might be less advantageous than President Putin thinks.

Mercenaries are back. No one knows how many billions of dollars slosh around this illicit market. All we know is that business is booming because when you need something absolutely, positively done in war, you call the private sector. Missions once conducted by special operations forces or the CIA are now outsourced — I know because I did them.

Mercenaries are deadlier than most people realize, a grave oversight. In 2018, a group of U.S. Army Rangers, Delta Force, Green Berets and Marines — America’s most elite troops — were pinned down in Syria. Attacking them were 500 mercenaries, hired by Russia. They were not the cartoonish rabble depicted by Hollywood movies. This was the Wagner Group, a high-end mercenary outfit with artillery, armored personnel carriers, and tanks.

The American commandos radioed for help. Warplanes arrived in waves, including Reaper drones, Apache helicopters, F-22 fighter jets, F-15 strike fighters, B-52 bombers, and AC-130 gunships. Scores of airstrikes pummeled the mercenaries, but they did not waver.

Four hours later, the mercenaries finally retreated. No Americans were killed, and the U.S. military touted this as a big win. But it wasn’t. It took America’s best troops and advanced aircraft four hours to push back 500 mercenaries. What happens when they have to face 1000? 5000? More? Even an undefeated military can lose.

Mercenaries are the second oldest profession, and their return is no surprise. Since 2015, mercenaries have flourished in Yemen, Libya, Nigeria, Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Mozambique, Central African Republic, and Venezuela. There are even cyber-mercenaries called “hack back” companies.

The UAE hired mercenaries to kill Houthis during the War in Yemen. Some of these were allegedly U.S. military although most came from Latin America.

There are many reasons why mercenaries are returning now. In fact, they have been gradually reappearing over the past three decades, but always in the shadows and that’s by design. Rich clients with a small or no military can swipe a check and wage war. The UAE hired mercenaries to kill Houthis during the War in Yemen. Some of these were allegedly U.S. military although most came from Latin America. After six failed years of fighting Boko Haram, Nigeria hired mercenaries to push the terrorist group out of their country, which they did in a few weeks. Libya is a mercenaries-on-mercenary war. Perhaps someday ExxonMobil will have its own army, too.

But why do states with big militaries use mercenaries? Because warfare is changing — it’s getting sneakier. We live in an information age, and weapons that provide plausible deniability, like mercenaries, are more important than raw firepower. In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine, not by blitzkrieg but through deception. They covertly deployed Spetsnaz special forces, mercenaries like the Wagner Group, Little Green Men, and fake pro-Russia militias. Dense propaganda, troll factories, and other active measures further concealed the truth, until it was too late. While the West stood befuddled about what was going on, the Crimea was a fait d’accompli.

Moscow created the fog of war, and moved through it for victory. Mercenaries ooze plausible deniability. If they are caught, the client can disavow them. Not so for army soldiers. Plus, Russian citizens (like U.S. ones) hate seeing their dead soldiers coming home in body bags, but do not care about dead contractors. Owing to this, Putin can engage in risky military operations with minimal domestic political consequence. For the first time since the Cold War, Russia has launched expeditionary operations in the Middle East and Africa. The weapon of choice? Mercenaries, like the Wagner Group.

Private warfare is a growing trend with alarming implications, yet few in the West seem to care. Perhaps they assume international law will take care of the problem, but this is magical thinking. Who will go into Libya and arrest all those mercenaries? The UN? NATO? Nobody. Worse, mercenary can shoot law enforcement dead. The market for force literally resists regulation.

Privatizing war changes warfare in profound ways modern generals do not comprehend.

A world awash in mercenaries means more war and suffering. History teaches us that unemployed mercenaries become bandits and racketeers, preying on people and sometimes taking over whole kingdoms, as happened to Milan in the 15^th century. Soldiers of fortune can start and elongate war for profit, and avoid outbreaks of peace. This is one reason why the Thirty Years War (1618-48) in Europe took so long, as mercenaries fought for all sides in great numbers. By the time it ended, Germany lost a greater percentage of its population than in WWII.

Privatizing war changes warfare in profound ways modern generals do not comprehend. If conflict is commoditized, then military and marketplace strategies apply to war. It’s like General Patton goes to the souk. You can win wars by outbidding your enemy for mercenary services, bribing your enemy’s mercenaries to defect, or not paying your mercenaries when the war is over. However, it’s a dangerous game because your enemies and mercenaries can do the same to you, and there is no reliable way to enforce contracts.

Treachery is the watchword of private warfare. The 14^th century Florentine, Niccolò Machiavelli, was ripped off by his own mercenaries in 1500 and 1506, during a war with Pisa, causing Florence to lose to its diminutive neighbor. A few years later, he writes in his book The Prince, that mercenaries are: “disunited, ambitious, without discipline, unfaithful; gallant among friends, vile among enemies; no fear of God, no faith with men.”

Private force will also change world order. Offering the means of war to anyone who can afford it will transform warfare and the future of war. If money can buy firepower, then large corporations and the super-rich will become a new kind of superpower. This will rewrite the rules of global order. Who, how and why people fight will change, and there will be wars without states, accelerating global chaos.

This trend will grow, fueled by a free market for force that generates war but cannot regulate it. Today’s militaries have forgotten how to fight private wars, leaving us all exposed. We must increase our strategic IQs to deal with this problem before it becomes a crisis.

There is good news. Mercenaries are as old as war, yet the world did not devolve into anarchy, as is often portrayed by critics of private force. In fact, they can even do good, if hired to do so. If the industry were properly vetted and transparent, they could support UN peacekeeping operations, stop impending genocides, rescue civilian populations from human predators, hunt crime lords, and launch humanitarian operations quickly to save lives — something the international community cannot do. Mercenaries are like fire: they can burn down the house or power a steam engine. It’s a question of how we use them, so let’s use them for good.

The Kremlin’s successful “comeback” in the Middle East is explained by the fact that Moscow has become accustomed to appearing on the political scene only during crises, when conventional players seek a quick but often emotional resolution. Another obvious reason is the logic of the Russian authorities which have traditionally exploited different upheavals to gain greater political leverage inside the country.

In general, the Syrian war has enabled the Kremlin to make a quiet “comeback” in the Middle East. From the outset, Moscow managed to raise its contacts with key regional and extra-regional stakeholders to an unprecedented level, thus achieving a dialogue on an equal footing that had been sought by the Kremlin since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Yet, many observers wonder whether Russia will be able to use these gains efficiently in the long term. This crucial question is still open-ended as the answer depends on the capabilities and consistent steps of the power vertical.

