S

pain reclaimed the FIFA World Cup title after substitute Ferran Torres scored an extra-time winner to secure a hard-fought 1-0 victory over defending champions Argentina in Sunday’s final, ending one of the tournament’s least spectacular championship matches with a dramatic finish.

Torres struck in the 106th minute, converting Spain’s 20th attempt on goal after more than 100 minutes of deadlock at New York/New Jersey Stadium. His decisive finish delivered Spain’s second World Cup title and completed another milestone for head coach Luis de la Fuente, who became the oldest coach to win the tournament at the age of 65.

The victory capped a remarkable period for Spanish football, with De la Fuente’s side extending its unbeaten run to 38 matches across all competitions after also winning the 2024 UEFA European Championship.

Spain controlled possession for most of the match and consistently pushed Argentina onto the defensive, registering 20 shots, including 12 on target. However, the European champions struggled to convert their dominance into goals as Argentina adopted a cautious approach focused on disrupting Spain’s rhythm.

The South American side rarely threatened in attack, producing only two attempts throughout the match and failing to record a single shot during the 90 minutes of regular time—a first in a World Cup final.

Spain’s breakthrough finally arrived in extra time after substitutes Ferran Torres and Nico Williams injected pace and creativity into an otherwise slow contest.

Messi unable to inspire Argentina

Argentina captain Lionel Messi, appearing in his third World Cup final, was largely contained by Spain’s organized defense and struggled to influence the match.

Teenage Spanish star Lamine Yamal, widely expected to provide attacking inspiration, also found little space against Argentina’s disciplined defensive setup.

Tensions boiled over after the final whistle as frustrated Argentine players became involved in a scuffle with their Spanish counterparts following a physically demanding contest.

De la Fuente praised his players after lifting football’s biggest prize, describing the squad as one that had “won everything.”

“I’m so proud of this generation of footballers who have remained true to our philosophy and continued improving it,” the Spain coach said after the match.

The triumph adds the World Cup to Spain’s recent European Championship success and reinforces the country’s position among international football’s elite.

Argentina coach Lionel Scaloni, whose side was unable to defend the title it won in Qatar in 2022, paid tribute to his players and to captain Messi despite the defeat.

Spain’s victory concluded the expanded 2026 FIFA World Cup, with Torres’ late strike proving enough to separate two of world football’s strongest teams after a tense and tactical final.

(Source: Reuters)

V

enezuela’s devastating twin earthquakes have rapidly evolved from a humanitarian catastrophe into the most serious political challenge facing interim President Delcy Rodriguez, as criticism mounts over the government’s handling of rescue efforts and long-standing weaknesses in the country’s emergency response system.

The twin earthquakes, which struck on June 24, have killed nearly 1,500 people, left tens of thousands missing and caused widespread destruction across parts of the country, particularly in the coastal state of La Guaira and the capital Caracas. Thousands remain displaced as emergency workers and volunteers continue searching through collapsed buildings for survivors.

While the initial public reaction focused on grief and shock, frustration has increasingly been directed at the government’s response, with residents, aid workers and analysts accusing authorities of reacting too slowly to one of the country’s worst natural disasters in decades.

For Rodriguez, who assumed the presidency following the removal of former President Nicolas Maduro earlier this year, the crisis represents the first major test of her administration.

In the immediate aftermath of the earthquakes, Rodriguez declared a national state of emergency, expressed condolences to victims’ families and appealed for international assistance.

However, critics argue that official rescue operations have failed to keep pace with the scale of destruction.

Residents from some of the worst-affected communities say they have relied largely on neighbors and volunteers rather than government emergency teams to search for trapped victims.

Mairet Perez, travelling from the Colombian border carrying relief supplies for relatives in La Guaira, described communities digging through rubble with little official assistance.

“Everyone in La Guaira is searching and digging out people with their bare hands,” she said. “And the government? What have they done? Nothing.”

She said some neighborhoods had still not been reached by government rescue teams days after the disaster.

The criticism has been echoed by political analysts who argue that years of economic decline, institutional weakness and underinvestment have left Venezuela poorly equipped to respond to a major emergency.

Phil Gunson, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, said the country’s emergency response capacity had deteriorated significantly over the past decade.

“The government response is anything from totally non-existent to, at best, completely inadequate,” Gunson said.

According to analysts, years of economic crisis, corruption, sanctions and declining public investment have weakened hospitals, emergency services, water systems and electricity networks, limiting the state’s ability to mount an effective disaster response.

International aid fills critical gaps

As domestic rescue efforts struggled, international assistance quickly became essential.

More than 20 foreign search-and-rescue teams have arrived in Venezuela, including personnel from the United States, Spain, Qatar and several Latin American countries.

The United States has deployed military aircraft carrying humanitarian supplies, medical equipment and specialist rescue personnel, while foreign governments have pledged additional financial and technical assistance.

Nevertheless, observers argue that the influx of international aid has also highlighted shortcomings within Venezuela’s own institutions.

Reports have emerged of delays affecting foreign rescue teams entering the country. Colombian firefighters were reportedly held for several hours at Caracas airport before receiving permission to proceed to affected areas.

Authorities have also restricted access to several disaster zones, requiring journalists and humanitarian organizations to receive official authorization before entering.

In some communities, frustrated residents reportedly broke through security cordons in an effort to begin rescue operations themselves.

Social media has also amplified criticism, with videos showing volunteers using basic tools to search collapsed buildings while appealing for additional equipment such as helmets, excavators and medical supplies.

The relative absence of Venezuela’s military from front-line rescue operations has drawn particular attention.

Civil society organizations noted that while soldiers have largely been deployed to regulate access into affected areas, many citizens expected a larger military role in search-and-rescue operations.

Some Venezuelans contrasted the limited deployment with the heavy military presence witnessed during political protests following the disputed 2024 presidential election.

Aid organizations also warn that previous legal restrictions imposed on nongovernmental organizations continue to complicate relief operations, as many community groups were weakened or forced to suspend activities in recent years.

Political consequences may extend beyond the disaster

Beyond the immediate humanitarian crisis, analysts believe the earthquakes could reshape Venezuela’s political landscape.

Rodriguez inherited power only six months ago after Maduro’s removal during a US-backed operation that dramatically altered the country’s political trajectory.

Although her administration has sought closer cooperation with Washington and international partners, Rodriguez remains a divisive figure because of her long association with the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) and her previous role as Maduro’s deputy.

Political scientist Javier Corrales of Amherst College said many Venezuelans continue to associate Rodriguez with the country’s prolonged economic collapse and institutional decline.

“She is seen as part of the problem,” Corrales said, noting that even some within the ruling party question her political direction following closer cooperation with the United States.

The earthquakes have also renewed scrutiny of Venezuela’s infrastructure.

Civil engineers note that although seismic building regulations were strengthened following the devastating 1967 Caracas earthquake, enforcement has often been inconsistent.

Experts argue that weak inspections, poor urban planning and substandard construction practices contributed to the collapse of numerous residential buildings during last week’s disaster.

Gunson also suggested that large-scale public housing programs developed under the governments of Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro may have left thousands living in buildings constructed below acceptable engineering standards.

For many survivors, the disaster has reopened wounds from previous natural disasters, with some families once again losing homes rebuilt after earlier floods and landslides.

Despite growing criticism, Rodriguez has continued touring affected communities while promising that reconstruction will begin as quickly as possible.

Her administration insists emergency operations remain ongoing and has pledged to coordinate reconstruction efforts alongside international partners.

Analysts caution that the political consequences of the disaster remain uncertain.

Natural disasters have historically transformed political fortunes, either strengthening governments that respond effectively or accelerating public dissatisfaction where responses are viewed as inadequate.

Some experts believe the influx of international aid could provide Rodriguez with an opportunity to demonstrate competent leadership if reconstruction proceeds transparently and efficiently.

Others warn that any perception of corruption, political favoritism or poor management could deepen existing public distrust.

For now, rescue workers continue searching through damaged neighborhoods as families await news of missing relatives.

While the immediate priority remains saving lives and assisting survivors, the earthquakes have also exposed the structural weaknesses that have accumulated over years of political and economic turmoil—weaknesses that now present Rodriguez with the defining challenge of her presidency.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

I

ndia’s 2026 state elections did not produce a simple story of victory and defeat. They revealed a country moving in two directions at once. From above, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) looks stronger, more confident and more geographically expanded. From below, Indian politics looks restless, younger and increasingly impatient with old forms of authority. The same political season that gave the BJP a historic breakthrough in West Bengal also gave India the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP), a satirical youth movement that has turned insult, unemployment and examination scandals into a new language of protest.

This contradiction is the real meaning of the elections. India is not only becoming more BJP-dominated. It is also becoming more politically uneven. The ruling party is expanding into regions once considered resistant to its ideological project, while regional parties, opposition alliances and younger voters search for new vehicles of expression. The result is an India that looks more consolidated on the electoral map, but less settled in society.

BJP expansion from above

The most symbolic result came from West Bengal. According to the Election Commission of India, the BJP won 207 seats in the 294-member assembly, while the All India Trinamool Congress, widely known as Trinamool Congress (TMC), fell to 80. The result ended Mamata Banerjee’s long dominance and broke one of the last major regional exceptions to BJP power. For decades, Bengal’s politics drew strength from leftist memory, regional pride, linguistic culture and a self-image of secular resistance. That image was always more complicated than its defenders admitted.

West Bengal was central to the opposition’s imagination because it showed that a regional leader could resist the BJP and speak against New Delhi from a position of strength. That model now looks broken. The BJP’s victory gives the party a psychological advantage ahead of the 2029 general election. It also weakens the opposition’s claim that regional strongholds can contain the BJP’s national expansion.

Yet the election was not a simple BJP wave. Tamil Nadu told a different story. The Election Commission’s results showed actor-politician Vijay’s Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) as the single largest party with 108 seats in the 234-member assembly, ahead of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK). Tamil Nadu shows that voter fatigue can disrupt established regional parties without automatically benefiting the BJP. Vijay’s rise suggests that younger voters may move beyond older Dravidian formations without accepting the BJP as the only alternative.

Assam, Kerala and Puducherry added further nuance. Assam confirmed the BJP’s strength in the northeast, with the party winning 82 seats in a 126-member assembly. Kerala produced a Congress-led result rather than a BJP breakthrough, while Puducherry showed that alliance management still matters in smaller political spaces. Taken together, these results put pressure on the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA), the opposition bloc formed to challenge the BJP nationally. Its problem is not only ideological, it is organizational and psychological.

The BJP, by contrast, has regained momentum after the limits exposed in the 2024 general election, when it remained the largest party but lost its single-party majority in the Lok Sabha. West Bengal gives it a new eastern frontier. Assam confirms its northeastern hold. Even where it did not dominate, as in Tamil Nadu, the weakening of older opposition parties may serve its long-term interests.

Cockroach anger from below

The rise of the Cockroach Janta Party is the clearest sign. The movement began after Chief Justice of India Surya Kant reportedly compared some unemployed youth and fake-degree holders to “cockroaches” and “parasites.” He later said sections of the media had misquoted his oral observations. But the phrase had already escaped the courtroom. Abhijeet Dipke, a U.S.-educated Indian activist, turned the insult into satire. The cockroach became a symbol of humiliation, survival and stubborn resistance.

The movement is funny, but it is not trivial. Its slogans are playful, but its anger is real. Young Indians are protesting because education has become uncertain, examinations have become scandal-prone, jobs are scarce and official responses often sound dismissive. Reuters reported that the CJP’s first street protest in New Delhi on June 6, 2026, focused on youth unemployment and examination-related grievances, including demands for Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan’s resignation over repeated paper leaks and grading errors.

This matters because exams are not a small question in India. For millions of families, they are the promised bridge between poverty and dignity. When that bridge begins to look broken, satire becomes serious. The CJP says what many young Indians feel but cannot easily organize around: they are over-tested, under-employed, mocked by power and expected to remain grateful.

The CJP may not become a conventional political party. It may fade, split or be absorbed by larger forces. But even if the organization disappears, the mood behind it will remain. India has a young population with rising aspirations and shrinking patience. That generation is asking whether nationalism, development slogans and electoral victories can answer the practical anxieties of jobs, exams and dignity.

Why this matters beyond India

This is where the 2026 elections and the Cockroach movement meet. The elections show the strength of political power. The movement shows the weakness of social consent. A party can win states and still face a generation that feels unheard. A government can expand geographically and still struggle to answer the desperation of students, job seekers and young graduates.

The consequences will not remain only domestic. In West Bengal, the BJP’s rise may harden politics around migration, citizenship, border security and Bangladesh. For Dhaka, Kathmandu, Colombo and other regional capitals, India’s internal political shifts matter because New Delhi’s domestic debates often shape regional behavior. If identity politics becomes stronger in Bengal, border communities and minorities may feel the pressure before foreign ministries do.

India after the 2026 state elections is therefore neither fully triumphant nor fully unstable. It is powerful, but tense. The BJP has expanded its map, but the opposition is not the only source of challenge. The challenge is also social, generational and emotional. It comes from young people who may not yet have a full program, but who have found a symbol in the cockroach: despised, difficult to eliminate and strangely capable of surviving.

For the BJP, the lesson is clear. Electoral expansion can create authority, but it cannot replace accountability. For the opposition, the lesson is equally sharp. Anti-BJP politics cannot rely only on old regional faces and emergency alliances. It must speak to the anxieties of the young, the unemployed, the exam-weary and the socially humiliated.

The 2026 elections changed India’s political map. The Cockroach Janta Party revealed something deeper: maps do not show pressure building under the surface. India today is governed from above with confidence, but questioned from below with increasing impatience. That tension may shape the road to 2029 more than any single state result.

T

he ongoing conflict between the US-Israel and Iran is progressing not only on the military front but also simultaneously through diplomatic channels. With the involvement of regional countries, there appears to be an increase in efforts to bring the conflict under control. In particular, it appears that Turkey and Pakistan, Iran’s two key neighbors, are making efforts to prevent the conflict from spreading to a wider geographical area and to establish common ground between the parties. This situation also demonstrates that diplomacy is no longer an alternative to war, but has become a process running parallel to it.

Whilst the Washington administration announced that a 15-point proposal had been conveyed to Iran via Pakistan, Tehran dismissed the proposal as “excessive” and maintained a cautious distance. Whilst the Iranian side accepted the exchange of messages via mediators, it denied claims of direct or indirect talks. This situation indicates that a concrete proposal exists and that Tehran has responded. Whether this exchange of messages and back-channel diplomacy will be sufficient to end the war remains to be seen.

Developments on the ground are not independent of these diplomatic efforts. Iran’s retaliatory strike on Israel’s Dimona region on 22 March signalled a new phase in the conflict. The Tehran administration is seeking to establish a new balance on the ground by, on the one hand, reminding the world of its control over the Strait of Hormuz, and on the other, deploying its ballistic missile capabilities. The retaliatory strikes against the Dimona and Haifa refineries in response to Israel’s attack on the South Pars natural gas field emerged as part of a strategy underscoring the principle of ‘reciprocity’.

By conveying the message, ‘Whatever is done to us, we will respond in kind’, Iran demonstrated that its retaliations were not random but a controlled military escalation. In this sense, whilst the military theatre fuels diplomacy, diplomacy also offers Iran the opportunity to construct a powerful narrative. The emerging picture has shown that the struggle for psychological superiority is at least as decisive as military developments. Within this framework, it would not be surprising to witness new phases of the war in the coming period. War and diplomacy depend on the will and determination of the parties involved.

Iran’s internal and external calculations

The Tehran administration remains distant and cautious regarding the diplomatic process that US President Donald Trump is attempting to initiate. Of course, this is not a choice for Iran but a necessity. For memories are fresh, and whilst negotiations were ongoing, war was imposed upon Iran. Whilst Tehran emphasizes that there are no direct talks with the US, statements from military and political circles suggest that Washington is ‘negotiating with itself’. This rhetoric gives the impression that Iran is maintaining its distance from any potential negotiations in the public eye, whilst managing the process in a controlled manner on the ground and through diplomatic channels.

Another noteworthy aspect at this juncture is how the process is being debated within Iran’s domestic public sphere. For the military balance established on the ground and the diplomatic efforts entail not only intense debate regarding foreign policy but also regarding Iran’s domestic political future. Whilst the Tehran administration argues that it can bring the war to an end and safeguard its gains through “strategic hawkishness” and “principled radicalism and toughness”, discussions on “resistance and the republic” are taking place domestically.

In an assessment written to mark Nowruz, the Iranian reformist politician Abbas Ahundi describes the current situation as “resistance that could be declared a victory”, whilst also arguing that there must be a swift shift towards a political solution following the war. More importantly, he emphasises that Iran must declare its openness to peace from a position of strength. Ahundi states: “Iran can declare victory. For Iran, the measure of victory is being able to halt the world’s greatest military and nuclear power and its Zionist ally, and prevent them from achieving their objectives. Iran must declare to the United Nations Security Council that it is prepared to accept a lasting peace. There is no need to continue the war after victory. This does not mean a unilateral ceasefire; rather, it is a declaration of readiness for peace from a position of strength.”

However, what makes Ahundi’s analysis significant is not so much his proposals on foreign policy as his inward-looking critiques. Today, public opinion in Iran is not a one-dimensional phenomenon. Whilst on the one hand the rhetoric of ‘resistance’ and ‘national unity’ brought about by the war takes centre stage, on the other hand, particularly amongst the urban middle classes and reformist circles, there are assessments that this process has made the country’s internal structural problems more visible.

The war’s unifying element within the country must be reinforced through the narrative of “resistance and the republic”. Within this framework, a question increasingly voiced in Iran is: if there is a “success” on the battlefield, how will this success translate into political and social transformation at home? Views are increasingly being expressed that lasting security is possible not only through military capability but also through internal legitimacy and social cohesion. Consequently, the debate in Iran today centers not only on how the war will end but also on what kind of Iran will emerge after the war. This leads us directly to the public agenda, economic conditions and the mood of society.

The public mood: The streets, the silent majority and the core group

Following the attacks launched by the US on 28 February targeting Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, it was predicted that Iran would rapidly collapse from within and experience either ‘surrender’ or a ‘social explosion’. However, contrary to these predictions, the squares and streets of Iran were filled with anti-US and anti-Israeli crowds under the banner of “national defense”. Indeed, during the first 10 days of the war and in the absence of Khamenei, who held the position of supreme commander, the country was effectively governed by the squares. The crowds who took to the squares in a great outpouring of grief and mourning following Khamenei’s death gradually became politicised, and stances and demands regarding the ongoing war were brought to the fore. The influence of these expectations and demands that emerged in the squares cannot be overlooked in the selection of Mojtaba Khamenei as Iran’s new leader.

In Tehran, however, life under the shadow of war continues in a strange way. The streets, squares and public spaces have become a stage where visible and invisible reactions converge. War is not an element that brings life to a standstill; rather, it has become a reality interwoven into the fabric of daily life. For instance, whilst people are doing their Eid shopping in one street, a few streets away thousands of people are able to take part in a march despite the risk of being shot. Although this may appear contradictory from the outside, it is not a new situation for Iranian society. In the same city, on the same day, and even within the same hour, conflicting emotions can coexist side by side. The Jerusalem Day marches provided one of the most striking examples of this state of mind. The fact that thousands of people continued marching towards Revolution Avenue despite Israel’s announcement that it would target the march route demonstrated this society’s reflex in times of crisis. Rather than the crowd dispersing following the sound of an explosion and rising smoke, they instead rallied even more tightly around their slogans, revealing how the perception of an external threat can spur mobilization.

This scene brings to life the concept of ‘people’s leadership’ frequently cited in Iran. In times of crisis, particularly in the face of external threats, certain segments of society can organize rapidly and fill the squares. This crowd represents a structure that could be described as the “core base” of the Islamic Republic of Iran: ideologically strong and possessing a high capacity for mobilization. However, Iranian society is not limited to this. Alongside these visible crowds, there remains a broad “silent majority”. This segment is neither fully pro-regime nor actively opposed to it.

In times of crisis, such as war, they mostly prefer to stay at home and observe developments from a distance. Consequently, whilst one day the squares in Iran may be overflowing with people, the very next day a distinct silence may prevail in the same city. We could say that this fluctuation actually reflects the fragmented yet flexible nature of Iranian society. War does not eliminate these different social currents; on the contrary, it makes them more visible. On the one hand, there is a core group that is ideologically organized and takes to the streets; on the other, a broad segment of society striving to maintain its daily life and acting cautiously in the face of uncertainty.

The “core group” taking to the streets

However, it would be wrong to suggest that there is a sharp and absolute divide between these two groups. The ‘silent majority’ in Iran is not, in most cases, a passive bystander. Urban and university-educated groups, in particular, are taking a stand against the war in their own ways, even if they do not take to the streets directly. There is an unseen interaction between the “core group” taking to the streets and this broader segment that remains at home or expresses its reaction through different channels. Within the same war, there is a social cohesion comprising people speaking different languages but sharing similar concerns.

For this reason, interpreting social mobilization in Iran solely through the crowds gathering in the squares is incomplete. What matters is being able to perceive the multi-layered structure formed by the visible and the invisible, the loud and the silent reactions. Despite the pressure brought by the war and uncertainty, these two strands of society are not entirely alien to one another; on the contrary, they complement each other. Whilst the core group is visible on the ground, the silent majority is building a form of resistance in the background through cultural, productive and everyday life practices.

There are small acts of solidarity in neighborhoods and homes. Even quiet discussions in a café can emerge as an element that nourishes this invisible network. ‘Maintaining normal life’ can itself become a form of resistance. This invisible network strengthens the psychological and cultural resilience of society, filling the voids created by war and crises.

In this context, we see calls from Iranian academics and intellectuals such as Peyam Fazıl Nejad within Iran for “a new dialectic to be established between resistance and the republic”. Fazıl Nejad uses the following words on this subject: “This is not merely a reaction to external aggression, but also the practical realisation of the idea of the republic: that is, the genuine participation of everyone in the country’s destiny. In this context, national and religious resistance is not the antithesis of the republic, but its complement; nor is the republic an element that weakens resistance, but one that strengthens it.”

According to Fazıl Nejad, the social unity and cohesion emerging within the country in response to the war must be supported by the idea of the republic, and this social capital must be preserved. In other words, if the current resistance is used to weaken the republic, social capital erodes and the country becomes vulnerable to new threats. However, if the resistance is structured in a way that broadens public participation; that is, if power is built from the bottom up rather than from the top down, this new balance could become a genuine protective mechanism for Iran. Ultimately, what will be decisive for Iran is the extent to which it can integrate the various segments of society into the system.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

A

cross Latin America, a profound demographic transformation is underway. From bustling avenues in Santiago to upscale neighborhoods in Mexico City, everyday life is reflecting a generational shift: fewer children are being born, and traditional ideas about family are rapidly evolving.

According to the latest data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), fertility rates across the region have fallen to an average of 1.8 children per woman—well below the replacement level of 2.1 needed to maintain stable population levels. The drop marks a dramatic decline from the 1950s, when women in the region had an average of nearly six children.

Experts say the pace of change has been striking. “It even exceeded what the United Nations projected two decades ago,” said Simone Cecchini, a senior official at ECLAC, noting that Latin America’s demographic transition has outpaced that of many European countries.

A cultural shift away from traditional family roles

One of the most visible signs of this transformation is cultural. In major cities like Buenos Aires and Quito, there are now more dogs than children. Pet-friendly housing developments, once a niche offering, are becoming mainstream, reflecting changing priorities among younger generations.

Sociologist Martina Yopo Díaz, based in Chile, describes a growing tendency for younger people to place less emphasis on parenthood as a life goal. “Children, and reproduction in a broader sense, are occupying an increasingly marginal place in the life projects of younger generations,” she explains.

This cultural evolution is closely tied to broader changes in gender roles. Women today have greater access to education and employment opportunities, and motherhood is no longer seen as an inevitable or defining milestone.

Declining teenage pregnancies drive change

A key factor behind the falling birth rate is the sharp decline in teenage pregnancies. Across Latin America, governments have expanded access to contraception and promoted reproductive rights, leading to significant public health gains.

In Chile, for example, teenage pregnancy rates have dropped by nearly 80% over the past decade. Regionally, births among girls aged 15 to 19 fell from around 70 per 1,000 in 2014 to approximately 50 in 2024, according to ECLAC data.

While still higher than in most parts of the world, the downward trend reflects increased awareness, education, and autonomy among young women. Experts say this shift has played a major role in accelerating the region’s demographic transition.

Inequality shapes reproductive choices

Despite the overall decline, fertility trends vary significantly across social groups. In a region long marked by inequality, access to resources continues to shape reproductive decisions.

Lower-income women often have more children than they intend, partly due to limited access to education and family planning services. In contrast, higher-income women frequently have fewer children than they would like, constrained by career demands and the high cost of raising a family.

Education is a critical factor. In countries like Mexico and Brazil, rising levels of schooling among women have been closely linked to declining fertility rates. As women spend more years in education and enter the workforce in greater numbers, they tend to delay childbirth and have fewer children overall.

“Women’s participation in the labor force, gender inequality, and fertility form a very complex knot,” Cecchini said, highlighting the interplay between economic opportunity and family life.

I

n conflict zones, some of the most enduring damage is unseen.

Although Kashmir is widely discussed in terms of territorial contestation in conventional political analysis, there is surprisingly little focus on how sustained exposure to conflict, violence, and systemic uncertainty influences everyday experiences, social behavior, and expression. Even after the headlines fade, these effects continue to shape how people live, think, and relate to their surroundings.

Restricted access to data and the risks associated with open communication in a tightly controlled environment severely limit research. The conditions necessary for systematic study are difficult to secure; therefore, empirical research on vital issues in Kashmir remains scarce.

However, it is critical to understand Kashmiris as subjects with agency whose responses reflect adaptive and strategic navigation within a highly constrained and closely monitored environment.

In regions marked by sustained instability, the essential foundations of childhood development are destabilized. Children are deprived of emotional security, access to stable social networks, physical protection, and a sustained sense of safety. Political instability frequently results in prolonged school closures, sometimes lasting entire semesters. Consequently, students have sometimes been promoted en masse despite prolonged interruptions to classroom instruction. During these periods, online education has not consistently served as a viable alternative, largely due to recurring internet shutdowns.

Setbacks and long-term effects

Children who are socialized in contexts of chronic insecurity and surveillance experience learning setbacks and are at risk of enduring behavioral, emotional regulatory, social trust, and political consciousness effects as adults. Hypervigilance and hypersensitivity often develop from an early age. In such conditions, children may remain in a persistent state of alertness or “fight mode,” where anger, irritability, and aggression mask underlying feelings of sadness and social isolation.

For many, silence is internalized early on, leading to self-censorship. Children observe and learn which questions lead to tension, which topics are avoided in gatherings, and which words are never spoken aloud.

This internalization of restraint develops into a broader psychological condition resembling learned helplessness with features of duality. Repeated exposure to uncontrollable loss, surveillance, or instability teaches individuals that their actions rarely alter outcomes. Taking action becomes risky, even futile. In such contexts, avoiding harm, adapting, not drawing attention, and survival become ways of life.

A scarcity mindset

Over the course of many decades of uncertainty and disruption, many Kashmiri households developed what psychologists describe as a scarcity mindset: A survival-oriented approach to resources shaped by prolonged instability. This mindset often manifests in everyday practices, such as stocking essential items for extended periods. In many Kashmiri households, for example, staple foods like rice are purchased in large quantities and stored for years as a rational adaptation to chronic uncertainty.

This mindset also extends into other areas of personal and social life. For example, communal solidarity in Kashmir is most visibly activated during moments of loss. Entire neighborhoods come together in times of grief. However, the same intensity of togetherness is largely absent during moments of joy or personal success. Successes tend to be shared quietly and are often prefaced with accounts of hardship, health concerns, or struggles that bear little direct relation to the joy being expressed.

Overt expression of joy seems discordant in contexts where loss is common. Thus, restraint and self-regulation become adaptive mechanisms of collective survival. This is one of the many unspoken social understandings: Visibility is risky.

Constant negotiation has produced a form of social “conflict correctness,” in which maintaining harmony and avoiding discomfort take precedence over direct expression.

The paradox of hospitality and hunger

Duality is deeply ingrained in Kashmiri social life. People often communicate guardedly, carefully calibrating what they say, to whom, and in what setting. Consequently, it can be challenging to discern sincerity from strategic restraint. However, it is important to understand that this is not due to an absence of honesty; caution is ingrained in Kashmiri society as a survival mechanism. This pattern can be seen extending into intimate spaces, such as the dinner table, if studied.

Kashmiri culture places immense value on hospitality. Yet, accepting food, expressing hunger, or stating personal preferences is often deferred or declined unless repeatedly insisted upon and often accompanied by emotional appeals or promises. If not confronted or engaged, this adaptive caution runs the risk of becoming a permanent psychological trait over the years.

Parents who are raising children while experiencing chronic stress often do so from a place of unresolved fear and grief. In households where loss or disappearance has altered family structures, caregiving roles are often reorganized. Widows and half-widows, in particular, take on a disproportionate amount of emotional and social responsibilities. This places them at the center of the intergenerational transmission of fear, resilience, and restraint.

For young people already living in a state of learned helplessness, the growing infiltration of drugs into Kashmiri society now fills the void left by the absence of meaningful work. Substance use often functions as a form of escapism. Interestingly, this coincides with agendas of weakening collective resistance and social cohesion.

Recent developments in world politics mark a crucial turning point regarding the establishment of a global political system based on international law. Following World War II, unprecedented initiatives were undertaken to establish a common legal framework at the global level under the United Nations and at the regional level under the European Union. With the aim of preserving global peace, states came together and declared their will for law, not power, to be the determining factor in international relations and they established institutional mechanisms to ensure this.

The common legal framework established under the European Union umbrella and continuously developed since then has indeed been successful in fostering peace among its members. EU countries, which were in a constant state of tension, conflict, and war until the mid-20th century, have not been at war with each other for 80 years, and there is no risk of armed conflict between them. After initially implementing economic integration, member states gradually extended it to the political sphere and security policies. They are also working to establish a common stance toward the outside world.

However, cooperation initiatives on maintaining peace at the UN level have not been as successful as those of the EU. During the post-World War II period, also known as the UN System, many wars involving global and regional actors occurred, notably in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and Iraq. However, significant steps were also taken toward the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the development of international law. Agreements such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) were signed to limit and reduce nuclear weapons, and environmental protection agreements such as the Paris Climate Agreement were established. Global judicial institutions such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) were also formed.

During this period, the West—primarily the United States—was the decisive actor in the global political system. Western countries promoted the image that they upheld international law and defended values such as democracy and liberalism. They argued that an increase in democratic countries with liberal values would make the world more peaceful. They also propagated the idea that international law should be the main element in interstate relations, even though they often violated it themselves. Western academics even proposed the Democratic Peace Theory, which claims that democratic countries pursue more peaceful foreign policies and find it more difficult to decide to go to war.

The West’s hardening face

At this point, however, it is clear that the U.S. no longer values or promotes international law, human rights, liberalism, or democracy. The U.S. increases its military spending significantly every year, pressures other NATO countries to do the same, threatens other countries with military force, and wants to forcibly take Greenland from Denmark, a NATO ally. The U.S. also says it wants to see Canada, another NATO member, as the 51st American state. The U.S. threatens its allies with economic sanctions, shoots down ships in the Caribbean on the grounds that they are carrying drugs, carries out summary executions, threatens to attack Venezuela, and amasses its navy off the country’s coast to attempt to seize its oil reserves.

The U.S. also unilaterally withdraws from agreements, such as the one with Iran, and imposes sanctions that would collapse the country’s economy. The U.S. supports Israel’s war of aggression, bombs Iran’s nuclear facilities, enables Israel’s genocide against the people of Gaza by supplying weapons and providing economic and diplomatic support, and withdraws from international institutions, such as UNESCO and the World Health Organization, and withdraws from international agreements such as the Paris Climate Agreement. President Trump talks about bringing peace to Gaza and Ukraine, but what he presents as peace is nothing more than surrender on the terms imposed by powerful aggressors.

These examples clearly demonstrate the U.S.’s understanding of peace and the type of global political system it desires: One in which the powerful impose their terms on the weak and get what they want. This is not a new phenomenon; international relations have always been shaped by power. Following the catastrophic events of World War II, including the use of nuclear weapons and the loss of approximately 80 million lives, Western countries created the illusion that diplomacy and dialogue would be fundamental to international relations. They believed that problems would be solved through peaceful means rather than force and that the use of military force would only be legitimate in cases of self-defense and with a UN Security Council resolution.

During this period, centered around the UN, the concepts of international law, human rights, democracy, and liberalism were used as tools to intervene in other countries. American interventions in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Chile, Cuba, Panama, Nicaragua, and many other countries were justified by the stated objectives of bringing democracy, protecting human rights, preventing violations of international law, and intervening against terrorism.

These justifications, used by Western countries in particular to mask their military, economic, and diplomatic interventions and pressures, have given rise to a substantial body of literature in International Relations centered on these concepts. One could argue that this literature has convinced some audiences that international relations are shaped by law and that Western countries base their foreign policies on democracy, human rights, and liberal values.

However, Israel’s two-year genocide in Gaza, supported by the U.S. and other Western countries, coupled with this aggressive alliance’s simultaneous attacks on Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iran, as well as the Zionists’ involvement in the attack on Qatar, signaled to many that the world had entered a new era.

Those awoken from the illusion and those still unawaken

The level of Zionist aggression, coupled with Russia’s attacks on Ukraine and the U.S.’s aggressive policies targeting countries such as Venezuela and Iran during the same period, raises the question of whether we have reached the end of an era in which Western countries discussed and propagated international law, human rights, and democratic values. Additionally, the United States’ increasingly protectionist economic policies, threats of sanctions against all countries (including allies), and similar protectionist tendencies among European countries raise questions about the future of the liberal economic order the West has promoted for years.

The question arises as to whether the world is returning to the era before the discourse of international law alongside this transformation in the West. Along with this question, the illusion of “order” created by Western countries around international law and the aforementioned values is being questioned. Some sectors of society are waking up to this illusion. For example, Middle Eastern countries have realized that even being part of the American alliance system cannot protect them from Zionist aggression. Only time will tell if this realization will prompt them to seek an alternative order or cause them to align more closely with the U.S. to avoid facing the same fate as Qatar. However, their insufficient military capacity leaves them vulnerable to greater pressure and influence from the Israel-U.S. Zionist alliance.

Although European countries played a significant role in creating the illusion of values such as international law and human rights, they, too, have been forced to abandon this illusion, particularly in light of the events surrounding the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is reminiscent of its pre-international law practices. Meanwhile, U.S. President Trump attempted to hand Ukraine over to Moscow under the guise of a peace plan. These events have caused Germany and some other European countries, which neglected their military strength for a long time while trusting Washington, to turn to building their own military power.

The world is reverting to a pre-international law era in which countries with strong militaries invade other countries, threaten invasion, and commit genocide in occupied territories without presenting valid justifications. While this reality is clear, it is not consistent with a realistic approach to continue to believe in actors such as the United States, which have built an “illusion of order around the concepts of international law and human rights” over the past 80 years.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

N

asry Asfura, the conservative candidate backed by U.S. President Donald Trump, has been declared the winner of Honduras’ presidential election, following weeks of delays, technical failures and allegations of fraud surrounding the November 30 vote.

The National Electoral Council (CNE) announced Wednesday that Asfura secured 40.3% of the vote, narrowly defeating center-right Liberal Party candidate Salvador Nasralla, who received 39.5%. The ruling LIBRE party’s candidate, Rixi Moncada, finished a distant third.

Asfura is set to assume office on January 27, serving a 2026–2030 term.

Delays, manual count and protests

The vote count was marred by widespread technical problems that forced authorities to manually count around 15% of tally sheets, representing hundreds of thousands of ballots. The prolonged process sparked political unrest, with the ruling LIBRE party calling for protests it described as opposition to an “electoral coup.”

Demonstrations at times blocked election officials from accessing vote storage facilities, further delaying the count. The final results were approved by two electoral council members and one deputy, while a third council member, Marlon Ochoa, was absent during the announcement.

Nasralla rejected the declaration of results, claiming valid ballots were excluded from the final tally. While urging supporters to remain peaceful, he described the outcome as illegitimate.

“I will not accept a result based on omissions,” Nasralla said, calling the outcome “the saddest Christmas for the Honduran people.” This marks his third unsuccessful bid for the presidency.

Congress President Luis Redondo, a member of the ruling LIBRE party, also rejected the results, calling them “outside the law” and “without value.”

Trump’s role

Trump openly endorsed Asfura before the election, calling him the “only real friend of freedom in Honduras” and warning of consequences if preliminary results were altered. He also threatened to cut U.S. financial support to Honduras if Asfura lost and pardoned former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández, a member of Asfura’s party who had been imprisoned in the U.S. on drug trafficking charges.

Opposition figures accused Trump of election interference, arguing his last-minute involvement influenced the outcome.

Following the announcement, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio congratulated Asfura and urged all parties to accept the results to ensure a peaceful transition. The Organization of American States (OAS) said it would issue a report on the election, noting unresolved issues in the vote count.

Asfura, 67, is a former mayor of Tegucigalpa and a businessman of Palestinian descent. Known by the nickname “Papi, at your service,” he built his reputation on infrastructure projects and a low-profile governing style.

He campaigned on a pro-business platform, emphasizing job creation, education and security, and has signaled he may reconsider Honduras’ diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.

Asfura is currently under investigation for alleged corruption linked to his tenure as mayor, charges he denies, calling them politically motivated.

“People don’t care about ideology,” Asfura said during the campaign. “They want solutions.”

(Source: Reuters)

T

he year 2025 ranked among the warmest on record globally, despite a shift toward neutral or weak La Niña conditions that typically moderate global temperatures, according to the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the EU’s Copernicus Climate Change Service.

Global temperatures in 2025 were recorded as the second- or third-warmest ever, following the record-setting heat of 2024. Scientists said the trend underscores the growing dominance of human-caused climate change driven by greenhouse gas emissions, with natural cooling cycles no longer sufficient to offset rising baseline temperatures.

The WMO warned that temperatures over the next five years are likely to remain at or near record levels. Its latest outlook shows an 80% chance that at least one year will surpass the current warmest year on record and a 70% chance that the five-year average will temporarily exceed 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.

Deadly summer heatwaves

Extreme heat during the summer of 2025 caused widespread health impacts across multiple regions, with July ranking as the third-warmest month on record globally.

Europe experienced its fourth-warmest summer, with particularly intense heat in western and southern regions. Land surface temperature anomalies reached up to 6°C above average in parts of northeastern Spain, southwestern France, the Balkans and Fennoscandia.

The UK recorded its hottest June on record in England and the second-warmest nationwide since records began in 1884, while the Netherlands experienced its second-hottest June since 1901. Spain endured its most intense heatwave on record in August, according to national meteorological authorities.

Scandinavian countries including Finland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway also saw prolonged heatwaves in July.

A study by Imperial College London and the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine estimated approximately 24,400 heat-related deaths across 854 European cities between June and August. About 68% of those deaths were attributed to climate change, with older populations particularly vulnerable.

Extreme heat across Asia and North America

Large parts of Asia were affected by extreme heat in 2025. Japan recorded one of its hottest Junes since 1898, while South Korea reported record daily temperature averages in late June.

India issued red heat alerts in New Delhi amid extended heat conditions, while temperatures in parts of Pakistan’s Punjab province reached around 50°C. Iran temporarily closed public institutions in 18 provinces to manage soaring energy demand driven by widespread cooling use.

In North America, the US experienced severe heatwaves, including a major June heat dome that exposed more than 255 million people to extreme temperatures. Readings frequently exceeded 38°C across large portions of the country.

The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention said extreme heat remained the leading weather-related cause of death, with preliminary 2025 data confirming at least 150 heat-related fatalities nationwide.

Droughts and water stress intensify

Extreme heat also intensified drought conditions in many regions by accelerating evaporation rates. Iran faced one of its most severe water crises on record, with Lake Urmia shrinking dramatically and dam levels in major cities falling to critically low levels.

Drought conditions also affected Syria, parts of Africa and South Korea, where the city of Gangneung was declared a disaster zone following record-low rainfall.

The WMO warned that global water cycles are becoming increasingly erratic, marked by sharp swings between floods and droughts. UN Water estimates that 3.6 billion people currently face water shortages for at least one month each year, a figure projected to exceed 5 billion by 2050.

Events in 2025 highlighted the accelerating risks posed by climate change, as heatwaves, droughts and related crises grow more frequent, more severe and more disruptive worldwide.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

O

ne common feature of European populist parties has been their anti-establishment and alternative claims. They desired radical changes, such as opposition to the EU or NATO, or opposition to the common currency. However, over time, they have become more compatible with both global power and national hierarchies. They have not shied away from making concessions in order to realise their policies through power rather than by remaining in opposition. One of the most important reasons for the existence of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party was the 2015 refugee influx and Merkel’s acceptance of it with her ‘we can do it’ motto.

What popularised the AfD, however, were its ‘remigration’ policies based on opposition to refugees. When it was founded in 2013, it was a party of anti-EU conservative liberal professors and senior executives, feeding on elitist reactions rather than being a people’s party.

The 2015 refugee influx, accompanied by Islamophobic connotations and the fears it brought, helped the AfD movement gain traction within society, with nationalist radicals within the party coming to the fore. When the riots and assaults during New Year’s celebrations in Cologne at the end of 2015 were blamed on North Africans, the AfD’s rhetoric and fears had already found their social counterpart.

A party looking to the future

At the beginning of 2015, despite losing popularity after an internal power struggle, the party’s support surged from 3% to over 10% following the refugee influx and Merkel’s famous ‘We can do it’ statement. However, the party still lacked a clearly defined programme. The party, which had undergone a change in leadership, saw different factions rallying behind different names. It was filled with small groups of leaders comprising libertarians, conservatives and radical nationalists.

Populist parties such as the AfD position themselves not as nationalist parties looking to the past, but rather as parties focused on the future. Therefore, instead of reckoning with the past, they take on the task of cleansing the future. The AfD speaks not of a thousand years of history, but of a thousand years of hope. A protectionism based on the future rather than on past superiority distances populist parties from ‘crime’. Ultimately, there is no place for refugees in their clean future. In this context, they consider themselves protective rather than exclusionary.

Rather than ridding themselves of the dregs of the past, they are sanitising the future. Ultimately, this kind of pacifist attitude also protects populist parties from encountering criminal law. On the other hand, Höcke, one of the party’s radicals, makes subtextual references to the ‘thousand-year Reich’ when talking about the future, which actually shows that the message is intended to hit home. Furthermore, the AfD’s use of the term ‘old parties’ when referring to parties outside its own ranks can also be considered part of its future-oriented politics.

When it was first established, the AfD relied on conservative upper-middle-class reactions based on opposition to the single currency and the EU, while also managing to garner the reactions of the lower classes during the 2015 refugee wave. Today, however, it can easily abandon or postpone its policy of reducing the number of refugees and foreigners in order to share power. Moreover, it does not include the supremacy of the dominant culture, with its nationalist connotations, in its programme.

The understanding of dominant culture based on establishing a cultural hierarchy has been replaced by a more pacifist claim to preserve culture. In this sense, it is increasingly taking the place of conservative right-wing parties. The political stance defending German dominant culture (leitkultur) and based on opposition to refugees made the AfD the leading party in the last decade but failed to bring it into power. The AfD parliamentary group has seen that the path to sharing power lies in compromising on dominant culture and opposition to refugees and has therefore not hesitated to change its political stance.

The desire for power and east Germany

Across Europe, there is a growing tendency for populist parties to seek power through Melonization. Pragmatic populism increases its concessions on core policies as it approaches power. One of the common characteristics of European populist parties is their pragmatism regarding power. Populist parties that have managed to transform their anti-Semitism into Islamophobia, which is less harmful to them and even gains them sympathy, and their belief in the superiority of their own nation into claims that preserve their political identity, have few principles they will not abandon on the path to power. The development of the AfD is somewhat different. Other populist parties in Europe have come to power with radical rhetoric and gradually abandoned it on their path to power.

The AfD, on the other hand, presented itself with liberal and conservative rhetoric such as opposition to the euro and reached around 5 per cent, found its footing with radical rhetoric such as opposition to refugees and Islam, but finally surpassed 20 per cent with claims of preserving the dominant culture and reverse migration, softening its exclusionary rhetoric in order to share power. Its emergence as the leading party with around 25 per cent in the latest opinion polls has triggered the AfD’s desire for power, and the harshness of its rhetoric has softened. On the other hand, the Christian Democrats have directed their opposition particularly towards Chancellor Merz in order to force him into a coalition with them.

The conservative right, based on Christian Democrats, has long sought to counter populist parties by adopting their slogans, thereby further legitimising parties such as the AfD within the political spectrum. The opposition to power-sharing with populist parties, constructed like a ‘firewall’ in German politics, is losing its meaning as the AfD grows. The fact that the coalition does not allow any party to implement only its own policies also leads to populist parties accusing conservatives of not keeping their word. Parties that consider themselves large enough to share power, such as the AfD, are particularly putting pressure on conservative parties and forcing them into coalition with themselves.

Reactions rather than political concepts

They readily soften their political claims in order to overcome the political firewall that excludes them. It still seems sociologically impossible for parties like the AfD, which are based on reactions rather than political concepts, to have the majority needed to govern the country alone. Therefore, they must enter into a coalition and share power. Their quick abandonment of the political claims reflected in their slogans is actually partly due to their sociological limitations.

The AfD draws a large portion of its social support from East Germany. In a sense, East German opposition to reunification is concentrated in the AfD. East Germans perceive reunification as an unequal relationship and believe they have no influence in German politics. Although the proportion of foreigners in their cities is not high, their location on the front lines of the refugee influx fuels xenophobia. They are also not in line with the federal government’s anti-Russian policies. Russia, with whom they have collaborated for many years, is not an enemy in the eyes of East Germans.

On the other hand, while struggling with economic backwardness, they also find the environmental and green policies of the West German welfare state unnecessary. For this reason, the party they are furthest from is the Greens. However, apart from the CDU, the other traditional parties already have a significant share of the vote. Apart from the CDU, they have no serious political rival other than Sahra Wagenknecht’s Union (BSW), which has culturally right-wing and economically left-wing policies.