No arms sale windfall following the weapons tests in Syria

Experts in Moscow enjoy discussing how the war in Syria became a promotion campaign for Russia’s weaponry. The real-world evidence for this hypothesis, however, is somewhat scant. Despite Moscow testing a wide spectrum of weaponry and military hardware in Syria, this has not translated into an uptick of its military exports to the Middle East and Northern Africa, a region which occupies a special place for Russia to expand its military-technical cooperation with countries around the globe.

Taking into account that arms negotiations usually take two years to conclude, it was rather amusing to read various hot takes on the upsurge in Russia’s weapons sales only six months after the start of Moscow’s intervention in Syria.

Russia’s military exports demonstrated steady growth prior to 2013 but have been plateauing ever since. According to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s public statements, the volume of Russia’s military sales amounted to $15 billion in 2014, $14.5 billion in 2015, $15.3 billion in 2016, $15.3 billion in 2017, $16 billion in 2018, $13 billion in 2019 (the Defense Department puts the figure for this year at $15.2 billion), and around $13 billion in 2020.

In 2015-2020, Egypt, Algeria, and Iraq were the main importers of Russia’s weapons. All three countries began striking their bundle agreements (or negotiating over particular classes of weapons) with Russia before its intervention in the Syrian civil war.

The values of contracts might be subject to manipulation, so looking at the actual physical volume of deliveries could give us a more accurate picture. In 2015-2020, Egypt, Algeria, and Iraq were the main importers of Russia’s weapons. All three countries began striking their bundle agreements (or negotiating over particular classes of weapons) with Russia before its intervention in the Syrian civil war.

The exception to this rule includes some of the agreements between Russia and Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. Those deals became media highlights due to the specifics of those countries’ relations with the U.S. But neither the sums of the contracts nor their assortment points at any sort of arms sale windfall.

However, it would be a misconception to interpret such steps as Moscow’s desire to become a mediator or that it is interested in building a balanced architecture of regional security – it just seeks to present itself as a mentor.

Strategically speaking, Russia has pursued a “clinger” policy in recent years. Moscow has been trying importunately to interact with everyone in order to impose a “dialogue on an equal footing” on Washington, its principal rival.

The Kremlin seeks to bolster its position by playing the contradictions card and making the most of the lack of concordance among traditional allies; by gaining a firmer foothold in the countries at the apex of the crisis – Syria, Lebanon, Iraq; or by mediating the overdue policy to diversify political ties.

Such tactics tend to be typical of non-state actors which do not have the means to secure themselves. The Kremlin has them in plentiful supply, both nuclear and non-nuclear ones. However, insufficient economic resources prevent Russians from winning unswerving loyalty – even that of their strategic allies, not to mention tactical ones.

Recipe for “success”

In the official propaganda, the emphasis is on exceptional strength which is devoid of significant economic power and which stems from the Soviet paradigm. The latter has defined the agenda promoted by the Kremlin and reinforced the familiar bugaboo of the external enemy against the image of upright state leadership.

Therefore, Putin, a politician who became a historic figure with the annexation of Crimea, could not simply put up with the sanctions imposed after 2014 or see Russia being compared to a besieged fortress. Although the image of the external enemy is indispensable to Russian officials’ speeches, it contradicts, first of all, the existing Western centrism of the Russian elite.

Moreover, pretending to see a threat and moralizing are not tantamount to rule-setting on the world stage. After the Russian “comeback” in the Middle East, where it had to deal with numerous non-state and quasi-state actors, Moscow was forced to resort to parallel diplomacy given the inability of official departments to solve the foreign policy tasks assigned to them in an effective manner.

Hence, we have seen the involvement of the Chechen think tank (Kadyrov’s Muslim team) in the negotiations, the deployment of Prigozhin’s mercenaries to fulfill military tasks, and the engagement of military intelligence to get rid of undesirables. Naturally, special forces should coordinate such activities rather than the Foreign Ministry.

Formally, the Russian Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministries work very close and in tandem. Nevertheless, it has been clear since 2017 that security officials, and military and intelligence agencies, sidelined diplomats in the Syrian and later in the Libyan cases. Still, the key players were only too glad to let Moscow call the shots in Syria as Russia would have to shoulder the burden of the crisis settlement and the responsibility for the survival of Assad’s ossified regime.

Arab tribes in Syria are a key element of the country’s social, cultural and historic identity. During the Ottoman Empire Arab tribes had strong relations with various sultans and were given weapons and money in order to secure their loyalty. Their cooperation with the Ottoman authorities was important for securing key trade routes to the east and to manage any threats from further east.

Eventually some tribes grew too strong and were co-opted by colonial powers to help topple the Ottoman Empire. Despite their services to the west, under the French mandate of Syria, Arab tribes were marginalized and their role in society, politics, and culture was heavily censored. The French were threatened by Arab nationalist sentiment and divided Syria along ethnic lines favoring minority groups including Christians, Druze and Alawites.

In 1946 this short sighted policy became the demise of the French as they left behind formerly unified territory divided along ethnic lines and the creation of two new states: Syria and Lebanon. Subsequent competition for power in Syria played out in the form of a series of coups and some short lived presidencies.

Hafez al Assad appointed himself President in 1970 when he ousted his Ba’ath Party comrades from power; the same people he helped bring into power during two previous coups in 1963 and 1966.

Under Hafez al Assad Arab tribes were viewed as a threat and managed by recruiting tribal members into the Ba’ath Party’s ranks. Tribal members were given positions in Syria’s notorious “mukhabarat”, intelligence agencies, and used to cull the tribal communities that were for the most part far living from governance centers.

In 2011 when the Syrian revolution began fissures emerged among tribal members. Syrians from the same tribe had different opinions about the Assad family and the revolution; and those divisions were easily identifiable among the ranks of fighters and activists on either side of the conflict. When Daesh emerged on the scene, Arab tribes were the first target for both the Assad regime and Daesh.

On the one hand Daesh insisted that the tribes should join the fight and revive the stolen glory of their ancestors while the Assad regime claimed the Arab tribes should cleanse their ranks of blasphemous Arabs that cooperate with Daesh and the opposition.

This tumultuous history of competition over the good graces of Arab tribes in Syria has resulted in a fractured social stalemate.

Even though they’re related they don’t agree on politics. The same can be said about many other tribes who were represented at the recent opposition sponsored tribal meeting. Nearly every one of the tribes has relatives which are operating in coordination with Russia, Iran, the Assad regime or the US backed YPG terrorists.

In Raqqa, another Arab tribe, Albuhamad, are also backed by Iran and are headed by Turki Albuhamad under the banner of the Tribal Fighting Force. They also coordinate closely with the YPG terror group’s so-called “Syrian Democratic Forces”. The participation of Arab tribes is an important ethnic card that the YPG and America both use to give credibility to their allegedly tolerant and multi ethnic autonomous governance project.