Their belief that East Germany’s backwardness and political problems can only be solved with strong leadership strengthens their inclination towards the AfD. On the other hand, the migration of qualified and young people from East Germany due to underdevelopment, while older and less educated people remain behind, also increases the tendency towards parties such as the AfD. Like other populist parties, the AfD also relies heavily on the theme that the people have been abandoned by the elite and those in power.

A

t a cost of $500 billion, the city of NEOM lies at the heart of Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman’s (MbS) initiative to modernize and reform Saudi Arabia. The project, which covers an area of 26,000 square kilometers, is being developed in Tabuk, in northwestern Saudi Arabia, and will extend to the borders of Jordan and Egypt. According to some, NEOM will become Saudi Arabia’s “Dubai” and capture the appeal that regional rivals have gained from their cities. At the core of the project is The Line, a 170-kilometer-long, car-free, vertical-axis city designed to have zero carbon emissions. Sub-projects such as the Trojena ski resort, the Oxagon industrial city, and the Sindalah island complex will also contribute to NEOM’s multi-layered architecture. However, it is evident that NEOM has become as much of a problem as it is a project.

Recent developments concerning the NEOM project that have come to public attention indicate that the project is evolving into more than just a technical construction process; it is also at the center of economic and political pressures. Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) commissioning international consulting firms to conduct feasibility studies on The Line project reveals that the administration has its doubts about the project’s feasibility. Reports that the NEOM administration plans to lay off more than a thousand employees and relocate some of them to Riyadh during the same period suggest an administrative restructuring is underway.

Although NEOM was initially conceived as an economic development initiative, it was marketed as a symbol of Saudi Arabia’s modernization aspirations due to its central role in the 2030 Vision. However, recent developments centered on NEOM and other mega-giga projects show that this vision has not been realized at the same pace on the ground. The project is subject to a process shaped by technical limitations, financial pressures, and geopolitical tensions. Consequently, contrary to the grand narrative at its inception, NEOM’s current situation has become a multidimensional picture of fragility.

NEOM’s internal vulnerabilities

The loss of momentum in NEOM’s ongoing construction process is due to structural problems inherent to the project itself. Building a city of this scale in a desert climate like Saudi Arabia’s requires capabilities, technologies, and financing that go beyond traditional engineering practices. High temperatures, intense dust erosion, water scarcity, and topographical challenges have made adhering to the projected timeline difficult. In this context, the length of the 170-kilometer Line project and its planned population capacity, as initially announced, show a significant mismatch with the progress achieved on the ground. Building infrastructure networks suitable for desert conditions, integrating power lines, and managing water resources sustainably have posed serious technical challenges that have not yet been fully resolved.

The financial aspect of NEOM’s vulnerabilities exacerbates the situation. The Public Investment Fund’s (PIF) announcement of an estimated $8 billion loss by the end of 2024 suggests that financing sources are limited. A lack of coordination at the management level, frequent changes in leadership positions, and slow decision-making processes are weakening the project institutionally. Progress continues partially in some sub-regions, such as Sindalah, but there are significant deviations from the planned schedule. As this table shows, NEOM’s most fundamental problems stem from internal fragilities rather than external geopolitical pressures.

The pressure of geopolitical tensions

The main tensions shaping Saudi Arabia’s neighborhood today include the Houthi crisis in Yemen, attacks on ships and tankers in the Red Sea, the conflict in Gaza prior to the ceasefire, rising regional tensions, ongoing competition with Iran, and oil price volatility. Since October 2023, the Houthis’ attacks on ships and tankers linked to Israel in the Red Sea have prompted Saudi Arabia to decide to build an alternative land trade corridor to reduce its dependence on the Red Sea route. However, this preference for a circumventing route could disadvantage NEOM’s logistics strategy in terms of time and cost.

Due to its reliance on the Red Sea coast and imported materials, NEOM is experiencing longer shipping routes, higher insurance costs, and delayed deliveries of materials and equipment due to Houthi attacks. This has been observed to slow down the pace of construction. To reduce its dependence on the Red Sea, Riyadh is attempting to establish a land trade corridor, which could impose additional time and production cost burdens on the project and the Saudi budget.

The ongoing conflict in Gaza and growing security concerns are heightening caution among foreign investors, who are adopting a wait-and-see approach that could disrupt project financing. Recent developments, such as a strategic review of the Line project and a new Trojena project tender, indicate that plans are being revised against this backdrop. Therefore, internal technical and financial constraints remain decisive for NEOM, while geopolitical tensions form the external framework that narrows these constraints.

Concrete manifestations of the slowdown

Recent developments reveal that internal fragilities in NEOM are exacerbated by regional geopolitical pressures. The Line, the project’s symbolic core, has officially been placed under strategic review. This indicates that timetables, phases, and targets may be redefined. Similarly, the cancellation and reopening of the main tender processes for the Trojena ski resort suggest that technical and financial calculations have fallen behind initial plans. Another factor contributing to the international visibility of this situation is the assessment by Moody’s. The international credit rating agency has described the progress of Saudi Arabia’s megaprojects as “uneven,” a finding closely monitored by investment circles.

During the same period, attacks carried out by the Houthis in the Red Sea have extended maritime shipping routes, increased insurance premiums for companies, and made delivery times unpredictable. The resulting slowdown in the flow of materials and equipment critical to NEOM’s construction process has directly affected the pace of construction. Additionally, information disclosed to the public about the project’s internal expenditure items has raised questions about resource prioritization. These developments demonstrate that NEOM’s slowdown is not due to one factor, but rather, a combination of internal technical and financial constraints and geopolitical pressures that create a mutually reinforcing cycle. The overall picture shows that the project is progressing in a complex arena, constrained by economic and geopolitical conditions.

W

hat if the solutions to humanity’s greatest challenges — from the climate crisis to cycles of violence and displacement — begin with something profoundly personal: the awakening of each individual’s inner sovereignty?

Across cultures, peoples who have faced genocide or dispossession continue to demonstrate ways of thriving that arise from deep spiritual grounding. Their resilience points toward a form of governance not built solely on power, but on relationship — with land, each other, and the wider universe.

Governance and belonging

Since the beginning of human history, societies have asked: How do we organize ourselves so that everyone can flourish? Who gets to make decisions, and how do we define our place within the vast cosmos?

In Australia, these questions echo through the Uluru Statement from the Heart, which calls for Voice, Treaty, and Truth — an enduring expression of Indigenous leadership in shaping the nation’s moral future. The statement’s strength comes not from political systems alone, but from a worldview that understands law as lore — the sacred pattern connecting people, ancestors, land, and stars.

Growing up in Cloncurry on Kalkadunga country in the 1970s, I heard many Indigenous languages spoken and saw two very different worlds side by side. The colonizing white presence was visible everywhere, yet it could not overpower the quiet, unbroken sovereignty of Country itself. Across more than 500 languages, ancestral wisdom continues to live in the waters, skies, and landscapes of the continent.

Indigenous governance, led equally by women and men, has long operated through balance, consensus, and reciprocity — systems that stand in contrast to patriarchal, capitalist models that separate power from care. The continuing call for Indigenous self-governance in Australia reveals how colonial structures still struggle to understand this deeper order.

Truth, healing, and grassroots renewal

The defeat of the 2023 Indigenous Voice referendum in Australia, driven by fear and misinformation, was a blow to many. Yet it also catalyzed a quiet transformation. Across the country, individuals began confronting their personal complicity in the colonization of stolen lands. Speaking these truths aloud — in families, communities, and local gatherings — has become its own form of healing.

This movement, emerging from within rather than imposed from above, reflects a shift from external authority toward inner responsibility. It is an expression of the same principle that sustains Indigenous cultures: sovereignty begins within and radiates outward into collective life.

Parallel lessons from Tibet

A similar story unfolds in Tibet, where cultural genocide under Chinese occupation continues. Ancient monasteries and homes have been destroyed, and Tibetan children are removed from their families and language. Yet the Tibetan people persist through the strength of their inner life.

The Dalai Lama’s Middle Way proposal offers a model for shared governance grounded in compassion and cultural autonomy. It envisions a political future where Tibetans control their spiritual and environmental well-being — echoing Indigenous Australian calls for self-determination and guardianship of land.

In exile, Tibetan communities maintain extraordinarily low rates of mental illness and social breakdown, despite displacement. Their resilience springs from practices that cultivate inner sovereignty — meditation, ethical conduct, and compassion for all beings. This same current of love and non-violence runs through Indigenous Australian traditions, where the earth is mother and relationship itself is sacred.

L

eftwing independent Catherine Connolly has won Ireland’s presidential election by a decisive landslide, securing 63% of first-preference votes in a result that stunned the political establishment and delivered a major symbolic blow to the ruling coalition.

The 68-year-old Galway TD and long-time social justice campaigner will become the Republic’s 10th head of state, succeeding Michael D Higgins after his 14-year tenure.

Speaking at Dublin Castle on Saturday night after being officially declared president-elect, Connolly pledged to be “a president for all”, vowing to defend Irish neutrality, champion climate justice and give a platform to the marginalized.

“I will be a voice for peace, a voice that builds on our policy of neutrality, a voice that articulates the existential threat posed by climate change,” she said, switching between Irish and English. “Together, we can shape a new republic that values everybody and champions diversity.”

A shock for the political mainstream

Connolly secured 914,143 of 1,442,698 valid votes, far ahead of Fine Gael’s Heather Humphreys, who received 424,987 (29%). Fianna Fáil’s candidate, Jim Gavin – who had withdrawn following a financial scandal but remained on the ballot – won 103,568 votes (7%).

Despite the commanding win, turnout fell to 46%, unusually low for a presidential election, and more than 213,000 ballots were spoiled or invalid, reflecting frustration with the lack of choice and the perception of a two-horse race.

Though the presidency is largely ceremonial, Connolly’s victory is widely interpreted as a rebuke to the two big centrist parties that have dominated Irish politics for a century.

Her candidacy surged on the back of anger over Ireland’s housing and cost-of-living crises, missteps by government strategists, unity among leftwing parties, a viral, youth-driven online campaign.

Sinn Féin, Labour, the Social Democrats and People Before Profit all backed Connolly once her momentum became clear, giving her a rare pan-left coalition of support.

A more outspoken presidency ahead?

Connolly has long been a critic of western foreign policy and has accused the U.S. and U.K. of enabling genocide in Gaza. Her victory raises questions about how far she will test the traditionally soft-spoken boundaries of the presidency.

Political analysts say friction with the government is likely if she uses the Áras as a platform for moral advocacy in the tradition of Mary Robinson and Michael D Higgins—but with a more radical tone.

For her supporters, Connolly embodies a generational shift and a rejection of politics-as-usual.

She gained traction with younger voters through podcasts, cultural endorsements and viral videos—including a lighthearted football keepy-uppy clip that became a campaign trademark. She was publicly supported by musicians and artists such as Kneecap and The Mary Wallopers.

Outgoing president Higgins congratulated her in a statement, saying the office would offer “full support” as she prepares for her inauguration next month.

Connolly will take office amid high expectations from Ireland’s left — and deep unease within government ranks — setting the stage for a presidency unlike any other in recent decades.

(Source: The Guardian)

P

eru’s political turmoil deepened early Friday as Congress voted to remove President Dina Boluarte from office, citing her failure to curb an escalating wave of violent crime that has gripped the nation. Lawmakers swiftly installed José Jerí, the 38-year-old president of Congress, as interim leader — the country’s sixth president in less than a decade.

The dramatic vote unfolded shortly after midnight, marking the culmination of weeks of mounting frustration over the government’s inability to stem rampant violence and organized crime.

In a 130-member unicameral Congress, 124 lawmakers backed Boluarte’s removal. None opposed the motion — a rare display of unity among Peru’s often-fractured political factions.

Lawmakers had convened an emergency debate late Thursday after approving four impeachment motions against the embattled leader. They invited Boluarte to appear before them to defend her record, but when she failed to attend, the vote to oust her proceeded immediately.

The move came just hours after a shooting at a concert in Lima injured five people, further inflaming public outrage over unchecked crime across the country.

A presidency brought down by violence and distrust

Boluarte, Peru’s first female president, had taken office in December 2022 following the ouster of leftist President Pedro Castillo, who attempted to dissolve Congress and rule by decree. As Castillo’s former vice president, Boluarte was elevated to complete his term, promising stability and reform.

But her nearly three years in office were marked by deep political division, corruption scandals, and a surge in criminal violence that has left tens of thousands of Peruvians feeling unsafe.

Within the first three months of her presidency, Peru saw more than 500 protests demanding her resignation. Analysts say her government’s credibility steadily eroded as crime worsened and economic inequality persisted.

Official figures released in August revealed the scale of the crisis: between January and mid-August 2025, at least 6,041 people were killed — the highest death toll for that period since 2017. Meanwhile, reports of extortion and organized crime have soared, with nearly 16,000 extortion complaints filed between January and July, a 28% increase compared to the previous year.

In a televised address on Wednesday, Boluarte partly blamed the deteriorating security situation on illegal immigration, claiming foreign criminal networks had taken root in Peru.

“This crime has been brewing for decades and has been strengthened by illegal immigration,” Boluarte said during a military ceremony. “Past administrations opened our borders and allowed criminals to enter without restriction.”

Her remarks drew sharp criticism from human rights groups, who accused her of scapegoating migrants while failing to present an effective national security plan.

Midnight vote, immediate transition

The impeachment session — Peru’s ninth attempt to unseat Boluarte since she took office — was the only one to succeed. The overwhelming vote reflected rare bipartisan agreement that her administration had lost control of the streets.

Moments after the result was announced, lawmakers erupted in cheers and began singing the national anthem. By dawn, José Jerí, who had presided over Congress, was sworn in as interim president in a televised ceremony.

Jerí pledged to uphold Peru’s constitution and oversee a peaceful transition of power ahead of elections scheduled for April 2026.

“I will defend the sovereignty of our nation and ensure that power is handed over to the democratically elected president next year,” Jerí said, moments after receiving the presidential sash.

During a brief speech broadcast just before Jerí’s swearing-in, Boluarte defended her record, highlighting social and economic initiatives launched under her leadership.

“I have not thought of myself, but rather of Peruvians,” she said, before the live feed abruptly cut to the inauguration of her successor.

A cycle of political instability

Boluarte’s ouster adds another chapter to Peru’s long-running cycle of political instability, where nearly every elected president in the past two decades has faced impeachment, resignation, or imprisonment.

Since 2016, the country has seen a rapid succession of leaders — Pedro Pablo Kuczynski, Martín Vizcarra, Manuel Merino, Francisco Sagasti, Pedro Castillo, and Dina Boluarte — none able to complete a full five-year term.

Boluarte’s downfall, however, underscores a particularly acute crisis: the convergence of political dysfunction and surging violent crime. Analysts say Peru’s Congress — which enjoys little more public trust than the presidency — is seeking to channel public anger at rising insecurity toward restoring its own legitimacy.

“This is less about reform and more about survival,” said Lima-based political analyst María del Carmen Rivas. “Peru’s political class has lost the confidence of the people. Removing Boluarte may calm the streets for a moment, but it won’t fix the deeper problems.”

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ocal authorities in Gaza have accused Israel of stealing organs from the bodies of Palestinians, adding to the misery of Palestinians who are facing genocide there. In a strongly worded statement, the government media office in Gaza asserted that the examination of bodies revealed significant changes, pointing to the alleged theft of vital organs.

The statement particularly criticized what it deemed “the silent position of international organizations operating in Gaza,” including the International Committee of the Red Cross, regarding this alleged crime committed by the Israeli occupation.

The accusations come as Israel released the bodies of dozens of Palestinians killed during its ground operation. The bodies were received by the Palestinian Health Ministry in Gaza through the Kerem Shalom border crossing. According to Marwan Al Hams, the director of Mohammed Yousef El Najar Hospital in Rafah city, the bodies arrived in various conditions—some intact, others in pieces, and some decomposed.

The Gaza-based government media office claimed that the Israeli army handed over bodies without specifying from where they were seized. The statement further alleged that Israel repeated such acts during the ongoing genocide, even exhuming bodies from graveyards.

International outcry and calls for investigation

The allegations of organ theft have triggered international outcry, with human rights organizations and activists demanding a thorough investigation into the matter. The Euro-Med Monitor, a human rights group, had previously accused Israel of stealing bodies from Gaza’s medical facilities for potential illegal organ harvesting.

In a report released earlier, the Euro-Med Monitor stated that the Israeli army took bodies from medical complexes in the northern Gaza Strip, including the Al-Shifa Medical Complex and the Indonesian Hospital. The report claimed that Gaza’s medical experts found evidence suggesting the absence of organs, including corneas, in bodies returned to their families.

The Geneva-based organization also accused Israel of keeping the bodies in freezing temperatures, potentially to conceal organ theft. Israel has a history of holding Palestinian bodies, with some kept in morgues, a secret facility near the Jordanian border, and others still missing and unidentified.

The health ministry in Gaza has revealed that scores of bodies of unidentified Palestinians were buried in mass graves multiple times throughout Israel’s indiscriminate war on Gaza. In an effort to aid future identifications, Salama Maarouf, head of the government’s press office, stated, “We have documented all the bodies and photographed all distinguishing marks before burying them in the mass grave.”

Global concerns and urgent appeals

The allegations of organ theft add a disturbing layer to the genocide in Gaza. The international community has expressed deep concern over these accusations, urging a swift and impartial investigation to uncover the truth.

In his Christmas message, Pope Francis voiced his concern over the humanitarian situation in Gaza, emphasizing the need for an end to military operations and a solution to the desperate humanitarian situation. The pope’s plea for peace and his call for international support to address the Palestinian question now resonate more strongly amid these shocking allegations.

The United Nations and other international organizations are under increasing pressure to intervene and ensure a comprehensive investigation into the organ theft allegations.

As the genocide continues to unfold, the international community awaits Israel’s response to these serious accusations and anticipates concrete actions to address the broader humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The quest for truth and justice in the face of these disturbing allegations remains at the forefront of global concerns.

Sources: TRT World and the New Arab

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n the mid-20th century, Stanley Milgram, professor of social psychology at Yale University, and Philip Zimbardo, professor of psychology at Stanford University, conducted scientific research on obedience to authority. Today, in the digital age, the results of these experiments underscore the importance of media literacy, while online cyberbullying highlights the consequences of unregulated authority in global society.

Unmasking obedience to authority

In 1961, Stanley Milgram set out to unravel the role of obedience to authority in shaping human behavior. Inspired by his observation of Nazi Germany and the actions of Adolf Eichmann, Milgram hypothesized that ordinary people may commit crimes and carry out cruel acts when instructed by an authority figure. His experiment was his way of trying to figure the truth behind his suspicions.

The Milgram Experiment revealed the disturbing ability of people to obey authority, even if it results in harming others. It highlighted the importance of ethical considerations and the potential consequences of unquestioning obedience in real-life situations, such as wartime atrocities.

There were three key roles in the experiment: the experimenter, who acted as an authority figure and guided the participants while wearing a lab coat to symbolize expertise and authority; the teacher, who was made to believe that s/he was participating in a study investigating the effects of punishment on learning; and the student, performed by an actor in a separate room, who was hooked up to electrodes.

The teacher’s role was to read a series of word pairs to the student and then test the student’s memory by presenting a word and asking for the corresponding pair. If the student answered incorrectly, the teacher had to administer an electric shock, increasing the voltage with each incorrect answer. The strength of the shocks ranged from a mild 15 volts to a severe 450 volts, each accompanied by recorded cries of pain from the student, who suffered no actual shocks.

To maintain the facade of the experiment, the experimenter repeatedly urged the teacher to continue, even if they exhibited reluctance, using a series of prompts such as “Please continue” or “The experiment requires that you continue.” Furthermore, for each subsequent incorrect response, the teacher was obligated to incrementally raise the voltage. An “authority figure” was also present alongside the teacher, distinguished solely by their attire—a lab coat. 

The most startling result of the Milgram Experiment was that 65% of the teachers administered the highest voltage of 450 volts despite the student’s obvious discomfort. Over time, participants began to perceive the experiment as a separate entity, detached from reality. The thought of its artificial origin seemed unimportant to them. Moreover, the majority of participants began to devalue the students in their perception, calling them “worthless” and “worthy of punishment.” Although a few individuals affirmed that they had recognized the ethical shortcomings of the experiment from the beginning, this did not deter most from continuing to participate.

Zimbardo and his team meticulously observed the interactions between the guards and the prisoners during the planned two-week duration of the experiment. Over the first five days of the experiment, the behavior of the guards became brutal. Psychologist Christina Maslach visited the site on the 6^th day, and she was upset at how participants were behaving, which pushed Zimbardo to end the experiment.

The Stanford Prison Experiment and the Milgram Experiment offer deep insights into the power of situational and role-based influences on human behavior. These studies vividly illustrate how ordinary people can adopt cruel and authoritarian roles when they assume positions of power and authority in controlled environments. The ramifications of these experiments extend beyond the laboratory setting into the real world, such as government policy, educational institutions, and political propaganda.

As we fast-forward to the digital age, we find the lessons of these experiments echoing in contemporary contexts. Misinformation and blind loyalty to supposed online authorities have become a widespread problem in the digital age. Misinformation promoted by powerful personalities or experts in many disciplines thrives on online platforms. Individuals may unquestioningly accept and spread misleading content online from seemingly authoritative sources, just as participants in the Milgram experiment obeyed the authority figure in the lab coat.

Authority, misinformation, and cyberbullying

As platforms like TikTok, Instagram, and X (former Twitter) continue to surge in popularity, people are under immense pressure to conform to prevailing narratives, driven by incessant and diverse trends that quickly go viral and equally quickly disappear. Just as the participants in Milgram’s research felt pressured to conform to the actions of others, online users may engage in behaviors they would normally disapprove of to gain social approval and a sense of authority in their online groups.

This adaptability to viral trends highlights the influence of real or perceived authority figures on online behavior. Obedience to online authority figures and compliance with falsehoods have significant effects influencing public discourse, decision-making, and even elections. 

Cyberbullying has also become a part of our lives with online social platforms. Similar to the Stanford Prison Experiment, social media platforms provide anonymity that encourages a sense of detachment from lived reality and thus from oneself, making cyberbullying and similar actions easier. This artificial sense of anonymity reduces personal responsibility and can easily lead people into harmful interactions which they would not engage in if the interaction were face-to-face.

When various anonymous individuals in online communities gain a large number of followers, they can begin to see themselves as authority figures and leaders of their followers. This power dynamic and perception of artificial authority can create scenarios where individuals abuse and misuse their power. In some distressing cases, they may even rally their followers to participate in coordinated harassment and cancellation campaigns, amplifying the harm inflicted.

In online communities, characterized by echo chambers, individuals often develop an “us versus them” mentality and perceive those who are not part of their group as enemies. This division can give rise to animosity, hostility, and the dehumanization of those with contrasting perspectives, akin to the tensions and loss of individuality often observed in prison settings. Just as guards and prisoners adopted different roles and behaviors depending on their assigned group, online echo chambers can drive individuals to extreme positions and behaviors, undermining empathy and understanding.

The groundbreaking experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram and Philip Zimbardo illuminated the profound influence of authority on human behavior, revealing the disturbing capacity of ordinary people to commit cruel acts when directed by authority figures. As we move into the digital age, these insights from the past take on new meaning.