Iran and Russia are also competing to co-opt Arab tribal militia groups including the Al Maghaweer Militia which is made of members of the Tay Tribe. They are present in Hassaka province and operate under the auspices of the pro Assad Russian backed National Defense militia. But they also receive support from Iran.

The Iranian and Russian backed tribes operating in YPG controlled areas are the Assad regime’s proverbial hand in the pot and the reason why Iran and Assad continue to have a significant influence on local politics in America’s zone of influence in north east Syria.

The tensions between these pro Assad Arab tribes and the YPG boiled over recently and tribes demanded that a separate court system be set up to deal with issues related to the Arab tribes. They believe that the YPG’s form of justice is inadequate and unfair to the interests of the Arabs and their tribes.

Iran and Assad are not only working to improve their relations with the Arab tribes in YPG controlled areas but also in areas under the Assad regime’s control. Last December Iran hosted a meeting of Arab tribal leaders in Tehran that arrived from Damascus. The aim was to convince the Arab tribes to cooperate with Iran against the presence of American troops and the YPG terror group east of the Euphrates.

To some extent the Assad backed and Iranian funded efforts have resulted in significant developments east of the Euphrates. In early April, 400 Arab tribal fighters in Qamishli graduated from a training course of the pro Assad Russian backed National Defense militia. Russian and Syrian military personnel as well as Assad regime bureaucrats were present at the graduation ceremony in an area that’s dominated by US backed YPG terrorists.

Even though Russia and Iran are both working to court Arab tribal members around Syria their interests are at loggerheads. Russia aims to limit Iranian influence east of the Euphrates while Iran aims to increase its presence in close proximity to American troops.

After a pandemic-restricted election campaign, Joe Biden officially became the 46^th president of the United States in an inauguration ceremony under heavy security measures on January 20, 2021. During his inauguration address, he outlined the task ahead of his administration. Biden signaled that rebuilding coalitions and with the words, “Here’s my message to those beyond our borders. America has been tested, and we’ve come out stronger for it. We will repair our alliances and engage with the world once again.”

Damaged Relationships

While the White House has expressed a desire to “repair alliances,” how convinced are Washington’s allies in the Middle East, and especially Turkey? Relations with the longtime NATO ally have steadily deteriorated over the past years. U.S. support for a Kurdish paramilitary group in Syria known as the YPG has been a particular flash point between the two allies. While Washington has used the group to combat Daesh (ISIS) in northeast Syria, Ankara has expressed concern due to the group’s status as the Syrian arm of the PKK, a designated terror group by both the U.S. and the European Union.

The relationship between the U.S. and the YPG was established in 2014 under the Obama administration. Although there is no official word from the White House about the U.S. policies in the Middle East, the presence of many Obama-era officials in the Biden administration gives us a glimpse into what to expect going forward.

Most worrying for Turkey among Biden’s appointments is the return of Obama’s “defeat ISIS” envoy Brett McGurk as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) czar on the National Security Council. Ankara views McGurk as the architect of the partnership between Turkey’s longtime ally and its archenemy, the PKK, a Marxist separatist Kurdish movement which has been carrying out acts of terrorism for forty years in Turkey’s southeast region.

McGurk’s worldview has been painted by the war on terror paradigm, just as that of the former U.S. president George W. Bush.

McGurk started his career at the State Department during the presidency of George W. Bush. Despite a transition to a Democratic administration in 2008, McGurk stayed on and was appointed as the special presidential envoy for the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in the Obama administration. McGurk continued to head the effort to defeat Daesh under Republican president Donald Trump until December 2018, when he resigned after opposing his commander in chief’s decision to withdraw American forces from Syria.

A ‘Democratic’ Rebranding

McGurk’s worldview has been painted by the war on terror paradigm, just as that of the former U.S. president George W. Bush. This ideological position, which has a black-and-white view of terrorist groups, led him to take decisions eschewing sovereign states like long-time NATO ally Turkey in favor of using questionable non-state actors to fight terrorists in Syria. Unfortunately, the geopolitical ramifications of these decisions were never taken into account.

With strong U.S. air support and intelligence sharing, the SDF was able to score moderate success against Daesh. However, tensions in the Arab-majority regions controlled by the Kurdish-minority SDF began to escalate due to poor governance by the group.

Furthermore, many Syrian Kurds were unhappy with the Marxist authoritarian rule that was being implemented. In addition, elements inside the SDF began to support actions of factions which aimed to destabilize areas under Turkish influence west of the Euphrates.

Following the rebranding of the YPG, McGurk successfully managed the perception of his new proxy group, painting the Marxist group as “secular” and the “best” option against Daesh.

The SDF’s seizure of Syria’s natural resources like the country’s oil and gas fields also created problems with not only the Assad regime but also the legitimate opposition. Many began to view the SDF as a group that wanted to fracture the territorial integrity of the country – and the group’s actions supported these concerns.

Whitewashing the YPG

Following the rebranding of the YPG, McGurk successfully managed the perception of his new proxy group, painting the Marxist group as “secular” and the “best” option against Daesh. This was supported by a campaign propagating that much of northeast Syria was Kurdish, when in fact many cities in the region like Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor have strong Arab majorities. The Western mainstream media quickly began to introduce the YPG/SDF as “freedom fighters” and proponents of women’s rights, overlooking the many human rights violations committed by the group.

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McGurk worked to legitimize the group by arranging meetings between U.S. officials and senior members of the YPG/SDF in northern Syria. As an envoy in the fight against Daesh, he was also very active on social media. On February 1, 2016, he tweeted, “Paid respects to over 1,000 Kurdish martyrs from Kobani battle. ISIL’s siege was broken 1-year ago last week.” A day after his tweet, photos of his visit were published.

One of the photos showed him receiving an appreciation plaque from a man in YPG uniform. That man was Polat Can, a senior member of the PKK terrorist organization. On May 17, 2017, McGurk held another meeting which brought together U.S. officials and senior members of the YPG in Raqqa, including Mazloum Kobani, (a code name) and the commander in chief of the SDF and the alleged adopted child of PKK founder Abdullah Ocalan. Kobani is viewed as a top-level terrorist by Turkey, which has issued a red arrest warrant against him and labeled him a high-value target.

The Talabani Meeting

The seeds of McGurk’s plan to partner the U.S. with the YPG were actually conceived in Iraq. In 2014 as Daesh was converging on the Syrian town of Kobani, Lahur Talabani, the co-president of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), had arranged a meeting between McGurk and Mazloum Kobani in Sulaymaniyah. It was at this meeting that the idea of U.S. support for the YPG was hatched. After the meeting, McGurk gave guarantees that the U.S. would support the YPG against Daesh.