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olitical parties are shaped by the different divisions within society. Studies on the emergence of political parties generally take into account different variables such as socioeconomic divisions, religious and ethnic distinctions, urban and rural divisions, sentiments towards the current system of governance, foreign policy preferences, and whether economic policies are state-oriented or private entrepreneur-oriented. However, the shaping of politics over time, the presence of parties in the political arena, as well as their rise or fall in influence, are also explained through various other dynamics.

Although political tendencies in the world are categorized on the basis of two main labels, namely right and left, the breadth of the political spectrum cannot be explained solely on the basis of this distinction. The practice of political culture, the conjunctural positioning of election periods, and the constitutional and legal obligations of the political and electoral system often render a distinction solely based on a template of values ambiguous. In Turkey, despite the changes and transformations in politics and society, the main issues and axes that shape voter behavior still remain decisive.

For example, in the 2023 elections, as a manifestation of Turkish modernization, the idea of shaping society from the top down through elites influenced the political actors of the opposition bloc as they tried to bring together parties with different identities under the leadership of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), assuming that the electorate would accept their engineered political vision. Through the discourse of the “historical and intellectual background of the Table of Six,” the opposition bloc tried to idealize the combination of right-left, conservative nationalist and secular liberal as a search for a kind of social contract, through ideas that even the actors sitting at the table themselves were ambiguous about.

Some of those who expressed this view, which was put forward as a “Century of accumulation,” did not hold back from declaring that after the elections the last thing they would want in their political lives was to be a CHP candidate. They misconstrued the transformation in politics and society in Turkey and presented de-politicization as a political tactic. This interpretation of politics was a manifestation of a failure to analyze fully the dynamics of Turkish politics and the basic worldviews and perspectives of Turkish society.

Continuities and ruptures in political culture

The divide that has existed between society and elites since Ottoman modernization has been the dominant determinant of Turkish politics in the last century. This dividing line, which stands out in political and sociological analyses as the center-periphery divide, has formed the founding basis for political parties in Turkey and the way they relate to society.

Since the Tanzimat period, certain elitist interest groups led and articulated by the military and civilian bureaucracy, mainly the forces representing the center, have supported political parties hat represent the interests and worldview of the latter. Meanwhile the more traditional, conservative, and religious segments of society, representing the periphery, have mostly clustered around the parties that are the main carriers of right-wing politics within the periphery bloc. Periodically and conjecturally exceptions exist and there are partial crossovers between these two main blocs, but for the most part identities are the main determinant of the behavior of the majority of voter clusters. In other words, the weight and determinacy of right-wing politics in Turkey persists.

Since its foundation, the CHP has represented the central forces, while the Democrat Party and its successors have been the representatives of the periphery. In the entire history of the republic, these two main blocs have also determined the course of ruling-opposition relations. Although the manifestations of social transformation were clearly visible in the 2000s, the CHP failed to achieve a meaningful increase in voter support, let alone win elections. Unable to come to power through democratic means, elitist interest groups and the tutelary structures with which they are allied have historically relied on the fragmentation of political space and the weakness of political structures to reduce the determinism of right-wing politics.

Since the 1960s, intellectuals and the press have played a central role in the fragmentation and polarization of Turkish politics. Most political scientists agree that the fundamental problem of fragmentation and volatility in Turkish politics is the result of intervention through different means and methods in the political sphere.

Political parties in Turkey were established at the beginning of the last century. A multiparty system was first introduced during the Second Constitutional Monarchy (Ikinci Meşrutiyet). In the early Republican period, the opposition attempted to form political parties, but they were soon shut down, as for example in the case of the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası). In the single-party period, opposition parties were not permitted, and in 1936, the CHP, which was the only party, was integrated into the state.

Multiparty politics began in 1946, but democratic politics began on May 14, 1950 when the Democratic Party (DP) came to power. Since the DP’s first years in power, the state elites—civil and military bureaucracy, the majority of the educated class including the academia, and the economic class fed by the state—wanted democracy to be practiced in a restricted sphere and aspired to monopolize the normative sphere of politics.

By supporting military coups against civilian politics and demanding the permanence of the tutelage establishment, these groups created mechanisms of distrust towards political parties. They believed that only they, as opposed to democratically elected politicians and political parties, could determine the developments that would be in the long-term interests of society.

Thus, when political parties “went astray,” military coups could be “legitimized.” From this perspective, these self-interested tutelage groups supported the coups and coup attempts of 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007, blaming the parties elected by popular vote. In order to justify their undemocratic behavior, they took refuge behind the argument that the “political parties had deviated from Atatürk’s principles.”

In order to construe a “flawed democracy,” the elite blamed the people who voted for political parties they did not approve of. When the parties they opposed were elected, they devalued the people’s preferences by saying “democracy is not just about the ballot box” and that the majority of voters belonged to the “ignorant masses.” The idea that the main characteristic of Turkish modernization was its top-down, coercive nature, that democracy could be dictated from above, and that the people should vote for the indicated parties was defended even by political scientists who described themselves as democrats.

Parties voted into power by the people were punished, periodically removed from power, and had their institutional structures banned from the political arena. Their replacements were asked to engage in politics in a limited and narrowly defined field and, if they came to power, to deal only with roads, sidewalks, bridges, and infrastructure services. Foreign policy, security, higher education, even education and youth policies were required to be framed and implemented by the presidential office under the control of tutelage and the civil and military bureaucracy under its command.

Since the transition to democracy and until the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, no party has been in power for a long period of time, with the exception of the DP’s 10-year uninterrupted government that ended with a coup d’état. In every election held from the late 1980s until 2002, a different party came out on top.

In Turkey, political parties have always lacked institutionalization and existed as leader-centered entities. The parties of leaders who could not manage political elite change and management well were constantly divided and lost ground. Again, as a result of the lack of institutionalization, external interventions in political parties’ elites often facilitated divisions. With the exception of the AK Party and the DP, none of the parties that were founded as offshoots of major parties have been able to become an alternative to power; these efforts have only contributed to the fragmentation of the political sphere, serving populism and the devaluation of politics.

Narendra Modi is roaring to the world that India is a worthy contender on the global scene. India has come to the fore with its massive economy, recent successes at the space front, potential megaproject linking India, the Middle East and Europe via rail and sea, and playing the role of a distanced ally towards to the competing world powers: the U.S. and China.

All eyes were on the G20 summit taking place in New Delhi this year, and Modi surely wanted to make a good impression. Schools and offices were shut, roads were blocked, and street vendors were removed. Even whole slums near the venue were covered in tarpaulin! Ironically, Modi’s speeches repeatedly described India as the world’s largest democracy and the ‘voice of the Global South’.

However, behind this sterilized facade lies discrimination, oppression, and erasure— on brand with the Hindu nationalism fueled by Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Numerous attacks on minority communities sweep through the country, including demolitions of Muslim houses, mosque and church attacks, grave desecrations and violent killings. Meanwhile, the government takes every step to define India as a Hindu nation.

In this month’s book bundle, we examine how Modi’s India both oppresses and suppresses its minority citizens. Through books that explain the political dynamics in India, the impact of state-sanctioned violence, and the silencing of critical voices, we observe how the world’s largest democracy goes wrong.

In the book Modi’s India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy, Christophe Jaffrelot delves into the intricate dynamics of Indian politics over the last two decades, with a particular focus on the rise of Hindu nationalism coupled with national-populism, largely attributed to Narendra Modi’s leadership. This confluence of factors has not only secured Modi’s electoral success, starting in Gujarat and extending to the entire country but has also transformed the very nature of democracy in India.

Jaffrelot’s work spotlights Modi’s ability to captivate a significant portion of the Indian populace by offering promises of development while simultaneously exploiting ethno-religious fault lines within the electorate. This national-populism is marked by Modi’s personalized political style, characterized by direct communication with voters through various channels, effectively saturating the public discourse.

To shed light on the consequences of this political shift, Jaffrelot conducts original interviews across India, revealing a troubling evolution toward what he terms an “ethnic democracy.” In this model, the majority community is equated with the nation, while religious minorities, specifically Muslims and Christians, find themselves relegated to the status of second-class citizens, vulnerable to harassment by ‘vigilante’ groups.

Furthermore, Jaffrelot elucidates how the political landscape in India has developed authoritarian tendencies for various reasons. In its quest for power not only at the national level but also in the states, the government has centralized authority at the expense of federalism, eroding the very institutions that once served as checks and balances, including India’s Supreme Court.

In sum, Modi’s India showcases a government, supported by popular mandate, stifles dissent and grows increasingly intolerant of ethnic and religious minorities. The book provides essential insights into politics, nationalism, and populism in contemporary India.

Christophe Jaffrelot, Modi’s India: Hindu Nationalism and the Rise of Ethnic Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2021) ISBN: 9780691206806, 656 pages

In Composing Violence: The Limits of Exposure and the Making of Minorities, Moyukh Chatterjee examines the haunting memory of the 2002 anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat, India, where armed Hindu mobs unleashed brutal attacks on Muslims in broad daylight, resulting in a staggering death toll that shocked the nation. Chatterjee’s investigation goes beyond the horrific events themselves, aiming to dissect how such highly visible political violence against minority communities serves as a catalyst for profound transformations in the domains of law, public culture, and power dynamics.

Contrary to the expectation that exposing state-sanctioned anti-Muslim violence would lead to its suppression, Chatterjee argues that these incidents actually set the stage for a fundamental shift in India, pushing it toward a Hindu supremacist state. He contends that examining the responses of both the state and civil society to this violence offers crucial insights into the inherent features of modern democracy, where riots and pogroms become tools for molding a society defined by a vulnerable minority and a dominant majority.

Chatterjee’s exploration focuses on multiple facets, including courtroom procedures, police archives, legal activism, and mainstream media coverage. Through this multifaceted approach, he constructs a theory of violence as a form of governance, effectively engineering minority populations.

Composing Violence invites readers to grapple with the profound and unsettling implications of anti-Muslim violence in India. Chatterjee’s meticulous analysis paints a picture of how violence can shape the course of democracy, raising profound questions about the fragility of minority rights and the complex interplay between power and prejudice in contemporary societies.

Moyukh Chatterjee, Composing Violence: The Limits of Exposure and the Making of Minorities (Duke University Press, 2023) ISBN: 978-1-4780-1966-4, 184 pages

What happens to those who dare question the injustices of the Modi regime? The book How Long Can the Moon Be Caged? provides a piercing examination of the authoritarian regime under Narendra Modi in India, where the suppression of critical voices and the silencing of dissent have become central objectives for the ruling BJP party. Their ethno-nationalist aspiration of establishing an exclusively ‘Hindu’ India, involves targeting anyone who dares to voice questions or opposition.

Authors Suchitra Vijayan and Francesca Recchia present a unique perspective highlight the experiences of political prisoners. Their approach combines astute political and legal analysis with firsthand accounts, offering readers an in-depth exploration of the subtle acts of resistance that occur both within and beyond prison walls, involving not only the prisoners themselves but also their families. The narrative unravels a tale of institutional decay and the erosion of fundamental rights.

The book spotlights the stories of those who have been falsely accused of inciting the Bhima Koregaon violence, student leaders who have protested against the discriminatory citizenship law of 2020, and activists associated with the Pinjra Tod movement. By weaving together these voices, How Long Can the Moon Be Caged? celebrates the remarkable bravery, unwavering humanity, and moral integrity of individuals who have been incarcerated for their unwavering solidarity with marginalized and oppressed communities.

In a world where the struggle for dissent and the preservation of civil liberties are ever more vital, this book serves as a powerful testament to the resilience of those who refuse to be silenced, while painting a vivid picture of the ongoing battle for justice and equality in India.

Suchitra Vijayan and Francesca Recchia, How Long Can the Moon Be Caged?: Voices of Indian Political Prisoners (Pluto books, 2023) ISBN 9780745347981, 216 pages

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hinking makes man human. Humans are beings that can exist as long as they think. Sometimes you think about a weed, a tree, an insect; sometimes you think about an event that affects the whole world. In the world we live in today, there is a topic that we have to ask and think about: the attacks of the Zionist regime on Palestine.

We also need concepts to think about: we can think about the genocidal attacks of the Zionist occupation regime on Palestine, for example, in terms of compassion, justice, and righteousness.

Killing compassion with the sense of envy

Let us begin with a simple question: what is compassion? According to Schopenhauer, compassion is the virtue of loving people, “true morality,” and inherent in human nature. Therefore, to be human means to have compassion in all circumstances, in all places, in all countries. For Schopenhauer, the feeling of compassion is intertwined with pity, and the source of this feeling is the suffering, needs, and concerns of others.

Accordingly, compassion opposes behaviors that can cause pain by saying “Stop!” What happens is that compassion tends to protect and help the other as a shield at the expense of self-harm. Rachel Corrie, an American peace activist, was an example of this. She was crushed to death by an armored bulldozer of the Israeli Defense Forces in Rafah, in the southern Gaza Strip, on March 16, 2003, while helping to prevent the occupation regime from demolishing the home of a Palestinian family.

While compassion is intertwined with pain, its opposite is envy. Envy is another name for the hedonistic attitude of taking pleasure in the misfortune of others. The envy of the bulldozer operator who killed Rachel Corrie and many leaders of the Zionist regime is not hidden— it is openly displayed. This, in Schopenhauer’s words, is “diabolic,” and when there is no compassion, there is envy as its opposite. Where there is envy, discrimination is inevitable. Discrimination is either direct, based on personal characteristics, or indirect, based on language, religion, race, gender, age, and so on.

While characterizations such as “human animals” and “animals” against Palestinians are direct discrimination, discrimination based on the characteristics of “being Muslim, Palestinian or Christian” is indirect discrimination. Another aspect of discrimination is the stigmatization of support for those who are discriminated against. Such stigmatization almost creates the perception that the “person is not human.” The stigmatization and even imprisonment of those “in favor of Palestine” in Europe is a typical example. This is called “social isolation” and it not only prevents peace, but also paves the way for social disruption and chaos. This can only be prevented by a policy of social inclusion which requires a will.

Holding on to truth to overcome oppression

Overcoming oppression requires the means of righteousness, because righteousness is essentially another aspect of justice, and righteousness has a significant impact on the establishment and maintenance of justice.  However, the nature of righteousness varies according to philosophical views, religious beliefs, and understanding of science. For this reason, righteousness is explained in terms of “convenience, internal consistency, excess, and pragmatic approaches.”

In the oldest and most widely accepted approach to justice, the convenience approach, on which other theories of justice are based, justice means correspondence with reality. For example, if you say, “There’s an airplane up there,” all you have to do is look up to know whether it is true or not; if the airplane is visible, then the statement is true. Despite the open bombing of innocent people by the Zionist occupation regime, U.S. .and European politicians are playing with people’s minds, making statements that the Zionist occupation regime did not bomb the hospital. This has nothing to do with “truth” because “the airplane is up there” and “bombing innocents during a live broadcast.”

At the same time, the actions of the Zionist occupation regime are correct according to the “internal consistency approach.” This is because it is based on behavior that is consistent with what is believed to be right. If this consistency exists, then what is done is considered right. In this sense, one’s essence, words, and actions must be consistent. Thus, righteousness means upholding one’s self-proclaimed (moral) principles in all times and places. Therefore, the Zionist occupation regime is “righteous” in the sense of internal consistency because it acts in accordance with its beliefs. The bombing of Palestinian homes, schools, hospitals, mosques, or churches, and innocent people by the Zionist occupation regime is a righteous act! Anyone who thinks otherwise is ridiculous according to the Zionist occupation regime.

Another approach that complements the convenience approach and helps overcome its shortcomings is the excess/surplus approach. The basic idea of this approach is that the use of the word “true” in propositions is redundant. For example, instead of the proposition “It is true that there is a book on the table,” one could say “There is a book on the table.” Here, the media comes to mind as the force that determines the field of “excess” or “deficiency.” Depending on the position of the Zionist occupation regime, the media renders the statements of the Palestinians and those who support the Palestinians meaningless by categorizing them as necessary untrue” or “unnecessary untrue.”

A final approach to explaining justice is the pragmatist approach. Here, truth is “what meets the need,” truth is only relative to results. Truth is shaped by the hands of self-interested people, and absolute or fundamental unchanging truth is irrelevant. What is at stake, then, is a lack of virtue. Thus, Western countries and especially Islamic countries “justify” their position on Palestine by saying that it is against their national interests.

As a result, let us consider someone who believes that it is right to help people who are oppressed. This person is expected to act justly, i.e., with righteousness, in a way that is consistent with this belief. In doing so, they should also activate their sense of compassion. This is the minimum requirement for being human!

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n today’s age of ubiquitous social media influence, The Social Dilemma remains a chilling reminder of the strong impact of big social media companies on society. It paints a simultaneous picture of dystopia and utopia. The documentary adeptly highlights the addictive nature of social media and the profit-driven motives of giants like Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok, even at the expense of promoting questionable content. This raises significant ethical concerns, especially for vulnerable young users.

Through interviews with tech industry insiders, engineers, ethicists, and psychologists, the documentary exposes the algorithms and design choices responsible for turning social media into an addictive and polarizing force. These insiders provide firsthand accounts of how tech giants prioritize engagement and profit over user well-being and societal harmony.

The Social Dilemma raises vital ethical questions about tech companies’ power and responsibility. It underscores how the race for user attention and ad revenue has fueled the spread of misinformation, conspiracy theories, and divisive content on these platforms. Now, the burden falls on individuals, companies, and governments to chart a path forward.

Greatest Risk of Social Media: Imperceptible Change

There is an ironic transition from the information age to the disinformation age, even though we have greater access now to information than ever before, we still find it difficult to reach the truth. “Imperceptible change” is planted within us, obstructing our intellectual defense as to whether an information that we get is true or not.

In The Social Dilemma, “imperceptible change” refers to the gradual and often subtle ways in which social media platforms and their algorithms manipulate and influence user behavior without the users themselves being fully aware of it. This concept highlights how these platforms are designed to keep users engaged and addicted by making subtle, unnoticeable adjustments to what content is shown and when it’s shown to maximize user interaction and time spent on the platform.

For example, the algorithms might show you certain posts or ads at specific times when they predict you are most likely to engage with them, or they might prioritize content that aligns with your existing beliefs and interests. Over time, these imperceptible changes can have a significant impact on how users perceive the world, reinforcing their existing beliefs and preferences and keeping them hooked on the platform.

The documentary introduces the concept of “imperceptible change,” illustrating how social media subtly manipulates user behavior through algorithmic adjustments. These alterations, like showing content at specific times or prioritizing like-minded content, shape users’ perceptions over time. It serves as a warning about these platforms’ power and the need for users to be more aware of their online experiences.

Social media companies will soon have to go further 

For a really long time, the users’ only real weapon against the detrimental effects of social media was their willpower and media literacy. Basically, they were on their own.

In 2018, when Mark Zuckerberg testified in the congress over the Cambridge Analytica scandal, he stated, “It’s clear now that we didn’t do enough to prevent these tools from being used for harm. That goes for fake news, foreign interference in elections, and hate speech, as well as developers and data privacy.” Has anything changed since then?

Succumbing to pressure, platforms are beginning to pay attention to their users’ experience. Instagram, YouTube and TikTok have introduced various tools that alert users of their extended usage and even put parental controls. YouTube and Instagram remind teens to take breaks since 2021. Meanwhile, TikTok announced a passcode entry regulation for minors after an hour on the app.

The documentary’s interviews with experts and industry insiders emphasize the urgent need for more substantial regulation and responsible use of technology. The exploration of the addictive pull of social media, akin to the stimulating effects of slot machines on our brains, mirrors the concerns that various countries are now addressing.

China’s has taken measures to limit screen time for children under eight and Utah’s imposition of a digital curfew for minors are just two examples of this growing trend. France’s requirement for manufacturers to install parental control systems also underscores the global recognition that action is needed. In June, France passed a law that prohibits the promotion of certain practices – such as cosmetic surgery and smoking. The penalties for non-compliance can go up to two years in prison and a fine of €300,000.

However, the most recent and thorough move yet comes from the European Union. The EU is leading the charge with its Digital Services Act —overseen by the European Commission. The EU’s Digital Services Act, which became effective on August 25, imposes new rules on platforms, including assessments of societal impact and measures to prevent addictive behavior and targeting of vulnerable groups. The Act aims to make platforms more responsible and protect minors.

The new EU rules will allow researchers to access data inside company servers. The platforms will undergo a yearly assessment of the impact of their design, algorithms, advertising and terms of services on a range of societal issues. Then, according to the findings of the assessment, propose and implement measures inspected by the European Commission, researchers and an audit company.

The EU is actively teaming up with tech firms, industry groups, and organizations focused on children to figure out how to create platforms that better protect minors. They’re working towards a set of guidelines by 2024 called the Code of Conduct on Age-Appropriate Design. This code would lay out a list of steps that the European Commission wants big social media companies to take in line with the new laws.

However, as The Social Dilemma suggests, there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the complex problems posed by social media. A nuanced approach is crucial, focusing on specific people, platforms, and features that are most risky. Additionally, the call for more data and a precautionary principle when it comes to minors is both reasonable and responsible.

Only time will reveal the effectiveness of these measures and potential loopholes, but the Act open a chapter of thorough examination of social media companies’ practices.

Reviewed by Batuhan Aça, Şeymanur Melayim, Muhammet Ali Oruç, Shahd Qaid, and Ezgi Yaramanoğlu.

Written by Dilara Özer

H

ave you ever experienced power cuts lasting more than five hours in the middle of a scorching heatwave? This is what Egyptians have been experiencing for the past two weeks and will continue to do so for the next month, according to Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly. The public, which has endured a heatwave of 40°C or more as well as power cuts, has expressed its growing discontent on various platforms in the hope that government officials will hear their voices.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian government continues to promote and invest in urban megaprojects such as the New Administrative Capital, the Cairo Monorail, and Capital Med. Madbouly recently claimed that these projects are being pursued for the necessary development of the Egyptian economy and were it not for them, the country would have collapsed some time ago.

Similarly, Saudi Arabia has been promoting its latest megacity project in the province of Tabuk known as “The Line.” If you have ever imagined living inside a mirror, The Line promises to make your fantasy come true. It is a 170-kilometer-long linear smart city stretching from west to east, and aims to be the world’s first city powered by renewable energy.

The Line

In his latest effort to promote this project, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) has teamed up with the Discovery Channel and produced a documentary titled “The Line: Saudi Arabia’s City of the Future in Neom.”

In the documentary, MBS dismissed critics of his vision, claiming that his futuristic urban megaproject, which is being constructed in an “untouched” area, will go a long way towards meeting the environmental sustainability needs of the population by 2030. He stated, “They say that a lot of the projects that are done in Saudi Arabia cannot be done, that they’re too ambitious. They can keep saying that and we can keep proving them wrong.”

Is it true that they are building The Line in an “untouched” area? According to Courtney Freer, a research fellow at the Middle East Center at the London School of Economics and Political Science, it is not. The Saudi security forces killed Abdul-Rahman Al-Howeiti of the Howeitat tribe in 2020 because he refused to leave his home, which was on the megaproject’s site.

In the same year, his tribe sent an urgent request to the UN for protection against their allegations of the government’s forced displacement. Furthermore, a report in the Wall Street Journal estimated that 20,000 people would be evicted from the area to make way for the city.

Utopian vision: Supporters of the urban megaprojects

With the current global environmental crisis, many seem to agree on the need to develop sustainable urban projects as a solution to the crisis. In addition, MENA’s largest cities are suffering from housing problems due to rapidly growing populations. So, it seems only fair that governments would come up with urban projects that can solve both problems.

Taking The Line as an example, Tarek Qaddumi, an executive director from Neom’s urban project, told the magazine Dezeen that the city will combat the negative effects of urban sprawl. Since the city is vertically layered, the structure will limit the expansion of urban areas. The city will also offer technological progress and sustainability as a way of life.

On the business side, many businesspeople believe that these urban projects will boost the economy and attract good investments. Take Mohamed Khaled, a commercial real estate consultant, as an example: he told Egypt Today that the New Capital will be the perfect place for those who want to invest their money in good locations, as it will offer great business opportunities.

The investment of the Talaat Mustafa Group, one of the biggest construction companies in Egypt, is evidence to this end. Reports have indicated that they have invested in the foundations for the “Noor City” project within the New Capital. Similarly, Rawan Ahmed, a Saudi entrepreneur, told the National that it is very exciting to have innovations such as The Line be featured in the kingdom.

In terms of smart sustainability, housing, and business, many believe that MENA’s urban megaprojects offer innovation for a better future.

Dystopian vision: Critics of the urban megaprojects

Many critics from different fields have criticized MENA urban megaprojects as dystopian because of the authoritarian nature of regional political structures, the cost of these projects, and the delusional goals set for them. Starting with the authoritarian nature, experts such as Robert Draper, a correspondent for GQ, claim that the urban megaprojects have clearly proven that governments do not involve their citizens in the decision-making process.

Returning to the Egyptian case, Michele Dunne, a nonresident scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, claimed that the New Capital’s emptiness proves that President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s vision doesn’t include most Egyptian citizens: ordinary citizens are not allowed there on the grounds that it is a “military compound.”

Similarly, the Saudi government hasn’t consulted its citizens on whether they would agree to evacuate their homes for the megaproject nor has it offered them adequate compensation. While MBS claims that The Line is being constructed in an “untouched” area to provide housing for the population, the reality tells a different story.

Local population and cost

According to a New York Times report, MBS has never mentioned the tribal community that is forced to leave the project’s site or the consequences they face for not complying. On October 2, 2022, the kingdom’s special courts handed down the death sentence to three members of the Howeitat tribe who protested against the forced eviction of their homes in 2020.

Experts such as Philip Oldfield, head of school at the School of Built Environment, University of New South Wales (UNSW), have also criticized the cost of these plans. Despite governments’ claims that these projects are being implemented to save the region from the ongoing climate and overpopulation crises, Oldfield has warned that the projects are costly for all the wrong reasons. A project like The Line could destroy the biodiversity of the Saudi desert. Would the migrating birds understand what a mirror is?

Furthermore, according to Oldfield, the financial and environmental costs of building the project will overwhelm any promised environmental benefits. He told Dezeen that the project will require a huge amount of steel, glass, and concrete – all of which are not considered low-carbon materials. His findings could also be applied to the Egyptian case.

M

uch has been written about the winners and losers of Turkey’s May 14 elections, but there is almost unanimous agreement that nationalism was the overall winner. The rise of nationalism in Turkish politics has been continuing unabated for about ten years. Ideologies such as liberalism, socialism, and Islamism, which have an international character, are either localized or weakened. The synthesis of Islamism, conservatism, and nationalism crafted by the AK Party with the foundation of the People’s Alliance has gained social support. Indeed, with this synthesis, the AK Party managed to come first in the parliamentary elections with 35.5% of the vote.

On the other hand, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the IYI Party each received 10% of votes; more precisely, the MHP 10.07% and the IYI Party 9.69%. The Kurdish ethno-nationalist Green Left Party (YSP) won 8.82% of votes and the Victory Party received more than 2%. If other small parties are included, the total support for the nationalist parties increases even more. Sinan Oğan, the presidential candidate of the ATA Alliance, who defines himself as an “Atatürk nationalist,” played a key role in the presidential race, winning more than 5% of the vote.

As nationalism becomes more popular and all political actors adopt a nationalist stance, it gradually hollows out and the pretexts of nationalism become more prominent. Undoubtedly, a nationalist wave swept the May 14 elections; however, it would be useful to have a closer look at the nature of this wave. Is it a sacred nationalism, a secular nationalism, a statist nationalism, an idealist nationalism, or an anti-immigrant nationalism that has emerged as a reflection of the European far right, a nationalism that focuses on race and ethnicity, an inclusive nationalism that focuses on shared political values, a unionist nationalism, or a Kurdish ethnonationalism?

CHP and HDP getting closer

As a matter of fact, all these types of nationalism could write their own success stories in the May 14 elections. Each claims to be a winner. In particular, the far-right, anti-immigrant line of the Victory Party, which forms the backbone of the ATA Alliance, gained new prominence when Sinan Oğan pushed the elections into a runoff. The political line represented by Muharrem İnce, who was forced out of politics by a FETO criminal cult conspiracy, and his Kemalist approach to politics are being marginalized on the political scene by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) itself. The CHP’s deviation from the Kemalist nationalist position deserves to be addressed as part of a broader political strategy.

Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who has politically neutralized the sincere Kemalist line in the CHP since the day he became president, has tried to make his party capable of forming alliances with other ideological positions. Kılıçdaroğlu’s most important “achievement” during his presidency is that he has eradicated the CHP’s Kemalist vein and enabled his party to form alliances with other political actors in order to cross the 25% threshold—historically, the CHP’s maximum support rate. Kılıçdaroğlu’s transformation of the CHP began with bringing his own party’s base closer to the HDP. This was a strategically important move.

In the course of ten years, the HDP and CHP bases have become closer. The rapprochement between the CHP and the HDP was the main strategic thrust that paved the way for Kılıçdaroğlu’s idea of forming the Table of Six. Without the behind-the-scenes CHP-HDP alliance, the other actors would be worthless. It was Kılıçdaroğlu’s CHP that compromised its values. With the purges of Önder Sav, Emine Ülke Tarhan, and, most recently, Muharrem İnce, the Kemalist character of the CHP seems to have been largely destroyed.

The CHP changed its shell

The vacancies left in the CHP by the ousted Kemalists were filled by actors with ethnic, sectarian, or leftist ideologies, and the party changed its shell. The well-known Atatürk nationalist CHP has been replaced by a very different CHP. Although this change caused discontent among the Kemalist faction within the party, many CHP dissidents have either been silenced or cowed into submission in the face of a major rival like Erdoğan. The CHP purged the Atatürk nationalists from its ranks and paved the way for cooperation with “Kurdish ethnonationalists” along the lines of the HDP.

Uniting secular nationalists and Atatürk nationalists in an alliance was the second phase of CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu’s plan to come to power. It was precisely this gap that the IYI Party tried to fill in Turkish politics: the IYI Party tried to become a rallying point for nationalists who had broken away from the MHP, nationalist Kemalists, and more extreme anti-immigrant populist nationalists. Although the IYI Party gained considerable momentum in the Table of Six format for a while, it lost this upward momentum over time. Kılıçdaroğlu faced IYI Party leader Meral Akşener for his own presidential candidacy and won.

Although Kılıçdaroğlu is adept at neutralizing smaller political actors, he failed to do so in the presidential race. The HDP/PKK shadow over the Nation Alliance was its weakest side. Kılıçdaroğlu, who had to face these criticisms, eventually fell behind President Erdoğan in the first round of the presidential elections. In this environment, Oğan managed to win over the reactionary votes that had broken away from the CHP and İnce.

A nationalist approach

In the May 14 elections, Turkish voters preferred a nationalist approach that is closer to a patriotic line expressed in terms of the strength of the state. The political line that received the most support was the nationalist formula that prioritizes a strong state, security, and integrity. Thus, the People’s Alliance, which prioritized the defence industry, an independent foreign policy, and the survival of the state, was the most successful.

This line was agreed upon by the AK Party, the MHP, and the Great Unity Party (BBP). On the other hand, the New Welfare Party (YRP) represented the Islamist-nationalist line, while HUDA PAR manifested a line that synthesized Islamic values with the Kurdish identity. HUDA PAR’s position within the People’s Alliance raised serious questions. As a result, HUDA PAR contributed as much to the People’s Alliance as it damaged it; overall, it could be argued that it contributed to the creation of a more inclusive political framework for the alliance.

The more populist nationalism of the IYI Party has lost momentum due to its participation in Nation Alliance. The Victory Party, which is more associated with the far right and is notable for its anti-immigration stance, has made an interesting entry into Turkish politics. In the coming period, there may be voter transitivity between these two parties.

Under Turkey’s presidential system, as long as the president continues to be elected with a 50%+1 electoral mandate, nationalist parties will continue to be an element of winning alliances. However, the competition between unifying nationalism and divisive and otherizing nationalism will continue to grow in the coming period. The main paradox of nationalist actors in Turkey will be the permeability between these positions. The unifying and state-oriented nationalism of the People’s Alliance was the victor in the May 14 elections; however, as in the West, anti-immigrant and ethnicity-based nationalism is likely to have a place in Turkish politics from now on.

The Victory Party’s recent agreement with Kılıçdaroğlu could backfire by weakening the support of liberal Islamists and Kurdish nationalists who backed Kılıçdaroğlu in the first round of the election.

A

fter the May 14 elections in Turkey, disturbing comments emerged on social media platforms aimed at earthquake survivors. How earthquake survivors would affect the election outcome had been heavily speculated, and many had criticized the government for the way it handled the disaster. Foreign and domestic opposition media alike considered that the earthquake would shake support for incumbent president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the earthquake-hit provinces, yet the results of the election proved otherwise. This prompted supporters of the opposition to share hateful remarks towards the earthquake victims who voted for Erdoğan. Such actions were condemned by government officials and investigated by the police.

How the earthquake-stricken region voted

Seven out of the ten earthquake-stricken provinces of Turkey showed preference for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In Kahramanmaraş, the epicenter of the earthquake, Erdoğan received a whopping 71.88% of the votes against Kılıçdaroğlu’s 22.20%. Other provinces, where Erdoğan maintained a large lead from his main opponent were Malatya (69.39% Erdoğan, 27.02% Kılıçdaroğlu), Gaziantep (59.76% Erdoğan, 34.65% Kılıçdaroğlu), Adıyaman (66.33% Erdoğan, 31.09% Kılıçdaroğlu), Osmaniye (62.33% Erdoğan, 30.70% Kılıçdaroğlu), Şanlıurfa (62.01% Erdoğan, 36.06% Kılıçdaroğlu), Elazığ (67.19% Erdoğan, 28.19% Kılıçdaroğlu), and Kilis (65.62% Erdoğan, 26.87% Kılıçdaroğlu). In these districts, the votes for Erdoğan and the People’s Alliance only slightly dropped compared to the 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections.

Kılıçdaroğlu emerged victorious in the remaining three provinces. In Hatay, one of the provinces with the most extensive destruction, Kılıçdaroğlu’s and Erdoğan’s votes were neck and neck with Kılıçdaroğlu winning by a 0.04% margin. Kılıçdaroğlu dominated in Diyarbakır with 71.96% of the votes, while Erdoğan received 26.48%. Adana also witnessed a competitive race between the two candidates with Kılıçdaroğlu collecting 50.89% of the votes against Erdoğan’s 43.92%. The turnout rate for the region was 80%.

Insults towards earthquake victims are investigated

Social media was flooded with posts aimed at earthquake victims by opposition supporters ranging from profanities, cursing, and insults to threats and victim-blaming. They claimed their support for Erdoğan was the reason for the devastation of their cities, and some said that they would never bother sending aid or financial assistance to them. A TikTok influencer who said “We will not do anything for you as of now. First, we’ll ask who you voted for” was arrested and later released on accusation of insult. A man shared a video swearing at the earthquake victims and asking how it was possible to vote for Erdoğan in the wake of the disaster.

Several social media users labeled the earthquake victims as “ungrateful” for the humanitarian aid poured into the disaster zone by the CHP-run municipalities and supporters of the opposition. Angered by the reaction, certain earthquake survivors even sent money to Kılıçdaroğlu “paying back” the aid. There were tweets that went as far as saying that the earthquake survivors who voted for the ruling party should have died in the deadly February 6 earthquakes.

Figures from the CHP were among those who shared insulting comments. In a post she shared on Instagram, CHP Ezine District Women’s Branch Chairwoman Cansu Doğan wrote, “I wouldn’t even throw my snot at you, you’ll regret it like a dog, you’ll die hungry.”

Kicking earthquake victims when they’re down

A striking incident took place in the Tekirdağ province governed by the CHP. Earthquake survivors accommodated by the municipality received a statement that their stay would be ended on May 21. Mayor Kadir Albayrak denied the claims that the decision was associated with the election outcome, and announced that their stay would be extended. He made accusations of a “perception operation,” by pro-government people. The accusation was ill-received by earthquake victims.

Melahat Karaman, who was injured during the earthquake in Hatay when a column fell on one of her legs, spoke to Demirören New Agency and said that they do not fabricate perception. Stating that she arrived in Tekirdağ three months ago, she said, “A column fell on my leg, I stayed in the rubble for two hours. Since I could not be treated in Hatay, I underwent surgery at Istanbul Bağcılar State Hospital. I have three platinum rods in my leg. I am currently staying in a house provided by a philanthropist. I did not stay at a hotel. My grandchildren and my daughter are in a hotel, my granddaughter called me crying. I came here when she said, ‘They kicked us out, where are we going to go?’ Yesterday evening, we were told that we were being subjected to a perception operation. Can you show Mr. Kadir [Albayrak] my leg?”

“Am I in the position to fabricate perception? I am already an earthquake victim; my wounds, my fears are enough for me. I will now return to Hatay, I have no home. The only thing I trust is my state. What was he trying to do by taking us out one day after the election? Were we being looked after for votes? Since we didn’t get the votes, we were fired. Now, did I do the perception operation or did he do it? I don’t have a seat to lose.”

Analysts say Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s vow to rebuild devastated cities reassured voters in the earthquake-stricken region, which are mostly AK Party strongholds, accompanied by doubts about the opposition’s ability to meet voters’ expectations. The runoff presidential election will show how reactions toward the earthquake survivors translate to the ballot box.

E

xtreme weather, rising sea levels, and damaged ecosystems may put billions of lives at risk. The “forgotten victims” of climate change will require a collaborative effort.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM), of the United Nations has projected that there will be as many as 1 billion environmental migrants in the next 30 years, with more recent estimates indicating 1.2 billion by 2050 and 1.4 billion by 2060. As the world warms further and the global population reaches its forecasted peak in the mid-2050s, this number is projected to increase dramatically after 2060.

Most Affected

According to the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), a research group that publishes yearly global terrorism and peace indexes, 1.2 billion people live in 31 nations that are not resilient enough to endure environmental hazards.

The IEPs first ecological threat register concluded the following:

• 19 countries experiencing the most challenges, including water and food shortages and increased vulnerability to natural disasters, are also among the world’s 40 least peaceful.
• Over a billion people reside in 31 nations whose resilience is unlikely to be sufficient to survive the effect of natural disasters by 2050, hence contributing to global population displacement.
• Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa face the most ecological risks.
• By 2040, more than half of the world’s projected population, or 5,4 billion people, would reside in the 59 nations experiencing high or extreme water stress, including India and China.
• By 2050, food insecurity might affect 3.5 billion individuals, an increase of 1.5 billion from now.

Pakistan, followed by Ethiopia and Iran, has the greatest number of people at risk of mass displacement. Haiti suffers the highest level of danger in Central America. In many countries, even minor ecological risks and natural calamities could result in mass population displacement, threatening regional and global security.

High-resilience regions, such as Europe and North America, will not be immune to the broader effects of ecological problems, such as the influx of a large number of migrants. In 2015, as a result of the wars in Syria and Iraq, two million refugees fled to Europe, highlighting the correlation between rapid population movements and political and social upheaval.

Climate refugees

The term ‘Climate Refugees’ has been present in public discourse since 1985, when UN Environment Program (UNEP) expert Essam El-Hinnawi defined ‘environmental refugees’ as: “ those who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of marked environmental disruption (natural and/or triggered by people) that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of their life”.

Since 2008, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center reports that over 318 million people have been forcefully relocated by floods, windstorms, earthquakes, or droughts, including 30,7 million in 2020 alone. This equates to one individual being relocated every second. Depending on the frequency and magnitude of major natural disasters, the total number of displaced individuals varies significantly from year to year, although the trend over the past few decades has been upward. Many are able to find safety within their own nation, while others are compelled to find safety abroad.

Several European nations, notably Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, were devastated by catastrophic floods in July 2021, resulting in fatalities and massive destruction. According to the latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the frequency and intensity of such severe weather events are projected to grow in the coming decades (IPCC). Climate refugees will likely rise in number.

Henrietta Fore, UNICEF Executive Director stated in a UNICEF press release, that “climate and environmental shocks are undermining the complete spectrum of children’s rights, from access to clean air, food and safe water; to education, housing, freedom from exploitation, and even their right to survive.

Virtually no child’s life will be unaffected.

Turkey-based think tank SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research) has recently published a 54-page report entitled Social Housing as a Solution to the Housing Problem. The report analyzes the causes and consequences of house inflation, and the potential impacts of the ongoing efforts to resolve the recent surge in house prices in Turkey. The report evaluates supply and demand dynamics in the Turkish housing market and discusses the international dynamics leading to soaring house prices.

House inflation is a recent critical challenge of the Turkish economy. Commodity price increases, supply-demand imbalance—especially the slowdown of home construction during the COVID19 pandemic—and the rapidly increasing demand for housing after the pandemic have led to volatile prices across the world.

A comprehensive and long-term solution to the housing crisis

Limitations on housing loans and rent increases have brought a temporary relief in Turkey. However, policymakers focus on solutions that will have longer term impacts, such as support for housing construction and the new social housing projects.

In this direction, Turkey’s first solution to the ongoing global housing crisis is the comprehensive and long-term social housing project called “İlk Evim, İlk Iş Yerim” (First Home, First Workplace). This first step is an ambitious project with the aim of making people homeowners, especially those who are the most affected by the rapid increase in housing prices. The project offers housing, land lots, or workplaces to citizens who do not own property, with relatively long-term payback periods extending to 20 years and affordable installments. The project has been introduced as the largest social housing project in the history of the modern Turkish Republic.

The main problem in the housing sector is the disruption in the supply and demand balance. More specifically, internal and external factors cause the demand to swell and the supply to weaken. Without disrupting the functioning of the market mechanism, the main role public interventions can play at this point is to focus on supporting the increase of supply, such as social housing, and to offer subsidies to the construction processes. New projects such as land subsidies are also valuable in this respect.

The demand-oriented policies of the past, including cheap loans, loan abundance, and extension of maturities to stimulate demand were directed step by step towards production incentives such as reducing costs, and land and infrastructure support, which will increase production and supply. The government’s goal with the new projects to be developed in this direction is to stabilize housing prices and rents, and to restore price stability.

Affordable housing in almost every city

Currently the main problem of the housing market in Turkey is the lack of supply. The sector, which has experienced a serious contraction since, at least, 2017 and especially since the pandemic period starting in 2020, could not keep up with the booming demand after the pandemic. In 2022, the contraction in construction reached 11%. The “İlk Evim, İlk Iş Yerim” project is designed especially for low-income groups.

Affordability is the key issue here. Low prices and long-term payment options provide a serious advantage to people with weak purchasing power. Access to housing is expanded with appropriate installment payments for social housing and land, at a certain percentage of the minimum wage according to the 2023 projection and in line with savings’ rates.

In almost every city, the opportunity to become a homeowner is offered to those most affected by the housing price increases with monthly installments that are significantly lower than monthly rents.

T

he most prominent reward of working for youth is benefiting from their limitless excitement. Beyond their contagious excitement, young people are interested and engaged in many personal and social aspects of life. To match their interests, any project concerning them should be equally comprehensive, far-reaching, and large-scale. Young people are the seeds of their infinite potential and harbingers of a visionary future.  

The youth are never outdated, and their outlook establishes the standards of today; whatever is offered to them, and whatever they participate in, r will outlast everything else. In order to nurture a generation with a wide-ranging and flourishing, with a universal vision and solid foundations, one must start by investing in young people—and to invest when they are most open to learning.

These motivations and ideas are core elements of our new project, the GNS Youth Platform, which is a digital venue for many of the activities young people are interested in. The platform features multiple branches, each focused on a different activity type. For example, there is a travel section where tickets for bus and train trips are given away so that young people can travel to different locations within Türkiye and personally visit the country’s many geographical and cultural beauties.

There is a book section where vouchers for purchasing books are given. In the sports section, we offer sports tickets allowing young people to witness the thrill of professional competitions live and firsthand. In the same context, the Ministry of Youth and Sports also offers free training sessions by professional trainers in multiple sports branches.

Similarly, in the art section, tickets for concerts, music festivals, theatrical performances, and movie theaters are given free of charge. We expanded our scope of reach by adding the “Goodness Segment where young people meet successful and inspiring individuals, and dive into possible career paths they are passionate about. Last but not least, by cooperating with the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, we created and handed out the “MuseumCard GNS” free of charge. With this card, young people can visit more than 300 museums and archaeological sites throughout our country.

When we first started this project, we had multiple aims in our minds. The most forthcoming was to have young people join different types of events to enlarge their cultural knowledge and fields of interest. Filling their life with beneficial and fun events, we eased the way for many youths to live a life full of art, sports, and culture. It is important for us that young people can turn to their ministry when they seek to enrich their lives and when they do so, they are met by our professional and qualified assistance.

 The number one duty of the Republic of Türkiye’s Ministry of Youth and Sports is to satisfy this societal need. Backing youth with optimal means also provides a natural protection since the youth’s energy and potential is channeled into healthy targets. In order to achieve this, first, young people must be in an environment where they can explore the outer world and their own potential. Then, they must be guided towards the professional and personal goals that best suit them.

To witness different aspects of life and to choose a path among many others, is a lengthy and complicated process. It is best to start this life-long process when one is young. The more people spend their time and energy in productive and worthy ways when they are young, the greater the chances when they become adults that they will lead better lives, doing what they love, and having the necessary qualities and skills to do so.

Fighting Social Inequality 

Social inequality is the reality of every society. Especially among the young population, social inequality may have long-lasting effects that can alter young people’s careers and personal lives, leaving unrepairable scars. After all, youth only comes once in a lifetime. As most scholars argue, the key issue in debates on inequality and social welfare is inequality of opportunity.

Though there are multiple definitions, inequality of opportunity can be described best as when members of the same society do not have access to the same possibilities, opportunities, and means. High levels of inequality of opportunity suggest that the conditions and circumstances a person is born into such as their gender, where they were born, their race, or their family background, significantly influence their life. Such factors influence the quality of education people receive, the job and career paths they choose, their social and professional cycles, and eventually the amount of money they earn. However, it is not something irrecoverable.

The GNS Youth Platform aims to balance this inequality and be a welcoming gateway for people from everywhere to travel anywhere, to attend art and sports events, and to read the books they like regardless of their cost. It is important that young people do not feel left out, and they are able to attend all such events or have all such experiences firsthand.