Kobani followed up his meeting with McGurk by visiting the powerful commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ elite Quds Force Major General Qasem Soleimani. The YPG commander wanted to ease Iranian concerns and gave assurances that their alliance with the U.S. would not be against Iran’s activities in Syria.

Ten years have passed since the protests began peacefully against the Syrian regime, and then soon turned into an armed conflict. Optimistic analysts believed that the regime would not survive for long, in front of pressure factors that all came together against it, between the pressure of the street at home and the pressure of the International community as well as the armed opposition.

However, after ten years, it seems that all those optimistic about the political change in the country have gone too far in their ambitions. Here is the Syrian president, preparing for a fourth presidential term, and he survived the conflict with unlimited Russian and Iranian support, at a time when the Syrian opposition failed to offer an alternative to the regime.

The Syrian revolution has entered its new year, burdened with a death toll of over half a million people while hundreds of thousands of missing. In addition to million of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and refugees in the neighboring countries and Europe, while the destruction of the infrastructure and the depletion of the economy reaches a new level recently.

At a time when the Syrians inside and outside Syria renewed their demands for freedom and the overthrow of the regime, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, was presenting offers to the Arab Gulf states to appease them to provide support in the reconstruction and re-float of the Assad regime.

The map of local actors and security

Security, stability, and early recovery are dependent upon one another in a political transition and reformation. As highlighted throughout history, security and stability are essential and were predominately achieved by instilling a new political order that removes the main sources of conflict. Syria is no exception, as the need for a political transition grows more urgent.

Although security and stability are a focus point for key stakeholders, the growing fragmentation and chaos has only expanded the various layers to attaining security. Also contributing, the prolonged political process, including the constitutional committee, have laid a confusing path with unclear outcomes that would lead to a stable political climate in the near future. The current outlook does not clearly outline when a secure and stable environment will be set for Syrians to return.

Based on responses from respondents residing in regime-held areas, the behavior of the security apparatuses affiliated with the Assad regime remains unchanged and persistent in utilizing the same detention and torture tactics as before 2011.

The general security situation in Syria continues to be highly volatile and fragmented mirroring the political, military, and economic instability. To varying degrees, each area is experiencing a host of challenges revolving around the social and economic repercussions from the continued war. Based on responses from respondents residing in regime-held areas, the behavior of the security apparatuses affiliated with the Assad regime remains unchanged and persistent in utilizing the same detention and torture tactics as before 2011.

The responses highlighted that the Assad-regime has even increased its brutality against civilians. The security apparatuses in regime, opposition, and SDF held territories are unable to fully control the behavior of individuals, entities, and groups under their respective command at varying degrees. This is mainly due to lack of accountability and corruption. Lack of professionalism by security-affiliated officials in opposition-held territories has contributed to the deteriorating security situation.

Local governance scenarios in Syria

• Autonomy: Today, Syria is effectively divided into three areas of control: In addition to the regime that controls the capital, Damascus, and the main cities in the country, there are the areas under the control of the PYD / YPG in the north, in addition to the Idlib region bordering the Turkish border, which is controlled by the opposition forces. This model is the model most desired by the Democratic Union / People’s Protection Units (YPG), which dominates the east of the Euphrates. This is because the organization, which does not find any difficulty in financing, recruiting fighters, bringing weapons and military training, through the support it receives from Russia and the West, is trying, through the political support it enjoys in international public opinion, to gain legitimacy as one of the main actors on the ground. ISIS, which has about 100,000 fighters, is the biggest threat to Syrian territorial integrity after the regime.

Federalism: The situation is based on the formation of a joint political entity consisting of three different local administrations, in the Idlib region, the eastern Euphrates region, and the regime-held areas in Damascus, in a manner that each maintains broad powers in its internal affairs. The most supportive of this scenario is Russia. Under this scenario, which was also based on the internal political experience of Russia, the PYD / YPG elements would be integrated into the regime’s army, so that the regime would secure control of all Syrian lands again.

The terrorist People’s Protection Units (YPG), which stated in talks that took place in 2017 between it and the regime, called for a “federal region under constitutional guarantees,” and also demanded self-administration, in exchange for its withdrawal from Arab-majority areas in the north of the country. It is known that both Russia and the regime described these talks as positive at that time.

Syria united with the guarantee of its territory alone:

​​This scenario is closer to the orientations of the Syrian opposition. Turkey has launched several military operations, against (ISIS) and against the PYD / YPG, in order to revive / maintain this scenario. It is not an exaggeration to say: The process of restoring Syria’s territorial integrity and restoring its national unity has become next to impossible. This is because the foreign military presence in the country on the one hand, and the plans of the world powers to map the region on the other hand, make the Syrian future hazy and unclear.

Moreover, the victory of the Democratic candidate, Joe Biden, in the presidential elections in the United States, will have a profound impact on the American scenarios for Syria. However, the policies of Biden, who served as Vice President under Barack Obama, and was part of the political and military chaos that Obama left in Syria, and of the United States’ foreign policy and approach towards Syria for the next four years, are a great mystery at the moment.

Ten years into the Syrian crisis, many commentators generally accept that President Bashar al-Assad’s government has “won” the gruesome conflict. But talk of peace and stability in the country requires speaking in relative terms because prolonged warfare and acts of terrorism continue to spill Syrian blood from Idlib to Homs to Deir Az Zor to Daraa.

Additionally, the impact of US-imposed sanctions makes reconstruction and redevelopment severely challenging for Syria—to say nothing about the catastrophic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on Syria’s severely impoverished, displaced, and starved citizens.

A major reason why finding a diplomatic settlement to the Syrian crisis has been so difficult comes down to the question of whether Assad could or should serve as the country’s head of state. The US and most European Union (EU) countries firmly maintain that Assad is entirely illegitimate. This pits most NATO countries against Russia and China.

The Damascus regime’s standing is a major flashpoint in Moscow and Washington’s geopolitical rivalry in the Middle East. With President Joe Biden focusing on countering Russian clout in the Middle East and other regions of the world, the new US leadership is likely to continue to see Syria as a high stakes conflict in terms of pushing back against Vladimir Putin’s international influence.

In the early stages of the Syrian conflict, from 2011 to 2015, some Gulf Arab monarchies were actively involved in the push to oust Assad’s regime. Aligned with the Obama administration and Turkey’s agendas in Syria, Gulf states gave Syria’s rebels significant support. This anti-Ba’athist “revolution” was expected to mark a geopolitical setback to Iran.

There were expectations that Assad’s regime was on the verge of falling to Sunni forces purportedly more favorable to Turkey and Gulf Arab monarchies, and far less amenable to Iranian interests. But Russia’s intensified military intervention in 2015 and the 2016/2017 battle of Aleppo led to the GCC states adjusting their positions on Syria.

Russia’s strong support for Assad made it clear to policymakers in Gulf capitals that regime change in Syria was no longer on the cards. Giving up on the idea of bringing down Assad, officials came to a de facto acceptance of his regime’s survival.

As the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and some other Arab states have feared Turkish military intervention in northern Syria and its implications for what they perceive to be a “neo-Ottoman” threat, Assad’s government has benefitted from various Arab regimes’ growing unease with Ankara’s foreign policy agenda. This was especially underscored in October 2019 when the UAE led a coalition of Arab states which stood unified against Turkey’s “Operation Peace Spring” in northern Syria.

What remains to be seen is how GCC members that want to do business with Syria face off with the US vis-à-vis the Caesar Act.

We must not overlook economics. Some in the Gulf want to profit from major reconstruction and business opportunities in post-conflict Syria. Yet what remains to be seen is how GCC members that want to do business with Syria face off with the US vis-à-vis the Caesar Act.

This legislation, which came into force in 2020, imposes stringent sanctions on major sectors of the Syrian economy and imposes secondary sanctions as well, meaning that third parties who do business with Syria may face punishment from the US Treasury. In the summer of 2020, the US government threatened the UAE and other Arab states with the Caesar Act. So far, President Joe Biden’s administration has not taken any softer stance.

Abu Dhabi would certainly like to see the Caesar Act lifted. Speaking alongside his Russian counterpart at a news conference in the UAE on March 9, the Emirati foreign minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan said the US’s economic pressure on Syria “as it is today makes the matter difficult”. For sure, if the UAE can convince the US to lift, or at least ease, the Caesar Act that would mark a major accomplishment in terms of Emirati lobbying capabilities in Washington.

Bahrain, which is under an increasing amount of Emirati influence, aligned with the UAE (rather than Saudi Arabia, as it might have done in the past) on both the questions of renormalizing relations with Syria and establishing full-fledged formalized ties with Israel. Yet it is safe to say that Manama must have at least received the ‘green light’ from Riyadh to restore diplomatic relations with Assad’s government in December 2018.

Oman, as the GCC state on warmest terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran, took a stance on the Syrian crisis that adhered to Muscat’s doctrine of “non-interference” and balanced geopolitical position in the region. Similar to Algeria’s sovereigntist governance ideology, Oman believes that independent nation-states must respect each country’s sovereign rights. Muscat also never saw Iran engaging in actions in Syria that threatened Omani interests, thus the Sultanate saw nothing substantial to gain from Assad falling to anti-Iranian forces.

It was unsurprising how Oman refused to sever diplomatic relations with Assad’s government. At the same time, the Omanis have been hosting members of the Syrian opposition, making it clear to all sides in the conflict that Oman is available to facilitate constructive dialogue between the parties in the interest restoring peace to Syria. Omani officials have visited Damascus as part of their efforts to help Syrians engage in dialogue that’s necessary for winding down the war.

Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar: Not Ready for Re-Normalization

Kuwait, where much of the financing for the Syrian opposition initially came from, has not joined the UAE and Bahrain in officially restoring formalized diplomatic relations with Assad’s government. But Kuwait’s position against Syria’s regime is less rigid than Saudi Arabia and Qatar’s.

Part of this must be understood within the context of Kuwait’s own demographic makeup and the government’s desire not to allow regional conflicts to inflame sectarian temperatures between Sunni and Shi’a citizens at home. Although the Russian, Iranian, and Syrian militaries along with Lebanese Hezbollah took actions in Syria that outraged many Sunnis in Kuwait, the atrocities committed by Assad’s jihadist enemies against religious minorities in Syria, including Shi’a/Alawite Muslims, raised fears among members of Kuwait’s Shi’a communities.

By taking a relatively ‘balanced’ position on the Syrian crisis that serves to only enhance Kuwait’s reputation as a consensus builder among Arab states, the Kuwaiti government has been somewhat careful about how it deals with Syria and the Assad regime.

Some experts contend that Saudi Arabia permitted Bahrain to formally re-accept Assad’s legitimacy as a trial balloon for Riyadh. Yet the last time in which the Saudi kingdom articulated its stance on Syria’s government was in 2019 when Riyadh affirmed its decision not to re-normalize relations with the Damascus regime.

To be sure, the day in which the Al Saud leadership decides to re-accept Assad as Syria’s legitimate head of state will mark a major watershed in Russia’s quest to facilitate the renormalization of Damascus’s position within the wider Sunni Arab world. For now, however, Riyadh is not ready to re-accept Assad.Qatar, which aligns with Turkey on many regional issues such as Syria, maintains that Assad’s government is illegitimate.

Officials from Doha continue to speak out against the Assad regime’s human rights abuses in various forums. That said, the 2017-2021 blockade of Qatar did require Doha to improve its relations with Tehran, although Syria remains a contentious regional issue where the Qatari and Iranian governments have agreed to disagree, although earlier in Syria’s civil war, prior to the eruption of the GCC crisis in 2017, the conflict was a greater source of friction between Doha and Tehran.

Security experts admit that we are living in a new era of terrorism and that the terrorist organization Daesh (ISIS) is its most outstanding example. Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East organized a panel entitled “The Future of ISIS” to discuss Daesh’s legacy including its detainees and returnees, and strategies against a potential resurgence of the group in Iraq and Syria. The experts that participated in the panel discussed their views on the future of the terror group.

When Daesh jihadists declared the foundation of a so-called Islamic State in 2014, a battle between the Salafist-jihadi group and Al-Qaeda members broke out. According to Mohammed Abu Rumman, a Jordanian scholar and former Minister of Culture and Youth, the fight between the two extended all across the world, starting from Iraq and Syria and later crossing over to Yemen, Afghanistan, and North Africa. This included various Salafist jihadists some of whom affiliated themselves with Daesh while others felt closer to Al-Qaeda. According to Abu Rumman, even though both organizations have lost some of their influence, the fight and competition between them remains and is likely to continue in the future.

Daesh tried to build a strategy and ideology in Iraq, Syria, and other regions by branding itself a representative of Sunni communities. On the contrary, Al-Qaeda is more concerned with its struggle against globalization and its relationship with the United States, its “distant enemy.” According to Abu Rumman, the future of Daesh can’t be discussed without understanding the situations in Iraq, Syria, and Al-Qaeda together.

No Chance of an Insurgency in Iraq and Syria

According to Mara Revkin, a fellow at Georgetown Law’s Center on National Security and the Law, as a terrorist organization Daesh has few chances of staging a successful insurgency in Syria and Iraq. In order to survive, terrorist organizations must secure a political ground and economic resources for sustainable financing. Revkin explained that Daesh has neither political nor economic support.