In this sense the GNS Youth Platform is a social responsibility project, making sure the same opportunities are offered to every young citizen. At the Ministry, we are working hard to recover the missed opportunities some might experience due to social inequalities. In terms of social cycles, for certain activities, we offer tickets for two, so young people can bring along their friends and enjoy the adventure together.

Improvements in Process

The project is growing, offering more opportunities in new areas. Additionally, since we, as the Ministry, deeply prioritize youth participation, we added new segments to the project that offer sports training courses, meet-and-greet career talks with important experts, and activities. We aspire for all youth to be more than just observers. We want to see all our youth take center stage and not observe life from the sidelines.

Experiencing new things in life will give young people a chance to become familiar with new areas requiring unique skill sets. From there they will be able to discover new aspects about themselves and where their capabilities lie. We believe that wisdom can spring from anywhere and it will be the greatest joy for us to see young people who benefited from this project bring their own experience and wisdom to the table, and, in this way, also contribute to the project.

Today, there are more than 50 sports, arts, culture, and other events that young people can join. Since February 2022, around half a million individuals have participated in the platform’s activities. We have already handed out 5,407 tickets. In an accumulative structure, their experience and feedback will help us improve the project so as to reach more people with better means, in addition to understanding new youth trends. For example, we give away tents and camping material because outdoor camping is a rising and popular activity among young people and as the Ministry, we would love to support them in this endeavor.

 This project is genuinely open to growth and expansion. It is designed to be open-ended; we are on the lookout to include anything our youth are interested in. We periodically upgrade the platform, adding new events and segments to carry it to the next level. We listen and take on the suggestions of young people and youth workers, and include them in all steps. With this strong advantage, we are sure that the GNS Youth Platform will become a significant part of young people’s lives.

It is becoming increasingly widespread for women to fall victims of violent gender-motivated attacks. According to the United Nations, globally, one in every three women aged above 15 experience either physical or sexual violence at least once in their lives. This means that 736 million people on Earth are victimized.

It is noteworthy that women become victims of violence solely because of their gender. There are many regulations and mechanisms established to combat violence against women at national and international levels. The number of scientific research projects on the subject increases as well, providing a substantial amount of data on the causes behind violence against women.

The UN data on violence against women gives a striking statistic, according to which in 2018, one out of seven women between the ages of 15 and 49 was subjected to physical or sexual violence by an intimate partner. There is a similar picture regarding femicide. In 2020, 58% of a total of 81,000 women lost their life globally at the hands of their partners or family members. This means that every 11 minutes a woman was killed by her partner or family member.

Women falling victim to their intimate partners or male relatives shows that violence is also fed by and is relatable to cultural norms. This is a reflection of the deep-rooted present-day reality that men continue to dominate the hierarchy structures across societal sectors. This is also obvious in daily life where in the majority of families traditional gender-based roles prevail.

Women being targeted by their intimate partners makes it more challenging to combat violence. Close contact and privacy between the victimizer and the victimized make women more vulnerable to violence, and cause delays in detecting and preventing violence. Another culturally specific factor is that some people regard violence as a legitimate or reasonable means of handling problems occurring in personal relations.

Yet, with the exception of self-defense and the state’s monopoly on violence, violence is utterly illegitimate and breaches the rule of law. Under all circumstances, violence must be rejected including violence directed against women and children.

Stalking is a fast-evolving threat

Stalking refers to “the act or crime of willfully and repeatedly following or harassing another person in circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to fear injury or death especially because of express or implied threats.” This is a relatively new form of violence and targets especially women. As technology advances, stalking becomes easier.

According to the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control (NCIPC) in the United States, 31.2% of women—twice the rate of men—have encountered stalking at least once in their lifetime. In specific, 32.4% of women in Australia, 23% in Britain, and 19% in Germany have been exposed to stalking. According to a 2015 study in Turkey, 27% of women encounter stalking at some point in their lifetime.

Stalking can be as traumatic as physical violence. Studies show that stalking victims experience depression, anxiety, insomnia, and social anxiety disorder much more often than other people. Stalking can be the beginning of a catastrophic process that often results in physical violence.

Many studies show that stalking pushes women into a dark tunnel that ends with physical and sexual violence, or with femicide. In the U.S., the rate of women who are stalked by an intimate partner and also physically attacked by the same offender is as high as 81%. In fact, stalking is considered a crime in many countries such as Britain, the U.S. (across all states), France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain and Turkey.

Prison sentences are a vital instrument to deter stalking. However, a study in Britain shows that the option of rehabilitating offenders should not be ignored. The mixed method of imprisonment and rehabilitation can be extended to other crimes of violence against women in order to rehabilitate offenders and minimize the risk of reoffending.

As in most of the crimes against women, including stalking, offenders don’t consider their behavior as a crime. A woman’s existence as an independent individual and one that is equal to a man is still a very modern phenomenon. The only way forward is to change harmful and archaic mentalities.

Recently, the debates in Turkish politics around migrants and refugees have heated. A short film titled Silent Invasion (Sessiz İstila in Turkish) funded by far-right nationalist Victory Party leader Ümit Özdağ, brought the topic to the fore. The film contains polarizing, racist, and exaggerated depictions of Istanbul in 2043 overtaken by Syrians where the Turkish population has become a minority and is oppressed. The film utilizes populist rhetoric urging people to consider migration issues as black-and-white.

The volume of posts circulating on social media that claim to show disorderly behavior by foreigners (mainly Syrian and Afghani refugees) has also increased. These posts amplified in number at a time when the Turkish population has become economically vulnerable due to the economic hardships, primarily the high inflation. Nowadays, the government’s policies for regulating legal and illegal migration are being questioned more frequently.

Frustrations surrounding migration

The arguments surrounding migration escalated in 2021 over refugees from Afghanistan who left their country following the U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban’s immediate takeover. Concerns surrounding Afghani refugees triggered those already existing over Syrians, aggravating calls from the public for stronger border security.

Since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, Turkey has hosted a large influx of refugees, a development for which the country was not well prepared. Turkey adopted an open-door policy for people fleeing the conflict, granting them temporary protection status.

The temporary protection regime grants legal residence and access to health care services, education, social assistance, and interpretation. It also provides a safeguard from being sent to Syria against the will of the recipient. Today, the number of refugees in Turkey has reached 4 million, 3.6 million of them Syrian.

The refugee crisis has cost Turkey around 40 billion dollars as it endures high inflation and economic problems. For many migrants, Turkey is a transit point to Europe or other countries in the West. Although the EU pledged 6 billion euros in aid for refugees, it has only provided half of the amount.

As a policy to combat economic problems partially, Turkey facilitated visas, residencies, and acquisition of Turkish citizenship by investment. This piled on to the recent economic frustrations.

New regulations to control migration and population integrity

In February, Turkey restricted additional settlement of refugees in 16 provinces. Furthermore, the Ministry of Interior announced that residency applications are closed to foreigners within local communities where the population of foreign nationals surpasses 25% of the total population. Upon implementation, 781 neighborhoods in Turkey were closed to registry.

Foreigners in areas with high concentration of foreign nationals will be relocated to different districts and provinces on a voluntary basis. According to Çataklı, they were given around two months to change their address with the help of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to facilitate the process. Those under temporary protection risk losing their status if their new address is not notified after two months.

The deputy minister also mentioned that unregistered newcomers from Syria will not automatically be given protection statuses. They will be taken to camps where it will be investigated whether they need temporary protection or not, as people from regime-controlled areas are entering Turkey for economic reasons rather than fleeing war or persecution.

New measures have been introduced to prevent regular migrants from turning into irregular ones upon visa expiry. Fingerprints will be taken upon visa application so that the migrants who enter the country with visas but do not leave when their visa expires and destroy their passports can be duly identified.

Furthermore, in April, it was announced that the amount required for Turkish citizenship through buying real estate increased from $250,000 to $400,000.

The Turkish government seems to be dealing with migration more extensively compared to previous years as signs of social discontent are strongly surfacing. However, it remains to be seen whether existing measures are sufficient or satisfying to public opinion. As elections in 2023 near, it seems migration will continue to remain a hot topic in Turkish politics.

A young Palestinian man leans on his crutch after having his leg amputated. Despite being shot and no longer being able to walk, Mohammed Elakhras, 33, sits on the front row of a football stadium to watch a local game between the Rafah and Gaza teams. He always hoped to be a football player. In his teenage years, he played for his school team and participated in tournaments. However, his dream of competing internationally was cut short after he was shot by an Israeli sniper while taking part in the Great March of Return (GMR), which began four years ago on March 30, 2018.

A generation on crutches

With one leg, and on his crutch, Mohammed’s dream will never come true. Israeli snipers amputated Mohammed’s dream along with his leg.

Whenever Mohammed watches a football match on TV or meets a group of people playing football in the street or at a stadium, he remembers his suffering.

The Ministry of Health in Gaza has declared that there are about 136 amputees in Gaza after the beginning of the GMR with 122 losing their lower limbs and 14 their upper limbs.

The lives of people with such complex injuries are dramatically affected: most have lost their jobs due to their disabilities while families often struggle to come to terms and provide for them.

Shot at the Gaza border

Mohammed took part in a peaceful protest as part of the Great March of Return, on May 25, 2018, which called for an end to Israel’s ongoing siege on Gaza. When he was shot, he was standing at the border looking at the other side where Israeli snipers were stationed. His fault, he says, was carrying a Palestinian flag which prompted an Israeli sniper to shoot him in the leg.

Palestinian paramedics weren’t able to reach Mohammed immediately to help him due to the shower of bullets by the same snipers that targeted anyone who attempted to get closer to him. Mohammed bled on the ground for quite some time.

Mohammed managed to reach a hospital late. His injury was severe, and the hospital was not equipped to deal with severe injuries. As a result, the only solution to save his life was to amputate his leg according to the doctors. His family had to accept the doctors’ decision. 

Losing an arm

Nidal Almoghair, 33, is another example of a forsaken dream. He was the team captain of the volleyball team in his school. Nidal lost his right arm when he noticed a strange object near his house in the first offensive on Gaza in 2008. He touched it, and his arm flew into the sky, shattered to pieces. He was 17 years old at the time, returning from school.

Nidal couldn’t complete his studies and attempted to commit suicide. He had always dreamt of being a mechanical engineer. His amputation also cost him his dream of participating in an international volleyball competition.

Nidal notes, “It’s difficult to live a normal life as I used to, but it’s my destiny and I have to accept it.” “I even forget that I have an artificial arm,” he adds.

“You know, I haven’t succeeded in staying in a job for more than a month because of my disability. Now, I’ve been married for two years. My wife is pregnant, and I don’t know how I will look after her and my child.”

The eldest son, now disabled

Fadi Abu Shaar, 21, lost his leg on March 22, during the GMR.

Fadi is the eldest son in his family. He was a freshman at Al-Quds Open University in the law department, and worked at a market near his family’s home to cover his tuition fees, feed his family, and pay for his sick father’s medicine.

“After losing my leg, I kept moving from one hospital to another to get medical care as the hospitals here in Gaza are poorly equipped. I missed many lectures and exams, and I couldn’t catch up with others.” “Then I left university,” he says with a tone full of sorrow.

Fadi’s mother added that their economic situation became difficult as he lost his job and spent all his savings on medical treatment.

“My brother became depressed and lost his sense of humor. His laugh used to fill our house. He was full of energy, but now all this is gone,” his 15-year-old sister Amany tells us.

Adapting to new life

Nidal, Mohammed, and Fadi are trying to adapt to their new realities. Although Mohammed and Nidal speak of their stories of suffering, many others refuse to talk about their injuries because of reliving the trauma. They are still afraid of being tracked by the Israeli occupation, and also don’t want people feeling sorry for them.

It’s normal for someone who lives in a post-traumatic situation not to speak up. Many amputees fear social stigma and prefer not to talk about their injuries. Seeing a mental health professional is more challenging as the local community considers seeking help by a professional as a sign of weakness mental illness, both of which still hold negative connotations.

On the fourth anniversary of being shot at the Great March of Return, will time be their best remedy? And will justice ever be served?

Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees are fleeing from their home country due to the Russian invasion. Many are still trying to leave Ukraine, filling the routes out with cars stretching for miles. But those who could cross the borders require help.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine began on February 24 and is ongoing, forcing more people to leave to the neighboring countries. The war has so far has cost tens of thousands of lives and can leave a war-torn Ukraine behind.

Valeria’s journey to becoming a refugee

Valeria, 21, a student who crossed the borders of Poland from Ukraine, is mourning the fact that she won’t return to her normal life in Ukraine. She never thought about leaving her country, even her village, when the war started. She told Politics Today, “We thought that it would be safer in villages; but it wasn’t.” Her father drove her to Kyiv, the capital, where she got on an evacuation train to Lviv on her way to Poland.

She added that “it was horrible. Too many people were on the train, there was no place. We stayed on the train for 12 hours, and sometimes we got a chance to sit on suitcases or the floor.” After she arrived in Lviv, she stayed there for a few days. Her friend drove her to the border, which she crossed on foot. Later, a volunteer took her and drove her to Warsaw. She notes that “it was quite amazing how people in other countries volunteered and helped us get to places, have food or somewhere to stay.”

EU Open-Door Policy

EU countries opened their doors to Ukrainian refugees from the first day. However, many host states are ill-prepared for this scale of mass displacement. In many countries, locals have opened their houses while many NGOs and governmental agencies are trying to protect and assist the refugees by providing for their basic needs.

Filippo Grandi, the United Nations high commissioner of refugees, recently identified the refugee crisis in Ukraine as “the fastest-growing refugee crisis in Europe since World War Two.” The UN reported that there are over two million refugees according to data published on March 8, 2022. Many of the refugees landed in Poland, which shares a border of 428 km with Ukraine. According to a UN report, the government of Poland has accepted over 1.2 million refugees, and the Poles have shown a warm reception to their neighbors.

Over the past few weeks, many other countries have also accepted a significant number of refugees. Moldova, a country with a population of four million, has taken 82,000 refugees. The country bears a great importance in terms of its long border with Ukraine, which stretches for 939 km, the longest after Ukraine’s border with Russia.

Ukraine’s neighbor in the Black Sea, Turkey, is one of the countries that is watching the conflict with alarm. According to Turkey’s Minister of Interior Süleyman Soylu over 20,000 Ukrainians arrived in Turkey by March 6.

At the same time, many people had to leave their homes to flee to safer cities within Ukraine. The UNHCR has reported that over one million people have been internally displaced in Ukraine. Lviv, a city located in the northwest of Ukraine, is a destination people are trying to reach. The city had a population of 720,000 people before the war. Tens of thousands of people flooded the city, especially those who escaped the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv. The city is a passage point for those who want to cross to Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary.

Apart from the Ukrainian refugees who have managed to flee, many are still trying to cross the borders to European countries. Most of them are women and children since men aged between 16 and 60 have been banned from leaving the country by the Ukrainian authorities.

Morocco has always dreamed of hosting the World Cup in order to foster a positive image of itself to the world. The economic benefits, of course, are a prime consideration, but there are also other important, undeclared reasons. Yet, despite considerable efforts, thus far, Morocco has not yet managed to host the coveted cup; Morocco is busy with selling a positive image of its status as a moderate, pro-Western Muslim country, and one that spearheads the fight against “Islamist terrorism.”

To some, these titles are necessary, and especially for European politicians from all parties who are anxious to maintain good relations with Morocco because of its role as a paid policeman on the European Union’s southern border. According to international terrorism experts, including many Europeans, the “spearhead against terrorism” attribute might be exaggerated – but that is another story.

So, what a wonderful opportunity for a country whose image has deteriorated considerably in recent years after many violations of the fundamental rights of its citizens to find itself positively projected on the international scene with an event like that of the young boy Rayan, who fell into a water well near the village of Tamorot, a community located near the town of Chaouen in the mountains of northern Morocco. In this dramatic story, Morocco had everything to gain by capturing the solidarity and affection of the whole world in order to make people forget, at least momentarily, the regime’s shortcomings.

We are not going to get into second-rate conspiracy theories such as the claims that the Moroccan regime orchestrated the fall of little Rayan for political and diplomatic gain. This is neither true nor fair. But without too much hesitation one can say that the fall of this child and the quick realization in “high places” in Rabat, the capital, that Morocco could benefit from it in the media, made it possible to exploit this episode for propaganda purposes.

We saw it. As soon as the tragedy began, all public media outlets, including radio and television stations, as well as private media outlets and the written press were all immediately put to work, with special envoys or local correspondents, to make this accident a major event in the lives of Moroccans. A tragedy that was to end with a climax: Rayan was to be brought out of his grave alive. And above all, saved by Moroccan hands.

The fall of 5-year old Rayan was a tragedy that Morocco wanted to end with a climax: Rayan was to be brought out of his grave alive. And above all, saved by Moroccan hands.

By refusing to accept foreign help, precious and experienced, by making Rayan’s rescue a strictly national affair, and by putting in place the material and technical means to succeed, the Moroccan authorities had in mind a recent, similar tragedy that shook Andalusia in 2019, a Spanish region very close to the north of Morocco. There, a child named Julen had fallen into a well and rescuers had tried to save him from a gruesome death. After 13 days of superhuman effort, the Spanish rescuers, including a team of miners with expertise in underground rescue, failed. The child was found lifeless. But, for almost two weeks, Spain had found itself at the center of the world.

Today, questions and certainties remain. In seeking to show the world Moroccan “know-how” in this field at all costs – when Morocco has none – have the authorities sinned out of vanity? Did the person or persons who piloted the Rayan operation from Rabat and knowingly refused foreign help, especially that of a very experienced Spanish team that had worked on the rescue of little Julen, get carried away by a patriotic but ingenuous, even reproachful, impulse? It is difficult to answer, as the decisions taken at the top of the state are extremely opaque.

On the other hand, and this is the main backlash, during this crisis, Moroccans discovered that a significant part of their press, especially the prolific electronic sites, had a particular vision of what the National Press Council (CNP) calls “journalistic ethics.” This official body, which has so little regard for the many ignominious violations of human dignity practiced by media close to the government, suddenly remembered that a very large part of the electronic press, many of whose members had an official press card, were in fact “yellow” media.

The CNP had to wake up from its lethargy to condemn in strong terms this trashy press for having overstepped “ethical limits” by displaying “petty sensationalism to increase the number of views, among other methods, to monetize humanitarian dramas.” The CNP was obliged to detail this “petty sensationalism,” such as the publication of photos of little Rayan dying and bloodied at the bottom of the well.

While Morocco did, in fact, benefit from international media interest during the five days of this unfortunate misadventure, it was unable to achieve the climax it had hoped for – namely, to show the world the image of a living Rayan in the hands of Moroccan rescuers. Instead, Rayan unwillingly served up on a silver platter the obscene nature of this defamatory press, which is largely funded by the taxpayer.

Arguably, the only gain for the Moroccan population from this affair is a likely new legislation, which the House of Representatives of the Moroccan Parliament is reportedly preparing, to effectively regulate the illegal but tolerated practice of well construction. In the desert, south of the country, water wells are dug to alleviate the ravages of the endemic drought that prevails there. In the mountains of Morocco, to the north, wells are used to irrigate cannabis crops, the production and sale of which has just been regulated by a new law.

A very modest outcome from such a great and ephemeral media show.

Finally, it’s been put to rest. The passionate and polemical debate between those of true faith and the heretics; equality and exclusivity; those who believe in freedom and those who oppress. If anything could sound the moral death knell of Europe’s purported universalism and nonsenses their ethical absolutism, it is their treatment of refugee children. The awful abuse by those with unrivalled power upon the powerless – that too, children, is the surest indicator of venality.

Whether it’s the sexual abuse of unaccompanied children throughout Europe or the recent forcible seizure of children in Sweden, something truly unholy is happening. What kind of sick, depraved system relishes in inflicting further suffering on the grief-stricken? Pity the weak in the lands claiming liberty. More specifically, the manner in which Sweden is precariously confiscating refugee children from their biological parents is outright shocking. Not just in the grotesque manner that children have been treacherously taken away from their parents, but in the cruel, sanctimonious justifications by Swedish Social Services.

High-sounding, grand glutinous words that boldly advocate for child welfare are parroted to claim the moral high ground and then weaponized to pulverize their tender lives. Imagine the utter hypocrisy of justifying mental anguish upon already troubled, scarred families and their children, all of whom fled war. This is a criminal absurdity. Without due care, thought or consideration, the Swedish state violently disrupts the lives of some of the most alienated segments of their own society, and justifies inflicting violence with reckless allegations of parental impropriety. Could anything be more perverse and misshapen? Villainy wears many masks, none more dangerous than virtue.

Critically, to further explore this crime of stealing innocence from war-scarred refugee children, it is important to judiciously deconstruct the claims that Sweden makes. How does it justify such unscrupulous behavior? In other words, what is the rationale for taking children away from their loved ones? To begin, Sweden justifies these extreme steps based on promoting their own self-image of being ‘champions of children’s rights and by claiming “Sweden has very strong legislation in order to protect the welfare of children.” Of course, nothing more to talk about then. Let’s just take their word for it.

The Swedish state – through its child welfare services  – the ‘Social,’took possession of a newborn baby immediately after delivery.

With such logic, it is inconceivable that the Swedish social system is not altruistic, trustworthy and reliable. However, when probing the reasoning behind child seizures, the opposite is true. Stealing children is often on unfounded, flimsy allegations by third-parties, unverified checks of domestic abuse, or dubious contentions of extremism. The Swedish state – through its child welfare services  – the ‘Social,’ rapidly intervenes without a process of mediation.

In one alarming case, they took possession of a newborn baby immediately after delivery. What is especially unbelievable is that any basic level of understanding of the principles of social work and child welfare undisputedly cautions against taking children away from their families and allows so only under the strictest situations and as a ‘last resort.’

A few further problematic issues further stand out: (a) What is the record of Swedish social services when seizing children; (b) How effective are they in providing a loving, caring home to the seized children; (c) Are the religious, moral rights of the parents being respected in raising the stolen children as Muslims? First, the situation for unaccompanied refugee children in Europe, and state-seized refugee children in Sweden specifically, is abysmal.

A report, based on research conducted by Human Rights Watch in Sweden from January 25 to February 8, 2016 identifies key shortcomings in the Swedish child welfare system. As a result of these shortcomings, some children “are not receiving the care and attention they need and to which they are entitled.” In other words, the evidence by independent investigators is the Swedish child welfare program suffers from serious drawbacks. Second, there are horrific stories of child abuse occurring in the homes of the children by their adoptive guardians.

The situation for unaccompanied refugee children in Europe, and state-seized refugee children in Sweden specifically, is abysmal.

In fact, on October 16, 2021, Swedish TV Channel aired a segment on the sexual abuse of Syrian refugee children, including instances of rape of children by their Swedish legal guardian. Also, there are at least, two cases of Syrian children, Yasmine and Dina, who were forcibly taken away from their families and later committed suicide.

The suicide of those two children should raise alarm about the repercussions of the Swedish Social horrific process. So much for the unquestionable standards of Swedish child welfare. Third, the seized children rarely are placed in the care of families that recognize, or even respect, the rights of their families to have their children raised according to their own faith and ethical values. Is this not basic in a democracy which recognizes and allegedly champions pluralism? Again, no concern for the Muslim faith and heritage of these children.

Altogether, the Sweden government’s reasoning is not convincing. In fact, it is eerily familiar to the residential school system in Canada that led to unspeakable crimes against Native Canadian children who were seized by the state. Similarly, the horrible situation of child welfare services in Sweden curiously ignores the following: clear directives to only institutionalize children as a last resort; ensure the safety of refugee children; account for the horrific suicide of refugee children and prevent the alarming cases of rape and drug abuse by refugee children taken away from their families.

All of this, unequivocally, indicates that that Sweden’s policy on seizing refugee children is illegal, immoral, and untenable. And what we are witnessing in the new emerging global political, socio-economic, and cultural transformations is not just the making of a counter-world order. Rather, it is the unmasking of the utter hypocrisy, of countries like Sweden, who advocate for rights of children in order to erase them.

The COVID19 pandemic has surely been the most challenging and costly shock of the past few decades. For some, it was even the biggest shock of the post-Great Depression era. Global economic activity in 2020 went down by 3.3% – and even up to 10% declines for some including the UK. On the other hand, in today’s new post-pandemic era, it is of the uttermost importance that we have learnt from our experiences of 2020 and 2021.

Lockdowns and closures led to unprecedented supply and demand shocks, and further negative long-term effects on investment and expectations. Global lockdowns, factory and business closures, travel restrictions, and school and public service closures, all led to astronomical declines in economic activities. Supply chains were broken, production processes were stopped, and business closures and unemployment rates skyrocketed. Unemployment surge and rising inequalities followed. The poor, low-skilled, and vulnerable were impacted disproportionately by COVID19.

The most eye-catching effect of the pandemic was the increasing inequalities trend all over the world with quarantines and lockdowns contributing to the trend of the past decades. COVID19 widened the gap between the poor and the rich. Inequalities between nations and within nations have all risen. But, how exactly has the recent COVID19 pandemic widened the gap between the poor and the rich? And, what are the implications for the future?

Rising inequalities

The authors of the “World Inequality Report 2022” show that global income and wealth inequalities are at their highest levels since the peak of western imperialism at the beginning of the 20^th century. The COVID19 pandemic was, surely, one of the most significant factors behind this rising trend. (Figure 1)

Pandemic lockdowns and business closures have also affected skilled and unskilled labor, and high-income and lower-income jobs unevenly. The stimulus packages that followed also helped the rich non-symmetrically. Asset price increases, for instance, have added to the wealth of the already “overly rich.” (Figure 1)

According to Oxfam, a UK-based international NGO, the 10 richest people on earth have doubled their wealth, while the rest of the world and, in particular, 99% of humanity has been worse off during the pandemic. Global inequalities have overall increased twofold between 2019 and 2022.

Oxfam 2022 report shows that growing inequalities have even been a key factor in increasing mortality rates during the pandemic

Various reports, from the UN, the IMF, the OECD, and Oxfam as well as World Investment Reports (WIRs) on the World Inequality Database (WID) demonstrate that gender, income, wealth, and racial inequalities, as well as cross-country inequalities, are getting worse. Oxfam 2022 report shows that growing inequalities have even been a key factor in increasing mortality rates during the pandemic.

Policy implications

The need for more equitable and inclusive development and a more balanced distribution of income flow between land, labor, and capital is more evident today. There is an ever-greater need for re-organization of the roles and income flows amongst all production factors.

Meanwhile, the world is moving towards a new era where state capitalism is also more evident. Governments play a central role in new multinational corporations. In particular, the rise of China (and Asia broadly) with its own socialism and state capitalism is a new eye-catching case not to be missed. New measures are needed to ensure inclusive development. Social, psychological, human, and democratic capital accumulation processes and economic transformations remain as the challenges of this new era.

Expansionary policies and government interventions are deemed necessary during the financial turmoil and the following real economic crisis, in order to mitigate the real costs of a recessionary shock. Another noteworthy implication of the pandemic was that it led to this type of interventionist Keynesian policies and the ensuing public debt burden, as well as macroeconomic stability.

However, these expansionary monetary and fiscal policies implemented by the major world economies seem to have exacerbated income and wealth inequality. The World Bank estimates another 100-150 million people have been pushed into poverty. Oxfam estimates this number to be around 160 million people. These figures are proportionately much higher in the least developed countries (LDCs) and the Southern Hemisphere.

A new form of globalization also seems to be in order. While the new post-pandemic era has brought forth the need for more government influence and regulation, it has also resulted in a new and much more complicated form of globalization trend. The post-1980s liberalization and opening up has gained international economic, financial, and technological aspects, and globalization is no more solely a political issue.

However, this latest globalization trend has also brought cross-country dependency and spillover effects, which are self-evident in particular during crises and recessions. More synchronized negative impacts are therefore inevitable.

The way forward

The post-pandemic era is becoming well-known for an acceleration in the rise of the developing world. China and Asia are two particular examples here. Developing economies have increased their share in the global economy, since at least the global financial crisis of 2008. The COVID19 pandemic has expedited this process.

The pandemic has also shown that capitalism is dysfunctional when labor is inactive.

The pandemic has also shown that capitalism is dysfunctional when labor is inactive. There has since been more focus on income and wealth equality, the rise of states and their institutions, and public interventions. The social and human development aspects of the discussions, and the search for alternative ways of getting out of the crisis are more widespread today. Economic growth and development discussions have been less cost-efficiency related, with an emphasis on the need for fairer and more inclusive development that ensures the continuation of labor.

The pandemic’s implications for rethinking in economics, as a critical assessment of the retro-Keynesian and neoclassical schools of thought, is also noteworthy. The classical approach of a sole focus on high productivity in the long run and low inflation, and efficiency and markets acting as invisible hands have been proven incompetent, especially during recessions. The Keynesian public interventions to correct the markets, stabilizing economic activity on its trend growth, and the pure focus on maximum employment have also proven nonfunctional.

People have migrated throughout history in search of basic resources and better living conditions. According to Francis Fukuyama, after the catastrophic world wars and the collapse of communism, the liberal democratic bloc declared itself victorious and idealism was born prophesizing that state boundaries would disappear and economies would be integrated.

Alas, no great war was in sight! However, this peaceful world vision developed a boil and a new wave of unprecedented global immigration emerged. As liberalism offered a perpetual peace, Europe, the most important representative of this theory in practice, became a top destination for emigrants who are in search of a better life. The EU has become one of the largest recipients of emigrants starting from the nearby Balkans.

Indeed, it is very difficult to account for a single reason that triggers migration from the Balkans. Reasons vary and combine economic, environmental, political, and social factors. However, generally, the academic literature on emigration studies underlines the economic reason as the primary and dominant push factor.

Migration comes along with a brain drain as the skilled labor force of poor countries gets poorer due to economic and political conditions and emigrates to richer countries for higher pay. Currently, Western Balkan countries and specifically Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Serbia are losing their well-educated youth.

According to Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Youth Studies, in 2018, one third of young people from the Western Balkans expressed a “strong” or a “very strong” desire to emigrate from their countries, ranging from 26% in Montenegro, 27% in Bosnia, 30% in Serbia, 34% in Kosovo, 35% in North Macedonia, and 43% in Albania. These figures are even higher in some other studies.

A population loss

The emigration from the Balkans is considered a permanent one. Balkan countries are now in jeopardy of losing a substantial portion of their population density and their demographic characteristics.

Migration has a very general effect on the Balkans. Economically, if the shortage of qualified workers continues, it will discourage foreign investments and directly affecting the GDPs of Balkan countries. Critical industries may not be able to find qualified staff, especially the health sector. Politically, emigrants are mostly young and educated, and don’t give credit to the old-fashioned political clichés and the incapable political leaderships, which hide behind nationalist rhetoric.

Migration from the Balkans in numbers

According to the Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) of Albania, there have been  around 400,000 emigrants between 2011 and 2020. According to Hurriyet Daily, about 1.7 million, roughly 37% of the population, has left the country in the past 30 years.

Currently, the Albanian population is 2,837,740 and the primary destinations of emigration are Italy and Greece. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Albania ranks 4th globally in the emigration of a skilled labor force and most youth dream of a future abroad.

Additionally, some officials and researchers don’t trust KAS numbers. According to them, KAS estimates are lower and the real numbers are higher. Also, interestingly, between 2014 and 2015, around 100,000 Kosovars emigrated to the EU, a massive emigration wave that was dismissed by the government of Kosovo at that time. The number of emigrants in 2019 was 34,911, and the chief destinations were Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria.

It is hard to find an accurate data on Montenegrin emigration. According to data by the United Nations, in 2015 the population of Montenegro was 625,781. Additionally, based on UN statistics, the overall number of Montenegrin immigrants worldwide increased from 148,982 in 2010 to 153,009 in 2019. Germany receives the highest number of Montenegrin immigrants, and Italy and Luxemburg were among the most popular countries. However, in recent years, preferences have changed and intraregional migration has become more popular, especially to former Yugoslav states such as Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia due to the proximity and cultural similarities.

Lastly, the current population of Serbia is around 6,908,220. The UN estimated that emigrants from Serbia in 2017 reached nearly one million at a rate of between 30,000 and 60,000 a year since the breakup of Yugoslavia. The main destinations of Serbs are Austria, Germany, and Switzerland.

Urgent need to end brain drain

Can a common solution be found for the continuous emigration waves from the Balkans? First of all, the European Union should seriously step in and provide financial support in finding an applicable policy. Since the EU opened up for skilled labor from non-EU countries, it is partly responsible and should take responsibility for the brain drain in the Western Balkans.

Especially Germany, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland should share the burden as they have benefitted the most. If the necessary precautions are not taken, Balkan countries will lose their youth and enthusiasm, and will end up empty villages within the so-called global village.

What is more, Western Balkan countries need to improve their databases on emigration. This is crucial to understanding the situation on the ground in order to formulate and recommend proper policies. Regular assessment is a must in line with accurate data and monitoring mechanisms.

The Western Balkan governments have to reverse this brain drain and encourage the sustainable return and placement of skilled emigrants in developing sectors such as IT, digitalization, robotics, design, etc. Countries could follow the example of Croatia.

In a critical time for Boris Johnson, Nusrat Ghani’s allegations have roiled the Conservative Party. The prime minister is awaiting the outcome of a pivotal inquiry into lockdown-flouting parties in Downing Street that took place during a period when government-backed public health restrictions prohibited most social gatherings.

In an interview with the Sunday Times, Nusrat Ghani said that when she was fired as transport minister during a reshuffle in 2020, she was informed that “Muslimness” had been mentioned as a concern at a Downing Street meeting.

“At the post-reshuffle meeting with the whips, I asked what the thinking was behind the decision to fire me…that my ‘Muslim woman minister’ status was making colleagues uncomfortable and that there were concerns ‘that I wasn’t loyal to the party as I didn’t do enough to defend the party against Islamophobia allegations.”

The accusations made by Ghani have been previously echoed by former Tory peer Baroness Sayeeda Warsi, the country’s first female Muslim cabinet minister and a persistent campaigner against Islamophobia. When she learned that Javid had been named chancellor, she stated in a tweet “It’s a shame… that it’s taken four years and a leadership contest to finally drag my colleagues kicking and screaming to address this issue.”

To be an Anti-Muslim bigot is to be rewarded and elevated to a party post but to speak out against it is to be shunned and politically exiled.

There has been criticism from the wider British Muslim community on Ghani’s role as a Conservative MP in normalizing anti-Muslim bigotry through government initiatives such as Prevent. Ghani’s definition of Islamophobia is markedly different from the standard definition, which is as follows: “Intense dislike or fear of Islam, especially as a political force; hostility or prejudice towards Muslims.”

“Thus, if the archetypal radicalizer in the first decade after 9/11 was the almost pantomime figure of Abu Hamza with his eye-patch, hook hands and wild rhetoric; his counterpart in the last ten years was likely to be smartly dressed, soft-spoken and to mouth platitudes about social justice and human rights,” she continued as saying.

Prevent has faced criticism not only from civil organizations but international bodies including the UN.

In a report on anti-Muslim hate and discrimination by UN Special Rapporteur, Ahmed Shaheed, on Freedom of Religion or Belief submitted, it stated the key issues form the Prevent Strategy:

• That the Prevent duty was leaving students fearful of exercising their rights to freedom of expression and belief.
• The Prevent duty risked being counter-productive by driving children to discuss issues related to terrorism, religion, and identity outside the classroom and online, where simplistic narratives are promoted and go unchallenged.

The language used by media outlets and politicians, notably during the “war on terror,” has contributed to the normalization of this bigotry. As with other types of discrimination, it is critical to hear the victims’ voices loudly.

Despite mounting worries from the British Muslim community over escalating Anti-Muslim prejudice, the conservative party has failed to settle on a definition. Islamophobia, as defined by the All-Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, is “rooted in racism and is a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness.”

The Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru, and the Mayor of London have all endorsed this term, but the Conservative Party has rejected it. The Tory government’s refusal to adopt the definition of Islamophobia despite the support of the definition by cross party parliamentarians is a reflection of the party’s stance towards Muslims and Islam.

A YouGov poll conducted on behalf of Hope Not Hate (an non-partisan organization tackling racism and fascism) show Conservative members showing worrying beliefs in Islamophobic myths, don’t want a Muslim to be Prime Minister, and overwhelmingly reject even the very idea that the Conservative Party has a problem with this issue.” 67% believe  “there are areas in Britain that operate under Sharia law,” as opposed to just 18% who oppose this. 39% of members believe that “Islamist terrorists reflect a widespread hostility to Britain amongst the Muslim community”.

Although the Conservatives are in power and have the responsibility of bringing this problem to the forefront, Islamophobia is not only a Conservative issue; the Labour Party is not exempt.

According to a report conducted by the Labour Muslim Network in Nov 2020 on Islamophobia and the Muslim experience, 29% of Muslim members and supporters have directly experienced Islamophobia in the Labour Party, 37% have directly witnessed Islamophobia within the Labour Party and 44 % don’t think the party takes it seriously.

Regardless of how strongly one may disagree with Nusrat Ghani, justice requires that we contextualize this moment within the larger framework of Islamophobia that Muslims suffer. In the end, when we tolerate one person’s persecution, we all lose. While we are not compelled to demonstrate sympathy or solidarity with one person, we must evaluate all angles in the injustice of Anti-Muslim bigotry, Anti- Muslim hatred, Islamophobia (which all mean the same thing).

Changing a word’s spelling, but the intent remains the same, defining the issue is never the problem, genuine change usually is.

In his definition of monarchical tendencies in African political culture, Professor Ali Mazrui put forward four factors. The first factor is the quest for aristocratic effect, as leaders desire large consumptions and expensive lifestyles. The second factor is the personalization of authority which in some instances goes to the extent of creating a distinct or royal title for the leader. The third factor is the sacralization of authority, which relates to personalizing authority and glorifying a leader and his office or institution. The fourth and last factor is the search for a royal historical identity motivated by a vague sense that national dignity would be lacking without a glorious past of ancient and kingly success. These factors could be seen in some African countries that practice family dynasties today.

Political dynasty exists when close family members or relatives succeed a retiring leader or president in office. It is more associated with monarchies, and political dynasty is not peculiar to Africa even though kings still reign majestically in most African countries due to their position as custodians of tradition and history of their people.

Multi-party elections and peaceful transfers of power have become more common in the continent since the 1990s, and today, among the fifty-four countries in Africa only three monarchies still maintain their monarchical status as head of state or government (Morocco, Lesotho, and Swaziland).

However, family dynasties could also be seen in some African countries. The common examples of ruling families and family dynasties in the continent are the handing over of power from fathers to sons, or from one brother to another. The current examples of sons succeeding their fathers are that of Gabon, Togo, Kenya, and Chad. In other countries with the longest-serving presidents, such as Uganda, Equatorial Guinea, and Cameroon, leaders are planning to hand power to their sons.

Family politics and ruling dynasties in Africa could be seen more in local government’s politics and state positions where candidates campaign based on their kinship or dynasty lineage.

There have been several failed plans by some presidents to make their wives the next presidents. In Zimbabwe, former leader, Robert Mugabe failed in his plan of handing power to his wife, which led to a crisis within his party ZANU-PF and the 2017 coup d’état. In South Africa, former president Jacob Zuma couldn’t influence his party, the African National Congress (ANC) during his ex-wife, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s leadership battle.

Family politics and ruling dynasties in Africa could be seen more in local government’s politics and state positions where candidates campaign based on their kinship or dynasty lineage. Yet, at the continental and national levels, the examples of Kenya, Ghana, and Chad offer a clear glimpse of ruling families and their impacts on democratic systems and politics.

Also, supporters and campaigns tend to focus on the personalities and family records of both men; Kenyatta’s political influence as the son of the first president and his family fortune all provide him with a distinct edge in elections, while on the other hand, Odinga’s supports cut across those who saw him as representing the economically and politically marginalized communities. For many Kenyans, the competition and rivalry between the two families mean choosing between Kenyatta who is the “good son” of the palace that will spend anything to protect the status quo, or between Odinga who is an underdog that will revolutionize the polity.

The implications of the family dynasty in Chad could be seen in the personification of state and national politics, constitutional amendments, and the cult of personality that revolves around the Débys.

In Chad, the ruling family has the fingerprints of military elements and foreign power support. In 1990, former president Idriss Déby, a Zaghawa of the Bideyat clan seized power and ruled the country until his sudden death in 2021 due to the injuries he sustained during clashes with northern rebels. The solution in this situation, as called for in Chad’s constitution is to hand power over to the National Assembly. However, the military and presidency disregarded the constitution and swiftly named General Mahamat, Déby’s 37-year-old son as the country leader. The unconstitutional move was also supported by many African and foreign leaders, including France who all pointed to the increase in terrorism and violent activities in Lake Chad and Sahel regions.

The implications of the family dynasty in Chad could be seen in the personification of state and national politics, constitutional amendments, and the cult of personality that revolves around the Débys. The 30-year rule of Idriss Déby is characterized by assigning family members and allies from his Zaghawa ethnic group to senior government positions.

Chad is highly diverse ethnically, hence tearing up the constitution after the death of Idriss Déby and putting another Déby at the helm of power complicate the relationships between Zaghawa which dominates the national politics, and others. This also led to divisions within the military, and intensified the internal crisis between the ruling family, especially between General Mahamat and his brother Zakaria, who was rumored to have been one of the first in line for succession.

In Ghana, the current president, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, was born into a prominent family and a residence that headquartered the first political party in Ghana. Akufo-Addo’s father, Edward, grand uncle, J.B. Danquah, and uncle, William Ofori Atta were all among the “Big Six” leaders (or founding fathers) that helped Ghana gain independence in 1957. Akufo-Addo’s supporters are also quick to point to his father’s contribution to Ghana whenever the opportunity arises.

However, the case of Ghana is different from what is seen in other African nations that practice family dynasties in politics, such as Togo or Chad, because the long-established families in Ghana play by the rules. Family ties in the Ghanaian case don’t necessarily weaken the democratic institutions, as Ghana is regarded as one of the most stable democracies in Africa, and everyone still has the same chance and opportunity to run for political seats.

Through the above examples and Mazrui’s definition, one could conclude that family dynasties have their roots in African cultures which promote the continuation of legacies and expansion of kingdoms from fathers to sons. The impacts in modern democratic politics, however, are that political power is concentrated in one or few families and authority is restricted amid a few, hence political rule in a country turns into a monarchical system.

Although some might argue that family dynasties bring development and stability in some countries, the conclusion that could be derived from the realities in many African countries is that the culture of family dynasties in democratic systems will result in prioritizing family lineage and alliance over competence, weak accountability, lack of competitiveness, transparency, representation in politics and more divisions among different ethnic groups. And the end products are corruption, bad governance, and economic mismanagement.

Since 2017, Judge Mario Carroza has been investigating the illegal adoptions from Chile which are estimated to number over 20,000 from the 1950s to the late 1990s. The judicial investigation so far has revealed that several professionals in trusted positions, such as doctors, social workers, religious persons and judges, were complicit in the trafficking network. So sophisticated was the network, that 19 juvenile court, 28 health centres, 24 religious or private homes, as well as 72 buildings in Chile were used as nurseries to host children pending their adoption. Mothers, meanwhile, were fed lies by professionals, including that their children were deceased, in order to sever any possibility of searches and reunification.

The US-backed Chilean dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet is well known for the neoliberal experiment unleashed upon the country. Against a backdrop of torture and disappearances which alerted the world to human rights violations in the country, the Pinochet dictatorship sought to embellish its image. Promoting a veneer of welfare was an integral part of its propaganda, and children became the unknown victims of an intricate trafficking network which facilitated the illegal adoption of minors to foreign countries.

Between 1971 and 1992, it is estimated that over 2,100 Chilean children were illegally adopted to Sweden. In October 2021, Swedish Social Affairs Minister Lena Hallengren announced an investigation into the adoptions. This comes after several years of the Swedish media reporting about irregularities in adoption documents.

Initial research in Chile pointed towards the Swedish Adoption Centre as facilitating the adoptions between both countries. Diplomatic relations between Sweden and Chile during the Pinochet dictatorship was marked by a right-wing campaign to combat the image portrayed by Chilean exiles which was vocal about the human rights violations in the country. The Sweden-Chile Society, which espoused fascist ideology and collaborated with Chile over the surveillance of exiles, was instrumental in facilitating ties between the dictatorship and the Swedish Adoption Centre.

Adoption became a policy for the Chilean state – a means through which Pinochet could establish diplomatic ties in countries where large communities of Chileans had sought exile.

Adoption became a policy for the Chilean state – a means through which Pinochet could establish diplomatic ties in countries where large communities of Chileans had sought exile. Between 1978 and 1988, the dictatorship institutionalized forced adoption through the National Plan for Minors

Charlotta Haggren was adopted to Sweden on January 1, 1974. She was the pilot case for adoptions from Chile to Sweden, according to Anna Maria Elmgren – a Swedish woman who worked for the Swedish Adoption Centre and whose name has been linked to several illegal adoptions.

CAW serves as a platform for adoptees globally. Many adoptees do not speak Spanish, having been brought up away from their home country and distant to news from Chile. The organization’s first concern was to bring news related to the illegal adoptions to the adoptees by means of their website, in English.

One of CAW’s main objectives nowadays is family searches and reunions. Alejandro Quezada, CAW’s founder, explains that a connection with the past, to establish what happened is important, notable the separation of children from the mothers and the ensuing abductions.

Currently, Quezada adds, the connection between adoptees is crucial. He explains that many adoptee groups may focus on different issues. “But one can see that one of the subjects is the “getting out of the fog”, understanding that the history they were always told about their adoption, might perhaps not be true. Or they know isn’t true because they found their biological family who tell the other side of the story which doesn’t coincide with what the adoptee was always told. Today, when adoptees get connected to our network and are looking for the truth, it is their believe there could be more to it and they look for like-minded adoptees from the same birth country to reflect with and understand their history more in depth.”

Quezada reflected upon how the investigations in Sweden are an important link in order to establish what went on Chile. “CAW as a platform is and will remain to be connected with the deputy who helped to have this investigation to start up. In case that we can offer anything in any form that can help the investigation move forward, then we will provide that, taking into consideration the privacy of the persons in case it would be personal information.”