The loss of its “caliphate” in Syria and Iraq was interpreted as a huge blow to the organization.

The loss of its “caliphate” in Syria and Iraq was interpreted as a huge blow to the organization. The group forfeited its technological bases and the territories it controlled, which were perceived as key areas for its continued presence. At the moment, this transnational terrorist group has been hindered from spreading violence and the changing dynamics have deprived the group of political and economic backing. Thus, the organization’s propaganda capacity has been doomed to fail.

Its limited activities, its internet and social media strategies, and losing its “caliphate,” turned the group into an underground organization and shifted its future plans. Abu Rumman noted that losses on the ground translate into a reduced presence on social media platforms, which are terrorist groups’ prime recruiting ground. A great contribution to this development was the declaration by the two social media giants, Twitter and Facebook, that they would not tolerate discourses encouraging violence on their platforms.

The Future of Daesh

The future of Daesh, in light of its ideology and presence in Syria and Iraq, is uncertain. Daesh lost all its strength including the local population’s support. Borzou Daragahi, a journalist and senior non-resident fellow at the Atlantic Council, argued during the seminar that their recruitment attempts constantly fail as the group has lost its legitimacy in the eyes of the local population, which stays away from the group.

In the future, it is less likely that Daesh will reorganize itself and establish strongholds in Syria and Iraq as it did in the past. The international community’s united fight against the terror group has effectively rendered a potential upsurge by Daesh impossible. This global effort is an exemplary case of  a global collaboration against a terrorist group.

Robert Ford, a former U.S. ambassador to Syria, said in a webinar that the United States under the Biden administration could deploy more troops to Eastern Syria, that withdrawal of troops is not subject to consideration, and that there will be a continued U.S. military presence in Syria. “There would be a continuation in discussing Syria, but a minor change can be witnessed by this new administration due to increased sanctions on Damascus.

The withdrawal of American troops can hurt the credibility of the U.S.,” he said. Ford went on to say that a slight change can also be seen regarding the refugee border policies as during Trump’s time in office not many refugees were accepted into the U.S., while Iraq and Syria will not be evaluated separately during the Biden presidency.

The webinar was hosted by SETA Washington D.C. on February 26, 2021 and examined the Biden administration’s possible policy towards Syria. Questions such as whether Biden would continue to interfere in Syria like his predecessors Trump and Obama or he would step back were among the topics of discussion.

The recent U.S. attack targeting pro-Iranian Shia militia in Syria was discussed by a number of experts, namely Robert Ford, a former U.S. ambassador to Syria; Dima Moussa, the vice-president of the Syrian National Coalition; and Wael Al-Zayat, the CEO of Emgage Foundation.

Dima Moussa asserted that uncertainty can be seen in Biden’s approach to the Syrian conflict as the Syrian issue is not present on the president’s priority list. She added that as far as the recent U.S. air strike against Syria is concerned, “an inheritance from Trump is seen for now.” She concluded, “We should wait a little bit more.”

Wael Al-Zayat started by noting that it is dangerous to make predictions pertaining to this issue which has been continuing for the last 10 years. “The U.S. again will spend a lot of time discussing the Syrian conflict under Biden’s administration. America’s connection with the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] will continue.

Robert Ford said that it would be better if Russia took control of the eastern part of Syria because Russia is closer to Damascus compared to Washington.

There might be a comprehensive talk between the U.S. and Assad’s regime. Dialogue between the U.S. and Turkey related to the Idlib issue would be puzzling. Bilateral dialogue between Turkey and the U.S. is inevitable for the sake of the Syrian victims because they consider both countries as their protectors.”

Robert Ford said that it would be better if Russia took control of the eastern part of Syria because Russia is closer to Damascus compared to Washington; that the KGB (the USSR’s Committee for State Security) and its successor, the Russian intelligence services, have been in close cooperation with Syria; and that the Iran-Syria relations have been closer than those of the U.S. and Syria. He added that that talks between Turkey and the U.S. are necessary.

She added that a solution is not possible by military means but only by political ones. Iran, the EU, and other regional actors should convince Assad to enter negotiations. According to Moussa, an international consensus needs to be reached, Russia needs to be a part of this coordinated effort, and a thorough policy plan should be introduced by Biden.

Al-Zayat clarified that a humanitarian approach should be the Biden administration’s top priority.

Al-Zayat clarified that a humanitarian approach should be the Biden administration’s top priority. The most important issue is how to define Syria’s national interests. Civilian protection is necessary in Syria, he noted, adding that the U.S. should not be spending its budget on Syria. The United States is already facing multiple problems like COVID-19, climate change, social justice, etc. “That’s why Biden should be focusing on eradicating other problems first, and then start thinking about the Syrian conflict,” he said.

Ford expressed his belief that the U.S. should not deploy troops to Syria without a clear-cut mission. He claimed that only Syrians can resolve the conflict because it started between their government and themselves. Ford clarified that he does not think that Turkey, Russia, or Iran can resolve this issue and neither can the U.S. An inclusive national plan by Syrians for Syrians is needed. He claimed that “Joe Biden has an incredible talent. He can manage situations very well, if he wishes…Biden will be deeply involved in the military confrontation in Syria.”

Al-Zayat concluded by going against Ford’s proposal, adding that A Syrian plan does not seem realistic because several sects are present there and they do not want to solve this conflict by themselves. There is no doubt that the conflict emerged between Syrians…; however, they are no longer its major component.

As Joe Biden has not been in power for long, it is difficult to say anything certain regarding his approach to the Syrian conflict. Predictions can be made but uncertainty is bound to remain. However, before taking any step for the resolution of the conflict, including imposing new sanctions or increasing the number of troops, the U.S. must take into account the current problems, the hopes, and the expectations of the Syrian people – both those living inside and outside of Syria.

Many scholars and pundits of the MENA region are wondering why the Islamists did not take over during the massive protests known as the “Arab Spring.” This question is relevant to the extent that political Islam for many decades has been a popular movement that has threatened regimes marked by a deficit of legitimacy.

To address this issue, we need to bear in mind that the ideological references of Islamism pertain to a sort of utopia which prevented the movement from being politically efficient. Many Islamists became aware of this ideological handicap, seeking another path in order to play a role in the state institutions.

What is Islamism?

Islamism can be defined as a resistance to the inescapable secularization, or at least, an attempt to bargain the place of religion in the public sphere. Facing the social and cultural transformations of past colonization and current globalization, religious consciousness is worried about the future of Islam.

Hence the demand for the implementation of Islamic law, sharia. But this demand is not limited to the judiciary; it encompasses a worldview that dictates how the state and society should be.

In this regard, Islamism is a utopia expressing the desire for a perfect society and a fair state. The utopia is about building a social world where selfishness does not exist. For instance, in the Islamist literature of the 1980s in Algeria, including the weekly publication Al Munqid, the issue of underdevelopment was explained by mismanagement and bad economic policy.

The idea is that despite the fact that God created enough wealth, poverty is widespread and it is the result of the rulers’ corruption and selfishness. To reach this utopian goal, the state needs to be run by righteous people who fear God and who are not prone to corruption. Islamists are in search of the ideal government and the ideal leaders in a society marked by fairness.

The excessive violence in Egypt and Algeria led to a split of the movement: a mainstream approach to take over the state peacefully through the electoral process, and a minority trend supporting Al-Qaida and Daesh. It is worth noting that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt accepted to create a party (Justice and Liberty Party), meaning that by implication they saw themselves as a political party among others, while in the past they claimed to be the party of all the Egyptians.

Islamism evolved towards what is called “post-Islamism,” inspired by the Turkish experience as embodied by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

By foregoing violence to take over the state and by accepting other parties as legitimate competitors, Islamism evolved towards what is called “post-Islamism,” inspired by the Turkish experience as embodied by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Islamists took part in elections, and in some countries, they won. They won in Tunisia in 2011, and in Egypt and Morocco in 2012 following the nationwide protests.

The internet factor

The internet factor, as a societal phenomenon, reduced the influence of the Islamist discourse among young people. Multiple debates in many virtual forums gave the opportunity to oppose the Islamist views on society, women, culture, etc. There was a sort of deconsecration of the Islamist discourse with the idea that the verses of the Koran could have many different interpretations. This deconsecration was made possible by the free speech that was encouraged by anonymity on social media.

Some young people went as far as to claim to be atheists, and others questioned Muslim theology. At the university, professors and students engaged in debates questioning the religious authority of thinkers such as Al Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah.

There is a climate never seen before where people are demanding a reform of the theology inherited from the past. Students have started to read Mohamed Shahrour, Mohamed Taha, Mohammed Arkoun, among others.

Undermined by its ideological and political contradictions, Islamism failed to emerge as the dominant force to take over the state following the Arab Spring. The Islamists do not see themselves any more as the party of the nation; they have accepted to be one party among others.

In Tunisia, they backed down on issues of women and freedom of consciousness. In Morocco, they aligned with the king who kept the army and the foreign affairs under his control, despite having gained more seats in the National Assembly than any other party.

In Egypt and Algeria, certain Islamists are seeking the blessing of the military to take part in the state institutions. In Iraq, Sunni Islamism has been weakened by the excesses of violence perpetrated by Daesh. It leaves a space to Shiite groups to be more active, whether they align themselves with Tehran or not.

The sudden passing of Hatem Ali, 58, a highly-respected Syrian film director and actor caused a storm in social media in the Arab world with people recalling his legacy and his priceless contribution to cinema. His collective work left a remarkable impact on Arabs’ collective memory.

With his sudden passing in Cairo, Ali left a huge void behind him. Hatem Ali was uniquely multitalented – he directed, acted, and wrote screenplays – and his cinematic productions tackled important historical, social, religious, and political themes.

The environment in which Hatem Ali was born and grew up is vital to understanding the true importance and meaning of his contribution to Arab and Syrian cinema. He was born to a Syrian family in the Golan Heights in 1962 and at the age of five became a refugee when Israel occupied the territory in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

The Syrian director spent most of his teenage life in Al-Hajar al-Aswad, an area which is adjacent to the Yarmouk refugee camp, the largest Palestinian refugee camp in Syria. Palestinian-Syrian director Majed Kayali asserts that Ali attended youth camps organized by the youth wing of the Palestinian Fatah movement in the early 1980s.

Hatem Ali and Palestine

The production of Al-Taghreba al-Falastenya (The Palestinian Exile), a 31-episode drama series, is one of Hatem Ali’s greatest contributions. In this drama series, he documented life under the British occupation of Palestine, the creation of Israel, the displacement of the Palestinians, and the daily life in refugee camps after the Nakba (Catastrophe), which describes the mass exodus of Palestinians in 1948.

The series was exceptional in many different ways: the first of its kind, reflective of reality and reviving the memory of younger generations of what had befallen on the Palestinians in 1948, of displacement and destruction.

In Al-Taghreba, Ali tackled social, economic, and cultural matters that were crucial for Palestinians. This included the differences between the peasant lives in villages and the urban lives in cities, the conflicts between landlords and peasants, the divisions among Palestinians, and the cultural and linguistic differences among various segments of Palestinian society.

Unlike his character Rushdi who refused to leave his homeland, Ali’s life took a different turn. Since 2012, Ali lived in self-exile which seems to have been a political message of refusing to accept the Syrian civil war which broke out following the 2011 uprising.

Not only did Ali direct The Palestinian Exile series, which went viral at the time of its broadcasting in 2004, but he also acted in it. Ali played the role of Rushdi, a young man whose father was killed in the fight against the occupying British forces, and who later in 1948 was separated from his mother. Rushdi had to live with his uncles away from his mother whose new place of residence came under Israeli control in 1948. He would only meet her for a few minutes, in 1967, after being smuggled into present-day Israel by a Palestinian-Israeli.

The series ends by Rushdi tearing up an offer letter he receives from Pakistan to undertake his undergraduate studies, sending a message to Palestinians that they should not leave their country despite the difficult conditions of living under occupation.

In 2008, Ali agreed to direct a TV series based on the Time of White Horses, a novel written by Palestinian novelist Ibrahim Nasrallah, which portrays life in a Palestinian village. However, his dream didn’t come true as certain mainstream Arab TV channels hesitated to produce the series because it was about Palestine.

Leaving Damascus

Unlike his character Rushdi who refused to leave his homeland, Ali’s life took a different turn. Since 2012, Ali lived in self-exile which seems to have been a political message of refusing to accept the Syrian civil war which broke out following the 2011 uprising. After 2011, Ali kept moving between capitals without publicly criticizing the Assad government, which didn’t send a representative to his funeral.

In 2015, the Syrian Actors Syndicate fired Ali and 200 other actors “for not paying their annual fees.” The state-owned media in Syria allocated limited coverage to Ali’s death. This can be taken to be indicative of the regime’s views on Ali, which are similar to those it holds on Jamal Suliman, a well-known Syrian actor and a friend of Ali.

Upon his departure from Syria, Suliman was unable to return to Damascus to bid farewell to his ailing mother. He recalled how she would call him “Abu Saleh,” his name in Al-Taghreba, stressing the importance of the series in the collective memory of the old and young alike.

Ali’s love for Damascus was exceptional. In the two-part drama series The Four Seasons, he detailed the daily life of a family in Damascus. His work could easily be used by anyone looking for references about the daily life in Damascus in the late 1990s and the early 2000s.