“Because it is important that Sweden tries to get the truth to the surface like they did in the Netherlands, it is of the utmost importance that information is shared in order for the investigation team to have a clear picture of history in intercountry adoptions. We will be awaiting the outcome of the Swedish investigation while remaining actively involved in initiating similar investigations with other European countries and governments. Once the results of the Swedish investigation are being published, we will most likely have in depth conversations with the people who initiated the investigation to look into further steps towards the Chilean part of it. Taking into consideration that today, Chile is the only country who send their children away to be adopted abroad and is investigating their history towards this crime against humanity,” Quezada explained.

On the Sweden investigation, Quezada notes, “Any result of the investigation will have an impact. Not only on the adoptee but on the whole adoption environment currently in place in Sweden. Also, any investigation and their results of a government into intercountry adoptions is not only being followed by adoptees who live in that country, but by adoptees worldwide. Question remains, what will be the following steps of the government after the results have been published. Which action will be taken to future generations if any.”

Social media came with a lot of promise. Initially, there was a hope that we may be able to reclaim the public space that traditional, collectivist society had to cede to an increasingly individualist, modern one. But the digital bridges that social media platforms built, made each one of us even more distant, leaving us permanently settling on secluded islands.

In some ways, we parted from ourselves in the process. Today, we write odes to nature, we tweet eulogies to photographers, we sing praises to artists, but hardly ever take the time to live through the delightful experiences delineated in these depictions. The gracious warmth of the sun, the hesitant whispers of the caressing winds, the shy glimmer of the defiant moonlight, almost each and every expression of nature has lost its meaning in “our reality,” eclipsed by the virtual.

The rare instances where we do get a chance to be at one with nature are again taken over by an excruciating impatience to share our experience with our “network.” The obsession with taking the right shot of the ethereal glide of a seagull has taken precedence over absorbing the breathtaking beauty of its carefree flight, clipping our own wings.

Nature has become a mere instrument for our own celebration – a thinly-veiled narcissism. We have lost the ability to be where we presently are. We stay in a state of projection, obsessed with illusive ideations of the “shareability” of a sight, at the cost of appreciation of its subtleties in the present.

Unfortunately, the profound appreciation we crave for, artificial intelligence cannot deliver at its finest mirage. Perversely, more or less, every share on social media brings some form of anxiety. Sometimes it’s from eagerness for more shares. Sometimes it’s a concern about possible reactions. Sometimes it springs from envy, when a friend’s post steals the limelight. It’s like being in the spotlight 24/7.

Perversely, more or less, every share on social media brings some form of anxiety.

As almost all teenagers with access to a smart device use social media, this becomes all the more concerning. According to research, 3 in 4 persons who develop a psychological issue are diagnosed before their 18th birthday.

On the other side of the coin of this bizarre flaunting epidemic lies obnoxious abuse, which social media tends to reward. Anyone is free to say anything, as thoughtless as it might be, about one’s religion, ethnicity, or even appearance, irrespective of the veracity of the contention. The algorithms are sometimes designed to even pick “dislikes” or “angry” reactions as a form of engagement, amplifying the reach of fake, polarizing content.

On the other side of the coin of this bizarre flaunting epidemic lies obnoxious abuse, which social media tends to reward.

A particular form of abuse, “trolling,” is a deliberate attack on a person for maximum “likes” from a specific cluster of users. Much to one’s dismay, a troll could be a 14-year-old anonymous user or a 64-year-old “thinker” who enjoys maintaining a provocative persona. With a bizarre air of righteousness, they could troll someone to prove the superiority of their favorite cartoon character or to establish the inferiority of an ideology that half the world adheres to.

Disrespect, in this appalling virtual world, is a brand; words are a weapon; images are mere toys; and the ability to enrage others is a prized virtue. No wonder, trolling behavior has been found to be correlated with psychopathic tendencies, sadism, and Machiavellianism.

Predictably, instead of constructive engagement and building bridges,  social media have effectively divided people into clusters and subcultures. A person reveling in being celebrated online and drawing consolation from being connected to people around the world is sometimes just networking with the worst of the animal spirits within. They are sinking deeper and deeper into their own cluster, with the outside, diverse world, starting to feel more alien. This becomes a lifestyle eventually and has lifelong effects on a person’s ability to respect differences of opinion and build empathetic relationships.

Social media have contributed to developing an “information superstructure” which is more powerful than the political and judicial institutions of control.

Of course, social media has a potential for good too. It has sometimes shown promise against entrenched power structures in the world. In fact, it has risen as a significant challenge against oppressive states and obscene occupations the world over, sometimes catching them completely off guard.

Nevertheless, social media have contributed to developing an “information superstructure” which is more powerful than the political and judicial institutions of control – noble in name and carriage, but motivated by little other than profits at the base.

At the micro-level, it’s a quagmire, painstakingly developed by “attention engineers” to monetize the adrenaline of unsuspecting users and capitalize on the digital addiction it creates. That benign-sounding “suggested” content may change the course of one’s life, bit by bit, forever – a theme brilliantly covered in the award-winning documentary “The Social Dilemma” featuring a hair-raising, insider account of the nuts and bolts of the Big Tech.

It would take a miracle to go back from how far we have come. But social media companies – motivated by a model aptly described as “surveillance capitalism” by the Harvard professor Shoshana Zuboff – shouldn’t be given a blank check in programming behaviors and reshaping the globe. The world must come together to devise apolitical mechanisms to keep these tech giants in check, focusing foremost on psychological health and well-being at large. On the individual level, relatively active consumption of content, more perceptive interactions, and avoiding being sucked down the rabbit hole of arguing with the ultracrepidarian could be helpful.

In the final analysis, however, it may be said that whether or not we realize it, in this taxing world, every one of us is longing for a break: a deep silence in placid woods somewhere by a river, a moment of heartfelt love and overwhelming appreciation, either from us, or for us – things that social media, at best, can give us only a weak nostalgia for. If Wordsworth were here, he’d perhaps have rather written, “The digital world is too much with us.”

For decades, the geopolitical and geo-sectarian rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has played out across the Middle East in various destabilizing ways. Since the Houthi rebels usurped control of Sana‘a in 2014, Yemen has been an important flashpoint in this competition for regional influence with Riyadh and Yemeni forces loyal to the UN-recognized Yemeni government waging war against the Iranian-backed insurgents for nearly seven years. The conflict(s) in Yemen still rages on. In recent days, the Government of Yemen “liberated” energy-rich Shabwah while the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed al-Amaliqa Brigades has been advancing into Marib. Meanwhile, Houthi missiles attacks keep on targeting their enemies, most recently including the UAE, at least according to the rebel group’s claims.

A major question that analysts have been asking since Saudi-Iranian talks began in Baghdad in April 2021 is, what could such dialogue mean for Yemen? It seems safe to conclude that although these talks have not led to major strategic or necessarily tangible changes in Yemen, there have been some tactical changes that could be grounds for some cautious optimism.

An important development in late 2021 was the death of Hassan Erlou who served as Iran’s ambassador to the Houthis. His passing called into question the relationship between the Houthis and their backers in Tehran, and how that could change the face of the war in Yemen. Erlou, who was smuggled into Yemen in 2020, was likely evacuated on an Iraqi plane from Yemen to Iraq, before flying home to Iran where he died from COVID19 on December 18, 2021.

“Erlou was obviously, from the evidence that we have, someone who was quite closely tied into the [Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)] and the Quds force,” explained Dr. Andreas Krieg, a senior lecturer at the School of Security Studies at King’s College London, Royal College of Defense Studies, in an interview with Politics Today. “He was on the U.S. Treasury watch list. Having someone like him leaving [Yemen] without being actually arrested and then flying over Saudi territory was quite a concession from the side of the Saudis. This was only possible because of Iraqi mediation.”

Yet there were many conflicting reports about Erlou and his situation in Yemen just before leaving the country. The Saudis and Iranians told different stories about what had happened as well as the significance of and reasons for his exit from Yemen. “According to the Saudis, Erlou’s return to Tehran reflected tensions between the Houthis and Iran, but there has been little evidence of a breach in the relationship between Sanaa and Tehran,” according to Dr. Annelle Sheline, a Research Fellow for the Middle East at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Some reports even claimed that the Houthis were pushing for Erlou’s exit due to rising domestic pressure to distance themselves from Tehran.

Nonetheless, as Dr. Krieg explained, beyond all the facades and information warfare, there is a renewed willingness to talk between Riyadh and Tehran. In fact, last month when the Organization of Islamic Cooperation gathered in Pakistan to address the situation in post-U.S, Afghanistan, diplomats from the Saudi Kingdom and the Islamic Republic met.

This meeting between Saudi and Iranian officials in Islamabad “suggests that there is a willingness and also permission from the superiors to actually have these talks continue and that’s the most important thing,” according to Dr. Krieg. Additionally, in late 2021 the Saudi government granted Iranian diplomats visas at the OIC—a development suggesting that Riyadh and Tehran could possibly restore diplomatic relations this year.

Last month, the Saudi-led coalition released video footage and photographs that purportedly confirmed that the Houthis are receiving support from Hezbollah and the IRGC. The videos purportedly show a Hezbollah leader giving Houthi leader Abdullah Yahya Al-Hakim instructions, Hezbollah trainers teaching Houthis to operate drones, boxes of drone parts with the Hezbollah logo, and satellite footage showing how the IRGC has assisted the Houthis in transforming the Sanaa International Airport into a drone and missile launching pad.

“The Saudis want the Iranians to stop their surrogate operations across the region, whether it may be in Yemen or Iraq,” argued Dr. Krieg. “The problem with that is that the Iranians are saying there are no surrogate operations, and that these are local operations which we have no control over, which is obviously a lie. But it’s obviously this kind of surrogate game is one that’s based on dissociation and plausible deniability. Hence, why it’s very difficult to come to any conclusion because the Iranians will say in the first place ‘we have no forces on the ground, so we have no control over what’s going on’. It’s true to an extent. The control that the Iranians have over surrogate operations is limited. That’s something that the Saudis understand, and it always provides the Iranians with a degree of plausible deniability and disassociation to tell others that they’re actually not involved. That makes it difficult to come up with a solution that is sustainable.”

These recent developments leave us questioning how Erlou’s replacement will affect the situation in Yemen. Earlier this month, Iranian officials appointed Abdul Reza Shahlai as Erlou’s replacement without giving him an official diplomatic title, which some believe may be a sign of positive relations between Tehran and Riyadh. According to Gregory Johnsen, a nonresident fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution: “If the narrative of a split between the Houthis and Iran is true, then it is notable that Shahlai will not be given a diplomatic title, and by selecting an official already in Yemen, Iran honored the Houthi commitment to Saudi Arabia not to bring in a ‘new diplomat’.” However, his appointment could also simply be a means of convenience. Shahlai has been in Yemen for several years, meaning that they would not have to go through the effort to smuggle a new diplomat into the country and he is already a seasoned military commander with experience in Yemen.

In the final analysis, Saudi Arabia will continue to see Iran as a threat in the long term, no matter the direction that dialogue between the two countries takes in 2022. Iranian influence in Yemen will continue terrifying the Saudis. Nonetheless, one can assume that thanks to Iraqi mediation the likelihood of a repeat of the Saudi Aramco attacks of September 2019 has decreased.

Within the context of the Iranians wanting to improve their relationship with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in order to create a new architecture in the sub-region, we might see Tehran begin to show more sensitivity toward Saudi security as it directly pertains to the Gulf. But beyond the Gulf, it is tough to imagine talks in Iraq between Riyadh and Tehran leading to the Islamic Republic winding down its surrogate or “proxy” operations throughout the greater Middle East.

Lord Alf Dubs was a former child refugee who escaped Nazi-occupied Prague on the Kindertransport in 1939 and was one of 669 Czech children saved by English stock dealer Nicholas Whinton. He went on to become an MP and a member of the House of Lords in the United Kingdom, as well as a passionate activist for refugee rights and a patron of a number of refugee-related organizations. Ayan Mohamed Ali spoke with him about his personal connection to the refugee plight and how his experiences with the Kindertransport initiative can assist influence UK government policy on refugees crossing the English Channel.

Q. Could you give a quick overview of your background in connection to the present refugee crisis for our readers who may be hearing about you for the first time?

I came to Britain as a child, an unaccompanied child refugee in 1939 on a Kindertransport. I’ve been active in politics for a long time. I was the director of the Refugee Council for some years, and I was in the House of Commons. I was active with refugees then, and in the House of Lords, I became more active with refugees. More recently, I got an amendment, so in 2016, which the government eventually had to accept, for getting unaccompanied child refugees to Britain.

That was passed, and several 100 got through under that amendment. I got to another amendment that family unions continue, where possible, under the European Union treaty, even after we left the EU, and that passed both houses 920 – 17, but the government deleted it in 2019. So, there are very few safe routes for child refugees, and certainly none from Europe at the present time.

Q. Do you believe that seeing the names and faces of the refugees who drowned trying to reach Britain will help to improve the existing unfavorable perception of refugees and the reluctance of some British people and the government to welcome more?

I certainly think that the shocking van in the tragedy of those people a couple of weeks ago was absolutely horrific. Whether that will make much difference to the government’s attitude, I don’t know. The government seemed to blame it on the traffickers but show little sympathy for the refugees who have no other way of coming here except to traffickers because the government have closed all the doors. What I believe is important is that people in this country should be made fully aware of the circumstances under which refugees have fled their country, fleeing from war, persecution, oppression, discrimination.

I think if there’s a better understanding of the awful lives, and the awful fear that they left behind, then there’d be more sympathy for those that come here, because these are not people who are just trying to improve their condition. Not that there’s anything wrong with time to improve your condition. But these are people who fled and have the full protection of the United Nations Geneva Convention.

Q. What’s your response to those who say accepting unaccompanied child refugees will create a pull factor, whereby migrants are incentivized to undertake dangerous journeys across the Mediterranean to places like Greece in the hope of being resettled elsewhere in Europe.

This is always the argument that people use the pull factors. I’m not convinced by that argument at all. I think that our push factors in terms of the terrible situation that refugees are left behind, I don’t think the pull factors really carry much weight in the argument.

Obviously, we want to make our country as welcoming as possible for refugees, although I don’t think we’re doing that

Obviously, we want to make our country as welcoming as possible for refugees, although I don’t think we’re doing that. Some of the terrible situations that child refugees have left, there was one same boy who told me that he’d seen his father blown up in front of him by a bomb in Aleppo, Damascus. It is the fear of that situation that drives people to leave much more than any pull factor.

Q. Many British residents have been turned off from engaging in the political process because of the lack of compassion in political arguments over immigration in parliament. What steps do you believe the government should take to address this?

Our problem is that the government has contributed to the hostility because they’ve announced they want to keep the numbers down. The signaling all the time that refugees are not welcome here. The new legislation that just passed the House of Commons and is going through the House of Lords will make the environment even more difficult for refugees.

I think what we need is a government that shows leadership, and that says where people are fleeing for safety. But under the International Geneva Convention, we as a country should be welcoming, rather than hostile. And the difficulty is that if senior politicians make hostile remarks against local communities, it’s not surprising. If there’s some hostility I think that is depressing and awful. I think what all would like is for political leaders to help public opinion to understand why people are fleeing. To say that as a country, we should be humanitarian, and welcome and we can’t take all refugees but those who we take, we should be welcoming.

Mpanzu Bamenga was eight years old when in 1994, he fled from the Congo to the Netherlands with his mother and older brother. Today, he is a municipal councilor in the Dutch city of Eindhoven and a passionate advocate for human rights. In 2016, he was elected the “Political Talent of the Year” as a councilor in the city of Eindhoven. In 2018, Bamenga arrived at the airport of his Dutch hometown after having lectured on human rights in Italy. He was selected by the border police for a passport check as according to the officials his appearance matched the risk profile of a “Nigerian money smuggler.” Latife Özdemir of Politics Today interviewed Bamenga – you can read the full interview here.

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Q. What is racial profiling, and should people worry about it?

Racial profiling is a forbidden form of discrimination by the government. Yes, it is something people should worry about because racial profiling comes from the idea that someone can be judged based on their skin color, ethnicity, or nationality instead of this person’s character. It is also against the fundamental right of being treated equally. It is against human rights. It threatens what we stand for and who we are as human beings.

Q. Not long ago, we were discussing racial profiling in the Unites States, but nowadays it seems that the issue also started to appear in the Netherlands as for example in the cases of Mitch Henriquez and the 17-year-old Rishi Chandrikasing, who was fatally shot by the police in 2012. Is racial profiling of Black people and citizens with an immigrant background becoming widespread in the Netherlands?

I think that racial profiling has always been there. To fight against something, you should first make it visible. It has always been hidden. It’s been brought to light – this is a step to fight against racial profiling. The first anti-discrimination bureaus in the Netherlands were opened 30 years ago. They basically started after situations of racism. It is widespread, not only in practice but also in policy. It is institutionalized in our society and to fight against it, we should address it. It is also part of implicit biases, and we act upon it, which is wrong because it can be contrary to one’s beliefs and values. But it is even worse if you act upon it and you are an official of the government.

Q. Do you think that the situation regarding racial profiling increased after events such as 9/11 for example?

I think that these kinds of events are used as a justification. For instance, now we have people coming from several countries, Syria, Afghanistan, etc. And now we are using it as a justification to say “We have to stop illegal migration, so how can we stop it if we are not able to control passports?” Well, ethnic profiling doesn’t mean that the border police can’t control passports – they can. But the question is “How do they do this?” Do they look at someone’s skin color and assume that this person must be from Syria, Afghanistan, or Africa? Or thinking that someone must be a money smuggler, a criminal, or a terrorist based on someone’s color? This is forbidden and against human rights.

Q. You experienced a racial profiling situation three years ago, how did you feel at the time?

It is very humiliating, and it also stigmatizes because it fits within the idea that the person who is stopped is a non-white person, so there must be, or there could be, something wrong. – It fits into stigmatization, which has consequences in society. For instance, when a young person wants to apply for an internship and the employee just looks at the name (Mohammed) and that person doesn’t even get the opportunity to present themselves or to get an internship at an organization.

This is a very big issue in the Netherlands. We have a lot of labor market and housing discrimination.

This is a very big issue in the Netherlands. We have a lot of labor market and housing discrimination. There are a lot of things going on here when it comes to the idea that when someone comes from a different country, this must be “wrong.” People are not judged by their character but by certain characteristics which you can’t change. It also shouldn’t matter what your religion or your skin color is. What they do is dehumanizing and humiliating if you are the victim.

Q. What are the legal mechanisms to face racial profiling?

When certain individuals have racially profiled a person, this person can file a complaint. This is a simple thing to do, one can go to court. After the complaint, one can go to the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman must look into the situation. One can go to the police or the anti-discrimination bureau as well.

Q. What are your thoughts regarding the decision of the court in your case?

The decision was not what we expected. Even though we know racial profiling is instituted, it is still a shock to hear the judge basically mentioning that it is all fine for the border police to stop someone also based on his or her skin color. It is pretty shocking that the law justifies this.  Still, our legal system gives us the possibility to go to a higher court. Especially in this case, when we talk about a fundamental issue, it is crucial and necessary to go to a higher court.

We started a petition which says “My color doesn’t say anything about my Dutch citizenship.”

Q. The decision at the higher court will be in nine months. What are you going to do until then? Are you planning to raise more awareness or to carry out any other activities?

Yes, we started a petition which says “My color doesn’t say anything about my Dutch citizenship.” We hope that we will get support and as many people as possible will sign it. I am sure that we already achieved more awareness, and that more and more people will understand what it is about and why racial profiling should be forbidden in the Netherlands. I hope the court will decide that ethnicity can never be a part of profiling,when there is no concrete suspect.

Q. As the municipal councilor in Eindhoven, what do you think about the house of representatives’ stance when it comes to racial profiling? Some argue that it’s passive. Do you agree?

At this moment, the judgement is still in the courts’ hands so the parliament must be careful about how to intervene. Therefore, I understand that some members of the parliament are hesitant to act at this point. But at the same time, a legal procedure can take up to six years, while the government is the executive body and parliament the legislative body, they can change this discriminatory situation tomorrow if they want. They don’t need a court decision for that.

Q. Do you think that the profiling and surveillance of people will become a bigger issue in Western democracies?

As long as we don’t fight racial profiling, it could be. It is simply a stupid idea to stop someone according to their looks or ethnicity. I believe that more awareness seems to be important, and especially having a mixed environment in education. We should do more in the field of education.

Q. You said during a speech three years ago that you still believe in a world which is just, inclusive, and where everyone is treated equally. Is the gap between the current situation and the ideal widening? If yes, is there still hope to achieve the world you talk about?

Of course, I believe in it with all my heart. I’m very positive and I believe that we are making important steps, and that we are in a final moment to change the world for the better. I think it is important to mention the words of Martin Luther King, “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.” This means that even though you are in a good situation you should think and care about other events happening in the world.

In June of this year, the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, failed to pass a law extending a ban on family unifications for Palestinian families, both those living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and those holding Israeli passports. The discriminatory law could not pass due to domestic competition and political differences among Israeli political parties following the formation of a government led by Naftali Bennet, a right-wing politician who replaced Benjamin Netanyahu, who is now haunted by charges of corruption while in office.

The Family Unification Law, designed to separate Palestinian families, came into effect in 2000, with the Israeli authorities claiming security concerns behind not giving residency and citizenship to Palestinians (or Arabs) marrying either Palestinians who hold Palestinian passports or Palestinians who hold Israeli passports. Here is the story of how some 22,000 Palestinians, according to the “Family Unification Is My Right” campaign, have ended up stateless under this law.

In 1967, Israel conducted a population registry. At the time, it excluded some 270,000 Palestinians from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip who happened to be outside of the Palestinian territories or were forced to leave the area when Israel occupied it. These Palestinians and their children became stateless and were unable to return back to the Gaza Strip or the West Bank.

Israel also applied the same regulations to Palestinians living in Israel and holding Israeli citizenship, where family unifications were banned under security concerns. This family unification ban targeted Palestinians who married Arabs, mostly from countries such as Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, and other countries which Israel categorizes as “enemies.”

Since 2000, when the Second Palestinian Intifada broke out, Israel has used family unifications as a bargaining chip against Palestinians.

Since 2000, when the Second Palestinian Intifada broke out, Israel has used family unifications as a bargaining chip against Palestinians, whereby it has granted only a few thousand Palestinians residence permits in return for political gains from the Palestinian Authority in 2008 and 2021.

Recently, and following the Israeli parliament’s failure to extend the family unification law, Israel announced its plan to grant 5,000 Palestinians the right to reside in Gaza and the West Bank, claiming that it will lift the extra restrictions on them.

The family unification ban includes Palestinians who returned to Palestine on “tourist visas” and “overstayed.” Depriving these Palestinians of national ID cards has meant that they suffer immensely. Palestinians who have no IDs – which are issued and approved by Israel – have difficulty accessing healthcare, education, and, most importantly, travel. They are trapped in the Palestinian territories, and they are afraid that if they leave, they will not be allowed to return. Many of them have been denied their right to travel for the past 20 years.

Najah Aby Khadra, 65, is a Palestinian who currently lives in Nuseirat refugee camp in the Gaza Strip. In 1967, she was forced to leave Gaza and flee to Jordan. When she came to visit her family in the Gaza Strip in 2000, she decided to stay as some of her children still live there. Three of her children were granted family unification while in Gaza, but their mother was denied this right causing her a series of challenges such as not being able to open a bank account, purchase real estate, or work in a trade.