In 1998, he directed Al-Zeer Salem, which brought him a lot of fame in the Arab world.

Ironically, and against his dying wish, Ali passed away in a hotel in Cairo, while stopping there to prepare for another drama work. Damascus, which he loved, expressed this love back, with thousands from all walks of life attending his funeral, including actors who are known to be loyal to Bashar al-Assad, in a rare scene that Damascus has not witnessed in nearly 12 years.

Restaging History

In addition to his works that tackled social and political issues, Hatem Ali left an important mark on historical drama in the Arab world, narrating important historical events, with his works translated into many languages. In 1998, he directed Al-Zeer Salem, which brought him a lot of fame in the Arab world.

The TV drama addresses the events that sparked a 40-year war following the killing of Udai bin Rabia’s brother, highlighting blood feud, a complex phenomenon that predates Islam in the Arab world.

Ali’s contribution to historical drama includes a series on Saladin and his conquest of Jerusalem, and the history of Muslims in Andalusia, including the rise and the fall of Muslim rule there.

Additionally, he directed a drama series about Omar ibn Al-Khattab, the second Caliph of Islam, documenting his life starting from the age of 18 until his death. His works documented the less-known and less-visited history of the Arab and Muslim worlds, including that of Spain.

Just before he passed away, Hatem Ali renewed his two-year Syrian passport. Upon his death in Cairo, his body was transported to Damascus, the city he loved and depicted in his works, to be laid to rest at Bab al-Sghir Graveyard, uniting Arabs and Syrians in a rare scene, and leaving behind important historical dramas.

Hatem Ali was not an ordinary director, but an original and brilliant one, who felt the pain of his people and understood their history. Just as he turned significant historical events into everlasting memories, Hatem Ali’s memory too will be honored by many in the region that will remember him as an outstanding director and actor.

The way forward in north east Syria wasn’t so clear until in early November Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke with Russia’s Vladimir Putin over the phone to hash out the details of a ceasefire agreement in Nagorno Karbakh. Erdogan reportedly said that the same spirit in the agreement in Azerbaijan should be applied in Syria.

Just as Russia and Turkey began setting up the ceasefire oversight arrangements in Nagorno Karbakh, Turkey’s sights were set on Ain Issa.

Even though the town is small, it sits on a critical juncture of the M4 highway. Ain Issa is around 40 km north of Raqqa City, and sits on the M4 highway which when heading goes directly to Manbij. Ayn al Arab, known to many as Kobani, is also a few kilometers north west of Ain Issa. Sitting on this major thoroughfare the town carries much more significant for any party or group that controls it.

In late November reports emerged of ongoing oil sales; by the self-styled Syrian Democratic Forces, a group which Ankara believes the PKK’s Syrian wing the YPG uses to hide behind, to Assad, despite America prohibiting such sales.

The outgoing US Special Representative to Syria James Jeffrey recently said 100,000 barrels of oil are being transferred monthly to Assad controlled areas. The oil is being transferred at the behest of Husam Katerji, a Assad loyalist named in the recent American ‘Caesar’ sanctions.

It’s moved from fields in north west Syria through Tal Tamer, also on the M4 highway, to Ain Issa, then south to Raqqa city. The oil is a main source of income for the terror groups operations. An issue that hasn’t been addressed by American officials mainly due to a lack of clarity on America’s political transition following Trump’s loss to Democratic president elect Joe Biden.

That’s not the only issue that Turkey has with the YPG operations in Syria. It was only after Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring and reached an agreement with Russia in Sochi that called for the withdrawal of the YPG from specific areas including Tal Rifaat, Manbij, and the border areas east of the Euphrates River that the cracks in the YPG’s local and regional alliances began to show.

Like America before them, Russia has also failed to force YPG forces from Manbij, Tal Rifaat, and Ayn al Arab on the border. The YPG is thought be responsible for dozens of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks killing droves of civilians in Turkey backed opposition controlled areas. Recently, a YPG sleeper cell member was captured by the Turkey backed SNA and provided critical intel about those operations.

The PKK has a long history in Syria rooted in the presence of the terror group’s founder Abdullah Ocalan in Syria in the early 90s.

The PKK has a long history in Syria rooted in the presence of the terror group’s founder Abdullah Ocalan in Syria in the early 90s. Turkey nearly went to war with Syria in 1999 because the terror group was thought to be using Syria for recruitment and training.

Decades later the PKK is still leveraging its relations with Damascus to establish a foothold for itself in the Syrian geopolitical arena. It’s that historic link to Syria that the PKK and its Syrian branch the YPG are clinging to hoping that they can eventually establish an autonomous administration.

In the following days it quickly become clear that Turkey and Russia are ceasing the small window of opportunity between US administrations to pressure the YPG financially and militarily. Reports emerged that Russia and Assad offered the YPG a safe exit from Ain Issa in exchange for the Russian military and Syrian regime forces to take control.

According to local sources, the deal was presented as a means to prevent Turkey backed SNA forces from taking the town, in what is believed to be a pre requisite for Turkish Russian cooperation.

It’s not clear if the YPG has agreed to the terms of the Russian-Assad proposal but it is clear that both Turkey and Russia are not letting down their guard.

Turkey continues to reinforce front line positions north and north east of Ain Issa with the help of SNA forces. On the other hand, Russia has sent reinforcements to Ain Issa to “reduce tensions” according to Russian Ministry of Defense’s center for Syrian reconciliation.

Close cooperation between Turkey and Russia has given both nations significant strategic advantages in Libya, Azerbaijan, and Syria. Their cooperation has bothered American and NATO officials and sidelined world powers that were more influential in Syria during the past decade.

But that cooperation is strained by a patchy history of operational flexes. The most notable of which are the 2015 downing and capture of a Russian pilot over near the Turkey-Syria border and the deadly Russian led attack on a Turkish military convoy in Idlib’s Jabal al Zawiya region that killed at least 33 Turkish soldiers in February.

While Turkey and Russia are putting the pressure on the YPG the United States has been trying to lift the YPG out of the shadows of the PKK’s terror designation. The PKK is a designated terror group in the U.S., the EU, and the UN. U.S. officials have repeatedly admitted that the American military worked with members of the group in Syria in the fight against Daesh despite knowing of their terror affiliation.

That’s why in November 2020, James Jeffrey made a final call for all PKK members to leave Syrian territory. But Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov says that America is the reason the YPG didn’t fulfill its end of the bargain in the Sochi deal.

The YPG know very well that their strongest bargaining chip are the oil fields under their control. Whether they’re trying to secure better terms with Assad and Russia or trying to convince America not to cut them loose and abandon them while they’re surrounded on all sides.